[G.R. No. 127198. May 16, 2005]LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ELI G. C. NATIVIDAD, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, San Fernando, Pampanga, and JOSE R. CAGUIAT represented by Attorneys-in-fact JOSE T. BARTOLOME and VICTORIO MANGALINDAN, respondents.D E C I S I O NTINGA, J.:This is a Petition for Review[1] dated December 6, 1996 assailing the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court[3] dated July 5, 1996 which ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) to pay private respondents the amount of P30.00 per square meter as just compensation for the States acquisition of private respondents properties under the land reform program.The facts follow.On May 14, 1993, private respondents filed a petition before the trial court for the determination of just compensation for their agricultural lands situated in Arayat, Pampanga, which were acquired by the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27). The petition named as respondents the DAR and Land Bank. With leave of court, the petition was amended to implead as co-respondents the registered tenants of the land.After trial, the court rendered the assailed Decision the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioners and against respondents, ordering respondents, particularly, respondents Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank of the Philippines, to pay these lands owned by petitioners and which are the subject of acquisition by the State under its land reform program, the amount of THIRTY PESOS (P30.00) per square meter, as the just compensation due for payment for same lands of petitioners located at San Vicente (or Camba), Arayat, Pampanga.Respondent Department of Agrarian Reform is also ordered to pay petitioners the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as Attorneys Fee, and to pay the cost of suit.SO ORDERED.[4]DAR and Land Bank filed separate motions for reconsideration which were denied by the trial court in its Order[5] dated July 30, 1996 for being pro forma as the same did not contain a notice of hearing. Thus, the prescriptive period for filing an appeal was not tolled. Land Bank consequently failed to file a timely appeal and the assailed Decision became final and executory.Land Bank then filed a Petition for Relief from Order Dated 30 July 1996,[6] citing excusable negligence as its ground for relief. Attached to the petition for relief were two affidavits of merit claiming that the failure to include in the motion for reconsideration a notice of hearing was due to accident and/or mistake.[7] The affidavit of Land Banks counsel of record notably states that he simply scanned and signed the Motion for Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 48, not knowing, or unmindful that it had no notice of hearing[8] due to his heavy workload.The trial court, in its Order[9] of November 18, 1996, denied the petition for relief because Land Bank lost a remedy in law due to its own negligence.In the instant petition for review, Land Bank argues that the failure of its counsel to include a notice of hearing due to pressure of work constitutes excusable negligence and does not make the motion for reconsideration pro forma considering its allegedly meritorious defenses. Hence, the denial of its petition for relief from judgment was erroneous.According to Land Bank, private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the DARs valuation of their properties. Private respondents thus failed to exhaust administrative remedies when they filed a petition for the determination of just compensation directly with the trial court. Land Bank also insists that the trial court erred in declaring that PD 27 and Executive Order No. 228 (EO 228) are mere guidelines in the determination of just compensation, and in relying on private respondents evidence of the valuation of the properties at the time of possession in 1993 and not on Land Banks evidence of the value thereof as of the time of acquisition in 1972.Private respondents filed a Comment[10] dated February 22, 1997, averring that Land Banks failure to include a notice of hearing in its motion for reconsideration due merely to counsels heavy workload, which resulted in the motion being declared pro forma, does not constitute excusable negligence, especially in light of the admission of Land Banks counsel that he has been a lawyer since 1973 and has mastered the intricate art and technique of pleading.Land Bank filed a Reply[11] dated March 12, 1997 insisting that equity considerations demand that it be heard on substantive issues raised in its motion for reconsideration.The Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.[12] Both parties complied.[13]The petition is unmeritorious.At issue is whether counsels failure to include a notice of hearing constitutes excusable negligence entitling Land Bank to a relief from judgment.Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:Sec. 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings.When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.As can clearly be gleaned from the foregoing provision, the remedy of relief from judgment can only be resorted to on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.[14]Measured against this standard, the reason profferred by Land Banks counsel, i.e., that his heavy workload prevented him from ensuring that the motion for reconsideration included a notice of hearing, was by no means excusable.Indeed, counsels admission that he simply scanned and signed the Motion for Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 48, not knowing, or unmindful that it had no notice of hearing speaks volumes of his arrant negligence, and cannot in any manner be deemed to constitute excusable negligence.The failure to attach a notice of hearing would have been less odious if committed by a greenhorn but not by a lawyer who claims to have mastered the intricate art and technique of pleading.[15]Indeed, a motion that does not contain the requisite notice of hearing is nothing but a mere scrap of paper. The clerk of court does not even have the duty to accept it, much less to bring it to the attention of the presiding judge.[16] The trial court therefore correctly considered the motion for reconsideration pro forma. Thus, it cannot be faulted for denying Land Banks motion for reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment.It should be emphasized at this point that procedural rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While in certain instances, we allow a relaxation in the application of the rules, we never intend to forge a weapon for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberal interpretation and application of rules apply only in proper cases of demonstrable merit and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. Party litigants and their counsel are well advised to abide by, rather than flaunt, procedural rules for these rules illumine the path of the law and rationalize the pursuit of justice.[17]Aside from ruling on this procedural issue, the Court shall also resolve the other issues presented by Land Bank, specifically as regards private respondents alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies and the question of just compensation.Land Bank avers that private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the DARs valuation instead of filing a petition to fix just compensation with the trial court.The records reveal that Land Banks contention is not entirely true. In fact, private respondents did write a letter[18] to the DAR Secretary objecting to the land valuation summary submitted by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office and requesting a conference for the purpose of fixing just compensation. The letter, however, was left unanswered prompting private respondents to file a petition directly with the trial court.At any rate, in Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals,[19] we declared that there is nothing contradictory between the DARs primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes the determination of questions of just compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just compensation. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to judicial proceedings.In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function.[20]Thus, the trial did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice.Land Banks contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just compensation should be based on the value of the property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In Office of the President, Malacaang, Manila v. Court of Appeals,[21] we ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the payment of just compensation.Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657)[22] before the completion of this process, the just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect, conformably with our ruling in Paris v. Alfeche.[23]Section 17 of RA 6657 which is particularly relevant, providing as it does the guideposts for the determination of just compensation, reads as follows:Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation.In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DARs failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.[24]In this case, the trial court arrived at the just compensation due private respondents for their property, taking into account its nature as irrigated land, location along the highway, market value, assessors value and the volume and value of its produce. This Court is convinced that the trial court correctly determined the amount of just compensation due private respondents in accordance with, and guided by, RA 6657 and existing jurisprudence.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISIONJOSEFINA S. LUBRICA, in herG.R. No. 170220capacity as Assignee of FEDERICOC. SUNTAY, NENITA SUNTAYTAEDO and EMILIO A.M.SUNTAY III,Petitioners,Present:Panganiban,C.J. (Chairperson),- versus -Ynares-Santiago,Austria-Martinez,Callejo, Sr., andChico-Nazario,JJ.LAND BANK OF THEPHILIPPINES,Respondent.Promulgated:November 20, 2006x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- xDECISIONYNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the October 27, 2005 Amended Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530, which vacated its May 26, 2004 Decision affirming (a) the Order of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, acting as Special Agrarian Court, in Agrarian Case Nos. R-1339 and R-1340, dated March 31, 2003 directing respondent Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to deposit the provisional compensation as determined by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD); (b) the May 26, 2003 Resolution denying LBPs motion for reconsideration; and (c) the May 27, 2003 Order requiring Teresita V. Tengco, LBPs Land Compensation Department Manager, to comply with the March 31, 2003 Order.The facts of the case are as follows:Petitioner Josefina S. Lubrica is the assignee[2]of Federico C. Suntay over certain parcels of agricultural land located at Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, with an area of 3,682.0285 hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-31 (T-1326)[3]of the Registry of Deeds of OccidentalMindoro.In 1972, a portion of the said property with an area of 311.7682 hectares, was placed under the land reform program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (1972)[4]and Executive Order No. 228 (1987).[5]The land was thereafter subdivided and distributed to farmer beneficiaries.The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the LBP fixed the value of the land at P5,056,833.54 which amount was deposited in cash and bonds in favor of Lubrica.On the other hand, petitioners Nenita Suntay-Taedo and Emilio A.M. Suntay III inherited from Federico Suntay a parcel of agricultural land located at Balansay, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro covered by TCT No. T-128[6]of the Register of Deeds of Occidental Mindoro, consisting of two lots, namely, Lot 1 with an area of 45.0760 hectares and Lot 2 containing an area of 165.1571 hectares or a total of 210.2331 hectares.Lot2 was placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27 but only 128.7161 hectares was considered by LBP and valued the same at P1,512,575.05.Petitioners rejected the valuation of their properties, hence the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) conducted summary administrative proceedings for determination of just compensation.OnJanuary 29, 2003, the PARAD fixed the preliminary just compensation at P51,800,286.43 for the 311.7682 hectares (TCT No. T-31) and P21,608,215.28 for the 128.7161 hectares (TCT No. T-128).