la cour internationale de justice - …...case concerning sovereignty over pedra branca/pulau batu...

Team Code-16

IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

LA COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

PEACE PALACE, THE HAGUE

NETHERLANDS

________________________________________________________________

THE REPUBLIC OF NIMROTH (APPLICANT)

V.

THE STATE OF WINROTH (RESPONDENT)

LA RÉPUBLIQUE DE NIMROTH (DEMANDEUR)

V.

L'ÉTAT DE WINROTH (DEFENDEUR)

THE CASE CONCERNING THE DEMARCATION OF ELIN RIVER BOUNDARY AND

CORRESPONDING MARITIME BOUNDARY IN NIMROTH OCEAN

MEMORIAL FOR RESPONDENT ‘STATE OF WINROTH’ / MÉMORIAL POUR LE

DEFENDEUR ‘L'ÉTAT DE WINROTH’

THE 2013 VIPS INTERNATIONAL LAW MOOT COURT COMPETITION

ii MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT ‘THE STATE OF WINROTH’

ON SUBMISSION TO

THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT

THE STATE OF WINROTH

iii MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT ‘THE STATE OF WINROTH’

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES...........................................................................................................vi

TREATIES...................................................................................................................................vi

CONFERENCES AND DECLARATIONS..........................................................................................vi

UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS.......................................................vi

INTERNATIONAL CASES AND ARBITRAL DECISIONS..................................................................vii

ICJ AND PCIJ DECISIONS..............................................................................................vii

OTHER DECISIONS……………....................................................................................viii

MUNICIPAL CASES...................................................................................................................viii

BOOKS........................................................................................................................................ix

JOURNAL ARTICLES.....................................................................................................................x

MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS.................................................................................................xii

QUESTIONS PRESENTED BEFORE THE COURT......................................................................xiv

STATEMENT OF FACTS.............................................................................................................xv

SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS.......................................................................................................xvi

PLEADINGS.................................................................................................................................1

[I.] THE ELIN RIVER BOUNDARY BETWEEN NIMROTH AND WINROTH LIES ALONG THE

NAVIGABLE CHANNEL OF ELIN RIVER AS IT STOOD IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE 2002-

TSUNAMI.....................................................................................................................................1

[I.A.] The boundary will not be delimited according to the agreement concluded

between Acadia and Gundustan.................................................................................1

[I.A.1.] The agreement was terminated due to non-observance........................1

[I.A.2] The Respondent State was not a party to the agreement between

Acadia and Gundustan.......................................................................................2

[I.B.] The Respondent State established title on the river through acquisitive

principle.........................................................................................................................3

[I.B.1.] Possession was à titre de souverain......................................................3

[I.B.2] Possession has to be peaceful and uninterrupted..................................4

[I.B.3] Possession should persist for a reasonable period................................4

[I.C.] The Respondent State has acquired sovereign rights over the River

through customary usage.............................................................................................5

iv MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT ‘THE STATE OF WINROTH’

[I.C.1] Existence of State Practice.....................................................................5

[I.C.1.A] Uniformity and consistency of the practice............................5

[I.C.1.B] Generality of the practice........................................................6

[I.C.1.C] Duration of the practice...........................................................6

[I.C.2] Existence of opinio juris.........................................................................6

[I.D.] Principle of uti possidetis will not be applicable in the present dispute.........7

[I.D.1] Eastern bank of the river was not the boundary defined under colonial

rule.....................................................................................................................8

[I.E.] Demarcation of boundary will be according to thalweg principle.................8

[I.E.1] Elin River is a navigable river...............................................................8

[I.E.2] Preference has been given to thalweg principle under international

law......................................................................................................................9

[II.] THE FIRST BASE POINT (OF THE BASELINE) OF THE MARITIME BOUNDARY OF WINROTH

IS THE TERMINAL POINT OF THE NAVIGABLE CHANNEL OF THE RIVER MEETING THE

NIMROTH OCEAN.....................................................................................................................10

[II.A.] Boundary will follow the middle of the navigable channel of the

river............................................................................................................................10

[II.A.1.] Boundary will remain where it stood immediately before the 2002-

tsunami.............................................................................................................10

[II.A.2.] The boundary delimited as per the avulsion and thalweg principle is

in accordance with principle of equity.............................................................11

[II.B.] In Arguendo, absence of any clause regarding boundary change signifies

the intention to delimit the boundary as per the contemporary general

international law.........................................................................................................13

[III.] WINROTH HAS SOVEREIGNTY OVER BOTH ISLANDS AND THEREFORE NIMROTH IS

PROHIBITED FROM EXERCISING SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE MARITIME AREAS AND THE

ISLANDS ALREADY UNDER THE SOVEREIGNITY OF WINROTH................................................14

[III.A.] The Respondent State has had sovereignty over the Tokano Island since

independence...............................................................................................................14

[III.B.] The Respondent State has sovereignty over the contiguous newly-

emerging “X” Island..................................................................................................14

v MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT ‘THE STATE OF WINROTH’

[III.C.] The Applicant State is prohibited from exercising sovereignty over the

maritime areas already under the sovereignty of the Respondent State and the

islands belonging to it................................................................................................15

[III.C.1.]Acts of the Applicant State violates international conventions.........16

[III.C.2.]Acts of the Applicant State violates general principles of

international law……......................................................................................16

[III.C.3.] Acts of the Applicant state violates customary principle of

international law..............................................................................................16

[III.C.4.] Discovery is an obsolete means of acquiring territory...................17

[III.C.5.] Annexation is not a legal means of acquiring territory....................17

PRAYER FOR RELIEF...............................................................................................................19

vi MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT ‘THE STATE OF WINROTH’

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

TREATIES

1. North Atlantic Treaty (Treaty of Washington), August 24, 1949, 34 UNTS 243....................16

2. Security Treaty between the Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America

ANZUS Pact), April 29, 1952, 131 UNTS 83.........................................................................16

3. Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation And Mutual Assistance (Warsaw Pact), June 6, 1955, 219

UNTS 3....................................................................................................................................16

4. United Nations Convention on Laws of Seas, December. 10, 1982, 1983 U.N.T.S.

397.......................................................................................................................................14,15

5. Vienna Convention on The Law Of Treaties, January 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S.

33........................................................................................................................................2,3,17

CONFERENCES AND DECLARATIONS

1. 2 United Nations Conference on Succession of States In Respect Of State Property, Archives

and Debts, A/Conf.117/16 (1983)............................................................................................17

UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS

1. Charter of the Organization of American States, December 13, 1951,119 U.N.T.S. 3...........16

2. Charter of the United Nations, October 24, 1945, 3 Bevans 1153......................................18,20

3. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-

operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625

(XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625(XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970)..........................................................16

4. Definition of Aggression, GA Res. 3314 (XXIX), A/RES/3314(XXIX) (Dec. 14,

1974).........................................................................................................................................17

5. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, International

Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 56th

Session, Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10

(2001).......................................................................................................................................16

6. International Law Reports, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its

18th

session, UN Doc. A/6309/ Rev. 1, (July 19, 1966)...........................................................16

7. Statute of The International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.........................7

vii MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT ‘THE STATE OF WINROTH’

8. United Nations Security Council resolution 476, U.N. Doc. S/RES/476 (June 30,

1980).........................................................................................................................................17

9. United Nations Security Council resolution 478, U.N. Doc. S/RES/478 (Aug. 20,

1980).........................................................................................................................................17

INTERNATIONAL CASES AND ARBITRAL DECISIONS

-- ICJ AND PCIJ DECISIONS –

1. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), 1951 I.C.J. 117 (Jan.

18).........................................................................................................................................3,4,6

2. Asylum Case (Peru v. Columbia) 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20).....................................................5

3. Case Concerning Kasikilil/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia,), 1999 I.C.J. 1045 (Dec.

13)...........................................................................................................................3,7,8, 9,10,12

4. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua

v. United States), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27)......................................................................7,16, 17

5. Case concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South

Ledge (Malaysia v. Singapore), 2008 I.C.J. General List No. 130 (May

23).........................................................................................................................................3,4,7

6. Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 3 (Jan.

10).......................................................................................................................................6,8,13

7. Case Concerning the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway), 1933 P.C.I.J.

(ser. A/B) No. 53 (Sept. 5).........................................................................................................7

8. Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), 1962 I.C.J. 6 (June

15)...............................................................................................................................................4

9. Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 7 (Feb. 3)….............4,8

10. Tunisia Libya Continental Shelf case (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 18

(Feb. 24)..............................................................................................................................11,12

11. Continental Shelf case (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J 13 (June

3)............................................................................................................................................5,11

12. Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada

v. United States of America), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct 12)...........................................................12

13. Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), 2009 ICJ Rep.

