WEEK 6 LIST OF LABOR LAW CASES

1. (Manila Water v. Rosario, G.R. No. 188747, January 29, 2014)

MANILA WATER COMPANY, Petitioner,vs.

CARLITO DEL ROSARIO, Respondent.

PRINCIPLE:

The grant of separation pay to a dismissed employee is determined by the cause of the dismissal. The years of service may determine how much separation pay may be awarded. It is, however, not the reason why such pay should be granted at all.

FACTS:

Del Rosario was employed as Instrument Technician by Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS). MWSS was reorganized pursuant to Republic Act No. 8041 or the National Water Crisis Act of 1995, and its implementing guidelines − Executive Order No. 286.

Because of the reorganization, Manila Water absorbed some employees of MWSS including Del Rosario.

Manila Water discovered that 24 water meters were missing in its stockroom. Upon initial investigation, it appeared that Del Rosario and his co-employee, Danilo Manguera, were involved in the pilferage and the sale of water meters to the company’s contractor.

When Del Rosario was directed to explain, he confessed his involvement in the act charged and pleaded for forgiveness, promising not to commit similar acts in the future.

During the formal investigation Del Rosario was found responsible for the loss of the water meters and therefore liable for violating Section 11.1 of the Company’s Code of Conduct. Hence, the dismissal of Del Rosario from employment.

This prompted Del Rosario to file an action for illegal dismissal claiming that his severance from employment is without just cause. Del Rosario averred in his position paper that his admission to the misconduct charged was not voluntary but was coerced by the company. Such admission therefore, made without the assistance of a counsel, could not be made basis in terminating his employment.

Manila Water answered and pointed out that he was involved in the taking of the water meters from the company’s stock room and of selling these to a private contractor for personal gain. Invoking Section 11.1 of the Company’s Code of Conduct, Manila Water averred that such act of stealing the company’s property is punishable by dismissal. They further averred that Del Rosario himself confessed his involvement to the loss of the water meters not only in his letter-explanation, but also during the

formal investigation, and in both instances, pleaded for his employer’s forgiveness.

**Labor Arbiter - dismissing for lack of merit the complaint filed by Del Rosario who was, however, awarded separation pay. According to the Labor Arbiter, Del Rosario’s length of service for 21 years, without previous derogatory record, warrants the award of separation pay. ----------- **Separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) month’s salary for every year of service based on his basic salary Php 11,244.00 at the time of his dismissal. This shall be computed from [1 August 1997] up to June 2000, the total amount of which is Php 118,062.00.

**Manila Waters filed a MR to NLRC however, it is denied.

**CA – affirmed the granting of Separation Pay by the Labor Arbiter

ISSUE:

WON Respondent Del Rosario is entitled for Separation Pay

RULING:

No. “As a general rule, an employee who has been dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code is not entitled to a separation pay.” However, in exceptional cases, separation pay has been granted to a legally dismissed employee as an act of “social justice” or on “equitable grounds.” In either case, “it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) did not reflect on the moral character of the employee.”

Citing the leading case of PLDT v. NLRC (247 Phil. 641, 1988), the Supreme Court laid down the rule “that separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in the instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct reflecting his moral character…”

In subsequent cases, the high tribunal “expanded the exclusions and elucidated that separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct, willful disobedience, gross and habituals neglect of duty, fraud or willful breach of trust, commission of a crime against the employer or his family, or those reflecting on his moral character…”

Although long years of service might generally be considered for the award of separation benefits or some form of financial assistance to mitigate the effects of termination, this case is not the appropriate instance for generosity under the Labor Code nor under our prior decisions. The fact that private respondent served petitioner for more than twenty years with no negative record prior to his dismissal, in our view of this case, does not call for such award of

benefits, since his violation reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty and worse, betrayal of the company. If an employee's length of service is to be regarded as a justification for moderating the penalty of dismissal, such gesture will actually become a prize for disloyalty, distorting the meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of undesirables.

The grant of separation pay to a dismissed employee is determined by the cause of the dismissal. The years of service may determine how much separation pay may be awarded. It is, however, not the reason why such pay should be granted at all.

In sum, we hold that the award of separation pay or any other kind of financial assistance to Del Rosario, under the nomenclature of compassionate justice, is not warranted in the instant case. A contrary rule would have the effect of rewarding rather than punishing an erring employee, disturbing the noble concept of social justice.

2. G.R. No.170904               November 13, 2013

BANI RURAL BANK INC. ENOC THEATER I AND II and/or RAFAEL DE GUZMAN, Petitioners, vs.TERESA DE GUZMAN, EDGAR C. TAN and TERESA G. TAN, Respondents.

FACTS:

The respondents were employees of Bani Rural Bank, Inc. and ENOC Theatre I and II who filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioners.

The complaint was initially dismissed by Labor Arbiter but on appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed it and ruled that the respondents had been illegally dismissed and ordered the petitioners to reinstate them with payment of backwages from the time o their dismissal (constructive) until their actual reinstatement, less earnings elsewhere.

The first computation of the monetary award under the March, 17 1995 resolution of the NLRC, the LA fixed the period of backwages from the respondents' illegal dismissal until August 25 1995 or the date when the respondents allegedly manifested that they no longer wanted to be reinstated.

The respondents appealed the LA’s computation with the NLRC. On July 31, 1998, the NLRC modified the terms of the March 17, 1995 resolution insofar as it clarified the phrase less earnings elsewhere. The NLRC additionally awarded the payment of separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement, under the following terms:

The NLRC justified the award of separation pay on account of the strained relations between the parties. In doing so, the NLRC ruled:

The second computation of the monetary awards under the July 31, 998 decision of the NLRC. In an order11 dated July 12, 2000, Labor Arbiter Gambito computed the respondents backwages only up to August 25, 1995.

