June 11, June 11, 20042004

Teaching Nonproliferation Summer InstituteTeaching Nonproliferation Summer InstituteUniversity of North Carolina, AshevilleUniversity of North Carolina, Asheville

Dr. Charles D. FergusonDr. Charles D. FergusonScientist-in-ResidenceScientist-in-Residence

Center for Nonproliferation StudiesCenter for Nonproliferation StudiesMonterey Institute of International StudiesMonterey Institute of International Studies

Supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, and the Nuclear Threat Initiativethe Ploughshares Fund, and the Nuclear Threat Initiative

Nuclear Terrorism: Nuclear Terrorism: Assessment and Prevention Assessment and Prevention and Mitigation Strategiesand Mitigation Strategies

Four Faces of Nuclear Four Faces of Nuclear TerrorismTerrorism

Acquisition of an intact nuclear weaponAcquisition of an intact nuclear weapon Crude nuclear weapon or Crude nuclear weapon or

Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Attack against or sabotage of a nuclear Attack against or sabotage of a nuclear

power plant or other nuclear facilitypower plant or other nuclear facility Radiological dispersal device (RDD) Radiological dispersal device (RDD)

or “dirty bomb”or “dirty bomb”

AssumptionsAssumptions

Unlike Cold War, today the main nuclear Unlike Cold War, today the main nuclear threat comes more from non-state threat comes more from non-state actors, i.e. terrorists.actors, i.e. terrorists.

Terrorists could not launch multiple Terrorists could not launch multiple numbers of nuclear weapons at U.S., but numbers of nuclear weapons at U.S., but if they had one, we cannot rule out them if they had one, we cannot rule out them having many.having many.

Most likely terrorists, if nuclear capable, Most likely terrorists, if nuclear capable, would only be able to build low-yield would only be able to build low-yield device, but cannot rule out acquisition of device, but cannot rule out acquisition of intact nuclear weapon from a state. intact nuclear weapon from a state.

Elementary, My Elementary, My Dear WatsonDear Watson

Motive Motive

MeansMeans

OpportunityOpportunity

Assessing Risk Assessing Risk

Risk = Probability X ConsequenceRisk = Probability X ConsequenceLarge uncertaintiesLarge uncertaintiesLack of dataLack of data

Alternatively:Alternatively:Risk = Motivations X Intentions X Risk = Motivations X Intentions X

Capabilities X ConsequenceCapabilities X ConsequenceNeed to understand terrorist group Need to understand terrorist group

motivations, capabilities, and motivations, capabilities, and dynamicsdynamics

Key Security Key Security PrinciplesPrinciples

Understanding and Reducing RisksUnderstanding and Reducing Risks

Practicing Defense-in-Depth or Multi-Practicing Defense-in-Depth or Multi-layered Security Approachlayered Security Approach

Leveraging Assets Both Nationally and Leveraging Assets Both Nationally and InternationallyInternationally

Understanding the Understanding the Chain of Necessary, Chain of Necessary, but not Sufficient, Conditionsbut not Sufficient, Conditions to Terrorist to Terrorist Acquisition and Use of Nuclear AssetsAcquisition and Use of Nuclear Assets

How to Become a How to Become a Nuclear Terrorist? Nuclear Terrorist?

1.1. Highly-Motivated Terrorist Group Desiring Highly-Motivated Terrorist Group Desiring Extreme or Unconventional Levels of Extreme or Unconventional Levels of ViolenceViolence

2.2. Technically Skilled or Can Hire Such SkillsTechnically Skilled or Can Hire Such Skills

3.3. Acquire Needed MaterialsAcquire Needed Materials

4.4. Smuggle Materials to Safe HavenSmuggle Materials to Safe Haven

5.5. Build/Acquire or Hire Other Group to Build/Acquire or Hire Other Group to Build or AcquireBuild or Acquire

6.6. Deliver Weapon to TargetDeliver Weapon to Target

7.7. Detonate/Use Weapon at TargetDetonate/Use Weapon at Target

Terrorist Terrorist MotivationsMotivations

Why haven’t there been any RDD or crude Why haven’t there been any RDD or crude nuclear weapon terrorist attacks?nuclear weapon terrorist attacks?