213 (July 13).............................................................................................................................11

14. Frontier Dispute Case (Benin v. Niger), 2005 I.C.J. 90 (July 12).............................................8

viii MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT ‘THE STATE OF WINROTH’

15. Guyana v Suriname, Arbitral Award, ICGJ 370 (PCA 2007) (Sept. 17)...................................1

16. Land and Maritime Boundary Case (Cameroon v. Nigeria), 1999 I.C.J. 983 (June

30)...............................................................................................................................................1

17. Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras) 1990 I.C.J. 92 (Sept

13).............................................................................................................................................10

18. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,

Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9).............................................................................16

19. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 227 (July

8).................................................................................................................................................5

20. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal

Republic of Germany v. Netherlands), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).......................2,5,6,7,11, 12, 16

21. Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia) 2008 I.C.J. 34 (Dec. 18)..............3

22. Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea

(Nicaragua v. Honduras), 2007 I.C.J. 659 (Oct. 8)..................................................................14

23. The Corfu Channel case (United Kingdom v. Albania) 1949 I.C.J 244 (Apr. 9)....................15

-- OTHER DECISIONS –

1. Award regarding the Boundary between the Colony of British Guiana and the United States

of Venezuela, 28 R.I.A.A 331 (2007)......................................................................................4,7

2. Dubai-Sharjah Border Arbitration (Dubai v. Sharjah), 91 I.L.R 543 (1993)............................3

3. Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg v. Cie. Luxembourgeoise de T´el´ediffusion, 91 I.L.R.

281..............................................................................................................................................6

4. Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary (Rann of Kutch) between India and Pakistan (India v.

Pakistan), 17 R.I.A.A. 1 (1968)............................................................................................4, 11

5. Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States of America) (1928), 2 R.I.A.A. 829

(Apr. 4).................................................................................................................................4,7,8

6. The Chamizal Case (Mexico v. United States of America) 11 R.I.A.A. 309 (Int’l Boundary

Comm. 1911).................................................................................................................3,4,10,11

7. The Laguna del Desierto case (Argentina v. Chile), 113 ILR 1 (1994)....................................8

MUNICIPAL CASES

1. Arkansas v. Mississippi, 250 U.S. 39 (1919)........................................................................9,12

2. Arkansas v. Tennessee 246 U.S. 158 (1918)...............................................................8,10,11,13

ix MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT ‘THE STATE OF WINROTH’

3. Brewer-Elliot Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77 (1922)...........................................8

4. Georgia v. South Carolina 497 U.S. 376 (1990).................................................................10,12

5. Hanes v. Oklahoma, 973 P.2d. 330, (Okla. Crim. App. 1998)..................................................8

6. Kansas v. Missouri 322 US 213 (1943)...................................................................................11

7. Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 1 (1906)....................................................................8,10,12

8. Nebraska v. Iowa 143 US 359 (1892)......................................................................................11

9. New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361 (1934)..................................................................8,9,12

10. Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922)..................................................................................8

11. The Anna, 5 C Rob. 373 (1805)...............................................................................................10

12. United States v. Cress., 243 U.S. 316 (1917).............................................................................8

BOOKS

1. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE, PEACE (1905)...............................8,14,15

2. 1 OLIVIER CORTEN, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATISES: A COMMENTARY

(PIERRE KLEIN, eds., 2011)......................................................................................................1,2

3. 106 SIR HUMPHREY WALDOCK, GENERAL COURSE ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW:

COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1962)....................7

4. 3 DR. J.H.W VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, STATE TERRITORY

(1970).........................................................................................................................................6

5. 3(2) GIDEL, DELIMITATION OF INTERNAL WATERS (1934).......................................................14

6. 4 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE LAW OF NATURE AND OF NATIONS (1691)..........................17

7. 4 STEINBERGER HELMUT, SOVEREIGNTY: ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

(2000).......................................................................................................................................15

8. A.G. ROCHE, THE MINQUIERS AND ECREHOS CASE (1959)........................................................7

9. A.O. CUKWURAH, THE SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

(1967).......................................................................................................................................10

10. A.S WISDOM, THE LAW OF RIVERS AND WATERCOURSES (2nd

ed., 1975)............................8,10

11. CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1993)...................................2, 3

12. CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 21ST

CENTURY (2005).........................1

13. D. P. O’CONNELL, THE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON SEA POWER (1975).........................................14

14. D.J. ATTARD, EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987).............................7

15. E. LAUTERPACHT, S. SCHWEBEL ET AL., LEGAL OPINION GUATEMALA’S CLAIM ON BELIZE

(2001)......................................................................................................................................3,8

x MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT ‘THE STATE OF WINROTH’

16. FISCHER WILLIAMS, SOME ASPECTS OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1934).........................6

17. H. S. MCDOUGAL et al., STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1960).........................................6

18. H.W BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS (2nd

ed., 1952)..................................................................6

19. HANS KELSON, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1952)...................................................15

20. HUGH KINDRED, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED IN

CANADA, (PHILIP SAUNDERS eds., 7th

ed., 2006)........................................................................8

21. HUGO GROTIUS, MARE LIBERIUM, (1916)................................................................................17

22. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (7th

ed. 2008).................2,3,5,6,7

23. JAMES BROWN SCOTT, JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN STATES OF

AMERICAN UNION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CASES DECIDED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF UNITED

STATES (2002)..........................................................................................................................11

24. JAMES CABLE, GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY:1919-1991 (1994)........................................................15

25. KRZYSZTOF SKUBISZEWSKI, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES

(2007).......................................................................................................................................16

26. L. HENKIN, R. C. PUGH, et al, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (3rd

ed.,

1993).........................................................................................................................................16

27. LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATISES (1961).....................................................................2, 3

28. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW (6th

ed. 2008)............................1,5,6,7,10,11,14,15

29. MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL, et al., LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE

(1963).......................................................................................................................................17

30. OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW (SIR R. JENNINGS AND SIR A. WATTS, eds., 9th ed.

1996)........................................................................................................................................2,4

31. P.A. VERYKIOS, LA PRESCRIPTION EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1934)...........................7

32. R. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1963)......................7

33. S. MCCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES (2nd

ed., 2007)......................10

34. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, (1797).....................................................................................9

JOURNAL ARTICLES

1. Anthony D’Amato, The Concept of Special Custom in International Law, 63 Am.J.Int'l.L.

211 (1969)...............................................................................................................................5,6

2. C. M. Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 Am.J.Int'l.L., 721

(1995).........................................................................................................................................1

3. Chi Carmody, Of Substantial Interest: Third Parties Under Gatt, 18 Mich. J. Int'l L. 615

(1996)......................................................................................................................................2,3

xi MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT ‘THE STATE OF WINROTH’

4. D. H. N. Johnson, Acquisitive Prescription in International Law, 27 B.Y.I.L. 332

(1950)......................................................................................................................................3,7

5. E. Lauterpacht, River Boundaries: Legal Aspects of the Shatt-Al-Arab Frontier, 9 Int'l &

Comp. L.Q., 208, (1963)..........................................................................................................10

6. I.C. MacGibbon, Customary International Law And Acquiescence, 33 B.Y.I.L 115

(1957).........................................................................................................................................6

7. I.C. MacGibbon, Scope of Acquiescence in International Law, 31 B.Y.I.L. 143

(1954).........................................................................................................................................4

8. J. Fischer Williams, Sovereignty, Seisin, and the League, 3 B.Y.I.L. 24 (1926).......................7

9. J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 Am.J.Int'l.L. 760 (1986)..................................................1

10. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A theory of Customary International Law, 1 University

of Chicago Law Review 66, 1116 (1999)...................................................................................5

11. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study On Customary International Humanitarian Law: A

Contribution To The Understanding And Respect For The Rule Of Law In Armed Conflict, 87

International Review Of The Red Cross (March 2005).............................................................7

12. John W. Donaldson, Paradox of the Moving Boundary: Legal Heredity of River Accretion

and Avulsion, 4(2) Water Alternatives (2011)...........................................................10,11,13,15

13. Joseph J. Kalo, The Changing Face of the Shoreline: Public and Private Rights to the

Natural and Nourished Sand Beaches of Northern Carolina, 78 N.C. L. Rev.

