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TUPAS v CA

FACTS:

Petitioners were party litigants in a casefiled in the RTC

petitioners received a copy of the decision ofthe Regional Trial Court of Pasay City onApril 3, 1989

they filed a motion for reconsideration onApril 17, 1989, or fourteen days later

The order of May 3, 1989, denying themotion was received by the petitioners'

counsel on May 9, 1989

Instead of filing the petition for review withthe Court of Appeals within the remainder

of the 15-day reglementary period, that is,

on May 10, 1989, the petitioner did so only

on May 23, 1989, or 14 days later

petitioners argue that they should not beprejudiced by the mistakes of their counselbecause they are laymen and not familiar

with the intricacies of the law

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were denied due

process by the alleged mistake of their counsel

HELD: NO

The petitioners' counsel did not file thepetition for review within the remaining

period, which he should have known was

only one day. Neither did he move for an

extension that would have been granted as a

matter of course. The petition for review

being indisputably late, he could not

thereafter ask that it be treated as a petition

forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of

Court, which can be filed within a

reasonable time. This remedy cannot be

employed as a substitute for a lost

appeal. 3It follows that for having

themselves forfeited the right to appeal, the

petitioners cannot now plaintively claim that

they have been denied due process

Rules of procedure are intended to ensurethe orderly administration of justice and the

protection of substantive rights in judicial

and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake

to suppose that substantive law and adjective

law are contradictory to each other or, as hasoften been suggested, that enforcement of

procedural rules should never be permitted if

it will result in prejudice to the substantive

rights of the litigants

As a matter of fact, the policy ofthe courts is to give effect to both

kinds of law, as complementing

each other, in the just and speedy

resolution of the dispute between

the parties. Observance of both

substantive and procedural rights is

equally guaranteed by due process,

whatever the source of such rights,

be it the Constitution itself or only

a statute or a rule of court

The petitioners have not shown that theircounsel was exceptionally inept or

motivated by bad faith or excusably misled

by the facts. There is no reason why we

should not apply the rule that clients should

be bound by the acts of their counsel,

including his mistakes

Petitioners counsel is a prestigiousmember of the bar and his conduct

at the trial demonstrated his

experience and skill as a trial

lawyer. The petitioners themselves

describe him as "a graduate of one

of the top law schools in the

country, a bar examiner in

Remedial Law, a law professor in

Remedial Law and other law

subjects, a former National Officer

of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines and a seasoned

practitioner for more than 30

years." 6The procedural mistake

might have been understandable in

an ordinary lawyer but not in the

case of the petitioners' former

counsel

if the petitioners felt so strongly that the saiddecision was erroneous they would have

demonstrated more spirit and promptitude in

assailing it. Instead, they waited to move for

reconsideration until the last hour and,

ultimately, when the motion was denied,

filed the petition for review only when it

was already too late. Under these

circumstances, equity cannot be extended to

them to soften the rigor of the law they have

not chosen to observe.

equity is available only in the absence of law and not

as its replacement. Equity is described as justice

outside legality, which simply means that it cannotsupplant although it may, as often happens,

supplement the law. We said in an earlier case, and

we repeat it now, that all abstract arguments based

only on equity should yield to positive rules, which

pre-empt and prevail over such persuasions.

Emotional appeals for justice, while they may wring

the heart of the Court, cannot justify disregard of the

mandate of the law as long as it remains in force. The

applicable maxim, which goes back to the ancient

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days of the Roman juristsand is now still

reverently observedis "aequetas nunquam

contravenit legis

BANCO ESPANOL-FILIPINO v PALANCA

JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED:Jurisdiction over the property which is the

subject of the litigation may result either

from a seizure of the property under legal

process, whereby it is brought into the actual

custody of the law, or it may result from the

institution of legal proceedings wherein,

under special provisions of law, the power

of the court over the property is recognized

and made effective.

The action to foreclose a mortgage is said tobe a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is

expressed the idea that while it is not strictly

speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of

that nature and is substantially such.

DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSUREPROCEEDINGS: Property is always

assumed to be in the possession of its owner,

in person or by agent; and he may be safely

held, under certain conditions, to be affected

with knowledge that proceedings have been

instituted for its condemnation and sale.

FACTS:

Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingcomortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila

to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio

returned to China and there he died on January 29,

1810 without returning again to the Philippines. The

mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but

since defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to

give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was

also directed to send copy of the summons to the

defendants last known address, which is in Amoy,

China. It is not shown whether the Clerk complied

with this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication

in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause

proceeded and judgment by default was rendered.The decision was likewise published and afterwards

sale by public auction was held with the bank as the

highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale was

confirmed by the court. However, about seven years

after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made

by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of

the original defendant, wherein the applicant

requested the court to set aside the order of default

and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings

subsequent thereto. The basis of this application was

that the order of default and the judgment rendered

thereon were void because the court had never

acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the

subject of the action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court acquiredjurisdiction over the defendant and the

subject matter of the action

Whether or not due process of law wasobserved

RULING:

On Jurisdiction

The word jurisdiction is used in several different,

though related, senses since it may have reference (1)

to the authority of the court to entertain a particular

kind of action or to administer a particular kind of

relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over

the parties, or (2) over the property which is the

subject to the litigation.

The sovereign authority which organizes a court

determines the nature and extent of its powers in

general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction

with reference to the actions which it may entertain

and the relief it may grant.

How Jurisdiction is Acquired

Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the

voluntary appearance of a party in court and his

submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the

coercive power of legal process exerted over the

person.

Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of

the litigation may result either from a seizure of the

property under legal process, whereby it is brought

into the actual custody of the law, or it may result

from the institution of legal proceedings wherein,

under special provisions of law, the power of the

court over the property is recognized and madeeffective. In the latter case the property, though at all

times within the potential power of the court, may

never be taken into actual custody at all. An

illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual

seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the

property is seized at the beginning of the action, or

some subsequent stage of its progress, and held to

abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration

of what we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is

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found in the proceeding to register the title of land

under our system for the registration of land. Here the

court, without taking actual physical control over the

property assumes, at the instance of some person

claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in

rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in

favor of the petitioner against all the world.

In the terminology of American law the action to

foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi

in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is

not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes

of that nature and is substantially such. The

expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow

application, used only with reference to certain

proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the

property alone is treated as responsible for the claim

or obligation upon which the proceedings are based.

The action quasi rem differs from the true action in

rem in the circumstance that in the former an

individual is named as defendant, and the purpose ofthe proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the

obligation or lien burdening the property. All

proceedings having for their sole object the sale or

other disposition of the property of the defendant,

whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of

remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The

judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive

only between the parties.

xxx

It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the

defendant for whom publication is made appears, the

action becomes as to him a personal action and isconducted as such. This, however, does not affect the

proposition that where the defendant fails to appear

the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be

considered with reference to the principles governing

actions in rem.

On Due Process

xxx As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it

may be laid down with certainty that the requirement

of due process is satisfied if the following conditions

are present, namely; (1) There must be a court or

tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear anddetermine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must

be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant

or over the property which is the subject of the

proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an

opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be

rendered upon lawful hearing.

Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant

shall have an opportunity to be heard, we observe

that in a foreclosure case some notification of the

proceedings to the nonresident owner, prescribing the

time within which appearance must be made, is

everywhere recognized as essential. To answer this

necessity the statutes generally provide for

publication, and usually in addition thereto, for the

mailing of notice to the defendant, if his residence is

known. Though commonly called constructive, or

substituted service of process in any true sense. It is

merely a means provided by law whereby the owner

may be admonished that his property is the subject of

judicial proceedings and that it is incumbent upon

him to take such steps as he sees fit to protect it.