NLRC’S RULING

In its decision dated September 28, 2001, the NLRC ruled that the computation of the respondents backwages should be until January 29 1999 which was the date when the July 31, 1998 decision attained finality.

CA RULING

The CA echoed the NLRC’s conclusions.

ISSUE

Whether the respondents’ backwages had been correctly computed under the decision dated September 28, 2001 of the NLRC, as confirmed by the CA, in light of the circumstance that there were two final NLRC decisions affecting the computation of the backwages.

RULING

YES.

The computation of backwages depends on the final awards adjudged as a consequence of illegal dismissal, in that:

First, when reinstatement is ordered, the general concept under Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, computes the backwages from the time of dismissal until the employee’s reinstatement. The computation of backwages (and similar benefits considered part of the backwages) can even continue beyond the decision of the labor arbiter or NLRC and ends only when the employee is actually reinstated.42

Second, when separation pay is ordered in lieu of reinstatement (in the event that this aspect of the case is disputed) or reinstatement is waived by the employee (in the event that the payment of separation pay, in lieu, is not disputed), backwages is computed from the time of dismissal until the finality of the decision ordering separation pay.

Third, when separation pay is ordered after the finality of the decision ordering the reinstatement by reason of a supervening event that makes the award of reinstatement no longer possible (as in the case), backwages is computed from the time of dismissal until the finality of the decision ordering separation pay.

The above computation of backwages, when separation pay is ordered, has been the Court s consistent ruling. In Session Delights Ice Cream and Fast Foods v. Court Appeals Sixth Division, we explained that the finality of the decision becomes the reckoning point because in allowing separation pay, the final decision effectively declares that the employment relationship ended so that separation pay and backwages are to be computed up to that point.43

RESPONDENT’S BACKWAGES

As the records show, the contending parties did not dispute the NLRC s order of separation pay that replaced the award of reinstatement on the ground of the supervening event arising from the newly-discovered strained relations between the parties.

Under these circumstances, while there was no express modification on the period for computing backwages stated in the dispositive portion of the July 31, 1998 decision of the NLRC, it is nevertheless clear that the award of reinstatement under the March 17, 1995 resolution (to which the respondents backwages was initially supposed to have been computed) was substituted by an award of separation pay. As earlier stated, the awards of reinstatement and separation pay are exclusive remedies; the change of awards (from reinstatement to separation pay) under the NLRC s July 31, 1998 not only modified the awards granted, but also changed the manner the respondents backwages is to be computed. The respondents’ backwages can no longer be computed up to the point of reinstatement as there is no longer any award of reinstatement to speak of.

3. PAL v. NLRC, G.R. No. 123294, October 20, 2010

CEDRIC

CEDRIC

4. Solidbank v. NLRC, G.R. No. 165951, March 30, 2010

The award of financial assistance is bereft of legal basis and serves to penalize petitioner who had complied with the requirements of the law. The Court also point out that petitioner may, as it has done, grant on a voluntary and ex gratia basis, any amount more than what is required by the law, but to insist that more financial assistance be given is certainly something that the Court cannot countenance. Moreover, any award of additional financial assistance to respondents would put them at an advantage and in a better position than the rest of their co-employees who similarly lost their employment because of petitioner’s decision to cease its operations.

FACTS: Sometime in May 2000, petitioner decided to cease its commercial banking operations and forthwith surrendered to the Bangko Central ng Pilipinas its expanded banking license. As a result of petitioners decision to cease its operations, 1,867 of its employees would be terminated. On July 25, 2000, petitioner sent individual letters to its employees, including respondents, advising them of its decision to cease operations and informing them that their employment would be terminated

 On July 31, 2000, petitioner sent to the Department of Labor and Employment a letter[5] dated July 28, 2000, informing said office of the termination of its employees and at the same time informing them that they would be giving a separation package. The separation package offered to Solidbankers is more than what is required by law.

 Petitioner granted to its employees separation pay equivalent to 150% of gross monthly pay per year of service, and cash equivalent of earned and accrued vacation and sick leaves as a result of their dismissal. Upon receipt of their separation pay, the employees of petitioner, including respondents, individually signed a Release, Waiver, and Quitclaim.  On September 27, 2000, respondents filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) complaints for illegal dismissal, underpayment of separation pay, plus damages and attorneys fees, and these were docketed as NLRC NCR Case Nos. 30-09-03843-00, 30-1004350-00, 30-10-03928-00, 30-10-04200-00, and 30-10-04036-00. On July 22, 2002, the LA rendered a Decision ruling that respondents were validly terminated from employment as a result of petitioners decision to cease its banking operations. The LA, however, inspired by compassionate justice, awarded financial assistance of one months salary to respondents. The dispositive portion of the Decision.

 Both parties appealed the LAs Decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On October 29, 2002, the NLRC rendered a Decision[10] affirming the findings of the LA that respondents were validly terminated. The NLRC ruled that the closure of a business is an authorized cause sanctioned under Article 283 of the Labor Code and one that is ultimately a management prerogative. The NLRC, however, modified the LAs Decision by increasing the amount of financial assistance to two months salary out of compassionate justice. 

 Aggrieved by the NLRC Decision, petitioner then appealed to the CA, specifically questioning the grant of financial assistance to respondents. On May 28, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision reversing the Decision of the NLRC. The CA shared the view of the LA that respondents should only be awarded one months salary as financial assistance and not two months salary as previously decreed by the NLRC. 

Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the CA in a Resolution dated October 28, 2004. ISSUE: Whether or not the award of financial assistance was proper. RULING: NO. 

