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The Struggle for the Heartland: Hybrid Geopolitics in the TranscaspianMazen Labbana

a Department of Geography and Regional Studies, University of Miami, FL, USA

To cite this Article Labban, Mazen(2009) 'The Struggle for the Heartland: Hybrid Geopolitics in the Transcaspian',Geopolitics, 14: 1, 1 — 25To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/14650040802578641URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14650040802578641

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Geopolitics, 14:1–25, 2009Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN: 1465-0045 print / 1557-3028 onlineDOI: 10.1080/14650040802578641

FGEO1465-00451557-3028Geopolitics, Vol. 14, No. 1, November 2008: pp. 1–44Geopolitics

The Struggle for the Heartland: Hybrid Geopolitics in the Transcaspian

Hybrid Geopolitics in the TranscaspianMazen Labban

MAZEN LABBANDepartment of Geography and Regional Studies, University of Miami, FL, USA

Geopolitical rivalry in the Transcaspian region is irreducible tocompetition for Caspian oil and gas. Nor has the rivalry betweenEast and West dissolved into an alliance in the “war on terror”.It is part of a broader process of expansion into the former Sovietrepublics, particularly in Central Asia, to integrate them into com-peting economic, military and security structures. In this process,the Transcaspian region itself is not the ultimate object of the com-petition; rather, global hegemony. Thus, processes of integrationappear to have been accompanied by opposite processes of con-tainment. I propose the notion of hybrid geopolitics to explicate thisdual process, examined primarily through military expansionacross the continent, in the form of military aid and bases, strategicalliances, security arrangements and arms trade.

Accepted theses on US geopolitics trace the roots of US foreign policy toideas deriving from classical geopolitics, particularly the theses of Mack-inder, according to which the territorial control of the Eurasian Heartland –the “geographical pivot of history” – formed the basis for the domination ofthe Eurasian landmass, and ultimately the globe.1 Thus, the control of theEurasian Heartland by any single power or combination of powers hostileto US interests represented a direct threat to the military and economicsecurity of the US and must, therefore, be contained by a counter-expansionof US ideological, political, and economic influence and, if necessary, bydirect territorial and military control. This policy was formulated moreexplicitly during the Cold War, with the Soviet Union, and subsequentlycommunist China, as its ostensible target. It appears, however, to have

Address correspondence to Mazen Labban, Department of Geography and RegionalStudies, University of Miami, 1000 Memorial Dr., Ferré Bldg., Coral Gables, FL 33124, USA.E-mail: [email protected]

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survived the end of the Cold War and the gradual transformation of Russiaand China from communist rivals to capitalist competitors and potentialallies against new rivals. Notwithstanding such concrete historical-geographicaltransformations, the fixation on the Eurasian Heartland remains a dominantmoment in analyses of US foreign policy in the post–Cold War period.2

Indeed, Mackinder’s geopolitical theses have enjoyed a renaissance in theaftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, which benefited fromincreased interest in Central Asia – the “pivot of the pivot” – throughoutthe 1990s and especially after the attacks on the US in September 2001 andthe subsequent invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq.3 It is thus argued that thedirect penetration of Central Asia by US and NATO forces lent Mackinder’stheses “contemporary geopolitical resonance”, especially that the US seemsdriven by anxieties about its global strategic future similar to those of theBritish Empire at the turn of the twentieth century.4 On this account, USdirect expansion of Central Asia, along with the expansion of US influencein the Caucasus and Eastern Europe, is not only continuous with the ColdWar strategy of containment, but also with British imperialism.

This account begs two questions that provide a starting point fromwhich to re-examine the form of post–Cold War geopolitics. First, is the UStoday at the same historical geographical juncture as the British Empire atthe turn of the twentieth century? Or, more precisely, as the British Empirein 1904, 1919, or 1943 – the years in which Mackinder formulated and refor-mulated his theses in search of strategies to uphold the hegemony of decliningBritish imperialism? Second, does US foreign policy (and strategy) have its“foundation” in Mackinder’s geopolitical theses? Is such a foundation neces-sary for formulating US strategy, and for explaining geopolitics in Eurasia?

There is no simple answer to any of these questions. I argue, however,that contemporary US policies and strategies in Central Asia – as well asRussian and Chinese policies – are driven less by geographical abstractionsof Mackinder’s concerns about the British Empire than by immediate geopo-litical realities that call into question the application of Mackinder’s formula-tions to the present. Mackinder developed his theses in relation to decliningBritish imperialism in competition with nascent rivals in Europe and Asia,Germany and Russia in particular – and arguably the US, notwithstandingthe underlying transatlantic rhetoric that would later inform Cold War geo-political discourse. Thus, Mackinder’s ideas may have been more relevant toBritish than US geopolitics in the Cold War period. As Britain and the SovietUnion sought buffer zones and spheres of influence in Europe, Roosevelt’sadministration sought a global open door policy that would expand liberalcapitalism under US hegemony, beginning with Europe, including EasternEurope, the European colonies, and potentially the Soviet Union.5 Truman’spolicy of containment, which did not abandon the post-war globalistproject, followed the Soviet Union’s voluntary refusal to join the BrettonWoods institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund, and to


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participate in the Marshall Plan and thus in the global expansion of a liberalcapitalist economy under US hegemony. It is the similarity between theconclusions that could derive from Mackinder’s theses and the immediategeopolitical dictates of the moment – the expansion of liberal capitalismtranslated as the necessary containment of Soviet Russia – that made Mack-inder’s theses seem to coincide with US Cold War strategy, rather than theirgeographical premises or geopolitical reasoning.6

Yet, even if Mackinder’s theses could be made to coincide with Cold Wargeopolitics, their application to contemporary geopolitics remains problematic.More than the containment of post-Soviet Russia by expansion into borderingterritory, geopolitical rivalry in Central Asia can be explained from a differentperspective as part of a broader process aimed at the elimination of whatSmith calls the “interstices of globalization” – geographical entities of all scalesthat have so far threatened the total expansion of (US-led) capitalism.7 Hence,it seems that what is more relevant to US policy and to the competition forCentral Asia today is not Mackinder’s geopolitical map with its ever-expandingHeartland, but Barnett’s “new map”, which identifies at the level of the wholeglobe “non-integrating gaps” – territories that have so far remained external toUS-led globalisation – as target areas for US military expansion.8 That the inte-gration of such territories, interstices and gaps, has taken an increasingly mili-tary form does not necessarily translate the process into a classical geopoliticalrivalry based in Mackinder. Nor is it the case, however, that geopolitical rivalryhas become a thing of the past, replaced by more benign forms of geoeco-nomic competition and multilateral and cooperative relations.

I propose the notion of hybrid geopolitics as a heuristic device to openthe question on the nature and form of geopolitical rivalry developing in thepost–Cold War period. The fluidity and complexity of the contemporarygeopolitical moment requires going beyond mono-casual explanations, andto think the relation between political power and geographical space interms that transcend the restraining legacy of Mackinder and take intoaccount disparate processes shaping contemporary geopolitical space. Thearticulation of a notion of hybrid geopolitics in this article is only oneattempt at transcending explanations that reduce geopolitical rivalry to aquest for the exclusive control of this or that territory because of aneconomic, demographic, or strategic significance, without downplaying thesignificance of such processes in accumulating political and economicpower. On this notion, contemporary geopolitical space is irreducible tomaps divided into concentric circles, centred on one place privileged by theobjective facts of geology and physical geography. Instead, it is a spacestructured by the fusion of sets of seemingly opposite processes – processesof exclusion or containment, through economic, military, ideological expan-sion overlaid by processes of integration through the same processes ofexpansion. This hybrid geopolitical space is riddled with tensions and con-tradictions, some of which are resolved through shifts from one process to


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another, depending on the political expediency of the moment and theshifting relations among the contenders, rather than the inherent physicalproperties of certain regions.

