july 1997 alerts - federal aviation administration...the general aviation airworthiness alerts...

General AviationAirworthinessAlerts

AC No. 43-16

ALERT NO. 228JULY 1997

Improve Reliability-Interchange ServiceExperience

A LE R TS

Contents of this publication are informational only. Due to the need for extensive distribution of this publication,only one copy is provided to an addressee; however, this publication may be duplicated.

CONTENTS

AIRPLANES

BEECH...................................................................................................................................1CESSNA.................................................................................................................................4DASSAULT-BREGUET........................................................................................................7GLOBE SWIFT......................................................................................................................7LAKE......................................................................................................................................8LEAR......................................................................................................................................8PIPER ....................................................................................................................................9

HELICOPTERS

AMERICAN EUROCOPTER.............................................................................................11BELL ....................................................................................................................................11ENSTROM ...........................................................................................................................12McDONNELL DOUGLAS...................................................................................................12

AGRICULTURAL AIRCRAFT

GRUMMAN..........................................................................................................................13

AMATEUR, SPORT, AND EXPERIMENTAL AIRCRAFT

LONG-EZ .............................................................................................................................13LYCOMING .........................................................................................................................14NORTH AMERICAN..........................................................................................................14VARIEZE .............................................................................................................................15ZENAIR ...............................................................................................................................15

PROPELLERS AND POWERPLANTS

HAMILTON STANDARD...................................................................................................16ALLISON .............................................................................................................................16TELEDYNE CONTINENTAL............................................................................................16TEXTRON LYCOMING......................................................................................................16

AIR NOTES

EAA OSHKOSH ’97.............................................................................................................17APPROVED PARTS SEMINARS.......................................................................................17CRITTERS...........................................................................................................................18AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES (AD’S).........................................................................18CORRECTION: AIRLINE SUPPLIERS ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE.................... 19ALERTS ON LINE..............................................................................................................19FAA FORM 8010-4, MALFUNCTION OR DEFECT REPORT........................................20SUBSCRIPTION REQUEST FORM..................................................................................20

July 1997 FAA AC 43-16

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FLIGHT STANDARDS SERVICEMike Monroney Aeronautical Center

The General Aviation Airworthiness Alerts provide a commoncommunication channel through which the aviation commu-nity can economically interchange service experience andthereby cooperate in the improvement of aeronautical productdurability, reliability, and safety. This publication is preparedfrom information submitted by those of you who operate andmaintain civil aeronautical products. The contents includeitems that have been reported as significant, but which havenot been evaluated fully by the time the material went topress. As additional facts such as cause and corrective actionare identified, the data will be published in subsequent issuesof the Alerts. This procedure gives Alerts’ readers promptnotice of conditions reported via Malfunction or DefectReports. Your comments and suggestions for improvement arealways welcome. Send to: FAA;ATTN: Designee Standardization Branch (AFS-640);P.O. Box 25082; Oklahoma City, OK 73125-5029.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATIONFEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

WASHINGTON, DC 20590

GENERAL AVIATION AIRWORTHINESS ALERTS

AIRPLANES

BEECH

Beech Defective FuelModel F33A Selector ValveBonanza Screen

2821

It was reported that during flight, low fuelflow and high exhaust gas temperature (EGT)indications were experienced.

After extensive troubleshooting, the problemwas found to be caused by an improperlyassembled fuel selector valve screen. Thisaircraft was equipped with a wing fuel tiptanksystem installed in accordance withSupplemental Type Certificate (STC)SA41629. In accordance with this STC, anonstandard fuel selector valve (P/N HE763)was installed. Due to the date of issuance ofthe STC (September 24, 1961) the

“instructions for continued airworthiness”were not issued by the STC holder. However,the assembly instructions were originallyprinted on the fuel filter canister, even thoughthey may have been obliterated since theoriginal installation. The submitter stated thatwithout these instructions, it is possible toincorrectly assemble the fuel screen, whichwill result in restricted fuel flow to the engineat higher power settings. The filter (or screen)assembly process is a very simple procedureinvolving only a few parts.

The STC holder issued assembly andinspection instructions via a revision to STCSA41629, dated April 23, 1992. The STC holderalso issued an additional sheet which wasmade available to all original purchasers of theSTC. (However, sometimes the updatedpublications cannot be delivered because theaircraft has been sold or otherwise changedownership.)

Part total time not reported.

FAA AC 43-16 July 1997

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Beech Defective InstrumentModel F33A Air FilterBonanza 3610

During a scheduled inspection, the in-lineinstrument air filter was found “heatdamaged.”

