kolesnikov 2015 - russian ideology after crimea

9/23/2015 RussianIdeologyAfterCrimeaCarnegieMoscowCenterCarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace

http://carnegie.ru/2015/09/22/russianideologyaftercrimea/ihzq?mkt_tok=3RkMMJWWfF9wsRohu6zOZKXonjHpfsX56OosW6S2lMI/0ER3fOvrPUfGjI4HS8... 1/16

SUMMARY

RussianIdeologyAfterCrimeaAndreiKolesnikov

PAPERSEPTEMBER22,2015

FollowingtheannexationofCrimeainMarch2014,theRussianpublichasembracedanincreasinglyconservativeandnationalisticideology.

FollowingtheannexationofCrimeainMarch2014,theRussianpublichasembracedanincreasinglyconservativeandnationalisticideology.Anyrepudiationofthisideology,letalonethetransformationofthecountryasawhole,willonlyhappenifdemandforchangefromthebottomcoincideswithadesireformodernizationfromthetop.

KeyFindings

ThenewsocialcontractdemandsthattheRussianpeoplesurrendertheirfreedominreturnforCrimeaandasenseofnationalpride.ItseizesonchangesthathavealreadyoccurredinthemindsofmanyRussians.Thenewideologyisbasedonadeliberaterecyclingofarchaicformsofmassconsciousness,aphenomenonthatcanbetermedthesanctificationofunfreedom.Confinedtoabesiegedfortress,surroundedbyexternalenemies,andfacedwithadomesticfifthcolumn,thepeopleofRussiahavebeguntoexperienceStockholmsyndromeandhavethrowntheirsupportbehindthecommanderofthefortress,PresidentVladimirPutin.Theyhaveadoptedhislogicandevendefendedhisinterests,believingthattheyaremembersofhisteam.Freedomofexpressionhasbeensignificantlycurtailedthroughasystemofbansandstrictformsofpunishment,includingcriminalprosecution,whichhavebothdidacticanddeterrentcomponents.Pressureondemocraticmediaoutletshasalsoincreaseddrastically.IdeologyinRussiaisamassproductthatiseasytoabsorbitislegitimizedbyconstantreferencestothepast,glorioustraditions,andoccasionallyfictionalhistoricalevents.Althoughideologyemanatesfromthetop,thereisdemandforitfromthebottom.

LookingtotheFuture

Witheconomicconcernsmounting,atsomepoint,theenergybehindthemassmobilizationoftheRussianbodypoliticwillbegintodissipate,andthesocialcontractthatemergedduringtheperiodofhighoilpriceswillstarttolosesteam.Ataminimum,thesausagethatwasexchangedforfreedom,so



tospeak,willhavetogetworseandmoreexpensive.WhiletheCrimeagambitprovedtobeamazinglyeffectiveatgeneratingpopularsupportfortheleadership,theregimewillhavetosupplythepeoplewithsomethingnewinthenearfuture.Supplywillhavetodrivedemand.Modernizationofthenewideologywillonlycomewhenthereisasupplyofreformistideasfromaboveandademandforthemfrombelow.ThestateideologyoffersnooverridingconceptforthefutureitsfoundationisRussiaspastglory.Inthissense,itmayhaveadecidedlylimitedlifespan.Thestrategicproblemfacingtheregimeis:WhatcanitoffertheRussianpeoplenowthattheCrimeancardhasbeenplayed?

MakingUnfreedomSacred

Russiasideologicalmatrixhasdeephistoricalroots,havingtakenshapeoverseveralhundredyears.Thatmakesitstrajectorydifficulttoalter.ThisideologyisentrenchedinthesamewaythatgraftisentrenchedintheRussiangovernmentandeconomy.Inaprivateconversation,theculturalsociologistDaniilDondureyreferredtograftasaculturalprescriptioninRussia,andideologymightbesimilarlylabeled.Itismorecomfortabletoconformthantodissent.Whenfacedwithachoicebetweenformalandinformaleconomies,Russiansfrequentlyoptfortheinformalrulesthattheyfindmorecomfortable.

Russiaremainsacountryofconceptsbasedonrelationshipsbetweentwoparties.Thetwomostimportantpairsofideasarepowerandproperty(havingpowerislinkedtoowningproperty)andcivilizationandthestate.Indiscussingthelatter,Dondureypointedoutthatthecivilizationstateasasuperinstitutionprotectspeople,traditions,itshistory,culture,morals,andtherulesofliving,butmostimportantly,itprotectsitsowndistinctnessandsovereignty.Thatisitsmandate.Itmustconstantlydemonstrateitsmammothpowerotherwise,thepeoplewillbedisappointed.Theyhavetobecertainthatanysacrificesaremadeforahigherpurposetoprotectthestate.RussianPresidentVladimirPutintalkedaboutthismandatefortheentiresecondhalfof2014:Wewillnotbesubjugated,herepeatedoverandover.1

RussianideologyismystifyinglikePutinsapprovalratings,itseemstobeenchanted.InTheSpiritofEnlightenment,theFrenchphilosopherTzvetanTodorovwrotethatEnlightenmentremovesthespellfromtheworld.2ThecontemporaryRussianregimeisattemptingtoputtheworldbackunderaspell,usingthetacticsofpreEnlightenmenttheocraciesratherthanthoseofmodernstates.Thistrendcanbedescribedasaprocessofmakingunfreedomsacred,andithasbeenaccompaniedbyanewfoundfundamentalismandintolerancetowardallthingsforeign.

IdeologicalSupplyandDemand

VladimirNabokovs1945NewYorkerstoryConversationPiece,1945,shedslightonRussianconservatism,describingthekindofconversationsthatcanstillbeheardinMoscowsconservativequarters,corporatebackrooms,andluxuryapartments.Indeed,Russianconservativeideologyhasnotchangedmuchsincethen.ThewordsoftheformerWhiteGuardcolonel,acharacterinthestory,brilliantlysummarizedthesentimentsexpressedbythemainstreaminmoderndayRussia:ThegreatRussianpeoplehaswakedupandmycountryisagainagreatcountry.Wehadthreegreatleaders.WehadIvan,whomhisenemiescalledTerrible,thenwehadPetertheGreat,andnowwehaveJosephStalin.IamaWhiteRussianandhaveservedintheImperialGuards,butalsoIamaRussianpatriotandaRussianChristian.Today,ineverywordthatcomesoutofRussia,Ifeelthepower,IfeelthesplendorofoldMotherRussia.Sheisagainacountryofsoldiers,religion,andtrueSlavs.3

WhatisbehindtherapidascentofthistypeofideologydrivenSlav,afterRussiaannexedCrimeain2014?Whyhavethesekindsofpeoplebecomesovisible(itishardtosaywhethertheyareinthemajorityornot)inpostCrimeaRussia,whichhadbeenmovingtowardtheWestforaquarterofacentury?Whyaretalkshowhostsonpublictelevisionchannels,Facebookusers,visitorstotheKremlinscafeteria,andpatronsof



upscalerestaurantssuddenlysoideological?Whoaretheconduitsofthisideology?

