kennedy ethnic policies pak

Policies of Ethnic Preference in PakistanAuthor(s): Charles H. KennedySource: Asian Survey, Vol. 24, No. 6 (Jun., 1984), pp. 688-703Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2644399 .Accessed: 23/08/2011 04:56

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Policies of Ethnic Preference in Pakistan

-__ _ Charles H. Kennedy

Perhaps to an unusual degree Pakistan has suffered since its birth from disabilities associated with regional differences and resultant competing national demands. From Partition in 1947 until the dismemberment of the state in 1971, Pakistan served as the ideological battleground for antithetical visions of Punjabi and Bengali nationalisms. Indeed, the consequences of such conflicting visions-the Civil War of 1971 and the emergence of Bangladesh-have marked the only instance in the 20th century of a successful secessionist movement. Ominously during the past decade, the specter of regionalism and possible future secessionist sentiment has been voiced by disaffected Pathan, Baluch, and Sindhi leaders.

Ironically, however, throughout its history Pakistan has adopted policies of ethnic preference formulated to address the demands of disaffected groups. Further, such policies have been rigorously implemented and have lessened ethnic inequality in governmental employment. This article analyzes Pakistan's ethnic quota. It is divided into four sections: The first examines the rationale for adopting the quota; the second details the history of ethnic preference policies in Pakistan; the third examines the operation of the system; and the final section offers some cautious lessons derived from the Pakistani experience.

Rationales Pakistan is a multiethnic state. Since the secession of Bangladesh in 1971,' Pakistan has contained four major ethnic groups. In numbers, the largest of these are the Punjabis, followed by the Sindhis, the Pathans, and the Baluch.2 There is also a significant "tribal population." Each of

Charles H. Kennedy is Assistant Professor in the Department of Government and Legal Studies, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine. The research for this article was generously supported by a research grant from the American Institute of Pakistan Studies and by Bowdoin College. Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the 11th Wisconsin Conference on South Asia and to the 19th Northeast Political Science Associa- tion Meeting (1982). a 1984 by The Regents of the University of California

1. Before 1971 Bengalis constituted roughly 55% of Pakistan's total population. 2. Approximate populations of provinces in 1982 are: Punjab 54 million, Sind 19

688

CHARLES H. KENNEDY 689

these groups is defined by an admixture of linguistic and political attributes-Punjabis in Punjab speak Punjabi as their mother language, Sindhis in Sind speak Sindhi, Pathans in the North-West Frontier Prov- ince (NWFP) speak Pushtu, and the Baluch in Baluchistan speak Baluchi or Brauhi. Tribal groupings live in all four of the provinces, but the greatest concentrations are in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Azad Kashmir. However, there is significant slippage in such definitions of ethnic identity. Considerable numbers of Punjabis, Pathans, and Sindhis live outside their respective provinces. This is particularly true in regard to the ethnically diverse major urban areas of Pakistan-Karachi, Lahore, and Rawalpindi. Further, more Pathans than indigenous Baluch live in Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan. There is also a slippage in regard to linguistic determinants of ethnicity. Pakistan has one national language, Urdu, and one official language, English. The great majority of Pakistanis, approximately 90%, speak or at least under- stand Urdu.i Regional languages are spoken by comparatively fewer people, and the proportion of those domiciled in a given region who speak the relevant regional language varies widely from region to region. Indeed, it can be demonstrated that the self-declaration of mother language is more indicative of political sentiment than of linguistic com- petence.5

However loose the definition of ethnic groupings in Pakistan may be, indisputable gaps exist in the respective levels of development of the four provinces. Generally speaking, the provinces of Punjab and Sind are the most highly developed, while the other provinces are relatively less developed. Indicators of such gaps include differentials in per capita income,6 life expectancy,7 and levels of industrialization.8 Such gaps are million, NWFP 14.6 million (including tribal areas, but excluding Afghan refugees), and Baluchistan 3.25 million. Comparable figures for ethnic communities do not exist. Source: Calculated by author using 1972 census data and assuming 3% annual growth rate per province.

3. Selig Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow. Baluich Nationalism and Soviet Temiptation (Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1980).

4. See Agha Iftikhar Husain, "Introduction of Urdu in Administration" in Agha Iftikhar Husain (ed.), Studies in Public Administration of Pakistan (Islamabad: Pakistan Administra- tive Research Centre, 1979).

5. For instance, roughly one-third of the successful candidates for the CSS examination who claimed Pakhtun as their mother language during 1974-77 did not speak or read the language. Source: Compiled by author from relevant biodata on probationers.

