keeping the red flag flying: the electoral success of the pds in east berlin

This article was downloaded by: [Pennsylvania State University]On: 21 November 2014, At: 20:33Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,London W1T 3JH, UK

Journal of CommunistStudies and TransitionPoliticsPublication details, including instructions forauthors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjcs20

Keeping the red flag flying:The electoral success of thePDS in East BerlinJoanna McKay aa Lecturer in European Studies , NottinghamTrent UniversityPublished online: 12 Nov 2007.

To cite this article: Joanna McKay (2000) Keeping the red flag flying: Theelectoral success of the PDS in East Berlin, Journal of Communist Studies andTransition Politics, 16:3, 1-20, DOI: 10.1080/13523270008415438

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523270008415438

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of allthe information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on ourplatform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensorsmake no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy,completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views ofthe authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis.The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should beindependently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor andFrancis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings,

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjcs20

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/13523270008415438

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523270008415438

demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoeveror howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, inrelation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private studypurposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution,reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of accessand use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Penn

sylv

ania

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

20:

33 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Keeping the Red Flag Flying: The ElectoralSuccess of the PDS in East Berlin

JOANNA McKAY

The German Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) in its electoral stronghold, EastBerlin, gains unparalleled support. This reflects not only the actions and achievementsof the reformed communists themselves, but also the response of other parties. ThePDS benefits from the persistence of an east-west divide in Berlin in social andeconomic terms, and to a certain extent perpetuates this division because of its originsand policies. However, while the party has consolidated its support in East Berlin, itssupport in West Berlin remains very weak, suggesting that the leadership's aim tobecome a modern socialist party for all Berliners, indeed, for all Germans, is unlikelyto be achieved in the foreseeable future.

The sustained success of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) inEastern Germany has surprised, even horrified, many politicalcommentators, who had assumed that it would not outlive the immediatepost-unification period in Germany. However, the party's membership andelectoral performance in the new Lander (states) varies considerably.Nowhere is it as strong as in East Berlin, in both federal and secondaryelections, and it is this success that has ensured the party's survival as aforce in German federal politics. This is a result of the electoral rulewhereby a party that wins three constituencies or 'direct mandates' (whichare contested on a 'first past the post' basis) in a federal election is eligiblefor representation in the federal parliament, the Bundestag, even if its totalvote does not cross the crucial five per cent hurdle which is otherwisenecessary to qualify for seats. In 1994 the PDS failed to win five per cent ofthe total vote, but retained an active role in federal politics purely by virtueof the four constituencies won in East Berlin. However, the party was onlygranted the status of 'parliamentary group' in the Bundestag and was notclassed as a fully-fledged parliamentary party or Fraktion. In 1998 the partymanaged to overcome the five per cent hurdle for the first time, but again,it won constituency seats outright only in East Berlin.

Joanna McKay is a lecturer in European Studies at the Nottingham Trent University. Her primaryresearch interests are parties and elections in eastern Germany and Berlin, and her book, TheOfficial Concept of the Nation in the Former GDR: Theory, Pragmatism and the Search forLegitimacy, was published in 1998.

Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.16, No.3, September 2000, pp. 1-20PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Penn

sylv

ania

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

20:

33 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

2 JOURNAL OF COMMUNIST STUDIES AND TRANSITION POLITICS

Apart from providing an electoral safety net for the PDS, its strength inEast Berlin also brings other benefits. First, Berlin is the only Land in theFederal Republic which is made up of territory from the former GDR andthe old West Germany. This gives the party a strong local base from whichto target West Germans on its doorstep, an almost impossible task elsewherein the 'old Lander' where the party lacks activists. Thus Berlin functions asa testing-ground for the party's federal aspirations, namely to become amodern socialist party for all Germans. Some of the most prominent PDSpoliticians at federal level, such as the leader of the parliamentary party,Gregor Gysi, have their constituencies in East Berlin; hence the relationshipbetween the federal party and the Land party in Berlin is closer than thatbetween the federal party and other local branches. Indeed, the local partyleadership in Berlin is one of the few Land branches which support thefederal party leadership's objective of expansion into western Germany.Others see this as a threat to their claim to be an East German Volkspartei,and therefore to their very raison d'etre.'

A final reason for the PDS's determination to maintain its support inEast Berlin is its propaganda value, with Berlin once again the Germancapital and one of the most important commercial centres in Europe.

Profile of the PDS in Berlin

At the last Land election the PDS polled 36.6 per cent in East Berlin and 2.1per cent in West Berlin, producing an overall vote of 14.6 per cent.2 Thiswas a considerable improvement on the previous Land election,3 suggestingthat the factors that have brought the post-communist party support haveincreased since reunification and not decreased as one might have expected.The fact that the party polled over 30 per cent of the vote in East Berlin atthe federal elections of 1994 and 1998 supports the assertion that it hasconsolidated its support base there. Furthermore, the PDS has consistentlypolled over 30 per cent in recent elections in the east of the capital,compared with an average vote of about 20 per cent in other easternLander.* Support for the party tends to be strongest in the outer areas of EastBerlin with their characteristic prefabricated blocks of flats, such asLichtenberg, Marzahn and Hellersdorf. These districts are unlikely tobenefit from the redevelopment of the old city centre and the transfer of thefederal seat of government to Berlin. However, as has been noted elsewhere,it would be incorrect to suggest that all PDS voters are either unemployed,poorly educated or generally from the lower rungs of the social ladder.Furthermore, the PDS is certainly not a working-class party.5 On thecontrary, it attracts intellectuals and individuals with an above-average levelof interest in politics - in particular, the intelligentsia of GDR times.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Penn

sylv

ania

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

20:

33 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

THE ELECTORAL SUCCESS OF THE PDS IN EAST BERLIN 3

At the end of 1998, the membership of the PDS stood at 16,868 in EastBerlin and 454 in West Berlin. However, unlike the party's share of the vote,its membership has fallen consistently during the 1990s. In March 1991 thePDS had 42,068 members in Berlin, primarily because many formermembers of the ruling communist party of the GDR, the SED, transferredtheir membership to the PDS upon reunification. This figure fell to 24,249in July 1993, dropping below 20,000 for the first time in 1996.6 However,since membership levels of other parties in East Berlin have not risensubstantially, it does not seem to be the case that former PDS membersjoined other parties: instead they simply ceased to hold any partymembership. In spite of these figures, the significance of PDS membershipshould not be overestimated since East Germans assumed democracy in1990 with a specific understanding of the significance of party membershipbased on their experiences under state socialism. Following reunificationmany joined the successor party to the old SED out of loyalty to EastGerman values, peer pressure, or even habit. However, current membershipfigures certainly give a more accurate impression of the true level of supportfor the PDS compared with the inflated figures of the immediate post-unification period.

