k. nizamis 2013 an unintentional stance

An Unintentional Stance?

A (Phenomenological) Critique of Dennett’s ‘Intentional Stance’ Theory of Mental Content

Khristos Nizamis

(May 2013)

Dennett tells us that what he calls an ‘intentional system’ is, by definition, “anything that [is] amenable to analysis by a certain tactic”, which he calls the ‘intentional stance’:

This is the tactic of interpreting an entity by adopting the presupposition that it is an approximation of the ideal of an optimally designed (i.e. rational) self-regarding agent. (Dennett 1994, p. 239)1

In adopting this stance, “[n]o attempt is made to confirm or disconfirm this presupposition”: the stance is merely concerned with “interpretations of the phenomena – a ‘heuristic overlay’, describing an inescapably idealized ‘real pattern’”.

Like such abstracta as centres of gravity and parallelograms of force, the beliefs and desires posited by the highest stance have no independent and concrete existence, and since this is the case, there would be no deeper facts that could settle the issue if – most improbably – rival intentional interpretations arose that did equally well at rationalizing the history of behaviour of an entity. (Dennett 1994, p. 239)

Evaluating the ‘plausibility’ of this theory poses an interesting philosophical problem in itself. One could argue that the notion of ‘plausibility’ always presupposes some ‘plausibility structure’:2 some ‘paradigm’ within which, e.g., a theory can at once ‘make

1 Another description of the same idea: “The intentional stance is the strategy of prediction and explanation that attributes beliefs, desires, and other ‘intentional’ states to systems - living and nonliving - and predicts future behavior from what it would be rational for an agent to do, given those beliefs and desires. Any system whose performance can be thus predicted and explained is an intentional system, whatever its innards.” (Dennett 1988, p. 495) 2 Although I borrow this term from Berger & Luckmann 1991, I do not intend it solely or even primarily in a sociological sense. I think the sociological concepts of ‘plausibility structures’ and ‘legitimation’ are amenable to a thoroughly philosophical (and even phenomenological) overhaul or translation, and that the philosophical (phenomenological) translation would be the logically fundamental one.

Khristos Nizamis, ‘An unintentional stance?’ 2

© 2013 Khristos Nizamis

sense’ and be sensibly ‘tested’ for ‘legitimacy’, whether logically or empirically or both. What is significant about Dennett’s theory, I shall argue, is that, on the hand, it tells us why it naturally should ‘make sense’ to us (thanks to the intentional stance), while, on the other hand, and in the same stroke, implicitly entailing that the theory can never be either philosophically or scientifically legitimated. This consequence is not one that Dennett intends, or seems to be explicitly aware of. To the contrary, he conceives of his project as a peculiarly scientific philosophical effort.3 I think that Dennett’s theory is a philosophically serious and important theory, and that is why it generates some philosophically serious and important problems. Three of these are especially significant:

(1) The problem of the ‘third-person’ perspective, and its relation to the ‘first-person’ perspective (2) The problem of ‘theoretical tautology’ (3) The ontological problem (or the problem of ontological reduction)

In this present essay, I will constrain myself to a summary outline only of the second problem; although some reference will inevitably also have to be made to the third one. By the problem of ‘theoretical tautology’, I do not mean a matter merely of ‘begging the question’. I take the criticism of ‘circularity’ made both by Harman (1988, p. 515) and by Lycan (1988, p. 519) in this sense of ‘begging the question’. Harman all too briefly reduces Dennett’s thesis to banal circularity; but this reduction is certainly based on an illicit oversimplification of Dennett’s arguments. Lycan also suspects a potential vicious circularity, but is somewhat more sympathetic:

If beliefs are characterized in terms of what subjects ought to be believing, and desires are characterized in terms of what subjects ought to be wanting, what is a belief or a desire in the first place? Dennett’s view is complex, and I am far from insisting that the apparent circularity is real, vicious, and decisive; but I would like to hear exactly why it is not vicious. (Lycan 1988, p. 519)

