kosovo_compromise_newsletter_01_oct07.pdf

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Institute 4S, Brussels september- october 2007

THE ONLY PRACTICAL WAY OUT OF THIS SITUATION ARE THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH A CLEAR SUBJECT MATTER THE FUTURE STATUS,

A CLEAR AIM A COMPROMISE SOLUTION, AND A CLEAR PROCEDURE UNBIASED MEDIATION. THE NEGOTIATIONS CONDUCTED BY

MARTI AHTISAARI COULD CERTAINLY NOT BE DESCRIBED AS SUCH.

Tere isnt a politician today in Europe, norin the world or that matter, who wouldcontest the view that the issue o Kosovoand Metohia is the most difficult one inEurope and among the most complex onesglobally. What makes it so difficult are notonly the irreconcilable positions o Serbiaand the Kosovo Albanians, but also thealmost irreconcilable stands o the signifi-cant global actors taking part in the reso-lution o the uture status o Kosovo andMetohia.Juxtaposed to this common stand is thereservation o the bulk o the influentialwestern states regarding the very nego-tiations between Belgrade and Pristina asbeing the right approach and method toresolving this difficult issue. As a result,their primary concern is not linked tothe readiness and capacity o the negotia-tion teams to reach the compromise aboutthe uture status o Kosovo and Metohia.Rather, it has to do with negotiations assuch as a suitable tool to arrive at the mu-tually acceptable solution.Tis attitude/position o the majority othe western countries may come as a sur-prise but only at the first glance. All thosewho ollow the events around Kosovo andMetohia, even the casual observers, knowthat ever since the beginning o the ne-gotiations around the uture status o thesouthern Serbian province (say, Novem-ber 2005) the same countries have firmlymaintained that the province should begranted the status o an independentstate. However, no official decision aboutthis had ever been reached anywhere nor

at any point and it is precisely this tacitagreement that may serve as an indicatoro the attitude and activities o these coun-tries in Kosovo and Metohia as well as inmatters related to it.In such circumstances, agreeing to nego-tiations between Belgrade and Pristinaabout defining the uture status o Kosovoand Metohia, has been a mere ormality tothe western politicians. In their view, thenegotiations could not have changed theinevitable chain o events but could ratherhelp around two things: firstly, they wouldaccomplish the prerequisite o SecurityCouncil Resolution 1244 (1999) whichstipulates that at one moment the uturestatus o Kosovo and Metohia must be ad-dressed, and secondly, they would haveushered Serbia into this process, again a

requirement in the same resolution, as it isstill the ormal bearer o sovereignty andterritorial integrity in Kosovo and Meto-hia.As demonstrated, in November 2005 the

with recognition as a state) which wouldbeyond doubt breach the internationallaw; in short, the argument o acts andeffect is gradually losing grounds and sub-stance in the regional, European and inglobal context alike.Te only practical way out o this situationare the negotiations with a clear subjectmatter the uture status, a clear aim acompromise solution, and a clear proce-dure unbiased mediation. Te nego-tiations conducted by Mr. Ahtisaari couldcertainly not be described as such. Tesewere not negotiations about the status,their aim was not a compromise solution,and the mediation was anything but unbi-ased. Te new round o negotiations, start-ing as o September 28th in New York, willbe acing an alltogether different nature oobstacles they will be extremely limitedin time, with a strong presence o reserveand suspicion as to the (successul) clo-sure. Te originators and propagators othis disbelie will again be the same coun-tries, more or less, which had supportedAhtisaaris simulation along with its vir-tual outcome.What conclusion can be drawn rom allthis?Primarily, that the view that the negotia-tions are not a viable way to solve a disputecan only be held by those who do not trustinternational law, and those who do notbelieve in the law are those who are proneto using orce to solve disputes. Tis typeo politics is in the very oundations othe reality argument, which we still hearofen enough, albeit less requently. Te

problem with this argument is not onlythat it is contrary to the law, but also that itis quite unair. Some reerences and indi-cations have been offered here to supportthis claim. Whatever the case, i the nego-tiations are not approached with utmostseriousness, the realistic alternative wouldnot be a victory o one reality but a last-ing conflict between the two, i not evenmore realities. Neither the United Nationsnor the European Union would have a re-sponse to such a scenario, and least o allcan a scenario be devised by those westerncountries which have ailed so ar to attri-bute value to the meaning and importanceo serious negotiations.

Slobodan Samardi is the Serbian Minis-ter or Kosovo and Metohia.

perspective o the western countries hadbeen that it was an issue o mere ormali-ties, steps to be carried out more or lessroutinely, thus bringing the entire task tothe sel-explanatory finish.oday, almost two years afer the deci-sion in the United Nations to embark onthe negotiations about the uture status oKosovo and Metohia, a significantly di-erent position is at hand. Te principalindicators o this shif in the situation areas ollows:- In line with its determination touphold the sovereignty and territorial in-tegrity o the country, Serbia has ormu-lated a comprehensive and unified statepolicy regarding Kosovo and Metohia, aswell as a related platorm or negotiationsaimed at resolving this issue;

- Proceeding rom these, Serbiahas been gathering a strong internationalsupport, primarily rom Russia as a stand-ing member o the Security Council andthe Contact Group, rom the other rele-vant countries, such as China, a number onon-standing member states o the Securi-

W H Y N E G O I A EKOSOVO STATUS CRISIS

ty Council, a number o members states othe European Union, and also rom someo the neighbouring countries;- Within the European Union thereis a growing awareness and understandingthat without the international legal rame-work it is impossible to resolve the issueo Kosovo and Metohia, and that the veryparticipation o the EU itsel in the uturewithout such a ramework is unthinkable;- In the international ramework,and especially within the European Union,the ultimatum-like position o the po-litical representatives o the Kosovo Al-banians persisting on the independenceo the province is becoming increasinglyunacceptable; this is largely aided by thegrowing awareness o the criminal andmafia-like structure which has spread itsinfluence deeply into the public lie o theprovince;- Tese changes in circumstanceshave rapidly decreased the number othose advocating that the issue should betaken off the agenda by a series o unilat-eral acts (secession to begin with, ollowed


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Institute 4S, Brussels

COA LIT ION OF THE WI LL ING II

A N EW BATCH?

end o the road -- as reflected in thecurrent stalemate in the UN SecurityCouncil some key US State Depart-ment officials are now flirting with adangerous idea o crushing Serbian andRussian dissent by creating by 2008 aCoalition o the Willing Part 2 analliance o states which would be will-

ing to recognize an unlawul unilateralproclamation o independence by theKosovo Albanians.