6. Shahid Javed Burki calculates that in 1977 the mean per capita income in the two richer provinces (Pun jab and Sind) was 28% higher than that of the poorer provinces. "A Note on Perspectives on Economic Development and Regional Inequalities in Pakistan" (paper presented to the 32nd Annual AAS meeting, 1980), p. 4.

7. In 1977 the mean life expectancy in rural Baluchistan was 42 years, and in rural NWFP 44 years. Mean life expectancy in the Pun jab and the Sind was 60 years. ibid., p. 7.

8. In 1977 there were 3,000 "registered factories" with over 20 employees in the

690 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXIV, NO. 6, JUNE 1984

widely perceived and politicized in Pakistan, and have resulted in the perception of the actual or potential specter of Punjabi, or to a lesser extent Sindhi, domination. Indeed, the most traumatic event in the history of Pakistan, its dismemberment in 1971, was occasioned by the perception of widening inequality between East and West Pakistan. Cur- rently, Pakistan faces several prospective Bangladeshes. The most serious is the demand for greater provincial autonomy in Baluchistan, but there are also significant separatist sentiments in the Sind, and intermittent- though recently dormant-demands for an independent Pathan state- Pakhtunistan. 9

A third ingredient that has influenced the growth of the quota system has been the inability of Pakistan to achieve balanced levels of institutional development. Pakistan inherited a political system from the British that was crafted to suit the needs of a colonial power-i.e., its overriding concern was to rule a subject people. As a consequence, a primary tool to effect this control, the administrative system inherited by the new state, demonstrated highly complex patterns of organization, well-established forms of socialization for its members, and a remarkable degree of institutional autonomy. Countervailing institutions, particularly those responsi- ble for ensuring governmental responsiveness to the demands of the public (legislatures, electoral bodies, local governments, etc.) existed in only an attenuated form. This developmental gap has persisted during the 37 years since independence. For example, Pakistan has been unable to establish the precedent of orderly succession of political leaders. The outcomes of the three national elections held in Pakistan- 1965, 1970, and 1977-were each challenged by the losers as "rigged," and only in the first did the "winner" remain in office.10 Similarly, Pakistan, ostensi-

Punjab and 2,889 in the Sind, while the NWFP had only 262 and Baluchistan 9. Pakistan, Statistics Division, Enquiry on Labour Welfare, 1977 (Karachi, 1981), pp. 1-15. Similarly in 1977, of all "establishments with 20 or more employees excluding defence establishments," 7,859 were found in the Pun jab, 2,673 in the Sind, 1,046 in NWFP, and 290 in Baluchistan. Pakistan, Report on Annual Establishment Inquiry, 1976-1977 (Karachi, 1981), p. 1.

9. Useful overviews of the nationalities question are found in Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan.' Enigma of Political Development (Boulder: Westview, 1980), Khalid bin-Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan (New York: Praeger, 1981), and in Selig Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow.

10. Actually the "winner," General Ayub Khan, was already in power in 1965. The 1970 election resulted in an overall plurality for Sheik Mujibur Rahman, and the eventual Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto received only a plurality in West Pakistan. The aftermath of the 1977 election resulted in charges by the Pakistan National Alliance of widespread rigging and fraud on the part of the PPP. Partly as a consequence of these charges, Bhutto was overthrown by a military coup that installed Pakistan's current leader, General Zia-ul Haq, in July 1977.


bly a republic, has been subject to extensive periods of martial law. During such periods, elected national assemblies,"1 albeit only marginally consequential during periods of civilian rule, have been disbanded, and political activity has been prohibited or placed under severe restraints. Also, despite numerous attempts at reform, local governments are still dominated by civilian bureaucrats deputed from the federal goverment for service in the provinces. Functionally, such "district administration" has performed the roles typically entrusted in other systems to elected officials-revenue collection, revenue distribution, rule adjudication, and the execution and formulation of local policy.12

Given this context, meaningful input into the policy-making process can only be ensured by securing representation in the civilian bureaucracy. Therefore, to represent the interests of ethnic groupings within Pakistan or to redress the consequences of inequalities between such groupings requires perforce direct incumbency of "nationals" in the civilian bureaucracy. It is this that makes the quota system so important to federal policy making in Pakistan. It can be argued that denial of civilian bureaucratic office in Pakistan is functionally equivalent to the denial of political representation.

