kant's metaphysics of the self - university of michigan

volume10,no.8 august2010

Kant’s Metaphysics

of the Self

Colin MarshallNew York University

© 2010 ColinMarshall <www.philosophersimprint.org/010008/>

N otmanyphilosopherswouldturntoKantforapositiveviewaboutthemetaphysicsoftheself(thereferentof‘I’).Onthecontrary,mostofKant’sinterpretersreadhimaswarningthat

anyattempttogiveapositiveaccountoftheself’snatureisdoomedtofailure,andasbuildinghistheorieswithoutmetaphysicalassump-tionsabouttheself.1Thisbroadinterpretiveapproach,whichI’llcallthe“anti-metaphysicalinterpretation,”oftenseesKant’sprojectasan-ticipatingWittgenstein’sclaimsthattheselforsubject“doesn’tbelongtotheworld,butisalimitoftheworld.”2

Insomeformorother,theanti-metaphysicalinterpretationispres-entinallmajordiscussionsofKant’sviewsontheself.Ina1993sur-veyoftheliterature,GünterZöllerstatedthat“[d]ifferencesofmethodand philosophical approach aside, the interpretations … show a re-markableagreementintheirunderstandingofKant’sthinkingselfasaformorstructurethateludesanyattemptatreification.”3Theconsen-susnowissimilar—forinstance,inthemostrecentbookonthetopicArthur Melnick argues that in Kant’s theoretical philosophy the selfshould be understood as something like an activity precisely because thisavoidsconstruingitasanentityofanysort.4

Inwhat follows, Iarguethatnotonly is theanti-metaphysical in-terpretationmistaken,butthatKantoffersusasubtle,plausiblemeta-physicalaccountoftheselfthathasnodirectanalogueinthecontem-poraryliterature.Inanutshell,theviewisthis:selvesareindividuated

1. ThisismuchlessplausiblewithregardtoKant’spracticalworks.Inthispa-per,IfollowthemajorityofotherwritersonthetopicandfocusprimarilyonKant’stheoreticalworks.Ibelieve,however,thattheinterpretationIproposeherecanbefruitfullyextendedtothepracticalworks.

2. Wittgenstein 1961, 5.632, quoted in Bennett 1974, 69. Wittgenstein’s discus-sionof“Iassubject”(inWittgenstein1965,66ff.)hasalsobeenappealedto.AWittgensteinianreadingofKant’sdoctrineof theselfhasbeenexplicitlyarguedforrecentlyinAllison1996a,andresistedinKitcher2000.

3. Zöller1993,460.SeealsoBrook1994foroneofthecleareststatementsofthisinterpretation.EvenPatriciaKitcher,whooffersoneoftheclearestproposalsaboutthenatureoftheself,assumesthispositionincriticizingsomeofKant’smetaphysicalstatementsabouttheself(e. g.,Kitcher1984,113).

4. Melnick, 2009, 3. I discuss this particular proposal below and in Marshall(forthcoming).

ImprintPhilosophers’

colinmarshall Kant’s Metaphysics of the Self

philosophers’imprint –2– vol.10,no.8(august2010)

Kant’suseof‘I’intheCritique of Pure Reasonismeantinamorestrictsense:“I,asthinking,amanobjectofinnersense,andamcalled‘soul’”(A243/B400).7 Inwhat follows, I’llbeconcernedwith thenotionof‘self’ that isassociatedwith thisnarrowersenseof ‘I’. (2)Aswillbe-comeclear,Kantholdsthathavingaselfrequiresmorethanmerelypossessing representations—it requireshavingcertain faculties.Butthoughhethinksanimalslackthesefaculties,andsolackselves,Kantascribesrepresentationstothem,sohemustholdthatanimalshaveamindofsomesort.8Mytopic,then,willbethesortofmind,referredtoby‘I’,whichwehaveandanimalslack.

1.2 metaphysics and MetaphysicsIntalkingaboutthe“anti-metaphysical”interpretation,Iintendtousetheword ‘metaphysics’ in thesenseprevalentamongcontemporaryanalytic philosophers, according to which a metaphysics of the selfwouldbesomeaccountofhowselvesareindividuated,whatsortofentitiestheyare,andhowtheyfitintoourbroadestconceptionofreal-ity.It’snotclearwhetherthiscontemporarysenseof‘metaphysics’canbegivenaprecisedefinition,butourintuitiveunderstandingofitwillbeenoughforwhatfollows.

Kanthimselfstatesthat“thisname[‘metaphysics’]canalsobegiv-entoallpurephilosophyincludingthiscritique”(A841/B869),buthealsousesittodescribeaspecificdogmaticenterpriseaimedatestab-lishingtherealityofGod,freedom,andimmortality(cf.B7).Thislatter

the thinking self that exists outside of appearances as my “proper self”(Groundwork4:457).

7. Unlessotherwisenoted,allEnglishtranslationsarefromPaulGuyerandAl-len Wood’s translation of the Critique of Pure Reason. As is standard, I refertopassagesfromtheCritiquebyindicatingthepagenumberofthefirstandsecondeditions (e. g.,A277/B333), andpassages fromotherpartsof Kant’swritingsbyindicatingthetitlewiththevolumeandpagenumberoftheBer-linAcademyedition(e. g.,Prolegomena4:348).

8. SeeAnthropology7:135fortheascription,andMetaphysik Mrongovius29:906,Metaphysik Vigilantius 29:1027,andAnthropology7:127forstrongstatementsofthedistinctionbetweenhumanandanimalminds.

by experiences, so that whatever entities are jointly responsible forunifyingsensationsintoasingleexperiencetherebyconstituteasin-gleself.

I proceed as follows. In Section 1, I clarify what in Kant’s theoryI’m calling the ‘self’, I distinguish two senses of ‘metaphysics’, and Iarguethattheanti-metaphysicalinterpretationshouldnotbethede-faultview.Section2presentswhatIthinkarethetwobestargumentsfortheanti-metaphysicalinterpretation,showshowneitherargumentisdecisive,andthenarguesdirectlyforametaphysicalinterpretation.Section3considersthemostobviouscandidatesforaKantianmeta-physics of the self, and concludes that none of them is satisfactory.Section4presentsmyowninterpretation,appealingtobothintuitiveandtextualsupport.Iconcludebybrieflynotingsomeofthebroaderphilosophicalvirtuesofthisview.

1. Preliminaries

1.1 The Self, the I, the Mind and the Thinking SubjectI’vedescribedmytopicasKant’smetaphysicsoftheselforoftherefer-entof‘I’,butintherelevantpassagesfromKantandintherelatedsec-ondaryliteraturethereisalsotalkofthemetaphysicsoftheI(das Ich),themind(das Gemüt),thethinkingsubject(das denkende Subjekt),andthesoul(die Seele).Inaddition,Kantusesboththesubstantiveformof‘self’(‘Selbst’)andthesimplereflexiveform(‘selbst’).

Kantnevergivesaclearstatementoftherelationsbetweenmostoftheseterms.Butonthepresenttopic,heusesthemallineffectivelythesameway.5Twopointsareinorder:(1)Kantrecognizesabroaduseof‘I’thatreferstothe“wholeman,”involvingbodyandsoul.6But

5. Cf.theuseof‘I’,‘mind’,‘subject’,and‘soul’atB68–69,andtheintroductiontotheParalogisms:“I,asthinking,amanobjectofinnersense,andamcalled‘soul’…Accordingly,theexpression‘I,’asathinkingbeing,alreadysignifiestheobjectofapsychologythatcouldbecalledtherationaldoctrineofthesoul”(A243/B400). ‘Subject’forKanthasavarietyofsenses(seeRosefeldt2000,33–35),butinmostofthepassagesIconsider, it isequivalenttotheotherterms.

6. Anthropology Lectures27:265.ButnotethatintheGroundwork,Kantdescribes



beasmakingnometaphysicalassumptionsabouttheselfatall.Thiswayof readingKanthas some textual support, andhasbeenadopt-edbymanyofhisinterpreters,10butit isneverthelessnotobviouslyright.Withaneye towardsKant’s insistence that itnevercame intohisheadtodoubttheexistenceofouterobjects(Prolegomena4:293),KarlAmerikshasargued thatKant isbest readasassuminga fairlyrobust conception of experience and reality,11 and prominent recentinterpreters(perhapsmostlyclearly,RaeLangtonandDesmondHo-gan)havefollowedAmeriksinattributingtoKantaricherbackgroundmetaphysicalpicturethanwouldmakesenseforsomeonewhoaimstorefuteskepticismonitsownterms.12

Theinterpretiveissuesherearedifficult,butitisclearthatitshouldnotgowithoutsayingthatKant’sprojectrequiredhimtoavoidmeta-physicalclaimsofallforms.TodecidewhetherKanthasametaphysi-calviewoftheself,wemustconsidermorespecificargumentsfortheanti-metaphysicalinterpretation.

2. For and against the anti-metaphysical interpretation

This section argues that we should reject the anti-metaphysical in-terpretation.AftersurveyingandrejectingwhatIseeasthetwobest

10. Forinstance,thisapproachisassumedinPaulGuyer’scriticismsofseveralargumentshefindsintheDeduction,namely,thattheywouldbequestion-beggingagainstaskeptic(e. g.,Guyer1987,86).Itisalsoachiefmotivationforattributing“transcendentalarguments” toKant(seeWalker,2006),andsomethinglikeitisthemotivationforPatriciaKitcher’sinterpretationofKantontheself(seeKitcher1994,Chapter4).MichaelForsterhasrecentlyarguedagainstreadingKantasrespondingtoCartesian“veilofperception”skepti-cism(inForster2008), thoughhestillgoesto lengthstofindsomesortofskepticalmotivationfortheKantianproject.

11. Ameriks1978(Ameriks’argumentissignificantlystrengthenedwhenpairedwithEngstrom1994).Ameriksgivesanoverviewofhisapproachintheintro-ductiontoAmeriks2003.Withrespecttothemetaphysicsoftheself,how-ever,Ameriksseemsrelativelycautious,saying thatweshouldattribute toKantonlythosemetaphysicalclaimsabouttheselfthatare“forcedonusbymoregeneralaspectsofKantianontology”—inparticular,thepropertyofim-materiality(Ameriks2000,308).

12. SeeLangton1998andHogan2009a.

senseof ‘metaphysics’describesthedisciplinethatKantcriticizesintheTranscendentalDialectic.