Those who study terrorist motivations are Those who study terrorist motivations are ““underwhelmed by the probability of underwhelmed by the probability of such an event [radiological or nuclear such an event [radiological or nuclear terrorism] terrorism] for most – but not allfor most – but not all – – terrorist groupsterrorist groups.” – Jerrold Post, IAEA .” – Jerrold Post, IAEA presentation, Nov. 2001presentation, Nov. 2001

Psychological and political constraints are Psychological and political constraints are great for most groupsgreat for most groups

Terrorist Terrorist Motivations Motivations (Cont.)(Cont.)

Post identified two groups that might engage in Post identified two groups that might engage in large scale radiological dispersal: large scale radiological dispersal: Non-traditional religious extremists (closed Non-traditional religious extremists (closed

cults)cults) Religious fundamentalists* [politico-religious]Religious fundamentalists* [politico-religious]

Several groups might be motivated to use limited Several groups might be motivated to use limited radiological attacks or attempt credible hoaxes:radiological attacks or attempt credible hoaxes: The above two, andThe above two, and Social-revolutionary*Social-revolutionary* Nationalist-separatist*Nationalist-separatist* Right-wingRight-wing

*Would not want to alienate their constituencies.*Would not want to alienate their constituencies.

Worst-Case Nuclear Threat: Worst-Case Nuclear Threat: Terrorists with Terrorists with

Nuclear WeaponsNuclear Weapons Even a crude nuclear Even a crude nuclear

weapon could destroy the weapon could destroy the heart of a city.heart of a city.

100,000 or more could die 100,000 or more could die immediately.immediately.

Devastating political and Devastating political and economic effects.economic effects.

$2 Trillion or more in $2 Trillion or more in immediate costs.immediate costs.

Global economic Global economic depression?depression?

Terrorist-Constructed Terrorist-Constructed Nuclear Weapon Nuclear Weapon (Improvised Nuclear (Improvised Nuclear Device)Device)

1.1. Terrorists must be motivated to conduct Terrorists must be motivated to conduct extreme violence using nuclear weapons.extreme violence using nuclear weapons.

2.2. They must have or hire the technical They must have or hire the technical expertise to build an IND.expertise to build an IND.

3.3. They must acquire the necessary They must acquire the necessary amounts of fissile material (HEU or amounts of fissile material (HEU or plutonium).plutonium).

4.4. They must be able to transport the They must be able to transport the material without being detected and material without being detected and caught.caught.

5.5. They must deliver the IND to a target.They must deliver the IND to a target.6.6. They must be able to detonate it.They must be able to detonate it.

Ease of Building Ease of Building Gun-type IND?Gun-type IND?

““With modern weapons-grade uranium, With modern weapons-grade uranium, the background neutron rate is so low the background neutron rate is so low that that terrorists, if they have such terrorists, if they have such materials, would have a good materials, would have a good chance of setting off a high-yield chance of setting off a high-yield explosion simply by dropping one explosion simply by dropping one half of the material onto the other half of the material onto the other half.half. Most people seem unaware that if Most people seem unaware that if separated HEU is at hand it’s a trivial job separated HEU is at hand it’s a trivial job to set off a nuclear explosion … [and] to set off a nuclear explosion … [and] even a high school kideven a high school kid could make a could make a bomb in short order.”bomb in short order.”

-- Luis Alvarez, -- Luis Alvarez, Adventures of a PhysicistAdventures of a Physicist

Required Skills to Required Skills to Build an INDBuild an IND

Schematic drawings – widely availableSchematic drawings – widely available Detailed drawings – not available Detailed drawings – not available Large Large

number of man-hours required to preparenumber of man-hours required to prepare Need team skilled in:Need team skilled in:

Physical, chemical, and metallurgical propertiesPhysical, chemical, and metallurgical properties Material characteristics affecting fabricationMaterial characteristics affecting fabrication Neutronics and radiation effectsNeutronics and radiation effects High explosives and chemical propellantsHigh explosives and chemical propellants HydrodynamicsHydrodynamics Electrical circuitry Electrical circuitry

Unlikely that an individual would Unlikely that an individual would possess all these skills and knowledge possess all these skills and knowledge even after years of trainingeven after years of training

Need a team. Need a team. Source: Mark et al. (1986)Source: Mark et al. (1986)

Gun-type vs. Gun-type vs. Implosion-type INDImplosion-type IND

Gun-type: Gun-type: – Simplest designSimplest design Cannot use plutonium; must use HEUCannot use plutonium; must use HEU