According to research data, the malerfemale ratio among PDS voters ismore or less equal and the age range is broad.7 However, party membershipis a different matter. As several scholars have pointed out, a large proportionof PDS members are aged 60 and above.8 Indeed, the drop in membershipsince reunification can partly be explained by the fact that more membersdie than the number of new ones who join.9 Consequently the party's'support reservoir' has been described as 'biologically limited'.10 The PDSis not the only party to experience difficulties in attracting young recruits,however. In the Eastern Lander in general, party membership appears tohave little appeal for young people and the moderate parties in particularlook distinctly middle-aged. The PDS has introduced various initiatives toattract younger members. Youth groups exist in most of the boroughs(Bezirken) of Berlin. Some are under observation by the Berlin Office forthe Protection of the Constitution, which monitors unconstitutional activity.Other initiatives have included a series of concerts under the slogan Rockfiir Links (Rock for the Left) and youth camps. However, the PDS hasneither a city-wide nor a federal youth organization on the grounds thatparallels would inevitably be drawn with the Free German Youth (FDJ) ofGDR times.

Although the party's membership is relatively elderly, the majority ofmembers of the PDS Fraktion in the Berlin parliament and the local partyexecutive are under 40 years old," unlike the other parties, with theexception of Alliance 90/The Greens.12 Not surprisingly, all those who hold

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Penn

sylv

ania

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

20:

33 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014


positions of influence within the PDS in Berlin are East Berliners, with theexception of three members of the Berlin parliamentary party who originatefrom West Berlin or West Germany. One Bundestag member representingan East Berlin constituency, Manfred Miiller, is a trade unionist from WestBerlin, but he continues to be a controversial figure owing to negativecomments he has made about the GDR. Furthermore, he is not actually amember of the PDS since the party still operates an open policy towardspotential candidates from outside its ranks.

In terms of ideology, both in Berlin and elsewhere, the PDS is far fromhomogeneous - indeed it is riddled with factions, from democratic socialiststo hard-line communists, all drawn to the party primarily because of its EastGerman roots.13 Rather like a typical people's party, out to win voters asopposed to believers, the PDS accepts differences of opinion within itsranks,14 but this inevitably leads to heated arguments over the party's roleand objectives, within both reunited Berlin and reunited Germany (seebelow).

Finally, as the successor party to the SED, the PDS is controversial inmany ways. Indeed, many other politicians (and some scholars) class it asanti-democratic and extremist.15 In many people's minds it is a continuationof a despised and undemocratic regime and it therefore poses a threat to theFederal Republic's liberal-democratic order. In May 1997 the Berlinparliament's Committee for the Protection of the Constitution discussed aproposal that the entire Berlin PDS should be observed. Berlin's interiorsenator, Jorg Schonbohm, was in no doubt about the 'anti-constitutionalalignment' of the local party in view of its background and programme, itslinks with other left-wing extremist groups, and the toleration and supportof Marxist-Leninist and militant anarchistic strands within the party. Aftermuch debate it was decided that just seven subgroups, including local youthgroups and self-confessed communists, should be observed and not theentire local party, although the situation would be reviewed periodically tosee whether the observation should be extended.16

A second controversy concerning the Berlin PDS is the party's attemptto sabotage official scrutiny of its MPs' past histories in order to establishwho collaborated with the SED regime. The party has been willing toconduct such investigations only according to its own criteria. In fact, threemembers of the YDS-Fraktion in the Berlin parliament were identified asformer Stasi informers. They refused to give up their seats, on the groundsthat the voters know about their past activities but still vote for themanyway." Not surprisingly, such revelations do little for the party's image inthe west.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Penn

sylv

ania

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

20:

33 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014


Programme and Objectives

In common with the leadership of the PDS at federal level, the local partyleadership in Berlin wants to transform the PDS into a modern socialistparty for East and West Germans, while at the same time maintaining aspecial responsibility for East German interests. Local politicians argue thatthe problems in the east and west of the city are becoming increasinglysimilar, especially concerning transport, the privatization of public utilities,and unemployment.18 Petra Pau, the local party chairwoman, has describedthe future of the Berlin PDS as 'city-wide and socialist, or not at all'.19

However, logic suggests that the party may not be able to have it both ways.To become a socialist party for left-wingers throughout Berlin would losevotes in the east among those who support it as the only representative ofeastern interests. This is not merely a local dilemma but one facing thefederal leadership of the PDS. Indeed, numerous scholars have expressedscepticism about the party's ability to represent eastern interests whilesimultaneously striving to become a 'nation-wide socialist alternative'.20

The official party programme of the PDS in Berlin is broadly in line withthe federal party programme.21 It is essentially socialist and there is little tosuggest that the PDS was a Marxist-Leninist party in a previous life. Indeed,on domestic issues the PDS has much in common with the other left-of-centre parties, most notably the Greens. However official party documents,drafted by the party executive or the Fraktion in the Berlin parliament, donot necessarily reflect the views of every party member and may not evenbe read by the party's electorate. Indeed, talk of 'modern socialism' is notnecessarily what the grassroots wants to hear, since many of them are olderthan the reform-orientated PDS functionaries and hold more traditionalviews, some communist, others conservative.22 For example, views differover an appropriate policy on law and order. Some members advocate aconservative line, on the basis of on their memories of the relatively crime-free GDR, which was partly attributable to the heavy police presence there.23

While many radical grassroots members advocate total opposition to theprevailing western-dominated bourgeois political culture, the partyleadership, at least in Berlin, favours a modern, effective party withinfluence within the existing political structures. Here there are manyparallels with the Greens who were almost torn apart by disagreementsbetween the uncompromising fundamentalists and the more moderaterealists during the 1980s. Pragmatists within the leadership want to prepareto govern, most realistically in coalition with the Social Democrats (SPD)and possibly the Greens. The PDS proposed the adoption of a non-party,left-of-centre candidate as mayor of Berlin, to be supported by all parties onthe Left as a means to beat the Christian Democrats.24 However, the chance

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Penn

sylv

ania

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

20:

33 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014


to run the capital is unlikely to arise in view of the absence of willingcoalition partners in a Land where West Germans are in the majority.