It will be observed that this mode of notification does

not involve any absolute assurance that the absent

owner shall thereby receive actual notice. The

periodical containing the publication may never in

fact come to his hands, and the chances that he

should discover the notice may often be very slight.

Even where notice is sent by mail the probability ofhis receiving it, though much increased, is dependent

upon the correctness of the address to which it is

forwarded as well as upon the regularity and security

of the mail service. It will be noted, furthermore, that

the provision of our law relative to the mailing of

notice does not absolutely require the mailing of

notice unconditionally and in every event, but only in

the case where the defendant's residence is known. In

the light of all these facts, it is evident that actual

notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not,

under the law, to be considered absolutely necessary.

The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizingthe efficacy of a means of notification which may fall

short of actual notice is apparently this: Property is

always assumed to be in the possession of its owner,

in person or by agent; and he may be safely held,

under certain conditions, to be affected with

knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for

its condemnation and sale.

Did the failure of the clerk to send notice to

defendants last known address constitute denial of

due process?

The observations which have just been made lead tothe conclusion that the failure of the clerk to mail the

notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such

an irregularity, as amounts to a denial of due process

of law; and hence in our opinion that irregularity, if

proved, would not avoid the judgment in this case.

Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and

this is the only form of notice which the law

unconditionally requires. This in our opinion is all

that was absolutely necessary to sustain the

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proceedings.

It will be observed that in considering the effect of

this irregularity, it makes a difference whether it be

viewed as a question involving jurisdiction or as a

question involving due process of law. In the matter

of jurisdiction there can be no distinction between the

much and the little. The court either has jurisdiction

or it has not; and if the requirement as to the mailing

of notice should be considered as a step antecedent to

the acquiring of jurisdiction, there could be no escape

from the conclusion that the failure to take that step

was fatal to the validity of the judgment. In the

application of the idea of due process of law, on the

other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to be so rigorous.

The jurisdiction being once established, all that due

process of law thereafter requires is an opportunity

for the defendant to be heard; and as publication was

duly made in the newspaper, it would seem highly

unreasonable to hold that failure to mail the notice

was fatal. We think that in applying the requirementof due process of law, it is permissible to reflect upon

the purposes of the provision which is supposed to

have been violated and the principle underlying the

exercise of judicial power in these proceedings.

Judge in the light of these conceptions, we think that

the provision of Act of Congress declaring that no

person shall be deprived of his property without due

process of law has not been infringed.

PERKIN ELMER v DAKILA

Jurisdiction; Cause of Action; Venue; Counter-

Claim. Perkins Elmer Instruments Asia Pte Ltd(PEIA) is a foreign (singapore) corporation not doing

business in the Philippines which manufactures and

sells lab instruments. Dakila Trading Corporation is a

local corp that sells, distributes and leases lab

equipments. Dakila and PEIA entered into a

distributorship agreement where Dakila would order

Instruments from PEIA or from local affiliate,

Perkins Elmer Instruments Philippines (PEIP), 99%

of its stocks are owned by PEIA. However, PEIA

unilaterally terminated the agreement, prompting

Dakila to file a case for Sum of Money against PEIA

with a writ of attachment on properties here in the

Philippines (the stocks of PEIP). Dakila asked thepermission of the court to deputize its General

Manager, Richard Tee, to serve

EXTRATERRITORIAL SUMMONS to PEIA in

Singapore. Alias summons were issued and were

delivered to Perkinelmer Asia, a separate and

distinct entity from PEIA or PEIP. PEIP filed a

motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, while

Perkinelmer wrote a letter stating that they have been

wrongfully served the summons. Dakila amended its

complaint saying that PEIA merely changed its name

and that all outstanding debts and obligations are still

answerable by Perkinelmer. Again the summons was

served in Singapore and again, PEIP filed a motion to

dismiss on the ground of lack of Jurisdiction and

cause of action, that the contract provided for

termination of the agreement at any time and that the

venue was improper. The RTC denied the motion and

required PEIP to answer the amended complaint. CA

affirmed.

Issues:

1. Whether the RTC had acquired jurisdiction.2. Whether there was a cause of action.3. Whether there was proper venue.4. (ancillary issue which the SC decided to

discuss) Whether a compulsory

counterclaim is deemed dismissed with the

dismissal of the original claim.

Held:

1. Jurisdiction was never acquired on thePerson of PEIA. Dakila anchored its extra-

territorial service of summons on Sec. 15,

Rule 14 of the RoC, but this rule pertains

only to actions in rem, not in personam. In

the case at bar, Dakila is suing PEIA for

collection of sum of money and damages,

the fact that PEIA had properties here in

the Philippines in the form of stocks of PEIP

which were attached, does not transform the

case from in personam to in rem or quasi-in

rem. Then again, in the Amended

complaint, PEIP did answer, so was

jurisdiction acquired by their participation?The SC said, It is settled that a party who

makes a special appearance in court for the

purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of

said court, based on the invalidity of the

service of summons, cannot be considered to

have voluntarily submitted himself to the

jurisdiction of the court. Take note, that

their lack of participation would waive their

right and the RTC would have ruled without

them. But it is consistent in PEIPs

pleadings that they have questioned the

RTCs jurisdiction from the very beginning.

2.

(Dakila may have had cause of action, andthe RTC may have been the proper venue,

but the fact is, jurisdiction was not acquired)

3. Despite the venue stipulation found in theDistribution Agreement stipulating that the

exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising

from the same shall lie in the courts of

Singapore or of the Territory (referring to

the Philippines), whichever is elected by

PEIA (or petitioner, as PEIA's alleged

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successor), the RTC of the Philippines

cannot be considered as an improper venue.

Truly, the venue stipulation used the word

"exclusive," however, a closer look on the

Distribution Agreement would reveal that

the venue stipulation was really in the

alternative i.e., courts of Singapore or of the

Territory, meaning, the Philippines; thus, the

court a quo is not an improper venue for the

present case.

It bears to emphasize that petitioner's counterclaim

against respondent is for damages and attorney's fees

arising from the unfounded suit. While respondent's

Complaint against petitioner is already dismissed,

petitioner may have very well already incurred

damages and litigation expenses such as attorney's

fees since it was forced to engage legal representation

in the Philippines to protect its rights and to assert

lack of jurisdiction of the courts over its person by

virtue of the improper service of summons upon it.

Hence, the cause of action of petitioner'scounterclaim is not eliminated by the mere dismissal

of respondent's complaint.

BOUDARD vs TAIT (1939 pa tong case na to)

Topic: personal jurisdiction in personam over non

residents

FACTS:

Emilie Boudard, in her capacity as the widow of

Marie Theodore Boudard and as guardian of her

coappellants (children born during marriage withdeceased), obtained a judgment in her favor from the

civil division of the CFI of Hanoi, French Indo-China

for the sum equivalent to P56k. The judgment was

rendered against Stewart Tait based on the fact that

Marie Theodore Boudard, who was an employee of

Stewart Tait, was killed in Hanoi by other employees

although outside their duties.