ThePolishphilosopherLeszekKoakowskiwrotethatideologyisalwaysweakerthanthesocialforcesthatexpressitandserveasconduitsofitsvalues.4Thisistrue.ItishardtocallanideologypowerfulwhenitispremisedontheczaristeraconstructofCountSergeyUvarov(thepolicyknownasOrthodoxy,Autocracy,andNationality)andreliesontheprescriptionsofselfisolationandmilitarismtoguideRussiainthepostindustrialtwentyfirstcentury.Itisimpossibletoconsiderterritorialacquisitionaparticularlyresonantgeopoliticalmoveinanagewhenseizingterritoryisnolongerconsideredasignofstrength.

TheideologyofthecurrentRussianregimeisantiquatedandweak.Nevertheless,theideologyhasbeenutilizedattherightplaceattherighttimeandhasbeensownonfertileground.AsKoakowskiwrote,thesocialwavethatsupportedtheideologyturnedouttobemorepowerfulthantheactualideologyborrowedfromtheeighteenth,nineteenth,andtwentiethcenturies.

TheregimehasattemptedtorewriteRussianhistory,justifyingthe1939WinterWaragainstFinlandandthe19791989invasionofAfghanistan(amongotherrevisionistinterpretations).Still,itdoesnotmerelyderiveitslegitimacyfrompastpolicyandideologybywhitewashingdarkpagesofhistory.Thestateisalsoreproducingoldideologicalprojects.TakeCatherinetheGreatsCrimeanproject,forexample.Underherrule,CrimeabecameaRussianprotectorateabufferstateofsortsaftertheTurksweredrivenout.InApril1783,thepeninsulawasannexedtoRussiawithoutasingleshotbeingfired.AshistorianofRussiancultureAndreiZorinwrote,CrimeaendowedRussiawithenormoussymboliccapital.ItcouldrepresentboththeChristianByzantiumandtheClassicHellas.5

TheRussianOrthodoxChurchhashistoricallyplayedalargeroleinallideologicalprojects(exceptduringtheSovietera).WhiletalkingaboutthecontinuityofRussianideologiesin2012,Zorinnoted,Theideaofasymbioticrelationshipbetweenthestateandthechurchisbeingrevived.Thestateisrelyingonlegitimacyderivedfromthechurch.Ontheotherhand,thechurchisbecominganadministrativeserviceofthestate,whichincreasesitsauthority.6

Asimpleideologyshouldconsistofsimplecomponents,likedesignatingenemieswithinandwithout.PutinsMarch18,2014,speechjustifyingtheannexationofCrimeafocusedonthisaspect:Thisisadecisionthatweneedtomakeforourselves.Arewereadytoconsistentlydefendournationalinterests,orwillweforevergivein,retreattowhoknowswhere?SomeWesternpoliticiansarealreadythreateninguswithnotjustsanctionsbutalsotheprospectofincreasinglyseriousproblemsonthedomesticfront.Iwouldliketoknowwhatitistheyhaveinmindexactly:actionbyafifthcolumn,thisdisparatebunchofnationaltraitors,oraretheyhopingtoputusinaworseningsocialandeconomicsituationsoastoprovokepublicdiscontent?7

PutinsaddresstotheFederalAssemblylaterthatsameyearalsooutlinedanotheraspectofcontemporaryRussianideology:Crimea,theancientKorsunorChersonesus,andSevastopolhaveinvaluablecivilisationalandevensacralimportanceforRussia,liketheTempleMountinJerusalemforthefollowersofIslamandJudaism.Andthisishowwewillalwaysconsiderit.8

AllofthisispartofthesupplysideofcontemporaryRussianideology.Butthedemandforitcamefirst.DemandforaneclecticbrandofRussiannationalisolationistideologywasdelayedbytheperiodofpoliticalandeconomicreformsinthe1990s,butPutinhasmanagedtocreateaproductthatisindemandandcanbeeasilyandprofitablysold,thusmakingitaccessibletoeveryone.Putinasabrandisalsopartofthisproduct,thisnewideology.

Massideology,likeanymassmarketedproduct,issimple,bothintermsofsupplyanddemand.Itisanideologycreatedwithoutmucheffortandabsorbedwithoutmuchreflection.

MilitarizationandStalinization

AttheendofDecember2014,thePublicOpinionFoundationconductedanopinionpollentitledHowRussiaisViewedAroundtheWorld.Respondentsweremarkedlymoreoptimisticthantheyhadbeeninapollfromtenmonthsearlier.InFebruary,57percentofthosepolledthoughtthattheywerelivinginadeveloped,



advancedcountrybyDecember,thatnumberhadrisento69percent.ThenumberofRussianswhobelievedthattheywerelivinginarichcountryincreasedfrom58percentto66percentinafreecountryfrom60percentto73percentinacountrythateveryonefearsfrom68percentto86percentandincountrywhoseinfluenceisgrowingfrom55percentto67percent.TheonlyproblemsfacingRussia,accordingtoRussians,hadtodowiththefactthatforeignersdonotlikeRussia.9AccordingtoaNovember2014LevadaCenterpoll,68percentofrespondentsconsideredRussiaagreatpower,comparedto48percentinSeptember2012.10

Russiansthinktheyarelivinginabesiegedfortress.Whilesomebelievethattheyhavebeentakenhostage,othersseemtoenjoytheirimprisonment.TheyhaveStockholmsyndromeandhaveturnedtheirunfreedomintosomethingsacred.

Thissacralizationofunfreedomgivesbirthtomilitarism.Russiansocietyhasbeenmilitarizedfordecades,ifnotcenturies.BeingpreparedforalightningfastmilitarymobilizationwasarguablythemainsharedvalueintheSovietUnion,duringandafterJosephStalinsrule.ThebadgethatSovietchildrenreceiveduponsuccessfulcompletionofathleticchallengeswasevennamedReadyforLaborandDefense.Sovietdiscoursewasrepletewithrhetoricaboutthestruggleforpeace,whichgavebirthtoarathercannyjokeaboutstrugglingforpeaceuntiltheworldwastornintopieces.ExorbitantmilitaryspendingcontributedtotheSovietUnionscollapse.Butthislessonhasbeencompletelyforgottennow.

ThereisaremarkablecorrelationbetweenthelevelofinflationintheRussianeconomyandthelevelofantipathytowardtheUnitedStatesandEuropeanUnion(EU)countries(seefigures13).WhileinflationisafundamentalproblemthathasbeenworryingRussiansagreatdeal,accordingtoavarietyofpolls,negativeviewsoftheWesthavebeenhittingnewrecordhighslately.

