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Table of Contents

EN BANC ....................................................................................................................................... 1FIRST DIVISION .......................................................................................................................... 9Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila .......................................... 18RULE 110 - PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES....................................................................... 22RULE 111 - PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION................................................................ 25

RULE 112 - PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION ............................................................... 26

EN BANC[G.R. No. 143047. July 14, 2004]

RICARDO S. INDING, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for thenullification of the September 23, 1999 Resolution[1] of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division),which denied the petitioners omnibus motion with supplemental motion, and its Resolution datedApril 25, 2000, denying the petitioners motion for the reconsideration of thesame.

The Antecedents

On January 27, 1999, an Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan charging petitionerRicardo S. Inding, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City, with violation of

Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019,[2] committed as follows:

That from the period 3 January 1997 up to 9 August 1997 and for sometime prior or subsequentthereto, in Dapitan City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Ricardo S. Inding, a high-ranking public officer, being a Councilor of Dapitan Cityand as such, while in the performance of his official functions, particularly in the operation againstdrug abuse, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there, willfully, unlawfullyand criminally, faked buy-bust operations against alleged pushers or users to enable him to claimor collect from the coffers of the city government a total amount of P30,500.00, as reimbursementfor actual expenses incurred during the alleged buy-bust operations, knowing fully well that he


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had no participation in the said police operations against drugs but enabling him to collect fromthe coffers of the city government a total amount of P30,500.00, thereby causing undue injury tothe government as well as the public interest.[3]

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25116 and raffled to the Second Division ofthe Sandiganbayan.

On June 2, 1999, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion[4] for the dismissal of the case forlack of jurisdiction over the officers charged or, in the alternative, for the referral of the case eitherto the Regional Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court for appropriate proceedings. Thepetitioner alleged therein that under Administrative Order No. 270 which prescribes the Rules andRegulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, he is a member of theSangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City with Salary Grade (SG) 25. He asserted that underRepublic Act No. 7975, which amended Presidential Decree No. 1606, the Sandiganbayanexercises original jurisdiction to try cases involving crimes committed by officials of localgovernment units only if such officials occupy positions with SG 27 or higher, based on Rep. ActNo. 6758, otherwise known as the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. Hecontended that under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No.7975, the RTC, not the Sandiganbayan, has original jurisdiction over the crime charged againsthim. The petitioner urged the trial court to take judicial notice of Adm. Order No. 270.

In its comment on the omnibus motion, the Office of the Special Prosecutor asserted thatthe petitioner was, at the time of the commission of the crime, a member of the SangguniangPanlungsodof Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte, one of those public officers who, by expressprovision of Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7975,[5] isclassified as SG 27. Hence, the Sandiganbayan, not the RTC, has original jurisdiction over thecase, regardless of his salary grade under Adm. Order No. 270.

On September 23, 1999, the respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying thepetitioners omnibus motion. According to the court, the Information alleged that the petitionerhas a salary grade of 27. Furthermore, Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, which amended Section4 of P.D. No. 1606, provides that the petitioner, as a member of the Sangguniang PanlungsodofDapitan City, has a salary grade of 27.[6]

On October 27, 1999, the petitioner filed a Supplemental Motion to his omnibus motion,[7]citing Rep. Act No. 8294 and the ruling of this Court in Organo v. Sandiganbayan,[8] where it wasdeclared that Rep. Act No. 8249, the latest amendment to the law creating the Sandiganbayan,collated the provisions on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan , and that the originaljurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a trial court was made to depend not on the penalty imposedby law on the crimes and offenses within its jurisdiction but on the rank and salary grade ofaccused government officials and employees.

In the meantime, the petitioner was conditionally arraigned on October 28, 1999 andentered a plea of not guilty.[9]

On November 18, 1999, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of theSandiganbayans September 23, 1999 Resolution.[10] The motion was, however, denied by theSandiganbayan in a Resolution promulgated on April 25, 2000.[11]

Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, contending as follows:

A. That Republic Act [No.] 8249 which took effect last 05 February 1997 made thejurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a trial court depend not only on the penaltyimposed by law on the crimes and offenses within its jurisdiction but on the rankand salary grade of accused government officials and employees.

B. That the ruling of the Supreme Court in Lilia B. Organo versus TheSandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 133535, 09
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/133535.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/133535.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/133535.htmhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/133535.htm


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September 1999, settles the matter on the original jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan as a trial court which is over public officials and employees withrank and salary grade 27 and above.

The petitioner contends that, at the time the offense charged was allegedly committed, hewas already occupying the position of Sangguniang Panlungsod Member I with SG 25. Hence,under Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249, amending Rep. Act No. 7975, it is the RTC and not the

Sandiganbayan that has jurisdiction over the offense lodged against him. He asserts that underAdm. Order No. 270,[12] Dapitan City is only a component city, and the members of theSangguniang Panlungsod are classified as Sangguniang Panlungsod Members I with SG25. Thus, Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975,and retained by Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249, does not apply to him.

On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, contendthat Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975,expressly provides that the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over violations of Rep. ActNo. 3019, as amended, committed by the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod,without qualification and regardless of salary grade. They argue that when Congress approvedRep. Act No. 7975 and Rep. Act No. 8249, it was aware that not all the positions specificallymentioned in Section 4, subparagraph (1) were classified as SG 27, and yet were specifically

included therein, viz:

It is very clear from the aforecited provisions of law that the members of the sangguniangpanlungsodare specifically included as among those falling within the exclusive originaljurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

A reading of the aforesaid provisions, likewise, show that the qualification as to Salary Grade 27and higher applies only to such officials of the executive branch other than the regional directorand higher and those specifically enumerated. To rule, otherwise, is to give a differentinterpretation to what the law clearly is.