Dennett (1988, p. 543) replies that there should be no problem for what he calls his ‘rationalist method of belief attribution’, “if used by someone who already has a good idea what beliefs and desires are”; and he asserts that he has provided a sufficient account of “the principles governing attribution ... to break out of the circle”. I think that Dennett can reasonably defend himself on these grounds; but I do not think that this (somewhat

3 Thus, e.g., he writes: “One must start somewhere, however, and my tactical choice is to begin with the objective, materialistic, third-person world of the physical sciences, and see what can be made from that perspective of the traditional (and deeply intuitive) notions of mind. ... In the end, since these are tactical choices, the proof must be in the results...” (Dennett 1988, p. 495; my emphasis)



superficial) notion and criticism of ‘circularity’ constitutes the deeper difficulty for his theory By the problem of ‘theoretical tautology’, then, I mean the problem of the absence of grounding for the theory. We could also call it the ‘bootstrapping problem’: the theory is obliged, ex hypothesi, to hold itself up by its own shoelaces. Another relevant metaphor: it is as though a hand wants to pull itself up with itself (so we could also describe this as ‘the problem of one hand clapping’). In the end, though, it is precisely because Dennett’s theory tells us, in essence, that a hand cannot grab hold of itself in order pull itself up (i.e., it is an (undesired) implication of Dennett’s theory that intentionality cannot verify itself), that his own theory is undermined: a theory cannot prove itself to be true, except tautologically. But a tautological theory is surely not what Dennett is looking for. Another way of posing this problem would be in terms of the possibility of separating, at some fundamental level, the epistemic status of ‘knowledge’ from that of ‘belief’; for a number of reasons – which in the final analysis boil down to the indispensability of intentionality (be it ‘derivative’ or ‘original’) for every kind of cognitive act – it seems implausible that such a separation could be meaningfully effected.4 There are many loci in Dennett’s arguments where this problem breaks the surface, yet causes no evident waves to disturb the flow of his thought. Thus, e.g., he writes of

the unavoidability of the intentional stance with regard to oneself and one’s fellow intelligent beings. This unavoidability is itself interest relative; it is perfectly possible to adopt a physical stance, for instance, with regard to an intelligent being, oneself included, but not to the exclusion of maintaining at the same time an intentional stance with regard to oneself at a minimum... (Dennett 1987, p. 27)

4 One way of expressing the relevance of this problem for Dennett’s theory is that of Baker (1989), in terms of ‘intentional-stance-dependent’ and ‘intentional-stance-independent’ features of physical systems; in other words, “to contrast Dennett’s instrumentalism about the intentional with his realism about the physical” (1989, p. 306). I think Baker is right that Dennett cannot avoid some such distinction “as long as he remains in any sense a realist”; i.e., a realist about anything at all, and especially a realist about physical systems in the physical world. Another way of looking at the problem would be in terms of an analysis of ‘factual knowledge’ (within the classical ‘textbook’ division of knowledge into (1) knowledge that, or factual knowledge; (b) knowledge how, or practical knowledge; (c) knowledge by acquaintance). The classical definition of ‘factual knowledge’ is as ‘justified true belief’. One analytical representation of this definition is as follows (Flew 1983, p. 194). There are three necessary and sufficient conditions of X’s knowledge that p: (i) p must be true; (ii) X must believe that p; (iii) X must be in a position to know that p. For Dennett, p cannot be intrinsically or determinately true (although it might be claimed that it can be ‘evanescently’ true in some functional circumstance; more on this claim later), because all propositions – just as all meanings – are abstracta in the same sense as beliefs. For the same reason, the second condition, believing that p, is just a product of the intentional stance; beliefs are also just abstracta; so, here we have one abstractum being about another abstractum. Finally, we come to the problem of how X can be in a position to know that p (which I take to mean ‘to know that p is in fact true’ or ‘to justify a belief in the truth of p’). It is here that we encounter the problem that is discussed in the main text, following.