Combined, these three ingredients-ethnic diversity, unequal regional or provincial development, and unbalanced institutional growth-explain the nature of Pakistan's policies of preference. Indeed, Pakistan's quota policy is governed by two partially contradictory principles: (1) the remedial or compensatory principle, and (2) the proportional representational principle. The first provided legitimacy for the implementation of the quota. Before 1971, the quota was designed to ameliorate inequalities between East and West Pakistan, and after 1971, inequalities between the Pun jab and "less-developed" regions. The latter principle, that of proportional representation, has been invoked both as a goal and as a strategy for effecting the compensatory principle-that is, since there is a loose fit between ethnic groupings and provincial domicile, proportional representation favors less-developed regions or groups.

History of the Quota Policy A number of factors, the most salient being the disparity of service representation between East and West Pakistan immediately subsequent

11. The Majlis-i-Shura (Federal Council), established in January 1982, is an advisory body wholly appointed by the Chief Martial law Administrator.

12. Major local government programs discontinued because of lack of effectiveness include (in order of original implementation): Panchayats, Village Panchayats, Basic Democ- racies, Integrated Rural Development, and the People's Works Programme. Since 1979 the Local Government Programme has been in effect.


to independence in 1947, led to the introduction in 1949 of a federal quota system that applied to candidates seeking competitive entry to officer level ranks in the federal bureaucracy.13 This policy provided that 20% of the vacancies in the Central Superior Services were to be filled on the basis of "merit" as a consequence of the Central Superior Services Examination (CSS examination). The remaining 80% of the vacancies were to be filled according to the following formula: East Pakistan 40%; Punjab and Bahawalpur 23%; Karachi 2%; and Sind, Khairpur, North- West Frontier Province and Frontier States and Tribal Areas, Baluchistan, Azad Kashmir, and Kashmir refugees, 15%.'4 As originally designed, the quota had application to approximately one hundred vacancies per year. Its thrust was to "prudently" increase the representation of Bengalis, who were woefully underrepresented at the time of Partition, by in effect creating separate competitive pools in the two wings. Advocates of the quota perceived it as a temporary, but necessary, remedial expedient that would be phased out five to ten years after its introduction.15 However, the quota grew and prospered in the fertile soil of regional animosities between East and West Pakistan. By 1956, the quota policy, which had started as an administrative directive within the Establishment Division, had grown to the status of a statutory exception to the "nondiscrimination clause" in the first constitutional6 This status was reiterated in the 1962 Constitution.17 The quota also became a topic of frequent debate in the National Assembly. Perhaps more important, however, the range of the quota also steadily expanded. By the early 1950s the quota was used for vacancies filled by the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) through interview, and it also slowly became applicable to departmental and attached departmental recruitment for posts in the central government. Indeed, by 1971, the quota was in use for approximately 2,000 entry-

13. The first application of the quota system for which written documentation exists occurred in 1950 with application to that year's entering batch of recruits. Pakistan, Second Report of the Pakistan Public Service Commission for the Period lstJanuiary to 3 1st December 1949 (Karachi, 1950), p. 7. However, according to members of the 1948 batch of recruits (those who entered service in 1949), the quota was in effect a year earlier, in 1949. The terms of the 1949 quota, slightly different from the 1950 quota, were: 15% merit, 43% East Pakistan, 42% West Pakistan. West Pakistan was further subdivided into Punjab 23%; NWFP, Sind, Baluchistan, and Northern Areas and Tribal Territories (NATT) 17%o; and Karachi 2%. Source: Interviews.

14. Ralph Braibanti, "The Higher Bureaucracy of Pakistan," in Braibanti, et al., Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition (Durham: Duke University Press, 1966), p. 265.

15. Interviews with principals. 16. Article 17. 17. Article 240.


level positions in the federal government each year, an increase of over 2000% in 22 years.'8

Despite the phenomenal growth of the quota, which was designed to keep the two wings together, centripetal tendencies became too great, and the resultant civil war left Pakistan dismembered. With the secession of Bangladesh went the original rationale for the quota system. However, instead of disappearing, the system has become increasingly vigorous during the past decade. In 1972-73, immediately following the secession of Bangladesh, the quota was temporarily transformed into a confusing array of six zones and four "provinces.'9 But by August 1973, it emerged in its present form: 10% merit; 50% Punjab (including Islamabad); 7.6% urban Sind (Karachi, Sukkur, and Hyderabad); 11.4% rural Sind (areas in Sind other than those above); 11.5% NWFP; 3.5% Baluchistan; 4% Northern Areas and FATA; and 2% Azad Kashmir.20 Why this particular formula was chosen is open to conjecture. It is true that the percentages roughly correspond to the respective populations of the regions2' and that the modified system follows fairly closely the relative weightings of the 1949 formulation, but no public sources indicate that such standards were used in formulating the regional quotas. More important, the broader questions of whether the quota should have been continued in the aftermath of the 1971 war, and if continued, what form it should have taken, seem to have had no formal public consideration, nor were they addressed directly by any of the numerous administrative commissions of the late 1960s and early 1970s.

