This article was downloaded by: [University of Western Ontario]On: 14 November 2014, At: 12:19Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

International Journal of EnvironmentalStudiesPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/genv20

Kuwait’s oil well fires, 1991:environmental crime and warAli Mohamed Al‐Damkhi a

a Department of Environmental Sciences, College of HealthSciences , Public Authority for Applied Education and Training(PAAET) , PO Box 9989, Salmiyah 22100, State of Kuwait E-mail:Published online: 02 Mar 2007.

To cite this article: Ali Mohamed Al‐Damkhi (2007) Kuwait’s oil well fires, 1991: environmentalcrime and war, International Journal of Environmental Studies, 64:1, 31-44, DOI:10.1080/00207230601125036

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00207230601125036

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoeveror howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to orarising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

International Journal of Environmental Studies,Vol. 64, No. 1, February 2007, 31–44

International Journal of Environmental StudiesISSN 0020-7233 print: ISSN 1029-0400 online © 2007 Taylor & Francis

http://www.tandf.co.uk/journalsDOI: 10.1080/00207230601125036

Kuwait’s oil well fires, 1991: environmental crime and war

ALI MOHAMED AL-DAMKHI

Department of Environmental Sciences, College of Health Sciences, Public Authority for Applied Education and Training (PAAET), PO Box 9989 Salmiyah 22100, State of Kuwait, Email:

aboanas58@hotmail.comTaylor and Francis LtdGENV_A_212435.sgm

(Received 3 November 2006)10.1080/00207230601125036International Journal of Environmental Studies0020-7233 (print)/1029-0400 (online)Original Article2007Taylor & Francis0000000002007AliAl-Damkhiaboanas58@hotmail.com

Increasing attention is being paid to the manipulation of environmental forces for hostile purposes.Some categories of this type of warfare, including the instigation of fires, have been practised inKuwait through the scorched earth tactic developed by Saddam Hussain. This paper examines theissue of the environmental crime idea behind the scorched earth tactic in Kuwait through the analysisof the intentions and evidence of sabotage and the description of the environmental and economicconsequences. As this analysis shows, Saddam had violated all the international environmental-related laws and treaties. It is recommended that a special court should be established and SaddamHussain should be tried in this court for his environmental crimes. It is also recommended that thereshould be more generally applicable environmental laws with international effect to deal with anysuch military acts which have environmental outcomes in the future.

Keywords: Kuwait; Oil well fires; Environmental crime; Gulf War

1. Introduction

1.1. Historical background

Increasing attention had been paid to the manipulation of environmental forces for hostilepurposes. Some categories of this type of warfare, including the instigation of fires have beenpractised since ancient times. An interesting example is that recorded around the 12th centuryBC when Samson is once having destroyed his enemies’ agricultural and horticultural fieldsby letting loose amongst them several hundred foxes whose tails had first been set afire [1].The use of the incendiary weapons during the First World War, although rather limited, gavethe world a hint of the massive incendiary warfare of the early 1960s [2].

Indeed, fire has been used extensively for military purposes in more recent times. The mostexaggerated military application for fire in recent times has been in the destruction of cities[3–6]. The incendiary destruction of crops, especially in counter-insurgency warfare, hasbeen practised on a small scale in modern times by the armed forces of a number of nations[7–10]. Intentional large-scale forest destruction by fire for military purposes, such as forarea denial or similar widespread harassment, seems to have been tried only rarely in modern

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

este

rn O

ntar

io]

at 1

2:20

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

32 A. M. Al-Damkhi

times [11–14]. The most noteworthy instances of rural incendiary attack because of theirpotential for ecological impact were three major attempts by the USA between 1965 and1967 to initiate massive forest fires over extensive Vietnamese-controlled areas. The totalarea of forests destroyed was almost 18,000 ha [15].

On the other hand, Westing [1] and Magnuson [16] mention a number of hostile modifica-tions of the atmosphere that had been suggested as military possibilities for the future. Inaddition to rainfall modification, these include various manipulations of the electrical proper-ties of the ionosphere or troposphere. The purpose of this form of attack would be to interferewith enemy radio, radar or other electromagnetic waves, thereby disrupting enemy communi-cation, remote sensing, navigation and missile guidance systems. During the Second Indoch-ina War, Hersh [17] reported the attempt of the USA to disrupt North Vietnamese radarsbeing used for aiming defensive surface-to-air missiles by introducing undisclosed chemicalagents into the troposphere. The layer of ozone that envelops the earth within the lowerstratosphere is considered to be necessary to shield the earth’s biota from harmful amounts ofultra-violet radiation. Sullivan [18] thinks it is perhaps already within military capability toopen a ‘window’ in this ozone layer over an enemy’s territory by injecting into it a brominecompound via controlled releases from an orbiting satellite.

Hostile manipulations of the land seem for the most part to be highly dependent for theirsuccess on local site factors [1,2]. For example, if an enemy region happens to be tectonicallyunstable it might become possible to trigger an earthquake there. Similarly, quiescent volca-noes situated in enemy territory could perhaps be stimulated into destructive activity. Somelocal landforms might well be amenable to disruption through the triggering of avalanches orlandslides. And for enemy tundra regions it might be feasible during the summer season todestroy the vegetational ground cover. This would result in a lowering of the level of thepermafrost which, in turn, would reduce the trafficability of the area and could result in addi-tional forms of military inconvenience.

All of the above-mentioned historical incidents and hostile manipulation of the environ-ment’s constituents show that fire is a relatively ordinary and constant destructive agentavailable to man. It should thus come as no surprise that through past ages fire has long beenused in warfare and continued to be aggressively manipulated, as evidenced during the Iraqiinvasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990.

