kant, derrida, and the relation between ethics and politics

7/29/2019 Kant, Derrida, And the Relation Between Ethics and Politics

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At the Intersection: Kant, Derrida, and the Relation between Ethics and PoliticsAuthor(s): Marguerite La CazeSource: Political Theory, Vol. 35, No. 6 (Dec., 2007), pp. 781-805Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20452600 .

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,sn5 ber 6De'awber, 2007 781-805?00 agPublitinAt the Intersection 1.1/0..7. 73

hotedtKant, Derrida, and the Relation http://onIinsaepub.combetween Ethics and PoliticsMarguerite La CazeUniversityfQueensland, ustralia

To elucidatethetensions n therelation etweenethics ndpolitics, constructa dialogue betweenKant, who argues that hey an be made compatible, ndDerrida,who claims togo beyondKant andhis idea of duty. orDerrida, ethicsmakes unconditionaldemands and politicsguides our responses to possibleeffectsof our decisions. Derrida argues that in politics theremust be anegotiation f the non-negotiable all of ethical responsibility. argue thatDerrida's unconditional ethics cannot be read in precisely Kantian termsbecause his 'impossiblereals' can be destructive. oreover,Derrida expandsthereachof ethicsbeyondKant bymaking all ethicaldemandsunconditionalorperfect, ethe does not articulate politics that ould enableus to respondto thesedemands.We need to take account of thesedifficultiesn theorizinghow ethics hould onstrain olitics nd how politicscan providethe onditionsfor thics.Keywords:Kant; errida; thics; olitics;utiesPolitics says, 'Be ye wise as serpents';morals adds (as a limiting ondition)'andguileless as doves.'1It is necessary todeduce a politics and a law from thics.2

Recent interpretations f Jacques Derrida's work note a close connectionwith themes found in Immanuel Kant's writing.3Nevertheless, most of

these discussions have not focused on the specific question of the relationbetween ethics and politics, which is central toDerrida's thought. In recentyears Derrida refersextensively toKant's ethics and political philosophy,for example in The Politics of Friendship and On Cosmopolitanism andAuthor's Note: I would like to thank theAustralian Research Council for supporting myresearch; audiences at theSociety forEuropean Philosophy conference, Reading University; theUniversity ofNew South Wales philosophy seminar; Damian Cox; two anonymous reviewers;and the editor of Political Theory forconstructive comments on earlier versions of this essay.

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782 Political Theory

Forgiveness and in essays on justice and law, democracy, and terrorism.4 nthe one hand, Derrida is influenced byKant's approach to ethics and politics, and on the other hand, he wants togo furtherthanKant, saying, 'So Iam ultra-Kantian. I am Kantian, but I am more thanKantian.'s Derrida'shyperbolic ethics goes beyond political considerations and yet he acceptsthatwe must act according to political concerns. InAdieu to EmmanuelLevinas, Derrida's position is that 'it isnecessary todeduce a politics and alaw from ethics.'6 Like Kant, Derrida concerns himself with questions ofethics and politics within the state,between states, and between individualsand states. Understanding the relationship between Kant and Derridathrough an engagement with these questions enables a more productiveconception of the intersection between ethics and politics that takes seriously the tensions involved.

Kant argues that ethics, or rathermorality forhim, and politics do notcome into conflict because ethics places limitsonwhat can be done inpolitics.7Derrida argues similarly thatethics must always take precedence orthatpoliticsmust be derived from ethics. However, forKant ethics ormorality is based on what ispossible, and forDerrida ethics is necessarily guidedby the impossible. For Derrida, ethics is comprised of unconditionaldemands, and politics of the strategieswe must develop to respond topossible consequences and effects of our decisions. On Kant's account, right(those duties that can be enforced) along with virtue (duties that cannot beenforced) comprise morals or ethics. While Kant believes thatonly thosemoral constraints that an be imposed should be part of politics,Derrida seesthe ethical virtues as being essential topolitics as well. I argue that erridagoes beyond Kant, as he claims, butwithout explicitly acknowledging thedifficulties that arise fromexpanding the influence of ethics on politics inthisway. Moreover, Derrida simultaneously gives up on the acceptance ofany principles thatcannot be overridden, as I will demonstrate by examininghis position on human rights. In this sense, he gives up a very importantfeatureofKant's position. I construct a dialogue between Kant and Derridain order todemonstratewhat is at stake in the disagreements between themand to explore thepotential conflicts between ethics and politics thatmustbe considered in any attempt toproduce an ethical politics.

The Intersection of Ethics and PoliticsTo understand how ethics and politics might intersect, the first uestion

thatneeds tobe considered is whether ethics and politics inevitably come


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La Caze /Kant, Derrida, and Ethics and Politics 783

into conflict. I will briefly sketchKant and Derrida's overall views on theirrelation and then consider inmore detail the differences between them. In'Toward Perpetual Peace' Kant argues thatmorals, in termsof right, should

be takenmuch more seriously inpolitical decisions; in fact, itshould be theoverriding consideration. As he writes, '[A]ll politics must bend its kneebefore right.'8 It should be noted that it is only the enforceable aspect ofethics that is relevant topolitics forKant.

The first step inKant's demonstration that there is no conflict betweenpolitics and ethics is the view thatwe are always free to act ethically. Hecontends thatmorals could not have any authority ifwe could not act onthem.9 ant's further rgument is that there is

no conflict f politics,as doctrineof right ut intopractice,withmorals, astheoretical octrine f right henceno conflict fpracticewith theory); or fthere ere, one would have tounderstand y the latter generaldoctrineofprudence, that s,a theory fmaxims for hoosing themost suitablemeanstoone's purposes aimed atadvantage,that s,todeny that here s a [doctrineoflmorals at all.'0

Given thatKant sees politics as the application ofmorality (that aspect ofmorality described in thedoctrine of right), it follows that any conflict intheapplication would undermine the idealism ofmorality andmake it egoistic or self-interested." Thus, complaints of conflict between politics andethics are simply complaints of inconvenience. This iswhat Kant means byhis claim that a moral politician, who makes political prudence conform tomorals, is possible, but a political moralist, who makes morals conform tothepolitical interests f a statesperson, isnot.'2Any attempt tomake moralsconform to political interests,he argues, undermines the concept of rightaltogether and replaces itwith force, so that it isno longermorals at all. Hesays there is only a conflict between morality and politics subjectively inpeople's self-interested inclinations,'3 and he observes that the real dangerto acting morally is self-deception that convinces us we are justified in following our own interests rather thanduty.Kant is of the view that followingour own interests is an unreliable business as it is difficult to calculate

whether our actions will have the right results, but in acting according tomorals we have a dependable guide.

While Derrida also believes thatpolitics should be deduced fromethics,he is not as sanguine as Kant concerning the possibilities of conflictbetween them.This is due to the strongcontrast-indeed, contradictionhe findsbetween unconditional ethical concepts and their onditional pairs.Derrida's account of unconditionality emerges from thedeconstruction of


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784 Political heoryparticular ethical concepts in a series of texts.He does not provide an ethical system or give an explicit or detailed answer to thequestion 'Why bemoral?' because he is not addressing themoral skeptic. In addition to justice,which for him is undeconstructible, he deconstructs concepts such ashospitality and forgiveness into theirpure and impure or unconditional andconditional forms.For example, pure hospitality involves a complete openness andwelcome of theother independent of any 'invitation,'whereas conditional hospitality depends on awide range of criteria concerning identity,length of stay,and so on."4 In relation to asylum seekers, one of the issuesDerrida is concerned with, these criteria are often determined by the stateand its laws. Conditions on hospitality may be necessary, but theyare nottruehospitality. Thus Derrida finds a kind of ethical imperative in the logicof theconcepts themselves. Insofar aswe aspire topure hospitality and trueforgiveness, they provide an ethical demand by highlighting the ethicalinadequacy of conditional hospitality and forgiveness.