[7]Not satisfied with the valuation, LBP filed onFebruary 17, 2003, two separate petitions[8]for judicial determination of just compensation before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, acting as aSpecial Agrarian Court, docketed as Agrarian Case No. R-1339 for TCT No. T-31 and Agrarian Case No. R-1340 for TCT No. T-128, and raffled to Branch 46 thereof.Petitioners filed separate Motions to Deposit the Preliminary Valuation Under Section 16(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 (1988)[9]and Ad Cautelam Answer praying among others that LBP deposit the preliminary compensation determined by the PARAD.OnMarch 31, 2003, the trial court issued an Order[10]granting petitioners motion, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, Ms. Teresita V. Tengco, of the Land Compensation Department I (LCD I), Land Bank of the Philippines, is hereby ordered pursuant to Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 in relation to Section 2, Administrative Order No. 8, Series of 1991, to deposit the provisional compensation as determined by the PARAD in cash and bonds, as follows:1.In Agrarian Case No. R-1339, the amount of P 51,800,286.43, minus the amount received by the Landowner;2.In Agrarian Case No. R-1340, the amount of P 21,608,215.28, less the amount of P 1,512,575.16, the amount already deposited.Such deposit must be made with the Land Bank of thePhilippines,Manilawithin five (5) days from receipt of a copy of this order and to notify this court of her compliance within such period.Let this order be served by the Sheriff of this Court at the expense of the movants.SO ORDERED.[11]LBPs motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution[12]datedMay 26, 2003.The following day,May 27, 2003, the trial court issued an Order[13]directing Ms. Teresita V. Tengco, LBPs Land Compensation Department Manager, to deposit the amounts.Thus, onJune 17, 2003, LBP filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with application for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 77530.[14]OnJune 27, 2003, the appellate court issued a 60-day temporary restraining order[15]and onOctober 6, 2003, a writ of preliminary injunction.[16]OnMay 26, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[17]in favor of the petitioners, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion, the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Order datedMarch 31, 2003, Resolution datedMay 26, 2003, and Order datedMay 27, 2003are hereby AFFIRMED. The preliminary injunction We previously issued is hereby LIFTED and DISSOLVED.SO ORDERED.[18]The Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly ordered LBP to deposit the amounts provisionally determined by the PARAD as there is no law which prohibits LBP to make a deposit pending the fixing of the final amount of just compensation.It also noted that there is no reason for LBP to further delay the deposit considering that the DAR already took possession of the properties and distributed the same to farmer-beneficiaries as early as 1972.LBP moved for reconsideration which was granted.OnOctober 27, 2005, the appellate court rendered the assailed Amended Decision,[19]the dispositive portion of which reads:Wherefore, in view of the prescription of a different formula in the case of Gabatin which We hold as cogent and compelling justification necessitating Us to effect the reversal of Our judgment herein sought to be reconsidered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED, and Our May 26, 2004 Decision is hereby VACATED and ABANDONED with the end in view of giving way to and acting in harmony and in congruence with the tenor of the ruling in the case of Gabatin. Accordingly, the assailed rulings of the Special Agrarian Court is (sic) commanded to compute and fix the just compensation for the expropriated agricultural lands strictly in accordance with the mode of computation prescribed (sic) Our May 26, 2004 judgment in the case of Gabatin.SO ORDERED.[20]In the Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals held that the immediate deposit of the preliminary value of the expropriated properties is improper because it was erroneously computed.CitingGabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[21]it held that the formula to compute the just compensation should be: Land Value = 2.5 x Average Gross Production x Government Support Price.Specifically, it held that the value of the government support price for the corresponding agricultural produce (rice and corn) should be computed at the time of the legal taking of the subject agricultural land, that is, onOctober 21, 1972when landowners were effectively deprived of ownership over their properties by virtue of P.D. No. 27.According to the Court of Appeals, the PARAD incorrectly used the amounts of P500 and P300 which are the prevailing government support price for palay and corn, respectively, at the time of payment, instead of P35 and P31, the prevailing government support price at the time of the taking in 1972.Hence, this petition raising the following issues:A.THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED THECASE IN A WAYNOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LATEST DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF LAND BANK OF THEPHILIPPINESVS. HON. ELI G.C. NATIVIDAD, ET AL., G.R. NO. 127198, PROM.MAY 16, 2005; and[22]B.THE COURT A QUO HAS, WITH GRAVE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, DECIDING ISSUES THAT HAVE NOT BEEN RAISED, AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION.[23]Petitioners insist that the determination of just compensation should be based on the value of the expropriated properties at the time of payment.Respondent LBP, on the other hand, claims that the value of the realties should be computed as ofOctober 21, 1972when P.D. No. 27 took effect.The petition is impressed with merit.In the case ofLand Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad,[24]the Court ruled thus:Land Banks contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just compensation should be based on the value of the property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. InOffice of the President, Malacaang,Manilav. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the payment of just compensation.TheNatividadcase reiterated the Courts ruling inOffice of the President v. Court of Appeals[25]that the expropriation of the landholding did not take place on the effectivity of P.D. No. 27 onOctober 21, 1972but seizure would take effect on the payment of just compensation judicially determined.Likewise, in the recent case ofHeirs of Francisco R. Tantoco, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,[26]we held that expropriation of landholdings covered by R.A. No. 6657 take place, not on the effectivity of the Act onJune 15, 1988, but on the payment of just compensation.In the instant case, petitioners were deprived of their properties in 1972 but have yet to receive the just compensation therefor.The parcels of land were already subdivided and distributed to the farmer-beneficiaries thereby immediately depriving petitioners of their use.Under the circumstances, it would be highly inequitable on the part of the petitioners to compute the just compensation using the values at the time of the taking in 1972, and not at the time of the payment, considering that the government and the farmer-beneficiaries have already benefited from the land although ownership thereof have not yet been transferred in their names.Petitioners were deprived of their properties without payment of just compensation which, under the law, is a prerequisite before the property can be taken away from its owners.[27]The transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government are conditioned upon the receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or deposit by the DAR of the compensation with an accessible bank.Until then, title remains with the landowner.[28]Our ruling inAssociation of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform[29]is instructive, thus:It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall be deemed the owner of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers cooperative.It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as ofOctober 21, 1972of the land theyacquiredby virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27 (Emphasis supplied.)it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. x x xThe CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank.Until then, title also remains with the landowner.No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.We also note that the expropriation proceedings in the instant case was initiated under P.D. No. 27 but the agrarian reform process is still incomplete considering that the just compensation to be paid to petitioners has yet to be settled.Considering the passage of R.A. No. 6657 before the completion of this process, the just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under the said law.Indeed, R.A. No. 6657 is the applicable law, with P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 having only suppletory effect.[30]InLand Bank of thePhilippinesv. Court of Appeals,[31]we held that:RA 6657 includes PD 27 lands among the properties which the DAR shall acquire and distribute to the landless.And to facilitate the acquisition and distribution thereof, Secs. 16, 17 and 18 of the Act should be adhered to.Section 18 of R.A. No. 6657 mandates that the LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP or as may be finally determined by the court as the just compensation for the land.In determining just compensation, the cost of the acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered.The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.[32]Corollarily, we held inLand Bank of the Philippines v. Celada[33]that the above provision was converted into a formula by the DAR through Administrative Order No. 05, S. 1998, to wit:Land Value (LV) = (Capitalized Net Income x 0.6) + (Comparable Sales x 0.3) + (Market Value per Tax Declaration x 0.1)Petitioners were deprived of their properties way back in 1972, yet to date, they have not yet received just compensation.Thus, it would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by P.D. No. 227 and E.O. No. 228 considering the failure to determine just compensation for a considerable length of time.That just compensation should be determined in accordance with R.A. No. 6657 and not P.D. No. 227 or E.O. No. 228, is important considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.[34]WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition isGRANTED.The assailed Amended Decision dated October 27, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530 isREVERSED and SET ASIDE.The Decision dated May 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals affirming (a) the March 31, 2003 Order of the Special Agrarian Court ordering the respondent Land Bank of the Philippines to deposit the just compensation provisionally determined by the PARAD; (b) the May 26, 2003 Resolution denying respondents Motion for Reconsideration; and (c) the May 27, 2003 Order directing Teresita V. Tengco, respondents Land Compensation Department Manager to comply with the March 31, 2003 Order, isREINSTATED.The Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46, acting asSpecial Agrarian CourtisORDEREDto proceed with dispatch in the trial of Agrarian Case Nos. R-1339 and R-1340, and to compute the final valuation of the subject properties based on the aforementioned formula.SO ORDERED.LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP.,respondents.G.R. No. 118745 October 6, 1995DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., ET AL.,respondents.FRANCISCO, R.,J.:It has been declared that the duty of the court to protect the weak and the underprivileged should not be carried out to such an extent as deny justice to the landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be on his side.1As eloquently stated by Justice Isagani Cruz:. . . social justice or any justice for that matter is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law.2In this agrarian dispute, it is once more imperative that the aforestated principles be applied in its resolution.Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) (G.R. No. 118745) and Land Bank of the Philippines (G.R. No. 118712) following the adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33465. However, upon motion filed by private respondents, the petitions were ordered consolidated.3Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on October 20, 1994, which granted private respondents' Petition forCertiorariandMandamusand ruled as follows:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition forCertiorariandMandamusis hereby GRANTED:a) DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 is declarednullandvoidinsofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposits in cash or bonds;b) Respondent Landbank is ordered toimmediatelydeposit not merely "earmark", "reserve" or "deposit in trust" with an accessible bank designated by respondent DAR in the names of the following petitioners the following amounts in cash and in government financial instruments within the parameters of Sec. 18 (1) of RA 6657:P 1,455,207.31 Pedro L. YapP 135,482.12 Heirs of Emiliano SantiagoP 15,914,127.77 AMADCOR;c) The DAR-designated bank is ordered toallow the petitioners to withdrawthe above-deposited amounts without prejudice to the final determination of just compensation by the proper authorities; andd) Respondent DAR is ordered to 1)immediatelyconductsummaryadministrative proceedings to determine the just compensation for the lands of the petitioners giving the petitioners15 days from noticewithin which to submit evidence and to 2) decide the caseswithin 30 daysafter they are submitted for decision.4Likewise, petitioners seek the reversal of the Resolution dated January 18, 1995,5denying their motion for reconsideration.Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL, Republic Act No. 6657).Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their land pursuant to the provisions of RA 6657, private respondents filed with this Court a Petition forCertiorariandMandamuswith prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction. Private respondents questioned the validity of DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 19926and DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990,7and sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same.Through a Resolution of the Second Division dated February 9, 1994, this Court referred the petition to respondent Court of Appeals for proper determination and disposition.As found by respondent court , the following are undisputed:PetitionerPedro Yapalleges that "(o)n 4 September 1992 the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of petitioner Yap were totally cancelled by the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte and were transferred in the names of farmer beneficiaries collectively, based on the request of the DAR together with a certification of the Landbank that the sum of P735,337.77 and P719,869.54 have been earmarked for Landowner Pedro L. Yap for the parcels of lands covered by TCT Nos. 6282 and 6283, respectively, and issued in lieu thereof TC-563 and TC-562, respectively, in the names of listed beneficiaries (ANNEXES "C" & "D") without notice to petitioner Yap and without complying with the requirement of Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 to deposit the compensation in cash and Landbank bonds in an accessible bank. (Rollo, p. 6).The above allegations are not disputed by any of the respondents.PetitionerHeirs of Emiliano Santiagoallege that the heirs of Emiliano F. Santiago are the owners of a parcel of land located at Laur, NUEVA ECIJA with an area of 18.5615 hectares covered by TCT No. NT-60359 of the registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, registered in the name of the late Emiliano F. Santiago; that in November and December 1990, without notice to the petitioners, the Landbank required and the beneficiaries executed Actual tillers Deed of Undertaking (ANNEX "B") to pay rentals to the LandBank for the use of their farmlots equivalent to at least 25% of the net harvest; that on 24 October 1991 the DAR Regional Director issued an order directing the Landbank to pay the landowner directly or through the establishment of a trust fund in the amount of P135,482.12, that on 24 February 1992, the Landbank reserved in trust P135,482.12 in the name of Emiliano F. Santiago. (ANNEX "E";Rollo,p. 7); that the beneficiaries stopped paying rentals to the landowners after they signed the Actual Tiller's Deed of Undertaking committing themselves to pay rentals to the LandBank (Rollo, p. 133).The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except that respondent Landbank claims 1) that it was respondent DAR, not Landbank which required the execution of Actual Tillers Deed of Undertaking (ATDU, for brevity); and 2) that respondent Landbank, although armed with the ATDU, did not collect any amount as rental from the substituting beneficiaries (Rollo, p. 99).Petitioner Agricultural Management and Development Corporation (AMADCOR, for brevity) alleges with respect to its properties located in San Francisco, Quezon that the properties of AMADCOR in San Francisco, Quezon consist of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of 209.9215 hectares and another parcel covered by TCT No. 10832 with an area of 163.6189 hectares; that a summary administrative proceeding to determine compensation of the property covered by TCT No. 34314 was conducted by the DARAB in Quezon City without notice to the landowner; that a decision was rendered on 24 November 1992 (ANNEX "F") fixing the compensation for the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of 209.9215 hectares at P2,768,326.34 and ordering the Landbank to pay or establish a trust account for said amount in the name of AMADCOR; and that the trust account in the amount of P2,768,326.34 fixed in the decision was established by adding P1,986,489.73 to the first trust account established on 19 December 1991 (ANNEX "G"). With respect to petitioner AMADCOR's property in Tabaco, Albay, it is alleged that the property of AMADCOR in Tabaco, Albay is covered by TCT No. T-2466 of the Register of Deeds of Albay with an area of 1,629.4578 hectares'; that emancipation patents were issued covering an area of 701.8999 hectares which were registered on 15 February 1988 but no action was taken thereafter by the DAR to fix the compensation for said land; that on 21 April 1993, a trust account in the name of AMADCOR was established in the amount of P12,247,217.83', three notices of acquisition having been previously rejected by AMADCOR. (Rollo, pp. 8-9)The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except that respondent Landbank claims that petitioner failed to participate in the DARAB proceedings (land valuation case) despite due notice to it (Rollo, p. 100).8Private respondents argued that Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 was issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because it permits the opening of trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657.9Private respondents also assail the fact that the DAR and the Landbank merely "earmarked", "deposited in trust" or "reserved" the compensation in their names as landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking possession of the property, the compensation must be deposited in cash or in bonds.10Petitioner DAR, however, maintained that Administrative Order No. 9 is a valid exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657.11Moreover, the DAR maintained that the issuance of the "Certificate of Deposit" by the Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and the ruling in the case ofAssociation of Small Landowners in the Philippines,Inc.,et al.vs.Hon.Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989 (175 SCRA 343).12For its part, petitioner Landbank declared that the issuance of the Certificates of Deposits was in consonance with Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land Registration Authority where the words "reserved/deposited" were also used.13On October 20, 1994, the respondent court rendered the assailed decision in favor of private respondents.14Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but respondent court denied the same.15Hence, the instant petitions.On March 20, 1995, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in G.R. No. 118745 alleging that the appeal has no merit and is merely intended to delay the finality of the appealed decision.16The Court, however, denied the motion and instead required the respondents to file their comments.17Petitioners submit that respondent court erred in (1) declaring as null and void DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, insofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposit in cash or in bonds, and (2) in holding that private respondents are entitled as a matter of right to the immediate and provisional release of the amounts deposited in trust pending the final resolution of the cases it has filed for just compensation.Anent the first assignment of error, petitioners maintain that the word "deposit" as used in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 referred merely to the act of depositing and in no way excluded the opening of a trust account as a form of deposit. Thus, in opting for the opening of a trust account as the acceptable form of deposit through Administrative Circular No. 9, petitioner DAR did not commit any grave abuse of discretion since it merely exercised its power to promulgate rules and regulations in implementing the declared policies of RA 6657.The contention is untenable. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows:Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands xxx xxx xxx(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, uponthe deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bondsin accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. . . . (emphasis supplied)It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit".The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment.18In this regard, it must be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulations cannot extendthe law and amend a legislative enactment,19for settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails.20In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law. Respondent court therefore did not commit any error in striking down Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null and void.Proceeding to the crucial issue of whether or not private respondents are entitled to withdraw the amounts deposited in trust in their behalf pending the final resolution of the cases involving the final valuation of their properties, petitioners assert the negative.The contention is premised on the alleged distinction between the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and payment of final compensation as provided under Section 1821of the same law. According to petitioners, the right of the landowner to withdraw the amount deposited in his behalf pertains only to the final valuation as agreed upon by the landowner, the DAR and the LBP or that adjudged by the court. It has no reference to amount deposited in the trust account pursuant to Section 16(e) in case of rejection by the landowner because the latter amount is only provisional and intended merely to secure possession of the property pending final valuation. To further bolster the contention petitioners cite the following pronouncements in the case of "Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform".22The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even before actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a well-accepted principle of eminent domain.xxx xxx xxxThe CARP Law, for its part conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.xxx xxx xxxHence the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.Notably, however, the aforecited case was used by respondent court in discarding petitioners' assertion as it found that:. . . despite the "revolutionary" character of the expropriation envisioned under RA 6657 which led the Supreme Court, in the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (175 SCRA 343), to conclude that "payments of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money" even as the Supreme Court admits in the same case "that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is money and no other" the Supreme Court in said case did not abandon the "recognized rule . . .that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation."23(Emphasis supplied)We agree with the observations of respondent court. The ruling in the "Association" case merely recognized the extraordinary nature of the expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation from the traditional mode of payment of compensation and recognized payment other than in cash. It did not, however, dispense with the settled rule that there must be full payment of just compensation before the title to the expropriated property is transferred.The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and determination of just compensation under Section 18 is unacceptable. To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already been deprived of the possession and use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. The irresistible expropriation of private respondents' properties was painful enough for them. But petitioner DAR rubbed it in all the more by withholding that which rightfully belongs to private respondents in exchange for the taking, under an authority (the "Association" case) that is, however, misplaced. This is misery twice bestowed on private respondents, which the Court must rectify.Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between provisional compensation under Section 16(e) and final compensation under Section 18 for purposes of exercising the landowners' right to appropriate the same. The immediate effect in both situations is the same, the landowner is deprived of the use and possession of his property for which he should be fairly and immediately compensated. Fittingly, we reiterate the cardinal rule that:. . . within the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain,just compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking.Without prompt payment,compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.24(Emphasis supplied)The promulgation of the "Association" decision endeavored to remove all legal obstacles in the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer.25But despite this, cases involving its implementation continue to multiply and clog the courts' dockets. Nevertheless, we are still optimistic that the goal of totally emancipating the farmers from their bondage will be attained in due time. It must be stressed, however, that in the pursuit of this objective, vigilance over the rights of the landowners is equally important because social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners, who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection.26WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the appealed decision is AFFIRMEDin toto.SO ORDERED.

SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO, CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR., RONGIE D. AGUILAR, TACIANA D. AGUILAR, ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN, ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR., EDGAR DUENAS, MARIO ERIBAL, REYNALDO C. ESENCIA, EMMA GONZAGA, RUBEN A. IBOJO, SAMUEL JAMANDRE, HILARION V. LANTIZA, ANSELMO LOPEZ, TERESITA NACION, CHARIE E. NASTOR, NELSON L. NULLAS, CARLITO S. OLIA, ANA PATIO, ROBERTO T. PATIO, ANTONIO P. ROCHA, FERNANDO C. RUFINO, PATERNO P. SAIN, CLAUDIO S. SAYSON, and JOEMARIE VIBO,Petitioners,vs.DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and HACIENDA MARIA, INC.,Respondents.D E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO,J.:This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the review and reversal of the Resolutions1of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2003 and 28 August 2003, respectively.The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:The petitioners, with the exception of two, are the recipients of Emancipation Patents (EPs) over parcels of land located at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur, with their respective Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and EP numbers presented below:PetitionersTCT/EP Nos.Areas(has.)

1. SAMUEL ESTRIBILLOTCT No. T-287/EP No. A-0376751.7833

2. CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR.TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037814TCT No. T-829/EP No. A-0272932.00000.1565