Thesedistinctionscanhelpusavoidasimplemistake:evenifKantisclearlyopposedtotheambitious,dogmaticsortofmetaphysics,thatalonedoesn’tshowthatheisopposedtometaphysicsinthecontem-porarysense.Tomakethisdistinctionclear,intherestofthispaperIuse ‘Metaphysics’ torefer tothedisciplineKantexplicitlyopposed,and‘metaphysics’torefertothebroaderenterprisewetodaythinkofasmetaphysics(leavingasidethequestionofhowKant’sown,moreinclusivesenseof‘metaphysics’linesupwithours).Kantisclearlyananti-Metaphysicianabouttheself,butthatdoesn’tentailheisananti-metaphysicianabouttheself.Thisdistinctionwillbecomeclearerbe-low,whenIsurveyparticularproposalsconcerningtheself’snature.

1.3 Why the anti-metaphysical approach needs supportIn the next section, I consider some arguments that an advocate oftheanti-metaphysicalinterpretationmightadvance.Beforedoingso,Iwanttomakeafewremarksaboutwhyananti-metaphysicalinterpre-tationofKant’sviewoftheselfshouldnot,forallitspopularity,bethedefaultview.EveryoneofKant’smajorpredecessors,eventhosewhowereskepticalaboutMetaphysics,offeredaclearmetaphysicalviewoftheself,9soacompleterejectionofpositivemetaphysicswouldbeadramaticenoughshiftthatwewouldexpectKanttohaveannouncedit.Sincehedidn’t,theonusisonthesideoftheadvocatesoftheanti-metaphysicalinterpretation.

Now, one reason why Kant is commonly interpreted in the anti-metaphysical way is that his theoretical philosophy is often read asa response toastrong formofskepticism. IfKant’sargumentswereaimed at a skeptic who admits nothing other than her own currentrepresentations, then, given the potency of Humean worries aboutanunderlyingself, themostcharitableway to interpretKantwould

9. Hume, for instance, was plainly skeptical of Metaphysics, and yet (eventhoughheappearedtohavehaddoubtsaboutitlater)offeredametaphysicalaccountofthemindasabundleorheapofperceptions.



A more radical version of this argument can be made on the ba-sisofKant’sclaimsconcerningthelimitsoftheuseofthecategories.Onthisversionoftheargument,notonlymustwelackknowledgeofthemetaphysicsoftheself,butweareunabletoevenrepresent factsabouttheselfasit isinitself.Inhisdiscussionofthedistinctionbe-tweenphenomenaandnoumena,Kantexplicitlystatesthat,withoutthepossibilityofacorrespondingintuition,aconcept“hasnosense,andisentirelyemptyofcontent”(A239/B298),thatwithoutempiricalintuitionsconcepts“havenoobjectivevalidityatall,butareratheramereplay”(A239/B298),andthatwithoutconditionsofsensibility,“allsignificance,i. e.,relationtotheobjectdisappears”(A241/B300).16Butsinceintuitionandsensibilityonlyyieldcognitionofappearances(cf.A42/B59),anapriorimetaphysicsoftheselfwouldhavetoinvolveauseofconceptswithoutintuitionorsensibility.Giventhat,Kantseemstobecommittedtoclaimingthatsuchadoctrinewouldbenotjustil-legitimate,butnonsense.

2.2 Why the first argument failsLet’sstartwiththelessradicalversionoftheaboveargument,whichfocusesonKant’sclaimsaboutthelimitsofourcognition.ThisversionworksbestontheassumptionthatKant’skeyclaim(namely,thatwehavenocognitionofourselvesasweareinourselves)meansthatwehavenoknowledgeof any facts aboutourselvesoutsideofhowweappear.Therearereasonsfordoubtingthisassumption,however,andseveral recent commentators have argued for more nuanced under-standingsofKant’sclaimsaboutcognition.Itisn’tessentialformypur-posestoconsidertheseproposalsindetail.17InsteadI’lljustindicatethreegeneralissuesthatunderminethecrucialassumption.

16. SuchpassagesarethemotivationforverificationistreadingsofKant,themostfamousbeingStrawson’sattributiontohimofaverificationist“principleofsignificance”(Strawson1966,16–17).

17. Schafer(unpublished),Adams1997,andSmit1999arguethatacloseunder-standing of the notion ofErkenntnis is needed when assessing Kant’s epis-temicclaims,thoughAdamsandSmittakeasomewhatdifferentapproachtothenotionthantheonementionedhere(focusingonKant’stalkofrealvs.

arguments for theanti-metaphysical interpretation, Ipresent twoar-guments for adopting some sort of metaphysical interpretation. AllthiswillleaveopenthepossibilitythatKant’sviewissimplyinconsis-tent(aviewtakenbymanyofKant’sreaders);13itisthetaskofSection4toshowthatthereisanaccountoftheselfwecanattributetoKantthatisconsistentwiththeimportantpartsofhissystem.

Theargumentsfortheanti-metaphysicalinterpretationIconsiderarebased,first,onKant’sclaimsaboutthelimitsofcognitionandob-jective significance, and second, on Kant’s rejection of rational psy-chology. Though these seem to be the best arguments for the anti-metaphysicalinterpretation,neitherisultimatelysuccessful.

2.1 The first argument: Kant’s epistemological and representational stricturesKant’sdiscussionsof theself showhe thinks that, if therewereanysuchthing,itwouldhavetobesomethingoutsideofappearances,intherealmofthingsinthemselves.Sincethatisarealmwecouldonlycognizeapriori,ametaphysicsoftheselfwouldhavetobeanapriorimetaphysicsofathinginitself.ButoneofKant’scentraldoctrinesisthatwehavenocognitionof things inthemselves(e. g.,A42/B59ff.),andheexplicitlycarries thisdoctrineover to thecaseof theself: “I

…havenocognitionofmyselfasIam,butonlyasIappeartomyself”(B158).14Sinceametaphysicsoftheselfwouldhavetoinvolvesomesortofclaimconcerningthenatureoftheselfinitself,itwouldseemthat Kant has ruled out the possibility of any such doctrine’s beinglegitimate.15

13. This isaconclusionthathasbeendrawnbymanywithrespecttothegen-eralrelationbetweenKant’stalkofthingsoutsideofrepresentationsandhismetaphysicalstrictures.PerhapstheearliestexamplewasJacobi’s1787asser-tionthatwithoutthethinginitself,hecouldn’tenterthecriticalsystem,andyetwithit,hecouldnotremainthere(Jacobi1968,vol.2,304).

14. SeealsoBxxviii,A278/B344,B409,andGroundwork AA4:451.

15. Asevidenceoftheinfluenceofthisargument:evenRobertHowell,areaderverysympathetictoKant’sviewsontheself,statesthatweshould“separateKant’sspecific,coreclaimsabouttheI thinkfromthefurtherviewshereachesoncehisidealismisadopted”(Howell2001,119).



casualassimilationsofKant’sclaimsaboutcognitiontoclaimsaboutknowledgeinoursense.20

Thethirdgroundconcernsnaturallanguage.Kantneversaysthatwedon’tknoworcognizeanyfactsaboutthingsinthemselves;hesaysthatwedon’tknow/cognizethethingsinthemselves.21Thereasonthisisimportantisthatineverydayspeech(bothinGermanandEnglish),

“Sdoesn’tknowX”istypicallyusedincontextswhereSclearlyknowssomefactsaboutX.Herearesomeexamples:“Idon’tknowthesepeo-ple,butIknowthatthey’remakingmenervous”and“Hedoesn’tknowtheargumentforGödel’sincompletenesstheorem,butheknowsthatithasmorethanthreesteps.”Theignorancebeingdescribedhereisnotamatterofknowingnofactsaboutthesubjectmatter,butofnotknowing certain important facts. We should grant, then, that Kant’sownlanguagehardlyforcesustowardsthecrucialassumptionoftheanti-metaphysicalargument.

Ifweturnnowtothemoreradicalversionoftheaboveargument,wefindthatrelatedpointshold.ThereisthefamiliarfactthatoneoftheguidingaimsoftheCritiqueisto“denyknowledgeinordertomakeroomforfaith”(Bxxx).Thatis,partofwhatKantdoesintheCritiqueistoarguethatwemustadmitthepossibilitythatourwillsarenoume-nallyfreecauses(acentralclaimforhispracticalphilosophy),andthatGodexistsinthenoumenalrealm.Thisprojectmakessenseonlyifitisnotnonsensetotalkofnoumenalcausationandentities.22

Moreover,acloserreadingofthetextgivesgroundsforthinkingboth(1)thattheclaimsaboutthelimitsofobjectivesignificanceareequivalent to the claims about the limits of cognition and (2) that

20.Elsewhere,Kantputshispointbysaying that “wedonotandcannothavetheleastacquaintance[Kenntnis]”withtherealsubjectofourthinking(A350).Thistermevenmoreclearlycallsoutforinterpretivecare.

21. The verb ‘erkennen’, like its root ‘kennen’, takes objects as its objects, not propositions. The significance of this general point about Kant’s claims is being explored by Karl Schafer in unpublished work. I’m indebted to Schafer for helping me appreciate the need for care in reading Kant’s claims about Erkenntnis.

22. This familiar point was even recognized by Strawson (e. g., Strawson 1966,240–41),whoconcludedthattheprojectdidn’tultimatelymakesense.

ThefirstgroundfordoubtingwhetherKantmeanstosaythatweknownofactsaboutourselvesoutsideofhowweappearisjustthatKanthimselfmakesclaimsabouthowweareoutsideofhowweap-pear.Forinstance,heassertsthatoursensationsaretheresultofob-jects affecting our minds (cf. A19/B33) and that the combination ofrepresentationscanonlybeexecutedbythesubject itself (cf.B130).Even Kant’s claim that we do not know ourselves as we are in our-selves presupposes that wehave a nature in ourselves, and this cer-tainlydoesnotseemtobemerelyaclaimabouthowweappear.Thisimplicationisclearinhisstatementthat“[this]soulIcognizeonlyasanobjectof internalsense throughtheappearancesconstitutinganinnerstate,andwhosebeingas it is in itself,whichunderlies theseappearances, isunknowntome”(Prolegomena4:336).IdiscussmoreexamplesofsuchclaimsinSection2.6,below.