Derrida develops his position concerning the relation between ethics andpoliticsmost explicitly in 'Ethics and Politics Today,'15 although he returnstothis question in a number of otherworks, includingAdieu toEmmanuelLevinas. What he focuses on is theresponsibilitytounderstand theseconcepts:

[R]esponsibility f course requiresthat nyanswer be preceded in rincipleby a slow,patient,rigorous lucidation of theconcepts that re used indiscussion. . . . or each of thewords ethics andpolitics,but also for ll of thewords that ne immediately ssociates with them.16Nevertheless, in spite of this need for seemingly endless elucidation,Derrida says that ll ethical and political decisions are structured y urgency,

precisely because we have to takedecisions without any certaintyabout therightnessofwhat we do. He writes that nethics and politics, thisstructure furgency 'is simultaneously thecondition of possibility and thecondition ofimpossibilityof all responsibility."7ForDerrida, ethics and politics also havein common that theyare answering thequestion 'What should I do?' andthatwe should give thoughtful and responsible answers to thequestion.Nevertheless, ethics and politics appear, at least, to be very different. erridacharacterizes theseperceived differencesbetween ethics and politics.Because ethical responsibility ppeals to an unconditional that s ruledbypure and universalprinciples already formalized,this thical responsibility,this thical responsecan and should be immediate, nshort, ather imple, itshould make straightfor thegoal all at once, straightto itsend,withoutgetting aught up inan analysisofhypothetical mperatives,ncalculations,


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inevaluations of interests nd powers. . . .Whereas, on thecontrary, tillaccording to thesame appearance,political responsibility,ecause it takesinto ccounta largenumber f relations, f relations fpower,ofactual laws,ofpossible causes and effects, fhypotheticalmperatives, equires timeforanalysis, requiresa gamble, that s, a calculation that snever sureand thatrequiresstrategy.18This richdescription of thefundamental difference between ethics and politics reflectsKant's distinction between thedependability of ethics and theunreliability ofmere hypothetical imperatives. Ethics is seen as occupyinga higher and more impractical realmwhose unconditional principlesmeanthat one can respond immediately, whereas politics is seen as concernedwith day-to-day practical strategies thatneed tobe carefully planned out.However, Derrida immediately notes that these characteristics are onlyapparent, and thatpolitics can be understood as more urgent than ethics.Heargues that theremust be a negotiation of the non-negotiable, so in thatsense thepolitical is always inscribed in the ethical.'9 For example, whenhostages are taken,a refusal tonegotiate is an acceptance of the risk to thehostages on thebasis that itwill save others in the future.Similarly, a decision to negotiate with the hostage takers is a decision to tryto save thehostages in thehope that itwill not be detrimental toothers' lives. 'Inbothcases' Derrida writes, 'thepolitical imperative and the ethical imperativeare indissociable.'20 This example is quite convincing as both alternativescan be understood inethical terms.Those who refuse tonegotiate believe itismore ethical to risk these hostages' lives than to allow a practice ofhostage taking togo on. Similarly, negotiatingwith hostage takersdoes notshow thatone has abandoned ethics, unless one takes theextreme view thatsimply communicating with such people is unethical. Thus political decisions inevitably involve ethical considerations onDerrida's account. and incases like this theyare difficult tomake because theoutcome is uncertainand the risks great.

Derrida famously claims in 'Force ofLaw' that '[j]ustice in itself, fsucha thing xists, outside or beyond law, isnot deconstructible.'2'He sees justiceas primarily an ethical concept and it is contrasted with law, or right,whichis a concept that is deconstructible. InAdieu toEmmanuel Levinas, Derridadiscusses theTorah in Jerusalem as an exemplification of the problem ofethics and politics. According tohim, theproblem is fundamentallyone ofnegotiation between thedemands of ethics and the realities of politics. TheTorah is read by Levinas in 'Cities ofRefuge' as justice: 'The Torah is justice, a complete justice . . .because, in itsexpressions and contents, it is acall forabsolute vigilance.'22Derrida says thattheTorah inJerusalem


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786 Political heorymust still inscribe the promises in the earthly Jerusalem.And henceforthcommand the omparisonof incomparables the definition f justice,of theconcession made, out of duty, to synchrony,o-presence, the system, ndfinally, he tate.) Itmust enjoin a negotiationwith thenon-negotiable so astofind the better" r the eastbad.23

The complete justice of ethicsmust be inscribed in concrete politics and law.In general Derrida distinguishes between the formal injunction to

deduce politics fromethics,which is absolute and unconditional, and thequestion of content thatwe have a responsibility todetermine for ourselvesin each particular case. In this sense we can see thatDerrida agrees with

Kant thatethical considerations always have a role inpolitics, but they donot constrain politics inquite the same way. Rather thanproviding a limittowhat is possible, they set up an impossible injunction thatpolitics canonly aspire to, rather thanfollow.To understand thisdifference between thetwo on the intersectionof ethics and politics more thoroughly,we need tosee the ways in which Kant takes seriously potential conflicts betweenethics and politics.

Tensions between Ethics and PoliticsKant's understanding of politics as bending its knee before ethicsmay

suggest thathe has no conception of therealityof politics. Yet in some wayshis view shows more awareness of the complexities of politics thanDerrida's. Kant notes that following ethical imperatives should be combined with political wisdom or an understanding of how best to instituteorwork towardperpetual peace.24 This iswhat itmeans tobe as wise as a serpent. Furthermore,Kant sees itas important toexplain why there is a perceived conflict between ethics and politics and tomake some caveats andexceptions tohis general view.

First, adherence topolitical maxims must derive from the concept of theduty of right.Within states, these rightsare to freedom, equality, and independence, which are the principles upon which states should be established.25For morals in the form of right to be applied in politics, Kantmaintains that rightsmust be able to be made public. His transcendentalformula of public right is 'All actions relating to the rightsof others arewrong if theirmaxim is incompatible with publicity.'26The key idea is thatactions that affect the rightsof others are unacceptable if theyneed to bekept secret. However, the reverse is not held to be true-actions that areconsistent with publicity are not necessarily right, s Kant observes, because


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a very powerful state can be quite open about itsmaxims.27 The power ofsuch a statemeans itdoes not have to be concerned about opposition orresistance to itsmaxims. Kant argues for thisprinciple of public rightasfollows:For a maxim that cannotdivulgewithout thereby efeatingmy own purpose, one that bsolutelymust be keptsecret if it is to succeed and thatcannotpubliclyacknowledgewithoutunavoidably arousing veryone'soppositiontomy project,can derive thisnecessaryand universal,hence a prioriforeseeable,resistance f everyonetome only from he njusticewithwhichitthreatensveryone.28

This principle is both ethical (part of thedoctrine of virtue) and juridical(related to right), and Kant attempts to show how it is relevant to civil,international, and cosmopolitan right. First, civil right concerns rightwithin a state. Kant upholds the rightof human beings to respect by thestate, saying, 'The rightof human beings must be held sacred, howevergreat a sacrifice this may cost the ruling power.'29 Nevertheless, withregard to the rights of people against the state,Kant argues thatrebellionis shown tobe wrong by the fact thatpublicly revealing amaxim of rebellion would make it impossible, whereas a head of state can publiclydeclare theirwillingness topunish rebels.30 Iwill saymore about thispointfurther n. Kant's view is that systems of law are justified by their foundation. Once theyare founded, however, theyshould not be overthrown. Incontrast, Derrida believes that a system of law can only be justified bywhat comes after its institution.3"Second, international right is the rightof nations. This right,Kant says, must be an enduring free associationbetween states.32Cosmopolitan right is the right tohospitality or the rightto visit all thecountries in theworld.