ThedeclineinpositiveattitudestowardtheUnitedStatesandtheEUpredatestheconquestofCrimea.(Infact,publicattitudestowardtheWestdeclinedsignificantlyduringRussias2008warwithGeorgia.)ButfollowingthestartofdirectconfrontationwiththeWestandthehybridwarintheeasternDonbasregionofUkraine,negativeopinionsstartedsettingonerecordafteranother.11

AnotherimportantpublicopinionindicatorattitudestowardStalinhasalsobeenbreakingrecords.AccordingtoaLevadaCenterpollfromDecember2014,52percentofRussiansconsideredhishistoricalrolepositive.Infact,thenumberofRussianswhoconsideredhisroledefinitelypositivehasgrownmostsubstantially.From

February2013toDecember2014,thenumberofsuchrespondentsgrewby7percentagepoints,from9percentto16percent.12

Thenumberofthosewhogreatlyadmired(2percent),admired(7percent),andrespected(30percent)Stalinaddsupto39percentofrespondents.ThenumberofthosewhosawthedeathofStalinasthelossofagreatleaderandteacherhasalsoincreased:fromFebruary2013toMarch2015,itwentupby6percentagepoints,from18percentto24percent.Mostimportantly,therehasbeenaradicalincreaseinthenumberofthosewhosawmassrepressionunderStalinasjustifiedbyhisgreatgoals.InNovember2012,21percentofthosepolledsomewhatagreedwiththisresponse,while4percentdefinitelyagreed.AsofMarch2015,thesenumbershadincreasedto38percentand7percent,respectively.13



TheRussianpublichasgenerallyendorsedgreaterStalinization.ProposalstocommemoratetheroleofStalinasagreatmilitarycommanderhavebecomecommonplace.Tocitejustonenotoriousexample,thePerm36Gulagmuseumwasturnedintoamuseumdedicatedtothecampguards.Inthiscontext,RussianparliamentarianIrinaYarovayasproposal,whichwassignedintolawinmid2015,14toprovidestatepensionstovolunteerlawenforcementassistants(thatis,informers)doesnotseematalloutoftheordinary.

TotheCrimeanmajority,madeupofPutinsupporters,StalinissynonymouswithorderandthegoldenageofRussianstatehood.Fromanideologicalstandpoint,thecurrentregimeisinsomewaysthesuccessortoStalinandthegreatSovietempire,andanheirtoitsmainachievementvictoryinWorldWarII.ItdoesnotevenoccurtomostpeoplethattheSovietUnionwonthewardespiteStalinratherthanbecauseofhim.Theydonotrealizethat,attheveryleast,Stalinispersonallyresponsibleforthedestructionoftheuppertierofmilitarycommanders,thepainfulseriesofdefeatsattheoutsetofthewar,andtheneedlesslyheavyhumanlosses.

AccordingtoanApril2015PublicOpinionFoundationpoll,46percentofRussiansviewedStalinsroleasthecountrysleaderduringWorldWarIIpositively,andonly7percentnegatively.Thirtypercentfoundthequestionhardtoanswer,whichisusuallythecasewith

serioushistoricalanalysis.Onarelatedquestion,24percentofthosepolledgaveStalincreditforthevictorymoreover,15percentviewedhisbrutaltacticspositively.15

Importantly,positiveattitudestowardStalinarenotsimplyabyproductoftheannexationofCrimeaandtheincreasedideologicalfervortheyhavebeenanideologicalfixturesinceatleastthemidtolate2000s.Infact,proStalinviewsprevailedinpublicopiniontowardtheendofPutinssecondtermaspresident.Forinstance,accordingtoaLevadaCenterpollcommissionedbytheFriedrichNaumannFoundationin2008,37percentofrespondentsexpressedgreatadmirationfortheSovietdictatorasopposedto12percentinApril2001.16

TheregimesdirectorindirectappealtothegreatnessoftheStalineraisnotsimplyawaytojustifyitsdomesticcrackdowns.IfasignificantnumberofRussiansgiveStalincreditfortheWorldWarIIvictory,thentothem,PutinisanheirtothegoodStalin.



Thoseclamoringforanewideologygotwhattheywantedanold,almostSovietideologyrepletewithStalinistsocialpractices.Thisbringsbackthequestionsofwhodrivesdemand,whoconsumesthisideology,andwhoexactlyarethedefendersofthebesiegedRussianfortress?

TheDefendersoftheFortress

In1964,thephilosopherHerbertMarcuse,whowouldlaterbecomearolemodelforthe1968generation,wroteamuchtalkedaboutbookentitledOneDimensionalMan:StudiesintheIdeologyofAdvancedIndustrialSociety.TheMarcusianonedimensionalmanwasaproductofcapitalismmoreorlessthesamestrandofcapitalismadoptedbytheRussianstatemuchlater.Infact,eventhetitleoftheintroductiontohisbookisquitetellingwhenitcomestothenatureofRussiansociety:TheParalysisofCriticism:SocietyWithoutOpposition.

Inasocietythatenjoysfreedomfromwant,asMarcuseputit(liketheburgeoningRussianmiddleclassduringtheeraofhighoilpricesandrecoveringeconomicgrowthintheearly2000s),Independenceofthought,autonomy,andtherighttopoliticaloppositionarebeingdeprivedoftheirbasiccriticalfunctioninasociety.Asaresult,thestateacquiresarighttodemandacceptanceofitsprinciplesandinstitutions,andreduceoppositiontothediscussionandpromotionofalternativepolicieswithinthestatusquo.Inthisrespect,itseemstomakelittledifferencewhethertheincreasingsatisfactionofneedsisaccomplishedbyanauthoritarianoranonauthoritariansystem.17

ThesocialcontractinRussiainthe2000sconformedtothistheory.Russianscouldprofitfromoilrevenuesinexchangeforsupportfortheregime.Putmorebluntly,Russiansgaveuptheirfreedominexchangeforsausage.Nowthatthefreedomfromwanthasbeencalledintoquestionbytheeconomiccrisis,thecontracthasbeenreformatted:RussiansarebeingaskedtogiveupfreedominexchangeforCrimeaandspiritualbonds.

Thetotalitarianregimesofpastcenturiessoughttoforgeanewtypeofman,replacingtempleswithspaciousandefficientpublicfacilities.Asaresult,theSovietpeople,representinganewhistoricentity,werebornfromthepopulationandvastexpansesoftheoldempire.

Inasimilarvein,anewtypeofapersonapostCrimeanoneemergedinRussiain2014.Thearchetypeisevenmoreonedimensionalthantheonethatmaturedamidtherunupinoilprices.ItisimpossibletoauthoritativelyconcludewhetherthistypeofpersonnowdominatesinRussiansociety,butthepostCrimeanmanclearlyexistsandimpactsthesocialmilieuaroundhim.

ThisnewpersonwasforgedashewatchedhistelevisionscreenduringtheannexationofCrimea.Marcusedescribedthisphenomenoninthecontextofthesocietyoftotalmobilization,which...combinesinproductiveunionthefeaturesoftheWelfareStateandtheWarfareState.18

Eventually,however,livingconditionsbecomeworsewhilethewarcontinues.Andinthisnewstate,eventhepostCrimeanmanstartstofearwar.

FiftyninepercentofthosepolledinaMay2015LevadaCentersurveyrespondeddefinitelyyesorlikelyyestoaquestionaskingwhethertheUnitedStatesposesathreattoRussia.TheirconceptoftheAmericanthreatwasrathervague,however.Comparedto2007,morepeoplebelievedthatforeignoppositiontoRussiasdevelopment(anabstractconcept)representsathreattothecountry.Additionally,31percentofRussiansfearedthepossibilityofmilitaryinterventionoroccupation(up10percentagepointsfrom2007).19

Thesefigurespointtoawholehostofchangesinsociety.Russianconsciousnesshasbeenmilitarized,makingthepopulationincreasinglyfearfulofandpreparedforwarperceptionsoftheUnitedStatesandUkrainehavealsochangedincludingtheconceptthatUkraineisasatelliteoftheUnitedStates,andthusanoccupiedcountryfightingagainsttherebelsinDonbasand,byextension,Russia.