The CFI of Manila dismissed the complaint of

petitioners based principally on the lack of

jurisdiction of the CFI of Hanoi to render the

judgment whose execution is being institutes in this

jurisdiction. The lack of jurisdiction was stated itselfin the decision of the court in Hanoi stating that Tait

was not a resident nor had a known domicile in

Hanoi. The evidence adduced in trial conclusively

proves that Tait nor his agents or employees were

ever in Hanoi and that the deceased was never his

employee. In fact, the first time Tait knew of the suit

and the sum being ordered for him to pay was when

he was served summons in the present case.

ISSUE:

Did the CFI of Manila err in dismissing the complaint

of petitioners for lack of jurisdiction? NO

RATIO:

Petitioners failed to show that the proceedings against

Tait in the CFI of Hanoi were in accordance with the

laws of France then in force. Moreover, the evidence

of record shows that Tait was not in Hanoi during the

time mentioned in the complaint. Judicial

proceedings in a foreign country regarding payment

of money are only effective against a party if

summons is duly served on him within such foreign

country before the proceedings. The fundamental rule

is that jurisdiction in personam over nonresidents, so

as to sustain a money judgment, must be based upon

personal service within the state which renders the

judgment. The process of a court of one state cannot

run into another and summon a party there domiciled

to respond to proceedings against him. Notice sentoutside the state to a non resident is unavailing to

give jurisdiction in an action against him personally

for money recovery; there must be actual service

within the state of notice upon him. A personal

judgment against a nonresident who has neither been

served with process nor appeared in the suit is

without validity. The process of a court has no

extraterritorial effect and no jurisdiction is acquired

by such.

Effects of a judgment of a foreign tribunal:

As to a specific thing, conclusive upon title to the

thingAs against a person, presumptive evidence of a right

GOMEZ v CA

Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

This an action for specific performance and/or

rescission filed by herein petitioners, spouses Gomez,

against the heirs of Jesus J. Trocino, Sr., herein

respondents and their mother Caridad Trocino.

Complaint alleges: Some time in 1975, the spouses

Jesus and Caridad Trocino mortgaged two parcels of

land to Dr. Clarence Yujuico. The mortgageforeclosed and the properties sold at public auction

and before the expiry of the redemption period, the

spouses Trocino sold the property to spouses Gomez

on December 12, 1989, who in turn, redeemed the

same from Dr. Yujuico. The spouses Trocino,

however, refused to convey ownership of the

properties to Gomez.

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On January 10, 1992, the trial courts Process Server

served summons on respondents, but it was returned.

Original summons issued were served to the

defendants Jacob, Jesus Jr., Adolfo, Mariano,

Consolacion, Alice, Racheal thru defendant Caridad

Trocino (mother) at their given address evidenced by

her signature found at the lower portion of the

original summons.

On January 27, 1992, the defendants, through their

counsel Atty. Expedito P. Bugarin, filed their

Answer. Defendant Caridad A. Trocino, respondents

mother, verified said pleading.

RTC ruled in favor of Gomez.

RTC issued an order ordering the Register of Deeds

of Cebu City to issue new titles in the name of herein

petitioners.

On March 13, 1996, respondents Adolfo and Mariano

Trocino filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition forthe annulment of the judgment rendered by the RTC-

Cebu. Private respondents alleged that the trial

courts decision is null and void on the ground that it

did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons as they

were not validly served with a copy of the summons

and the complaint.

At the time summons was served on them, Adolfo

Trocino was already in Ohio, U.S.A., and has been

residing there for 25 years, while Mariano Trocino

was in Talibon, Bohol, and has been residing there

since 1986. They also refuted the receipt of the

summons by Caridad A. Trocino, and therepresentation made by Atty. Bugarin in their behalf.

On September 30, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued

the assailed Decision granting the petition and

annulling the decision of the RTC-Cebu.

W/N summons was effectively served on

respondents?

SC = NO.

This case is an action in personam because it is an

action against persons, namely, herein respondents,

on the basis of their personal liability. As such,personal service of summons upon the defendants

is essential in order for the court to acquire ofjurisdiction over their persons.

A distinction, however, must be made with regard to

service of summons on respondents Adolfo Trocino

and Mariano Trocino. Adolfo Trocino, as records

show, is already a resident of Ohio, U.S.A. for 25

years. Being a non-resident, the court cannot acquire

jurisdiction over his person and validly try and decide

the case against him.

On the other hand, Mariano Trocino has been in

Talibon, Bohol since 1986. To validly acquire

jurisdiction over his person, summons must be served

on him personally, or through substituted service,

upon showing of impossibility of personal service.

Such impossibility, and why efforts exerted towards

personal service failed, should be explained in the

proof of service. The pertinent facts and

circumstances attendant to the service of summons

must be stated in the proof of service or Officers

Return. Failure to do so would invalidate all

subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.

In the present case, the process server served the

summons and copies of the complaint on respondents

Jacob, Jesus, Jr., Adolfo, Mariano, Consolacion,

Alice and Racheal, through their mother, Caridad

Trocino. The return did not contain any particulars asto the impossibility of personal service on Mariano

Trocino within a reasonable time. Such improper

service renders the same ineffective.

Due process of law requires personal service to

support a personal judgment, and, when the

proceeding is strictly in personam brought to

determine the personal rights and obligations of the

parties, personal service within the state or a

voluntary appearance in the case is essential to the

acquisition of jurisdiction so as to constitute

compliance with the constitutional requirement of

due process.

Moreover, inasmuch as the sheriffs return failed to

state the facts and circumstances showing the

impossibility of personal service of summons upon

respondents within a reasonable time, petitioners

should have sought the issuance of

an alias summons. Under Section 5, Rule 14 of the

Rules of Court, alias summons may be issued when

the original summons is returned without being

served on any or all of the defendants.28 Petitioners,

however, did not do so, and they should now bear the

consequences of their lack of diligence.

The fact that Atty. Expedito Bugarin represented all

the respondents without any exception does not

transform the ineffective service of summons into a

valid one. It does not constitute a valid waiver or

even a voluntary submission to the trial courts

jurisdiction. There was not even the slightest proof

showing that respondents authorized Atty. Bugarins

appearance for and in their behalf.

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While Caridad Trocino may have engaged the

services of Atty. Bugarin, it did not necessarily mean

that Atty. Bugarin also had the authority to represent

the defendant heirs. The records show that in all the

pleadings which required verification, only Caridad

Trocino signed the same. There was never a single

instance where defendant heirs signed the pleading.

The fact that a pleading is signed by one defendant

does not necessarily mean that it is binding on a co-

defendant. Furthermore, Caridad Trocino represented

herself as the principal defendant in her Motion to

Withdraw Appeal.

Consequently, the judgment sought to be executed

against respondents were rendered without

jurisdiction as there was neither a proper service of

summons nor was there any waiver or voluntary

submission to the trial courts jurisdiction. Hence, the

same is void, with regard to private respondents

except Caridad Trocino.

Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified

of the action brought against him. Service of such

writ is the means by which the court acquires

jurisdiction over his person.11 Any judgment without

such service in the absence of a valid waiver is null

and void.

DIAL CORP v SORIANO

FACTS:

The petitioners are foreign corporations organized

and existing under the laws of the United States, the

United Kingdom, and Malaysia, are not domiciled inthe Philippines, nor do they have officers or agents,

place of business, or property in the Philippines; they

are not licensed to engage, and are not engaged, in

business here. The respondent IVO is a Philippine

corporation which through its president, Dominador

Monteverde, had entered into several contracts for

the delivery of coconut oil to the petitioners. Those

contracts stipulate that any dispute between the

parties will be settled through arbitration under the

rules of either the Federation of Oils Seeds and Fats

Association (FOSFA) or the National Institute of Oil

Seed Products (NIOP).

