kei korea-chinaforum newsletter v2

7/31/2019 Kei Korea-chinaforum Newsletter v2

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/kei-korea-chinaforum-newsletter-v2 1/8

NORH KOREA’S INFLUENCE ON

SOUH KOREA-CHINA RELAIONSDr. Yong-Hyun Kim

Visiting Scholar, U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS

Associate Professor, North Korean Studies, Dongguk Universit

STATUS & ANALYSIS OF

KOREA-CHINA RELATIONS

• Economic cooperation between South Korea and Chinais rapidly developing. China consumes one third o SouthKorea’s exports. I the South KoreaChina ree trade agree

ment (FA) is implemented, the level o economicintegration between the two countries will be urtherreinorced.

• Although China and South Korea have strong economicties, their military and diplomatic cooperation haveseen less visible progress.

• Te North Korea problem hinders the developmento ChineseSouth Korean undamental diplomatic tiessuch as military and diplomatic ties.

• Te cooperative but ambiguous relationship betweenChina and the U.S. attributes to the development o South Korean and Chinese relations.

CHINA’S STRATEGIC INTEREST

TOWARDS NORTH KOREA

• China’s strategic interest regarding North Korea isto maintain positive relations with the Kim Jongunregime while exerting inuence over North Korea.

Te Korea Economic Institute (KEI) and the Project 2049Institute have entered into a new partnership in 2012 to

revitalize the KoreaChina Forum which started in 2005.KEI and Project 2049 will host seminars regularly with shortpapers written by panelists. Te papers will be eatured aerthe seminar in this newsletter.

Te KoreaChina Forum is a public education programdesigned to explore the deepening relationship betweenChina, the two Koreas, and the U.S., and its implicationsor Asian security. Te Forum seeks to analyze the growingchallenges and opportunities o the relationship through theprism o strategic oresight, economic interdependence, andregional sccurity.

We hope you nd the newsletters inormative and educational.Please do not hesitate to contact us with your eedback.

Tank you,

KEI & Project 2049 Institute

Te views expressed are the authors’ own and do not refect theviews o the two institutes.

F O R U M

N O T EEditors P E R S P E C T I V EKorea

O F C O N T E N T STable KOREA PERSPECIVE.................................................1-3 by Dr. Yong-Hyun Kim

AIWAN PERSPECIVE.............................................3-6 by Dr. Kwei-Bo Huang

U.S. PERSPECIVE..........................................................6-8 by Randall Schriver



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• China will not accept direct U.S. inuence over the Yalu

and umen Rivers.• Even i relations between the U.S. and North Korea are

restored, China will not let its strategic interests in NorthKorea be diminished.

• China’s oreign policy toward North Korea will remainconsistent under the new leadership o Xi Jinping.

• China will attempt to continue to strengthen its advantageous position over North Korea through North Korea’seconomic dependence on China, and its growinginuence over the North Korean military and politics.

•

Because China’s strategic interest in North Korea is strongerthan the U.S., the U.S. aces limitations on carrying outNorth Korean policies that are as eective as China’s.

THE DEGREE OF STABILITY IN NORTH

KOREA UNDER THE KIM JONG-UN REGIME

Power Structure of the Kim Jong-Un Regime

• o overcome Kim Jongun’s lack o experience and youngage, he has rapidly acquired numerous high level leadership positions. He has already been granted titles such

as the supreme commander o the Korea People’s Army,irst secretary o the Korean Workers’ Party, and theirst chairman o the National Deense Commission.

• With Kim Jongun at the center, he is supported by hisamily members Jang Sungtaek and Kim Kyunghee,Choi Ryunghae, Lee Youngho, second and third generation North Korea elites, and central military ofcials.

• Rather than a collective leadership, North Korea isstructured under a clear centralized leader and his topsupporters who support the leader.

Preconditions for Stability under the KimJong-un Regime

• China’s acknowledgement o the Kim Jongun regimeis crucial. Kim Jongun’s upcoming visit to China thisall to meet with the h generation Chinese leader,Xi Jinping, will determine North Korea’s stability underKim Jongun.

• North Korea’s survival and growth is only possible when

the Obama administration treats the Kim Jongunregime as a negotiating partner in resolving issues o nuclear weapons, normalization o U.S.North Korearelations, and peace settlements through dialogues.