On Kant's account, politics can be made commensurable with moralityonlywithin a federative union of states thatmaintains peace:Thus theharmony fpoliticswithmorals ispossible onlywithin a federativeunion (which is therefore iven a priori and is necessaryby principlesofright), nd all politicalprudence has for tsrightful asis the stablishment fsuch a union in itsgreatestpossible extent,withoutwhich end all its subtilizing sunwisdomand veiled injustice.33

This point suggests, reasonably, that so long as states are at war or are notwilling topursue peace, political practice andmorality are likely toconflict.


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788 Political heoryAlthough Kant believes that politics can be made commensurable withmorality, he concedes thatpractical circumstances or conditions can makeit difficult to bring this ideal into effect and that itmay be brought aboutgradually. For instance, states may have towait to introduce reformsuntilit can be done peacefully.34 In her book Kant's Politics, Elisabeth Ellis discusses the role thatprovisional right,or right that acknowledges thedifficult circumstances under which we are likely to be applying morals, playsinKant's account of politics.35 She notes thatKant recommends that evenin themidst ofwar, forexample, we should act 'in accordance with principles thatalways leave open thepossibility of . . . entering a rightful ondition.'36 In thisway, Kant provides guidance to thosemaking decisions inless than ideal conditions.

While Kant is confident about ethics and politics 'agreeing,' there aresome complicated exceptions he mentions in the essay 'On the commonsaying: thatmay be correct in theorybut it is of no use in practice.'37Heobserves that sometimes unconditional or perfect and conditional or imperfect duties might conflict. This sense of imperfection refers to the latitudeallowed in fulfillingtheduty rather than a state of imperfection in societiesthat are not yet governed ideally,which provisional right is concerned with.Kant defines a perfect duty as 'one that admits no exception in favor ofinclination' (1996a, 4:422), whereas an imperfect duty is one that is virtuous and worthy to fulfillbut it is not culpable not to do so unless that ismade into a principle (1996a, 6: 390). I should note here that this distinction between perfect and imperfectduties divides the virtues. Duties of thevirtue of respect to others are perfect,whereas duties of love are not, or, inotherwords, we have discretion as towhen we should follow them.38 uchduties may conflict

if t s amatterof preventing omecatastropheto the tateby betraying manwho might stand in therelationshipto anotherof father nd son.This prevention f trouble o theformer sanunconditionalduty, hereas preventingmisfortune to the atter sonly a conditionalduty (namely, nsofar s he hasnotmade himself guiltyof a crime against the state).One of the relativesmight report heother'splans to the authorities ith theutmostreluctance,but he iscompelled bynecessity (namely,moral necessity).39In this case, theduty toprevent catastrophe to the state clearly trumps theduty to prevent misfortune to a relative provided the relative is actingtreacherously.However, Kant does not discuss a case where preventinggreatmisfortune to the statewould conflictwith a duty toprevent a violation


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of therights of the relative or indeed any other person.Although it is a difficult practical problem thathe does not examine in depth, he is quite clearthat such rights should never be violated and he does touch on the issuebriefly.

In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant says that 'there is a categoricalimperative, Obey the authoritywho has power over you (inwhatever doesnot conflict with innermorality).'40Morals can conflict with political practice if a leader demands we do something unethical, and when theydo we

must obey morals. However, here and elsewhere, as I noted, Kant condemns revolutions, a condemnation thatseems counter tohis own theory. tis rarely observed thatKant had an ingenious caveat tohis view on revolutions. In his notes concerning the 'Doctrine ofRight,' he comments,

Force,which does notpresuppose a judgmenthaving thevalidity f law[,] isagainst the law; consequently thepeople cannot rebel except in the caseswhich cannotat all come forward na civilunion,e.g., the nforcement f areligion, ompulsion tounnatural rimes, ssassination,etc.41The implication appears to be that if such actswere generally forced upona people, theycould not properly be in a civil union. Therefore, tyrannicaland totalitarian regimes may well not count as civil unions forKant. Thenrevolution could be ethical in the sense that such a revolution would be creating a civil union. Thus such examples of conflict between duties to thestate and other duties that could be brought against Kant would beaccounted forby this caveat. However, revolution for such reasons as poorgovernment or inequitywould still be excluded as theycould occur in acivil union.

Cases where the state tried toprevent philanthropy provide other examples of conflict between politics andmorality, this timerelevant to the doctrineof virtue. Kant also believes thatpolitics and virtue should agree, butnotes thatphilanthropy is an imperfectduty,or inotherwords thathow it isfulfilled is to a great extent amatter of discretion. In any case, his view isthatpolitics easily agrees with this sense of morality 'in order to surrenderthe rightsof human beings to their superiors.'42What he has inmind hereis that 'politics,' or rather those in power, like topretend thatperfect dutiesof rightare imperfect duties that theybestow only as benevolence and soare very ready to claim they are moral in that sense. This distinctionbetween perfect and imperfect duties, a distinction rejected by Derrida, isimportantto conceiving an ethical politics, I argue.


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790 Political heoryDerrida's account of the relation between ethics and politics treats these

complications in a differentway fromKant, as one might expect, becausehe relies on the idea of negotiation to overcome these complications. Oneof the criticisms of Derrida's deconstructive ethics is that itdoes not give usany guidance as to how tomake decisions. For example, Simon Critchleywrites, 'Iwould claim, with Laclau, thatan adequate account of the decision is essential to thepossibility of politics, and that it is precisely this thatdeconstruction does not provide.'43Derrida's view thatwe must negotiatebetween ethics and politics leaves us with thequestion of how far towardeach we should tend in our negotiations. Ethics with its unconditionaldemands is impossible to satisfy forDerrida, and politics must be limitedby ethics. They seem to act as constraints on each other such that the decision, and the action, will always lie somewhere between the two.There isan in-between position ormany in-between positions that evinas gesturestoward in 'PoliticsAfter!':

So there ould be no alternative etween recoursetounscrupulousmethodswhose model is furnishedyRealpolitik and the rritatinghetoric f a careless idealism,lost inutopiandreamsbutcrumbling ntodust on contactwithreality r turningnto a dangerous, impudent nd facile frenzy hich professes tobe taking p thepropheticdiscourse.44Levinas's presentation of a case against ethics inpolitics often put explicitlyor implicitly highlights its absurdity and the need to sketch out alternative in-between positions. This iswhat Derrida attempts to do.Derrida claims that there are no rules to determine what would be thebetter or least bad alternatives. Another way thatDerrida expresses theproblem is by writing 'The hiatus, the silence of this non-response concerning the schemas between the ethical and thepolitical, remains. It is afact that it remains, and this fact is not some empirical contingency, it is aFaktum.'4s It is not clear how to deduce politics fromethics. However, healso says thatpolitics and lawmust be deduced from ethics, in order todetermine that 'democracy is "better" than tyranny' nd "'political civilization" remains "better" than barbarism.'46Derrida's promotion of democracyand respect for international law (as well as reflection on its foundations)parallels Kant's concern with republicanism and establishing a cosmopolitanworld order.47He accepts with Kant and Hannah Arendt that a worldgovernment is not desirable, and yet believes we need togo beyond theirviews to thinkof a 'democracy to come' (la democratie a' venir) thatwillunite law and justice.48The reason Derrida is so positive about theconcept


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La Caze / ant, Derrida, and Ethics and Politics 791

of democracy is that it 'is the only one thatwelcomes the possibility ofbeing contested, of contesting itself,of criticizing and indefinitely improving itself.'49 his democracy to come is not intended toreferto a future stateof democracy but to a call for 'a militant and interminable political critique.'50This democracy is envisioned byDerrida to challenge the authorityand sovereigntyof the state and, on an international scale, to emerge innew institutionssuch as the InternationalCriminal Court. Further on in theessay, Iwill show how Derrida's ideas about democracy stand out fromhisoverall account of negotiating between ethics and politics.In thenext section, I examine thedifferences between Kant's regulativeideals and the categorical imperative and Derrida's idea of unconditionalethical demands thatmotivate his conception of an ethical politics. This discussion will clarify theirvery distinctive accounts of unconditionality.

