keeping it real! evolution in political science: a reply to kay and curry

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Keeping it real! Evolution in politicalscience: a reply to Kay and Curry

PETER KERR

It seems that one can hardly mention the word ‘evolution’ in politicalscience circles without attracting a salvo from various critics (see also PeterJohn’s (1999) contribution to this journal and the responses by KeithDowding (2000) and Allan McConnell (2000)). One sure-fire recipe forattracting academic controversy is to pour a liberal dose of the ‘e’ wordinto the pages of a popular political science journal, lightly season withmodest claims about its potential utility, stir these two ingredients together,then sit back and allow the passions of your peers to come to the boil.

Not that such criticism is surprising, given the unfavourable theoreticalbaggage with which evolutionary explanations of change in the social sci-ences have in the past been burdened. The unsavoury recipe of ingredientswhich have been mixed into evolutionary explanations in social scienceover the years include functionalism, reductionism, teleology and, in somecases, even sinister claims about racial or sexual hierarchies. So why wouldanyone wish to invoke such a loaded term in discussions about political,economic or social change? For my own part, my previous piece in thisjournal (2002) had three aims. Firstly, I intended to highlight a resurgenceof interest in evolutionary conceptions of change in social (and more per-tinently, political) science debates. Secondly, I pointed out that many neo-evolutionary theorists have tended to bake a more sophisticated cake than

British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 5, No. 1, February 2003, pp. 118–128

before; one which is more often than not constructed around notions ofdynamism, contingency, openness and agency. Thirdly, I wanted to assertthat these evolutionary conceptions of change can be useful to political scientists, who often tend implicitly to infer an evolutionary logic in theiranalyses of institutional and policy change. Whilst it’s surprising to haveprovoked controversy with such a limited set of claims, I do neverthelesswelcome the very positive, though critical, engagement with evolutionarytheory which Adrian Kay and Oliver Curry make and would like to thankboth authors for their constructive comments.

In my previous article, as Kay rightly asserts, I avoided providing a con-crete definition of an evolutionary approach to political science. Instead,my aim was, in a less ambitious sense, to rescue evolutionary theory fromits definitional entanglement with the types of theoretical baggage withwhich it has formerly been associated. My point was that evolutionarytheory need not be defined in terms of functionalism, reductionism or anytype of historical determinism. Both Kay and Curry take issue with thisclaim, though in rather different ways. On the one hand, Kay argues thatan evolutionary theory, in order to have explanatory power, must be func-tionalist (though he argues that this is undesirable), unless it is used in amore narrow sense as a rich metaphor (his preferred option). On the otherhand, Curry asserts that there is no value to be gained from its use as ametaphor and that, instead, there is greater scope for extending biologicalanalysis into political science in order to predict human behaviour. If these are the choices, I would certainly side with Kay’s plea for evolutionto be used as a rich metaphor, though I would reject, on epistemologicalgrounds, the binary choice that he offers between explanation andmetaphor. At the same time, I would entirely reject Curry’s plea for evo-lution in social science to be utilised in a similar way to its use in biologyand would add that I find this plea rather alarming. It is precisely this type of attempt to import directly biological explanation into social scienceliterature that has caused the greatest damage to the evolutionary paradigm.

Getting real: what constitutes a ‘real’ evolutionary approach?

At the heart of this debate is the question of what constitutes a ‘real’ evo-lutionary explanation. Clearly, both authors are agreed that an evolution-ary paradigm in the social sciences intrinsically must be linked to someform of evolutionary explanation in biology. Moreover, given that evolu-

A reply to Kay and Curry

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tionary theory in biology offers both causal and predictive explanatorypower, so must an evolutionary approach to social science. I would contestthe first of these claims and provide some qualifications to the second.