Tese suggestions indicate that Wash-ington is not ready to conduct honestnegotiations, but much like it didduring the ailed Ahtisaari process -- topursue a predetermined independencescenario or the resolution o the Koso-vo status.Such an approach is not only dishonesttowards Belgrade and Moscow, but alsotowards the European Union, which isclearly interested in finding a viable so-lution. As such, this approach is muchmore a pressure against the EU, thanagainst Serbia and Russia.

I the US policy in the next ew monthso talks will be used to orm some sorto an alliance or the independence oKosovo instead o brokering a negoti-ated deal and a creative solution, Wash-

ington must then take responsibility orthe likely ailure o the talks and thecatastrophic consequences which a sce-nario o a one-sided recognition mightprovoke in the region, within the EUand the world.

It is difficult to expect any change o

positions rom Belgrade and Pristinaon the status question at the least orthe time being. A possible and realisticchange is in the perspective o the inter-national actors. Tis might involve rais-ing the level o warnings against thosewho would like to exploit the rustra-tions. Some US officials in particularmust reject the line independenceone way or another, while EU offi-cials should reinorce their argumentor Kosovos integration in Europeanstructures one status or another. BothWashington and Brussels should aim torelativise the importance o ormal sta-tus, particu larly in Kosovo itsel whereextremely high expectations have led toobsession with statehood instead o theocus on the morning afer.

Understandably, the US are irritatedwith the ailure to impose through adiplomatic blitzkrieg an indepen-dence or the Kosovo Albanians, but

Its no big diplomatic secret that theEuropean integration o the WesternBalkans as a whole is to a large extentdepending on the pace o integration oSerbia and Croatia, two o the countrieswhich have the largest political andeconomic clout in the region.

While Croatias accession plans arelargely being met, Serbia is said to beacing a dilemma: Europe or Kosovo.But is this truly the case? Tis alse andimposed choice was intended to putpressure on Serbs, desiring both to jointhe European Union and to keep at leastsome ormal connections with a regionwhich is inseparable rom its nationalidentity.

Tis dilemma never ormally stated has accompanied all through its waythe so-called Ahtisaari process, whichin the last year and a hal produced noresults and no solution, beore being re-placed with a new negotiations process,currently being led by the EU, Russiaand the US.

Martti Ahtisaaris process was doomeddue to its key internal weaknesses: itwas one-sided rom the start, its out-come was predetermined all along, andit ailed at the end to respect the basicprinciples o international law.

Its practical results are a disappointedKosovo Albanian community whichwas given hopes way too high, an an-gry Serbia which was threatened withorceul disintegration while trying toachieve European integration, a rus-trated US which did not see its plan gothrough, a divided EU which lost quite

some o its credibility and a new, stron-ger Russia in both the Balkans and theinternational field.

Instead o finally recognizing that theircurrent Kosovo policy has come to the

this rustration will only worsen i theydecide to push democratic Serbia awayrom its normal European democraticand integrative processes by supportingthe secession o Kosovo.

Te EU is well aware that Serbia is theengine behind the European integra-

tion o the Western Balkans. I Serbiastops in its European integrations, sowill Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegroand Macedonia, while the Union willace a new crisis in its own ront yard.Tis is why the EU wants to avoid anangry and humiliated Serbia.

I the US strategic goal is to stop Euro-pean integrations in the Balkans andopen up old wounds and new flash-points, it will go through with the rec-ognition o a unilateral declaration oindependence by the Kosovo Albaniansand pressure on EU states to do thesame. Otherwise, it will seek a compro-mise solution, in collaboration with theEU, Russia and the two parties.

Aleksandar Miti is the director o theKosovo Compromise project (www.kosovocompromise.com) and editor-in-chie o this newsletter.

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INSTEAD OF FINALLY RECOGNIZING THAT THEIR CURRENT KOSOVO POLICY HAS COME TO THE END OF THE ROAD AS REFLECTED IN

THE CURRENT STALEMATE IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL SOME KEY US STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS ARE NOW FLIRTING WITH A

DANGEROUS IDEA OF CRUSHING SERBIAN AND RUSSIAN DISSENT BY CREATING BY 2008 A COALITION OF THE WILLING PART 2 AN

ALLIANCE OF STATES WHICH WOULD BE WILLING TO RECOGNIZE AN UNLAWFUL UNILATERAL PROCLAMATION OF INDEPENDENCE BY

THE KOSOVO ALBANIANS.

oo Borkovi


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A N E W B E G I N N I N G F O RK O S O VO

beginning in Kosovo. Any continuationon the basis o the three aorementionedassumptions could cause serious troublein Kosovo and elsewhere in the world.

What is urgently needed now is impar-tial, proessional mediation by coun-tries, civil society and individuals whohave no other mandate but to help theparties solve their conflict.

A conflict has ound a sustainable solu-tion when the parties have investigatedall creative uture options and workedtheir way towards a uture arrangementthat they can accept voluntarily and arethereore committed to implement onthe ground.