In any event, following the war Prime Minister Bhutto's economic policies served as a catalyst for the continued expansion of the quota system. Between 1972 and 1975, Bhutto nationalized numerous industries (banking, insurance, heavy machinery, natural resource extraction,

18. 367 candidates entered through direct competition (CSS Examination), 912 entered through Central Public Service Commission direct recruitment (by interview), and approximately 800 were admitted through departmental and attached departmental recruitment. Source: Calculated by author.

19. As of January 1972, the quota was constitued as follows: Zone 1 = Quetta, Kalat, and Tasbela; Zone 2 = Hyderabad and Khairpur Divisions; Zone 3 = Iahore Division and districts of Rawalpindi, Gujrat, Sargodha, Lyallpur, Multan, and Sahiwal; Zone 4 = Bahawal- pur Division and districts of Muzaffargarh, Dera Ghazi Kahn, Campbellpur, Jhelum, Mianwali, and Jhang; Zone 5 = Agencies, states and tribal areas, including Added and Special Areas Adjoining Settled Areas; Zone 6 = Peshawar and Dera Ishmail Khan Divi- sions (excluding Zone 5). Also recruitment was continued separately for the NWFP (Zones 5 and 6), Sind (Zone 2), Punjab and Bahawalpur (Zones 3 and 4), and for Karachi. Percentile bases for such recruitment during 1972-73 were never finalized.

20. Pakistan, Establishment Division, memo no. F 8/9/72 TRV, August 31, 1973. 21. In 1973 approximate populations were: Punjab 55.5%, urban Sind 6.8%, rural Sind

13.8%, Baluchistan 3%, NWFP 12.3%, NATT 3.7%, and Azad Kashmir 4.4%.


rice, cotton, textiles, cement, automobiles, etc.). As a consequence, such industries, formerly in the private sector, became subject to the terms and conditions of federal employment so that recruitment to autonomous and semiautonomous corporations (188 such institutions existed in 1981)22 came under the quota. But the expansion was not restricted solely to federal initiative. During the early 1970s the provinces established their own quotas for provincial recruitment. In Punjab, recruitment to provincial posts became subject to three reservations-Zone 1, developed districts; Zone 2, undeveloped districts; and merit on an all-Punjab basis.23 In Sind, provincial recruitment followed the federal designation of "rural" and "urban."24 And in the NWFP, provincial recruitment was divided into five zones, two of which are relatively less developed and three relatively more developed.25 The operation of the provincial quotas is analogous to the operation of the federal quota-that is, recruitment to competitive posts in the provincial civil services, direct recruitment to posts advertised by the provincial public service commissions, departmental recruitment to provincial departments, and recruitment to provincially run public enterprises have been made subject to the relevant quotas.

In the 1970s quotas also came to be applied to admissions to various educational institutions. However, the patterns of relevant quotas differ from province to province and from institution to institution. The Qaid- i-Azam University-the only federal university-admits students on the basis of the federal quota. In the provinces, the dominant pattern is admission of provincially domiciled candidates on the basis of merit with reservations for the children of military personnel and for those domiciled in variously defined "undeveloped" regions. But sometimes admission is based on intraprovincial quotas26 or is determined in an ad

22. Pakistan, International Symposium on Economic Performance of Public Enterprises (La- hore: Pakistan Administrative Staff College, 1981).

23. Zone 1 (developed) = Lahore Division and the districts of Rawalpindi, Gujrat, Lyallpur, Multan, and Sahiwal. Zone 2 (less developed) = Bahawalpur Division and the districts of Muzaffargarh, DG Khan, Cambellpur, Jhelum, Mianwali, and Jhang.

24. Urban = Karachi, Hyderabad, and Sukkur. Rural = everywhere else. 25. The "less developed" regions allow age relaxations for relevant candidates. Also

attached to the NWFP quota is a 10% provincial reservation for military personnel domiciled in the province.