On the first claim, although it is inevitable that evolutionary theorisingin both the natural and social sciences share similar types of linguistic andconceptual frameworks, evolutionary theorising in social science has itsown distinct tradition from that used in biology. The theoretical assump-tions which underpin social science evolutionary explanations differ enormously, not only from each other, but particularly from biologicalexplanations. And so they should. In biology, the variables which allownatural selection to take place are entirely exogenous in relation to the sub-jects of evolution and, therefore, change occurs as a ‘blind’ process. In thesocial sciences, on the other hand, change can be both blind and wilful;the product of a constant interplay between agents and their wider social,political and economic environments. In my previous article I went to greatlengths to argue that this means that selection arguments in social sciencecannot be directly analogous to selection arguments in the natural world.

The introduction of deliberate, goal-seeking, human agents as centralvariables in the equation means that the explanatory framework in socialscientific evolutionary explanation must be both more complex and flexi-ble than in biology, and also more interpretive. This does not equate tosaying that the explanation should be intentional; rather, it is to argue thatintentional explanation must be afforded a key role within the explana-tory framework and also that a hermeneutic quest for ‘understanding’human behaviour must run parallel to any attempt at explanation. Whatit does equate to saying though, is that a definition of ‘evolution’, whichis tied exclusively to Darwinian natural selection, is inadequate. As I made clear in my previous article, what we see in the social sciences is aproliferation of different conceptions of ‘evolutionary’ explanations, some of which are closely tied to Darwinism, but most of which are not.Take for example, the evolutionary economics offered by Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter (1982, 11), which is, in the authors’ own words, ‘unabashedly Lamarckian’—i.e. borrowed from a tradition longdiscredited and rejected by biologists. The reason for the rejection ofLamarckian biology is its assertion that a key mechanism for ensuringreproductive success is the transmission or inheritance of cultural traits—a learning process unlikely to occur in the biological realm, but which iscentral to human interaction.

In this sense then, there can be no ‘real’ conception of evolutionarytheory. In particular, it is inappropriate to link the definition directly to the

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natural sciences. To deny, as both authors appear to do, that a theoreticaltradition can itself evolve and adapt in its explanatory premises would bedirectly to tie, directly say for example, Marxism to Marx or feminism tothe concept of patriarchy, despite the vast proliferation of both positivistand non-positivist Marxist and feminist perspectives. We can take thispoint and apply it to Kay’s claim that an evolutionary perspective must beintrinsically functionalist. As the author is no doubt aware, the debate overwhether or not functionalism is intrinsic to evolutionary theorising inbiology itself is an old and inconclusive one (see for example: Nagel, 1961;Hempel, 1965; Cummins, 1975). Even if one side-steps this debate, as Kaydoes, and takes the position that, in biology, evolutionary explanation doeshave to be functionalist, there is no inherent logic to the suggestion thatthis should similarly be the case in social explanation, where human inten-tionality is continuously at work. Moreover, if one follows the logic ofKay’s argument, that in order to have explanatory power evolutionarytheory must be tied to functionalism, then one would have to assume thatthis ought to be the case in any explanatory framework, be it evolution-ary theory or otherwise. Why should evolutionary theory be treated as aspecial type of case in that it must be bound by a single and uniform definition? If functionalism is a necessary condition for explanation in evolution, then shouldn’t it be treated as a necessary condition for any typeof explanatory schema? One can think of many rival conceptions of changein political science—such as rational choice theory, institutionalism orbehaviouralism—all of which would claim to offer explanatory powerwithout resort to functionalism. Similarly, once we divorce evolutionaryexplanation from a definition that links it to biology, then Curry’s claimthat I do not refer to the same type of ‘adaptation’ as that used by biolo-gists becomes a moot point.

All the ‘e’s: evolution, explanation and epistemology

This brings me on to the second claim which Kay and Curry make—thatan evolutionary theory must have explanatory and predictive power; otherwise it is nothing more than a meaningless metaphor. My first instinctwhen I read this was to think that I should defend evolutionary theoryagainst being labelled a metaphorical device. But to do so would be toenter into what is a positivist trap of distinguishing between ‘real’ expla-nation—i.e. that which identifies clear causal links which are observableand static over time—and metaphor—i.e. anything which falls beyond this



narrow, empiricist, definition. Of course, my aim was to assert the notionof evolution as a useful and rich metaphorical tool or heuristic devicewhich can sensitise our attention to certain types of processes or mecha-nisms that govern change. Yet, this is not to argue that its use as ametaphor intrinsically limits its explanatory power.