The present study focuses on geopolitical rivalry in the Transcaspianregion developing in the post–Cold War period.9 I argue that the Transcaspianitself is not the ultimate object of this rivalry, although it plays a significantpart in it, especially if the rivalry is seen in its hybrid nature. In whatappears to be a geographical paradox, the centrality of the Transcaspian,particularly Central Asia, resides in its peripheral position at the intersectionof Europe, Russia, China, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and to a certain extentIndia. The geopolitical significance of the Transcaspian region is in thatthe relations of the contenders with each other are partly shaped by theirrelations with (the countries of) the region. Thus, expansion into theTranscaspian serves as an instrument in the broader rivalry among competinghegemonies, which has led to the cultivation of allies, partly throughmilitary connections ranging from the establishment of military bases anddirect military presence, to military aid, arm sales, and military training. Inthis respect, military expansion into the Transcaspian does not only servestrategies of territorial control for the purpose of securing access to thehydrocarbon riches of the region, the containment of Russia, or the “war onterror”, as opposed to strategies of geoeconomic integration and multilateralcooperation. Those are elements of one hybrid process. Indeed, the devel-opment of various forms of military relations between the “great powers”and the countries of the Transcaspian – as much as among the “great powers”themselves – is one form of economic integration, rather than a momentthat precedes it, let alone opposes it. The expansion of military relationsthus acquires two inter-related aspects: the expansion of military power andreach of the contenders, in strategic competition with each other; and thesimultaneous expansion of the markets for arms and other military services –markets for industries that are dominant in, and close to the governmentsof, the US and Russia (and China). While this process has not transcendedremnant policies of containment, it is irreducible to them. On one side, theUS has sought the integration of the former Soviet republics, includingRussia, into Western economic and military structures, while containingRussian influence in the Transcaspian (and Eastern Europe). Indeed, as thecase of NATO shows, the integration of Russia in “the West” premises itscontainment. On the other side, Russia has oscillated between, and at timestried to combine, forging a “pragmatic alliance” with the US in the common“war on terror” and forging strategic and military alliances in Asia to counterUS hegemony and to contain the military and political expansion of the USin the Transcaspian. While this process has curbed the expansion of UShegemony in Asia to a certain extent, it has also produced “partnerships”with China and India that exhibit similar hybrid relations of integration andcontainment.



In the following, I first show that the hydrocarbon riches of the Caspianare not sufficient reason to explain contemporary geopolitical rivalry inEurasia. The section that follows presents a summary of the evolution of USand Russian policy towards the Transcaspian and analyses their respectiveexpansion into Central Asia beyond the question of terrorism. This leads tothe discussion of the hybrid geopolitics resulting from Russia’s “return to theWest” in the section that follows. The alliance between Russia and China tocounter US and Western expansion in Asia is discussed in the last section,which examines the strategic partnership developing since the late 1990s,focusing finally on the development of hybrid geopolitics in the expansionof the Russian arms trade with China and India.

CASPIAN OIL

Although the competition for oil in the Caspian Basin and the commonstruggle against “international terrorism” in Central Asia figure prominentlyin analyses of geopolitical rivalry among the US, Russia and China, bothare not satisfactory to explain its source and pattern (the question of the“war on terror” is taken up in the next section). Many analysts have inter-preted the regional and global competition for the control of the Transcas-pian since the collapse of the Soviet Union as primarily a race to thecontrol of the oil and gas reserves of the region, especially the formerSoviet littoral states other than Russia – Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, andTurkmenistan.10 Certainly, political and economic gains can derive fromcontrolling the hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian Basin, but the growingrivalry in the Transcaspian, particularly between the US and Russia (andChina), cannot be reduced to competition for natural resources. It is notthat the control of oil extraction and transportation is not in itself impor-tant, but that this must not be construed as the ultimate object of thecompetition. If at all related to oil, the strategic interest in the region is notthe control of oil per se but in the integration of the economies of theregion, including Russia, into the global economy through the exports ofoil in exchange for imports and opening for competing investment capitalfrom the west and the east.

Throughout the 1990s, the Caspian region was thought to containhydrocarbon resources of global significance, enough to relieve the US andEurope of their dependence on Gulf oil and to present a counterweight, ifnot an equivalent rival, to OPEC. The size and significance of Caspian oiland gas reserves, however, were deliberately exaggerated by governmentseager to attract foreign investment and, particularly, by the US Departmentof State, to attract US investors and justify the interventionist strategy of theUS in the region. After being placed at around 7 billion barrels (bbl) in theearly 1990s, the speculation on the proven reserves of the Caspian grew to


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hysterical proportions by the mid-1990s, placing them at around 200 billionbbl in 1995, compared to Saudi Arabia’s 250 billion bbl.

By the late 1990s, however, the Caspian oil frenzy calmed as the oiland gas reserves turned out to be much smaller than anticipated. Moreover,in the context of low oil prices and sluggish demand in oil markets, they didnot justify the already high costs of extracting and transporting them out ofthe Caspian region. By 1998, the proven oil and gas reserves of the Caspianwere estimated at around 68 billion bbl; but after actual drilling, they werere-estimated in the early 2000s at around 20–30 billion bbl.11 But oil reservesand production are highly uneven across the region and regional estimatesconceal wide differences among the different countries. Most of Caspian oilis concentrated in Kazakhstan, whose reserves at the end of 2006 amountedto 40 billion bbl approximately, compared to Russia’s 80 billion bbl.12 Incomparison, Azerbaijan had 7 billion bbl and Turkmenistan, richer in gas,contained around 500 million bbl. The significance of Kazakhstan, however,is not in the size of its reserves but in the difference between its share ofworld reserves (3.3%) and share of world production (1.7%), compared toRussia’s 6.6% and 12.3%, respectively. Thus, despite the doubling of its pro-duction capacity in the past fifteen years, Kazakhstan’s production capacityis not yet fully realised. This is due primarily to internal institutional limitsand a small economy incapable of absorbing large monetary surpluses fromincreased production.13 If those were removed, Kazakhstan can potentiallyproduce 3 million bbl/day in 2015, with much of it to export and probablymuch of that to China, placing it at best in the league of Norway andVenezuela, rather than OPEC or the Middle East.

The Caspian, with its modest hydrocarbon potential, appeared as aviable alternative to the Persian Gulf as long as the latter remained closed toUS oil companies. The opening of the upstream oil and gas sector of moreprofitable producers shifted the interest of the oil companies away from theregion, with the voluntary opening of the Saudi, Iranian and, until recently,the Russian upstream oil sector to foreign companies, and the forced openingof Iraq specifically to US oil companies, with 115 billion bbl in provenreserves and an estimated 200–300 billion in probable reserves. With thisshift, the interest of the US administration in the Caspian region shifted froma focus on oil to questions of “security”. The region did not lose geopoliticalsignificance, but this was no longer primarily attached to the region’s hydro-carbon riches.

THE US AND RUSSIA IN THE TRANSCASPIAN

There are striking parallels in analyses of the foreign policies of the US andRussia concerning the Transcaspian region in the post–Cold War period.14

Two general assumptions are common in varying accounts of both. First,



during much of the 1990s, the Transcaspian region remained strategicallyperipheral to the interests of the US. Those were defined negatively – toensure that no other power, namely Russia and Iran, advanced into the“geopolitical vacuum” created by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia, inits turn, sought to disengage, or distance itself from the newly independentrepublics of the Transcaspian throughout most of the 1990s, a period inwhich its relation with the US oscillated between close alignment and rejectionof US global hegemony. Notwithstanding differences in relation to individualrepublics, Russia’s policy was mostly defensive – a “policy of obstruction”aimed at preventing the expansion of “external” powers that may under-mine Russia’s precarious stability. Yeltsin’s policy of “divorce” had deliber-ately severed Russia’s ties with its “less developed partners” to the south,especially the Central Asian republics. In what became the Yeltsin-Kozyrevforeign policy, Russia instead concentrated on its own modernisation in itsattempt to reintegrate with the West, economically and politically, as well asideologically by forging a national identity that placed Russia in Europeancivilisation.

Second, both US and Russian foreign policies shifted in the second halfof the 1990s. The strategic significance of the Transcaspian came to the fore,which propelled the US and Russia into direct expansion into the region. Inthe US, especially in the last years of the second Clinton administration, USpolicy shifted from a narrow focus on economic security to broader issuesof political security and stability. This developed further with the Bushadministration into an explicit expansion under the banner of the “war onterror”, thus lending the region further strategic significance. Central Asiacame to be perceived in US foreign policy as both a “potential breedingground for terrorism” and an indispensable base from which to launchthe war on terrorism originating elsewhere: to prevent the infiltration ofexternal disruptive forces – “men, ideas and guns” – and to battle internalopposition and uprisings that may spread instability throughout the wholeregion. In Russia, the so-called Yeltsin-Kozyrev policy gave way by around1996 to a more “nationalistic” stance. Russia was now bent on establishingprevalence over the former Soviet republics. This was coupled to an explicitrejection of US hegemony over the international system and a “quest formultipolarity”, which reached its apogee in the late 1990s with the develop-ment of the Russo-Chinese “strategic partnership” (see below). This presum-ably lasted until September 2001, when the declared “war on terror” broughtRussia full circle to align itself (again) with the US, as a partner in aUS-centred hegemonic alliance. The expansion of Russia’s influence inCentral Asia henceforth took an increasingly economic form. Rather than ter-ritorial or militaristic restoration of Russian “big space”, Russia expanded itsinfluence through a set of multilateral and cooperative agreements that accel-erated economic integration and ensured the expansion and dominance ofRussian companies against foreign competitors, especially in the energy sector.