3. RONGIE D. AGUILARTCT No. T-913/EP No. A-0272953.1441

4. TACIANA D. AGUILARTCT No. T-944/EP No. A-0272964.2405

5. ARTEMIO G. DE JUANTCT No. T-302/EP No. A-0378093.3082

6. ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR.TCT No. T-290/EP No. A-0356763.1437

7. EDGAR DUENASTCT No. T-949/EP No. A-0376584.0128

8. MARIO P. ERIBALTCT No. T-952/EP No. A-0378362.3087

9. REYNALDO C. ESENCIATCT No. T-950/EP No. A-0378442.0950

10. RUBEN A. IBOJOTCT No. T-928/EP No. A-0378731.5737

11. SAMUEL JAMANDRETCT No. T-909/EP No. A-1593482.2670

12. HILARION V. LANTIZATCT No. T-288/EP No. A-037674TCT No. T-401/EP No. A-0378254.55260.4579

13. ANSELMO LOPEZTCT No. T-973/EP No. A-0378404.4939

14. TERESITA NACIONTCT No. T-900/EP No. A-0378492.2140

15. CHARIE E. NASTORTCT No. T-825/EP No. A-0378293.9291

16. NELSON L. NULLASTCT No. T-396/EP No. A-0378262.7491

17. CARLITO S. OLIATCT No. T-910/EP No. A-0376731.7954

18. ROBERTO T.PATIOTCT No. T-912/EP No. A-0378606.4266

19. ANTONIO P. ROCHATCT No. T-914/EP No. A-0378302.2143

20. FERNANDO C. RUFINOTCT No. T-923/EP No. A-0378484.5322

21. PATERNO P. SAINTCT No. T-954/EP No. A-0378134.3223

22. CLAUDIO S. SAYSON, andTCT No. T-891/EP No. A-0378803.7151

23. JOEMARIE VIBOTCT No. T-893/EP No. A-0378271.31852

The two other petitioners, Emma Gonzaga and Ana Patio, are the surviving spouses of deceased recipients of EPs over parcels of land also located at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur, with their corresponding TCT and EP numbers identified as follows:(Deceased) Registered OwnersTCT/EP Nos.Areas(has.)

1. MANUEL S. GONZAGATCT No. T-920/EP No. A-0378324.1953

2. RAFAEL PATIOTCT No. T-929/EP No. A-0378613.00783

The parcels of land described above, the subject matters in this Petition, were formerly part of a forested area which have been denuded as a result of the logging operations of respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc. (HMI). Petitioners, together with other persons, occupied and tilled these areas believing that the same were public lands. HMI never disturbed petitioners and the other occupants in their peaceful cultivation thereof.HMI acquired such forested area from the Republic of the Philippines through Sales Patent No. 2683 in 1956 by virtue of which it was issued OCT No. P-3077-1661. The title covered three parcels of land with a total area of 527.8308 hectares, to wit:Lot No.Area(in hectares)