Here, we are entering the murky waters of epistemology—yet another‘e’ word likely to lead one quickly into dispute with one’s peers. The phrase‘here be dragons’ springs to mind and so I enter this part of the discussionwith some caution. Nevertheless, there are two points which must be made.Firstly, there are a number of authors who have attempted to highlight thecausal links between selection mechanisms and reproduction in the socialand political realms from within a positivist evolutionary framework. Thework of Hugh Ward (1989 and 1997), which I highlighted in my previ-ous article, represents a sophisticated example of this approach. The aimof such authors is to highlight and demonstrate the effects of a diverserange of variables which can, and do, set external limits upon human inten-tionality. The aim at all times in these approaches is to ‘explain’ outcomesby reference to identifiable mechanisms which have helped to shape thoseoutcomes. As Kay rightly points out, the most successful of these attemptsare to be found in the field of evolutionary economics. Secondly though,it is important to make the point that one does not need to be firmlyentrenched within a positivist paradigm to be able to make the sameexplanatory claims. From my own perspective, I have attempted elsewhereto construct an evolutionary explanation which is grounded within arealist epistemological framework (Kerr 2001). The basis of realism issimilar to that of positivism in the sense that it attempts to explain out-comes by identifying a range of ‘generative mechanisms’ which have helpedto shape those outcomes. In this sense, realism asserts a foundationalistontological logic that detailed empirical research can help to uncovercausal links which explain the relationship between outcomes and theprocesses which generate change.

Realism, though, differs from positivism in two important respects.Firstly, realists invoke a much more layered conception of ontology (seefor example Archer 1995). Realism works on the assumption of ‘depthontology’—i.e. that these generative mechanisms are highly complex, oftenstructural and most crucially, not always directly observable. In this sense,part of the explanatory schema must be an attempt at ‘interpreting’ causallinks from observable outcomes. By not restricting its focus to directlyobservable causal links, the ‘depth ontology’ which realism offers is ableto produce a much richer layer of explanatory variables and generative

Peter Kerr


mechanisms than rival positivist explanations. The explanatory frame-work is at all times multi-layered and incorporates an appreciation of the constant and dynamic interaction between agency and the wider structuralenvironment in which intentional human action occurs. Secondly, theincorporation of agency into the explanatory schema means that theanalyst must take an even bolder step beyond positivism. Given that agentsare themselves active in interpreting their own structural context and thatthe meanings which they attach to any given situation are likely to differ,part of the quest for explanation must be the incorporation of the notionof hermeneutics; i.e. an understanding of the differential meanings whichagents infer upon their actions. My argument would be that the emphasisupon layers of generative mechanisms, some of which are ‘hidden’ fromour view, combined with the search for hermeneutic understanding, meansthat a realist explanation is much richer than the narrow definition ofexplanation that positivism has to offer.

Bringing context to the fore: generative mechanisms and selection

In my own view, the evolutionary paradigm represents an ideal explana-tory framework for incorporating this type of depth ontology. Evolutionprovides precisely the type of dynamic conception of change whichacknowledges the crucial interaction between context and agency. It recog-nises that the context in which action occurs is a multi-layered one andtherefore the generative mechanisms which shape outcomes are both mul-tiple and dynamic. It is important to emphasise—particularly in light ofrecent criticisms of evolutionary theory (see in particular Dowding 2000)—that the explanatory framework in an evolutionary conception of changeis far richer and more valuable to political scientists than intentionalistexplanation. Indeed, it is precisely as a corrective to intentional explana-tion in political science that I attempt to invoke an evolutionary explana-tion. Intentional explanations have colonised almost every area of thediscipline; what we find is the proliferation of political science explana-tions which are constructed around the central notions of choice, prefer-ence, autonomy and agency. My own argument would be that this isunhelpful in providing us with an holistic and layered conception ofchange. What evolutionary theory does is both to place agents within theirstructured context and to emphasise that this context places limitationsupon the choices, preferences and autonomy which agents have. In thissense then, to put an evolutionary slant on this statement, the ‘environ-



ment’ in which action occurs creates a ‘selective bias’ towards certain typesof political strategy over others.