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The implication drawn from the accounts sketched above is that USpolicy shifted from isolating Russia and excluding it from the Transcaspianregion to integrating it in the campaign against terrorism. Similarly, Russia inits turn shifted from a rejection of US hegemony and obstruction of USexpansion into the region to an acceptance of both in the period followingthe events of September 2001. Consequently, the relations between the USand Russia shifted from a more confrontational stance in the second half ofthe 1990s to something close to an alliance after 2001. Yet, the empirical cir-cumstances point to limitations in both assumptions and their implications.First, US military expansion into Central Asia preceded the invasion ofAfghanistan in 2001 – the primary justification for US military deploymentsin Central Asia – and was well on its way by the mid-1990s. The events ofSeptember 2001 confirmed the interventionist and militaristic stance of USpolicy in Asia rather than initiating the shift towards it. The same in the caseof Russia. Despite the policy of “divorce”, the integration of the SouthCaucasus and Central Asia into military and security arrangements did notbegin with the reassertion of Russian “nationalism” under Putin, but hadalready proceeded in the 1990s. Here also, the events of 2001, but moresignificantly the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and subsequent political eventsin the region, accelerated a process that was already in the making – aprocess that was by no means displaced by purely economic arrangements.Second, the rivalry between the US and Russia, in the Transcaspian andEastern Europe, did not subside with the rapprochement of 2001, but seemsto have intensified. Despite a sympathetic stance in the US administrationtowards Russian influence in the former Soviet Union and the Middle East,as a better alternative to the influence of Iran or Islamic fundamentalism,Russia remained to the US a source of disrupting influence – an obstacle tothe efforts of the US to spread “democracy” in Eastern Europe and to curbthe potential proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, as the cur-rent conflict over Iran demonstrates. The alliance in the war on terror didnot prevent the Bush administration, replete as it is with Cold War veterans,from treating Russia as an opponent to be contained. On the other side,Russia saw in the US a useful ally in curbing the spread of Islamic move-ments and eradicating terrorism across the region, by providing the materialmeans that Russia lacked and by providing the very discourse that definesterrorism and legitimates intervention against it. Yet, US military expansion,under the pretense of the “war on terror”, ranging from US military bases inCentral Asia to missiles in Eastern Europe, including the invasion of Iraq,appears in Russia as a threat equal to, if not more menacing, than the threatof terrorism. Both threats would propel Russia to seek security and militaryalliances with the Central Asian republics and China. In the following, I shalldevelop the first point further by arguing that the military expansion of Russiaand the US in Central Asia is irreducible to the question of terrorism. The nexttwo sections develop the second point further on two levels, the first



examining the hybrid nature of US-Russia relations, and the second examiningthe emerging alliance between Russia, China, and India, as a reaction andchallenge to the expansion of US hegemony.

Lily Pads Along the Arc of Instability: Central Asia in the War on Terror

It is generally assumed that Central Asia, as a region, acquired critical impor-tance for the US after US oil companies signed contracts with Kazakhstan in1993 and 1994. As it gained further strategic importance in the “war onterror” after 2001, Central Asia became a major recipient of US assistance,most of which in the area of security, including border control, narcoticsand arms control.15 Because of its location, Central Asia also became a stra-tegic launch pad in the “war on terror”, a “base from which to project [USand NATO] power into the region”.16 But the military expansion of the USinto Central Asia was already in progress in 2001, and must be seen againsta more general transformation in the global military footprint of the US inthe post–Cold War period taking place well before the “war on terror”.

US military expansion into Central Asia has proceeded since the early1990s, indirectly through NATO sponsored programmes such as the Partnershipfor Peace programme (PfP) and the Central Asian Battalion (CENTRASBAT).The Partnership for Peace programme was adopted at the NATO summit inJanuary 1994. It is primarily a US initiative designed to provide NATO with a“flexible system of halfway houses” that allows for its expansion withoutrequiring an expansion of membership.17 The Central Asian Battalion, onthe other hand, was formed in 1995 by an agreement between Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, to operate under the auspices of the UnitedNations for the purpose of “peacekeeping” and preventing conflict involatile areas.18 But CENTRASBAT quickly became the focus of majormilitary exercises sponsored by the PfP. Moreover, the sponsorship ofCENTRASBAT shifted from Atlantic Command to Central Command followingthe modification of the US Unified Command Plan to include Central Asia inCentral Command’s “area of responsibility.”

CENTRASBAT exercises were intended to prepare US forces for assaultsin Central Asia and to prepare the militaries of the Central Asian republics towork with US and NATO forces to upgrade their “interoperability”. One mili-tary analyst, writing before the “war on terror” and the invasion of Afghanistan,described the PfP programme as part of the US strategy of “extraordinarypower projection” – activities that would “facilitate transition [of CentralAsian republics] to war and participation in its initial stages”.19 What war theUS was preparing for in 2000 is not evident. Still, the US military footprint hasonly expanded after September 2001, and a quasi-permanent, pre-emptive“war on terror”, which has become much less localised and more open-ended, has served to justify and legitimate such an expansion. Indeed, the


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discursive campaign on terrorism served to globalise the military footprintof the US as it transformed its structure.

The transformation of perceptions of the nature of security threats andareas of potential conflict in the post–Cold War world led to the transformationof the “footprint” of the US military forces in terms of location and structure.The current geography of US military bases resembles a palimpsestcomposed of a splintered network of non-permanent, small, and austereoperations bases – so-called “lily-pads” – flung across the whole globe todeal with local, small-scale security threats, laid over the larger, more per-manent bases established on the edges of Eurasia to contain the Sovietthreat during the Cold War. Only on this second level the geographical formof US deployment seems to replicate that of containment – and this is howit is perceived in Russia, together with the eastward advance of NATO andplans to place a missile defence shield in Eastern Europe. But more thanencircling Russia, or fighting terrorism in Central Asia, the footprint of theUS military forces reflects on the ground a broader strategy of global expansion.It coincides with the so-called “arc of crisis” or “arc of instability”, spanningacross the Global South from Central and South America through NorthAfrica to Southeast Asia, and bisected by Central Command’s “area ofresponsibility”, stretching from Kenya, Sudan and Egypt in the southwestall the way northeast to include the five republics of Central Asia, in additionto the Arab Peninsula, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The combination ofthese two areas coincides with the region designated by Barnett as the non-integrating gap, the region that is most likely to “incubate the next generation ofglobal terrorists” – i.e., represent potential threats to US-led globalisation –and that became more visible after September 2001. The significance ofCentral Asia is that it sits at the intersection of these two areas, perceived bythe US Department of Defense as problem areas and, therefore, areas thatmay require military intervention. Equally important, Central Asia also sitsbetween Russia, China and India – three developing economies with poten-tial regional power, and whose cooperation has further significance at theglobal scale. The three have had their own, often conflicting, strategic plansfor Central Asia, and, together with Iran, have strengthened and establishednew economic, political, and military ties with the former Soviet Republics.As such, Central Asia is critical for the further expansion, or obstruction, ofUS-led globalisation and the stationing of military forces there goes beyondthe immediate threat of terrorism or the protection of oil installations.

In the Steppes to Stay? Reclaiming the Heartland

The expansion of US military forces and assistance in Central Asia and thebrief interlude of strengthening US-Uzbek relations provoked a double-tiered strategic competition – between the US and other major powers withinterest in the region, particularly China, India and Russia, and among the



Central Asian republics themselves. The forging of a US-Uzbek “strategicpartnership” in 2002 pushed the republics of Central Asia to pursue Russianand Chinese involvement in order to “balance” Uzbekistan’s ascendancyand potential regional hegemony. Yet, not wanting Uzbekistan to be thesole beneficiary of US assistance, the other Central Asian republics sought atthe same time to strengthen their own bilateral relations with the US and tocultivate its willingness to spend millions of dollars on the modernisation ofmilitary infrastructures, equipment, training of personnel, etc. to secure ageopolitical foothold in the region. An initial opening to the US invitedgreater Russian involvement, and this was to expand with the shift inattitude towards US presence in Central Asia, especially in the case ofUzbekistan after 2005.