ThesecondgroundfordoubtingtheassumptioncomesfromKant’sownclaimsaboutcognition(Erkenntnis),thetermhetypicallyusesinexpressing these limitations. Kant is quite clear that ‘cognition’ is atechnicalterm.IntheDeduction,hestatesthatcognitionconsists“inthedeterminaterelationofgivenrepresentationstoanobject”(B137,seealsoB146–74)andintheIntroductiontotheBeditionhedescribestheproductionofcognitionasinvolvingthecomparisonofdifferentsensoryrepresentations.18Asimilarpoint ismadeinthe Jäsche Logic atAA9:65.WhetherornotonetakessuchpassagesasdemonstratingwhatKantmeansby‘cognition’,19theydogiveusreasonstoquestion

logicalpossibility).Inrecentwork,DesmondHoganexploresaverydifferentapproachtothisissue,onewhich,ifultimatelydefensibleandgeneralizable,wouldalsoprovidearesponsetotheaboveargument(Hogan2009a,Hogan2009b,Hogan2009c).SomethingsimilaristrueofLangton1998.

18. B1. Inotherplaces,Kantuses ‘Erkenntnis’more liberally.Cf.A320/B376–77,whereanintuitionorconceptaloneiscountedasacognition,andtheplacesin the logic lectures where any representation of something is counted ascognition(e. g.,Logic Lectures24:132,24:845,and Jäsche Logic9:64).But thisbroaderunderstandingofthenotionmakesit impossibletomakesenseofKant’scentralclaimsconcerningcognitionintheCritique(suchastheclaimthatitrequiresbothintuitionsandconceptsatA51/B75).

19. SomethingSmitdoesinSmit2000.



eightplacesinthatchapterinhiscopyoftheAedition,Kantwroteinqualificationsthatexplicitlyrefertodeterminatenessandcognition.25

Moreover, the B edition adds a passage that emphasizes the claimthatwithoutsensibilitywehaveonlyanundetermineduseofconcepts(B307).WhiletheBeditiondoesretainsomeofthestronger-soundingclaims,theclearshiftinemphasissupportstheconclusionthatKantneverreallyintendedtoclaimthatnosensecouldbemadeoftalkofwhatexistsoutsideofappearances,26sothischapterleavesopenthepossibilityofametaphysicalinterpretation.Thefirstargumentfortheanti-metaphysicalinterpretationcomesupshort.

2.3 The second argument: Kant’s attack on rational psychologyThereisanother,morespecificargumentfortheanti-metaphysicalin-terpretation:becausetheselfisnotitselfanappearance,butisratheroutsideofappearances,andbecausetherealmofappearancesistheempiricalrealm,Kantcouldn’thaveadvancedaviewoftheself’sna-ture on any empirical (and so a posteriori) grounds. Therefore, anysuchviewwouldhavetohavesomeaprioribasis.ButKantappearstorejectthepossibilityofanyaprioriviewoftheself.HistargetintheParalogisms,rationalpsychology,isdefinedasthedoctrineaimedatacquiringknowledgeaboutthesoulmerelyonthebasisoftheconcept‘I’ortherepresentation‘Ithink’(cf.A342/B400ff).Kantalsoseemstothinkthatrationalpsychology is theonlypossibleaprioriapproachto the metaphysics of the self, hence: “If more than the cogito werethe ground of our pure rational cognition of thinking beings in gen-eral…thenanempiricalpsychologywouldarise…thusitwouldbe

25. Atthebeginningofthechapter,atA237/B296,atA246/B303,twiceatA247/B304,atA251,atA253andatA259.ThisisdetailedinErdmann1881andintheGuyer/Woodtranslation.

26.This connection between determinate representation and meaning is alsoquiteclearwithregardtotheself intheMetaphysical Foundations of Natural Science:“TheI…itselfmerelyathought,designates,asamereprefix,athingofundeterminedmeaning—namely, thesubjectofallpredicates—withoutanyconditionatallthatwoulddistinguishthisrepresentationofthesubjectfromthatofasomethingingeneral”(Metaphysical Foundations4:542).

Kant’srevisionstothePhenomenaandNoumenachapterinthesec-ondeditionoftheCritiquewereintendedtoclarifythisexactpoint.

On(1):immediatelyaftersayingthatthecategorieshave“relationtoanobject”onlyviathesenses,Kantclarifieswhathemeansbydeny-ing“validity”(Gültigkeit)toextra-sensoryusesofthecategories:“with-outtheconditionofsensibleintuition…thecategorieshavenorela-tionatalltoanydeterminateobject,thustheycannotdefineone,andconsequentlytheydonothaveinthemselvesanyvalidityasconcepts”(A246,myemphasis).Throughoutthechapter,infact,Kantoftenputshispointaboutthevalidityofconceptsintermsoftheirrelationstode-terminateobjects,andasweshouldnowexpect,intermsofcognition.23 IfKantclarifieshisclaimsaboutthelimitsofobjectivesignificanceinthesamewaythatheclarifieshisclaimsaboutthelimitsofcognition,thenhis claimsabout the formerareprobablynostronger thanhisclaimsaboutthelatter.24Sincewe’veseenthatthereisreasonfortak-inghisclaimsaboutcognitioninarelativelyweaksense,thereisalsoreasonfortakinghisclaimsaboutthelimitsofmeaningandobjectivesignificanceinasimilarlyweaksense.Oncewedothat,theargumentfortheanti-metaphysicalinterpretationlosesitsforce.

On(2):thereisalsoevidencethatKantrealizedhehadbeenmis-leadingintheAedition’sPhenomenaandNoumenachapter.Inatleast

23. Forinstance:“thoughapurecategory,inwhichabstractionismadefromanyconditionofsensibleintuitions…noobject isdetermined,ratheronlythethoughtofanobjectingeneralisexpressedinaccordancewithdifferentmodi”(A247/B304);“theotherthings,towhichsensibilitydoesnotreach,arecallednoumenajustinordertoindicatethatthosecognitionscannotextendtheirdomaintoeverythingthattheunderstandingthinks”(A254/B310);and“Ifweseparate[intuitionsandconcepts],thenwehave…representationsthatwecannotrelatetoanydeterminateobject”(A258/B314).

24. WhileKarlAmeriksmistakenlysuggests theproblematicpassagesarecon-finedtotheBedition,hedoesgestureatboththisresponse,and(followingKempSmith)thepointofthenextparagraph,whenhenotesthatKanthada “tendency to say something iswholly ‘withoutmeaning’,or ‘significance’,whenwhathemeansismerelythatitdoesnotprovideknowledge”(Ameriks2000, xxxv). Hogan 2009a charges Ameriks with adapting a “non-literal”readingofKant’s claims,but thischarge restsonhis inheritedassumptionthatKant’sclaimsaboutErkenntnisshouldbe“literally”understoodasclaimsaboutknowledge.



Iconclude, then, that the twomostpromisingarguments for theanti-metaphysical interpretation are inadequate. Just as importantly,though,therearestrong,straightforwardgroundsforacceptingameta-physicalinterpretationofKant’sviewsoftheself.BothKant’soverallprojectandthespecificclaimshemakesappeartocommithimtohav-ingsomepositiveaccountoftheself.Iargueforeachpointinturn.

2.5 The metaphysical commitments of Kant’s Copernican revolutionVarious interpretershaveargued thatKant’swhole “Copernican”ap-proachtophilosophymuststemfromaconceptionofadeterminatemindwithfaculties.27Forinstance,consideroneofthemoredramaticclaimsmadeintheAedition:“Thusweourselvesbring intotheap-pearances thatorderandregularity in themthatwecallnature,andmoreoverwewouldnotbeabletofinditthereifwe,orthenatureofourmind,hadnotoriginallyputitthere”(A125).Theprojectmakessenseonlyifweunderstandthemindasbeingagenuineentitywithanatureofitsownthatismorebasicthantheworldofappearances,andwhereatleastsomeaspectsofthatnatureareknownapriori.28 This point is in fact captured by Kant’s descriptions of “logical” fea-turesoftheselforself-consciousness(e. g.,A350,B413),for“transcen-dentallogic”isdescribedasthedisciplinethatsetsoutto“isolatetheunderstanding…andelevate fromourcognitionmerely thepartofour thought that has its origin solely in the understanding” (A62/B87).TheselformindistheobjectofinvestigationintheCritique—soKantsurelymusthavehadsomepositiveconceptionofwhathewasinvestigating.

27. E. g.,Waxman1990,276–77,Ameriks2000,5andKitcher2000,41–43.

28. IncontrasttotheviewIfavor,Waxmanthinksthatthereisnogoodsolutiontotheinterpretiveproblem,andsoconcludesthat“oneisobligedtoconcludethatKant’sfundamentaldescriptivecategories—‘representation’(entailinga‘represented’)and ‘thing in itself’—lackanywarrant” (Waxman1990,290).PatriciaKitcherconsidersasimilarworryandconcludesthatitwouldbebesttoabandonKant’sviewoftheselfasnoumenal(Kitcher1984,127).

norationalpsychology”(A347/B405–406).SinceKantthinksthat“thewholeofrationalpsychology…collapses”(A382),wecanseeminglyinferthathethinksthereisnoviableaprioribasisforpositiveclaimsabouttheself,andsonoviablepositivemetaphysicsoftheself.ThiswouldexplainwhyKantinsiststhatwehavecognitionofourselvesonlythroughinnersense(e. g.,B406),whichcouldn’tbethebasisforanapriorimetaphysics.