Moreover, had there been an intention to make Salary Grade 27 and higher as the sole factor todetermine the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan then the lawmakers could have

simply stated that the officials of the executive branch, to fall within the exclusive originaljurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should have been occupying the positions with a Salary Gradeof 27 and higher. But the express wordings in both RA No. 7975 and RA No. 8249 specificallyincluding the members of the sangguniang panlungsod, among others, as those within theexclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only means that the said sangguniangmembers shall be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the said court regardless of theirSalary Grade.

In this connection too, it is well to state that the lawmakers are very well aware that not all thepositions specifically mentioned as those within the exclusive original jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan have a Salary Grade of 27 and higher. Yet, the legislature has explicitly madethe officials so enumerated in RA No. 7975 and RA No. 8249 as falling within the exclusiveoriginal jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because of the nature of these officials functions and

responsibilities as well as the power they can wield over their respective area of jurisdiction.[13]

The threshold issue for the Courts resolution is whether the Sandiganbayan has originaljurisdiction over the petitioner, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsodof Dapitan City, whowas charged with violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The Court rules in the affirmative.


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(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;[21]

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in theOffice of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlledcorporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under theCompensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to theprovisions of the Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under theCompensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned insubsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.[22]

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A.

In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salarygrade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupyingthe rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall bevested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, andMunicipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction asprovided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.[23]

A plain reading of the above provision shows that, for purposes of determining thegovernment officials that fall within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in casesinvolving violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised PenalCode, Rep. Act No. 7975 has grouped them into five categories, to wit:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,

otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher. . .

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under theCompensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions


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of the Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under theCompensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

With respect to the first category, i.e., officials of the executive branch with SG 27 or

higher, Rep. Act No. 7975 further specifically included the following officials as falling within theoriginal jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, andprovincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in theOffice of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlledcorporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

The specific inclusion of the foregoing officials constitutes an exception to the generalqualification relating to officials of the executive branch as occupying the pos itions of regionaldirector and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and

Position Classification Act of 1989. In other words, violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 committed byofficials in the executive branch with SG 27 or higher, and the officials specifically enumerated in(a) to (g) of Section 4 a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975,regardless of their salary grades, likewise fall within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Had it been the intention of Congress to confine the original jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan to violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 only to officials in the executive branch withSG 27 or higher, then it could just have ended paragraph (1) of Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, asamended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, with the phrase officials of the executive branchoccupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 andhigher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. Or the category inparagraph (5) of the same provision relating to [a]ll other national and local officials classified asGrade 27 and up under the Compensation and Classification Act of 1989 would have sufficed.

Instead, under paragraph (1) of Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep.Act No. 7975, Congress included specific officials, without any reference as to their salary grades.Clearly, therefore, Congress intended these officials, regardless of their salary grades, to bespecifically included within the Sandiganbayans original jurisdiction, for had it been otherwise,then there would have been no need for such enumeration. It is axiomatic in legal hermeneuticsthat words in a statute should not be construed as surplusage if a reasonable construction whichwill give them some force and meaning is possible.[24]

That the legislators intended to include certain public officials, regardless of their salarygrades, within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is apparent from the legislative


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history of both Rep. Acts Nos. 7975 and 8249. In his sponsorship speech of Senate Bill No.1353, which was substantially adopted by both Houses of Congress and became Rep. Act No.7975, Senator Raul S. Roco, then Chairman of the Committee on Justice and Human Rights,explained:

Senate Bill No. 1353 modifies the present jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan such that only thoseoccupying high positions in the government and the military fall under the jurisdiction of the court.

As proposed by the Committee, the Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction over casesassigned to it only in instances where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupyingthe positions of regional director and higher or are otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher bythe Compensation and Classification Act of 1989, whether in a permanent, acting or interimcapacity at the time of the commission of the offense. The jurisdiction, therefore, refers to acertain grade upwards, which shall remain with the Sandiganbayan.

The President of the Philippines and other impeachable officers such as the justices of theSupreme Court and constitutional commissions are not subject to the original jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan during their incumbency.

The bill provides for an extensive listing of other public officers who will be subject to the originaljurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It includes, among others, Members of Congress, judges andjustices of all courts.[25]

More instructive is the sponsorship speech, again, of Senator Roco, of Senate Bill No. 844,which was substantially adopted by both Houses of Congress and became Rep. Act No.8249. Senator Roco explained the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Rep. Act No. 7975, thus:

SPONSORSHIP OF SENATOR ROCO

By way of sponsorship, Mr. Presidentwe will issue the full sponsorship speech to the membersbecause it is fairly technicalmay we say the following things:

To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 7975 was enacted for that Court toconcentrate on the larger fish and leave the small fry to the lower courts. This law becameeffective on May 6, 1995 and it provided a two-pronged solution to the clogging of the dockets ofthat court, to wit:

It divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over public officials whose salary grades were atGrade 26 or lower, devolving thereby these cases to the lower courts, and retaining thejurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only over public officials whose salary grades were at Grade

27 or higher and over other specific public officials holding important positions in governmentregardless of salary grade;[26]

Evidently, the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) Section 4 a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606, amendedSection 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, were specifically included within the original jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan because the lawmakers considered them big fish and their positions important,regardless of their salary grades.