Because IVO defaulted under the contracts, thepetitioners and 15 others, initiated arbitration

proceedings abroad, and some have already obtained

arbitration awards against IVO.

IVO filed a complaint for injunction and damages

against nineteen (19) foreign coconut oil buyers

including the petitioners, with whom its president,

Dominador Monteverde, had entered into contracts

for the delivery of coconut oil. IVO repudiated

Monteverde's contracts on the grounds that they were

mere "paper trading in futures" as no actual delivery

of the coconut oil was allegedly intended by the

parties.

On motion of IVO, respondent Judge authorized it to

effect extraterritorial service of summons to all the

defendants through DHL. Pursuant to that order, the

petitioners were served with summons and copy of

the complaint by DHL courier service.

Petitioners filed motions to dismiss the complaint

against them on the ground that the extraterritorial

service of summons to them was improper and that

hence the court did not acquire jurisdiction over

them.

RTC denied.and upheld the validity of the

extraterritorial service of summons to them.

The petitioners' motions for reconsideration of that

order were also denied by the court (Annex M),

hence this petition for certiorari with a prayer for the

issuance of a temporary retraining order which We

granted.

ISSUE: Whether extraterritorial service was proper?HELD: NO. Only in four (4) instances is

extraterritorial service of summons proper, namely:

"(1) when the action affects the personal status of the

plaintiffs; (2) when the action relates to, or the

subject of which is, property within the Philippines,

in which the defendant has or claims a lien or

interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief

demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part,

in excluding the defendant from any interest in

property located in the Philippines; and (4) when the

defendant non-resident's property has been attached

within the Philippines" (De Midgely vs. Fernandos,

64 SCRA 23).The complaint in this case does not involve the

personal status of the plaintiff, nor any property in

the Philippines in which the defendants have or claim

an interest, or which the plaintiff has attached. The

action is purely an action for injunction to restrain the

defendants from enforcing against IVO ("abusing and

harassing") its contracts for the delivery of coconut

oil to the defendants, and to recover from the

defendants P21 million in damages for such

"harassment." It is clearly a personal action as well as

an action inpersonam, not an action in rem orquasi

in rem. "An action in personam is an action against a

person on the basis of his personal liability, while anaction in remedies is an action against the thing

itself, instead of against the person."(Hernandez vs.

Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., 76 SCRA 85). A

personal action is one brought for the recovery of

personal property, for the enforcement of some

contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for

the recovery of damages for the commission of an

injury to the person or property (Hernandez vs.

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Development Bank of the Philippines, 71 SCRA

292).

As Civil Case No. 87-40166 is a personal action,

personal or substituted service of summons on the

defendants, not extraterritorial service, is necessary to

confer jurisdiction on the court.

In an action for injunction, extraterritorial service of

summons and complaint upon the non-resident

defendants cannot subject them to the processes of

the regional trial courts which are powerless to reach

them outside the region over which they exercise

their authority (Sec. 3-a, Interim Rules of Court; Sec.

21, subpar. 1, B.P. Blg. 129). Extraterritorial service

of summons will not confer on the court jurisdiction

or power to compel them to obey its orders.

Neither may the court by extraterritorial service of

summons acquire jurisdiction to render and enforce a

money judgment against a non-resident defendant

who has no property in the Philippines for "the

fundamental rule is that jurisdiction in personam over

non-residents, so as to sustain a money judgment,must be based uponpersonal service within the state

which renders the judgment"(Boudard vs. Tait, 67

Phil. 170, 174).

WHEREFORE, We hold that the extraterritorial

service of summons on the petitioners was improper,

hence null and void. The petition for certiorari is

granted. The orders dated April 24, 1987 (Annex B)

and December 15, 1987 (Annex H) of the respondent

Judge are hereby set aside. The complaint in Civil

Case No. 87-40166 is hereby dismissed as against the

petitioners for failure of the court to acquire

jurisdiction over them.

CRUZ v CRUZ

FACTS:

petition for review on certiorari of the resolution of

the Court of Appeals

On December 15, 1999, petitioner spousesLydia Flores-Cruz and Reynaldo I. Cruz

purchased a lot from Lydias siblings (all

surnamed Flores)

Their father, Estanislao Flores,used to own the land as aninheritance from his parents. When

he died, petitioners paid the realty

taxes on the land although neither

of them occupied it. Petitioners

sold portions thereof to third parties

later on

After the death of Estanislao, petitionersfound out that respondent spouses Leonardo

and Iluminada Goli-Cruz et al. were

occupying a section of the land

petitioner Lydia offered to sell them saidportions but the talks failed. They askedrespondents to leave but the demands were

ignored

Respondents countered that their possessionof the land ranged from 10 to 20 years and

that the property was alienable public land.

They likewise argue that they had no

knowledge of petitioners and their

predecessors ownership of the land. They

took steps to legitimize their claim and paid

the realty tax on their respective areas for

the taxable year 2002. Subsequently,

however, the tax declarations issued to them

were cancelled by the Provincial Assessors

Office and re-issued to petitioners

On August 6, 2001, petitioners filed acomplaint for recovery of possession of the

land in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan,

Branch 82

Respondents filed a motion to dismissclaiming, among others, that the RTC had

no jurisdiction over the case as it should

have been filed in the MTC since it was a

summary action for ejectment under Rule 70

of the Rules of Court

RTC denied the motion and rendered adecision in favor of petitioners and ordered

respondents to vacate the land

CA ruled that the RTC had no jurisdictionover the action for recovery of possession

because petitioners had been dispossessed of

the property for less than a year

It held that the complaint was onefor unlawful detainer which should

have been filed in the MTC. Thus,it ruled that the RTC decision was

null and void

According to the CA, consideringthat petitioners claimed that

respondents were possessors of the

property by mere tolerance only

and the complaint had been

initiated less than a year from the

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demand to vacate, the proper

remedy was an action for unlawful

detainer which should have been

filed in the MTC

ISSUE: whether the RTC had jurisdiction over this

case

HELD: NO

the nature of the actionon which dependsthe question of whether a suit is within the

jurisdiction of the courtis determined

solely by the allegations in the

complaint and the law at the time the action

was commenced

Only facts alleged in the complaintcan be the basis for determining the

nature of the action and the courts

competence to take cognizance of

it. One cannot advert to anything

not set forth in the complaint, such

as evidence adduced at the trial, to

determine the nature of the action

thereby initiated

The necessary allegations in a complaint forejectment are set forth in Section 1, Rule 70

of the Rules of Court

Petitioners alleged that the formerowner (Estanislao, their

predecessor) allowed respondents

to live on the land. They also stated

that they purchased the property on

December 15, 1999 and then found

respondents occupying the

property. Yet they demanded thatrespondents vacate only on March

2, 2001

It can be gleaned from theirallegations that they had in fact

permitted or tolerated respondents

occupancy

Based on the allegations in petitionerscomplaint, it is apparent that such is a

complaint for unlawful detainer based on

possession by tolerance of the owner. It is a

settled rule that in order to justify such an

action, the owners permission or tolerance

must be present at the beginning of thepossession.Such jurisdictional facts are

present here

It is no longer true that all cases of recoveryof possession oraccion publiciana lie with

the RTC regardless of the value of the

property.