2.4 Why the second argument failsThoughKantdescribesrationalpsychologyasageneralmetaphysicalproject,heisalsoconfidentthathehasanexhaustivelistofitsbasicclaims:

Thetopicsoftherationaldoctrineofthesoul,fromwhicheverythingelsethatitmaycontainhastobederived,arethereforethefollowing:1.Thesoulissubstance2.Initsqualitysimple3.Inthedifferenttimesinwhichitexists,numericallyidentical…4.Inrelationtopossibleobjectsinspace[morecertain].(A344/B402)

Becausethislistissupposedtobeexhaustive,ifthereweresomeclaimaboutthenatureoftheselfthatrequirednoneoftheseclaims,itwouldnot constitute a part of rational psychology as Kant sees it, and weshouldnotassumethatKantwoulddismissituntilweevaluateitrela-tivetohisepistemologicalstrictures.Hereisasuggestion,tobefleshedoutbelowinSection4:whenKantrejectsrationalpsychologyasa“ra-tionaldoctrineofthesoul,”hemeanstoberejectingaMetaphysicsofthesoul,andsoallowingmoremodestmetaphysicalclaims(e. g,.thatthesoulisaffectedbyvariousthingsandhasfaculties).Ifthereweresomepositiveclaimsaboutthenatureofthesoulthatweretoomod-esttocountaspartofMetaphysics,andcouldstaywithinthelimitshesetsforcognitionandobjectivesignificance,thensuchclaimswouldnothavebeenpartofhistargetintheParalogisms.Thismeansthatthesecondargumentfortheanti-metaphysical interpretationisalsofarfromconclusive.



independentconceptionofwhatthe“unityofapperception”amountsto.IntheBDeductionKantevenintroducesthenotionbyreferencetoa single selfor subject: “allmanifoldof intuitionhasanecessaryrelationtotheIthinkin the same subjectinwhichthismanifoldistobeencountered”(B132,myemphasis).IntheADeductionhecashesoutthenotionintermsof“theidentityofoneself”(A108).32

DieterHenrich, inhiswidely influential interpretationof theDe-duction,resiststhis,assertingthat“theidentityofself-consciousnessisnotsufficienttoenableoneto infer the identityofareal thingorevenofanobject which isknowable with respect to its realnature.Numericalidentitybelongstoself-consciousnessassuch.”33Similarly,HenryAllison,whenconsideringtheParalogismschapteroftheDia-lectic,holdsthattheillusionKantthererevealsis“toconsidertheunityofapperceptionasifitweretheunityofathing.”34Bothinterpretersassumethatwehaveagrasponwhatitisfortheretobeidentityorunityofself-consciousnesswithoutthinkingoftherebeinganidenti-calorunifiedself.Butreflectionwillshowthatwehavenosuchgrasp;ifthere’sreallynothingatallthat’sidenticalorunifiedoverdifferentstates, then there just can’t be identity or unity of consciousness inthosestates.

Importantly, saying that there must be something that’s identicaldoesn’titselfpresupposeanyoftheviewsKantattacksintheParalo-gismschapter,namely,thatweknowthatthingisasubstance(FirstParalogism),orsimple(SecondParalogism),ordistinctfrommaterial

32. SeealsoA103,whereapperceptionisclarifiedrelativetofactsaboutchangesinamind’srepresentationalstate.

33. Henrich1994,264.HenrichexplicitlypointstotheParalogismsasshowingthis.Eventhemoremetaphysically-mindedKarlAmerikssays that thepas-sagesfromtheDeduction“havetobereadquitecarefullylestKantbetakentobemakingpreciselytheparalogisticfallacyheclearlycriticizeselsewhereintheCritique”,andgoesontoclaimthat“the‘identical’itemhereneednotbeathingbutcanbemerelyaformalconditionoritsrepresentation”(Ameriks2000,140).

34. Allison2004,340.TobiasRosefeldtarguesthattheDeductionpassagesonlyconcern“thelogicalidentityoftheI,”wherethisneedstobedistinguishedfromtheidentityofathingindifferentstates(Rosefeldt2000,128).

2.6 Commitments to non-trivial facts about the self ’s identityThemetaphysicallycommittingclaimsconcerningtheidentityoftheself appear primarily in the Transcendental Deduction. Many inter-pretersof theDeduction,drivenbytheanti-metaphysical interpreta-tion,readthisstretchoftheCritiqueinanon-metaphysicalway,29butIbelievethatthiscanbedoneonlybyseriouslywarpingthetext.

ThereislittlequestionthatoneofthecentralnotionsintheDeduc-tionisthe“unityofapperception,”30whichKant(somewhatmoreintel-ligibly)alsodescribesasthe“identityofself-consciousness.”31Amongotherthings,Kantstatesthatthisunityis“necessary”insomesense(e. g.,A107,B142),thatitisessentiallyconnectedtoourfundamentalconcept of an object (e. g., A109, B139), that concept-guided synthe-sisand/orjudgmentsarethemeansforbringingcognitionsintothisunity(e. g.,A111–12,B141),andthatwehavesomeaprioriconceptionofthisunityasappliedtothemanifoldofsensibleintuition(e. g.,A118,B150).

Atleastsomeoftheseclaimsaremeanttobenon-trivial, fortheyarepivotalstepsintheDeduction,andKant’saimthereisnon-trivial(justifyingouruseofthecategories).Theimportantpointisthis:un-lessKantiseitherinvokinganewphilosophicalprimitive(andthereisnoclearevidencethatheis)orsomehowreifyingself-consciousness,thereisnoplausiblewaytounderstandwhatitisfortheretobe“iden-tity of self-consciousness” over different representations without un-derstandingitasinvolvingasingleconsciousselfthatisthesameinthedifferentrepresentations.Weshouldnotassumethatwehavean

29. In addition to Henry Allison and Dieter Henrich (discussed below), cf.Ameriks2000,139–142,andBrook1994,179ff.AnimportantexceptionisAr-thurMelnick,whothinksthattheDeductionmakessenseonlyifweunder-standtheselfasanactivity(cf.Melnick2009,88ff.).

30. E. g.,“thesyntheticunityofapperceptionisthehighestpointtowhichonemustaffixalluseoftheunderstanding,eventhewholeoflogicand,afterit,transcendentalphilosophy”(B134n.).

31. Thisisfairlyclearin§16oftheBDeduction.Henrich1994discussesunityofapperceptionandidentityofapperceptionasdistincttopics,butI’munabletomakeclearsenseofwhatthedifferenceissupposedtobe,andhowthetextissupposedtojustifythedistinction.



Now,theargumentsjustgivendon’ttelluswhatpositiveaccountoftheselfKantmighthavehad.Partofthemotivationfortheanti-meta-physicalinterpretationhasbeenthatitisunclearwhatmetaphysicalaccountof theselfcouldconsistentlyfit intoKant’ssystem.BeforeIpresentmyproposal, thenext sectionwill illustrate the relevantdif-ficultiesbyconsideringtheobviouscandidatesfortheaccount.

3. The metaphysics of the self: some possibilities

Kantusesthesamebasicontologicalcategoriesashispredecessorsindiscussingthenatureoftheself,andindiscussingthelimitsofcogni-tionandofthesignificanceofthecategories.37Onthatontology,theworldconsistsofsubstancesandtheiraccidents.Anespeciallyimpor-tantclassofaccidentsisthatofpowersorforces,wherebysubstancesinfluenceeachothers’accidents.Representationsareaspeciesofacci-dent,asarerelations.38Inwhatfollows,Iuse‘entity’asablankettermforbothsubstancesandaccidents.

Usingtheseterms,wecandescribethemostobviouscandidatesforanapriorimetaphysicsoftheself.FollowingDescartesandLeibniz,Kantcouldhaveheldthattheselfwasasubstance.FollowingHume,hecouldhaveheldthatitwasabundleofrepresentations.Twoothercandidatesappearintheliterature:theselfasanactivityoract,andtheselfasaformorstructure.Iconsidereachinturn.Inthecourseof

intohis theoreticalphilosophy,understands “theunityof the thinkingsub-ject”inafullymetaphysicalsense(Carl1989,12–14).MyclaimisthatnotallmetaphysicalaspectsofthenotionwerelostintheCritique.

37. Thisisn’ttosaythatKantthinksthatallapplicationsofthosecategoriesarejustified.Cf.Metaphysics Mrongovius29:849–851. Kant’scritiqueofLeibniz’smonadology,forinstance,isfocusedonLeibniz’sclaimsconcerningthena-tureofsubstances,andtheonlyobjectiontotheapplicationoftheconcept‘substance’ inthepassageconcernsgettingdeterminateknowledgeofanob-ject(recallSection2.2).Inthis,IagreewithAmeriks1992andChapter3ofLangton1998.

38.Wuerth2006,506–508discusseshowinthe1770sKantinsistedonthesedis-tinctionsspecificallywithregardtotheself.Inparticular,KantcriticizestheWolffiansforblurringthedistinctionbetweensubstancesandpowersandforconstruingthesoulasapower(cf.Metaphysics L1,28:261).

things (Fourth Paralogism). To be sure, the Third Paralogism is con-cernedwithidentity,buttheissueisouridentityaspersons,andKanttalks freely thereofour identityasselves(in theAeditionatA361–366)orassubjects(intheBeditionatB408).35

IfweclarifyourreadingoftheDeductioninthisway,thenwecanrecognize other passages that also make clear metaphysical claimsabouttheself.Herearetwosuchpassages(otherswillbequotedbe-lowinSection4.2).Theitalicsaremine:

[E]ven this representation—that all these appearancesandthusallobjectswithwhichwecanoccupyourselvesareallinme,i. e.,determinationsofmy identical self—ex-presses a thoroughgoing unity of them in one and thesameapperceptionasnecessary(A129)

Iamthereforeconsciousof the identical self in regard tothemanifoldoftherepresentationsthataregiventomeinanintuitionbecauseIcallthemalltogethermyrepre-sentations(B135).

SincetheDeductionissupposedtobeapriori,Kantissayingherethatwehaveanapriorigrasponwhatittakesforustohaveaunified,iden-ticalselfwithrespecttosomesetofrepresentations.Below,Isaymoreaboutwhatthatgraspmightconsistin.Fornow,thepointisthattherearecommitmentstonon-trivialmetaphysicalclaimsabouttheselfintheverychapterthatKantassertsisthemostimportant“forgettingtothebottomofthatfacultywecalltheunderstanding”(Axvi).36

35. Kant’s notion of ‘person’ (Person) then, is more loaded than Locke’s, sinceidentityofselfdoesn’tentailidentityofpersonforKant.Thispointhasbeenoverlookedbypreviouscommentators(mostinfluentially,inStrawson1966,Ameriks 2000, and Sellars 1970). I defend this interpretation of the ThirdParalogismat length inmy“The Identityof theSelf inKant’sThirdParalo-gism”(manuscript).Notethat,withtheexceptionofsomeveryKant-inspiredwork, all contemporary discussions of unity of consciousness assume thatconsciousstatescanbeunifiedonlyifthosestatesarestatesofthesamemind.

36.WolfgangCarlhasarguedthatatleastoneofKant’sdraftsoftheDeductionfromthemid-1770s,whereKantfirstintroducesthenotionofapperception



the possibility of the self’s ultimately being a collection or series ofsubstancestoillustratethemistakesofrationalpsychologyintheSec-ondandThirdParalogisms(A353andA363–64n.,respectively).

