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Just and Unjust Wars and just war doctrine inideological warfareJaz Azari aa King's College, LondonPublished online: 18 Sep 2008.

To cite this article: Jaz Azari (2008) Just and Unjust Wars and just war doctrine in ideological warfare, Small Wars &Insurgencies, 19:2, 274-281, DOI: 10.1080/09592310802069391

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REVIEW ESSAY

Just and Unjust Wars and just war doctrine in ideologicalwarfare

Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations, by

Michael Walzer, 4th edition. New York: Basic Books, 2006. Pp. 361, index.

$19.95 (paperback). ISBN-10: 0465037070, ISBN-13: 978-0465037070.

‘Just war’ doctrine has been formulated through the combined writings of

theologians, jurists, moralists, and international policy-makers, among others, to

establish that war meets certain ethical or moral standards. It concerns the

morality of when and to what extent the use of force is ethically justified. In the

twenty-first century, with the salience of terrorism and insurgency globally, just

war doctrine requires re-examination and perhaps redefinition to match present

realities.

One of the seminal works of just war thought is Michael Walzer’s Just and

Unjust Wars. Written originally in 1977 in response to the moral debacle of

American conduct in Vietnam, Walzer denounces wars of aggression and

intervention. He argues for just war on the basis of a common morality shared by

nations and the non-negotiable respect for individual human rights. Thirty years

later in the fourth edition of Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer begins his preface not

in opposition to American involvement in Vietnam but, instead, in Iraq. Walzer

discusses the morality of regime change, critiquing the US intent to go to war to

promote democratic change. Though Walzer concedes instances where the use of

limited force may be necessary to deter exceptionally dangerous governments,

his primary answer to oppressive regimes is to use ‘politics-short-of-force.’ By

working through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to provide individuals

with the agency to create civil society, Walzer contends it is possible to create the

conditions for regime change through just means.

Whether or not one agrees with Walzer’s brief treatment of jus ad bellum and

the Iraq War, Just and Unjust Wars is worth re-examining for its applicability to

contemporary warfare. Walzer’s underlying premise is that a ‘contractarian

rationale’ exists for just war. According to the Stanford Encyclopaedia, moral

contractarianism views moral norms as arising from mutual agreement between

participants for perceived mutual benefit.1 The implicit social contract builds on

the founding political science theories of Hobbes, Kant, Rousseau, Rawls, and

Gauthier. Walzer enters the debate from the position of the ‘moral reality of war’

and society’s shaping of how actions in war are perceived rather than what the

actions were themselves.

ISSN 0959-2318 print/ISSN 1743-9558 online

q 2008 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/09592310802069391

http://www.informaworld.com

Small Wars & Insurgencies

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The basis of Walzer’s theory of contractarian rationale stems from his assertion

that ‘[O]ne of the things most of us want, even in war, is to act or to seem to act

morally’ (20). Two issues complicate this statement in the twenty-first century. The

first relates to cultural biases in interpreting ‘justness.’ In 1970s America, Walzer’s

theory and historical examples revolved predominantly around continental

European wars in which Western principles rooted in Christian theological tradition

were largely understood by all parties involved. The problem with the Western-

Christian-centrism arises when ‘justness’ applies to wars in which the combatants

were not socialized in this tradition. ‘Justness’ becomes a question of the historical,

cultural, and religious traditions residing in the cultures in conflict.

Second, unlike many of the wars in previous centuries, combatants waging

war are often non-state actors. These actors will often not observe international

laws, which were created explicitly in an attempt to enhance the morality of

interstate warfare. Instead, their actions will be informed by group dynamics and

ideology, with no state authority to sanction or demand responsibility of the

actions of these individuals. Thus the ‘just war’ paradigm needs revisiting.

The Western philosophies of just war stem largely from Christian traditions.

As early as the fifth century CE, philosophers wrestled with the dilemma that the

Christian credo of peace and good will toward man could be excused when

perceived to be necessary. One of the most influential philosopher-theologians of

the time, Augustine of Hippo, is seen as marking the start of just war discourse in

his work City of God. A believer in original sin and the flawed nature of man,

Augustine expounds the dilemma of jus ad bellum for the good Christian and how

he can be involved in war without sacrificing his Christian values.2 Augustine

finds a balance by viewing jus ad bellum as linked to right intention. If war is

conducted out of a desire for vengeance, personal glory, hatred, or for other selfish

ends, the war is unjust. However, Augustine also adds that ‘we go to war that we

may have peace,’3 making the ends of peace a justification for the means of war.