 Based on Article 283, in case of cessation of operations, the employer is

only required to pay his employees a separation pay of one month pay or at least one-half month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. That is all that the law requires.

 In the case at bar, petitioner paid respondents the following: (a)

separation pay computed at 150% of their gross monthly pay per year of service; and (b) cash equivalent of earned and accrued vacation and sick leaves. Clearly, petitioner had gone over and above the requirements of the law. Despite this, however, petitioner has been ordered to pay respondents an additional amount, equivalent to one months salary, as a form of financial assistance.

  After a thorough consideration of the circumstances at bar, this Court

finds that the award of financial assistance is bereft of legal basis and serves to penalize petitioner who has complied with the requirements of the law.

  Moreover, a review of jurisprudence relating to the application of compassionate and social justice in granting financial assistance in labor cases shows that the same has been generally used in instances when an employee has been dismissed for a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code and not when an employee has been dismissed for anauthorized cause under Article 283. 

As a general rule, an employee who has been dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under Article 282[26] of the Labor Code is not entitled to separation pay.[27]Although by way of exception, the grant of separation pay or some other financial assistance may be allowed to an employee dismissed for just causes on the basis of equity.[28]

 The reason that the law does not statutorily grant separation pay or

financial assistance in instances of termination due to a just cause is precisely because the cause for termination is due to the acts of the employee. In such instances, however, this Court, inspired by compassionate and social justice, has in the past awarded financial assistance to dismissed employees when circumstances warranted such an award.

 Looking now at Article 283, this Court holds that the same was drafted by the legislature, taking the best interest of laborers in mind. It is clear that the causes of the termination of an employee under Article 283 are due to circumstances beyond their control, such as when management decides to reduce personnel based on valid grounds, or when the employer decides to cease operations. Thus, the bias towards labor is very apparent, as the employer is statutorily required to pay separation pay, the amount of which is also statutorily prescribed.

 While the CA should not be faulted for sympathizing with the plight of

respondents as they suddenly lost their means of livelihood, this Court holds that it is precisely because of the sudden loss of employment − one that is beyond the control of labor − that the law statutorily grants separation pay and dictates how the same should be computed. Thus, any business establishment that decides to cease its operations has the burden of complying with the law. This Court should refrain from adding more than what the law requires, as the same is within the realm of the legislature.

 It bears to stress, however, that petitioner may, as it has done, grant on a

voluntary and ex gratia basis, any amount more than what is required by the law, but to insist that more financial assistance be given is certainly something that this Court cannot countenance, as the same serves to penalize petitioner, which has already given more than what the law requires. Moreover, any award of additional financial assistance to respondents would put them at an advantage and in a better position than the rest of their co-employees who similarly lost their employment because of petitioners decision to cease its operations.

 Withal, the law, in protecting the rights of the laborers, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. The management also has its own rights, as such, are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Out of its concern for those with less privileges in life, the Supreme Court has inclined more often than not toward the worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded the Court to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and applicable law and doctrine.

5. Escario vs. NLRC G.R. No. 160302 September 27, 2010

Full Text: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/160302.htm

However, separation pay is made an alternative relief in lieu of reinstatement in certain circumstances, like: (a) when reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the passage of a long period of time or because of the realities of the situation; (b) reinstatement is inimical to the employers interest; (c) reinstatement is no longer feasible; (d) reinstatement does not serve the best interests of the parties involved; (e) the employer is prejudiced by the workers continued employment; (f) facts that make execution unjust or inequitable have supervened; or (g) strained relations between the employer and employee

FACTS: The petitioners were among the regular employees of respondent Pinakamasarap Corporation (PINA), a corporation engaged in manufacturing and selling food seasoning. They were members of petitioner Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Balanced Foods (Union).

They participated in an strike.

The Labor Arbiter ruled that the strike was illegal and they abandoned their employment.

The NLRC agree with the illegal strike; however, disagree that union members should be considered to have abandoned their employment. The mere participation of a union member in the illegal strike does not mean loss of employment status unless he participates in the commission of illegal acts during the strike. While it is true that complainant thru individual memorandum directed the respondents to return to work there is no showing that respondents deliberately refused to return to work. A worker who joins a strike does so precisely to assert or improve the terms and conditions of his work. If his purpose is to abandon his work, he would not go to the trouble of joining a strike.

The CA affirmed with the NLRC.

The petitioners were given an order of reinstatement but PINA opted not to reinstate them, so give them separation pay.

ISSUE : whether or not separation pay is given in lieu of reinstatement - YES

RULING:

The petitioners were ordered reinstated because they were union members merely instigated or induced to participate in the illegal strike. By joining the strike, they did not renounce their employment relation with PINA but remained as its employees.

 The absence from an order of reinstatement of an alternative relief should

the employer or a supervening event not within the control of the employee prevent reinstatement negates the very purpose of the order. The judgment favorable to the employee is thereby reduced to a mere paper victory, for it is all too easy for the employer to simply refuse to have the employee back. To safeguard the spirit of social justice that the Court has advocated in favor of the working man, therefore, the right to reinstatement is to be considered renounced or waived only when the employee unjustifiably or unreasonably refuses to return to work upon being so ordered or after the employer has offered to reinstate him.[27]

 However, separation pay is made an alternative relief in lieu of

reinstatement in certain circumstances, like: (a) when reinstatement can no

longer be effected in view of the passage of a long period of time or because of the realities of the situation; (b) reinstatement is inimical to the employers interest; (c) reinstatement is no longer feasible; (d) reinstatement does not serve the best interests of the parties involved; (e) the employer is prejudiced by the workers continued employment; (f) facts that make execution unjust or inequitable have supervened; or (g) strained relations between the employer and employee.[28]