In spite of the intention to move westwards, the PDS is still concernedwith the preservation of memories of the GDR, which confirms thesuspicions of many in the West that it is simply a GDR nostalgia party.Berlin offers plenty of opportunities for such action, including the campaignto preserve the asbestos-ridden Palace of the Republic. They have also ledthe campaign to prevent the renaming of streets and squares in East Berlincommemorating socialist heroes,25 and supported the campaign to preventthe replacement of the distinctive eastern-style 'green man' at pedestriancrossings with his androgynous West German equivalent.26

Why East Berliners Vote PDS

Predicting and accounting for the performance of any political party ineastern Germany is potentially a hazardous task. This is largely becauseinsufficient time has passed for long-term party identification to develop,27

and the social indicators prevalent in the west, such as class and religion,simply do not apply.28 The brief East German experience of democracy hasfeatures in common with that of other former eastern bloc countries.However, unlike their counterparts elsewhere, the East Germans werepresented with a well-established party system, and suddenly foundthemselves a minority group in their own state. Even so, after three all-German elections, and several legislature periods in the Lander, there isnow a sizeable body of evidence on which to base explanations of electoralbehaviour in eastern Germany.

Nine years on from reunification it is clear that in East Berlin, at least,the PDS has consolidated its support and has proved that it was not just a'flash in the pan'. Various scholars have investigated the reasons for thecontinuing support for the party descended from the regime East Germansoverwhelming rejected during the period 1989/90.29 However additionalfactors help to explain why the party performs better in East Berlin thanelsewhere.

The main factors that bring the PDS support throughout the so-called'new Lander' can be summarized as follows. First, many East Germanscontinue to be disappointed with the results of German reunification.According to Wolfgang Gibowski, this includes 'those who have lostinfluence and prestige as a result of unification, not necessarily those whohave suffered material losses'.30 Consequently such individuals give theirsupport to the one party which cannot directly be blamed for their situationand which is not guilty of western chauvinism. In the words of the leader ofthe PDS in the federal parliament, Gregor Gysi, the strength of the party is

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Penn

sylv

ania

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

20:

33 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014


'symbolic of the failure of the Federal Government's dream ofreunification'.31 Secondly, for many, voting PDS has become part of a newpost-unification East German identity which, according to the federal partychairman, Lothar Bisky, never actually existed in GDR times but has arisenas a consequence of West German treatment of the East Germans.32 Thirdly,the PDS has local sub-organizations (for example, youth clubs and thenotorious Communist Platform), and arranges activities similar to thoseprovided by the SED in GDR times. Such facilities provide camaraderie andthings to do for those with plenty of time on their hands such as theunemployed and retired throughout eastern Germany. Finally, while somemay support the PDS because of its contemporary socialist policies, thepossibility cannot be ruled out that others do so out of a sense of allegiancethe old GDR system or communism, or both. For them the PDS is clearlythe only option.

But there are additional factors that have brought the PDS consistentlybetter election results in East Berlin than elsewhere. Petra Pau attributes thesuccess of her party in East Berlin to the following factors. First, otherparties have neglected the east of the city. The Christian Democratic Union(CDU), in particular, has caused polarization between east and west forshort-term political gain in the west, and has attempted to link the PDS withnegative aspects of Berlin's history such as the Wall. Contrary to theintentions of the CDU, however, this has brought electoral gains for thereformed communists. Second, the PDS is strong on the ground in Berlin,with campaigns led by local people. Third, it is in touch with everyday life.Finally, Pau has conceded that many voters vote for the PDS in spite of itsprogramme, not because of it, and sometimes even because this is the mosteffective way of annoying the CDU.33

From a more objective point of view, the success of the PDS in Berlincan be attributed to the following factors. First, the GDR was highlycentralized and a large number of SED functionaries were concentrated inEast Berlin and they initially transferred their membership to the PDSfollowing reunification. Secondly, the party is highly visible in the capital.The federal party headquarters is located there, not in Bonn like thewestern-based parties (until 1999), and prominent PDS personalities such asGysi34 and Bisky frequently appear in public locally. Thirdly, the PDS notonly secures the sympathy of a sizeable proportion of East Berliners, but italso mobilizes them on election days. Thus there tends to be a highcorrelation between strong support for the PDS and a higher than averageturnout.35 Finally, several neighbourhood branches of the Berlin PDS, suchas Lichtenberg, are flourishing and can to rustle up armies of activists forcampaigns. In these areas the PDS is more than a party, providing animportant social function. Contrary to the party's reputation as a political

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Penn

sylv

ania

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

20:

33 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014


retirement home, several branches were quick to take advantage of newtechnologies and have their own web-sites, in addition to the party's web-site for the whole of Berlin.

The failings of other parties have also benefited the PDS in Berlin. Theyall continue to be dominated by West Berliners and the old West Berlinmentality dating back to the cold war is still evident, most clearlydemonstrated by anti-GDR comments from the Berlin CDU, which arediscussed below. In addition, the governing grand coalition has failed tosolve many of Berlin's most pressing problems.

Ultimately, most of those who vote PDS probably still do so because itis regarded as the only voice of the East Berliners in a parliament dominatedby West Berliners. The same is true in Bonn, where the PDS has beenperceived by many as the voice of the East Germans at federal level. Inshort, to vote PDS is not necessarily an indication of socialist conviction butrather a rejection of West German political culture.

How Other Parties Tackle the 'PDS Question'

Berlin is unique in the German polity by virtue of being the only reunitedLand, and as a consequence politicians from West Berlin have to fight thePDS on their own territory, unlike their fellow party members elsewhere inthe old West Germany. Parties in Berlin on the left of the political spectrumhave an additional problem, namely how far to co-operate with the PDS inorder to gain a governing majority. The contrasting approaches of theCDU, SPD and the Greens, all with their roots in the west, are nowexamined.

The most vehemently anti-PDS rhetoric to be heard in Berlin emanatesfrom the CDU. This is partly because this party remains uncomfortablyweak in East Berlin,36 especially in terms of membership figures,37 but alsobecause many western politicians regard their party as having been in theforefront of the fight against communism for four decades. However, forseveral years the Berlin branch has been split between those who advocatea firm line and regard the PDS as a threat to democracy, and those whobelieve that such an approach will be counter-productive and will beperceived as an attack not only on the PDS but also on its supporters. Thosein the former camp tend to be West Berliners for whom anti-communismbecame a way of life during the cold war because of the precarious positionof the city. Comments from the governing mayor of Berlin, EberhardDiepgen (CDU), such as 'We'll never hand the city over to thecommunists', epitomize the endurance of this mentality. Such views arewelcomed in the party headquarters in Bonn, most notably by the formerGeneral Secretary of the CDU, Peter Hintze, who was responsible for the

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Penn

sylv

ania

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

20:

33 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014


'red hands poster' during the 1998 federal election campaign,38 and thefamous 'red socks' campaign of 1994.39

In the Berlin parliament, the CDU Fraktion leader, Klaus Landowsky,has repeatedly attracted criticism from all sides, including eastern membersof his own party, because of his strong attacks on the PDS which verged onblatant prejudice against East Berlin and its population. For example, hecalled the PDS (and those prepared to co-operate with them) 'rats' and 'licein fur', and stated that West Berlin must remain the economic backbone ofthe city and not be allowed to become 'mouse-grey like the east'.40

Landowsky's critics within his own party feared that, far from demonizingthe PDS, these attacks would be regarded by East Berliners as westernchauvinism and would further discourage them from voting for theestablished 'West' Berlin parties. This appeared to have occurred when the'red socks' campaign was launched at federal level a few years earlier.