• South Korea’s acknowledgement o the Kim Jongun regimeis also important. North Korea’s relationship with SouthKorea has been weakened due to North Korea’s ocus onostering stronger ties with China and the U.S. However, ahealthy relationship with South Korea is a constant variableor North Korea’s survival.

• Power distribution o elites around Kim Jongun is anotheimportant actor. Even though it is the possibilities o power struggle amongst the elites should not be disregardedthe struggle could be mitigated i a system were to be

implemented where there is more equal distribution o power within the elites.

• Economic growth is crucial to improving the livingconditions o the North Korean citizens. Tis guaranteesthe stability o the Kim Jongun regime at the grassroots level.

PROSPECTS OF NORTH KOREA’S INFLUENC

ON SOUTH KOREA-CHINA RELATIONS

•

Due to North Korea’s relative decline, China is workingtowards strengthening its relationship with North Koreathrough new strategic assessments rather than itstraditional approaches.

• Given the current economic situation in North Korea,it has no choice but to increase its economic dependenceon China. Because China is the only reliable ally to NorthKorea, this will increase China’s leverage over North Korea

F O R U M

“ Although China and South Korea

have strong economic ties, their

military and diplomatic cooperation

have seen less visible progress.”



• China realizes that there is no alternative to the Kim

Jongun regime and that maintaining a close relationshipwith North Korea is necessary. However, the Chineseleadership will continue to cautiously observe Kim Jongun’s decisions on reorms and the opening o its country.

• Te North Korea variable will remain a limiting actorin the development o South KoreaChina relations.

• I the Kim Jongun regime is unable to recover romeconomic hardship and does not achieve stability inthe areas o politics, military, and oreign policy, theNorth KoreaChina ties will deepen. In the oppositecase, the North Korea will not play a signicant role

in the development o South KoreaChina relations.• As long as the North Korea problem is prolonged,

undamental and overall development o South KoreaChina relations will be limited.

• I there is no breakthrough regarding North Korea’snuclear issue and i North Korea continues with urthernuclear testing, the conicting opinions between SouthKorea, China, and the U.S. will increase tension betweenSouth Korea and China.

AIWAN’S ROLE IN SOUH KOREA-

MAINLAND CHINA RELAIONSDr. Kwei-Bo Huang

Associate Professor, Department of Diplomacy,

National Chengchi University

aiwan President Ma Yingjeou’s hallmark in oreign policy

is the adoption o “exible diplomacy” in his administration’sexternal relations. Te policy emphasizes goodwill in crossaiwan Strait relations by calling or a “diplomatic truce”with mainland China. While the Republic o China (alsoknown as aiwan) had been olabeled a “troublemaker,” thislabel may have had more to do with the increasing politicalclout o mainland China and the diplomatic backlashes inreaction to aiwan’s oreign policy. Te objective o Ma’s

policy shi since 2008 lies in reorienting aiwan’s oreig

policy toward a proactive attitude and approach in crosaiwan Strait reconciliation. Indeed, crossaiwan Strarapprochement during the past our years has helped tstabilize the regional security environment, and countries the region benetted rom a peace dividend. Tereore, whexperiences and lessons learned by aiwan, in particulathe role that aiwan is playing in interacting with mainlanChina or the gradual stabilization o the aiwan Strait, mahelp South Korea manage its relations with mainland China?

DIVIDENDS OF PEACE BROUGHT BY

TAIWAN’S EFFORTS AFTER MAY 2008 Mechanisms or managing crossaiwan Strait reconciliation havnot been institutionalized yet, but contemporary developmenin relations between aiwan and China—characterized by leconrontation—has encouraged many countries to approacaiwan with more nonpolitical initiatives that can lead to greateeconomic prosperity and social, educational, and culturexchanges. Furthermore, nontraditional security cooperatioacross the aiwan Strait could have a moderating eect omainland China’s interactions with other countries. Measursuch as nuclear security cooperation, medical and healtcooperation, and joint crimeghting and judiciarcooperation have gradually developed between the two sideo the aiwan Strait. Successul experiences derived romthese elds o cooperation may be shared with other countriin the AsiaPacic to promote human security cooperatiowith mainland China in the uture.