This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that some of the officials enumerated in (a)to (g) are not classified as SG 27 or higher under the Index of Occupational Services, Position


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Titles and Salary Grades issued by the Department of Budget and Management in 1989, then ineffect at the time that Rep. Act No. 7975 was approved. For example:

Category New Position Title Grade

16. FOREIGN RELATIONS SERVICE

Foreign Service

Foreign Service Officer, Class II[27] 23[28]Foreign Service Officer, Class I[29] 24[30]

18. EXECUTIVE SERVICE

Local Executives

City Government Department Head I 24[31]City Government Department Head II 26[32]

Provincial Government Department Head 25[33]

City Vice Mayor I 26City Vice Mayor II 28City Mayor I 28[34]City Mayor II 30

19. LEGISLATIVE SERVICE

Sangguniang Members

Sangguniang Panlungsod Member I 25Sangguniang Panlungsod Member II 27Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member 26[35]

Office of the City and Provincial Prosecutors[36]

Prosecutor IV 29


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Prosecutor III 28Prosecutor II 27Prosecutor I 26Noticeably, the vice mayors, members of the Sangguniang Panlungsodand prosecutors,

without any distinction or qualification, were specifically included in Rep. Act No. 7975 as fallingwithin the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, the consuls, city departmentheads, provincial department heads and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, albeitclassified as having salary grades 26 or lower, were also specifically included within theSandiganbayans original jurisdiction. As correctly posited by the respondents, Congress ispresumed to have been aware of, and had taken into account, these officials respective salarygrades when it deliberated upon the amendments to the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction.Nonetheless, Congress passed into law Rep. Act No. 7975, specifically including them within theoriginal jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. By doing so, it obviously intended cases mentioned inSection 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, when committedby the officials enumerated in (1) (a) to (g) thereof, regardless of their salary grades, to be tried bythe Sandiganbayan.

Indeed, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that the intent of the legislature is thecontrolling factor in the interpretation of a statute.[37] From the congressional records and the textof Rep. Acts No. 7975 and 8294, the legislature undoubtedly intended the officials enumerated in

(a) to (g) of Section 4 a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by the aforesaid subsequent laws, tobe included within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides that if the accused isoccupying a position lower than SG 27, the proper trial court has jurisdiction,[38] can only beproperly interpreted as applying to those cases where the principal accused is occupying aposition lower than SG 27 and not among those specifically included in the enumeration inSection 4 a. (1)(a) to (g). Stated otherwise, except for those officials specifically included inSection 4 a. (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades, over whom the Sandiganbayan hasjurisdiction, all other public officials below SG 27 shall be under the jurisdiction of the proper trialcourts where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to SG 27 orhigher. By this construction, the entire Section 4 is given effect. The cardinal rule, after all, instatutory construction is that the particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as

detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must beconsidered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmoniouswhole.[39] And courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, ifat all possible. Ut magis valeat quam pereator that construction is to be sought which gives effectto the whole of the statuteits every word.[40]

In this case, there is no dispute that the petitioner is a member of the SangguniangPanlungsod of Dapitan City and he is charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of Rep. Act No.3019. Members of the Sangguniang Panlungsodare specifically included as among those withinthe original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Section 4 a.(1) (b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amendedby Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975,[41] or even Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249[42] for thatmatter. The Sandiganbayan, therefore, has original jurisdiction over the petitioners casedocketed as Criminal Case No. 25116.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions of theSandiganbayan dated September 23, 1999 and April 25, 2000 are AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 125066. July 8, 1998]


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ISABELITA REODICA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,respondents.

D E C I S I O N

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van alongDoa Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly becauseof her recklessness, her van hit the car of complainant Norberto Bonsol. As a result, complainantsustained physical injuries, while the damage to his car amounted to P8,542.00.

Three days after the incident, or on 20 October 1987, the complainant filed an Affidavit ofComplaint[1] against petitioner with the Fiscals Office.

On 13 January 1988, an information[2] was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofMakati (docketed as Criminal Case No. 33919) charging petitioner with Reckless ImprudenceResulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury. The information read:

The undersigned 2nd

Asst. Fiscal accuses Isabelita Reodica of the crime of

Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injuryas follows:

That on or about the 17th

day of October, 1987 in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila,Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovementioned accused,Isabelita Velasco Reodica, being then the driver and/or person in charge of a Tamaraw bearingplate no. NJU-306, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage andoperate the same in a reckless, careless, negligent and imprudent manner, without regard totraffic laws, rules and regulations and without taking the necessary care and precaution to avoiddamage to property and injuries to person, causing by such negligence, carelessness andimprudence the said vehicle to bump/collide with a Toyota Corolla bearing plate no. NIM-919driven and owned by Norberto Bonsol, thereby causing damage amounting to P8,542.00, to thedamage and prejudice of its owner, in the aforementioned amount of P8,542.00.

That as further consequence due to the strong impact, said Norberto Bonsol suffered bodilyinjuries which required medical attendance for a period of less that nine (9) days andincapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the same period of time.

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.

On 31 January 1991, the RTC of Makati, Branch 145, rendered a decision[3] convictingpetitioner of the quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with slightphysical injuries, and sentencing her:

[t]o suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor,and to pay thecomplainant, Norberto Bonsol y Atienza, the sum of Thirteen Thousand Five

Hundred Forty-Two (P13,542), Philippine Currency, without subsidiary impairmentin case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.[4]

The trial court justified imposing a 6-month prison term in this wise:

As a result of the reckless imprudence of the accused, complainant suffered slightphysical injuries (Exhs. D, H and I). In view of the resulting physical injuries, thepenalty to be imposed is not fine, but imprisonment (Gregorio, Fundamental ofCriminal Law Review, Eight Edition 1988, p. 711). Slight physical injuries thrureckless imprudence is now punished with penalty of arresto mayorin its maximum


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period (People v.Aguiles, L-11302, October 28, 1960, cited in Gregorios book, p.718).[5]

As to the sum of P13,542.00, this represented the cost of the car repairs (P8,542.00) andmedical expenses (P5,000.00).

Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as

CA-G.R. CR No. 14660. After her motions for extension of time to file her brief were granted, shefiled a Motion to Withdraw Appeal for Probation Purposes, and to Suspend, Ex AbundantiCautela, Period for Filing Appellants Brief. However, respondent Court of Appeals denied thismotion and directed petitioner to file her brief.[6]

After passing upon the errors imputed by petitioner to the trial court, respondent Court ofAppeals rendered a decision[7] on 31 January 1996 affirming the appealed decision.

Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration[8] raising new issues, thus:

NOW THAT AN ACQUITTAL SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE, MAY WE REVISIT THEPENALTY AND MOVE THAT IT BE REVIEWED AND SET ASIDE SINCE IT ISRESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TO BE ERROR TO COMPLEX DAMAGE TOPROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, AS BOTH ARE LIGHTOFFENSES, OVER WHICH THE RESPONDENT COURT HAD NOJURISDICTION AND EVEN ASSUMING SUCH JURISDICTION, IT CANNOTIMPOSE A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.[9]

. . . . . . . . .

REVERSAL OF THE DECISION REMAINS POSSIBLE ON GROUNDS OFPRESCRIPTION OR LACK OF JURISDICTION.[10]

In its Resolution of 24 May 1996, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion forreconsideration for lack of merit, as well as her supplemental motion for reconsideration. Hence,the present petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court premised on thefollowing grounds:

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED JANUARY 31, 1996AND MORE SO ITS RESOLUTION DATED MAY 24, 1996, ARE CONTRARY TOLAW AND GROSSLY ERRONEOUS IN THAT THEY IMPOSED A PENALTY INEXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW FOR THE CRIME OF RECKLESSIMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, ON THE BASIS OFA CLERICAL ERROR IN A SECONDARY SOURCE.

A IN THE CASE OF PEOPLE V. AGUILAR,[11] THE SAME CASEWHERE THE COURTA QUO BASED ITS FINDING OF APENALTY WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THEREGIONAL TRIAL COURT, WHAT WAS STATED IN THEORIGINAL TEXT OF SAID CASE IS THAT THE PENALTY

FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES THROUGH RECKLESSIMPRUDENCE ISARRESTO MENORAND NOTARRESTOMAYOR. IT IS GRAVE ERROR FOR THE RESPONDENTCOURT TO PUNISH PETITIONER MORE THAN SHESHOULD OR COULD BE PUNISHED BECAUSE OF ACLERICAL ERROR COPIED FROM A SECONDARYSOURCE.

B. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSEDITS DISCRETION WHEN IT COMPLEXED THE CRIME OF


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RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN DAMAGE TOPROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES IMPOSING ASINGLE EXCESSIVE PENALTY IN ITS ELLIPTICALRESOLUTION OF MAY 24, 1996.

C. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERREDWHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION

NOTWITHSTANDING THE DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTIONAND LACK OF JURISDICTION.

Anent the first ground, petitioner claims that the courts below misquoted not only the title,but likewise the ruling of the case cited as authority regarding the penalty for slight physicalinjuries through reckless imprudence. Concretely, the title of the case was not People v. Aguiles,but People v. Aguilar;while the ruling was that the penalty for such quasi offense was arrestomenornot arresto mayor.

As regards the second assigned error, petitioner avers that the courts below should havepronounced that there were two separate light felonies involved, namely: (1) reckless imprudencewith slight physical injuries; and (2) reckless imprudence with damage to property, instead ofconsidering them a complex crime. Two light felonies, she insists, do not rate a single penalty

of arresto mayoror imprisonment of six months, citing Lontok v. Gorgonio,[12] thus:

Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries,damage to property amounting to P10,000.00 and slight physical injuries, a chief ofpolice did not err in filing a separate complaint for the slight physical injuries andanother complaint for the lesiones menos gravesand damage to property (Arcayavs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365).

. . . . . . . . .

The case of Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, cited by investigating fiscal, is different fromthe instant case because in that case the negligent act resulted in the offenses of lesionesmenos gravesand damage to property which were both less grave felonies and which,

therefore, constituted a complex crime.

In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones levesthrough reckless imprudence should have been charged in a separate information.

She then suggests that at worst, the penalties of two light offenses, both imposable in theirmaximum period and computed or added together, only sum up to 60 days imprisonment and notsix months as imposed by the lower courts.

On the third assigned error, petitioner insists that the offense of slight physical injuriesthrough reckless imprudence, being punishable only by arresto menor, is a light offense; as such,it prescribes in two months. Here, since the information was filed only on 13 January 1988, oralmost three months from the date the vehicular collision occurred, the offense had already

prescribed, again citing Lontok, thus:

In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesioneslevesthrough reckless imprudence should have been charged in a separateinformation. And since, as a light offense, it prescribes in two months, Lontokscriminal liability therefor was already extinguished (Arts. 89[5], 90 and 91, RevisedPenal Code in relation to sec. 2[e] and [f], Rule 117, Rules of Court). The trial courtcommitted a grave abuse of discretion in not sustaining Lontoks motion to quashthat part of the information charging him with that light offense.


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Petitioner further claims that the information was filed with the wrong court, since Regional TrialCourts do not deal with arresto menor cases. She submits that damage to property and slightphysical injuries are light felonies and thus covered by the rules on summary procedure;therefore, only the filing with the proper Metropolitan Trial Court could have tolled the statute oflimitations, this time invoking Zaldivia v. Reyes.[13]

In its Comment filed on behalf of public respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General

(OSG) agrees with petitioner that the penalty should have been arresto menor in its maximumperiod, instead of arresto mayor, pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

As to the second assigned error, the OSG contends that conformably with Buerano v.Court of Appeals,[14] which frowns upon splitting of crimes and prosecution, it was proper for thetrial court to complex reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries and damage to propertybecause what the law seeks to penalize is the single act of reckless imprudence, not the resultsthereof; hence, there was no need for two separate informations.

