Chapter 3 Analytical Framework and Hypotheses

Chapter 3 constructs the analytical framework for this study and its contributions to

discourse analysis of verbal irony. Speech act theory and its connection with verbal irony

has been discussed in full and its strengths confirm the significance of the framework;

however its shortcomings will now be addressed with an introduction of a new

classification of speech act—performative, with an explanation of how performative

speech acts construct character identity. On the basis of modified speech act theory and

echoic theory, the three echoic groupings of verbal irony are created as the contribution

of this study to accentuate characterization. Afterward we discuss the synthesis of echoic,

incongruity and superiority theories for the interpretation of verbal irony as the analytical

framework. Included are the formulated hypotheses and the methods utilized to test the

validity of the analytical framework.

3.1 Theoretical Basis: A Delimitation of Verbal Irony for this Study

This study defines verbal irony by echoic theory (Wilson & Sperber, 2012),

incongruity theory (e.g. Norrick, 2003) and superiority theory (e.g. Morreall, 2009).

Based on echoic theory, verbal irony encompasses an echoic allusion to a prior thought or

occurrence, and can be present either as a direct echo of someone’s thought or a vague

reference to perceptions of societal norms (see section 2.4.2 for the echoic theory). We

claim that incongruity is always apparent within verbal irony, and can be identified from

the discrepancy in figurative and literal meanings; the duality may be evident even in two

different points of view between the ironist and the object of irony (Leech & Short,

2007). The concept of superiority, including the banter principle, is also found within

verbal irony, as the S identifies a target of his or her irony in a display of dominance (see

section 2.4.3.3 for superiority theory). Our assertion that incongruity and superiority

theories work in unison for the explication of verbal irony receives support from Dynel:

“The incongruity-resolution theory may be combined with the superiority approach, each

accounting for distinct sources of humor which coincide in sarcastic irony” (Dynel, 2013:

313). The amalgamation of these three concepts forms the definition of verbal irony for

the purposes of this study in the data analysis. We define verbal irony as such: when an

1

ironist attempts to display supremacy over another through an echoic allusion which aims

to convey a duality (Juez, 1995), its intended meaning belies its literal meaning or the S

aims to highlight a contrast in views. The ironist dissociates himself from the idea, either

deceptively or covertly, believing it to be untruthful, unsuitable or ridiculous (Wilson,

2006).

The study highlights how verbal irony occurs through the machinations of speech

act theory (Searle, 2001b [1979])—that unconventional and infelicitous speech acts can

still exemplify working utterances in the context of conversation. Scholars (e.g. Kumon-

Nakamura et. al., 1995; Cai, 2010) have used speech act theory in the identification of

ironical statements, yet they have not shown how this method exhibits irony’s execution.

Our analysis of modified speech act theory gives a comprehensive view, incorporating

Butler’s (2002) [1990] performative speech act expressed through verbal irony to portray

characterization. Conversational analysis explicates how the recognition of the verbal

irony in Elizabeth and Mr. Darcy’s exchanges infers its use. Using a modified speech act

theory in conjunction with echoic theory identifies how verbal irony is found in

discourse, which is the method used to verify the data collection. The adopted approach is

two-tiered to include both the modified speech act taxonomy and echoic allusion. The

ironical utterances are classified through the modified speech act taxonomy for the S’s

intent, and the irony is verified through the echoic allusion within the utterance for the

H’s uptake. From the echoic allusions of each ironical utterance, this study introduces the

concept of echoic groupings to depict characterization. The incongruity and superiority

theories are utilized to analyze the ironical utterances. Incongruity theory accentuates

infelicity, i.e. the discrepancy between the utterance’s literal meaning and the intended

meaning veiled behind irony. According to this research, incongruity is observed as a

necessary component in verbal irony and complements the explication of the echoic

allusion. Superiority theory entails that the S has an intended target of his or her verbal

irony, which emphasizes Mr. Darcy’s and Elizabeth’s dissociative attitudes towards each

other and society within their ironical exchange. Because superiority theory incorporates

the banter principle, superiority theory is also useful to explicate ironical utterances

which are civil or friendly.