26. For instance, admission to Sind medical colleges (the Medicine Bachelor, Bachelor Surgery program) is determined by the place of domicile within Sind. Admission to Dow Medical College is restricted to those candidates living in Karachi; Liaqat Medical College is restricted to those candidates domiciled in Hyderabad, Thatta, Badin, Tharparkar, Nawab- shah, and Sanghar; Chandka Medical College is restricted to candidates from Larkana, Sukkur, Shikapur, Khairpur, Jacobabad, and Dadu. Admission to the Medicine Bachelor, Dental Surgery program at Liaqat Medical College (the only program of its type in the Sind) is on an all-Sind basis. Similarly, admission to the Diploma of Associate Engineer degree programs is based on a district quota.


hoc fashion by the institution itself.27 Since 1977 President Zia's regime has also introduced certain innova-

tions into the quota system. The most far reaching has been the establishment of a 10% quota for former military personnel seeking competitive entry to governmental services through the CSS or provincial examinations.28 This, of course, has confused the regional rationale of the quota. Further confusion has been introduced with episodic age relaxations by the FPSC for recruitment from minority communities.29 And very recently a "sons of the soil" argument has been advanced by the government of Baluchistan in its demands to the federal government to establish two quotas within Baluchistan, one for native Baluch and one for Pathan and Punjabi migrants.30

If all this sounds hopelessly complicated, that is correct. Currently, recruitment to virtually every position in the federal and provincial goverments is subject to a quota. What started out as a relatively limited program designed to ameliorate the unhappy effects of Bengali under- representation in the secretariat, has in three decades been transformed into a program of entitlement for virtually every governmental vacancy.

The Operation of the System We turn our attention now to three sets of questions associated with the operation of the quota system: (1) How is the quota system applied to the selection process of recruits at the various levels of operation and how

27. For instance, Gomal University (NWFP) admits candidates for graduate degrees on the basis of ten different categories-six intraprovincial and four based on special attributes of candidates. Similarly, the Lady Health Visitor Course at the Public Health Nursing School, Lahore, gives preference to "widows" and "destitutes."

The admission of Baluch candidates to educational institutions has involved direct interprovincial agreements establishing reservations for Baluch nations in non-Baluch institutions. For instance, in 1982 116 seats in various medical colleges, 88 seats in various engineering colleges and universities, 15 seats in the College of Home Economics in Karachi, 7 seats in the National College of Arts, Lahore, 50 seats in cadet colleges, 7 seats in the College of Dentistry, Karachi, aqd 8 seats in various MBA programs were reserved for Baluch students in institutions located outside their home province. Source: Govern- ment of Baluchistan, Services and General Administration Department.

28. Regularized in the Federal Public Service Commission Act, February 1980. 29. The standard employed by the FPSC since 1981 is: "3 year relaxation to candidates

belonging to scheduled castes, Buddhist community, recognized tribes of the tribal area, Azad Kashmir, Northern Areas/Districts of Gilgit, Ghizar, Skardu, and Diamir."

30. In the summer of 1982, the government of Baluchistan called for the modification of the federal quota system as it applies to Baluchistan. The demands include dichotomizing recruitment into two zones, Zone A and Zone B. Zone A would encompass the Tribal Areas of Baluchistan (over 98% of the land area) and Zone B would encompass the Settled Areas, the cities-a pattern similar to that in effect in the Sind. Also, demands have been voiced to establish separate quotas for Baluchi and non-Baluchi speakers in each zone.


exactingly and enthusiastically is it implemented? (2) Is the bureaucracy of Pakistan regionally representative and do such levels of representation differ in regard to rank or type of governmental service? (3) How does the quota system interact with the bureaucratic system of Pakistan and what are the system's fixed costs?

HOW DOES THE SELECTION PROCESS WORK? At the federal level the quota is applied to the selection process in three distinct patterns. Pattern 1 applies to competitive entry through the Central Superior Services Examination administered by the FPSC. In this pattern the quota is applied both to entry-level competition and to the competition for entry into occupational cadres. After the number of vacancies is determined for a given year by the Establishment Division, an open competition is held in which candidates from all domiciles partici- pate. Ten percent of such vacancies are filled by candidates who score highest on the exam regardless of domicile (the merit quota). The re- mainder are filled by the respective merit-rank within domiciles. For example, if in a particular year there are one hundred vacancies, 10 will be filled on the basis of overall merit, 50 will be filled from the most meritorious Punjabis, 19 from the meritorious Sindhis, etc. (as per the federal quota cited earlier). Vacancies in occupational cadres are similarly allocated on the basis of the quota, the preferences of individual candidates, and exam scores. This pattern applies to the recruitment for approximately 250 vacancies per year.3'

Pattern 2 is applicable to the selection of candidates who enter on the basis of an interview, either administered by the FPSC or directly by the ministry or department concerned. Here posts are advertised or listed against regional vacancies. For example, if the Ministry of Defense needs to recruit communication engineers, the ministry sets domicile require- ments (which should be based on existing regional balances within the ministry) for the relevant vacancies. In an illustrative case in 1976, the ministry had to fill fourteen vacancies, and designated that seven should come from the Pun jab, four from the NWFP, and three from rural Sind. Accordingly, the FPSC interviewed candidates only from such domiciles and made appointments on the basis of these interviews.32 This pattern applies to the recruitment of approximately 3,000 candidates per year.