Te mediation process and mediatorsmust be considered impartial and neu-tral by all parties. Tey will need a quite

large team o proessional expertise inthe area, in conflict analysis, mediation,reconciliation and orgiveness - all com-petences much more important thanbeing a career diplomat or, say, a ormerpresident.

Te UN, the EU, the OSCE and other or-ganizations should provide security andfinance the process which may well takemore than a year. During that period,none o the parties should explore andnegotiate solutions with a pistol in theirbacks or a time-bomb on the tracks.

Tere must be enough time, parties andspace or a new process to succeed.

Tere must be enough time, becausehurrying the process is detrimental tothe quality o the process: in the Viennatalks, rounds were held at increasinglyshorter intervals as pressure to concludethe process increased.

Tere must be enough participants, sinceroom must be given to arguments, needsand interests on all sides. Te uture oKosovo will influence the whole regionand, thus, there are many participants togive a stake in the solution. Also, it is nolonger easible that only governmentstry to make peace; democratic peace isabout providing or civil society to stateits concerns and contribute its creativ-ity. While diplomats can leave, citizensmust stay and live with the result o thepeace-making process.

While certain ideas rom the Ahtisaariprocess can be kept as a basis or a solu-tion, Belgrade s proposals must not beautomatically rejected as underdevel-oped and unrealistic.

On the other hand, Belgrade must ur-ther mobilize its proposals and present

them as a real incentive to Pristina aswell as a constructive alternative or theinternational community.

Tere must be enough space, because asolution must be created within a viableramework. Te overwhelming major-ity o international actors insist on thelegality and legitimacy o a UN Secu-rity Council resolution as well as onthe norms o the UN Charter; Kosovoshould not be an exception rom all oth-er similar cases.

It has been made very clear that ignor-ing the territorial integrity o Serbia willnot be accepted in the worlds top body.

As a result and as a starting point, itshould thereore be accepted that inter-national law must be respected and thata space or solution can be ound be-tween the territorial integrity o a stateand the right o a majority to rule itsel.

During the last 20 years, the Kosovoconflict has been handled by the in-ternational community on the basis othree counterproductive assumptions.

One, it was believed that it could bedealt with as a special case and in isola-tion rom the rest o ormer Yugoslavia ,Europe and larger world order issues.

wo, it was seen as a political power is-sue rather than a case or proessionalconflict-resolution.

Tree, there was a belie that deficientconflict analysis and the lack o media-tion could be covered up by NAOspeacemaking bombings in 1999.

Te US, EU, NAO, UN and OSCEwould do well to finally recognize - andeven better publicly admit - that they

have come to the end o the road withthese three assumptions, as reflected inthe current stalemate in the UN Secu-rity Council. Proposals or supervisedindependence by ormer Finnish presi-dent Marti Ahtisaari have been blockedby a threat o a Russian veto.

Both the Albanians and the Serbs todayeel humiliated, victimized and cheatedby the mismanagement o the interna-tional players.

Washington is rustrated by its ailureto get through a speedy imposition oKosovos independence, Moscow is de-termined not to allow this impositionas a breach o international law and

Brussels is spending more time manag-ing its internal cohesion than creativelythinking about how to get out o the im-passe.

Fall 2007 is thereore the time or a new

However, i the parties can find a wayto an independent Kosovo that is ac-ceptable to Serbia , its citizens and thoseo Kosovo, then no one should opposethat.

In act, independence versus integrationare typical power issues. o now intro-duce a conflict-resolution perspectivewould imply two new oci: what is thisconflict about and, consequently, howcan Kosovo , Serbia and neighbouringcountries develop in such a way that

uture lie in Kosovo will be good orthose living there?

At the end o the day, the ormal statuso the province is much less importantthan the quality o peoples everydaylie.

Neither independence nor re-integra-tion can in and o itsel be a guaranteeor a good lie or all. For both side thesepositions have been mantras or toolong.

What all people in the region want, needand have a right to are things such asgood schools and health care, reedomo movement, gender balance, good

economic opportunities, employment,social security etc. And above all, theyneed to make peace, stop hating andgo or reconciliation with their neigh-bours.

Without these, no status solution willsucceed or last or long.

Politicians need to use these as a start-ing point to the process, ending with thequestion: What status should Kosovohave in order to best ulfill these needsor all in the region? Such an approacho substance and human need ratherthan ormality and law would engagecitizens in a new democratic way.

Te solutions ound to these lie qualitygoals would compel the parties to enterinto an overall agreement voluntarilyand with serious commitment to alsoimplement them.

It will certainly not be easy. But in con-trast to the now ailed power policywith conflict-mismanagement, this typeo principled conflict-handling holdsa hope or peace -conflict-resolution,peace-making and building with genu-ine human reconciliation.

By Jan Oberg and Aleksandar Miti

Jan Oberg is the director o the ransna-tional Foundation or Peace and Future

Research in Lund, Sweden.(www.transnational.org)

Aleksandar Miti is the director o theproject Kosovo Compromise .(www.kosovocompromise.com)

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CHRONOLOGY OF AHTISAARIS FAILURE :