The subsections below explain the logic behind the analytical framework, and how

the theories utilized in the analysis are tied together to offer an approach for depicting

2

characterization through ironical performative speech acts. The discussion introduces a

new classification of speech act according to Butler’s (2002) [1990] theory. The new

classification of performative speech act replaces Searle’s (2001b) [1979] declarations to

provide an innovative model which includes a wider variety of utterances than

declarations. The following section discusses the connection between performative

speech acts and characterization.

3.1.1 Performative Speech Acts and Characterization

According to Searle’s classification of illocutionary acts, if the propositional content

refers to real things and predicates something true then it must be an all-encompassing

truth verifiably agreed upon in any case to allow the illocutionary point to be classified as

assertive (Searle, 1976: 10). Not all assertions can amount to such genuine truth; so

reasonably, the speech act taxonomy is not sufficient, for declarations do not address the

role of institutional authority well. Therefore, we call for an expansion of speech act

theory on the distinctions of Searle’s illocutionary point, which he calls declaration. A

declaration, according to Searle, requires some institutional right of authority (Searle,

2001b [1979]: 19) (refer to section 2.2.2 for Searle’s declarations). This study finds that

Searle’s definition does not classify declarations for which the S may have no authority,

and the declaration classification of speech acts has not been well supported or received

by other scholars (e.g. Kumon-Nakamura et al, 1995; Strawson, 1964). For example a S

gives a H an idea about X, but the idea is opinionated, subjective, or even wrong,

although the S may believe it to be a true assertion: John and Mary just met and

immediately he relayed his opinion to Mary’s good friend Amy saying “Mary is not a fun

person to be friends with.” This is not an assertive speech act; rather this study contends it

is a performative because John imposed a new assumption to the world declaring Mary is

not a fun person to be friends with when Mary has at least one friend Amy to prove that

she could be friendly enough to have friends (see section 2.2.2 for directional fit of

speech acts). Perhaps these utterances are “more complex types” of expressions that

Searle overlooked in his explanation of proposition (Searle, 2001a [1969]: 33). Therefore

it is essential to successfully classify this type of utterance, which is found pervasively in

Pride and Prejudice.

Strawson (1964) attempted to remedy the role of authority unaddressed by Searle in

3

relation to the illocutionary act of declarations. Unlike Austin (2002) [1962], Strawson

claimed that not all illocutionary acts could be classified as “essentially conventional”

(1964: 457). Although agreeing that all illocutionary acts by a S must contain an overt

intention behind them and be subject to uptake by the H, Strawson claimed that if the S’s

intention could be frustrated without any break in rules or conventions, then the act itself

was not conventional. For example, if a doctor greets his patient saying, “Hello, how are

you today?” and the patient refuses to answer, the doctor’s intention has been frustrated

but no rule has been broken because the patient is not obligated to answer the question.

Strawson’s critique of Austin’s theory claims that convention is not essential for

performance to occur (Yoshitake, 2004: 33). This is exemplified through his explanation

that the frustration of a conventional illocutionary act could only occur with some break

of rules or conventions. Strawson’s account suggests that even when there is no authority

behind the act, such as in a non-conventional illocutionary act, the act may still work to

alter the context in which the utterance takes place. Therefore, based on Strawson’s

argument this study can be further extended to suggest that an utterance, provided the

illocutionary intention is allowed to come to pass, explains how a person’s utterance

defines identity with respect to character construction. In Pride and Prejudice, this formal

analysis is important to determine the essential links between the style of the novel’s

characterization and verbal irony, the linguistic basis for that style.

Scholars such as Strawson (1964) and Yoshitake (2004) provide groundwork for this

study to fill the gap left by prior studies on the effectiveness of Searle’s (2001a) [1969]

speech act theory. Especially using Strawson’s rationale as a foundation for this research,

the introduction of the performative speech act in the speech act taxonomy addresses the

insufficiencies left by declaration’s inability to include utterances without backing

institutional authority. This study adopts the concept of Butler’s (2002) [1990]

performative speech act, which is distinct from Austin’s (1979) performative speech act.

The use of the term performative as an illocutionary force or point should not be

confused with Austin’s use of the term in the performative-constative spectrum (see

section 2.2.1 for Austin’s performative), but as a new illocutionary act to enable character

construction via speech act. In this discussion, a performative speech act is a new

classification of speech act and is a contribution of this study, which counts as an

undertaking to identify a character as possessing some quality. Performative speech acts

4

are necessary because declarations cannot properly portray characterization due to their

rigidity; declarations are decidedly more restrictive than performative speech acts and the

constructions put forth by declarations are more difficult to reverse.