When the case was filed in 2001,Congress had already approved

Republic Act No. 7691which

expanded the MTCs jurisdiction to

include other actions involving title

to or possession of real property

(accion

publiciana and reinvindicatoria)

where the assessed value of the

property does not exceed P20,000

(orP50,000, for actions filed in

Metro Manila)

Because of this amendment, the testof whether an action involving

possession of real property has

been filed in the proper court no

longer depends solely on the type

of action filed but also on the

assessed value of the property

involved. More specifically, since

MTCs now have jurisdiction

overaccion publiciana and accion

reinvindicatoria (depending, ofcourse, on the assessed value of the

property), jurisdiction over such

actions has to be determined on the

basis of the assessed value of the

property

This issue of assessed value as ajurisdictional element in accion

publiciana was not raised by the parties nor

threshed out in their pleadings. Be that as it

may, the Court can motu proprio consider

and resolve this question because

jurisdiction is conferred only by law. It

cannot be acquired through, or waived by,any act or omission of the parties

To determine which court (RTC or MTC)has jurisdiction over the action, the

complaint must allege the assessed value of

the real property subject of the complaint or

the interest thereon.

The complaint did not contain anysuch allegation on the assessed

value of the property. There is no

showing on the face of the

complaint that the RTC had

jurisdiction over the action of

petitioners. Indeed, absent anyallegation in the complaint of the

assessed value of the property, it

cannot be determined whether it is

the RTC or the MTC which has

original and exclusive jurisdiction

over the petitioners action

Moreover, the complaint was filed (August6, 2001) within one year from the demand to

vacate was made (March 2, 2001).

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Petitioners dispossession had thus not

lasted for more than one year to justify

resort to the remedy ofaccion publiciana

Since petitioners complaint made out a case for

unlawful detainer which should have been filed in the

MTC and it contained no allegation on the assessed

value of the subject property, the RTC seriously erred

in proceeding with the case. The proceedings before

a court without jurisdiction, including its decision,

are null and void. It follows that the CA was correct

in dismissing the case

HASEGAWA v KITAMURA

Facts:

1. The petitioner Nippon Engineering Consultants

Co. is a Japanese consultancy firm which provides

technical and management support in the

infrastructure project of foreign governments. It

entered into a Independent Contractor Agreement

(ICA) with respondent Kitamura, a Japanese nationalpermanently residing in the Philippines. Under the

ICA, the respondent will extend professional services

to the petitioner for a year.

2. Subsequently Kitamura was assigned as project

manager of STAR project in 1999. In 2000, he was

informed by the petitioner that it will no longer renew

the ICA and that he will be retained until its

expiration. Kitamura filed a civil casefor specific

performance before the RTC of Lipa and damages.

3. The lower court ruled that it has jurisdiction over

the dispute and denied the petitioner's motion todismiss since accordingly, it is vested by law with the

power to entertain and hear the civil case filed by

Kitamura. The Court of Appeals upheld the lower

court's decision.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction

over the case

HELD: YES

1. The only issue is the jurisdiction, hence, choice-of-

law rules as raised by the petitioner is inapplicable

and not yet called for (reference to lex loci, lexcontractus, or state of most significant rule). The

petitioner prematurelyinvoked the said rules before

pointing out any conflict between the laws of Japan

and the Philippines.

2. The doctrine onforum non conveniens cannot be

invoked to deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction.

Dismissing the case on this ground requires a factual

determination hence the principle is considered to be

more a matter of defense.

FIGUEROA v PEOPLE

Estoppel by laches

NATURE:Petition for review on certiorari

FACTS:Petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless

imprudence resulting in homicide. TheRTC found

him guilty. In his appeal before the CA, the

petitioner, for the first time, questionedRTCs

jurisdiction on the case.The CA in affirming the

decision of the RTC, ruled that the principle of

estoppel by laches hasalready precluded the

petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the

RTCthe trial went

on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participatin

g therein and without him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity.The petitioner, for his part, counters that

the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject

matter may be raised at any time even for the first

time on appeal. As undue delay is further

absentherein, the principle of laches will not be

applicable.Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON petitioners failure to raise the issue of

jurisdiction during the trial of this case,constitute

laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam

v. Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding thefact that said

issue was immediately raised in petitioners appeal to

the CAHELD:No.

RATIO:Citing the ruling in Calimlim vs. Ramirez, the Court

held that as a general rule, the issueof jurisdiction

may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even

on appeal, and is not lost bywaiver or by estoppel.

Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue

of lack of jurisdiction only in cases inwhich the

factual milieu is analogous to that of Tijam v.

Sibonghanoy.Laches should be clearly present for

the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable,

that is,lack of jurisdiction must have been raised sobelatedly as to warrant the presumption that theparty

entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to

assert it.In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of

jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a

stagewhen the proceedings had already been elevated

to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional

casebecause of the presence of laches.In the case at

bar, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are

not present. Petitioner Atty.Regalado, after the

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receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her

guilty of contempt,promptly filed a Motion for

Reconsideration assailing the said courts jurisdiction

based onprocedural infirmity in initiating the

action. Her compliance with the appellate courts

directive toshow cause why she should not be cited

for contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to

thateffect could not be considered as an active

participation in the judicial proceedings so as to

takethe case within the milieu of

Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey

the mandate of the court that could lead to dire

consequences that impelled her to comply.

The petitioner is in no way estopped by laches

in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC,

consideringthat he raised the lack thereof in his

appeal before the appellate court. At that time,

noconsiderable period had yet elapsed for laches to

attach.

DISPOSITIVE:Petition for review on certiorari is granted. Criminal

case is dismissed

METROMEDIA v PASTORIN

Subject Matter Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction by Estoppel.

Johny Pastorin was a field collector for the

Metromedia Times Corporation (MT). Prior to the

incident which gave rise to this case, he was already

served a letter of termination for tardiness. But he

was not dismissed, due to the intervention of the

collective bargaining agent of his union. Thereafter,

Pastorin obtained a loan from one of the dealers ofMetromedias publications, Gloria de Manuel for 9k.

Pastorin paid only 1,125 and then reneged on his

obligations, he also stopped collecting de Manuels

payables to Metromedia. De Manuel wrote a letter to

Metromedia, reporting the incident and asking for

help to collect on the loan (didnt say if she was ever

paid). Pastorin was asked by MT to explain the

incident, to which he admitted everything but did not

explain why he made the loan or how he was going to

repay it. A suspension of 4 days was given and

transfer to the Administration Department. Pastorin

instead did not report for work and sued MT for

constructive dismissal, back-wages and other moneyclaims with the Labor arbiter, whom decided in

Pastorins favor. MT appealed to the NLRC, claiming

lack of Jurisdiction of the LA as it was a grievance

issue cognizable by a voluntary arbitrator. NLRC

reversed, hence the appeal.

Issue:

Whether MT in questioning jurisdiction belatedly

only on appeal to the NLRC was already estopped.

(There was no estoppel, the GR must apply, that

Jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage. The

exceptions provided by jurisprudence for estoppel are

extraordinary circumstances as in Tijam where it

was questioned only 15yrs after appeal was made-

Pastorin didnt even try arguing against MT, he

merely fought for the decision of the LA to be

affirmed, which actually had no jurisdiction.)