ButKantultimatelythinkswecannotevenassumethatwearecon-stitutedbyone or moresubstances, forheexplicitly insists thatouraprioriawarenessofourselvesdoesnotdetermine“whetherIcouldex-istandbethoughtofonlyassubjectandnotaspredicateofanotherthing”(B419).ItislikelythatKanthasinmindSpinoza’sviewthatthemindisanaccidentofGod,theonesubstance.41Thismeansthat,atleastonhismoreconsideredview,Kantwoulddenythatwehaveanyaprioribasisforaffirmingordenyingthatweareasimpleentity,andthatwehaveanysuchbasis for thinkingofourselvesasbeingsub-stancesratherthanaccidents.IfKanthassomeaprioriconceptionofthenatureoftheself,itwouldhavetoremainneutralonbothissues.

3.2 The self as a bundle of representations?Humefamouslyclaimedthatthemindisnothingbuta“bundleorcol-lectionofdifferentperceptions.”42PatriciaKitcher,inarguingthattheTranscendentalDeductionsarearesponsetoHume’schallengetothenotionofpersonalidentity,43hasdescribedtheKantianIorselfas“acontentuallyinterconnectedsystemofmentalstates.”44Onthisinter-

41. Spinoza,Ethics, 2p11d.(translationfromEdwinCurleyinSpinoza1985).KantexplicitlydescribestheSpinozisticviewinhislectures(cf.Lectures on Religion 28:1052).

42. Hume1978,I.vi.VI.

43. OriginallyinKitcher1982.

44. Kitcher1984,117(seealsoKitcher1990,122,andKitcher1998,79).Inherear-lierwork,KitcherwasclearthatthiswasatbestapartialreflectionofKant’sownview,sinceitmadetheselfultimatelyphenomenal(seeKitcher1984,121and134,andKitcher 1990,121,wheretheaccountisdescribedas“deliberatelyrevisionist”).Sheholds,however, thatKant’smainmotivations formakingthe self noumenal are external to his theoretical philosophy (e. g., Kitcher1990,139),andtheaboveargumentsshowthisisamistake.Withasimilaranti-metaphysicalapproach,AndrewBrookhasclaimed thatKant “didnotjustthinkofthemindashavingasystemofrepresentations;healsothoughtofitasbeingarepresentation,namely,theglobalrepresentationwithinwhichmanyoftheusualdenizensofasystemofrepresentationsareallcontained”

doingso,IidentifythemaindesiderataforaplausibleinterpretationofKant’sviewsontheself.

3.1 The self as a substance?LeibnizandDescartesholdthattheself(thatinmewhichthinks)isamentalsubstance.Boundupwiththisconclusionistheclaimthattheselfisimmortal,forpartofwhatdistinguishesgenuinesubstancesfromaccidentsistheirstrongontologicalindependence.

Now,inhispre-Criticalwork,Kantdoestalkoftheself’sbeingasubstance.39Moreover,muchofKant’swayof talkingabout theselfintheCritiquesuggestscontinuitywiththeearlierrationalists’views.LikeDescartes,heconsistentlyfavorsthefirst-personsingularintalk-ingaboutthenatureoftheself.Healsoseemstothinkthatthereissomethingspecialaboutentitiescapableofusingthefirst-person.IntheAnthropology,hesaysthatthefactthatahumancanuse‘I’“raiseshiminfinitelyaboveallotherlivingbeingsonearth.Becauseofthisheisaperson,andbyvirtueoftheunityoftheconsciousnessthroughall changes that happen to him, one and the same person” (Anthro-pology7:127).Partofthetraditionalexplanationforthespecialnessofhumanswasthattheypossessedimmaterial,simple, immortal, intel-lectualsouls.

Atthesametime,itisclearthatintheCritiqueKantdoesnotacceptDescartes’andLeibniz’sviewof theself’smetaphysicalnature.KantunambiguouslyattacksthewarranttoanysuchclaimintheFirstPa-ralogism(A348–351,B411–12).Hisprecisetargetistheclaimthatweknowapriorithattheselfisasubstance,especiallyinsofarasthiscar-riestheimplicationofimmortality.Thisisn’ttoruleoutthatwemightinfactbeoneormoresubstances;thepointisjustthatwehavenoaprioriwarrantforregardingourselvesassuch.40Indeed,heemploys

39.Forarecentsurvey,seeWuerth2006.

40.Thisissettingasidejustificationsstemmingfrommoralconsiderations,suchasourneedforsupposingourselvestobeimmortalinordertothinkofourendless progress towards moral perfection (see Critique of Practical Reason 5:122).



consisting of some accident or accidents of substances, so long asthataccidentoraccidentsarenottherepresentationsofwhichweareconscious.46

At thesametime,Kitcher’s readingdoeshavetextualmotivation.Therearestrongtextualgrounds(surveyedbelow)forbelievingthatKantthinksthatthereisanintimateconnectionbetweensomeinter-relatedsetofrepresentationsandtheself,andanyplausibleproposalconcerningKant’spositivemetaphysicsoftheselfmusttakethiscon-nectionintoaccount.

3.3 The self as a force?Another interpretation of Kant’s views, inspired by his B423n. claimthat the I “exists in the act,”47 is to see the self as an act or activity.ThisrelativelyrecentinterpretationhasbeenarticulatedbyRolf-PeterHorstmannandArthurMelnick,48effectivelytyingKant’sviewtothatofFichte.49BothHorstmannandMelnickaredrawntothisinterpreta-tionbecauseitwouldgiveKantaclearbreakwiththemetaphysicalviewsofhispredecessors.

WhileseeingtheselfasanactivityappealedtosomeofthelaterGermanidealists,itisunlikelythatKantwasdrawntoiteveninthesecondeditionoftheCritique,forthesimplereasonthatheconsistent-lyascribesactivitytotheself,withoutsuggestionofidentification.InthesecondeditionoftheTranscendentalDeduction,Kantclaimsthat

“amongallrepresentationscombinationistheonlyonethatisnotgiven

46. In theessay “Whatdoes itmean toorientoneself in thinking?”,Kantdoesclaimthatthere’ssomethingincomprehensibleabouttheSpinozisticviewofthepsychologicalsubject’sbeinganaccident(“Whatdoesitmean”8:143n.).Eventhere,however,hemaybereadasmerelysaying(alongthelinesoftheParalogismschapter)thatwecannotrepresentourselvesasanaccident,wherethisstopsshortofimplyinganymetaphysicalconclusions.

47. GuyerandWoodtranslate“in der Tat existiert”as“infactexists.”Thecontextdoes provide some reason for this translation—if they are right, then thepresentproposallosesitsbestpieceoftextualsupport.

48. Horstmann1993,Horstmann2007,andMelnick2009.

49. Fichte,forinstance,saysthat“TheIis,tobeginwith,nothingbuta ‘doing’”(Fichte1994,81)

pretation,Kant’sviewisamoresophisticatedversionofHume’s.LikeHume,Kantwouldberejectingthecommonsenseviewthatamindissomethingdistinctfromtherepresentationsthatithas.

ThereareatleasttwoseriousproblemswiththisreadingofKant,evensettingasidethemetaphysicalcommitmentsofKant’smoralphi-losophy.ThefirstproblemisthatKantcertainlyhasthevocabularytoexpress a Humean bundle view, and yet instead typically expressestherelationoftheselftorepresentationsintermsthatwouldbehardforaHumeanreadingtoaccommodate.Perhapsmostclearly:theselfisthethingthatcombinesrepresentationsinsynthesis(cf.A77/B103).Kant nowhere suggests that representations themselves could havesuchapower.

ThesecondreasonwhytheHumeanreadingofKantisimplausibleisthatKantisemphaticthatwedonotknowourselvesasweareinourselves.Thisiscrucial,forinstance,tohisdefenseofthepossibilityofgenuinefreewill(intheresolutionoftheThirdAntinomy),andforhisclaimthatwecannotknowwhetherwearedifferentinkindfromthematerialobjectsweexperience(intheFourthParalogism).Whatwe are aware of are the appearances of ourselves. Appearances arerepresentations, so if we are bundles of representations, then thereneedstobeanotherlevelofrepresentationsthatistheappearanceofthatbundle.ButthisisclearlynotKant’sview—heholdsthatwecandirectlyattachan‘Ithink’toanyrepresentation(cf.B131),andthere’sno indication on his part that this amounts to the appearance of arepresentation.45

None of this rules out the (Spinozistic) possibility of the self’s

(Brook 1994,44). JamesVanCleve thinks suchaview is suggestedbypas-sageswhereKantsaysthattheselfisneverdirectlyobserved,onthebasisof the further,Russellianclaimthat “logicalconstructionsarealways tobepreferredtoinferredentities”(VanCleve1999,239)—anapproachthatcouldatmostbetakenasasuggestedrevisionofKant’sview.

45. KitchergrantsthatsuchworriesshowthatherinterpretationcannotreflectthewholeofKant’sviewsontheself,butinsiststhatherinterpretationisthemostcharitableonewecanascribetoKant(e. g.,“Kantvigorouslyrejectsaphenomenalthinker,yethecannotconsistentlyadvocateanoumenalone,”Kitcher1984,138,alsoKitcher1990,Chapter5).



experiencepossible,”52andGünterZöllerclaimedthatmostinterpre-tationsofKant“showaremarkableagreementintheirunderstandingofKant’sthinkingselfasaformorstructurethateludesanyattemptatreification.”53InthepassagefromZöller,itisnotclearwhetherthisissomebroadlyAristotelianviewoftheselfasaformorstructure,orwhether the idea is closer to Strawson’s truly anti-metaphysical sug-gestionthattherepresentation‘I’doesn’trefertoanything,butmerelystandsinanon-referringexpressiverelationtoaformorstructure.54

Butifwetakethisasametaphysicalview,howplausibleisitasaninterpretation?Thefirstquestiontoaskiswhethertheidentificationiswithatypeofform(e. g.,apatternofconnectionthatvariousgroupsofcausallyindependentrepresentationsmighthold),orsometokenofatype.Theformeroptionseemsveryimplausible,foritwouldimplythattheselfwasn’taparticularentityatall,butrathersomethingthatmightbeinstantiatedinvariousplaces.Kantneversuggestsanythingsoradical.55

Thisleavesthepossibilitythattheselfissomeparticularinstanceofaformorstructure.Yetthisinterpretiveproposalwouldonlyfacemore serious versions of the problems faced by the previous candi-date:Kantascribesstructuretousandourrepresentations,andthereisneveranysuggestionthataformcouldperformthesortofactionsheascribestoourmind(suchas“synthesizing”).Moreover,Kantas-sertsthatthingsinthemselvesmusthavenon-relationalnatures,56and

52. Strawson1966,167.

53. Zöller1993,460.SeealsoAllison1996b,96,Ameriks2000,140,andMcDow-ell1994,101.

54. Thiswouldmake‘I’morelike“Goodbye”thanlike“thisthinker.”

55. W.H.WalshandothershaveclaimedthatsomethinglikethisiswhatKantmeansintalkingabouttranscendentalapperception(cf.Walsh1997,50).Butevenifthishighlyunnaturalreadingofthetextiscorrect,itwouldleavethequestionathandunsettled—fortherecertainlyareindividualselves,andthequestioniswhatKantthoughtabouttheirnature.Thatthereissomeuniver-salthatcanbecalleda“self”wouldbebesidethepoint.