We can compare this approach to other attempts within political scienceto explain outcomes. I am reminded in particular here of Dowding’s defi-nition of how political scientists should proceed in their attempts at expla-nation (see the debate between Dowding 2001 and Marsh and Smith 2000and 2001). Dowding argues that proper political science explanationsshould use models in order to generate hypotheses (what he rather grandlyrefers to as ‘predictions’) which can be tested using a mixture of quanti-tative and qualitative methods (though the former is apparently moreappropriate). This is a considerably simplistic form of explanation which,in most cases, leads directly to intentionalism given that the easiest vari-ables to ‘test’ are those which can be traced back to preferences and choice.More importantly though, it is also a closed and static explanation whichis presumptive of what generative mechanisms have helped to shape theoutcome. What is missing from this type of explanation is a satisfactoryappreciation of the question ‘why do some preferences shape outcomesmore than others?’. Unless we can answer that question then the expla-nation becomes paper thin and indeed it is relatively easy to construct anargument that this type of ‘explanation’ amounts to nothing more than amere ‘description’ of a narrow set of variables, pre-selected by the analyst,that helped to shape outcomes. In order to answer the ‘why’ question onewould need to invoke a much deeper conception of ontology. This doesnot mean the superficial and somewhat vague appreciation of contextualfactors that we see in most political science literature, but an explanatoryframework in which context is intrinsically central to the explanation. Italso requires, as Kay rightly points out, an open and contingent explana-tory framework in which the analyst is agnostic from the outset about thelayers of generative mechanisms that produced the outcome.

The concept of ‘selection’ in evolutionary arguments is helpful in that itplaces context central to any explanation of change. To answer the ‘why’question one would need to consider a wide range of contextual factors,including the motivations of other actors in the field (thus retaining thepossibility of intentional explanation), institutions, social structures, domi-nant discourses and ideational processes. Some combination of these vari-ables would have to be invoked in order to help explain why a particularoutcome reflected the preferences of one set of interests over another. Thus,evolutionary theory assumes a competition—or ‘struggle for survival’—between different sets of ideas or preferences which is played out within

Peter Kerr


a context which is selectively biased towards some ideas over others. Itthen forces us to look at the types of mechanisms that can help to explainthe reproduction of certain ideas or outcomes over time. Through detailedempirical research, these selective mechanisms can be identified. Theycould range from public opinion and media representation to institutionalinertia and economic resources.

Selection in this sense is, as Kay suggests, merely a metaphor, though,as we are invariably concerned with which policies are being ‘selected’, itcan also be taken literally. However, two things need to be emphasisedhere. Firstly, selection in biology is similarly metaphorical, in that it ismerely an umbrella term which is utilised in order to encapsulate a varietyof different processes which enhance or inhibit reproductive success.Linking selection arguments in biology to functionalist explanation doesnot make the concept of ‘natural selection’ any less metaphorical. Secondly,whether in biology or the social sciences, it is a metaphor which does pointto causal mechanisms, although the causal link in such explanations mayonly be a loose one, given the element of interpretation involved when onehasn’t hypothesised the causal variable from the outset as in, for example,rational choice explanation. Critics such as Kay and Curry suggest thatbecause the concept of selection here is metaphorical, then it is possible toapply the same types of contextual variables and assumptions withoutexplicit resort to evolutionary theory. This is certainly true. To do sothough, would be to begin to apply a similar evolutionary ‘logic’—what Itermed in my previous article an ‘appreciative’ conception of evolutionarychange. Therefore, evolution is a useful type of metaphor—one whichintrinsically sensitises us to the constant interplay between context andagency. It is this interplay which is most often missing in political scienceexplanations. Although critics suggest that an appreciation of the interac-tion between context and agency is possible without evolutionary expla-nation, it is nevertheless the case that very few political scientists do ever invoke the type of depth ontology that is central to evolutionary arguments.