Another significant example:

I claim that the intentional stance provides a vantage point for discerning similarly useful patterns. These patterns are objective – they are there to be detected – but from our point of view they are not out there entirely independent of us, since they are patterns composed partly of our own ‘subjective’ reactions to what is out there...” (Dennett 1987, p. 39)

Ultimately, we will be obliged to ask whether – ex hypothesi – Dennett’s materialist realities are not also necessarily abstracta; and if not, why not. Given Dennett’s theory of intentionality, on what basis could any intentional object be admitted as an illatum, rather than an as abstractum (cf. Dennett 1987, p. 53)? 5 The ‘tautology’ problem poses an entirely different kind of question from that of whether or not there could be ‘scientific evidence’ to either verify or falsify the theory. Unless there is some (philosophically) plausible connection established, or at least proposed, between the conceptual logic of a theory, and the domain of ‘empirical evidence’ to which it purports to refer, we have no way of interpreting (translating) the ‘empirical evidence’ as either affirming or denying the theory. In Dennett’s theory, this problem is raised to a higher magnitude by the fact that the possibility of this very principle (i.e., of establishing a legitimate and reliable connection between ‘theory’ and ‘empirical reality’) is (inadvertently) denied. It is denied in two ways:

(1) through the problematisation of ‘meaning’: all intentionality is derivative, and so no meaning is stable or reliable; it’s not only that have we no access to any grounding facts that could guarantee our meanings; rather, there are no such grounding facts at all); (2) through the problematisation of ‘beliefs’: the ontological status of beliefs is put in radical question by Dennett through his detailed articulation of his ‘intermediate’ or ‘stance-dependent’ realism (1988, pp. 496, 497). What this stance amounts to is the attempt to provide an account of the ontology of beliefs (and ultimately, of all (folk psychological) ‘mental content’) that demonstrates why beliefs are neither merely fictional non-entities (like banshees), nor robustly real entities (like viruses) (Dennett 1991, p. 27). Perhaps, for Dennett, beliefs could be better likened to mirages and rainbows: there is some real physical basis for their occurrence, but their occurrence depends upon the presence of a subjective observer. It would be wrong to say of a

5 Dretske (1988, p. 511) touches upon this problem, picking up on the passage I have just cited: Dretske calls it “an opaque reference”, suggesting that it is not quite in accordance with Dennett’s “official view” (to borrow a phrase of Baker 1989) about ‘real patterns’. But Dretske doesn’t cut anywhere near deeply enough. Nevertheless, he poses the basic form of the challenge: why is Dennett a realist about some things (treating them as illata, “posited theoretical entities”), such as electricity; but only a ‘semi-realist’ about others (treating them as abstracta, “calculation-bound entities or logical constructs”, like centres of gravity and the equator), like beliefs and desires? As Dretske nicely puts it, “Dennett doesn’t ... have a uniform stance on stances” (1988, p. 511) Baker (1989, pp. 312-314) sees cognate difficulties with the “status of stances”.



rainbow that there is simply nothing there at all: the rainbow cannot occur unless there are water droplets and sunlight and an observer in the right position. On the other hand, it would also be wrong to say that the rainbow exists independently of the observer, in the way that the water droplets and sunlight do. On this account, we could say that what Dennett wants to do is to show how the rainbow (beliefs) depends upon a particular pattern of physical facts (the ‘real patterns’ he describes, e.g., in Dennett 1991), and a particular position (the intentional stance) of an observer (the subject of experience).6

Note that, if we comb carefully through Dennett’s writings, we can fairly readily find clear and ample evidence of how Dennett is thinking about the relationships between concepts of meaning, belief, and propositions (all of which are necessary for the construction of theories). It is quite clear that they are all infected with the same kind of fundamental indeterminacy and derivativeness that he explicitly ascribes to intentionality.7 And so too, therefore, must all theories be, including Dennett’s own. Therefore, the only way that Dennett’s theory can ‘support’ itself is purely tautologically: ‘if the theory is true, then it is true precisely because it is true’. No other grounding basis for the possible truth of the theory is available; and even if it were available, the theory itself could not avail itself of the evidence, because it asserts that all beliefs and meanings (in a word, intentionality) – and therefore, all theories – are, by their very nature, without ultimate foundation.8 This result in many ways resembles what we might call Hume’s ‘mild and intermediate sort of scepticism’, or his ‘sceptical stance’.9 In other words, there is no deeper