After 2001, Russia (and China) accepted US expansion in Central Asiaboth as a welcome effort to strike terrorism at its presumed source, and togive some legitimacy to its own war on separatist rebels in Chechnya – warsthat the US had frowned upon during the 1990s and has been uneasy insupporting. Russia, thus, tolerated US military forces in its southern peripheryas long as they were temporary and aimed at a single objective: the eradicationof the Taliban. The Russian government even opened its air space to non-military US flights and provided the US military forces with intelligence anda decade-long strategic experience in Afghanistan, in addition to modest,yet effective, influence with the Central Asian republics, which were eagerto cultivate closer relations with the US and NATO, without completelyrelinquishing their good relations with Russia. Central Asian republics facinginternal opposition could not risk losing Moscow’s support, as US calls forpolitical reform and promotion of democracy throughout the 1990s, culmi-nating in the “Tulip revolution” in Kyrgyzstan and change in the relationwith Uzbekistan in 2005, have made the support of the US against domesticopposition questionable. The more the relation between the US and Russiasoured in subsequent years, the more Central Asian republics in need ofsuch support turned towards Russia. But in the early years of the war onterror, with apparent collaboration between the US and Russia, it seemedthat the Central Asian republics could “balance” their relations with both.Kyrgyzstan, with a government propped by Russian support, was the first inthe region to open its airspace to the US Air Force and to allow the US toestablish a military base near the capital. The US returned the favour byextending military and economic assistance to Kyrgyzstan.

Putin’s pragmatic rapprochement policy – actively integrating intorather than opposing the emerging global system – did not imply, however,an embrace of US hegemony on the continent. As it became apparent thatthe “war on terror” had no clear end in sight and increasingly less definedobjectives, US military presence in Central Asia came to be perceived inRussia (and China) as part of a broader geopolitical strategy not tied exclu-sively to the purpose and duration of the campaign against the Taliban in


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Afghanistan. This coincided with the further expansion of NATO and amore aggressive effort by the US to install its nuclear defence system inEastern Europe (see below), which provoked in Russia (and China) a senseof creeping containment, or “encirclement”, the reaction to which was arenewed expansion of Russian influence in Central Asia.

Russia now was caught between two evils, and its active expansion inCentral Asia in competition with the US had to combine with an affirmationof its alliance with the West in the “war on terror.” On one level, Russiaaimed to expand its leverage over the Central Asian republics in order tocurb the expansion of US influence.20 But on another, equally significantlevel, Russia (and China) benefited from delegating some responsibility tothe US in cracking down on Islamic movements, thus ostensibly preventingpolitical instability in Central Asia by making Russia’s southern borders lessvulnerable to the infiltration of Islamic militants that may threaten politicalstability at home. Both Russia and the five Central Asian republics have longperceived a common security problem in the rising and spreading militantIslamic movements to the south and, despite Yeltsin’s “divorce” policy,Russia has been involved in Central Asia since 1992, when the civil warerupted in Tajikistan, threatening to spread Islamic fundamentalismthroughout Central Asia up to the Russian borders. This translated into moretangible efforts beginning in the mid-1990s, namely in 1996, when the Talibantook over Kabul, at around the same time that the rebellion in Chechnyathreatened to bring militant Islamic movements all the way up through theNorth Caucasus to Moscow. The Shanghai Five, which would develop into theShanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with the inclusion of Uzbekistan in2001, was founded in 1996 by Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, andTajikistan to resolve boundary disputes with China, but expanded later in1998 to include issues of terrorism, separatism and extremism – i.e., militantIslamic movements, especially in Russia (Chechnya), China (Xinjiang) andeventually Uzbekistan (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan). In April 2000,Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, signed a “security pact”whose chief aim was to control the “powerful ideological expansion” ofIslamic fundamentalism emanating from Afghanistan. The agreementprovided for “joint military action in case of an attack”. Shortly after, in May2000, Russia signed a number of bilateral agreements with Uzbekistanproviding for military cooperation to help the latter fight the surging Islamicmovement, and in July China and Russia agreed with Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to establish an “antiterrorist center” in Bishkek,Kyrgyzstan, and reiterated their desire again in August with Uzbekistan, to“crush” the Islamic guerillas “using the most decisive measures.” Threats ofmilitant Islamic movements became the cement that locked Central Asia inbilateral and multilateral agreements with Russia (and China) well before2001. Russia at times even offered Central Asian republics unilateral guaranteesagainst the threat of “terrorism,” but due to the state of its military forces,



and its costly involvement in Chechnya, Russia could not commit to actualmilitary operations. Even its subsequent rhetorical support for the US “waron terror” did not translate into actual military engagement. Nonetheless, bythe end of the decade, Central Asia had become, for Russia (and China), theroute through which the “inspiration” and support of the Taliban for sepa-ratist rebels at home travelled from its original source in Afghanistan.21 ForRussia, Central Asia was its “security buffer” against a potential “Muslimcorridor” stretching from the Persian Gulf north to the periphery of Moscow.By October 2000, Russia was still reinforcing its “defensive positions” on theborder between Afghanistan and Tajikistan, rather than its own border withTajikistan, to protect the “gateway to Central Asia” against the spread of theTaliban. By December 2002, Russia had begun deploying military aircraftfrom those “defensive positions” to Kant in Kyrgyzstan, where the US hadestablished its military base one year earlier.

Direct US military infiltration of central Asia and increased assistance inmilitary and security programmes resuscitated Russia’s efforts to strengthenits security ties to the Central Asian republics through multilateral and bilat-eral agreements, after those faltered after 2001. Those agreements were nolonger centred only on the security threats of militant Islamic movements,but also, more prominently, on the direct expansion of US and NATO forcesinto Central Asia. Thus, in 2002 Russia established the Collective SecurityTreaty Organization, partly to counter the eastward expansion of NATO andas a similar, alternative security provider in Central Asia.22 The invasion ofIraq in 2003 exacerbated anxieties about US unilateralism and the prospectof US military presence lasting even longer than Russia had anticipated. Thisprodded the six members of the SCO to revive it, and in 2004 the SCO setup the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure, a permanent organ in Tashkent,and has since held joint military exercises.

The summer of 2005 was to bring further developments that expandedRussia’s presence in Central Asia further, in addition to widening the sphereof security and military cooperation in Asia. At its annual conference inKazakhstan in July 2005, with India, Iran and Pakistan present as observers, theSCO demanded US withdrawal from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.This came on the heels of a joint communiqué issued in June by Russia,China and India, emphasising, again, the “multipolarity” of the internationalsystem and a pledge by Russia and China to cooperate against (US) monopolyof world affairs. The “strategic partnership” announced in 1996 with theformation of the Shanghai Five was back on the agenda, after the commonalliance in the “war on terror” took centre stage for a short while after 2001.The revival of strategic partnerships and Central Asian security ties withRussia (and China) was lent additional momentum by the re-orientation ofUzbekistan towards Russia and China. Crackdown by Uzbekistan’s govern-ment on demonstrators in 2005, and the massacre that ensued, pushed areluctant US administration, under pressure from Congress, to criticise


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Uzbekistan’s government and to demand investigation into the incident.Uzbekistan retaliated first by restricting airlifts from the US military baseat Karshi-Khanabad and, when the US supported the transfer of Uzbekrefugees to Europe, the Uzbek government gave the US its six monthsnotice to evacuate the base and terminate the agreement that established it.The complete evacuation of the base in November 2005 coincided with amilitary pact between Uzbekistan and Russia, which were already conductingjoint military exercises by August 2005.

Thus, contrary to the dominant account, US and NATO military expansioninto Central Asia was less a response to the resurgence of Russian “nationalism”in the mid-1990s, and Russia’s reassertion of its “national interests” in itstraditional sphere of influence, than a cause, or at least a catalyst forrenewed Russian interest in alliances with the Central Asian republics, as aresponse to perceived security threats from increased Western military pres-ence in Russia’s southern and western peripheries. If indeed the advanceinto Central Asia was meant to contain Russia (and China) and prevent theformation of Eurasian alliances, it seems to have actually accelerated suchprocess as Russia, China, and to a certain extent India, have since sought tostrengthen their ties with Central Asia and with each other as a responseto perceived threats of US expansion. Once again, Central Asia is not itselfthe ultimate object of geopolitical rivalry, but one site through which thecontenders enter a complex, hybrid space that is defined by their hybridrelations with each other.

HYBRID GEOPOLITICS: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE CLASH OF CIVILISATIONS

Russia and the US occupy a prominent place in each other’s strategies in theTranscaspian – each is the other’s ultimate object in what I refer to as hybridgeopolitics, irreducible to containment or territorial control along the linesof Mackinder’s Heartland thesis. This is in part because each regards theother as a contender in the global system, yet, as discussed above, also anally against threats of terrorism and political instability. But this is alsobecause US policies towards Russia have their roots in heterogeneous – to acertain extent contradictory – strains in successive US administrations in thepost–Cold War period. A similar contradiction can be traced in Russianattitudes towards the US and Western Europe, especially regarding the east-ward expansion of NATO and the EU.