FROM LONDONS HIGH HOPES TO NEW YORKSREALITY CHECK

which the Security Councils resolutionwould be a must and started flirtingwith the idea o unilateral recognitionoutside the UN ramework. Spring 2007 was thus used or severaldiplomatic initiatives linked to Kosovo:an attempt by some US officials to cre-ate a diplomatic blitzkrieg, an intensepressure on the opponents o the Ahti-saari plan within the EU and the prepa-ration or the UN SC process throughpressure on Russia and Serbia. At the end o March, US officials ar-rived to Brussels to proclaim openlytheir support or the independence oKosovo and create a transatlantic ront,but the inormal meeting o EU minis-ters o oreign affairs in Bremen showedagain the dissonance among Europeancountries when it came to create a com-mon EU position at the UN SecurityCouncil. Te US-led speedy indepen-dence effort was dealt a serious blow. Despite these divisions and Russianwarnings, the Contact Group quin-tet (Western members) pushed or theAhtisaari plan as the basis or a drafresolution in Security Council. Hopes were apparently high that themedia reports quoting anonymous dip-lomats and analysts predictions wouldbe right and that Moscow would backdown at the very last moment. But, the reality check-up started at theGerman Baltic seaside resort o Heile-gendamm in early June, where Putinclearly told his G8 summit colleaguesthat Moscow would veto an Ahtisaari-based UN Security Council resolution. Freshly-elected French president Nico-las Sarkozy was first to tell the world atthe summit about the necessity to holdurther talks. It took several weeks and five unsuc-cessul UN Security Council drafs orall to realize that the Ahtisaari processwould not end up with its backing by aSecurity Council resolution. Moscow stood firmly with its threenyet: no to the annulment o UN SCresolution 1244 (calling or human

rights protection and Serbias territorialintegrity and sovereignty over Kosovo),no to a prejudged outcome and no to ar-tificial deadlines. Te US was rustrated by the outcomeand started to openly call or inde-pendence one way or another, with orwithout the UN SC resolution a scaryscenario indeed or the unity o the EU. Security Council members China,South Arica and Indonesia all threeworried about the impacts o a Kosovoprecedent on the issues o territorialintegrity expressed relie at the out-come. On August 10, 2007, ollowing the ap-pointment o a EU-US-Russian troika,a new, distinctive process began withshuttle diplomacy between Belgrade

and Pristina.

Tis chronology is part o the cd- romKosovo 2007: Te Fast-rack toEurope(www.kosovocompromise.com).

Te three key Kosovo status talks prin-ciples o the Contact Group set in Lon-don in January 2006 (no return to thepre-1999 situation, no partition, nojoining o neighboring states) werecriticized or streaming the process to-wards the independence-like solution.I pre-1999 autonomy was rejected be-cause o the Milosevic times, why wasntthe pre-1989 (pre-Milosevic) autonomyreerred to as possibility? Why was par-tition o Kosovo outlawed, while parti-

tion o Serbia was not? Why mention aban to the joining o neighboring stateswhen it only made sense in the case osecession o Kosovo rom Serbia? Nevertheless, the three principles stillallowed enough space or a negotiatedsolution in order or Russia, a membero the Contact Group, to go along withthe process, despite president VladimirPutin clearly stating rom the start Mos-cows resolve to agree only on universalsolutions. Unortunately, some US and UK o-ficials interpreted Moscows lack o pub-lic objections at this stage a sign o tacitapproval or a process with a predeter-mined outcome o independence. A alse sense o urgency (violencemight erupt each day now i they dont

get what they want) combined with thelack o argumentation (the Kosovo suigeneris mantra) greatly damaged anyserious discussion on the status. Te negotiation rounds were held atincreasingly shorter intervals and Rusiastarted grudging more publicly. Te EU member states, which hadbeen putting the key status discussionsunder the red carpet by preparing ortheir status-neutral ESDP mission, hadtheir first serious discussion on the con-sequences o the status only at the Lux-embourg meeting o oreign ministersin October 2006 when clear divisionswithin the EU erupted. Greece, Spain, Romania, Cyprus andSlovakia emerged as the most reluctantbloc within the EU vis--vis the ex-pected Ahtisaari outcome, while Russiastepped up its opposition to any out-come which would not be acceptable toboth sides. Te leaking o the core proposals othe Ahtisaari plan made sure there wereno surprises in either Belgrade in Pris-tina when the Finn finally presented hisproposals in February 2007. Serbiasparliament rejected them, while theKosovo assembly supported the plan. NAO immediately ollowed with itssupport despite the reluctance o somemember countries while the situationwas more complex at the other end oBrussels, in the EU. Put under intense pressure to acceptthe Ahtisaari plan in the name o Eu-ropean CFSP unity, Madrid, Bucharest,Nicosia, Athens and Bratislava adopteda reserve deense post: they grudging-ly said yes to the Ahtisaari process butconditioned it by the absolute necessityto have a UN Security Council resolu-tion. Tis ran contrary to the US expec-tations, which opposed a scenario under

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LESSONS FROM VIENNA

vital that the reedom o the parties is notcurtailed i they are to be given the maxi-mum chance o finding a mutually accept-able solution.Although Ahtisaari perhaps did his best totry to resolve the Kosovo status issue in di-ficult circumstances under intense pressure,it is now necessary to adopt a different ap-proach. Perhaps as a starting point it shouldbe accepted that international law must im-peratively be respected and that a solutionshould be ound within this context. Tis

would not exclude the possibility o Kosovobecoming independent, i a orm acceptableto both sides could be identified. Equally, itshould also be accepted that Albanians arethe majority in Kosovo and have the right torule themselves. A return to Belgrades rulethereore is not an option, but this would notexclude the possibility o Kosovo remainingwithin Serbia i the right level o autonomycould be ound.It is not just the mediators who must changetactics, but the sides themselves as well. Bothwent into the Vienna process with firmly en-trenched positions, and came out with theirpositions unchanged.I the talks are to be successul, both sidesshould accept that concessions must bemade i their proposals are to become more

acceptable to the other side, and thus movethe parties closer towards agreement. It isin this context that a one-sided approachshould be avoided, as all parties should ac-cept that there are two sides to this process,both o which deserve equal consideration.