A dynamic conception of change

Kay, unlike Curry, acknowledges the need for a dynamic and contingentconception of change. On this point I agree and, indeed, my previousarticle argued that evolutionary explanation provides us with precisely that



conception. However, an important qualification needs to be made here.Contingency in the process of change is at all times relative. It is the recog-nition of this point which is the very raison d’etre of an evolutionary expla-nation. Future changes are highly constrained by past choices, as well asby a variety of contextual factors; thus, once a particular direction hasbeen taken, change is likely to become locked into a ‘path dependency’. Inthis sense then, change is not always evenly contingent; at certain timesthe direction of change may be more open than at other times. Accordingto Kay, this conception of path dependency is entirely different from an evolutionary explanation. However, I would argue that path depen-dency arguments are not as distinct from evolutionary arguments as Kay asserts.

According to Kay, ‘the theories of the path-dependent process focus onthe costs of exit from the developmental path for groups or individualactors’. However, in my view, it is precisely the ‘costs of exit’ which providea selection mechanism ensuring that these groups become locked into thedevelopmental path. In evolutionary explanation such as that provided by Ward (1989 and 1997), the ‘rewards’ for staying within that path faroutweigh the costs of exit, thus ensuring a selective pressure towards thereproduction of similar types of choice or behaviour. The way in whichKay distances evolutionary explanation from path dependency theoriesinvolves caricaturing my evolutionary argument. He asserts that I arguethat it is the functional ‘fit’ between choices and the environment that keep policies locked into path dependency and that dysfunctional featuresare eliminated through selection. This is not what I argue at all. Indeed, I go out of my way to eschew functional arguments and, instead, arguethat change is a contingent process which can take many paths but which becomes shaped over time by selection pressures such as ‘costs ofexit’.

Kay also argues that one should remain agnostic and critical about thegenerative mechanisms which shape outcomes. I agree with this, if byagnostic he means that we make no prior assumptions about what thosegenerative mechanisms might be. An evolutionary approach allows forsuch agnosticism, as much as it allows for a dynamic and contingent con-ception of change. Thus, I have no dispute here with Kay’s argument,except to point out that the call generally for a ‘dynamic’ approach tochange is rather vague and to some extent meaningless, unless it is situ-ated within an explanatory or heuristic framework which provides someindication of where to begin to search for those dynamics. This is wherethe evolutionary ‘metaphor’ is most useful.

Peter Kerr


Conclusion

In this short article I have mainly focused on the general criticisms madeby Kay as his comments are more geared towards the claims I made in myprevious article. Curry’s engagement with my argument is much less directand is based upon a definition of evolution that is linked directly to biology.As I have gone to some length, both here and elsewhere, to point to thedistinctiveness of recent evolutionary arguments in social science, Curry’scriticisms seem to be wide of their mark. I would entirely reject any attemptto import biological arguments into social science explanations. Previousattempts at sociobiology have been, at various times in history, linked todoctrines such as Fascism and arguments about laissez-faire capitalism.The arguments which I have tried to make about the utility of an evolu-tionary approach are light years removed from these types of attempt tolink social science to natural science. Instead, I have tried to argue thatnotions of ‘evolution’, ‘selection’ and ‘adaptation’ provide us with richmetaphors or heuristic devices which can sensitise us towards processesand mechanisms that help to shape change. Their use as metaphorhowever, does not discredit their explanatory power, since they point us inthe direction of variables that can be empirically examined and can helpexplain political outcomes.

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Marsh, D. and Smith, M. (2000) ‘Understanding Policy Networks: Towards a DialecticalApproach’, Political Studies, 48, 4–21.

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Dr. Peter KerrUniversity of BirminghamDepartment of Political Science and International StudiesEuropean Research InstituteBirmingham, B15 2TTemail: [email protected]

Peter Kerr


keeping it real! evolution in political science: a reply to kay and curry

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