1.2. The environmental catastrophe in Kuwait

As it became increasingly apparent that the US and Allied Forces would oust Iraqi forcesfrom Kuwait, the retreating Iraqis carried out the threat of the ‘scorched earth’ tactic devel-oped by Saddam Hussein on 21 February 1991 by setting the major oil fields in Kuwaitablaze at the same time [19]. Scorched earth was a policy adopted by Stalin as the SovietArmy fell back before the German invasion of Hitler’s Wehrmacht in 1941. Kuwait became amodern-day version of Dante’s Inferno as described by Schmickle [20], as midday turnedinto midnight in Kuwait City. Few who were in occupied Kuwait can forget the awfulpanorama when the retreating Iraqi troops set the Kuwait oil fields ablaze [21]. ‘It was likebeing on a different planet, like the surface of Mars’, as described by Cooper [22]. The terri-ble scene of blazing fires at the Kuwaiti giant Burgan oil field, which the author had neverseen before when he visited the area in July 1991, was truly the ‘National Park of Hell’ asdescribed by an US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) official [23].

The scorched earth tactic resulted in the following aspects of environmental catastrophe inKuwait:

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

este

rn O

ntar

io]

at 1

2:20

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

Kuwait’s oil well fires, 1991: environmental crime and war 33

● A total of 755 Kuwaiti oil wells sustained damage (608 of which were burning, 42 ofwhich were gushing, and 105 of which were damaged), while only 113 active wellsescaped damage and remained intact [24]. Table 1 shows the status of Kuwait’s oil wellsby field after being torched by Iraqi troops.

● About 156 million barrels of crude oil were released into the desert, with an average of 7.8barrels per m2, forming 399 oil lakes and covering a surface area of 49.31 km2. The largestoil lake was found at the southern part of the giant Burgan oil field, which had a total areaof 72 km2. The oil lakes in the northern fields formed, on some occasions, rivers of crudeoil that were up to 4 km long. These lakes varied from being relatively shallow to beingaround 3 m deep [25]. Thirty-nine oil lakes of the 399 contained an estimated 25 to 40million barrels of oil [26].

● An estimated 11 million barrels of oil were intentionally released by Iraqi soldiers to theArabian Gulf from January 1991 to May 1991 [27]. This is more than 20 times larger thanthe Exxon Valdez spill and twice as large as the previous world record [28]. On 25 Janu-ary 1991 Iraq began pumping Kuwaiti oil into the Arabian Gulf, creating an oil slick thatcovered thousands of square kilometres. According to the US Department of Defense[29], Iraq continued to dump oil into the Arabian Gulf until 27 January when Coalitionstrike aircraft interrupted the flow by destroying the main mixing manifold of the Kuwaitioil systems.

● Adjacent to the nearby Minagish and Umm-Gudair oil fields and along Kuwait’s southernborders, the Iraqi troops had constructed several obstructive defences consisting of firetrenches, called the ‘Saddam line’ by US troops, by releasing oil into low-lying areas. Thetrenches were roughly 1 km long, 3 m wide, and 3 m deep [19].

● Vast amounts of unexploded munitions and booby traps – left behind by the Coalitionbombing, the ground war, and the retreating Iraqi forces – were required to be removedand cleared from each new area where the firefighting teams planned to work. Minefieldsand unexploded munitions covered an area of more than 530 km2; and comprised about20,000 items of mines and munitions [19].

Table 1. The status of Kuwait’s oil wells by field after being torched by Iraqi troops and the ground war started (as on 7 November 1991) [24]

Oil fieldOn-fire wells

Gushing wells

Destructed wells

Total wells sabotaged Intact wells

Burgan 290 22 34 346 67

Magwa 97 7 20 124 16

Ahmadi 60 3 16 75 7

Rawdatain 63 2 5 70 3

Sabriya 38 4 9 51 2

Bahra 3 2 0 5 0

Ritga 0 0 0 0 8

Minagish 27 0 9 36 5

Umm Gudair 30 2 11 43 2

Abdaliyyah 0 0 0 0 0

Dharif 0 0 0 0 3

Khashman 0 0 1 1 0

Total 608 42 105 755 113

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

este

rn O

ntar

io]

at 1

2:20

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

34 A. M. Al-Damkhi

2. Ecological consequences of the environmental catastrophe

2.1. Air pollution and impacts on human health

The burning oil wells in Kuwait created a huge, widely dispersed smoke plume that degradedthe region’s air quality and released various potentially hazardous gases, including carbondioxide (CO2), carbon monoxide (CO), sulphur dioxide (SO2), hydrogen sulphide (H2S),nitrogen oxides (NOx), and particulate matter (soot) that potentially contained partiallyburned hydrocarbons and metals. If sufficiently concentrated, both gases and particulatematter potentially can damage health in exposed populations [26]. Carbon dioxide accountedfor over 83% and carbon monoxide was about 0.5% of the emission products. The Kuwait oilfires produced approximately 133, 0.8, and 8 million metric tones of carbon dioxide, carbonmonoxide, and elemental carbon (largely soot), respectively. Total carbon dioxide emissionwas about less than 2% of the global emission from the burning of fossil and biomass[30,31]. Sadiq and McCain [27] concluded that the effects of the burning oil wells in Kuwaitmay be significant on a regional scale; but their global effects including greenhouse warmingare likely to be insignificant, in contrast to the early ‘petroleum winter effects’ predictions.

Model calculations and data presented in the Gulf War aftermath showed that most of thesmoke plume remained suspended from 2 to 5 km above the ground, and it rarely touched theground [32]. Beneath the plume there was a severe reduction in daylight, and a day-timetemperature drop of ∼10°C within ∼200 km of the source. Episodic events of acid rain andphotochemical smog had occurred within ∼1000–2000 km of Kuwait [33]. Soot and smokedecreased solar radiation, ambient temperatures, and visibility during February throughSeptember 1991. The temperature decrease was in the range of 0.8 to 4°C. In actuality, thesmoke caused local temperatures in Kuwait to cool [27,28].