In what areas could compromises be made?Firstly, Belgrade could offer Kosovo a specialstatus, which would allow it to become morethat just a province and have a state identityo its own. A state identity could even al-low Kosovo to have its own emblem and flag.Te Serbian governments idea to relinquishsome elements o sovereignty and allowKosovo access to the World Bank and Inter-national Monetary Fund, with some repre-sentation abroad, are good compromises, asonly by increasing the level o autonomy and

areas o competence, would Albanians beable to eel that they had sufficient control oKosovo to be ree o Belgrades rule, even itdid remain a part o Serbia.Te level o autonomy could be urther in-creased by being brought into line with thatwhich Kosovo enjoyed under the 1974 Con-stitution.Although actual membership o interna-tional financial institutions is reserved orsovereign states, Kosovo could neverthelesshave access to the unding as this is quitedifferent rom actual membership. It couldalso become a member o international or-ganisations or which sovereign statehood isnot a requirement.Kosovo could be represented abroad by itspresident and prime minister, who could

co-operate with, and establish relations withstates, provinces, regional and internationalorganisations. Tey could also enter intoregional and international agreements, pro-viding o course, i the sovereignty o Serbiais to be maintained, they did not inringe

Although it is reasonable to expect that thetalks cannot go on orever, there should beno artificial deadlines, and no hurrying othe process due to external pressures.Te talks should be allowed to run theircourse and reach a natural conclusion otheir own. In Vienna, rounds o talks wereheld at increasingly shorter intervals as pres-sure to conclude the process intensified.Tis did not allow or sufficient develop-ments - which may have brought the twosides closer together to occur in the in-tervening period, and consequently Mar-tti Ahtisaari and his colleagues came to theconclusion that an agreement between Bel-grade and Pristina was not possible.Despite this belie, Ahtisaari and his teambecame increasingly concerned that thenon-negotiated solution they had beenasked to draf by the Contact Group wouldbe rejected by Belgrade. Te Contact Groupmay have realised that it would be difficult toimpose such a solution upon the parties, buta quick end to the process took priority.More options should be put on the tableand pre-determined solutions avoided, asthis will be a disincentive to the parties anddiscourage them rom engaging in seriousnegotiations. Te previous talks were ham-pered by a lack o available options, leaving

Ahtisaari no alternative other than to leadthe parties down a dead-end road towardsthe independence stalemate.Whilst it is necessary to observe Contact

Group guidelines, the range o optionsshould be extended and diversified, as it is

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THERE ARE IMPORTANT LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM THE VIENNA PROCESS IF THE NEW TALKS, UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE CONTACT

GROUP, ARE TO BE SUCCESSFUL.

upon core elements o sovereignty (oreignpolicy, monetary policy and deence).Pristina could make concessions by beingmore open to options other than a ull orsupervised independence perhaps a highlevel o autonomy able to achieve the sameresult, but within Serbian borders could beconsidered. I there is to be actual indepen-dence, then some orm that could possiblybe acceptable to Belgrade should be ound.Just as there are many orms o autonomy,there are also several orms o independence

and many options in between.It appears that some lessons have alreadybeen learned.Now that an imposed solution has proved tobe a non-starter, the Contact Group is doingthe very thing that should have been donein Vienna by giving the parties more scopeand more time.Te new mediators have even stated thatthey are open to any solution i both par-ties can agree. With a balanced view and anopen mind, and a willingness to be flexibleand compromising, perhaps a successuloutcome will be achieved.

Frances Maria Peacock is a political analystand counsellor of the Conservative Party inthe UK.


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KOSOVO A UNIQUE CASE OF ARBITRARIN ESSKEY INERNAIONAL ACORS HAVE USED A NUMBER OF ARGUMENS IN ORDER O ADVANCE HE INDEPENDENCE OF KOSOVO AND MEOHIA

KOSOVO FOR SHOR AS AN ACCEPABLE SOLUION. SINCE EACH ARGUMEN ENCOUNERED PROBLEMS OF INCOHERENCE AND INCONSISENCY FROM HE SANDPOIN OF INERNAIONAL LAW, HE LOGICAL OUCOME WAS IN HE END O DECLARE KOSOVO A UNIQUE CASE OWHICH EXISING NORMS OF INERNAIONAL LAW CANNO BE APPLIED.

Let us briefly summarize the argu-ments preceding the declaration ouniqueness. One o the first argu-ments launched was that indepen-dence is an inevitable outcomedue to moral reasons.Serbia lost the right to govern theprovince because the regime o Slo-bodan Milosevic grossly violatedthe human rights o the Albanianminority. Besides ignoring that actthat the Milosevic era has ended,and extending the punishment tothe very political orces that ousted

him, the moral argument suggeststhat the breadth o Serbian repres-sion was o unprecedented magni-tude and thereore the permanentsuspension o Serbian sovereigntyover Kosovo is a rightul outcome.I moral principles are to be takenseriously then they have to be ap-plied consistently- to all internalconflicts where the rights o a mi-nority, or ethnic groups have beengrossly violated.Tis is not done, sovereignty is notsuspended, and borders are not re-drawn even in cases where the re-pression and number o victims areincomparably greater than in Koso-

vo.Furthermore, i we look at the hu-man rights situation o Serbs livingin Kosovo afer the NAO bomb-ing, then we ace a dismal recordo systematic and drastic violationso their rights by the Kosovo Alba-nians.In other words, the credibility o themoral argument is dismantled by thepolicy o the Albanians themselves.Tey have lost the moral right to be-come independent.Another argument in avor o inde-pendent Kosovo, is the democraticone, according to which it is neces-sary to respect the will o the Alba-nians in Kosovo, that is, extend the

right to sel-determination to mi-norities.I in the name o redefining democ-racy and international law this argu-ment were to be credible it wouldalso require that the declared will oother ethnic communities has to berespected as well.For instance, the will o Serbs in partso Kosovo or Bosnia where they are amajority, or the will o the citizens inAbkhasia, Southern Ossetia, rans-dniestria, etc. But the internationalactors contest the extension o thisright to others, reserving it only orthe Albanians in Kosovo. By doingso, they inevitably empty the argu-

ment o its democratic content.An additional argument that is ofenlaunched plays on the actor o ear.I the status o Kosovo is not urgentlyresolved violence and regional desta-bilization will ensue.