Pattern 3 applies primarily to the recruitment of individuals to autonomous corporations and public enterprises. This pattern requires the candidates to submit domicile certificates to the hiring authorities (rele-

31. Figures from 1978-81. 32. Example drawn from Pakistan, FPSC, Annual Report for the Year 1976 (Karachi,

1978).


vant personnel boards), but the domicile limits are typically not binding on the actual hiring practices of such boards. However, considerations of regional balance often play a significant, if informal, role in hiring decisions. In this pattern domicile serves more as a target than as a quota.

The operation of provincial quotas follows analogous patterns: Selec- tion to the provincial civil services conforms to the first pattern; recruitment to other provincial posts the second pattern; and recruitment to provincially administered public enterprises the third pattern. Selection for educational institutions (predominantly under provincial control) is determined by the independent decisions of college and university personnel boards in terms of their relevant institutional quotas.

Regardless of the relevant pattern the essential document that must be presented by all candidates to establish regional status is the so-called domicile certificate. An individual's domicile is determined by several factors, including father's domicile, place of principal residence, place of schooling, and place of prior recruitment. In most cases the determina- tion of domicile is unambiguous; where it is in doubt it is determined by relevant bureaucratic authorities, buttressed by duly authorized wit- nesses, and/or in rare cases by court proceedings. The stakes of domicile declaration are high, and the motivation for tampering with or misrepre- senting one's domicile is accordingly very much present. However, despite allegations in the press (primarily by disaffected Pun jabis), instances of blatant cheating on domicile certificates are infrequent.33 Even in the absence of overt cheating, there still remains the perception in some circles that candidates from less-favored regions are not "sons of the relevant soil." That is, they are immigrants, however defined, to their respective domiciles. Though I believe that this argument has little merit, unfortunately there is no available information to test this hypothesis.

DOES THE QUOTA WORK? To answer this question in an ideal manner requires information concerning the composition of the bureaucracy, given the operation of the quota system, and comparable information concerning the hypothetical composition of the bureaucracy in its absence. Complete data concerning the former does not exist, and information on the latter is beset with numerous imponderables. However, one can informally sidestep these difficulties by comparing representation in different sectors of the federal bureaucracy over time. Table 1 presents such an approach, and reveals two significant patterns. First, urban Sind and the Pun jab, when compared with quota percentages, are overrepresented in the bureaucracy, while

33. One inequitable practice, discontinued in 1980, was to automatically assign women candidates to the domiciles of their fathers.

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the other provinces are underrepresented. Second, and perhaps more interesting, is the finding that the secretariat, which has been subject to the quota for some thirty years, is more representative than are attached departments, subject to the quota for approximately ten years, and both are more representative than autonomous corporations, which at the time of my data (1974) were not subject to the quota. That is, the quota has made the bureaucracy demonstrably more representative, or alterna- tively, the quota has lessened the overrepresentation of urban Sind and perhaps the Punjab, while increasing the representation of other provinces.

A more detailed analysis of posts subject to the competitive examination is possible. As I have shown elsewhere,34 candidates from the Pun jab consistently score higher on the CSS examinination than candidates from other provinces. Therefore, in the absence of the quota system, it can be demonstrated that Pun jabis would dominate the bureaucratic system to an extent far greater than is currently the case. Specifically, it can be demonstrated that such domination would be particularly severe in the case of selection to the prestigious All-Pakistan Unified Grades.35

Therefore, all available evidence points to the fact that the quota system has made the bureaucracy more regionally representative. In- deed, though there is some slippage, the ostensible goal of the quota-to increase regional equality in the bureaucracy-seems to have been addressed by the operation of the system. And at least at the higher levels of the bureaucracy that have been subject to the quota system for three decades, the fit between the quota's target and actual representation in the bureaucracy is close. That is, the quota works.