Unconditional Ethics, Regulative Ideals, and theCategoricalImperativeThe central features of Derrida's ethics, namely, the linking of ethics

with politics, the settingup of unconditional ideals, and his concern withcosmopolitanism, make him sound very Kantian. This interpretationhasbeen both encouraged and resisted by Derrida. For instance, inLimited,Inc.,Derrida says thathe uses the term 'unconditionality' 'notby accidentto recall the character of thecategorical imperative in itsKantian form,'and'it is independent of every determinate context, even of the determinationof a context in general.'51 However, Derrida does not characterize theinjunction thatrecommends deconstruction inKantian terms 'because suchcharacterizations seemed tome essentially associated with philosophemesthat themselves call fordeconstructive questions' and he has reservationsabout thinking f theunconditional as a regulative idea or ideal.52 t is important toclarify this idea because itsheds lightonKant's and Derrida's understanding of ethical action.

One problem with Derrida's disclaimer here is thata regulative ideal inKant's sense does not appear to relate tounconditionality.As Derrida notes,this term sused too loosely inphilosophical discourse.53Kant discusses thenotion of regulative ideas in theCritique ofPure Reason.54 These regulativeideas are that f the existence of thehuman soul, an independentworld, andGod. These ideas cannot be proven; nevertheless we should posit them astheyplay an importantrole in our thinkingby directing our studies of psychology and physics in the case of our ideas of the soul and theworld. The


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idea of God provides the sense that everything in theworld is part of anorganized unity-'as if ll such connection had its source inone single allembracing being, as the supreme and all-sufficient cause.'55 In contrast,Derrida's unconditional concepts are not ideas thatwe posit as useful fortheorizing but concepts we take seriously as action guiding, although wecannot fulfill theirdemands.

In a detailed discussion of justice and duties in Philosophy in a Time ofTerror, Derrida outlines three reservations about aligning what he calls hisimpossible reals with Kant's possible ideals. First, Derrida says, his impossible is 'what ismost undeniably real' in its urgency and its demands.56 Thiscan be seen as incontrast toa possible ideal thatwe work toward, likeKant'scosmopolitan ideal. Unlike Kant's dictum thatought implies can, Derrida'sdictum is that 'ought implies cannot.' This is an important differencebetween the two.On Derrida's account, one can take imperatives tobe realeven ifone does not thinktheycan be reached or satisfied. Iwould note thatideals can also be real in the sense of being urgent and making demands. Atone point,Kant says thatvirtue 'is an ideal and unattainable,while yet constantapproximation to it is a duty.'57 he fundamental difference is that antbelieves thatwe can fulfill ur duty in thisapproximation, but Derrida holdsthat such approximation is in no sense a fulfillment f duty.Like Kant, Derrida sees autonomy as 'the foundation of any pure ethics,of the sovereignty of the subject, of the ideal of emancipation and of freedom,' but unlike Kant he believes that this autonomy will always beimposed on by heteronomy or the imperative of theother,of politics, of theconditional, and theremust be a transaction between these two imperatives.58 he unconditional imperativedemands thatwe go beyond duty.Theunconditional imperative of justice contrasts with law, as unconditionalhospitality and forgiveness contrastwith their conditional pairs.59 In everycase the unconditional tempers the conditional and must be taken intoaccount when making decisions. Derrida presents his understanding as ananalysis of the 'logic' of these concepts, which, when deconstructed, splitinto these doubles. The result is thatKant's imperfect duties, which allowsome latitude in how we fulfill them,become perfect duties on Derrida'saccount. They are perfect in the sense thatwe cannot put limits on what itis to fulfill them, although we will inevitably fall short of theirdemands.

Second, Derrida says thathis notion of responsibility is one of goingbeyond any rule that determines my actions. Here, Derrida seems to beshiftingfromKant's metaphysics, where the regulative ideas or postulatesofworld, God, and the soul play a role, tohis ethics,where the categorical


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imperative and maxims play the central role.60He says that 'as a quasisynonym for "unconditional," the Kantian expression of "categoricalimperative" is not unproblematic; we will keep itwith some reservations. 61The concernwith needing to go beyond a rule thatdetermines actions isonethat requires some discussion, and Iwill return to this issue after brieflyconsideringerrida'sthird eservation.

Derrida's third reservation returns toKant's metaphysics, saying that ifwe were to take up the term 'regulative idea' we would 'have to subscribeto the entire Kantian architectonic and critique.'62This point is rather anexaggeration, yet I believe he is right to reject the notion that he understands unconditional demands as regulative ideas. As I have pointed out,the concepts function very differently.Finally, I can also see why Derridarejects a Kantian reading of his unconditional ethics in the case of hospitality, ecause whereas Kant's categorical imperative is somethingwe canaim to act on even ifwe cannot be confident of achieving it,Derrida'sunconditional hospitality is not only impossible but also positivelydestructive since ifwe are completely open to any kind of visitation wegive up our sovereignty and therefore our capacity to offer hospitality.While itcan be held up as an 'impossible real' to improve our politics andethics,we do not want to come too close to it.Nevertheless, forgivenessand justice seem not to be destructive in the same way as hospitality.Andjustice, as Derrida says in 'Force of Law,' is not deconstructible. Thus theanswer to thequestion of whether Derrida's unconditional ethical conceptsare like those of Kant's ethical imperatives can only be answered by looking at particular examples. A furtherdifference is thatKant accepts thathospitality is conditional and that forgiveness is an imperfect duty. SoDerrida is going beyond Kant inmaking conditional and imperfectdutiesinto unconditional and perfect ones, albeit duties thathave to be negotiatedwith their conditional equivalents.