Generally, the US administration has tried to combine a “clash of civili-sation” with a “neo–Cold War” policy towards Russia in the post–Cold Warperiod. The former stressed the need to strengthen US relations with Russiaand integrate Russia into the West, while the latter reiterated the necessity toisolate Russia from its actual and potential allies, and contain the spread of



its influence in its traditional sphere. “Neo–Cold War” factions in the US, notunlike their Russian counterparts, are closely associated with the oil and,especially, arms industry. They perceive in Russian policies an “inexorablelogic” of “deep rooted national interests” – an almost primordial drivetowards geopolitical expansion – echoed on the other side in Russian per-ceptions of a permanent expansionist drive in “Anglo-Saxon” geopolitics(see note 3). Given the current state of the Russian military forces, however,Russia would presumably resort to its energy companies to exert its politicalinfluence, not only in the Transcaspian, through its monopoly over pipe-lines out of the region, but also in Western and Eastern Europe, since Russiasupplies most of Europe’s gas. Russia’s opening and reorientation towardsthe West is therefore most likely a deceptive manoeuvre to prepare forrebuilding its “national power” and restoring its “former colonies.” The“clash of civilisation” campaign, running parallel and almost opposite to theneo–Cold War trend, has instead encouraged the incorporation of Russia inan alliance against the spread of militant Islam – in a war between “westerncivilisation” and “Oriental” barbarism. This has encountered in Russia a sim-ilar desire to eradicate the radical Islamic threat from the South, buttressedby the desire among certain Russian intellectuals and policy makers to“return to Europe”. Accordingly, Russia’s rivalry with the West has becomeincreasingly “meaningless”, and the threats that Russia has faced since theSoviet involvement in Afghanistan, and later from Tajikistan and Chechnya,have shifted the focus of its strategists to a “North-South axis as a majorsource of insecurity” instead of the West-East confrontation of the Cold War.23

The return of Russia to the West, however, and its integration intoWestern economic and security arrangements has proceeded on thepremise that Russia is integrated as a contained Russia, deprived of its pre-sumed imperial impulses. The eastward expansion of NATO (and the EU) isa case in point. The US administration has pushed for an accelerated, directenlargement of NATO since 1998, despite internal criticisms that the east-ward expansion of NATO would, on one hand, “dilute” NATO and make itless cohesive and, on the other hand, antagonise Russia and disrupt potentialarms control agreements. Notwithstanding, in 1998 NATO added Poland,Hungary, and the Czech Republic; and in April 2004, seven new membersjoined: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia,all of which, conveniently enough, have supported the further involvementof the US in Iraq, and have been active in “rebuilding” Afghanistan.

Although Russia has not strictly opposed the expansion of the EU andthe integration of countries of the former eastern bloc in it – an expansionthat the US is more enthusiastic about than both Western and SouthernEuropeans – it has perceived a more serious threat in the eastwards expansionof NATO, despite all assurance from the US and other NATO members thatNATO is no longer aimed at Russia, but has rather become a “peacefulpolitical association for cooperation and democracy” that Russia could


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eventually join.24 The inclusion of Russia in NATO in 2002, and the estab-lishment of the NATO-Russia Council, was thus partly intended to relieveRussia from its anxiety about NATO’s expansion. But it was also intended torelieve the West from anxieties about potential Russian expansion and therestoration of “Greater Russia” as an alternative to the West. The extensionof NATO membership to Eastern Europe, thus, was motivated partly by astrategy to protect it from any (perceived) potential Russian expansion. Theconfluence between the integration and containment of Russia is reflectedin its truncated participation in NATO, and is expressed as integration of anisolated Russia. Russia was admitted to NATO not as a full member boundby the alliance’s collective defence agreements; moreover, it was admittedas a member without the power of veto over NATO decisions. The reassur-ance of Russia by NATO members had to be reciprocated by an assuranceon the part of Russia about the seriousness of its cooperation with NATO.This reassurance, however, came coupled to announcements about Russia’sreserved right to launch pre-emptive military interventions in former Sovietrepublics to protect the rights of ethnic Russians.

As paradoxical as it may seem, the integration of Russia into an allianceostensibly designed to contain Russia reproduces an essential aspect ofNATO, which is to uphold US hegemony over its Cold War allies byintegrating them within an asymmetrical military alliance that sets limits totheir political autonomy.25 Thus, the integration of Russia into NATO couldbe explained as an attempt to contain Russia as an ally, and containment inthis case is not opposed to integration, but is achieved through it, as a stepto aid the transition of Russia into a free market capitalist economy withoutallowing a “resurgent Russian empire” to threaten the global expansion ofcapital under US hegemony. That this has not succeeded so far is due tothe economic and military independence that contemporary Russia enjoyscompared with contemporary Eastern Europe and with post-war WesternEurope. Indeed, the eastward advance of NATO, and the erection of amissile defence shield in Eastern Europe, has only resuscitated plans for astrategic partnership and the forging of closer relations between Russia andChina.

EURASIAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS: ANOTHER HYBRID GEOPOLITICS?

Certainly, the sharing of security concerns in Central Asia fostered newalliances and transformed geopolitical rivalry such that it could no longer fitCold War models, or the so-called Great Game.26 Geopolitical rivalry, how-ever, did not altogether disappear and has curiously promoted an allianceof a potentially Eurasian scale. Russia’s pragmatic turn to the West did notprevent it from cultivating economic and security ties with China, India and



Iran to counter US global hegemony. Since 1997, shortly after the founda-tion of the Shanghai Five (SCO’s predecessor), Russia and China issued ajoint statement pledging to promote the “multipolarisation of the world” andto establish a “new international order.” In all but name, US hegemony,and expansionism in the post–Cold War period, was the object of this andsubsequent statements and partnerships. The increased penetration of CentralAsia by US military forces, as early as 1997, has heightened the sense of“encirclement” in Russia and, especially, in China, enhanced by US supportof the active “remilitarisation of Japanese imperialism” and the shift inJapan’s defence policy from a local passive strategy to a regionally orientedactive defence strategy.27 The projection of US military power and the readi-ness of the US to resort to the use of military force, which gained increasingsignificance with the Kosovo war in 1999, culminating in the invasion ofIraq in 2003, did nothing to alleviate concerns about US military expansionin Asia. Further rejection of US “hegemonialism” was reiterated in a jointcommuniqué issued on the eve of the SCO summit in 2005 (see above), inwhich Russia and China, with India this time, pledged, once again, cooper-ation towards multipolarity as they called for withdrawal of US troops fromCentral Asia.28 In the meantime, economic and military ties between Russiaand China have grown – the two countries have trade to the tune of $48 billion(in 2007) compared with $10 billion in 2000.

The “strategic partnership” between Russia and China that developedduring Yeltsin’s presidency, and which Putin consolidated further in his“multivectored” foreign policy, did not entirely eliminate strategic competitionand tensions over Central Asia. China’s economic prowess in particularraises concerns in Russia about China’s potential influence in the CentralAsian republics (especially Kazakhstan), and about the revival of its territorialclaims in the Russian Far East.29 Moreover, not unlike Maoist China, whichprovided the third world with a model of development as the West stoodunimpressed, China today provides the Central Asian states with a viablemodel of capitalist development, its most admirable feature being the com-bination of economic growth with a “tightly controlled political regime” –i.e., an authoritarian state. (In fact, this combination is arguably an indicatorthat authoritarian capitalism may be the most successful form of neoliberalcapitalist development). The concession of territory from the former Sovietrepublics to China – remnants of old Sino-Soviet border disputes – is anadditional indication of the willingness on the part of the Central Asianrepublics to recognise China’s potential hegemonic role.30

Similar issues complicate the relations between India and China. India,like China and Russia, is involved in its own war against separatist groupsand Islamic fundamentalism, “infecting” the large, already discontent, Muslimpopulation of India. With the “war on terror”, Central Asia thus became partof India’s “extended security horizon”, especially with the decline ofRussia’s capacity to manage the security of the region, and has lent the US


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support in establishing military presence in Central Asia.31 India, whichcompetes with China for Central Asian resources and markets, especiallyenergy-rich Kazakhstan, has also offered military assistance and arms deals toUzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, mainly as a bulwark against Pakistanisupport of the Taliban and its influence on Islamic threats in Central Asia –a threat shared by both India and the Central Asian republics. India’ssupport for US military presence in Central Asia and economic-militarypenetration of Central Asian markets did nothing to alleviate almost half acentury of geopolitical tensions with China.32

Despite concerns in both Russia and India about China’s rearmament,which has grown in pace and scope in more recent years, Russia has in factcontributed to the build-up and development of Chinese military capabilities.This is partly due to the dependence of Russian industry on Chinese andIndian purchases of Russian weapons, spare parts, and ammunition, which,with the transfer of defence technology and training of Chinese personnel,alleviates some of the concerns about the “hypothetical possibility” thatChina might use Russian arms to launch an offensive against Russia. Hence,if the “strategic triangle” can potentially integrate Russia, China, and India inan alliance to counter US hegemony on one hand and to fight threats ofIslamic fundamentalism on the other, it can also serve to contain suspicions ofthe three partners regarding each other’s economic and military expansion. Insuch an alliance, China has been mostly focused on US interventionism inCentral Asia and its broader military implications; India has been more inter-ested in curbing Islamic threats as well as Chinese hegemony, or potentialexpansion; Russia has strategic and economic interests in all three, but alsoan economic interest in keeping its military-industrial complex running.