Implosion-type: Implosion-type: – More sophisticated, but still first generation More sophisticated, but still first generation

weaponweapon Can use either plutonium or HEUCan use either plutonium or HEU

Gun-type INDGun-type IND

Implosion-type Implosion-type INDIND

Major Hurdle: Major Hurdle: Acquisition of Fissile Material Acquisition of Fissile Material

Material TypeMaterial Type Global Inventory Global Inventory (metric tons)(metric tons)

Military plutonium Military plutonium (Pu)(Pu)

250250

Civil Pu, unirradiatedCivil Pu, unirradiated 205205

Civil Pu, irradiatedCivil Pu, irradiated 1,0651,065

Military HEUMilitary HEU 1,6701,670

Civil HEUCivil HEU 2020

Ref: David Albright and Mark Gorwitz, ISIS, 1999

HEU First HEU First StrategyStrategy

Large stockpiles of HEU plus Large stockpiles of HEU plus relative ease of construction of gun-relative ease of construction of gun-type device type device

Need to prioritize Need to prioritize securing, securing, consolidating, and eliminatingconsolidating, and eliminating HEU. HEU.

Eliminate by down-blending into a Eliminate by down-blending into a low-enriched (non-weapons usable) low-enriched (non-weapons usable) form. form.

HEU Stocks of HEU Stocks of Biggest ConcernBiggest Concern

Russia – about 500 metric tons outside Russia – about 500 metric tons outside of weaponsof weapons

Pakistan – smaller stocks, but turbulent Pakistan – smaller stocks, but turbulent regionregion

Research facilities – dozens of sites in Research facilities – dozens of sites in some 40 countries; about 20 tons of some 40 countries; about 20 tons of HEUHEU

Naval and maritime useNaval and maritime use North Korea and Iran?North Korea and Iran? United States?United States?

Accumulation of Accumulation of PuPu

Some states such as France, Some states such as France, Japan, and Russia continue to Japan, and Russia continue to separate tons of plutonium per separate tons of plutonium per yearyear

Even reactor-grade Pu can be Even reactor-grade Pu can be used in nuclear bombsused in nuclear bombs

Acquisition of Acquisition of Intact Nuclear Intact Nuclear WeaponWeapon

TheftTheft

PurchasePurchase

Gift?Gift?

CoupCoup

Arsenals of Arsenals of Nuclear-Armed NationsNuclear-Armed Nations

NationNation Total Active Total Active WeaponsWeapons

Total Inactive Total Inactive WeaponsWeapons

United United StatesStates

9,6509,650 2,7002,700

RussiaRussia 8,3808,380 8,000-8,000-10,00010,000

France France 288288 00

BritainBritain 200200 00

ChinaChina 400400 00

IsraelIsrael 75-20075-200 00

IndiaIndia 30-3530-35 00

PakistanPakistan 24-4824-48 00

North KoreaNorth Korea 1-3?1-3? 00

Ref:

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002

Greatest Risks of Greatest Risks of Terrorist Terrorist AcquisitionAcquisition

Russia – Russia – Large numbers of forward deployed Large numbers of forward deployed

tactical nuclear weaponstactical nuclear weapons Pakistan – Pakistan –

Presence of al QaedaPresence of al QaedaUnstable political systemUnstable political systemParts of government (ISI) sympathetic Parts of government (ISI) sympathetic

to terrorist causesto terrorist causesNascent nuclear command & control Nascent nuclear command & control

systemsystem

Highest Priority Efforts to Highest Priority Efforts to Prevent Terrorist Acquisition Prevent Terrorist Acquisition ofofIntact Nuclear WeaponsIntact Nuclear Weapons

Press Russia to bring forward deployed Press Russia to bring forward deployed TNWs into central storage – in general TNWs into central storage – in general the most portable weapons are the the most portable weapons are the most vulnerable.most vulnerable.