Held: (sorry, here, the SC laid bare all the

Jurisprudence on jurisdiction by estoppel, so I think

the syllabus would actually be helpful, basically the

NLRC decision was affirmed, MT was not estopped)

1. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS;

JURISDICTION; CASES WHERE THE COURT

UPHELD THAT A PARTY'S ACTIVE

PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCEEDINGS

BEFORE A COURT WITHOUT JURISDICTION

ESTOPPED SUCH PARTY FROM ASSAILING

LACK OF JURISDICTION.Tijam represented an

exceptional case wherein the party invoking lack of

jurisdiction did so only after fifteen (15) years, and at

a stage when the proceedings had already beenelevated to the Court of Appeals. Even Marquez

recognizes that Tijam stands as an exception, rather

than a general rule. . . . In the case of Martinez, the

issue is not jurisdiction by estoppel but waiver of

preliminary conference. In that case, we said: As

pointed out by petitioners, private respondents had at

least three opportunities to raise the question of lack

of preliminary conference first, when private

respondents filed a motion for extension of time to

file their position paper; second, at the time when

they actually filed their position paper in which they

sought affirmative relief from the Metropolitan Trial

Court; and third; when they filed a motion forreconsideration of the order of the Metropolitan Trial

Court expunging from the records the position paper

of private respondents, in which motion private

respondents even urged the court to sustain their

position paper. And yet, in none of these instances

was the issue of lack of preliminary conference raised

or even hinted at by private respondents. In fine,

these are acts amounting to a waiver of the

irregularity of the proceedings. For it has been

consistently held by this Court that while lack of

jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a party's

active participation in the proceedings before a court

without jurisdiction will estop such party fromassailing such lack of jurisdiction. The case of Ducat

was categorical in saying that if the parties

acquiesced in submitting an issue for determination

by the trial court, they are estopped from questioning

the jurisdiction of the same court to pass upon the

issue. But this should be taken in the context of the

"agreement" of the parties. Centeno involved the

question of jurisdiction of the Department of

Agrarian Reform Arbitration Board (DARAB). The

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Court did rule therein that "participation by certain

parties in the administrative proceedings without

raising any objection thereto, bars them from any

jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse decision is

rendered against them." Still, the Court did recognize

therein that the movants questioning jurisdiction had

actually sought and litigated for affirmative reliefs

before the DARAB in support of a submitted

counterclaim. No similar circumstance obtains in this

case concerning the petitioner.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASES WHERE ESTOPPEL

DOES NOT APPLY TO CONFER JURISDICTION

TO A TRIBUNAL THAT HAS NONE. The

jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter was assailed in the

cases of De Rossi v. NLRC and Union Motors

Corporation v. NLRC during appeal to the NLRC.

Since the same circumstance obtains in this case, the

rulings therein, favorable as they are to the petitioner,

are germane. In De Rossi, this Court elucidated:

Petitioner maintains that MICC can not question now

the issue of jurisdiction of the NLRC, consideringthat MICC did not raise this matter until after the

case had been brought on appeal to the NLRC.

However, it has long been established as a rule, that

jurisdiction of a tribunal, agency, or office, is

conferred by law, and its lack of jurisdiction may be

questioned at any time even on appeal. In La Naval

Drug Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA

78, 90, this Court said: "Lack of jurisdiction over the

subject matter of the suit is yet another matter.

Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction

over the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed.

This defense may be interposed at any time, during

appeal or even after final judgment. Such isunderstandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is

conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone

the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently

set aside." We held in the Union Motors Case: The

long-established rule is that jurisdiction over a

subject matter is conferred by law. [Ilaw at Buklod

ng Manggaggawa v. NLRC, 219 SCRA 536 (1993);

Atlas Developer & Steel Industries, Inc. v. Sarmiento

Enterprises, Inc., 184 SCRA 153 (1990); Tijam v.

Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, 30 (1968)]. Estoppel

does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal

that has none over a cause of action. Where it

appears that the court or tribunal has nojurisdiction, then the defense may be interposed at

any time, even on appeal or even after final

judgment. Moreover, the principle of estoppel

cannot be invoked to prevent this court from

taking up the question of jurisdiction.3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE WHEN

JURISDICTION BY ESTOPPEL APPLIES AND

WHEN IT IS CLARIFIED BY THE COURT.The

rulings in Lozon v. NLRC addresses the issue at

hand. This Court came up with a clear rule as to

when jurisdiction by estoppel applies and when it

does not: Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter

of the suit is yet another matter. Whenever it appears

that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject

matter, the action shall be dismissed (Section 2, Rule

9, Rules of Court). This defense may be interposed at

any time, during appeal (Roxas vs. Rafferty, 37 Phil.

957) or even after final judgment (Cruzcosa vs. Judge

Concepcion, et al., 101 Phil. 146). Such is

understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is

conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone

the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently

set aside. In People vs. Casiano (111 Phil. 73, 93-94),

this Court, on the issue of estoppel, held: "The

operation of the principle of estoppel on the question

of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the

lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had

no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided

upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are

not barred, on appeal, from assailing suchjurisdiction, for the same 'must exist as a matter of

law, and may not be conferred by consent of the

parties or by estoppel' (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However,

if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was

heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for

instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the

party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be

permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent

positionthat the lower court had jurisdiction.

Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that

jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend

upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN ESTOPPEL MAYNOT BE USED TO ASSAIL ABSENCE OF

JURISDICTION; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR.

Applying the guidelines in Lozon, the labor arbiter

assumed jurisdiction when he should not. In fact, the

NLRC correctly reversed the labor arbiter's decision

and ratiocinated: What appears at first blush to be an

issue which pertains to the propriety of complainant's

reassignment to another job on account of his having

contracted a private loan, is one which may be

considered as falling within the jurisdiction of the

Office of the Labor Arbiter. Nevertheless, since the

complainant is a union member, he should be bound

by the covenants provided for in the CollectiveBargaining Agreement. . . . Based on the foregoing

considerations, it appears that the issue of validity of

complainant's reassignment stemmed from the

exercise of a management prerogative which is a

matter apt for resolution by a Grievance Committee,

the parties having opted to consider such as a

grievable issue. Further, a review of the records

would show that the matter of reassignment is one

not directly related to the charge of complainant's

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having committed an act which is inimical to

respondents' interest, since the latter had already been

addressed to by complainant's service of a suspension

order. The transfer, in effect, is one which properly

falls under Section 1, Article IV of the Collective

Bargaining Agreement and, as such, questions as to

the enforcement thereof is one which falls under the

jurisdiction of the labor arbiter." In line with the

cases cited above and applying the general rule that

estoppel does not confer jurisdiction, petitioner is

not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the

labor arbiter before the NLRC on appeal.

Respondent relied solely on estoppel to oppose

petitioner's claim of lack of jurisdiction on the

part of the labor arbiter. He adduced no other

legal ground in support of his contention that the

Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over the case.

Thus, his claim falls flat in light of our

pronouncement, and more so considering the

NLRC's correct observation that jurisdiction over

grievance issues, such as the propriety of thereassignment of a union member falls under the

jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator.

SHELTER v HON. FORMARAN

CHAVEZ v CA

FACTS: An Information for Libel dated 26 June

1995 was filed before the RTC of Manila against

private respondents Rafael Baskinas and Ricardo

Manapat, with petitioner Francisco Chavez as the

complainant. The Information reads in part:

"That on or about March 1995, in the City of Manila,Philippines, the said accused [Baskinas and Manapat]

conspiring and confederating with others whose true

names, real identities and present whereabouts are

still unknown and helping one another, with

malicious intent of impeaching the honesty, virtue,

character and reputation of one FRANCISCO I.