Butler intended the performative speech act to construct identity, and she interpreted

that “gender is performative” (2002 [1999]: xv). Thus it can be concluded that character

construction is also a “performative act” (Butler, 2002 [1990]: xxix). Butler’s (1997)

concept of subjection also supports the use of performative speech acts for character

construction, for subjection is the process of creating the subject’s identity and is a

performative process. Subjection can only be performed through power, and in turn the

act of subjection relinquishes power to the newly-created subject (1997: 13-15). Taking

into account theories from Foucault and Althusser, the process of subjection occurs

through language, and the subject is not only created through the power of discourse but

persists under the subordination of that power which creates it (Butler, 1997: 5-9). For

example, if John continually claims Mary is unfriendly, this will begin to create her new

identity to others. The power of John’s words will influence the way others form their

opinions of Mary’s character if they choose to have their preexisting assumptions about

Mary replaced by John’s performative speech acts. In addition, Butler’s (1997) concept of

subjection allows for the fluidity of identity creation, for a subject can influence his own

identity by his opposition or submission to the power which creates him and thus his

identity may be perpetuated or altered. In this same example Mary, as John’s subject for

character construction, could be influenced by John’s performative speech acts; therefore

Mary, subordinated under John’s power of discourse may perpetuate John’s new

assumption or alter her personal identify if she wishes to do so.

From the logic of our research, we claim that institutional authority is not a

necessary component for identity construction, therefore Butler’s performative makes an

ideal replacement for declarations. In performative speech acts, the premise of subjection

fundamentally explains that the words carry their own authority, therefore subjection

offers a replacement for institutional authority, rendering performative speech acts

functional. Taking Butler’s theories into account, we define character construction as the

act of identity creation through subjection. This conception of character construction is

derived from Butler’s notion of subjection, therefore the performative speech act is

delimited according to her deductions from the theories synthesized in this section. It is

5

crucial to note that although a H may pass judgment on the S himself in addition to the

subject of the S’s utterance, the S does not construct his own character in an utterance

referencing another person unless the S also directly or indirectly references himself in

the utterance. This effect is to emphasize that the H(s) can readjust a character

construction based on the S’s opinion about someone; however the H(s) does not directly

construct the S’s own character when the H only refers to a third person. To illustrate the

effectiveness of performative speech acts to replace declarations, take the example of a

baby being named. The hospital which provides a birth certificate is an institutional

authority, and thus when claiming, “Her name is Maria” the speech act is a declaration

because it is backed by the authority of the hospital. The utterance is also a performative

speech act, as it creates the identity of the baby. Therefore, performative speech acts

successfully classify declarations backed by institutional authority and those not backed

by some authority as in the case of John, Mary and Amy. Performative speech acts and

declarations both have the same illocutionary point to bring something into existence

according to the S’s intention, e.g. naming Maria and calling Mary an unfriendly person.

The illocutionary force of the act of portrayal, of one character to verbally

demonstrate the personality and behaviors of another, is performative. It empowers the S

to be the master of a constructed identity, the artist who creates “a specific vision of

social order” in which character identities arise (Worthen, 1998: 1097). The illocutionary

force derives its power from textually conceived “regimes” of socialization, i.e. the

societal construction has given the creators of identity some substance with which they

can demonstrate their portrayals (Worthen, 1998: 1097). Furthermore, the illocutionary

force can gain validity and influence via the interaction of the preconceived text and the

character’s portrayal from within its own contextual web of circumstance (Worthen,

1998: 1097). Performative speech acts are the foundational basis for this presentation

because character formations are not assertive speech acts but performative constructs

brought about by both physical and verbal actions to bring a truth into existence.

The substance of character construction is often manifest in the thought of some

beholder (i.e. the S), meaning the portrayal is made according to the observation of some

exhibitions of a particular personality (i.e. the character being portrayed). Therefore, the

character’s identity is linked to Austin’s performativity (Cameron, 2006 [1997]: 420);

Butler points out those gender identity actions are fabrications made and perpetuated via

6

discourse (2002 [1990]: 136). When an actor or S depicts a characteristic, either of the

actor’s self or of another, the utterance in effect is not truly representative of something

verifiably existent in the world—it constitutes a reality which functions to provide an

audience (H) with a character brought into existence through the act of the S’s utterance

(Cameron, 2006 [1997]: 420; Geisdorfer Feal, 2001: 5). As such, any comments one

makes upon someone’s demeanor become the material for that person’s identity.