6 This brings us directly to the ontological problem: specifically, to the problem of the status of, and relations holding between, differing ontological regions (or different ontological scales and different ontological kinds or categories). This is a very subtle and very complex problem, and is fundamental to the mind-body problem itself. It is precisely what is in question, here; and precisely why, e.g., Dretske (1988, p. 511) can argue that beliefs are ‘real’, whereas Dennett can argue that, while they are not ‘unreal’, it is saying too much to say that they are robustly and fundamentally ‘real’, and proposes, instead, to explain why they are only ‘mildly and intermediately real’. As he puts it: “a mild and intermediate sort of realism is a positively attractive position” (Dennett 1991, p. 29). 7 Thus, e.g., he states: “Propositions are abstract objects, but they are more like dollars than numbers. There are no real, natural, universal units of either economic value or semantic information.” (Dennett 1988, p. 500) This perhaps more-than-analogical equation of ‘economic value’ and ‘semantic information’ is deeply problematic and questionable. 8 This would include both what Dennett calls “linguistically infected beliefs (opinions)” and “animal beliefs” (1988, p. 500). Dennett says: “The illusions of Realism [about beliefs] are engendered ... by a misplaced concentration on verbalized beliefs, or what I call (in a special technical sense) opinions.” (1988, p. 498) But would this not also necessarily include Dennett’s own verbalized beliefs, which are the elements out of which he puts together his theory? 9 Grayling (1995, p. 527) summarises the relevant idea well: “Hume’s conclusions are far from sceptical. He argues that human nature is so constituted that we cannot help but believe in such fundamental matters as causality, the reliability of inductive reasoning, and the existence both of selves and of an external world.



basis for our commitments other than the fact that we happen to have them, and cannot help having them. Prima facie, this view might seem to accord well with Dennett’s deep commitment to the theories of biological evolution and natural selection: presumably, in the last analysis, the fact that we have the commitments we do have is neither more nor less than the result of natural selection over the long course of the biological evolution of our species. But there is, in fact, a deeper problem here: if our commitments (i.e., beliefs) are ultimately groundless (in a strictly and formally epistemological sense; and this means specifically, semantically groundless), then how can we claim to explain their existence ‘scientifically’, on the basis of the theories of evolution and natural selection (i.e., on the basis of certain rationally ordered constellations of meanings, propositions, and beliefs)? In other words, the deeper problem here has two parts: the problem of the epistemological status of theories; and the problem of the status of our ontological assumptions concerning physical reality. For this reason, while Dennett is right to suggest that science and metaphysics are different pathways, he is quite wrong to assume that they ‘therefore’ can, and do, and indeed must, function independently of one another (or, more to the point for Dennett, that science can, and does, and must do so) (Dennett 1991, pp. 28-29). Moreover, the metaphysical problems that science, as a practice, can conveniently ignore, nevertheless do and must come back to confront it, once its epistemological status is cross-examined. The reason why is that, if we want to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, that the kind of theoretical knowledge that science produces is in some basic sense ‘true’ (as distinct from practical ‘know-how’ knowledge, which may be useful, but for which a fundamental description in terms of ‘truth’ is irrelevant10), then we must be in a position to correlate the sense (meanings) of our theories with the ontological domains to which they refer and which they purport to describe and explain. But how exactly this is to be accomplished is precisely a fundamental problem (and, a fortiori, it is not a scientific problem!).11 And Dennett’s theory, in principle, entails the denial of such a possibility (in fact, it entails the denial even of the meaningfulness of such a possibility).

What he is indeed sceptical about – and this is quite a different matter – is the claim of rationalist philosophy to give proofs of the truth or falsity of these commitments.” 10 Ryle, e.g., rejected the notion that practical knowledge can be reduced to knowledge of truths as an “intellectualist legend” (cf. Ryle 1968, pp. 29-30). Dennett points out that the ‘intellectualist myth’ that Ryle attacked strongly resembles the current cognitivist program, and says that “cognitivists have been right to shrug off much of Ryle’s celebrated attack as misguided” (Dennett 1988, p. 500). But, he goes on to assert that Ryle offered a central criticism that has not been properly appreciated: “Ryle saw that at bottom all cognition (all knowledge, belief, thinking, inference, etc.) had to be grounded in varieties of know-how that are only tacit – present not in virtue of any explicitly represented rules.” (1988, p. 500) It makes sense that Dennett would emphasise this point: it fits with his functionalist perspective. But, if all cognition is to be grounded in varieties of tacit know-how, then this would suggest that the question of ‘truth’ would again be irrelevant at that deeper, functional level of cognitive systems. 11 It should be evident that there is a serious problem with any (radically empiricist or metaphysical realist) claim that the (‘real’) items of our ontology are simply and purely ‘given’, pre-theoretically, and that we have