(1870).......................................................................................................................................11

14. Joseph L. Sax, The Accretion/Avulsion Puzzle: Its Past Revealed, Its Future Proposed, 23

Tul. Envtl. L.J. 305 (2009).......................................................................................................10

15. Klara Kanska and Rafal Manko, Shifts in International Boundaries, 26 Polish Y.I.L. (2002-

03).........................................................................................................................10,11,13,14,15

16. L.J. Bouchez, The Fixing of Boundaries in International Boundary Rivers, 12 Int’l & Comp.

L.Q. (1963)....................................................................................................................8,9,10,12

17. Micheal Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International law, 47 (1) B.Y.I.L. 15

(1975).........................................................................................................................................5

18. Paul Lincoln Stoller, Protecting the White Continent: Is the Antarctic Protocol Mere Words

or Real Action, 12 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 335 (1995).........................................................2,3

19. Robert Rosenstock, The declaration of Principles of Internal Law concerning Friendly

Relations: A Survey, 65 Am.J.Int'l.L. 713 (1971)....................................................................16

xii MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT ‘THE STATE OF WINROTH’

20. S.A. Sinh, River boundary delimitation and the resolution of the Sir Creek dispute between

Pakistan and India, 34(2) Vt. L. Rev. 357 (2009)...................................................................10

21. Sang-Myon Rhee, Sea Boundary Delimitation Between States Before World War I, 76

Am.J.Int'l.L. 555 (1982).............................................................................................................9

22. SHI Jiuyong, Maritime Delimitation in the Jurisprudence of the International Court of

Justice, 9 (2) Chinese J.I.L 271 (2010)....................................................................................12

23. Sikander Shah, River Boundary Delimitation And The Resolution Of The Sir Creek Dispute

Between Pakistan And India, Vt. L. Rev. (2009)................................................................11,13

24. Sir Humphery Waldock, Disputed Sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies, 25

B.Y.I.L. 321 (1984)..................................................................................................................17

25. T. Buergenthal, Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaties in National and

International Law, 235 Recueil des cours (1992)......................................................................1

26. Y. Iwasawa, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the United States: A Critical

Analysis, 26 Va. J. Int'l. L.635 (1986)........................................................................................1

MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS

1. American Law Institute, Third US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (1987).................16

2. Dr. Daphné Richemond-Barak, The International Court of Justice on Kosovo: Missed

Opportunity or Dispute "Settlement”?, http://www.idc.ac.il/publications/files/540.pdf.........12

3. Miyoshi Masahiro, Sovereignty and International Law (2013),

https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/conferences/sos/masahiro_miyoshi_paper.pdf............15

4. Monthly Law Reporter, Rivers as International Boundaries (August 1857),

http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/mntylr20&div=11&g_sent=1&collecti

on=journals...............................................................................................................................11

5. Nugzar Dundua, Delimitation of maritime boundaries between adjacent States, United

Nations-The Nippon Foundation Fellow (2006-07),

http://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/

dundua_0607_georgia.pdf.......................................................................................................2,6

6. Peter Sullivan, David Bernhardt, et. al., The Canada-United States Boundary, International

Boundary Commission.............................................................................................................11

7. Rafael Nieto-Navia, International Peremptory Norms (jus cogens) and International

Humanitarian Law, http://www.iccnow.org/documents/WritingColombiaEng.pdf..................2

http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/mntylr20&div=11&g_sent=1&collection=journals


xiii MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT ‘THE STATE OF WINROTH’

QUESTIONS PRESENTED BEFORE THE COURT

The State Of Winroth respectfully submits the following issues for consideration before

this Hon’ble Court:

I. WHETHER THE ELIN RIVER BOUNDARY BETWEEN NIMROTH AND WINROTH LIES ALONG THE

NAVIGABLE CHANNEL OF ELIN RIVER AS IT STOOD IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE 2002-TSUNAMI.

II. WHETHER THE FIRST BASE POINT (OF THE BASELINE) OF THE MARITIME BOUNDARY OF

WINROTH IS THE TERMINAL POINT OF THE NAVIGABLE CHANNEL OF THE RIVER MEETING THE

NIMROTH OCEAN.

III. WHETHER WINROTH HAS SOVEREIGNTY OVER BOTH ISLANDS AND THEREFORE NIMROTH IS

PROHIBITED FROM EXERCISING SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE MARITIME AREAS AND THE ISLANDS

ALREADY UNDER THE SOVEREIGNITY OF WINROTH.

xiv MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT ‘THE STATE OF WINROTH’

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Republic of Nimroth (hereinafter, ‘Applicant State’) – It had been a colony of Acadia since

1600 AD. In 1964, it gained independence from the Acadian rule as a result of a long

bloodless freedom struggle and became the member of UN. Its economy is a prosperous

mixed economy.

2. State of Winroth (hereinafter, ‘Respondent State’) – It was ceded to Acadia by Raja of

Gundustan (hereinafter, ‘Gundustan’) in 1924 through an agreement. In 1964, it got

separated from Nimroth and joined UN. It is a small developing country.

3. The 1924 Agreement (hereinafter, ‘Agreement’) – According to the agreement the eastern

bank of the River Elin (hereinafter, ‘river’) was marked with a green ribbon (line) signifying

the boundary between Gundustan and Acadian Nimroth. The river is located in a seismic

zone.

4. Events of 1964 –The boundary between the two nations decided was the natural boundary

that separated Nimroth and Gundustan before 1924.

5. Negotiation in April 2002 – The old and unresolved territorial dispute and the understanding

pending demarcation of boundary was reconsidered. As per the understanding both nations

agreed to use the water without prejudice to the demarcation of boundary based on the

Agreement.

6. Tsunami in December 2002 –An unprecedented flood changed the river’s course to the East

of its original path swallowing 24 kms stretch of Winroth’s agricultural land.

7. Earthquake in November 2011 – The river branched out 19 kms in east, from its 2002-

position. Much of the arable land of Winroth was swallowed. The new tributary of almost

became the main channel leaving the old channel sand bed with few water courses. A new

island six nautical miles south of the Tokano, was also formed.

The present matter is dispute regarding the demarcation of the river and corresponding

maritime boundary in Nimroth Ocean.

8. Submission to the ICJ – On 4th October, 2013, both the nations submitted the dispute by

way of a special agreement to the ICJ.

xv MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT ‘THE STATE OF WINROTH’

SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS

[I] THE ELIN RIVER BOUNDARY BETWEEN NIMROTH AND WINROTH LIES ALONG THE


TSUNAMI.

The boundary between the Applicant and the Respondent state lies along the navigable

channel of Elin river as it stood immediately before the 2002-tsunami.

Firstly, the agreement between Acadia and Gindustan will lose its significance in the

present context as it has been terminated due to non-compliance and non-observance. The

agreement was never applied into practice by both the nations. Moreover, the Respondent

State was not a party to the Agreement and hence, it should not be bound by the

Agreement. The rights of the Respondent State thus, will not be affected by the

Agreement.

Secondly, the Respondent State has acquired sovereign rights over the river by using

the water since time immemorial. It has gained sovereignty over the river through both

acquisitive prescription and customary usage. The Applicant State did not question or

oppose the usage of river by it, which indicated its tacit consent in the acquisition of

rights by the Respondent State.

Thirdly, the Applicant and the Respondent State will not inherit the boundary

established by their colonial ruler that is the principle of uti possidetis will not be

applicable as there were no boundaries established during colonial rule, the only

boundary established was to facilitate the administration of the two nations.

Lastly, whenever a navigable river serves as boundary between two states the

boundary is to be delimited as per the thalweg principle. The thalweg principle states that

the middle of the navigable channel of the river will be the boundary between two

nations.

xvi MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT ‘THE STATE OF WINROTH’

[II] THE FIRST BASE POINT (OF THE BASELINE) OF THE MARITIME BOUNDARY OF

WINROTH IS THE TERMINAL POINT OF THE NAVIGABLE CHANNEL OF THE RIVER

MEETING THE NIMROTH OCEAN.

The boundary demarcation between the Applicant and the Respondent State will be

according to the thalweg principle and therefore will lie in the middle of the navigable

channel of the river. The boundary so delimited will be such that the first base point (of

the baseline) of the maritime boundary of the Respondent State is the terminal point of

the navigable channel of the river meeting the Nimroth Ocean.

