karns y mingst_realism[1]

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: . The Politics and Processes :1: ',of Global Governance\

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Published inthe United States of America in2004 byLynne Rien ner Publishers. Inc.1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 8030 Iwww .rienner.com

and in the United Kingdom byLynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.3 Henr ietta Street, Coven t Garden, London WC2E 8LU 2004 by Lynne Rienner Publ ishers. Inc. All rights reservedLibrar y of Congress Cata loging-i n. P ub lication Dat aKarns. Margaret P.Imernationa l o rganizations : the politics and processes of globalgovernance I Margaret P. Karns and Kare n A. Mingst.Includes bibliographica l references and index.ISBN 1-55587-987-X (alk. paper)ISBN 1-55587-963-2 (pb : alk . paper )I. lnternational age ncies . 2. Internationalorganization . I. Mingst, Karen A., 1947- II. T it le.JZ4850.K37 2004341.2 -dc22

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The Theore tical Foundatio ns of Glo bal Governan

rewards and punishments. For example, mec hanisms cou ld be eto offe r pos i tive incentives for sta tes to refr ain from e ngagdes truction of the polar regions and to tax or threaten to tax thosto cooperate.

Co llec tive goods theory can be used to exp lain the role of inagreements, the UN, and many IGOs, as we ll as internati onalproducing (or underp roduc ing) various goods . It can also be usetigate the gaps in interna tiona l efforts to dea l with po licy issues .goods theory is especially useful for exami ning those natura l gmons areas such as the high seas or ozone layer whe re no statesovereignty beca use these have bee n designated to be part of thher itage o f human kind .

Thus, co llec tive or public goo ds theory along with other li


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46 Understanding Global Governance The Theoretical Foundations of Glo

was a co hesive international socie ty bound together through eli te tie s andcommon morality. Thu s, international law and government, in his view, arelargely weak and inef fecti ve. For Morg enthau , international organizationsare a tool of sta te s to be used when desired ; they can increase or decreasethe powe r of states, but they do not affe ct the basic characteristics of theinternational sy stem; because they reflect the basic distribution of poweramong states , the y are no more than the sum of their member s ta tes . In fact,the y are susceptible to grea t power manipulation. Thus, intern ational organizations have no indep end ent ef fe ct on state behavior and wi ll not over tim echa nge the sy s te m itself. Contemporary reali st s echo these view s. Forexample, John Mearsheim er (1994-1 995 : 13) has argued , "The most powerful s ta les in the sy s te m create and sh ape institution s so that the y ca nmaintain thei r share of wo rld power , or ev en increase i t."

Most realist theori st s do not cl aim that interna tiona l coopera tion isimpossibl e, only that there are few incentives for states to en ter into int er nati onal arrangements and the y can always ex it such arrange ments with lit tle difficulty. Hence , since international institution s and agreements hav eno enforcement power , they will have l it tle ind ependent imp act on stateac tion s or world politics in general. They have no authority and hen ce nopower (Gruber 2000). Reali sts do not ac know l edg e th e importance orstrength of nonstate actors su ch as NGOs and MNCs in int ernational poli tics and governance, nor do they accept the idea of IGO s as independentac tors.To most realists, deterrence and bal an ce of power have pro ven moreeffective in maintaining peace than international institutions.

Neorealism or Structural RealismAmong the variants of realism, the most powerful is neoreal ism or s tructura l realism, which owe s much to Kenneth Waltz's Theory of InternationalPol it ics (1979) . The core difference between traditional realis ts and neorealis ts lies in the emphasis placed on the structure of the int ernational sys tem for explaining world politics. Th e system's structure is determined bythe ordering principle , nam el y the absence of overarching authority (anar

hierarchy of relation s between states with unequalorder is a product les s of state acti ons, much lessthan of sy stem stru cture .In neorealist theory, the possibilities for intelogically slim, though not imp ossible. As Waltz (19

When faced with the possibilityof cooperating forfeel insecure must ask how the gain will be divideto ask not "Wi ll both of us gain?" but "Who wexpected gain is to be divided, say, in the ratio omay use its disproportionate gain to implement a page or destroy (he other. Even the prospect of largeparties does nOI elicit their cooperation so lon gother will use its increased capabilities.