In the traditional security realm, closer relations betweeaiwan and mainland China will not lead to ultimaunication o China, primarily because o the undamentdierences between the institutions—political, economiand social—on the two sides o the aiwan Strait. aipei w

not change its policies o seeking a peaceul dispute settlemeand incremental developments toward a nuclearree homeland, nor will the Ma administration accept any measurinitiated by mainland China that will damage the intereo aiwanese people and the stability o the regioo be sure, a stable ramework or crossaiwan Strarelations will contribute to broadening the oundatioor peace and stability in the AsiaPacic, and Presiden

Taiwan

F O R U M

P E R S P E C T I V E



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Ma has reafrmed on various occasions that aiwan

endorses bilateral and multilateral arrangements, includingthe U.S.Japan security alliance, in the AsiaPacic so long asthey are benecial to regional peace and stability.

HOW SHOULD SOUTH KOREA VIEW TAIWAN

IN ITS RELATIONS WITH MAINLAND CHINA

Given the similarity o their economic structures, SouthKorea and aiwan’s economies are competitive in nature. Yet,an interestbased calculation should lead to a more constructiveapproach to South Koreaaiwan relations. In act, competitiveand cooperative modes coexist. In addition, South Korea

can try to help maintain the stability and positive interactionin the aiwan Strait because it will eventually benet SouthKorea as well.

Beore this paper proceeds to provide some suggestions orSeoul, it is necessary to introduce in brie the economic,nontraditional security, and politicomilitary relationships between South Korea and mainland China. SouthKorea’s trade volume topped $1 trillion in 2011. South Korea’sexports to mainland China increased 14.9% to $134.2 billionannually in 2011, which accounted or 24.1% o South Korea’stotal exports and made mainland China still the largest market

o South Korea in 2011. South Korea’s trade surplus withmainland China reached $47.8 billion in the same year.Mainland China is also South Korea’s largest overseas targetor investment.

Nontraditional security threats rom mainland China thatconcerns South Korea are necessary to be dealt with in a timely manner. Such incidents as the powdered milk and cookies containing melamine, the smuggling o capsules made rom deadetuses and placentas, the severe dust storms hitting the KoreanPeninsula, and the illegal shing cases/disputes are unortunatebut serve as triggers or bilateral or subregional collaboration.

Issues related to territorial sovereignty between SouthKorea and mainland China have not escalated to overtclashes in bilateral diplomacy, but they do exist. Disputes overSuyan Rock / Ieodo (or Socotra Rock) and over Rixian Ree /Gageo Ree can become destabilizing orces in the region i not

managed well. Furthermore, the U.S.South Korea allianc

which helped to saeguard democracy in South Korea ancurb communist aggressions in Asia, must ace an increasinduality in mainland China’s role in AsiaPacic stabilitOn the one hand, mainland China may be seen as a majochallenge to the security alliance as mainland China’s militabuildups with ambiguous strategic intentions are insufcieto orm the condition or peaceul coexistence. On the othhand, mainland China may be a key actor stabilizing thKorean Peninsula by its inuence on North Korea.

Te patterns o interactions and problems between SoutKorea and mainland China are very similar to those betwee

aiwan and mainland China. Tereore, it is possible that thexperiences and lessons learned by aiwan, as well as the ro

that aiwan is playing in interacting with mainland China othe gradual stabilization o the aiwan Strait, may help SouKorea better manage its relations with mainland China.

Joint Venture with Taiwanese Businesses

With these economic opportunities, South Korea must considan eective way to maintain its economic competitiveness mainland China’s market. A 2005 research paper by JapanMizuho Bank (MHBK) maintains that “there has been a sharincrease o Japanese companies investing in [mainland] Chinthrough joint ventures with aianese companies and its owsubsidiaries in aiwan.” More specically, South Kor

should consider aiwan, whose people share similar Chinecharacteristics, as a “orwarding base” to boost its economties and prots both in mainland China and aiwan.

ake or example recent nonpolitical relations betweeJapan with aiwan. Japan and aiwan signed an investme

F O R U M

“ Although Taiwan is not central

in Seoul-Beijing relations, it is not

an obstacle to the development

of bilateral relations. ”



protection agreement in September 2011. Tis agreement

not only protects Parties with access to dispute settlement viainternational arbitration and provide a stable investmentenvironment, but also enhances linkages in industrial supply chains between the two signatories. Tis is widely believed tobe a consequence o new economic strategic thinking in thepostFukushima (earthquake) era that aims to redirect part o Japanese investment and industrial sources to aiwan and tourther increase the “survival rate” o Japanese businesses inmainland China. Despite the act that the economies o SouthKorea and aiwan are not as complementary as the aiwanJapan example, it behooves aipei and Seoul to explore new ways o cooperation between South Korea’s multinational

corporations and aiwan’s small and medium enterprises,which ormed the backbone o aiwan’s economic miracle, towork together in the mainland Chinese market.