AsRussianshavegrownmoreconfidentoftheircountrysgreatnessandconsolidatedsupportaroundtheirleaderandtheannexationofCrimea,concernsofotherthreatscomingfromtheUnitedStateshave



dissipated.TheCrimeanmajoritydoesnotfeareconomicandpoliticaldomination,andindeedmanyRussiansbelievethattheircountryisselfsufficient.TheCrimeanmajorityisunafraidoftheWestimposingitsvaluesonRussiaitsvalues,itseems,arenolongersusceptibletoWesterninfluence.

Despiteincreasedmilitarization,mostRussiansunderstandmutuallyassureddestructionperfectlywellandareafraidofnuclearwarbetweenRussiaandtheUnitedStates.FiftytwopercentofRussianspolledagreedthatawarbetweenthetwocountrieswouldhavenowinners.Still,33percentofrespondentswereconfidentthatRussiawouldwinanuclearwar(5percentthinkRussiawouldlose).Accordingtothesamepoll,32percentofrespondentsbelievedthatPutincanauthorizetheuseofnuclearweaponsintheeventofamilitaryconfrontation.Aboutonethirdofrespondentswerescaredbythepresidentsrecentstatementonthepossibleuseofnuclearweapons.20

Eventhoughthereisplentyofbelligerenttriumphalismapparentintheviewsofsomerespondents,thelevelofmilitarizationactuallyleadsasignificantportionofRussianstofearthattheirpresidentwouldbemorelikelytousenuclearweaponsthantheU.S.government.

AWaveofConservatisminPoliticsandSociety

ThecreationofthepostSovietmanwascompletebytheendoftheefforttoadoptmarketprinciplesinthelate1990s.Asstrangeasitmayseem,thisarchetypalfiguremorecloselyresembledtheSovieteramodelthanthepostCommunistRussianmanoftheearly1990s.ThefuturePutinmajorityofthe2000s,whichwouldbecometheCrimeanmajorityin2014,startedtakingshapeattheturnofthecenturyasareactiontothetraumaticcollapseoftheempireandthedisruptivechangesinthecountryssociopoliticalandeconomicorder.Paternalisticattitudes,antimarketopinions,andnationalistandimperialistbeliefsbegantoprevail.

Thiswaveofconservatismhasbeengatheringmomentumandpoliticalstrengthforyears.ItdidnotsimplyappearovernightwiththeannexationofCrimea.FormerRussianpresidentDmitryMedvedevsfouryeartenure,whichnurturedillusionsaboutRussiasmodernizationandintegrationintotheWesternworld,onlyincreasedthepopulationslevelofdisenchantmentandcreatedanopeningforconservativeviewstogainground.Inturn,the2012presidentialelectiongavetheregimeamandatetostrengthenitsauthoritarianfoundations.

Theresultsofthe2008FriedrichNaumannFoundationpollarequitetellinginthisregard.21InOctober1991,immediatelybeforetheSovietUnionscollapseandtheintroductionofeconomicreforms,theLevadaCenter(whichwas,atthetime,partoftheRussianPublicOpinionStudyCenter)foundthat62percentofRussiansviewedWesternlifestylespositively.Only10percentheldanegativeview.22ThisattitudeundergirdedRussiansfaithintheomnipotenceofliberalreformsandtheirdesiretodiscardtheSovietpast.By2008,30percentofthosepolledviewedWesternlifestylesnegatively,eventhoughasubstantialpartofthecountryspopulationhadalreadybeenlivingintheWesternconsumptionparadigm.Perhapsthisexplainswhythepercentageofpositiveresponsesdidnothitrockbottom,thoughitdiddecreasesubstantially,fallingto46percentin2008.23

Whenpollstersaskedthesamequestionsinthefallof2014(aftertheannexationofCrimea),34percentofrespondentsviewedWesternlifestylespositivelyand42percentnegatively.Analmosttwentyfiveyearoldtrendhadpracticallyreversed.24

Thesocalleduniquepath(anationalmodeldistinctfromtheEuropeanone),howevervaguelyandintuitivelyunderstood,hasinvariablyremainedthemostpopularmodelforRussiasdevelopmentitspopularityhoveredaround60percentinthe2000s,whileabout20percentsupportedaEuropeanpath.25

Interestingly,theuniquepathwasnotaspopularatthestartofthe2010sasatothertimessincethebreakupoftheSovietUnion:itwassupportedbyonly37percentofRussiansin2013.Thatnumberincreasedto55percentinApril2015,afterthefirstwaveofpostCrimeapatriotism.Nevertheless,theEuropeanpathalsoenjoyedarelativelyhighlevelofsupport31percent,whichisprobablyrelatedtothefactthatanentiregenerationofRussiansnowconsidersWesternlifestylesandconsumerbehaviornormal.26



BytheendofformerRussianpresidentBorisYeltsinstenureandatthestartofPutins,asignificantnumberofRussianshadbecomesupportersofgovernmentinterventionintheeconomy,havinglivedthroughtheshockofmarketreformsandthe1998devaluationoftheruble,whenRussiadefaultedonitsforeigndebts.27

Sincethen,peoplehavegenerallybecomemorecriticalofeconomicreforms,especiallyinthehousing,utilities,education,healthcare,pension,andenergysectors,andnaturalmonopolyreformsthatPutinproposedintheearlyyearsofhispresidency.Thesereformsaffectedpeopleseverydaylives,andeventhoughmanyRussianswerenotsatisfiedwiththestateofaffairs,theyfearedthatthingswouldonlygetworseandmoreconfusingifchangesweremade.28

Thefailureofthe2005minireforms,whichsoughttomonetizenumerousSovieterabenefits,madethepublicand,importantly,elitesevenmoreresentfulofreformsofanykind:theupperechelonlostinterestinthemandhasremainedskepticalthatreformscanbesuccessfullymanaged.TheseconcernswerelaterrealizedastheregimeflipfloppedonpensionreformbotchedimplementationofhealthcarereformandpoorlyadministratedtheUnifiedStateExamforhighschoolgraduates.Ordinarypeople,perhapsunderstandably,preferrednochangeatall.29

ThemaindriverofRussianspostYeltsinselfidentificationwasthegrowingdesireforRussiatobeseenasagreatpower,acountrythatisbothfearedandtobereckonedwith,astheysawit.Atthesametime,highlivingstandardswereseenasthemaincharacteristicofabrightfutureandastrongcountry.Moreover,pragmaticratherthatideologicalviewsgraduallygainedgroundeconomicgrowth,highoilprices,andtheemergenceofaconsumptionorientedmiddleclasswerebeginningtochangeRussiansocietyfundamentally.30Whilebeingpaternalistic,imperialist,andnationalistatheart,Russiancitizenspreferredtoremainpragmaticindividualistsintheirdailylives.