At the time of the catastrophe, the medical and environmental community feared exposureto the fires would result in catastrophic acute and chronic health effects. Nevertheless, thefires’ high combustion efficiency, the nature and amount of the smoke’s contaminants, thelofting effect created by solar heating, and the local wind and weather conditions combinedto reduce the fires’ impact on military and civilian populations [34].

In assessing health implications of the Gulf crisis, Sadiq and McCain [27] faced manyproblems, especially inadequacies in health statistics and technical limitations of availablescientific data. From a human health point of view, smoke, sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxide,and carcinogenic chemicals from Kuwait oil fires were most likely to cause harm. Smokefrom the Kuwait oil fires and burning of diesel fuel was not toxic; but, the health of individu-als repeatedly exposed to smoke episodes for prolonged periods could have been adverselyaffected [34]. Results of air monitoring studies indicated, except for particulate matter, thatair contaminants were below levels established to protect the health of the general popula-tion. On the other hand, there were self-reports by a number of veterans who complained ofacute symptoms they claim were a result of their proximity to the burning oil wells [35].

The degree to which a person is exposed to a contaminant mainly determines the long-termhealth effects that may result from that exposure. This assessment considers not only a pollut-ant’s concentration, but also the length of time a person is exposed. Fortunately, the timeperiod during which military and civilian populations were subjected to the fires’ pollutionwas relatively short. Nevertheless, some reports of various short-term adverse healthsymptoms did occur and may have been related to exposures to oil fire smoke [36]. SomeDesert Storm veterans have expressed concerns about health problems they partly attributedto their exposure to oil smoke. Some of these problems have involved an exacerbation of an

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

este

rn O

ntar

io]

at 1

2:20

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

Kuwait’s oil well fires, 1991: environmental crime and war 35

existing respiratory condition (e.g. asthma, bronchitis), and some have reported short-termsymptoms, including coughing, black mucous in nasal discharge, eye and throat irritation,and the onset of skin rashes and shortness of breath [34,35].

Under the more typical atmospheric conditions occurring during the war, the levels ofmost pollutants measured in the Gulf were below US ambient and occupational standards andmuch lower than those known or expected to cause short- or long-term health effects. Anexception was the levels of particulate matter, particularly in the respirable size range (i.e.less than 10 micrometres in diameter), which were sufficiently high to cause potentiallyshort-term adverse health effects. These high particulate matter levels have been associatedwith an allergic response in civilian populations; hospital studies indicate approximately 18%of Kuwait’s civilian population suffers from some respiratory complaint, mainly asthma,compared to roughly 6% in the US [36].

A second exception was the short-term, intense exposures to oil fire fall-out and debrissome military personnel experienced. While intense, these incidents generally were of shortduration and involved exposure to smoke, oil, soot (carbon particles), and other oil combus-tion by-products. Medical studies showed that some sensitive populations may experiencemild irritation from crude oil, particularly in contact with the eyes [37]. Furthermore, thevolatile organic compound fraction of crude oil is an inhalation hazard. In very high concen-trations these compounds may depress the central nervous system and lead to othersymptoms [38]. Available monitoring data, however, indicate levels were too low to result inadverse short-term health effects. The long-term health effects associated with these short-term exposures are less clear. Here also the literature evaluating this unique, short-term,intense exposure lacks information [27]. Clinical and anecdotal information available on acadre of firefighters whose exposures were more severe in frequency and duration indicatesthey had, on average, 10 years’ experience in fighting similar fires, did not use respiratoryprotection equipment, did not exhibit the symptoms Gulf War veterans commonly report, andhave not experienced any long-term health effects [39,40].

2.2. Impacts on marine environment

The Arabian Gulf’s ecosystem was not safe in the least during the Gulf War. With the esti-mated 11 million barrels of oil that were intentionally released to the Arabian Gulf, more than1280 km of Kuwait and Saudi Arabian beaches were oiled and marine wildlife was devas-tated [27]. Oiled birds revealed by the media, for example, on CNN, gave an accurate pictureof the occurrences in the Gulf. In fact, birds were the hardest hit of any group of organismsand thousands lost their lives. Along with the migratory birds, marine turtles were also indanger. Both the hawksbill and green turtles (already classified as endangered species) usethe offshore islands of the Gulf as nesting sites. After the National Commission for WildlifeConservation and Development (NCWCD) investigated the Gulf beaches, they determinedthat some turtles had died and that most green turtles in Karan Island, Saudi Arabia, hadlesions [27]. Other species affected by the oil spillage included leatherback and loggerheadturtles, dugongs, whales, dolphins, migratory birds like cormorants and flamingos, and seasnakes [41].

The fishing industry in the Gulf was deleteriously affected by the oil spillage into the Gulf,which was important because it is one of the most vibrant productive activities in the regionafter the production of oil. As an example of the vitality of this industry, Ali [41] indicatedthat, prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Gulf had yielded production of marine life ofup to 120,000 tons of fish a year; after the oil spillage, these numbers significantly dropped.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

este

rn O

ntar

io]

at 1

2:20

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

36 A. M. Al-Damkhi

In addition to this degradation to an economic activity, many people living on the Gulf coastdepend on fishing as purely a survival activity, and the oil spillage has disrupted the spawn-ing of shrimp and fish.

Some sources indicated that at least 80 ships were sunk during the Gulf War, many ofwhich carried oil and munitions. These ships, along with those submerged during the Iraq-Iran War, will remain, according to Sadiq and McCain [27], a chronic source of contamina-tion of the Arabian Gulf for many years.