The Arms Trade Triangle

Russian export of arms and military-industrial assistance to India and Chinaexpresses in material terms a growing, albeit precarious, economic andmilitary cooperation among the three countries, as part of a broader alliancethat may challenge US hegemony. Although in recent years Russia, China,and India have repeatedly reiterated their commitment in the “war onterror”, they have also repeatedly reiterated “shared views” on multilateralism,“multi-polarisation” of international relations, the necessity of diversifyingdevelopment models, and a more prominent and effective role for theUnited Nations – all thinly veiled criticisms of US monopoly over interna-tional affairs. This fledgling alliance, however, as is the case with thealliance between the US and Russia in the “war on terror”, did not transcendthe contradictions and conflicts among the three regional powers, some ofwhich are inherited from the Cold War. The hybrid geopolitics that charac-terises the rivalry between the US and Russia in their alliance against terrorismhas produced another hybrid geopolitics, embedded in an alliance between



Russia, China and India in which the three have to reconcile their varyingrelations with the US yet shared position against US hegemony with theirvarying precarious relations with each other and mutual suspicions of eachother’s influence – particularly, China. Russian arms exports to China andIndia have played an instrumental role in negotiating these precarious relations.

Throughout the 1990s, Russia embarked on revitalising its two sourcesof material power – the energy sector and the armed forces. Closely relatedwith the latter is Russia’s defence industry, which is the only manufacturingindustry in Russia that is still fairly competitive in the world market. Russiainherited from the Soviet Union a huge inventory of arms, military waresand technologies, and navy fleets that sit rusting in harbours. The end of theCold War, however, and the transformation of Russia’s strategic requirements –the loss of arms exports to former Soviet clients – decreased Russia’s overallarms exports from $25 billion in 1987 to $2–$3 billion in 1990. Since around2000, Russia has expanded its arms exports, especially to China and India, itslargest arms trade partners, to subsidise its defence and aerospace industries.In 2003, Russian arms exports were slightly above $5 billion, representingaround 25% of the international market share and second only to USexports, with 50% market share. They grew steadily to $5.7 in 2005, $6.4 in2006 to reach $7 to $7.5 billion by 2007. A significant share of those exportswent to China, under a Western arms embargo since 1989. Of all Russianarms exports between 1992 and 2006, valued at around $58 billion, around$26 billion in fighter jets and fighter jet engines, bomber aircrafts and sub-marines, were delivered to China, in addition to the transfer of technologiesto help China develop its domestic defence industries.

Although China accounts for the biggest share of Russian arms exports,long-standing rivalry between Russia and China over their respectiveregional hegemony and over territorial claims in the Russian Far East hasstirred concerns in Russia about prospective Chinese military self-sufficiency.This has resulted in more sophisticated Russian weapons and weapontechnologies going to India rather than China, and for more than strategicreasons. While India purchases “complete systems” and finished defenceproducts, in addition to production technologies, in exchange for hardcurrency, China’s purchases have so far consisted mostly of small amountsof “off-the-shelf” items, negotiated in barter and in-kind arrangements (inaddition to a modest transfer of manufacturing technologies). Yet, anexpanding Chinese military budget combined with a continued embargo onarms exports from the West can potentially expand future sales and militarycontracts between Russia and China.33 Moreover, although Russia is India’smajor supplier, it is not the only one, which makes China even a more guar-anteed outlet for the Russian arms industry in a rather saturated world market.India by contrast buys arms from the US, France, Sweden and Israel, and istherefore not entirely dependent on Russia for its defence requirements asmuch as Russia is dependent on Indian purchases of arms.


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In the absence of a self-sufficient Indian defence industry, however,India’s military prowess remains dependent on the import of Russian armsand especially on military-technical assistance, cooperative projects, andjoint ventures that may help India develop its domestic defence industries.US military support of Pakistan, and reluctance to expand military coopera-tion with India after the nuclear tests of 1998, has only reinforced India’sreliance on Russian military exports, as part of a broader set of economicexchanges between India and Russia. India’s rapid economic developmentin recent years has pushed state-owned Indian oil and gas companies tosearch for supplies and investments in Russia and Central Asia. Indiaalready has investments in the Sakhalin oil projects in addition to invest-ments in Iran and Kazakhstan. (This is also an important area in whichIndia and China have enjoyed different relations with Russia: althoughRussia has supplied China with oil in exchange for Chinese loans thathelped Russian state companies acquire private oil companies, Russia hasnot opened its oil industry to direct investment by Chinese companies).Russia has also benefited from the import of telecommunication technologyfrom India (computer chips, silicon products, especially for space andmissile programmes, otherwise embargoed) available from Westernsources at much higher prices. In short, both countries, in addition toChina, represent to each other alternatives to the West, especially underconditions and threats of embargo in the high-tech and arms industry. Withan expanding physical transportation network across the continent, theprospect of an integrated economic space, tying the economies of Russia,China and India together with Central Asia, seems a possible foundationupon which a geopolitical entity can challenge US-led globalisation,despite conflicts and mutual suspicions among the three. More thanCaspian oil and terrorism, it is this prospect that has led the US to expandinto Central Asia almost immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union,to lay the ground for the integration of the former Soviet economies intoWestern markets and security arrangements. Ironically, US expansion hasonly accelerated the integration of Central Asia in an economic-strategicspace centred on a precarious, hybrid Sino-Russian alliance.

* * *

Military connections of various sorts, justified and framed by threats rangingfrom terrorist attacks to drug trafficking, nuclear proliferation and US “hege-monialism”, are simultaneously elements of economic expansion and inte-gration not only because they aim at establishing the “secure” environmentnecessary for economic expansion, but because they contribute directly tothe process of economic expansion. Capital does not follow the sword, asthe adage goes, as much as it accompanies it, or inheres in it. Geopoliticalcompetition for, or in, Central Asia, with consequent US military expansionand assistance packages to the central Asian republics and the arms trade



triangle between Russia, China and India, is part of a broader competition tointegrate the economies of this territory in competing political economichegemonies. The significance of this region is not so much in being a per-manent source of danger for “Western civilisation”, or simply in the naturalresources embedded in its soils, but in its implication on the nature andshape of global hegemony. The fixation on Eurasia on the side of the USemanates from the challenge to its declining global hegemony while thesearch for a Eurasian alliance on the other side springs from the attempt tochallenge further declining US hegemony. A complex geopolitical space isforged from this process as opponents become allies and new enemies areproduced – a space characterised by forces that push for integration,engagement, and cooperation and forces that push for exclusion, isolation,and containment. A study of the extent and variety of such divergent forcesat the heart of contemporary geopolitical space is beyond the scope of thisessay. I proposed the notion of hybrid geopolitics as a device to make senseof these forces as they take place in the competition for the Transcaspian inan attempt to move beyond accepted, traditional geopolitical conceptualisa-tions, constrained by seemingly universal and eternal truths about CentralAsia and the physical and metaphysical geography of Mackinder’s geopolitics.Geophysical realities do not form objective foundations for geopoliticalrealities and strategies, but it is rather that the dictates of geopolitical rivalryof competing hegemonies, which perceive one region or another as strate-gically significant, attach to that region geophysical facts, or exaggerate onesthat are already present, and produce its physical geography as an objectivefact. The absolute “grammar” of physical geography is not the basis ofgeopolitical rivalry, as traditional geopolitics would have it, but its necessaryproduct.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The author would like to thank three anonymous reviewers and RichardGrant for their critical remarks and suggestions.