In contrast to this neoreal is t emphas i s on rel ativeneoliberals st re ss that actors with common intereabsolute gains (S tein 1982: 318) . Charles Lip son (ou t rel ati ve gains are more imp ortant in secur i tyissue s. Thu s, cooperat ion is more difficult to achand mor e dependent on st at es ' power. Sin ce anarcare wa ry of becoming too dep endent on others,and increased capabilities.Many neorealists do rec ogni ze the emergenct ional regimes and institutions, but believe their iger ated . Others such as John Mearsheim er are notnational institution s, but outright disdainful. Inmerel y arenas for pur suing power re lationships. Tence on state behavior and thu s hold littl e promiin the post -Cold War wo rl d" (Me arsheime rMe arsheimer (49) sugges ts that the American relis apt to lead to more failures . Wh ile all neorealiMearshe imer, it is clea r that man y do not believe


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48 Understanding Global Governance The Theoretical Foundations o fthe view that markets are the most efficient mechanism of human behavior,strategic choice theoris ts of ten use the language of microeconomic theoryto explain stat e choices. Yet they also acknowledge that market imperfections may arise . There may be incomplete information or too high transaction costs . Then, organizations and institutions can play ke y roles. Theymay also act as constraints on choice.

Lloyd Gruber (2 000) has paid particular attention to internationalarrangements. He is intrigued by the fact that states find it rational to takepart in international arrangements, even though they would prefer the original, precooperation status quo. He argues that states fear being left behind;they want to join the bandwagon , even when it is not directly in their bestinterest. Sta tes come to bel ieve that the s tatus quo-not participating insuch agreements - i s not an option and they may be forced to con form tothe rules of the game .Key to rational or strategic choice theory is the assumption that stateac tions are based on rational calculations about subjective expected utility.Such calculations incorporate estimates of others' capabilities and likelyintentions . From this perspective, then, Keohane (1993: 28 8) suggests,"International institutions exi st largel y because they facilitate self-interested cooperat ion by reducing unc ertainty, thu s stabilizing expectat ions."Hence, an analy sis of rational state action within Europe, for example, musttake Europe's many international institutions into account.Rational choice theorists are also interested in how states use international instituti ons to further their national goals and how they design institutions to reflect those goals. Thus, they see institutional designs as "rationa l, ne gotiated re spo n se s to the problems int ernational actor s fa ce "(Koremenos, Lipson, and Snid al 2001: 768). For example, U.S., Canadian,and Mexican negotiators made certain that the North Ameri can Free TradeAgreement con formed to the rules of the global trading sys tem underGATT. Similarly, participati on in the nuclear nonproliferation regimerequires states to accept inspecti ons, a deliberate strategy to reduce uncer

s ta te that use s its positi on in particular waywhether this must be a single state (Krasner 1976ship between leadership or power and a liberalGilpin (1987 : 72) note s, "Hegemony without amarket economy is mor e likely to lead to imperition of politic al and economic res.trictions on les

Hegemonic stability theory is based on theket economy is a collective or public good (Kinbe sustained without the ac tions of a dominantpredominant state with "control over raw matericapital, control over markets, and competitive aof highly valued goods" (Keohane 1984: 32), ileadership over other economies as well as to uleverage ove r other states. I f, and it is an imppower is committed to an open, liberal worldcrimination and free markets, it can use its posiof the collective good-an open trading sys temtem. In so doing, it must perform several rolesnorms and rules , preventing cheating and free rish are the co sts of maintaining the system , enctrade barri ers, managin g (to some degree) theown dynamism as an eng ine of growth for thering kno wledge and technology, and re spondchoice theorists would argue , the hegemon mayior that serves to perpetuate its power and positi

There are , to dat e, only two examples of sThe first occurred during the nineteenth centurydominant position to create an era of free trapowers. The second occurred afte r World Warestablished the Bre tton Woods international trand promoted the reduction of trade barri ers, the


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50 Unde rstanding Global Governance

persist, eve n if the hegemon 's power decl ines and it is not perforlead ership role. A residu e of common interests and the norm s of thehelp to maintain it, for "reg imes are more read ily maint ained thanlished" (Kindleberger 1986: 8).

Realism itse lf , as we have see n, has little to say about the piglobal gove rnance given its emphas is on power, state in terests, anchy. Irs variants, however, have contributed significantly to understhe base s of sta tes' choice s and the role of power, especially hegpower, in the creation of in ternational regimes. Cross-fertilizat iondifferent theories clearly strengthens research into different aspectsal gove rnance . Th is will become even more evident when we loodevelopment of co nstructivism.

karns y mingst_realism[1]

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