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8615708

Wesche, Kenneth Warren

THE DEFENSE OF CHALCEDON IN THE 6TH CENTURY: THE DOCTRINE OF "HYPOSTASIS" AND DEIFICATION IN THE CHRISTOLOGY OF LEONTIUS OF JERUSALEM

Fordham University PH.D. 1986

University Microfilms

I n t e r n a t i O n a l 300 Ν. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml48106

Copyright 1986

by

Wesche, Kenneth Warren

All Rights Reserved

THE DEFENSE OF CHALCEDON IN THE 6TH CENTURY: THE DOCTRINE OF "HYPOSTASIS" AND DEIFICATION IN THE CHRISTOLOGY

OF LEONTIUS OF JERUSALEM

Kenneth W. Wesche A.B. Northwest Nazarene College, 1976

M.Div. Nazarene Theological Seminary, 1981

DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF THEOLOGY AT FORDHAM UNIVERSITY

NEW YORK 1986

FORDHAM UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

. Α ρ γ α . 1 . . . Χ 5 λ 19.ÄJ5.

This dissertation prepared under my direction by

Kenneth W. Wesche

entitled T h e Defens.?...0.?...?!?.^.?M?.?...™..Î.1?.?...?.™™...9.?.n.™F.y.:

The Doctrine of "Hypostasis" and Deification in the Christology of Leontius of Jerusalem.

has been accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

Degree of DQ5.t.9.r.„o.£..EhÂios.QpJtlX '.

in the Department of .TM9.1.Q9Ï

John. Meyendor f f ) ν (Mentor)

i n g e r , S . J . ) (*Wer)

(RfeV. Joseph M i t r o s , S. J J(Reader)

©1986

KENNETH WARREN WESCHE

All Rights Reserved

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction 1

Prolegomenon 1

A. "Neo�Chalcedonianism" 7

Β. Historical Sketch 13

1. Chalcedon and the Writings of

St. Leo and St. Cyril 13 2. Chalcedon and the Monophysites 18 3. Chalcedon and the Testimony of St. Euthymius 20 4. Chalcedon and Imperial Policy: The Henoticon 22 5. Justinian and Chalcedon 27

C. Leontius of Jerusalem and His Writings 30

1. Chronology and Biographical Data 30 2. Leontius, Origenism and Nestorianism 31 3. Leontius, the Monophysites, and the

Chalcedonian Faith 33

Chapter One; Towards An Understanding of Hypostasis 36

A. Some Fundamental Assumptions 36

1. Chalcedonian Terminology: Its Danger and Difficulty...36

2. A Modern Critique of Leontius of Jerusalem 40

B. The Notion of Hypostasis Conceived in Itself 46

1. Earlier Descriptions of Hypostasis 46 2. Leontius' Description of Hypostasis

Conceived in Itself 49

C. Hypostasis and its Relation to Nature and Properties.......58

1. The Particularity of the Hypostasis .58 2. The Hypostasis and its Natures and Properties 63

Chapter Two; The Notion of the Whole and

the Identity of Christ 74

A. The Hypostasis of Christ and the Logos 76

1. Christ: the Logos Incarnate 76

2. The Logos: the "Ego" of Christ 80

^ 3. The Logos in Union with the Flesh 87

B. The Natures of Christ and the Logos 93

1. In Two Natures 93

2. The Logos: the Subject of the Union 101

Chapter Three: The Notion of the Whole and

the Natural Union in Christ 108

A. The Natures of Christ as Wholes 108

1. The Whole and Composition 108

2. The Whole in terms of Definition 113 B. Union by Nature 127

1. "Ενωσις Φυσική 127 2. Σΰνθεσιν Φυσική 132

Chapter Four; The Hypostasis of Christ and

The Human Nature. 142

A. The Foundation of Existence 142

1. The Hypostasis, Physis, and Difference 142

2. Ένυπόοτατος 152 3. Hypostasis as the Foundation of Existence 162

B. The Human Nature and the.Christ's Mode of Existence 175

1. The Logos Assumes a Particular Nature 176 2. The Logos Becomes Incarnate 191

a. The natural properties and the hypostasis 196 b. The Logos suffered in the flesh 204

Chapter Five: Salvation as Deification.., 209

A. Man's Origin and Destiny 210

1. The Natural Divinity of Man 210

2. The Content of Deification 218

B. The Mediation of Salvation or How Deification is Accomplished 226

( 1. The Incarnation 228

^ 2. Regeneration 235 3. Death and Resurrection 242

Conclusion. 248

List of Abbreviations 262

Bibliography 263

Abstract

Vita

\

( THE DEFENSE OF CHALCEDON IN THE 6TH CENTURY: THE DOCTRINE OF HYPOSTASIS AND DEIFICATION IN THE CHRISTOLOGY OF

LEONTIUS OF JERUSALEM

Introduction.

Prolegomenon. The sixth century marks a crucial period in the

history of doctrinal development. We find ourselves at a

"crossroads" where the ambiguities of Chalcedonian christology are

brought into sharper focus and where the understanding given to the

terms hypostasis and physis, whether Cyrillian or primarily

Antiochene, will lead christian thought in different directions in

christology. Though East and West may still reflect to some degree

a common mind, their different interpretation of these terms has a

profound impact on their theological understanding, manifested most

clearly, for example, in the Carolingien response towards the

veneration of icons affirmed at the 7th Ecumenical Council, in the

"filioque" controversy, and in the Thomistic notion of "created

grace" and the controversy between Barlaam of Calabria and Gregory

Palamas over "uncreated energies".

The need for a clearly articulated account of Chalcedonian

christology was made clear by the continued opposition of the

Charles Moeller, "Textes 'Monophysites' de Léonce de Jérusalem," Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 27 (1951), p. 471.

(

1

2

2 monophysites who appealled to Nicea and Cyril of Alexandria as

their utmost authority and accused Chalcedon of succumbing to

Nestorianism when it adopted the "in two natures" formula of

Flavian and St. Leo over Cyril's "of two natures". Under

Justinian, the theologians who were faithful to Chalcedon sought to

show that the Council was in fact faithful both to Nicea and to

Cyril. While their efforts centered first upon reconciling

Chalcedon's "in two natures" with Cyril's "of two natures" and also

his key formula, "One nature of God the Word incarnate", they

gradually came to see that the solution to the difficulty could be

found most easily by focusing on Chalcedon's "one hypostasis".

Perhaps the most outstanding theologian in sixth century

byzantium who contributed towards a philosophy of hypostasis in

which was demonstrated Chalcedon's fidelity to Nicea and Cyril was

ο

Leontius of Jerusalem, writing between the years 538�544. Until

recently he was identified with Leontius of Byzantium, and so the

distinctive character of his own christology was obscured by the

The term "monophysite" is given to those Cyrillian "fundamentalists" who rejected the "two natures" formula of Chalcedon exclusively in favor of Cyril's "One nature of God the Word incarnate." For a study of monophysite theology, one may confer the comprehensive work of J. Lebon, Le monophysitisme sëvérien; étude historique, littéraire et théologique sur la résistance monophysite au concile de Chalcédoinë jusque'à la constitution de l'Eglise jacobite. (Louvain 1909); and also a study by the same author in Grillmeier-Bacht Das Konzil von Chalkedon I, (Würzburg, 1951), entitled, "Le christologie du monophysisme syrien," pp. 425-580. For a discussion of the term "monophysite" see in particular the former, pp. xxiiff.

3 For the chronology of Leontius' literary activity, see Marcel

Richard, "Léonce de Jérusalem et Léonce de Byzance," Mélanges de sciences religieuses 1 (1944) pp. 45-47.

3

(̂ radically different christology of his namesake. With the work of

Marcel Richard, however, Leontius of Jerusalem has been

distinguished from Leontius of Byzantium and the christology of his

own writings, the Contra Monophysitas and the Adversus Nestorlanus,

has been clearly delineated from the corpus of Leontius of

Byzantium. Consequently, a systematic study of Leontius of

Jerusalem as a theologian in his own right is now possible, but the

task is only beginning.

Originally, the aim of this thesis was to assess the

relationship of the hypostasis and "mind" of Christ in 6th century

byzantine christology. This question, fully addressed in the

monothelite controversy of the 7th century, penetrates the crux of

the christological problem; how the presence of a human mind does

not necessarily lead to two subjects of attribution or to two

This identification was first established by Fr. Loofs in his study Leontius von Byzanz und die gleichnamigen Schriftsteller der griechischen Kirche. (Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur III, 1-2) Leipzig, 1887.

"Léonce de Jérusalem et Léonce de Byzance." In spite of Richard's study, however, there are still some scholars who maintain the basic premise of Loofs. Stephan Otto, for example, though he acknowledges the distinction between the two Leontii, maintains that "the speculative basis of the writings of Leontius of Byzantium and Leontius of Jerusalem are one and the same," and he argues that, "...it can be shown that Leontius of Jerusalem is no opponent of the Byzantine, but most probably is his co-worker." Person und Subsistenz: Die philosophische anthropologie des Leontios von Byzanz; ein Beitrag zur spatantiken Geistesgeschichte p. 14.

The only systematic study of Leontius of Jerusalem that I am aware of is the dissertation of Athanasios Basdekis, Die Christologie des Leontios von Jerusalem. Seine Logoslehre. [Kath. Theo. Diss.] Munster, 1973.

4

"personal" entities. However, even though one finds in the mid 6th

century the beginnings of a separate monophysite party founded on

the doctrine of the Christ's ignorance, it is clear that the

question concerning the knowledge of Christ has not reached the

sophistication of the monothelite controversy; the issue of

Christ's ignorance in the 6th century carries the same significance

as the term "Theotokos" in the Nestorian controversy, and the

doctrine of theopaschism in the period between Chalcedon I and II,

and that concerns the identity of Christ — is he the Logos, or the

man Jesus who is other than the Logos? In this period, the Church

reaches the last phase of its dogmatic task to give coherent

expression to the theological insight formulated at Nicea: that the

subject of the incarnation is the Logos himself. Once this task is

completed in the 6th century, at the Council of 553, the foundation

will have been laid upon which the Church will then be fully

prepared to address the question concerning the relation of the

mind and hypostasis of Christ.

Nonetheless, since the monothelite controversy was a natural

development of the christological controversies of the 6th century

the question is still relevant to our study. The relationship of

monotheletism to the christology of the 6th century raises the

These were the "agnoetae", under the leadership of a certain Gaianus, who taught that since the Lord did not know the hour of judgment, but only the Father knew, therefore the Christ is ignorant and must be a man. They were opposed by the monophysite patriarch of Alexandria, Theodosius who wrote against the Agnoetae saying that the Christ is not ignorant. See De Sectis, PG 86, col. 1232 Dl-13. —

5

question as to who is the authentic predecessor of the Orthodox

response to monotheletism; that is to say, was the christology

confirmed at the Council of 681 a correction or the legitimate heir

of the sixth century byzantine christology represented by Leontius

of Jerusalem? The question is particularly relevant in light of

the opinion of C. Moeller that the seeds of monotheletism are to be

found in the christological suppositions represented by Leontius of

Jerusalem and not in the christology of the Severian monophysites.

This in turn raises the question of the orthodoxy of those 6th

century theologians who, with Leontius of Jerusalem, were engaged

in the effort to show on the basis of a coherent philosophy of

hypostasis the genuine Cyrillianism of Chalcedon. Who, in other

words, among the luminaries of the period, is genuinely faithful to

the christology of Chalcedon?

This defines the aim of our study. In that Leontius of

Jerusalem was the most outstanding of those 6th century

Chalcedonians engaged in the effort to reconcile the terminologies

of Chalcedon and Cyril, his christology provides a good source of

study for establishing the continuity of these Chalcedonians to the

christology of Chalcedon. In order to accomplish our aim, we have

focused particularly on how hypostasis and nature are conceived in

"Textes 'Monophysite' de Léonce de Jérusalem," p. 471, η. 11.

6 g

Leontius of Jerusalem's thought. The conclusions reached in this

study may illumine the relationship of the hypostasis and mind of

Christ as it was addressed in the monothelite controversy of the

7th century.

Leontius' fidelity to Chalcedon has been questioned on the

basis of an interpretation of 6th century christology that has

characterized it as "neo-chalcedonian". Whether or not such an

appellation can be maintained depends on the intent of Chalcedon

itself and a clear recognition of the criteria used in establishing

the Chalcedonian definition of faith. For this reason, we begin

our study by outlining the perspective which has characterized the

christology of Leontius of Jerusalem and others like him as

"neo-chalcedonian". We will then offer a brief historical sketch

of Chalcedon and the events it provoked that will be sufficient to

show the perspective from which this study is based.

In the christology of the 6th century defenders of Chalcedon the Greek terms hypostasis and prosopon were opposed to the terms physis and ousia as the particular to the common. In our study we have consistently translated the term physis by the English term nature, and ousia by the term essence. However, since physis and ousia were synonymous and christologically referred to the same thing, when speaking in general terms we have used the English term nature to cover both physis and ousia. We have maintained the Greek terms hypostasis and prosopon since they bear a more definite philosophical connotation than the term "person"; and, though Leontius of Jerusalem may use them as synonyms — using them as the Alexandrian school used the term physis in a christological context, — there still are instances where he applies prosopon in a different sense than hypostasis.

The term was coined by J. Lebon in his study Le monophysitisme sévèrien. and has been taken up since as an appellation peculiarly descriptive of 6th century byzantine christology.

7

A. "Neo-Chalcedonianism.

Nephalius of Alexandria, who was active in the first two

decades of the 6th century, is described as the first real

"neo-chalcedonian". The distinctive characteristic of

"neo-chalcedonianism" is the simultaneous usage of Cyrillian and

Chalcedonian terminology: the Cyrillian "one nature" to guard

against Nestorianism, and the Chalcedonian "two natures" to guard

12 against Eutychianism. The effort to shape the perspective

characterizing "neo-chalcedonianism" into a philosophical school of

thought begins in John the Grammarian of neo-Caesarea who

championed the Chalcedonian cause against Severus of Antioch

13 between 514-518. It is taken up by Ephrem of Amid, Justinian,

see C. Moeller, "Un représentant de la christologie néo-chalcédonienne au début du sixième siècle in Orient, Nephalius d'Alexandrie," Revue d'histoire Ecclésiastique 40 (1944-45) pp. 73-140. A comprehensive sketch of "neo-chalcedonianism" is given by the same author in, "Le chalcédonlsme et le néo-chalcédonisme en Orient de 451 à la fin du Vie siècle," in Grillmeier-Bacht, Pas Konzil von Chalkedon I. pp. 637-720.

12 For a general overview and critique of "neo-chalcedonianism"

see Marcel Richard, "Le néo-chalcédonisme," Mélanges de sciences religieuses 3 (1946) pp. 156-161; and Aloys Grillmeier, "Der neu-Chalkedonismus. Um die Berechtigung eines neuen Kapitals in der Dogmengeschichte," in Mit Ihm und in Ihm. Christologische Forschungen und Perspektiven (Freiburg, Basel, Vienna: Herder, 1975) pp. 371-85.

13 Severus was the foremost leader of the monophysites,

following in time the leadership of Timothy Aelurus and Philoxenus of Mabbugh. Fragments of John's writings against Severus have been located in the Apology of Eulogius of Alexandria, PG 86 cols. 2944-2953; cf. C. Moeller, "Trois fragments grecs de l'Apologie de Jean le Grammairien pour le concile de Chalcédoinë," RHE pp. 683-688.

8

Leontius of Jerusalem, and Leontius of Byzantium (who, because of

his strict dyophysitism and his attempts to reach terminological

uniformity, is not included among the "neo-chalcedonians").

The aim of the "neo-chalcedonians" was to develop a coherent

philosophy of hypostasis and nature in order to demonstrate the

inherent continuity between the christology of St. Cyril's 12

Anathemas and the terminology of Chalcedon and St. Leo's Tome.

Demonstrating the harmony between Chalcedon and Cyril in itself was

nothing new; but such a harmony was denied by Severus and the

monophysites so that a convincing philosophical model was needed.

What was new, was the attempt to construct a philosophical notion

of hypostasis and nature in a christological context, governed not

by the categories of Plato or Aristotle, but by the terminology of

the Chalcedonian definition of faith and the christology of St.

Cyril. Incorporated into this effort was a two-fold definition of

hypostasis; "existing by itself" which was added to the definition

of hypostasis taken from the trinltarian theology of the

Cappadocians, "a particular with concrete characteristics". This

two-fold definition of hypostasis, so Moeller suggests, is what

gives to "neo-chalcedonianism" its monophysitic coloring.

Determining the legitimacy of such a charge is a major objective of

this thesis.

see Moeller, "Textes 'monophysites' de Léonce de Jérusalem," pp. 468-470.

We should note here that such a characterization has already been challenged by John Meyendorff in Christ In Eastern Christian Thought (New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1975) pp. 76-77.

9

In assessing the place of the "neo-chalcedonians" in the

history of dogma one must determine whether they were imposing a

new interpretation onto the theology of Chalcedon, or were

reflecting the common consensus. This in turn, however, rests on

one's understanding of Chalcedon itself and the role played by St.

Cyril of Alexandria and the Tome of St. Leo. The interpretation

of post-Chalcedonian byzantine christology which has produced the

term "neo-chalcedonian" rests on the historical assumption first of

all that the fathers of Chalcedon "sought to reconcile antiochene

theology with Cyril's christology; they accepted most of his

writings, but rejected his third letter to Nestorius (the 12

Anathemas) and his letters to Succensus. As a result, Cyril

received short shrift by the fathers of Chalcedon." The

interpretation of the general stance towards Cyril after Chalcedon

continues in the same vein: "It would appear that in the second

half of the 5th century the great majority of Chalcedonians had the

same attitude towards Cyril as the fathers of 451. They accepted

the writings of Cyril read at Chalcedon as the touchstone of all

his other writings. However, to prove this they were quickly

forced by their polemicists to inventory Cyril's other writings in

order to show their continuity."

At the crux of this interpretation is the relation of Cyril's

See Patrick Gray's critique, The Defense of Chalcedon in the East (451-553). (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1979), pp. 1-4.

This and the preceding citation taken from M. Richard, "Le néo-Chalcédonisme," p. 158.

10

12 Anathemas, and in particular the 12th which proclaims the

doctrine of theopaschism, to the theology of Chalcedon. Those

Chalcedonians who rejected theopaschism, and Cyril's 12 Anathemas

are given the appellation "strict Chalcedonians", as opposed to

these "neo-Chalcedonians" who accepted the whole of Cyril's

doctrine, and who interpreted Chalcedon and Leo's Tome in a

Cyrillian context. The attitude towards the doctrine of

18 theopaschism constitutes a major barrier between these two groups,

but it is believed that of these two groups, the innovators are

those "neo-chalcedonian" theologians who constitute an "École",

that is to say, "...a group of Chalcedonians who decided to revise

the attitude of their party to certain contested writings and

formulas of St. Cyril, and after some resistance, managed to impose

19 their viewpoint on the whole of orthodoxy." On this basis,

"neo-chalcedonianism" is described as, "...a new interpretation of

the theology of Chalcedon, opposed on some point to a more ancient

20 form of this theology."

This account of "neo-chalcedonianism" is not universally

shared, however. Aloys Grillmeier recognizes that the newness of

the term "neo-chalcedonian" lies in the attempt to reconcile two

conflicting terminologies — two natures, one nature — but not in

proposing a new christology: "As a terminological synthesis, it is

ι ο

Ibid., p. 159.

19Ibid., p. 157f.

20 Ibid, p. 156.

11

out of date; as a christological synthesis it is always our

21 concern." The attempt to reconcile two different terminologies,

he says, is unfortunate in that it requires one to continually move 99

between the concepts of Plato (neo-platoniem) and Aristotle.

Nevertheless, this terminological synthesis of sixth century

byzantine theology "introduced an essential element of theological

progress in that it taught to distinguish between nature and

hypostasis. With this, theology indicated the way to a new 23 metaphysic of Person to serve the mystery of the incarnation."

The desire to find a terminological synthesis, however, does

not seem so much unfortunate as necessary since Chalcedon assumed

rather than addressed the issue of how hypostasis and nature are to

be properly distinguished. As a result, the more prominent

defenders of Chalcedon who in the first years after the Council

interpreted hypostasis in the sense of the Antiochene prosopon, and

not in the sense of Cyril's one nature, were received by the

monophysites as the real representatives of Chalceon. If, however,

we understand that Chalcedon formulated its definition of faith

under the influence of St. Cyril, and that even Leo's Tome was

accepted because of its harmony with Cyril's writings, even his 12

Anathemas, then we must see the attempt to reconcile Cyrillian and

Chalcedonian terminology as necessary and inevitable; this process,

21 "Der neu-Chalkedonismus," p. 385; see also p. 384.

22Ibid., p. 383.

23Ibid., p. 384.

12

moreover, does not imply a departure from Chalcedon, but a movement

into the very heart of Chalcedonian christology. Any description,

therefore, of the synthesis of Cyrillian and Chalcedonian

terminology as "neo", whether "neo-conservative" (Harnack), or

"neo-Alexandrian", or "neo-chalcedonian" belies the real

continuity between the Fifth Ecumenical Council — which ratified

this "neo-chalcedonianism" — and Chalcedon I.

At issue, then, is not only a proper evaluation of 6th century

byzantine christology, labeled "neo-chalcedonian", but the proper

interpretation of Chalcedon itself, which certainly effects the

place one gives to Leontius of Jerusalem and the christological

synthesis he represents in the history of dogma. Consequently, we

must give a brief account of events from Chalcedon to the time of

Leontius of Jerusalem in order to establish the perspective guiding

this thesis, which is that a genuine continuity exists between

"neo-chalcedonianism" and Chalcedon.

The description of R.V. Sellers, The Council of Chalcedon. (London 1953), p. 293.

13

Β. Historical Sketch

1. Chalcedon and the Writings of St. Leo and St. Cyril. In

his writings against Nestorius Cyril taught a union "of" two

natures constituting "one incarnate nature of the Logos." He

derived this formula from an Apollinarian forgery, the letter "ad

Jovianum", believing it to be a genuine letter of St. Athanasius.25

By such language St. Cyril emphasized the faith of Nicea which

attributed to the one Logos, the Son of God, and not to the Christ

as another subject, all the events of the incarnation including his

birth of the Blessed Virgin, and his death on the Cross.

Against Nestorius he composed twelve anathemas upholding the

Nicene dogma; in these 12 Anathemas he confessed the hypostatic

26 union of the Word with the flesh In such a way that the Logos,

the second Person of the Trinity, was the subject of the birth from

The text of the letter is in Hans Lietzmann, Apollinaris von Laodicea und seine Schule (Tübingen, 1904) pp. 250-253. The formula itself is found on p. 251, lines 1-2.

26 The 2nd Anathema: "If anyone shall not confess that the Word

of God the Father is united hypostatically to flesh, and that with that flesh of hie own, he is one only Christ both God and man at the same time: let htm be anathema." (This and the following texts of the Anathemas are given an English translation and commentary in NPNF 2nd series, vol. XIV, The Seven Ecumenical Councils pp. 207 -218.)

14

27 28

the Virgin and the passion. The christological controversy

provoked by the monophysite rejection of Chalcedon would center

around the christology proclaimed in these 12 Anathemas.

St. Leo composed his Tome in response to the errors of

Eutyches and sent it to Archbishop Flavian of Constantinople to

support him against the proceedings of Dioscorus at the 29 "Latrocinium" of Ephesus in 449. Leo's greatest contribution to

christological doctrine was his interpretation of the two-fold

30 energies in Christ. However, he emphasized the distinction of

Christ's two natures in such a way that the monophysites

interpreted him in a Nestorian sense. But the fathers of Chalcedon

saw in Leo's Tome, together with the writings of St. Cyril, the

most concise explanation of the Catholic Faith. The language of

Chalcedon's christological definition incorporated the terminology

of Leo and Cyril to emphasize both the Identity of subject in

Christ, and at the same time his full humanity and divinity: "The

27 The 1st Anathema: "If anyone will not confess that the

Emmanuel is very God, and that therefore the Holy Virgin is the Mother of God [Theotokos], inasmuch as in the flesh she bore the Word of God made flesh [as it is written, "The Word was made flesh"]: let him be anathema."

28 The 12th Anathema: "Whoever shall not recognize that the

Word of God suffered in the flesh, that he was crucified in the flesh, and that likewise in that same flesh he tasted death and that he is become the first-begotten of the dead, for, as he is God, he is the life and it is he that giveth life: let him be anathema."

29 See Aloys Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition: Vol. I.

From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451). Trans, by John Bowden (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1975) pp. 526-539.

30 J Ibid., p. 537.

15

same [subject, i.e. the Son of God]...is acknowledged in two

31 natures,...each nature concurring in one prosopon or hypostasis."

The authority, however, in determining the orthodoxy of the

32

terminology finally adopted was St. Cyril. By implementing Leo's

"in two natures" formula into the context of St. Cyril's writings

the Chalcedonian fathers believed they had forged an effective

weapon against both Eutychianism and Nestorianism.

At Chalcedon the Illyrican and Palestinian bishops objected to

Leo's language, maintaining that such phrases as, "Each nature

preserves without lack its own properties," and, "Just as the

divine form does not destroy the form of a servant, so also that of

the slave does not destroy the form of the divinity," and, "Each

form [i.e. nature] acts in communion with the other; the Word

performing what properly belongs to it, and the flesh carrying out

what belongs to the flesh," were too Nestorian since they implied 33 two subjects in Christ.

In response, Atticus of Nicopolis requested a period of five

days to study the document of Leo in the context of Cyril's letter

to Nestorius which contained the 12 Anathemas. Earlier in the same

31 The Greek text of the Chalcedonian definition of Faith is

found in ACQ. Tomus II, Vol. I. 1-3, pp. [325f.].

"Tftien Leo's Tome was read the bishops responded: "Cyril so taught! Eternal be the memory of Cyril! Leo and Cyril taught the same thing!" ACO II.1.2., p. [277], See Patrick Gray, The Defense of Chalcedon in the East, p. 9; and John Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought, pp. 26-27.

cf. ACO II.1.2., p. [278]. An English translation of Leo's Tome is given in E.R. Hardy, Christology of the Later Fathers, (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1954) 360-370.

16

session the letters of Cyril confirmed at the Council of Ephesus

had been read to the assembly, but this did not include the

Anathemas. None of those present was opposed to the request, but

the bishops thought it unnecessary, crying out: "We all believe in

this manner! None of us is in doubt! We are ready to sign!"

However, even though the Council's definition of Faith

employed Cyril's term hypostasis and its synonym prosopon in place

of Cyril's "one nature" to designate that by which Christ is one,

those blindly loyal to Cyrillian terminology, the so-called

"monophysites", could not accept the definition because it

maintained two natures in the one hypostasis or prosopon. The term

"nature" in a christological context was used in the Alexandrian

tradition as a synonym to hypostasis and prosopon, and indicated a

35 concrete subject of attribution. In that the philosophical

content of the terms prosopon, hypostasis, and nature had not yet

been established, the Chalcedonian definition of Faith, if it was

not read in a Cyrillian context, could very easily be interpreted

in a Nestorian sense: two concrete subjects of attribution, the

divine and human natures, coming together to produce a christic

prosopon.

Those of Antiochene outlook felt free to interpret

Chalcedonian christology apart from Cyril's 12 Anathemas and in

light of the doctrines of Leo whose christological terminology was

34ACO, p. [279].

35 see J. Lebon, Le monophysitisme sévèrien, pp. 255-257.

17

more congenial to their own. In fact, such an interpretation was

laid on the Council's definition by its most prominent defender,

36 Theodoret of Cyrus.

His interpretation, however, was not consistent with

Chalcedon's objectives. Leo's doctrines had been implemented into

the christological framework of St. Cyril already ratified at

Ephesus in order to effectively meet the new challenge of

Eutychianism. To select only certain writings of Cyril, and to

reject or ignore his 12 Anathemas which went to the heart of his

thought, was unfaithful to the intent of Chalcedon and left it open

to charges of Nestorianism.

See M. Richard, "La lettre de Theodoret à Jean d'Égees," Minora Opera II (Turnhout, Brepols, Leuven: University Press, 1977), 48, p. 416.

18

2. Chalcedon and the Monophysites. Succumbing to

Nestorianism was the charge made against Chalcedon by the

37

monophysites. As a test of orthodoxy the monophysites held up

Cyril's 12 Anathemas, focusing in particular on the 12th Anathema

which confessed that the Logos had suffered in the flesh. The

doctrine of theopaschism was of significance as crucial to them in

determining Chalcedon's true character as the term Theotokos had

been in the Nestorian controversy. The discomfort manifested by

some prominent defenders of Chalcedon with regard to theopaschism

confirmed the monophysites' view of Chalcedon's supposedly

Nestorian outlook. Patriarch of Constantinople Gennadius, for

example (458-471), rejected the Anathemas of St. Cyril but strictly 38

adhered to Leo's Tome, and Theodoret of Cyrus never could bring

As specific examples one may refer to the charges of the monk Theodosius to which St. Euthymius responds in the years immediately following the Council; cf. Cyril of Scythopolis* Vie de Saint Euthyme, traduite par A.-J. Festugière, O.P. (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1962) p. 96; and the proceedings of the monophysite Philoxenus of Mabbugh against Flavian, Patriarch of Antioch, at the Council of Sidon in 512. Because Flavian refused to anathematize the Council he was removed on the grounds of being a crypto-Nestorian (Evagrius' Ecclesiastical History, Ill.xxxi).

38 See the fragments of Gennadius collected in Franz Diekamp,

Analecta Patristica (Roma: Pont. Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, 1938), pp. 73-84; in particular p. 76, lines lOff.

19

39 himself to attribute the Passion to the Logos himself.

In the year 470 the monophysite Peter the Fuller of Antioch

introduced into the Trisagion — "Holy God, Holy Mighty, Holy

Immortal" — the phrase, "Who was crucified for us," in order to

assert Cyrillian orthodoxy and to offer further evidence that

Chalcedon had not remained faithful to St. Cyril but had fallen

into Nestorianism. This theopaschite formula was addressed to the

Logos, not to the Trinity, and meant to affirm that the Logos and

not someone else suffered and died on the Cross. But it was

ambiguous and could be interpreted as an address to the Holy

Trinity. For this reason many defenders of Chalcedon could not

accept it. And, even though it might be accepted as an address to

the Divine Logos in particular, those especially of Antiochene

outlook preferred caution in attributing suffering to the Logos

lest one implicate the divine nature as well. This, however, was

In his letter to Bishop Timotheus (letter 130), dated 450, Theodoret maintains, "When relating the passion the divine Scripture nowhere usee the term God, since that is the name of the absolute nature." And though he identifies the Lord Jesus Christ as "none other than the Son who completes the Trinity," in his letter to John the Oeconomus (letter 146), still he attributes the passion to the humanity of Christ as an independent subject (Eranistes III), or to the Christ as a whole, but never to the Logos himself (for English translation of these texts, see NPNF vol. Ill; Gerard Ettlinger, S.J. has compiled a critical edition of the Greek text, with prolegomena, of the "Eranlstes" In Theodoret of Cyrus: Eranistes, (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1975). On Theodoret's christology, cf. M. Richard, "Un écrit de Theodoret sur l'unité du Christ après l'incarnation," Rev. Sc. Rel. 14 (1934) pp. 34-61; Richard, "Notes sur l'évolution doctrinale de Theodoret," Rev.Se.Rel. 25 (1936) pp. 459-481; Günter Koch, Strukturen und Geschichte des Heils in der Theologie des Theodoret von Kyros. (Josef Knecht: Frankfurt am Main: 1974); and K. McNamara, "Theodoret of Cyrus and the Unity of Person in Christ," Irish Theological Quarterly 22 (1955) pp. 313-328.

20

taken by the monophysites as sufficient proof that the

Chalcedonians interpreted the hypostatic union in a sense

synonymous with the Christie prosopon of Nestorius and not in

accordance with the christology expressed in Cyril's Anathemas.

3. Chalcedon and the Testimony of St. Euthymius. The Faith

of the Chalcedonian fathers was very simply this: the Logos, the

second Person of the Trinity, himself was incarnate and was

consubstantial both to man and to God without confusion or

division. Though the more notable defenders of Chalcedon were

Antiochenes such as Theodoret of Cyrus and Gennadius of

Constantinople, the common consensus may be more reflected in the

confession of the simple Palestinian monk St. Euthymius (d. 473) to

the monophysite Theodosius. Though Euthymius was not informed of

all the Council's proceedings, he knew its definition and saw no

false doctrine in it. According to hie biographer, Cyril of

40 Skythopolis, he defends the Council in these words:

"It appeals to Nicea, Constantinople, and those assembled in Ephesus against the impious Nestorius: it makes appeal to Cyril, the bishop of Alexandria and calls him 'teacher of the true faith'; it proclaims that the Holy Virgin is Theotokos, and confesses that from her was born in the flesh one Son, who is the Word of God. It attributes to this Son two generations, the one intemporal and incorporeal from the Father, the other temporal from his Mother the Virgin in a body animated with a soul. It confesses that the one Christ is known in two natures according to the concepts of deity and humanity.

40 Kyrillos von Skythopolis. Texte und Untersuchungen 49, 2.

(Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1939) pp. 43-44: French trans, by Festugiére, op. cit., p. 97.

21

Furthermore, the Council added the words, 'without confusion, without change, without division, and without separation,' because of those who dare to divide or separate the ineffable and indescribably hypostatic union which was accomplished in the womb of the Virgin; and because of those who say that the Word of God was changed into flesh; and because of those who affirm that the flesh of the only-begotten is consubstantial to the Deity; and because of those who do not confess the hypostatic union of the Word with the flesh but who invent the monstrous impiety of a commixture, or confusion, or consubstantiation. These say that both the deity and the flesh have produced one nature and so, because of what they say, they are no longer able to preserve in the Christ his passibility because of his impassible divine nature, nor his impassibility because of his passible humanity.

Therefore, in order to show the correct understanding, the Synod inserted in its definition the expression 'in two natures', not to divide the Christ into two independent and separate natures, but because it confessed that the Christ is the same in both natures and that both natures are in the same [Christ]» And so, when we hear the Council declaring the Christ in two natures, we do not think that it introduces any division or separation in the one synthetic hypostasis of Christ, but we understand that by this phrase the Council intended to indicate the difference of natures in the manner in which St. Cyril, the Archbishop of Alexandria, described: '[We do not confess the union] in such a manner that the difference of the natures is suppressed by the union."1

The significance of St. Euthymius' confession lies in the

authority given to St. Cyril who is called, "the teacher of the

True Faith;" and in the fact that St. Euthymius clearly understands

Leo's "in two natures" formula adopted by Chalcedon in the context

of St. Cyril: "We understand that by this phrase the Council

intended to indicate the difference of natures in the manner of St.

Cyril...." In addition, the confession that the Blessed Virgin is

Theotokos and that the union is according to hypostasis is an

obvious allusion to Cyril's 12 Anathemas.

At the same time, this confession also illustrates that in the

22

defense of Chalcedon a philosophy of hypostasis was slowly

emerging; a philosophy, however, whose intent was to give

expression primarily to the theological content of the Chalcedonian

definition rather than to an analysis of being since, after all,

the hypostatic union is "ineffable and indescribable". This

theological outlook is what distinguishes the confession of St.

Euthymius and later Cyrillian defenders of Chalcedon from that of

Theodoret of Cyrus. Both understand the distinction of nature and

hypostasis in the terms established by St. Basil as the distinction

between the common and the particular, and both can apply this

41 distinction to the Trinity in the same way. However, though

Theodoret is able to identify the Christ with the Logos, because of

his philosophical mind he is unable to proclaim the implications of

this identification with conviction. St. Euthymius, on the other

hand, manifests no such difficulty; his simple confession reveals

the simple faith of a monk and not the mind of a philosopher.

Without hesitation he affirms that, "...Christ and the Divine Logos

are not different [persons], but Jesus Christ our Savior is one and

the same unique Son of God, even though we do not ignore the

42 difference of natures which come together in him."

4. Chalcedon and Imperial Policy: The Henoticon. St.

cf. Vie de Saint Euthyme 26 (Greek text in Schwartz, Kyrillos von Skythopolis pp. 39-40: French translation in Festugifere, pp. 94-95). For Theodoret cf. The Eranistes [Dialogues] I (NPNF III, pp. 161-162.

vie de St. Euthyme, 26: Schwartz, p. 40; Festugiére, p. 95.

23

Euthymius is a particular example of the attitude among some

defenders of Chalcedon towards Cyril's 12 Anathemas. The public

reaction to the various policies adopted with respect to Chalcedon

by the Emperors is further illustration of how some Chalcedonians

were able to uphold the Council and all the writings of Cyril at

the same time.

The political pressures on Constantinople played a major part

in determining imperial policy towards Chalcedon. The Emperors

believed it necessary both to maintain communion with Rome in order

to insure her military support against the Persians, and also to

reconcile the Palestinian and Coptic provinces, predominantly

monophysite, to imperial policy, in order to provide the Empire

with a buffer zone on her eastern frontier. The difficulty of

realizing both goals at the same time centered around Chalcedon;

either the monophysites in the Egyptian and Palestinian provinces

must be reconciled to Rome and therefore to Chalcedon, or Rome, and

therefore Chalcedon, must be sacrificed to the monophysites, or at

least minimalized.

Under the influence of Timothy Aelurus, one of the leading

monophysites, the Emperor Basiliscus published a circular

condemning Chalcedon in the year 475, The supporters of

Chalcedon, however, were strong enough to force Basiliscus to

publish a counter-circular condemning his own condemnation of

43 Chalcedon. A short time later the Emperor Zeno, after he had

Evagrius' Eccl. Hist. III.iii-vii.

24

recovered the throne from the usurper Basiliscus, sought a

different approach towards conciliation of the monophysites by the

44 publication of the Henoticon (Instrument of Union) in 482.

As its name suggests the Henoticon was framed to unify the

opposing factions in Alexandria who were divided over Chalcedon by

45 emphasizing the points of agreement between them. It expressly

received Cyril's 12 Anathemas and explicitly recognized only the

first three Councils. Though not expressly condemning Chalcedon,

it mentions it only in a negative context: "And these things we

write not as setting forth a new form of faith, but for your

assurance: and every one who has held or holds any other opinion,

either at the present or another time, whether at Chalcedon or In

any synod whatever, we anathematize."

Both Patriarch Acacius, the framer of the Henoticon, and the

47 Emperor Zeno subscribed to Chalcedon. Before he could receive

appointment to the see of Alexandria, Peter Mongus was required to

renounce his earlier condemnation of Chalcedon and sign the

Henoticon. Only then was he received into communion by the

44 The text of the Henoticon is in Evagrius' Eccl. Hist.

III.xlv.

45Ibid., Ill.xii.

46Ibid., p. 139. 47

See Eccl. Hist. Ill.xxii, and C. Moeller's emendation of the text so that it reads: "...the Emperor altogether refused to anathematize the synod at Chalcedon." ("Un représentant de la christologie néo-chalcédonienne au début du Vie siècle in Orient, Nephalius d'Alexandrie," RHE 40, p. 91.)

25

48 Patriarch Acacius. The Emperor Zeno, in response to the Pope who

had written of his concern that the appointment of Peter meant the

abandonment of Chalcedon, assured the Pope that the reception of

49 Chalcedon was the requirement for Peter's appointment.

These events suffice to show that there was in the East an

influential group of Chalcedonians who saw no conflict in upholding

the Henoticon with its explicit mention of Cyril's 12 Anathemas.

At the same time, however, by continuing the policy of the

Henoticon neither Zeno nor his successor Anastasius were able to

secure the peace of the empire which they had hoped could be

obtained at the expense of theological clarity. On the one hand,

the policy of the Henoticon was instrumental in provoking the

Acacian Schism, since for Rome, express endorsement of Chalcedon

was necessary as an affirmation of papal primacy, and thereby a

warrant of theological orthodoxy. On the ether hand, failure to

outline a clear and unambiguous policy towards Chalcedon was

leading to a tumultuous state of affairs within the Eastern

provinces of the Empire. The leading instigators were the

"Akephaloi" (those without a head), a group which included

Philoxenus and Severus, who separated from Peter Mongus when he

48 H Eccl. Hist. Ill.xvi & xvii. 49

Ibid., III.xx. Peter's attitude towards Chalcedon, however, was ambiguous and contradictory. After his appointment had been secured, he revealed his true colors by anathematizing the Tome of Leo and the Council of Chalcedon (cf. Ibid. Ill.xxii).

As described by Evagrius, the result of Anastasius' policy was that each bishop acted according to his individual opinion, III.xxx.

26

subscribed to the Henoticon and would not expressly anathematize

Chalcedon. This was the same group who at the Council of Sidon in

512 secured the removal of Flavian of Antioch on grounds of being

Nestorian.

The weakness of the Henoticon lay in its failure to reflect

the true state of affairs. Even though both supporters and

opponents of Chalcedon could subscribe to the Henoticon and Cyril's

Anathemas, some refused to remain neutral with respect to

Chalcedon. Since no clear policy was adopted towards Chalcedon

there was no basis on which to resolve the real point of contention

causing the turmoil.

And yet in spite of the influence of the monophysite bloc, It

was clear that outright rejection of Chalcedon was impossible.

Rejection of Chalcedon had been adopted as imperial policy only

once by the Emperor Basiliscus, and that policy had to be quickly

reversed. Significantly, it was not reversed because of pressure

from Rome, but because of pressure from within the Eastern

provinces themselves.

When the Emperor Anastasius introduced the monophysite version

of the trisagion formula into the services of the Great Church the

reaction of the Chalcedonians compelled him to withdraw the formula

or risk losing his throne. This is enough to illustrate that in

the East those who received Chalcedon were a substantial,

influential group, and their reception of Chalcedon included also

51Eccl. Hist. IH.xliv.

27

^ Cyril's Anathemas, officially endorsed in the Henoticon.

5. Justinian and Chalcedon. Due to the strength of the

Chalcedonians a monophysite ecclesiastical policy was clearly a

52 blind alley. But if ignoring the Council could not secure peace,

the only feasible solution was outright acceptance of Chalcedon.

Not until the reign of Justin I (518-527), however, under the

direction of his nephew Justinian, was the policy of the

Chalcedonian emperors Marcian and Leo I restored. The Henoticon

was abandoned and in 519 the Acacian Schism between Rome and

Constantinople was healed. As a part of this change in policy the

monophysites were expected to accept Chalcedon.

The direction in which to pursue this aim co>:_d only consist

in proving the genuine Cyrillianism of Chalcedon on the basis of

the christology expressed in Cyril's Anathemas. This effort did

not involve a shift in theological outlook; rather, it required a

clearly articulated philosophy of hypostasis and nature that would

show the inherent harmony between Chalcedon's, "one Son of God in

two natures," and Cyril's, "one incarnate nature [or hypostasis] of

the Divine Logos from two natures."

Justinian himself did not contribute to this effort of

philosophical clarity; his dogmatic writings reflect the

philosophical consensus that had been reached with regard to

Cf. Georges Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State, trans, by Joan Hussey (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1969 revised edition) p. 68.

28

hypostasis and nature more than they plough new ground. But

Justinian did recognize that the theological implications of this

philosophy of hypostasis focused precisely on the doctrine

proclaimed by Cyril in his 12th Anathema and raised by the

monophysites as a test of orthodoxy, and that was the doctrine of

theopaschism.

Justinian urged Pope Hormisdas to accept the theopaschite

formula of the Scythian monks for the peace of the Church, and in

531 he issued a decree anathematizing those who denied that, "Jesus

Christ, the Son of God, our incarnate God, who became man and was

53 crucified, is one of the holy and consubstantial Trinity." Pope

Hormisdas was uncertain how to respond to this proposal. Pope John

II, however, eventually subscribed to the formula in 534. The

agreement with Rome gave Justinian confidence that on the basis of

this coumon doctrine, union with the monophysites could now be

attained. He convened a colloquy between Orthodox and monophysite

bishops in the year 532. The colloquy was unable to accomplish its

purpose, however since the monophysites steadfastly refused to be

reconciled to Chalcedon. Finally, at a Synod of 536, presided over

by Patriarch of Constantinople Menas, the monophysites were

condemned. Severus, the venerable leader of the monophysites who

had been called to the capital in 535, was allowed to return to

Egypt where he died in 538.

Lex Iustin. Cod. I.I.6; see J. Tixeront, History of Dogmas, trans, from the French edition by H.L.B., vol. Ill, The End of the Patristic Age (430-800). (St. Louis, Missouri: B. Herder, 1916) p. 126.

29

Conclusion. This should be sufficient to indicate the basis

on which we contend that the term "neo-chalcedonian" is

historically inaccurate: the 12 Anathemas of St. Cyril were always

at the heart of Chalcedonian christology, both at Chalcedon itself

and among its defenders in the West as well as in the East. The

theological inaccuracy of the term follows. From this perspective,

we intend to demonstrate the fidelity of so-called

"neo-chalcedonian" christology to Chalcedon, focusing on Leontius

of Jerusalem as its representative.

Cf. H.M. Diepen, "Les douze anathématismes au Concile d'Éphèse et jusque'en 519," Revue Thomiste 55 (1955) pp. 300-38. Diepen concludes, "Neo-chalcedonism was not a new doctrine, only a change of tactics, prompted by the ambiguous conclusions drawn from the moderation of St. Leo and the fathers of Chalcedon," p. 338.

30

C. Leontius of Jerusalem and his Writings.

1. Chronology and Biographical Data. The end of our

historical sketch brings us to the beginning of the period of

Leontius' literary activity. Because Leontius always refers to

Severus' followers, and never to Severus directly, M. Richard

suggests the year of Severus' death, 538, as the "terminus a quo"

for the Leontian corpus: the Contra Monophysitas and the Adversus

Nestorianu8, written in that order. Both are parts of a single

work, part of which (the main body of the Contra Mono.) has been

lost. Such a date is supported by Leontius' reference to the

uncovering of the Apollinarian forgeries by John of Scythopolis

(the reference is in PG 86, col. 1865C), whose episcopate was

between the years 530 and 550. As the "terminus ad quern" Richard

proposes the year 544 on the grounds that Leontius gives no

indication of the Three Chapters controversy which rocked the

. 56 empire.

The fact that Leontius naturally turns to the regions of Judea

and Samaria when giving examples drawn from geography corroborates

the evidence given by his name; he comes from Jerusalem, at least

as a youth, perhaps as a monk. Beyond this it is difficult to

identify Leontius further. Richard believes he is the apocrlsary

"Léonce de Jerusalem et Léonce de Byzance," pp. 38-39.