Such attempts to condemn the PDS on account of its past prompted thereformed communists to argue that it was not they who wished to destroythe inner unity of the capital for electoral gain, but the CDU. Many of thelatter had apparently not come to terms with the fact that the cold war wasover. They accused their Christian Democratic critics of hypocrisy sincesome eastern CDU members had held positions in the CDU of the GDR, abloc party allied to the ruling SED, and effectively served the needs of theregime.41

Landowsky and others aimed to discredit not only the PDS but also theother parties that had not yet officially ruled out all forms of co-operationwith the post-communist party, namely the SPD and the Greens. Theintention was to portray the CDU as the only option for those who wantedto exclude the PDS from Berlin politics altogether, and to conjure up 'thespectre of a left-wing alliance' with the PDS hovering over its shoulder.Allusions were made to the eastern Land of Sachsen-Anhalt where the PDStolerated a minority government led by the SPD. Criticism of the SPD forits apparently pro-PDS stance peaked with the 'Riigen Declaration', apamphlet published by the CDU Fraktion in the Berlin parliament in April1997. This was a response to the 'Erfurt Declaration', issued by a numberof prominent left-wing figures who had appealed for an alliance of all thoseon the left to bring about an end to CDU domination in both Bonn andBerlin.42 The CDU's Riigen Declaration overtly attacked the 'renamed SED'which had allegedly destroyed 'inner reconciliation' in reunited Berlin. TheCDU portrayed itself as the only party that had fought uncompromisinglyagainst communism and condemned all those prepared to accept politicalparticipation by the 'SED successor party'.43 The intention was clearly toreinforce the message that the CDU was the only party in Berlin that wouldguarantee no role for the PDS. This hard-line approach towards the PDS

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Penn

sylv

ania

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

20:

33 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014


encouraged several high-profile civil rights campaigners from East Berlin toleave other parties in order to join the CDU in a blaze of publicity and to thedelight of Christian Democrat leaders.44

However, others within the Berlin CDU have distinguished between thePDS leadership and ordinary PDS voters. They believe that a moresophisticated level of political debate is necessary to win over voters in EastBerlin, many of whom are believed to hold quite conservative views, asmentioned above. As a consequence, some might switch directly from thePDS to the CDU.45 The fact that the Berlin CDU is relatively free of theinfluence of Catholicism (compared with elsewhere in western Germany)would make this transition even easier.

In 1995 the Berlin CDU established a 'Workshop for Unity' as a forumwhere the views of party members in East Berlin could be aired and toencourage mutual understanding between members from the east and westof the city. Its director, Martin Federlein, believed that the CDU could notwin in East Berlin with 'political nobodies' and called upon prominentpersonalities from the party headquarters in Bonn to stand against the PDSin East Berlin in the federal election. However, he feared that this appealwould fall on deaf ears because such individuals were afraid of losing face,and because local politicians would refuse to step aside for them.46 In short,it appears that those who advocate a strong anti-PDS campaign by theBerlin CDU have tended to get their way.

The SPD is the second strongest party in East Berlin in electoral terms,and, while membership there is not as high as the party would like, it ishigher than that of the CDU.47 However, the 'PDS question' has anadditional dimension for the Berlin Social Democrats. While they aim todiscredit the PDS in the hope of winning over its voters, it is conceivablethat the Social Democrats might have to accept PDS toleration of a minorityred-green coalition, in order to defeat the CDU. Any form of co-operationwith the PDS would be for purely strategic reasons, but subsequent co-operation with a party it had previously criticized would clearly cause theSPD embarrassment.48

In the meantime, many prominent figures within the local SPD appearedto be avoiding this most difficult of issues, hoping that an improvement intheir own electoral fortunes would make such a decision unnecessary.49

Other members of the Berlin SPD waited to see how the PDS developed andwhether or not it would distance itself from its communist past, beforedeciding on the question of SPD-PDS co-operation. Others, such as theformer local party chairman, Klaus Boger, made it clear that the notion ofany form of co-operation with the post-communist party would beunacceptable since Berlin is an 'east-west' Land, implying that the PDSwould be unacceptable to West Berliners. The debate is likely to continue to

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Penn

sylv

ania

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

20:

33 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014


cause bitter arguments, and may well expose different opinions betweenmembers from the east and the west of the city, whose opinions regardingthe PDS question are determined by different factors and experiences.

In its official strategy for dealing with the PDS, the Berlin SPD hasgenerally rejected the excessively hostile line taken by several prominentmembers of the Berlin CDU. The Social Democrats prefer to attack PDSpolicies rather than their origins and have accepted that the post-communists do have a clear democratic mandate. In view of the significanceof a good result in East Berlin for the PDS in the 1998 federal election, themessage many SPD politicians wanted to get across is that every vote forthe PDS made a change of government less likely. In the end, however, thequestion of co-operation with the PDS is likely to continue to be a highlydivisive issue among Social Democrats in Berlin. In addition the party willhave to co-ordinate its line regarding the PDS with its prospective coalitionpartner, the Greens, some of whom are likely to take a more flexibleapproach towards the issue.

The Greens in Berlin are ostensibly made up of three different groups,two of which originate in the east of the city, although in numerical termsthe party remains heavily western-dominated. The three groups are the wellestablished Greens/Alternative List from West Berlin, whose roots can betraced back to the late 1970s; the East Berlin Greens, a smaller group whicharose out of the unofficial peace movement in the GDR; and Biindnis 90,which emerged from the East German opposition movement and formed apolitical alliance in 1990, as its name suggests. Compared with its strengthin West Berlin, the party as a whole remains very weak in the east,especially in terms of paid-up members.50

The 'PDS question' has caused big problems for the Greens since theend of 1996.5' Differences of opinion have been particularly wide betweenmembers of Alliance 90 and the rest of the party. For the former, the PDSrepresents a continuation of the very system they worked to overthrow,hence co-operation is out of the question. Even so, the two parties'programmes are in many respects quite similar, although some would arguethat this is because the PDS has simply copied many of the Greens' left-wing policies. Furthermore, with a grand coalition ruling the capital, thetwo opposition parties are constantly thrown together in the Berlinparliament. In fact, moderates in the PDS and radicals from the Greens(almost exclusively from West Berlin, however), do have a considerableamount in common. Some of the latter sympathize with the PDS becausethe bigger parties attempt to marginalize it, as they did the Greens in the1980s. Indeed, radical left-wing Greens believe that if coalition with therelatively bourgeois SPD is thinkable, then co-operation with the PDScertainly is.52

