JUSTICE AND FAIRNESS IN UPBRINGING

‘Should parents be licensed? And would parental licensing promote social justice?’

By

Brian Valenzuela Sotomayor

Should parents be licensed?

Firstly let us look at the reasons why a parenting licensing system is being proposed; Lafollette

(2004) argues that licensing parents could protect children from incompetent parenting and

would benefit children; by reducing the possible risk of suffering from maltreatment, neglect or

abuse (ibid, p185). On the other hand according to Westman (2004), ‚even if the idea that

children have a right to competent parenting and that licensing parents could be useful are

accepted, both can be dismissed as idealistic and impractical‛ (ibid, p353). My argument in

support of parental licensing will be idealistically represented along with a selection of

impracticalities that will ‘predominantly’ be utilized to provoke considerations as to why parental

licensing could promote ‘social justice’.

efore exploring whether parental licensing would be helpful towards preventing the possible

risk of children suffering from a long train of abuses; we must first establish what social justice

is, only then can we begin to build a distinction as to whether parental licensing can promote

social justice.

B

According to Barry (2005) social justice diverges from the ‘virtues of inequality’; by challenging

the systematic and abusive nature and organisation of societies basic institutions. Social justice

demands that the personal rights, responsibilities, equal opportunities and resources that are

available to people, should be equal, but if they are not, then its reasoning must be based on

reducing inequality (ibid, p7). Let’s begin to develop an argument by first exploring examples of

‘the long train’ of abuses and neglect that are experienced by children.

‘A long train of abuses’

Children can potentially suffer from maltreatment across various forms of abuse; the four most

common range from; physical, sexual, emotional and neglect (see CDC, 2010; ACYF, 2008). A

recent longitudinal study has revealed that within the United Kingdom the problems facing

children revolve around seven fundamental aspects of childhood, including the aspect of family

life (see Layard & Dunn, 2009).

The long term affects of abuse and neglect can cause a disadvantageous development

of children, often resulting in serious societal problems (see NIAC, 2011). For example, criminal

behaviour is amongst the many potential problems that can arise from bad parenting (see

Unnever et al, 2006). Furthermore, an intergenerational pattern is believed to exist whereby

children, who are converted by a history of abuse, often transform into abusive adults and

possibly abusive parents, this is a ‘potentially’ harmful self-fulfilling prophecy (see Bert, et al

2009).

These potential threats of abuse and neglect towards children underlines Lafollette’s

(2004) rationale for the licensing of parents; part of his appeal is that parenting possesses ‘a

hazardous criterion’ and that parenting should be regulated in order to prevent harm (ibid,

p186). For example, Lafollette (2004) argues that regulation policies already exist in order to

prevent people from fulfilling a certain job or role in society, based on their level of competence

(ibid, p183). Lafollette makes it clear that this form of regulating competence towards

‘hazardous activities’ is a ‚fundamental task within any stable society‛ and that is why it should

be applied to parenting (ibid, p183).

Lafollette’s argument is compelling as parenting does satisfy the ‘hazardous criterion’ of a role

in society that should be regulated in ‘definition’; parenting is a potentially harmful activity that

can negatively affect a Childs upbringing. Arguably, we could assume that in line with the

possible ‘long train of abuses’ that can be experienced by children at the hands of their parents

does promote a desirable attempt towards ‘safeguarding children’ from harmful parents.

Let us re-accommodate our thoughts from Lafollette’s idealistic notions of preventing harm and

now consider the precedence that parental rights and responsibilities has above the

considerations of protecting innocent children, from the ‘long train of potential abuse and

neglect’.

Lafollette (2004), provides three theoretical arguments against parental licensing to

solidify his argument in support of parental licensing; (firstly), The Parental Right to have

children. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Article 16 states that, ‚men and

women have the right to marry and found a family‛, thus meaning that it is in fact a human right

to have children. Let further examine this ‘parental right’. Lafollette (2004) argues that parental

rights is not without limitation, as ‚rights can be limited to protect innocent people‛ (ibid, p186),

this is true, but is not currently being upheld by law. For instance, in some cases ‘parental

rights’ are so powerful that it can take precedence over the demands of social justice and the

protection of innocent children from potentially harmful and incompetent parents. For example;

in order for an adult to conceived a child through the process of surrogacy, both the parents to

be, and the surrogate must pass a Criminal Records Bureau Check (CRB), before ‚conceiving

a child within the surrogacy arrangement‛ (see COTS, p17). This is a noble precautionary

safeguarding procedure, as it is considering the future needs of the child within the surrogacy

process over the rights of adults to become parents. This procedure provides a ‘limited’

measure of safety for the child; whereby a person who is suitable or unsuitable for parenthood

can will be identified based on their previous legal cautions’ or convictions. Once again this is a

noble precaution, but why is this not a requirement within the process of biological

pregnancies?