After2010,thedesiretoseeRussiaasagreatpowerbegantomatchorprevailoverpragmaticconcerns,accordingtotheLevadaCenter(seefigure4).

AnswerstothequestionIsRussiacurrentlyagreatpower?revealchangesinhowRussiansidentifythemselves(seefigure5).Though31percentofrespondentstoaLevadaCenterpollsawRussiaasagreatpowerin1999,thatnumberincreasedsharplyto53percentin2000afterPutinassumedthepresidencythenumbersubsequentlydeclinedduringhisreign,thengraduallyincreasedto55percentby2010.31InMarch2015,68percentofrespondentssaidthatRussiaisagreatpower.

TheRussianpoliticalestablishmenthasbeeneagertosupplytheideologycalledforbythemasses.InMarch2015,49percentofRussiansgavePutincreditforrestoringthecountrytoitsgreatpowerstatus.32

Theregimehasgenerallybenefitedfromastableyetrelativelyhighlevelofdemandforconservativeideologyoverthepastfifteenyears.Afteralmostadecadeofsociopoliticaltransition,atransformationalcrisis,andaruptureofthesocioeconomicorder,populardemandforsomethingabstractlyconservativewaspoisedtocometothesurface.

AgainstthebackdropofpatternsinRussianpoliticsandideologyoverthepastdecadeandahalf,thePutin



majoritysstrongsupportfortheRussianleadershouldcomeasnosurprise.

Thepresidencyistheonlyfunctioninginstitutioninthispoliticalsystem.Therestofthesystemexistslargelytosupporttheleader.Alloftheconstitutionalinstitutionsofgovernmentthatis,theparliament,courts,ministries,partysystem,andcivilsocietyaremerelytransmissionbelts,toborrowVladimirLeninsterm.

IdeologyandtheRussianOrthodoxChurchsanctifythispoliticalsystem,whichcloselyresemblesacorporatestate.Itisasysteminwhicheverycommunityprofessional,gender,andothersiscontrolledbygoverningbodiesandcannotexistoutsidethestate.

Insuchasystem,thestateproffersitsownversionofcivilsocietytosuppressorthwartactualgrassrootspolitics(forexample,theCivicChamber,asupervisinggroupforcivicactivitiestheUnitedPeoplesFront,aquasicivilsocietygroupthatresemblesItaliandictatorBenitoMussoliniscorporationsandgovernmentapprovedandgovernmentsponsorednongovernmentalorganizations).Thestatelegallyenshrinesconceptssuchasforeignagentandundesirablenongovernmentalorganization,amongothers,whichgivesitplentyoftoolstoexertcompletecontroloverrealcivilsociety.

Thestatetakesasimilarapproachtothepartysystem,whereparliamentarygroupspropupthepartyinpower(UnitedRussia)fromdifferentsides,makingpoliticsresembleanacrobaticcircusroutine.UnitedRussiaplaystomainstreamvoterstheelectoratewithabstractpatriotictendenciesandnoindependentworldview.TheCommunistParty(CPRF)andtheLiberalDemocraticParty(LDPR),aswellastheostensiblysocialdemocraticJustRussiaparty,inessenceserveasthedepartmentsofthepartyinpowerresponsiblefortheleftandrightwingelectorates,makingsurethesevotersdonotradicalizeandcontinuetosupportthesystem.Foritspart,theCPRFchannelsvotesfromtheleftwingandsociallydisenfranchisedelectorate,thuskeepingitfromjoiningnonparliamentarypartiesandpreventingleftleaningvoterswithnostalgiafortheSovietpastfromradicalizing.TheLDPRattractsandsterilizesthenationalistvote.Anyothernonmainstreamnationalist,patriotic,ultraleft,orultrarightviewsareblockedordeclaredextremist.Theonlyoptionvotersareleftwithistosupportgovernmentapprovedpartiesotherwise,theywillbemarginalized.

Thefreeforallmultipartysystemofthe1990sandtherelativelyfreearrangementofthe2000sarelonggone.The2010sofferoneasimplechoice:youareeitherfortheregimeanditssatellitesandideology,oryouareagainstit.

Thegovernmentsponsoredideologyisbroadenoughtokeepanypoliticalforceorviewthatsupportsthecurrentregimeunderoneumbrella.Therestendupoutsideofthesystem,occupyingamarginal,nicherole,andsometimessupportersoftheseviewsaresenttoprison.

TheLiberalQuestion

TheviewsexpressedbyopponentsofthesystemareoftencalledliberalinRussianpoliticaldiscourse.Thisisanobviousovergeneralization.Inasimilarfashion,supportersofaWesternizedpathofdevelopmentwereallcalleddemocratsinthe1990s.

Therearesomeimportantdifferencesamongopponentsoftheregime.Ontheonehand,intheeyesofstatepropaganda,anyonedefendingWesternunderstandingsofhumanrights(forinstance,samesexmarriage,


http://carnegie.ru/2015/09/22/russianideologyaftercrimea/ihzq?mkt_tok=3RkMMJWWfF9wsRohu6zOZKXonjHpfsX56OosW6S2lMI/0ER3fOvrPUfGjI4HS... 10/16

whichisadivisiveissueinRussia)isaliberal.AnyonewhostandsupforUkraineinspired,Euromaidanlikeprotests,whichinvariablyareportrayedasfinancedbythehostileWest,isalsobrandedaliberal.Ontheotherhand,thereistheAtlanticlobbyintherulingelite,anditconsistslargelyofloyalistliberals.Thesepeoplearetryingtoreshapethecontoursofthesystemsdevelopment(or,rather,degradation)fromwithin.Theyarealsooccasionallyreferredtoasthesixthcolumn.

Thepublicembracesalooselyarticulatedbutclearlyunderstoodpremisesupportedbystatepropaganda:thesocalledliberalismofthe1990swasresponsibleforthebreakupofthecountry,widespreadpoverty,wildcapitalism,andoligarchicrule.Inmanyways,Putinscharismarestsontheextremelyimportantideologicalbasisthathealonebroughtorderandstabilitytothecountryafterthechaosofthe1990s.

Nuancedunderstandingsofpoliticsstartfromthesepremises.

AccordingtotheLevadaCentersresearch,peopleconsidergreedtobethemaincharacteristicofthecountryscurrentelites.33Inmassconsciousness,theideathateveryoneontopstealsservesasbothanaxiomandanexcuseforpoliticalapathy,becauseitiscommonlybelievedthatnothingcanbedoneanyway.

Overtime,allofthissomewhatreducedPutinsapprovalratings(seetable1).Thatis,until2014,whenhisapprovalratingsskyrocketed.

Thelevelofmistrusttowardthesystemdiminishedasthepresidentsapprovalratingssoared.34Moreover,DefenseMinisterSergeiShoiguandForeignMinisterSergeyLavrov,whowereintegraltosomeofPutinsaccomplishments,alsosawtheirapprovalratingsgoupbetween2014and2015.35

SocalledliberalsandproponentsoftheEuromaidanrevolutionandWesternvalueswillremainscapegoats,blamedforunderminingthecentralaccomplishmentoftheera,Russiasreturntogreatpowerstatus.