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Penn

sylv

ania

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

20:

33 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014


Discipline tends to be more lax within the Greens than in other parties,therefore various views are expressed regarding a suitable relationshipbetween themselves and the PDS. Some members prefer to say as little aspossible on the subject since any suggestion of a possible arrangement withthe PDS would give the CDU the opportunity to suggest that a vote for theGreens was a vote for the PDS. The intention was to wait and see whetherit could prove itself to be democratic and whether the party would distanceitself from the crimes of the SED before making a decision. Others acceptedthat if the only way to end Berlin's unpopular grand coalition were with theassistance of the PDS then so be it."

It appears that the inevitable loss of members in the east as a result ofco-operation with the PDS is considered to be a price worth paying by manyprominent western Greens. But others fear that the PDS would agree todemocratic principles and renounce links with the past purely for reasons ofopportunism, only to break these agreements once they had got what theywanted. Some fundamentalist Greens simply regard the PDS as too petitbourgeois,54 while East German civil rights activists still fear that thosewhom they deposed in 1989 might return to power. As mentioned above,this controversy led several members of Alliance 90 to join other parties -in most cases the CDU, because it was the only Berlin party to rule out anyform of co-operation with the PDS. Overall it has been estimated thatbetween a third and half of Green party members in Berlin would supportco-operation with the PDS.55

The debate among the Greens in Berlin regarding possible co-operationwith the PDS looks set to continue. Ultimately, however, the party will haveto agree a strategy regarding the former communists with the only party itsmembers really want to rule with, namely the SPD. In short, the reunificationof the two halves of Berlin and the 'PDS question' are yet more divisiveissues for a party that has never been short of things to argue about.

Impact of the PDS on Berlin Politics

The clear democratic mandate of the PDS in the Berlin parliament meansthat it cannot be marginalized, unlike in the Bundestag where it acquired thestatus of a fully-fledged parliamentary party only in 1998. The party alsohas a strong presence in neighbourhood assemblies (Bezirksverordnetenver-sammlungen) and boasts four local mayors. Although it has always been inopposition in Berlin and stands little or no chance of getting its bills passed,the PDS has raised awareness of problems affecting the east of the city (asdo PDS MPs in the Bundestag).

The strength of the PDS in East Berlin has had an impact on the partysystem within the capital.56 In theory, it has created additional coalition

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Penn

sylv

ania

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

20:

33 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014


possibilities, but in practice it is unlikely to be an acceptable coalitionpartner for other parties since Berlin is not purely an East German Land.However, since the PDS is in ideological terms a left-wing party, it could beargued that it splits the total vote for left-of-centre parties in Berlin. This inturn reduces the chances of an SPD or red-green Land government, andultimately helps the CDU to retain power. On the other hand, the existenceof the PDS may have prevented the rise of the far right in East Berlin whichsome people had feared in view of East Berliners' lack of experience of amulticultural society." Instead, it seems that there is no need for a westernprotest party when they can vote for one of their own. However, such aconclusion may be premature given the success of the far right GermanPeople's Union (DVU) in Sachsen-Anhalt in the spring of 1998,58 especiallysince many PDS voters would not approve of their party's more liberalpolicies if they examined them carefully.

The party leadership's aim to move into the west has not been achieved,either in the capital or in the Federal Republic as a whole. Particular targetgroups in West Berlin are those for whom the Greens and the SPD havebecome too compromised, especially following the establishment of thered-green coalition government at federal level. The federal government'shandling of the war in Kosovo may have brought the PDS new membersfrom the unusually large pool of Green supporters and alternative thinkersin certain districts of West Berlin. Other targets include members of thelong-established Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin (SEW) and otherradical West German organizations which have thrived in West Berlin'srelatively liberal political culture. Prominent members of the Berlin PDSvisit trade unions, women's groups and even secondary schools in the hopeof winning support in the western part of the city. However, for the majorityof West Berliners, the PDS will always be at best the voice of the EastBerliners, and at worst a continuation of the communist regime whichthreatened their livelihoods for 40 years. Consequently the party has failedto attract many members in West Berlin (about 400, concentrated in theinner-city area of Kreuzberg), a fact that will hinder the party's long-termsurvival.

The 1998 Federal Election

During the 1998 federal election campaign, the Berlin PDS pursued a dualstrategy, aiming to win at least three constituency seats, as it had in 1994,and to gain over five per cent of the national vote, thereby achievingFraktionsstatus in the Bundestag for the first time. In addition, it was clearthat to win all five East Berlin constituencies in 1998 would have greatpropaganda value for the PDS. The party was particularly keen to hold on

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Penn

sylv

ania

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

20:

33 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014


to the constituency of Mitte-Prenzlauer Berg, the location of the newgovernment quarter, giving the local MP a high public profile. The chancesof the PDS winning direct mandates elsewhere in the eastern Lander wereslim, although two other constituencies, namely Rostock and Schwerin-Hagenow, were targeted during the election campaign, since the SPD hadwon them by a only small margin in 1994. Thus PDS supporters in thecapital were made to feel that the future of the party as a federal force wasin their hands. As Petra Pau admitted, 'It is no secret that the electoralsuccess of the PDS essentially depends on their performance in Berlin.'59

However, the party could not count on victory in its four Berlinconstituencies. In particular, a win in Mitte-Prenzlauer Berg could not betaken for granted for several reasons. First, there was the embarrassment ofthe resignation of the previous incumbent, the writer Stefan Heym, followinghis victory for the PDS in 1994. Second, the significance of the constituencywas clear given the high calibre of candidates put forward by all the mainparties. The SPD had a very strong candidate in the popular East Germanpolitician and deputy chairman of the party, Wolfgang Thierse. Even the CDUtargeted the constituency, offering a well-known former East German civilrights activist as its candidate, and the chairman of Berlin's almost invisibleFDP also stood there. But the PDS had difficulty finding a suitable candidatefor the seat. Further embarrassment was caused by the imposition of acandidate, a retired West German admiral, albeit one with dissident views, onthe local party by the federal party leadership as part of a strategy to appeal tovoters originally from the west. However, he withdrew, officially because ofproblems with his financial affairs. Eventually the chairwoman of the Berlinlocal party, Petra Pau, was adopted as the PDS's candidate, in spite of havingpreviously stated that she did not want the nomination.60