Firstly, the principle of avulsion will be applicable in the present case. Avulsion

principle states that the in case of violent shifts in the course of river, the boundary

remains where it was. It means that the boundary lies in the older channel irrespective of

the fact that the older channel is now a dry bed with no or minimal water in it. Therefore,

in the present case when the river changed its course due to earthquake and tsunami the

boundary will remains at its earlier place which is the middle of the navigable channel of

the river.

Further, the demarcation of boundary between the Applicant and the Respondent

State as per the principles of avulsion and thalweg is in accordance with that of equity.

While delimiting boundary between two nations the social and economic factors must be

taken into consideration. Delimitation as per equity in the present dispute gives both the

nations the right to navigation and the right to use water on their side of the river. If the

eastern bank of river is agreed as the boundary, the Respondent State will suffer a great

loss. Already due to the earthquake and tsunami its agricultural land had been swallowed

by the river, its export is affected and territory is lost.

Finally, the Agreement which prescribes eastern bank as boundary between the

Applicant and the Respondent State did not contain any clause as to what would happen

to the boundary when the river might change its course, knowing that the river is situated

in a high seismic zone. This absence of any clause reveals the will of the parties to solve

the disputes according to the principles of thalweg and avulsion as they are the

contemporary general principles of international law.

xvii MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT ‘THE STATE OF WINROTH’

[III] WHETHER WINROTH HAS SOVEREIGNTY OVER BOTH ISLANDS AND THEREFORE

NIMROTH IS PROHIBITED FROM EXERCISING SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE MARITIME AREAS

AND THE ISLANDS ALREADY UNDER THE SOVEREIGNITY OF WINROTH.

Both of the islands, the Tokano Island and the “X” Island belong to the Respondent State

and it has complete sovereignty over them.

Tokano was subjected to the Respondent State’s sovereignty since independence and

it exercised the same on it. It lies six kilometres east of the mouth of the river, therefore

lies within the territorial sea of the Respondent State.

The newly emerged contiguous island “X” lies six nautical miles south of the Tokano

Island. The northern end of this new island lies in the territorial sea of the Respondent

State and the rest of the island falls in its contiguous zone. Therefore, the Respondent

State is entitled to exercise its particular jurisdiction over the new island.

In order to respect the territorial supremacy of the Respondent State, the Applicant

State is prohibited under international law from exercising its sovereignty over the new

island. The Applicant State tried to acquire the island through annexation which is not

considered a legal means to acquire territory. The acts of the Applicant State which

intended to claim sovereignty over the new “X” Island involves threat and use of force.

Therefore, the acts violates the conventions, general and customary principles of

international law.

1 MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT ‘THE STATE OF WINROTH’

PLEADINGS

[I.] THE ELIN RIVER BOUNDARY BETWEEN NIMROTH AND WINROTH LIES ALONG THE


TSUNAMI.

The boundary between the Applicant and the Respondent State will be according to the

thalweg principle. Notwithstanding the Agreement between Acadia and Gundustan, the

eastern bank will not be the boundary between the Applicant and the Respondent State

because the Agreement is terminated by non compliance. Moreover, the Respondent State has

acquired sovereign rights over the river.

[I.A.] The boundary will not be delimited according to the Agreement concluded

between Acadia and Gundustan.

Delimitation of boundary between the Applicant and the Respondent State will not be

decided according to the agreement between Acadia and Gundustan because the Agreement

has been terminated and the terms of the Agreement are not applicable to the Respondent

State as it was not a party to the Agreement.

[I.A.1.] The Agreement was terminated due to non-observance.

Agreements are terminated1 depending upon the existing circumstances.

2 On occasions, it

appears that a treaty has been terminated by a tacit agreement among the parties involved to

let the treaty lapse through non-observance3and non-compliance.

4 In other words, if one of

the parties fail to comply with the terms of the treaty; and the other one does not protest such

1 1 OLIVIER CORTEN, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATISES: A COMMENTARY 1023 (PIERRE

KLEIN, eds., 2011). 2 Y. Iwasawa, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the United States: A Critical Analysis, 26 Va. J. Int’l.

L. 635 (1986); J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 Am. J. Int’l. L. 760 (1986); T. Buergenthal, Self-Executing

and Non-Self-Executing Treaties in National and International Law, 235 Recueil des cours 303 (1992); C. M.

Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 Am. J. Int’l. L 721 (1995). 3 MALCOM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 94 (6

th ed., 2008); Land and Maritime Boundary Case (Cameroon v.

Nigeria), 1999 I.C.J 983 (June 30); Guyana v. Suriname, I.C.G.J 370 (PCA, 2007) ¶378 (September 17). 4 CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 21

ST CENTURY 116-117 (2005).


non-observance, it indicates towards a tacit agreement that they no longer wish to be bound

by the provisions of the instrument.5

It is submitted that the Agreement which delimited the boundary between Acadian Nimroth

and Gundustan was never applied into practice. Since, the Applicant and the Respondent

State constituted a single colony of Acadia, there was no boundary between both the states.

The administrative jurisdiction of the Applicant State ended on the western bank of the river

and that of the Respondent State started on the Eastern bank.6 Therefore, under the Acadian

rule no one had sovereignty over the river.

In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases,7 this honourable court clearly stated that:

“the number of ratifications and accessions so far secured is, though respectable,

hardly sufficient, especially in a context where practice outside the treaty was

contradictory.”8

Customary international law recognizes that a treaty becomes void if the parties cannot carry

out the obligations called for in it.9

The demarcation of boundary in 1964 will not be binding as the later conduct of both the

parties was not as per the delimitation concluded in the Agreement.

[I.A.2] The Respondent State was not a party to the Agreement between Acadia and

Gundustan.

The principle of pacta tertis nec nocent nec prosunt"10

is a generally accepted principle of

modern treaty law.11

Treaties bind “consenting and contracting parties only, and strangers to

5 OLIVIER CORTEN, supra note 1; Id.

6 Compromis ¶1.

7 North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany

v. Netherlands), (1969) I.C.J 3 (February 20). 8 Id., at ¶73.

9 Nugzar Dundua, Delimitation of maritime boundaries between adjacent States, United Nations-The Nippon

Foundation Fellow (2006-07),

http://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/dundua_0607_geor

gia.pdf ; Rafael Nieto-Navia, International Peremptory Norms (jus cogens) and International Humanitarian

Law, http://www.iccnow.org/documents/WritingColombiaEng.pdf. 10

Paul Lincoln Stoller, Protecting the White Continent: Is the Antarctic Protocol Mere Words or Real Action,

12 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 335, 358 (1995). 11

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 34, January 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (VCLT);

OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1260 (SIR R. JENNINGS AND SIR A. WATTS, eds., 9th ed., 1996)

(OPPENHEIM); Chi Carmody, Of Substantial Interest: Third Parties Under Gatt,18 Mich. J. Int'l L. 615, 620

(1996); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 622-624 (7th

ed., 2008); CHRISTINE

CHINKIN, THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 63(1993).


any treaty are legally unaffected by it”.12

This general principle that, a treaty does not create

either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent is also incorporated in Vienna

Convention on Law of Treatises, 1969.13

In the present matter the Respondent State was not a party to the treaty between Acadia and

Gundustan. Therefore, the treaty will not affect the rights of the Respondent State.

[I.B.] The Respondent State established title on the river through acquisitive

prescription.

It has been ruled by this Court on several occasions that title can be lost by long and

uninterrupted possession by another.14

An undisturbed, uninterrupted15

and unchallenged

possession/occupation16

has to be manifested. To acquire title by prescription, possession

must: first, be exercised à titre de souverain; secondly, be peaceful and uninterrupted; thirdly,

persist for a reasonable period.17

Here, all the essentials to acquire sovereignty are fulfilled,

hence, the sovereign rights over the river are acquired by the Respondent State.

[I.B.1.] Possession was à titre de souverain.

Acts à titre de souverain are acts performed as a function of state authority.18

Regulation of

fisheries, oil concessions, etc. contributes to sovereign acts.19

In the Island of Palmas case20

,

the case was decided in favor of Denmark owing to the administration of government

activities there. In the present matter Winorth used the river water for the purpose of

agriculture as well as for fishing. It received US $80 billion from the export of rice and fish.21

Therefore, clearly when the acts performed by the Respondent State contributed to its

national income, the acts were authorized by state and hence were à titre de souverain.

12

CHRISTINE CHINKIN, id, at 25; Paul Lincoln Stoller, supra note 10; LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATISES

309-310 (1961). 13

VCLT, art. 34. 14

Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), 1951 I.C.J. 117, 139 (January 18); Case

Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), 1999 I.C.J. 1045, 1105 (December 13); Case

Concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia v.