 Here, PINA manifested that the reinstatement of the petitioners would not

be feasible because: (a) it would inflict disruption and oppression upon the employer; (b) petitioners [had] stayed away for more than 15 years; (c) its machines had depreciated and had been replaced with newer, better ones; and (d) it now sold goods through independent distributors, thereby abolishing the positions related to sales and distribution.[29]

 Under the circumstances, the grant of separation pay in lieu of

reinstatement of the petitioners was proper. It is not disputable that the grant of separation pay or some other financial assistance to an employee is based on equity, which has been defined as justice outside law, or as being ethical rather than jural and as belonging to the sphere of morals than of law. [30] This Court has granted separation pay as a measure of social justice even when an employee has been validly dismissed, as long as the dismissal has not been due to serious misconduct or reflective of personal integrity or morality.[31]

 What is the appropriate amount for separation pay?

 In G & S Transport,[32] the Court awarded separation pay equivalent to one

month salary per year of service considering that 17 years had passed from the time when the striking employees were refused reinstatement. In Association of Independent Unions in the Philippines v. NLRC,[33] the Court allowed separation pay equivalent to one month salary per year of service considering that eight years had elapsed since the employees had staged their illegal strike.

 Here, we note that this case has dragged for almost 17 years from the

time of the illegal strike. Bearing in mind PINAs manifestation that the positions that the petitioners used to hold had ceased to exist for various reasons, we hold that separation pay equivalent to one month per year of service in lieu of reinstatement fully aligns with the aforecited rulings of the Court on the matter.

WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision dated August 18, 2003 of the Court of Appeals, subject to the modification to the effect that in lieu of reinstatement the petitioners are granted backwages equivalent of one month for every year of service.

6. Motorola Phils. v. Ambrocio G.R. No. 173279, March 20, 2009

JAS

JAS

7. RODOLFO J. SERRANO vs. SEVERINO SANTOS TRANSIT and/or SEVERINO SANTOS,

G.R. No. 187698, August 9, 2010

DOCTRINE: COMPUTATION OF RETIREMENT PAY

A covered employee who retires pursuant to RA 7641 shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/12) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.

The law is explicit that one-half month salary shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days service incentive leaves unless the parties provide for broader inclusions. Evidently, the law expanded the concept of one-half month salary from the usual one-month salary divided by two.

The retirement pay is equal to half-months pay per year of service. But half-months pay is expanded because it means not just the salary for 15 days but also one-twelfth of the 13th-month pay and the cash value of five-day service incentive leave. THIS IS THE MINIMUM. The retirement pay package can be improved upon by voluntary company policy, or particular agreement with the employee, or through a collective bargaining agreement. (The Labor Code with Comments and Cases, C.A. Azcunea, Vol. II, page 765, Fifth Edition 2004).

FACTS: Petitioner Rodolfo J. Serrano was hired as bus conductor by respondent Severino Santos Transit, a bus company owned and operated by its co-respondent Severino Santos.

After 14 years of service or on July 14, 2006, petitioner applied for optional retirement from the company. As petitioner’s request to first go over the computation of his retirement pay was denied, he signed the Quitclaim on which he wrote U.P. (under protest) after his signature, indicating his protest to the amount of P75,277.45 which he received, computed by the company at 15 days per year of service. 

Petitioner soon filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter, alleging that the company erred in its computation since under Republic Act No. 7641, otherwise known as the Retirement Pay Law, his retirement pay should have been computed at 22.5 days per year of service to include the cash equivalent of the 5-day service incentive leave (SIL) and 1/12 of the 13th month pay which the company did not. 

The company maintained, however, that the Quitclaim signed by petitioner barred his claim and, in any event, its computation was correct since petitioner was not entitled to the 5-day SIL and pro-rated 13th month pay for, as a bus conductor, he was paid on commission basis.  

The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of petitioner and awarded him P116,135.45 as his retirement pay differential. On respondent’s appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the LA’s decision but ordered the payment of petitioner’s retirement differential in the P2,365.35. The NLRC held that since petitioner was paid on purely commission basis, he was excluded from the coverage of the laws on 13thmonth pay and SIL pay, hence, the 1/12 of the 13th month pay and the 5-day SIL should not be factored in the computation of his retirement pay. ISSUE: Whether or not the 5-day SIL and pro-rated 13th month pay should be included in the computation of petitioner’s retirement pay.

RULING: The Supreme Court reinstated the LA’s previous decision and held that petitioner’s retirement pay should include the cash equivalent of the 5-day SIL and 1/12 of the 13th month pay. 

Republic Act No. 7641 amended Article 287 of the Labor Code by providing for retirement pay to qualified private sector employees in the absence of any retirement plan in the establishment. Further, the Implementing Rules of said law provide: 

SECTION 1.

General Statement on Coverage. This Rule shall apply to all employees in the private sector, regardless of their position, designation or status and irrespective of the method by which their wages are paid, except to those specifically exempted under Section 2 hereof. As used herein, the term Act shall refer to Republic Act No. 7641 which took effect on January 7, 1993.

SECTION 5Retirement Benefits.

5.1 In the absence of an applicable agreement or retirement plan, an employee who retires pursuant to the Act shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (―) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year. 5.2 Components of One-half (―) Month Salary. For the purpose of determining the minimum retirement pay due an employee under this Rule, the term one-half month salary shall include all of the following:

(a) Fifteen (15) days salary of the employee based on his latest salary rate. As used herein, the term salary includes all remunerations paid by an employer to his employees for services rendered during normal

working days and hours, whether such payments are fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece of commission basis, or other method of calculating the same, and includes the fair and reasonable value, as determined by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, of food, lodging or other facilities customarily furnished by the employer to his employees. The term does not include cost of living allowances, profit-sharing payments and other monetary benefits which are not considered as part of or integrated into the regular salary of the employees.