56. “[T]hroughmererelationsnothinginitselfiscognized”(B67).MyclaimisweakerthanRaeLangton’sthesisthatallpropertiesofthingsinthemselvesarenon-relational(Langton1998).

throughobjectsbutcanbeexecutedonlybythesubjectitself”(B130),andsuchascriptionsarefoundthroughoutthecriticalworks.Thereissimplynohintofanontologicalshifttowardsseeingtheselfasaforceoractivity.50EventheclaimthattheI“existsintheact”wouldbeabi-zarrewayofidentifyingtheselfwithanact:naturallyread,itseemstosaythattheactistheconditionfortheself’sexistence.

In addition, as we saw above, in the Paralogisms Kant says thattheselfmightinsomesensebeoneormoresubstances.Sincethere’snoindicationthathethoughtactscouldbesubstances,Kantcouldn’thaveconsistentlyheldthattheselfwasanactoractivity.

Ofcourse,wewouldhavesomereasonforsuspectingKantofbe-ginningtoshifttowardsanactivityviewifitweretruethathecouldmakehisphilosophyconsistentonlybyconstruingtheselfasaforceoract.Butaswe’ll see, that’snot thecase.At thesame time,Horst-mannandMelnickarecertainlyrighttoseeafundamentalconnectionbetweenmentalactivityandouraprioriunderstandingofthenatureoftheself,51andanysuccessfulaccountwillhavetomakesenseofthisconnection.

3.4 The self as a form or structure?Yetanotherpositionintheliterature,inspiredbyclaimssuchas“thisI…isthemereformofconsciousness”(A382),isthattheIisaform.Theseinterpretivepositionsarealittledifficulttountangle,forsome-times they appear to be anti-metaphysical. For instance, Strawsonclaimed that, when it is separated from empirical bases of applica-tion, the representation ‘I’ “merely expresses that unity which makes

50.Kitcherconsidersaviewalongtheselinesandobjectsthattheself“cannotbeidentifiedwithactsofspontaneity,sincethesearedistinctevents”(Kitcher1990,122).Thisobjectionaloneisnotdecisive,however,forthepointoftheviewwouldbetoidentifytheselfwiththesingleactivitythatisconstituted by variousinstancesofspontaneity.

51. Cf.Kant’sclaimthat“ineveryjudgmentIamalwaysthedeterminingsubjectofthatrelationthatconstitutesthejudgment”(B407).Alsosee§25oftheBDeduction.



seriesofentitiesproducedthetokenrepresentation,thenthatgroupofentitiesisthereferent.Thecoreideahereisthatweindividuatetheself(thereferentof‘I’)astheproducerofacertainrepresentation(thetoken‘I’).Ifmultipleentitieswereinvolvedintheproductionofthatrepresentation,thenwecansaythattheyjointlycomposetheself.

Wecanextendthisideatocaseswhere‘I’appearsaspartofsomelargerrepresentation,e. g.,thethought“I’mreading.”Saythatinthiscasethe“I’m”partofthethoughtwasproducedbyaslightlydifferentgroupofentitiesfromthatwhichproducedthe“reading”partofthethought(aphysicalistmightfillinthedetailsherebysayingthatthethoughtwas temporallydrawnoutenough thata fewneuronsdiedandwerereplacedwhileitoccurred).It’splausibletosaythattheselfisconstitutedbywhateverentityorentitiesproducedtheentire thought of which the token ‘I’ was a part, not just those responsible for thetoken‘I’.Thatis,since‘I’isasingularterm,wecansaythatthetoken‘I’refersnotjusttothevariousentitiesthatproduceditbuttoanin-dividualcomposedofalltheentitiesthatproducedthelargerthoughtofwhichitisapart.Here,weindividuateaselfastheproducerofanI-involvingthought.Tobesure,toavoidcircularity,wehavetoassumethatfactsaboutwhatmakesforaunifiedthoughtdonotpresupposefactsaboutantecedentlyunifiedorsimplethinkingentities,butthatisnotobviouslyabsurd.58

Thenextstepistoeliminatetherequirementthat ‘I’occurinthethoughtthatindividuatestheself.Perhapsallthatisrequiredisthat,withalittleprompting,theentitiesproducingthethoughtcouldhaveproducedthethoughtwithan‘I’init.Soaselfcouldbeindividuatedbyathoughtsuchas“Thisisgettinginteresting”justsolongas,hadthingsbeenslightlydifferent,theentityorentitiesthatproducedthatthoughtwouldhaveproducedthethought“I thinkthis isgettingin-teresting.”Andifthatlatterthoughthadbeenproduced,thenthe‘I’itcontainedwouldhavereferredtoanindividualcomposedofall the

58. Thequestionhereisattheheartoftheargumentfromtheunityofthoughttothesimplicityoftheself,whichwasapparentlyendorsedbythepre-criticalKant.Foradetaileddiscussion,seeAmeriks2000,Chapter2.

formsareplausiblyconstitutedbyrelations(cf.A20/B34),sohisdoc-trinethatthemindhasanuncognizablenatureinitselfwouldbecomeunintelligible.Finally, thebestpieceof textualsupport forthis inter-pretation, thesentenceatA382, isone thatKantrevised inhisowncopyofthefirstedition,tosayinsteadthattheIis“the(unknowntous)objectofconsciousness”,andremovedfromthesecondedition.

4. An effect-relative compositional approach to the self

TheprevioussectionsurveyedtheobviouspossibilitiesforwhatmightbeattributedtoKantasanapriorimetaphysicsoftheself.Thefactthatthereareclearproblemswitheachofthesecandidateshascertainlyadded motivation to the anti-metaphysical interpretive approach. Ifthereisaplausibleinterpretation,itmustbeonethat(1)allowssomesense inwhich, forallweknow, theselfmightbeoneormoresub-stancesoraccidents,(2)keepsaclearsenseinwhichwelackcognitionoftheselfinitself,(3)allowstheselftobeoutsideofrepresentations,and(4)maintainsanintimateconnectionbetweentheself,mentalac-tivity,andacertainunifiedsetofrepresentationsthatconstitutesanexperience.

Inowargueforaninterpretationthatsatisfiesallfourdesiderata.Moreover,theviewthatIattributetoKantisonethathasindependentphilosophicalplausibility,andsoisonethatcanbecharitablyattrib-utedtoKant.Ifirstpresenttheviewinanintuitiveway,andthenturntothetextualbasisfortheattribution.

4.1 An intuitive approachConsiderwhatcouldplausiblybecalledanecessarytruthaboutthemental representation ‘I’:any tokenof that representationwill refertowhateverproducedtherepresentation,where‘produced’indicatesasortofimmediatecausalresponsibility.ThereisnoreasontodoubtthatKantacceptedthis.57Wecanthensaythat ifsomecollectionor

57. ContrarytoStrawson1966,166,Chisholm1976,42,Rosenberg1986,68,andAmeriks 2000, 54. For resistance to the non-referring interpretation, seeBrook1994,Chapter4;Howell2001,121,127;andLonguenesse2007.



onething.Otherentitiesmighthavealsocontributedtothefilm(e. g.,theactors),butbecausetheircausalcontributionisdistinctfromthatof the director, producer, and editor, they aren’t components of theproductionteam.Likewise,evenifotherentitiescontributetoanex-perience(e. g.,thosethatgiverisetointuitions),thatisadistinctcon-tributionfromthatoftheunifyingactivity,andsothoseentitiesaren’tpartoftherelevantindividual(theself).61

The operative metaphysical principle also surfaces elsewhere inthehistoryofphilosophy.Anexplicitstatementofitcomesinthesev-enthdefinitioninPartIIofSpinoza’sEthics:“ifanumberofindividualssoconcurinoneactionthattogethertheyareallthecauseofoneef-fect,Iconsiderthemall,tothatextent,asonesingularthing.”Wecancallthisprincipleaprincipleof“effect-relativecomposition,”andtheresultingviewoftheselfthe“effect-relativecompositionviewoftheself”(hereafter“theeffect-relativeview”).

Ishouldaddressonepotentialconfusionfromthestart.Theeffect-relativeviewisprimarilyametaphysicalview,notanepistemologicalone.Soitdoesnotfollowfromthefactthattheselfiscomposedrela-tivetoaneffectthatitisonlyknownbyinferencefromthateffect.OntheviewI’vedescribed,itistruethatweknowourselvesonlyifweareproducingsomeeffect(somethinking),butwemightsaythatweareequallyimmediatelyawareoftheeffectandofourselvesproducingit(B157–58n. suggests this may have been Kant’s view). Metaphysicalpriorityneedn’tdetermineepistemologicalpriority.62

61. Wemightalsosay thatall theentities thatcontributedto theeffect inanywaywhatsoeverconstituteanindividual.Inthefilmcase,wemightcallthisthe“film-makingteam.”Likewise,alltheentitiesthatcontributetoacertainexperiencecouldbesaidtoamounttoanindividual(perhapsanindividualworld—cf.§21oftheInaugural Dissertation).Butthisisallquitecompatiblewiththerebeingsomesmallerindividualthatisthefilm-productionteamortheself.

62.Therearesomesubtlequestionsherethatwouldtakesometimetofullyad-dress,andit’snotpartofmyaimheretogiveafullaccountofKant’saccountof self-knowledge.With that said, I can tentativelyofferonemore levelofepistemological detail: In being aware of oneself as thinking, on this view,one is immediately aware of some thing (or things) X that is producing acertaineffectE.Now,XconstitutesaselfinvirtueofproducingE.Sooneis

entities thatproduced the larger thought.Thatan ‘I’ thought ispos-sibleinthiswayindicatesthatacertainamountofunifiedthoughtisalreadypresent.