CHAVEZ, former Solicitor General of the

Philippines, and with the evident purpose of injuring

and exposing him to public ridicule, hatred and

contempt, did then and there willfully, unlawfully

and maliciously cause to be published in "Smart

File," a magazine of general circulation in Manila,

and in their respective capacity as Editor-in-Chiefand Author-Reporter, the following, to wit:

x x x x

with which published articles, the said accused meant

and intended to convey, as in fact they did mean and

convey false and malicious imputations of a defect,

vice and crime, which insinuations and imputations

as the accused well knew are entirely false and untrue

and without the foundation in fact whatsoever, and

tend to impeach, besmirch and destroy the good

name, character and reputation of said FRANCISCO

I. CHAVEZ, as in fact, he was exposed to dishonor,

discredit, public hatred, contempt and ridicule.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1

Private respondents moved to quash the Information,

as well as the corresponding warrants of arrest

subsequently issued. However, these motions were

denied by the RTC of Manila.

Private respondents then filed a Petition for

Certiorari with the CA. The petition was granted;

hence the present petition.

ISSUE: whether the above-quoted Information is

sufficient to sustain a charge for libel, considering the

following requirement imposed by Article 360 of the

Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No.

4363?

HELD: Jurisprudence applying the provision has

established that it does not

The criminal action and civil action for damages in

cases of written defamations, as provided for in this

chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separatelywith the court of first instance of the province or city

where the libelous article is printed and first

published or where any of the offended parties

actually resides at the time of the commission of the

offense: Provided, however, That where one of the

offended parties is a public officer whose office is in

the City of Manila at the time of the commission of

the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of

First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or

province where the libelous article is printed and first

published, and in case such public officer does not

hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be

filed in the Court of First Instance of the province orcity where he held office at the time of the

commission of the offense or where the libelous

article is printed and first published and in case one

of the offended parties is a private individual, the

action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of

the province or city where he actually resides at the

time of the commission of the offense or where the

libelous matter is printed and first published x x x.

Referring to the fact that the Information against

private respondents states that the libelous matter was

"caused to be published in Smart File, a magazine of

general circulation in Manila," the Court of Appeals

deemed the cases ofAgbayani v. Sayo

3

and Sorianov. IAC4as controlling. Based on the doctrines

pronounced in said cases, the appellate court held that

the Information failed to allege where the written

defamation was "printed and first published," an

allegationsine qua non "if the circumstances as to

where the libel was printed and first published is used

as the basis of the venue of the publication."5It was

observed that "venue of libel cases where the

complainant is a private person is either in any of

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only two places, namely: (1) where the subject article

was printed and first published; and (2) where

complainant of the commission actually resides at the

time of the commission of the offense." The

Information, it was noted, did not indicate that the

libelous articles were printed or first published in

Manila, or that petitioner resided in Manila at the

time of the publication of the articles.

The rules on venue in article 360 may be restated

thus:

1. Whether the offended party is a public official

or a private person, the criminal action may be

filed in the Court of First Instance of the province

or city where the libelous article is printed and

first published.2. If the offended party is a private individual, the

criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First

Instance of the province where he actually resided at

the time of the commission of the offense.

3. If the offended party is a public officer whose

office is in Manila at the time of the commission ofthe offense, the action may be filed in the Court of

First Instance of Manila.

4. If the offended party is a public officer holding

office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in

the Court of First Instance of the province or city

where he held office at the time of the commission of

the offense.7

The Information by itself is defective on its face, for

the reasons we have stated, that there is no need to

evaluate whether Smart File was actually printed and

first published in Manila or Makati City. The plain

fact is that the Information failed to make the

sufficient allegation in that regard, and even anyascertainment that the articles were printed and first

published in Manila does not cure the jurisdictional

defect of the Information.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SPRINGFIELD v RTC JUDGE

STA. ANA v CARPO

VDA. DE BALLESTEROS v RURAL BANK OF

CANAMAN

GARCILLANO v HOUSE OFREPRESENATTIVES

Topic: Supreme Court Power of Judicial Review

FACTS:

This case is about the tapes ostensibly containing a

wiretapped conversation purportedly between GMA

and a high ranking official of COMELEC which

resulted to a controversy that placed the legitimacy of

the GMAs admin on the line. The tapes, notoriously

referred to as the Hello Garci tapes, allegedly

contained GMAs instructions to COMELEC

Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate the

results of the 2004 presidential elections in her favor.

A privilege speech of Sen. Chiz Escudero set in

motion a congressional investigation jointly

conducted by the respondents. NBI submitted to

respondent House Committees 7 original tape

recordings of the 3 hour conversation. Garcillano

filed with this court a Petition for Prohibition and

Injunction with orayer for TRO for the committees to

be restrained from using the tape recordings of the

illegally obtained wiretapped conversations and have

them stricken off the records. 2 years after the

debastes and discussions on the matters stopped, Sen.

Lacson delivered a privilege speech which was

referred to the Senate Committee on National

Defense and Security. Sen. Santiago aired concern of

the possible transgression of RA 4200 prohibitingand penalizing wire tapping. Petitioners Ranada and

Agcaoili as retired justices filed the same petition as

Garcis for violation of RA 4200. They also argued

that the intended legislative inquiry violates sec. 3

art. III of the constitution. The senate did not issue

the injunctive writ so it proceeded with its public

hearings on the Hello Garci tapes. Major Sagge as

member of the ISAFP moved to intervene as he was

being summoned by the senate to appear and testify.

While both petitions involve the Hello Garci

recordings, they have different objectives- the first is

poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in theHouse while the second seeks to prohibit and stop the

conduct of the senate inquiry on the wiretapped

conversation. The Court dismisses the 1st petition and

grants the 2nd.

ISSUE:

Whether the Senate is allowed to continue with the

conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without

duly published rules of procedure? NO.

RATIO:

The standing of petitioners are established. As to the

dismissal of the 1st petition, it has already been moot

and academic since the tapes were already played so

the relief prayed for by Garci cannot be granted

anymore.

As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court

grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to

continue with the conduct of the questioned

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legislative inquiry without duly published rules of

procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional

requirement. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987

Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or

the House of Representatives, or any of its respective

committees may conduct inquiries in aid of

legislation in accordance with its duly published rules

of procedure." The requisite of publication of the

rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of

due process. With respect to the Senate at the time of

the case, no effort was undertaken for the publication

of rules when they first opened their session.

Respondents justify their non-observance of the

constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that

the rules have never been amended since 1995 and,

despite that, they are published in booklet form

available to anyone for free, and accessible to the

public at the Senates internet web page. The Court

does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the

rules cannot justify the Senates defiance of the clearand unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI

of the Constitution.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate

Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the

Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the

legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated

cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation

by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have

caused the publication of the rules, because it can do

so only "in accordance with its duly published rules

of procedure."

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is

DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No. 179275 isGRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued

enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the

Philippines and/or any of its committees from

conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered

on the "Hello Garci" tapes.

LAZATIN v HON. DISIERTO

Petition forcertiorari under Rule 65.

Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of

the Ombudsman filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging

herein petitioners with Illegal Use of Public Funds.

The complaint alleged that there were irregularities inthe use by then Congressman Carmello F. Lazatin of

his Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) for

1996, i.e., he was both proponent and implementer of

the projects funded from his CDF; and he received,

as claimant, eighteen (18) checks amounting

to P4,868,277.08. Petitioner Lazatin, with the help of

petitioners Marino A. Morales, Angelito A. Pelayo

and Teodoro L. David, was allegedly able to convert

his CDF into cash.