Lot No. 1620, Pls 428.52

Lot No. 1621, Pls 411.64

Lot No. 1622, Pls 4487.47

TOTAL527.834

On 21 October 1972, Presidential Decree No. 275was issued mandating that tenanted rice and corn lands be brought under Operation Land Transfer and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries.HMI, through a certain Joaquin Colmenares, requested that 527.8308 hectares of its landholdings be placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving compensation therefor, HMI allowed petitioners and other occupants to cultivate the landholdings so that the same may be covered under said law.In 1973, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) conducted a parcellary mapping of the entire landholdings of 527.8308 hectares covered by OCT No. P-3077-1661. In 1975 and 1976, the DAR approved the Parcellary Map Sketching (PMS) and the Amended PMS covering the entire landholdings.HMI, through its representatives, actively participated in all relevant proceedings, including the determination of the Average Gross Production per hectare at the Barangay Committee on Land Production, and was a signatory of an undated Landowner and Tenant Production Agreement (LTPA), covering the 527.8308 hectares. The LTPA was submitted to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in 1977.Also in 1977, HMI executed a Deed of Assignment of Rights in favor of petitioners, among other persons, which was registered with the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of OCT No. P-3077-1661. The annotation in the OCT showed that the entire 527.8308 hectares was the subject of the Deed of Assignment.In 1982, a final survey over the entire area was conducted and approved. From 1984 to 1988, the corresponding TCTs and EPs covering the entire 527.8308 hectares were issued to petitioners, among other persons.In December 1997, HMI filed with the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of CARAGA, Region XIII, 17 petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage under Presidential Decree No. 27 of 277.5008 hectares of its former landholdings covered by OCT No. P-3077-1661. HMI claimed that said area was not devoted to either rice or corn, that the area was untenanted, and that no compensation was paid therefor. The 17 petitions, which were later consolidated, sought for the cancellation of the EPs covering the disputed 277.5008 hectares which had been awarded to petitioners. HMI did not question the coverage of the other 250.3300 hectares under Presidential Decree No. 27 despite claiming that the entire landholdings were untenanted and not devoted to rice and corn.On 27 November 1998, after petitioners failed to submit a Position Paper, the RARAD rendered a Decision declaring as void the TCTs and EPs awarded to petitioners because the land covered was not devoted to rice and corn, and neither was there any established tenancy relations between HMI and petitioners when Presidential Decree No. 27 took effect on 21 October 1972. The Decision was based on a 26 March 1998 report submitted by the Hacienda Maria Action Team. Petitioners TCTs and EPs were ordered cancelled. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied. Petitioners appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which affirmed the RARAD Decision.After the DARAB denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, the latter proceeded to the Court of Appeals with their Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Court of Appeals issued the following assailed Resolution:A perusal of the petition reveals that the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was executed by Samuel A. Estribillo who is one of the petitioners, without the corresponding Special Power of Attorneys executed by the other petitioners authorizing him to sign for their behalf in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and necessarily DISMISSED.6Petitioners filed a "Motion for Reconsideration With Alternative Prayer with Leave of Court for the Admission of Special Power of Attorney (SPA) Granted to Petitioner Samuel Estribillo by his Co-Petitioners." The Court of Appeals denied the motion by issuing the following assailed Resolution:Petitioners seek the reconsideration of Our Resolution promulgated on January 27, 2003 which dismissed the petition for certiorari.We find no reason to reverse, alter or modify the resolution sought to be reconsidered, since petitioners have failed to show that their belated submission of the special power of attorney can be justified as against the unequivocal requirements set forth by Sec. 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.While it is true that the Supreme Court has recognized special circumstances that justify the relaxation of the rules on non-forum shopping, such circumstances, however, are not present in the case at bar.More importantly, said Rules cannot be relaxed in view of the Supreme Courts ruling in Loquias vs. Ombudsman, 338 SCRA 62, which stated that, substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance by the rules. The attestation contained in the certification [on] non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same.Since the Verification and Certification on Non-Forum shopping was executed without the proper authorization from all the petitioners, such personal knowledge cannot be presumed to exist thereby rendering the petition fatally defective.Par. 2, Sec. 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended states:"Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice x x x"It is, thus, clear that the Motion for Reconsideration has no legal basis to support it and should be dismissed forthwith. Moreover, granting arguendo that a special power of attorney belatedly filed could cure the petitions defect, the requirement of personal knowledge of all the petitioners still has not been met since some of the other petitioners failed to sign the same.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.7Petitioners now file this present Petition contending that there had been compliance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. They further reiterate their argument that the EPs are ordinary titles which become indefeasible one year after their registration.The petition is impressed with merit.1awphil.netPetitioners have sufficiently complied with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure concerning the Certification Against Forum shoppingRule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was preceded by Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which required a certification against forum shopping to avoid the filing of multiple petitions and complaints involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and other tribunals and agencies. Stated differently, the rule was designed to avoid a situation where said courts, tribunals and agencies would have to resolve the same issues. Rule 7, Section 5, now provides:Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.Revised Circular No. 28-91 "was designed x x x to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible."8Technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate, justice.9The same guidelines should still apply in interpreting what is now Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.Petitioner Samuel A. Estribillo, in signing the Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping, falls within the phrase "plaintiff or principal party" who is required to certify under oath the matters mentioned in Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Such was given emphasis by this Court when we held in Mendigorin v. Cabantog10and Escorpizo v. University of Baguio11that the certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by the plaintiffor anyof the principal parties and not only by the legal counsel. In Condo Suite Club Travel, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,12we likewise held that:The certification in this petition was improperly executed by the external legal counsel of petitioner. For a certification of non-forum shopping must be by the petitioner,or anyof the principal parties and not by counsel unless clothed with a special power of attorney to do so. This procedural lapse on the part of petitioner is also a cause for the dismissal of this action. (Emphasis supplied)The Court of Appeals heavily relied on the seemingly conflicting case of Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman,13where this Court ruled that:At the outset, it is noted that the Verification and Certification was signed by Antonio Din, Jr., one of the petitioners in the instant case. We agree with the Solicitor General that the petition is defective. Section 5, Rule 7 expressly provides that it is the plaintiff or principal party who shall certify under oath that he has not commenced any action involving the same issues in any court, etc. Only petitioner Din, the Vice-Mayor of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, signed the certification. There is no showing that he was authorized by his co-petitioners to represent the latter and to sign the certification. It cannot likewise be presumed that petitioner Din knew, to the best of his knowledge, whether his co-petitioners had the same or similar actions or claims filed or pending. We find that substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance by the rules. The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. Petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. (Emphasis supplied)Loquias, however, was a case involving only five petitioners seeking relief from the Resolution of the Ombudsman charging them with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, where the above declaration "at the outset" was made together with a determination on the lack of jurisdiction on our part to decide the Petition.14There being only five petitioners in Loquias, the unreasonableness of the failure to obtain the signatures of Antonio Din, Jr.s four co-accused is immediately apparent, hence the remark by this Court that "[p]etitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification." In the present petition, petitioners allege that they are farmer-beneficiaries who reside in a very remote barangay in Agusan del Sur. While they reside in the same barangay, they allegedly have to walk for hours on rough terrain to reach their neighbors due to the absence of convenient means of transportation. Their houses are located far apart from each other and the mode of transportation, habal-habal, is scarce and difficult. Majority of them are also nearing old age. On the other hand, their lawyers (who are members of a non-government organization engaged in development work) are based in Quezon City who started assisting them at the latter part of the RARAD level litigation in 1998, and became their counsel of record only at the DARAB level. The petitioner who signed the initiatory pleading, Samuel Estribillo, was the only petitioner who was able to travel to Manila at the time of the preparation of the Petition due to very meager resources of their farmers organization, the Kahiusahan sa Malahutayong mga Mag-uugma Para sa Ekonomikanhong Kalambuan (KAMMPE). When the Petition a quo was dismissed, petitioners counsel went to Agusan del Sur and tried earnestly to secure all the signatures for the SPA. In fact, when the SPA was being circulated for their signatures, 24 of the named petitioners therein failed to sign for various reasons some could not be found within the area and were said to be temporarily residing in other towns, while some already died because of old age.15Be that as it may, those who did not sign the SPA did not participate, and are not parties to this petition.The Court of Appeals merely said that the special circumstances recognized by this Court that justify the relaxation of the rules on the certification against forum shopping are not present in the case at bar,16without discussing the circumstances adduced by the petitioners in their Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, assuming for the sake of argument that the actuation of petitioners was not strictly in consonance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it should still be determined whether there are special circumstances that would justify the suspension or relaxation of the rule concerning verification and certification against forum shopping, such as those which we appreciated in the ensuing cases.In General Milling Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,17the appeal to the Court of Appeals had a certificate against forum shopping, but was dismissed as it did not contain a board resolution authorizing the signatory of the Certificate. Petitioners therein attached the board resolution in their Motion for Reconsideration but the Court of Appeals, as in this case, denied the same. In granting the Petition therein, we explained that:[P]etitioner complied with this procedural requirement except that it was not accompanied by a board resolution or a secretarys certificate that the person who signed it was duly authorized by petitioner to represent it in the case. It would appear that the signatory of the certification was, in fact, duly authorized as so evidenced by a board resolution attached to petitioners motion for reconsideration before the appellate court. It could thus be said that there was at least substantial compliance with, and that there was no attempt to ignore, the prescribed procedural requirements.The rules of procedure are intended to promote, rather than frustrate, the ends of justice, and while the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, it, nevertheless, must