U.S.-Russia need to work toward mutual U.S.-Russia need to work toward mutual and transparent nuclear weapons and transparent nuclear weapons dismantlementdismantlement

Provide security assistance to Pakistan Provide security assistance to Pakistan contingent on constraints of NPTcontingent on constraints of NPT

Attacks on or Sabotage Attacks on or Sabotage of Nuclear Power Plants of Nuclear Power Plants and Other Nuclear and Other Nuclear FacilitiesFacilities

Commercial nuclear power plantsCommercial nuclear power plants

Research reactorsResearch reactors

Spent fuel storage poolsSpent fuel storage pools

Reprocessing facilitiesReprocessing facilities

Attacks on Nuclear Attacks on Nuclear Facilities – Facilities – Worst consequenceWorst consequence

Major consequence of Major consequence of successful attack: successful attack: release of radioactivity release of radioactivity off-siteoff-site

Soviet-designed plants Soviet-designed plants without containments, without containments, e.g., Chernobyl-type e.g., Chernobyl-type plants (RBMKs)plants (RBMKs)

13 are still operating.13 are still operating. Also, many reactors in Also, many reactors in

the UK do not use the UK do not use containments.containments.

U.S. Nuclear U.S. Nuclear Power PlantsPower Plants

Good NewsGood News:: All U.S. NPPs have reactor All U.S. NPPs have reactor

containments.containments. All employ defense-in-depth All employ defense-in-depth

safety systems.safety systems. NRC responded quickly after 9/11 NRC responded quickly after 9/11

to enhance security.to enhance security.

U.S. NPPs (Continued)U.S. NPPs (Continued)

Bad NewsBad News:: Vulnerability to airplane attack?Vulnerability to airplane attack? Control rooms and most nuclear Control rooms and most nuclear

spent fuel pools are outside spent fuel pools are outside containment structures. containment structures.

External power supplies and water External power supplies and water intakes could be vulnerable.intakes could be vulnerable.

Research Research Reactors Reactors

Good NewsGood News:: Small inventory of radioactivity compared Small inventory of radioactivity compared

to commercial NPPs.to commercial NPPs.Bad NewsBad News:: Spent nuclear fuel here could be portable.Spent nuclear fuel here could be portable. Many research reactors located in or near Many research reactors located in or near

universities.universities. Many do not use or have weak Many do not use or have weak

containments.containments. Many still use HEU for fuel or have it on-Many still use HEU for fuel or have it on-

site.site. Mainly concern for foreign research facilities.Mainly concern for foreign research facilities.

Priorities for Priorities for Protecting Nuclear Protecting Nuclear FacilitiesFacilities

Ensure that design-basis-threat accounts Ensure that design-basis-threat accounts for 9/11-type attack and need to factor in for 9/11-type attack and need to factor in beyond-design basis threats.beyond-design basis threats.

Take quick fix actions to upgrade Take quick fix actions to upgrade protections around control rooms and protections around control rooms and spent fuel pools.spent fuel pools.

Make sure that research facilities also are Make sure that research facilities also are employing defense-in-depth security employing defense-in-depth security measures. measures.

Need performance-based, not Need performance-based, not compliance-based security system. compliance-based security system.

RDDs: A Rising RDDs: A Rising ConcernConcern

RDDRDD = Radiological Dispersal Devices = Radiological Dispersal Devices such as “dirty bombs”such as “dirty bombs”

Heightened ConcernHeightened Concern: Are : Are radioactive radioactive materialsmaterials secure? secure?

Attacks of September 11, 2001Attacks of September 11, 2001 Al QaedaAl Qaeda has expressed has expressed

interest in RDDsinterest in RDDs Widespread news reportingWidespread news reporting

Characteristics of RDDsCharacteristics of RDDs

RDDs are RDDs are NOTNOT Weapons of Mass Destruction Weapons of Mass Destruction

– Few, if any, people would die immediately or Few, if any, people would die immediately or shortly after exposure to ionizing radiation from shortly after exposure to ionizing radiation from typical RDDtypical RDD

RDDs can be Weapons of Mass RDDs can be Weapons of Mass DisruptionDisruption

Major effects:Major effects: Panic (psychological and social effects)Panic (psychological and social effects) Economic costs (decontamination and Economic costs (decontamination and

rebuilding)rebuilding)

Components of Components of Radiological Radiological WeaponsWeapons

Radioactive materials:Radioactive materials: Radioactive sources: Used in medicine, Radioactive sources: Used in medicine,

food irradiation, research, industrial food irradiation, research, industrial gauging, oil-prospecting, etc.gauging, oil-prospecting, etc.