(28) Informations docketed as Criminal Case Nos.

26087 to 26114 were filed against herein petitioners

before the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner Lazatin and his co-petitioners then filed

their respective Motions for

Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, which motions

were granted by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division).

The Sandiganbayan also ordered the prosecution to

re-evaluate the cases against petitioners.

Subsequently, the OSP submitted to the Ombudsman

its Resolution. It recommended the dismissal of the

cases against petitioners for insufficiency of

evidence.

The Ombudsman, however, ordered the Office of the

Legal Affairs (OLA) to review the OSP Resolution.

In a Memorandum the OLA recommended that the

OSP Resolution be disapproved and the OSP be

directed to proceed with the trial of the cases against

petitioners. On October 27, 2000, the Ombudsman

adopted the OLA Memorandum, thereby

disapproving the OSP Resolution and ordering theaggressive prosecution of the subject cases. The cases

were then returned to the Sandiganbayan for

continuation of criminal proceedings.

Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition.

Petitioners asseverate that the Ombudsman had no

authority to overturn the OSP's Resolution dismissing

the cases against petitioners because, under Section

13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the

Ombudsman is clothed only with the power to watch,

investigate and recommend the filing of proper cases

against erring officials, but it was not granted the

power to prosecute. They point out that under the

Constitution, the power to prosecute belongs to theOSP (formerly the Tanodbayan).

Next, petitioners insist that they should be absolved

from any liability because the checks were issued to

petitioner Lazatin allegedly as reimbursement for the

advances he made from his personal funds for

expenses incurred to ensure the immediate

implementation of projects that are badly needed by

the Pinatubo victims.

SC = petition unmeritorious.

Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the

then existing Tanodbayan, aka Office of the Special

Prosecutor, "shall continue to function and exercise

its powers as now or hereafter may be provided bylaw, except those conferred on the Office of the

Ombudsman created under this Constitution." The

underscored phrase evidently refers to the

Tanodbayan's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or

subsequent amendatory legislation. It follows then

that Congress may remove any of the

Tanodbayan's/Special Prosecutor's powers under P.D.

No. 1630 or grant it other powers, except those

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powers conferred by the Constitution on the Office of

the Ombudsman.

Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one

considers that by express mandate of paragraph 8,

Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, the

Ombudsman may "exercise such other powers or

perform functions or duties as may be provided by

law," it is indubitable then that Congress has the

power to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor

under the Office of the Ombudsman. In the same

vein, Congress may remove some of the powers

granted to the Tanodbayan and transfer them to the

Ombudsman; or grant the Office of the Special

Prosecutor such other powers and functions and

duties as Congress may deem fit and wise. This

Congress did through the passage of R.A. No. 6770.

Petitioners now assert that the Court's ruling on the

constitutionality of the provisions of R.A. No. 6770

should be revisited and the principle ofstare

decisis set aside. Again, this contention deserves

scant consideration.The doctrine ofstare decisis et non quieta movere (to

adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which

are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil

Code of the Philippines which provides, thus:

ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting

the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the

legal system of the Philippines.

The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to

judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country

to follow the rule established in a decision of the

Supreme Court thereof. That decision becomes a

judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases

by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisisis based on the principle that once a question of law

has been examined and decided, it should be deemed

settled and closed to further argument.141avvphi1

Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of

certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should

be applied to those that follow if the facts are

substantially the same, even though the parties may

be different. It proceeds from the first principle of

justice that, absent any powerful countervailing

considerations, like cases ought to be decided

alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the

same event have been put forward by the parties

similarly situated as in a previous case litigated anddecided by a competent court, the rule ofstare

decisisis a bar to any attempt to relitigate thesame issue.16

The doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial

system that the Court has ruled that "[a]bandonment

thereof must be based only on strong and

compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue

of predictability which is expected from this Court

would be immeasurably affected and the public's

confidence in the stability of the solemn

pronouncements diminished."17Verily, only upon

showing that circumstances attendant in a particular

case override the great benefits derived by our

judicial system from the doctrine ofstare decisis, can

the courts be justified in setting aside the same.

In this case, petitioners have not shown any strong,

compelling reason to convince the Court that the

doctrine ofstare decisis should not be applied to this

case. They have not successfully demonstrated how

or why it would be grave abuse of discretion for the

Ombudsman, who has been validly conferred by law

with the power of control and supervision over the

OSP, to disapprove or overturn any resolution issued

by the latter.

CRUZ v MIJARES

FACTS

petitioner sought permission to enter his appearance

for and on his behalf, before the RTC, for Abatementof Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth year law student,

anchors his claim on Section 34 of Rule 138 of the

Rules of Court that a non-lawyer may appear before

any court and conduct his litigation personally.

Atty. Stanley Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin Mina,

Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial

brief to which petitioner Cruz vehemently objected

alleging that a Motion to Dismiss is not allowed after

the Answer had been filed.

Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit,

praying for the voluntary inhibition of Judge Mijares.

The Motion alleged that expected partiality on the

part of the respondent judge in the conduct of the trialcould be inferred from the contumacious remarks of

Judge Mijares during the pre-trial. It asserts that the

judge, in uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a

negative frame of mind, which engenders the belief

that justice will not be served.

Motion denied. Petitioner filed a motion for

reconsideration of the said order and was denied as

well.

ISSUE: (1) whether the extraordinary writs of

certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65

of the 1997 Rules of Court may issue; and (2)

whether the respondent court acted with grave abuse

of discretion amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction when it denied the appearance of the

petitioner as party litigant and when the judge refused

to inhibit herself from trying the case.

HELD:

1. This Courts jurisdiction to issue writs of

certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction is

not exclusive; it has concurrent jurisdiction with the

RTCs and the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of

jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as an

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absolute, unrestrained freedom to choose the court

where the application therefor will be directed. A

becoming regard of the judicial hierarchy most

certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of

extraordinary writs against the RTCs should be filed

with the Court of Appeals. The hierarchy of courts is

determinative of the appropriate forum for petitions

for the extraordinary writs; and only in exceptional

cases and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by

the nature of the issues reviewed, may this Court take

cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.

Considering, however, that this case involves the

interpretation of Section 34, Rule 138 and Rule 138-

A of the Rules of Court, the Court takes cognizance

of herein petition. Nonetheless, the petitioner is

cautioned not to continue his practice of filing

directly before this Court petitions under Rule 65

when the issue raised can be resolved with dispatch

by the Court of Appeals. We will not tolerate litigants

who make a mockery of the judicial hierarchy as it

necessarily delays more important concerns beforeus.

2. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part

of Judge Mijares when she did not inhibit herself

from the trial of the case.

In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the

ground for bias and prejudice by clear and

convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from

participating in a particular trial, as voluntary

inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and

addressed to the sound discretion of the judge. The

decision on whether she should inhibit herself must

be based on her rational and logical assessment of the

circumstances prevailing in the case before her.Absent clear and convincing proof of grave abuse of

discretion on the part of the judge, this Court will rule

in favor of the presumption that official duty has been

regularly performed.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY

GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of

the Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City are

MODIFIED. Regional Trial Court, Branch 108,

Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of

Appearance of petitioner in Civil Case No. 01-0410

as a party litigant.

FIRST UNITED v PORO POINT

FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS v CA

AMPONG v CSC

CGP TRANSPORT v PU LEASING

Topic: Court of Appeals

FACTS:

The case stemme