Ibid., pp. 42-47. See also P. Gray, The Defense of Chalcedon pp. 122-123.

57Ibid., p. 52.

31

Leontius who participated in the colloquies between Orthodox and

58 monophysites in 532 and 536. David Evans, however, identifies

59 that particular Leontius with Leontius of Byzantium. One can say

with reasonable certainty, however, that our Leontius was close to

the imperial court. His writings indicate familiarity with the

cosmopolitan setting of Constantinople, and with the proceedings of

the colloquies of 532 and 536.

2. Leontius, Origenlsm and Nestorianism. This places

Leontius in the time and place of the Origenistic crisis and it is

significant that the title of the Adv.Nest, is: "Against Those Who

Say There are Two Hypostases in Christ and Who Deny the Union in

Him." It may very well be that the opponents Leontius has in

mind are Origenists whom he lumps with the Nestorians since they

both deny a natural union of natures in Christ.

There is no explicit reference to Nestorians or Origenists in

the Adv.Nest., but there are clear allusions to their doctrines.

In particular, Leontius refers several times to the Origenistic

doctrine which requires a mediator between God and man, passages we

will have time to analyze in the main body of the thesis. This,

together with the denial of the Nestorians concerning the notion

CO

Ibid., p. 81.

59 Leontius of Byzantium: An Origenist Christology. (Dumbarton

Oaks, 1970), pp. 156-183.

PG 86, col. 1400. Since most of the citations from Migne from this point on are from vol. 86 references to Migne will include the volume number only when it is other than vol. 86.

32

(_ that two natures form only one hypostasis in Christ, is especially

important for assessing the meaning Leontius intends to give to the

phrase, "union by nature" (ëvoXJLÇ φυσική and σύνθεσίς φυσική ).

In passing we may note that this does not, however, resolve

the question concerning the Origenism of Leontius of Byzantium.

Leontius of Jerusalem does attack directly the notion of hypostasis

defended by Leontius of Byzantium in Byzantium's Contra Nestorianos

62 et Eutychianos I.I, and Leontius concludes his caricature by

saying: "By reason of these [arguments] they say that they are

63 among the cherubim." Since this description aptly fits some of

the doctrines among Origenist circles, that they would be like the

angels, Evans offers this as corroborating evidence of Leontius of

Byzantium's Origenism. Daley, on the other hand, argues rather

convincingly that being characterized as an Origenist does not

necessarily mean one holds the doctrines of Evagrius; but only that

one is given to philosophical speculation in explaining matters of

On the Origenism of Leontius of Byzantium see the following studies together with their bibliographies: Marcel Richard, "Léonce de Byzance, était-il origenist?" Revue des Études Byzantines 5 (Paris, 1947) pp. 31-66; and David Evans, Leontius of Byzantium. For opposing views see J.J. Lynch, "Leontius of Byzantium: A Cyrillian Christology," Theological Studies 36 (1975) pp. 455-71; and Brian Daley, S.J., "The Origenism of Leontius of Byzantium," Journal of Theological Studies. New Series, vol. 27, part 2 (Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1976) pp. 333-369.

62cols. 1278C 14 - 1280A 3.

63col. 1560C 2f.

64Evans, pp. 139-143.

33

doctrine. Given the destination of Adv.Nest. — those who deny

the hypostatic union and affirm two hypostases in Christ, i.e.

Nestorians and Origenists — , the reference to Leontius of

Byzantium only indicates that he was a rigid dyophysite, whether he

held to the doctrines of Evagrius or not, and that his

understanding of the hypostatic union was unacceptable to Leontius

of Jerusalem, and for that reason Leontius lumps him with

Origenists and Nestorians.

3. Leontius, the Monophysites» and the Chalcedonian Faith.

The Contra Monophysitas is directed primarily against the Severian

monophysites. We need not be surprised that though the Severians

had been condemned at the Synod of 536, they are still the subject

of polemic for the Orthodox. Justinian had Initiated the

colloquies of 532 in high hopes that the monophysites could be

reconciled to the Chalcedonian faith if Chalcedon's genuine

Cyrillianism could be shown. Even though the Synod of 536 revealed

the monophysites were beyond reconciliation, their lose to the

Church required a period of adjustment. Justinian still hoped they

could be won to Chalcedon by reasoned argument and so, when a group *

of Alexandrian monophysite monks returned to the Catholic Church in

542 under the Alexandrian patriarchate of Zoilos, apparently his

hopes were fanned and he took the opportunity to address through

them monophysitism in general. He sent the monks who had converted

Daley, pp. 366-69.

a doctrinal treatise which he composed to prove the genuine

Cyrillianism of Chalcedon and the error of the monophysites.

Leontius' objective may have been the same. The Leontian

corpus demonstrates Chalcedon as the middle road between two

extreme errors: that which says on the one hand that there are two

hypostases in Christ and which denies the union of natures in him,

and that which says on the other hand that there is one nature,

implying either a confusion of the divine and human natures, or

their alteration.

In his philosophical explication of the notion of hypostasis

Leontius manifests distinctive peculiarities. For example, he uses

the term Κυριάκος άνθρωπος , an Antiochene term which no one else

of the period takes up, and fits it into hie christological

framework. The result le a notion of hypostasis and nature which

recalls Gregory of Nazianzus, and which is congenial both to

Alexandrian and Roman traditions. It is no accident, then, that

Leontius' insight into the mystery of the incarnation leads

naturally and inevitably to the understanding of salvation as

deification. As for Gregory of Nazianzus, man's transformation

into a divine mode of life — which does not change the definition

of human nature, but realizes its true destiny — is the summit of

his thought, the center to which every road leads in his

theological exposition. Deification is the highest good man can

"Contra Monophysitas" in E. Schwartz, Drei dogmatische Schriften Iustinians. Abhandlungen der München. Akademie der Wissenschaft. NF. 18 (Munich, 1939) pp. 7-43.

attain; it is God's ultimate purpose for man, explaining man's

nature and destiny and the reason and aim of the Word's

incarnation, an event foreshadowed even in the first creation.

Our study of Leontius' christology takes us first to an

examination of his notion of hypostasis. This is really the

foundation of his thought and will provide the basis on which to

examine his notion of physis, and finally his understanding of

salvation as deification.

Chapter One

Towards An Understanding of Hypostasis

A. Some Fundamental Assumptions.

1. Chalcedonian Terminology: Its Danger and Difficulty. The

difficulty of the christological problem was recognized as early as

Gregory of Nazianzus who sought "to come to terms with the question

the insolubility of which Apollinaris had tried to make clear to

the Niceans: how could two "perfect realities" come together in a

real unity?"

The difficulty was brought into sharper focus by the Council

of Chalcedon when the Council's definition of faith made a distinc-

tion between hypostasis and nature. As Moeller has described it:

"How is the human nature of Jesus perfectly consubstantial to ours

if it is deprived of its own hypostasis? The definition of

Chalcedon, by introducing the one hypostasis in the formula of the

two natures, poses one of the most difficult problems of

2 speculative theology." The difficulty concerns a coherent account

of the distinction between nature and hypostasis.

Approached theologically, or if you will mystically, it is not

difficult to understand that one and the same is both God and man;

that the eternal Word and Son of God, in assuming human nature to

himself, himself becomes man. But when one proceeds to make

K. Holl, Amphilochius von Ikonium in seinem Verhältnis zu den Grossen Kappadozlern (Tübingen und Leipzig: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 1904), p. 186.

2 "Le Chalcédonlsme et le néo-Chalcédonisme," p. 696.

36

37

philosophical sense of this dogma, that is to say to give it

terminological coherency, one is confronted on the one hand with a

profound difficulty, and on the other with a serious danger.

On the one hand, if one is able to go beyond the terminology

and penetrate the mystery to which it points, he finds himself

speaking in riddles to express that mystery: one hypostasis in two

natures, two natures in one hypostasis; the hypostasis transcends

the nature, and yet the nature transcends the hypostasis; the

hypostasis is distinct from the nature, yet "is" the nature; the

hypostasis is composite, yet the hypostasis is absolutely simple;

the hypostasis changes, yet remains absolutely the same.

On the other hand, if one takes the philosophical model too

absolutely, and deals only in terms of the philosophical

terminology, he finds it very difficult to maintain the mystery of

the identity of subject In Christ and at the same time to give an

adequate account of Christ's human nature without treating it as an

independent subject of attribution: not the Logos in his divine

nature, but the human nature receives the divine gifts of honor and

the name that is above every name; not the Logos in his divine

nature, but the human nature alone suffers and dies. In other

words, it is very difficult to treat the human nature without, for

all intents and purposes, treating it in the same way one would the

hypostasis. The danger related to this is that in treating

hypostasis and nature separately for purposes of analysis one risks

fragmenting hypostasis and nature into separate entities.

But of course, there is no such thing as a nature that is not

38

personalized. Nor is nature a thing that one can extract from the

hypostasis, which itself cannot be separated from the nature, and

plop it on the operating table, and examine it separately by

itself. In the case of Christ, then, the question is: if the human

nature does not exist without an hypostasis, and yet its hypostasis

is the Divine Logos, and if the one is Creator and the other

created, then how can the human nature maintain its humanity if it

does not possess its own hypostasis?

Chalcedonian terminology makes this task even more difficult.

If there is only one hypostasis, and that is the Son of God

himself, any philosophical account of nature that describes it in

any way as an hypostasis, whether in terms of relation, or

particularity, or completeness — even though it may in fact be all

of these things — is unfaithful to Chalcedonian and Nicene

Orthodoxy.

One can find these difficulties in Leontius of Jerusalem. But

one must understand that Leontius, as well as those involved in the

same defense of Chalcedon — John the Grammarian, Ephrem of Amid,

and others — is a theologian and not a philosopher, employing

philosophical language as a tool to give expression to the mystical

vision of the Church. Leontius was a monk, Ephrem of Amid a

bishop, and the theological understanding of the Emperor Justinian

was derived from his many conversations with priests. Their

defense of Chalcedon against the charges of the Severians was

necessarily philosophical In character in order to demonstrate that

the theological insight of Chalcedon and Cyril was the same.

39

Consequently, one must understand the terms they use from the

perspective of their ultimate objective: viz., to prove that

Chalcedon is Nicene, that is to say that the Logos is the "who" who

was born of the Blessed Virgin, who suffered, and died. At the

same time, the value of their defense is measured by the degree to

which their philosophical terminology upholds this theological

insight of Nicea. This does not involve a methodological

contradiction. One can discern by the way in which these

theologians explain themselves the theological intuition guiding

their philosophical analysis, and on this basis one can determine

how faithful their philosophical analysis is to their theological

intuition.

At the same time, one must not expect a fully developed or

coherent system since the theologians of the first half of the 6th

century had embarked on what was truly a new venture. Nonetheless,

Leontius of Jerusalem comes remarkably close. But successful or

not, Leontius and his fellow Churchmen are theologians first,

philosophers second.

Understanding this is of major importance in approaching the

writings of Leontius of Jerusalem. Leontius is fully aware of the

ineffability of the mystery of the Incarnation; in seeking to

express the mystery his terminology takes on profound subtleties

which means that the intent of any particular passage or phrase can

be understood only if it is read in the context of his fundamental

theological assumptions. However, one's own theological

assumptions also have a significant impact on how one assesses

40

Leontius' christology, and this we intend to demonstrate in the

following.

2. A modern Critique of Leontius of Jerusalem. Charles

Moeller represents a popular consensus concerning the christology

of the misnamed "neo-chalcedonian" school to which Leontius of

3 Jerusalem belongs. Leontius is governed, so Moeller says, by the

two definitions of hypostasis which haunt the whole

"neo-chalcedonian" enterprise: the basilian definition of

hypostasis as "concrete properties such as size, and color, or to

put it concisely, the characteristic properties of the prosopon;"

and a distinctively "neo-chalcedonian" definition of "that which

exists by itself". The unification of these two definitions is

4 attributed to John the Grammarian, and they are taken up and

developed by Leontius of Byzantium and Leontius of Jerusalem. The

latter departs somewhat from the grasp of this two-fold definition,

but even so Is unable to fully shake the spectre of its influence.

He "defines hypostasis explicitly," says Moeller, "by such generic

formulas as existence, co-existence, concrete subsistence in the

unity of one reality which acts by itself, which is close enough to

One can refer to any of Moeller's articles for a critique of "neo-chalcedonianism" in general, but his most telling critique is given when he evaluates the christological implications of the thought of Leontius of Jerusalem in particular; see his article "Textes "Monophysites" de Léonce de Jerusalem."

4 A Greek fragment of John's Apology in which he treated this

question is in the Apology of Eulcgius, PG cols. 2944D - 2945D, in particular col. 2945BC.

41

the second definition supposed by John the Grammarian (existence by

itself)."5

Moeller goes on to say that this two-fold definition of

hypostasis assumed by Leontius of Jerusalem and other

"neo-chalcedonians" reveals monophysitic tendencies. Consequently,

"the solution of 6th century byzantine christology marks the origin

of 'monophysitism'." For, if hypostasis is defined as concrete

characteristics such as size and color, and if the human nature of

Jesus has no hypostasis, then obviously the human nature of Jesus

has no size or color or any other concrete characteristics. It has

disappeared! On the other hand, to define hypostasis as "that

which exists by itself" means that hypostases consist of

"subsisting relations" which, when applied to the Trinity, results g

in tri-thelsm. This is the difficulty one falls into, so Moeller

argues, when one confuses the spheres of christology and

trinitarian theology, and he proposes that the distinction between

these two spheres which was carefully observed by Severus and the

Church Fathers should be reintroduced into our theological

9 instruction.

"Textes 'Monophysite'," p. 472; see also Moeller's "Le Chalcédonlsme et le néo-Chalcédonisme," pp. 672f.

Textes 'Monophysites', p. 469. Moeller repeats his proposal in, "Le Chalcédonlsme," p. 649.

"Textes 'Monophysites', p. 469; and also "Le Chalcédonlsme," p. 698.

g

"Textes 'Monophysites', p. 468.

9Ibid., p. 479.

42

A full critique of Moeller would take us too far afield.

Suffice it to say that his critique of 6th century byzantine

christology in general, and of Leontius of Jerusalem in particular,

is curious on two grounds. First, the suggestion that to unite the

spheres of christology and trinitarian theology constitutes an

abuse sets off all kinds of alarms. To begin with, the knowledge

that God is Three Persons is possible only on the basis of the

confession that Jesus Christ is the Son of God. That is to say,

our knowledge and confession of the Holy Trinity is rooted in our

confession of Christ, and to suggest that christology and

trinitarian theology should be maintained as distinct spheres in

dogmatic instruction is to obscure, if not deny, their essential

unity for the christian faith. For, if the Son and co-eternal Word

of God the Father is indeed the one who became man, and is not

another than Jesus, then the mark of a truly Catholic christology

is that it naturally leads to a trinitarian theology without

requiring an adjustment in contemplative thought as one shifts to a

different aspect of dogma. In other words, if the Second Person of

the Trinity is the one who was incarnate, then whatever can be

applied to his hypostasis christologically must also be applied

theologically. And so, the attempt to find some form of expression

which can be applied simultaneously and consistently to christology

and trinitarian theology is inherent in the christian confession

itself.

Second, the christology against which Moeller measures the

fidelity of Leontius of Jerusalem to Chalcedon would itself be

43

judged by Leontius to be heterodox. The thrust of Moeller's

critique is to demonstrate the inadequacy of every other

christological explication but that of St. Thomas, and to promote a

christology founded on the assumptions implied in the notion of

created grace. However, governed by these assumptions, Moeller

is led to describe the relationship of the human nature to the

Logos in a manner which Leontius would charge as implying in fact

two hypostases.

Moeller recognizes that Leontius rejects the notion of

"created grace" on the grounds that it would then make the divinity

of Christ's human nature an "accident", necessarily inferior in

dignity to the divine essence. Moeller reveals his real concern,

and fundamental assumption, in what follows: on the grounds that

Leontius' christology implies the negation of created grace, "one

would suppose as a result that Leontius emphasizes the

transfiguration of the human nature of the Christ by the divinity

present in it. To ignore created grace, to make the

particularizing properties subsist in the composite property of the

divine hypostasis is to turn our thought in the direction of a real

absorption of the human in the divine." Moeller goes on to say:

"The theme of deification of the human nature in Christ is central

in the doctrine of Leontius of Jerusalem. It is unnecessary to

recall the importance of this idea in eastern christology, starting

Ibid., pp. 479-481.

See ibid., p. 476, and Moeller's documentation.

from the 2nd half of the 6th century."

We refrain from challenging the accuracy of the last

statement, which seems to forget that deificaf.on is more than a

theme, but the very content of salvation in the thought of St.

Irenaeus, St. Athanasius and Gregory the Theologian, in order to

move directly to the real issue at stake of which this notion of

deification is symptomatic. Moeller then moves on to state:

"Without question, this deification is not a true absorption.

Leontius often recalls that the human nature of Jesus is complete,

and of the same essence as ours. There is not a formal heresy

here, but a characteristic tendency. The notion of deification,

ambiguous for the reasons already indicated, gives the Impression

that this author makes of the divine nature the 'quo' of the

activities of the incarnate Word. On the same level, one foresees

the ambiguity of such terms as 'the humanity of Christ', the

'instrument of the divinity', or 'Christ who is the living God-man

[Theandric]'."13

The heart of Moeller's own christology can be located in this

statement: "The concrete characteristics (which form a 'princlpium

quo' of the humanity of Jesus), living and acting (that which

moderns call a personality in the psychological sense, a term that

is otherwise ambiguous and better to avoid), do not directly

subsist in the property of the divine hypostasis, but in the human

12Ibid.

13Ibid.

45

V nature." In other words, Moeller proposes a "who" subsisting in

a larger "Who". The human nature is a complete and closed unit

which wholly exists in the Divine hypostasis which serves as the

human unit's "princlpium quod".

Moeller himself suggests that "concrete characteristics" be

abandoned when it is a question of the hypostasis of Christ, and

when speaking of the unity of Christ's hypostasis our study should

be limited to the ontologlcal subsiste:·ce of the human nature

(along with its individuating notes) in the divine hypostasis in

order to assure the human nature of Jesus its complete

consubstantiality with our nature. The operation of the Divine

Logos in the human nature is, as a result of this scheme, described

in terms of created grace, and the ultimate blessedness of the

human nature is the "beatific vision".

Moeller is correct to recognize the fundamental opposition of

this christology to that of Leontius of Jerusalem. We wish to

emphasize two fundamental points which will help us begin our study

of Leontius in a light as clear as possible. The basic assumption

implied in Moeller's presentation is that man by nature cannot be

touched by God without altering or destroying the integrity of

human nature. This is suggested first in the view that the human

properties of Jesus' human nature do not subsist directly in the

divine hypostasis but in the human nature itself, and second in the

"Le Chalcédonlsme et le néo-Chalcédonisme," p. 703. The same is repeated in "Textes 'Monophysites'," p. 475.

( 15Ibid., pp. 479 and 481.

46

view that the human nature of Jesus is acted upon by the Logos

through created grace. Such a concept is absolutely opposed to the

christology of Leontius of Jerusalem in which human nature is truly

human in its openness to God, and in its capacity to receive the

Divine Himself, which means that man's true destiny is not some

'beatific vision', but deification and communion with God.

The second point is this: to suppose that the human nature is

its own independent unit, and to imply in relation to this that

human nature cannot be touched by the Divine, from the perspective

of Leontius of Jerusalem, makes the doctrine of a real union

impossible. Even though the human nature may not be called a

hypostasis in such a system, it is so by its definition as far as

Leontius is concerned, and is consequently unfaithful to Nicene

Orthodoxy and Chalcedon. Quite clearly, at stake here is the real

meaning of the Chalcedonian hypostasis; and this involves a very

definite anthropology and soteriology. In the light of this, let

us now begin our study of the christology of Leontius of Jerusalem

as it is revealed through his notion of hypostasis.

B. The Notion of Hypostasis Conceived in Itself.

1. Earlier Descriptions of Hypostasis. As we noted earlier,

the enterprise in which Leontius and others was engaged was a new

one: viz., to give coherent philosophical expression to the

christological confession of the Church by demonstrating the

inherent unity of meaning in the terminologies of Cyril and

Chalcedon. The philosophical character of the task led the

47

theologians of the 6th century to focus on what we might call the

structural characteristics of the hypostasis; In other words, they

seem to have been occupied with the question "what" is the

hypostasis in contrast to the Severians who, being theologians of a

more mystical bent, were always guided by the question "who" is the

hypostasis.

And so, we find in the philosophical theology of the

Chalcedonians such descriptions of hypostasis as we have already

described: "that which exists by itself," or the "particular" which

is numerically distinct from other particulars, and which is

distinguished by the characteristic properties of the prosopon.

For example, John the Grammarian establishes the general

philosophical principle of hypostasis, on which he bases his

doctrine of the Trinity and of Christ, in this way:

"The [essence] which commonly exists completely in each particular man (έν τοις καθ' έκαστον άνθρωποις ) is properly called essence. The particulars (oL κατά µέρος) are distinguished from one another not by the essence, but by the accompanying properties (ίδΐώµασΟ such as size and color; to say it concisely, by the characteris-tic properties of the prosopa."

The hypostasis as the particular, and the essence as the

common, is applied in the same way to the doctrine of the Trinity,

and of Christ:

"We say that each characteristic hypostasis possesses completely the marks of the Godhead; the creative capacity and whatever else is in the uncreated nature. And in this way we affirm that the Trinity is of the same

16PG col. 2945B 14 � C 4.

17Ibid., cols. 2944D 13 � 2945B 13.

48

essence, the same essence being known wholly in three proeopa. The Father possesses the essence of the Godhead completely, as does the Son and the Holy Spirit.

In this respect, Paul defends the true proclamation when he says: 'For in him dwells the fullness of the Godhead bodily.' He did not say that the Father was incarnate, but that the entire Godhead exists completely in the hypostases; in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, existing completely in each hypostasis as the Savior himself said: 'All things of the Father are mine.' In other words, whatever marks belong to the essence of the Father belong also to the Divine Logos who was incarnate. The Son is not the Father, nor is the Father the Son for these names indicate their relationship to one another.

So how would we not say that the essence of the Godhead is completely in the Christ, whom we say is perfect God? And how, to those who confess that he is perfect man, will we not also confess that the whole essence of humanity exists in him? For he did not assume a part of the human nature, as Apollinaris taught who said that he took flesh deprived of a rational soul; but he assumed the whole essence, which is flesh animated with a rational and intellectual soul."

Beneath this structural analysis one discerns the struggle to

give clear terminological expression to the "mystical" intuition

that the hypostasis of Christ is in fact a "who", the Divine Logos.

One discerns the same struggle in Ephrem of Antioch. In seeking to

show that Cyril uses the term physis in two ways, one for essence

and one for hypostasis, Ephrem gives at one time the cuetomary

structural definition of hypostasis as the particular (Ιδική) which

18 is constituted of the common essence, and at another time as one

being in which the human and divine natures share one particular

19 existence (Ιδιοσυστάτως ύπαρχεiv).

In Photius, Bibliotheca. Edited and translated by R. Henry, vol. IV (codex 229) (Paris: 1965) p. 133.

19Ibid., p. 127.

49

V One can discern in the accounts of John and Ephrem a

penetration into the mystery of hypostasis that goes deeper than

their philosophical descriptions. But philosophically, they are

unable to go deeper than a structural view of the "outer exterior"

of the hypostasis. As such, to characterize their notion of

hypostasis strictly in terms of "existence by itself" or "the

particular with characteristic properties", while true to a point,

is a misrepresentation since these are only working definitions

employed to give some account of the mystery of hypostasis, and in

particular the mystery of the hypostasis of Christ. In this regard

Leontius makes a contribution. This contribution consists in the

wealth of terms he employs to describe the "structure" and

characteristics of the hypostasis that makes possible a deeper

penetration into its inner mystery.

2. Leontius' Description of Hypostasis Conceived in Itself.

One may question whether the definitions Leontius proposes for

hypostasis are descriptions more than definitions. The

definitions, or descriptions, he offers are many and various, and

sometimes appear to conflict one another; at least they conflict

one another if treated as strict definitions rather than

descriptions. Though one may indeed fix upon one characteristic

that is perhaps most distinctive of the hypostasis, this must not

be applied too rigidly, and only in the context of the whole extant

Leontian corpus. By fixing Leontius too rigidly to any one of the

descriptions he proposes, scholars have succeeded only in

50

misrepresenting him.

Of the extant Leontian corpus, the Adv.Nest, presents in

greater detail than the CMon. the fundamental premises of

20 Leontius' christological exposition. In general, whatever is

presented in the CMon. is repeated in the Adv.Nest, and given a

more thorough philosophical analysis. The philosophical framework

of Leontius' notion of hypostasis is worked out primarily in the

first two books of the Adv.Nest. The first book deals with the

21 union of natures in the Lord Jesus Christ , and the second is

entitled: "A Refutation of the Impieties of Those Who Say There

Are Seen Two and not One Hypostasis in the Dispensation of the

22 Logos' Incarnation." Books III - VII make their own significant

contribution to the overall notion of hypostasis, but their

application generally rests on principles established in the first

two books.

If we were to press Leontius to give a succinct, precise

account of the hypostasis of Christ, and we allowed him no space to

play the windbag, he would very likely give us this answer: the

hypostasis of Christ is the hypostasis of the Logos. But if we

relaxed the terms of our question and allowed him the time to

The CMon., though it appears in the second place in the PG, was the first part of Leontius' polemical work. Its text can be found in the 2nd volume of PG 86, cols. 1769 - 1902. The Adv.Nest. is found in the first volume of PG 86, cols 1400 - 17681. See the introduction, p. 30.

21col. 1401A 13ff.

col. 1525CD.

51

explain himself, then the fun would begin.

Our study of Leontius' notion of hypostasis may begin with a

passage in Adv.Nest. II.1 which follows an extended account of the

23 different ways in which the term hypostasis is used.

Interestingly, Immediately before coming to a notion of hypostasis

that can be applied christologically, Leontius presents a

definition of hypostasis that recalls the definition of Theodoret

of Cyrus, a definition he considers unsuitable: "Hypostasis can

refer to the coming together of individual prosopa of the same

essence, or of different essence." Leontius has a different notion

25 of hypostasis, which he describes in the following way:

"Hypostasis also refers to when particular, different natures, together with their properties but not their prosopa, come together (τίνων συνελθουσον φύσεων διαφόρων ίδικων ) in union in the same thing under one existence (ύφ* έν στάσις). That is to say, there occurs a particular (vévrïtat τις) "standing together" (σΰοτασίς) which belongs to one single individual (ένδς µόνου άτοµου).

It is also generally agreed that hypostasis refers to the coming together not of different natures, but of many particular properties (ιδιωµάτων µερικών) by themselves, from all of which is constituted one universal property In one particular subject (έν τίνΐ ύποκεΐµένω évC), or in one single nature.

So then, hypostasis is called existence (στάσις = condition, position, or standing), or "existing together" (σύστασίς) which is conceived in a particular subject either in simplicity or in composition, either in that which is particular (ίδική) or that which is common as in the Godhead, either in one nature by itself or in several

23cols. 1525C � 1532A; in particular cols. 1529C � 1532C. Marcel Richard finds here the heart of Leontius' notion of hypostasis: "Léonce de Jerusalem et Léonce de Byzance," p. 61.

24col. 1529B 11 - C 2.

25col. 1529C 4 - D 4.

52

united together, provided that they are in one existence (υπάρξει). The hypostasis may be constituted of particular properties, or of [one] common property as in the case of one particular individual."

One can make several observations. First, in reference to the

definition of hypostasis that he rejected immediately before

turning to this one — which referred the term hypostasis to the

coming together of several prosopa — , Leontius explicitly states

that when the term hypostasis refers to the coming together of

several natures, it does not include the coming together of their

prosopa.

Second, one should note carefully that the term hypostasis

itself is not the coming together of natures, or of properties, but

it is itself that in which the στάσις or σύστασίς is observed. In

other words, the hypostasis itself is not a union or a coming

together, but it is that in which the union or coming together

takes place. Consider for example the terms used to describe the

hypostasis. That in which several things — natures with their

properties, or properties without their natures — come together is

one particular subject (τίνΐ ύποκεΐµένω ένΟ; it is one single

indivisible, that is individual (έΐς µόνος άτοµος). In other

words, even though the hypostasis may be constituted of several

different natures or properties, it itself is one indivisible

subject.

Third, in the case of natures coming together, the properties

are associated with the natures, not the hypostasis. And even in

the case of properties coming together without their natures, they

do not constitute the hypostasis, but one universal property that

53

(, is in the hypostasis. (In this particular context, the phrase, "in

one single nature," seems to carry the concrete sense of physis as

it was used by the Severians to indicate the concrete particular

subject.)

Already we have uncovered some of the basic characteristics of

hypostasis; it may be constituted of several natures, or one

nature, of several properties or one. Its constitution may be

simple or composite, it may be particular or common; but the

hypostasis itself is simple and not composite. It is that in which

the simple or composite constitution, or σύστασίς, Is observed; and

as such it is distinguishable in thought from the nature and its

properties.

Leontius shows this more clearly as he continues his

26 explanation:

"So the term hypostasis as such refers quite properly and appropriately to all of these things that pertain to the "existing together." And the indivisible subject (τδ ύποκευµενον άτοµον), which Is distinguished from all those of the same or different species by the mark of particularity (CôlKÔv), indicates by the number of each prosopon that the particular in itself (τάδε τΙ καθ' έαυτήν), is a kind of "standing away from" (άπόοτασίς), and is distinguished from essences in that essences are indistinct. For this reason, I suppose, the fathers called the same thing "prosopon".

Now, the term hypostasis is called by other terms such as essence and nature because it is that which supports, or underlies any plurality; it is not believed to refer to accidents which have no existence by themselves, but it is understood to subsist by itself (Clip' εαυτής έστάναί);...and the term hypostasis, together with the terms prosopon and physis, indicates the concrete, underlying reality which each of the other terms suppose."

cols. 1529D 4 � 1532B 5.

54

In the context of the previously cited passage a definite

image of hypostasis begins to emerge. In the previous passage, it

is said that the term hypostasis may refer to those instances when

several different, particular (ίδικαί) natures come together. Here

the hypostasis too is said to be distinguished by the mark of

particularity (ColKÔV). Both natures and hypostasis can be

particular — with this distinction however: though the hypostasis

is particular, It is not a particular nature. The significance of

this will become more clear as we proceed.

John the Grammarian cited the customary definition of

27 hypostasis as "nothing other than the essence with properties."

Termlnologically, this is no different than what Leontius will say

28 in another passage: "The hypostases are natures with properties,"

but Leontius gives a much more precise meaning to this definition.

Note, when one describes the hypostasis as a nature with

properties, the mind conceptually moves from nature to hypostasis.

The model of being presented to the mind shows nature as the

foundation of being; add a few properties to the nature and one has

produced the individual.

But Leontius means something quite different by the same

expression. The hypostasis is not to be identified analytically

with the nature or the properties; it is conceptually distinguished

from them, and it is not produced by them. In short, the

col. 2948A 9.

col. 1485B 9.

55

( hypostasis itself is the foundation and not the product of being:

it is the ύποκεΐµενον πράγµα, "the underlying reality," or if you

will, the "real subject."

As the foundation of being our conception of hypostasis

acquires a solidity, an independence, it would not otherwise have;

distinguished from nature and properties, the hypostasis itself is

an indivisible subject (άτοµος υποκείµενος); it is particular

(ιδική), and can be distinguished from other particulars in the

sense of being a kind of "standing away from" (άπόστασίς).

We see that Leontius in fact has not abandoned the Cappadocian

definition of the hypostasis as τό Εδίον; it would be more accurate

29 to say that he has brought it into much sharper focus. Indeed,

Leontius maintains the term ίδιον, though he alters its descriptive

function to bring it in accord with his general account of

hypostasis. In what immediately follows the two passages cited

above, Leontius goes on to distinguish the hypostasis from

consubstantials as ϋδίον. He addresses the difficulty posed by his

opponents, that the hypostasis of the Christ cannot be

30 consubstantial to God and to David at the same time:

"Why must you insist that we say the same hypostasis is consubstantial either to God the Father or to David? To begin with, hypostases are not made known [by the same principle as] consubstantials, neither does the same principle that pertains to the nature of consubstantials belong in any respect to the hypostasis; rather, the hypostasis holds the opposite principle to consubstan-tials. For particularity (EölOV), which distinguishes

29 contra Richard, "Léonce de Jérusalem," p. 61.

30col. 1532C 6 - 13.

56

particular individuals of the same nature from one another, is the more proper [principle] of the hypo-stasis, and it indicates the singularity (καθ* αυτά) of each [individual]."

These passages together should demonstrate that Leontius is

31 not working with two definitions of hypostasis; since the

hypostasis is not the union itself, but that which underlies the

union, the hypostasis is the same whether it unites one or more

natures and/or properties.

The same is true with regard to the two supposedly distinctive

features of so�called "neo�chalcedonian" christology. As with

particularity (ιδική or τό CölOV), so also "to exist by itself",

which one finds in the previous passage cited above, is not

definitive, but descriptive of the hypostasis. These are not two

definitions, but two descriptive characteristics of the hypostasis

as an indivisible, or individual, subject that supports, or

underlies the plurality of properties and/or natures coming

together.

In this same context, Leontius elsewhere likens the hypostasis

to an indivisible point that cannot be destroyed. Though a point

can be made more complex by additions to it, it cannot be

diminished to nothing since in the end, it is absolutely simple,

32 and is not constituted of parts.

As Richard suggests, "Léonce de Jerusalem," p. 61; specifically, Richard says the hypostasis may refer to the union of natures without prosopa, or it may refer to the union of properties without natures.

32Adv.Nest. 1.42; col. 1501D 1 - 12.

57

^ Leontius has not simply exchanged one word for another; he has

led us to a completely different — though certainly not new! —

conception of being in which being is not primarily essential, but

personal. We have come to the threshold of a deeper understanding

of hypostasis: indeed, we begin to catch glimpses of the

distinctive character not only of christian theology, but of

christian anthropology as well. If we were to construct a

philosophy of man on the principles described thus far, we could

give as a preliminary principle that persons are indivisible

subjects incapable of absorption or destruction. This is a

radically different doctrine from, say, Eastern mystical philosophy

in which the person or self is "nothing" but a manifestation of the

Divine pleroma destined for mystical re-absorption in the Divine.

Now, if we were dealing with a strictly philosophical system,

we could expand this to a universal principle; not some indistinct

lump of nature is the underlying substrata of being, but particular

individuals. This, of course, is an Aristotelian model. But

Leontius is not an Aristotelian. On the other hand, he is not a

Platonist or neo-Platonist. That is to say, he is not a

philosopher but a theologian, and for this reason we absolutely

cannot understand him in the context of Aristotelian or Platonic

categories, or even in terms of some kind of hybrid union of

categories. Though we may say that for Leontius, the foundation of

being is personal, we may not say that particular individuals are

the foundation of being, but before we can explain this, there are

other observations that must be made.

58

Obviously such a model presents its own difficulties.

Theologically, the question that immediately comes to mind is the

charge of Moeller: to conceive of hypostasis as a particular

existent, existing by itself, leads to tritheism, does it not? The

question is significant because, among other reasons, it points out

the integral connection between the doctrine of Christ and the Holy

Trinity in the applicaton of hypostasis. And it is on the basis of

this connection that Leontius addresses this very problem. Now at

this point, a full response to this problem would anticipate our

later investigation; but we can give a partial response insofar as

it gives a clearer vision of the Leontian notion of hypostasis.

The key is understanding the hypostasis as a particular, but not a

particular nature. Our reflection in this regard moves us to an

analysis of the hypostasis in its relation to nature and

properties.

C. Hypostasis and its Relation to Nature and Properties.

1. The Particularity of the Hypostasis. Leontius addresses

the understanding of hypostasis as a particular nature or essence

in Adv.Nest. II.6 where he rejects such a notion on the grounds

33 that it leads to tri-theism. His opponents, he says:

"...have proposed, after having diligently studied the matter, that hypostases are nothing other than particular natures; so if we say that the two natures [in Christ], are particular, or at least one of them, that is the humanity, then we should understand that there are also two hypostases, since we have agreed that the divine

col. 1548D 3 - 8 .

59

hypostasis already exists."

Leontius' response to this is significant insofar as it

distinguishes his understanding of hypostasis from that of Leontius

of Byzantium. He maintains that we ascribe a term to something

because of what the object is by definition, not because of what it

34 is in relation to something else:

"If there is a particular essence and some other [essence] is added to it, we should not call that essence [that has been added] an accident; and if there is a particular accident that comes to possess an essence that is added to it, we should still call it primarily and properly an accident, and not an essence since it has become accidental to the essence [that was added]."

For Leontius of Jerusalem, the principle of definition is a

basic tenet in his philosophical explication of hypostasis; in this

context, the essences of Christ, as well as his hypostasis, are

what they are by definition, they are not terms that describe the

relation of a being to other beings. This follows from his

understanding of the hypostasis as the real, concrete, indivisible

subject underlying the properties and/or natures of its

constitution.

Having established this, Leontius then turns to show the

35 theological consequences of such a notion:

"Now we can 3how the absurdity of your arguments which you believe are so obvious in another way. For example, if the hypostases are nothing but particular essences, and it is said that the hypostases of the Holy Trinity are three, then you must also say that there are three essences. And so you have insinuated by your blasphemy a

34col. 1549A 4 � 9 .

35Ibid., A 13 � Β 5.

three�fold God into the dispensation [of our Lord]."

The argument here repeats an argument he has made earlier in

which he applies the definition of hypostasis as a particular

nature christologically and theologically. If nature and

hypostasis are the same, that is to say if hypostases are

particular natures, then, says Leontius, "Either you believe there

are three essences, or one divine hypostasis; and in the second

place, if we say two natures in the Lord, then we must also say two

36 hypostases."

Leontius then moves to anthropology, and by so doing he

implies that on all levels of theological instruction there is a

fundamental unity rooted in the christological confession of the

37 Church. He continues:

"We can recognize your nonsense by another argument. If there were a particular essence of Matthew, then it would differ in no respect from the particular essence of Mark since both maintain the same principle and definition. Nor would the hypostasis or prosopon of Matthew differ from the hypostasis or prosopon of Mark, but each hypostasis would receive the same definition and principle of description. And so, not only would we know these men in the same [definitions and principles], but all men will be known in their same properties and hypostases."

We must understand that the argument Leontius has made here is

itself founded on the more basic principle that the hypostasis is

an indivisible subject, the foundation of its constitution,

characterized — though we cannot say defined — by particularity

Adv.Nest. 1.6; col. 1420C 13 � 15.

37Ibid., Β 6 � C 3.

and distinction. In Adv.Nest. II.7, the chapter immediately

following the one we have just cited, Leontius addresses this

38 objection of his opponents:

Objection: "If, since the manhood subsists in the Divine Logos, the manhood does not have its own hypostasis, how, if he comes to exist in him, does the manhood have his own nature? and yet, if the man has his own nature, surely he also has his own hypostasis!..."

Response: "Since natures, both like and unlike, are distinguished and united not by definition, but by the number of natures (that is to say, each nature is distinguished from other natures, whether like or unlike, by numbering them), we have made the term hypostasis indicate the union of those natures that are dissimilar, and the distinction of those that are the same since the hypostasis is, properly speaking, a distinct particular (τις) and an individual that stands by itself (άπόστασίς) in relation to another individual.

Now if objects which are similar are so by nature, and if objects which are dissimilar are separated from one another by their natures, well this obviously does not pertain to definition, but to existence itself, for hypostases are maintained by that [principle] whereby they are distinct, and in that they are distinct, they cannot be united. So if the manhood [of Christ • τόν άνθρωπον] has its own particular hypostasis, and if in fact the hypostasis is that which separates him from the [Divine Logos], then how can he be united to the Divine Logos?

So then, since the hypostasis [of Christ] is separated from all other men who exist outside of him, and natures can be united to one another without confusion in a hypostasis in which their proper definitions are not destroyed by the other; then to exist in distinction and separation from every nature does not belong to the principle of nature but to the principle of hypostases.

Surely the human nature is not prevented from being united to the nature of the Divine Logos since it remains nature as such and shows its natural definition even in the union! But it is impossible that a hypostasis should be united to another hypostasis for then two hypostases, that is to say, [two] "standings away from another" (αποστάσεις ) would be maintained; but this being separate from others is the most intimate property of

cols. 1549D 1 � 1552B 7.

62

C individuals."

We will have reason to return to this passage. For now we

would point out that this is not to say there is no such thing as a

particular nature; though even this concept too will need to be

explained. And Christ's human nature is in fact a particular

39 nature. However, this does not make it a hypostasis in any way,

neither by relation nor by definition, since the hypostasis,

conceived in itself, is not a particular nature, but the particular

indivisible subject conceptually distinguishable from the natures

and properties that constitute it, and as such the receiving ground

of whatever natures or properties it assumes.

And so, to describe the hypostasis in terms of a particular

existent does not lead to three Gods since the hypostasis is not a

particular nature, but a particular indivisible subject who is the

foundation of the nature. Now, the reader may argue that Leontius

has only changed the character of tri�theism. Though he may say

three particular existente in one nature, Is he not in fact saying

— if the hypostasis is the foundation of being — that there are

three foundations of the Divine Nature?

40 In its proper place, we will show that this is not the case.

The passage commonly referred to in order to indicate some incoherency in Leontius' account of hypostasis is 1485D If.: "So we say that the Logos assumed a somewhat (τίνος � the translation of this word is critical, but its interpretation is not left to one's whim since its proper understanding can be obtained with certainty from the context, both local and general) particular nature from our nature into his own hypostasis." Our study will focus specifically on this passage later in chapter 4.

/ See Chapter 4:A.3.

63

For now, we want only to demonstrate how his account has effected

our understanding of the hypostasis. Distinguished from natures

and properties, indivisible in itself, and as the underlying

subject, this means first of all that the hypostasis cannot be

joined or united to another hypostasis, or to another hypostatic

nature since there would then be two foundations, two indivisible

subjects in the same being, which is impossible.

But second, the hypostasis is able to receive other natures

and/or properties without experiencing addition in itself, or a

change in its definition; this means that the hypostasis is "open".

If it were a particular nature, it would be closed in on itself;

every nature in the one hypostasis of Christ would have its own

hypostasis, its own independent center, and as such could be

affected only by an operation exterior to itself. In the

hypostasis of Christ, then, there would not be a union of natures,

but an assembling of independent prosopa.

This has a profound impact on our understanding of human

nature and destiny. Very naturally, our continued study of the

relation between the hypostasis, the physis, and the properties

will eventually lead us to the topic of salvation as deification.

2. The Hypostasis and Its Natures and Properties. In accord

with the theology of his time, Leontius frequently describes the

hypostasis of Christ as a "composite hypostasis". This term

properly refers to the union of the divine and human natures in

Christ and when we turn to study Leontius' teaching on the union of

64

the human and divine natures in Christ, we will study more

completely the relation of the hypostasis as the whole to the

natures and properties that make up its constitution as parts. In

order to fully grasp its meaning, however, we must first consider

how the composition of properties and natures in the hypostasis

refers to the hypostasis itself, and so here we want to deal with

this question only as it concerns the make�up of the hypostasis

conceived in itself.

In Adv.Nest. 1.6 Leontius poses an argument of his opponents

based on the assumption that: "Whatever is united with something

else to produce one living nature or hypostasis becomes a part of

41 that nature or hypostasis." In addressing this assumption,

Leontius enters into a complicated analysis of the relation between

42 the hypostasis and its parts. He says:

"The description of the hypostasis consists in this: in individuals some properties are non�essential in relation to those of the same essence, and some are accidental and acquired (έπίουσίωδων), existing or being added in such a manner that they cannot be separated from the individual. But the essences of the composites are not parts of hypostases for the parts [of the composite] belong to essences, not to hypostases; nor do any of the accidents that come into being exist as a part in an individual hypostasis apart from the destruction of the subject [i.e., accidents do not exist by themselves if the subject is taken away]; nor do the natural properties themselves exist as a part of those hypostases whose essences they axeL but rather they are particular principles (µερικοί λόγοι). If the properties are a part of the hypostasis and the whole is akin to and identical with its own parts, and there is no genus beyond the whole of its own parts, then the whole of the hypostasis

col. 1420BC

col. 1421A 9 � C 7.

65

will be a property of the universal, and in itself it will [be conceived] without substance.

Not only this, but if the whole hypostasis is wholly a property, then either the property will be the property of someone else [who shares in the essence of which the hypostasis is a property], in which case the investiga-tion would continue indefinitely; or, if it is not the property of another, then neither the property nor the hypostasis will exist.

So then, it is not true that neither the essences, nor the accidents, nor the essential properties are conceived as parts of the essential hypostasis [i.e., they are not parts of the hypostasis which is composed of essences], but they belong to the essence. Rather, in a particular individual these are seen to belong to the essence, or to put it another way, they are seen around the essence."

The passage requires close reading; its interpretation is made

easier by the fact that Leontius is distinguishing his own position

43 from that of the monophysites:

"If you were to argue against those who say that one nature has been produced from the combination of two natures, your argument would have some validity to it, but since you dare to charge us with the same thing, we who confess that one hypostasis and not one nature has been produced from the composition, well, how is it that we just now heard you saying that whatever is united to produce this [one nature or hypostasis] is itself an essential part of this hypostasis?"

Leontius is simply answering the notion that essences and

properties make up the hypostasis itself; that is to say that the

hypostasis is the product of essences and properties. This, as we

have seen, is the conception that comes to mind when we conceive of

hypostasis as a particular nature with properties.

The heart of the argument is the most complex: "...nor do any

of the accidents which come into being exist as a part in an

individual hypostasis without the destruction of the subject....If

col. 1421A 2 - 9 .

66

the properties are part of the hypostasis, and the whole is akin to

and identical with its own parts, and there is no genus beyond the

whole of its own parts, then the whole of the hypostasis will be a

property of the universal, and by itself it is without substance."

What he seems to mean is this: if the properties were conceived as

a part of the hypostasis, and not the essence, then if one takes

away some property from the hypostasis, even an accidental or

non-essential property, then one will have destroyed the particular

individual of the hypostasis since the hypostasis is its

properties.