Taiwan as a Partner for Control over Economic

Dependence on Mainland China

Both South Korea and aiwan’s export dependence on mainland China are high, and the latter is almost doubled that o the ormer in 2011. In 2011, aiwan’s exports to mainlandChina increased 7.4% to $91.1 billion, which accounted or43.7% o aiwan’s total exports and made mainland Chinathe largest market or aiwan exports in 2011. aiwan’s tradesurplus with mainland China was $47.5 billion in the sameyear, denoting a 2.8% reduction. Mainland China is alsoaiwan’s largest overseas target or investment.

Greater economic and trade interactions may result in highereconomic dependence or interdependence, which, or normaltrading partners, should not be a concern. However, higheconomic dependence may result in greater ragility in botheconomic and political terms i relations between the tradingpartners turn sour. o pursue an eective control over theirexport dependence on mainland China, as well as to avoidsetbacks coming possibly with mainland China’s slow down in

domestic economic growth, South Korea and aiwan should jointly map a strategy o risk aversion by enhancing economicties with one another.

Taiwan Strait as a Showcase of Cooperation and

Peaceful Settlement of DisputesNontraditional security cooperation between aiwaand mainland China has thrived since May 2008. Timpact o nontraditional security threats is not conneto national borders, and because these threats need to bdealt with by all the governments and societies concerneSouth Korea should be able to discern how the two sido the aiwan Strait collaborate to cope with these threatwhich will be valuable or South Korea’s planning anpreparation in this regard.

Meanwhile, it is o great importance or all parties to contem

plate and work on shaping the conditions or stable development in crossaiwan Strait relations. I progress continuinto the oreseeable uture, it could become a showcase o Chnese Communist Party Secretary General Hu Jintao’s “Hamonious World.” Ten, perhaps, this would encourage utuChinese leaders to apply this model to other parts o the AsiPacic where mainland China is engaging other countries territorial disputes.

While Seoul is rapidly improving its overall relations witmainland China, territorial disputes with mainland China stserve as potential threats to peaceul relations. According

South Korea is well positioned to act as a supportive thirparty to encourage constructive and actbased dialogubetween aipei and Beijing because these dialogues whelp shape a more selrestrained, more responsible, and leaggressive behavior o mainland China toward the othparties in a dispute. Moreover, aiwan, with the morsupport rom the international community, will be mocondent in negotiating and interacting with mainland Chinpeaceully, and this may be the key to incentivizing mainlanChina’s more benign behavior toward the region.

CONCLUDING REMARKSAlthough aiwan is not central in SeoulBeijing relations, is not an obstacle to the development o bilateral relationOn the basis o its rapprochement policies toward mainlanChina, aiwan’s experiences—both government and civ

F O R U M



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F O R U M

society, including enterprises—in engaging mainland China

could contribute to the urther development o SeoulBeijingties. With the current pace in crossaiwan Strait relations,both SeoulBeijing ties and Seoulaipei ties can becometwo sets o parallel relations that will not conict with eachother, and a new thinking about Seoulaipei ties—with moreunderstandings o aipei—could serve as a driving orce or a“winwinwin” situation.

ON CROSS-SRAI RELAIONS AND

HE UNIED SAES

Randall Schriver, President and CEO, Project 2049 Institute

Transcript from Korea-China Forum, May 29, 2012

With respect to how things may unold and are potentially managed in the aiwanROK (Republic o Korea) relationship, i relations are on the same trajectory as in the crossStraitrelationship, then what aiwan is looking at is essentially thechallenge o managing potential economic tensions (with the

ROK) and how the ROKaiwan economic relations are seen—be that competitive or complementary. Tis is in a sense theeasy scenario to look at, i the crossStrait relationship remainson the current trajectory. o be sure, President Ma Yingjeou’spolicies along with his counterparts across the Strait havebeen very successul in terms o the rapprochement and therebuilding o crossStrait ties.