To refute the third assigned error, the OSG submits that although the Municipal Trial Courthad jurisdiction to impose arresto menor for slight physical injuries, the Regional Trial Courtproperly took cognizance of this case because it had the jurisdiction to impose the higher penaltyfor the damage to property, which was a fine equal to thrice the value of P8,542.00. On this

score, the OSG cites Cuyos v. Garcia.[15]

The OSG then debunks petitioners defense of prescription of the crime, arguing that theprescriptive period here was tolled by the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office three daysafter the incident, pursuant to People v. Cuaresma[16] and Chico v. Isidro.[17]

In her Reply to the Comment of the OSG, petitioner expressed gratitude and appreciationto the OSG in joining cause with her as to the first assigned error. However, she considers theOSGs reliance on Buerano v. Court of Appeals[18] as misplaced, for nothing there validates thecomplexing of the crime of reckless imprudence with physical injuries and damage to property;besides, in that case, two separate informations were filed -- one for slight and serious physicalinjuries through reckless imprudence and the other for damage to property through recklessimprudence. She then insists that in this case, following Arcaya v. Teleron[19] and Lontok v.Gorgonio,[20] two informations should have been filed. She likewise submits that Cuyos v.

Garcia[21] would only apply here on the assumption that it was proper to complex damage toproperty through reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries through recklessimprudence. Chico v. Isidro[22] is likewise inapposite, for it deals with attempted homicide,which is not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Petitioner finally avers that People v. Cuaresma[23] should not be given retroactive effect;otherwise, it would either unfairly prejudice her or render nugatory the en banc ruling inZaldivia[24]favorable to her.

The pleadings thus raise the following issues:

I. Whether the penalty imposed on petitioner is correct.

II. Whether the quasioffenses of reckless imprudence resulting in

damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00 and recklessimprudence resulting in slight physical injuries are light felonies.

III. Whether the rule on complex crimes under Article 48 of the RevisedPenal Code applies to the quasioffenses in question.

IV. Whether the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the firsttime on appeal.

V. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the offenses in


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question.

VI. Whether the quasioffenses in question have already prescribed.

I. The Proper Penalty.

We agree with both petitioner and the OSG that the penalty of six months of arresto mayorimposed by the trial court and affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals is incorrect. However, wecannot subscribe to their submission that the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period isthe proper penalty.

Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence,shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony,shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period toprisioncorreccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony,the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed;if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menorin its

maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act whichwould otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less seriousfelony, the penalty of arresto mayorin its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted indamage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine rangingfrom an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, butwhich shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.

A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any personwho, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done

maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion,without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in thefirst two paragraphs of this article, in which case the courts shall impose the penalty next lower indegree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.

According to the first paragraph of the aforequoted Article, the penalty for recklessimprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, a light felony, is arresto menor in its maximum

period, with a duration of 21 to 30 days. If the offense of slight physical injuries is, however,committed deliberately or with malice, it is penalized with arresto menorunder Article 266 of theRevised Penal Code, with a duration of 1 day to 30 days. Plainly, the penalty then under Article266 may be either lower than or equal to the penalty prescribed under the first paragraph ofArticle 365. This being the case, the exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365applies. Hence, the proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries ispublic censure, this being the penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor.[25]

As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, thethird paragraph of Article 365, which provides for the penalty of fine, does not apply since the


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reckless imprudence in this case did not result in damage to property only. What applies is thefirst paragraph of Article 365, which provides for arresto mayor in its minimum and mediumperiods (1 month and 1 day to 4 months) for an act committed through reckless imprudencewhich, had it been intentional, would have constituted a less grave felony. Note that if thedamage to the extent of P8,542.00 were caused deliberately, the crime would have beenmalicious mischief under Article 329 of the Revised Penal Code, and the penalty would then bearresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months which ishigher than that prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 365). If the penalty under Article 329were equal to or lower than that provided for in the first paragraph, then the sixth paragraph ofArticle 365 would apply, i.e., the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto menor in itsmaximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period or imprisonment from 21 days to 2months. Accordingly, the imposable penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in damage toproperty to the extent of P8,542.00 would be arresto mayorin its minimum and medium periods,which could be anywhere from a minimum of 1 month and 1 day to a maximum of 4 months, atthe discretion of the court, since the fifth paragraph of Article 365 provides that in the impositionof the penalties therein provided the courts shall exercise their sound discretion witho ut regard tothe rules prescribed in article 64.

II. Classification of the Quasi Offense in Question.

Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo), but likewise by means of fault(culpa). There is deceit when the wrongful act is performed with deliberate intent; and there isfault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack ofskill.[26]

As earlier stated, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is punishable bypublic censure only. Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code defines light felonies asinfractions of law carrying the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, orboth. Since public censure is classified under Article 25 of the Code as a light penalty, and isconsidered under the graduated scale provided in Article 71 of the same Code as a penalty lowerthan arresto menor, it follows that the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physicalinjuries is a light felony.

On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in damage to property is, as earlierdiscussed, penalized with arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since arrestomayor is a correctional penalty under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, the quasioffense inquestion is a less grave felonynot a light felony as claimed by petitioner.

III. Applicability of the Rule on Complex Crimes.

Since criminal negligence may, as here, result in more than one felony, should Article 48 ofthe Revised Code on complex crimes be applied? Article 48 provides as follows:

ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. -- When a single act constitutes two or

more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is necessary a means forcommitting the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, thesame to be applied in its maximum period.

Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more grave or less gravefelonies, a complex crime is committed. However, in Lontok v. Gorgonio,[27] this Court declaredthat where one of the resulting offenses in criminal negligence constitutes a light felony, there isno complex crime, thus:

Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there is no complex


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crime. The resulting offenses may be treated as separate or the light felony may beabsorbed by the grave felony. Thus, the light felonies of damage to property andslight physical injuries, both resulting from a single act of imprudence, do notconstitute a complex crime. They cannot be charged in one information. They areseparate offenses subject to distinct penalties (People vs. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001; SeePeople vs. Estipona, 70 Phil. 513).

Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries,damage to property amounting to P10,000 and slight physical injuries, a chief ofpolice did not err in filing a separate complaint for the slight physical injuries andanother complaint for the lesiones menos gravesand damage to property [Arcayavs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365].

Hence, the trial court erred in considering the following felonies as a complex crime: theless grave felony of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount ofP8,542.00 and the light felony of reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries.

IV. The Right to Assail the Duplicity of the Information.

Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that the quasi offense of recklessimprudence resulting in slight physical injuries should have been charged in a separateinformation because it is not covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. However,petitioner may no longer question, at this stage, the duplicitous character of the information, i.e.,charging two separate offenses in one information, to wit: (1) reckless imprudence resulting indamage to property; and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries. This defectwas deemed waived by her failure to raise it in a motion to quash before she pleaded to theinformation.[28] Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses arecharged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to object to it before trial, thecourt may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved and impose onhim the penalty for each of them.[29]

V. Which Court Has Jurisdiction Over the

Quasi Offenses in Question.

The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the time ofthe institution of the action, unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect thatit is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment.[30]

At the time of the filing of the information in this case, the law in force was BatasPambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Section32(2)[31] thereof provided that except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction ofthe Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs),Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) had exclusive originaljurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two

months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both fine and imprisonment,regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising fromsuch offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof.

The criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was then determined by the duration of theimprisonment and the amount of fine prescribed by law for the offense charged. The questionthus arises as to which court has jurisdiction over offenses punishable by censure, such asreckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries.

In Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan,[32] this Court found that a lacuna existed in the law as to


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which court had jurisdiction over offenses penalized with destierro, the duration of which was from6 months and 1 day to 6 years, which was co-extensive with prision correccional. We theninterpreted the law in this wise:

Since the legislature has placed offenses penalized with arresto mayorunder thejurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts, and since by Article 71 ofthe Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 217,

it has placed destierrobelow arresto mayor as a lower penalty than the latter, in theabsence of any express provision of law to the contrary it is logical and reasonableto infer from said provisions that its intention was to place offenses penalized withdestierroalso under the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts andnot under that of courts of first instance.

Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years and 2months were within the jurisdictional ambit of the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs, it follows that thosepenalized with censure, which is a penalty lower than arresto menor under the graduated scale inArticle 71 of the Revised Penal Code and with a duration of 1 to 30 days, should also fall withinthe jurisdiction of said courts. Thus, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries wascognizable by said courts.

As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00,the same was also under the jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs or MCTCs because the imposablepenalty therefor was arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods -- the duration of whichwas from 1 month and 1 day to 4 months.

Criminal Case No. 33919 should, therefore, be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the partof the RTC of Makati.

VI. Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.

Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence resulting in slightphysical injuries, being a light felony, prescribes in two months. On the other hand, reckless

imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, being a less grave felonywhose penalty is arresto mayorin its minimum and medium periods, prescribes in five years.

To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses have already prescribed, it isnecessary to determine whether the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office three days afterthe incident in question tolled the running of the prescriptive period.

Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. -- The period of prescriptionshall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by theoffended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filingof the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when suchproceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are

unjustifiably stopped by any reason not imputable to him. (emphasis supplied)

Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the prescriptive period shall be interrupted bythe filing of the complaint or information, does not distinguish whether the complaint is filed forpreliminary examination or investigation only or for an action on the merits.[33] Thus, in Franciscov. Court of Appeals[34] and People v. Cuaresma,[35] this Court held that the filing of thecomplaint even with the fiscals office suspends the running of the statute of limitations.

We cannot apply Section 9[36] of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that incases covered thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months,


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as in the instant case, the prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or informationdirectly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a prior preliminary examination orinvestigation; provided that in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may becommenced only by information. However, this Section cannot be taken to mean that theprescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information directly with saidcourts.

It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantivelaw. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.[37] Hence, incase of conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and theRevised Penal Code, the latter prevails.

Neither does Zaldivia control in this instance. It must be recalled that what was involvedtherein was a violation of a municipal ordinance; thus, the applicable law was not Article 91 of theRevised Penal Code, but Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled An Act to Establish Periods ofPrescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to ProvideWhen Prescription Shall Begin to Run. Under Section 2 thereof, the period of prescription issuspended only when judicial proceedings are instituted against the guilty party. Accordingly, thisCourt held that the prescriptive period was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the

Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, as such did not constitute a judicial proceeding; what couldhave tolled the prescriptive period there was only the filing of the information in the proper court.

In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code,Article 91 thereof and the rulings in Franciscoand Cuaresmaapply. Thus, the prescriptive periodfor the quasioffenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscalsoffice three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the termination of thiscase. We cannot, therefore, uphold petitioners defense of prescription ofthe offenses charged inthe information in this case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of respondentCourt of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14660 is SET ASIDE as the Regional Trial Court, whosedecision was affirmed therein, had no jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 33919.

Criminal Case No. 33919 is ordered DISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban, andQuisumbing, JJ., concur.

PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE - FULL TEXTThe Lawphil Project - Arellano Law FoundationG.R. No. 102342 July 3, 1992LUZ M. ZALDIVIA vs. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., ET AL.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANC

G.R. No. 102342 July 3, 1992


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LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, petitioner, vs. HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity as ActingPresiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 76, San

Mateo, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CRUZ,J .:

The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for violationsof municipal ordinances.

The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit inviolation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province ofRizal.

The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990.1The referral-complaint of the police was

received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990.2The corresponding

information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990.3

The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed, butthe motion was denied. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the denial was sustainedby the respondent judge.