Moreover, if the hypostasis itself is made up of properties

and is a member of a species, then it itself is conceived as an

aggregate set of properties that contribute to making the essence

what it is. Now if the hypostasis is a property which contributes

to making the essence what it is, then every property of the

hypostasis, including the accidental and non-essential, must also

belong to the more universal essence, and consequently to every

member of the species, if Indeed they all partake of the same

essence. On the other hand, if some accidental property does not

exist, then neither does the essence since, if the essence is made

up of the hypostases which themselves are properties, to take away

any one of the hypostases, or any one of the properties of the

hypostasis, alters the universal essence to which the hypostasis

belongs as an essential part.

Leontius, however, does not conceive of the hypostasis as

itself made up of essences or properties, but as an independent

67

subject which, in an analysis of being, is distinguishable from the

essences or properties. Conceived in itself the hypostasis is

simple and indivisible; it is one subject that cannot be confused

with another indivisible subject; it is not composite but is itself

the one, simple, immutable foundation which receives the increase

of whatever natures and properties it takes to itself. In this

context, one should not be confused when Leontius' indicates that

the union has produced the hypostasis. What he means is quite

simply that in the coming together of the natures, the result is

not a new hypostasis, but a union in the hypostasis of the Logos.

But this will become more clear when we turn to our study of the

union.

Leontius returns to the same argument, though in a somewhat

different key, in Adv.Nest. 1.8. Here he addresses his opponents'

notion that, "Whatever is united to something of a different

essence to form one nature or hypostasis, is itself shown to be a

part of what is produced from these natures." Again, he

distinguishes his own christology from that of the Severians. He

44 says:

"Now we said earlier that were you to apply to those who say there is one nature of the Lord, and not to us, the notion that when objects are united they make one nature, you would be correct. But we have shown that objects brought together in union form one hypostasis only, since no one can say properly speaking that the parts of the hypostasis are properties of the essences, if indeed these properties are not seen without their essences. The aggregate total of these [properties] presents to the mind one hypostasis and by themselves,

col. 1432A 7 - D12.

apart from their natures, they are unable to exist or come together.

But if particular existence does not belong to these properties, since they always accompany others, how would totality be properly conceived of them? And since they change, and are not all in individuals at once, then that means the hypostasis itself is what is said to exist in terms of number. But one should understand that the whole itself, in terms of number, never changes even if some of it or parts of it change.

But if you say that the parts of the hypostasis are the natures which serve as its properties, then, if you see the whole hypostasis and the whole nature constituted of parts in the same way, either you will see a particular nature constituted from [other] natures coming together in confusion, and then you will see the creation of a nature different than those natures coming together in one hypostasis, or you will say that the whole of the hypostasis exists differently than its parts, If in fact you think the parts of the essence are themselves without essence; and, from the union of things that exist you will infer something that does not exist, for there is no middle term between what is substantial and what is nonsubstantial.

But if you say the parts of the hypostasis are its essence and essential properties, then once again, the same thing [i.e., the hypostasis] in itself cannot at the same time be substantial [i.e., its essence] and nonsubstantial [i.e., its properties]. The whole, then, will be assimilated to one of its parts only, and differentiated from the other of its parts. Thus there will be one thing that can be counted, which in part is of essence (and it is impossible that it should be nonsubstantial), and which in part is accidental (and it is unclear how this could be essential). As a result, if the parts that are in the essences of the whole are themselves also essential, as the essences are, then there are seen to exist in the parts of the whole, and not in the whole only, parts of the part, and so on ad infinitum.

Moreover, if one part, or essence, perishes, the others, that is the essential parts which are all accidents, must also be destroyed with it in the whole. The whole, too, will most certainly be destroyed along with one of its parts. Who could say anything more absurd than this? For if the essence and the accidents are each parts, and the whole contains no more than these, and the accidents are essential; then if the essence is destroyed, that is one part of the whole, all the other parts will be destroyed along with it, and the whole will perish on account of one of its members."

69

Leontius has repeated the essential points of hie earlier

argument. The result is a clear conception of the distinction

between nature and hypostasis. The hypostasis is the foundation of

its constitution, the indivisible subject which itself is simple

and immutable even though it may receive new additions.

The argument Leontius gives In this passage introduces us to

two other significant points in his christology. First is the

potentially confusing, but very important, notion that the

properties belong to the nature, not to the hypostasis, and yet

they accrue to the hypostasis and are manifested in it: "The

aggregate total of these [properties] presents to the mind one

hypostasis and by themselves, apart from their natures, they are

unable to exist or come together." This will form a major part In

our study of the doctrine of union; and in connection with that, it

serves as a key in penetrating to the heart of Leontius' teaching

on deification.

The second point is the description of the hypostasis as "the

whole", a description Leontius frequently uses. However, it is

important to note that the whole itself is not something made up of

parts; it does not increase or diminish as one adds or takes away

the natures or properties of its constitution: "But if particular

existence does not belong to these properties, since they always

accompany others, how would totality be properly conceived of them?

And since they change, and are not all in individuals at once, then

that means the hypostasis itself is what is said to exist in terms

of number. But one should understand that the whole itself, in

70

terms of number, never changes even if some of it or parts of it

change."

This prepares us for our study of Leontius' doctrine of union,

which we want to begin by examining how his notion concerning the

relation of the whole and its parts guides his teaching on the

hypostatic union. To conclude our present study, however, we may

note that the conception of the hypostasis as a whole, which itself

never changes in number, and which receives the addition of natures

and properties, gives us a clear image of the hypostasis as "open";

it is characterized by particularity. As Leontius said in an

earlier passage, distinction from others is the most intimate

property of the individual, but it is not a particular nature. It

is one subject who cannot be united with another subject without

becoming either a juxtaposition of two subjects — and therefore

not a true union — or another subject altogether, which would

entail its alteration or destruction. As such, the hypostasis is

open to receive other natures and properties, but not other

hypostases. And in receiving these additions, the hypostasis

remains what it is and does not change.

As if there were any doubt concerning the simple and

non-composite character of the hypostasis, one other passage must

be cited in this connection. In Adv.Nest. 1.20 Leontius answers

, . 4 5 the question:

"Is the Divine Logos immutable in his hypostasis as he is in his nature, or not? If you say he is not, then he

45col. 1485AB.

71

is not absolutely simple, nor incorruptible, nor is he God. Moreover the Father and the Holy Spirit, unless they subsist in a different way, will also be subjected to the same things, for their hypostases, too, will be thought to be potentially mutable. But if because the impiety of this is clear, everyone confesses that the Logos is immutable even in his hypostasis, how will his hypostasis become composite when it is simple?"

Leontius responds:

"But how do you understand the simplicity of his hypostasis? For the hypostases are natures and their properties. So if you believe that the hypostasis is simple because it possesses one nature and one simple property, or [if you believe the hypostasis is simple because, though it may possess] however many natures there may be, the one property alone is simple, then the one hypostasis of this particular will not be simple, nor [the hypostases] of the Divine Beings themselves. For the Father is the one who begets the Logos, and he himself is unbegotten, and he is the one from whom the Holy Spirit proceeds; and the Logos is the Son who is begotten and the one through whom the Holy Spirit proceeds. These several simple properties are of the same hypostasis, all of which are understood at the same time to be one composite property, whether of the hypostasis of the Father or of the Son."

In other words, Leontius is arguing that if his opponents

think the hypostasis of the Logos is simple because it has but one

property and one nature, the fact is, that the hypostasis of the

Logos possesses several simple properties. By their definition,

then — that is, a hypostasis is simple if it is a simple nature or

has a simple property, — the hypostases of the Divine Beings,

since they have several distinct properties, are not simple but

composite. Finally, Leontius turns to the union of natures in

47 Christ and concludes:

col. 1485BC.

col. 1485C 1 - D 11.

72

( "So then, the union is of natures in the hypostasis,

or there is a union of one nature with the other, but from these natures there has not been produced a composite nature, since they are not united by confusion, nor is there a union of hypostases since the union is not of hypostases. But the properties of the hypostasis of the Logos have become more composite, since it accumulates more properties in itself along with its own simple properties after the incarnation, which proves that neither his nature nor his hypostasis is composite or mutable."

The passage is most intriguing, but we must confine ourselves

to the question at hand and defer a more detailed examination to

its proper place. In the context of the hypostasis conceived in

itself, one notes that the hypostasis of the Logos is itself

simple; that which increases in the hypostasis of the Logos are the

natures, and the properties, not the hypostasis. The hypostasis

itself is that in which the accumulation of properties takes place;

yet the hypostasis of the Logos remains what it is: simple and

immutable.

The definition which Leontius gives of hypostasis is the

customary definition common to all parties: "The hypostases are

natures with properties." But in the whole context of his

thought, we understand what Leontius means: that the hypostasis is

a particular indivisible subject, which in itself is simple,

immutable, and non-composite. It itself is not made up of natures

and properties; at the same time, however — and here is where

confusion may begin — , we do understand that the hypostasis is

constituted of natures and of properties, but not in itself. The

col. 1485B 6.

73

hypostasis is distinguished in thought from its own constitution,

and this enables us to conceive it as "open", capable of addition

without itself increasing in number; capable of receiving new

natures without itself being altered. Again, to increase the

possibility for confusion, we understand that the properties belong

not to the hypostasis, but to the nature or natures; and yet they

accrue to the hypostasis, and with their natures are manifested in

the hypostasis.

This is where our study has led us thus far. As one can see,

in having established the hypostasis as the indivisible subject

underlying and conceptually distinguished from its constitution,

and as a particular — but not a particular nature — that is

"open", capable of change without changing, that in itself is

simple and immutable; in having established all this, we bave

perhaps succeeded in raising more questions than we have answered.

Whatever confusion may reign at this point, it will find its focus,

and its dissolution, in the notion of the hypostasis as "the

whole". We naturally conceive of a whole as constituted of, and in

a way identical to, its parts; the very concept of "whole" implies

composition. And yet Leontius understands the whole as both simple

and composite. His explanation of this notion will lead us into a

study of his teaching on the hypostatic union of Christ and finally

to his doctrine of deification.

c Chapter Two

The Notion of the Whole and the Identity of Christ

We have come upon a two�fold problem which may be summed up in

this way: the hypostasis remains absolutely simple and immutable

even in becoming more composite and subjected to change, and the

properties belong to the nature, yet accrue to and are manifested

through the hypostasis. Though it has two aspects, the problem is

one in that both aspects raise the question, how does Leontius

maintain the reality of the human nature, especially if it has no

human hypostasis of its own and all the properties of the human

nature accrue to and are manifested through the hypostasis of the

Logos?

That the hypostasis of Christ remains simple and immutable

even In becoming more composite Is of a piece with Leontius'

doctrine of the union in Christ and his confession concerning the

Christ's identity. In this connection Leontius' applies the

concept of the "whole" (τό δλον) In different ways to explain the

same mystery from different aspects. The term may refer to the

hypostasis or to the natures of Christ. Applied to the parts, or

natures, of Christ it reveals a profound doctrine of union that

confirms the notion of hypostasis as the Indivisible, underlying

subject, conceptually distinguishable from its constitution. At

the same time we begin to see how the integrity of the human nature

is maintained in its genuine union with the Logos.

Applied to the hypostasis of Christ, the concept of the whole

74

75

reveals how the hypostasis remains simple and immutable even in

becoming more composite precisely because it reveals the identity

of Christ. However, in leading us to that point our study begins

with a difficulty. In a way that seems puzzling, Leontius speaks

of the Logos and the "Lord's human nature" (Κυριάκος άνθρωπος ) 1 as

parts of the whole, viz. Christ, in such a way that they appear as

independent subjects of attribution. This is nowhere so apparent

as in Books III and IV of the Adv.Nest. where Leontius sets forth

the proper understanding of the titles "Son of Man" and

"Theotokos." This would seem to indicate that the Christ as a

whole is other than the Logos, that is, the hypostasis of Christ is

the product rather than the foundation of the union, and would

conflict with those passages in which Leontius identifies the

hypostasis as the indivisible subject underlying its constitution.

Our task in this chapter is to work through this difficulty

and come to an understanding of precisely who or what is the

hypostasis of Christ. Once we have established Christ's identity,

we will be prepared to penetrate more deeply into Leontius'

doctrine of union, and begin to see how the human nature retains

its full integrity without its own hypostasis, whereupon we may

Our translation of the phrase Κυριάκος άνθρωπος is determined by the whole context of Leontius' exposition. Literally, the phrase could be translated, "the manhood of the Lord," or, "the Lord's man," or, "the Lordly man." But these translations, in that they suggest the human nature of Christ possesses its own prosopon or personal center, imply a christology that is not Leontius'. The context of the phrase seems to be Leontius' explanation of Christ's particular nature (a concept we will examine in greater detail in chapter 4:B.l); to bring this out we have translated the phrase, "The Lord's human nature."

76

(. come to a clearer understanding of Leontius' doctrine of

deification.

A. The Hypostasis of Christ and the Logos.

1. Christ: the Logos Incarnate. Leontius uses the model of

the whole as a prism; as he turns it about, one image gives way to

another, and yet always reflects the same mystery. He says the

Logos is both the whole and part of the Christ in order to give

full expression to the mystery that the Divine Logos himself became

man, experienced the things of the flesh, and yet at the same time

did not turn into flesh. Unlike Leontius of Byzantium, Leontius of

Jerusalem's notion of hypostasis is fixed; it always refers to the

same concrete individual, the Logos, and not to an ontological

2 relationship. Based on this unmovable, fixed foundation we may

address the question of Christ's identity first in the context of

the Logos as the whole of Christ.

Very simply, the Christ is the Logos incarnate: "In the

acquisition of those things which he did not have [viz., the human

nature and its properties], the Divine Logos and Son of the Father 3

became Christ." And again: "When we say the Divine Logos, we

always understand the Christ after the union of two natures." And

See V. Grumel's summary of Leontius of Byzantium's account of hypostasis (Contra Nest, et Euty., PG 86, cols. 1238-89) in DTC IX, 1 (1926) col. 412.

3Adv.Nest. 1.40; col. 1501A 3 - 5 .

4Ibid., VII.2; col. 1764B 2f.

77

again: "We do not say that the Logos has become what he already

was, that is incorporeal; but we believe he has become what he was

not, that is to say corporeal and incarnate."

The Christ is not the product of the union, that is to say a

new hypostasis, as is made clear by Leontius' vehement blast

against his opponents whose notion of the "prosoplc union" produces

6 a new prosopon:

"You fools who think you are wise,...consider; just as the union according to mixture constitutes a mixture [that is more recent], as for example the mixture of wine and water; and just as the union according to a certain composition constitutes a composition [that is more recent], as for example the constitution of a choir; and just as the union according to juxtaposition constitutes a juxtaposition [that is more recent], as in the case of [the wood and stones of] a house; and just as the union according to nature constitutes a nature [that is more recent], as for example the body that is constituted of the [four natural] elements; so also the union according to prosopon is something more recent, revealing some new prosopon."

This text calls to mind the passage we cited earlier in which

Leontius asserts that the union does not mean the coming together

of different hypostases — that is impossible since the hypostasis

is an άπόστασίς distinguished above all by being distinct — , but

the coming together of the divine and human natures with their

properties in the hypostasis of the Logos:

"So then, since the hypostasis [of Christ] is separated from all other men who exist outside of him, and natures can be united to one another without

5Ibid., IV.31: col. 1696D 12f.

6Ibid., III.8: cols. 1633D 9 � 1636A 8.

7Ibid., II.7: col. 1552A 9ff.

78

confusion in a hypostasis in which their proper definitions are not destroyed by the other; then to exist in distinction and separation from every nature does not belong to the principle of nature, but to the principle of hypostases.

Surely the human nature is not prevented from being united to the nature of the Divine Logos since it remains nature as such and shows its natural definition even in the union! But it is Impossible that a hypostasis should be united to another hypostasis for then two hypostases, that is to say [two] standings away from another (απο-στάσεις), would be maintained. But this being separate from others is the most intimate property of individuals."

And so Leontius affirms that the Christ is not a new

hypostasis, or nature, but he is the Logos who has become what he

8 was not, incarnate:

Objection: "The union you talk about either makes a new nature, so why do you not receive those who mix the natures? Or, it creates a new hypostasis, so why do you reject us? Or, if there is neither a new [nature] nor a [new] hypostasis, then nothing has been produced."

Response: "But gentlemen, it is not necessary that every union produces either a new nature or a new hypostasis. For example, iron burned in embers does not display a new nature, nor a new hypostasis, for both the hypostasis of the iron and the [hypostasis] of the hot embers remain the same; but in the hypostasis of the iron the nature of the fire, which in itself is without hypostasis, is united to the nature of the iron, thereby becoming with it one hypostasis.

So what constitutes the union in Christ? Nothing other than the things which before were not united with one another and which are now united in the one hypostasis of one of the [natures — the nature of the Logos] that has been united. This [union] is sufficient to enrich our nature with all of the divine nature."

In the hypostasis of the Logos the union takes place, and we

can speak of a result produced by the union in this sense: the

coming together of the human and divine natures results not in a

Ibid., 1.49: col. 1512A 9 � Β 8.

79

new hypostasis, but in a union of the human and divine natures in

the pre�existing hypostasis of the Logos. The Logos' hypostasis is

q the foundation of the union:

"The Logos possesses the same [hypostasis] even after the addition of the hypostatic properties of the flesh which is in him, and which belong to him; and now that the [humanity] is united with the Logos, it is the property of the Logos because of his union with the flesh; for according to the principle (λόγος) of his hypostasis and in the assumption of the flesh, there is a union of [the human] essence with his essence, and the hypostatic properties, introduced into his prosopon, make his [prosopon] distinct from the Father and the Holy Spirit who are of the same essence as he."

In another place Leontius asserts: "There was not a different

hypostasis before and a different one after [the incarnation], but

it was the same." Equally clear is this passage:

"We refuse to say that one hypostasis is put together from several hypostases, but we say this: the flesh was not formed before it was assumed by the Logos, as you think, but from the beginning of its existence it was personalized in the hypostasis of the Logos, in Christ, whom you make into a two�fold hypostasis."

The name "Christ", then, is an "economical" designation

referring to the Logos in his new, corporeal state. The subject of

the Christ, the hypostasis of the Christ is the Logos himself. The

Christ, then, is not other than the Logos but he is the Logos

incarnate. However, we can go deeper even than this in our under-

standing of the identity of Christ's hypostasis.

'Ibid., 1.28: col. 1493D 1 � 8.

10Ibid., 1.30: col. 1496D 6f.

11Ibid., 1.29: col. 1496A 6ff.

80

2. The Logos: the "Ego" of Christ. One witnesses among

specialists of the period a reservation to go beyond the term

"particular" to describe the understanding of hypostasis in the 6th

century. The reservation may be justified in the case of Leontius

of Byzantium, but not in the case of Leontius of Jerusalem. In a

most significant text Leontius gives evidence of a deeper

understanding of the hypostasis that gives a more subjective

content to such descriptions as an "indivisible particular", or

"underlying subject", or "that which stands away from". The

hypostasis can be understood as the "Ego", the "I", and the "Ego"

12 of the Christ is the Logos Himself:

"Our opponents say: if Christ himself raised himself from the dead, then he ought to have said he would raise himself when he said, 'Destroy this temple and in three days I will raise myself up.'

Well then, why do you not consider the opposite since you think you are so completely illumined with piety? For if another raises up that which was destroyed, which was one of his parts, his body, then when he was discoursing with them, he ought to have said, 'Destroy this temple (which clearly means his body), and in three days either God, or simply someone else, will raise it up; certainly not myself who am discoursing with you who am clearly of soul and body.'

So then, it is clear that the same prosopon which Is indicated by the appellation "myself" (έγώ), includes the body which was destroyed, and the soul which was discoursing through the body, and the God who raised up what was destroyed."

The hypostasis or prosopon, says Leontius, is indicated by the

appellation έγώ which includes the whole Christ: the Logos and the

flesh. And so for Leontius, to say that the hypostasis of the

Logos is the foundation of the union, and that the Logos is the

Ibid., 11.48: cols. 1600D 1 � 1601A 7.

81

hypostasis of Christ, is to go much deeper than the conception of

the hypostasis of the Logos as the "ontologlcal ground" underlying

13 a diversity of subjects, one of whom is the man Jesus. This

means that even the "I" of the Κυριάκος άνθρωπος , the Lord's human

nature, is the Logos: "From the first moment of his existence the

hypostasis of this particular man Christ was divine, which is

equivalent to saying that the hypostasis of God was made man

through the union of the human essence with the divine essence."

To speak of the Logos as the "whole" of Christ, then, means that

his hypostasis is the subject of the incarnation. The Logos

himself is the "Ego" of Christ; the flesh he assumes is not its own

subject, but its "Ego" is the Logos himself: "While the flesh

belongs to another nature, it does not belong to another prosopon,

but the Divine Logos made it his own when he assumed it into his

own hypostasis."

The human nature, or the Κυριάκος άνθρωπος , is not itself an

"I", or some subsisting subject with its own center, however one

may define that center; there is no room to speak of two "qui", or

of two "me's" in Christ whether one is speaking ontologically or

psychologically: The "self" of the whole Christ is none other

13 As conceived, for example, by Karl Rahner: see in particular

Theological Investigations, I p. 181.

14Adv. Nest. 11.43: col. 1597B 3ff.

15Ibid., 11.45: col. 1597D 7ff.

Moeller gives credence to this notion in "'Textes' Monophysites de Léonce de Jérusalem," pp. 480f.

82

(̂ than the Logos in that the hypostasis, or the "Ego", of the union

is the pre�existing hypostasis of the Logos.

And so, the Christ is not other than the Logos; he is not a

new prosopon, the product of the Logos and the flesh coming

together; Leontius understands that, "Christ, who in his divinity

is invisible, and in his humanity is visible, is God and not man."

And again: "We believe that the whole of Christ, both in terms of

the Logos and the manhood that is in him, is always God; but quite

simply, since the whole belongs to the Logos, it is always God in

18 terms of the Logos by himself."

"The whole belongs to the Logos and is always God in terms of

the Logos by himself." In the light of the text cited earlier,

this would mean that the έγώ of all the parte of Christ is the

Logos Himself. We can now understand what Leontius means when he

says that though the whole may become more composite, it never

increases in number, and why the hypostasis is itself immutable and

19 non�composite. Whatever change the Logos may undergo in his

incarnation, he is always himself. He is the indivisible,

underlying subject (άτοµον ύποκείµενον πράγµα), that is to say the

"Ego", who is the foundation of the natures that come together.

We also begin to understand in what sense the hypostasis is

particular. It is a particular subject, not a particular nature,

17Adv.Nest., V.24: col. 1745D 4f.

18Ibid., V.l: col. 1724A Iff.

19 See above, pp. 68�72.

83

and though particular natures may be united, particular hypostases

may not; for if the hypostasis is the "I", then union of hypostases

means either the co�existence of two egos — and consequently their

union cannot be genuine — , or the alteration of the "I" into

someone else.

One might be concerned that in order to establish the

hypostasis as the "Ego" of Christ, we are relying too heavily on

one isolated text. Our conclusion in this regard is, of course, an

interpretation; but one that seeks to penetrate to Leontius' real

intention as that can be discerned from the whole context of his

thought. The value we give to this one text is admittedly a

somewhat subjective determination. However, the image of the

hypostasis as the "Ego" emerges when this one text is conjoined

with Leontius' affirmation that the Logos himself is the one who

became incarnate, that the flesh is assumed in the hypostasis of

the Logos, and that the Logos himself becomes Christ when he

assumes the flesh.

Our interpretation finds corroboration when we read another

passage which clearly means to imply that the identity of the whole

Christ is the Logos. In Adv.Nest. 1.19, Leontius refutes his

opponents who seek to prove that the Christ is a man as other men

on the grounds that his disciples and other pious men have

20 performed even greater miracles than he did. He argues:

"By Christ'β own power and authority, and by his own command, he said [to the leper], "I will, be clean." But

20col. 1480A 2 � D 6.

84

his disciples performed their miracles by saying, "In the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, rise up and walk." It is clear that the performance of the miracle belongs to Christ but the administration [of the miracle] belongs to his disciples, for it was in reality their faith in the Lord that enabled them to accomplish the miracles, and they valued this faith alone.

Indeed, in what manner do his disciples show the characteristic most proper to God, I mean the creative faculty, as he shows it in the man born blind? For he who fashioned from clay [a healing plaster] for the eye of the blind man (literally • for the part that is more vital and intricate than the others in the human body), showed through one member of his body (i.e. his hands that made the plaster) that he was the one who took dirt from the earth and fashioned man in the beginning.

Moreover, who among the prophets or disciples, or anyone other than [Christ] himself, Is able to raise himself from the dead? And whose body of those who are on earth has not seen decay in the tomb? Or who has born witness that he possesses the power to lay down his soul, and take it up again?...Who among the disciples has power to rebuke the unclean spirits, or who among them is able to still the winds and the seas just by his word? And what other man's word caused [the multitudes] to marvel because it was [spoken] with power and not as other men? And by whom among the apostles or prophets who have died are heaven and earth, sun and moon, day and night, the living and the dead held together, and their boundaries and places established? And whose birth was from a conception without seed, and was announced by a star from heaven, and a choir of angels singing [praises to God]? And who among those [of earth] has demonstrated the things of the Spirit in a fleshly body such as passing through the hymen of a virgin and walking on water? Or has demonstrated the things of the flesh in a spiritual body that could be touched with sensible hands (a reference to his sojourn on earth after the resurrec-tion), and after the resurrection, he received meat from his disciples and ate, though he was not hungry?

By these things he shows that he is the creator and provider of both the fleshly and spiritual nature, and he makes and transforms all things, and is ever able to work wonders In all the conditions of nature; for It is easy to this one alone who makes anything also to transform It. But who among those who are human in nature only has borne witness to the fact that he [who is human in nature only] has ascended into heaven, or has come down from heaven? And so, not even this [argument of yours] turns out to prove your impiety as you would wish, since the performance of miracles one finds among men of piety belongs to the power of the Lord."

85

This passage calls directly to mind the hymns of the 6th

century melodist-poet, Romanos, whose hymns manifest the same

christology. Romanos offers further confirmation that we have

correctly perceived a notion of hypostasis in terms of "self" or

"Ego". Romano s, as Leontius of Jerusalem, was a member of

Justinian's imperial court; the reception given to his hymns would

suggest, however, that this philosophy of hypostasis does not

reflect the christology of some school imposed on the Great Church,

but rather the common confession of the general populace. Typical

is Romanos' kontakion, "On the Presentation in the Temple."

"Let the chorus of angels be amazed at the marvel, And let us mortals lift up our voices in a hymn, As we see the ineffable condescension of God;

For the hands of an old man embrace The One at whom the powers of Heaven tremble. He who alone loves mankind.

Thou who for us didst assume flesh from the Virgin, Thou who wast lifted up as an infant in the arms of an old man,

Magnify the power of our faithful rulers; Strengthen them in Thy power, 0 Word, Make joyous their righteous kingdom,

Thou alone who loves mankind.

Thou who didst sanctify the Virgin's womb by Thy birth, Thou who hast blest the hands of Simeon, Thou, who dost hasten to save us, 0 Christ, God,

Bring peace to the state in wars, And strengthen the rulers whom Thou dost love,

Thou alone who loves mankind."

And so the kontakion continues. Other passages deserve to be

extracted: "He who is the Creator of Adam, is being baptized as a

child. He who is not contained in space is held in the arms of the

Elder. He who exists in the infinite arms of His Father, of His

86

C own will is limited in His flesh, and not in His divinity."21

These are but a few of many passages one could cite, all of which

clearly affirm the same christology. One notes the personal form

of address, "Thou Who, He Who, etc." which is addressed to the

Divine Logos who himself is the subject of the events recounted in

the kontakion. And so, we may say that in Leontius we do not find

a philosophical account of Christ peculiar to one crusty old monk,

or reflective of a particular "ecole", but that in every aspect his

christological explication reflects the simple confession of the

common laity that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the Living God.

The Christ possesses but one "Ego", or hypostasis, and that is the

Divine Logos himself.

Our examination of Leontius' meaning when he refers to the

Logos as the whole of Christ has established the identity of

Christ. The hypostasis of Christ is the Logos who himself took on

flesh and was incarnate; the subject of Christ is the Logos

himself. If we examine what Leontius means when he describes the

Logos as a part of the Christ, we will find the same affirmation,

and at the same time delve even more deeply into his doctrine of

union.

Kontakia of Romanos, Byzantine Melodist. Vol. I: On the Person of Christ. Translated and annotated by Marjorie Carpenter, (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1970), pp. 39f.

3. The Logos in Union with the Flesh. In the light of

Leontius' description of the Logos as the whole of Christ, passages

such as the following which describe the Logos as a part of Christ

22 may offer some difficulty:

Objection: "The Divine Logos is either a part of the hypostasis of Christ, or the whole. Now, if he Is a part, and this [hypostasis] is the Son, then the Divine Logos Is a part of the Son. And so, the Trinity before the incarnation is two halves."

Response: "But if he is the whole [of the hypostasis], then the Divine Logos did not exist before the incarna-tion since the whole would exist before its parts, for the flesh which comes to be most recently is part of the whole.

Now the part is, properly speaking, that which is conceived in some way with something that is incomplete; the Divine Logos absolutely is not of such a kind. But the natures of the holy hypostasis of Christ are seen as parts by virtue of their mutual conjunction with one another in the whole that is of Christ. Now the whole is always something that is complete (δλον τίνα), but in the whole of Christ the diversity remains with reference to the parts."

Together with the passage Immediately following this one we

23 can begin to unravel the difficulty:

Objection: "If the Divine Logos is the whole of this hypostasis, so our opponents say, tell us of what he is the complement? For the Divine Logos is not a part of the Divine Logos since nothing is said to be a part of itself."

Response: "To begin with, we do not say that the Logos by himself (απλώς) is the whole of the hypostasis of our Lord Christ, but rather he has been made flesh (σεσαρκωµένος). On the other hand, if because the whole refers to the hypostasis itself in such a way that, just

•Adv.Nest. II.2: col. 1536D Iff.

Ibid., II.3: col. 1537A 1 � Β 10.

88

as the Christ is from something other than the Logos, so also the same thing must be completed of parts which are always other than its wholes, then tell us: if God the Father is the whole of his patristic hypostasis, from what other parts is he made complete? For, as you would have it, God the Father is not a part of God the Father. Who will not deplore your cavils and insanity which you willfully commit?

It simply is not true that the whole always refers to something constituted of parts, as we said before. But gentlemen, consider that whatever is complete maintains its own principle. For in this manner we say that the point is a whole, and also the monad, and we know that these are not composite. At the same time of course, it is not true that the entire whole is of a different species than all the parts seen in it at once, for what about the purple robe spun of fine thread and the blood of the shell-fish, or the red-hot iron composed of [fire and] iron?"

Leontius has turned his prism to show the image of the whole

that reveals the parts of Christ, though from the angle opposite to

the one we will study in the following chapter. Even so, Leontius

is still thinking in terms of subject just as he was when referring

to the Logos as the whole of Christ, but with a different emphasis.

He is in fact repeating the argument we outlined earlier that the

hypostasis itself is conceptually distinguished from its parts,

that it is not composite but simple and immutable, the underlying

subject of its constitution. But the focus of his thought has

shifted from the hypostasis of Christ in itself to the ontologlcal

structure of the Logos in union with the flesh.

From this perspective, the intention is to assert that the

Logos is not the same as his flesh, nor does he turn into the

nature of the flesh, but he remains what he was. Even so, if one

looks closely at the texts cited, Leontius still affirms that the

Logos is the subject of the incarnation: "We do not say that the

89

( Logos by himself (άπλως) is the whole of the hypostasis of our Lord

Christ, but rather he was made flesh (σεσαρκωµένος)." The one who

was incarnate, that is, was the Logos himself, though he remains

what he was.

As we said before, "Christ" is the name of the Logos after he

assumed into his hypostasis the flesh. Now that we are looking at

the union, and not at the "Who" of Christ, we must say from the

earlier citation: "If the Divine Logos is the whole [of the

hypostasis of Christ], then he did not exist before the incarnation

since the whole [of Christ which includes the flesh created more

recently] would exist before its parts [that is, the flesh would

exist before the flesh], for the flesh which comes to be most

recently is part of the whole." Leontius makes the same point more

clearly in another passage: "The Logos did not turn into flesh, but

was in the flesh; his invisible hypostasis became visible when the

flesh received Its being in [his hypostasis]."24

Conversely, the flesh is not the Logos, but is added to the

Logos and so the flesh, too, cannot be considered as the whole of

the Christ; otherwise, the flesh would be eternal as is the Logos,

and Leontius would have to concede to his opponents every argument

they have made: that hypostasis and nature are the same thing, and

that union with the flesh means the Logos himself has changed and

24Ibid., VII.10: col. 1768hD If.

90

C 25 become composite, or even that there was a time when he was not.

The full significance and real intent of describing the Logos

as a part of the Christ is uncovered in another passage. In

Adv.Nest. V.32 Leontius addresses the charge that his christology

is in fact monophysite, that is another version of Arianism or

Apollinarianism. The charge is based on the assumption that the

coming together of the human and divine natures produces a new,

composite hypostasis. Leontius' opponents are incapable of

grasping the distinction between hypostasis and physis, and so they

maintain: "If the Divine Logos was not part of the flesh, but was

part of man, then are you not in fact an Arian or an Apollinarian!"

26 To which Leontius responds:

"But the Logos is neither part of the flesh, nor of the man, may it never be! For even though someone should unlawfully place the Logos in the flesh in place of the soul as did these revilers of God whom you mentioned, nevertheless, he would not suggest that he is a part of man in the same way. For the man is not such a whole that is made up of a soul-less flesh and the Divine Logos for the principle and definition of man is that of a body animated with a rational soul, not one which is animated by the Divine Logos. And so, even though we were to say that the Logos is in some manner part of the Christ, clearly this means that the Logos is part of the whole, and he is not part of a mere man. This [whole] simply refers to his one prosopon that is constituted of different natures."

25 This objection typifies Leontius* opponents who refuse to

distinguish between hypostasis and physis. In Adv.Nest. IV.10, they argue: "If the Divine Logos is properly and truly said to have been born of the Virgin, and the flesh which was born of her is properly and truly said to be mortal and corruptible and animated with a rational and intellectual soul, then either the flesh exists before the Virgin, or the Divine Logos exists after the Virgin."

col. 1752B 10 - C 8.

91

Though not directly relevant to the point in question, we may

note in passing the definition of man assumed by Leontius in this

text. Human nature, by definition is flesh endowed with a human,

rational soul. Of fundamental importance, body and rational soul

form a human nature, not an hypostasis. The significance of this

will become more clear when we turn to the question of how Christ's

human nature is particular, but not thereby an hypostasis. And

when we turn to examine Leontius' notion of the whole in terms of

definition, we will see that this principle is a fundamental tenet

in his assertion that the human nature in Christ is whole, perfect,

and intact.

Returning to the problem at hand, this text helps us to

interpret properly the thrust of Leontius' argument in this

respect. When he refers to the Logos as a part of the Christ he is

speaking of the Christ in terms of the union, not in terms of the

hypostasis. The Christ as a whole includes the flesh as well as

the Logos. Because, however, we understand that the hypostasis of

Christ itself is the Logos, the underlying subject of the natures

coming together, to say the Logos became flesh is not to say the

Logos turned into flesh, or that he has come together with the

flesh to produce a new prosopon, viz. the Christ — a "wondrous new

27 mixture composed of the Logos and flesh." Rather, it is to say

that the pre�existent Logos himself took what he did not already

As Apollinaris described the union; fragment 10 in Lietzmann, p. 207; "δ καινή κτίσις καΐ µίζις θεσπεσΙα* θεός καΐ σαρξ µίαν (καΐ τήν αυτήν) απετέλεσαν φΰσιν."

have, the flesh, while remaining what he was. Even when looking

through the prism from this angle, the Logos is still the subject

of the incarnation.

Leontius likens the assumption of the flesh to wood that is

28 overlaid with gold, or to a man putting on armor:

"Why, unless you are quite deaf, do not the words of the Son of Thunder ring out in your ears: 'And the Word became flesh!' Gentlemen, if you hear that the Logos became flesh by suffering a change of nature, as we say the coral plant is petrified, or what was before alive has become a corpse, then you would think correctly that his immutability has been destroyed. But if we teach that the assumption of the flesh by the Logos is like the union of wood and gold when the wood is overlaid with the gold, or like the man who covers himself with armor, then how have we proposed a change in his nature? For if the wood remains in its nature wood, even when its nature is made to subsist in (ένυπόστατος) that which has been overlaid with gold, and if the man, even when he adds to his natural hypostasis the armor, remains man who in his nature by itself is without armor, so also the Logos, when he clothes himself with flesh which is added to his natural hypostasis, remains incorporeal in his nature, that is to say in the definition of his essence. For immutability in nature is observed in the principles of its essence, not in those additions to the essence; and since its nature likewise remains in these [principles of essence], the change in aspect takes place in the hypostasis."

The Logos is the subject, the "I" who in himself is complete,

who takes to himself another whole, that is the human nature, not

another hypostasis, and makes It his own. In so doing he is not

altered in who or what he already was, but he remains himself, the

Divine Logos. And in this union, the human nature, too, remains

perfectly human.

And so, when Leontius refers to the Logos as the whole of

Adv.Nest. IV.36: col. 1704C 7 � D 12.

93

Christ he is speaking specifically in terms of the hypostasis. The

hypostasis of Christ is the Divine Logos, the subject of the

incarnation. When, on the other hand, Leontius refers to the

Divine Logos as a part of the Christ, he is not speaking in terms

of the hypostasis, but in terms of the union, and is simply

asserting that the Divine Logos assumed into his own divine

hypostasis what he did not have, the flesh, while he remained who

he was. Whether before or after the incarnation, then, whether in

terms of the whole or the parts, the Christ is the Divine Logos.

B. The Natures of Christ and the Logos.

1. In Two Natures. If we shift our ground and approach the

question of Christ's identity from the natures that constitute his

hypostasis we see that Leontius' christology confirms the mystery

which the Chalcedonian fathers believed was expressed more clearly

by the formula "in two natures" than by the formula "of two

natures." Over against the Nestorians and Origenists, the

Severians and the Chalcedonians meant to affirm the dogma of Nicea,

that the same Son of God is both distinct from and yet fully

consubstantial to his Father and Mother. But for Leontius the

distinction between hypostasis and nature implied by the definition

of Chalcedon is alone faithful to Nicea.

He demonstrates that the consubstantiality of Christ is denied

in the failure to properly distinguish between hypostasis and

nature, of which the Severians also are guilty. The outcome is an

hypostasis that in itself is composite and this has serious

94

consequences. Against the monophysites, "who say that our Lord

29 Jesus Christ is one composite nature," Leontius defends the two

natures formula of Chalcedon. His argument is similar to the one

he makes in the Adv.Nest. against those who say there are two

30 hypostases in Christ. In the CMon. he argues:

"Having met with their difficulties we will now pose a few difficulties for them, and we will begin by saying: if the Christ is consubstantial to the Father, and also to us in his one essence by which you say he is known, then we too are clearly consubstantial to the Father, for things that are similar to the same thing at the same time, are also similar to each other."

And again:

"If, when they say that [one] nature is produced from [two] natures, they say that the one nature is a homonym of the two natures that were prior to the one nature, it is clear that they understand the one nature [Christ] to be neither God nor man. But if the one nature is synonymous to the two natures, then it will obviously be of one or the other, for neither one is synonymous to the other. So then, it will be either only God or man; for if the two natures are not synonymous to each other, then whatever [nature] is not synonymous to the one will at the same time be synonymous to the other."

The Severian monophysites, of course, used the term physis in

a christological context to indicate the concrete individual, just

as the Chalcedonians used the term hypostasis to indicate the same

thing. However, the distinction between hypostasis and physis

enables Leontius to express the Nicene dogma much more clearly. In

that the divine hypostasis is the έγώ, the Logos himself, the Logos

29 The title of the CMon. : col. 1769.

30Ibid., 1: col. 1769.

31Ibid., 2: col. 1769.

95

becomes more composite not in his identity but in the union of the

human and divine natures in his hypostasis. As a result, one does

not conceive the creation of a newly produced composite subject

constituted of a confusion of divine and human natures, but the

same Son of God who, because his identity is not to be confused

with his constitution, becomes fully man while remaining fully God.

Against his opponents in the Adv.Nest., who identify Leontius

with the Severians and accuse him of making, with the Severians, a

new composite nature, Leontius works out in greater detail the

application of the distinction between hypostasis and physis to

show that Christ is both the same One and at the same time fully

consubstantial to his Father and Mother.

Every composite, his opponents argue, must be superior or

inferior to each of its parts by itself since the parts come

together to produce a new composite nature (« hypostasis).

Leontius counters that to begin with, this would make the Christ

superior to the Divine Logos and also to the Father and the Holy

Spirit than whom nothing is superior, and so the absurdity of such

32 a notion is apparent. However, the Christ is not a new composite

hypostasis, but the hypostasis of the Logos incarnate. Beneath

this we can discern several significant assumptions. For one

thing, we discern the hypostasis as the indivisible subject

underlying its constitution, and as such it is conceptually

distinguished from the natures united in it. In this Leontius is

Adv.Nest. 1.51: col. 1516B 1 - C 5.

96

distinguished from the monophysites whose ambiguous terminology

would suggest that the union of human and divine natures results

not in a union of natures in one hypostasis, but in a "composite

33 hypostasis (= physis)", constituted "of two natures". Finally, a

particular nature is not a hypostasis, which is of a piece with the

distinction between hypostasis and physis; the hypostasis or the

έγώ of Christ is the Logos himself, to whom belongs the particular

human nature and the divine nature.

Now, Leontius does speak of a composite whole that is somehow

34 more than either of its parts by themselves:

"Since the whole, which is constituted from dissimilar parts, is in some way different than its own parts (έτερον πως των ίδιων µερών εστί), both by being more composite, more varied, and more complete, and by being different to each of its parts by itself, it acquires a certain difference in relation to its own parts. We find an example in a drug, in a house, in the red�hot iron, and in man. For in the composition of copper and oil, when it is applied to the opening of a wound, [the composition] manifests a power which neither one of the parts naturally has by itself. The same is true In the figure and form of the house which passes beyond the figure and form of the rocks and wood in it. The definition of man also manifests something more than the definition of body and soul [by themselves] since death is attached to neither part by itself, nor is laughter, or weeping, or anything such as this that is peculiar to man. And it is clear that the definition and name of the whole man himself must "transcend" (παραλάσσω � which can also mean "to differ", "to go beyond", "to be superior to") the other souls and bodies which in themselves are consubstantial to hie own parts."

Leontius goes on to apply the same principle to the Christ who

This is the central notion which Leontius refutes in the CMon..

34Adv.Nest. 1.52: col. 1517 D 2 � 1520A 10.

97

as a composite whole is more even than the Divine Logos by himself,

and is able to do what neither the Logos nor the flesh is able to

do alone:

"If you would look at the matter carefully with the eyes of your mind, you would see quite easily that certain operations have occurred in the union which neither God without the flesh, nor man without God would be able to accomplish. Can you explain to us in what manner God without the flesh ever passed bodily through his mother without corruption, or how the body without God passed through the incorruptible body of his mother? What man will not be hungry when he has fasted for forty days? And who, before or after the forty days fast, would hunger wholly after God? Who would say that God ever walked on the water with feet that are genuinely corporeal? Or that human nature, without God, would walk across the surface of the sea without falling into the deep? Indeed, with regard to other miracles like these, neither did the divine nature ever accomplish any miracle similar to these in a corporeal manner, nor did the human nature ever accomplish the miracles wholly by itself."

However, if we look closer we see that Leontius is not

speaking in terms of the hypostasis of Christ, but in terms of his

union with the flesh. The body is the body of the Logos by which

he is enabled to accomplish human things, and the body is able to

go beyond its natural limitations because it is the body of the

Logos. The subject of the Christ is still the Logos. The Christ

is not another than the Logos who accomplishes human and divine

things, but it is the Logos himself who accomplishes them in his

union with the human nature.

Since the union of natures in Christ does not result in a new

hypostasis or a new nature, the hypostasis remains the same and the

natures that come together retain their own definition. And since

Adv.Nest. I.11: col. 1448AB.

98

the hypostasis is not a particular nature, being conceptually

distinguished from its constitution, the union of natures does not

affect the identity or the indivisible structure of the hypostasis

36 conceived in itself:

"When the whole (τό δλον) is superior to each one of its parts, then in the union (συνθέσει ) it acquires some kind of figure, quality, or species which is different than the parts. It did not use to exist in any of them, nor does it do so now, but it is seen in the juxtaposi-tion (προσθέσιν ) to be different than any of the species to which each of its parts belong. For example, the house, constructed out of the nature of stones and wood, has form and a certain configuration which neither the wood nor the stones have by themselves. And yet it does not possess a different nature than them that is superior. The same is true in the case of the curtain. Through the interweaving and union of the different colors with one another, the curtain exceeds each one of the parts that constitute It when they are by themselves before the union. It is not superior to all of its colors simply by virtue of any one of its colors by itself....

If then, when the Logos and the flesh are united, we see a new property of nature in Christ which is other than the divine and human natures, then we would have to say with you that the composite in itself is superior to its parts! But if we see nothing but the parts themselves, then how, with regard to these parte, will we teach not that they are of the same honor, but that the whole is superior to its parts?"

As a result, the Logos incarnate is distinct from his Father

and Mother according to his hypostasis, that is in terms of his

identity, and at the same time fully consubstantial to both

according to his natures, that is in terms of his

37 constitution:

"Now you say, 'If there appear both parts and whole in

col. 1517B 6 � D 1.

col. 1520A 14 � Β 12.

99

Christ as some of you maintain, then, since divinity and humanity are his parts, we can prove that the whole will be something other than the parts.'

But then, according to this definition of the whole, Christ could not be classified with those that are of the same essence as his parts, and the Lord will be the same in nature, that is in respect to his whole, neither to his Father nor to his Mother. And. according to this definition of the whole, since it pertains to the concept of the number of the whole, he could not even be included lu the number of the divine Trinity unless he constitutes a quarternity, and if he is numbered [with the Trinity] he shows that [the divine Trinity] is not consubstantial to itself. And if he is numbered in the category of the the human mass, even then, the whole particular, for the same reasons, will not be consubstantial to the [human mass]."

