kenneth merchant
TRANSCRIPT
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Management AccountingPractice and ResearchRelated to VerticalHierarchieswithinOrganizations
Kenneth A. Merchant
University of Southern California
EIASM, December 2006
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What is a vertical hierarchy?
Organization built on series ofsuperior/subordinate relationships
Headquarters/divisions/departments
Functional Divisionalized
Geographical
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Critical problems in vertical
hierarchies
The organizational coordination problem
The management control/agency/motivation
problem
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Primary control alternatives in
vertical hierarchies
Direct supervision(monitoring)
Bureaucracy (rules andprocedures)
Meritocracy (autonomy plusaccountability
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Creating a meritocracy is
generally the preferredalternative
Encourage coordinated actions.
Energize the workforce.
Stimulate learning, creativity/innovationand continuous improvement.
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Management accounting in
meritocracies Long history
E.g., DuPont, General Motors, GE
Centralized control withdecentralized authority
Responsibility accounting
E.g., Solomons (1965)
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Virtually all corporations of at
least minimal size Create financial plans/budgets
Measure financial andoperational performancemonthly
Use responsibility accounting
Provide rewards based onfinancial performance
(typically annually)
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So is best practice well
established?
Not exactly
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Among the things we dont know
1. Why so heavy an emphasison summary financialmeasures of performance
when it is known that thesemeasures provide poorindications of value creation?
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What we want (in for-profit
organiations)
Measures that go up when value is createdand down when value is destroyed.
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What weve got
Correlation between annual accountingearnings and annual value creation .20
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Lots of financial measurement
alternatives
Profit measures (e.g., PAT, PBT,operating income, EBITDA,
OIBDA)Return measures (e.g., ROE,
ROC, ROI, RONA, RAROC,CFROI)
Residual measures (e.g.,residual income, EVA,economic profit)
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Summary financial measures:
unsolved questions
Which measures work best in which settings?
Can the measures be improved?
Are there roles for financial measures even ifthey do not reflect value changes well?
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Correlations between accounting
earnings and value creationOne year
Two years
Five years
Ten years
Source: Easton et al, JAR, 1992.
Should firms just extend themeasurement horizon?
.22
.39
.57
.79
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Among the things we dont know
(cont.)2. How best to link market, financial and non-financial measures of performance?
Lots of frameworks for IntegratedPerformance Measurement Systems
Balanced Scorecard Tableau de Bord
Performance Prism
Intellectual Capital Navigator
SMART (Strategic Measurement and
Reporting Technique) EFQM (European Foundation for Quality
Managements Excellence Model)
(Or more generally, MBO/CSF)
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Measurement issues when using
a combination of measures How to test the assumed
causal linkages?
How many measures is
enough? How should the measures be
weighted in importance? (Whatis balance?)
What to do when measureshave interactive or non-lineareffects on overall performance?
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An example of
a non-linear relationship
Relationship between Satisfaction
and Forthcoming Year's Profit
5-Month Survey
Satisfaction with Customer Service
1.0.9.8.7.6
Profitb
yCommunity
400000
300000
200000
100000
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We must understand better
The different purposes of performancemeasurement systems.
Does some combination of the major categories say
it all? attention directing, problem solving,decision facilitating and/or decisioninfluencing
Difference between a dashboardand an objective function?
Difference between a completeobjective function and anoptimally designed incentivesystem?
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Among the things we dont know
(cont.)3. Why do so many organizations
base performance-dependentrewards on corporate
performance even though fewemployees can have a materialeffect on overall corporateperformance?
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Among the things we dont know
(cont.)4. Can budgeting be improved,
or is it really pass?
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Among the things we dont know
(cont.)5. Why is the typical bonus
formula so complex?
For example:
Organizational level ofperformance
Objective function
Performance contingencies
Shape of the reward function
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Shape of a typical short-term
bonus function
Rewards
Results
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Among the things we dont know
(cont.)6. Why dont firms use truth-
inducing incentive systems?
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Among the things we dont know
(cont.)7. Why are systems sometimes
dramatically different acrosssettings
Individual contingenciesand combinations of them
Management style
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Among the variances in practice
that are difficult to explain Differences in use of punishments Differences in tolerance for use of
subjectivity in performance
evaluations Differences in implementation
of the controllability principle
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Differences in application of the
controllability principle
1. One companys philosophy:No tolerance for any
excuses.
President: We dont pay foreffort. We pay for results.
2. Most(?) companies protectmanagers from some bad
luck but reward them forvirtually all good luck.
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An important, poorly understood
contingencynational setting
Performance-dependent incentives for departmentmanagers in automobile retailers:
U.S.(n = 433)
% earning formula bonus 64.3%Size of formula bonus (% salary) 54.6%Primary performance measure=profit 94.0%
Formula bonus floor and cap 1.6%
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Cross-national differences in
reward systems (cont.)Performance-dependent incentives for department
managers in automobile retailers, U.S. vs.Netherlands:
U.S. Netherlands(n = 433) (n = 145)
% earning formula bonus 64.3% 10.3%Size of formula bonus (% salary) 54.6% 8.6%Primary perf. measure=profit 94.0% 15.4%
Formula bonus floor and cap 1.6% 23.1%
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Among the things we dont know
(cont.)8. More generally, what are the
motivations of people in thehierarchy?
We know that its often not:a. Value maximization; e.g.,
superiors encouragesubordinates to create slack.
b. Pure self-interest; e.g.,many people try to do theright things even atpersonal cost.
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Conclusion
There is a lot yet to be learned,even in this very maturearea of managementaccounting.