Spent nuclear fuelSpent nuclear fuel Nuclear wasteNuclear waste

Means of dispersal:Means of dispersal: Conventional explosivesConventional explosives Fizzle-yield improvised nuclear devicesFizzle-yield improvised nuclear devices Aerosolized particlesAerosolized particles Contamination of water suppliesContamination of water supplies

FAS Study: Cesium FAS Study: Cesium BombBomb2 curies Cs-137; 10 lb. TNT2 curies Cs-137; 10 lb. TNT

Inner ring: 1 cancer death/100 people due to remaining radiationMiddle ring: 1 cancer death/1,000 peopleOuter ring: 1 cancer death/10,000 people: EPA recommends decontamination or destruction

X

Location of myhome

Goiania, Brazil, 1987 Goiania, Brazil, 1987 Cesium-137 Dispersal Cesium-137 Dispersal IncidentIncident

Scavengers broke into abandoned medical Scavengers broke into abandoned medical facilityfacility

Stole 1,375 curie Cs-137 sourceStole 1,375 curie Cs-137 source Cut into pieces and distributed to friends and Cut into pieces and distributed to friends and

familyfamily Junk dealer caused further dispersal of Junk dealer caused further dispersal of

powdered sourcepowdered source Results:Results:

Four deaths and one arm amputationFour deaths and one arm amputation Some 200 people contaminatedSome 200 people contaminated More than 110,000 monitored (Fear More than 110,000 monitored (Fear

mongering via news media)mongering via news media) Massive cleanup that captured most of the Massive cleanup that captured most of the

materials (about 1,200 curie)materials (about 1,200 curie)

High-Risk Materials? High-Risk Materials?

HIGH RISKHIGH RISK LOW RISKLOW RISK

FindingFinding: : Only aOnly a small fraction of small fraction of commercial radioactive sources pose commercial radioactive sources pose inherently high security risksinherently high security risks

But still large numberBut still large number

High-risk sources are:High-risk sources are: PortablePortable DispersibleDispersible More radioactive More radioactive

High-Risk Materials High-Risk Materials (cont’d)(cont’d)

High-Risk Radioactive High-Risk Radioactive Source ExamplesSource Examples

Radiography Sources

Mobile Cesium Irradiators

Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs)

Only 7 reactor-produced radioisotopes Only 7 reactor-produced radioisotopes present high security concern:present high security concern:

• Internal Health Hazards (Mainly):Internal Health Hazards (Mainly): americium-241 americium-241 californium-252californium-252 plutonium-238plutonium-238

• Internal Internal andand External Health Hazards: External Health Hazards: cesium-137cesium-137 cobalt-60cobalt-60 iridium-192iridium-192 strontium-90 (primarily internal hazard)strontium-90 (primarily internal hazard)

High-Risk Materials High-Risk Materials (cont’d)(cont’d)

Radioactive Source Radioactive Source LifecycleLifecycle

Radioisotope

Production

SourceManufacture

LegitimateUsers

IllegitimateUsers

Orphan Sources

Recycling/Manufacturer

Disposal

Govt.Disposal

Site

Ref: Greg van Tuyle, Los Alamos National Laboratory; CNS Occasional Paper No. 11

Disused Sources

Major Areas of ConcernMajor Areas of Concern

1.1. ““Disused” SourcesDisused” Sources

2.2. ““Orphaned” Sources Orphaned” Sources

3.3. Regulatory Controls in FSU and Developing Regulatory Controls in FSU and Developing CountriesCountries

4.4. U.S. Export and Domestic Licensing RulesU.S. Export and Domestic Licensing Rules

5. Consequence mitigation and public 5. Consequence mitigation and public educationeducation

1. “Disused” Sources1. “Disused” Sources

Bad News:Bad News: Large numbersLarge numbers Vulnerable to theft, diversionVulnerable to theft, diversion Potential safety hazardPotential safety hazard Could become “orphaned”Could become “orphaned” Inadequate disposal facilitiesInadequate disposal facilities

Good News:Good News: ”Disused” sources are largely ”Disused” sources are largely accounted foraccounted for

Bad News:Bad News: Many Thousands of High-Risk Many Thousands of High-Risk SourcesSources

– Result of:Result of: High disposal costsHigh disposal costs Lack of adequate depositoriesLack of adequate depositories

– Most in FSU – terrorist and illicit Most in FSU – terrorist and illicit trafficking activities cause concerntrafficking activities cause concern

Good News:Good News: Ongoing programs, e.g., Ongoing programs, e.g., IAEA, U.S., and Russia efforts focused on IAEA, U.S., and Russia efforts focused on FSUFSU