NOTES

1. See S. Dalby, ‘American Security Discourse: The Persistence of Geopolitics’, Political GeographyQuarterly 9/2 (1990) pp. 171–188. For an extensive and historical treatment, see J. Agnew, Geopolitics:Re-Visioning World Politics (London: Routledge 2003). For more recent examination of Mackinder’sinfluence on US foreign policy, see N. Megoran and S. Sherapova, ‘Mackinder’s “Heartland”: A Help orHindrance in Understanding Central Asia’s International Relations?’, Central Asia and the Caucasus 4/34(2005) pp. 8–20; U. Khasanov, ‘On modern Geopolitical Pluralism or One-Nation Hegemonism’, CentralAsia and the Caucasus 4/34 (2005) pp. 29–36; C. Seiple, ‘Uzbekistan: Civil Society in the Heartland’,Orbis 49/2 (2005) pp. 245–259. There’s an interesting contradiction in Seiple’s account: Mackinder’s the-sis formed the foundation of US foreign policy in the Cold War, yet the US failed to recognise the


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“geostrategic” significance of Mackinder’s thesis until 2001 and has yet to recognise its “geopsychological”component in dealing with the Muslim nations of Central Asia. For an extended discussion, seeC. Seiple, ‘Revisiting the Geo-Political Thinking of Sir Halford John Mackinder: United States–Uzbekistanrelations, 1991–2005’ (PhD dissertation, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 2006). For a critiquefrom a different perspective, see N. Megoran, ‘Revisiting the “Pivot”: The Influence of Halford Mackinderon Analysis of Uzbekistan’s International Relations’, The Geographical Journal 170/4 (2004) pp. 347–358;‘The Politics of Using Mackinder’s Geopolitics: The Example of Uzbekistan’, Central Asia and the Caucasus4/34 (2005) pp. 89–102.

2. The domination of “Eurasia’s two principle spheres . . . remains a good definition of strategicdanger for America,” wrote Kissinger, “Cold War or no Cold War, for such a grouping would have thecapacity to outstrip America economically and, in the end, militarily”. H. Kissinger, Diplomacy(New York: Simon and Schuster 1994) p. 813 (emphasis added). See also Z. Brzezinski, The GrandChessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books 1997).Kissinger repeats almost verbatim Walter Rostow’s statement on US national security at the height of theCold War: “It is the American interest that no single power or group of powers hostile or potentially hos-tile to the United States dominate that area [Eurasia, including Africa and the Middle East] or a sufficientportion of it to threaten the United States or any coalition the United States can build and sustain”(quoted in Dalby (note 1) p. 178). Taking Mackinder to metaphysical proportions, Colin Gray arguedmore recently that no matter the “identity of the foe”, “it is a ‘timeless truth’ that great peril to the Westcan come only from Eurasia. The ‘grammar’ of world physical geography allows for no other assump-tion.” C. S. Gray, ‘In Defense of the Heartland: Sir Halford Mackinder and His Critics a Hundred YearsOn’, Comparative Strategy 23/1 (2004) pp. 9–25; quote from p. 21.

3. See the articles collected in the special issues of The Geographical Journal 170/4 (2004) andCentral Asia and the Caucasus 4/34 (2005). The collapse of the Soviet Union also unleashed a (paradoxical)interest in Anglo-American geopolitics in Russia, which was condemned during the Soviet era. In verybrief terms, Cold War containment and the expansion of NATO since the 1990s are explained in variousstrains of Russian geopolitical discourse as expressions of a permanent Western drive in accordance with“Anglo-Saxon” geopolitics to weaken Russia’s power over the Heartland, if not to establish Westerncontrol over it. See A. P. Tsygankov, ‘Mastering space in Eurasia: Russia’s Geopolitical Thinking after theSoviet Break-Up,’ Communist and Post-Communist Studies 36/1 (2003) pp. 101–127; E. G. Solovyev,‘Geopolitics in Russia – Science or Vocation?’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 37/1 (2004)pp. 85–96; M. Bassin and K. E. Aksenov, ‘Mackinder and the Heartland Theory in Post-Soviet Geopoliti-cal Discourse’, Geopolitics 11/1 (2006) pp. 99–118.

4. K. Dodds and J. D. Sidaway 2004, ‘Halford Mackinder and the “Geographical Pivot of History”: ACentennial Retrospective’, The Geographical Journal 170/4 (2004) pp. 292–297; J. Hyndman, ‘RevisitingMackinder 1904–2004’, The Geographical Journal 170/4 (2004) pp. 380–383. Dalby (note 1) provides aninteresting dialectic of the relation between explicit geopolitical discourse and US hegemony. He arguesthat despite the persistence of classical geopolitics, there is no direct reference to Mackinder or Spykman inUS security discourse in the post-war period, especially in relation to containment. This “silence” wassymptomatic of the implicit hegemonic position and “structuring role” that the discourse on containmentenjoyed during this period. Direct references to geopolitics appeared with the decline of US hegemony andwith it the policy of containment as a viable basis for US “security”. On this reading, the revival of geopol-itics in the post–Cold War era could be seen as evidence of the further decline of US hegemony, which isunderlined further by the resort to explicit imperialist and colonialist practices. On the simultaneous milita-risation of US foreign policy and the decline of its global economic hegemony, see S. Amin, The LiberalVirus: Permanent War and the Americanization of the World (New York: Monthly Review Press 2004); andJ. Agnew, Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power (Philadelphia: Temple University Press 2005).

5. See M. Walker, The Cold War: A History (New York: Henry Holt 1993); N. Smith, Endgame ofGlobalization (London: Routledge 2005).

6. In this respect, Spykman proved more relevant in arguing that the real prize in any rivalry inEurasia was the Rimland rather than the Heartland. The significance of Central Asia thus lay in its politi-cal geographical location rather than any intrinsic physical geographical value (e.g., natural resources orindustrial and agricultural potential), the control of which prevented Soviet expansion into the richerterritories of Europe and the Middle East. See L. Hekimoglu, ‘Whither “Heartland”? Central Asia, Geographyand Globalization’, Central Asia and the Caucasus 4/34 (2005) pp. 66–80.

7. N. Smith, American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization (Berkeley,CA: University of California Press 2003).



8. T. P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century(New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons 2004).

9. The Transcaspian region encompasses the former Soviet republics of Central Asia and theSouth Caucasus: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan; Armenia, Georgia,and Azerbaijan.

10. The literature on the Caspian in the post–Cold War period is vast. See M. P. Croissant andB. Aras (eds.), Oil and Geopolitics in the Caspian Sea Region (Westport, CT: Praeger 1999); M. P. Amineh,Towards the Control of Oil Resources in the Caspian Region (New York: St. Martin’s Press 2000);H. Amirahmadi (ed.), The Caspian Region at a Crossroad: Challenges of a New Frontier of Energy andDevelopment (New York: St. Martin’s Press 2000); R. E. Ebel and R. Menon (eds.), Energy and Conflict inCentral Asia and the Caucasus (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield 2000); R. H. Dekmejian and H. H. Simonian,Troubled Waters: The Geopolitics of the Caspian Region (London: I. B. Tauris 2001); M. T. Klare, ResourceWars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Metropolitan Books 2001); L. Kleveman, TheNew Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press 2003). S. L. O’Hara,‘Great Game or Grubby Game? The Struggle for Control of the Caspian’, Geopolitics 9/1 (2004) pp. 138–160;S. O’Lear, ‘Resources and Conflict in the Caspian Sea’, Geopolitics 9/1 (2004) pp. 161–186; A. N. Stulberg,‘Moving beyond the Great Game: The Geoeconomics of Russia’s Influence in the Caspian EnergyBonanza’, Geopolitics 10/1 (2005) pp. 1–25. Although they differ in interpretation and conclusion, allauthors emphasise, and often exaggerate the significance of Caspian hydrocarbon resources and putthem at the centre of the competition for geopolitical competition and conflict in the Caspian Basin.

11. See Dekmejian and Simonian (note 10); A. Rasizade, ‘The Mythology of Munificent CaspianBonanza and its Concomitant Pipeline Geopolitics’, Central Asian Survey 21/1 (2002) pp. 37–54.

12. BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy (London: BP p.l.c. 2007). The Energy InformationAdministration gives lower estimates of 30 billion bbl and 60 billion bbl for Kazakhstan and Russiarespectively.

13. See R. Ahrend and W. Tompson, ‘Caspian Oil in a Global Context’, Transition Studies Review14/1 (2007) pp. 163–187; B. Bauer, ‘Kazakhstan’s Economic Challenges: How to Manage the Oil Boom?’,Transition Studies Review 14/1 (2007) pp. 188–194.