(b) The cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leave;

(c) One-twelfth of the 13th month pay due the employee.

(d) All other benefits that the employer and employee may agree upon that should be included in the computation of the employees retirement pay.  

Admittedly, petitioner worked for 14 years for the bus company which did not adopt any retirement scheme. Even if petitioner as bus conductor was paid on commission basis then, he falls within the coverage of R.A. 7641 and its implementing rules. It bears emphasis that under P.D. 851 or the SIL Law, the exclusion from its coverage of workers who are paid on a purely commission basis is only with respect to field personnel. 

8. Eligir v. PAL, G.R. No. 181995, July 16, 2012

Facts: Petitioner Bibiano C. Elegir (petitioner) was hired by Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) as a commercial pilot in 1971. Pursuant to a new flight program adopted by PAL, petitioner was appointed as one of the pilots for the B747-400 captain positions. He and the other pilots were sent to Seattle to undergo training for the new aircraft which he completed in 1995. He decided to retire on May 5, 1996, after rendering a total of more than 25 years in service which is an option allowed by the CBA between the airline and the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines where he is a member of good standing. PAL asked him to reconsider his decision saying that they have not yet fully recovered the full value of his training and that if he should continue with his decision to retire the airline will be constrained to deduct the expenses of his training from his retirement pay.

On November 6, 1996, the petitioner went on terminal leave for thirty (30) days and thereafter made effective his retirement from service. Upon securing his clearance, however, he was informed that the costs of his training will be deducted from his retirement pay, which will be computed at the rate of P 5,000.00 per year of service. The petitioner argued that his retirement benefits should be based on the computation stated in Article 287 of the Labor Code, as

amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7641, and that the costs of his training should not be deducted therefrom.

PAL refused and argued that petitioner's retirement pay should be based on PALALPAP Retirement Plan of 1967 (PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan) and that he should reimburse the company with the proportionate costs of his training. Thus, on August 27, 1997, the petitioner filed a complaint for non-payment of retirement pay, moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees against PAL.

LA: On February 6, 1998, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered the decision for the payment of retirement benefits to the petitioner for a total of P 4,150,106.20 saying that the law intended to give bigger and better benefits to workers under existing laws or CBA agreements and that PAL had no right to withhold the petitioner's retirement benefits due to his retirement before the lapse of three years. There was no document showing that the petitioner was required to stay with the airline for three years after the training or that he was required to reimburse the cost of his training from his retirement benefits should he retire earlier than the three year period. The LA also dismissed PAL's claim that petitioner's submission of his bid for the position created an innominate contract du ut facis between him and the company.

NLRC: Modified the decision of the LA. Petitioner was only 52 years old when he opted to retire and therefore was not qualified to receive the benefits offered under Article 287 of the Labor Code, but he was eligible for retirement under the CBA since he had served for more than 25 years with the same company. It ruled that the benefits should be computed in accordance with both Article 287 of the Code and the Retirement Plan of the CBA. It also ruled that petitioner is under obligation to reimburse a portion of the expense for his training program as captain since it would be grossly unfair for petitioner to reap the fruits of his training if he would not be made to return the said benefits in form of service for a reasonable period of time. Both parties filed MR’s. It denied PAL’s MR

CA: Reversed the decision of the NLRC. It ruled that retirement pay should be computed in accordance with CBA retirement plan as ruled in PAL v. Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines. It denied petitioner’s MR.

Issues: Should retirement benefits be computed based on Article 287 of the Labor Code?

Ruling: Petitioner’s retirement pay should be based on the PAL retirement plans. The two retirement schemes are alternative in nature such that the retired pilot can only be entitled to that which provides for the superior benefit. Even if there is an existing CBA but if it provides lesser benefits than what is provided in the Labor Code , the Code will apply to assure the retiree of the reasonable amount of retirement pay. Consistent with the purpose of the law, the CA correctly held that the PAL retirement plan applies because it provides for higher benefits. Under the PAL retirement plan petitioner qualified for late retirement sine he rendered more than 20 years as pilot and is entitled to receive a lump sum of P 125, 000 for his services. He is also entitled to equity of the retirement fund under the Retirement Benefit Plan. This is more compared to what he will receive under the Labor Code which is equivalent to at least ½ of his monthly salary for every year of service. The benefits under the PAL retirement plan are to the petitioner’s advantage.

It also ruled that the petitioner shall reimburse PAL for his training costs. The court recognized PAL’s right to recoup losses incurred due to pilot training and modified the provision on age limits for pilots seeking advanced positions. Pilots 57 years old shall be frozen in their position while those 55 years of age that have previously qualified in the company turbo jet aircraft are permitted to occupy any position in the turbo jet fleet. Allowing the petitioner to leave the company before he has t fulfilled is reasonable expectation of service will result to unjust enrichment since the training gave him new skills and increased his salary. Reason and fairness dictate that he must return to PAL a proportionate costs of training.

9. Grace Christian High School vs. Lavandera, G.R. No. 177845, August 20, 2014

Ratio:

RA 7641, which was enacted on December 9, 1992, amended Article 287 of the Labor Code, providing for the rules on retirement pay to qualified private sector employees in the absence of any retirement plan in the establishment.

The foregoing provision is applicable where (a) there is no CBA or other applicable agreement providing for retirement benefits to employees, or (b) there is a CBA or other applicableagreement providing for retirement benefits but it is below the requirement set by law. Verily, the determining factor in choosing which retirement scheme to apply is still superiority in terms of benefits provided.