What Derrida does not say is how we can or should negotiate betweenethics and politics, between unconditionality and conditionality.A consideration of the issue of rule following,mentioned above, provides some indications. He hints thatthere is a connection with Kant's ethicswhen he notesthat ifwe simply apply a rulewhen acting, 'Iwould act, as Kant would say,inconformitywith duty,but not throughdutyor out of respect for the law.'63Thus, the problem of negotiation appears tobecome a question of how tomake a decision or reach a judgment. Derrida's claim is that

[w]ithout ilence,without thehiatus,which isnot the bsence of rulesbut thenecessityof a leap at themoment of ethical, political,or juridical decision,


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794 Political heorywe could simply nfoldknowledgeinto program r course of action.Nothingcould make usmore irresponsible; othing ould bemore totalitarian.64

Derrida sees Kant as both irresponsible and totalitarian inprescribing rulesfor action as ifwe were nothingmore thancalculating machines.Furthermore, Derrida criticizes Kant for conflating right and virtue orassuming that politics can be deduced from ethics. One commentator,Olivia Custer, finds this reading of Kant as emerging most clearly in

Derrida's discussion of hospitality, where Derrida criticizes Kant forimposing restrictionson hospitality, thereby turning n ethical concept intoa juridical one.65However, I interpret errida's insistence on hospitality asan ethical concept as one that is not fullyadequate to the realities faced bythose seeking asylum, a concrete case towhich he believes his account ofhospitality is relevant.As I argue in another essay, Derrida's emphasis onhospitality as an ethical concept makes practical measures for asylum seekers and refugees dependent on goodwill, rather thanputting a set of structures,based on right, nplace.66This makes his conception of unconditionalethical duties, once negotiated with political realities, atmost ameliorativeof theworst excesses of inhospitable or otherwise unethical governments.As I noted earlier, forKant virtue is thatpart ofmorality or ethics thatcannot be enforced ormade part of politics. Thus, the accusation thatKantthinks one can deduce politics fromethics, understood as politics deducedfromvirtue, is inaccurate. Kant did not thinkthatvirtue and rightwere necessarily co-implicated but instead had a hope thatpeople would live according to thevirtues of love and respect once rightrestrained politics. In fact,Derrida himself brings virtue intopolitics by emphasizing the importanceof ethical concepts such as unconditional hospitality and forgiveness topolitics.Yet he avoids suggestingwhat hospitality would amount to or inwhatcircumstances we should forgive.67Kant's further istinction between perfect and imperfectduties demonstrates theproblems with Derrida's reading.While perfect duties appear toprovide a rule for action, imperfectduties allow leeway concerning whatacting out of dutymeans. When I attempt to act from theduty of beneficence, for example, I need to consider the time, the context, those whowould benefit, and theappropriateness ofmy action.68Thus Derrida's criticism of Kant's notion of duty could only apply to the perfect duties ofrespect. The duties of love do not follow determinate rules. There can alsobe conflicts between our imperfectconditional duties thatwe would haveto resolve forourselves in the absence of rules. It isDerrida's transformation of imperfectduties intoperfect ones thatmakes duties of love seem as


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if they could involve rule following. This is one of the paradoxical aspectsof Derrida's thinking.While he makes imperfect duties into perfect ones,their status as such is undermined by his view that they are impossible.They appear to be reminders of our inadequacy as ethical actors.

Particular judgments, for Derrida, are always made in relation to anunconditional injunction.While in judging, one must reinterpret nd reaffirm xisting rules; the udge is not just ifhe or she

doesn't refer oany law, toany rule or if, ecause he doesn't takeany ruleforgrantedbeyond his own interpretation,e suspendshis decision, stopsshort efore theundecidable or ifhe improvises nd leaves aside all rules,all principles.69Such a process of judgment involves the recognition of the specificity ofparticular cases, something likeKant's notion of a reflective judgment thatbegins with theparticular, but it does not require the creation of new principles. Derrida acknowledges that new judgments can conform to existinglaws but theymust reaffirm hem.How I understand his point is as theneedto consider each situation afresh even when applying a law or principle.This point is reasonable, butmore difficult to accept isDerrida's idea ofnegotiation and the impossibility of unconditional demands. Iwould suggest thatmost ethical choices are not impossible, although political lifetends to provide more of such dramatic choices than private life. For Kant,we are able to formulatemoral laws forourselves and act on them.He saysthat it takes only 'common human reason' towork out our duty and that 'Ido not . . .need any penetrating acuteness to see what I have todo inorderthatmy volition bemorally good.'70Kant notes, however, thatwe can neverbe completely sure that our motives are pure.71 In the next section I willshow how Kant's account fares better in relation to human rights, as anexample of truenon-negotiability, and how Derrida goes beyond Kant, ashe claims, in introducingvirtue topolitics.

ReconstructingumanRightsI am critical of both Kant and Derrida and find insights inboth their

work. On the issue of human rights, ant's overall framework ismore productive thanDerrida's even thoughhe identifies inconsistencies inKant'saccount. Kant's argument provides an important step toward an ethicalpolitics, in spite of his unappealing condemnation of revolutions and lack


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796 Political heoryof consideration of conflicts between human rights and duties to the state.Such a politics is one where at the very least certain human rights arerespected. It should be noted that Derrida refers to the Declaration ofHuman Rights as a means of challenging the sovereignty of states.72However, even these rights,which we need, must be subject to negotiationor transactionwith the conditional andmust be questioned. He writes,

To take this istoricityndperfectibilityofhuman rights] nto ccount in anaffirmative ay we must neverprohibit themost radical questioningpossibleof all the oncepts atwork here: thehumanity fman (the "properofman"orof thehuman,which raises thewhole questionofnonhumanliving eings,as well as the uestion of thehistory f recent uridical conceptsor performatives such as a "crimeagainsthumanity"), nd then thevery conceptsofrights r of law (droit), nd even the onceptofhistory.73

In one sense, what Derrida is saying is thatwe need to reflectmore on allthe concepts related tohuman rights,and in that sense, there is no problemwith thatkind of questioning.

However, it iswhen this idea is combined with Derrida's view thatwehave to negotiate with the unconditional that his position becomes moredifficult. If such things as human rights are always potentially negotiable,then they cannot be relied on as principles to guide ethical or politicaldecisions. Questions of the death penalty, denaturalization, treatmentofrefugees, and conduct of war, forexample, are not subject toany limitationsas such.Any unconditional demands are always weighed up against conditional exigencies. So, for instance, even torturemight be justifiable if it canbe negotiated or exchanged for some other value or in the lightof conditional considerations. This is the implication of Derrida's claim that theTorah 'must enjoin a negotiation with the non-negotiable,' quoted earlier.74It is also the implication of unconditional demands, such as hospitality, thatare themselves destructive. Derrida's comments on democracy are quiteuseful for thinking about political systems, as he says thatdemocracy ispreferable to other systems because it opens onto a future and is perfectible.75These criteriamay enable us todetermine preferable courses ofaction in some circumstances and could be seen as parallel toKant's suggestion that in difficult circumstances such as war we should act in such away as to 'always leave open thepossibility of . . . ntering a rightful ondition.'76What Imean by this is that in relation to thepolitical organizationof states (at least) Derrida concedes thatdemocracy really is preferable toother formsof government, and we can take the freedom and equality on


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which it is based as guiding principles. However, I do not believe that thisexception resolves theproblems inDerrida's views on human rights.

I am not suggesting that ant's understanding of human rights ispreferable toDerrida's in every respect. Certainly Kant's account of the details oftheprinciples of right leaves much tobe desired, particularly thatof independence as a citizen, as he excludes women and non-property ownersfrom the role of active citizens.77Nevertheless, one could extend this principle in an inclusiveway. Another problem I see inKant's account of rightis his acceptance of capital punishment for thecrimes of high treason andmurder.78This acceptance appears to be in conflict with the categoricalimperative to treat veryone as ends in themselves and with thewhole tenorof theKantian view thatwe should treat otherswith respect.However, asNelson Potter argues, inboth these cases Kant can be revised in a mannerthatmakes his view more consistent, particularly since Kant himself wasofferinga critique of thecontemporary cruel punishments often carried outas well as arguing fora limitationon the crimes capital punishment shouldbe applied to.79 hese are reconstructions thatwould be necessary forgenuine compatibility between ethics and politics, inmy view.Derrida does not address thisquestion of how importantKant takes thedeath penalty to be, although he emphasizes Kant's connection of the ustalionis (law of retribution) to thebasis of criminal justice.80 Iwould arguethatone could retain this conception of punishment but still maintain anabolitionist stance, although itwould be preferable tohave a differentviewof punishment as well.8" Kant's ideas of rightsneed to be reconstructed ina number of ways, some ofwhich they already have been in practice (atleast widely), to include women as active citizens, and some of which theyhave not, to exclude capital punishment, for example. An ethical politicsshould make an explicit commitment to certain rights and work out howtheycan be established and upheld.While Derrida isdoubtless against capital punishment, for example, he does not set out the principles on whichthatopposition isbased, but says thatboth thedeath penalty and abolitionist discourse are deconstructible.82 This analysis suggests that the deathpenalty is negotiable, and thatraises an issue about how his view could bemade compatible with a commitment tohuman rights.