14. See G. Smith, ‘The Masks of Proteus: Russia, Geopolitical Shift and the New Eurasianism’, Transac-tions of the Institute of British Geographers 24/4 (1999) pp. 481–494; T. Ambrosio, ‘From Balancer to Ally?Russo-American Relations in the Wake of 11 September’, Contemporary Security Policy 24/2 (2003) pp. 1–28;T. Bukkvoll, ‘Putin’s Strategic Partnership with the West: The Domestic Politics of Russian Foreign Policy’,Comparative Strategy 22/3 (2003) pp. 223–242; O. Gladkyy, ‘American Foreign Policy and U.S. Relations withRussia and China after 11 September’, World Affairs 166/1 (2003) pp. 3–23; D. Trenin, ‘Southern Watch:Russia’s Policy in Central Asia’, Journal of International Affairs 56/2 (2003) pp. 119–131; R. Allison, ‘StrategicReassertion in Russia’s Central Asia Policy’, International Affairs 80/2 (2004) pp. 277–293; R. Allison, ‘Region-alism, Regional Structures and Security Management in Central Asia’, International Affairs 80/3 (2004)pp. 463–483; P. K. Baev, ‘Assessing Russia’s Cards: Three Petty Games in Central Asia’, Cambridge Review ofInternational Affairs 17/2 (2004) pp. 269–283; A. M. Jaffe and R. Soligo, ‘Re-Evaluating US Strategic Prioritiesin the Caspian Region: Balancing Energy Resource Initiatives with Terrorism Containment’, ComparativeReview of International Affairs 17/2 (2004) pp. 255–268; S. N. McFarlane, ‘The United States and Regionalismin Central Asia’, International Affairs 80/3 (2004) pp. 447–461; J. Peroviy, ‘From Disengagement to ActiveEconomic Competition: Russia’s Return to the South Caucasus and Central Asia’, Demokratizatsiya: The Jour-nal of Post-Soviet Democratization 13/1 (2005) pp. 61–86.

15. Of the $90 million budgeted by US government agencies for assistance in Kazakhstan in 2002,$41.6 million were allocated for “security and law enforcement”, $13.7 million for “democracyprograms”, which include anything from the support of political parties, NGOs, to internet access,and $14 million for “market reforms.” In all other four Central Asian republics (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) military assistance exceeded assistance for market reform, democracyprogrammes, and other forms of assistance; only in Tajikistan did the budget for humanitarian assistanceexceed that of military assistance. See M. B. Olcott, ‘Taking Stock of Central Asia’, Journal of Interna-tional Affairs 56/2 (2003) pp. 3–17; see also Allison (note 14); A. Bohr, ‘Regionalism in Central Asia: NewGeopolitics, Old Regional Order’, International Affairs 80/3 (2004) pp. 485–502.

16. See L. J. Goldstein, ‘Making the Most of Central Asian Partnerships’, Joint Force Quarterly 31(Summer 2002) pp. 82–90; E. Ahrari, ‘The Strategic Future of Central Asia: A View from Washington’,Journal of International Affairs 56/2 (2003) pp. 157–166; S. E. Cornell, ‘The United States and CentralAsia: In the Steppes to Stay?’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17/2 (2004) pp. 239–254.


24 Mazen Labban

17. See J. Borawski, ‘Partnership for Peace and Beyond’, International Affairs 71/2 (1995)pp. 233–246.

18. M. B. Olcott, ‘Regional Cooperation in Central Asia and the South Caucasus’, in Ebel andMenon (note 10) pp. 123–144.

19. S. Blank, ‘American Grand Strategy and the Transcaspian Region’, World Affairs 163/2 (2000)pp. 65–79.

20. Some argue that Russia exerts such leverage through sizeable Russian and Russian-speakingpopulations in Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and especially Kazakhstan. This leverage is enhanced by thedefection of opposition and dissident elites to Moscow.

21. Russia threatened the Taliban with airstrikes on targets in Afghanistan should the Taliban lendsupport to the Islamic rebels in Chechenya or Central Asia. The US appealed to Russia not to attackAfghanistan, ironically two years after the Clinton administration had bombed “suspected terroristcamps” there in 1998, and shortly before the US mounted its own military campaign on Afghanistanunder Bush.

22. The Collective Security Treaty Organization is a “collective security system” based on the 1992Tashkent Collective Security Treaty, and including Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, in additionto Armenia and Belarus. (US-oriented) Uzbekistan and (neutral) Turkmenistan opted out of thesesecurity agreements, and the other Central Asian states remained doubtful of Russia’s ability to beeffective and impartial in its military intervention. Uzbekistan eventually joined in 2006. For Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, the main attraction in the Treaty was the potential sales of military equipment –for Moscow, this promised potential long-term military cooperation.

23. See D. Trenin, ‘A Farewell to the Great Game? Prospects for Russian-American SecurityCooperation in Central Asia’, European Security 12/3–4 (2003) pp. 21–35.

24. See H. J. Wiarda, ‘The Politics of European Enlargement: NATO, the EU, and the NewU.S.-European Relationship’, World Affairs 164/4 (2002) pp. 178–197.

25. See J. Kolko and G. Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy,1945–1954 (New York: Harper and Row 1972); D. Harvey, ‘The Geopolitics of Capitalism’ [1985], inSpaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography (New York: Routledge 2001) pp. 312–344; E. Mandel,The Meaning of the Second World War (London: Verso 1986). For a similar, though specificallyMackinder-inspired reading, see S. Sherapova, ‘Mackinder’s “Heartland” Theory and the Atlantic Commu-nity’, Central Asia and the Caucasus 4/34 (2005) pp. 103–116.

26. Historically, this term refers to the war of espionage between the Russian and British empiresin Central Asia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It has been used in recent years in referenceto the geopolitical competition that emerged in the Transcaspian region from the collapse of the SovietUnion. Some have expanded the “New Great Game” to include regional hegemons, in addition to the USand Russia, and the multiplicity of forces that reach beyond the region itself. (See R. Menon, ‘The NewGreat Game in Central Asia’, Survival 45/2 (2003) pp. 187–204). Others have argued that the real newgame is between the US and China, with Russia bound to play a secondary role in a Sino-Russian part-nership against the US while China will enjoy the longest lasting and broadest impact in Central Asia.(See S. Atal, ‘The New Great Game’, The National Interest 81 (2005) pp. 101–105; J. P. Pham, ‘Beijing’sGreat Game: Understanding Chinese Strategy in Central Eurasia’, American Foreign Policy Interests 28/1(2006) pp. 53–67). Finally, there are those who are critical of the applicability of the concept and theterm to the current geopolitical environment, since the Central Asian republics have become indepen-dent states that are part of the competition rather than mere “cipher states”. Moreover, cooperativerelations among the competitors coexist with, and undermine the competition, thus rendering the accu-racy of the concept even more problematic (see M. Edwards, ‘The New Great Game and the New GreatGamers: Disciples of Kipling and Mackinder’, Central Asian Survey 22/1 (2003) pp. 83–102; A. Sengupta,‘9/11 and Heartland Debate in Central Asia’, Central Asia and the Caucasus 4/34 (2005) pp. 8–20;I. Torbakov, ‘The West, Russia, and China in Central Asia: What Kind of Game is Being Played in theRegion?’, Transition Studies Review 14/1 (2007) pp. 152–162).

27. See G. Achcar, ‘The Strategic Triad: the United States, Russia and China’, New Left Review I/228(March/April 1998) pp. 91–126; D. Shambaugh, ‘China’s Military Views of the World’, InternationalSecurity 24/3 (2000) pp. 52–79; O. M. Lee, ‘The Impact of the U.S. War on Terrorism upon U.S.-ChinaRelations’, Journal of Chinese Political Science 7/1–2 (2002) pp. 71–123; G. McCormack, ‘RemilitarizingJapan’, New Left Review 29 (Sept./Oct. 2004) pp. 29–45.



28. A more recent joint statement on US unilateral interference and military posture came out ofMedvedev’s first visit to China, as the new Russian president. See E. Wong and A. Cowell, ‘Russia andChina Condemn U.S. Missile Shield Plan as Threat to Stability’, New York Times, (24 May 2008) p. A8.

29. See B. Lo, ‘The Long Sunset of Strategic Partnership: Russia’s Evolving China Policy’, Interna-tional Affairs 80/2 (2004) pp. 295–309. Indeed, Pham (note 26) traces China’s influence in Central Asiato the fourteenth century, through a mixture of commercial exchange, diplomatic ties, migration of HanChinese, and military force.

30. Olcott, ‘Taking Stock of Central Asia’ (note 15).31. S. Blank, ‘India’s Rising Profile in Central Asia’, Comparative Strategy 22/2 (2003) pp. 139–157.32. The direct Sino-Indian rivalry has its roots in the war of 1962, followed by stronger ties

between China and Pakistan, which pushed India closer to the Soviet Union. Although China has notconsidered India to be a serious strategic threat, the latter’s nuclear tests of 1998 changed Chineseperceptions of the military potentials of India. India perceives China’s military ties with Pakistan, Myanmar,and Bangladesh and other smaller countries on the periphery of India as part of a Chinese plan to encircleIndia, exacerbated by China’s development of its maritime capabilities and increased naval activities inthe Indian Ocean, especially since much of India’s trade is seaborne.

33. China’s military budget grew to around $59 billion in 2008, from approximately $50 billion in2007 and $42 billion in 2006. These are official figure that the Pentagon, chiefly concerned about USmilitary hegemony in Southeast Asia, speculates represent only half the amount of actual military spending.


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