not be met at the expense of substantial justice. Technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, not suppress, the cause of justice and a deviation from the rigid enforcement of the rules may be allowed to attain that prime objective for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of courts. [Acme Shoe, Rubber and Plastic Corp. vs. Court of Appeals; BA Savings Bank vs. Sia, 336 SCRA 484].In Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,18the authority of petitioners resident manager to sign the certification against forum shopping was submitted to the Court of Appeals only after the latter dismissed the Petition. It turned out, in the Motion for Reconsideration, that he already had board authority ten days before the filing of the Petition. We ratiocinated therein that:On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by the submission thereof after the filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the failure of the petitioner to submit the required documents that should accompany the petition, including the certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to certifications against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file a petition on behalf of the corporation.In certain exceptional circumstances, however, the Court has allowed the belated filing of the certification. In Loyola v. Court of Appeals, et al. (245 SCRA 477 [1995]), the Court considered the filing of the certification one day after the filing of an election protest as substantial compliance with the requirement. In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (264 SCRA 696 [1996]), the Court allowed the filing of the certification 14 days before the dismissal of the petition. In Uy v. Landbank, supra, the Court had dismissed Uys petition for lack of verification and certification against non-forum shopping. However, it subsequently reinstated the petition after Uy submitted a motion to admit certification and non-forum shopping certification. In all these cases, there were special circumstances or compelling reasons that justified the relaxation of the rule requiring verification and certification on non-forum shopping.In the instant case, the merits of petitioners case should be considered special circumstances or compelling reasons that justify tempering the requirement in regard to the certificate of non-forum shopping. Moreover, in Loyola, Roadway, and Uy, the Court excused non-compliance with the requirement as to the certificate of non-forum shopping. With more reason should we allow the instant petition since petitioner herein did submit a certification on non-forum shopping, failing only to show proof that the signatory was authorized to do so. That petitioner subsequently submitted a secretarys certificate attesting that Balbin was authorized to file an action on behalf of petitioner likewise mitigates this oversight.It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory, nonetheless the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum-shopping. Lastly, technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal.In Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines,19we, likewise, considered the apparent merits of the substantive aspect of the case as a special circumstance or compelling reason for the reinstatement of the case, and invoked our power to suspend our rules to serve the ends of justice. Thus:The admission of the petition after the belated filing of the certification, therefore, is not unprecedented. In those cases where the Court excused non-compliance with the requirements, there were special circumstances or compelling reasons making the strict application of the rule clearly unjustified. In the case at bar, the apparent merits of the substantive aspects of the case should be deemed as a "special circumstance" or "compelling reason" for the reinstatement of the petition. x x xThere were even cases where we held that there was complete non-compliance with the rule on certification against forum shopping, but we still proceeded to decide the case on the merits. In De Guia v. De Guia,20petitioners raised in their Petition for Review the allowance of respondents Appeal Brief whichdid not containa certificate against forum shopping. We held therein that:With regard to the absence of a certification of non-forum shopping, substantial justice behooves us to agree with the disquisition of the appellate court. We do not condone the shortcomings of respondents counsel, but we simply cannot ignore the merits of their claim. Indeed, it has been held that "[i]t is within the inherent power of the Court to suspend its own rules in a particular case in order to do justice."In Damasco v. National Labor Relations Commission,21the non-compliance was disregarded because of the principle of social justice, which is equally applicable to the case at bar:We note that both petitioners did not comply with the rule on certification against forum shopping. The certifications in their respective petitions were executed by their lawyers, which is not correct. The certification of non-forum shopping must be by the petitioner or a principal party and not the attorney. This procedural lapse on the part of petitioners could have warranted the outright dismissal of their actions.But, the court recognizes the need to resolve these two petitions on their merits as a matter of social justice involving labor and capital. After all, technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving herein the rights and obligations of these parties. Moreover, we must stress that technical rules of procedure in labor cases are not to be strictly applied if the result would be detrimental to the working woman.The foregoing cases show that, even if we assume for the sake of argument that there was violation of Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a relaxation of such rule would be justified for two compelling reasons: social justice considerations and the apparent merit of the Petition, as shall be heretofore discussed.Certificates of Title issued pursuant to Emancipation Patents are as indefeasible as TCTs issued in registration proceedings.Petitioners claim that the EPs have become indefeasible upon the expiration of one year from the date of its issuance. The DARAB, however, ruled that the EP "is a title issued through the agrarian reform program of the government. Its issuance, correction and cancellation is governed by the rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Hence, it is not the same as or in the same category of a Torrens title."The DARAB is grossly mistaken.Ybaez v. Intermediate Appellate Court,22provides that certificates of title issued in administrative proceedings are as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in judicial proceedings:It must be emphasized that a certificate of title issued under an administrative proceeding pursuant to a homestead patent, as in the instant case, is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a judicial registration proceeding, provided the land covered by said certificate is a disposable public land within the contemplation of the Public Land Law.There is no specific provision in the Public Land Law (C.A. No. 141, as amended) or the Land Registration Act (Act 496), now P.D. 1529, fixing the one (1) year period within which the public land patent is open to review on the ground of actual fraud as in Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529, and clothing a public land patent certificate of title with indefeasibility. Nevertheless, the pertinent pronouncements in the aforecited cases clearly reveal that Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529 was applied by implication by this Court to the patent issued by the Director of Lands duly approved by the Secretary of Natural Resources, under the signature of the President of the Philippines in accordance with law. The date of issuance of the patent, therefore, corresponds to the date of the issuance of the decree in ordinary registration cases because the decree finally awards the land applied for registration to the party entitled to it, and the patent issued by the Director of Lands equally and finally grants, awards, and conveys the land applied for to the applicant. This, to our mind, is in consonance with the intent and spirit of the homestead laws, i.e. conservation of a family home, and to encourage the settlement, residence and cultivation and improvement of the lands of the public domain. If the title to the land grant in favor of the homesteader would be subjected to inquiry, contest and decision after it has been given by the Government through the process of proceedings in accordance with the Public Land Law, there would arise uncertainty, confusion and suspicion on the governments system of distributing public agricultural lands pursuant to the "Land for the Landless" policy of the State.The same confusion, uncertainty and suspicion on the distribution of government-acquired lands to the landless would arise if the possession of the grantee of an EP would still be subject to contest, just because his certificate of title was issued in an administrative proceeding. The silence of Presidential Decree No. 27 as to the indefeasibility of titles issued pursuant thereto is the same as that in the Public Land Act where Prof. Antonio Noblejas commented:Inasmuch as there is no positive statement of the Public Land Law, regarding the titles granted thereunder, such silence should be construed and interpreted in favor of the homesteader who come into the possession of his homestead after complying with the requirements thereof. Section 38 of the Land Registration Law should be interpreted to apply by implication to the patent issued by the Director of Lands, duly approved by the Minister of Natural Resources, under the signature of the President of the Philippines, in accordance with law.23After complying with the procedure, therefore, in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree (where the DAR is required to issue the corresponding certificate of title after granting an EP to tenant-farmers who have complied with Presidential Decree No. 27),24the TCTs issued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the same protection accorded to other TCTs. "The certificate of title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent, x x x. Lands covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person."25As we held through Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Lahora v. Dayanghirang, Jr.26:The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and the character of the certificate of title that may be issued by virtue thereof, is thatwhere land is granted by the government to a private individual, the corresponding patent therefor is recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically brought within the operation of the Land Registration Act, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards provided in Section 38 of the said Act.In other words,upon expiration of one year from its issuance, the certificate of title shall become irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in a registration proceeding.(Emphasis supplied.)The EPs themselves, like the Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) in Republic Act No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), are enrolled in the Torrens system of registration. The Property Registration Decree in fact devotes Chapter IX27on the subject of EPs. Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs are, in themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in registration proceedings.The only defense of respondents, that the issue of indefeasibility of title was raised for the first time on appeal with the DARAB, does not hold water because said issue was already raised before the RARAD.28The recommendation of the Hacienda Maria Action Team to have the EPs cancelled and the lots covered under the Republic Act No. 6657,29with the farmer-beneficiaries later on being issued with CLOAs, would only delay the application of agrarian reform laws to the disputed 277.5008 hectares, leading to the expenditure of more time and resources of the government.The unreasonable delay of HMI in filing the Petition for cancellation more than 20 years after the alleged wrongful annotation of the Deed of Assignment in OCT No. P-3077-1661, and more than ten years after the issuance of the TCTs to the farmers, is apparently motivated by its desire to receive a substantially higher valuation and just compensation should the disputed 277.5008 hectares be covered under Republic Act No. 6657 instead of Presidential Decree No. 27.30This is further proved by the following uncontested allegations by petitioners:(i) HMI neither asked for rentals nor brought any action to oust petitioners from the farm they were cultivating;(ii) HMI had not paid realty taxes on the disputed property from 1972 onwards and never protested petitioners act of declaring the same for realty taxation;(iii) HMI, represented by a certain Angela Colmenares, signed the LTPA covering the entire landholdings or the area of 527.8308 hectares, which was then represented to be rice and corn lands;(iv) HMI abandoned the entire landholdings after executing the Deed of Assignment of Rights in 1977.WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73902 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The following EPs and the corresponding TCTs issued to petitioners or to their successors-in-interest are hereby declared VALID and SUBSISTING:Original GranteesTCT/EP Nos.