The ideas espoused by Augustine were expanded upon in the thirteenth

century by Thomas Aquinas. His work Summa Theologica is a lynchpin of just

war theory, exploring in his four articles in ‘Of War’ how Christians can

determine the lawfulness of war, the role of the clergy in war, the lawfulness of

ambushes, and fighting on holy days.4 Aquinas starts from the position that war is

‘contrary to divine precepts,’ namely peace, and is thus sinful and contrary to

Christian belief. Yet he, like Augustine, determines that there are causes for just

war. He believes sovereigns have the authority to call for war if they feel the

common wealth is threatened. Aquinas also supports Augustine’s idea of right

intention and argues for the advancement of common good rather than an

individual’s private gains. Ultimately, Aquinas subscribes to Saint Ambrose’s

view that, ‘There are certain rights of war and covenants, which ought to be

observed even among enemies.’5

The Islamic tradition of just war takes an interesting position alongside

Christian tradition. Though not widely discussed in Western circles, Islamic

philosophy on the use of force has influenced thinkers in the East since the early

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seventh century. Just war in the Muslim world centres on three main areas: the

Qur’an, the Prophetic traditions (Sunna), and the work of early Islamic jurists.6

The early interpretations of the Qur’an and Sunna distinguished just wars from

holy wars. According to these interpretations, the just war is used to ‘protect and

preserve values’ through proportionate means while the holy war is understood as

‘ideological war – armed struggle against threats to the highest values accepted

in the culture.’7 Similarly, the term jihad has three separate interpretations. It is a

personal, spiritual struggle; a means to ‘make God’s cause succeed (8:39)’ and an

adherence to moral obligations; and a way to expand dar al-Islam, or the sphere

of Islam, through wars of expansion.8 The third interpretation was seized upon by

Muslim authorities and pushed as a justification of war and conquest. By the tenth

century, jihad was tied to the use of military force.9

Like Christian traditions regarding war, however, strict criteria and

restrictions were placed on the use of jihad. For it to be morally condoned,

jihad had to meet one of four requirements: it furthered God’s cause; it stopped

hostile forces and the spread of ‘discord on earth’; it retaliated against immoral

governments and those who had ‘broken the covenant’ with Islam; and it

defended Muslim families, rights, and property.10 Without one of these

requirements, war defied Islamic principles of justness.

The tenth-century jurist and exegete al-Tabari developed the Islamic ideals of

just war. Al-Tabari determined wars were necessary to fight evil and establish an

ethical order if society was found to be in a state of disarray.11 According to al-

Tabari, the seventh century proved wars of self-defence were legitimate so long

as peace had first been offered to the aggressors. Interestingly, al-Tabari also

singles out the dangers of ‘unbelief’ in Islam. Al-Tabari reasons that unbelief can

lead to persecution of Muslims, which was never justified. The Qur’anic verse,

‘God loveth not aggressors . . . [P]ersecution is worse than slaughter’ (2: 190–91)

signalled for al-Tabari that the use of defensive war against unbelievers was

wholly justified.12 Al-Tabari also describes the importance of authority in

determining just war. While the Shi’a believe the imam is the only religious

representative with authority to interpret the word of God, it is also only the imam

who holds the authority to determine whether an offensive war can be

undertaken. This contrasts with the Sunni belief that anyone has the authority,

vested by God, to wage offensive jihad to further God’s cause.13 Both subsets of

Islam view defensive jihad as justifiable and not requiring the approval of the

imam.14 They also converge on the issue of ‘unbelief,’ which is viewed as

dangerous to Muslims because it often leads to persecution.

As Walzer predicted, there are certain core beliefs of morality in war shared by

both Western/Christian and Islam. The question is where do these commonalities

lie and are they significant enough for today’s opposing forces today to reach

Walzer’s social contract for just wars?

First, Christian and Islamic writing both describe a doctrine of discrimination

and proportionality. Discrimination is the principle that non-combatants should be

protected unless their deaths are unavoidable to ensure victory.15 Islamic law is

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explicit in this regard, calling for the protection of women, children, and other non-

combatants in war.16 In early Christian discourse, by contrast, theologians such as

Franciscus de Victoria (sixteenth century) argued that discrimination applied to

Christians but not non-Christians.17 Some scholars point to Islamic shari’a’s

clause that ‘Necessity overrides the forbidden’ as an exemption for Muslims to

obey the convention of discrimination.18 Proportionality, the concept that the

destruction caused by war is not greater than the value gained in fighting, is also

embraced by both traditions. Philosopher Henry Sidgwick (nineteenth century)

argued that proportionality existed in two forms: first, that force should be used

meaningfully, not needlessly, and with restraint; and second, that victory itself was

worth the costs associated with the war.19 This is similar to Islamic tradition, in

which the Prophet and his caliphs established principles of restraint in war to

minimize the harm to the society in which the war was waged.20

Second, both religious philosophies point to the necessity of a legitimate

authority sanctioning war for it to be just. In the tenth-century work the Virtuous