That the same One is consubstantial to both God the Father and

man is so because the coming together of the human and divine

natures does not mean that the hypostasis of the Logos becomes a

different "who", for the divine hypostasis remains the same even in

taking another nature; nor does the hypostasis of the Logos assume

another "who" to himself, for the hypostasis is not a particular

nature but the particular "subject" or foundation of the natures

and properties that constitute it. And so, on the basis of the

distinction between hypostasis and physis Leontius affirms the

christology of Chalcedon that the same One is fully God and man.

Again we see the hypostasis as "open", and we begin to glimpse the

intimacy of the union; the human nature, unprotected by its own

hypostasis, enters into genuine union with the divine without, so

Leontius maintains — and this we have yet to show — , suffering

alteration.

There is more, however. This leads directly to the deeper

mystery expressed by the "in two natures" formula of Chalcedon. In

100

the process of qualifying the proper use of the terms "whole" and

"part", Leontius indicates that not only are the two natures in the

one hypostasis of the Divine Logos, but the Divine Logos himself is

38 in his two natures:

"Let our opponents understand to begin with that our fathers used the terms "parts" and "whole" in reference to our Lord Christ simply to confirm his union (σΰνθεσιν ), and to reject every type of union (ένωσίς) understood in a different way. Moreover, because both parts which we say are in Christ are each properly conceived to be a genuine nature, and because the parts have come together in a union of natures, since both essences constitute the whole as natural parts, so also they are both complete and exist in Christ. At the same time, the [fathers] did not want to leave room to any suspicion that one or the other of the parts in Christ is thought ever to have existed by itself, so that if the whole is preserved, the parts are never seen without each other."

The point of this particular passage is somewhat confusing and

needs explanation. Leontius seems to mean that in the Christ, that

is to say in the union of the Logos with the flesh, not even the

Logos ever existed by himself since thin would imply that the

Logos, as hypostasis rather than the divine nature, is a part of

the Christ and is not himself the hypostasis of the Christ. It

would also imply, if the divine nature ever existed by itself in

the Christ that there was a time when the human nature was outside

the hypostasis of the Christ, and consequently in its own

39 hypostasis. Leontius continues:

"But even though they [the fathers] say such things as "union", (σΰνθεσίς ), "whole", and "mixture" (άνακράσΐν),

col. 1520B 13 � C 14.

cols. 1520C 13 � 1521A 4.

101

V nevertheless, they say these things in reference to Christ only insofar as each term has a harmless sense. Any implication which they deem inconsistent with these terms used in reference [to Christ] they do not allow.

For example, when they use the term "mixture" (κράσιν), they wished to indicate only that the whole of the parts united exists in all the parts, but they did not admit the confusion, or the opposition of the properties which results from this, or that the parts are somehow weakened or altered by one another in the mixture....

Now because they understand that a part by itself is not in composition, and they know that the Logos is not united to the flesh by another, and since they say that not every aspect of the union of parts can be applied to the Divine Incarnation, therefore they isolate the more harmless sense of the terms in order to elucidate the divine mystery which is so difficult to comprehend, and to describe the ineffable image of the Logos in order that the minds of those of us who are not as strong might not be left to themselves when seeking to understand these things about the Christ."

The union is described as "a union of natures," not of

hypostases, and each nature in the union is wholly preserved. The

hypostasis is the foundation in which the natures are united

together. At the same time the hypostasis is in all its parts.

"For example," says Leontius, "when they use the term 'mixture'

they wished to indicate that the 'whole' of the parts united exists

in all the parts, etc." The Logos himself is God and man; he is

the "I" who is "in" the human and divine natures of Christ.

Chalcedon is affirmed and at the same time revealed to be faithful

to the dogma of Nicea: the same Son of God is in two natures

without alteration or confusion of natures or identity, and the two

natures are in the same Son of God, and so the same Son of God is

distinct from and consubstantial to his Father and Mother.

2. The Logos: the Subject of the Union. In terms of the

102

distinction between hypostasis and physis let us consider again the

question of the Logos as a part of the Christ in reference to the

identity of Christ. In a manner consistent with his affirmation

that the Logos is the hypostasis or subject of Christ Leontius

emphasizes in this context the role of the Logos in the

incarnation.

It is clear, says Leontius, that every species is brought into

being by another, and the Divine Logos is the creator of every

40 species. But if the Christ is a new nature, a new species, and

the Divine Logos is a part of this new species, then, "that which

has been produced has been brought into being by the one who made

it out of one of its own parts, and the cause will be made a part

included in the whole by one of its effects, which is impossible.

And since this is impossible, it is clear that it is said

41 improperly."

In other words, the production of this new Christie species

would mean a new hypostasis of which the Divine Logos becomes a

part. Leontius denies this, referring back to his explanation

concerning the fathers' use of the terms part and whole; we cannot

understand these terms literally for they are used to explain as

much as possible the ineffable mystery of the Incarnation. Rather,

42 says Leontius, we understand that:

40col. 1521D llff.

41col. 1524A 13ff.

42col. 1524BC

103

"The part which has brought forth the whole which is called Christ is itself that which is united to another, that is the Logos [is the part which has brought forth the whole and has united himself] to the flesh, both from his essence and in his hypostasis, with the part that is with him. That is to say, he has constituted this whole out of the fleshly essence, thereby showing himself to be neither superior nor inferior to himself and to the part that is in union with him in his [hypostasis]. For the power which creates species, as we have said, has also given this same power In the species not to another but to the part which is united with him in the hypostasis. He is made man on account of the one part, and he deifies [the human part] in itself through his [own deifying power], and there Is not another who is superior, and he is able to make a species composed of himself and of the other. So how will some whole appear in Christ that is different in essence than either of his parts?"

The hypostasis of the Christ is not a new thing, neither a new

composite nor a new nature, but the Divine Logos himself who has

united himself to human nature: "We believe that the Divine Logos / **i

himself is in union with the human nature." The hypostasis of

Christ cannot be conceived as other than, or superior to his parts

as Leontius' opponents would have it because one of his parts is

the Divine Logos who is himself the hypostasis of Christ. Leontius 44 goes on to say:

"From this it has become clear that, since we already agreed that the Divine Logos is the creator of species, and has placed the parts in composition, he will be the same both in nature and in number, and the whole is called a composite by a different conception, even if the fathers have said that the Logos is a part in it; and the same thing is attributed of the Christ, according to which he [the Divine Logos] is both part and whole; so that, even though the one term [the whole] refers to both parts in the composite together, and the term "part" refers to each of the parts in him conceived by

col. 1521B 1.

col. 1524C 1 - D 12.

104

themselves, by either term he will be conceived in the same way as perfect God.

Therefore, you incorrectly propose to us that the whole is of different essence than its parts because of the union, and you incorrectly regard the number as more recent. For even though we say that the whole, since it refers to a particular, can be counted since it refers to every composite, it does not increase in number because of the parts which exist and are of the same essence. Even though many names suggest different ideas of the same [person], the large number of names refers to only one reality. For example, one ought to understand that the names Simon, Peter, Cephas, Bar-Jona, apostle, disciple of the Lord, and teacher of the Holy Church of God, refer to the same subject and to one man who is one in essence and hypostasis, and yet the number of his nature or hypostasis does not change."

Again, to say that the Divine Logos is a part of the Christ is

simply to affirm that he does not belong to the nature of the

flesh. Rather, he is the subject who unites to himself the human

nature; he is the one who becomes man, and not some other. As the

subject of the incarnation, he is the owner of his own whole. As

a part of his own whole, he is the dominant part since he is the

46 subject who has brought about his own union:

"We do not call the Christ God as though he is [God] in part, for even though the divinity is said to be a part of Christ in order to make his composition clearly understood, nevertheless we understand that the Logos is the perfecting principle of every part, and of the whole, for we do not say that the Logos is inferior to Christ, but that he is more simple, and he is perceived as the dominant part who causes the coming together of the human part that is brought into composition with him, and he is the connecting principle of the union, and of the mode of his composition."

This helps to explain a portion from a passage we cited above

col. 1525AB.

Adv.Nest. IV.37: col. 1712C Iff.

105

in which Leontius maintains, "...Even though the one term [the

whole] refers to both parts in the composite together, and the term

"part" refers to each of the parts in him conceived by themselves,

by either term he will be conceived in the same way as perfect

God." How is the Christ conceived as perfect God even In reference

to his parts conceived by themselves? Is the human nature perfect

God? As will become clear in the following chapter, the human

nature maintains its full integrity based on the principle of the

whole in terms of definition. For now the difficulty is easily

explained in this way: when speaking in terms of the union, and not

in terms of hypostasis the Christ is called by the name of his

dominant part, the Divine Logos. By dominant part, Leontius

clearly means the subject of the composition which is the

hypostasis of the Logos. So, whether we speak of the Christ in

47 terms of hypostasis or union, we say that the Christ is God. Or

we may say it another way, the Logos is the hypostasis of Christ

and therefore the subject of the union. He is the one who clothes

48 himself with the flesh, becoming himself the Christ:

Leontius applies this principle of calling the whole by the dominant part, together with the notion of the whole in terms of hypostasis, in a most interesting fashion when he defends the term Theotokos in Adv.Nest. IV. He responds in chapter 37 to his opponents who deny the term Theotokos and argues: "It is obviously the custom in divine scripture to refer to the whole by referring to those parts which, in composition, appear to be dominant....In the same way, in conformity with piety and with the holy scriptures, we call the Christ God since the divine part of him is the dominant part. But most especially we call him God because we see, not in the one part only, but in the whole itself, the most distinguishing mark of God, and that is slnlessness," (col. 1705B 1 - C 11).

Adv.Nest. IV.3: col. 1657B 9ff.

106

"In terms of his [divine generation] the Logos is eternal and absolutely simple, but in terms of his [carnal] generation he begins to exist in a composite way; for when he is known to have added a more recent nature (» τίνος), he is no longer called the Logos [who exists] in a simple way, but the Christ who is now composite."

And so, though a union of natures has taken place in Christ, a

new composite Logos�flesh hypostasis has not been produced, for, as

Leontius says elsewhere: "The flesh is not proper with respect to

the nature of the Logos, but the properties [of the flesh] have, in

49 these last days, come to exist in his hypostasis."

Our study to this point has been conducted primarily from the

perspective of the hypostasis conceived in itself. Having

established the identity of Christ's hypostasis, we are able to

understand how the hypostasis of Christ remains simple,

indivisible, and Immutable even when it becomes composite. Since

the hypostasis is not a particular nature with properties but a

particular "Ego" — the "I" that serves as the foundation of the

natures and properties that come together in union — , the union of

the Logos with a "particular" human nature (a concept that remains

to be explained) in no way involves a second hypostasis, whether by

definition or implication, for the human nature has no subjective

center of its own, or better, it does have its own subjective

center and that is the Logos himself. But this leads directly to

the other side of the problem articulated at the outset of this

chapter: how does the human nature maintain its integrity if it

Adv.Nest. VII.3: col. 1765C If.

107

does not have a human subjective center, that is its own human

hypostasis?

Chapter Three

The Notion of the Whole and the Natural Union in Christ.

In the preceding chapter we studied the concept of the whole

as it was applied to the hypostasis of Christ and to the union.

The notion of the whole may also be applied to the natures of

Christ in a manner which affirms the completeness of their natural

definition. When the prism is viewed from this angle the intimacy

and genuineness of the union in Christ is even more forcibly

expressed, and the notion of hypostasis as the indivisible subject

underlying its constitution again is affirmed.

A. The Natures of Christ as Wholes.

1. The Whole and Composition. Neither the monophysites nor

those opponents of Leontius who assert two hypostases in Christ

give any indication of understanding the distinction between

hypostasis and physis implied by the definition of Chalcedon. The

dictum common to all parties was, "there is no nature without

hypostasis." But there was obviously a difference in the way the

dictum was applied. The Nestorians and Antiochenes understood

hypostasis in terms of "what", and since there are two "whats" in

Christ there are two hypostases. The monophysites, on the other

Articulated first, interestingly, by Theodore of Mopsuestia, On the Incarnation, Book VIII, fragment 7. Greek text in H.B. Swete, ed. Theodor! Episcopi Mopsuesteni In Epistolas B. Pauli Commentaril. 2 vols. (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1880) Vol. 2, Appendix A, p. 299.

108

109

hand, understood hypostasis in terms of "who" and because they

insisted on the unity of the Logos incarnate, using the term physis

to designate the one concrete particular, they allowed only one

hypostasis. In neither case is there a real ontologlcal analysis

of the relationship between hypostasis and physis. This is

illustrated perhaps most vividly in the use made of the analogy of

soul and body. The monophysites, in order to demonstrate the

oneness of Christ, used the analogy to show that body and soul come

together to form a particular concrete individual, a "physis" in

this context which is synonymous to the Chalcedonian hypostasis.

The Chalcedonian defense — particularly in the persons of

2 Leontius, Ephrem of Antioch and Justinian — uses the same analogy

to show that body and soul come together to form a nature or

essence, not an hypostasis.

Consequently, the fundamental assumption of Leontius'

opponents in the Adv.Nest. is that any complete particular nature

must possess its own hypostasis. At the outset of the Adv.Nest.,

Leontius raises this objection of his opponents in order to

distinguish his understanding of hypostasis from that of the 3

monophysites:

"Whatever is united to something else is united either as one whole to another whole, as one part to another part, or as a part to a whole; otherwise it would be

For an example from the writings of Ephrem, see Photius' Bibliotheca (texte et traduction par R. Henry) vol. IV, codex 229, p. 147. For Justinian see his "Edict on the True Faith," in Schwartz, Drei dogmatische Schriften Iustinlans, p. 80.

3Adv.Nest. 1.1; col. 1401B 1 - 9 .

110

impossible to speak of union. But what is whole, and what is a part cannot be said of Him who is uncircum-scribed. Therefore, the Divine Logos is not united to a manhood like ours since he is uncircumscribed. But if he is united [to a manhood like ours] he is then composite and has become circumscribed, which is a wicked thing to say."

His opponents, of course, are setting up the principles on

which they deny the union of the Divine Logos with the flesh. If

the humanity of Christ is complete and other than the Divine Logos,

it therefore possesses its own hypostasis. On the other hand, if

the hypostasis of Christ is one, and it includes the human and

divine natures, then the hypostasis itself must be composite; it is

not distinct but it itself is made up of the human and divine

natures. In his refutation, Leontius establishes the proper

distinction between hypostasis and physis by applying the notion of

the whole not in terms of composition, but in terms of definition.

He must first of all overthrow his opponents' basic premise

that the parts coming together in union already exist — revealed

in the proposition that whatever is united to something else is

united either as one whole to another whole, as one part to another

part, or as a part to a whole — which he does by turning to the

4 composition of the cosmos:

"It is clear that the sensible universe, that is the visible cosmos, exists in composition. So why do they say that this particular union consists of whole or partial elements which exist before [the union], or else that it is wholly composed of elements brought forth from non-existence? For if they think that in the beginning the world came into existence from whole or partial elements which already existed, then let them tell us

col. 1401B 13 - C 10.

Ill

{. their opinion so that should they speak in this manner, we may converse with them as we would with other Greeks, and not as with those who differ from us only concerning the mode of the incarnation. But if they prefer contentiousness to piety and say that the composite cosmos came into existence from non-existence, well, let them understand that non-being is neither a whole nor a part."

Leontius continues: if a composite must come from already

existing wholes or parts, and yet no part of the world pre-existed,

then the world cannot exist as a composite, unless it is brought

into composition with God who alone existed before the world.

Since this is the case, we see that in the composition of the world

none of the world's parts already existed; and so the composition

of the world does not come about through the union of one

pre-existing whole or part to another pre-existing whole or part.

Thus, the basic premise of his opponents, that everything united is

made composite from parts or wholes that already exist, is not true

and the very foundation of their assertion concerning the

composition of the Logos resulting from his union with the flesh is

overturned.

Now Leontius moves to the second proposition which assumes

that any whole, since it is produced and made complete through the

union of its parts, is identical to its constitution and therefore

itself composite and circumscribed (circumscribed because if

composite, the parts are delineated by each other). This would

mean that if the human and divine natures in Christ are united in

the hypostasis of the Logos, and as parts constitute the Logos,

See cols. 1401D 1 - 1404B 5.

112

v then the hypostasis of the Logos itself has become a composite

whole, constituted of the human and divine natures so that if,

crudely speaking, one takes away the human nature, one has but half

of a hypostasis left.

Leontius points out the absurd consequences that would follow

from such a conception by turning again to concrete examples taken

from the created world:

"Everyone knows that a point is without parts, but when it is united [with other points] there is produced a line. How then is that which is not composite made composite? For it is generally agreed that a point is without parts. The same can be said of a moment of time; although it is without parts, when several [moments] are united, they produce chronological time.

And what will you tell us about the soul? Do you believe that it itself is composite since it is united to the body, or, if it is undivided and without parts, is it natural to the body since, as you think, whatever is united is composite?"

If his opponents' second proposition is true, Leontius argues,

then either the soul, if in fact it is simple, cannot be united to

the body, or if it is united to the body, then it must be composite

and circumscribed. And so:

"If in fact you believe that along with the intellec-tual, the spiritual, and the angelic, the soul, too, which is in the image of God and an effulgence of the glory of the Almighty, is divided into parts so that it is assumed to be composite [since It is united with the body], well, either these things are akin to one another and the prototypes and antecedents of the soul will be considered, after the pattern of the soul, to be divided into parts, since the soul is the image and likeness of these things; or you must say that these things are simple and that the soul, together with them, does not

6col. 1404B 10 - C 5.

7cols. 1405D 8 - 1408A 5.

113

^ allow itself to be in composition with corporeal

bodies."

And so, if we do not admit this, then neither can we admit

that whatever is united with something else to constitute a whole

becomes as a result composite and circumscribed together with its

other part. It is not therefore necessary that the hypostasis and

its constitution be conceptually identical such that the hypostasis

becomes composite when it is constituted of two or more natures.

Indeed, on the contrary, their conceptual distinction must be

maintained. In the preceding chapter we saw how Leontius asserted

that if the hypostasis is conceived to be identical with its

natural constitution, resulting in a hypostasis that in itself is

composite, then this implies that the Christ is consubstantial

neither to his Father or Mother since, in the coming together of

the human and divine natures to constitute this new composite

"christic" hypostasis, the Logos in his incarnation becomes a

different nature altogether. Now Leontius is addressing the same

problem with a different objective in mind: he means to affirm that

the natures coming together in the hypostasis of the Logos are not

altered in their own natural definition. They remain what they are

and are not confused with the other. To this end he applies the

concept of the whole to the natures conceived in themselves.

2. The Whole in terms of Definition. Having overthrown the

foundations of his opponents' argument to his own satisfaction,

Leontius now turns to give his own account of the concept of the

whole in order to show how natures may remain complete and maintain

1

their integrity even in composition:

"The term whole does not always indicate simply and absolutely that which is complete with respect to parts, or that which is constituted of parts, as you think. For if that were so, then either everything simple would be called incomplete since it is without parts and does not maintain its completeness from being constituted of parts; or, objects that are whole and complete are no longer simple since they are constituted of parts and as a result, completeness does not belong to those objects which are simple; or else they will appear as universal.

But now if we grant this, your views would not even grant simplicity to God himself unless his completeness were composed of parts. And necessarily this supraperfect divine whole, existing indivisibly will himself be said to require composition of parts in order to be complete and whole. So then, he must be deprived altogether of one or the other, either of simplicity or of completeness.

But in fact, gentlemen, whatever is complete according to its own definition is, properly speaking, a whole; whether it is simple and indivisible, or composite and divisible, if it is seen by itself to maintain its own definitions intact. Now because these things are so, and because they do not prevent the subject from being indivisible by virtue of the definition of the whole, therefore we say that any point, monad, a present indivisible moment of time, the Divine, and everything simple, is whole and complete. We ascribe wholeness to them not because they possess their own parts intact, for we have already acknowledged that they are without parts, but because they possess the whole of that which is proper to their species, preserving undamaged and complete the definition of being without parts, each of these, according to its own nature, bears the distinctive mark of the species.

And so, these things explain the whole; and something that is whole can be united to another whole and it is not necessary that the whole be said to be in composition because of the union."

This general understanding of the whole has profound

consequences. Applied specifically to the natures of Christ, the

concepton of the union in Christ moves beyond composition which

col. 1408A 9 - C 12.

115

V would imply space and quantity, and accordingly confusion or

juxtaposition. Now Leontius may concede that one whole is united

to another whole, but on his terms. The Logos is united to the

human nature, not as one part in need of the other to make the

whole complete but as one complete whole with another complete

whole to constitute a genuine union of being in which each whole,

now a "part", maintains completely its own natural definition.

9 Leontius says:

"In the same way that we spoke of the indivisible, the whole also ought to be called uncircumscribed for by the term "uncircumscribed whole" it will be perfect with all the properties that belong to being uncircumscribed. For if, according to your theory, the whole is conceived only from the completeness of parts, then since God Is without parts and he is uncircumscribed, he will not exist as a whole. And if he does not exist as a whole, then even though he may be free from composition, nevertheless, he will be described as imperfect. But if anything is whole, it can also enter into composition. If then he possesses infinity, and possesses [the properties of] infinity completely, then since he does indeed possess these properties of infinity he can be united to whomever to whatever quantity their statements suppose. And so the whole is united as something which is complete by the principle of infinity and indivisibility.

But we have tried to explain these things because you understand the concept of the whole incorrectly. From those things we have taken into account, the whole is united — in the case of bodies only, but especially in the case of individual objects which are of continuous quantity — from parts of things placed together in a spatial juxtaposition, and which thereby maintain a certain relation to one another.

But you would seem my noble friends, from your physiological study of objects perceived by the senses, to have done away with, in this very study, what is not perceived by the senses. For we see very well how you maintain that the uncircumscribed cannot be united to composite parts, since to begin with, the uncircumscribed is something said to be in a spatial condition, and so

cols. 1408C 13 - 1409B 7.

the uncircumscribed is a hindrance to any kind of spatial union. But this is juxtaposition, not union.

If you therefore believe the union of the Logos with the flesh is of such a kind, because in being united one of these stretches far beyond the other...then it is clear that you imagine the concepts both of union and infinity in a manner unbefitting God, that is to say in corporeal terms, and you imagine [the union] as a coming together of one body of lmmeasureable length and quantity with another inferior body, their parts entering into a certain kind of relationship."

When the wholeness of a nature is conceived in terms of

natural definition rather than in sensible terms the union of

natures in Christ can be affirmed as genuine; it is not a

juxtaposition, and yet the Divine Logos does not become

circumscribed. To the contrary, he remains just what he is by

nature. Leontius explains:

"If these mindless notions [which seek to describe God in sensible terms] are most disgusting, we should say that God circumscribes the world in a manner other than the way bodies circumscribe [other bodies], for properly speaking, all incorporeal entities do not circumscribe anything as body, nor is the uncircumscribed [God] circumscribed because he does not have a body by which he would be circumscribed by a larger body....Although the whole can be contained in something that is smaller and which it itself circumscribes [as for instance the Divine Logos in the flesh] without hindrance and without being circumscribed since it is confined by nothing, this one [the Divine Logos] that is truly uncircumscribed operates whatever it wishes of its own natural power since it is circumscribed and confined by no constraining force. This is the great marvel referred to by him who said concerning the Christ in the flesh: 'In him all the fullness of the Godhead dwells bodily.'"

A bit later Leontius continues:

"In fact the uncircumscribed is a whole by virtue of

cols. 1409D 8 - 1412B 3.

cols. 1412D 11 - 1413A 5.

117

being uncircumscribed, just as the circumscribed has been shown [to be a whole] by virtue of being circumscribed, and is therefore able to be united; and just as the indivisible is not hindered from circumscribing the composite, so also it is not hindered from being united to the composite, and according to that which is proper to itself, it does not become itself composite."

According to Leontius' notion of the whole in terms of natural

definition we may understand that the coming together of the two

natures in Christ constitutes a genuine union of being. And yet,

even though the two natures are complete, they are genuinely one.

On the other hand, since they preserve their own natural

definitions they do not produce a new composite nature but remain

two.

A close look at the implications of this account reveals the

same notion of hypostasis outlined in the preceding chapter.

Leontius has demonstrated that his opponents' identification of the

whole with its parts, such that the whole in terms of hypostasis is

by definition composite, is untenable. In Leontius' account, the

wholes come together to form a genuine union of natures, not of

hypostases, and each remains whole in the hypostasis. The

hypostasis in which the wholes are united is conceptually

distinguished from its parts and remains the same. This does not

mean, of course, that the union of natures produces one new nature.

In the Contra Monophysitas Leontius repeatedly asserts that we

cannot say one nature in Christ because in fact we see two. But

because we understand that each nature united is whole in terms of

definition, and not in terms of composition, the "union of natures"

(ένωσίς φυσική) means that the union in Christ is direct and so

118

intimate they are genuinely one, even though at the same time we

discern two distinct natures. It is only a trick of the mind that

establishes an artificial division of the two natures in Christ for

purposes of analysis; they are not separated or divided except in

12 thought only:

"Since our mind is unable to think of a plurality at one and the same time, even if it is a plurality of thoughts, it must divide the union [of Christ] into the natures that have been united in order to discern both the union and the natures that have been united. We see the different principle of each [nature]; and considering each of the [natures] that have been united in itself we discern what properties each nature has. If we do not consider it in this way we do not understand the union since it Is perceived by means of the communication of properties; and to consider the properties of the union is not accomplished by one single [operation of] the mind."

The union is of "particular" natures, which are not thereby

hypostases, but they both possess, or are possessed by, the same

hypostasis. Not only, then, is the hypostasis "open", but the

natures, too, since they are "unprotected" from one another and in

that their "Ego" is one and the same, are "open" to one another;

and yet they remain what they are in terms of their natural

definition.

In Adv.Nest. 1.14 Leontius responds to his opponents' denial

of the union in Christ in a different key, though using these same

fundamentals as the basis of his argument. Even here one can

discern clearly the principle that the union of Christ is of one

whole with another whole, each whole remaining intact since it

CMon. 10; col. 1776CD.

119

maintains perfectly its natural definition.

The objection he addresses in this chapter is especially

significant in the light of Moeller's suggestion that monotheletism

finds its roots in the christology represented by Leontius of

13 Jerusalem. Leontius opponents argue:

"If the Divine Logos is united to a flesh endowed with a soul like ours, then just as the rational soul is united to our body [and must operate in accordance with the operations of the body, so also] the Divine Logos must operate against his will in accordance with the operations of his flesh which is endowed with a soul like ours."

This anticipates the notions of the 7th century monothelite

Sergius, Archbishop of Jerusalem, who himself echoed the philosoph-

ical assumptions of the 4th century heresiarch Apollinaris.

Neither Apollinaris, nor Leontius' opponents, nor Sergius can admit

a human rational principle in Christ on the grounds that this would

14 result in internal conflict between the human mind and the Logos.

Leontius repeats one of his favorite arguments at this point; one

cannot explain the union of Christ by appealing to unions known to

exist in the created world. Frequently he appeals to the analogy

of soul and body to demonstrate that it is indeed possible for the

13Adv.Nest. 1.14: cols. 1452D 10 - 1453A 2. 14

See V. Grumel, "Recherches sur l'histoire du monothelisme: III. Du monénergisme au monothelisme. Action et role d'Honorius," Échos d'Orient 28 (Jan. - Mar. 1929) p. 272, and compare with fragment 150 of Apollinaris in Lietzmann. We will return to the texts and to the point referred to here in the Conclusion.

120

Logos to be united to the human nature. However, the analogy can

only be carried so far. The analogy of soul and body, which his

opponents use to disprove the union in Christ, cannot be applied

absolutely to Christ since, recalling his earlier contention that

the divine union is unlike any other, the union of soul and body is

of two created wholes whereas the union in Christ is of one

pre-existing whole with a newly created whole. He argues:

"Well then, you who are so wise; if some [prototype] whose own peculiar definition is similar to something else in some respect, must the [prototype] be the same as its example in every respect? But then how would what we call the example remain? It has become the prototype since it lacks nothing of the prototype in the comparison. Specifically, if the comparison refers to the properties which surround the essence, or to the accidents which are in the essence, and not to the essence itself, how would anyone be so careless as to say that the properties peculiar to the one [essence] belong also to the other? In this manner of thinking the properties will be common to both!

Indeed, if this is what you think, you must also believe that because both Ethiopians and ravens are black, then whatever we attribute to the raven must also occur in the Ethiopian. Now if in fact the comparison pertains to objects whose parts are non-essential, well in the same way we must look in each of the parts [that are being compared] for everything that is similar. Now if it is said of ravens that at times they fly, and at times they walk on the ground, must one also think that the Ethiopians behave in the same way? But of course, we say these things of the Ethiopians in a different sense than we say them of the ravens. And if the people in the theater and the rocks in it are said to be in the same place, well then, we will agree that they are united to one another because of their local union. And so, we

Typical is Adv.Nest. 1.26 in which Leontius argues that if the flesh can, in the resurrection, be united permanently to the soul which has existed in heaven before the flesh, then nothing hinders the flesh from being united with the pre-existent Logos (col., 1492D lOff.).

16col. 1453B 1 - C 11.

121

V will attribute laughter to the rocks, and being hewn to the men since they both appear in the same place. How gullible can you get! How ridiculous can you be!"

Though it is rather obscure, and presented in a way foreign to

our methods of argument, one can still discern here the principle

that each whole maintains its own definition: "...how would anyone

be so careless as to say that the properties peculiar to the one

essence belong also to the other?" In what follows one can see

again how the thrust of the argument rests on the notion of the

whole In terms of definition established in Adv.Nest. 1.1:

"Now obviously we will not understand the comparison of something that is like something else [but not exactly the same] by inquiring into something else, or by selecting just one of the other types of composition we know: whether the union of mere relation, or of local position, or a transforming union, or a mixture resulting in confusion....And so you will never get us to say that whatever is united by being combined together in such a union [as these] is also the case in the Logos. For if that were the case, then the Logos would suffer when the flesh suffers, and he would increase as the flesh increases, and his [energies] would correspond to the operations of the flesh and, as his flesh passes its prime, his energies would be reduced, and even thwarted, as happens in the case of the soul and body. Then you would have to say that he is brought into union by someone other than himself, and insofar as it is permitted, he would partake of the things of the flesh unwillingly, or through necessity, or for reward, for this is the case with the soul and body."

Leontius is not denying that the Logos experiences the things

of the flesh (for then he would contradict himself when he affirms

the doctrine of theopaschism, or the term Theotokos), but he is

refuting a notion of union that subjects the Logos to the common

categories of time and space that characterize every other known

col. 1456C 1 - D 2.

122

C union in the created world. Since the hypostasis of the union in

Christ is the divine hypostasis of the Logos, though the Christ is

genuinely human in nature, he is more than an ordinary man and

cannot be restricted to all the principles applying in the union of

18 body and soul in an ordinary human hypostasis:

"Show us a nature to which the nature of the Divine Logos is similar in every respect and we will show you a union to which his union is similar in every respect. But if there is no nature to which he is similar, obviously there is no union of natures to which his union is similar....

But now if we cannot show some other Creator who has brought forth the creation from nothing, then you could not even grant to God [that he has created the world from nothing]; nor will you believe that the God who begets is Father, or that the Son who is begotten is God; and according to your view, there will not even be Christ himself who is like us, not even according to your definition, since we could never show you, nor could you show us, any other [Christ] than him. Unless, of course, you say in accordance with the opinion of the Jews, that he is equal to the prophets in every respect."

We can see even more clearly the significance of Leontius'

principle of definition when he applies it directly to the

difficulty his opponents raised concerning the mind of Christ.

Gregory of Nazianzus, in the controversy with Apollinaris, had

already affirmed that the union of the Logos with a body endowed

with a human mind does not obviate, but fulfills the definition of

human rationality: "Our mind," he said, "is perfect and commanding,

but only with regard to soul and body; it is not absolutely

perfect. It is a servant and a subject of God. It is not a fellow

cols. 1456D 13 - 1457B 1.

123 IQ

ruler, nor is it held in equal honor." Leontius essentially

repeats the same argument in his response to his opponents who pose

the difficulty raised by the presence of a human mind in Christ in 20 this manner:

"Whatever is united to another either leads that with which it is united, as the soul leads the body, or is led by it, as the body is led by the soul. Or, it neither leads nor is led, as the parts of a house. But in a union, everything which neither leads nor is led is obviously irrational and mindless, as the body and the parts of the house. So, if the Divine Logos is united to a human nature like ours, either he leads or he is led, or he is neither the one nor the other. And if he leads, the man who Is like us will be irrational and mindless, an impious thing to say belonging to the vomit of Arius and Apollinaris. But if he is led, let them direct the blasphemy away from this to the head of those who say the Divine Logos is united to a human nature like ours. But if he does not lead because in the union, the Lord's human nature is irrational; or if he is not led because of the blasphemy which results from this, then in neither case is he united to a humanity like ours, for whatever is united to another either leads or is led, or is neither the one nor the other, as we said."

The highlight of Leontius' response is the following:

"Were you to begin with the reasoning of your second proposition in your syllogism, you could just as easily say something like this: we know that all elements in a union which are led are irrational, not simply because they are led, but also because they are led in their union.

Now we would say to this: if this is the case, then do you understand that these elements are irrational because they are in a union, or simply because they are led? Or could it be because they are always such by their nature? Whether they are referred to and considered in themselves or in union, irrational elements are known [to be irrational] whether they are among those things which are united or among those things which are not united to them, and they are borne wholly by the force of the agent

Ep. 101, "Ad Cledonium," PG 37: col. 185.

'Adv.Nest. 1.16: cols. 1460D 6 - 1461A 9.

124

which possesses them. You cannot prove that what is rational by nature will become irrational when it enters into union, or vice versa, for nothing becomes less rational when it enters into union.

Now, if you do not believe this to be true, but you believe the body has become irrational because it is led in its union, then you must obviously believe that if it were to exist by itself it would become rational. And you will believe that the body disunited from the soul partakes of irrationality when it is united with the rational soul. Now who can endure the opinions of such irrational men? And yet, if the union is the cause of irrationality in the body, then you must assume that it is properly the cause of irrationality; and you would then believe that the soul likewise becomes irrational. But if it is irrational, It too is led; and if it is led in the union, it too will be led by none other than the body to which it is united. And thus, the reverse of what you originally proposed has been demonstrated, since on the contrary, in terms of the body, the union becomes the cause of a particular agent, namely, the soul [leading the body] and not of [the soul] being led [by the body].

And so if these things are true, and it is foolish to think such things of the soul, it is clear that rationality is ascribed to something by nature whether it is in union or not; and we know that it is not natural for the soul to be led by those things which naturally lead, but it is natural to the soul to lead. And we understand that it is natural to the body to be irrational by nature, and inanimate both in the union and apart from the union, and it is led; it does not lead.

These things, then, have demonstrated that it is not the union, but the nature of something, whether it is rational or irrational, that is the cause of something either leading or being led. Therefore, we should examine well from what remains of our investigation if the nature of rational things is to lead in every respect naturally, and if it never at any time is led, so that we might know, if this is the case, that if the Lord's human nature (Κυρίακόν άνθρωπον ) was led by the Logos, whether or not this means it is irrational and mindless.

If it is not led, then, and never wholly, and it is not ministered to by the lord, then a city is never led and never will be led by its governor, nor an enlisted man by his sargeant. Indeed, even unto death, he will be seen to be constrained by the command of the Logos; and the souls of the pious, and the angels, and the powers, and all others of the blessed ranks of heavenly soldiers will never be led by God in any respect if they possess reason and a mind, as your sagacity would wish to prove. Or, if it is led, it will be revealed to be irrational in

125

V every respect. For you have granted this as a proof of rationality: simply not being led, and you do not add as you should, not being led necessarily in any respect.

My friends, your ingenious arguments subject you to the ridicule of those who are truly rational."

More prolix than Gregory, but the point is the same. The

natural definition of human nature is a body ruled by a rational

human soul, and union with the Logos does not alter the natural

definition of the human mind: "Rationality is ascribed to something

by its nature whether it is in union or not." At the same time,

the human mind is not absolutely commanding, as Gregory observed,

but it is natural for the human mind to be led by God. Union with

the Logos, then, does not destroy the mind's natural definition but

fulfills it. It is not by coincidence that Leontius' theology, as

well as Gregory's, moves naturally to the doctrine of salvation as

deification for they share the same understanding of man.

These examples illustrate how Leontius applies the notion of

the whole to the natures conceived in themselves in order to affirm

that the human nature is not altered in its natural definition in

the genuine union of the Divine Logos with the flesh. This is

illustrated again in 11.17 where Leontius' opponents raise this

question:

"If the Divine Logos fills all things and is invisibly and personally present in all things, but the Christ was seen in his hypostasis to be circumscribed in his mother, and in his manger, and in his house before his holy resurrection; and not only this but he was also circumscribed in space for it says, 'He ascended to heaven,' and, 'He whom heaven must receive,' and, 'He will come again in the same manner you saw him ascending

col. 1573Dff.

126

C Into heaven;* then is it not so that there is one visible and circumscribed hypostasis, and another that is invisible and uncircumscribed?"

Leontius applies the notion of the whole in terms of

definition to the divine Trinity in order to affirm that the union

of natures in Christ is genuine, and not a spatial juxtaposition.

22 He says:

"But if every outline of the hypostasis is spatially limited, then the Logos also will be spatially distinguished in regards to the hypostasis of the Father and the Holy Spirit. And if you therefore say that the Logos is spatially in everything, then the two other hypostases of the Godhead either are each one in another universe and not in this one, or they are not in any. For in this universe there is no space for them to exist separately since the Logos fills all things. And how, even as you said, will the divine hypostasis of him who is wholly filled with all things, also be in all things? For it is not possible for the same thing to be both the place where things exist and also to exist in some place with them.

So then, if these things do not pertain to the spatial limitation of the hypostasis of the Logos, what hinders him from remaining the Divine Logos, and though he assumes the nature of the flesh, from maintaining those things which distinguish him as the Logos of God, and from acquiring in addition to his [divine characteris-tics] those things which are distinctive of the flesh in his one hypostasis? For just as the Logos does not make for himself many hypostases from all of his own properties by which he is distinguished from the hypostasis of the Father and the Holy Spirit — for example, in that he is begotten and does not beget, and in that he is related to the Father as his deliberative will and reasonable word, and in that he is not the one who proceeds out of him into another, and in that he is the demiurge [of God] — , so also he does not make many hypostases when he adds to his hypostasis many other properties that are opposite to his divine properties. For since he differs only in being unbegotten, the hypostasis of the Father is perfectly distinguished from the hypostasis of the Son and the Holy Spirit. And though the hypostasis of the Father is distinguished by

col. 1576A 6 - C 9.

127

the fact he begets, he is not more complete, neither would it be said that he possesses two hypostases."

Applying the concept of the whole in terms of definition to

the Holy Trinity brightly illumines the force of Leontius'

argument. God is beyond any earthly category, including that of

space and quantity which, when applied to the concept of the whole,

implies a kind of corporeal composition, and when we speak of the

wholeness of his nature we may do so only in non�sensible,

apophatic terms. When the concept of the whole in terms of

definition, and not in terms of composition, is applied to the

natures of Christ, it is possible to conceive a genuine union in

which the natural definitions of each nature are wholly maintained.

At the same time, the union of natures does not alter the

foundation of the union, the hypostasis; it remains what it was.

The notion of the hypostasis as a particular subject — but not a

particular nature — , conceptually distinguished from its

constitution, is clearly discernible.

However, we have yet to come to the heart of the matter. That

each nature remains a complete whole in the union, together with

the notion of the hypostasis as the particular subject underlying

the natures that come together, prepares us to understand what

Leontius means when he describes the union in Christ by such terms

as: ένωσις φυσική, and, σύνθεσις φυσική.

Β. Union by Nature.

1. "Ενωσίς Φυσική. Leontius has compiled a large stock of

colorful phrases to describe the union in Christ; terms such as:

128

ουσιώδης σύνθεσις , ουσιώδης δνωσις, or ουσιώδης συµπλοκής. "Ενωσις

φυσική is perhaps the term Leontius uses most often. Taken up in

the context of the whole in terms of definition, it affirms that

the Divine Logos has united himself directly to human nature

without a mediator. This means that he does not work in

conjunction with the human nature, nor in harmony with it, but in

and through it as his own bodily instrument.

In the following passage from Adv.Nest. 1.14, Leontius builds

on the principles he has established earlier and appeals to

different kinds of operations resulting from natural unions to

affirm the "natural union" (ένωσίς φυσική ) of the Divine Logos

23 with humanity:

"If you consider yourselves worthy to receive the teaching of the written word, but you refuse to comply [to them] as you have just now professed to us, and yet you receive the witness of the divinely inspired words, well sooner or later you will learn that God makes the wise of this world foolish, and we would be able to put you to shame by your foolish statements, because the natural union (ένωσίς φυσική) of the true God with true man has taken place truly in our Lord Jesus Christ. His holy flesh did not exist before its union with the Logos, but at the same time [that it was created from nothing] it was naturally united to the one who is beyond nature.

In this context, one could reflect on the parts in us; there are some organic parts in us that are natural, and particular, or special. The simple organs are not conceived as being acted on from outside, but they co�operate with the operations that are in them and by means of them according to nature, and together they produce a particular operation; as for example, in man the tongue, the palate, and the other parts of the mouth together produce speech, laughter, and sound.

Now if we agree that to bring into existence those things which do not yet exist, not even In potentiality, is distinctive peculiarly of the Divine Nature, and he is

cols. 1457B 9 � 1460A 6.

129

V able to create without any mediating nature — as for example, the formation of a living human flesh which was taken from the earth (for our Lord and God Jesus Christ showed this Life in the one who was blind from birth, and when he raised up his own body, and when he made with his fingers a clay mixture for his eyes, and yet was able to do these things by his Word alone [without any mediator]) — , well if this is so, then it is clear that God acts In this manner because he shows that his human flesh is united to himself by nature. And for this reason he displays the things that belong most properly to his [own Divine] nature when he works through his body as a man.

Just as someone is unable to speak, or to laugh, or to converse with anyone by means of some instrument that is not united to him by nature, so also, If God is not united to his own flesh by nature, he could not exhibit his most proper divine operations through his flesh. But it was truly the Divine power alone which, through the mediation of his own body, fashioned the eyes of the flesh from the earth and gave Life and Illumination, and he raised up man in his own body fashioned from the earth, and he overthrew the power of death. These things could not have been done by another, and the Divine Logos made these things known to us when he worked through his flesh to demonstrate to us his own union."

The premise of this passage recalls the earlier argument of

Leontius in Adv.Nest. 1.1 concerning the coming together of

pre-existing entities to constitute a whole. Leontius appeals to

it here to establish the reality of the Divine Logos' intimate

union with the human nature. There is no union from pre-existent

things, he argues, since all things are brought into being by God

from nothing. Since God alone pre-exists, his union with the flesh

can be compared to no other union; even when compared to the union

of body and soul one must be clear where the analogy ends and the

differences begin.

Since the Logos himself brings all things into being from

non-being without any mediator or mediating nature, he needs no

mediator to bring his own human nature into existence from f

130

v. non�being, nor is he united to the human nature through some

mediator. Against this background we can understand the meaning of

the phrase, ένωσίς φυσική. The Divine Logos unites his own nature

to the human nature; his flesh never existed except in union with

Him. The body of Christ is the Logos' own, and the Logos works in

the body endowed with a rational soul directly, that is to say "by

nature."

There is in this argument an allusion to the christology of

Evagrius in which the Logos is united to the human nature through

the mediation of the Christie VOÛÇ. If this is the case, it

illumines even more the point Leontius wishes to emphasize. As far

as Leontius is concerned, any union that is not "by nature" is not

genuine, nor is it befitting God. In another chapter, he makes the

24 same point even more forcefully:

"So why should it seem incongrous to you that, if he entrusted the creation of man to himself and not to some other [demiurge] whom he created, he should now bear the human nature which he himself created for the purpose of his re-creation?...

But if God himself accompanies us, as he attests, will we not ascend? And if the divine mercy of the good Lord of all allows this ministry in accordance with the affirmation of his own minister, and if the prophet also says, "Not an angel but the Lord Himself will save us," surely it should be clear to you already from these oracles that our leader has borne witness that he would deem it unworthy not to redeem us by his own nature, and that he is not ashamed to effect our salvation himself, and that he does not need any other mediating servant to effect the kindess he would for us. For despising the shame of the cross, he himself, according to the divine teaching of the Apostle, was in the form of God, and he emptied himself, not another."

/ col. 1469B 4 - C 8.

131

It should be clear how the concept of the natural union is

rooted in Leontius' notion of the hypostasis as a particular

subject underlying its constitution, and his explication of the

natures in Christ as wholes in terms of definition rather than in

terms of composition or spatial juxtaposition. As wholes, that is

as complete in terms of their natural definition, the human nature

and the Logos are united "by nature" meaning they are directly

united in the hypostasis of the Logos — "the natural union of the

true God with true man has taken place truly in our Lord Jesus

Christ" — , not juxtaposed or related; and in their union the

principles of their natural definition remain intact.

If we understood the union in corporeal or quantitative terms,

it would be most difficult, if not impossible, not to confuse or

mix the natures. But when we move beyond spatial, quantitative

categories altogether, and think only in terms of definition, we

may begin to conceive of a genuine union in which the natures of

Christ are genuinely one, even "mixed" together without destroying

or altering their peculiar natural principles. Obviously, this has

profound implications on anthropology which concern —

significantly enough — Leontius' doctrine of deification.

This confirms P. Gray's conclusion, which he seems to make rather tentatively, that Leontius means by natural union the coming together of the divine and human natures: op. cit., pp. 133-134.

2. Σύνθεσίς Φυσική. In Adv.Nest. I.19 Leontius' opponents

offer several proofs to show that the Divine Logos could not have

been united to the human nature according to essence (ουσιώδης

συµπλοκής and ένωσίς κατ' OÙoCav). Two of these may be considered

in the present context. First is their assertion that the

formation of Christ was by the Holy Spirit and not by the Logos,

and that his slnlessness was the result of the Holy Spirit

indwelling him; therefore, the Christ was in essential union (κατ'

OÛoti.V) with the Holy Spirit, and not with the Divine Logos.

Second, if the dignity and names of honor were given to the Christ,

he obviously did not possess them by nature; therefore, they must

be the gift of God's love and good pleasure, and not the result of

26 an essential union with the Logos.