Tis is a weak argument because US,NAO and EU have all the instru-ments to preempt and prevent anysuch violence.However, instead o making this aclear non-option, they use the threato violence as an additional pressure,calculating that the Serbs are exhaust-ed by all the deeats and incapable ocounter threats. Te constructed ur-gency is clearly a cynical simulation ione has in mind the unresolved con-flicts that have dangerously troubledthe world or decades (Middle East,

Kashmir, etc.) or ongoing conflictsthat are taking a tragic toll in humanlives (Darur, or example).It is unclear why would an unre-solved status, in a situation where thehuman rights o Albanians are cur-rently not being violated, attain thestatus o regional/global crisis thatneeds to be urgently resolved even bybreaking the international law, whilesuch urgency is missing in relation toongoing violent conflicts elsewhere.Flirting with violence and in its nameenorcing a zero-sum outcome, arbi-trarily implementing the internation-al law cannot prevent destabilization.Te logic o such argument gives le-

gitimacy to violence as a means ocreating new states on the territoryo existing ones. Once such an ex-ample is set, the consequences will bedifficult to control without coercivemeans.Another argument that has appearedattempts to convince Serbia that iit renounces Kosovo, i.e. construc-tively cooperates, it would finallyprove that it chose a European utureinstead o the Balkan past. Tis ar-gument misrepresents the Europeanexperiences and goals.First, one o the achievements o theEuropean integration processes is thereconciliation between hostile na-tions. How can these capacities be

celebrated, and at the same time theidea o irreconcilable enemies whocannot live in a common state, butcan become credible members o EUbe accepted.Instead o accepting hostilities andmistrust as permanent eatures oSerb-Albanian relations, consistentEuropean spirit would reconcile,negotiate, compromise, and deviseinnovative ormulas o integration.Second, disintegration, creation oweak and dysunctional states is intotal contrast to the European inte-grative processes, and thus cannot bebut in some orm disruptive or theEuropean project.

I Serbia is a prospective member oEU, then it would be logical that inthe resolution o its problems, theprinciples o the community that itwill be become a member o, will beapplied.

Tereore, it is a paradoxical demandthat in order to prove its Europeanorientation, Serbia is required to ac-cept non-European principles andnon-European solutions or an es-sentially a European problem.In order to transcend the inconsis-tencies o previous arguments, thesolution was ound in proclaimingKosovo a unique case that demandsspecific answers inapplicable to otherconflicts. Tis argument should havesecured the legitimacy o indepen-dent Kosovo as a solution, at the same

time it should have served to delegiti-mize the aspirations o other ethnicgroups in the region and broader tosecession.An independent Kosovo will not seta precedent, cause global disruption,we are told, because it will be a caseon its own.Such a status will be secured by notrecognizing the right to sel-determi-nation in the case o other minoritiesby the global powers. In other words,who will have the right to create anew state, a reinterpreted right tosel-determination and who will bedeprived o it, depends only on thearbitrary will/support o the USA

and EU.Kosovo is not a unique case by anystandards. Te number o victims(around 6.000), the transitional au-thority and presence o KFOR arenot signs o uniqueness.Te UN has in various orms and di-ering duration set up transitional au-thorities, without turning them intopermanent suspensions o sovereign-ty (or instance, in East Slavonia).Such an idea in the case o Kosovois even more problematic having inmind the illegal NAO bombing thatpreceded it.I Kosovo becomes independent thiswill confirm that the NAO bombingwas in no way carried out to protect

human rights, but to violently changethe borders o a sovereign state.Kosovo is not a unique case exceptby the efforts made to present it assuch, and the consequences this en-orced uniqueness may produce -the destruction o the oundations othe international legal order.Tus, an independent Kosovo can-not but be a dangerous precedent,opening a new chapter o violentredrawing o state borders and pos-ing a ateul question: internationallegal order is being destroyed, whatis evolving in its place?

Radmila Nakarada is professor at the

Faculty of Political Science of the Uni-versity of Belgrade and Researcher atthe Institute of European Studies.

I am ready to die or what I believe in,

but thank God, I dont believe in anything

anymore.

*

Stop thinking only about your past.

Look at what were doing to you today!

*

We are pleased that you will once again

become our traditional riends.

*

We never take responsibility or our acts.

We are not a terrorist organization.

*

We are calling on the spirit to return inside

the lamp. His reedom o movement will be

guaranteed.Aleksandar Baljak

ull-time aphorist

*

You will have ull reedom o speech.

Tat will somewhat restrict your reedom o

movement.

*

Te longer the war,

the closer we are to peace.Slobodan Simi

psychiatrist

*

Te conflict could not have been avoided.

You were fighting or peace, we were fighting

against war.

Ilija Markovi

economist

*

Lets return to the negotiating table.

What are you drinking?

Andjelko Erdeljanin

satirical writer

*

Reincarnation would allowor the other side to be heard.

Milan Beti

sales consultant

*

Te verdict surprised everybody.

Especially the judge.

Vladan Soki

legal expert

*

Te truth will emerge, sooner or later.

Like every drowned corpse.

Dragan Rajii

gas-station worker

*

Afer all the political conrontation it is timeto return to normal life.

War.

Momilo Mihajlovi

copyshop clerk

A P H O R I S M S


7/8


A unilateral independence o Kosovowould normally oblige other countriesnot to recognize such an illegal act. Butsince there is no worldwide regulatorybody which has the authority or mech-anism to assert such measures, thereare no practical guarantees that inter-national law would be enorced.