It is therefore not surprising that Dennett approvingly adopts the expression ‘meaning rationalism’ from Millikan (1984), who, he says, sets out “to topple it from its traditional pedestal”. Dennett describes ‘meaning rationalism’ as “the intuition that lies behind the belief in original intentionality”, and writes:

Something has to give. Either you must abandon meaning rationalism – the idea that you are unlike the fledgling cuckoo [which acts instinctively, but with “no inkling of the meaning of its activity”] not only in having access, but also in having privileged access to your meanings – or you must abandon the naturalism that insists that you are, after all, just a product of natural selection, whose intentionality is thus derivative and hence potentially indeterminate. (Dennett 1987, p. 313)

The expression, ‘potentially indeterminate’, is a sugared pill: for, what Dennett really means (although, strictu sensu, by Dennett’s own theory, neither he nor we can know what he really means) is that intentionality is derivative and hence fundamentally indeterminate, and whatever ‘determinateness’ it can ever lay claim to is only ever a matter of specific evolutionary circumstance: in one environment, Dennett’s (1987, pp. 290ff) two-bitser’s inner physical state ‘means’ a US quarter, but in another, it ‘means’ a Panaman balboa, and there is nothing more fundamental about how or what it means anything at all, other than these functional, contextual relations. I note, and would agree with, Dennett’s assertion that the fact that there is no ‘fact of the matter’ to ground beliefs and meanings in physical systems “is not a surrender to relativism or subjectivism”, but in a very different sense and for very different reasons from his; indeed, in a sense and for reasons quite contrary to his.12 He argues that “when and why there is no fact of the matter is itself a matter of objective fact” (Dennett 1987, pp. 28-29). But I think that there is a fundamental problem in Dennett’s claim (or, I could say, his belief) that, on his view, we should be capable of establishing a (philosophically or scientifically) valid distinction between ‘the absence of ground for matters of fact’ in the case of intentionality, and the alleged ‘objective fact’ of that absence itself. The point is that I do not think it is possible for Dennett to arrive at ‘objective facts’ independently of

some kind of direct – or even indirect – access to things as they are in themselves that is non-theoretical, i.e., pure of any meaning or belief experienced by us. In other words, it is not true that we can verify our theories by comparing them against the items of ontology, as though we had access to the latter ‘as they are in themselves’, independently of our consciousness of them. This is not a denial of realism per se, but it is a rejection of metaphysical realism, and also of ‘scientific realism’ inasmuch as the latter concept presupposes a metaphysical relevance for science; a relevance which, as I have been suggesting in my arguments, cannot sensibly be assigned to science as a practice; but nor can it be assigned to science as theoretical knowledge without presupposing that science itself has already established the epistemological basis of its claims to truth vis-à-vis the empirical realm to which it refers (i.e., vis-à-vis its realist ontology). 12 For me, to say that beliefs and meanings cannot be grounded in physical systems is, to put it succinctly, to say that materialism is false.