ConclusionThis engagement between the two philosophers is interesting in itself,yet my aim inpursuing thisencounter between Kant and Derrida is also to


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798 Political heoryilluminate the difficulties that arise in conceiving an ethical politics.

Derrida's demanding view of ethics highlights some of the gaps inKant'svision. Derrida is right toclaim thathe goes beyond Kant. I contend that inraising the importance of virtue as well as right topolitics, his view is animportant advance on Kant's. Derrida's focus on unconditional ethicsbrings the imperfect duties ofKant to the forefront f politics. This insistence on the importance of unconditional ethical demands topolitics forcesus to thinkmore carefully about the role of these demands and about theresponsibility of both ethics and politics to each other. Derrida's workreminds us how significant ethical virtues involved in hospitality, friendship, and forgiveness, for example, are to public life. Nevertheless,although his account demonstrates the significance of ethics topolitics, itdoes not clarifyhow importantethics should be or suggestwhat conditionswould facilitate the negotiation between ethics and politics. Preciselybecause Derrida goes furtherthanKant by bringing up the importance ofthevirtues, he should have more to say about what would make them flourish. However, Derrida does not account for the conditions thatwill supportan ethical politics and make ethical livingmore likely,perhaps because hebelieves thatany specific suggestions would be 'totalitarian.' The idea of a'democracy to come' involves some important suggestions for internationalinstitutions but does not articulate changes thatwould be needed to assistgroups and individuals tomeet those demands. His emphasis on unconditional ethical concepts such as forgiveness and hospitality places theonuson the individual to tryto live up tounconditional demands. Yet a distinction should be made between unconditional demands thatare necessarilydestructive if fulfilled, such as hospitality, and thosewhich are not necessarily destructive in the same sense, such as forgiveness.

While Derrida goes beyond Kant in emphasizing the importance ofvirtue or imperfect duties, he does not advance beyond Kant by suggestingwhat kind of political structureswould enable the flourishing of thesevirtues. His transformation ofKant's imperfectduties into perfect dutiesalso makes thedevelopment of such enabling structures even more unlikely.Thinking of the virtues as perfect duties sets us on a path toconstruing ethical politics as a utopian dream and could justify the careless idealismLevinas warns against or quietism in the face of impossibility.Derrida'semphasis on the impossibility of following unconditional ethical demandsis likely to lead to theundermining of theauthorityof ethics thatKant wasconcerned about.While Kant was probably a little too confident about theease with which we act ethically (although without being sure thatwe aredoing so), ethical demands need to be within the realms of possibility for


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us to be able to cultivate ethical responses and to construct political structuresthat support the ethical life.Kant expresses a vision where one focuseson enforcing what needs to be enforced while leaving the other aspects ofethics to look after themselves,whereas I argue thatwe should also consider how to at least encourage virtue. These are the problems I believeneed to be addressed in conceptualizing an ethical politics.

What emerges is that themost credible conception of the relationbetween ethics and politics isone that onsiders both thenorms of rightthatKant outlines and thevirtues, inDerrida's sense, such as forgiveness, generosity, and hospitality.What Imean is that the limits to action set up byKant should be acknowledged (and in some instances extended) and thatpolitical organization should take account of theneed forpractical benevolence and ethical responses. Understanding the intersection of ethics andpolitics in thisway requires a sense of what it is to act with respect andbenevolence forothers, so that all decisions have these ethical standards astouchstones to judgment. In order for errida's suggestion of an expansionof theethical realm tomake sense, political lifewould involve creating thebest conditions for ethical relations to ourselves and to others, in additionto the constraintsKant believes ethics should place on politics.While weshould acknowledge the special circumstances of politics, politics shouldbe ethical inmore thanone sense.

There are risks here in thepossibility of interference inprivate or ethical relations to the self,which Arendt and Foucault, for example, fear.83However, I disagree with Kant thatwe should simply hope thatvirtue follows in thewake of rightor, to think f it anotherway, that love will followrespect because every aspect of our lives is affected by political decisions.Such decisions could play a role inensuring at an institutional and individual level thatwe are able ormore likely tocarryout imperfectduties to ourselves, such as the duty to perfect ourselves, and the imperfectduties ofbenevolence to others. To give priority to ethics asDerrida conceives it,thevirtues of respect and of love would have to be encouraged and form thebasis of politics. These ethical considerations are relevant to the threespheres thatKant discusses-relations within states, between states, andbetween states and individuals. It is also relevant to relations between individuals. Thus, the complexities of including thevirtues in an ethical politicswould have tobe carefully considered with regard toall these relations.

These features of an ethical politics involve both basic human rightsasadvocated by Kant and the cultivation of virtues as suggested by Derrida.Furthermore, pursuitof thevirtues itself an facilitatea transformation f politics and political conditions, and I take thispoint to be implicit inDerrida's


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800 Political heoryfocus on unconditional ethical demands. Nevertheless, the freedom impliedby thenotion of an imperfectduty,where there is a great deal of discretion astoparticular ethical decisions, should be retained.Between Kant's possibleideals and Derrida's impossible reals, there is a possibility of ethical andpolitical action that isnot simply ameliorative. Politics must be conceived inaway thatmakes negotiatingwith ethics a more promising affair.

Notes1. Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, trans.Mary J.Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1996), 8:37.2. Jacques Derrida, Adieu toEmmanuel Levinas, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault andMichaelNaas (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1999), 115.3. See, for example, Christopher Norris, What's Wrong with Postmodernism: CriticalTheory and theEnds of Philosophy (Baltimore: JohnHopkins University Press, 1990), 194207, for a discussion of Derrida's relation toKant's epistemological project; Irene Harvey,Derrida and The Economy of Diff?rance (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), whois concerned with the influence ofKant's notion of critique and conception of the limits of reason; and Philip Rothfield, ed., Kant afterDerrida (Manchester, UK: Clinamen, 2003), whichis a collection of essays on a range ofKantian themes.4. Jacques Derrida, The Politics of Friendship, trans. George Collins (London: Verso,1997); and Jacques Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, trans.Mark Dooley andMichael Hughes (London: Routledge, 2001).5. Jacques Derrida, Questioning God, ed. John Caputo, Mark Dooley, and Michael J.Scanlon (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 66.6. Derrida, Adieu toEmmanuel Levinas, 115. Levinas's influence on Derrida's ethics hasbeen explored more thoroughly thanKant's. This work includes Simon Critchley, The Ethicsof Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press,1999); Simon Critchley, Ethics, Politics, and Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas, and

Contemporary French Thought (London: Verso, 1999); Diane Perpich, "A Singular Justice:Ethics and Politics between Levinas and Derrida," Philosophy Today 42, supp. (1998): 59-70;and Miriam Bankovsky, "Derrida Brings Levinas to Kant: The Welcome, Ethics, andCosmopolitical Law," Philosophy Today 49, no. 2 (2005): 156-71, who also considers therelation of both to Kant. Derrida discusses Levinas in Jacques Derrida, Writing andDifference, trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 2001); and inDerrida, Adieu toEmanuelLevinas. On Kant and Derrida on hospitality, see Marguerite La Caze, "Not JustVisitors:Cosmopolitanism, Hospitality, and Refugees," Philosophy Today 48, no. 3 (2004): 313-24.Beards worth analyses the relation between Kant and Derrida on law and violence inRichardBeardsworth, Derrida and the Political (London: Routledge 1996), 46-70.7.1 prefer the term ethics tomorality as it seems less focused on individual mores to thecontemporary ear.8. Immanuel Kant, "Toward Perpetual Peace," inKant, Practical Philosophy, 8:380.