Leontius concedes that the Holy Spirit exists in the Christ

and that it is because of the Holy Spirit's indwelling that the

Christ is sinless. But then he turns this very assertion against

his opponents to prove that the Divine nature was in the

27 Christ:

"If the cause of our justification is the free choice of our nature, and if we understand that the Holy Spirit is the [deliberative faculty] in Christ's nature, well, if this [viz. the Holy Spirit] is in fact truly God then surely it is most clear to us, even against your will, that you yourselves have conceded that the divine nature exists in Christ through the Spirit."

col. 1472BD.

col. 1484D 9 - 14.

133

^ C Moeller correctly perceives the significance of Leontius'

28 argument in this particular text. Leontius affirms that Christ

is the Divine bearer of the Holy Spirit. However, if the Holy

Spirit is God, and God is of one essence, then the fact that

Christ's human soul is moved directly by the Holy Spirit only

confirms that the Divine nature is united directly with the human

nature apart from any kind of mediation, and this includes that of

29 "created grace".

In response to his opponents' contention that the names given

to Christ are the gift of God's love and good pleasure and not of

the essential union, Leontius again concedes the point, only to

show that in fact it proves the opposite: the humanity of Christ is

30 most intimately and directly united "in" the Logos:

"Now if someone says that the superexcellent God is three hypostases and not one, what other would this [Person of the Logos] be than God and Lord by nature? For he who is given a name does not give it to himself alone, nor is he above every name since there are many who are called gods and lords in heaven and on earth in some respect. So if another receives this name than the one who is truly God by nature, then either the one who gives him the name must remain without a name, or in one or the other of them this name from now on is false. For either it will be possessed falsely by the one who Is of a different substance who received it recently and does not possess it properly, or from now on it is not said truly of the one who had it first, since the name is lost to the one who has received it more recently, and it no longer continues to belong to his own nature.

A natural name that is proper belongs to one, and not to two different natures. So then, either the name is

28 "Le chalcédonlsme et le néo-chalcédonisme," p. 714f.

29Ibid., p. 714.

30Adv.Nest. 1.19: co l . 1481B 10 - D 5.

134

not said to have been given to this individual really and properly, or If it was given properly, then It is given in a manner that is different to itself and that is in relation to the other [nature] as a result of the union with him who alone is named with this name truly. And thus, because [the one nature] has come Into existence in him, the name will exist in him [in whom he exists] and in the other, for a name that departs from its own subject cannot really be said to belong to that nature [to whom it goes]. And we understand the account concerning honor and dominion and all the other things in the same way."

In other words, the honor and the name given to Christ belong

to the Christ naturally and genuinely because of the natural union

of the human nature with the Logos. As an example, Leontius offers

the iron which is given the name, and as one would say the honor,

of fire because its nature is united directly with the fire. He

gives other examples, "When light is mixed with water, the light

illumines the water by virtue of the union, and is thereby given

the name of the Light, and when plaster is united with gold, one

calls the statue golden." He then gives an illustration from the

opposite side to clarify his meaning: "Even though the King were to

call one of his horses "man", only one would have the name truly

and there would not be two who possess the name more than all those

who hold the name "man" by nature, [but only one, (presumably) the

Kingl."31

In what one might consider rather strange fashion, Leontius

demonstrates the absurdity of his opponents' position by arguing

that if the dignity and name given to Christ are considered an

honor because they are given according to the good pleasure of God,

col. 1481 AC

135

^ . well, since by their will rulers give to their wicked servants

scourgings and chains, these punishments, too, should be considered

32 honors and dignities. Leontius then shows what he believes to be

the true union according to good pleasure which further illustrates

33 his concept of the "union by nature":

"If, when we speak of the composition of natures (σύνθεσίν φυσικήν) and we assert that it did not come about by the good pleasure and mercy of our good God, you therefore believe that you may confirm that there is no union because the Economy [or union of Christ] was not according to good pleasure; well, let us proclaim to you that the union of good pleasure, which is the greatest demonstration of His goodness is precisely this: we know that God is absolutely free from envy because he was pleased to bestow on us the dignity, not of someone who is common or profane, but of one who is of his very own nature and who is not united to him through some kind of relation (τυχούσης); but he has allowed us to partake not of some other good, but of Himself."

It may be that Leontius makes a point to use forceful

terminology such as ένωσίς φυσική , or σύνθεσίς φυσική in order to

establish what he means by "hypostatic union"; not a hypostatic

union in the sense an Origenist or Nestorian might give to it, but

a hypostatic union in which the natures of God and man are genuine-

ly and directly united without mediation in the one hypostasis of

the Logos. Leontius makes his meaning clear in the following:

"We say the union in Christ is natural since there is a union of natures in him, [but we do not say it is according to the principle of nature]. For if we were to say the union came about according to the principle of nature, then the Father and the Holy Spirit who are of

32col. 1484AB.

33col. 1484BC

Adv.Nest. 1.50: cols. 1512D 9 � 1513A 10.

136

his same nature would be united to the flesh. And if the humanity, too, is united to God by virtue of nature, then all men, even Pilate, Herod, and Caiaphas would be Christel...And so we say the union in Christ is according to the principle of hypostasis (υποστατική), but this is opposite to the sense we speak of in the natural union, for it is not a union of hypostases [as it is a union of natures], but it is a union in the Logos' own hypostasis."

In regards to the same point we may quote from another

text:

Objection: "If you say that the man taken from us exists in the Divine Logos, how, by existing in him, will his existence not include an hypostasis? We, rather than you, claim that the manhood subsisted in the Divine Logos."

Response: "But, as it appears, you disregard in what respect you differ from us, and so you bring in another objection. We do not grant, as you do, that the man who was once united subsists in his own [hypostasis], lest, as a result of presenting two hypostases that have been preserved by virtue of the particularizing principle of the natures that have come together, we completely overturn the union. For if both of the natures in Christ exist in their own [hypostasis], what sort of union do you think is possible for them? Do you say that the union was in the same manner in which David was united to his enemy Goliath in the struggle of their conflict, and in the act of slaying him? Or was it in the manner in which Joseph was united to Benjamin while he was living in Egypt? Or is it in the manner in which the ardor of the musician [is united] to his lyre? Or do you consent to any other union such as these?

We, on the other hand, believe that the Logos and the flesh are at the same time in one common hypostasis. But if you are not of our opinion, but you retain yours, how will you lay It upon yourselves to say that the manhood has its being in the Logos? For whatever is said to be in something witnesses to being in union with it; but to say that each of the subjects is in its own hypostasis clearly admits their separation from one another!"

To bring out the meaning implied in these passages we may

Adv.Nest. II.9: col. 1553C 1 � D 15.

137

C. translate σύνθεσις φυσική , or δνωσις φυσική as a composition of

natures, or a union that is natural, or a union of natures. That

is to say, the human and divine natures in Christ are not

juxtaposed, they are not relatively connected to one another, but,

without being confused or altered in their natural definitions they

are genuinely united. They do not come together to constitute a

particular nature or hypostasis, but they are united in a

particular hypostasis, in the "Ego" of the Divine Logos. We may

dare to say they touch: "[The union of the divine and human

natures in Christ] is enough to enrich our nature with all of the

36 divine nature".

Earlier we suggested that not only the hypostasis, but the

natures, too, are "open". These texts bring this even more clearly

into view. Unprotected from one another by their own hypostases,

the divine and human natures can be united with one another so that

they actually touch, even "mingle" with, one another, without

losing their natural definition. This indicates that man possesses

such an affinity with God that the union of the Logos with human

nature is not "unnatural" nor impossible. This is an understanding

37 of man common to all of the so�called Eastern tradition. Gregory

of Nazianzus was so bold as to describe the union of God and man as

36Adv.Nest. 1.49: col. 1512B 7f.

37 See especially J. Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian

Thought, chapter 6.

138

a mixture (µίξις) and an intermingling (περίχωρέω); Maximus the

Confessor will describe the union as an interpénétration

39 (περιχώρησίς). Leontius, as we have seen, uses such terms as

σΰνθεσις φυσική or δνωσις φυσική.

Leontius' notion of "union by nature" carries with it

significant soteriological implications; in his union with the

flesh God himself has opened the way of salvation to mankind. The

following text deserves to be cited in full to illustrate the force

of Leontius' presentation:

Objection: "Whatever Is united to another is united either through itself or by another. The soul united to the body Is an example of something united through itself; the parts of a house an example of being united by another for it is built by man. But the Divine Logos is not united through himself for he is his own work; nor is he united by another, for he is Inferior to no one, inasmuch as everything that is united to another, not by itself but by another, is constituted as something inferior to that by which it Is united. And if the Divine Logos is united neither through himself nor through another, he is not composite, and never enters into union with anything."

Response: "...We would explain the matter in this way. Whatever makes something makes it itself or on behalf of another. And whatever makes something itself, as you would have it, is in need of that which has come into

38 "The names are mixed (κίρναµένων) as the natures, and they

flow into one another (περίχωρουσων) by the law of their intimate union (συµφυΐας)," Ep. 101 Ad Cledonium PG 37 col. 181; "For both of the natures are one in the mixture," (Ep. 101 Ad. Cledonium, PG 37, col. 180): "I partake of Him through the mixture," (Theological Oration 30.6, Sources Chrétiennes 250, p. 236, lines 11-12): "What greater destiny can befall man's-humanity than that he should be intermingled with God and by this intermingling should be deified?" (Or. 30.3: SÇ 250, p. 230, lines 6-7).

39 See Lars Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, pp. 27ff.

40 H Adv.Nest. 1.12: cols. 1448B 8 - 1449D 7.

139

being. And whatever makes something on behalf of another, is inferior to the other, as you say. There-fore, God made the world either by his own hands, or he made it on behalf of another to whom he is inferior. Or, if he made the world neither through himself, nor on behalf of another to whom he is inferior, then he never made it, and how can you say such things when you wouldn't even want this extreme wickedness of yours to be put in writing?

But even that which provides for something provides for it either itself, as the soul provides for the body, or on behalf of another, as the stewards provide for the house-hold servants on behalf of their lord. Therefore, God, too, who is the provider of all things according to what you said, does this either through his own hand, and will then be in need of those things which he provides for; or, he will be as though someone inferior not simply to one over-lord, but to all; and he will become inferior to the things which he provides for, the birds of the air, the lilies of the field, and the herds for whom he prepares in due season food and shelter. Who would endure such blasphemies?

But you willingly overlook the chief point of the mystery of the Divine Incarnation....He who is, came into being in accordance with his providence for the inferior creatures, and for the sake of the care which the one who is superior freely gives because of his goodness. Through him the good and almighty God, the cause of all things, is made known.

For this reason, therefore, those who are truly orthodox and who inquire into the truth about him, say that his own purpose was to be united [with us]; for the scriptures say of him, "Though he thought it not robbery to be equal with God, he emptied himself and took the form of a servant." Now, what benefit could come when in complete accordance with his own purpose, he emptied himself and came down [from heaven]? Nothing other than that we whom he assumed might be redeemed from our slavery and become equal to God in the sense that, as his goodness had destined for us in the beginning, we might be in the image and likeness of God.

Surely you yourselves are in a sorry state if you believe such aid is never offered to those in need on the part of those who are self-sufficient! Do you not know yourselves, or have you never heard of some man who has often exposed himself to danger in order to rescue his dog, or some other creature, because it has fallen into a pit or a hole? Now if this happens daily among those who are not of the devil and who cherish corruptible creatures that are perishing, what will we say of those events that have taken place openly before all? That he who stood without fear of falling, for his own sake

140

^ entered into danger with the one who was perishing and descended into the abyss with him? But explain how he would be benefited as much as the other [in doing this]!

Now if the one who gives aid to someone in trouble gives aid as to his superior then your account proves that the man who saves the dog many times is inferior to the dog, even if it were the king who, through his good pleasure, gave aid to some beast. So, when the Samaritan ministered to the one who had fallen among thieves and helped him to his donkey and ministered to him in various ways, lending him money besides, then either, as you say, he did these things for himself and not the other, because having suffered what the [victim] suffered he was pained by the victim's wounds; or, since he ministered to his superior he will have done nothing virtuous and will be undeserving of gratitude or reward.

In this manner of thinking, God who gives help to all, more than all would be inferior to all, and, as you would have it, he who helps all would be suspected of being inferior not just to one thing, or a few things, but to the whole world. Who would endure such nonsense! And so it is clear that for us and for our sakes our God has united himself to us."

We have seen that a fundamental tenet of Leontius' affirmation

is the principle of the whole in terms of definition, on the basis

of which he maintains a genuine union of the human and divine

natures in Christ. However, we have not fully met the difficulty

concerning the integrity of Christ's human nature. Even though the

principle of the whole in terms of definition allows us to conceive

of a genuine union in which the natures are fully preserved

according to their natural definitions, one might accuse Leontius

of playing word games. For what are we to make of the notion that

the accidents or properties of the nature accrue to the divine

hypostasis of the Logos? Has not the human nature disappeared in

spite of whatever Leontius may claim?

Now that we have established both the ontologlcal structure

and the identity of the hypostasis of Christ, and have seen on what (

141

basis Leontius affirms that the human and divine natures are

genuinely united without losing their natural definitions, we may

turn to consider just how he explains this affirmation.

Chapter Four

The Hypostasis of Christ and the Human Nature

Leontius addresses the question concerning the integrity of

the human nature in Christ on what we might call two fronts, both

of which are anchored in the distinction between hypostasis and

physis. The first is specifically intended to meet the objection

of his opponents that the human nature cannot be real if it does

not have its own hypostasis. This front we might label, "the

foundation of existence." On this front, Leontius challenges the

ontologlcal conception assumed by his opponents' interpretation of

the dictum, there is no nature without an hypostasis, in order that

he might assert his own ontologlcal conception of hypostasis and

physis.

Interestingly, this constitutes for Leontius the most direct

response to the question of how the human nature personalized in

the Logos remains complete and intact without its own human

hypostasis. He seems to believe that if he can demonstrate how the

distinction between hypostasis and physis is to be properly

conceived he will have overthrown his opponents' basis for

affirming that there must be a second, human hypostasis in Christ

if there is a complete human nature. This may not seem to be the

most effective response to the question of the human nature's

integrity for it does not seem to meet the real heart of the

problem. But it is necessary for it establishes the ontology

guiding Leontius' interpretation of the dictum, there is no nature

142

143

V without an hypostasis, and consequently it opens the way for

understanding the second front, which we have labeled, "the mode of

existence". This does go to the heart of the question.

The second front embraces two aspects: the fate of the

hypostasis of the Logos after the incarnation, and the possibility

for the co-existence of two natures whose natural properties are

contrary to one another. It is not specifically directed at the

question concerning the integrity of the human nature in Christ; it

is intended primarily to affirm that the Logos remains the same

before and after the incarnation even though he becomes more

composite through the acquisition of the human nature and its

properties, and to illustrate Leontius' conception of the proper

distinction between hypostasis and physis. However, in the process

of developing his argument in this regard, Leontius reveals

important notions concerning the role of the human nature in the

incarnation, and how it affects the mode of existence of the Logos'

hypostasis. From this we can discern how the human nature retains

its full integrity in Christ even though it does not possess its

own human hypostasis.

A. The Foundation of Existence.

1. Hypostasis, Physis, and Difference. An examination of the

hypostasis conceived in itself has revealed it to be the underlying

subject of its own constitution. Though a particular, it is not a

particular nature and is conceptually distinguished from the

nature/s constituting it. In Leontius' conception, hypostasis and

144

physis are distinguished in one and the same particular, and

whether speaking in terms of the universal or the particular,

physis consistently refers to the common stuff that makes the

hypostasis "what" it is. This leads Leontius to a significantly

different application of the dictum, there is no nature without

hypostasis, and implies an ontologlcal conception radically

different from his opponents.

We have already suggested that Leontius' ontologlcal

conception is "personal", that is to say the hypostasis is the

foundation of existence. The objections raised by Leontius'

opponents indicate that they conceive the foundation of existence

to be the physis, the hypostasis being the final level in the

particularization of the common ousia. This results in a certain

ambiguity of expression. Depending on the context, physis may

indicate the common stuff, or the concrete individual. In the

former, the hypostasis is a particular example of the common stuff;

in the latter, hypostasis indicates a particular whose natural

definition is complete. This leads to an interpretation of the

dictum such that hypostasis and physis correspond to one another on

a one to one basis. On this basis the full reality of the human

nature can be preserved only if it has its own hypostasis. From

this perspective, Leontius' opponents assert that Christ's

consubstantiality to us and to his Father is real only if his human

nature has its own hypostasis as does his divine nature. They

1 argue:

Adv.Nest. II.5: col. 1540A 1 - C 1.

i 145

"If you understand that the hypostasis is consub-stantial to the Father in part, and to David in part, explain these parts according to which he is consub-stantial to the Father and to David. Is he God and man, or something else? If he is something else explain what he is. But if he is God and man then the man [in him] will not possess its own hypostasis in relation to David to whom he is consubstantial as the Divine Logos possesses his own hypostasis in relation to the Father to whom he is consubstantial. For whatever is without hypostasis (άνυπόστατον ) is never said to be consub-stantial to that which is hypostatic (ένυπδστατον ). So if there is one hypostasis of the Divine Logos, and it is perfect and consubstantial to the Father, then the man who is taken from us either is without hypostasis and is referred to by mere words, or he is hypostatic and possesses a complete hypostasis of his own insofar as he is man.

"But if," his opponents continue, "the man is without hypostasis, then his consubstantiality to David is superfluous for we have established that whatever is without its own hypostasis cannot be consubstantial to what possesses its own hypostasis (ένυπόστατον ). But if the man [in Christ] possesses his own hypostasis, then he is rightly said to be consubstantial to David, for generally speaking, hypostasis is said to be consubstantial to hypostasis. And so, your captious argument which maintains that there are not two hypostases [in Christ], but two natures of the Divine Logos and the manhood taken from us, is undone."

Leontius counters by asserting that if there are two

hypostases in Christ, then Christ cannot be God and man, but only

one or the other: "But gentlemen," he says, "if we teach that this

one hypostasis in its natures is God and man, how will this

hypostasis be man or God if each nature possesses its own

2 hypostasis?" That is to say, if each nature possesses its own

hypostasis, then Christ can be consubstantial neither to God nor to

man for the one hypostasis will be fully consubstantial to man and

2col. 1540C Iff.

146

not to the Father, and the other hypostasis will be fully

consubstantial to the Father and not to man. The implications of

his opponents' position shows that in fact, their own proposition

leads to the very difficulty they claimed for Leontius: Christ will

be two hypostases, each one of which is only one nature, and Christ

must either be God only, or man only, or something else.

Implied once again is the understanding that the hypostasis is

not a particular nature; it is not the "what", but the "who" of the

individual. Even though the natural parts of the individual may be

complete, they do not possess their own hypostasis for a nature is

not an hypostasis, but exists In the hypostasis. He says: "There

is no part that is its own hypostasis...for no part is considered 3

in itself, but in the hypostasis that is the whole."

To break his opponents' one to one correspondence of

hypostasis and physis Leontius seeks in various ways to establish

the basis on which particularity is properly understood. This

leads to a basic argument of his concerning the proper application

of "difference". Particular natures that are different, he wants

to say, are different by nature and do not need an hypostasis to

distinguish them. Earlier, he asserted against his opponents, "If

we grant in him a union of things that are different according to

nature, and if they are unmingled, then there is no need for two

hypostases."

3col. 1540C 5 - 1 1 .

4Adv.Nest. 11.12: col. 1557C 13ff.

147

Obviously, he could not make this argument apart from the

conceptual distinction he makes between hypostasis and physis in

one and the same particular such that the hypostasis is the

underlying subject of the nature/s constituting it. On the basis

of this conceptual distinction, he argues:

"Now do you really understand...that because of the difference of its several [constitutive parts], this one particular individual is in need of several hypostases? Who can tolerate such nonsense?...

For example, must there be two hypostases in the garment made of linen and wool in order to compare the wool in the garment to other wool that is the same, and the linen in the garment to other linen? Well then, if we take another example, there must be two houses, in order to discern on the one hand the beams of wood and on the other the rocks that are consubstantial to others of their same species. In short, this account of yours must be applied to everything.

Now if it is unpardonable for even young boys to say these things, then you should listen to how one speaks in the proper manner. When there is discerned in one and the same hypostasis of our Lord Jesus Christ both that which is perfect God by nature, and that which is perfect man [consubstantial] to us by nature, this reveals two essences of which the one hypostasis is composed. In this way we can compare this hypostasis with the hypostasis of David; not according to hypostasis, but according to the different essences according to which this one hypostasis shows both diversity and sameness.

But now, according to the principle of hypostasis, it is clear that the comparison to both [the Father and to David] will always show, by common agreement, that this hypostasis is different to the Father and to David, just as every hypostasis in its singularity is always distinguished from all other hypostases. Therefore, the hypostasis of the natures of Christ shows in its parts that the same dissimilarity in essence also possesses consubstantiality according to these same parts."

So, the hypostasis is not only conceptually distinguished from

the nature/s constituting it, but it is also distinguished from

5cols. 1541C 1 - 1544A 14.

148

other hypostases. This means that the same hypostasis of Christ is

consubstantial to David and to the Father according to his natures.

In one and the same particular, there is the principle that

distinguishes him from all other particulars, the principle of

hypostasis, and the principle according to which he is of the same

essence as David and the Father, the principle of nature:

"For the hypostasis is of the same or different essence not in terms of the principle of hypostasis, but in terms of the principle of essence. And so, the fact that there are two natures does not hinder us from showing that the hypostasis of Christ is one. Nor is it difficult to establish that the natures are two, even though we say the hypostasis is one. Nor does what is consubstantial in the different parts of the one hypostasis possess anything that is without hypostasis [because all the natures possess the one hypostasis], and there are not necessarily two hypostases because there are two [essences] that are consubstantial for consubstantiality does not pertain to the principle of individuality [or singularity]. No more does the fact that there is more than one single nature, that is to say several natures in the prosopon that is of different essences, require that there be an equal number of hypostases."

The distinction between hypostasis and physis in one and the

same particular, such that particular natures are not themselves

hypostases, is directly connected to how difference is properly

applied to hypostasis and physis, a concept that Leontius develops

in Adv.Nest. II.7, a passage we cited earlier in Chapter 1. This

time, Leontius' opponents want to know what happens to the human

nature if it subsists in the Logos without its own

hypostasis :

col. 1544B 3 - 13.

cols. 1549D 1 - 1552B 7.

i

149

Objection: "If, since the manhood subsists in the Divine Logos, the manhood does not have its own hypostasis, how, if he comes to exist in him, does the manhood have his own nature? And yet, if the man has his own nature, surely he also has his own hypostasis!..."

Response: "Since natures, both like and unlike, are distinguished and united not by definition, but by the number of natures (that is to say, each nature is distinguished from other natures, whether like or unlike, by numbering them), we have made the term hypostasis indicate the union of those natures that are dissimilar, and the distinction of those [natures] that are the same, since the hypostasis is, properly speaking, a distinct particular (τις) and an individual that stands by itself (άπόστασίς) in relation to another individual.

Now if objects which are similar are so by nature, and if objects which are dissimilar are separated from one another by their natures, well this obviously does not pertain to definition, but to existence itself, for hypostases are maintained by that [principle] whereby they are distinct, and in that they are distinct, they cannot be united. So if the manhood [of Christ] has its own particular hypostasis, and if in fact the hypostasis is that which separates him from the [Divine Logos], then how can he be united to the Divine Logos?

So then, since the hypostasis [of Christ] is separated from all other men who exist outside of him, and natures can be united to one another without confusion in a hypostasis in which their proper definitions are not destroyed by the other; then to exist in distinction and separation from every nature does not belong to the principle of nature but to the principle of hypostases.

Surely the human nature is not prevented from being united to the nature of the Divine Logos since it remains nature as such and shows its natural definition even in the union! But it is impossible that a hypostasis should be united to another hypostasis, for then two hypostases, that is to say, [two] "standings away from another" (αποστάσεων ) would be maintained; but this being separate from others is the most intimate property of individuals (των καθ' έκαστα)."

Natures that are different, then, are already distinct by

their own natural definition and do not need an hypostasis to be

distinguished from each other. A particular nature, then, is

distinguished from the hypostasis in that it is the stuff that

150

(, makes the hypostasis what it is, while the hypostasis is the

particular subject in which the particular nature exists. And so,

difference, when applied to the hypostasis, indicates different

particular individuals who are distinguished from one another by

their hypostases. When applied to nature, however, difference does

not indicate different hypostases, but quite simply different

natures. Again we see that Leontius' conception is distinguished

from that of Leontius of Byzantium. In Leontius' thought, the

notion of hypostasis and physis is fixed, and always refers to the

same thing; it is not a notion referring to ontologlcal

relationships as in Leontius of Byzantium.

This has profound Implications which we haven't the time to

examine in this thesis. We take the time to mention briefly just

one. Whereas the body, when separated from the soul in death is

now an hypostasis since it exists by itself according to the

definition of Leontius of Byzantium, for Leontius the body even in

death is embraced together with the soul that is in heaven — or

hell — by the same hypostasis. Such a philosophy of hypostasis

illumines the mystical insight informing the Catholic Tradition's

veneration of relics, not to mention the mystery of Christ's body

g that did not see corruption even in death.

This argument concerning particularity and difference calls to

mind Leontius' application of the whole. When applied to the

There are texts to which one can refer where Leontius alludes to this conception. For example, Adv.Nest. 1.24: col. 1492BC; 1.33: col. 1497BC; II.1: col. 1536A 8 � Β 4; 11.15: col. 1569BC; 11.33: col. 1592AB.

151

(._ natures of Christ the human nature as a whole is maintained in

terms of its natural definition even when united directly to the

divine nature. Unprotected by its own hypostasis, the union of the

human nature with the divine is genuine, and yet the natural

definition of each nature remains. More than that, the argument

establishes that strictly in terms of definition, the complete

human nature is not thereby a second hypostasis in the Christ; it

is simply a natural part, in itself a whole because its natural

principles are complete, united with the divine part, itself also a

whole in terms of natural principles, in the hypostasis of the

Logos. Obviously, we have not yet explained, but only repeated, on

the basis of the distinction between hypostasis and physis, the

affirmation that the human nature remains intact in its union with

the divine even though it does not possess its own human

hypostasis. But on our way to the explanation, we are uncovering

the ontologlcal conception that serves as the foundation for

maintaining the real incarnation of the Logos. This ontologlcal

conception gives to Leontius' explanation of the dictum, there is

no nature without an hypostasis, a significantly different

understanding. If a particular nature is not itself an hypostasis,

then that means it must exist in an hypostasis. The hypostasis is

the foundation of existence, and, as we have already indicated, two

particular natures, specifically the divine and human, when they

come together in Christ, do not constitute a new, composite

hypostasis, or two hypostases, but they constitute a "natural

union", or "union of natures" In the hypostasis of the Logos. The

152

ontologlcal conception assumed here is revealed in Leontius'

account of the important term ένυπάστατος .

2. Ένυπόστατος . The one believed by some to have

contributed the term "enhypostasis" to christological terminology

9 is Leontius of Byzantium. The term was used in a christological

context as early as Apollinaris, though certainly in a different

sense than that intended by Leontius of Byzantium or Leontius of

Jerusalem.

Leontius of Byzantium explains his meaning of the term, along

with évouota, θυσία, and ϋπδστασίς , in Contra Nestorianos et

Eutychianos. It was Loofs who drew attention to this passage and

translated the "en�" prefix of "enhypostasis" in a locative sense,

meaning that the impersonal human nature is absorbed "in" the

hypostasis of Christ, receiving thereby and partaking of the one

12 hypostasis of the Logos.

9 See Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought, p. 67;

and David Evans, Leontius of Byzantium, pp. 133�139.

Cf. "Quod unus sit Christus," 10; Lietzmann, p. 301, line 4. "No one who thinks well, or who is absolutely sober and has the capacity to think would say that just as the Logos, who is perfect and hypostatic (ένυπάστατος ), did not assume flesh in order that he might become perfect God, so also the body was not in need of the Logos in order that he might become perfect and hypostatic man."

ncols. 1277C 14 � 1280B 10.

12

Friedrich Loofs, Leontius von Byzanz und die gleichnamigen Schriftsteller der griechischen Kirche, Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur, Band III, Heft 1�2 (Leipzig, 1887).

153

^ Maintaining the locative sense of the prefix "en", David Evans

went beyond the thesis of Loofs and proposed in his study on the

Origenism of Leontius of Byzantium that both the human nature and

the Divine Logos are united "in" the hypostasis of the νους Christ."

Given Leontius of Byzantium's notion of hypostasis which refers to

ontologlcal relationships, the human nature and the Divine Logos

constitute their own hypostases when by themselves, but in the

incarnation the two are united "in" a "tertium quid": the

13 hypostasis of the Christ which they both share.

In an unpublished paper delivered at the Patristic Conference

in 1979, the Rev. Brian Daley, S.J., challenged this understanding

of enhypostasis attributed to Leontius of Byzantium, maintaining

that, "...the theory that Christ's personal unity was achieved

through the 'enhypostatization' of a full, but impersonal human

nature into the person of the Divine Logos has nothing to do with

14 Leontius of Byzantium." He argues convincingly — and we will

see that the interpretation given to the term by Leontius of

Jerusalem supports Fr. Daley's contention — that in Leontius of

Byzantium enhypostasis must be understood as the opposite to

anhypostasis and is simply an example "of those Greek adjectival

formations in which the prefix "en�" is joined to a substantive to

signify the possession of some thing or quality, as opposed to an

Evans, pp. 136�138.

14 The title of the paper, which Fr. Daley intends to publish

sometime, is: "The Christology of Leontius of Byzantium: Personellem or Dialectics?" I am very much indebted to Fr. Daley for sending me a typescript of his essay.

154

V alpha�privative, which would signify its absence....Enhypostatos

would simply mean "hypostatic", having a concrete existence, as

opposed to "anhypostatic" or purely abstract." Fr. Daley's study

raises the question: if Leontius of Byzantium did not intend the

term enhypostasis in the sense understood by Loofs and Evans, with

whom did the "locative" sense in a specifically christological

context originate?

It may be true that Leontius of Byzantium was responsible for

introducing the term again into christological terminology, but the

christological sense it was to have in later Tradition (in

particular, John of Damascus ) is found not in Leontius of

Byzantium, but in Leontius of Jerusalem; specifically in a passage

where he attacks the meaning given to the term by Leontius of

Byzantium. The passage is Adv.Nest. 11.13. From Leontius' polemic

one can discern how he at least understood Leontius of Byzantium,

and how he believes the term enhypostasis should be properly taken.

Ridiculing the group to which Leontius of Byzantium supposedly

belongs, he says:

"When they are babbling and thinking what to say to those standing near, and they are asked to show a nature without hypostasis, they answer the one who is asking and say, 'There is no nature without hypostasis. For we, too,' they say, 'assert that essences are hypostatic (ένυπόστατους). However, if anything is hypostatic it is

See his Philosophical Chapters, chs. 29 and 44: and An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith 1.6: Engl, trans, by Frederic H. Chase, Jr. in Fathers of the Church, (Catholic University of America Press: Washington, D.C., 1958) vol. 37, Saint John of Damascus; Writings.

16PG col. 1560A 1 � C 1.

not necessarily also hypostasis, just as it is also true that if anything is essential (ένουσία ) it is not also essence (OUota). For consider, when we say that the hypostases of the Holy Trinity are three, we also say they are essential. And yet, we do not say that there are three essences in the three hypostases, even though we grant that each of the hypostases is essential. So then, if we may speak of three essential hypostases in one essence, it is clear that we may also speak of two hypostatic natures in one hypostasis. And so, we never speak of a nature without hypostasis, nor do we teach that two hypostases are two natures. In the same way, we never say that the hypostases of the Holy Trinity are non�essential (ανούσιους), nor do we divide the three hypostases into three essences.

'On the other hand,' they say, 'when we speak in a different manner and say that a body is colored, we do not understand that the body is the same as the color. For it is not true that if something is colored, it is therefore color. In the same way, then, if anything is hypostatic (ένυπάστατον), it is not true that it is therefore hypostasis. This goes without saying,' they say. 'And so, he who says two natures must not say they are without hypostasis, or that there must also be two hypostases since, as we have shown, a hypostasis is not the same as the hypostatic (ένυπάστατον ) . ' "

What Leontius of Byzantium really meant is not so important

for our purposes as what Leontius took him to mean. Leontius

believes he has uncovered the real intent of Leontius of

Byzantium's terminology; "enhypostatized nature" really means for

him a nature with its own hypostasis that has been united with

another hypostasis thereby becoming "enhypostaton". He

17 argues:

"They say these things, and so deceive their audience, and in their pride they number themselves among the Cherubim because of these insights of theirs. But see how they have destroyed their own house by what they have said. They are ignorant through their own ignorance, and they mock their hearers who are as ignorant as they when they are deceived by expressions so closely the same.

7col. 1560C 2 � D 13.

156

For if nature is analagous to the body, and hypostasis to color, and they speak of hypostatic (ένυπόστατους) natures just as they speak of colored bodies, then a hypostasis must be a hypostatic nature, just as color must be a colored body. For it is not possible to conceive a hypostatic nature apart from a hypostasis.

If then, anything must differ in nature and in hypostasis, then show me what is different in nature and not what is different in hypostasis. Nor should they beguile the more simple�minded, misleading them because of the similarity of their expressions, by saying, 'If a hypostasis is essential (ένούσιος) and is not different in essence (έτεροούσίος), the nature also is hypostatic (ένυπάστατον) and is not a different hypostasis (έτεροϋπδστατος).' The last part is not true because if anything is different in essence, then obviously it is also of a different hypostasis. If then the natures differ from one another, they differ according to nature, and it is clear that they also differ according to hypostasis. And if it is not possible to speak of a difference of natures in one nature, then it is no more possible to speak of a difference of hypostases in one and the same hypostasis."

In other words, Leontius understands that by "hypostatic

nature", Leontius of Byzantium means a nature that has its own

hypostasis. Even though the hypostatic nature may be "inserted" in

another hypostasis, since the nature itself is hypostatic, it

nonetheless maintains its own hypostasis. It is clear that the

sense given to enhypostasis in this context is that maintained by

Fr. Daley. Enhypostasis means that the nature possesses its own

hypostasis, that is, it is not an abstract, but a real, concrete,

particular nature.

This meaning, however, is unacceptable to Leontius for it

implies that in the one hypostasis of Christ there are two natures

which, since they are both hypostatic, possess their own

hypostases. The gist of Leontius' polemic at this point, then, is

that according to this sense there cannot be two hypostatic natures

157

^ in one hypostasis just as there cannot be two hypostases in one

18 hypostasis. Leontius continues:

"Our questions were put to you earlier, but since you addressed them unsuitably you have convinced only those who hold to your opinions. For If — since in this example a hypostasis is analogous to color, and nature to the body, and you say that the body and the color must therefore exist — you then draw the conclusion that there are two hypostases, since there are two natures, understand that we also say this; whenever a body is said to be colored, there must be color. In the same way, then, whenever a nature is said to be hypostatic (ένυπόστατος), there must be a hypostasis."

As this makes even more clear, a "hypostatic nature",

according to the sense Leontius believes Leontius of Byzantium

gives to it, is a nature that has its own hypostasis. The result

is that in the Christ there are two hypostases since there are two

natures which are both hypostatic, that is possessing their own

hypostasis. Now Leontius takes up the term enhypostasis and gives

19 to it his own meaning:

"Now we say that two natures exist in one and the same hypostasis. This does not mean that one of the natures can exist in the same hypostasis without an hypostasis (ούχ ώς δυναµένης θατέρας ανυπόστατου είναι έν αυτό),

b u t

rather that both are able to exist in one common hypostasis. And thus, each one is hypostatic (ένυπόστατος) In one and the same hypostasis."

Leontius gives to the "en�" prefix a locative sense meaning

that the divine and human natures share the one hypostasis of the

Logos. In this sense, the human nature is not "anhypostatos" for

its hypostasis is the Logos himself. One can clearly see how the

col. 1561A 1 � 12.

col. 1561B 8 � 13.

158

presentation in this passage reflects all the christological tenets

outlined in the preceding chapters of our thesis. The hypostasis

is the particular, underlying subject, but not a particular nature.

The hypostasis of the Logos is the subject of the incarnation, the

"who" who assumes to himself, in his own hypostasis, the human

nature making it his own. In this assumption the human nature is

genuinely united, directly and without mediator, to the Divine

20 Logos. Leontius makes his meaning clear with an example:

"For it is not necessary that if something must exist, it must also exist by itself. For example, none of the houses in a city are without a lord; and yet, though all have a lord, it is not necessarily so that there is therefore only one lord for there are many common lords in a city. In the same way, then, when there are a number of natures, they must both subsist and be hypostatic (ίιφεστηκέναι καΐ ένυποστάτους ). But if they are not separate from one another, and they enter into union, it is commonly agreed that it is not necessary that each one exists by itself."

As in the case of his other examples, this one requires some

close reflection to flush out its meaning. We get some help from

21 the context:

"Clearly, there is not a difference of hypostasis (ούχ έτεροϋπδστατον είναι)» but both natures — which are hypostatic — must be conceived in one and the same hypostasis (αλλ* έν µια καΐ τη αυτό ύποστάσει νοεισθαι άµφοίν αυτών τό ένυπδστατον δει ). Therefore, we fully agree with what you said, that it is not possible to speak in the case of one and the same hypostasis of a difference of hypostasis. Most certainly do we say that there is no difference of hypostases in the one hypostasis of the Lord, even though we grant the difference of the hypostatic (oneστατικών) properties that belong to the parts [of Christ: (parts • the

col. 1561B 13 � C 7.

col. 1561C 8 � D 8.

159

l natures)]. So we do not say in the case of the Lord that there is a union of different hypostases, for this was shown before to be impossible since there cannot be a union of different hypostases in the same [hypostasis] which Is most characterized by distinction. But we understand a union (σύνθεσιν) of different natures in the one [hypostasis] of the Logos which existed from the beginning; but there is not a second hypostasis, for then he would be from [two] hypostases. And this is how we understand these matters."

Leontius is simply illustrating the implications of taking

"hypostatic nature" in a substantive sense. Hypostatic nature

implies that each nature must exist somehow by itself, or in its

own hypostasis, even when in union with another "hypostatic

nature".� From Leontius' perspective, the example of the "lord of

the house" would, according to Leontius of Byzantium, go like this,

putting it in the terminology under study: one "lordly house" (=

hypostatic nature) united with another "lordly house" means that

two houses come together, each with their own lords (natures with

their hypostases). Leontius, however, wants to say that if two

houses (natures) were to come together they would have one common

lord (hypostasis), not two.

To say that each nature is "enhypostaton," then, means that

each nature is "in" one and the same hypostasis. There are not two

hypostatics, but two natures that are hypostatic, or better, that

are "en"�hypostaton; that is to say two "naked" natures that are in

the one hypostasis of the Logos. Leontius' account in Adv.Nest.

11.14 provides a larger context in which to understand his argument

22 concerning the proper application of the term enhypostasis:

22cols. 1565D 12 � 1568B 13.

"But even though we know one hypostasis in the case of each ordinary man, and in every hypostasis the natures are distinguished, nevertheless, in the case of the Lord's human nature (Κυρίακδν άνθρωπον ), it did not exist by itself, and was never distinguished from the hypostasis of the Logos. And so we know that in its [antecedent ™ the Lord's human nature] case alone there was no particular hypostasis. For we say that the humanity of the Savior did not exist in its own particularity, but from the beginning it existed in the hypostasis of the Logos. And now, to be sure, we do not know the hypostasis of the Logos by itself as though the hypostasis of the Logos were by itself since the Logos, after his ineffable union, co�exists (συνυφέστηκεν) with the humanity in his hypostasis that is now composed of [two] consubstantial [natures].

So then, we confess that there is one common hypostasis of both natures, and this hypostasis existed before the human essence and formerly belonged to the Logos in the common essence of the Godhead. And the hypostasis, after having created in itself the nature of the Lord's human nature (Κυριακού άνθρωπου), and after having embraced it and joined it to its very own nature, entered into a more diversified composition due to the fact that it was also [the hypostasis] of the corporeal nature and began to share its own particularity with it. So now, the hypostasis of the Logos is distinguished from the Father and the Spirit not only by the property of being begotten, as he was before, but clearly also because of the acquisition of a greater number of [distinctively human] natural, physical, and personal (προσωπικών) properties.

So how will it be numbered as a hypostasis alongside the hypostasis of the Divine Logos when it never exists outside of the Logos' hypostasis? And if there ever was a hypostasis that belonged to the flesh before it was assumed, which no one who is pious would ever say, then how, when it was assumed — that is to say when that which assumed and that which was assumed remained together — would they be able to remain in themselves [i.e., in their own definitions?], and how could their distinction from one another be preserved, which very distinction constitutes the hypostasis? [In other words, if they were united, the distinctiveness of the two hypostases would have been destroyed]."

One can compare Leontius' account with John of Damascus'

161

23 explanation of the term enhypostasis:

"Again, that nature is called enhypostaton which has been assumed by another hypostasis and in this has its existence. Thus, the body of the Lord, since it never subsisted of itself, not even for an instant, is not a hypostasis, but an enhypostaton. And this is because it was assumed by the hypostasis of God the Word and this subsisted, and did and does have this for a hypostasis."

One can see how Leontius' notion of enhypostasis is rooted in

the conceptual distinction he establishes between hypostasis and

physis. The particular natures that exist in the hypostasis are

not themselves hypostases. If they are "hypostatic" that means

they are "in" the one hypostasis of the Logos, directly united to

one another without mediator, "unprotected" from one another by

their own hypostases.

We still have not come to the heart of the question concerning

the preservation of the full integrity of the human nature in

Christ, but we have indicated the metaphysical definition of

hypostasis and physis on which we might understand Leontius'

explanation. At the same time, we have sharpened the intensity of

the question. A human nature coming without its own hypostasis

into "natural" or "composite" union with the divine nature, yet

maintaining its own natural principles, obviously assumes a certain

ontologlcal relationship between man and God. How the human nature

maintains its integrity in union with the divine can be seen most

clearly when we consider its relationship to the Logos with respect

to the incarnate Logos' mode of existence. With this, the final

Philosophical Chapters, ch. 44 (trans, by Chase, op. cit. pp. 68f.).

162

tumbler will be in place for us to move to Leontius' doctrine of

deification.

Before we turn to this "second front", however, we must

complete what we have sought to establish so far and present a

passage for study in which Leontius himself reveals in rather

straightforward language the philosophy of hypostasis and physis

governing his christological thought. A study of Leontius'

argument in this respect will offer confirmation of our

interpretation thus far and enable us to pick up some threads left

untied up to now.

3. Hypostasis as the Foundation of Existence. Leontius

repeatedly indicates the trinitarian implications derived from the

christological application of hypostasis. The identification of

hypostasis and physis in one and the same particular such that a

particular nature must have its own hypostasis is shown to be false

precisely because of the impact such an identification has on the

24 doctrine of the Trinity. Leontius argues:

"Is it not so that while the one nature of the Holy Trinity is the same, we nevertheless believe that the hypostases are different? But, as you would have it, it will follow that if the natures are different from the fact that the hypostases are said to be different, so also, if the natures are the same, then the hypostases, too, will be said to be the same. In fact, you are saying that the natures must be equal in number with the hypostases. So then, since the nature of the Holy Trinity is not only the same, but also one, the hypostasis, too, will be one and the same."

col. 1564A 7 � Β 2.

163

(, As we indicated before, Leontius' opponents seem to view the

hypostasis as the final level of being, and essence as the

foundation of being. The hypostasis is governed by essence and is

the final step in the particularization of the essence. Leontius'

ontology, however, is the opposite. Hypostasis is the foundation

of being, not the final level of particularization. As has been

described by another: "The hypostasis is not the product of nature:

it is that in which nature exists, the very principle of its

25 existence." However, we cannot go from here and simply say that

hypostasis governs essence or physis for as we will see, though

hypostasis is the foundation of being, the interplay between

hypostasis and physis Is a mystery that finds expression in

paradox: the hypostasis is the principle of existence and physis

determines the mode of the hypostasis' existence. In a true sense,

both transcend and determine the other.

In Adv.Nest. 11.13, Leontius challenges the ontologlcal

relationship between hypostasis and physis assumed by his

.. 26 opponents:

"Now if you were to say that a difference of nature

25 J. Meyendorff, op. cit., p. 76.

26

Adv.Nest. 11.13: col. 1564B 2 � 9; a difficult passage, the Greek of which is: "Et δέ εΕποιτε, δτι είτις µέν φύσεως διαφορά, πάντως καΐ υποστάσεως έστιν εΐτις δέ υποστάσεως διαφορά, où πάντως καΐ φύσεως, διά τό έπ* έλαττον οδσαν της ουσίας τήν Οπδστασιν µή άντιστρέφειν προς αυτήν τοις λδγοις· πρώτον µέν al ΙδικαΙ φύσεις δηλαδή ουκ επί πλείστον των υποστάσεων, άλλα καΐ έπ' έλαττον τι νοοΐντο δν· µόναι δέ επί πλεΐδν είσιν at KOtvat."

164

means a difference of hypo^::asis, but a difference of hypostasis need not mean a difference of nature because the hypostasis, since it is inferior to the essence, cannot be altered in the definitions relative to [the essence], well, the first result of this [principle you have laid down] is obviously this: the particular natures are not understood to be more than, but less than the number of hypostases, and universale are superior to particulars."

Leontius is making both a christological and trinitarian

application of his opponents principles: "If you were to say that a

difference of nature means a difference of hypostasis..." In other

words, if there are two different natures in Christ, there must be

two different hypostases. "But a difference of hypostasis does not

mean a difference of nature..." That is, there is one divine

essence, but three divine hypostases. The three hypostases do not

mean there are three essences. "Because the hypostasis, since it

is inferior to the essence, cannot be altered in the definitions

relative to [the essence], etc." The implication is that the

essence is the foundation of the hypostasis so that if the essence

is different, the hypostasis must also be different; and if the

essence is the same, the hypostasis must also indicate sameness of

27 essence. Leontius continues:

"Well, all right; we will grant this to you. Now, of course, if the nature is one, the hypostases must be several since the number of those things that are less universal must be more than those things that are more universal, which means that the hypostases which are in one nature, in relation to the universal [translating the word έπιµορίω which literally means "supraparticular"] will then be either two, or several, or one. Now, if this is the case, then, if there are two natures of the Lord [which, if they are universal and therefore less in

Λ� '•Ibid., Β 9 � C 9,

number than the hypostases], they must possess either four, or three, or two hypostases, or something like this, in accordance with your fundamental principle (αύθεντικήν υµών τήνδε νοµοθεσίαν).