2.3. Effects on soil, vegetation and wildlife

The first casualty of this environmental crime and war was the planet. The land was abusedgreatly from transportation of heavy artillery and movement of troops across the desert inaddition to the mass movement of the firefighting teams and the transportation of heavyequipment needed to extinguish the oil fires [42]. Outside of the desert soil, plant life wasalso destroyed in great numbers. About 15–25% of the desert vegetation was uprooted,trampled, and destroyed over the course of the war [43]. A huge area of the greenbeltssurrounding Wafra, Abdali and Sulaibiyah agricultural areas of Kuwait was destroyed. Morethan 60% of Wafra agricultural area was covered with black soot and oily mist.

Comparing the impacts of forest fires on the soil as mentioned by Westing [1], one couldconclude that the massive ground fire, resulting from burning oil lakes scattered in theKuwaiti desert, did a considerable amount of harm to its ecosystem by damaging the soil. Thelitter, which is the main protective layer of the soil, was severely reduced and damaged by oillakes fire and accordingly the soil becomes subject to increased erosion and associatedproblems. Additionally, as Kuwait is considered within the many regions throughout theworld where natural wildfires are an occasional occurrence, it is anticipated that fire hasresulted in varying amounts of ecological damage especially to plants which in turn would beharmful to animals indirectly via destruction of their food and cover.

Scientists have also attempted to draw attention to the potential effects of acid rain fromthe Kuwaiti oil fires. Kuwaiti crude contains 2.44% sulphur and 0.14% nitrogen, and it wasestimated that the daily sulphur dioxide and nitrous oxide emissions would be between 750and 10,000 tons per day, thereby causing excessive damage to agricultural production in theregion [41]. More than 50% of the oil lakes in Kuwait formed during the oil well fire periodwas recoverable, leaving a large volume of oil in the bottom of the lakes. According to Sadiqand McCain [27] soil contamination from the oil lakes was limited to less than 0.5 metres oftop soil or about 35 million cubic metres.

3. Discussion

3.1. The idea of the environmental crime in Kuwait

At the beginning of this discussion one should ask an important question: was SaddamHussain, the former Iraqi president, trying intentionally to create an ecological catastrophe inKuwait and in the region? If yes, is there any evidence that supports the environmental crimeidea? Accordingly, should Saddam be tried in an internationally specialized court for suchhostile actions and their subsequent consequences mentioned previously in sections 1.2 and2? And on what local or international environmental laws and conventions Kuwait can rely tosupport such a trial?

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

este

rn O

ntar

io]

at 1

2:20

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

Kuwait’s oil well fires, 1991: environmental crime and war 37

The sections following try to deal with some important issues concerning the intention andevidence for sabotage, the motivation behind the scorched earth tactic and the consequencesof such hostile actions from the environmental and economic point of view. Analysis of suchissues may give a clear vision of the environmental crime idea this paper is trying to show.

3.2. Intentions and evidences of sabotage

1) The intentions of Saddam’s regime to destroy and eliminate Kuwait’s entire oil infra-structure started practically three months prior to Kuwait’s invasion and came to light at theGeneva Meeting held 2–3 May 1990 and attended by the 13 members of the Organization ofPetroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The decision made at that meeting was to rebalancethe oil market after the OPEC reduction of 1.455 million barrels per day [44]. Kuwait, SaudiArabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) had to bear one million barrels or about 70% ofthe reduction, while Iraq’s contribution to the reduction was only 20 thousand barrels perday. Iraq’s policy on the sale price of oil, at that period, favoured moderate to high oil prices.This policy, which relied much more heavily on oil sales for income, contradicted Kuwait’spolicy which favoured relatively low prices of oil through its massive investment income.Thus, Iraq had a clear intention to hold up Kuwait’s oil production capability, and it seemedthat economic factors contributed heavily to its motives to invade Kuwait and destroy its oilindustry.

2) At the same time that Iraqi troops were building up their force, Saddam was threateningthat ‘if he had to be evicted from Kuwait by force, then Kuwait would be burned’ [27]. Aspromised, upon evacuation, Iraqi troops set fire to over 600 oil wells in several Kuwait oilfields.

3) Shortly after the invasion, as it became increasingly apparent to the Iraqi leadership thata military confrontation with the US and its Allied Forces was unavoidable, it developed ascorched-earth tactic to sabotage systematically the Kuwaiti oil wells which are the heart ofKuwait’s oil production system [29]. Several credible reasons were given to explain such amass sabotage carried out by the retreating Iraqi forces as detailed in section 3.3.

4) In mid-August 1990, intelligence information about Iraq’s intentions to target anddestroy Kuwait’s oil infrastructure came to light. Kuwaiti intelligence sources in the occu-pied territory reported that Iraqi oil experts and engineers had already begun mining Kuwait’swells with explosives in ways that might complicate extinguishing the fires and well-capping. Iraqi engineers and demolition experts were reported to be spending one full nightwiring the Burgan and the Minagish oil fields with explosives. These two fields provedparticularly significant targets as they ultimately comprised almost 50%, or 382, of the wellssabotaged. Simultaneously with the demolition effort, the Iraqi army was busy installing vastminefield barriers in and around the oil fields that would hinder the Allied approach [19].

5) In December 1990, before the Coalition air strikes began, it was indicated that Iraq’sforces practised their well destruction procedures and experimented with the effectiveness ofexplosives on six mock-ups in Iraq [29]. The Kuwaiti surveillance teams, supervising thestatus of the oil installations during the Iraqi occupation, documented in their daily reportsthe blowouts of about 27 oil wells in different oil fields which were selected and detonated byIraqi troops as a rehearsal of their well destruction procedures and a test of effectiveness ofthe explosives used. The 18–20 oil wells were set ablaze in the Giant Burgan oil field, sixwere in Minagish oil field and at least one was in Magwa oil field [19]. Table 2 shows the oil

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

este

rn O

ntar

io]

at 1

2:20

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

38 A. M. Al-Damkhi

wells targeted by Iraqi troops and identified by the Kuwaiti surveillance teams before thecommencement of the ground war.