Facts:

Filipinas filed a complaint for illegal (constructive) dismissal, non-payment of service incentive leave (SIL) pay, separation pay, service allowance, damages, and attorney’s fees against GCHS6 and/or its principal, Dr. James Tan.

She alleged that on May 11, 2001, she was informed that her services were to be terminated effective May 31, 2001, pursuant to GCHS’ retirement plan which gives the school the option to retire a teacher who has rendered at least 20 years of service, regardless of age, with a retirement pay of one-half (½) month for every year of service.

GCHS denied that they illegally dismissed Filipinas. They asserted that the latter was considered retired on May 31, 1997 after having rendered 20 years of service pursuant to GCHS’ retirement plan and that she was duly advised that her retirement benefits.

The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the illegal dismissal complaint for lack of merit. The LA ruled that Filipinas was not terminated from employment but was considered retired as of May 31, 1997 after rendering 20 years of service and was only allowed by GCHS to continue teaching on a year-to-year basis (until May 31, 2001)in the exercise of its option to do so under the aforementioned retirement plan until she was informed that her contract would not be renewed

The LA found the retirement benefits payable under GCHS retirement plan to be deficient vis-à-vis those provided under RA 7641,17 and, accordingly, awarded Filipinas retirement pay differentials based on her latest salaryas follows:

P18,662.00/30 =

P622.06/day

P622.06 x 22.5 =

P13,996.35 x 20 =

P279,927.00

- P

136,210.00

P143,717.00

1

8

The NLRC set aside the LA’s award. It held that under Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7641, the retirement package consists of 15 days salary, plus 13th month pay and SIL pay pro-rated to their one-twelfth (1/12) equivalent.

The CA affirmed with modification the NLRC’s Decision.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in using the multiplier "22.5 days" in computing the retirement pay differentials of Filipinas.

Held:

No. Both NLRC and CA correctly ruled that Filipinas’ retirement benefits should be computed in accordance withArticle 287 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7641, being the more beneficent retirement scheme. They differ, however, in the resulting benefit differentials due to divergent interpretations of the term "one-half (1/2) month salary" as used under the law.

RA 7641, which was enacted on December 9, 1992, amended Article 287 of the Labor Code, providing for the rules on retirement pay to qualified private sector employees in the absence of any retirement plan in the establishment. The said law states that "an employee’s retirement benefits under any collective bargaining [agreement (CBA)] and other agreements shall not be less than those provided" under the same – that is, at least onehalf (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year – and that "[u]nless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term one-half (1/2) month salary shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves."

The foregoing provision is applicable where (a) there is no CBA or other applicable agreement providing for retirement benefits to employees, or (b) there is a CBA or other applicableagreement providing for retirement benefits but it is below the requirement set by law. Verily, the determining factor in choosing which retirement scheme to apply is still superiority in terms of benefits provided.

The Court, in the case of Elegir v. Philippine Airlines,Inc.,35 has recently affirmed that "one-half (1/2) month salary means 22.5 days: 15 days plus 2.5 days representing one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the remaining 5 days for [SIL]."

10. UNILEVER PHILIPPINES, INC.vs.MARIA RUBY M. RIVERA

[G.R. No. 201701,June 3, 2013]

Facts:

Unilever is a company engaged in the production, manufacture, sale, and distribution of various food, home and personal care products, while Rivera was employed as its Area Activation Executive. Unilever enforces a strict policy that every trade activity must be accompanied by a Trade Development Program (TDP) and that the allocated budget for a specific activity must be used for such activity only.

There was a random audit conducted where fund deviations upon Rivera’s instruction were found out. So, Unilever issued a notice to Rivera asking her to explain on the anomalies. Rivera admitted through an email the fund diversion, but reasoned that it was due to difficulty of procuring funds from the head office and those funds were used in the company’s promotional ventures.

Unilever found Rivera guilty resulting to sever their professional relations and eventually denied Rivera’s request to retirement benefits even if she served the company for 14 years.

Rivera filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal and other monetary claims against Unilever.

Labor Arbiter - dismissed her complaint for lack of merit and denied her claim for retirement benefits, but ordered Unilever to pay a proportionate 13th month pay and the corresponding cash equivalent of her unused leave credits

NLRC - partially granted Rivera’s prayer - Unilever was guilty of violating the twin notice requirement in labor cases & was ordered to pay her P30,000.00 as nominal damages, retirement benefits and separation pay. However, when Unilever filed a motion for reconsideration, the NLRC modified its earlier ruling by deleting the award of separation pay and reducing the nominal damages from P30,000.00 to P20,000.00, but affirmed the award of retirement benefits to Rivera

CA - affirmed with modification the NLRC resolution stating that Rivera is not entitled to retirement benefits but awarded separation pay in her favor as a measure of social justice

Issue:

Whether or not a validly dismissed employee, like Rivera, is entitled to an award of separation pay.

Ruling:

No, she is not entitled to a separation pay.

As a general rule, an employee who has been dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code is not entitled to a separation pay. In exceptional cases, however, the Court has granted separation pay to a legally dismissed employee as an act of "social justice" or on "equitable grounds." In both instances, it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) did not reflect on the moral character of the employee.

In the case at bar, Rivera was dismissed from work because she intentionally circumvented a strict company policy, manipulated another entity to carry out her instructions without the company’s knowledge and approval, and directed the diversion of funds, which she even admitted doing under the guise of shortening the laborious process of securing funds for promotional activities from the head office. These transgressions were serious offenses that warranted her dismissal from employment and proved that her termination from work was for a just cause.