Theresultsofthisapproachdependonhowbigunifiedthoughtscanget.Ifwecanlegitimatelythinkofanentirecourseofexperienceas constituting a single thought (with smaller thoughts and percep-tionsascomponents),thenwehaveawayofindividuatingselvesthatwilllineupcloselywithoureverydaybeliefsabouthowlongandinwhat circumstances people “last”. Filling this out would require spe-cificphilosophicalviewsaboutwhatconstitutesaunifiedthought,butsuchviewshardlyseemimpossible.

Whatsortofmetaphysicalviewisthis?Onemightbetemptedtocall it a response-dependent approach to the composition of selves.Yet we normally think that a response (in the relevant sense of ‘re-sponse’)presupposesamindorself,soitwouldmakelittlesensetousethenormalnotionofresponse-dependencehere.Fortunately,thereisamoregeneralmetaphysicalprinciplethatcapturesourintuitions.59

The principle I want to appeal to states that a set of entities cancompose a single individual on the basis of their jointly making adistinctive contribution to a single effect (in this case, a thought orexperience).60Thismetaphysicalprinciplehasindependentintuitiveappeal.Forinstance,wemightspeakoftheproductionteamforafilm,whereweknowwe’rereferringtoanon-arbitrarygroupofpeoplesim-plybecausetheyjointlymadeadistinctcausalcontributiontosome

59. Forageneralresponse-dependentaccountofcomposition,seeKriegel2008.

60.This approach has some similarity to Thomas Nagel’s suggestion that theselfbeunderstoodtobewhateveritis“inwhichtheflowofconsciousnessand thebeliefs,desires, intentions,andcharacter traits that Ihaveall takeplace” (Nagel 1986, 45). Nagel’s view is inspired by a Kripkean account ofthereferenceofnaturalkindterms,however,andsodoesn’trequirethatthemetaphysicsoftheselfitselfnecessarilyinvolvesfactsaboutourmentallife.Rather,ourmentallifeisjustwhatweusetorefertotheself.Forthatreason,Nagelidentifiestheselfwiththehumanbrain,whereastheviewI’mpresent-ingwouldatmostsaythattheselfiscomposedofabrain.OnlythelatterviewallowsthatIcouldsurvivethedeathofmybrainincaseswhereithasanap-propriatepsychologicalsuccessor.



claims,theunityofthoughtmightbetheresultofacollectiveunityofsubstancesjustas“the[single]movementofabodyisthecompositemovementofitsparts”(A353),64andthecontinuityofrepresentationsmightbebased ina seriesof substances that pass their states fromonetoanother,justas“[a]nelasticballthatstrikesanotheroneinastraightlinecommunicatestothelatteritswholemotion”(A363n.).65

Kantalsohastheresourcesneededforaneffect-relativeview.Sucha view requires some theory of how mental representations couldbeunifiedinto larger thoughtsorrepresentations,andKant focusesmuchofhisenergy in theCritiqueondeveloping justsucha theory.Infact,thisisoneofthecentralissuesintheDeduction.Onlyafewparagraphsbeforeintroducingthenotionoftranscendentalappercep-tion,Kantstatesthataconceptisa“singleconsciousness”that“unifiesthemanifoldthathasbeensuccessivelyintuited,andthenalsorepro-duced,intoonerepresentation”(A103),andhelaterexplainshowdif-ferentperceptionsareunifiedintoasingleexperience:

Thereisonlyoneexperience,inwhichallperceptionsarerepresentedasinthoroughgoingandlawlikeconnection

…Thethoroughgoingandsyntheticunityofperceptionsispreciselywhatconstitutestheformofexperience,anditisnothingotherthanthesyntheticunityofappearancesinaccordancewithconcepts.(A110)

Thediscussionofhowrepresentationsareunified isevenclearer intheBversionoftheDeduction,whoseopeningsectionisentitled“On

theconceptofthinking…butdoesnotsignifythatthethinkingIisasimplesubstance”(B407–08).

64. I see no good grounds for Ameriks’ claim that in the A edition Kant “pre-ferrednottochallengetheassertionofthesimplicity…ofthesoulassuch”(Ameriks2000,51),thoughAmeriksisrightthatKant’sattitudetowardssim-plicityislessclearinhislecturesonmetaphysics.

65. Thoughhestopsshortoffleshingouttherelevantmetaphysics(perhapsduetohisworriesaboutKant’sidealism),RobertHowellcorrectlynotesthattheelasticballanalogyshows that the identityof the selfmustbe “formal”or

“functional”(Howell2001,121,141).

Beforeturningtothetextualbasisforattributingaversionoftheeffect-relativeviewtoKant,IshouldmakeitclearthatthestepsI’vedescribedherearenotinferences.Someonecouldconsistentlyacceptthestartingpointof saying that ‘I’ refers towhateverproduced thattokenmentalrepresentationandrejecttherestofthepictureI’vede-scribed.But Ido think theyarenaturalsteps,and that theresultingpicture isveryattractive,especially ifwe(likeKant)arecertain thatwe’resomethingoutsideofourrepresentationsbutaren’tcertainwhatthatsomethingis.

4.2 Textual basis for attributing an effect-relative view to KantAcarefullookatthetextshowsthatKantinfacthasboththespecificconcernsandthespecificresourcesthatwouldnaturallyleadhimtoaneffect-relativeaccountoftheself,andthattherearepassageswhereKantcanplausiblybereadasarticulatingaversionofsuchanaccount.Together,thesefactsconstituteastrongcaseforattributingsomever-sionoftheeffect-relativeviewtohim.

Let’sstartwiththeconcerns.Theconcernsthatmotivatetheeffect-relativeviewfocusonthepossibilitythat,despitethesimplicityoftherepresentation ‘I’, what underlies thought cannot be assumed to bemetaphysicallysimple(e. g.,aCartesianintellectualsubstance).Now,Kantundoubtedlyholdsthat“messiness”ontheleveloftheproducerofthoughtcan’tberuledoutapriori.ThepointoftheSecondParalo-gismisthatwecannotassumethatasimplesubstanceunderlieseachthought,andthepointoftheThirdisthatwecannotassumethatanidenticalsubstanceispresentthroughoutchangingstatesofthinking(thougheventhere,Kantmakesclaimsthatclearlypositasinglethingofsomesort63).InthelongerAversionoftheParalogismsKantillus-trates thiswithphysicalanalogies.As farasweknowapriori,Kant

immediately aware of the thing that composes or constitutes a self (albeitwithoutknowingitsintrinsicnature),andItakethattobesufficientforim-mediateawarenessofaself.I’mgratefultoananonymousrefereeforpressingmetoclarifythispoint.

63. E. g., “That the Iofapperception,consequently inevery thought, isasingle thing that cannot be resolved into a plurality of subjects … lies already in



functionsofsynthesis,namelyof thesynthesis inaccor-dancewithconceptsasthatinwhichaloneapperceptioncandemonstrate a priori its thoroughgoing and necessary iden-tity.(A112)

[O]nly because I can comprehend [the representationsgiveninintuition’s]manifoldinaconsciousnessdoIcallthemalltogethermyrepresentations,forotherwise I would have as multicolored, diverse a self as I have representations.(B134)

Solongaswe’renotantecedentlycommittedtotheanti-metaphysicalinterpretation,eachofthesepassagescanbereadasmakingthesame,relativelystraightforwardpoint: inorder for there tobeasingleselfbehindsomesetofrepresentations,theymustbeunified(byanactofsynthesis)intoasinglerepresentation.Inotherwords,Kantistellingusabout thenatureof theself,and isdeclaringthat factsabout theunity of representations are explanatorily antecedent to facts aboutthemetaphysicsoftheself.67NotethatthisviewaboutantecedenceiscompatiblewithclaimsKantmakesintheDeductionwhichsuggestthatapperceptionissomehowthe“ground”fortheunityofrepresen-tations(e. g.,A117n.,B134n.),forthelatterclaimscanbereadassayingthatapperceptionhasanepistemic,psychological,conceptual,ornor-mativepriority,notametaphysicalone.68Forthesesamereasons,the

67. ContrarytoKitcher2006,199,thereisnoincompatibilitybetweentheideathattheselfconstructsknowledgeandtheideathatitconstructsitself.Rather,it is by constructing knowledge that self constructs itself. And contrary toKitcher1990,122,seeingtheselfaswhat’sresponsibleforsynthesisdoesn’trequireseeingsynthesisasaconscious,intentionalactivity.

68.On a related point: one might worry that the effect-relative view sits un-comfortablywithKant’sclaimthatidentityofsubjectacrossrepresentations

“doesnotyetcomeaboutbymyaccompanyingeachrepresentationwithcon-sciousness,butratherbymyaddingonerepresentationtotheotherandbeingconsciousoftheirsynthesis”(B133).Whilewemightreadthisassayingthatanidenticalsubjectismetaphysicallypriortotheidentityofself-conscious-nessinrepresentations,itcouldalsobetakenassayingthattheremustbeaunifiedactofsynthesispriortotherebeingidentityofconsciousness.Solongas a unified act of synthesis does not presuppose an antecedently unified

thepossibilityof combination in general” (B129),whereKant statesthat“amongallrepresentationscombinationistheonlyonethatisnotgiventhroughobjectsbutcanbeexecutedonlybythesubjectitself”(B130).Later, in(perhapssuperficial)contrasttotheAedition,Kantclaims that judgments are the means by which representations areunified:“ajudgmentisnothingotherthanthewaytobringgivencog-nitionstotheobjectiveunityofapperception”(B141).

Whatwefindinbotheditions,then,isKantgivingatheoryofhowrepresentationsareunified,whichisexactlythesortoftheoryneededfor an effect-relative approach to the self. I’ll call the version of theeffect-relativeviewthatusesKant’stheoryofhowrepresentationsareunifiedthe“Kantianeffect-relativeview”:

The Kantian Effect-Relative View.Foranyparticularunifiedexperience, whatever thing or things are immediatelycausally66 responsible for the unity of that experiencecomposeaself.

The‘immediately’heremakesroomfortheSpinozisticpossibilitythattheselfisanaccidentoraccidentsofsomesubstancewithoutbeingthatsubstance,eventhoughthecausalactivityoftheaccidentmaybeultimatelyattributabletothesubstance.