Whatmakesliberalideology,theliberalpartiesthatdisappearedfromthefederalparliamentin2003,andliberalsthemselvessounpopular?

First,againstthebackdropofsweepingsocioeconomicreforms,allpostSovietcountriesthatimplementedliberaleconomicreformsfacedanaturalconservativebacklashfromelitesandthegeneralpopulation.Inalmostallstatesintransition,liberalreformerswereheldaccountablefordelaysinstartingthereformseventhoughmostoftheculpabilitylaywitheithertheCommunistorquasiCommunist

nomenklatura.Still,thesocialandemotionalpricethathadtobepaidforreformswasultimatelyquitehigh,particularlyinRussia.

Alargenumberofsocialgroupswerenotincludedintheprocessofreform,leadingmanyofthemtoviewthecountrystransformationashostile.Whenliberalreformseventuallyledtogrowth(boosted,nodoubt,byhighoilpricesandthefeelingofafreshstartaftertheYeltsintoPutintransition),liberalswerenotgivencredit:theylostoutinthe2003parliamentaryelectiondespitethesuccessoftheireconomicpolicies.

Second,thepeculiarcharacteristicsofthetransferofpowerfromBorisYeltsintoVladimirPutinandthebungledcreationofasystemofprivatepropertyinRussia(inparticular,theriggedloansforsharesauctionsandthebarringofforeigninvestorsfromthefirststagesofprivatization)ledtoanoligarchictakeoverofthetopoftheeconomicsystemandthefusionoffinancialandpoliticalelites.

However,aftermakingthedestructionoftheoligarchyoneofhismainpoliticalgoalsandeliminatingthemost



prominentanddefiantfigures,Putinchangednothingelseabouthowthesystemfundamentallyworked.Hehungontotheoldloyaloligarchsandredistributedasignificantportionofassetsamongthenewoligarchs,sometimescalledPutinsfriendsor,inreferencetothecountryssecurityagency,theRussianOrthodoxKGBofficers(thissomewhatsimplifiednameneverthelessaptlydescribesthesepeoplesideology).Asaresult,Russiasawareturntoastatecontrolledeconomy,alackofcompetition,andapaltrynumberofsmallandmidsizebusinesses.

Third,manyRussiansinterpretedthestate,social,andeconomictransformationofthe1990sasacontinuationofdecayandtheformationofaneworderoneofchaosanddisorder.Whenthependulumofpublicopinionswungtowardconservatism,theregimedidnotjustfollowtrendsbutalsocontributedtogreaterstatismandpatriotism.Ontheonehand,thisreflectedtheactualviewsoftherulingeliteontheotherhand,thisideologicaltiltcontributedtothepreservationandstrengtheningofpaternalismandpersonalizedpower.Suchasystemrequiredtheimageofanenemy,andtheliberalsandliberalideologyfittheprofile.Thepatrioticwave,whichbecameatsunamiaftertheannexationofCrimea,compensatedforRussiasdefeatintheColdWarandtheabandonmentofSovieterasocialperks.Longawaitedvictorieswerefinallywon,atleastintheRussianmassconsciousness.

TheNewSocialContract

Thekeyquestionsare:Wherearethelimitsoftheideologyseffectiveness?Andwhenwillitscapacitytomobilizeandanesthetizethepublicbegintodissipate?

About30to35percentoftheRussianworkforceisemployedinthepublicsectororgovernmentconnectedenterprises.AccordingtoestimatespreparedbyeconomistsNikitaMaslennikovandBorisGrozovsky,60to70percentofRussiancitizensdependonthestate.Thesepeopleknowthattheyarelivingoffofoilrentstheregimesrevenuescomefromoilandgassales,andbyvotingfortheregime,theyarevotingfortheirwallets.AsaresultoftheeconomiccrisisRussiaisfacing,asseen,forinstance,intherisinginflationrateandfallinggrossdomesticproduct,36theirwalletshavebeenseriouslydepletedandwillremainsoforquitesometime.Thus,thesausageinexchangeforfreedomsocialcontractwillstarttowitheraway,whiletheCrimeaandspiritualbondsinexchangeforfreedomcontractwillbeunabletomaintainlongtermsocialharmony.

Inanidealworld,thestatemighthaverecognizedtheimperativetohelpmakethepubliclessdependentonit.However,therentredistributionstatefailedtocreatetheinstrumentsortheenvironmentnecessaryformostofRussiansocietytothriveinamarketeconomy.

Rentrevenueswerenotdistributedequitablyevenduringtheperiodofeconomicgrowthalthoughtheyweredistributedrelativelyequallytopeopleatthebottom.Atthetopofsociety,politicalleadersandoligarchicinsiderscapturedanoutsizedshareoftheserevenues.This,itcanbesaid,wasaperiodoftrickledowngrowth.Theeconomicslumpseemstohavemadesomeoutsidethehallsofpowerhappytheycannowrejoiceinthefactthateveryoneeventhericharesuffering.Still,therecessiondoesnotguaranteeequalitywhilethecrisishasaffectedeveryone,themostsociallyvulnerablesegmentsofthepopulationhavebeenhardesthit.Varioustypesofrentaredistributedtoanincreasinglynarrowercircleofpeopleandcorporations.

Consequently,thesocialcontractengineeredduringtheperiodofhighoilpriceswillbegintoloseitsabilitytospurmobilizationofsocietyitsideologicalcomponentauniquebrandofRussianisolationismwillwitheraswell.

Nevertheless,informationbaseddictatorships,aseconomicsprofessorSergeyGurievandpoliticalscienceprofessorDanielTreismanhavecalledauthoritarianregimesthatrelyonpropagandaandinformationwarfare,canstayinpowerforalongtime.However,theworsetheeconomyisdoing,thetougherpoliticalrepressionbecomes.GurievandTreismanusedTurkeyasanexample:AstheTurkisheconomicgrowthdeclinedfrom7.8percentin2010to0.8percentin2012,thenumberofjailedjournalistsincreasedfrom4to49.37Inaseparatepaper,theynotedthatininformationbaseddictatorships,Repressionisusedagainstordinarycitizensonlyasalastresortwhentheopportunitiestosurvivethroughcooptation,censorship,andpropagandaareexhausted...Difficulteconomictimesprompthigherrelativespendingoncensorshipand



propaganda.38

Ideologyandspiritualbondssubstituteandcoverupfordefunctinstitutions.Thisis,infact,thekeyfunctionoftheRussianstates(orquasistates)ideology.

Inthissense,presentdayRussianideologylacksastrategicmandate.Itaccomplishestheimmediate,tacticalgoalsofmobilizingandconsolidatingpublicopinion.Thisispreciselywhytheideologyofisolationismandstatismderivesitsstrengthfromthepastitlookstotheenergyofthestatesbygonegloryratherthantheenergyoffutureglory.ThusitlackskeyelementsofCommunistideology:grandgoalsandnewhorizons.Inshort,contemporaryRussianideologyoffersnooverridingconceptforthefutureandcannotprovidethenationapathtodevelopment.