Butler (2002) [1990] developed her concepts from two prominent figures before her,

Beauvoir and Foucault, which emphasize how character construction is inseparable from

the performative speech act itself. The idea of character construction of the individuals in

the plot through their performative speech acts is in purport with performative speech

acts and gender identity construction. Butler draws again from Beauvoir’s thoughts in her

theory of gender construction, defining performativity as “that reiterative power of

discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains” (Butler, 1993: 2).

Essentially, Butler contends that gender is constructed through discourse, which brings

identity into existence. Beauvoir’s theories of this gender construction are also drawn

from early Foucault when he developed his pattern of words creating reality. For

instance, he posited that language, gestures, and performances have meanings that are

dependent on who speaks/acts them and the context in which they are enacted. Hall

addresses Foucault’s concept of discourse, claiming “a discourse is a group of statements

which provide a language for . . . a particular topic” (Hall, 1992: 291). Discourse

constructs the topic, based upon Foucault’s definition. Through such public discourse,

knowledge about the topic acquires authority, infusing a “truth” about it (Hall, 1992:

293).

The discourse is what constructs the individual character. According to Foucault’s

theory, discourse takes shape as knowledge with the words carrying their own power.

Butler’s notion of identity and actions are essentially productions made and perpetuated

via discourse (2002 [1990]: 136). Beauvoir shared similar views that Butler reiterates in

her theory of identity construction: “When we are discussing gender, we are talking about

ways that we can change societal understanding of women, men, and women and men,”

(Beauvoir, 1976: 3). Performative speech acts facilitate the construction of characters,

specifically in this study the development of identity. They enable a S to produce

representations of identity by designating his host according to descriptive language,

7

which in turn builds a H’s indexical knowledge of that host. This study of Pride and

Prejudice will show that the act of character construction is undertaken by the characters’

verbal irony—they interpret and contrast each other’s character identity through

propositions of performative speech acts. As mentioned above, characterization is fluid

and has the ability to constantly change when new assumptions are put forth by the

characters. While the context within the plot alters, the ironical utterances tend to reflect

new perceptions based upon those changed contexts.

Characterization is inferred through the dialogue between Elizabeth and Mr. Darcy.

These dialogues incorporate many ironical utterances, which impact the expression of

that character construction. Austin posits performativity in literature to “be in a peculiar

way hollow or void if said” by a character or performer (in Worthen, 1998: 1095). As in

theater, dramatic performance may seem such a hollow sign of social workings, but these

structures are nevertheless “reproduced through a conventional apparatus of visibility (the

proscenium and the realistic modes of dramatic narrative and audience interaction it

shapes)” (Worthen, 1998: 1095); in this understanding the structure of character occurs

within a dominating social influence. Worthen’s study asserts that performative speech

acts construct identity despite their mode of communication (1998: 1095).

We assert that through performative utterances, one actually embodies his own

existence and the things you say can be what you do; they form and construct who you

are. Butler states that gender is distinguished by choice and by social construction (2002

[1990]: 147-152). Butler’s theory of social construction was influenced by Beauvoir:

“One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman. No biological, psychological, or

economic fate determines the figure that the human female presents in society”

(Beauvoir, 1976: 267). Ultimately, culture frames appropriate some way of behaving or

believing. As such, cultural conditions play an important role in the manufacturing of

performative speech acts. On the basis of these concepts from Butler and Beauvoir, this

study argues that Mr. Darcy and Elizabeth construct each other’s and their own personal

identities.

Characterization through performative speech acts is prominent throughout Pride

and Prejudice. This provides a challenge to both Elizabeth and the readership as the

novel continually remodels Mr. Darcy according to hearsay about his past, and the direct

witness of both the readership and the novel’s characters of his concurrent actions at each

8

step. The utilization of performative speech acts in characterization is one of the

contributions of this study.