1. SAMUEL ESTRIBILLOTCT No. T-287/EP No. A-037675

2. CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR.TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037814TCT No. T-829/EP No. A-027293

3. RONGIE D. AGUILARTCT No. T-913/EP No. A-027295

4. TACIANA D. AGUILARTCT No. T-944/EP No. A-027296

5. ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN,TCT No. T-302/EP No. A-037809

6. ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR.TCT No. T-290/EP No. A-035676

7. EDGAR DUENASTCT No. T-949/EP No. A-037658

8. MARIO P. ERIBALTCT No. T-952/EP No. A-037836

9. REYNALDO C. ESENCIATCT No. T-950/EP No. A-037844

10. RUBEN A. IBOJOTCT No. T-928/EP No. A-037873

11. SAMUEL JAMANDRETCT No. T-909/EP No. A-159348

12. HILARION V. LANTIZATCT No. T-288/EP No. A-037674TCT No. T-401/EP No. A-037825

13. ANSELMO LOPEZTCT No. T-973/EP No. A-037840

14. TERESITA NACIONTCT No. T-900/EP No. A-037849

15. CHARIE E. NASTORTCT No. T-825/EP No. A-037829

16. NELSON L. NULLASTCT No. T-396/EP No. A-037826

17. CARLITO S. OLIATCT No. T-910/EP No. A-037673

18. ROBERTO T.PATIOTCT No. T-912/EP No. A-037860

19. ANTONIO P. ROCHATCT No. T-914/EP No. A-037830

20. FERNANDO C. RUFINOTCT No. T-923/EP No. A-037848

21. PATERNO P. SAINTCT No. T-954/EP No. A-037813

22. CLAUSIO S. SAYSONTCT No. T-891/EP No. A-037880

23. JOEMARIE VIBOTCT No. T-893/EP No. A-037827

24. MANUEL S. GONZAGATCT No. T-920/EP No. A-037832

25. RAFAEL PATIOTCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037861

RUFINA VDA. DE TANGUB, Petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, PRESIDING JUDGE of the [CAR] RTC, Branch 4, Iligan City, and SPOUSES DOMINGO and EUGENIA MARTIL, Respondents.D E C I S I O NThe jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, acting as a special agrarian court, in the light of Executive Orders Numbered 129-A and 229 and Republic Act No. 6657, is what is at issue in the proceeding at bar.Rufina Tangub and her husband, Andres, now deceased, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte in March, 1988, "an agrarian case for damages by reason of the(ir) unlawful dispossession . . .was tenants from the landholding" owned by the Spouses Domingo and Eugenia Martil. 1 Several persons were also impleaded as defendants, including the Philippine National Bank, it being alleged by the plaintiff spouses that said bank, holder of a mortgage on the land involved, had caused foreclosure thereof, resulting in the acquisition of the property by the bank as the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, and in the sale by the latter, some time later, of portions of the land to the other persons named as its co-defendants (all employees of the National Steel Corporation), and it being prayed that mortgage and the transactions thereafter made in relation thereto be annulled and voided. 2In an Order rendered on August 24, 1988, respondent Judge Felipe G. Javier, Jr. dismissed the complaint. 3 He opined that by virtue of Executive Order No. 229 "providing the mechanisms for the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program approved on July 24, 1987" Executive No. 129-A approved on July 26, 1987, as well as the Rules of the Adjudication Board of the Department of Agrarian Reform, jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over agrarian cases had been transferred to the Department of Agrarian Reform.:-cralawThe Tangub Spouses filed a petition forCertiorariwith this Court, docketed as UDK-8867, assigned to the Second Division. Discerning however no special and important reason for taking cognizance of the action, this Court referred the same to the Court of Appeals, that tribunal having concurrent jurisdiction to act thereon.: nadThe Court of Appeals, by Decision promulgated on October 23, 1989, 4 dismissed the petition, finding that the jurisdictional question had been correctly resolved by the Trial Court. The Court of Appeals, adverted to a case earlier decided by it, on August 30, 1989, Estanislao Casinillo v. Hon. Felipe G. Javier, Jr., et al., in which it was "emphatically ruled that agrarian cases no longer fall under the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts but rather under the jurisdiction of the DAR Adjudication Board." 5 The ruling was grounded on the provisions of Executive Orders Numbered 229, approved on July 22, 1987, and 129-A, issued on July 26, 1987, in relation to Republic Act No. 6657, effective on June 15, 1988. Said executive orders, it was pointed out, were issued by President Corazon C. Aquino undoubtedly in the exercise of her revolutionary powers in accordance with Section 6, Article XVIII [Transitory Provisions] of the 1986 Constitution providing that the "incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is convened."The petitioner Rufina Vda. de Tangub, now widowed, is once again before this Court, contending that the Trial Court's "order of dismissal of August 26, 1988, and the decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals affirming it, are patently illegal and unconstitutional" because they deprive "a poor tenant access to courts and directly violate R.A. 6657, PD 946, and Batas Bilang 129."The petition is without merit.Section 1 of Executive Order No. 229 sets out the scope of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). It states that the program ". . . shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produce, all public and private agricultural land as provided in Proclamation No. 131 dated July 22, 1987, including whenever applicable in accordance with law, other lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture."Section 17 thereof.1) vested the Department of Agrarian Reform with "quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters," and2) granted it "jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DENR and the Department of Agriculture [DA], as well as "powers to punish for contempt and to issue subpoena, subpoena duces tecum and writs to enforce its orders or decisions."Section 4 of Executive Order No. 129-A made the Department of Agrarian Reform "responsible for implementing the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and, for such purpose," authorized it, among others, to "(g) Prov