And so, not only will you want to wickedly divide the composite prosopon [of the Lord] into several hypostases, but you will want to divide the simple and particular nature, both the nature of the Lord and of everyone else, into a greater number of hypostases. The particular nature of Paul alone, for example, may manifest two [hypostases] from the nature of the soul, and maybe three from the nature of the body."

Exactly what Leontius is referring to in the last sentence is

unclear, but the metaphysic to which he refers is quite clear.

Essence is the foundation of hypostasis, and "governs" the

hypostasis. In this conception, while the mind may be able to go

from one nature to several hypostases, it cannot move from one

hypostasis to several natures. As one can see, according to

Leontius' account of his opponents' principle, if essence is the

principle of existence, one can indeed maintain three hypostases

and one essence in the Trinity, since the Trinity is the same in

essence. But if essence is the foundation of being and the

principle of existence, then we cannot account for the hypostatic

union in Christ. If there are two natures, there must be at least

two hypostases.

But now Leontius turns to show that, in fact, on the basis of

the fundamental principle that hypostasis and physis are the same

thing, or at least are related to one another on a one to one

basis, the unity of the Trinity is not maintained after all. He

refers to individuals in the created world to illustrate his

contention that essence cannot be conceived as the foundation and

166

principle of existence:

"The whole world, and everything in it, condemns by its reality how confused your opinion is. For unless there is one hypostasis of a plant that is composed of the four natural elements, or one hypostasis of the red-hot iron composed of [two] different natures, or one hypostasis of man who is composed of different natures, or one hypostasis of the temple, or one hypostasis of some drug, or one hypostasis of anything else in the world that is composed of different natures, then we are incorrect when we say that a man, or a plant, or anything in the world we have mentioned, is one.

Now, we do not believe that the number of hypostases increases in proportion to the number of natures. For then, whatever is united by nature cannot be called one in any way whatsoever. At the same time, since you have said many times that nature and hypostasis are the same, even though you may grant that the hypostases of the Holy Trinity are different, in fact, the natures also are different, and if there are several hypostases, there must be as many essences [or, more loosely translated: Tour principles show that even though you admit the distinction of hypostases in the Trinity, you cannot admit that their essence is one]."

One can get dizzy trying to keep up with Leontius in his rapid

ascent to the pinnacle of his argument. Having granted that his

opponents' principles can allow for three hypostases in one

essence, he concludes by claiming the reverse, that in fact his

opponents cannot claim one essence of the three divine hypostases.

We must replay the argument in slow motion and trace its main path.

"For unless there is one hypostasis...of anything in the world

that is composed of different natures, then we are incorrect when

we say that a man, or a plant, or anything in the world we have

mentioned, is one." The examples taken from particular subjects

known to exist in the world demonstrate that there are not as many

cols. 1564C 12 - 1565A 8.

167

hypostases as there are natures. This is equivalent to saying that

the hypostasis is not subject to the essence; the essence, or

physis, is in the hypostasis, the hypostasis is not in the essence

or physis for the hypostasis, not the essence, is the ύποκείµενον

πράγµα, the underlying subject. "Now we do not believe that the

number of hypostases increases in proportion to the number of

natures: for then, whatever is united by nature cannot be called

one in any way whatsoever." Applied christologically, if essence

is the principle and foundation of existence, Christ cannot be one

for he is composed of two natures.

Leontius now moves rapidly to his climax by recalling the

basic principle of his opponents: "Whereas, since you have said

many times that nature and hypostasis are the same, etc." The

thrust of his argument seems to be this: if every particular nature

(soul, body, earth, airi fire, water) carries its own hypostasis,

then everything composed of particular natures is not one

hypostasis but many. Conversely, each hypostasis will possess one

nature. Now if we apply this principle again to the Trinity, we

see that each hypostasis possesses its own nature since hypostasis

and nature are the same thing. So if there are three hypostases,

there are three natures.

We can try to understand Leontius' argument from another

angle. When this principle — that the hypostasis and nature are

the same thing — is applied to particulars (individual subjects or

hypostases in the language of Leontius) in the world, we see that

each particular, which is a hypostasis, is composed of several

168

(̂ particular natures. Now, if what is universal is fewer in number

than what is particular, it is clear that the particular

hypostasis, since it is fewer in number than the particular natures

of which it is composed, is the more universal and therefore must

be subjected to the same type of ontologlcal analysis as the

universal, that is to say a nature or essence. Hypostasis and

nature are the same thing in that they are both subjected to the

same analysis of being. Now, moving back to the Trinity, if

hypostasis and nature are the same because they are subjected to

the same ontologlcal analysis, then we have three universale in the

Trinity and not three particulars of one universal.

Leontius, however, maintains the distinction between

hypostasis and physis in one and the same particular. By

definition, the hypostasis is the distinctive, particular subject

underlying the nature/s constituting it, and it is distinguished

from all other hypostases, the most intimate characteristic of

which is being distinguished, or "standing away from" (άπδστασίς).

The nature, then, exists in the hypostasis and is made particular

in the hypostasis. And so, the hypostasis is the foundation of

being and principle of existence.

Gregory of Nazianzus presented the same ontologlcal model when

seeking to express the mystery of the Trinity: the Divine Persons

are not contained by the Divine essence, but the essence is

� 09

possessed by the Persons: "...τά έν otç ή θεότης." Leontius says

Oration 31.14, Sources Chrétiennes 250 (Paris: Cerf, 1978), p. 304.

169

/ 30 ^ something similar:

"Anyone who gives thoughtful attention to the matter will perceive that the [incarnation] was not an insult to the one nature [of the Trinity], or the hypostasis [of the Logos], but on the contrary exceedingly glorious. For just as [the divine nature] shows through its being unbegotten, begotten, and proceeding, that it is capable of existing in its simple hypostases, so also it shows itself capable of existing in hypostatic composition."

In the context of the whole of Leontius' thought this is

consistent with his notion of hypostasis as the simple, underlying

foundation of the "naked" natures that are directly and genuinely

united "in" the one hypostasis of the Logos. The ontology implied

here profoundly affects the dictum, "there is no nature without

hypostasis." Particular natures do not exist except in hypostases;

the hypostasis is the foundation and principle of existence. This

means that being — not only the divine being, but also human being

created in the image of God — is primarily hypostatic, personal.

Leontius says: "In all other mere men, there is no nature of man

that can be observed by itself, but each nature belongs to a

particular someone (τουδέ τίνος), and is seen as an enhypostatized

„31 nature.

Now, here we come to a most important, profound tenet. It is

only implicit in Leontius, but even so it is quite clear, and will

become explicit in Maximus the Confessor. We said earlier that if

we were dealing with a strictly philosophical system we might

expand this princple of hypostasis to a universal law of being and

30Adv.Nest. 11.30: col. 1589B 1 � 8.

31Adv.Nest. V.28: col. 1748D 3ff.

170

say that persons are the foundation of being. We went on to say

that Leontius is a theologian and not a philosopher and though we

may say that hypostasis is the foundation of being and the

principle of existence, we cannot say that persons are the

foundation of being. What we mean by this is quite simple: the

hypostasis of the Logos alone is the foundation of being, and in

that man is created in the image of God (or, to put it more

explicitly, in the hypostasis of the Logos), man is personal as is

the Divine Trinity, but the foundation of his being, and

consequently the fulfillment of his destiny, is not himself, but

God, the realization of which is made possible by the Logos'

assumption of human nature.

This notion is nowhere systematically developed, but it is the

inevitable, natural consequence of the whole of Leontius'

christological thought, especially if we reflect on it in the

32 context of the whole of Eastern Tradition. It is clearly Implied

in his doctrine of the incarnation, and in his understanding of

salvation as deification, both of which can be understood only in

relation to the doctrine of creation. The Logos brought directly

into existence everything that exists without any mediating nature;

his creative act is the ground of being, and so it is only

"natural" that his own hypostasis should serve as the underlying

foundation of the human nature in the Economy in order that man's

destiny might be realized in God.

See especially, J. Meyendorff, op. cit., ch. 6.

171

Though undeveloped, the notion is explicitly referred to in

several passages. In Adv.Nest. 1.52 Leontius concludes with this

33 statement:

"If we say that...everything [brought into being] is in this part [of the Christ], that is in the Divine Logos, then how will Christ's composite [i.e., his union] be something other than in [the Divine Logos]; how will some particular whole be more universal than he is so that the Logos who comprehends all things might be comprehended by it? For the Logos himself is the fullness which fills all in all."

In seeking to emphasize that Christ's human nature is neither

outside nor other than the Logos, Leontius indicates a doctrine of

34 the Logos that anticipates the synthesis of Maximus the Confessor.

The Logos is the origin and destiny of all creation and Is himself

the foundation and principle of all existence.

Another text that is even more clear is found in Adv.Nest.

35 11.30:

"So then, we confess the Trinity correctly when we confess that it is composed of one, simple nature; but of these three hypostases, which are simple and unmixed, possessing in themselves the same simple nature, in one of them, the natural simplicity peculiar to divinity is seen to exist in a composition which is with our nature. For the Godhead, who created us through the Word of Truth, that is the Son, in order that he might recall his creatures who had for so long wandered away from him, assumed them again into himself in the same hypostasis

33Adv.Nest. 1.52: col. 1525B Iff.

34 On Maximus' thought, one may confer the introduction of

Polycarp Sherwood to his translation of Maximus' "The Ascetic Life," and "The Four Centuries on Charity," in Ancient Christian Writers, vol. 21 (Newman Press: New York, NY/Ramsey, NJ) 28�98. See also Lars Thunberg, op. cit., and J. Meyendorff, op.cit., chapter 7.

35Col. 1589A 3 � Β 1.

172

through whom it brought those things that exist into being, which is one of the three hypostases, so that those who had come forth into being might not fall away into eternal death."

This passage takes us back to a question we posed earlier: if

the hypostasis is the foundation of being, and the principle of

existence, has not Leontius simply changed the character of

tritheism? Are there not then three foundations in the Trinity?

There are not. The hypostasis of the Logos is the foundation

of all created being since through him all things came into

existence, but his hypostasis is not the source of the uncreated

Trinity. The divine essence "exists" in the Three Persons, but its

source is not the hypostases, but the hypostasis of the Father; the

Trinity, in other words, is a monarchy. This is made clear in

several texts. For example:

"If someone says that the name Theotokos is a common name since it is ascribed to the Father and the Mother of the Lord from the nature of the child, and his generation ought either to be seen as similar to both, or the name ought to be assigned to the [generation] which is more proper; well, if indeed the Father eternally brings forth the Son into existence as God alone, even though he is without beginning, surely the term Theotokos would apply more particularly and properly to him alone, and no one else would share it with him.

But it is clear that the Father cannot be called a parent in terms of his essence, for he does not produce another God who is numerically distinct in essence. Otherwise there would be three Gods. But of those who are of the same one essence and who are of different properties, the one [hypostasis of the Father] is the cause of the other in the same essence."

Elsewhere, Leontius says: "The Father is the one who begets

the Logos and he himself is unbegotten, and he is the one from whom

Adv.Nest. IV.37: col. 1709BC

173

the Holy Spirit proceeds, and the Logos is the Son who is begotten,

37 and the one through whom the Holy Spirit proceeds." This has

profound implications. Reflection guided by this conception comes

to the understanding that the source of the Trinity's unity is not

the essence, but the hypostasis of the Father. This in turn

reveals that, in a manner of speaking, God's nature is not

"essential", but "personal".

In Adv.Nest. VII Leontius defends the theopaschite formula and

in the process, he reveals again the ontologlcal conception

38 governing his theology. He says:

"If the Logos is one of the Holy Trinity in terms of hypostasis, he is not one of three in terms of essence, but the Logos is glorified together with the other two. And strictly in terms of his own hypostasis, he is not common to the Father or to the Spirit, neither before nor after the flesh, for they are not the Logos. Strictly as hypostasis, he will never be common to any other hypostasis. So how do you maintain, with reference to the phrase, "One of the Holy Trinity," that the Logos, whether by himself, or as incarnate is common to the other two prosopa in the same respect in which any one of the three differ? For they are not one in terms of definition, or in the number of the hypostases. Their oneness is to be sure in terms of essence and by virtue of the number of their essence, in terms of which they are never three, so that we might say the Christ is One of Three. And in this way we explain his sameness to the other two [persons]. For it is clear that the hypostases possess one identical nature, not in terms of hypostasis but in terms of the essence that is in them (άλλα κατά τήν έν αύταΐς oùotav). On this basis we say that they enjoy absolutely one existence (υπάρξει) and identity. And we say that the Son's similarity is in relation to the Father, and that he is the image of the Father when his property [as begotten] is conceived in reference to his nature."

Ibid., 1.20: col. 1485B 9ff.

Adv.Nest. VII.4: col. 1768B 3 � C 15.

174

^ The hypostasis is the foundation of the nature's existence.

But more than that, as suggested by this passage, we cannot define

the hypostasis as "existence by itself" since, as Leontius says, in

the Trinity there is but one existence shared by all three, the

source of which is the Father. Particularity, or being

distinguished absolutely from every other individual, is the most

intimate characteristic of the hypostasis, but this does not mean

the hypostasis is absolutely separate. Leontius does not conceive

of the hypostasis in isolation; it is united to other hypostases by

nature, yet distinguished from them according to hypostasis. The

hypostases of the Trinity, then, though certainly distinct from one

another, are one in essence and existence, and the source of their

oneness is the Father, to whom the Logos and the Holy Spirit are

consubstantial.

The impact of this ontologlcal conception has been described

again by another: "This conception assumes that God, as personal

being, is not totally bound to his own nature; the hypostatic

existence is flexible, "open"; it admits the possibility of divine

acts outside of the nature (energies) and Implies that God can

personally and freely assume a fully human existence while

39 remaining God, whose nature remains completely transcendent."

Having established the ontologlcal conception which serves as

the foundation of Leontius' philosophical definition of hypostasis

J. Meyendorff, op. cit., p. 77.

175

^ and physis, we may now turn to the second front where the real

burden of the question concerning the preservation of the human

nature's integrity in the hypostasis of Christ is not only affirmed

but finally explained. All the aspects on this front can be most

comprehensively embraced by the description, "mode of existence."

It includes the question of the human nature's particularity, the

co-existence of contrary natural properties in one and the same

hypostasis, and the relationship and impact of the natural

properties on the hypostasis of the Logos.

B. The Human Nature and the Christ's Mode of Existence.

As already indicated, what we have called the "second front"

in Leontius' christology is not really a systematized effort, as is

the "first front", to directly meet the question of the human

nature's integrity in Christ. However, behind the assertions made

by Leontius that the hypostasis of the Logos remains the same even

after the acquisition of the human nature we can discern a

coherently developed understanding that touches on the role of the

human nature in the incarnation and its relationship to the

hypostasis of the Logos.

In what follows, we set forth what appears to be the

progression of Leontius' thought in this regard by turning to

various texts where the basic principles assumed by Leontius seem

most apparent. We have already established the hypostasis as the

foundation of existence, conceptually distinguished from the

nature/s constituting it. These natures constituting the

176

hypostasis are particular natures, but on the basis of the

conceptual distinction between hypostasis and physis, Leontius

maintains that a particular nature is not an hypostasis. Even

though the human nature does not have its own hypostasis,

therefore, it may still be complete. The next step is to consider

more directly what Leontius means when he says that the Logos

assumes a particular human nature.

1. The Logos Assumes a Particular Human Nature. We refer to

a passage cited earlier where Leontius describes the human nature

as somewhat (τίνα) particular. In determining the meaning of this

passage, scholars have consistently failed to see the significance

^ ^ 40 of the context:

"You, not we, say that a hypostasis has been united to a hypostasis so that you also say there is a union of hypostases. But we say that just as the iron which is made red�hot in the furnace does not lose any part of its hypostasis from the species of the fire, but admits only the nature into its own hypostasis — for likewise the hypostasis of the fire in the furnace remains, lacking nothing, even after the iron becomes red�hot — so also we say that the Logos assumed from our nature a somewhat particular nature (φΰσιν ίδικήν τίνα) into his own hypostasis."

The phrase, "a somewhat particular nature", is explained by

the analogy of the iron and fire. As the iron takes from the fire,

so also the Logos takes from human nature and makes what he took

his own. To put it more graphically, he takes out of the common

lump of human nature a portion — which is identical to the whole

40 H Adv.Nest. 1.20: col. 1485C 7 � D 2.

177

l, according to all its natural properties and definitions — and

assumes it into his hypostasis making it his own. The Logos' human

nature is "somewhat" particular, or to put it another way, it is

particular in a certain sense. From the whole of Leontius' thought

it is clear that he means it is particular, not because it is a

separate hypostasis, and not because it is isolated, or cut off,

from the rest of human nature, but because it belongs particularly

to the Logos. At the same time, insofar as it is taken from us, it

is like us in every respect and in his own human nature, the Logos

is consubstantial to all mankind.

This positive description of the term "particular" ^δΐκή) is

balanced in another passage by a negative description. In

41 Adv.Nest. V.30 Leontius says:

"To say that the deity in Christ subsists (συνενυπδστατος) with the flesh is the same as to say that the deity subsists with the man ( άνθρωπον ). But, as we said, while to say that the deity subsists with the flesh is not a new concept, whether in terms of nature or hypostasis — since in Christ, as in others, it is seen as a distinct part of the whole — nevertheless, to say the deity subsists with the man does lead to a new concept different than all others in terms of hypostasis. For the man in Christ is not particular, but it shares [with the divine nature the one hypostasis of the Logos = αντί γάρ ίδικής, κοινήν); and instead of a human hypostasis it has acquired a divine hypostasis; instead of being a term that refers to a whole hypostasis, in the hypostasis of the Logos the man is seen as a part, for this is to be sure the ultimate blessedness for the man [in Christ]."

The passage from Adv.Nest. 1.20 affirms the human nature is

particular (τίνα ίδικήν) In order to assert that it belongs

cols. 1749D 1 � 1752A 4.

178

particularly to the Logos. The passage just cited, V.30, denies

the human nature is particular in order to assert the same thing;

the human nature does not possess its own hypostasis. It is not

separated from the Logos but shares the same hypostasis with the

divine nature (αντί γάρ Ιδικής, κοινήν).

The full meaning of Leontius' argument is caught more easily

when one turns again to his account of the notion of the whole when

applied to the union. Using the analogy of the whole Leontius

asserts that the human nature assumed by the Logos retains its full

definition, as does the divine nature. In this context, one begins

to see that precisely because the natures are made particular in

the hypostasis of the Logos, and are not some vague, common mass

that are mingled and confused in their coming together, their union

does not constitute a new nature or hypostasis, but each nature

remains what it is in the hypostasis that serves as the foundation

of the union. Leontius makes this quite clear as he continues in

42 the passage from Adv.Nest. 1.20:

"We say the Logos assumed a certain particular nature from our nature into his own hypostasis. So then, the union is of natures in the hypostasis, that is to say, the union is of one [nature] with the other. But from these natures there has not been produced a composite nature, since they are not united by confusion, nor is there a union of hypostases, since the union is not from hypostases. But the properties of the hypostasis of the Logos have become more composite since it accumulates more properties in itself along with its own simple properties after the incarnation, which proves that neither his nature nor his hypostasis is composite or mutable."

col. 1485D lOff.

179

The last sentence is particularly interesting in what it says

concerning the properties, but we hold this for later. For the

moment, one notes that the hypostasis itself is simple and does not

change in the union, because, as we have said before, it is the

foundation of the union. But it is interesting that even the

natures are described as non�composite and immutable. The context

makes clear that Leontius is simply affirming that the divine and

human natures do not constitute a composite nature, but in their

own natural definitions they remain what they are. We recall

Leontius' application of the phrase "natural union"; the union is

of natures, it is direct and Immediate, and yet even though the

natures "touch", their definitions remain unaltered. In another

passage Leontius again refers to the analogy of the iron and fire

to assert the same thing: the human nature is directly united with

the divine in the hypostasis of the Logos, not resulting in a new

composite nature or hypostasis, but each nature remaining what it

43 was:

"But gentlemen, it is not necessary that every union produces either a new nature or a new hypostasis. For iron burned in the embers does not display a new nature, or a new hypostasis. For both the hypostasis of the iron and the [hypostasis] of the hot charcoals remain the same; but In the hypostasis of the iron, the nature of the fire, which in lself is without hypostasis, is united to the nature of the iron, thereby becoming with it one hypostasis. What then constitutes the union in Christ? Nothing other than the things which before were not united with one another, and which are now united in the one hypostasis of one of the [natures] that has been united. This is enough to enrich our nature with all of the divine nature."

Adv.Nest. 1.49: col. 1512A 11 � Β 9.

180

(, Leontius' notion of the particular nature follows from his

ontologlcal conception of the hypostasis as the foundation of

being. Nature does not exist except in an hypostasis. As he says,

44 there is no such thing as a nature by itself:

"In all men, there is no nature of man that can be observed by itself, but each nature belongs to a particular someone, and is seen as an enhypostasized nature. At the same time, the flesh, simply because it is of flesh, is not said to be distinguished from the soul in its own hypostasis, neither is the soul distinguished from the flesh in its own hypostasis."

If there is no nature by itself, there is no particular nature

by itself either. To put it crudely, there is no particular nature

that can be extracted from the hypostasis and made to survive on

its own. The particularity of nature is understood in terms of the

particularity of the hypostasis. The term "particular nature" does

not refer to a nature by itself, whether inside or outside the

hypostasis, but it refers to the personalization of the common

nature in a particular hypostasis. In the particular hypostasis,

the common nature exists and becomes particular, that is to say it

becomes the intimate possession of the particular hypostasis.

We can return to the analogy of the iron in the fire; the

common human nature is made particular in the Logos, becoming his

very own. This does not mean that the particular nature is

isolated from the rest of human nature, existing as an entity unto

itself. Following our model, it is taken from the common "lump".

Consubstantial to the whole "lump" of human nature, it is

Ibid., V.28: col. 1748D 3ff.

181

^ distinguished not in its natural particularity, but in its

hypostasis.

The meaning becomes more clear, perhaps, if we explain the

particular nature in the terms of the iron�fire analogy. The bar

of iron is dipped into the midst of the fire and assumes the fire

into itself. In the analogy, the bar of iron remains in the fire;

in the fire it becomes red�hot and is filled with the common

substance of the fire. And yet the common substance that is

particularly in the bar of iron is the iron's own; yet again,

though the common substance of fire that is in the iron is the

iron's own, it is still common to the rest of the fire.

In this sense the Logos' human nature is his own and no one

else's. In this sense it is "particular" (τίνα ίδικήν). Of

course, "The flesh was not formed before it was assumed by the

Logos, as you think," says Leontius, "but from the beginning of its

existence it was personalized (προσωποποιηθήναί) in the hypostasis

of the Logos, in Christ." This does not mean, obviously, that

the human nature did not exist before Christ, for the "common lump"

of human nature existed from the beginning in particular human

hypostases. But from this common lump, the Logos took a "portion"

as it were and made it his own. As we will see shortly, this

carries profound theological consequences, and confirms the

suggestion that for Leontius the foundation of all created being is

not hypostases, but the hypostasis of the Logos.

Ibid., 1.29: col. 1496A 9ff.

182

Explained in this way, Leontius' account of the particular

nature reveals that he is not a rigid indivualist. Though

distinguished according to the principle of hypostasis, man does

not exist in isolation from other persons, but he is united

according to the principle of essence, and in that the Logos made

our human nature his own, man has become one with him according to

nature. As Leontius says: "The Logos clothed himself with our

nature, and having clothed himself with all of us when he took the

flesh, he gave [to his flesh] the Spirit of his own nature." And

again: "It is right that the saving and all-powerful nature be

united with our nature to bring it to righteousness, assuming us

into the one hypostasis as a primal offering so that the enemy

might be able to invade our nature, since he was checked by the

hypostasis of the [Logos] in which our nature existed."

In assuming human nature, the Logos assumed us. That is to

say, he did not assume human hypostases, for then there would

either be no genuine union or a destruction of our identities as

particular "who's", but he assumed the same nature which we all

possess, and in our nature he assumed us for we are human by

nature. We are united with the Logos by virtue of our common human

nature, and yet we remain who we are, we remain free, according to

the principle of hypostasis.

Again, the notion of the whole, when applied to the natures

46Ibid., VI.1: col. 1753Clff.

47Ibid., 1.47: col. 1505C 11 - D 2.

183

themselves, illumines the real heart of Leontius' thought. In the

analogy of the iron and fire, the one bar of iron is immersed into

the roaring furnace and after a while begins to glow with the fire

it has assumed into itself. Now, the fire in the iron is only a

"portion" of the whole fire, and yet it is fire in terms of natural

definition. And so, in terms of natural definition, the fire in

the iron is "whole" and complete. For, as Leontius explains, the

union of whole natures is not conceived in terms of space or

quantity, but in terms of definition. The natures united are whole

because they possesses completely the principles of their natural

definition. So, though the analogy of iron and fire leads us to

describe the particular nature as a "portion" of the common lump of

human nature, we understand that the "portion" is whole and

complete because we conceive its wholeness not in terms of space or

quantity, but in terms of definition.

The notion of the particular nature is explained further in

Leontius' polemic against the monophysites where he takes the

christological formulae "of two natures" and "in two natures" and

explains them in terms similar to the analogy of the iron and fire.

Just as the iron, when dipped into the fiery charcoals, takes fire

into itself from the common fire, so also the Logos takes "from"

the common lump of human nature a "portion" and makes it his own,

making it particular "in" his own hypostasis. The peculiar way in

which he applies the formulae, however, reveals another important

aspect in the notion of a particular human nature. In CMon. 58,

he writes:

"If they [the monophysites] say that one nature is from two natures, but that there are not two natures of our Lord Jesus Christ, let them explain, since the nature of the Godhead is without doubt beyond the principle of the universal and particular, how they understand the other of the two natures of which the Savior is constituted, that is the humanity; is it common or particular?

If they ever consider it apart from the Logos, by itself constituting a certain particular, then they have clearly fallen into the impiety of Nestorius. But if they say it is common, whether in thought or in reality, then they must speak with respect to the essence of the entire species. So then, if they say that one of the natures from which the Savior is constituted, which subsists in terms of one nature, is conceived in thought, then it is clear that half of the definition that pertains to him by nature is in thought and not in reality, viz., the human part of his composition. But if he was incarnate of the Virgin in this human part, and was seen among men, and was crucified, etc., then these, too, will have happened in thought, and not in reality.

But if these things happened in reality, and they say that the nature of the humanity in itself is common, well, since Judas and Pilate belong to this common nature that is said to exist in reality, then they, too, no less than the Lord, were crucified and raised from the dead. And the Lord, no less than they, betrayed and crucified both them and himself. And in this manner of thinking, Annas and Caiaphas would be conceived as having been begotten with him from the Holy Virgin. Indeed, David, his forefather, and the immaculate one herself, since they belong to the common nature, will have given birth to the common nature of humanity and the [Blessed Virgin] will be conceived as having given birth to herself together with the Divine Logos. But who would invent anything more ridiculous, or more Impious?

But if it is said, 'You who therefore glorify the Lord in two natures, of what sort do you say these are?' we will respond without envy that we say "from two" with respect to both the divinity and the common humanity which exist before the union of Christ; but we say "in two" with respect to the common divinity which is beyond the principle of the common and the particular, and with respect to his single particular humanity (της Ιδικής µδνου αυτού άνθρωπότητος). For the phrase, "from two

cols. 1800C 13 � 1801C 1.

185

natures" can be understood also of the nature that is taken by extraction from the common [lump] of humanity together with that which exists in the Godhead in thought. For in our mind we conceive the things that are conceived in Christ before Christ, but to confess that which subsists in him is not to confess that which is before him, but that which is in him. Thus, as his humanity subsists, those who know two natures united say, "in Christ," rather than saying that he is "from two natures."

There are two significant points to be made in connection with

this text. First, the preposition "from" refers to the common

nature that does not exist in reality, but in thought. The

preposition "in" refers to the particular human nature that exists

in reality in the hypostasis of Christ. And so, in the context of

these formulae, to say the human nature is particular means that

Christ's human nature is real; it is not an abstraction. It exists

in reality in the hypostasis of the Logos so that the Logos really

experienced the events of the incarnation. To put it another way,

because the human nature in Christ is particular, that is the

Logos' own, the incarnation is real and not an abstraction because

it happened to the Logos in particular, not to all the individuals

of the race.

This leads directly to the second point of significance, which

is already quite apparent, and that concerns the importance of the

distinction between hypostasis and physis. Nature is not itself an

hypostasis but exists in the hypostasis; the human nature of Christ

becomes real and begins to exist in the divine hypostasis. In this

sense, the whole of the essence is in the hypostasis, but all the

hypostases to whom the nature belongs are not. Though one might

say that all of humanity, and the whole of the Trinity is incarnate

186

in the hypostasis of the Logos, this is said according to nature or

essence, not according to hypostasis. In terms of hypostasis, the

only one who is incarnate is the Logos.

In the Adv.Nest. Leontius directs this same argument against

49 those who say there are two hypostases in Christ:

"One of the defenders of our teaching, when asked by someone who is not inexperienced in such matters, 'Are these natures of which you speak universal or particular?' answered; 'The one can be the other by different definitions. For if the natures possess in themselves the definition of the common essence, they will be called common, as for example the definition of humanity as a whole is a living, rational, mortal being. This clearly includes the nature that belongs to all of us. In the same way, he said, we would also speak of the Divine Logos.

'But according to the other principle the natures would be particular and not common [equating, obviously, the term physis in a christological context with hypostasis] and the entire Holy Trinity was not incarnate, and certainly it was not incarnate in every individual who is included in the human nature.' But when he was asked by this same person if the particular natures would be the hypostasis, he said that this solution comes from Nestorius, and this defense alone is enough to overturn their doctrine."

On the basis of this distinction between hypostasis and physis

Leontius addresses his opponents who cannot understand the subtlety

of his presentation. His opponents argue:

"We ask again, do you understand what we are saying? Explain what you mean by each nature you call God and man. Is the human nature a particular man, and the Divine Logos a particular God, or is it man in general and the Holy Trinity? Or is it man in general and the Divine Logos? Or is it a particular man and the Holy Trinity? Now, that it is not the Trinity that is joined with universal man, or even with any particular

col. 1548B 5 - C 5.

Adv.Nest. II.6: cols. 1544C 1 - 1545D 11.

187

individual, you have clearly affirmed when you say, "One of the Holy Trinity was crucified and suffered." Therefore, it remains that you say the Divine Logos, and that by the term 'one nature', you refer either to universal man, or to a particular individual man and not to all mankind."

And Leontius responds:

"You tell us in what respect the particular man differs from the whole of mankind. Is it not already evident that the difference is according to the one hypostasis or prosopon? Surely you say two prosopa and hypostases because you say two natures when you speak of the one particular man and of the Divine Logos!

But if you wish to speak of man in general, or if you wish to conceive him in the mind and remove him from the definition of essence that is derived from individuals, and you lay hold of him in the mind, then either you will say that God has become man without there being any underlying essence in [the man in general]; or, when you teach that one of the Trinity was incarnate in the whole lump of nature itself, you will bring all individuals together in a particular existence! If the former, surely you say the incarnation of the Lord has taken place in thought only, and not really (καΐ ούχ υπάρξει ούσιώδεί)! But if the latter, how will the Divine Logos not be incarnate in men who are impious and sinful, both in the past and who are yet to be? What impiety even to mention your wisdom!

But if you wish to understand man in general in another way, by introducing the so�called "Ideas", even then the incarnation will have no place. For, in order that the others might be excluded [from the incarnation], his body that he took from Mary cannot be rightly referred to as a part of him. And surely you most clearly impugn the Scripture which teaches that the Lord's human nature (κυρίακόν άνθρωπον ) is one of us! For it says, 'The book of the generation of Jesus Christ, Son of David, Son of Abraham.· And it is clear that the Lord has come from Judah, and 'The husband of Mary, from whom Jesus the Christ was born.' And, 'Jesus of Nazareth, a man manifested by God among you with power, and mighty deeds, and signs which God did through him in your midst, as you yourselves know. * 'And so God has overlooked the time of your ignorance and proclaims to all everywhere to repent for he has established a day when he will judge the world in righteousness through a Man whom he has appointed, having furnished proof to all men by raising him from the dead.' And, 'As through one man came death, so also through man came the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam we all have died, so also in

188

Christ we all are made alive.' And, 'One God, one mediator of God and man, the man Jesus. ' And, 'Jesus increased in wisdom and stature and in favor with God and man,'etc.

So then, in relation to all these scriptures, and innumerable others like them,...how is it possible to say that every man [as is Christ] is from the seed of Abraham, and yet not from the whole seed, but from the tribe of Judah, and yet not from the whole tribe of Judah, but from the house of David, and yet not from the whole house of David, but from the Virgin Mary! Would you also say that Caiaphas, too, has been born from the Virgin Mary? For even he is one of the individuals of the human race. Or would you say that Mary herself is therefore a man? But if she is not a man, explain in what essence she exists. But if she is man, then how has she begotten man in general since many generations of men were before her, and many have come after her? Or how is that which is universal able to give birth to something that is among those who are universal? But indeed, you cannot say that the whole mass of nature together is male, nor even female. For the term "man" is the common designation of both, but the terms "male" and "female" has been appointed to distinguish the difference that belongs to the common nature."

Very interestingly, with this argument he has repeated in the

CMon. and the Adv.Nest. Leontius is turning the old charge of

Severus — that the philosophical explanation of hypostasis and

physis given by John the Grammarian implicates all the persons of

the Trinity — on his own head. In the refutation both against the

monophysites and against those who say there are two hypostases in

Christ, Leontius is attacking a one to one correspondence between

hypostasis and physis. Because the monophysites understand physis

in terms of hypostasis when speaking christologically, they fall

into ambiguity of expression, for when speaking of the nature

Christ assumes, they obviously are speaking of the common "stuff".

Now if, Leontius says, the nature Christ takes is common, and all

individuals are included in this common nature, and we are working

189

on the principle that hypostasis and physis are the same thing,

then all individuals constituting the nature will be involved in

the incarnation.

But on the basis of his own conception of the distinction

between hypostasis and physis, and recalling his explanation of

that distinction in terms of the whole, Leontius is able to

conceive how the whole of the race is in the one hypostasis of

Christ without obliterating the distinction between individuals who

constitute the race and involving them in the incarnation. As the

foundation of existence, the hypostasis is not a particular example

of the common nature, but a particular person in whom the nature

exists and becomes particular or real. It becomes clear that

Leontius' notion of the particular nature assumed by Christ does

not mean he conceives a "collection" of particular natures

somewhere waiting to be inserted into particular hypostases, but

the particular nature, following the analogy of the iron in the

fire, is the human nature that belongs to, and is made particular

and real in, the hypostasis. Every particular of the race is

united to the other by nature because the whole race is present in

each hypostasis — one recalls that the whole, when applied to the

natures in themselves, is conceived in terms of definition, not

quantity — , and yet every particular is distinguished from the

other by its own identity. In terms of "salvation history" the

whole race is present in the one hypostasis of Adam, and now in the

one hypostasis of Christ. Leontius writes:

51Ibid., cols. 1545D 12 - 1548A 6.

190

"Why is not this other passage clear? Namely, that just as Adam is one of the whole [race], and the first in the establishment of death through whom we all likewise have become mortal by nature, so also Christ, in the flesh, is one of the whole race, and the Prince of the passage to immortality, through whom we all who are in him have come into the possession of immortal life."

This recalls what we said earlier: that the Logos alone is the

foundation of all created being. Every human person is in Christ

not according to hypostasis — according to hypostasis we are all

distinct and "stand away from" one another — , but according to

nature, the whole of which is made real or particular in each

particular hypostasis, and according to which Christ is

consubstantial to us and to God the Father.

To make his thought clear we can go beyond the presentation of

Leontius without betraying his principles. The human nature

assumed by the Logos is our nature, and he makes it his own. Not

only has it never existed apart from the Logos, but it has not

existed apart from any hypostasis for nature does not exist except

in the hypostasis. Before Christ, it existed in Adam and in all

those who are in Adam. Now in these last days, the Logos himself

has descended into the "fire" and has assumed the "fire" into

himself, and in his hypostasis the "fire" becomes particular; that

is it becomes his own, and it is real. What happens to the "fire"

in the Logos' hypostasis happens to the Logos alone, and so, even

though the "fire" that is in the hypostasis of the Logos is the

same fire that is in all human hypostases, or "bars of iron", the

hypostasis of the Logos alone is incarnate. The hypostases of the

Father and the Son, and all other human hypostases are, of course,

191

most certainly implicated in the incarnation, but in terms of

essence. Here, the reader may expect Leontius to complete the

thought and say, "not in terms of hypostasis." However, we will

see when we turn to his doctrine of deification, that in fact human

hypostases are implicated in the incarnation; but they are

implicated through their essence through which they are united to

the Logos.

Now, if the particularity of Christ's human nature means it

becomes real when it is personalized in the Logos, which in fact is

another way of saying that it maintains its own natural definition

in its union with the divine nature, and if the human nature's

identity is the Logos himself, or to put it another way, if Christ

is the name given not to the human nature, but to the Logos when he

assumed the flesh, it should be clear that the human nature does

not disappear for it has some kind of impact on the hypostasis of

the Logos. This takes us directly to the next step in the

progression of Leontius' thought: how the human nature affects the

Logos' mode of existence.

2. The Logos becomes incarnate. Perhaps the clearest and

most straightforward evidence that the human nature assumed by the

Logos maintains its full reality is that it changes the mode of the

Logos' existence. This change applies to the hypostasis of the

52 Logos, not to his divine nature. Leontius repeatedly makes this

cf. for example Adv.Nest. 1.42: col. 1501D 2, "It is not his nature, but the hypostasis of the Logos which admits the increase."

192

l̂ point when explaining the Logos' birth from the Virgin. It is the

hypostasis of the Logos to whom the Virgin gives birth, not the

divine nature; and this constitutes the Logos' second generation.

In his generation from his Mother, however, the hypostasis of the

Logos experiences a change, not in that he finds the source or the

beginning of his existence, for he has of course eternally existed

from his eternal generation from the Father, but in that he begins

53 to exist in a different way, namely in the flesh:

"It is agreed that the birth of the flesh that is possessed by God is also the birth of the incarnate God; but only as befits each nature. For neither flesh nor birth is able to alter the nature of God. Conversely, God, as he wills, does not alienate the nature or the natural birth of the flesh according to the terms, and times, and modes of his dispensation. Therefore, the birth of God is the beginning of his incarnation, and the beginning of his existence in the flesh."

Typical is what Leontius says in Adv.Nest. IV.18. He has his

opponents raise the objection: "If the Divine Logos is born of a

woman properly and in truth, either he is born subject to time, or

the woman is beyond time. But of course, neither is God subject to

time, nor is the woman beyond time. Therefore, God is not properly

and truly born of a woman." To which Leontius responds: "But we

have already said, you humbugs, that when he was born of the woman

in time he was not brought into existence, but into a certain mode

of existence (ούκ εις τό είναι, αλλ' εις τό τοιώσδε είναι)."

The hypostasis itself is not the mode of existence, but it is

53Ibid., IV.ll: col. 1673A 2ff.

54col. 1684C 7ff.

193

C that which experiences the different mode of existence when it

assumes the human nature. In a manner of speaking, one may say

that the hypostasis does not change with respect to its being (TO

είναι), but only with respect to its mode of existence (τοίώσδε τό

είναι):

Objection: "If that which is from eternity is truly begotten in a subsequent time, then in fact this has not come into being as a whole or in reality. And if the latter is impossible, so is the former."

Response: "But even though the existing one (the Logos � τό ÖV) is not brought into existence (OÙ γίνεται), but into a certain way of existing (αλλά εις τό τοίώσδε δν), even so it can be begotten into a different mode of existence; not in that it undergoes change, but rather in that it receives something more recent. For no one has said to you that something can essentially (κατά τό αυτό) both exist eternally and also have a beginning in time. Therefore, what prevents us from understanding that what is without beginning with respect to its existence (τό είναι) can exist in a different way (κατά τό άλλοίως είναι), that is to say, to begin to exist as incarnate? For we say that it exists differently not by being changed or altered in its own being (τοΰ οικείου είναι), but by the assumption and essential union (ένωσιν ουσιώδη) of another reality (έτερου πράγµατος) which before was separated from it."

And again:

Objection: "If the Logos became flesh by being changed into flesh, this means that the Logos is Creator and Mother. But if the Logos has become flesh without change, then how, since the Logos has not changed, does he undergo birth as though he has changed?"

Response: "He is born by a certain type of generation, not by being transformed, but at the same time, he does not remain absolutely simple as before (ουδέ απλώς µένων νυµνδς)» n o r does he remain in his simple existence (εις τό είναι), nor does he remain in the manner of existence

55Adv.Nest. IV.28: col. 1693D 5 � 1696A 3.

56Ibid., IV.42: col. 1716C 4 � D 7.

194

which describes him before, but he is now with the flesh; and henceforth I dare to say his hypostasis is altered in its manner of being in this way (εις τό τοίώσδε είναι τό λοιπόν άλλοιωθέντα πως τήν ύπδστασιν), not because there is a change of the Logos' properties, or because there is a change of his properties as God; but because he receives and acquires the other properties of Jesus, and he acquires the properties of the human nature (τον ανθρωπον) in the same one hypostasis of the Logos himself which increases and receives more properties, both hypostatic and natural, which surpass all prosopa on either side and make it consubstantial [to God and man].

Therefore, in no way is he formed as the Logos, but the Logos himself is formed as the Christ; and this happens only in reference to one of his parts, the flesh."

That the hypostasis of the Logos is that which undergoes the

change of existence clearly is of a piece with the conception of

the hypostasis as the foundation of the union; as the foundation,

or subject of the union, the divine hypostasis and not the divine

nature, experiences the change into a corporeal mode of existence.

As the foundation of the union, the natures and their properties

accrue to the hypostasis, not to each other, for they are made real

and they exist in the hypostasis. The acquisition of the human

nature with its properties renders the Logos' hypostasis visible

and corporeal, whereas before the Logos was invisible and

incorporeal. For example, Leontius says:

"There was not a different hypostasis before, and a different one after [the incarnation], but it was the same. Even so, the Logos appears differently in his different states (άλλως δέ καΙ άλλως έµφαινδµενος δ Λόγος) since before [his incarnation] his hypostasis was invisible only, but now it is visible on account of the visible covering which it has assumed into itself."

This addresses the question of Leontius' fidelity to the Faith

Ibid., 1.30: col. 1496D 8ff.

195

of Nicea. The Logos himself enters into human nature, he clothes

himself with the flesh, and exists "in" a complete, real human

nature. In the flesh, he exists as a real man. In other words,

the Word of God himself was incarnate and made man, was born of the

Virgin, and in his flesh he suffered, and died. Once again,

however, the hypostasis, and not the nature, of the Logos is the

subject who is made flesh: "But gentlemen, the flesh is not proper

to the nature of the Logos, but the properties of the flesh, in

58 these last days, have become the possession of his hypostasis."

Moreover, since the Logos is himself the underlying subject of the

natures constituting his hypostasis, the same one who before was

consubstantial to the Father only, has become consubstantial to man

59 without being altered in terms of identity or essence:

"If because the Logos in his essence is not flesh by nature, but God, and in this he is consubstantial to God the Father, and then he is united to the flesh, there is no change in the nature of God. And it is clear that the hypostasis of the Logos has remained consubstantial to the Father, and at the same time has truly become of a different essence than the Father because he has assumed another nature into his hypostasis."

At the same time, the mystery expressed by Chalcedon is

affirmed: the Logos is "in" two natures, and two natures are "in"

the Logos. As subject, the Logos is both God and man, he exists in

his divine nature and in his human nature. As the foundation of

the union, he is that in which the natures are united without

confusion.

Ibid., VII.3: col. 1765C Iff.

Ibid., 1.34: col. 1497C 9 - D 2.

196

So, in that the human nature affects the Logos' mode of

existence, rendering him truly incarnate, it is clear that the

human nature is not lost in the immensity of the Logos' divinity

for the Logos becomes fully man through the assumption of a

complete human nature which, since it becomes particular in the

hypostasis of the Logos, renders the Logos' existence as man real.

The impact of the human nature on the Logos' existence is illumined

even further in his account of the natural properties and their

relation to the hypostasis, and in the doctrine of theopaschism.

a. The natural properties and the hypostasis. The question

as to how Leontius maintains the reality of the human nature has

been partially answered, but now we want to turn directly to the

difficulty expressed earlier, namely, how is the human nature's

reality affirmed when its properties accrue to and are manifested

in the hypostasis?

Already, the answer should be apparent in the light of

Leontius' ontologlcal conception of the hypostasis as the

foundation and principle of existence. Nature is not the

foundation of being, it doesn't even exist except in the

hypostasis. It comes to reality only in the hypostasis, and

consequently its properties are displayed through the hypostasis.

That the hypostasis is not itself the properties, but that in which

the properties come to exist together with their natures, is

crucial for understanding Leontius' thought.

The manner in which Leontius answers the general question, how

does one come to a knowledge of nature, helps to understand how the

197

human nature in Christ is not lost even though its natural

attributes accrue to and are manifested in the divine hypostasis of

the Logos. In Adv.Nest. 11.19 Leontius' opponents appeal to an

Aristotelian principle in order to establish two hypostases in

Christ:60

"Every nature, it is said, is made known through its hypostases for no one knows the category of horse if he does not know a particular horse. Likewise, one does not know the category of goat, or any other species, whether common or particular, if he does not know a particular member of that species. So then, if you know two natures in Christ, it is clear that you knew first of all their hypostases."

Because a particular, complete nature must possess its own

hypostasis, Leontius' opponents argue that if we know Christ is

human in nature, we know it because we see in him a human

hypostasis. Leontius, however, while acknowledging the same

Aristotelian principle, overturns the manner in which his opponents

apply it. His conclusion rests on the analogy of body and soul:

"When we see Andrew, we do not see separate hypostases of his soul

and body, but we know one hypostasis of the whole Andrew. Yet, at

the same time, we conceive his two natures of soul and body."