The whole affair highlighted internal problems within the partyhierarchy, with commentators once again comparing the behaviour of theparty leadership with that of the old SED. It also showed how much the PDSwanted to hold Mitte, knowing that the SPD had put up the toughest ofopponents. A final problem for the post-communists was that the populationof this fashionable inner-city area had significantly changed since theprevious federal election and many West Berliners had moved there.Nevertheless, according to Pau, 'The PDS in Berlin and in the constituencyof Mitte-Prenzlauer Berg does not regard itself as an eastern party', henceall Berliners would be welcome.61

During the campaign, the Berlin PDS simultaneously portrayed itself asan anti-capitalist, socialist party for all those who wanted not just a changeof government but also real political change, and as a party with a particularresponsibility to represent eastern interests. However, the federal partyleadership and the local party leadership were both aware of the significance

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Penn

sylv

ania

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

20:

33 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014


of even a tiny increase in support in the west. Consequently, a balance hadto be struck between appearing to be the champion of East Germaninterests, on the one hand, and being a modern socialist party for all, on theother. Gerhard Schroder's efforts to steer the SPD towards the centre of thepolitical spectrum had left plenty of room to the left of his party.Consequently the PDS emphasized issues such as social justice, equalityand the environment in the hope of being accepted as a socialist alternativefor all Germans. However, as mentioned above, the objective of movingwestwards, advocated by both the party leadership at federal level and inBerlin, is not shared by the PDS leadership in other Lander. For them theissue is largely irrelevant, and poses a threat to their self-proclaimed role asguardians of eastern interests.

When the votes were counted, the PDS polled 30.0 per cent in EastBerlin, 2.7 per cent in West Berlin and 13.5 per cent in Berlin as a whole.Compared with an average vote for the party in Eastern Germany of 19.5per cent this was very favourable, although the result was slightly lowerthan in 1994.62 This may be attributable to the 'Schroder effect' and voters'desire to remove Helmut Kohl from office, since it is noticeable that theSPD's proportion of the second votes (which ultimately determine thecomposition of the Bundestag), rose in every East Berlin constituencywithout exception. However, many East Berliners clearly wanted their localMP to be from the PDS. The ever popular Gregor Gysi polled 46.7 per centin his own constituency.63 The only part of West Berlin with any noticeablesupport for the PDS is the inner-city area of Kreuzberg, where the partypolled a modest 4.4 per cent.64

In general, the result for the PDS in East Berlin at the 1998 federalelection suggests that the factors that previously brought the party successin the east of the capital continue to apply. However, the fact that itscandidates failed to increase their level of support in the west of the citysuggests that their claim to be a modern socialist party for all Germans hadlittle impact as an electoral strategy.

In the end, the party did not have to rely on the East Berliners to gainaccess to the Bundestag since it polled 5.1 per cent in the Federal Republicin total. However, electoral support for the PDS in the east of the capital wasstill approximately ten per cent higher than elsewhere in the new Landerand once again it won only constituency seats there. The other partiesdeserve some of the blame for this because of their failure to transcend theeast-west divide of Berlin and to find local figures with whom EastBerliners can identify. While one might expect regular contact withwesterners, and a common sense of pride in being Berliners, would helpEast Berliners to become accustomed to life in the Federal Republic morequickly than other East Germans, this does not seem to have happened.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Penn

sylv

ania

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

20:

33 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014


Instead, Berliners seem to be more aware of what divides them than otherGermans and this is reflected in voting patterns.

Prospects for the PDS in Berlin

The future of the PDS in Berlin will depend on the continuation of bothlocal factors and factors that have so far encouraged voters to support theSED's successor party throughout the new Lander, in particular, the feelingthat East Germans are 'second-class citizens' in the Federal Republic.However, such factors may not continue indefinitely. In particular, it isquestionable how long the party can continue to benefit from the problemsassociated with reunification and east-west inequality. On the other hand,some commentators predict that it could still take decades for the east tocatch up with the former West Germany in real terms, hence the PDS maybenefit from dissatisfaction with reunification and with West Germanpoliticians for some time to come. Furthermore, unlike governing parties, asan opposition party it will be able to get away with internal divisions and itsidealistic policies will not be put to the test.

In East Berlin, the consistency of the PDS's electoral performancessuggests that it has consolidated its support. The party's strength in terms ofmembership is an enviable resource, but in the long term it will decline bynatural means unless more young people join. The post-communists havealso benefited from the shortcomings of the western-based parties withinthe Berlin polity, all of which struggle to appeal to East and West Berlinerssimultaneously. However, if the other parties do finally manage to producemore appealing political figures with whom the East Berliners can identify,the PDS will no longer have the upper hand in this respect.

In the long term, the PDS will either have to retain a very high level ofsupport in the east of the city, or make inroads into the west to secure itsfuture. The local party leaders, in line with their counterparts at federallevel, clearly favour the latter option. According to the joint chairman of theBerlin parliamentary party, this would inevitably require the party to shakeoff the image of caretaker of GDR traditions, to develop solutions to theproblems of the city as a whole, and to come to terms with its history in away that will satisfy even western voters.65 Even so, it is clear that thecrucial period is already over, and if it were just a 'flash in the pan' the PDSwould already be in decline.

Conclusion

Berlin is the only one of Germany's 16 Lander to experience its own minorreunification process. Here, within one city, the unwelcome consequences

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Penn

sylv

ania

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

20:

33 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014


of German unity, including the continuing differences in mentality andprosperity between West and East Germans, are impossible to ignore. ThePDS has benefited from the economic, social and psychological division ofBerlin, and, some would argue, perpetuates this division because of itsorigins and its eastern priorities. Until the factors that serve to reinforce theso-called 'wall in the mind' disappear, such as conflicting attitudes andvalues, and differences in living standards between the east and the west, thePDS is likely to continue as a key player on the Berlin political scene. Thisis something with which all the western-based parties will have to come toterms.

To date, the strength of the PDS in East Berlin has guaranteed the party'sfuture as a controversial force in German politics at federal level. However,with increasing electoral support across the new Lander, the PDS may nolonger need to rely on the capital for its survival as a federal party. Even so,the example of Berlin is indicative of the party's problems in establishing asupport base in the west, suggesting that in the long term this aspiring'modern socialist party' for all Germans is destined to remain an EastGerman regional party.

NOTES

1. For example, Christine Ostrowski of the PDS in Saxony heavily criticized the objective ofwestern expansion and the implantation of 'politourists' from the West German left into theEast, for which she received a dressing-down from the party leadership: 'Zwischen DDR undModerne', Die Zeit, 23 April 1998, p.4.