However, because there was a violation of the twin-notice requirement when Unilever was not direct and specific in its first notice to Rivera (the words it used were couched in general terms and were in no way informative of the charges against her that may result in her dismissal from employment), it warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. So, the Supreme Court increased the award of nominal damages from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00.

11. G.R. No. 164774             April 12, 2006STAR PAPER CORPORATION, JOSEPHINE ONGSITCO & SEBASTIAN

CHUA, Petitioners, vs.

RONALDO D. SIMBOL, WILFREDA N. COMIA & LORNA E. ESTRELLA, Respondents.

Facts:Petitioner Star Paper Corporation (the company) is a corporation engaged

in trading – principally of paper products. Josephine Ongsitco is its Manager of the Personnel and Administration Department while Sebastian Chua is its Managing Director.

Respondents, Ronaldo D. Simbol (Simbol), Wilfreda N. Comia (Comia) and Lorna E. Estrella (Estrella), on the other hand, were all regular employees of the company.

Respondent Simbol:During his employment, respondent Simbol met Alma Dayrit, his co-

employee and whom he got married. Prior to their marriage, respondent Ongsitco advised the couple that if they decide to get married, one of them must resign pursuant to the company policy promulgated in 1995.

“1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has [a] relative, up to [the] 3rd degree of relationship, already employed by the company.

2. In case of two of our employees (both singles [sic], one male and another female) developed a friendly relationship during the course of their employment and then decided to get married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy stated above.” Thus, Simbol resigned pursuant to the company policy.

Respondent Comia:Respondent Comia was also hired by the company where she met her co-

employee, Howard Comia, and got married. Same with the respondent Simbol, Ongsitco also reminded the couple about the company policy. Hence, respondent Comia resigned from the company.

Respondent Estrella:Respondent Estrella was hired by the company wher she met her husband

Luisito Zuñiga (Zuñiga), also her co-worker. Petitioners stated that Zuñiga, a married man, got Estrella pregnant. The company allegedly could have terminated her services due to immorality but she opted to resign.

All the respondents each signed a Release and Confirmation Agreement were they stated that they have no money and property accountabilities in the company and that they release the company of any claim or demand of whatever nature.

On the other hand, respondents argued that Simbol and Comia did not resign voluntarily; they were compelled to resign in view of an illegal company policy.

As to respondent Estrella, she alleges that she had a relationship with co-worker Zuñiga who misrepresented himself as a married but separated man. After he got her pregnant, she discovered that he was not separated. Thus, she severed her relationship with him to avoid dismissal due to the company policy.

Subsequently, respondent Estrella met an accident and was advised by the doctor to recuperate for twenty-one (21) days. When she returned to work she found out that her name was on-hold at the gate and was denied entry.

She was directed to proceed to the personnel office where one of the staff handed her a memorandum. The memorandum stated that she was being dismissed for immoral conduct. She refused to sign the memorandum because she was on leave for twenty-one (21) days and has not been given a chance to explain. The management asked her to write an explanation. However, after submission of the explanation, she was nonetheless dismissed by the company.

Due to her urgent need for money, she later submitted a letter of resignation in exchange for her thirteenth month pay.

Thus, respondents filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive dismissal, separation pay and attorney’s fees averring that the company policy is illegal and contravenes under Article 136 of the Labor Code. They also contended that they are dismissed because of their union membership.

Petitioner’s Argument:Petitioners allege that its policy "may appear to be contrary to Article 136

of the Labor Code" but it assumes a new meaning if read together with the first paragraph of the rule. The rule does not require the woman employee to resign. The employee spouses have the right to choose who between them should resign. Further, they are free to marry persons other than co-employees. Hence, it is not the marital status of the employee, per se, that is being discriminated. It is only intended to carry out its no-employment-for-relatives-within-the-third-degree-policy which is within the ambit of the prerogatives of management.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the case due to lack of merit which was affirmed by the NLRC.

However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the NLRC.Hence, this petition.

Issue:WHETHER OR NOT THE POLICY OF THE EMPLOYER BANNING SPOUSES

FROM WORKING IN THE SAME COMPANY VIOLATES THE RIGHTS OF THE EMPLOYEE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LABOR CODE OR IS A VALID EXERCISE OF MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE.

Court’s Ruling:YES.Art. 136 of the Labor Code provides:

“It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.”

The court employs the standard of reasonableness of the company policy which is parallel to the bona fide occupational qualification requirement. (refer to the note below on bonafide occupational …..)

The requirement of reasonableness must be clearly established to uphold the questioned employment policy. The employer has the burden to prove the existence of a reasonable business necessity.

The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate effect. The

failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the employee’s right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working together in one company.

Lastly, the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our jurisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners. The protection given to labor in our jurisdiction is vast and extensive that we cannot prudently draw inferences from the legislature’s silence that married persons are not protected under our Constitution and declare valid a policy based on a prejudice or stereotype.

Thus, for failure of petitioners to present undisputed proof of a reasonable business necessity, we rule that the questioned policy is an invalid exercise of management prerogative.

NOTE: (In case Atty. asked the provisions, doctrine and the related jurisprudence)

1987 Constitution 1. Article II, Section 18 . The State affirms labor as a primary social economic

force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.x x x

2. Article XIII, Sec. 3 . The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.

The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth.

The Civil Code1. Art. 1700. The relation between capital and labor are not merely

contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.

2. Art. 1702 . In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.

DOCTRINES/PRINCIPLES

These courts also find the no-spouse employment policy invalid for failure of the employer to present any evidence of business necessity other than the general perception that spouses in the same workplace might adversely affect the business. They hold that the absence of such a bona fide occupational qualification invalidates a rule denying employment to one spouse due to the current employment of the other spouse in the same office. Thus, they rule that unless the employer can prove that the reasonable demands of the business require a distinction based on marital status and there is no better available or acceptable policy which would better accomplish the business purpose, an employer may not discriminate against an employee based on the identity of the employee’s spouse. This is known as the   bona fide occupational qualification exception.