Tis is why Serbia would have the le-gal right to a wide diapason o possiblereactions, rom retorsion to reprisals,in the case o a unilateral declarationo independence o Kosovo and its rec-ognition by other states. Serbia has already underlined that anypossible act o unilateral declarationo independence by Kosovo would beconsidered illegal and null. Tis meansthat or Serbia, not a single act broughtby the authorities in Kosovo wouldbe valid. In such a scenario, the stateo Serbia would have the obligation totake adequate measures against stateswhich would potentially recognizeKosovo. Tese can be divided in twocategories: (A) measures o retorsion,and (B) and measures o reprisals.

A) Measures o retorsionMeasures o retorsion represent unilat-eral measures which a state can under-take and which in themselves do notrepresent a breach o international law.Te state undertakes them as an answerto an unriendly act rom another state.Most commonly, it involves the changeo status or break up in diplomatic rela-tions. Also, it can lead to a disruption

in commercial relations primary orsecondary boycott as well as in theree circulation o people and capital.In the Kosovo case, this option opensmany retaliatory possibilities since itwould be related to a specific relation-ship in the triangle Serbia-Kosovo-or-eign countries. Te concrete situationsare as ollows: Serbia by definition

would not recognize personal andtravel documents issued by organso an independent state in Kosovo,nor would it recognize car plates is-sued by these authorities. As a result,no one rom the territory o Kosovocould enter or cross Serbia unless he isin possession o documents which Ser-bia considers as valid. Serbia could goa step urther and orbid entry on itsterritory to any oreign citizen who hasvisited Kosovo and who has in its doc-uments the seal o a state which Serbiaconsiders as non-existent. Te mostradical move would be to orbid entryto Serbia to all citizens rom countrieswhich would recognize the indepen-dence o Kosovo.Te same parallel can be made in thefield o commerce. Serbia could decideon the breakup o commercial relationswith states which would have recog-nized the independence o Kosovo ororbid work in Serbia to those firmswhich are also doing business in Koso-vo.Te question o legality o such reac-tions, in a situation where Serbia is le-gally bound by previous internationalobligations (ree circulation o people,goods or capital, o example) and thequestion o the overall useulness othese actions can be answered throughan analysis o the possible measures oreprisals that Serbia can undertake.

B) Measures o reprisalsAs opposed to measures o retorsion,

reprisals can represent a breach o in-ternational law per se, but this breachis justified as it represents an answer toan earlier violation o international law.Tis means that Serbia could undertakeall those aorementioned measureseven i they were in contradiction withearlier bilateral or multilateral conven-tions that the country had signed.

In terms o the second question thato the utility it is perectly clear thatSerbia itsel would be losing in the caseo interruption o commercial ties withstates which would recognize the inde-pendence o Kosovo or i it orbid tocitizens o those countries the entryinto Serbia. Tere is neither any ben-efit rom cutting diplomatic links withthese countries, nor even rom lower-ing them down. On the other side, acertain reaction or threat o reactionthrough a orbidding or all companieswhich are doing business in Kosovo todo business in Serbia as well (same goesor the orbidding o entry into Serbiaor all oreign citizens who had visitedKosovo) could have some effects. Itcould be a direct pressure against theillegitimate government in Pristina andindirectly against all countries whichintend to recognize it.But none o this would actually reversethe situation on the ground -- and thisis where we come to the core o theproblem. Te meaning and goal o thecounter-measures would be to over-turn the violations o international lawand bring them back to legal ground.Te problem is the ollowing: the rec-ognition o a sel-proclaimed new stateby another state creates a legal relation-ship between the newly-recognizedstate and the state which issues recog-nition. As such, the act o recognitionis in principle non-revocable. State Awhich recognizes state B cannot revokeits recognition because it becomes lim-

ited by international principles whichexist among subjects o internationalpublic law. Tat is why the aoremen-tioned countermeasures can hardly beefficient.Te only remaining possibility to re-voke the recognition would be tochange the situation on the ground, i.e.military reaction. Does Serbia have the

7

SERBIAS POSSIBLE RESPONSES

ARE SERBS REALLY INDIFFERENT ABOUT KOSOVO?

Kosovo is Serbias cancer, its im-pediment to European integration, itsmythical obsession: clichs aboutthe Serbs irrational link to Kosovo

abound and pop up as often as it isneeded to discourage Serbs from tak-ing part in the fate of their southern

province.Some of these have indeed found theirway in the minds of a part of the Ser-

bian population tired of past hardshipsand hoping for a better life.But those seeking to nd a realistic,long-lasting solution to the Kosovostatus should analyze more seriouslythe true relationship between Serbsand their province instead of falling

prey to the aforementioned stereo-types and supercial results of opin-ion polls which show that everydaylife problems precede Kosovo on the

priority lis t.True, indifference inside the Serbian

society occurs as a phenomenon, es-pecially in the second part of the 20thcentury.This is a consequence of the numer-ous catastrophes and national trag-edies Serbia has had to cope with.

The circumstances in which Serbianpeople have lived and survived in thelast few decades have imprinted an in-delible mark of tragedy and injustice:

striving for national-religious con-sciousness while being subdued byrepressive methods of communism,the tragic collapse of Yugoslavia, theequally tragic destiny of Serbian enti-ties and communities outside of Serbia,war crimes, exodus, NATO bombings,Hague tribunal proceedings, Montene-grin independence and now, aboveall, the issue of Kosovo.Thus, the Serbs national conscious-ness is such an emotionally painfulissue that everyday life and materialexistence appear to be of primary im-

portance at rst glance.The polls cannot however underminethe high importance that the fate ofKosovo has in the eyes of the Serbs.They can also often indirectly show the

importance of Kosovo in Serbias po-litical interest.The results of the public opinion re-search poll carried out by the Centrefor Free Election and Democracy inJune 2007, showed the following re-