2. In the Berlin Land parliament the PDS currently has 34 members (out of a total of 206) andis in opposition along side Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Alliance 90/The Greens); Berlin hasbeen governed by a grand coalition since 1991.

3. In 1990 the PDS polled 23.6 per cent in the east, 1.1 per cent in the west and 9.2 per cent inBerlin overall.

4. In the most recent Land elections elsewhere in Eastern Germany, the results for the PDS wereas follows: Brandenburg (1994) - 18.7 per cent; Thuringen (1994) - 16.6 per cent; Saxon-Anhalt (1998) - 19.3 per cent; Saxony (1994) - 16.5 per cent; Mecklenburg-Vorpommern(1998) - 24.4 per cent (Source: Landeswahlleiter).

5. Gerald R. Kleinfeld, 'The Return of the PDS', in D. Conradt et al. (eds.), Germany's NewPolitics (Providence, RI, and Oxford: Berghahn, 1995), p.242; Geoffrey Roberts, PartyPolitics in the New Germany (London: Pinter, 1997), p. 179.

6. Source: Statistisches Landesamt Berlin. At the time of writing, the party's web-site gives amembership figure of 'about 19,000' for the whole of Berlin.

7. For more details of PDS voters in the 1995 Berlin election, see Joanna McKay, 'The Wall inthe Ballot Box: The Berlin Election of 1995', German Politics, Vol.5, No.2 (1996), p.278.

8. According to Lothar Probst, in Rostock over 50 per cent of members are over 60 years old:see his 'Die PDS in Rostock', in Peter Barker (ed.), The Party of Democratic Socialism inGermany: Modern Post-Communism or Nostalgic Populism? (Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA:Rodopi, 1998), pp.59, 71; Nicholas Hubble confirms that this is also the case in Thuringia:see his 'The PDS in Erfurt and the Erfurter Erklärung', in Barker, The Party of DemocraticSocialism, p.92.

9. This was admitted to the author by Petra Pau, Bundestag member (MdB) and member of theBerlin Parliament (MdA) in an interview in Berlin, 5 Nov. 1997.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Penn

sylv

ania

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

20:

33 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014


10. Kleinfeld, 'The Return of the PDS', p.241; for more comments about the membership andstructure of the PDS, see pp.224-6.

11. This is also true of the PDS elsewhere and at federal level: see 'Zwischen DDR undModerne', p. 4.

12. Alliance 90, an alliance of East German civil rights groups formed in 1990, merged with theGreens in March 1993.

13. On the issue of ideological diversity within the PDS in general, see Roberts, Party Politicsin the New Germany, pp. 178-9.

14. According to the party programme, 'the PDS includes people of different philosophies,ideologies, and religions whose common ground lies in their intentions to try to introducefundamental social change': cited in Kleinfeld, 'The Return of the PDS', p.226.

15. See, for example, the work of the prolific PDS expert, Patrick Moreau, including Die PDS:Profil einer antidemokratischer Partei (Munich: Hanns Seidel Stiftung, 1998).

16. The seven groups are: Kommunistische Plattform; Arbeitsgemeinschaft Junge Genossen inund bei der PDS; Arbeitsgemeinschaft Autonome Gruppen in und bei der PDS;Kommunistische Arbeitsgemeinschaft in und bei der PDS; Forum West; MarxistischesForum; and PDS Bezirksorganisation Kreuzberg. The surveillance question was decided bythe Berlin Parliament's Committee for the Protection of the Constitution on 23 April 1997(source: Drucksache 13/92).

17. 'PDS Abgeordnete wollen sich nicht "gauken" lassen', Berliner Morgenpost, 19 Oct. 1997.18. This point was made by Harald Wolf, MdA (author's interview, Berlin, 22 Nov. 1997) and

by Petra Pau, MdB, MdA (author's interview, Berlin, 5 Nov. 1997). The unemployment ratein East and West Berlin has consistently been very similar in recent years (16.3 per centacross the capital in February 1999: source: Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit). By contrast, theaverage West German unemployment rate is about half that of eastern Germany.

19. In German, 'gesamtstadtisch-sozialistisch oder gar nicht'. For source, see Pau's manifestofor the 1998 federal election at <http://members.aol.com.PDSholt249/>.

20. See, for example Henry Krisch, 'Searching for Voters: PDS Mobilization Strategies,1994-97', in Barker, The Party of Democratic Socialism, pp.47-8; Günter Minnerup, 'ThePDS and the Strategic Dilemmas of the German Left', in Barker, The Party of DemocraticSocialism, pp.216-18.

21. For an interesting though rather dated summary of the party's programme, see Kleinfeld,'The Return of the PDS', pp. 226-30.

22. At the Land party conference, Berlin, 22-23 Nov. 1997, tension between ordinary membersand party functionaries and local MPs was evident to the author.

23. 'Sozialistische Bürgerrechtspartei für den Osten', Die Tageszeitung, 13 June 1997.24. In 1995 and again in 1998, they suggested the former West German permanent representative

in East Berlin, Giinter Gaus: see PDS Landesverband Berlin, press release, 19 March 1998.25. See Schilderstürmer Bilderstürmer. Der Berliner Kulturkampf um Strassenschilder, a

pamphlet published in June 1997 by the PDS Fraktion in the Berlin parliament,26. For an account of the significance of this issue, see Mark Duckenfield and Noel Calhoun,

'Invasion of the Western Ampelmännchen'', German Politics, Vol.6, No.3 (1997), pp.54-69.27. Indeed, Kaase and Klingemann have argued that the 'level of non-identification with any of

the political parties' is 'the most important difference between East and West Germany':cited in Helga Welsh, 'Five Years and Several Elections Later', in Conradt, Germany's NewPolitics, p.51.

28. For a good introduction to differences between the East and West German electorates, seeRussell J. Dalton, 'A Divided Electorate?', in G. Smith, W. Paterson and S. Padgett (eds.),Developments in German Politics 2 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), pp.35-54.

29. Gordon Smith's is typical of early explanations: 'Its appeal is twofold: on one level the PDSis a vehicle for protest against the policies that are held responsible for the economic malaisein the former GDR, and on the other it can be interpreted as a form of cultural defenceexpressing the resentment felt towards the perceived haughty disregard on the part of WestGermans for any positive aspects of all of East German society': see Smith, 'Dimensions ofChange in the German Party System', in Stephen Padgett (ed.), Parties and Party Systems inthe New Germany (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993), p.98; see also Kleinfeld, 'The Return of the

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Penn

sylv

ania

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

20:

33 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014


PDS', pp.237-46 (on the 1994 elections); David Conradt, 'The 1994 Campaign and Election:an Overview', in Conradt, Germany's New Politics, p. 14; Hans-Georg Betz and Helga A.Welsh, 'The PDS in the new German Party System', German Politics, Vol.4, No.3 (1995),pp.97-107; Beatrice Harper, 'Why does the PDS Reach the Parts Bundnis 90/Die Grünencan't Reach?', in Barker, The Party of Democratic Socialism, pp.98-103.