There must be a compelling business necessity for which no alternative exists other than the discriminatory practice. To justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove two factors: (1) that the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and, (2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.

JURISPRUDENCE

1. Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO and Pedro Tecson v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc., we passed on the validity of the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any competitor company. We held that Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs and information from competitors. We considered the prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo’s employees reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of Glaxo. In laying down the assailed company policy, we recognized that Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.

2. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company v. NLRC. In said case,

the employee was dismissed in violation of petitioner’s policy of disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage.

We held that the company policy violates the right against discrimination afforded all women workers under Article 136 of the Labor Code, but established a permissible exception, viz.:

[A] requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried could be justified as a "bona fide occupational qualification," or BFOQ, where the particular requirements of the job would justify the same, but not on the ground of a general principle, such as the desirability of spreading work in the workplace. A requirement of that nature would be valid provided it

reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance. (Emphases supplied.)

12. Del Monte v. Velasco, G.R. No. 153477, March 6, 2007

DON

DON

13. Domingo v. Rayala, G.R. No. 155831, February 18, 2008

Sexual harassment is an imposition of misplaced superiority which is enough to dampen an employees spirit and her capacity for advancement. It affects her sense of judgment; it changes her life.

It is incumbent upon the head of office to set an example on how his employees should conduct themselves in public office, so that they may work efficiently in a healthy working atmosphere. Courtesy demands that he should set a good example.

FACTS

Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo, then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala before Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma of DOLE. The complaint contains the following allegations :

Holding and squeezing Domingos shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money allegedly for school expenses with a promise of future privileges, and making statements with unmistakable sexual overtones all these acts of Rayala resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual favor.

Upon receipt of the Complaint, DOLE Secretary referred it to the OP, Rayala being a presidential appointee. The OP, through then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, ordered Secretary Laguesma to investigate the allegations in the Complaint and create a committee for such purpose.

On December 4, 1998, Secretary Laguesma issued Admin. Order. No. 280, Series of 1998, constituting a Committee on Decorum and Investigation (Committee) in accordance with Republic Act (RA) 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.

The Committee heard the parties and received their respective evidence. On March 2, 2000, the Committee submitted its report and recommendation to Secretary Laguesma. It found Rayala guilty of the offense charged and recommended the imposition of the minimum penalty provided under AO 250, which it erroneously stated as suspension for six (6) months (the correct penalty is 6months and 1 day).

Executive Secretary Zamora, issued AO 119, which dismissed Rayaua from service effective upon receipt of the Order.

Rayala filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the OP denied in a Resolution. Under Rule 65, iled a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order. However, it was dismissed for disregarding the hierarchy of courts. MR was filed and the case was referred to CA for appropriate action.

CA: sufficient evidence on record to create moral certainty that Rayala committed the acts he was charged with. Dismissed for disgraceful and immoral conduct in violation of RA 6713, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.

Rayala timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

CA(modified its ruling in a special division of 5): the penalty of dismissal is DELETED and instead the penalty of suspension from service for the maximum period of one (1) year is HEREBY IMPOSED upon the petitioner. The rest of the challenged decision stands.

Domingo filed a Petition for Review, but was denied for having a defective verification. MR granted, petition reinstated.

Rayala likewise filed a Petition for Review arguing that he is not guilty of any act of sexual harassment.

Meanwhile, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA, but was denied.

On June 28, 2004, the Court directed the consolidation of the three (3) petitions.

ISSUES

(1)   Did Rayala commit sexual harassment? (yes)(2)   If he did, what is the applicable penalty? (1 yr suspension)

RULING

(1) YES. Factual findings are conclusive on the SC. And quite significantly, Rayala himself admits to having committed some of the acts imputed to him.

It is noteworthy that the five CA Justices who deliberated on the case were unanimous in upholding the findings of the Committee and the OP. They found the assessment made by the Committee and the OP to be a meticulous and dispassionate analysis of the testimonies of the complainant (Domingo), the respondent (Rayala), and their respective witnesses.  They differed only on the appropriate imposable penalty.

That Rayala committed the acts complained of and was guilty of sexual harassment is, therefore, the common factual finding of not just one, but three independent bodies: the Committee, the OP and the CA. It should be remembered that when supported by substantial evidence, factual findings made by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are accorded great respect and even finality by the courts. The principle, therefore, dictates that such findings should bind us.

(2) The presence of taking undue advantage of a subordinate may be considered as an aggravating circumstance in this case. And where only aggravating and no mitigating circumstances are present, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. Hence, the maximum penalty that can be imposed on Rayala is suspension for one (1) year.

In this case, it is the President of the Philippines, as the proper disciplining authority, who would determine whether there is a valid cause for the removal of Rayala as NLRC Chairman. This power, however, is qualified by the phrase for cause as provided by law. Thus, when the President found that Rayala was indeed guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Chief Executive did not have unfettered discretion to impose a penalty other than the penalty provided by law for such offense.

Under AO 250, the penalty for the first offense is suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year, while the penalty for the second offense is dismissal. On the other hand, Section 22(o), Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Section 52 A(15) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service both provide that the first offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable by suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. A second offense is punishable by dismissal.

As cited above, the imposable penalty for the first offense of either the administrative offense of sexual harassment or for disgraceful and immoral conduct is suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. Accordingly, it was error for the Office of the President to impose

upon Rayala the penalty of dismissal from the service, a penalty which can only be imposed upon commission of a second offense.