Singapore), 2008 I.C.J. General List No. 130, ¶274-7 (May 23) (Pedra Branca). 15

Dubai-Sharjah Border Arbitration (Dubai v. Sharjah), 91 I.L.R 543, ¶ 149, 620 (1993). 16

The Chamizal Case (Mexico v. U.S.A), 11 R.I.A.A. 309, 328 (1911); Territorial and Maritime Dispute

(Nicaragua v. Colombia) 2008 I.C.J 34, ¶84 (December 18). 17

Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island, supra note 14; D. H. N. Johnson, Acquisitive Prescription in

International Law, 27 B.Y.I.L. 332, 344-347 (1950) (Johnson). 18

Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island, supra note 14, at 1104. 19

E. LAUTERPACHT, S. SCHWEBEL et al., LEGAL OPINION GUATEMALA’S CLAIM ON BELIZE 60-61 (2001). 20

(1928) 2 R.I.A.A 829 (April 4). 21

Compromis ¶5.


[I.B.2] Possession has to be peaceful and uninterrupted.

Possession is considered peaceful when it is unchallenged by other states.22

A state must do

everything reasonable to protest against encroachment.23

Absence of protest may amount to

tacit acquiescence in a rival claim to sovereignty.24

In the present matter the usage of water

by the Respondent State was peaceful and uninterrupted. the Applicant State did not question

the usage. Therefore, it is submitted that absence of protest amounted to tacit acquiescence of

the Respondent State’s claim.

[I.B.3] Possession should persist for a reasonable period.

Possession must persist for a period such that there develops a “general conviction that the

present condition of things is in conformity with international order”.25

Various courts and

tribunals, including this Court, have held 64 years,26

60 years,27

50 years,28

31 years29

and

even 23 years30

to be reasonable periods. In the instant matter the Applicant State did not

object to the Respondent State’s act of using the river waters for 38 years continuing from

1964 to 2002. Its inaction and absence of protest for these many years thus, amount to tacit

acquiescence in possession of the Respondent State.

Therefore it is humbly pleaded that since the acts done by the Respondent State amount to

sovereign acts. The possession was peaceful and uninterrupted and for a reasonable period,

consequently the Respondent State has acquired sovereign rights over the river.

22

Island of Palmas Case (United States v. Netherlands), (1928) 2 R.I.A.A 829, 845 (April 4); Pedra Branca,

supra note 14, at ¶66. 23

The Chamizal Case, supra note 16. 24

Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary (Rann of Kutch) between India and Pakistan (India v. Pakistan) (1968), 17

R.I.A.A. 1, 75 (Runn of Kutch); Pedra Branca, supra note 14, ¶121; Case Concerning the Temple of Preah

Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), (1962) I.C.J. 6, 23(Jun 15) . 25

OPPENHEIM, supra note 11, at 707. 26

Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, supra note 14. 27

Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), (1994) I.C.J. 7, 82 (Separate Opinion of Judge

Ajibola) (February 3). 28

Award regarding the Boundary between the Colony of British Guiana and the United States of Venezuela, 28

R.I.A.A 331, 335 (2007) (British Guiana). 29

Libya/Chad Territorial Dispute, supra note 27, at 81. 30

I.C. MacGibbon, Scope of Acquiescence in International Law, 31 B.Y.I.L.143, 162 (1954) (MacGibbon).


[I.C.] The Respondent State has acquired sovereign rights over the river through

customary usage.

It is submitted that the Respondent State in addition to acquiring rights over the river through

acquisitive prescription has also acquired rights through customary usage. For constituting a

custom two basic elements need to be established.31

These are the material facts, that is, the

actual behaviour of states, and the psychological or subjective belief that such behaviour is

‘law’.32

[I.C.1] Existence of state practice.

The actual practice engaged in by states constitutes the initial factor33

to be brought into

account.34

There are a number of points to be considered concerning the nature of a particular

practice by states,35

including its consistency and uniformity, generality and duration36

upon

the circumstances of the case and the nature of the usage in question.37

[I.C.1.A.] Uniformity and consistency of the practice.

A customary rule must be ‘in accordance with a constant and uniform usage practiced by the

States in question’.38

In the North Sea Continental Shelf case39

the ICJ remarked that state

practice, ‘including that of states whose interests are specially affected’, had to be ‘both

extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked’.40

In the present

situation, the alleged state practice by the Respondent State is using the river water; the

Respondent State has ‘constantly and uniformly’ used the water over 38 years. The extensive

use can be discerned by the fact that the fishing from the river contributed to its GDP.

31

MALCOM N. SHAW, supra note 3, at 74; Continental Shelf case (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J

13, ¶27, 29-30 (June 3); North Sea Continental Shelf cases, supra note 7. 32

MALCOM N. SHAW, supra note 3.; Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta Continental Shelf Case, id., at 13, 29;

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, 1996 ICJ 227, 253; Jack L. Goldsmith &

Eric A. Posner, A theory of Customary International Law, 1 University of Chicago Law Review 66, 1116

(1999). 33

Anthony D’Amato, The Concept of Special Custom in International Law, 63 Am. J. Int'l L 211, 56 (1969). 34

MALCOM N. SHAW, supra note 3, at 76; North Sea Continental Shelf cases, supra note 7, at 3, 43. 35

Micheal Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International law, 47(1) B. Y.I.L. 15, 16 (1975); IAN BROWNLIE,

supra note 11, at 7. 36

IAN BROWNLIE, supra note 11, at 6. 37

MALCOM N. SHAW, supra note 3, at 76; Micheal Akehurst, supra note 35. 38

Asylum Case (Peru v. Columbia), 1950 I.C.J 226 (November 20). 39

1969 I.C.J. 3. 40

North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 7.


[I.C.1.B.] Generality of the practice.

Generality of the practice implies that there is absence of protest by states in face of a

practice followed by the other.41

Silence may denote either tacit agreement or simple lack of

interest in the issue.42

In the present situation there is an apparent silence and abstention of

protest by the Applicant State which evidences the generality of the alleged practice.

[I.C.1.C.] Duration of the practice.

In international law there is no rigid time element and it will depend upon the circumstances

of the case and the nature of the usage in question.43

Further, where generality and

consistency of practice are provided evidence for, no particular duration is required.44

The threshold that needs to be attained before proving a durable, consistent, uniform and

general state practice is met here. Therefore the acts of the Respondent State amounted to

state practice in view of customary practice.

[I.C.2] Existence of opinio juris.

The term is derived from the Latin phrase opinio juris sive necessitatis ("an opinion of law or

necessity").The opinio juris, or belief that a state activity is legally obligatory, is the factor

which turns the usage into a custom and renders it part of the rules of international law.45

Generally, states are seen to acquiesce46

in the behavior of other states if they do not protest

against them.47

The assumption runs as that such behavior is accepted as legitimate.48

In other

words where a state or states take action which they declare to be legal, the silence of other

states can be used as an expression of opinio juris or concurrence in the new legal rule.49

The

decision in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case50

may appear to suggest that where a state

acts contrary to an established customary rule and other states acquiesce in this, then that

41

IAN BROWNLIE, supra note 11, at 8; 3 DR. J.H.W VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL

PERSPECTIVES, STATE TERRITORY 37-41 (1970). 42

IAN BROWLIE, supra note 11. 43

MALCOM N. SHAW, supra note 3, at 76; North Sea Continental Shelf Case, supra note 7. 44

IAN BROWNLIE, supra note 11, at 7; Nugzar Dundua, supra note 9. 45

MALCOM N. SHAW, supra note 3, at 78; IAN BROWNLIE, supra note 11, at 8; FISCHER WILLIAMS, SOME

ASPECTS OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 312 (1934); H.W BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 93 (2nd

ed., 1952);

Anthony D’Amato, supra note 33. 46

Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 3, 459 (January 10). 47

Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg v. Cie. Luxembourgeoise de T´el´ediffusion, 91 ILR 281, 286. 48

Id. 49

I.C MacGibbon, Customary International Law and Acquiescence, 33 B.Y.I. L. 115, 131 (1957); H. S.

MCDOUGAL et al., STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 763 (1960). 50

Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, supra note 14.


state is to be treated as not bound by the original rule.51

In the present case as well, the fact

that the Respondent State carried out activities in the Elin River and the Applicant State did

not protest against this usage can be taken as establishment of opinio juris and establishment

of de facto boundary. 52

Further, when there is sufficiently dense practice, an opinio juris is contained within that

practice.53

Therefore, in the present case the fact that the activities conducted by the

Respondent State were itself consistent and uniform for a period of 38 years will also

establish opinio juris.