We’re now in a position to see that several passages can plausi-blybereadasstatementsoftheKantianeffect-relativeview.Herearethree,withaddeditalicstomaketherelevanceclear:

[T[heoriginalandnecessaryconsciousnessofthe identity of oneselfisatthesametimeaconsciousnessofanequallynecessaryunityofthesynthesisofallappearancesinac-cordancewithconcepts.(A108)

[T]he entire sensibility… must stand under universal

66.Ifwestaytruetothetext,thiswillbenoumenal,atemporalcausation.Atem-poral causationhas struckmanyas incoherent,but the ideaof it ishardlyunique to Kant—cf. Augustine’s view of God’s relation to the temporaluniverse.



insight intotheirnatureapart fromtheircontributiontothatexperi-ence.Thismeansthattheviewsatisfiesdesiderata(1)and(2).Never-theless,theeffect-relativeviewdoestaketheselftobecomposedofsomeentityorentitiesthatareoutsideofitsrepresentations,andsoitsatisfies(3).Last,theviewassertsthattherelevantentityorentitiescomposeaselfinvirtueoftheirunifyingrepresentationsintoanexpe-rience.Soitalsosatisfiesdesideratum(4).70

5. Philosophical virtues of the Kantian effect-relative view

TheKantianeffect-relativeviewisarelativeofLocke’sviewofperson-alidentity.71Locke’sviewhas,byandlarge,hadapositivereception.MuchoftheappealoftheLockeanviewstemsfromitsmetaphysicalmodesty:itrequiresnoassumptionthattheselfisfundamentallydif-ferentfrommaterialbeings,andcanallowforpersonalidentitytoget

“messy”inimaginedcasesofpeoplefusingandfissioning.TheKantianeffect-relative view should have a similar appeal, though much willhangonhowacceptabletheKantianunderstandingofthestructureofrepresentationsis—thatis,onwhetherwecanfindanunderstandingof‘synthesis,’ ‘intuition,’etc.,thatfitsintotheontologyofcontempo-raryviews.72

Buttheeffect-relativeviewalsohasvirtuesthatthe(original)Lock-eanviewlacks.Itimposesastricterrequirementontwoentities’beingpartof thesameself—amerememory link isn’tenough,butrather

70.Thereisafurthercomplicationthattheviewshouldperhapsbeextendedtoaddress.Kantholdsthat, forallweknow, innerandoutersensemayhavethesameground(cf.A379–80,B409).Thisinturnopensupthepossibilitythatdifferentselvesmighthavethesameground(cf.Melnick2009,38).Tomaintainthedistinctionbetweenthedifferentselves,then,wemayneedaprincipleofeffect-relativedivision,accordingtowhichonethingcanconsti-tuteseveralthingsonthebasisofproducingseveraleffects(inthiscase,expe-riences).Elsewhere,Ihopetoexplorethisfurtherprinciple,anditsrelevancetoKant’sbroaderphilosophy.

71. BookII,chapter27ofLocke’sEssay.

72. AnumberofinterpretersofKanthaveworkedtodopreciselythis.Kitcher’sworkisoneexample.SeealsoMeerbote1990.Allison1996aresistsjustsuchattempts,butisbasedinananti-metaphysicalreadingofKant.Kanthimselfclearlyholdsthatatleastourfacultyofreasoncannotbenaturalisticallyex-plained(cf.Groundwork4:452,Critique of Judgment5:254).

Kantianeffect-relativeviewisalsocompatiblewithKant’sclaimsthatwecannotthinkofourselvesinthesamewaywethinkofobjects(e. g.,A346/B404,B422).Becauseofthis,theviewisconsistentwith,andhasthepotentialtoclarify,arangeofinterpretationsoftheAnalytic.

Intheabovepassages,Kantspecifieswhichoftheentitiesthatcon-tributetoathoughtcountasconstituentsoftheself.Itisthoseentitiesthatcontributetosynthesis, thecombiningofrepresentations.Otherentities give rise to sensations (uncombined, “raw” representations),andthoseentitiesdon’tcountasconstituentsoftheself.Inthehylo-morphictermsKantsometimesuses,itisthoseentitiesthatgeneratetheformofanexperiencethatcomposeaself.Inmorecontemporaryterms,wemightsaythattheselfiscomposedofwhateverentitiesareresponsibleforprocessingdataintoanexperience,notthosethatgen-eratethedata.69

This interpretation satisfies all the desiderata listed at the begin-ningofthissection.Onceagain,wewantaviewthat(1)allowssomesense inwhich, forallweknow, theselfmightbeoneormoresub-stancesoraccidents,(2)keepsaclearsenseinwhichwelackcognitionoftheselfinitself,(3)allowstheselftobeoutsideofrepresentations,and(4)maintainsanintimateconnectionbetweentheself,mentalac-tivity,andacertainunifiedsetofrepresentationsthatconstitutesanexperience.

Ontheeffect-relativeview,wedonotknowwhatis immediatelycausally responsible for unifying representations into a single expe-rience. It couldbeseveral substancesoraccidents,andwehaveno

subject,thiswouldbequiteconsistentwiththeeffect-relativeview.I’mgrate-fultoananonymousrefereeforpointingoutthatB133mightofferthebasisforanobjection.

69.Theeffect-relativeviewactuallyprovidesawayoffleshingoutmanyofthemerelysuggestiveclaimsaboutKant’stheoryoftheselfthatarefoundintheliterature.Apartfromhisviewoftheselfasanact,thiscanbesaidofHorst-mann’sproposalthattheselfbeunderstoodonanalogywithacenterofgrav-ity(inotherwords,afunctional-roleaccountoftheself)inHorstmann2007,andofRichardAquila’sproposalthat“thepurely‘formalI’isa‘determining’formorstructurewhoseoriginalembodiment in,ordetermining of,theIofinnersenseiswhatconstitutesthelatterasa‘soul,’andthusasathinkingbeingoran‘I’”(Aquila1997,34).



else,becauseKant’stheoryofrepresentationspositsadeepcontrastbetweenusandnon-rationalcreatures.75Butsomevariantofhisviewmaybeaseriouscontender,foritallowsustohaveaprioricertaintythatweexistandsomeaprioriknowledgeofournaturewhilebeingagnosticconcerningourfundamentalconstituents.

Conclusion

TheaccountI’vedescribedraisesanumberofinterpretiveandphilo-sophicalquestions,including:WhatexactlyisinvolvedinthecrucialunifiedexperienceonwhichtheKantianeffect-relativeviewisbased?HowdoestheviewallowforKant’srealismaboutandassumedinsightintomental faculties?Howfarback in thecausalchaincanthecon-stituentsoftheselfbe,andhowdoesitmakethecut-off(sothatone’sparentsarenotpartofone’sself)?Howdoesthisviewofthereferenceof‘I’tieinwithourconceptionofourselvesasembodiedentitiesin-habitingthephysicalworld?Andespecially:WhatmethodologydidKantthinkentitledhimtothisviewoftheself?

Theseareimportantquestions.Somespeaktoissuesthatarespe-cifictomyinterpretation,whileothersstemfromgeneralinterpretiveorphilosophicalissues.I’mconfidentthatsomehaverelativelyclearanswers,butI’munsureabouttheothers.76Nevertheless,theKantianeffect-relativeviewallowsustoclearlyaddressissuesinKant’sworkthathavebeenobscuredbythedominanceoftheanti-metaphysicalinterpretation.77

75. Cf.Metaphysik Mrongovius29:906,Metaphysik Vigilantius 29:1027,andAnthro-pology7:127.

76.Onthequestionofmethodology:thereareatleastthreeprimafacieplausibleaccountsofhowKantwouldhavearrivedatthisview:itcouldberesultofconceptualanalysis,itcouldbeagiven“factofreason”(cf.Critique of Practical Reason 5:31),orifhavingaselfisanecessaryconditionforexperience,itcouldevenbetheresultofatranscendentalargument.

77. Formuchhelpfulfeedback,IamgratefultoBéatriceLonguenesse,DonGar-rett, David Velleman, Karl Schafer, John Richardson, Jeff Sebo, John Morri-son,JonathanSimon,JohannesHaag,MikeRaven,DinaEdmundts;thepar-ticipantsofNewYorkUniversity’s2007–2008ThesisPreparationSeminar;Rolf-PeterHorstmannandthemembersofhis2009colloquiumatHumboldtUniversität;andtworefereesforPhilosophers’ Imprint.

asortof“experientialcontinuity.”Ithasn’tbeenpartofthispapertodelveintoKant’sviewsonwhatmakesforaunifiedexperience,butitclearlywouldinvolvemuchmorepsychologicalcontinuitythansinglememorylinks.Thisisavirtueoftheview—havingasinglememorypassedfromonebeingtoanotherseemsliketoolittleforthemtobepartsofthesameself.73

The Kantian effect-relative view also ties certain types of mentalactivitytothesurvivaloftheself,specifically,thoseactivitiesinvolvedinmaintainingaunifiedexperience.Thisprovidesastrikingegoisticjustificationofourgeneralconcernwithhavingacoherentpictureoftheworld.OntheviewI’vedescribed,weexpresssomethingclosetothe literal truthwhenconfusionandscatter-mindedness leadsus tosaythatwe’re“fallingapart.”

Last,theKantianeffect-relativeview,takenassomethingapriori,offersanexplanationofhowtherepresentation‘I’isusedwithouttheworryofreferencefailure,whilestillseeming,asKantsays,“empty”.‘I’involvesnodeterminateconceptionoftheself,andsocouldbewield-edinscenariossuchasAnscombe’ssensorydeprivationtank.74Itgivesanexplanationofhow,insuchascenario,wemightknowthatwe’rethesamepersonwhosteppedintothetankeventhoughwe’velostallsenseofourbodies.Foraslongasweareawareofaunifiedcourseofexperiencethatstretchesfromtheearliertimetothepresenttime,wehaveagrasponwhatweneedtoindividuateourself.

Of course, much more detail needs to be provided in order fortheviewtobeacontemporarycontenderforhowweunderstandtheself.IsuspectthatsomeofthedetailsofKant’sactualviewwon’tbeplausibletomanycontemporaryphilosophersintheend—ifnothing

73. Cf.Parfit1984,206.KitchernotesasimilarvirtuefortheviewsheattributestoKant(Kitcher1990,124–25).Thereis,ofcourse,alargeliteratureonLocke’sviewandpersonalidentitythatI’mnottouchingon.

74. Anscombe1975.Howell2001discusseshowparticularreferencestotheselfmight work, but doesn’t address issues of keeping track of oneself acrosstimes.Notethatitisbecausetheeffect-relativeviewissupposedtobea priori that it canhelpexplainself-referenceand theself-ascriptionof representa-tions.Thisisincontrastto,say,Kitcher’sHumeanviewoftheself,whichispresentedasaninferencetothebestexplanation(Kitcher1990,125).



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