The illocutionary force of a performative speech act, which is the essence of our

argument, is not assertive, because character construction is a performance which is

manifest in its act, so the directional fit of words-to-world is inappropriate. Identity

construction through discourse occurs simultaneously with the act in saying; it forms a

new world of understanding rather than describing something already existent. However,

these performative speech acts of identity construction are not just declarations because a

S who acts to construct identity does not necessarily have any institutional authority to

appropriate their position to this work. In a broader context, the performative illocution

then also works when the S makes character judgments of himself and others, whether he

or she has authority. If a S proposes himself or herself to be in some qualitative state or

condition, the S holds a right of subjection to make that claim of character self-portrayal.

Also, when the S makes some claim regarding another person’s character, the claim can

be projected as a new assumption about someone or something on the H, who then

assesses the effect of that utterance upon his or her preexisting notions.

Furthermore, characterization is not static; it can be reiterated or undone through any

subsequent performances by the individual or another upon that person’s behalf. That is

to say, performative speech acts are not necessarily as sturdy as declarations. We contend

that character construction is the act of bringing into existence specific attributes of

character at a time, rather than creating a whole identity in one instance. Characterization

is an entire process that occurs over time, a piecemeal creation through individual

utterances of a single identity through the amalgamation of multiple personality traits.

For example, over the course of a lifetime a person may have many different personality

phases, and opinions are adjusted as a person leaves one phase and enters another,

constructing identity.

While the S’s utterances are according to cultural conditions, she, in the execution of

performative speech acts, certainly intends the utterance to form an extended world of

meaning according to her idea. However, when the S’s speech act is infelicitous and

breaks with convention, the utterance should be further examined for evidence of

figurative language, such as verbal irony for its frequent recourse recognized in this

study. In our spoken conversational analysis of Pride and Prejudice, utterances perceived

9

as ironical in the discourse between Elizabeth and Mr. Darcy will be identified and

examined under our analytical framework. Utterances that depict characterization are

found in performative speech acts, which are not included in Searle’s speech act

taxonomy. Character construction occurring via figurative language such as verbal irony

may only be classified using performative speech acts, therefore necessitating its

inclusion into the taxonomy to replace declarations. In addition to modified speech act

taxonomy, this study has also adapted the echoic account to classify echoic groupings of

characterization through verbal irony.

3.1.2 Echoic Groupings: An Original Contribution to Echoic Theory

This study formulates an original contribution to echoic theory by identifying three

echoic groupings of verbal irony through which characterization is seen. These groupings

are formed based on the echoic allusions of the ironical utterances, which emphasizes

echoic theory’s importance for this study. Not only is echoic theory used to verify the

data, but it also aids to form echoic groupings to identify characterization. The three

echoic groupings are based on the echoic allusions when Mr. Darcy and Elizabeth are in

disagreement, display neutral civility, or are in agreement. This study contends that these

echoic groupings are not necessarily found chronologically within Pride and Prejudice.

However, based on the echoic grouping dominance, this study generates three echoic

grouping dominance phases depicting Mr. Darcy and Elizabeth’s characterization.

Echoic groupings are based on echoic theory’s allusion, that the ironical utterance is

echoing a preexisting thought or idea. Echoic allusions found in each utterance verify the

perlocutionary act that is for the H’s uptake of the verbal irony, intended by the S. The

echoic allusion verifies the irony by confirming the infelicity, or incongruity, within the

utterance. The figurative meaning is hidden behind the literal meaning, revealing the

irony within the utterance. The S’s intended illocution of an ironical performative speech

act works to construct a character’s identity.

To conclude this section, we have described the theoretical basis on which we

construct the analytical framework. The concept of performative speech acts borrowed

from Butler (2002) [1990] works to replace the restrictive declarations to modify Searle’s

(2001b) [1979] speech act theory, which we combine with echoic groupings to classify

our data. From Butler we claim performative speech acts depict characterization, and thus

10

our analytical framework features both ironical performative speech acts and echoic

groupings. Below we describe how the theories form the analytical framework, which is

the basis for the data analysis in Chapter 5.

3.2 Analytical Framework: Towards a New Model for Verbal Irony

The diagram below is an illustration of our analytical framework. The logic is that

character construction stems from performativity. Performativity is the concept that

verbal and non-verbal actions construct the identity of a person or character (refer to

section 3.1.1). Performativity occurring through discourse can be both figurative and

literal, but this study centers on the figurative use through verbal irony.