It is a norm of customary international law to gain sovereign rights over a territory,54

by

constant and “virtually uniform”55

state practice56

and widespread opinio juris.57

It is also a

general principle of law, prevalent in all legal systems,58

in the doctrines of adverse

possession,59

seisin,60

and uscapio.61

In the present case, as the state practice is continuous

and uniform and opinio juris can be clearly established, therefore, the Respondent State has

acquired rights through customary usage also.

[I.D.] Principle of uti possidetis will not be applicable in the present dispute.

In the present matter since the eastern bank of the river did not constitute the boundary

between the Applicant and the Respondent State, the principle of uti possidetis cannot be

applied to establish the Applicant State’s title over the river.

51

MALCOM N. SHAW, supra note 3, at 90; Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against

Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶78 (June27). 52

D.J ATTARD, EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 273 (1987). 53

106 SIR HUMPHREY WALDOCK, GENERAL COURSE ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: COLLECTED COURSES OF

THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (1962); Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on customary

international humanitarian law: A contribution to the understanding and respect for the rule of law in armed

conflict, 87 Int’L Review of the Red Cross 857( March 2005); IAN BROWNLIE, supra note 11, at 8. 54

Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island, supra note 14, at 1103; Palmas, supra note 22 , at 839, 846; Pedra

Branca, supra note 14, at ¶274-277. 55

North Sea Continental Shelf Case, supra note 7, at 43. 56

Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, supra note 51. 57

British Guiana, supra note 28; Case concerning the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway),

"Memorial of Denmark" (1933) Ser. C No. 52, 103. 58

Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(c) (I.C.J. Statute); P.A. VERYKIOS, LA PRESCRIPTION EN

DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 25 (1934). 59

R. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 (1963); A.G. ROCHE, THE

MINQUIERS AND ECREHOS CASE 35 (1959). 60

J. Fischer Williams, Sovereignty, Seisin, and the League, 3 B.Y.I.L. 24, 32 (1926). 61

Johnson, supra note 17, at 337.


[I.D.1] Eastern bank of the river was not the boundary defined under colonial rule.

Uti possidetis juris prescribes that borders of new states follow the administrative boundaries

of the antecedent colonial power.62

The administrative jurisdiction of the Applicant State

ended on the western bank of the river and that of the the Respondent State began with the

eastern bank of the river63

and hence, the Applicant State gained no sovereign rights over Elin

River by the principle of uti possidetis.

[I.E.] Demarcation of boundary will be according to thalweg principle.

Thalweg is a German word which means “the channel continuously used for navigation.”64

It

is a specified area and not a line.65

Under international law, thalweg is used to demarcate

navigable rivers66

including boundary rivers.67

In general, where there is a navigable channel

demarcating two states,68

the boundary will follow the middle line of that channel (the

thalweg principle).69

[I.E.1] Elin River is a navigable river.

For a river to satisfy the requirements of navigability it must “in its ordinary and natural

condition afford a channel for useful commerce”.70

For being able to provide such a channel

the tides in the river must “ebb and flow”.71

In the present matter, Elin River has been used

by the riparian population of both the states for the purpose of navigation and fishing.72

Thus,

it is evident that the river is navigable.

62

Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute, supra note 46, at 554, 565. 63

Compromis ¶1. 64

L.J. Bouchez, The Fixing of Boundaries in International Boundary Rivers, 12 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 789,

791,793 (1963). 65

L.J. Bouchez, id. 66

L.J. Bouchez, id; Brewer-Elliot Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 86 (1922); Oklahoma v. Texas,

258 U.S. 574, 586 (1922); United States v. Cress., 243 U.S. 316, 323 (1917); A.S WISDOM, THE LAW OF RIVERS

AND WATERCOURSES 57 (2nd

ed., 1975). 67

Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island, supra note 14, at 1062; Arkansas v. Tennessee 246 U.S. 158, 169–

70 (1918); New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 379 (1934); Arkansas v. Mississippi, 250 U.S. 39, 43 (1919);

Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 1, 50 (1906). 68

1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE, PEACE, 225 (1905). 69

Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island, supra note 14, at 1062; Frontier Dispute Case (Benin v.

Niger), 2005 I.C.J. 90, 149 (July 12); New Jersey v. Delaware, supra note 67; The Laguna del desierto case

(Argentina v. Chile), 113 ILR 1, 209 (1994). 70

Hanes v. Oklahoma, 973 P.2d 330, 334 (1998). 71

A.S. WISDOM, supra note 66. 72

Compromis ¶1.


[I.E.2] Preference has been given to of thalweg principle under international law.

Delimitation of boundaries between two nations by thalweg principle has been preferred

under international law,73

when states have no prior agreement on how to delineate the river

boundary. It aims at achieving fairness and equality.74

The primary interest protected under

the thalweg principle is the navigational freedom of riparian states.75

It is humbly contended that in the present matter the river is navigable and accordingly the

boundary should be delimited as per the thalweg principle. Further, the Respondent State has

been using river water since a long time; therefore, through customary usage and acquisitive

prescription it has acquired rights over it.

73

Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island, supra note 14. 74

Sang-Myon Rhee, Sea Boundary Delimitation Between States Before World War I, 76 Am. J. INT’L L. 555,

586 (1982); Bouchez, supra note 64, at 794. 75

Rhee, id., at 556; New Jersey v. Delaware, supra note 67; VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS ¶266(3) (1797).


[II.] THE FIRST BASE POINT (OF THE BASELINE) OF THE MARITIME BOUNDARY OF WINROTH

IS THE TERMINAL POINT OF THE NAVIGABLE CHANNEL OF THE RIVER MEETING THE

NIMROTH OCEAN.

The boundary between the Applicant and the Respondent State is the middle of the navigable

channel of Elin River. The boundary will remain the same even after the earthquakes and

tsunami, such that the first base point (of the baseline) of the maritime boundary of the

Respondent State is the terminal point of the navigable channel of the river meeting the

Nimroth Ocean.

[II.A.] Boundary will follow the middle of the navigable channel of the river.

The boundary between the Applicant and the Respondent State will remain the navigable

channel of the river even after the shifts encountered due to earthquake and tsunami. The

actions of avulsion are accepted principles of international law.76

They constitute "well

known principles of international law".77

Hence, the present matter should be decided on the

basis of existing general principles of avulsion.

[II.A.1.] Boundary will remain where it stood immediately before the 2002-tsunami.

In cases where the shifts in the course of river results because of violent shift, it has become

the general rule78

that the boundary stays at the same point along the original river bed.79

Avulsive changes, which are perceptible and manifest changes, 80

to a watercourse channel do

not move a river-based boundary.81

The international frontier remains in the original

channel,82

even if it no longer carries any water.83

The reason for such a proposition is that if

76

MALCOM N. SHAW, supra note 3; A.O. CUKWURAH, THE SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW (1967); S.A. Sinh, River boundary delimitation and the Resolution of the Sir Creek

dispute between Pakistan and India, 34(2) Vt. L. R, 357-413 (2009). 77

The Chamizal case, supra note 16. 78

John W. Donaldson, Paradox of the Moving Boundary: Legal Heredity of River Accretion and Avulsion, 4(2)

Water Alternatives (2011) (Donaldson). 79

Georgia v. South Carolin, 497 U.S. 376 (1990); Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v.

Honduras) 1990 I.C.J 92, 351, 546 (September 13). 80

Joseph L. Sax, The Accretion/Avulsion Puzzle: Its Past Revealed, Its Future Proposed, 23 Tul. Envtl. L.J, 305

(2009). 81

MALCOM N. SHAW, supra note 3, at 498; Donaldson, supra note 78; Klara Kanska and Rafal Manko, Shifts in

International Boundaries, 26 Polish Y.I.L (2002-03). 82

The Anna 5 C.Rob. 373 (1805); Arkansas v. Tennessee, supra note 67; Louisiana v. Mississippi, supra note

67; Georgia v. South Carolina, supra note 79, at 439; Chamizal case, supra note 16, at 782; E. Lauterpacht,

River Boundaries: Legal Aspects of the Shatt-Al-Arab Frontier, 9 ICLQ 208, 216 (1963); L. J. Bouchez, supra

note 64, at 789; S. MCCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES (2nd

ed., 2007); Case

Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island, supra note 14, at 1045.


a river changes its bed suddenly, the old channel is easily recognisable and can continue to

form the boundary, usually without causing major evidentiary problems.84

In 1911 Chamizal Arbitration,85

the court clearly stated that the two processes of accretion

and avulsion were universally recognized as correct where the boundaries between states or

nations are found in running water.86

Avulsion has no effect on the boundary, but leaves it in

the centre of the old channel,87

although no water may be flowing in it and irrespective of

subsequent changes to the new channel.88

It was held in the case of Nicaragua and Costa Rica,89

countries neither gain nor lose

territory when a river marking an international boundary changes its course due to avulsion.90

Therefore, in the present case, even if the river has abandoned the earlier bed, the boundary

will remain where it was i.e. the middle of the navigable channel and as it stood immediately

before the 2002-tsunami.