ThepostCrimeasocialcontractleavesRussiansfewchoices.PoliticaleconomistAlbertHirschmansexitvoiceloyaltymodeloforganizationalbehaviorisanappropriatetheorytoapplytothissituation.39Accordingtothistheory,citizenscanmaketheirvoicesheardthroughprotestsanddemandsforchange.Theycanchooseanexitstrategythroughinternalmigrationoremigration.Peoplecanalsodisplayloyaltybyadjustingtothecircumstances,eveniftheyarenotdesirable.(Inoneofhisearlyworks,formerU.S.nationalsecurityadviserZbigniewBrzezinskinotedthatunderauthoritarianregimes,oneadjustsbycomplyingwithprohibitions,whileundertotalitarianregimes,onealsohastodowhatisprescribedandrequired.40)

Whenpeoplesopinionsfailtobringaboutchangeorareforcefullysuppressed(forexample,theeventsof2012inRussia),theychoosebetweenexit(thedominantstrategyinRussiabeforeMarch2014)andloyalty(thedominantstrategyafter2014).Thelatteroptionisjustifiedandsupportedbytheisolationistideologythatbearsoutitsmoralrectitude.

Theregimehasreachedthelimitofitseffectivenessbecauseitdestroyedinstitutions.Elitessharealargepartoftheblameforthisinstitutionaldegradation.Afterall,thequalityofinstitutionsiscontingentonthequalityoftheelites.Theexcessofoilmoneyisalsotoblame.Thesewindfallsobviatedtheneedforreformandencouragedrentorientedredistributionpracticesthatbenefitedstateaffiliatedenterprisesaswellasthedefenseandlawenforcementsectors.

Theregimesincreasingauthoritarianismpointstothefactthattheleadershipisafraidoflosingcontroloverthenationalists,forexample.TheregimewantstocontinuetobeRussiasNumberOneNationalist,thusmonopolizingnationalistideologyandorganizations.Overall,theregimesattempttocontroleverythingisoneofthekeytrendsofthePutinera:itextendstotheeconomy,politics,ideology,andevenpeoplessoulstheRussianOrthodoxChurchhasbecomeoneoftheleadingbroadcastersofanisolationistideology.

Notonlyisideologyaninstrumentofconsolidation,mobilization,andcontrol,butitalsoallowstheregimetodeludeitself.Havingsecuredhighconfidence,approval,andelectoralratings,theregimedistancesitselffromrealityandanesthetizesitsanxietyandfears.

Modernization?

Isthereawindowofopportunityforamodernizingideology?Isitpossibletoendowaretrogradeauthoritarianprojectwithacollectivevisionofthefuture?Whatwouldsuchanideologylooklike?

Modernizationbeginswithgettingridofmythologizingandsacralthinkingitrequiresasoberreassessmentandareturntotruthandarealisticworldview.Afterthat,avisionofthefutureandastrategicprogramwithanultimategoalandaroadmapcouldemerge.OtherRussianreformprojectstheneconomicministerYegorGaidarsreforms(19911992),thelaterstructuralreforms(1997),theneconomicministerGermanGrefsprogram(2000),andthe2020Strategy(2011)proceededfromthesamereassessment.

Theeventsof2011wereaturningpointinRussiasdevelopment.First,elitesegmentsofsocietyrealizedthatthemodernizationplanannouncedbyDmitryMedvedevwasnotonlyanillusionbutalsoapoliticalploythatstrengthenedVladimirPutinsgriponpower.Unfairparliamentaryelectionsfollowedshortlythereafter.Educatedandurbanizedsegmentsofsocietywereclearlyaheadofthestateintermsoftheirdemandsfor



functioninginstitutions.TousethephilosopherJrgenHabermassterm,the20112012protestswereacatchinguprevolution(dienachholenderevolution)causedbythestatesrefusaltocompletereformsandmodernize.41Thestatedidnotagreetosuchdemands,applyingrepressivelawsandusingforcetoproveitsrightness.Undertheseconditionsgiventhelackofviabledemocratic,liberal,orcivilsocietyrepresentationinpoliticsthedominanceofquasipatrioticideologyandtheadoptionofrepressiveandrestrictivelawsafterthe2012electionstheliberalprojectisimpossible,atleastintheshortormediumterm.

Politicalandfinancialelitesarenotreadytoincurthecostsofreforms,includingpersonalcosts(suchasgivinguptheirpowerandallowingmarketcompetition).Yet,therearesignsofachangeinpublicopinionalready:despitetheconservativeshiftinmassconsciousnessandtheunpopularityofsocalledliberalisminpublicopinionpolls,manyRussiansstillbelievethatthestateshouldprovidesocialbenefitstopeoplewhileholdingontothemarketeconomy,twocoretenetsofmodernliberalism.Althoughonly9percentofrespondentstoanAugust2013LevadaCenterpollconsideredthemselvesliberal,4255percentofRussianstoldthesamepollstersinMarch2015thattheyrelyonlyonthemselves,whichtestifiestothestatesinefficiencyandacontinuedlackoftrustinstateinstitutions.43Theyarereadytoberesponsibleforthemselvesandinthissensearelesspaternalistic.Thisisagoodbasisformodernization.

Modernizationrequiresaclearsignalfromthetopanddemandfromthebottom.Eliteswouldlikelybeabletoexpresstheirdemandsbyindicatingthatdemocratizationandfurthermovementawayfromstatecapitalismtoamorecompetitivemarketeconomyandafreersocietyarepossible.Thiskindofmodelworkedduringperestroika.

Itisalmostimpossibleforaresearchertopredictatwhatpointtheregimewillshiftfrommythologicalthinkingtoapragmaticallyformulated,strategicvisionofthefuture.However,staterepressioncannoteliminatethedemandforchangein20112012(amongotherthings,liberalshavesinceprotestedthemurderofliberalpoliticianBorisNemtsov).Soonerorlaterboththoseontopandthoseatthebottomwillcreatethedemandforapragmaticallyformulated,liberaleconomicideology.Historicalandpoliticallogicsuggestthatasignalfromthetopwillinevitablymeetdemandfromthebottomatsomepoint.Modernizationstartswhenthelowerechelonsofsocietystarttoseestagnationandunderdevelopmentasburdensomeandtheuppersegmentsseethemasdangerous.

TheauthorwouldliketothankVasilyZharkov,headofthePoliticalScienceDepartmentattheMoscowSchoolofSocialandEconomicSciences,forhisvaluablecontributiontothiswork.

Notes

1DaniilDondurey,SverkhtsennostiopyatostanavlivayutRossiyu?[AreMetavaluesStoppingRussiaAgain?],Gefter.ru,February2,2015,http://gefter.ru/archive/14175.

2TzvetanTodorov,LespritdesLumires[TheSpiritofEnlightenment](Paris:RobertLaffont,2006).CitedfromtheRussiantranslation(Moscow:MoscowSchoolofPoliticalStudies,2010),8.Theterm,worldunderaspell,orEntzauberungderWelt,wasfirstusedinthissensebyMaxWeberin1919.

3VladimirNabokov,ConversationPiece,1945,NewYorker,June23,1945.

4ErnestGellner,ConditionsofLiberty:CivilSocietyanditsRivals(PenguinBooks,1996).