sults: to the question of Which coun-tries should Serbia rely on when deal-ing with foreign affairs?, 34% ofrespondents answered in favour of Rus-

sia, 32% had been for the EU, and 5%for the USA. It is clear that the dailynews about the policies of Russia andthe USA towards Kosovo critically in-uenced the results, i.e. Russian poli-cies advocate a solution based upon areached agreement between the Serbianand Albanian sides, whereas American

policies support independence.Apart from polls which through theirdifferent methodologies can providevarious, sometimes contradictory inter-

pretations one should not forget otherfactors which have recently showed

popular Serb interest in Kosovos fate:- In March 2004, during thethree-day massive violence against theKosovo Serb community, dozens ofthousands of Serbs took the streets to

demonstrate.- In October 2006, more thanthree million Serbian citizens voted infavor of the new constitution, whichmain feature was related to the autono-my of Kosovo within Serbias borders.

right to an armed response to a uni-lateral declaration o independence oKosovo? Is this its only possible coun-ter-reaction?!Serbia would not use orce against anystate which would eventually illegallyrecognize the independence o Koso-vo but it would maintain order onits own territory. However, in theoryand practice things could get morecomplicated. Countries which wouldrecognize the independence o Koso-vo would consider it an aggressiono Serbia against a newly-recognizedcountry. Te more countries recognizeKosovo and the later a possible Ser-bian reaction, the easier such a posi-tion could be held. In any case, Serbiawould need to ast change the de actosituation in the field to Serbian benefit.In other words, Serbia would need toassure the respect o international lawby itsel.Given the political signals rom Bel-grade, such a radical option is highlyunlikely, but one thing is sure: dozenso other states in the world would eas-ily ace the same predicament, havingno legal means to prevent secessionistmovements on their territory shouldthose be recognized by third parties.Te whole system o national integritywould gradually all apart, due to eitherlocal interests, quid pro quo measuresor geopolitical superpower tactics.Let us hope, or the sake o worldwidepeace and stability, that the vicious cir-cle o unilateral recognitions will notbe opened, in Kosovo nor anywhereelse.

Milo Jovanovi is research associateat the Institute o International Politicsand Economy in Belgrade.

- In January 2007, some 3,7 mil-lion people, or 94% of voters placedtheir ballots for the parties which haveexpressed clear and unequivocal sup-

port for Serbias position on Kosovo.Thus, the Serbs interest in Kosovocannot simply be quantied by polls.But even if it was, one would not needto look further away than the pollsamong Kosovo Albanians themselvesfor an equally confusing answer.According to Shkelzen Maliqi, a lead-ing Albanian political analyst in Pris-tina, the question of independence isnot a priority for the majority of citi-zens [of Kosovo]. Unemployment and

poverty are the biggest problems forthe Albanians, although independencestill rates highly.

Petar Petkovi is research associate atthe Institute of International Politicsand Economics in Belgrade.


8/8


Tis newsletter is edited in Brussels.

Editor-in-chie: Aleksandar Miti([email protected])

Contributors: Slobodan Samardi, Jan Oberg,Frances Maria Peacock, Radmila Nakarada, Milo Jovanovi, Petar Petkovi,

Boris Miti, oo Borkovi, aphorists o the Belgrade Aphoristic Circle

Design & Marketing: Apostrophe, Belgrade

o join our mailing list, please send your details to [email protected]

, Institute 4S, Brussels. For the publisher: Predrag Lj. erani ([email protected]) All rights reserved.

8

Institute 4S, BrusselsBoulevard Louis Schmidt 103, 1040 Brussels

[email protected]

Te Kosovo Compromise Projectwww.kosovocompromise.com

Last year, our Kosovo 2006: The

Making of a Compromise cd-rom

had a clear goal - to present in con-

cise multimedia format the crucial

background to the Kosovo conict

and open up a real, constructive de-

bate at a time when independence

was deemed the only available op-

tion.

It took 5,000 carefully targeted cd-

rom copies, hundreds of media arti-

cles in over 20 languages, 50,000+

web site visits and, lets be realis-tic, ve unsuccesful independence

resolution drafts in the UN Security

Council, to refocus the status nego-

tiations and put them back on the

right track.

This fall, the new Kosovo 2007:

The Fast-Track to Europe cd-rom

and website provide further insight

into the new negotiations process,

once again using stylish design and

clear presentation.

The sites main features are the

original news digests and high-pro-

le analyses updated daily at 10am

Brussels time, as well as the uniqueKosovo Compromise Charts section,

a series of graphs covering key as-

pects of the negotiations process: the

diverging Serb and Albanian points

of view, the failures and lessons of

the Vienna talks, the local and geo-

political power balance interests,

the independence vs autonomy pros

and cons, the hypothetical post-sta-

tus daily life issues and Belgrade-

Pristina institutional relations, the

who-gets-what in a true compromise

solution and the responses to Euro-

integration requirements that such a

solution would yield.

And should you feel intimidated

by the quantity of useful informa-

tion, you can always save it all with

one mouse click and indulge in our

amusing quotes, aphorisms and cari-

catures sections.

To subscribe to our mailing list or

to order free copies of the CD-ROM,

please contact info@kosovocom-

promise.com. Both 2006 and 2007

cd-roms are also available online

through www.kosovocompromise.

com

Boris Miti is the creative director

and copywriter of the Kosovo Com-

promise Project.

RESET & COMPROMI SE

CONTENTSWhy Negotiate p.1Coalition o the Willing II p.2A New Beginning or Kosovo p.3

From High Hopes to Reality Check p.4Lessons rom Vienna p.5A Unique Case o Arbitrariness p.6Serbias Possible Responses p.7Are Serbs Really Indifferent About Kosovo? p.7Reset and Compromise p.8

kosovo_compromise_newsletter_01_oct07.pdf

Documents