City, Islamic political philosopher al-Farabi asserts that only a ‘virtuous city,’ led

by the ‘virtuous ruler,’ is able to wage just war. He creates a set of conditions the

ruler must meet in order to be deemed wise and capable enough to lead the just war,

including familiarity with and understanding of the land’s laws and traditions, the

mental faculty to decipher the meaning behind the laws, and the judgement to

decide what is good for the city.21 With few leaders actually able to meet these

conditions, al-Farabi is implying the incidence of war should be rare, as few leaders

will have legitimate authority to conduct a just war. In Western/Christian tradition,

authority is equally important. St. Thomas Aquinas posits that only the sovereign

authority can sanction war because it is the authority’s duty to ‘watch over the

business of the weal [sic ] of the city, kingdom, or province subject to them.’22

Third, a central principle in both Western/Christian and Islamic thought is that

self-defence of an individual is rarely denied. When applied to nations, there is an

accepted tenet that nations have a prima facie right to defend themselves against

aggression, provided that the proportionality in that defence is observed. Islamic

interpretation of self-defence is more difficult to determine. One Qur’anic passage

posits ‘if God had not enabled people to defend themselves against one another,

monasteries and churches and synagogues and mosques . . .would surely have

been destroyed’ (22: 39–40).23 Thus self-defence is part of the preservation of

God’s cause, making it not simply a choice for Muslims but rather fard ‘ayn, a

moral obligation.24 The line between self-defence and the contentious ‘aggressive

jihad’ is argued by Islamic scholars. Indeed, modernists such as Egyptian scholar

Muhammad Abu Zahra have contended, ‘War is not justified . . . to impose Islam as

a religion on unbelievers . . . The Prophet Muhammad fought only to repulse

aggression.’25 The debate within the Islamic community continues to struggle with

defining war for self-defence and acts of true aggression.

Fourth and perhaps most crucial to the current character of warfare, issues of

terrorism and irregular attacks are heavily debated in both schools of religious

just-war thought. The difficulty for both schools of thought is threefold: who,

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using non-government sanctioned warfare, can be considered to have a ‘just

cause’ rather than acting as ‘armed bandits,’26 in what situations irregular means

can be justified, and against whom these attacks can be carried out. The

Western/Christian tradition identifies instances where ‘resistance,’ presumably

using irregular means, is justifiable. Resistance is morally authorized against an

unjust government, which has either seized power forcibly and is thus unlawful,

as was the case with German occupation of France during World War II, or when

a lawful body has grown corrupt and has lost its original legitimacy, as was the

case domestically with the German government in the same period.27 On the

other hand, combatants using irregular means are often not uniformed and may be

indistinguishable from the civilian population. The non-combatant population,

then, is put at greater physical danger as soldiers might not make the right

determination of who is or is not a threat. Because of this, irregular warfare can be

viewed as unjust.

With regards to Islam, irregular warfare has traditionally been viewed in

terms of resistance and rebellion and is currently a subject of contentious debate.

One of the official Muslim judicial foundations on irregular warfare is the Ahkam

al-Bughat, which was concerned with rebellion of Muslims within an Islamic

state and against an authority figure such as an imam.28 Rebellion against the

imam was justified if the leader was viewed as unjust, an antithesis of sorts to al-

Farabi’s virtuous ruler. Since obeisance to God is the a priori duty of all Muslims,

rebellion – using irregular or other means – against the authority who is

perceived as deviating from ‘God’s cause’ is justified. In more recent history,

extremists such as Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb exploited this reasoning in

support of their views on when attacks are just. Indeed, war itself was for them

not limited to states but to ‘loose parties of believers and unbelievers.’29

This leads to a very open interpretation of who comprises these ‘loose parties.’

As is the case generally with Islamic definitions, it is up to those sanctioning

and perpetuating the acts of violence to decide who qualifies as appropriate

enemies or ‘people of war’ (ahl al-harb)30 who can be targeted without moral

repercussions.

Having explored Islamic and Christian just war doctrine, it is evident that

there is considerable overlap of basic principles. However, it is also clear that a

combatant’s interpretation of just war thought is wedded to rationalization of

actions for a specific end. It can also be said that in terms of contemporary

warfare, there is a disconnect between state and non-state actors conducting ‘war’

as they define it. With these considerations in mind, can Walzer’s contractarian

rationale be applied to the world today? Not without revision.