9. This position follows from his view that ought to implies can in Immanuel Kant,Critique ofPractical Reason, inKant, Practical Philosophy. Kant says thatour awareness ofthemoral law when we construct maxims of the will leads us to the concept of freedom.Furthermore, our experience confirms this concept of freedom when we remember thatwe


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can act against our strongest desires and even our love of life in order to act ethically (ibid.,5:30). By contrast, in the Groundwork (in Kant, Practical Philosophy), Kant argues thatbecause we are autonomous we are bound by themoral law: 'If, therefore, freedom of thewillis presupposed, morality together with itsprinciple follows from itby mere analysis of itsconcept' (ibid., 4:447). Elsewhere, in a review of Schulz's '[ajttempt at an introduction to adoctrine ofmorals,' he asserts thatwithout thispossibility of freedom, any imperative is absurdand the only position we can adopt is fatalism (ibid., 8:13).10. Kant, Practical Philosophy, 8:370. Kant defines right as 'the sum of the conditionsunder which the choice of one can be united with the choice of another in accordance with auniversal law of freedom' (ibid., 6:230). He furtherdistinguishes between natural or privateright,which includes rights to property, rights to contracts, and domestic right, and public orcivil right, which concerns therights of a state, the rights of nations, and cosmopolitan right.The doctrine of virtue includes duties to ourselves and the duties to others of love and respect.11. The doctrine of right concerns the a priori basis of ethical laws. One might disagreewith Kant's view thatpolitics is the doctrine of rightput intopractice and argue, for example,that ethics and politics are two separate spheres, as Arendt does in Hannah Arendt,Responsibility and Judgment, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Schocken, 2003), 147-58.12.Kant, Practical Philosophy, 8:372.13.According toKant, the aims ofmoral evil are self-contradictory and self-destructive,whereas those of moral goodness are consistent and conducive tohappiness, so evil gives wayto themoral principle of goodness (Kant, Practical Philosophy, 8:379). See Kant's discussionof radical evil in Immanuel Kant, "Religion within theLimits of Reason Alone," inReligionand Rational Theology, trans, and ed. Allen W Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1996).14. Richard Kearney and Mark Dooley, Questioning Ethics: Contemporary Debates inPhilosophy (London: Routledge, 1999), 70.15. Jacques Derrida, Negotiations: Interventions and Interviews, 1971-2001, trans.ElizabethRottenberg (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2002), 295-314. The essay was firstgiven as a talk in 1987.16. Ibid., 295.17. Ibid., 298.18. Ibid., 301.19. Levinas also believes thatwe have to negotiate between ethics and politics. RobertBernasconi says thatLevinas is not concerned to resolve conflicts between ethics and politics,yet 'the task of negotiating in practice the conflicting demands under which I find myself,involves the use of reason, that is, the thirdperson perspective'; Robert Bernasconi, "TheThird Party: Levinas on the Intersection of the Ethical and thePolitical," Journal of theBritishSociety for Phenomenology 30, no. 1 (1999): 81. In his view, while Levinas 'favors' ethics overpolitics, they are not in opposition for him.20. Jacques Derrida, "Ethics and Politics Today," in Jacques Derrida, Negotiations(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2002), 305. Both these approaches have been usedin response to the taking of foreign hostages in Iraq. In thatcircumstance, I think itwould behard to justify a refusal to negotiate as there is not enough order for one to argue that suchnegotiation would 'create a precedent.'

21. Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation ofAuthority,'" trans.MaryQuaintance, in Deconstruction and thePossibility of Justice, ed. Drucilla Cornell, MichelRosenfeld, and David Gray Carlson (London: Routledge, 1992), 14.


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22. Emmanuel Levinas, Beyond theVerse: Talmudic Readings and Lectures, trans.Gary D.Mole (London: Athlone, 1994), 46. For another reading of Levinas's essay, in relation to theidea of political utopianism, see Oona Eisenstadt, "The Problem of the Promise: Derrida onLevinas on the Cities of Refuge," Cross Currents 52, no. 4 (2003): 474-82.23. Derrida, Adieu toEmmanuel Levinas, 112. Levinas's idea of justice appears tobe verydifferent from Derrida's. For Derrida, justice is the ultimate ethical ideal, the undeconstructible, thatgoes beyond particular laws (Derrida, "Force of Law," 14). For Levinas, justiceis the political necessity ofweighing different competing claims, contrasted with the infiniteresponsibility for the particular other that is the ethical relation. InDerrida's outlook, justicetakes this concern with singularity.24. Kant, Practical Philosophy, 8:377.25. In 'On the common saying: That may be correct in theory,but it is of no use inpractice,' Kant defines the principles of a civil state as (1) thefreedom of every member of thesociety as a human being, (2) his equality with every other as a subject, and (3) the independence of every member of a commonwealth as a citizen (ibid., 8:290); and likewise inImmanuel Kant, The Metaphysics ofMorals (in ibid., 6:314), and in Immanuel Kant,Perpetual Peace, Kant says that theprinciples of a Republican state are freedom, equality, andthe dependence 'of all upon a single common legislation (as subjects)' (in ibid., 8:350). Acomparison of Kant's republicanism with Derrida's idea of democracy is one I do not have thespace to pursue here.26. Ibid., 8:381. The second transcendental principle of public right is as follows: 'All

maxims which need publicity (in order not to fail in their end) harmonize with right and politics combined' (ibid., 8:386). Kant's argument for this principle is that ifmaxims can only besuccessful through publicity, theymust correspond to the universal public end, which is happiness, and for him this iswhat politics must do.27. Ibid., 8:385.28. Ibid., 8:381.29. Ibid., 8:380.30. There has been a great deal of interest inKant's condemnation of rebellion here, particularly since he is a well-known supporter of the French Revolution; ibid., 6:320-23. See, forexample, Kimberly Hutchings, Kant, Critique, and Politics (London: Routledge, 1996), 46;and Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. Ronald Beiner (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1982), 44-51.31. Derrida, "Force of Law," 35.

32. Kant's examples of ethical constraints on politics between states include the nonacquisition of existing states, the abolition of standing armies, no national debts with regardto external affairs, non-interference with the governments of other states, and not using duplicitousmeans inwar; definitive articles recommend republicanism for all states, a federalism offree states, and the cosmopolitan right of hospitality. Kant examines three cases of apparentconflict between politics and morals in international right and presents their resolution: whereone nation promises to aid another nation but decides to release itself from the promisebecause of the effects thatkeeping thepromise would have on itsown well-being, where lessernations could notmake public the idea that they intend to attack a greater power preemptively,and where a large nation could not make it known that itwould absorb smaller nations if itthought thatnecessary to itspreservation (Kant, Practical Philosophy, 8:383-84). Third, Kantsays that cosmopolitan right's maxims work by analogy to those of international right.Cosmopolitan right is interesting since thepower imbalance between individuals and states isenormous.