By extension of the analogy, we see in Christ only one

hypostasis, but in his one hypostasis we see properties and

62 operations that belong both to the flesh and to God:

"It is clear to one who applies himself very

60cols. 1577D 14 - 1580A 4.

61col. 1580B 12 - C 3.

62Adv.Nest. 1.7.1: cols. 1581C 12 - 1584A 9.

198

(̂ diligently that all the properties which belong to the flesh of the Lord are included in the one set of properties that belong to the hypostasis, and the hypostasis is a more universal cause than all of them. Whatever the flesh is essentially, it is not without God, and has never subsisted in isolation [from God] in itself.

And furthermore, whatever other properties he displays as his own which are beyond any human attribute, belong to his deity as, for example, the sinless birth, the sanctity of his entire life, the fact that his counsel was always absolutely good, the surpassing might of his strength to work miracles, the surpassing wisdom of his knowledge, his absolutely perfect and supranatural virtue, and other divine things such as this. But if the divine operations never appear without the divine nature, then the properties must belong to the entire hypostasis itself as its own. For no one would attribute those properties which belong to or are seen in one hypostasis to be properties that belong to another hypostasis.

So then, those properties which belong to the flesh of the Lord, and those which are divine, bear witness to the fact that his hypostasis is itself not without the divine nature. But if the divine nature is not without its hypostasis, then this clearly confirms that the divine hypostasis is the hypostasis of the flesh."

Leontius' debt to the Areopagite is evident here, and yet he

applies the theological principles of the Areopagite in his own

way, based on the conceptual distinction between hypostasis and

nature. As demonstrated above, nature and its properties do not

exist except in the hypostasis. But this does not mean that the

nature is wholly governed by the hypostasis, contributing nothing

of its own to the hypostasis, for as we have seen, the human nature

assumed by the hypostasis of the Logos affects the way in which the

Logos exists; the hypostasis "gives" to the natures and their

properties their existence and identity, and the natures with their

properties "give" to the hypostasis its mode of existence.

This "give and take", one notes, centers around the

hypostasis. As the foundation and principle of existence, the

199

hypostasis receives the natures and its properties so that the

hypostasis, not the nature, becomes more composite; not, of course,

in that it assumes another hypostasis, but in that it acquires more

natural and hypostatic properties to distinguish it from other

particulars. In the hypostasis of Christ, the attributes of both

divine and human natures exist, and through the one hypostasis they

are made manifest so that the one hypostasis reveals both divine

and human attributes:

"It is generally agreed that the Lord, though he assumed our nature, was not deprived of those things which are beyond our nature. For his virginal conception, and his undefiled birth, displayed much more than the manner of our generation, as also his forty day fast, and other things such as this."

In this context, one can return to Leontius' notion of the

whole when applied to the union in Christ. In that the Logos is

united to the human nature and now possesses the properties of the

human nature in addition to the properties of his divine nature,

becoming in this respect m�> :e composite, he is able to do as the

64 whole what his parts, the natures, cannot do by themselves:

"If you would look intently at the matter with your intellectual eyes, you would see quite easily that certain operations have ocurred in the union which neither God without the flesh, nor man without God would be able to accomplish, as has been done now. For have you explained to us in what manner God without the flesh ever passed bodily through his mother without corruption, or how the body without God passed through the incorruptible body of his mother? And what man, when he fasts for forty days, will not be hungry? And who, before or after the forty days fast would hunger wholly

Ibid., 1.20: col. 1580D 7ff.

Ibid., I.11: col. 1448A 1 � Β 2.

200

after God? And who would say that God ever walked on the water with truly bodily feet? Or that human mature, without God, would walk across the surface of the sea without falling into the deep? Indeed, with regard to miracles similar to these, neither did the divine nature ever accomplish any miracles similar to these in a corporeal manner, nor did the human nature accomplish the miracles wholly by itself."

To repeat, the hypostasis of Christ itself is not the natural

properties, but that in which the natures with their complete

collection of properties exist. It becomes more composite by

acquiring new characteristics derived from its human nature, and

yet it still remains the same for the hypostasis is the Logos

himself who acquires the properties of the human nature. In the

hypostasis of the Logos the natures and their properties are united

and in the hypostasis, not in each other, their properties mingle

and meet; and so they are displayed in the hypostasis.

This helps explain Leontius' repeated assertions that the

Logos becomes more composite in the incarnation. He does not mean

that the hypostasis of the Logos itself becomes more composite, but

that in the incarnation, the Logos receives the set of human

properties so that he is distinguished as hypostasis from the

Father, and from all other men, by a larger number of

6C characteristics. For example, he says:

"The Divine Logos possesses the same [hypostasis] even after the addition of the hypostatic properties of the flesh which is in him, and which belongs to him, and now that the flesh is united with the Logos, it is the property of the Logos as a result of his union with the flesh. For, in the principle of his hypostasis, and in the assumption of the flesh, there is a union of essence

Ibid., 1.28: col. 1493D Iff.

201

with his essence, and of the hypostatic properties, that are introduced into his prosopon making it distinct from the hypostases of the Father and the Holy Spirit who are of the same essence."

In other words, whereas before he was distinguished from the

Father, and all other men, in that he is the Son of God, he is now

distinguished from the Father and all other men in that he is the

Son of Mary. Leontius' assertion that the hypostasis of the Logos

becomes more composite is simply another way of saying that the

human nature assumed by the Logos contributes to the incarnation of

his hypostasis, enabling him to exist as truly man. In a passage

from Adv.Nest. II.7, Leontius applies the analogy of the red-hot

iron in such a way as to illustrate that the phrase "composite

hypostasis" does in fact conform to his notion of the hypostasis as

the indivisible, underlying subject of the nature/s constituting

it:66

"We do not understand that the human nature came into being in its own particular hypostasis that belonged to it alone, that is to say that belonged to a mere man, but rather that the human nature came into being in the pre-existent hypostasis of the Logos, in which are joined together the properties and attributes of the human nature; and in the concurrence of both natures, and from both natures, and from the characteristics which are heaped up [in the hypostasis] derived from both essences, he manifests himself to be one prosopon who is one of the Holy Trinity; and his hypostasis truly is one by Itself, and it is not human. For it possesses the divine nature and properties; and yet it exists not only in divine properties for it adds to the set of divine characteristics those of the nature it has assumed.

This is clearly demonstrated in the red-hot iron. While the lump of iron already exists in its own hypostasis, when it is put into the fire, the nature of the fire springs up in the hypostasis of the iron, never

cols. 1552D 5 - 1553A 9.

202

at any time existing in its own hypostasis, but in the hypostasis of the iron. Then, when the iron is brought out of the furnace, the fire possesses even outside the furnace, the hypostasis of the iron in its own true form; and yet the fire in the furnace is undiminished."

This is a rather graphic illustration that reveals well the

conception to which Leontius is pointing throughout his exposition.

In the bar of iron one can see both the nature and hypostasis of

iron, both of which are so intimately one that their distinction

can be conceived only in thought. In the same way, the Logos is

divine by nature and hypostasis; his hypostasis "is" divine "by

nature". Though the bar of iron acquires the fiery nature when

immersed into the furnace, becoming "fiery", it is still one, and

it is still iron. The hypostasis of the Logos, descending into the

lump of humanity, acquires new characteristics — he becomes truly

man — and yet he remains the same.

Connected to this is the problem of how the divine and human

natures, naturally contrary, can co�exist without altering or

destroying one another, a problem which greatly perplexes his

opponents. Leontius' conceptual distinction between hypostasis and

nature provides a model by which to conceive how this can be so.

ν 67 He says:

68 "Everything that happens to the visible appearance

of his flesh, whether natural sufferings, or outward

67Adv.Nest. V.25: col. 1748AB.

68 In the Greek the term is prosopon which obviously in this

context is not synonymous to hypostasis. Compare this, for example, with Adv.Nest. 11.16, where Leontius distinguishes between prosopon when referring to the visible parts of the body, and hypostasis which refers to the underlying subject.

203

humiliations, or whatever else may happen to it, are made his own. For he made the flesh personal when he assumed it into his own hypostasis. Now, of course, the nature of the Logos did not appropriate the definitions (λόγοι) of the nature of the flesh. Even though the deity made the inferior humanity worthy of the divine hypostasis, and of the divine natural properties, nevertheless, the divine nature is distinct in its own natural properties. The divine nature, for example, deifies for it is the deifying nature, and the humanity is deified for it is the nature [capable of] deification. The human nature is exalted, the divine is not; the divine nature has given its properties and the human nature received the natural gifts [of the divine nature]. And so, our doctrine of the union according to prosopon [i.e., hypostatic union] in no way destroys the difference of these natures."

69 In another passage one finds this explanation:

Objection: "If the Logos possesses one hypostasis that is uncreated, and one that was created, he who takes away the number of the hypostases takes away one of the hypo-stases of the Logos; either the one that is uncreated, or the one that is created."

Response: "But no one who is pious would say the Logos has in fact two hypostases. But the whole of his one hypostasis, which is known to be constituted totally of uncreated properties before the incarnation, now, through an increase in hypostatic characteristics, is constituted of principles and operations that are created."

Again, one observes that the understanding of the hypostasis

as the underlying subject. It cannot itself be defined as

"co�existence" because it is that in which the divine and human

natures co�exist. The co�existence of the human and divine natures

is possible because their union is in the hypostasis, not in each

other, so that their definitions are not destroyed. The full

explanation of how they can co�exist, however, will be found in the

doctrine of deification which assumes a natural affinity between

Adv.Nest. 11.39: col. 1596C Iff.

204

man and God such that man's natural destiny is fulfilled only in

communion with God.

The natural properties, then, accrue to and are manifested in

the hypostasis because they find their existence in the hypostasis.

At tbe same time, however, they make their own contribution to the

hypostasis of the Logos; they do not disappear, for they enable the

Logos to become truly man. For a particular, concrete example of

how these principles are applied we may turn to Leontius' account

of the doctrine of theopaschism.

b. The Logos suffered In the flesh. Leontius addresses the

doctrine of theopaschism directly in the 7th book of the Adv.Nest.

His explication of it is based on the conceptual distinction

between hypostasis and physis and is of one piece with what he

affirms concerning the human nature's impact on the divine

hypostasis' mode of existence.

Suffering, properly speaking, applies to the part of Christ

that is able to suffer, namely the human nature; the blows that

fell on Christ fell, properly speaking, on his body. But

according to the principle whereby the whole may be referred to by

its parte, it is correct to say that the Logos suffered in the

flesh since the flesh is his. This does not mean that the Logos

suffered only by appropriation of the flesh; he really did suffer,

Leontius makes this point in Adv.Nest. 11.16 (cols. 1572B 1 - 1573 A 10) where he distinguishes between the prosopon of Christ that was struck, that is the visible parts of Christ, and his hypostasis which indicates the individual.

c but in his human nature:

205

71

"We do not say that the Logos was begotten or that he suffered simply by appropriating the flesh, but since in the union of several [natures] into one hypostatic whole, the names of the [natures] that are in the [hypostasis] can be referred to the whole — as for instance, we say with respect to men...that a man was broken, and yet we really mean only bis bodily limb... — therefore, it is clear that we can say that, since the flesh of Christ suffered, the Logos who in himself is impassible, suffered because of a union, not an appropriation. And for that reason he was born, and with the flesh he submitted to the birth as his own; not as though he became flesh, but because he was in the flesh; and his own invisible hypostasis took on a [visible] form when the flesh came into existence in his hypostasis."

The suffering of the Logos should not be difficult to

understand, so Leontius maintains, because we speak of man in a

similar way. Leontius points out that though a man is cut or

maimed In his flesh, we are not so foolish as to say that his soul

is cut and maimed; and yet we still affirm that the man himself

72 suffered, not simply his flesh. In this way we may understand

73 the sufferings of Christ:

"It is therefore clear that the expression, 'in the flesh,' refers neither to the instrument that causes the suffering, nor is it conceived to stand by itself as a part of the Divine Logos whereby it is said, "the Divine Logos suffered in the flesh." For example, we say that such and such a one stumbles with his feet, or that he is suspended by his hands.

Now, when we say the Divine Logos, we always understand the Christ after the union of the natures. And when we say that the flesh according to which he suffered is a part of the Christ, we speak of the Divine Logos just as we do the Christ. We do the same thing

71Adv.Nest. VII.10: col. 1768hB 9 � D 3.

72Ibid., VII.2: col. 1761D 8 � 1764A 9.

73Ibid., col. 1764A 10 � Β 15.

206

with respect to man, for we speak of a man as though he were divided since Paul says that he is weak in his flesh, but strong in his spirit; and that though he is absent from them in the flesh, yet he is present with them in the spirit.

And so we should understand that Judas is the slayer of God for the Christ is the Divine Logos. Therefore, to say that Christ suffered for us in the flesh, according to the Apostle Peter, clearly means that the Divine Logos suffered not as a part of the Christ, but as the Christ. For instance, the whole of Job is said to suffer, even though he suffered only in the flesh since the Lord said to the Devil, 'Only his soul you may not touch.'"

The explication here rests on the distinction Leontius has

established between hypostasis and physis. The Logos suffered as

the Christ, meaning that he suffered in his human nature, not in

74 his divine nature.

"You, too," says Leontius to his opponents, "agree that the being made lowly belongs to the Logos. But this being made lowly is said to have gone as far as death, even the death on a cross. So you must conclude that the passion and death belong to the Logos, though in a different way than they belong to his corporeal essence which is intimately united with him and shares his hypostasis."

Since the Logos, therefore, is the hypostasis in which the

human nature has been assumed, it is not true that the Logos did

not suffer, for the Logos is in his flesh. Indeed, the Logos

himself is enabled to suffer precisely because he has assumed a

passible essence and exists in it. Consequently, the human nature

in which he exists affects his hypostasis such that it is now able

to experience the things of the flesh: "The Logos is said to suffer

in his hypostasis for he assumed the passible essence into his own

hypostasis together with his own impassibility. And the attributes

Ibid., V.23: col. 1745B 12ff.

207

of the essence are rightly attributed to the hypostasis, according

to custom."

To conclude: the hypostasis is the foundation of existence; it

Is that in which nature exists and becomes real. In the Christ the

properties of the human nature come into existence from the very

beginning in the divine hypostasis of the Logos; they do not exist

in themselves or by themselves. Their reality is revealed in the

hypostasis of the Logos which gives them their reality. And since

the human nature, together with its attributes, accrues to the

hypostasis, it makes the hypostasis of the Logos exist in a fleshly

way, enabling it tc suffer In its passible essence. Two natures,

the divine and human, the one impassible, the other passible, are

in one and the same subject; and the same subject is In the two

natures; in the one he exists lmpassibly as God, in the other he

exists passibly as man. It would be difficult to find a clearer

explication of Nlcene�Chalcedonian christology: the Same Son of God

in two natures, two natures in the one hypostasis or prosopon of

the Son of God. "Whether the Logos is considered In the

impassibility which he enjoyed both before and after the

incarnation, or in the passions of the flesh, he is shown to be the

1.76

same.

Rather than presenting a crypto�monophysitic christology in

which the humanity is so Insignificant that either God becomes

Ibid., VII.9: col. 1768h Alff.

Ibid., VII.6: col. 1768dC 8ff. ί

208

passible by nature, or the humanity becomes God by nature,

Leontius' doctrine of hypostasis presents a full human nature and a

full divine nature completely preserved in the one hypostasis of

Christ. Their union is so intimate and direct they actually touch,

but they touch in the one hypostasis and so maintain their natural

definitions; consequently, the natural properties affect the

hypostasis' mode of existence, they do not alter or destroy the

natural definitions of one another. The hypostasis is that which

changes, not the essence; and yet even though the hypostasis

changes, it remains the same for it is always the same subject.

The human nature has not been lost at all precisely because it

has made the Logos incarnate. More than that, it maintains its

natural definition to the point that it enables the Logos to

experience all the events and passions of the flesh, even to the

point of death, while the Logos yet remains perfect God. For

Leontius, the doctrine of theopaschism clearly affirms the full

reality of the human nature assumed by the hypostasis of the Logos.

Of course, as God both in hypostasis and in one of his

natures, the Logos is superior to his human nature. The descent of

the Logos into human existence cannot therefore possibly render the

divine hypostasis eternally subject to passibility or to the laws

of death that govern his human nature; rather, it can only lead to

the ascent of man to a divine existence. We have now come to the

doctrine of deification.

C CHAPTER FIVE

Salvation as Deification

That a particular human nature, without its own human

hypostasis, can be assumed by the Logos and united directly to the

divine nature in the hypostasis of the Logos without suffering

alteration or destruction of its natural definition assumes,

obviously, a definite anthropology. God and man possess

essentially a spiritual affinity such that it is natural for man to

be in communion with God.

Up to now, we have seen that Leontius affirms this in

different ways; he explains it to some degree when he deals with

the impact of the flesh on the Logos' mode of existence,

maintaining that the human nature, though united intimately to the

Logos, is not lost but renders the Logos incarnate and capable of

experiencing the things of the flesh. One recalls the first half

of the Athanaeian formula, "God became man that man might become

God."

In turning to the second half of the formula, one might stop a

moment and reflect; if the Logos becomes man without experiencing

any change in his identity or natural definition, and if the human

nature which he assumes remains human, might not man become God

without losing his identity or changing in his natural definition?

For Leontius, of course, this is indeed so. What we want to do in

this chapter is uncover the basic anthropological principles that

are assumed in, and follow from, Leontius' christology. Perhaps

these principles distinguish Leontius and the byzantine tradition

209

most from other traditions.

210

A. Man's Origin and Destiny.

1. The Natural Divinity of Man. For Leontius man's origin

reveals his natural divinity; Adam's immediate cause, or parent

(αϋτίος), was God himself such that Adam alone of all the creatures

2 is called the son of God:

"One should clearly understand that Luke the Evangelist saw that this particular likeness refers to Adam alone whose immediate parent (αίτιος) is God, the father of spirits; for of him alone was God the immediate cause in terms of his soul since God breathed in him the spirit of life so that he became a living soul, since his body was fashioned from the earth, and in this respect, being created in the image and likeness of God was reserved for man alone. And he was clearly the son of God, the Father of spirits, because God was his particular parent, and he, in terms of a particular part [viz., his soul], was created in the likeness of God.

And so, Luke traces the genealogy of [Christ] back to Adam and says that Adam was the son of God, just as he says that Seth was the son of Adam, that is to say that he was born of Adam. And just as Matthew says that Jacob was born of Isaac, and Abraham begat Isaac, so also he says, 'Born of Adam, who was of God.'"

The impartation of the breath of life, Leontius says

elsewhere, was a pledge for the time when God's own nature would

enter into a living flesh animated with a soul. This is expressed

in Adv.Nest. 1.18 where Leontius addresses a notion of his

opponents which asserts that God could be united to man only if it

Joseph F. Mitros, S.J., offers an interesting summary of the different soteriologies represented in patristic thought in his article, "Patristic Views of Christ's Salvific Work," Thought (Fordham University Quarterly) Vol. XLII, No. 166 (Autumn, 1967) 415�447. See in particular pp. 428�30.

Adv.Nest. III.4: col. 1612D 1 � 1613A 4.

211

would benefit God in some way, a notion Leontius rejects as absurd.

In response, he asserts the purpose of God's union with our nature

and points to the creation as a foreshadowing of the

3 incarnation:

"So if you say, why would the God who needs no benefit need to be united to the nature that does, and therefore he is held in low esteem and dishonor, we would say to you that it was for the deification of those who needed a benefactor, and through their deification our God, who for our sakes united himself to us and displayed triumphantly to the world that he himself possesses such goodness and bénéficient power, is loved and glorified by all more and more.

And this is the reason, in spite of your ridiculous notions concerning this, that he did not need to create man for his own benefit in the first creation. But just as he commanded the earth and the waters to produce plants and herbs, sowing seeds after their kind, and the souls of reptiles and other creatures, so also when he now saw fit to entrust the creation to another mediating creature, he did not disgrace himself by creating humanity himself; nor did he disgrace himself when he created man in his own image and likeness, and stamped his own character on the earthly mass of clay; most certainly he did not disgrace himself when he Imparted to him by his own Inflation the breath of life so that man became a living soul. From the beginning his abiding in the man fashioned from the lump of clay was given as a pledge of the time when his own nature would enter into union with the flesh fashioned from the earth."

From these two texts it is clear that man is naturally divine

in that his very being, his becoming a living soul, is through the

divine breath of God. This spiritual dimension of man's nature

distinguishes him from all other creatures for it is in terms of

his soul that he is by nature created in the image and likeness of

God. In this sense, God indwells humanity even before the

incarnation, though not in a personal, or hypostatic, way. The

cols. 1468D 1 - 1469A 12.

212

importance of this, however, is not so much that Goi Indwells man

making him divine, but that the impartatlon of God's divine breath

gives to man's nature an innately divine stamp. Even before the

incarnation, man by nature possesses a spiritual affinity with God

in the spiritual dimension of his being.

Man's innately divine character is underscored by Leontius'

4 traducianist views:

"As we see in the case of man, in his generation the body receives its existence from the parents, but generation does not simply bring the soul into existence (for this it has from God as in the case of the first parent Adam), but it is brought into existence with its body when it is fashioned, and it cannot be separated from it. And, as we said, he receives existence on the one hand from the body, and on the other hand from the soul, and yet these births of both natures are referred to properly and in truth as belonging to one man.

So why don't you stop your buzzings which derive from unbelief, and why can't you say that the God who was born is truly the incarnate Logos, when you admit without hesitation that the soul which is made flesh is begotten from the same parents who give existence to the flesh, and you say that the parents of the soul and the body are the same?"

One must see this passage in the context of the whole of

Leontius' thought. When he says that man has his soul from God as

in the case of Adam, he is not presenting a creationist view as it

might seem such that in every individual generation, the body is

received from the parents and the soul is given to each individual

by God. Rather, he is referring to the soul generlcally and simply

means that man as a species has from the beginning received his

soul from God. Body and soul, for Leontius, are not two separate

Adv.Nest. IV.19: col. 1685A 12 � Β 12.

213

V natures that can exist by themselves; together they constitute the

one nature of man. This one nature, as we have seen, exists in

particular human hypostases. Each human hypostasis has but one set

of parents and from these parents the human individual receives the

whole of his nature. The consequence of this, applied to man, is

that man by nature produces other men of the same nature, and

essential to this human nature is the soul, given by God and of

divine character. Man, in other words, is innately divine, proven

by the fact that his offspring, too, receives the same inherently

divine human nature directly from its human parents.

Now, this raises two questions which must be addressed to make

our presentation complete. First, one may recall that Gregory of

Nazianzus, too, taught a natural affinity between man and God and,

as Leontius, placed this affinity in the spiritual dimension of

man's being. For Gregory this was the mind; the mind, he says, is

that point where God and man meet, "...where the natures so

separate were knit together by the affinity of each to the element

which mediated between them." Gregory derived his understanding

in this regard, of course, from Origen. We have suggested

elsewhere that one of Leontius' primary opponents was Origenism and

it is significant that though he is clearly one with Gregory in

The ultimate objective of this argument, of course, is not to prove man's divinity, but that the one Christ is both fully human and divine in that his natures are received from his parents, the Father and the Blessed Virgin. This is the thrust of books III and IV of the Adv.Nest..

Greg. Naz. In Defense of His Flight to Pontus, NPNF vol. VIII, p. 210.

214

teaching man's natural affinity with God, nowhere does he suggest

that the mind is the point of union. Indeed, he seems at pains to

distinguish his christology from any hint of Origenism and in this

respect he goes so far as to insist that the Logos is not united to

man by virtue of the kind of natural affinity taught by the

Origenists, but according to his own good pleasure — "good

pleasure" understood in the context of Leontius' own christological

exposition — , or economically. He says in Adv.Nest. 1.6:

"We understand that the union of the soul and the body, and of everything else, is ordained by the creator Logos. He possesses an absolute knowledge of all creatures, both alike and different, which escapes our understanding many times. Therefore, if God is not united naturally to the flesh from a kind of natural likeness and affinity, neither must he share in suffering, but he assumes it according to his own good pleasure, and from the goodness and kindness of his will."

What does this mean, particularly in light of what he teaches

concerning the natural union? Again, one must be careful to read a

particular passage in the context of the whole of Leontius'

thought. As his use of the term ένωσίς φυσική and its equivalents

clearly indicate, Leontius does indeed teach a natural union

between God and man. But what he wants to make clear is that even

though God is united to man by nature in his own hypostasis, he is

nonetheless altogether different than man, and suffire not because

it is his nature to suffer, but because he wills to suffer in his

flesh. This has significant consequences on our understanding of

Leontius' christology. Due to the fact that Leontius was writing

7col. 1425B 9 � C 2.

215

during the height of the Origenistic controversy, one can

understand that Leontius may be seeking to clearly state that

Christ is not some pre-existent VOÛç, the same as all other men

whose own pre-existent minds have fallen into bodies, but Christ is

himself God and not man. This could be the reason why, even though

he quite obviously understands that man possesses a spiritual

affinity with God, he is so careful never to suggest that the point

of union between God and man is the mind. The result is a

difference in emphasis, though the central point is the same.

Rather than focusing on one aspect of man's being, Leontius'

christology brings to mind the understanding that the whole of man

is united to the whole of God as a result of man's natural affinity

with God.

This carries significant implications concerning the

definition of human nature, which implications are brought into

focus by the second question raised by Leontius' doctrine of man's

innate divinity: if man is most like God in the spiritual dimension

of his being, and yet if the point of union is not the mind, then

how can the Logos who is incorporeal by nature be united with the

flesh? In response, Leontius appeals to the analogy of soul and

body and argues that just as there is nothing that hinders the

flesh from being united permanently to the Incorporeal soul, so

also there is nothing that hinders it from being united with the g

pre-existent Logos. The fact that the flesh is united permanently

Adv.Nest. 1.26: cols. 1492D 1 - 1493A 1.

216

with the soul, and the divine breath animating the soul of man is

that which makes man distinctively human, reveals that Leontius is

governed by the same intuition expressed by the Cappadocians: man

is essentially a spiritual being who exists in a fleshly way. The

flesh, in other words, as an essential part of human nature, is not

naturally other than man — man is not a soul Imprisoned in the

flesh — , but it is Included in the natural definition of human

"being".

Our aside has brought us full circle, for if we look at the

implications stemming from the response to our two questions, we

find ourselves once again standing before the notion of

deification. Man is of divine origin, he was created and made a

living soul by God; indeed, God is the Immediate parent of the

father of our race, Adam. However, as is made clear from what

Leontius says, or does not say, concerning the soul and the flesh

and the point of union, man is not God, and never becomes God by

nature. This, of course, is obvious for God alone is uncreated,

and man is created. Deification, then, does not mean that man is

changed into what he is not by nature. But — and this will become

more clear as we proceed — deification means that the highest

element of human nature, namely its divine character, is enabled to

burst into full flame when it meets with the divine nature in the

hypostasis of the Logos. The spiritual dimension of man's being is

set up in its rightful place of dominance, leading man away from

the passions and corruption of the flesh to eternal communion with

God.

217

This defines man's destiny. Just as his origin is in God, so

also is his end. As Leontius explains: "The human nature ( δ

άνθρωπος ) in Christ is not by himself (töl^)..but he is a part in

the divine hypostasis, for this is truly the ultimate end of 9

absolute blessedness." The possibility of reaching his natural

destiny, however, was lost in the Fall, and this explains the

purpose of the incarnation, and the content of deification.

Ibid., V.30: col. 1749D 6 - 12.

(

ν

218

2. The Content of Deification. The doctrine of deification

assumes first that man is not God, but is in need of God to save

him from destruction. Though man is innately divine having been

brought into being by God and made a living soul by the breath of

God, this is not enough to keep him from the corruption caused by

., . 10 his sin:

"The human nature is not vivified now by the energy of the life�giving Logos as in the creation of Adam, for man even now is corruptible by that power [which made the flesh of Adam alive]. But [in Christ] the vivifying nature dwells in the [human] nature in the union of two essences which displays one hypostasis. Henceforth, just as corruption, which is potentially in the human nature, is no longer able to become actual [in the human nature of Christ], so also incorruptible life, which is potentially in the human nature that exists in a human hypostasis, encompasses the human nature that is in the divine hypostasis."

In Christ a new thing has happened: man is no longer made

alive simply by the energy or breath of God, but God has united

himself to human nature. For, If the vivifying energy of God

whereby man became a living soul is not enough to save him from

falling into non�being whence he came, then God himself must enter

into human nature. God alone is strong enough to conquer the evil

one, and hence the objection raised by Leontius' opponents — that

to attribute the victory to God rather than man renders the victory

over sin of no consequence for man — really misses the point. His

opponents want to know: "If the flesh shares in the particular

existence of the Logos who is all�powerful and sinless by nature,

Ibid., V.20: col. 1741C 7 � D 4.

219

k how will it be called sinless? What kind of victory over evil is

it when it receives aid, which is not really a victory? For then

the success would be attributed to the one and not to the other."

The impact the christology of Leontius' opponents has on their

understanding of salvation is obvious; because they cannot conceive

a genuine union of God and man, but must maintain two hypostases in

Christ, they cannot understand how the Logos' Passion and

Glorification applies to all of human nature. On the basis of his

conception of a genuine union in Christ, Leontius refutes his

opponents by asserting that God himself has conquered sin in, and

12 not outside of, our human nature:

"Very well then, you who have trusted in your own power and who boast in the fullness of your own wealth, would you confess with us that neither a brother nor a man can redeem? And that it is not a man, but the Lord who makes the adversary weak by the strength of his own might? Gentlemen, hear the holy Lord who says: "Let not the strong man boast in his strength." And understand that to prevail over sin itself without aid belongs only to the sinless nature; whereas if we possessed [this sinless nature] we would be revealed to be in fact gods already.

But since our nature is liable to fail, it is there-fore, when subjected to the stratagems of the temptor, prone to be dragged away in sin by the operation [of the temptor]; and we are in need of someone's power hiding in the impotence of our nature, so that we might not be oppressed by the treacherous power which is set against us, or that anyone should torture us with the sting of death, which is sin and which makes us die, and robs us of immortality.

However, this is not accomplished outside of our nature in any way, nor is it temporary. For the weakness of our nature was the cause for the invasion of mortality [emendation of the text which reads "immortality"] into

Ibid., 1.47: col. 1505A 13ff.

Ibid., col. 1505B 4 - D 11.

220

V our own hearts, and was the inventor of evil. Therefore, it is right that the saving and all-powerful nature be united with our nature to bring it to righteousness, assuming us into the cne hypostasis as a primal offering so that our enemy might not be able to invade our nature, since he was checked by the hypostasis of the [Logos] in which [our nature] existed. For while he was working in our nature from the time of the garden until now, now he finds that our very nature subsists in the very hyposta-sis of our protector, which is by nature inaccessible to death, to sin, and to the devil.

Therefore, in his supernatural mercy, God has established his own flesh in slnlessness; and since we sinners are of the same essence [as his flesh], he deems us worthy to partake of his own sinless, spiritual essence in the coming age when we shall be with him. Therefore, the Divine Logos is found to be our eternal redeemer, and for this reason we glorify him."

The passage points out the significance of Leontius' notion of

hypostasis; it enables one to conceive how the Logos becomes man

while remaining the same. Because he is genuinely united with

human nature and yet remains the Logos of God, he himself gains the

victory over sin and death and this victory resides within human

nature itself. Connected with the fact that the Logos remains the

same in his incarnation is the fact that he remains impassible in

his hypostasis and in his divine nature. And because he remains

impassible and incorruptible even when he assumes the passible and

corruptible human nature, he raises man to his own incorruptible

being:

"If you say that the Divine Logos is not united to the passible nature because of his Impassible nature, lest the Divine should be found In the subsistence of the passible nature to possess some of its passible accidents, well, you Insult the divine nature precisely in those things whereby you glorify it. For if the unconquerable is conceived as incapable of being broken

Ibid., 1.17: cols. 1464D 11 - 1465B 13.

221

V simply because it is not present at the same time with the substance that is broken, then it would not be indestructible by nature, but the special character of indestructibility will belong to it by accident, because it flees and keeps itself away from destruction. And so, it would be possible that even glass and all other fragile bodies would have this special character.

On the other hand, the impassibility of a particular nature is acknowledged to derive from nature if it does not suffer injury when the members to which it is united suffer injury. And so we rightly marvel at the fact that the indestructible approves submitting the proof of its own nature's [impassibility] to the test of reality.

For example, in a similar case, what is called asbestos is attested to be noncombustible not because it does not associate with the nature of fire (for, if this were so, we could say that all matter, even grass, is noncombustible [if it stays away from fire]) but because it does not burn even when it is united to burning bodies, and when this happens we are rightly amazed.

Therefore, on the one hand, the perception of our own eyes attests to the fact that the flesh of the Lord has suffered; but on the other hand, his operation both during and after the Passion fully assures us that the Logos [even in his flesh] has not suffered. For, he would not have granted life to the human race, that is to the mortal nature, when he suffered and died, unless he truly raised himself from the dead. And so, he has died according to one of his natures, and in his other he raised himself since Christ lives and is not dead."

This is, in fact, the content of deification; infused with God

himself man is raised to the Impassible, incorruptible life of God.

Infusing human nature with his own incorruptible strength is the

purpose of the Logos' entrance into human nature. He himself is

the "antidote" for man's weakness whereby man has fallen into the

14 sickness of sin and death:

"So that his union with the flesh might be made firm through his likeness [to us], and his kindness through [his] union with us, it was not possible for him to change into [human nature], nor for him to attain in this manner his purpose. On the contrary, he made it

Ibid., 1.6: col. 1425C 3 - 1428A 1.

222

immutable with himself, and the nature that is naturally mutable [he elevated] to a superior mode once and for all. That is to say, he assumed [the mutable nature] into his own Immutable [hypostasis].

Although he who is naturally Immutable was not changed into the inferior nature, he assimilated himself to it, and he procured the natural composite (σύνθεσιν φυσικήν �in this case the human nature composed of body and soul) eternally for himself. Though the cause of his union with the flesh came about through his good �jill and pleasure, his aim for the nature united to himself was its perfection and confirmation and assimilation to himself. For in the good pleasure of his goodness, he went to the extreme limits of his goodness and offered himself wholly to those who are dissimilar to him in nature, and he who is the chief of the creation has now united himself to him who plainly had turned away from him, and the eternally existing one united himself to him who is not [or, who was created from nothing] in a manner which he alone knows. And whereas in the past he commended in some way all beings to himself, now he makes them to subsist in himself, having led them to a more exalted existence. The ever�existing one has caused all things to be embraced and surrounded by himself so that not one of his own might return again to non�being through corruption, and that they may all remain incorruptible with the incorruptible one. [As it is written]: 'In Christ all of creation has been released from the bondage of corruption.'"

In this sense the divine nature prevails over the human

nature: it does not change or alter the human nature according to

its natural definition, but rather it transforms the human nature

to a superior state, namely that of incorruptibility and

impassibility in communion frith God so that it is no longer subject

to sin:

"But gentlemen, if the immutability of the divine nature always prevails over the mutability of the human nature, and when it transforms it to a superior state, deifies it in itself (as we say that the iron is made like fire, and not that the fire is made like iron), then surely, in the same way, one ought to name the one who is

Ibid., IV.21: col. 1685C 15 � D 9.

223

born, and the birth itself, and the woman who gave birth, by the nature which always remains according to its own principles and not by that nature which is transformed!"

And again:

"All those sustained in piety confess with us that something new has been produced from something old, and that there has been a transformation; and this new thing has clothed all the rest of creation with incorruptibi-lity, and has freed it from the bondage cf corruption, so that our bodies which are given over to death, might be raised up to incorruptible life."

The transformation involved in deification does nut mean a

change in the natural definition of man but rather a change in his

mode of existence, as Leontius repeatedly asserts in different

ways. His most straightforward affirmation is found in these

words: "...the human part has been deified not by being destroyed,

but by being made superior."

Deification does not alter the natural definition of human

nature because to live in the divine, incorruptible life of God is

natural to man; he came from God and his destiny is eternal

communion with God. Leontius describes man's communion with God in

the most intimate terms: just as the Logos is united essentially

with human nature, so man is now in essential communion with God.

Following his analogy of the red�hot iron to describe the

incarnation, he likens man's union with God to a burning

ember:

16Ibid., IV.29: col. 1696A 10 � Β 3.

17Ibid., IV.37: col. 1712B lOf.

10

Ibid., IV.32: col. 1697D 9 � 1700A 5.

224

^ "We do not believe ar you do, [for we believe] that being born again from the Spirit is of essence. For, either it is understood as 'energy' which is applied to the wood by the nature of the carpenter, or it is of essence, as fire in the burning ember. Now if it is like the former, then it is clear that what is regenerated effects something which not even the energy the carpenter applies to the wood is able to effect. And, if it is according to the latter, then it is clear that it can effect the things of the fire and the fire produced in the wood. And if this is so, then there is a participation (µετάληφίς) of the essence which has produced it with that which is produced."

In communion with God in Christ, christians become sons of God

19 just as the old Israel, but with a difference:

"We christians, too, are called sons of God [as are the Israelites], as it says in this passage: 'You are all sons of God through faith in Christ Jesus.' So then, we too, are taught by the Spirit of God in the precepts of blamelessness, and In the law of righteousness. And we are called to freedom and immortality, and to immutabi-lity which comes from the resurrection of the dead. No longer do we offer supplications in fear, since the blessed life will suffer no change, and we are free from sorrows, and from the rulers of this dark age, for we live as citizens of heaven. For in order that we might become holy and blameless in his presence, we have been foreordained in love to adoption as sons of God, and to possess the likeness of our heavenly father when we receive our sonship for which we wait eagerly, that is to say, the redemption of our bodies, so that we are no more able to sin in any way. And for that reason it will no longer be natural for us to die, but being exalted in power our nature will no longer be capable of evil and so it is clear that in these things we are assimilated to God far beyond Israel of old when he was called son."

Just as all are in Adam, the son of God, so all are in the

second Adam, the only�begotten Son of God, and in him the whole of

human nature is transformed from the sickness of Adam's nature to

the resurrected life of Christ. In the age to come, those who are

Ibid., III.8: col. 1628B 8 � C 14.

225

sons of God in Christ will be changed from a carnal nature to a

spiritual nature, they will be revealed to be immortal rather than

mortal, free rather than slaves, sinless rather than sinners,

20 immutable rather than mutable. That man is transformed from his

present sinful existence to a divine existence, that he becomes

spiritual rather than carnal, immutable rather than mutable,

sinless rather than sinful, and free rather than subservient,

without being destroyed according to his natural definition reveals

that corruption and death are unnatural to man, whereas the pure,

sinless divine life of God alone is natural.

Human nature is able to enter into genuine union with the

Logos and to share with the divine nature the one divine hypostasis

because to touch God is to move towards the very heart of what it

means to be human. The mystery is that in this genuine union in

Christ, all of mankind is involved for he assumed the whole of

human nature and yet, though all become one with Christ by virtue

of his assumption of our human nature, we remain personally

distinct for he did not assume our hypostases, but our nature. The

question this raises, however, is precisely how Christ mediates

salvation or deification to all human Individuals.

(

Ibid., III.8: col. 1629C 5 - D 1.

226

Β. The Mediation of Salvation, or, How Deification is Accomplished.

How salvation is mediated raises two inter�related key

questions. The one concerns the relation of our human nature to

Christ's particular human nature. As we saw earlier, Leontius

insists that Christ's human nature must be particular, that is to

say made real in his own divine hypostasis; if it were common then

all men would have been included in the incarnation, or the events

of the incarnation would not have been real, either of which is

impious and absurd. And so, it was the particular human nature of

Christ that was deified, ascended into heaven, and in Christ sits

at the right hand of God. At the same time, following his notion

of the whole in terms of definition rather than quantity or space,

though the human nature of Christ is particular, it is whole and is

our human nature. And so Leontius maintains that all mankind was

included in the hypostasis of the Logos in that he assumed the

whole of our nature. For example, in a passage cited earlier, he

says: "Therefore, it is right that the saving and all�powerful

nature be united with our nature to bring it to righteousness,

assuming us into the one hypostasis as a primal offering so that

our enemy might not be able to invade our nature, since he was

checked by the hypostasis of the [Logos] in which [our nature]

21 existed." This is my nature and yet Leontius insists that the

21Ibid., 1.46: col. 1505C lOff.

227

^ . passion, resurrection, ascension, and glorification happened to the

Logos alone in that the particular human nature to which these

events happened belonged to him alone. So what does this mean that

our human nature has been taken up in Christ and deified? Has

deification taken place in our nature only in Christ and not in us?

Then how is it accomplished in us; how is it common to us?

The other question concerns the existential character of

Christ's human nature, or to put it most concisely, Leontius'

stance towards aphthartodocetism, a doctrine common to monophysites

and dyophysites alike. As we saw above, the content of deification

is to be clothed with the incorruptible life of God. Now, is

deification accomplished simply by the Logos assuming our human

nature so that Christ's particular nature becomes incorruptible the

moment the Logos enters into it — this is the heart of 22 aphthartodocetism —, or does the Logos assume a corruptible

human nature and render it incorruptible by leading it through his

Passion?

If we constantly keep these questions in mind when we study

the manner in which Leontius conceives the mediation of salvation

we can arrive at the heart of Leontius' soteriology the more

quickly. The arrangement we have adopted breaks down naturally

In the 6th century, the chief mover of aphthartodocetism was Julian of Halicamassus. Rene Draguet describes the essence of his thought in his study: Julien d'Halicarnesse et sa controverse avec Sévère d'Antioche sur l'incorruptibilité du corps du Christf" (Louvain: 1924), p. vii: "Maintaining that the body of the Savior was incorruptible before the resurrection, Julian went on to teach

f that the Word in his divinity had transformed the humanity he had \ taken from our nature in the act of union."

228

\ into three specific sub-headings; it is, of course, our own

systematlzation of Leontius' thought who does not treat the

question of soteriology in systematic fashion. However, it seems

to be clearly suggested from the movement of his thought implied in

the statements he makes specifically in reference to the

deification or salvation of man.

1. The Incarnation. In the simplest terms, the incarnation

renders deification possible. From the texts we have cited

earlier, this should already be abundantly clear. Taking our human

nature that has been stricken with the disease of sin into himself,

the Logos re-fashions it and purifies it, restoring it to its

original beauty. In a passage from Adv.Nest. 1.18, after asserting

that God has united himself directly to human nature without a

mediator in order that he himself might redeem our nature, Leontius

describee the renewal of human nature effected by God's entering

23 into human flesh in this way:

"We would say that our renewal is altogether in need of, and necessarily occurs through, [the Logos'] union [with the human nature]. For example, if one were to make an image in pure wax with the seal of someone's ring, and that image fell to the earth and was then covered over with dirt; and if the one who found it saw [the image] through the dirt that was covering it even though the image of the signet ring's character that was recently stamped in the wax had become obscure and difficult to discern; and if he wanted to make the image clear again and to renew the seal with which it was formerly stamped and that was now covered up so that the dirt was mixed with the wax; he would Insert in the wax the same ring which had made the image before, and

Adv.Nest. cols. 1469D 1 - 1472A 16.

229

applying it more forcefully, he would impress the recent character upon the same wax again, [this time] by means of uniting the formative nature with iron so that the character [of the seal] would be impressed very plainly, and the former image would be fashioned again on the wax which had become earthy. As a result, it is now unable to admit any more transformation.

In the same way, God also renewed with great care the humanity created in hie own image and which had become mixed with earthly things so that the beauty of the divine image was obscured. Very efficiently, he granted to him his pristine beauty which is the likeness of God, and he united his own divine nature in the garment of the earthly nature, and he effected his spiritual union with those who have experienced the union with the flesh, and the Logos himself, in his omnipotent goodness, recalled the rational beings to himself."

With regards to Leontius' affinity with aphthartodocetism, an

important question at this point is, how did the Logos accomplish

the renewal of our nature? Simply by uniting himself with it, or

by leading it through the Passion to Glorification? In the

Adv.Nest. Leontius nowhere explicitly mentions aphthartodocetism,

but he is clearly against it. Though the Lord's human nature was

obviously different than the rest of humanity in that it belonged

exclusively to the Lord and was filled with his divine energies,

nonetheless it was made incorruptible because the Logos throughout

his earthly sojourn in the flesh, from his birth to his death,

constantly directed it towards a spiritual mode of existence; in

this manner the Lord's human nature was established spiritually

throughout the whole of human existence, that is from birth to

24 death. Says Leontius:

"While he exists in the flesh and sets himself not in the things which are of the flesh, but of the Spirit, the

Ibid., 11.20: col. 1581B 12ff.

230

Logos transforms the mode of his own composition [» the body � soul composition of human nature]. Instead of separating himself from the aggregate [properties] that are natural to the flesh, the Divine Logos becomes that which belongs to the normative (γνωµικής) union with the Spirit. Whoever, then, is joined to the Lord becomes one Spirit with him."

At the same time, one does not want to say that the human

nature of Christ was corruptible, not because Leontius is an

aphthartodocetist, but because it was brought into existence in the

Logos and made the Logos' own, and for that reason alone it is

inconceivable that the Logos' should ever allow his flesh to see

corruption. But this is not to say that the human nature of Christ

realized the fullness of deification simply in its union with the

Logos for that would render the entire earthly sojourn, including

25 the Baptism and Passion pointless. Though united with the Logos,

the whole point of the incarnation was to lead the human nature

through a normal human existence, from birth to death, in order

that at every step the Logos might transform its carnal mode of

existence into a spiritual one. For example, he says In Adv.Nest.

.26 IV.46:

"God sent his Son in the likeness of sinful flesh on account of the Impotence of the Law in which he was made weak through the flesh, and not only did he cleanse, but he also condemned sin in his flesh. So then, since

25 Cf. the study of Fr. Mitros cited above, "Patristic Views of

Christ's Salvific Work;" Fr. Mitros believes the view which he calls the "physical or platonic theory of salvation" — in which one might place Leontius — finds its chief difficulty precisely here, viz., how to account for the Logos' assumption of human nature for man's salvation without rendering the passion, resurrection, and glorification superfluous: pp. 428�29.

Adv.Nest. cols. 1717D 9 � 1720A 13.

231

Christ possesses the power of every cleansing in his own flesh which was made by God, he has fulfilled all the righteousness of the Law in his flesh in order that the nature of the flesh might be free, having been cleansed from the condemnation of the Law, and in order that he might show the flesh worthy of the spiritual life which he condoned to give it.

