IAEAInternational Atomic Energy Agency

EPR-Public CommunicationsL-01

Case Studies

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Learning objectives

• Review past nuclear and radiological emergencies that have been of public and media interest.

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Chernobyl accident – Overview

• Unit 4 reactor on April 26th, 1986;

• Low power test with safety systems bypassed;

• Sudden uncontrollable power surge;

• Temperature increased;• Violent explosion and 1000

tonne lid blown off; • Fuel, core components and

other debris were released into the environment.

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Dose Range (Sv)

Number of Emergency Workers on-site Number of Deaths

0.8 - 2.1 41 02.2 – 4.1 50 14.2 – 6.4 22 7

6.5 – 16 21 20

Chernobyl – Dose ranges (workers)

• 134 of the 600 emergency workers showed signs of Acute Radiation Syndrome (ARS)

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Goiânia, Brazil (1987)

• Goiânia: the capital of Goiâs State, Brazil;

• Population: approximately 1 million;

• The emergency happened in a poor section of the city, in an old abandoned radiotherapy facility.

Goiânia

Rio deJaneiro

São Paulo

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Goiânia, Brazil (1987)

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Goiânia – Abandoned radiotherapy clinic

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Goiânia – Monitoring people for contamination

Established area for public monitoring;

Public found out through rumours - no public announcement made;

Many people (unnecessarily) – 112,000 went to be monitored;

Strained limit resources.

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Goiânia – City contaminated

0.5 km

Significant contamination

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Goiânia – City contaminated

• 730 workers; • Houses:

• 41 evacuated;• 6 demolished.

• Public places decontaminated: 58.

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Goiânia – Communicating with the public

• No early public announcements were made;• People found out about the emergency by

rumours;• This increased public concern and confusion

about what actions they should take.

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• On 3 November, Mr. Litvinenko was admitted to a north London general hospital with vomiting, diarrhoea and abdominal pain;

• His condition deteriorated and he was transferred to a specialist hospital in London;

• Mr. Litvinenko said to a broadcast interviewer: “I had defected from a foreign security service and I had been poisoned.”

London polonium incident

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London polonium incident

• Police requested the assistance of their scientific advisers and the HPA in identifying what could have caused the clinical picture.

• Mr. Litvinenko had a significant quantity of Po-210 in his body!

• HPA indicated that an intake in excess of 1 GBq of Po-210 would have been required to explain the clinical course.

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London polonium incident – Public health response strategy• HPA developed key objectives for the public health

response:• To prevent further exposure of the public:

• work closely with the police to aid their criminal investigation and identify sites and individuals that might be contaminated;

• develop an environmental monitoring strategy to support this;• assess and advise on public access and remediation of

contaminated sites.• To assess risks to those potentially exposed:

• develop and implement risk assessment criteria;• offer, implement and report on personal monitoring though urine

analysis.• To provide advice and reassurance to those exposed

and the general public.

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Polonium contamination

• More than 40 locations (hospitals, hotels, offices, restaurants, bars, transportation) were identified that had to be monitored and assessed;

• HPA co-ordinating the monitoring programme using resources from several organisations across the UK;

• At the peak there was 70 monitoring staff working in shifts.

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London polonium incident – Public health response 1

• On 25 November, HPA requested to the media asking members of the public who were in specific potentially contaminated locations in a specified period to call NHS Direct (a 24-hour National Health Service helpline);

• A questionnaire was used to assist the collection of key information from callers.

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London polonium incident – Public health response 2

NHS Direct : 3,837 calls

questionnaire

HPA follow-up : 1,844

Public Health TeamAssigned to each of the main locations and site specific risk assessments and questionnaires developed to identify those at risk and requiring monitoring using an alpha spectrometry technique on 24 hour urine samples.

Clinical Assessment TeamTriaged individuals identified from any source who reported symptoms which could be associated with radiation effects, or were seriously concerned.

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London polonium incident – Individual monitoring programme• HPA developed a monitoring technique and

protocols;• Urine samples from 752 persons:

• 139 individuals above reporting level;• The highest assessed dose was for the family

member caring for Mr. Litvinenko at about 100mSv.

• 664 individuals from 52 countries and territories were also monitored:• 13 individuals above reporting level.

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London polonium incident – Communicating with the public and media• HPA announced in the first press conference on 24

November:• Test on Mr. Litvinenko had detected a significant quantity

of Po-210;• The nature of alpha radiation and how Po-210 was only

a hazard it if was ingested inhaled or absorbed through wounds;

• The proactive monitoring that was being carried out at the locations identified by the police.

• HPA released press statements each day in the weeks as well as responding to thousands of media calls and ensuring the website was up-to-date with information.

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Biological effects

Acute and/or late Environmental effects Psychological effects Social problems

Economical

TEPCO’s Fukushima-Daiichi Accident

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“Internal Contamination Induces Brain Damage

- from Chernobyl Experience”

“20 years later in Japan,Malformation, Curious

Illness, Mental Retardation”

TEPCO’s Fukushima-Daiichi Accident

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“Many Experts”

People are confused?!What is good ?

“Information on Radiation Effects”based on their own ideas

What is wrong ?

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TEPCO’s Fukushima-Daiichi Accident