intentionality (but I do not deny that it is possible to arrive at ‘objective facts’ by means of intentionality – but this possibility does not sit well with Dennett’s theory). Or, to put it another way, Dennett’s belief that the ‘intentional stance’ can be meaningfully and legitimately distinguished from the ‘design stance’ and the ‘physical stance’ is mistaken. I would argue that all ‘stances’ – including Dennett’s intentional stance, if it existed, and his design and physical stances – must necessarily and without exception be grounded in intentionality.13 There is an ever-evolving machine, with an ever-evolving function, in an ever-evolving context: this seems to be Dennett’s great truth. But how can the machine (in this case, Dennett’s brain) ascertain the truth of its self-description, its self-theorisation? Any such theorisation must be undercut and undermined by its own principle (i.e., that all ‘meaning’ is derivative and indeterminate); or, at best, one might suppose, that it is ‘true’ only in terms of a specific proper function that it fulfils within a particular context at a particular time and place in the course of evolution. But this would be a category mistake: machines and their functions surely cannot be ascribed truth values (we usually suppose that only propositions can). So, it would seem that, at best, we can only say that the theory ‘successfully’ fulfils a current proper function (rather than asserts a current ‘truth’). But what function could a theory fulfil (especially a philosophical theory about what our minds are and how they work), if that function cannot be the assertion of a fundamental truth? And on what basis could we measure its ‘success’? That of our survival? But surely our species has managed to survive thus far, and could no doubt continue to survive, without such a theory? At this point, perhaps we would have no further recourse than to use our imaginations, and to invent a story; preferably, one supposes – given the dispositions that natural selection has presumably left us with – the story that pleases us most.

13 I don’t think this is an argument that would only make sense to a phenomenologist: Baker touches upon this same problem, but without conceiving of it or analysing in quite this way, and therefore without following through its consequences, when she recognises that “the attempt to render physical and intentional explanations compatible leads ... to a kind of metaphysical dilemma” (Baker 1989, p. 312), which plays out as a conflict between Dennett’s instrumentalism and intentionalism. But she does, in her conclusion, note cryptically: “Although not emphasized here, the wildness of the consequences of the theory should not be overlooked.” (Ibid., p. 315)



References Baker, L. R. 1989, ‘Instrumental Intentionality’, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 56, pp. 303-316 Berger, P. L. and Luckmann, T. [1966] 1991, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge, Penguin Books, London Dennet, D. C. 1987, The Intentional Stance, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts Dennett, D. C. 1988, ‘Précis of The Intentional Stance’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 11, pp. 495-511, 535-546 Dennett, D. C. 1994, ‘Dennett, Daniel C.’, in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, UK and Cambridge, Massachusetts Dennett, D. C. 2001, ‘The Fantasy of First-Person Science’, http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/chalmersdeb3dft.htm Dennett, D. C. 2003, ‘Who’s On First? Heterophenomenology Explained’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10, No. 9–10, 2003, pp. 19-30 Dennett, D. C. 2007, ‘Heterophenomenology reconsidered’, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 6, pp. 247-270 Dreyfus, H. and Kelly, S. D. 2010, ‘Heterophenomenology: Heavy-handed sleight-of-hand’, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 6, pp. 45-55 Flew, A. 1984, A Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd Edition, Pan Books / The Macmillan Press, London Fodor, J. 2008, ‘Against Darwinism’, Mind & Language, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 1–24 Gallagher, S. and Zahavi, D. 2012, The Phenomenological Mind, 2nd Edition, Routledge, London and New York Grayling, A. C. 1995, ‘The Empiricists’, in A. C. Grayling (ed.), Philosophy: A Guide Through the Subject, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 484-544 Harman, G., ‘What is the intentional stance?’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 11, p. 515

http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/chalmersdeb3dft.htm



Husserl, E. [1934-1937] 1970, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. D. Carr, Northwestern University Press, Evanston Lycan, W. 1988, ‘Dennett’s instrumentalism’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 11, pp. 518-519 Millikan, R. G. 1984, Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts Millikan, R. G. 1989, ‘Biosemantics’, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 86, No. 6, pp. 281-297 Noë, A. and Thompson, E. 2004, ‘Sorting Out the Neural Basis of Consciousness: Authors’ Reply to Commentators’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 87-98 Ryle, G. [1949] 1968, The Concept of Mind, Harmondsworth: Peregrine Books Searle, J. 2000, ‘Consciousness’, Annual Review of Neuroscience, Vol. 23, pp. 557–78. Vallor, S. 2009, ‘The fantasy of third-person science: Phenomenology, ontology, and evidence’, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 8, pp. 1-15

k. nizamis 2013 an unintentional stance

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