[II.A.2.] The boundary delimited as per the avulsion and thalweg principle is in

accordance with principle of equity.

Equity as a legal concept is a direct emanation of the idea of justice.91

Equity deals with

taking into account complex of circumstances, the consideration of which enriches justice.92

Moreover, while applying positive international law, a court may choose among several

83

Nebraska v. Iowa 143 U.S 359 (1892); Kansas v. Missouri 322 U.S 213 (1943); MALCOM N. SHAW, supra

note 3; Klara Kansa and Rafal Manko, supra note 81. 84

Klara Kansa and Rafal Manko; supra note 81. 85

The Chamizal case, supra note 16. 86

JAMES BROWN SCOTT, JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN STATES OF AMERICAN UNION:

AN ANALYSIS OF THE CASES DECIDED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF UNITED STATES 393 (2002); Peter Sullivan,

David Bernhardt, et. al., The Canada-United States Boundary, International Boundary Commission. 87

Nebraska v. Iowa, supra note 83; Joseph J. Kalo, The Changing Face of the Shoreline: Public and Private

Rights to the Natural and Nourished Sand Beaches of Northern Carolina, 78 N.C.L. Rev. (1870). 88

Arkansas v. Tennessee, supra note 67; Donaldson, supra note 78; Klara Kansa and Rafal Manko, supra note

81; Rann of Kutch, supra note 24. 89

(2009) I.C.J Rep. 213 (July 13). 90

Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) (2009) I.C.J. Rep. 213 (July

13); Donaldson, supra note 78; Sikander Shah, River Boundary Delimitation And The Resolution Of The Sir

Creek Dispute Between Pakistan And India, Vt. L. R. (2009); Monthly Law Reporter, Rivers as International

Boundaries (August 1857),


(August 30, 2013). 91

North Sea Continental Shelf Case, supra note 7; Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta Continental Shelf Case,

supra note 31; Donaldson, supra note 78; Klara Kansa and Rafal Manko, supra note 81. 92

Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf case (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) 1982 I.C.J 18, ¶24 (Separate

opinion of Judge Jimenez de Arechaga) (February 24); North Sea Continental Shelf Case, supra note 7, ¶88;

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta Continental Shelf case, supra note 31, at ¶45.


possible interpretations of the law, the one which appears, in light of the circumstances of the

case, to be closest to the requirements of justice.93

Delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles, 94

and

taking into account all the relevant circumstances.95

It has been observed by the Chamber that

economic and social factors should be taken into consideration.”96

The delimitation by

thalweg takes into consideration right of navigation by both the nations.97

It also preserves

the right to exercise jurisdiction on their side of the river.98

It is submitted that in the present case if the boundary between the Applicant and the

Respondent State is not delimited as per the thalweg and avulsion rule, the results would be

inequitable. The socio-economic condition of the Respondent State should be taken into

consideration while delimiting boundary. Ten percent of the population of the Respondent

State is living below the poverty line.99

The exports of the country consist primarily of

agricultural products, including fish and rice, and exports account for 60% of the GDP.100

Further, the Tsunami of 2002 swallowed 24 kilometers stretch of the Respondent State’s

agricultural land.101

The rice and fish exports were affected to the tune of US $80 billion.102

Taking into consideration all the facts it is pleaded that if the delimitation is not as per the

rules of avulsion and thalweg, the Respondent State will lose both its territory and the river

which will have detrimentally effects on its growth. The Respondent State will be deprived of

its agricultural land and at the same time it would substantially affect its economy being

significantly dependent on exports of rice and fish. Further, it was assessed that if the

interpretation given by the Applicant State was agreed to, the Respondent State would lose

around 263 sq. miles of the Exclusive Economic Zone as well as the Continental Shelf which

is rich in Hydrocarbons, to the Applicant State.103

Thus, it is submitted that considering the

93

Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf case, id., at ¶71; Dr. Daphné Richemond-Barak, The International Court of

Justice on Kosovo: Missed Opportunity or Dispute "Settlement"?,

http://www.idc.ac.il/publications/files/540.pdf. (August 30, 2013). 94

SHI Jiyong, Maritime Delimitation in the Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, 9(2) Chinese

J.I.L 271-291 (2010). 95

North Sea Continental Shelf Case, supra note 7, at ¶101; Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf case, supra note 92. 96

Case concerning delimitation of the maritime boundary in the gulf of Maine area (Canada v. United States of

America). 1984 I.C.J 246, ¶237 (October 12). 97

Arkansas v. Mississippi, supra note 67; Louisiana v. Mississippi, supra note 67. 98

Arkansas v. Tennessee, supra note 67; New Jersey v. Delaware, supra note 67. 99

Compromis ¶5. 100

Id. 101

Compromis ¶9. 102

Id. 103

Compromis ¶12.


socio-economic conditions of the Respondent State, the delimitation of boundary between the

nations as per the thalweg and the avulsion principle would be equitable and would be closest

to the requirement of justice.

[II.B.] In Arguando, absence of any clause regarding boundary change signifies the

intention to delimit the boundary as per the contemporary general international law.

Everything depends on the will of the parties in a given case and the questions which arise

are only issues of interpreting that will.104

In the present case, the river was situated in a high

magnitude seismic zone.105

Despite knowing this, there was no provision in the agreement

which stipulated for boundary delimitation, in case when the river would change its course.

Therefore, non-existence of any prior clause implies that the parties intended that the changes

would be governed by contemporary general international law. In the present context the

principle of thalweg and avulsion are the general principles of international law. According

to these principles the boundary will be the middle of the navigable channel of the Elin river

and will continue to remain same even the after the shifts encountered by the river due to

earthquake and tsunami in 2002 and 2011. Moreover, the delimitation of the boundary

according to these principles will be just as it would be in consonance with equity.106

Hence, it is humbly submitted that the boundary between the Applicant and the Respondent

State should be decided as per the avulsion and thalweg principles. Therefore, the boundary

will continue to be the middle of the navigable channel of the river as it stood before the

earthquake in 2002 such that the first base point (of the baseline) of the maritime boundary of

the Respondent State is the terminal point of the navigable channel of the river meeting the

Nimroth Ocean.

104

Klara Kanska and Rafal Manko, supra note 81; Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute, supra note 46. 105

Compromis ¶4. 106

Klara Kanska and Rafal Manko, supra note 81; Arkansas v. Tennessee, supra note 67; Sikander Shah, supra

note 90; Donaldson, supra note 78.


[III.] WINROTH HAS SOVEREIGNTY OVER BOTH ISLANDS AND THEREFORE NIMROTH IS


ISLANDS ALREADY UNDER THE SOVEREIGNITY OF WINROTH.

The Respondent State has had sovereignty over the Tokano Island since Independence and it

has sovereignty over the contiguous newly-emerging “X” Island as well. Hence, the

Applicant State is prohibited from exercising sovereignty over the maritime areas already

under the sovereignty of the Respondent State and the islands belonging to it.

[III.A.] The Respondent State has had sovereignty over the Tokano Island since

independence.

The sovereignty of a Coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters to an

adjacent belt of sea,107

described as the territorial sea108

. All states have the right to establish

the breadth of the territorial sea up to a 12 nautical miles from the baselines.109

A coastal state

enjoys sovereign rights over territorial sea and extensive jurisdictional control over it.110

Here, Tokano Island is located in the territorial sea of the Respondent State, six kilometers

east of the mouth of the river.111

The island lies within the territorial sea of the Respondent

State and hence it has complete sovereignty over the island.

The Respondent State had been continually exercising its sovereignty over the island. Its state

owned Petroleum Company called “Win petroleum” explored good quality oil reserves

around Tokano Island which produced oil at the rate of 4700 barrels a day.112

[III.B.] The Respondent State has sovereignty over the contiguous newly-emerging “X”

Island.