There are two key flaws in Walzer’s approach.

First, it has yet to be established whether the non-state actors’ (in the form of

Islamic extremists and insurgents) definition of a moral war can be joined up

rationally with the Western/Christian state view to create standards of just war for

its participants. This does not seem plausible. The idea of ‘rationality’ itself and

mutual benefit with these two groups are culturally, ideologically, and, to an

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extent, pragmatically driven. How, then, can groups settle on a common ethical

foundation in warfare? Can combatants as part of Al-Qaeda, as the principal

religious extremist ideologue driven by a set of political objectives, using a strict

Wahhabist and Salafist interpretation of Islamic principles to justify its use of

force against the West and Islamic regimes, be persuaded to at least adhere to the

overlapping principles of Western/Christian and Islamic tradition of discrimi-

nation and proportionality? As extremist successes often rely on principles of

indiscrimination and rate attacks by symbolic impact rather than considerations

of proportionality, the answer is inevitably no.

The second problem with Walzer’s rationale is an assumption that there is

a level of understanding of the opponent’s morality as it affects his decision-

making. This is not always the case. For example, members within the

Western/Christian community, to include the more conservative commentators

and evangelicals, wrongly looked at Islamic tradition writ large, rather than the

interpretations of individuals involved in the current conflict, as condoning

sweeping violence.31 This obstructs the creation of a common foundation

because one group – the Western/Christian community – already believes an

opposing community’s values – perceived violence – is irreconcilably

opposed to its own. Returning to Gauthier, contractarianism requires that both

sides believe in the rationality and moral reasoning of the other to be able to

predict how the actor will make decisions (inevitably leading to the classic

prisoner’s dilemma). However, if either side in a war does not understand the

other, the contractarian rationale becomes an unrealizable concept because

neither side can count on the other to think or act as he thinks or acts.

Moreover, if one side believes the other will act irrationally – in this case due

to ideological demands that supersede the interests of the individual himself –

no social contract can be forged because there is no guarantee it will not be

broken.

Ultimately, what can be derived from Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars is an

appreciation for the inherent difficulty of defining just war between two vastly

different cultures and ideologies. The main combatants today, a myriad of

Islamic extremist groups, use a sliding spectrum of moral rectitude to justify

war against states and individuals perceived to threaten their cause. As these

disparate groups – whose authority, responsibility, and ultimate aims rest with

themselves – wage war on predominantly Western states, the concept of just

war becomes null and void. Ultimately, it can be concluded that Walzer’s

contractarian rationale, while applicable to interstate war, is incompatible with

contemporary, irregular warfare.

Jaz Azari

King’s College, London

Email: jennifer.azari@kcl.ac.uk

Acknowledgements

The author would like to extend special thanks to Will Morgan for assistance with the essay.

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Notes

1. ‘Contractarianism’, (2007) Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Available fromhttp://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractarianism/#3 (accessed 18 February 2008).

2. Fixdal and Smith, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Just War,’ 287.3. BBC Website, ‘Religion & Ethics – Ethical Issues’. Available from http://www.bbc.

co.uk/religion/ethics/war/just/history.shtml (accessed 20 February 2008).4. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, part II, question 40.5. Ibid.6. Sachedina, ‘Development of Jihad,’ 36.7. Ibid., 47.8. Ibid., 35–36.9. Ibid., 38.

10. Ibid., 46.11. Ibid., 38.12. Ibid., 42–43.13. Ibid.14. Ibid., 45.15. Lammers, ‘Approaches to Limits on War in Western Just War Discourse,’ 65.16. Hehir and Mottahedeh, A Just War?, 6.17. Lammers, ‘Approaches to Limits on War in Western Just War Discourse,’ 65.18. Tibi, ‘War and Peace in Islam,’ 133.19. Mapel, 436.20. Hashmi, ‘Interpreting the Islamic Ethics of War and Peace,’ 161.21. Butterworth, ‘Al Farabı’s Statecraft,’ 89–93.22. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, part I, question 40.23. Hashmi, ‘Interpreting the Islamic Ethics of War and Peace,’ 150.24. Ibid., 156.25. Ibid., 159.26. El Fadl, 149.27. Finnis, ‘The Ethics of War and Peace in the Catholic Natural Law Tradition,’ 30–31.28. El Fadl, 150–51.29. Tibi, ‘War and Peace in Islam,’ 137.30. Johnson and Kelsay, Cross, Crescent, and Sword, 201.31. Kelsay, Arguing the Just War in Islam, 4.

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