6) The instructions included in the Iraqi documents showed undoubtedly that the sabotageoperations, which involved engineering, logistics, management, training, implementation,and operational safety were not a random last-minute attempt to destroy the oil wells, butwere in fact a cautiously supervised and deliberately planned endeavour to destroycompletely Kuwait’s oil infrastructure [45].

7) A review study in Kuwait carried out after liberation by Badolato and Dexter [45],revealed the huge amount of demolition materials used to sabotage Kuwait’s oil wells. Suchmaterials included tons of plastic explosives, thousands of both electric and non-electricblasting caps, kilometres of detonating cord and electric circuit wires in addition to safetyfuses and explosive boosters. The review study concluded that the distribution, movementand storage of demolition materials alone, regardless of thousands of personnel involved,required a major logistics effort. Indeed, that was an indication of the fact that Saddam’sregime went to great lengths to ensure the sabotage would be successful.

8) Iraqi documents, found in Kuwait after its liberation, revealed detailed instructions sentto Iraqi oil field engineers on how to place explosives [30]. Under these engineers’ supervi-sion, Iraq’s forces packed 30 to 40 pounds of plastic explosives on each well-head and thenplaced the detonation cords to allow simultaneous detonation of multiple wells. Additionally,to maximize any associated gas hazards, the sabotage procedure was designed to break well-head valves or the Christmas tree without igniting the crude oil. The Iraqi occupation troops,on the other hand, were also instructed to monitor the status of the well-head explosives andthe detonation cord to ensure that the sabotage would be successful.

9) According to the US Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) judgment [29], Saddam read-ied his forces to use chemical weapons, only to reverse himself late in the autumn (fall). Iraqiactivity between the invasion of Kuwait and the beginning of operation Desert Storm andtraces of chemical agent discovered by Coalition military personnel after the war indicateIraq initially moved chemical munitions to the Kuwaiti theatre after the invasion. Reportingindicates these stocks probably were maintained in special ammunition bunkers. Under Iraqidoctrine Baghdad would not have issued chemical munitions to combat units until immedi-ately before battle. The chemical weapons apparently were withdrawn from the theatre late in

Table 2. The oil wells targeted by Iraqi troops and identified by the Kuwaiti surveillance teams before the commencement of the ground war

Oil fieldNo. of oil

wells targeted Oil well no. Day targeted

Giant Burgan 2 BG-221 + BG-214 Thursday 24 January 19911 BG-293 Monday 28 January 19912 BG-381 + BG-386 Tuesday 5 February 19911 BG-326 Wednesday 6 February 19916 BG-152 + BG-61 + BG-73

BG-317 + BG-918 + BG-113Saturday 16 February 1991

Minagish 6a Unknown Monday 11 February 1991Magwa 1a Unknown Saturday 16 February 1991

aThe number was identified by eyewitnesses of the Kuwaiti surveillance teams.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

este

rn O

ntar

io]

at 1

2:20

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

Kuwait’s oil well fires, 1991: environmental crime and war 39

the fall. The CIA believed that Saddam decided to withdraw his chemical ordnance fromKuwait because he concluded the potential benefit of chemical warfare was outweighed bythe risk of revenge by the United States and others. It is noteworthy that chemical weaponsplayed a key role in Iraq’s offensives in 1988, and Iraqi attacks on Iranian cities with missilesterrified Iranian citizens already weary of the long, costly war between the two countries overcontrol of the Shatt-al-Arab (1980–1988).

3.3. Motivation behind the scorched earth tactic

1) The probable motive in destroying the Kuwaiti oil fields was to ensure that the US andthe Coalition recaptured nothing of value in Kuwait.

2) In addition to this scorched earth policy, Iraq’s Generals saw tactical value in ignitingthe oil wells as part of their response to a Coalition ground offensive. They hoped that thesmoke would slow down the operation of Coalition airforces and that the burning wellswould serve as obstacles to the movement of Coalition ground forces. After igniting a smallnumber of Kuwaiti oil wells immediately after the start of the Coalition air campaign, Iraqrefrained from further destruction and waited for the ground war.

3) Additional Kuwaiti oil wells were set ablaze in mid-February 1991. The CIA believedthis move was another effort to try to alleviate the impact of the air war. The Iraqi leadershipprobably hoped the smoke of the fires would cover up much of Kuwait and hold backCoalition air strikes against Iraqi forces. At some strategic facilities in central Iraq, smokegenerators were employed near installations to prevent a pilot from seeing and thereforetargeting the site [29]. By instigating such fire and destruction, the Iraqi leadership aimed togive their armed forces a weapon that had the capability of modifying the environment, eitherto their own advantage or to the disadvantage of the US and Coalition.

4) On 25 January 1991, Iraq began pumping Kuwaiti oil into the Arabian Gulf, creatingan oil slick that covered thousands of square kilometres. Iraq continued to release oil intothe Arabian Gulf until 27 January when Coalition strike aircraft interrupted the flow bydestroying the main mixing manifold of the Kuwaiti oil systems [29]. According to West-ing [1], such a release could be realized as a hostile modification of the Arabian Gulf tomanipulate its physical and chemical characteristics which may be meant to disrupt acous-tic (sonar) or electromagnetic properties of the attacked waters. Again the purpose for sucha release, in addition to others, would be the interference with and distraction of the USand Allied underwater communication, remote sensing, navigation and missile guidancesystem.

5) In time of war, with the employment of scattered anti-personnel mines and unexplodedmunitions around the oil wells and oil fields as discussed earlier, the task of firefighting, asthe Iraqi leadership hoped, became a very sophisticated and complicated mission and consid-erably delayed its operation [19].