5AndreiZorin,KormyadvukhglavogoorlaLiteraturaigosudarstvennayaideologiyavRossiivposledneytretiXVIIIpervoytretiXIXveka[FeedingtheTwoHeadedEagle.LiteratureandStateIdeologyinRussiaDuringtheLastThirdofthe18thCenturyThroughtheFirstThirdofthe19thCentury](Moscow,2001),100.

6AndreiKolesnikov,Esliestvashingtonskiyobkom,todolzhenbytiTsKa[IfThereisaWashingtonRegionalCommittee,ThereMustbeaCentralCommittee],Novayagazeta,September28,2012.

7VladimirPutin,AddressbythePresidentoftheRussianFederation,March18,2014,



http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603.

8VladimirPutin,PresidentialAddresstotheFederalAssembly,December4,2014,http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47173.

9PublicOpinionFoundation,OtnosheniekRossiivmire:mneniyarossiyan[HowRussiaisViewedAroundtheWorld:theOpinionsofRussians],poll,January16,2015,http://fom.ru/Mir/11911.

10LevadaCenter,68%rossiyanschitayutRossiyuvelikoyderzhavoy[68PercentofRussiansConsiderRussiaaGreatPower],pressrelease,December11,2014,http://www.levada.ru/11122014/68rossiyanschitayutrossiyuvelikoiderzhavoi.

11LevadaCenter,Mezhdunarodnyeotnosheniya[InternationalRelations],pressrelease,February9,2015,http://www.levada.ru/09022015/mezhdunarodnyeotnosheniya.

12LevadaCenter,RollichnosteyvistoriiRossii[TheRoleofPersonalityintheHistoryofRussia],pressrelease,January20,2015,http://www.levada.ru/20012015/rollichnosteivistoriirossii.

13LevadaCenter,Staliniegorolvistoriistrany[StalinandhisRoleintheHistoryoftheCountry],pressrelease,March31,2015,http://www.levada.ru/31032015/staliniegorolvistoriistrany.

14FederalnyyzakonRossiyskoyFederatsiiot29iyunya2015godaNo173FZ[FederalLawoftheRussianFederationofJune29,2015No.173FZ],publishedbyRossiyskayagazeta,July3,2015,www.rg.ru/2015/07/03/pensiyadok.html.

15PublicOpinionFoundation,RolStalinavVelikoyOtechestvennoyvoyne[StalinsRoleintheGreatPatrioticWar],poll,May12,2015,http://fom.ru/Proshloe/12154.

16UmomRossiyuponimat[ToUnderstandRussiaWithOnesMind],Gumanitarnyykontekst[HumanitarianContext],no.1(2009):3238.

17HerbertMarcuse,OneDimensionalMan:StudiesintheIdeologyofAdvancedIndustrialSociety(BeaconPress,1964),availableatwww.marcuse.org/herbert/pubs/64onedim/odmcontents.html.

18Ibid.,283.

19LevadaCenter,UgrozadlyaRossiisostoronySShA[TheThreattoRussiaFromtheUnitedStates],pressrelease,May12,2015,http://www.levada.ru/12052015/ugrozadlyarossiisostoronyssha.

20Ibid.

21ToUnderstandRussia,3238.

22Ibid.

23Ibid.

24LevadaCenter,NuzhnaliRossiidemokratiya?[DoesRussiaNeedDemocracy?],pressrelease,October28,2014,http://www.levada.ru/28102014/nuzhnalirossiidemokratiya.

25ToUnderstandRussia.

26LevadaCenter,Bolshinstvorossiyankhotyat,chtobyRossiyashlaposobstvennomuputi[MostRussiansWantRussiatogoitsOwnWay],pressrelease,April21,2015,http://www.levada.ru/2104



2015/bolshinstvorossiyankhotyatchtobyrossiyashlaposobstvennomuputi.

27Ibid.

28LevadaCenter,Reformy,ozhidaniyarossiyan[Reforms,RussiansExpectations],pressrelease,April3,2003,http://www.levada.ru/03042003/reformyozhidaniyarossiyan.

29Ibid.

30KakoyvykhotelibyvidetseychasRossiyuvpervuyuochered?[HowWouldYouLiketoSeeRussiaTodayintheFirstPlace?],Levada.ru,http://www.levada.ru/archive/gosudarstvoiobshchestvo/rossiiskayaidentichnost/kakoivykhotelividetseichasrossiyuv.

31LevadaCenter,PozitsiiRossiinamezhdunarodnoyarene[RussiasPositionsintheInternationalArena],March23,2015,www.levada.ru/23032015/pozitsiirossiinamezhdunarodnoiarene.

32KiraLatukhina,Rossiyanenazvaliglavnyedostizheniyaprezidenta[RussiansNamedtheMainAchievementsofthePresident],Rossiyskayagazeta,March27,2015,http://www.rg.ru/2015/03/27/dostijeniasite.html.

33LevGudkov,ResourcesofPutinsConservatism,inPutinsRussia:HowitRose,HowitisMaintained,andHowItMightEnd,editedbyLeonAron(AEI,2015).

34LevadaCenter,Doverieinstitutamvlasti[TrustinStateInstitutions],November13,2014,http://www.levada.ru/13112014/doverieinstitutamvlasti.

35LevadaCenter,Avgustovskiereytingiodobreniyaidoveriya[AugustApprovalandCredibilityRatings],August26,2015,www.levada.ru/26082015/avgustovskiereitingiodobreniyaidoveriya.

36AnnaAndrianova,RussianGDPPlunges4.6%,Bloomberg,August10,2015,www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/20150810/russianeconomyshrinks46asoilslumprisksdeeperrecession.

37SergeyGurievandDanielTreisman,Avtoritarizmvvekinformatsii[AuthoritarianismintheInformationAge],Vedomosti,March25,2013,http://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2015/03/25/avtoritarizmvvekinformatsii.

38SergeyGurievandDanielTreisman,HowModernDictatorsSurvive:Cooptation,Censorship,Propaganda,andRepression,DiscussionPaperNo10454(London:CenterforEconomicPolicyResearch,2015).

39AlbertO.Hirschman,Exit,VoiceandLoyalty.ResponsestoDeclineinFirms,Organizations,andStates(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1970).

40Zbig:TheStrategyandStatecraftofZbigniewBrzezinski,editedbyCharlesGati(Baltimore:2013),XV.

41JrgenHabermas,DienachholendeRevolution[TheCatchupRevolution](Berlin:Suhrkamp,1990).

42LevadaCenter,Politicheskievzglyadyrossiyan[PoliticalViewsofRussians],pressrelease,September23,2013,http://www.levada.ru/23092013/politicheskievzglyadyrossiyan.

43LevadaCenter,Vzaimodeystviegrazhdanigosudarstva[InteractionBetweenCitizensandtheState],pressrelease,April6,2015,http://www.levada.ru/06042015/vzaimodeistviegrazhdanigosudarstva.



RelatedTopics

RussianDomesticPoliticsandPoliticalInstitutions

PutinologyRussianIdeology

Sourcehttp://carnegie.ru/2015/09/22/russianideologyaftercrimea/ihzq

kolesnikov 2015 - russian ideology after crimea

Documents