A coastal state may claim a contiguous zone up to 24 nautical miles from the baselines.113

The coastal State has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving

and managing the natural resources, and with regard to other activities for the economic

107

OPPENHEIM, supra note 68, at 600; 3(2) GIDEL, DELIMITATION OF INTERNAL WATERS 181 (1934); D. P.

O’CONNELL, THE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON SEA POWER 303 (1975). 108

UNCLOS, art. 2; Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea

(Nicaragua v. Honduras), 2007 ICJ 659, ¶234 (October 8). 109

UNCLOS, art. 3. 110

MALCOM N. SHAW, supra note 3. 111

Compromis ¶7. 112

Compromis ¶8. 113

UNCLOS, art. 33(2), MALCOM N. SHAW, supra note 3, at 580.


exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water,

currents and winds.114

Coastal states may exercise particular jurisdictional functions in the

contiguous zone.115

Here, the Island “X” is located six nautical miles south of Tokano Island.116

Its northern end

lies well within the Territorial Sea of the Respondent State.117

Consequently, the island is in

the contiguous zone118

of the Respondent State, hence, it has sovereignty over it. The

Respondent State, also notified in its official Gazette that the new island named “X” was part

of the territory of the Respondent State and all the laws of the Respondent State were

extended to the emerging island “X”.

[III.C.] The Applicant State is prohibited from exercising sovereignty over the maritime

areas already under the sovereignty of the Respondent State and the Islands belonging

to it.

Territorial sovereignty of a nation means supreme political authority, exclusive jurisdiction119

and supremacy120

over its own independent territory. It also implies that a state is obliged to

refrain from performing certain acts within that space which is the ‘territory’ of another

state.121

Here, Tokano Island and the “X” Island are the territory of the Respondent State.

The Applicant State’s act of sending its navy122

to guard the island and planting its flag123

is

an encroachment upon the Respondent State’s territorial supremacy. Moreover, these acts of

acquiring territory involves threat and use of force, and therefore are violative of convention,

customary principles and general principles of international law.

114

UNCLOS, art. 56. 115

MALCOM N. SHAW, supra note 3, at 554. 116

Compromis ¶13. 117

Id. 118

JAMES CABLE, GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY:1919-1991 14 (1994). 119

The Corfu Channel case (United Kingdom v. Albania) 1949 I.C.J 244, 35 (April 9); Miyoshi Masahiro,

Sovereignty and International Law (2013),

https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/conferences/sos/masahiro_miyoshi_paper.pdf. 120

4 STEINBERGER HELMUT, SOVEREIGNTY: ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 507 (2000). 121

HANS KELSON, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 151(1952). 122

OPPENHEIM, supra note 68, at 173, In the interest of territorial supremacy of the other state, a state is not

allowed to its troops, its men of war, and its police forces into or through foreign territory or to exercise an act

of administration on foreign territory without permission. 123

Compromis ¶14.


[III.C.1.] Acts of the Applicant State violates international conventions.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter declares that “all members shall refrain in their international

relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political

independence of any state.” The use of threat and force over some other nation’s territory has

been condemned under and outlawed by various conventions and treaties.124

[III.C.2.] Acts of the Applicant State violates general principle of international law.

The prohibition of use of threat and force is a general principle of law.125

Even further the

principle is recognized as jus cogens by ICJ126

and ILC.127

[III.C.3.] Acts of the Applicant State violates customary principle of international

law.

The principle of prohibition of use of force is regarded as a principle of customary

international law.128

The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly

Relations has been accepted with overwhelming majority,129

and thus it reflects state practice

and the required opinio juris for establishment of custom.130

Therefore, the principle of prohibition of threat and use of force to acquire someone else’s

territory is general principle of international law, customary principle of international law and

even further, it is established by several conventions. Hence, the the Applicant State’s act of

acquiring territory over the maritime areas and “X” Island belonging to the Respondent State

124

Article 1 of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1949 contains obligation of states from the Charter of the United

Nations to abstain in international relations from resorting to threats and use of force in any way not joinable

with the purposes of the United Nations; Warsaw Pact, 1955; Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

(OTASE/SEATO,1954); Pact on Security of USA, Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS Pact, 1951);Charter of

the Organization of American States (1948), in one of the principles, American states condemn offensive war

(Article 5, paragraph); The principle of prohibition to use force and threat has even more been worked out in the

Yugoslav Draft Declaration on the Rights and Obligations of States the text of which was revised at the

Conference for International Law held in Belgrade in 1951. 125

G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. Doc. A/RES/25/2625(XXV) (October 24, 1970). 126

Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (merits), supra note 51. 127

International Law Reports, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 18th

session UN

Doc A/6309/ Rev. 1 (May 4- July 19, 1966). 128

KRZYSZTOF SKUBISZEWSKI, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 745 (2007); L. HENKIN,

R. C. PUGH, et al, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 893 (3rd

ed., 1993); American Law Institute,

Third US Restatement of Foreign Relations Law 27 (1987). 129

Robert Rosenstock, The declaration of Principles of Internal Law concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey

65 Am. J. Int’l. L. 713 (1971). 130

North Sea Continental Shelf Case, supra note 7.


is violative of international law and thus, the Applicant State should abstain itself from doing

the same131

and should withdraw its navy from the island.132

[III.C.4.] Discovery is an obsolete means of acquiring territory.

Discovery as a source of acquiring title is contrary to state practices.133

It has failed to receive

the approval of reputed jurists like Hugo Grotius134

and Pufendorf135

and therefore is not in

relevant in contemporary general international law.

Therefore, the Applicant State cannot claim the “X” Island through discovery.

[III.C.5.] Annexation is not a legal means of acquiring territory.

Annexation of territory by force is prohibited under contemporary international law and is

also considered obsolete method of acquiring territories.136

In the 1970 Declaration on

Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations, it has continuously affirmed

that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible137

. The declaration lays down a

‘general prohibition on the threat or use of force’ and declares that the territorial acquisition

resulting from the threat or use of force shall be illegal.138

In Nicaragua v USA,139

the court held that the prohibition on the use of force is covered by

treaty law (that is the UN Charter), by customary international law and the prohibition was a

Jus Cogens norm. Therefore, the Applicant State cannot acquire territory of the Respondent

State through annexation which is an illegal means of acquiring territory.

Hence, it is humbly submitted that the both the islands, Tokano and “X” belongs to the

Respondent State by virtue of the fact that both of them falls within the territorial sea of the

Respondent State. In addition to this, the Applicant State’s act of acquiring the “X” Island

131

Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Act, International Law Commission,

U.N. GAOR, 56th

Session, Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, art. 35(2001). 132

Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory

Opinion, 2004 I.C.J 136 (July 9). 133

Sir Humphery Waldock, Disputed Sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies, 25 B. Y. I. L 321, 322-

23 (1984); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL, et al., LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 833-34

(1963). 134

HUGO GROTIUS, MARE LIBERIUM, 11 (1916). 135

4 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE LAW OF NATURE AND OF NATIONS 112 (1691). 136

United Nations Conference On Succession Of States In Respect Of State Property, Archives And Debts

A/C0nf.117/16 (1983). 137

S/RES/476 (30 June 1980) and S/RES/478 (20 August 1980). 138

Definition of Aggression, GA Res. 3314(XXIX), A/RES/3314(XXIX) (December 14, 1974), art. 5(3);

VCLT, art. 52. 139

1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).


involves use of threat and force and are thus violative of the international principles of law.

Consequently, the Applicant State is prohibited from doing the same and it should respect

the Respondent State’s territorial sovereignty.


PRAYER FOR RELIEF

For the foregoing reasons, THE STATE OF WINROTH, Respondent respectfully requests the

Court to adjudge and declare that:

I. THE ELIN RIVER BOUNDARY BETWEEN NIMROTH AND WINROTH LIES ALONG THE


TSUNAMI.

II. THE FIRST BASE POINT (OF THE BASELINE) OF THE MARITIME BOUNDARY OF WINROTH IS

THE TERMINAL POINT OF THE NAVIGABLE CHANNEL OF THE RIVER MEETING THE

NIMROTH OCEAN.

III. WINROTH HAS SOVEREIGNTY OVER BOTH ISLANDS AND THEREFORE NIMROTH IS


ISLANDS ALREADY UNDER THE SOVEREIGNITY OF WINROTH.

Respectfully Submitted:

Agents for The State Of Winroth

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