But if his birth was in need of these things as man, then also it was in need of circumcision, and of John's baptism of repentance, and all the rest. So if he was in fact in need of the baptism of repentance it was without question as sinless; for repentance is not an object of praise among the righteous; and even though Christ accomplished these things, though he did not need them [since he was sinless], it is clear that he did these things in order to fulfill all righteousness according to the dispensation of his flesh, and to show hie deity from his fulfillment of the Law, and In order that he might fill the weakness of all fleshly nature, something he accomplished from his divine essence alone."

The full deification of Christ's human nature, that is its

being invested with incorruptibility, was not fully realized until

27 the resurrection. In Adv.Nest. V.l Leontius maintains that the

Logos had to go through the whole of human life, from birth to

death, in order that his human nature might attain to the

glorification of deification through the resurrection from the

dead. He says:

"But when, then, do these men believe that the Christ, whom they say is man by nature, received glory, grace, and sonship, and when was he considered worthy to receive divine honor, and the name that is above every name? For they confess these things from the beginning, immediately from his conception. But what is the advantage of thse

A point Leontius makes frequently; cf., for example, Adv.Nest. IV.37: col. 1712AB, "...the flesh itself, according to nature, is deified completely after the resurrection...," and also 1.19: cols. 1476CD and ff., "We agree that the Lord's human nature obtained impassibility and incorruptibility from the resurrection, etc."

cols. 1724A 4 - D 6.

232

^ great gifts if they do not take away his passion, nor his dishonor, nor his death? For he is still passible, unless he has acquired something more, or else he became free from passion when he suffered in and through someone else.

So then, let them explain who suffered for Christ, and for us. But if he acquired these [gifts] after the resurrection, then there was a time when he did not possess the adoption as son by grace or by honor or by dignity, which they speak of, and then they affirm, though in different ways, that he is only a man as we are.

So then, if these names given to him were not by virtue of a certain manner of indwelling, or as a gift, then they refer to the Logos. But how can the passage, 'He humbled himself, taking the form of a servant,' refer to the Logos if he despised the shame of death? Or this passage, 'For if they had known, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory?' Or the confession of Peter, 'You are the Son of the Living God?' Or the testimony of the Father which said, 'You are my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased?' So they are not extricated from their difficulties.

But we say that since the hypostatic union of the Logos and the flesh took place at the very beginning in the holy womb of the Virgin, it was the good pleasure of the Logos himself that his natural greatness should become poor throughout his life in the flesh in order that the Logos, who accomplishes all things by His Word, and not by robbery, nor by injustice, might, after the death of his flesh, himself exalt the humanity united to him, through his entire spotless life in righteousness, offering it as the first fruits of spiritual immortality, and eternal honor and blessedness. In this I suppose when Christ asked for glory from the Father, speaking both in the prosopon of his humanity, and from the prosopon of the Logos, when he said that this is what he had even before the foundation of the world, and when he proclaimed himself to be both glorious and inglorious, he heard, Ί have glorified you already,' that Is to say through the mysterious birth from the Virgin and from the other divine signs; and he heard, Ί will glorify you again,' that is through the resurrection after his death, through his immortality, his judgment of the world, and his authority and exaltation over all things, and, to put it simply, through the likeness of deification, and through the glory that was before the world which belonged to the Logos who was in him."

One should observe that in this passage Leontius maintains

that the Logos has established his human nature in a spiritual mode

233

of existence in every moment of his earthly, human existence from

his conception to his resurrection. And so, the incarnation alone

does not accomplish man's salvation; or better, the incarnation

itself includes not only the taking of human flesh, but also the

passion, resurrection, and glorification. To establish the human

nature In a spiritual mode of existence at every point of its

existence, from birth to death and resurrection, defines the

purpose of the incarnation and so not only the Christ's taking of

human flesh, but also his enduring the passion and obtaining

glorification are absolutely essential for man's salvation.

But now, we have said that the passion and glorification

happen to the Logos' particular human nature, and not to the whole

human race, and yet the human nature he assumes is the whole human

nature. How are we to understand the relation of Christ's

particular human nature to the rest of humanity?

We have already seen that since Leontius conceives the whole

in terms of definition and not in terms of space or quantity, he is

able to affirm that the whole of human nature is in the hypostasis

of Christ, just as it was in the hypostasis of our father Adam. In

Adam all men die because of their sin; but those who are In Christ

29 partake wholly of the human nature which he has renewed:

"Just as Adam is one of the whole race, and the first in the establishment of death through whom we all likewise have become mortal by nature, so also Christ, in the flesh, is one of the whole race; and he is the Prince of the passage to Immortality, through whom we all who are in him have come into the possession of immortal

29Adv.Nest. II.6: col. 1548A Iff.

234

life."

Because Christ has transformed our human nature, a

transformation he accomplished by leading it from birth to death in

a spiritual mode of life, there now exists the real possibility for

30 all men to attain deification:

"But even though he is their brother (their - the children of flesh and blood) since he has come forth in this present age from our forefather Adam in a corporeal generation, nevertheless, because in his resurrection from the dead he has made his body spiritual, and he has offered it to us for our nourishment in order that he might infuse in us who are dead, by his power, the energy which will raise our bodies after death to a spiritual life; he is clearly the author who has brought our now corruptible bodies Into a spiritual, Immortal, and incorruptible nature in the age to come."

These passages raise some important questions. We saw above

that Leontius rejects the notion that Christ's human nature Is

common; that is to say it is not an abstract entity comprising all

men for if that were the case, the events of the Incarnation would

be abstract, not real, and all men, including Pilate and Herod and

Judas, would be included in the events of the Incarnation. The

understanding implied in the passages just cited is consistent with

that affirmation. Deification is not automatically mediated to all

of mankind simply because we all share in the same humanity assumed

and deified by the Logos. There is in these passages a clear

allusion to the Sacramental Life of the Church as the means whereby

spiritual renewal is accomplished. To understand Leontius in this

regard, one must find the connection between Leontius' explanation

I Ibid., V.22: cols. 1744D 4 - 1745A 1.

235

of Christ's particular human nature, and the notion of the whole in

terms of definition rather than space or quantity. This puts the

question concerning the relationship of the "particular" to the

"universal" in a distinctively "Leontian" light.

2. Regeneration. The incarnation, we said, makes deification

possible for man. This is because the Logos has re-created, or

transformed, human nature into a spiritual mode of existence; he

has restored the original dominance of man's spirit over his flesh,

thereby raising human nature from a carnal to a spiritual life,

leading it to full deification through his resurrection from the

dead and his glorification. This Christ has done by

"spiritualizing" every aspect of his human existence, beginning

with his conception. Though he truly was born in the flesh, he was

conceived in a manner unlike any other man for he was conceived of

31 the Holy Spirit and the Blessed Virgin. Leontius says:

"We proclaim in an orthodox manner the pious teachings of the holy fathers, that the Divine Logos who exists before the ages is one Son from the one Father. We confess that in his one generation he is unique, and that in his second generation, accomplished in these last days Ly his own good pleasure and love for mankind, he himself united himself with a manhood like ours, and he came forth in the flesh, conceived of the Holy Virgin in a generation similar to ours. However, neither in his first generation, nor in his second, is he the same to anyone else in every respect; for no one else has been begotten in a manner similar to his first generation, which is eternal, and immutable, and perfect, and incontrovertible, and indivisible, and complete, and immovable; neither has anyone been begotten in a manner similar to his second generation which was without seed,

Ibid., IV.9: cols. 1669B 2 - 1672A 4.

236

and without corruption, and beyond the laws of nature, and which was conceived of the Holy Spirit, and was made perfect, and was formed, and supplied with bodily parts and organs in time, and in all respects he made the definition of his human essence complete in the pure womb of the Immaculate One, the human flesh of the Logos, derived from her alone, being made complete and being joined to him in an instant as a temple and tabernacle.

Indeed, we also believe that the Virgin gates were in truth closed, and while it is truly contrary to nature for bodies to pass through bodies without rupturing the womb, his flesh, which was the receptacle of God, passed through the womb of the Virgin by the supernatural power of the Spirit of the Logos who dwelt in her. Surely, we will praise this Virgin in whom and from whom the Logos came forth as a bridegroom from his holy bridal chamber, having been wedded to his flesh. And for this reason we confess her to be truly the birth-giver of God! Through her, wisdom has built himself a house. And what is wondrous is that he comes forth from his Virgin Mother without removing the natural property of her womb; but on the contrary, he comes forth in a spiritual manner in the chamber [of his flesh] which he receives from her who bore him, and he preserves its own natural property, that is the property of the flesh In which the Logos dwelt. For coming forth spiritually, and passing through the womb of the Virgin without rupturing her womb, the Logos empowers his flesh. For since he is without flesh, when he enters into it, he is not straitened by it. For since by his own good pleasure he has given himself to the Virgin, and he who is without flesh gives himself a fleshly form which he takes from her, and in a divine manner he unites his flesh which he has taken from her to himself."

That the Logos is truly man, though born in a spiritual

manner, underscores the anthropology assumed in Leontius'

christology and doctrine of deification; man is naturally

spiritual, not carnal; his natural mode of existence, in other

words, is to be dominated by his spirit, not his flesh. This does

not deny that the flesh is a real part of man, or that it is a kind

of prison in which the soul has fallen as a result of sin; rather

it affirms that even the natural mode of the flesh is to exist in

the Spirit.

237

In connection with this, Leontius believes that the manner of

Christ's birth is of soteriological significance. Christ's human

nature has been restored to full humanity by the indwelling of the

Logos; but that means that it has been restored to its "naturally"

spiritual existence. In order for man to be renewed, he must be

united to the particular human nature of Christ which, of course,

is our nature; in other words, just as the Logos was born in a

"spiritual manner", so also man, who is born in a carnal manner,

must be born again, that is, he must be restored to his naturally

"spiritual" life. This is made possible through Holy Baptism in

which man may enter into the reality of Christ's "spiritual birth"

and partake of his pure, deified, and incorruptible humanity —

which, of course, is ours. And so, just as the conception and

birth of Christ marked the beginning of his humanity's journey to

deification in the resurrectoin, so also our "regeneration" marks

the beginning of our deification. Leontius makes the mystical

connection between Christ's birth and our regeneration in Holy

32 Baptism clear in the following passage:

"It is generally agreed that the Lord, though he assumed our nature, was not deprived of those things which are beyond our nature. For his virginal conception, and his undefiled birth displayed much more than the manner of our generation....For he who is all powerful is not in need of time to accomplish the objects of his good pleasure, and the conception and pregnancy of the Blessed Virgin, which belongs to the word of Faith, cannot be described. She simply believed that what was spoken to her by the Lord would be fulfilled, for the [conception of the Blessed Virgin] is beyond all hope of understanding and nature and far exceeds the operations

Ibid., 11.20: cols. 1580D 7 - 1581B 8.

238

of the corporeal seeds. For, while the seed of the flesh is carnal, emitted by a natural operation through carnal desire, faith is the glory of the soul which is bestowed and given by the good-pleasure of God through the ever-living Word of God; which gives participation in the discernment of his own innate judgment by what was said to the Logos himself, 'In you I am well pleased.'

So then, in our spiritual regeneration through the water and the Spirit, all of us who are carnal in our nature, and who believe In Christ who was born thus in the flesh, are born again in the timeless Spirit."

The soteriology implied in Leontius' exposition is rich in its

implications. For one thing, deification is realized only in

Christ. As Leontius insists, we can be justified only by partaking

33 of Christ's sinless essence. This again would seem to follow

from the understanding that the hypostasis of the Logos is the

foundation of all being and in him alone is it possible for fallen

nature, originally created by him as pure, to be re-created and

restored to its "pristine beauty".

The beginning of this operation is the acquisition of the Holy

Spirit in Holy Baptism. However, this is only the beginning of

deification. As we saw earlier, just as the Logos transforms the

flesh into a spiritual existence not simply by uniting himself with

it but by setting it in the things of the Spirit throughout his

earthly life, so also Leontius understands that man is called to

realize his spiritual regeneration by struggling against the

desires of the flesh throughout his life in order to complete his

transformation in the spiritual life to which he has been born in

Baptism. What lies behind this is indicated in what Leontius says

Ibid., V.15: col. 1737 B C

239

in the passage just cited: "For, because the soul which is in the

flesh is united by the decree of God, and because it accepts in a

spiritual manner the spiritual seed, it is deemed worthy of the

spiritual nature, and [is united to it] by nature." In other

words, in Holy Baptism the soul of man is restored to its rightful

place of dominance in the human composite. Though the notion of

"synergism" is not explicitly referred to, it is clearly present in

that the soul takes the initiative in receiving the Word of Faith,

and the Holy Spirit realizes the soul's desire. Now the soul takes

the lead in the ascetic discipline necessary to turn the individual

away from the desires of the flesh and to set his whole existence

in the things of the Spirit, becoming thereby worthy of his

spiritual re-birth. As Leontius says in a passage in which he

refutes the implications his opponents' views have on the ascetic

34 aspect of salvation:

"Is the soul saved by the body? [Of course not!] For by struggling against it, and through discipline — even to the point where neither death nor pain impede it from its own particular operations because death is no longer a concern, since the soul has set its thoughts against it, thereby proving its independence from the dissolution of its bonds with the body — it procures for itself a reward. And so, although we live in the flesh, we are not commanded to walk according to the flesh [but according to the Spirit]."

Every aspect in Leontius' doctrine of deification follows from

the principles he has established in his christology. Regeneration

does not involve a change of essence, but rather a new mode of

existence. Just as the pre-existent Logos was able to experience a

( Ibid., 1.7: col. 1429B 8ff.

240

second birth, thereby entering into a fleshly mode of existence, so

also as a result, man is able to experience a second birth through

which he may enter into a spiritual mode of existence. This notion

comes through especially in Adv.Nest. IV where Leontius addresses

his opponents' notion that generation necessarily involves the

production of essence rather than bringing into existence. On this

principle, his opponents seek to establish that the Logos could not

have experienced a second generation from the Virgin. By refuting

it, and establishing that generation means bringing into existence,

and not the creation of essence (since God alone Is the creator of

essences), Leontius not only demonstrates that the Logos was born a

second time, whereby he began a fleshly mode of existence, but also

that we may be born a second time, whereby we may enter into the

35 deified life of Christ. He says:

"Gentlemen, no one says that these things which already exist [� heaven and earth and all things] have been brought into being, or even that the heaven has been brought into being. Nevertheless, all those who are sustained in piety confess with us that something new has been produced from something old, and that there has been a transformation; and this new thing has clothed all the rest of creation with incorruptibility, and has freed it from the bondage of corruption, so that our bodies which are given over to death, are raised up to incorruptible life.

But then, according to you, since the world already exists in corruption, we can no longer say that it has been brought into incorruptibility, or that it has been regenerated, for you say that whatever exists cannot be brought into being. You did not add: that which is, is not produced. But you do not even allow to what exists in some way that what does not exist is brought into being. Now, according to your arguments, we cannot even say that something incorruptible has been granted to that

Ibid., IV.29: col. 1696A 8 � Β 13.

241

which is corruptible, in accordance with our saving hope. For as when man is born he is clothed with corruptibi-lity, so when we are regenerated we are clothed with incorruptibility."

Man's re-birth means entering into the union of God and man in

Christ Jesus; it is a genuine union of essences, and so a "natural

union" in which the human nature is infused with the divine Life of

God, without suffering an alteration of its natural definition.

Again, this follows from Leontius' christology: just as the human

nature is an acquisition to the divine hypostasis of the Logos —

without changing the nature or identity of the Logos — so also the

Holy Spirit is an acquisition to human hypostases, without changing

36 the nature or identity of the human individual;

"But if the garment of the Logos is the flesh, and if the Logos is God, and if the flesh is man, it follows that one ought rather to say with respect to the Christ that he is a 'man-bearing* God, and one ought to call his apostles, who were clothed with power from on high when the Holy Spirit of God came upon them, 'God-bearing' men. For, in their case, the divine nature is conceived as an acquisition to the human hypostasis. But in the case of the Lord it is the other way around: the human nature Is understood to be an acquisition to the divine hypostasis, for he clothed himself with our nature, and having clothed himself with all of us when he took the flesh, he gave to it the Spirit of his own nature."

In this new Life, man possesses the gift of immortal life; he

acquires the gift of the Holy Spirit himself. Because of the

Logos' assumption of human nature into his own hypostasis, it is

possible for man to receive into his own human hypostasis the

37 spiritual nature of the future resurrection:

Ibid., VI.1: col. 1753B 1 - C 3.

Ibid., 11.35: col. 1593B 13 - C 9.

ν

242

"The same hypostasis of the Logos became man in the assumption of the human nature, even though it is itself without a prosopon. For although the hypostasis of the Logos became the hypostasis of the flesh, the Logos did not become flesh, but rather, the Logos acquired the flesh. And although his nature became the nature of the flesh because of the hypostasis which they both shared, his nature did not dwell among us corporeal beings, that is In the flesh, but it was the Logos who became flesh. Therefore, the Logos is able to bear the names of both natures, since he exists now in one prosopon of a double nature, though before he was in one prosopon of a single nature. And if anyone should say that it is Impossible for one prosopon of one nature to bear another nature in itself, then neither are the prosopa of our fleshly nature able to receive the spiritual nature of the future resurrection."

That we receive the spiritual nature of the future

resurrection reveals what should already have become obvious. We

have said that Leontius' doctrine of deification or salvation

follows his christology. Regeneration is the beginning of our

deification in that it brings us into a spiritual mode of

existence, and ascetic discipline throughout our life is necessary

to set the whole human composite in the things of the Spirit, just

as the Logos directed his human composite towards the things of the

Spirit throughout his life. But if the humanity of Christ reached

full deification in the resurrection, then it should be clear that

the full realization of our deification is likewise obtained

through our death and resurrection in Christ.

3. Death and Resurrection. To repeat what we have

established: the Incarnation renders deification possible for man.

Through regeneration, each individual person is raised Into the

( spiritual existence of Christ's deified humanity. Now, in ascetic

243

discipline the individual follows the example of Christ who

throughout his earthly sojourn set his flesh in the things of the

Spirit. This is the beginning and the process of deification. The

end of deification is attained in death. Just as baptism is the

gateway through which one is born into the spiritual life of

Christ, so also death, which has been transformed by the "prince of

immortality" into the passage to Immortality, has become the

gateway through which one enters into the fullness of deification.

38 In this connection, we present a text we cited earlier:

"But even though he is their brother since he has come forth in this present age from our forefather Adam In a corporeal generation, nevertheless, because in his resurrection from the dead he has made his body spiritual, and he has offered it to us for our nourishment in order that he might infuse in us who are dead, by his power, the energy which will raise our bodies after death to a spiritual life; he is clearly the author who has brought our now corruptible bodies into a spiritual, immortal, and incorruptible nature in the age to come."

The allusion to Holy Communion reveals that the infusion of

Christ's deifying power into our dying bodies through the partaking

of Christ's Body and Blood leads us through death to the attainment

of incorruptibility which will be fully realized in the general

resurrection, that is in the age to come. Even our present

corruptible flesh, therefore, which directly partakes of Christ's

deified Body and Blood, is infused with that deifying power whereby

it will be transformed in the age to come into a spiritual body,

clothed with incorruptibility. In another passage, Leontius

Ibid., V.22: col. 1744D 4 - 1745A 1.

244

proclaims:

"If he who is the Spirit is alone the Life�giver by nature, then there is no one other than the Lord who holds the power of life and death; therefore life was only in God himself, and the same was put to death and made alive, and he makes to die and to live, he goes down to Hell, and returns; therefore it is clear that in raising himself, the Lord established himself as Son of God, not expiring with his human part, for God is immortal, but he worked from the part that is properly the divine operation, and he made alive his dead part; and this is the surpassing greatness of the power of God to us who believe according to the energy of the power of his might, which he worked in Christ, raising him from the dead. And also being infused in us through the partaking of his Holy Body, he makes alive our mortal bodies after death through his Divine Spirit who dwells in us."

What we have so far presented intensifies the question of how

Christ's particular human nature is related to all mankind. On the

one hand, Leontius maintains, in line with his notion of the whole

in terms of definition, that the human nature assumed by Christ is

our human nature, it is the whole of human nature. And so, in

deifying and clothing his body with incorruptibility, he has

clothed all of us with incorruptibility. On the other hand, what

he indicates in terms of salvation would seem to contradict this.

We seem to have discovered a latent notion which would suggest that

there Is a deified human nature, Christ's, and another human nature

that is not deified, ours, except when we are regenerated into a

spiritual existence through Holy Baptism.

To meet this difficulty, we must call to mind part of our

earlier presentation. We saw before that regeneration does not

Ibid., V.3: col. 1728A 3 � Β 4.

245

involve a change of essence, but a change in man's mode of

existence. Apart from faith and repentance, man continues to live

in a fleshly, carnal mode. Human nature itself, however, has been

transformed in Christ; in Christ human nature "exists" in a

deified, spiritual "state"; it has been restored to its natural

mode of existence. Moreover, because Christ's human nature is

particular, it is real and concrete. Therefore, what has happened

to Christ in the flesh is real, and because it is real it applies

to all those who share in the same nature. Leontius explains

himself in this way:

"But we quite simply and openly proclaim to you this that is easily understood: the divine nature did not submit to being united with us through some good pleasure that was extended to us; it would never occur to those who are pious to say or to think this! But the incarnation of the divine nature occured simply because of his exceeding goodness to us, so that just as the wealth of deification happened first, directly, and immediately to the particular nature of the Lord's human nature (Κυρίακδν άνθρωπον) as to the head of the human nature, the first born of many brethren and the head of the body which is the Church, through his intimate union with God and through the hypostatic union of the [divine nature] with the [humanity of the Lord]; so also the [benefits] of his super�excellent power penetrated derivatively to the rest of human nature and to the other brethren of Abraham's seed by means of their mediation and participation in their natural union with the humanity of the Lord that was taken from our nature and who was benefited first. So there is one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus our Lord who mediates for us because he is of the same lump, though he is the chief, and because the only�begotten is our brother, though he is the first born, and because he is of the same body, though he is the head."

We must reflect closely on the implications of Leontius'

Ibid., 1.18: col. 1468B 6 � D 1.

246

notion of a particular human nature to come to some understanding

of his thought concerning the mediation of salvation. Nature does

not exist except in hypostases, for the hypostasis is the

foundation and principle of existence. And so, we cannot speak of

some abstract common humanity, for it does not exist except in

individual persons. In each hypostasis, human nature becomes

particular, it becomes real. The Logos assumed our human nature

and made it real, in his own hypostasis, but he did not assume human

hypostases. Consequently, though he led our human nature to

glorification and transformed it in his own hypostasis into its

natural spiritual mode of existence, in so doing he did not destroy

what is at the heart of man's divine likeness: personal freedom.

Leontius' doctrine of deification implicitly assumes this. Though

human nature has been raised to incorruptibility in Christ, each

particular individual is free to choose whether or not he will

enter into the spiritual mode of existence to which his own human

nature has been raised in Christ. In so saying we come to an

important insight: in Christ, the "bridge" to our salvation is our

own nature: "The Kingdom of God," says our Lord, "is within you."

In rejecting the Gospel of Christ, man rejects not only God, but

himself; he falls victim to a tragic nihilism.

The Logos has filled our nature with himself, and so he has

clothed it with his own incorruptibility. The Logos has "hidden

himself", as Leontius says, in our nature as a check to the devil.

May we not understand, then, that the deeper one penetrates to the

most inner core of his own human being, the closer one comes to

247

v . God? And the closer one comes to God, the closer he comes to his

true self and to all other "selves". May we not understand the

beginning, as well as the process, of salvation as the turning away

from our superficial existence — the far-off country as it were —

towards the inner depths of our being? In other words, is not

salvation the serious struggle to come to our true "selves", to

come to our senses as in the parable of the Prodigal Son? That

deification or salvation means coming to our true selves confirms

that the foundation of human being is personal; we are not absorbed

into the divine fullness of God when we are united with him in

Christ, but in communion with him we remain who we are. And so

just as God is open to receive human nature into himself, without

destroying it or the identity of those who belong to it, so also we

are open to receive God himself, to touch him and in so doing to

realize our true destiny. The content of deification or salvation,

then, reveals that being is personal, or "hypostatic". This only

confirms that at the deepest level of his being, man is created in

the image and likeness of the tri-une hypostatic God, and his

origin and destiny is in God.

ν CONCLUSION

Summary and Appraisal. Our objective has been to uncover the

fundamental principles of Leontius' christology in order to assess

his faithfulness to Catholic Tradition as expressed particularly by

the fathers of Nicea and Chalcedon. Against Nestorius, Cyril of

Alexandria defended the Nicene insight that the same Son of God who

is consubstantial to the Father was incarnate, suffered, and died.

In order to emphasize the unity and true identity of Jesus Christ

Cyril appealed to terms he thought sanctioned by St. Athanasius,

the terms hypostasis and physis, both of which were used in a

christological context to indicate the concrete individual.

Nestorius was condemned at Ephesus, but on the death of Cyril, a

new error from the other extreme sprang up in the person of

Eutyches. Against Eutyches St. Leo emphasized the full humanity of

Christ in order to emphasize that the Christ's humanity remains

complete and intact in its union with the Divine Logos. The

monophysites, however, mistakenly interpreted Leo to imply two

subjects in Christ, the human and the divine and charged him and

Chalcedon with Nestorianism.

Guided by the christological Insight of St. Cyril, Chalcedon

incorporated the language of Leo's Tome Into its definition of

faith in order to combat the old enemy Nestorianism and the new

enemy Eutychianism. The resulting definition served to distinguish

the key terms hypostasis and physis and to moor them to a fixed

frame of reference. This did not solve, however, but only defined

248

249

more precisely the philosophical problem presented by the christian

faith, viz., how can two perfect realities be united as one without

losing their distinctive natural principles?

Leontius of Jerusalem was engaged In the task of synthesizing

the language of Chalcedon with that of Cyril in order to

demonstrate that the Nicene faith of Cyril was faithfully

represented in the definition of Chalcedon. Leontius' frame of

reference, then, was not the categories of Plato or Aristotle, but

the language of Chalcedon and the faith of Nicea. In this respect,

we say that Leontius was a theologian and not a philosopher for he

did not base his christological exposition of hypostasis and physis

on concepts derived from philosophical categories, but rather on

the faith of Chalcedon and Nicea. His use of philosophical

categories was employed in the service of that faith in order to

elucidate the mystery to which the conciliar definitions point.

The christian faith affirms that the same Son of God was

Incarnate, suffered, and died. The philosophical problem

introduced is the question of how the Son of God himself becomes

man without ceasing to be God. In seeking to come to an

understanding of the difficulty one is led not only to a

consideration of Christ's identity, but also to a consideration of

man's nature and destiny, and more specifically, the content of

salvation. The key to unlocking Leontius* thought in this regard

is his notion of hypostasis and how it is related to physis.

In light of the charges made by C Moeller, that Leontius'

christology reflects monophysitic tendencies, and in light of the

250

interpretation of the christology Leontius represents implied in

the label "neo�chalcedonian", we have been concerned in our

dissertation to examine how Leontius' notion of hypostasis reflects

primarily on the problem concerning the preservation of the human

nature's integrity in its union with the Divine Logos. The problem

is made acute by the fact that the human nature has no human

hypostasis of its own, and the properties of the human nature

accrue to the divine hypostasis of the Logos. This would indeed

seem to lead to at least a crypto�monophysitism for how can the

human nature remain human, and how can it avoid absorption into the

divine, if it Is not protected from the divine nature by a human

hypostasis of its own? And, if the properties of the human nature

accrue to a divine hypostasis, then is not the human nature somehow

lost, or at least rendered of little theological significance?

For Leontius, the solution to the whole difficulty rests on a

proper understanding of the distinction between hypostasis and

physis. The hypostasis is the underlying subject, the foundation

of the nature's existence, conceptually distinguished from the

physis. The hypostasis is a particular, but not a particular

nature. The common nature, rather, is made particular because it

exists in, and becomes the possession of, a particular hypostasis.

And so Leontius says that the nature of Christ is somewhat

particular (τίνα ιδική), or perhaps a better translation would be

"particular in a certain sense." In other words, the common human

nature, which all human hypostases share, becomes particular in

Christ just as it is particular in each human hypostasis. But now

251

we come to a most Important implication. Though the hypostasis is

the foundation of the nature's existence, we cannot say that

hypostases are the foundation of being, for the foundation of being

is the one hypostasis of Christ. Consequently, when he assumes our

human nature into his own hypostasis, he himself becomes the

first�fruits of humanity. He Is the Second Adam; that is to say,

as the first Adam is the progenitor of the race, and the one in

whom the whole race fell, the Second Adam is the Creator of the

race in whom the whole race through his Passion, Resurrection, and

Glorification is raised to eternal life In communion with God, the

origin and destiny of man.

Leontius insists that the assumption of a naked human nature

by the Logos does not alter the natural principles either of the

Logos or the humanity he assumed. On the contrary, he insists that

such a union between God and man fulfills man's destiny. This

rests on the belief that man by nature possesses spiritual affinity

with God such that he can actually touch God, and that in so doing

he fully realizes what it means to be human. Because man by nature

possesses spiritual affinity with God — he is in a real sense

innately divine; he became a living soul through the divine breath

of God, and his original parent (αϋτίος) Is God himself — the

Logos of God may assume human nature into his own hypostasis

without destroying or altering its natural definitions. In so

doing, the Logos fills human nature with himself; he Is in human

nature just as human nature is in him. This affirms the faith of

Nicea: the same Son of God became himself man. And it affirms the

252

V definition of Chalcedon: the same Son of God is in two natures, the

divine and human, and the two natures concur in the one hypostasis

and prosopon of the Son of God.

This reveals the content of salvation, or the destiny of man,

and that is to be filled with God himself and to live in God. To

be filled with God himself, and to live the Life of God is for

Leontius the real content of deification. Deification, however,

does not involve a change in man's nature, but rather a change in

his mode of existence from a fallen, corruptible mode of existence,

to one that is incorruptible. Indeed, far from changing human

nature such a destiny fulfills human nature in that man is innately

divine from his creation. Deification for Leontius, then, fully

realizes what distinguishes man most from the rest of creation; man

alone was fashioned by the hands of God, man alone was brought to

life by the divine breath of God, man alone was created in the

image of God. To live the divine Life of God, therefore, is the

natural end of man's origin.

The anthropology assumed in Leontius' christology, then,

provides the answer to the problem of the integrity of the human

nature. Since man and God possess a spiritual affinity with one

another, the human nature may contribute to the divine hypostasis

of the Logos its own natural properties, making the Logos

incarnate, and the divine hypostasis may contribute to the human

nature its own incorruptibility and impassibility without altering

in this exchange the natural properties of either nature. Both

contribute to the other while remaining what they are; and because

253

the divine hypostasis is the creator and origin of the human

nature, its assumption of the human nature, which involves entering

into the human condition of birth and death, can only result in

raising it to a superior, divine mode of existence.

If properly understood, Leontius' christology, then, goes to

the heart of Nicea and Chalcedon. His terminological synthesis

results in an affirmation that the Logos himself was incarnate —

this is the faith of Nicea — , and that the human nature he

assumed, though without its own human hypostasis, was complete —

this is the affirmation of Chalcedon. Indeed, Leontius reveals

that Chalcedon properly interpreted leads us to understand that man

possesses spiritual affinity with God, for the Logos assumes a

naked human nature without destroying its natural definition; and

that his natural destiny is deification, for it is precisely in

assuming a naked human nature that the Logos filled it with himself

and raised it to a divine mode of existence.

We must conclude, therefore, that Leontius has successfully

met the philosophical difficulty posed by the language of Chalcedon

and St. Cyril. He has not, to be sure, answered all the

difficulties inherent in the problem, as we will show in what

follows, but he has maintained in a coherent way the two concerns

represented by Nicea and Chalcedon: that the same Son of God was

incarnate, and that the human nature he assumed was complete and

was not lost. In so doing he has established a solid basis on

which the further difficulty concerning the relation of Christ's

mind to the hypostasis of the Logos can be addressed.

254

In what follows we wish to look ahead and offer in a

preliminary way some reflections on how Leontius' christological

exposition is related to the manner in which the question of

Christ's mind in its relation' to the hypostasis of the Logos was

eventually resolved at the Council of 681. Before coming to that,

however, it would be helpful if we considered the value of this

thesis as it pertains to further research.

Looking Ahead. In establishing the fundamental principles of

Leontius' christology we have focused primarily on the Adv.Nest..

This serves the useful purpose of uncovering the christological

characteristics of one of the works whose authorship some, who are

unconvinced by the work of M. Richard, may still dispute. The next

step would be to undertake the same type of systematic examination

of the CMon. and compare the results in order to confirm or reject

Richard's conclusions that the two are written by the same Leontius

of Jerusalem. Our belief has been that the CMon. introduces the

same christological principles found in the Adv.Nest., but does not

analyze them in the same depth of detail. Nonetheless, a study

focusing primarily on the CMon. would be of value for the purposes

of this question.

As a second step following from our thesis, it would be of

great value to undertake the same kind of systematic study of those

writings attributed to Leontius of Byzantium and compare those

results with the conclusions drawn from the study of the Adv.Nest.

and the CMon. The value of this would be to confirm either the

255

thesis of M. Richard, who believes the two Leontii represent very

different christologies, or someone such as Stephan Otto , who

believes the two are very close.

Now, concerning the significance of Leontius' christological

exposition for the question of how Christ's mind is related to the

hypostasis of the Logos as that question was eventually resolved at

the Council of 681, we have already suggested in the introduction

that in the 6th century the same issues at stake in the controversy

over theopaschism were involved in the question concerning the

knowledge of Christ, namely whether or not the Christ was the Logos

himself incarnate, or someone other than the Logos united in some

special way to the Logos. In the second decade of the 7th century,

the question of the mind or will of Christ proceeds to a deeper

level. Up to that time, theologians were accustomed to using two

formulas: "one operation" to emphasize the unity of Christ, and

"two operations" to emphasize the two natures. In letters to Cyrus

of Alexandria, and then to Pope Honorius, Archbishop Sergius of

Constantinople argues that maintaining two formulae in Christ

involves an awkwardness that necessitates their suppression and

2 replacement by the single formula of one operation. For our

purposes, that which is of essential importance is the basis for

See the introduction, p. 3.

2 See the historical and theological study of monotheletism by

V. Grumel iu "Recherches sur l'histoire du monothelisme," Echos d'Orient XXVII (July-Sept. 1928) and XXVIII (Jan.-Mar. 1929). Concerning the correspondence of Sergius with Honorius, see the third part of this study, entitled, "Du monénergism au monothelisme," in XXVIII, pp. 272-282.

256

Sergius' belief that the formula of the two operations was

untenable. In his correspondence with Honorius, "the inconvenience

that made the most impression on the Pope," says Grumel, "was that

which Sergius derived from the dyo�energistic formula. It

necessarily follows, said the Patriarch, that to admit in the

Christ two wills means opposition between them, and consequently,

two persons possessing a contrary will: δύο τους τάναντία

θέλοντας ."3

The phrase, "δΰο τους τάναντία θέλοντας ," especially arrests

one's attention for it is the identical phrase used by Apollinaris

4

to maintain the same thing. The anthropology suggested by such an

understanding places the center of the "Ego" In the mind. The mind

is the ruling principle, the ήγεµονικόν. Hence, to unite one

ruling principle with another without involving the destruction of

the one is clearly impossible. We have already indicated that for

Leontius, who in this regard follows, as we showed, Gregory of

Nazianzus, it is natural for the human mind to be led by the

Logos.

However, the resolution of the problem goes much deeper than

this for even in these terms, it would be possible to conceive of

JIbid., vol. XXVIII, p. 272.

4 See Lietzmann, Apollinaris von Laodicea und seine Schule, fr.

150: "Et γαρ πας νους αυτοκράτωρ εστί ίδικφ θελήµατι κατά φύσιν κινούµενος, άδύνατδν έστιν έν ένΐ καΐ τφ αύτφ ύποκειµένφ δΰο τους τάναντία θέλοντας άλλήλοις συνυπάρχειν έκατέρου τό θεληθέν έαυτφ καθ* δρµήν αύτοκίνητον ενεργούντος."

See chapter 3, pp. 122f.

257

the humanity as possessing its own personal center, the mind, that

is led by the Logos In its subsistence in the divine hypostasis.

As we have seen, however, in the christology of Leontius the "Ego"

is not the mind for the mind is an essential part of human nature.

But rather, the "Ego" is the hypostasis. As the foundation of its

natural constitution, the hypostasis "transcends" its parte,

embracing them all, and at the same time existing in them all. In

a significant text, Leontius describes the hypostasis as the whole

which "transcends" (the Greek word he uses is παραλάσσω) the body

and soul. The ruling principle of the human composite, then, is

not the mind but the hypostasis or the "Ego".

Leontius in fact is simply forming some kind of philosophical

articulation of a principle already implicitly assumed in monastic

literature. Again and again, particularly in those tracts dealing

with "watchfulness" — a key word in monastic piety — one comes

across the injunction to set oneself as a guard over his mind, or

his intellect, or hie soul, in order to attain to a knowledge of

God. The mind, then, and the movement of the mind is a natural,

not a personal, phenomenon whose movement or operation is directed

by the "Ego" or hypostasis. In Christ, the ruling principle is the

hypostasis of the Logos and the movement of the mind is directed

Adv.Nest. 1.52: cols. 1517D 1 � 1520A 11.

As particular examples, see especially St. Hesychios, "On Watchfulness and Holiness," in The Philokalia Vol. I, trans, and edited by G.E.H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard, and Kallistos Ware, (London: Faber & Faber) 1979, pp. 162�198; and St. Isaiah the Solitary, "On Guarding the Intellect," Ibid., pp. 22�30,

258

not by a human hypostasis but by the divine hypostasis of the g

Logos. Now, this will involve difficulties concerning Christ's

"gnomic will", and the task of unraveling this difficulty will fall

9 to Maximus the Confessor.

For our purposes, we only wish to note that for the human mind

to be directed by the divine hypostasis in no way changes its

natural definition for, as Leontius makes quite clear in his

doctrine of deification, the natural movement of human nature is

from God and to God. In this sense is it natural for the human

mind to be led by God, for its author and the full attainment of

its faculties is God himself. Ascetic discipline, then, involves

bringing our own personal will (our "hypostatic" or "gnomic" will

to anticipate the terminology of Maximus, — our will whereby we

have freely rebelled against God and whereby we may freely return

to God) into conformity with what is natural to us, namely living

in the divine Life and according to the commandments of God. Now,

in this respect, we come upon a very interesting statement made by

Leontius. His opponents raise the difficulty: "If the divine

See the statement of J. Meyendorff in Christ in Eastern Christian Thought, concerning the position of the author of the De Sectis that Christ was learning what he did not previously know, pp. 86f: "This position of the author of the De Sectis, taken over by the anti-Iconoclastic writers of the eighth and ninth centuries, proves that the Christology defined in 553 in no way excludes the existence in Christ of a fully human consciousness; furthermore, it shows that the notion of hypostasis, which in Christ is that of the Logos, is not identifiable with that of consciousness, which remains a phenomenon of nature."

9 See the introduction of Polycarp Sherwood, op. cit. pp.

51-63.

259

hypostasis preserves his divine knowledge, and in the flesh

preserves ignorance as man, how will the distinction of the

hypostases remain, and the hypostases which are distinguished not

remain?" To which Leontius replies:

"But nature exists in the state of knowledge or ignorance in the hypostasis. But it Is not the hypostasis by itself that possesses the faculty of knowledge, for we do not say that all the parts of the hypostasis of Paul have the faculty of knowledge. For example, we do not say that his fingers or any of the parts of his corporeal nature have the faculty of knowledge, but only that faculty to which knowledge is natural, and that is the psychic faculty alone, namely the mind. Nor do we refer primarily to the whole nature. So how would what we say of the hypostasis be said of the nature?"

Nowhere does Leontius give specific indication of his

understanding concerning the knowledge or ignorance of Christ.

This text perhaps comes as close as any. In the absence of a

sufficient number of references to the problem from which we might

derive some fairly solid conclusions, we must be careful not to

ascribe too much to Leontius in this regard. However, in the light

of this text and the general christological principles established

by Leontius, we might reflect on the implications of his thought

with reference to the question under discussion.

"Nature exists in the state of knowledge or ignorance in the

hypostasis." The Implication seems to be that because the human

nature of Christ exists in the divine hypostasis, it receives the

state of its knowledge from the divine hypostasis in which it

exists. On this basis, one might conclude that for Leontius,

Adv.Nest. 11.32: col. 1589C 5ff.

260

Christ is "all-knowing". However, this is a pre-mature conclusion,

or at least an uninformed one. The question concerns the content

of real knowledge. As Leontius says in Adv.Nest. V.30, the

ultimate end of blessedness for the human nature is to be in

Christ, and as he also says repeatedly, the aim of the Incarnation

is to lead man through death to incorruptibility. The natural

movement of man, then, is from and to God. But we can turn this

around and, recalling Gregory of Nyssa and looking forward to

Maximus the Confessor, say that the natural definition of human

nature, insofar as it i3 created, is to move towards God. Though

this is not systematically developed in Leontius as it is in

Gregory and Maximus, it is clearly there. With regard to the

integrity of Christ's human nature, this has very important

consequences. If the Logos becomes fully man and fully preserves

the natural definition of man, then, if he is perfect man, he moves

insofar as he is man continually towards God. Moreover, if Christ

is perfect man, and if the Logos is the "Wisdom of God", then he is

from the beginning moving towards God in possession of the full

knowledge of God. This movement towards God is, of course,

infinite for God himself is infinite. To say, then, that the Logos

incarnate "increases in wisdom and stature" is simply an

affirmation and description of perfect humanity. The Logos

On the doctrine of Gregory of Nyssa, see J. Danielou, From Glory to Glory. Texts from Gregory of Nyssa's Mystical Writings, trans, by Herbert Musurillo, S.J. (St. Vladimir's Seminary Press: New York, 1979) 1-71. On Maximus the Confessor, see P. Sherwood, pp. 28-98.

261

^ incarnate then is "all-knowing" in that he possesses, and as man

grows in, real knowledge, and that is not knowledge of the "day and

hour" — in these terms he is "ignorant" as all men — but

knowledge of God.

With this we conclude the present investigation. Insofar as

Leontius' christology affirms both that the Logos himself is

incarnate, and that the human nature which he assumes and with

which he clothes himself is complete, he is shown to be in full

accord with Nicea and Chalcedon. His christology, moreover,

reveals that a truly christian theology must find its beginning and

end in the doctrinal statements of the Ecumenical Councils of the

Catholic Church and that this theological "enterprise" is not so

much concerned with systematization as it is with coming to a

genuine knowledge of God to which these conciliar definitions of

Faith point. Informed by the mystery to which these conciliar

definitions point, one is directed to the mystery of the

Incarnation, and from there to the mystery of man, and of God, and

to the real content of salvation.

(

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACO - Schwartz, Edward, ed., Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum. Strasbourg: 1914ff. Tom. II, Vol. I, 2.

DTC - A. Vacant and E. Mangenot, Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique. Paris: 1909ff.

Evagrius' Eccl. Hist. - Evagrius Scholasticus, Ecclesiastical History. Edited by J. Bidez and L. Parmentier. A reprinting of the 1898 London edition of Methuen. Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1964.

NPNF - Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, eds., Nicene and Post-Nlcene Fathers of the Christian Church (second series). Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

PG - J.P. Migne, Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Graeca. Paris: 1903ff.

RHE - Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique. Louvain: 1900ff.

263

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ABSTRACT

Kenneth W. Wesche

B.A. - Northwest Nazarene College

M.Div. - Nazarene Theological Seminary

The Defense of Chalcedon in the 6th Century: The Doctrine of "Hypostasis" and Deification in the Christology of Leontius of Jerusalem.

Dissertation directed by the Very Rev. John Meyendorff.

The thesis considers how Leontius' christology bears primarily

on the problem of the integrity of Christ's human nature in its

union with the Divine Logos. The problem is made acute by the fact

that not only has the Christ no human hypostasis but Leontius

maintains that the properties of the human nature accrue to the

divine hypostasis of the Logos. How can the human nature avoid

absorption into the divine if it is not protected from the divine

nature by its own human hypostasis? And, if the properties of the

human nature accrue to a divine and not a human hypostasis, is not

the human nature at least rendered of little theological

significance?

The solution to the difficulty lies in Leontius' anthropology.

Basing itself on primary sources, the thesis proposes that for

Leontius, since man possesses a spiritual affinity with God, the

human nature may contribute to the divine hypostasis of the Logos

its own natural properties, making the Logos incarnate, and the

divine hypostasis may contribute to the human nature its own

incorruptibility and Impassibility without altering in this

exchange the natural properties of either nature. Both natures

contribute to the other while remaining what they are; and because

the Logos is the creator of the human nature, his assumption of the

human nature, which involves entering into the human condition of

birth and death, can only result in raising it to a superior,

divine mode of existence

The thesis concludes that Leontius has successfully met the

philosophical difficulty posed by the language of Chalcedon and St.

Cyril. He has maintained in a coherent way the two concerns

represented by Nicea and Chalcedon: that the same Son of God was

incarnate, and that the human nature he assumed was complete and

was not lost.

VITA

Born September 29, 1954 in San Antonio, Texas, Ken Wesche was

raised in Idaho. He graduated from Capital High School in Boise,

Idaho in 1972 and in the Fall of that year matriculated at

Northwest Nazarene College in Nampa, Idaho where he majored in

elementary education. He received his bachelor's degree in

elementary ed. from NNC in May 1976. Following his graduation from

NNC he taught 4th grade in the Boise Public Schools for two years.

In the Fall of 1977 he matriculated at Nazarene Theological

Seminary in Kansas City, Missouri, and received the M.Div. degree,

magna cum laude, in the Spring of 1981. He was accepted into the

Ph.D. program of Fordham University theology department (The Bronx,

New York) in September, 1982, where he majored in Patristic

theology. His thesis was completed in the winter of 1986 under the

mentorship of the very Rev. John Meyendorff.

During the last three years of his studies at seminary in

Kansas City, Ken was awarded a teacher assistantship, and student

instructorships to teach beginning and intermediate New Testament

Greek, and beginning and advanced Biblical Hebrew. Fordham

University awarded him a graduate assistantship. He completed his

doctoral studies with a cumulative G.P.A. of 3.9/4.0, and was

awarded a "High Pass" on his Ph.D. comprehensive examination.