4

In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first argues that the charge againsther is governed by the following provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure:

Sec. 1. Scope This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, theMunicipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

B. Criminal Cases:

1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

2. Violations of rental law;

3.Violations of municipal or city ordinances;

4.All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offenses charged does notexceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both,irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arisingtherefrom. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 9. How commenced. The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope of thisRule shall be either by complaint or by information filed directly in court without need of a priorpreliminary examination or preliminary investigation: Provided, however, That in MetropolitanManila and chartered cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information; Provided,further, That when the offense cannot be prosecutedde oficio, the corresponding complaint shallbe signed and sworn to before the fiscal by the offended party.

She then invokes Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods ofPrescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide


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When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading as follows:

Sec. 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless provided in such acts, prescribe inaccordance with the following rules: . . . Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shallprescribe after two months.

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution ofjudicialproceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constitutingjeopardy.

Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing violationsof law not included in the Penal Code. (Emphasis supplied)

Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the two-month statutory periodfrom the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the charge against her should have beendismissed on the ground of prescription.

For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filingof the complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with therespondent judge, the Solicitor General also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules onCriminal Procedure, providing as follows:

Sec. 1. How Instituted For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in specialcases, the institution of criminal action shall be as follows:

a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by filing the complaintwith the appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigationtherein;

b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal CircuitTrial Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the said courts, or a complaint with the fiscal'soffice. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint may be filed onlywith the office of the fiscal.

In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged. (Emphasissupplied.)

Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent maintains that the filing of the complaintwith the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase "such institution" and that thephrase "in all cases" applies to all cases, without distinction, including those falling under the Ruleon Summary Procedure.

The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an adoption of the following dictum inFrancisco v. Court of Appeals:

5

In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar, thisCourt has re-examined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at theconclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decisions holdingthat the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes ofpreliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription ofthe criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try


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the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of theRevised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filingof the complaint or information" without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the courtfor preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even ifthe court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, itsactuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it isunjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that arenot under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate theprosecution is to file the requisite complaint.

It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30, 1983, two months before thepromulgation of the Rule on Summary Procedure on August 1, 1983. On the other hand, Section1 of Rule 110 is new, having been incorporated therein with the revision of the Rules on CriminalProcedure on January 1, 1985, except for the last paragraph, which was added on October 1,1988.

That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule onsummary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not apply tooffenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the lastparagraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not

governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the canon thatwords in a statute should be read in relation to and not isolation from the rest of the measure, todiscover the true legislative intent.

As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers areviolations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner,which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and notSection 1 of Rule 110.

Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of theMunicipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceedingfour years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine andimprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civilliability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, oramount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property throughcriminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine doesnot exceed twenty thousand pesos.

These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be fileddirectly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation."

6

Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a

preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced onlywhen it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminaryinvestigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the datethe case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.

This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that theperiod of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guiltyparty." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to thesubmission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His contention isthat we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.


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At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedureand Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as thespecial law. And if there be a conflict between Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules onCriminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under ArticleVIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.

7

Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe that the decision wouldhave been conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense involved was grave oraldefamation punishable under the Revised Penal Code with arresto mayorin its maximum periodtoprision correccionalin its minimum period. By contrast, the prosecution in the instant case is forviolation of a municipal ordinance, for which the penalty cannot exceed six months, 8and is thuscovered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if thecomplaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays theinstitution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility shouldnot justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deducedfrom their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but arewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.

Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commencedfrom its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11,1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of thecomplaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicialproceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of theinformation with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2,1990, after the crime had already prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order dated October 2, 1991 isSET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 90-089 in the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal, is herebyDISMISSED on the ground of prescription. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado,Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

RULE 110 - PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES

Section 1. Institution of criminal actions. Criminal actions shall be instituted asfollows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) For offenses where a preliminary investigation is required pursuant to section1 of Rule 112, by filing the complaint with the proper officer for the purpose of conductingthe requisite preliminary investigation. (b) For all other offenses, by filing the complaint or


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information directly with the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, orthe complaint with the office of the prosecutor. In Manila and other chartered cities, thecomplaints shall be filed with the office of the prosecutor unless otherwise provided intheir charters.

The institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period of prescription ofthe offense charged unless otherwise provided in special laws.chanrobles virtualawlibrary

Sec. 2. The complaint or information The complaint or information shall be in writing, in thename of the People of the Philippines and against all persons who appear to be responsible forthe offense involved. Sec. 3. Complaint defined.A complaint is a sworn written statementcharging a person with an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or otherpublic officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated. Sec. 4. Information defined.An information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by theprosecutor and filed with the court. Sec. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. Allcriminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under thedirection and control of the prosecutor. However, in Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal CircuitTrial Courts when the prosecutor assigned thereto or to the case is not available, the offendedparty, any peace officer, or public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated mayprosecute the case. This authority shall cease upon actual intervention of the prosecutor or uponelevation of the case to the Regional Trial Court. (ReadA.M. NO. 02-2-07-SC [Effective May 01,2002] Latest Amendments to Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

which provides: " Section 5. Who must prosecute criminal action. - All criminal actions eithercommenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control ofa public prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule of the public prosecutor or in the event oflack of public prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of theProsecution Office or the Regional State Prosecutor to prosecute the case subject to the approvalof the court. Once so authorized to prosecute the criminal action, the private prosecutor shallcontinue to prosecute the case up to end of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor,unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn. x x x").

The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filedby the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without includingthe guilty parties, if both are alive, nor, in any case, if the offended party has consented to theoffense or pardoned the offenders.

The offenses of seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness shall not be prosecuted upon a

complaint filed by the offended party of her parents, grandparents or guardian, nor, in any case, ifthe offender has been expressly pardoned by any of them. If the offended party dies or becomesincapacitated before she can file the complaint, and she has no known parents, grandparents orguardian, the State shall initiate the criminal action in her behalf. chan robles virtual law library

The offended party, even if a minor, has the right to initiate the prosecution of the offenses ofseduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness independently of her parents, grandparents, orguardian, unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing so. Where the offended party, who is aminor, fails to file the complaint, her parents, grandparents, or guardian may file the same. Theright to file the action granted to parents, grandparents, or guardian shall be exclusive of all otherpersons and shall be exercised successively in the order herein provided, except as stated in thepreceding paragraph.