Think back to Barry’s (2005) notion of social justice; let’s focus on the constraints that

the personal rights and opportunities of both biological and surrogate parents have, as they

currently stand they are ‘unequal’. This automatic biological right to have children represents

precedence above the safeguarding of children. According to Barry (2005) this represents the

‚absence of an explicit conception of social justice‛ altogether (ibid, p10); whereby the

opportunities for adults to have children should be equally distributed within society unless

reasoning based on reducing ‘inequality’ can be provided. Based on this strand of inequality

towards an adult’s right to have children, not only should we consider how a parenting licensing

system would promote ‘social justice’ between biological and surrogate pregnancies, but

whether children should be allowed to be born into a family environment that is

‘unsafeguarded’? A paradox does seem to exist as both methods of conception ‘are pursuing

invariably the same object’ and will be presented with the same level of parental responsibility;

there seems to be no valid reasoning that justifies such a precedence of parental rights towards

becoming a parent. Lafollette (2004) has also found that, ‚biological parents are statistically

more likely to maltreat children and therefore should be provided with the same level of

protection (ibid, p195), even without statistics the principle of equality for children and parents

represents the intrinsic value of a parental licensing system.

Another argument against parental licensing illustrates that the current precedence that parental

rights has over the rights of children would shift and begin to predominantly ‘legally favour’ the

rights of children. Westman’s response states that: Children’s rights would not be favoured over

the rights of parents, but would create a more equal grounding of human and civil rights

between children and parents (Westman, 2004. p351), in which case would promote a fair and

justified ‘restrictive nature’ towards the prior example of requirements of surrogate pregnancies.

For instance, the civil rights of children could include the limits of competent parenting, which

according to Westman (2004) would not necessarily change the balance of a parent and Child’s

rights, but the balance of parental responsibility towards parenting competently (ibid, p340).

This could promote a more just and fair upbringing for children; whereby ‚All are equal before

the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law to have

children‛ (UDHR: article 7, 1948). If children are protected by law, without discrimination,

shouldn’t parental opportunities and responsibilities required by parenthood be ‘impartially’

regulated?

In order to distinguish an answer, we must allocate by definition, whether preventing

potential harm caused by ‘incompetent parenting’, should be interchangeable with

considerations for the ‘rights to become a parent’. Westman (2004) aligns with this notion as he

describes society as being ‘devoted’ to the ‘free pursuit of adult interests’ and that ‘the

responsibility of our actions’, is a ‘difficult expectation’ (ibid, p353). Can parental rights be

considered as a difficult expectation?

Accordance to The Children’s Rights Alliance for England, Article 3 states that; ‚children

should be treated as a priority‛, whereby, ‚adults should always try to do what is best for young

people and children‛, and that the ‚government must do everything to make sure that children

and young people are safe and well looked after‛ (1991, pg11). This is not a difficult

expectation, it is the law. This example highlights both Lafollette and Westmans’ argument

whereby; ‘the benefits of regulating potential harm towards children’ could overrule any

objections of such a system being developed.

In terms of promoting social justice, licensing parents would basically require a reduction of

inequalities towards the rights, responsibilities and opportunities of children and parents within

society (Barry, 2005. p169), which seems to be evident within the examples of the requirements

of surrogacy, and the equal protection that would be provided to children from possibly suffering

at the hands of incompetent parents.

Conclusion

When a ‘long train of abuses’ and ‘usurpations’, pursuing invariably the same object

evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their

duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security.

(Roland, 1776)

In conclusion the above can metaphorically illustrate, that those who have the ability to act, also

have the responsibility to take action. In a more related concept, those who decide to become a

parent should also satisfy the responsibility that is essential to parenting; presently this is not

necessarily a regulated truism but a ‘pessimistic freedom’ towards the human ‘right’ of

procreating and nurturing a child. In this case, a ‘long train’ of abuses and usurpations can be

associated with the neglect and abuse that can potentially be experienced by children, who are

currently at the un-regulated mercy of their parents. The biological and automatic ‘Parental

right’ to have children clearly embodies a gross usurpation upon the human rights of children,

creating a ‘fundamental task’ towards safeguarding children from potentially harmful, unjust and

an unfair upbringing. So, to answer the fundamental question as to whether licensing parents

could be helpful towards preventing the potentially neglectful and abusive upbringing of

children, ‘yes’ it would be ‘helpful’ as a prevention towards minimising the potential harm he

incompetent parents can have on children, even amongst unintentional harm. Licensing parents

in the promote of social justice is justified by that rights of children being competently parented,

and the equal consideration towards the human rights for adults to become parents. There are

many issues as to how we should measure parental competence, and the various problems

that would be encountered by such a licensing system, but this does not make licensing

parents any less desirable and socially just towards protecting the needs that children have in

experiencing a more just and fair upbringing.

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