But there could be hiccups in the crossStrait relationship.Te rst set o hiccups could be related to i the currenttrajectory o crossStrait relations continues, and there aresome dashed expectations on aiwan’s part in terms o what is

accomplished outside o the crossStrait relationship andother regional relationships. Te aiwanKorea relationship has been described in aiwan as an “insideout”strategy: x the crossStrait relationship so that you can

improve relations throughout the region, perhaps pursu

trade liberalization bilaterally with other countries, perhapgreater participation in multilateral organizations, global oregional. Tis is still a largely untested proposition. Te crosStrait relationship has in act improved a great deal, and whave FA (ree trade agreement) talks underway betweeaiwan and Singapore, aiwan and New Zealand, but theare not concluded. And there is o course the bigger questioabout a PP (ranspacic Partnership) or aiwan at sompoint. I aiwan and the PRC maintain this trajectory, theris still that untested question o how this insideout strategwill work and i aiwan can successully branch out to othbilateral, regional, global institutions. Tis is embedded i

the question about aiwanKorean relations going orwardBut that said, it is not entirely clear that the current trajector(between aiwan and China) will continue. I do not want tbe a pessimist and I do not want to sound cynical, but tooen we only talk about the trajectory being disrupteby events in aiwan. For example, a return to power o thopposition party (DPP) would make government leaders Beijing prooundly uncomortable. But those dynamics couchange relatively soon, depending on this interactive crosStrait dynamic which is really based on how each respectivdomestic political situation unold.

Let me give a scenario—there is a possibility that at some poinleaders in Beijing, sensing a lame duck president in aipei andclosing window because o looming elections, may press hardor crossStrait discussions to go outside the economic spheand go into the political sphere and in the security sphere. Teare much more difcult discussions and much more contro versial inside aiwan, and so that could be a disruption to thtrajectory that then could be elt throughout the region. I thtrajectory is upset, that would present uncomortable choicor a lot o people—it certainly would or the United States—because aiwan is oen seen as an important relationship iits own right. But or other countries aiwan is oen seen as

subset o managing U.S.China relations; that is certainly truo other countries in the region, including Korea.

P E R S P E C T I V EU.S.



F O R U M

ON KOREA-CHINA RELATIONS AND

THE UNITED STATESI think or a long time we have been guilty in the United States o overstating the degree to which we share common interests withChina, on the Korean peninsula and particularly the challengesassociated with North Korea.

Tere are plenty o people who all into this category, but Ithink by and large our governments, whether they have beenrepublican or democrat, have dried back towards a constructwhere we operate rom a eeling o shared interests, and thatis consequential to Beijing in terms o how you ashion yourapproach to the Korean peninsula when you are sitting inWashington. Te U.S. and China have common aversions,and in a perect world it would be a nuclearree peninsula orall parties including China. I think nobody wants instability or hard landings or certainly conict, but those are commonaversions as opposed to common interests.

Te distinction [between common aversions and commoninterests] becomes consequential when you talk about whatwe do with this as a matter o policy and decision makinggiven our respective views. I think the United States andChina oen start stepping out in dierent directions becausetheir prioritization o interests, which are not completely

shared, is dierent. Te Chinese have long valued stability,they think about things like potential reugee problems i there was instability in North Korea, about losing that buerin the event o a hard landing where Seoul and Washingtonhave some sort o an upper hand in a post conict situation.So the priorities are dierent, which creates a dierent set o interests. Tereore the question going orward is, do we embrace a more realistic notion o what our respective interestsare and operate rom a base that is closer to objective reality,or will we dri back towards trying to have a handinglovepartnership that will ultimately ail, because it’s an overstatement o the degree to which we have shared interests?