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La Caze / ant, Derrida, and Ethics and Politics 803

33. Ibid., 8:385.34. Another example Kant gives is thatit cannot be demanded of a state that itgive up its constitution even though this is adespotic one (which is, for all that, the stronger kind in relation to external enemies),so long as it runs the risk of being at once devoured by other states; hence, as for thatresolution, itmust also be permitted to postpone putting it into effect until a morefavorable time. (Ibid., 8:373)

Thus, it is reasonable towait until the state is secure from invasion before rectifying injusticeif that injustice is protecting the state.35. Elisabeth Ellis, Kant's Politics: Provisional Theory for an Uncertain World (New

Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2005), 112-54.36. Kant, Practical Philosophy, 6:347.37. Ibid.38. Another way Kant puts this point is that although respect 'is a mere duty of virtue, itis regarded as narrow in comparison with a duty of love, and it is the latter that is considereda wide duty'; ibid., 6:450.39. Ibid., 8:301.40. Ibid., 6:371.41. Immanuel Kant, "Doctrine ofRight," in TheMetaphysics ofMorals, ed.Mary Gregor

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), XIX, 594-95, quoted inRobert J.Dostal,"JudgingHuman Action: Arendt's Appropriation ofKant," Review ofMetaphysics 37 (1984): 732.42. Kant, Practical Philosophy, 8:386.43. Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction, 200. In a later essay, Critchley presentsDerrida's account of the decision more sympathetically by describing it as non-foundationalbut non-arbitrary and necessarily contextual; Simon Critchley, "Remarks on Derrida andHabermas," Constellations 1, no. 4 (2000): 461-62.44. Levinas, Beyond theVerse, 194.45. Ibid., 116.46. Derrida, Adieu toEmmanuel Levinas, 114-15. Another way thatDerrida expresses thisproblem isbywriting, as shown above in the text, 'The hiatus, the silence of thisnon-responseconcerning the sch?mas between the ethical and the political, remains. It is a fact that itremains, and this fact is not some empirical contingency, it is a Faktum1 (ibid., 116).47. Quoted inGiovanna Borradori, Philosophy ina Time ofTerror: Dialogues with J?rgenHabermas and Jacques Derrida (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 114-15.48. Ibid., 120.49. Ibid., 121.

50. Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, trans.Pascale-Anne Brault andMichael Naas(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005), 86. Critchley has a very good, albeit brief,discussion of what Derrida means by democracy to come in "Remarks on Derrida and

Habermas," 463-64.51. Jacques Derrida, Limited, Inc., ed. Gerald Graff (Evanston, 111.:Northwestern

University Press 1988), 152.52. Ibid., 153.53. Derrida, Rogues, 83.54. Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans.Norman Kemp Smith (London:

Macmillan, 1986), A669-704, B697-732.


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804 Political heory55. Ibid.,A686,B714.56. Borradori, Philosophy ina Time of Terror, 134. Derrida also says he hesitates to conflate his idea of justice with a Kantian regulative idea (Derrida, "Force of Law," 25). He

repeats his reservations inDerrida, Rogues (83-85), in a discussion concerning democracy.57. Kant, Practical Philosophy, 6:409.58. Borradori, Philosophy ina Time of Terror, 131-32.59. Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness.60. Kant's description of moral ideas in theCritique ofPractical Reason also seems helpful:[I]f I understand by an idea a perfection towhich nothing adequate can be given inexperience, themoral ideas, are not, on that account, something transcendent, that is,something of which we cannot even determine the concept sufficiently or ofwhich itis uncertain whether there is any object corresponding to itat all, as is the case withthe ideas of speculative reason; instead, the moral ideas, as archetypes of practicalperfection, serve as the indispensable rule ofmoral conduct and also as the standardof comparison. (Kant, Practical Philosophy, 5:127).

Here Kant is referring to moral virtues such as wisdom and holiness. This idea seems quiteclose to Derrida's in the fact that they are impossible?nothing in experience can matchthem?but are not transcendent, and can be used as a standard.61. Jacques Derrida, Of Hospitality: Anne Dufourmentelle Invites Jacques Derrida toRespond, trans.Rachel Bowlby (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000), 81.62. Borradori, Philosophy ina Time of Terror, 135.63. Derrida, "Force of Law," 17.64. Derrida, Adieu toEmmanuel Levinas, 111.65. Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, 21-22; and Olivia Custer, "Kant afterDerrida: Inventing Oneself out of an Impossible Choice," inRothfield, Kant after Derrida,171-204.

66. La Caze, "Not JustVisitors."67. See Marguerite La Caze, "Should Radical Evil Be Forgiven?" inForensic Psychiatry:Influences ofEvil, ed. Tom Mason (Totowa, N.J.: Humana Press, 2006), 273-93, where I arguethatDerrida's view of forgiveness implies that the onus is on the victim to forgive, althoughhe does not argue for itexplicitly.

68. See Kant, Practical Philosophy, 6:452-55.69. Derrida, "Force of Law," 23.70. Kant, Practical Philosophy, 4:403. Kant observed that even experts could lack judgment in his essay on theory and practice:[T]here can be theoreticians who can never in their lives become practical because theyare lacking in judgment, for example, physicians or juristswho did well in their schooling butwho are at a loss when theyhave to give an expert opinion. (Ibid., 8:275)

He thinks that this is due to a lack of the 'natural talent' of judgment. But, as Kant makes clear,thisdifficulty in judgment applies to certain professional fields, not to ethics.71. Ibid., 4:407-8.72. Derrida, Rogues, 88.73. Borradori, Philosophy ina Time ofTerror, 133.74. Derrida, Adieu toEmmanuel Levinas, 112.75. Borradori, Philosophy ina Time of Terror, 113-14.


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76. Kant, Practical Philosophy, 6:347.77. Ibid., 6:314-15. Kant makes a distinction between active citizens, who are independentand can vote, and passive ones, who he argues are dependent on the will of others.78. Ibid., 6:320, 6:333.79. Nelson Potter, "Kant and Capital Punishment Today," Journal ofValue Inquiry 36, nos.2/3 (2002): 267-82.80. Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth Roudinesco, For What Tomorrow . . . Dialogue, trans.Jeff ort (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2004), 148.81.1 do not have the space to argue formy position here, but I think it is important to indicate thepoints where I thinkKant ismisguided. Of course there are other points, such as hisview of the status ofwives and servants (Kant, Practical Philosophy, 6:277, 6:315), which are

deeply problematic; I have only focused on two important issues.82. Derrida and Roudinesco, For What Tomorrow, 148.83. Arendt contends that ethics involves a concern with the selfwhereas politics involvesa concern with theworld; Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment, 153.Michel Foucault believesthat subjects must be free to practice ethical relations with themselves and others; Michel

Foucault, Essential Works ofFoucault 1954-1984, vol. 1, ed. Paul Rabinow (London: Penguin,1997), 281-301.

Marguerite La Caze is an Australian Research Fellow (2003-2007) in philosophy at theUniversity of Queensland working on amajor project on "Wonder and Generosity as Guidesto theEthics and Politics of Respect forDifference." She has research interests and numerouspublicationsnEuropean hilosophynd feministhilosophy.er publicationsnclude heAnalytic Imaginary (Cornell, 2002); Integrity and the Fragile Self, coauthored with DamianCox andMichael Levine (Ashgate, 2003); and recent articles with a focus on thework of Kantand Derrida inPhilosophy Today (2004) and Contemporary Political Theory (2006).

kant, derrida, and the relation between ethics and politics

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