In order to classify all the ironical utterances between Mr. Darcy and Elizabeth, this

study uses a framework which incorporates both the modified speech act theory (see

section 2.2 for Searle’s speech act theory and 3.1.1 for the inclusion of performative

speech acts into Searle’s taxonomy) and the echoic theory’s allusion (see section 2.4.2 for

echoic theory). Ironical utterances are developed under the auspices of unconventional

speech acts which successfully work despite simultaneously demonstrating infelicity.

Searle’s (2001b) [1979] and Austin’s (2002) [1962] felicity conditions are the basis for

determining violations of speech acts. Figurative language is a device for characters to

express their opinions in an innocuous way. The verbal irony works in the sense that a

speech act is indirectly conveying an intended illocutionary act by way of pragmatically

framing the utterance in a context for an intended H to embark upon an uptake that an

utterance be evaluated as ironical. According to our framework, the irony within the

utterance is located in the perlocutionary act when the H resolves the intended meaning

hidden in the S’s literal meaning. The verbal irony is examined through the two-tiered

method of pairing S intent with H uptake intended by the S, within an utterance, two sides

of the same coin: first classifying S intent (illocutionary act) via modified speech act

theory and then further identifying H uptake (perlocutionary act) with echoic allusions of

disagreement, neutral, and agreement echoic groupings.

This study formulates a theoretical framework based on a modification to Searle’s

speech act theory (2001b) [1979], emphasizing the significance of the S’s intent. Speaker

intent is revealed through modified speech act theory, which emphasizes the illocutionary

11

act of an utterance. For the occasions where Searle’s taxonomy of illocutionary acts is too

ambiguous to properly categorize an act of identity formation, this study has modified the

previous taxonomy to replace declarations with Butler’s (2002) [1990] performative

speech acts as illocutionary acts. This new taxonomic classification encompasses a

broader approach to Searle’s declaration category to indicate how speaking an utterance

can initiate and alter the identity of an individual or grouped person(s) or thing(s).

Therefore according to Butler’s concept of performative speech acts (refer back to section

3.1.1 for performative speech acts and characterization), we argue in this study that

performative speech acts are the foremost speech act to depict characterization, for the

other four types of speech acts may or may not aid to construct character identity.

However, the other four types of speech acts are necessary for classifying the ironical

utterances in order to objectively determine the echoic grouping dominance phases.

To examine the utterance from the effect of H uptake intended by the S, modified

speech act theory must be supplemented by echoic allusions for objective classification of

ironical utterances. The perlocutionary act, the intended effect upon the H from the S of

the ironical performative utterance, is analyzed according to incongruity and superiority

theories interpreted via echoic allusion. This study finds incongruity and superiority

theories of humor are relevant to the analysis of verbal irony for several reasons. We

contend incongruity is inherent in verbal irony, highlighting the infelicity in the utterance

reveals the duality of the intended meaning and literal meaning. For each ironical

performative speech act analyzed, the divergence in figurative and literal meanings is

described to stress the intention of the S (Mr. Darcy or Elizabeth). Superiority theory,

which incorporates the banter principle, is also found to be an integral part of each

ironical utterance, explaining the use of verbal irony to display perceived inferiority of

the H.

The logical connections of the analytical framework figure are represented by the

lines. For instance, both humor and verbal irony are types of figurative language,

therefore these two concepts fall under the “parent” figurative utterances. The direct

connections between the theories and concepts are represented by solid black lines. The

connection between incongruity and superiority theories and verbal irony are represented

by the dotted lines, because these theories do not fall directly under irony such as echoic

theory, yet their utilization in the explication of verbal irony is supported by the shared

12

aspects of humor and irony (e.g. Juez, 1995; Dynel, 2013).

13

14

Figure 3.1 Analytical Framework

3.3 Hypotheses

Based upon the analytical framework, this study posits two hypotheses:

1. Characterization through verbal irony is represented via S intent and H

uptake.

2. Echoic groupings depict characterization when utterances are comprised

of

disagreement, neutral, and agreement echoic groupings.

The hypotheses will be tested by first classifying each utterance according to the

modified speech act taxonomy and echoic allusions to verify that the utterance is

ironical. The classification and verification comprise the two-tiered method of pairing S

intent with H uptake within an utterance. Once the utterances are identified as ironical

and classified via modified speech act taxonomy, the analysis can proceed.

15