THE SYSTEM'S FIXED COSTS But if the operation of the quota has been successful in promoting regional equality, it has also resulted in several unhappy consequences. The first and most often mentioned cost concerns the systematic frustra- tion of the merit principle of selection for bureaucratic posts. For posts subject to competition, some candidates are recruited into the bureaucracy who would not be eligible in the absence of the quota, and others are denied positions for which they would be eligible on the sole basis of merit. For posts subject to interview, prospective candidates with requisite qualifications for particular posts are systematically excluded from competition because of regional considerations. In both instances the quota selects candidates who may not be the "best" available for particu-

34. Charles H. Kennedy, "Context, Content and Implementation of Bhutto's Adminis- trative Reforms" (Ph.D. thesis, Duke University, 1979), pp. 188-223.

35. Ibid., p. 212.


lar jobs. It can be argued that such a selection policy makes the bureaucracy of Pakistan, seldom praised for its efficiency, even less efficient.

The process of implementing the quota also often results in significant delays in filling vacant posts. For example, if a post falls vacant in a federal department subject to FPSC recruitment rules, the notification of the vacancy is passed on to the FPSC both for advertisement and for the assignment of the quota. The post is then listed, candidates with the necessary qualifications and domicile are interviewed, and ideally an individual is recommended for appointment. If all runs smoothly, this process takes approximately six months. However, if finding an individual with both the requisite qualifications and domicile certificate proves difficult, as often happens, the process can be delayed considerably. It is not unusual for a case of this type to drag on for two to three years, with the post left vacant or filled on an ad hoc basis by the relevant department. It is also not uncommon for vacancies to go unfilled because no candidates with the requisite qualifications and domicile apply for the given job. In recent years this latter phenomenon has occurred with increasing frequency, particularly for technical vacancies.36 Also, since 1977 the FPSC has had trouble filling vacancies through the competitive examination process. Indeed, in 1982 the FPSC was forced to conduct a special competitive examination limited to candidates from urban Sind, rural Sind, Baluchistan, the Northern Areas, and Azad Kashmir to address the shortfall.37

Third, the complexities of the quota may discourage prospective candidates, particularly from urban areas, from standing for the competitive examination and/or from seeking other governmental employment. The opportunity costs of participating in the recruitment process to the Central Superior Services are great. A candidate must first prepare and stand for the examination, then wait for the results before knowing whether one is successful or, often more important, whether one has gained entry to a preferred occupational grouping. This process takes anywhere from fifteen to eighteen months.38 Such costs are compounded by the uncertainty of the operation of the quota. From the perspective of

36. Pakistan, FPSC, Annual Report, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981 (Karachi).

37. There were 73 vacancies in all. Urban Sind 21, rural Sind 36, Baluchistan 5, Northern Areas 9, and Azad Kashmir 2. For the special exam, age limits were lifted from 25 to 35 years, and Third Division candidates, normally barred from participation in the CSS, were allowed to compete. The results of the exam had not been announced by October 1982, although 2888 candidates took the exam. Source: Interviews.

38. From 1974 to 1979, assignment to occupational groups was delayed from nine months to one year longer until after the Final Passing Out Examination from the program of joint training at the Academy for Administrative Training.


an individual candidate, there are two avenues to assure assignment to one's preferred occupational grouping: (1) scoring in the top 10% of the successful recruits (i.e., within the merit range), or (2) scoring relatively high in comparison with one's regional grouping. However, it is impossi- ble to assess accurately the probabilities of either of these outcomes given the limited amount of information available to candidates. Until group assignment takes place, candidates do not know how they stand in relation to other candidates. Similarly, as mentioned above, recruitment by interview is also a slow and uncertain process. Given such considerations, candidates are in effect encouraged to seek alternative careers.

Of course, the likelihood of finding satisfactory alternative employment is a function of the availability of such employment. And since relatively greater numbers of such jobs are available in urban areas, if our hypothesis is correct, it follows that there would be a tendency for the number of candidates standing for the competitive examination from urban areas to decrease. Our data confirm this expectation. The number from the Punjab has declined 22% and from urban Sind 39% over the period 1969-74, while there has been no comparable decrease in the number standing from other provinces.39 Before 1974 such urban candidates typically sought employment in corporations based in urban areas, particularly Karachi-hence the overrepresentation of urban Sind in autonomous corporations as demonstrated in Table 1. Since 1974, when the quota was applied to the nationalized autonomous corporations, such channels have been closed and the resultant glut of prospective urban employees has swelled the ranks of those seeking employment in the Middle East. Indeed, perhaps not unexpectedly, demands for the application of regional quotas for granting exit visas to Middle Eastern states have recently surfaced.40