6) The trenches which the Iraqis intended to ignite were constructed to obstruct the forwardmovement of the Allied Forces and readying the strategic forces at least initially. Accordingto the CIA reports [30], the Iraqi military leadership probably believed its unconventionalweapons (such as those trenches fire) could have a similarly strong impact in a war with theCoalition for Kuwait as they had had in the war with Iran. Although they had little impact onthe outcome of the war, these and other burning oil lakes eventually hindered the post-war

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

este

rn O

ntar

io]

at 1

2:20

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

40 A. M. Al-Damkhi

firefighting efforts as they were difficult to extinguish and made movement around the burn-ing wells even more dangerous [25].

7) The huge lakes of standing crude oil that had formed in some oil fields as a result of thepersistent well-head damage, and the subsequent release of free-gushing oil into thesurrounding areas, released large amounts of organic vapours into the atmosphere, whichcarried risks of ground-level fires and pollution of underground water. Most of those lakesmade portions of the land inaccessible which in turn hindered the firefighting operations [22].It was expected that oil decontamination would be slow and complete recovery of oil contam-inated soils may require many years or even decades [27].

3.4. Consequences of sabotage

1) The remedial work on Kuwait’s oil industry, including well control and capping, repairof gathering centres, and the reconstruction of refineries exceeded $5 billion [46]. It tookKuwait two years and more than $20 billions to restore its oil production [20]. Kuwait spentan estimated $1.5 billion on the firefighting effort alone [26]. Lost economic output for theperiod of occupation totalled about $10 billion [47]. Economic losses were also sustainedfrom damage to Kuwait’s ports, national airport, electricity-generating systems, petrochemi-cal and other industrial facilities, satellite system, telephone and telecommunicationsnetwork, media installations, and cultural sites. Conservative estimates of the total economiccost of the occupation to Kuwait are in the range of $30–50 billion [26,47].

2) During that period, various sources estimated the damaged well-heads released approxi-mately 4–6 million barrels of crude oil and 70–100 million cubic metres of natural gas perday [48,49]. Experts claimed that Kuwait had lost 3% of its total reserves after eight monthsof blazing fires [50]. Accordingly, in September 1995, Kuwait filed a $385 million claimagainst Iraq for environmental damage due to occupation of Kuwait [51]. The specific claimsmade to the United Nations were for damages to health, maritime environment, groundwaterresources and desert environment.

3) According to Bjornerstedt et al. [8], it is generally recognized in military circles todaythat the total destruction of any country is accomplished more expeditiously, less expen-sively, with higher casualties and with greater depression of enemy civilians by incendiaryattack (or instigating fire) than by any other conventional means. Such recognition is clearlyapplicable to the Kuwait case. It is notable that ‘fire and sword’ have constituted the policy ofconquest from ancient Roman times, however. The only difference is the forms of fire used,the extent of the damage, and its consequences.

4) The Kuwaiti government faced a very difficult situation when its members returnedhome from exile. They decided to act rapidly and vigorously in order to address that catastro-phe, which looked certain to cause serious environmental deterioration. The country wastotally devastated, and the people were deeply shocked by such a disaster, which led to adecline in oil industry activity, an income deficiency, and a lack of the fuel necessary to runelectric power plants, refineries, and water desalination plants [27,42].

5) During and immediately following these events, the author as an eyewitness of theIraqi invasion of Kuwait, noticed that people manifested a pattern of dissociative behaviourand anxiety symptoms and other reactions. A review of the empirical literature on psycho-logical reactions to trauma (as the case of Kuwait) suggests that this pattern of symptoms

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

este

rn O

ntar

io]

at 1

2:20

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

Kuwait’s oil well fires, 1991: environmental crime and war 41

has often been identified across different kinds of traumatic events and referred to as AcuteStress Disorder (ASD) [52]. According to Koopman [52], ASD is likely to constitute apsychological adaptation to a stressful event, limiting painful thoughts and feelings associ-ated with the event and allowing the person to function at least minimally. Those symp-toms, which lasted for the seven months of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait [21],unfortunately impaired, as the author noticed, the people’s quality of life and disrupted theirsocial and other functioning.

6) Kuwait is a signatory to many regional and international environmental-related conven-tions [53] which were violated by Saddam Hussain and the Iraqi leadership. The release ofmillions of barrels of crude oil into the Arabian Gulf is an explicit violation of the Interna-tional Convention of 1954 for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil which Kuwaitjoined on 19 November 1961. Regrettably by such release, Iraq even violated the KuwaitRegional Convention of 1978 for Co-Operation on the Protection of the Marine Environmentfrom Pollution in the Arabian Gulf which it signed on 24 January 1981. The 80 Iraqi shipswhich were sunk during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, many of which carried oil and muni-tions, represent another violation of the International Convention of 1972 on the Preventionof Marine Pollution by Dumping of Waste and other Matter which Kuwait joined on 1 March1973. The sabotage of Kuwait oil wells by the scorched earth tactic is a violation of the Inter-national Convention of 1969 on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage which becameeffective for Kuwait on 1 July 1981. Fortunately, as Kuwait signed the International Conven-tion of 1971 on the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund on 24 January 1981, thiswould facilitate any compensation claims Kuwait would file against Iraq. Finally, by a 3%loss of Kuwait oil reserves, Iraq proved again the violation of the basic fundamental laws ofthe International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources of 1978, whichKuwait signed on 24 February 1986.

7) To address this disaster and its consequences worldwide, Al-Sukkari [54] encouragedthe efforts to establish the first environmental court in the Mediterranean Basin in May1992 and the suggestion of the Japanese Lawyers Association for establishing an interna-tional court specialized to deal with the environmental issues. The Japanese suggestion,which was a discussion of concern in the Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil inJuly 1992, needs to be followed-up by the concerned environmental community world-wide.