Tere are certainly several subplots to this: Some people talk about changing views in China, and while it is true that they value these things and have so ar prioritized in a certainway, we do not know i the attitudes towards North Korea

are changing. Would incidents such as these recent kid

nappings be the straw that breaks the camel’s back, when therealize that this alliance is more o an albatross than it is helpul modality to maintain the buer? Tese are questionthat we cannot answer with great certainty, but we do knowhen China has been tested in the very recent past, whethethat’s the sinking o the Cheonan or the shelling o the islanChina has chosen to back its traditional ally at the expeno ROKChina relations and certainly at the expense o U.SChina relations. So to date, whether or not there is debagoing on in China or i there are dierent views beinrepresented, they have chosen to stick with their coprinciples, which have been true up to this point and have n

altered the policies in any meaningul way.With respect to U.S.ROK relations, it has always struck mthat the issue o the DPRK and its various challenges casimultaneously cut in a couple o dierent policy directionIn a way it is so undamental to the alliance, having thcommon threat and uncertainty—alliances historically aormed because there is a common threat and a view thatdeterrent capability is needed, as well as a capability or thworst case scenarios and worst contingencies. But in othways, it has trapped the alliance in a myopic kind o view othings, that we are an alliance that exists because o Nort

Korea and the challenges that are ound on the peninsula, anit has been a bit o an inhibitor to having a more regional oglobal alliance. Whether or not both alliance partners will buinto that, eventually there could be a discussion there.

From the U.S. perspective, this kind o longterm pivot something that is desired. We do see the U.S.ROK alliancas a global alliance and in some ways, certainly when we accontingencies in Iraq; it is not lost on people that the ROhad the third largest contribution o troops aer the U.and the UK at one juncture. But again, is this challenge othe DPRK ultimately an inhibitor to moving in the directioo a more regional and globaloriented alliance? O cours

everybody has resource constraints, everybody is dealing wiperhaps more austerity when it comes to the allocation o thoresources, and is there such a nearterm challenge that wcannot ully make that pivot or the alliance?



KEI and PROJECT 2049 INSTITUTE Editorial Board

Editors: Abraham Kim, Sarah Yun and Russell Hsiao | Contract Editor: Gimga Group | Design: Gimga Group

The Korea Economic Institute (KEI) is a not-for-prot policy and educational outreach organization focused on promoting dialogueand understanding between the United States and Korea. Established in 1982, KEI covers all aspects of the alliance, includingeconomic, trade, national security, and broader regional issues through publications, forums and conferences. KEI is an afliate withthe Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, a public research institute in the Republic of Korea.

The Project 2049 Institute, established in January 2008, seeks to guide decision makers toward a more secure Asia by the century’smid-point. The organization lls a gap in the public policy realm through forward-looking, region-specic research on alternative securityand policy solutions.

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors. While this monograph is part of the overall program of the KoreaEconomic Institute and Project 2049, its contents do not necessarily reect the views of the institutes.

Copyright © 2012 Korea Economic Institute | The Project 2049 InstituteKorea Economic Institute | 1800 K Street NW, Suite 1010 | Washington, DC 20006 | T. 202.464.1982 | F.202.464.1987 | www.keia.org

The Project 2049 Institute | 2300 Clarendon Blvd, Suite 250 | Arlington VA 22201 | T. 703.879.3993 | [email protected]

F O R U M

Te upcoming elections in Seoul will o course be o great

interest to people here in Washington, irrespective o how President Lee may be viewed back in Korea, he iscertainly viewed here as being a very strong supporter o thealliance. And although we do not know which candidatewill prevail at this point in a close election, there is a sensethat we have it about as good as we can have it. For a lot o Americans, the U.S.Korea relationship started in 1950 andwe have a very ahistorical perspective on things. Mosto our riends in Korea are quick to remind us the relationship goes back a lot urther and is ar more complicatedthan just the U.S. coming in to save the day. All o thoseissues will probably play out in the course o the election but

more importantly aer the election, in ashioning theapproach to the United States, the next president willhave to deal with those complexities. We are having anelection in the United States as well, or the most part ourAsia policy has been remarkably bipartisan, consistentand stable over the years, whether it had been republican ordemocrat, so I think continued stability is the best guess.

However, there are stability scenarios that, while stable, ov

the long term are not necessarily in our long term interests.the Kim dynasty (monarchy, whatever the appropriate termis) remains in power, i Chinese inuence continues to grosteadily over time, i China’s involvement in the economcontinues to grow, i China’s connections to the military, thparty and so orth continue to evolve and develop, there isscenario that is very stable, which is North Korea gets pullecloser and closer into the Chinese orbit, even more so than ittoday, to a point where Seoul’s calculus might start to chang

Tis is an edited and abridged version o the speakercomments that were made on May 29, 2012 at the KoreaChina Forum.

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