Finally, the quota system, though demonstrably increasing provincial representativeness in the bureaucracy, has also reinforced invidious distinctions between provinces. The current system's reliance on a small merit quota, coupled with the widely publicized and oft-repeated theme of provincial-based distinctions of performance on the examinations or of distinctions in relevant qualifications of levels of skill, leads to the perception that job seekers from the more-favored provinces bear the brunt of the government's attempt to equalize access to the bureaucracy. Indeed, hardly a day passes when one of the major Pakistani dailies does not run an editorial by a disaffected individual, usually a Punjabi, calling for greater reliance on merit in some phase of federal personnel policy, and implicitly claiming reverse discrimination. Conversely, individuals from

39. See C. H. Kennedy, "Context, Content," p. 214. 40. Interviews, 1982.


less-favored provinces must live with the phenomenon that they are perceived as less qualified than their counterparts from the Punjab. Such distinctions are given added credence by the quota's implicit paternalism, and reinforce the already formidable ethnic, cultural, racial, and linguistic cleavages between provinces. Indeed, the very existence of the quota provides statutory verification of the hypothesis that some regions or peoples are superior or inferior to others. Such perceptions are the stuff of secessionist movements.

Lessons It may be dangerous to attempt to draw lessons from the admittedly unique particulars of Pakistan's experience with policies of ethnic preference. However, I cautiously maintain that three themes relevant to the Pakistani experience are likely to be replicated in any state adopting similar policies.4'

First, policies of preference tend to spread. The quota system in Pakistan had relatively limited origins, with an initial application to barely one hundred vacancies per year. But once established, the logic of its spread became irresistible. If the quota was necessary to redress inequality of representation through the competitive examiniation process for bureaucratic posts, was it not also necessary for it to be applied to the arguably more aribitrary selection of candidates through interview? And, if the quota was necessary to redress inequalities of qualifications in central governmental departments, why was it not also applicable to provincial governmental posts? And finally, if it was necessary to redress distinctions in qualifications, was it not also necessary to get at the fount of such inequalities-the educational institutions themselves?

The second lesson is that policies of preference are hard to terminate. The quota system was introduced in Pakistan with the expectation by its framers that the need for its operation would end five years after its commencement. And since its introduction, virtually every major administrative report, numerous service association demands, and innumer- able editorials have called for the quota's dismantlement. But even mod- est proposals calling for marginal modifications in the terms of the quota's operation have been ignored with impunity by successive governments.42 The reason, of course, is that reforming the quota is very dangerous to

41. Cf. Myron Weiner, Mary Katzenstein, and K. V. Narayana Rao, India's Preferential Policies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

42. For example, the Pay and Services Commission of 1978 examined the question of terminating the quota and recommended a modification calling for 20% merit, instead of the current quota of 10%. The government has not accepted the proposal. The author testified before this commission on this issue in 1978.


the potential reformers. Any modification of the quota terms would likely be interpreted as favoring some groups at the expense of others, and would be attributed to the ulterior motives of clever politicians. For this reason, prudent policy makers in Pakistan have given the quota a wide berth.

The third lesson may be the most important. No matter how thoroughly implemented, policies of preference havse fixed costs. The more obvious costs include the effect of abandoning the merit principle on administrative efficiency, and the attendant procedural entanglements associated with implementing a quota policy. Pakistan's system has suffered enormously from both types of costs. Hypothetically, one could imagine a set of policies that minimizes such costs, but one cannot finesse the cost of the inevitable tradeoff between the goal of equality of outcome between groups and the consequences of inequitable laws that is provoked by the introduction of a quota system. Pakistan's quota system works to increase equality of representation between provinces, but coincidentally it also exacerbates perceptions of inequities between provinces. Lurking in the shadows of all quota policies is the specter of reverse discrimination, and perhaps more important, the cancer of invidious comparisons of superiority or inferiority between regions or groups that such considerations imply.

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Issue Table of ContentsAsian Survey, Vol. 24, No. 6 (Jun., 1984), pp. 597-703Front MatterThe Role of the Control Organs in the Chinese Communist Party, 1977-83 [pp.597-617]The Reform of Provincial Party Committees in China: The Case of Zhejiang [pp.618-636]China's Special Economic Zones: Their Development and Prospects [pp.637-654]Elections in Jakarta [pp.655-664]Transfers from the Center to the States in India [pp.665-687]Policies of Ethnic Preference in Pakistan [pp.688-703]Back Matter

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