30. Wolfgang Gibowski, 'Germany's General Election in 1994', in Conradt, Germany's NewPolitics, p. 128.

31. Berlin PDS party conference, Berlin, 22 Nov. 1997.32. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 24 Oct. 1995.33. Author's interview with Petra Pau, MdB, MdA, Berlin, 5 Nov. 1997.34. The importance of Gysi for the overall success of the PDS is examined by Kleinfeld, 'The

Return of the PDS', p.233-4.35. This correlation was noted by the Statistisches Landesamt Berlin and by researchers at the

Freie Universitat Berlin: reported in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 Nov. 1995.36. The CDU polled 14.7 per cent in East Berlin compared with 29.5 per cent in West Berlin at

the 1998 Federal election, and 23.6 per cent against 45.4 per cent at the Berlin election of1995.

37. At the end of 1997 the CDU had 12,351 members in West Berlin, compared with 2,005 inEast Berlin, down from 3,271 at the beginning of 1991 (source: Statistisches LandesamtBerlin).

38. Hintze was behind a poster that portrayed the SPD and PDS hand-in-hand - an allusion tothe forced merger of the SPD and KPD to form the SED in the Soviet Zone in 1946.

39. PDS supporters were equated with the 'red socks' of the past, a euphemism for members ofthe SED during the GDR period; for more detail, see Kleinfeld, 'The Return of the PDS',p.236

40. 'CDU-Parteitag: Ostler greifen Landowsky an', Berliner Morgenpost, 3 Nov. 1996.41. 'Schaut man sich die neuen Freunde an ... ', Frankfurter Rundschau, 22 Jan. 1997.42. Erfurter Erklärung. Verantwortung für die soziale Demokratie (Berlin and Erfurt, 9 Jan.

1997). For an exploration of the significance of this declaration, see Hubble, 'The PDS inErfurt', pp.84-7.

43. CDU Fraktion, Rügener Erklärung (18 April 1997).44. They included Günther Nooke, Angelika Barbe and Erhard Neubert.45. This view was held by Martin Federlein of the CDU (author's interview, Berlin, 3 Nov.

1997), and it was a fear of the SPD's Hans-Peter Seitz, MdA (author's interview, Berlin, 24Nov. 1997).

46. Author's interview with Martin Federlein, Berlin, 3 Nov. 1997.47. The SPD polled 35.1 per cent in East Berlin and 39.6 per cent in West Berlin in the 1998

federal election; in the Berlin election of 1995 the figures were 20.2 per cent in the east and25.5 per cent in the west; membership stood at 2,720 in East Berlin at the end of 1997(18,004 in the west), an increase since the end of 1990 when it stood at 1,799 (source:Statistisches Landesamt Berlin).

48. For an examination of SPD-PDS relations in general, see Klaus-Jürgen Scherer, 'Die SPDund die PDS', in Barker, The Party of Democratic Socialism, pp.182-93; Eckhard Jesse,'SPD and PDS Relationships', German Politics, Vol.6, No.3 (1997), pp.89-102.

49. 'Berliner SPD will die PDS ignorieren', Berliner Zeitung, 22 Sept. 1997.50. At the end of 1997 the Greens had 2,507 members in West Berlin and 615 in the east (source:

Statistisches Landesamt Berlin). In the Federal election 1998 the party polled 13.5 per centin the west of the city compared with 7.9 per cent in the east; the figures for the 1995 Berlinelection are 15 per cent in the West compared with 10 per cent in the East.

51. For a general discussion of Green-PDS relationships see Elisabeth Schroedter, 'DieAusseinandersetzung von Bündnis 90/Die Grünen mit der PDS', in Barker, The Party ofDemocratic Socialism, pp. 194-208.

52. This is the view of Ida Schillen, MdA (author's interview, Berlin, 13 Nov. 1997).53. 'PDS bleibt für die Grünen Reizthema', Der Tagesspiegel, 26 Aug. 1997.54. 'Kein Sozialismus auf der Straßenkreuzung', Süddeutsche Zeitung, 13 Nov. 1996.55. 'Die Grünen im PDS-Spagat', Die Tageszeitung, 23 Jan. 1997.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Penn

sylv

ania

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

20:

33 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

2 0 JOURNAL OF COMMUNIST STUDIES AND TRANSITION POLITICS

56. On the impact of the PDS on the German party system in general, see Roberts, Party Politicsin the New Germany, pp.176-7.

57. At the 1995 local election the far right Republikaner polled 2.9 per cent in East Berlin andat the end of 1997 had 266 members there (source: Statistisches Landesamt Berlin). At the1998 federal election, right-wing extremist parties polled a total of 6.2 per cent in the east ofthe capital compared with 4.1 per cent in the west (source: Bundeswahlleiter).

58. The DVU won 12.9 per cent of the vote in the Sachsen-Anhalt Land election of 1998 butsupport fell to just 3.2 per cent at the federal election just six months later (figures fromBundeswahlleiter).

59. See Petra Pau's press release, 26 March 1998; also Manfred Müller's election manifesto, at<http://home.ipn.de/~pdshsh/MM.HTM>.

60. Author's interview with Petra Pau, MdB, MdA, Berlin, 5 Nov. 1997; see also PDSLandesverband Berlin, press release, 2 Feb. 1998.

61. 'Online-Chat mit Petra Pau', 18 Aug. 1998, at <www.pds-online.de/berlin/lv/chat/frameset/htm>.

62. The figures for the 1994 election were East Berlin 37.4 per cent, West Berlin 2.6 per cent,Berlin overall 14.8 per cent.

63. Figures from <www.bundestag.de>.64. Constituency of Kreuzberg-Schöneberg; figure from <www.bundestag.de>.65. Author's interview with Harald Wolf, Berlin 22 Nov. 1997. Wolf, a West German who left

the Greens to join the PDS, first expressed concern about his party's chances in the West in1991, according to Henry Krisch: see Krisch, 'From SED to PDS: The Struggle to Revive aLeft Party', in Russell J. Dalton (ed.), The New Germany Votes (Oxford and Providence, RI:Berg, 1993), p.181.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Penn

sylv

ania

Sta

te U

nive

rsity

] at

20:

33 2

1 N

ovem

ber

2014

keeping the red flag flying: the electoral success of the pds in east berlin

Documents