4. Conclusion

The environmental and economic adversity imposed on Kuwait, and to the Gulf Region ingeneral, both during and after the scorched earth tactic, will be sustained for many years tocome. The destruction caused by the oil fires and the oil spills, was devastating, and at timeswas fatal. Not only did human beings suffer the health and psychological consequences of thesabotage, but the ecosystem and the atmosphere were also victims. Saddam Hussain violatedall the international laws and treaties concerning the environment.

It is evident that the outcome of environmental manipulations for hostile purposes (as inthe case of Kuwait) is likely to be unpredictable in magnitude, spatial confinement, sideeffects and duration. Thus, the intended effects of such military activities cannot be broughtto bear on an enemy without the likelihood of an even greater effect on the regional civilpopulace, to say nothing of the impact on the regional ecology.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

este

rn O

ntar

io]

at 1

2:20

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

42 A. M. Al-Damkhi

Thus, in order to counteract such aggressive manipulation of the environment in the futurefor any military purposes, this paper makes the following recommendations:

1) An international environmental court should be establishment to deal with any environ-mental manipulation for hostile purposes, and any violation of the international laws andtreaties concerned with the environment. Unfortunately, this is necessary because manycountries nowadays can bring about similar adverse consequences through military use ofenvironmental resources.

2) Saddam, because he issued the sabotage orders, should be tried for the environmentalconsequences on the local, regional and the international levels. Moreover, all Iraqi person-nel, both civilian and military, who were responsible for the environmental crimes committedin Kuwait during the invasion of Kuwait should be tried as the agents and or accessories ofSaddam.

3) There is an urgent need to revise all the existing environmental treaties worldwide thatare concerned with reducing environmental damage and or environmental offences or crimes.

4) Environmental law as a discipline should have a criminal law content as well as a civillaw content. This would allow the possibility of, for example, indicting Israel which duringits attack on Lebanon in 2006 created huge oil spills in the Mediterranean.

References

[1] Westing, A.H., 1977, Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Environment (London: Taylor & Francis Ltd).[2] SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), 1975, Incendiary Weapons (Stockholm: Almqvist

& Wiksell).[3] Caidin, M., 1960, The Night Hamburg Died (New York: Ballantine).[4] Bond, H. (Ed.), 1946, Fire and the Air War (Boston, MA: National Fire Protection Association International).[5] Craven, W.F. and Cate, J.L. (Eds), 1953, The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945, Vol.

V in Army Air Forces in World War II (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press).[6] Futrell, R.F., Mosely, L.S. and Simpson, A.F., 1961, United States Air Force in Korea 1950–1953 (New York:

Duell, Sloan & Pearce).[7] Kutger, J.P., 1960–1961, Irregular warfare in transition. Military Affairs, 24, 113–123.[8] Bjornerstedt, R. et al., 1973, Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use

(New York: United Nations).[9] Howard, J.D., 1972, Herbicides in support of counterinsurgency operations: a cost-effectiveness study. MS

thesis, US Naval Postgrad School.[10] US Department of the Army, 1967–1970, Counterguerrilla Operations, US Dept. Army Field Manual No. 31-

16, 164.[11] Fujita, N. and Harrington, J.D., 1961, I bombed the U.S.A. US Naval Inst. Proc., 87(6), 64–69.[12] Time, 1968, Shrinking sanctuary, 91(17), 28.[13] Perry, T.O., 1968, Vietnam: truths of defoliation. Science, 160(3828), 601.[14] McConnell, A.F., 1969–1970. Mission: ranch hand. Air Univ. Rev. 21(2), 89–94.[15] Shapley, D., 1972, Technology in Vietnam: fire storm project fizzled out. Science, 177(4045), 239–241.[16] Magnuson, W.G. (Ed.), 1966, Weather Modification (Washington, DC: US Senate Committee on Commerce).[17] Hersh, S.M., 1972, Rainmaking is used as weapons by U.S. New York Times, 3 July, pp. 1–2; 4 July, p. 3; 9

July, p. E3.[18] Sullivan, W., 1975, Ozone depletion seen as a war tool. New York Times, 28 February, p. 20.[19] Al-Damkhi, A., 2005, For the History: The Catastrophe of Destruction and the Miracle of Reconstruction in

Kuwait’s Oil Sector (Canada: CRM Publisher).[20] Schmickle, S., 2003, Scientists and soldiers planning to save oil fields. Available online at: http://

www.startribune.com/stories/303/3756861.html (accessed 23 July 2006).[21] Al-Damkhi, A., 1992, Invasion: Saddam Hussain’s Reign of Terror in Kuwait (London: Kuwait Research and

Advertising Co. Ltd).[22] Cooper, C., 2003, A burning issue about Iraq: will Hussein set oil ablaze?, The Wall Street Journal, 27 January.

Available online at: http://www.alba.net//content/WSJ%20Iraq.1046713180 (accessed 23 March 2006).

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

este

rn O

ntar

io]

at 1

2:20

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

Kuwait’s oil well fires, 1991: environmental crime and war 43

[23] Popkin, R., 1991, Responding to eco-terrorism. EPA Journal, July/August. Available online at: http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/foreign/03.htm (accessed 23 July 2006).

[24] Bechtel, 1991, Status of Kuwait’s oil wells at the end of firefighting operations. Report No. WBC-405/21206,last updated 7 November 1991 and issued by the consultant and the technical partner of Kuwait Oil Company(KOC), Kuwait, Ahmadi.

[25] Al-Beshara, J.M., 1991, The Kuwait oil fires and oil lakes: facts and numbers, in: A.K. Al-Shatti and J.M.Harrington (Eds) The Environmental and Health Impact of the Kuwait Oil Fires. Proceedings of an Interna-tional Symposium held at the University of Birmingham, UK.