2. “Orphaned” Sources2. “Orphaned” Sources

3. Regulatory Controls in FSU 3. Regulatory Controls in FSU and Developing Countriesand Developing Countries

Bad News:Bad News: Regulatory controls are Regulatory controls are weak or non-existent – weak or non-existent – about half the about half the world’s nationsworld’s nations

Good News:Good News: N Number of high-risk umber of high-risk sources outside the FSU is sources outside the FSU is limitedlimited

→ Concentrate security efforts on FSUConcentrate security efforts on FSU

4. U.S. Export Licensing Rules4. U.S. Export Licensing Rules

Bad News:Bad News: Rules are currently Rules are currently inadequate to prevent illicit commerce inadequate to prevent illicit commerce

Unlimited, unregulated exports of high-Unlimited, unregulated exports of high-risk sources to most destinations risk sources to most destinations including Syriaincluding Syria

ExceptionsExceptions: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North : Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Sudan are embargoed but no Korea, and Sudan are embargoed but no measures to prevent transshipments. measures to prevent transshipments.

Good News:Good News: Regulatory measures Regulatory measures could be implemented quickly could be implemented quickly if if given prioritygiven priority

Consequence Mitigation Consequence Mitigation and Public Educationand Public Education

Bad NewsBad News: Little apparent effort by the : Little apparent effort by the government to prepare the public for a government to prepare the public for a radiological attack.radiological attack.– No apparent stockpiling of decon gear at No apparent stockpiling of decon gear at

regional sitesregional sites– Not apparent that credible spokespeople are Not apparent that credible spokespeople are

being trainedbeing trained Good NewsGood News: DHS, NRC, and CDC : DHS, NRC, and CDC

have useful info on Web sites. have useful info on Web sites. – R&D is ongoing in decon technologies. R&D is ongoing in decon technologies. – Also, development of medical Also, development of medical

treatments, e.g. Prussian Bluetreatments, e.g. Prussian Blue

Strengthening the Strengthening the Radioactive Source Security Radioactive Source Security SystemSystem

Recommendations: Recommendations:

1.1. Implement Source ControlsImplement Source Controls

2.2. Establish Regulatory MeasuresEstablish Regulatory Measures

3.3. Manage Security RisksManage Security Risks

4.4. Prepare for RDD AttackPrepare for RDD Attack

1. SOURCE CONTROLS1. SOURCE CONTROLS

a)a) Safely and securely dispose of Safely and securely dispose of disused sourcesdisused sources• Example:Example: DOE Off-Site Source Recovery DOE Off-Site Source Recovery

Program needs additional supportProgram needs additional support

b)b) Track down and secure orphan Track down and secure orphan sources, especially those in the NIS, sources, especially those in the NIS, that pose the highest security riskthat pose the highest security risk

Strengthening the Strengthening the Radioactive Source Security Radioactive Source Security SystemSystem

2. REGULATORY MEASURES2. REGULATORY MEASURES

a)a) Assist nations with weak or essentially Assist nations with weak or essentially nonexistent regulatory controls nonexistent regulatory controls (buttress IAEA assistance programs)(buttress IAEA assistance programs)

b)b) Protect against illicit commerce in Protect against illicit commerce in radioactive sourcesradioactive sources

c)c) Implement improved U.S. export Implement improved U.S. export licensing ruleslicensing rules

Strengthening the Strengthening the Radioactive Source Security Radioactive Source Security SystemSystem

3. MANAGE SECURITY RISKS3. MANAGE SECURITY RISKS

Decrease security risks from future Decrease security risks from future radioactive sources by:radioactive sources by:

a)a) Encouraging producers to make Encouraging producers to make fewer high-risk radioactive sourcesfewer high-risk radioactive sources

b)b) Promoting use of non-radioactive Promoting use of non-radioactive alternativesalternatives

Strengthening the Strengthening the Radioactive Source Security Radioactive Source Security SystemSystem

4. PREPARE FOR RDD ATTACK4. PREPARE FOR RDD ATTACK

a)a) Educate the public, the press, and Educate the public, the press, and political leadershippolitical leadership

b)b) Equip and train first respondersEquip and train first responders

c)c) Conduct planning exercisesConduct planning exercises

Strengthening the Strengthening the Radioactive Source Security Radioactive Source Security SystemSystem