No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of any of the offensesmentioned above shall be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint filed by the

offended party.The prosecution for violation of special laws shall be governed by the provision thereof. Sec.6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.A complaint or information is sufficient if it states thename of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissionscomplained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate dateof the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in thecomplaint or information. Sec. 7. Name of the accused.The complaint or information muststate the name and surname of the accused or any appellation or nickname by which he hasbeen or is known. If his name cannot be ascertained, he must be described under a fictitious
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name with a statement that his true name is unknown.If the true name of the accused is thereafter disclosed by him or appears in some other manner

to the court, such true name shall be inserted in the complaint or information and record.Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the

designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting theoffense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of theoffense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.

Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation.The acts or omissions complained of as constituting theoffense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and conciselanguage and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enablea person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as itsqualifying and aggravating circumstance and for the court to pronounce judgment. Sec. 10.Place of commission of the offense. The complaint or information is sufficient if it can beunderstood from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essentialingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular placewhere it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is necessaryfor its identification. Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense. - It is not necessary to statein the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is amaterial ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a dateas near as possible to the actual date of its commission. Sec. 12. Name of the offended

party. The complaint or information must state the name and surname of the person againstwhom or against whose property the offense was committed, or any appellation or nickname bywhich such person has been or is known. If there is no better way of identifying him, he must bedescribed under a fictitious name.

(a) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown,the property must be described with such particularity as to properly identify the offensecharged. (b) If the true name of the person against whom or against whose property theoffense was committed is thereafter disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause suchtrue name to be inserted in the complaint or information and the record. (c) If theoffended party is a juridical person, it is sufficient to state its name, or any name ordesignation by which it is known or by which it may be identified, without need of averringthat it is a juridical person or that it is organized in accordance with law.

Sec. 13. Duplicity of the offense. A complaint or information must charge only one offense,

except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Sec. 14.Amendment or substitution.A complaint or information may be amended, in form orin substance, without leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to therights of the accused.

However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged inor excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by theprosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state itsreasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especiallythe offended party.

If it appears at anytime before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the properoffense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new onecharging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall

not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for theirappearance at the trial. Sec. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. - (a) Subject toexisting laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality orterritory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.

(b) Where an offense is committed in a train, aircraft, or other public or private vehicle in thecourse of its trip, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of any municipality orterritory where such train, aircraft, or other vehicle passed during its trip, including the place of itsdeparture and arrival. chan robles virtual law library

(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminalaction shall be instituted and tried in the court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or


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territory where the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the generally acceptedprinciples of international law.

(d) Crimes committed outside the Philippines but punishable under Article 2 of the RevisedPenal Code shall be cognizable by the court where the criminal action is first filed. Sec. 16.Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. Where the civil action for recovery of civilliability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may interveneby counsel in the prosecution of the offense.

RULE 111 - PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.(a) When a criminal action is instituted, thecivil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemedinstituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves theright to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before theprosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party areasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral,nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in thecomplaint or information, the filing fees therefore shall constitute a first lien on the judgmentawarding such damages.

Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information,the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actualdamages.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in thecriminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigatedin a separate civil action.

(b) The criminal action for violation ofBatas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include thecorresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full thefiling fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actualdamages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral,nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing feesbased on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of thesedamages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awardedshall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it maybe consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. Ifthe application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 ofthis Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. Sec. 2. When separatecivil action is suspended. After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civilaction arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminalaction. chan robles virtual law library

If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter shallbe suspended in whatever state it may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspensionshall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment onthe merits rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of the offended party, beconsolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In case ofconsolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automaticallyreproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witness presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties topresent additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided
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jointly.During the pendency of the criminal action, the running period of prescription of the civil action

which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled.The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However,

the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a finaljudgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise didnot exist. Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently.In the cases provided inArticles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of theCivil Code of the Philippines,the independent civil action maybe brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shallrequire only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recoverdamages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. Sec. 4. Effect ofdeath on civil actions.The death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency ofthe criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the delict. However, theindependent civil action instituted under section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted toenforce liability arising from other sources of obligation may be continued against the estate orlegal representative of the accused after proper substitution or against said estate, as the casemay be. The heirs of the accused may be substituted for the deceased without requiring theappointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litemfor theminor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be

substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the manner

especially provided in these rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased. chanrobles virtual law library

If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to anycivil action the offended party may file against the estate of the deceased. Sec. 5. Judgmentin civil action not a bar. A final judgment rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant fromcivil liability is not a bar to a criminal action against the defendant for the same act or omissionsubject of the civil action. Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question .A petitionfor suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civilaction may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminaryinvestigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspendshall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. Sec. 7.

Elements of prejudicial question.The elements of a prejudicial questions are: (a) the previouslyinstituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in thesubsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not thecriminal action may proceed.

RULE 112 - PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

Section 1. Preliminary investigation defined; when required. Preliminary investigation is aninquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-foundedbelief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and shouldbe held for trial.

Except as provided in Section 7 of this Rule, a preliminary investigation is required to beconducted before the filing of a compliant or information for an offense where the penaltyprescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to thefine. Sec. 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations.The following mayconduct preliminary investigations:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants; (b) Judges of theMunicipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; (c) National and RegionalState Prosecutors; and (d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.

Their authority to conduct preliminary investigations shall include all crimes cognizable by theproper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
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Sec. 3. Procedure. The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the followingmanner:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) The c

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