[26] Husain, T., 1995, Kuwaiti Oil Fires: Regional Environmental Perspectives, 1st edn (Oxford: BPC Wheatons).[27] Sadiq, M. and McCain, J.C., 1993, The Gulf War Aftermath: An Environmental Tragedy (Boston, MA: Kluwer

Academic).[28] Zimmer, C., 1992, Ecowar, Discover, January, 37–39.[29] US Department of Defense, 2000, Oil well fires: environmental exposure report – fighting the oil well fires –

Tab C. Report No. 2000160-0000026 Ver. 2.0, last updated 2 August 2000. Available online at: http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/owf_ii/owf_ii_tabc.htm (accessed 25 February 2006).

[30] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 1991, Damage assessment – Kuwait oil. Intelligence Information Report.Available online at: http://www.gulflink.osd.mil. (accessed 23 May 2006).

[31] USEPA, 1991, Kuwait Oil Fires: Interagency Interim Report (Washington, DC: US Environmental ProtectionAgency).

[32] Bakan, S. et al., 1991, Climate response to smoke from the burning oil wells in Kuwait. Nature, 351(6325),367–371.

[33] Browning, K.A. et al., 1991, Environmental effects from burning oil wells in Kuwait. Nature, 351(6325),363–367.

[34] USAEHA, 1991, Interim: Kuwait Oil Fire Health Risk Assessment, No. 39-26-L192-91, US Army Environ-mental Hygiene Agency.

[35] US Army Central Command, 1991, Kuwait oil fire gas and smoke hazards. A message by TacticalOperations Center Logs, Luck Tac Journals. Available online at: http://www.gulflink.osd.mil (accessed 22May 2006).

[36] Ayers, J.G., 1991, Potential respiratory effects of the Kuwaiti oil fires on the population of Kuwait, in: A.K.Al-Shatti and J.M. Harrington (Eds) The Environmental and Health Impact of the Kuwait Oil Fires. Proceed-ings of an International Symposium held at the University of Birmingham, UK.

[37] Draxler, R.R., McQueen, J. T. and Stunder, B.J., 1994, An evaluation of air pollutant exposures due to the1991 Kuwait oil fires. Atmospheric Environment, 28(13), 2197–2210.

[38] Etzel, R.A. and Ashley, D.L., 1994, Volatile organic compounds in the blood of persons in Kuwait duringthe oil fires. International Archives of Occupational and Environmental Health, 66(2), 125–129.

[39] Bizovi, K.E. and Leikin, J.D., 1995, Smoke inhalation among firefighters. Occupational Medicine: State of theArt Reviews, 10(4), 721–733.

[40] Scannell, C.H. and Balmes, J.R., 1995, Pulmonary effects of firefighting. Occupational Medicine: State of theArt Reviews, 10(4), 789–801.

[41] Ali, J., 1994, The economic and environmental impact of the Gulf war on Kuwait and the Persian Gulf: Kuwaitcase No. 162. The Trade & Environment Database (TED). Available online at: http://www.american.edu/TED/KUWAIT/HTM (accessed 10 June 2006).

[42] Martin, M.C. and Altintas, H., 2003, Wars and environment: the case of the gulf wars. Proceeding of theSecond Middle East Technical University Conference (M.E.T.U.) on International Relations: RegionalPerspective, 23–25 June, Ankara, Turkey, pp. 1–11.

[43] Al-Houty, W., Abdal, M. and Zaman, S., 1993, Preliminary assessment of the Gulf War on Kuwaiti desertecosystem. Journal of Environmental Science and Health: Part A, 28(8), 1705–1726.

[44] Krupa, M., 1997, Environmental and economic repercussions of the Persian Gulf War on Kuwait: Kuwait caseNo. 9. The Trade & Environment Database (TED), Available online at: http://www.american.edu/TED/KUWAIT/HTM (accessed 10 June 2006).

[45] Badolato, E. and Dexter, R., 1992, Sabotage of Kuwait’s oil. Ocnus.Net. Available online at: http://www.ocnus.net/cgi-bin/exec/view.cgi?archive=21#=4492 (accessed 25 February 2006).

[46] US Embassy Kuwait, 1991, Overview of current business conditions in Kuwait, a memorandum issued on 26December 1991, p. 2.

[47] United Nations, 1996, The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict 1990–1996, The United Nations BlueBooks Series, Vol. IX (New York: United Nations).

[48] Tawfiq, N.I., 1991, Response by Saudi Arabia to the environmental crisis caused by the Gulf War, in: A.K. Al-Shatti and J.M. Harrington (Eds) The Environmental and Health Impact of the Kuwait Oil Fires. Proceedingsof an International Symposium held at the University of Birmingham, UK.

[49] El Desouk y, M. and Abdulraheem, M.Y., 1991, Impact of oil well fires on the air quality in Kuwait, in: A.K.Al-Shatti and J.M. Harrington (Eds) The Environmental and Health Impact of the Kuwait Oil Fires. Proceed-ings of an International Symposium held at the University of Birmingham, UK.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

este

rn O

ntar

io]

at 1

2:20

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14

44 A. M. Al-Damkhi

[50] Rennie, D., 2003, Pentagon prepares for Saddam’s oil inferno. The Daily Telegraph. Available online at:http://www.alba.net//content/Telegraph%20Iraq.1046709152 (accessed 23 February 2006).

[51] McClain, H., 2001, Environmental impact: oil fires and spills leave hazardous legacy. International CNN.com.Available online at: http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/gulf.war/legacy/environment (accessed 19 March2006).

[52] Koopman, C., Classen, C., Cardena, E. and Spiegel, D., 1995, When disaster strikes, acute stress disorder mayfollow. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 8(1), 29–46.

[53] Kuwait Environment Protection Authority (KEPA), 2002, State of Kuwait: The Environmental Strategy, Part:I (Kuwait: KEPA and UNDP).

[54] Al-Sukkari, A.A., 1995, Environment: An Islamic Perspective (Cairo: Atlas Press).

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

este

rn O

ntar

io]

at 1

2:20

14

Nov

embe

r 20

14