The filter (P/N RA1J4-7) was installed in thesecondary pressure system. The submitterspeculated the filter had been subjected toexcessive heat from the engine exhaust systemdue to its location approximately 6 inches fromthe left exhaust stack. The clear plastic of thefilter had melted and shattered into pieces.Small pieces of the plastic material or foreignobjects could pose a blockage hazard to theinstrument air system. The submitter statedthat a filter with a metal canister is availablefrom a different manufacturer.

Two reports were received which statedsimilar failures of the filter with this samepart number.

Part total times-26 and 50 hours.

Beech Landing Gear FailureModel H35 3230Bonanza

The pilot stated that during a landingapproach, a “down and locked” indicationcould not be attained when the gear lever wasplaced in the “down” position. Although theemergency extension system was used, thepilot could not confirm the cycle wascompleted prior to landing. During theafterlanding roll, the landing gear collapsed.

The aircraft “settled” on the main gear innerdoors and the nose gear doors. This minimizeddamage to the aircraft, and there were nopersonal injuries. An investigation revealedthe landing gear failed due to a malfunction ofthe landing gear motor (P/N 35-380094-3).When the motor was disassembled, thebrushes were found “worn beyond limits.”The landing gear motor brushes should beinspected during scheduled inspections and

replaced long before they approach the “wearlimit.” A functional check of the landing gearsystem, including the emergency system, isalso very important during scheduledinspections.


Beech Landing GearModel A36 MalfunctionBonanza 3200

The pilot reported that when the gear wasselected to the “down” position, the landinggear circuit breaker opened. The circuitbreaker was reset; however, the landing gearstill would not extend, and it was necessary tomanually extend the gear.

An investigation disclosed that the circuitbreaker (P/N CB2320A), located on the rightlower instrument panel, failed internally.With the circuit breaker in the “reset”position, electrical power would not flow fromone terminal to the other. It was suggestedthat the circuit breaker failure may have beencaused by age and/or the number of cycles.

Part total time-6,219 hours.

Beech Fuel Control SecurityModel 58 7322Baron

During routine maintenance, the fuel controlassembly was found loose.

Two of the three attachment bolts weremissing, and the other bolt was loose. Thesebolts are intended to attach the fuel injectionassembly to the throttle control lever(P/N 632554-24). Also, a shroud (P/N 646673)was found broken, loose, and chafing on fuelline fittings. Some of the fittings were chafedthrough more than half of their wall thickness.

The submitter speculated these defects werecaused by improper installation of the throttlelever. Improper installation allowed thethrottle lever to contact and exert pressureagainst the shroud assembly. The attachment


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bolts sheared. This condition also restrictedcontrol lever travel. Extreme care and use ofthe proper technical data should eliminatethis type of incident.


Beech Wheel FailureModel A90 3246King Air

After landing, the left main landing gear outerwheel half (P/N 50-300010-109) failed as theaircraft was turning off of the runway.

The wheel half evidently blew off, hit therunway surface, bounced “up into the nacelle,”and caused minor skin damage. The availableevidence indicated the wheel half failed due topre-existing cracks. The cracks originated atthe valve stem hole, the inner circumferenceof the wheel half, and/or a dent on the outsiderim area. This part was manufactured inJanuary 1968. The submitter recommendedthat, in conjunction with scheduledinspections, these parts should be “paintstripped,” and have a nondestructiveinspection (dye penetrant or eddy current).These recommendations will allow earlydetection of cracks, and the chance of furtherdamage could be prevented. Wheel halveswhich have been in service for long periods oftime should be closely inspected.

Part total time-8,291 hours. Number ofcycles-8,394.

Beech Window FailureModel 100 5610King Air

The pilot reported that approximately15 minutes after takeoff, at 12,000 feetaltitude, the pilot’s left side window failed.

The window (P/N 50-420066-353) failurecaused loss of cabin pressure. The pilot wasable to make a safe emergency landing. Thesubmitter stated the defective window wasthe “improved stretched acrylic type.” Thedefective window was sent to themanufacturer for analysis.

At this time, no cause for this incident hasbeen determined. If further information isobtained, it will be printed in a future editionof this publication.

Window total time in service-4,008 hours.

Beech Nose Landing GearModel B200 Door SecurityKing Air 5344

During a scheduled inspection, the noselanding gear door hinge (P/N 50-820183-7) wasfound cracked.

The crack appeared to originate on theinboard side of the hinge lip at a rivet hole.The submitter speculated this defect wascaused by the installation of a “Cherry MaxRivet (-4)” on the hinge lip. The hinge lip areais .75 inch wide. Apparently, this does notleave enough edge distance, and the assemblyis weakened. The submitter suggested thatthe manufacturer re-design the hinge to havea “thicker lip area.”

This suggestion and the report were sent tothe responsible FAA aircraft certificationoffice for appropriate action.


Beech Main Landing GearModel B200 Bearing FailureKing Air 3213

A catastrophic failure of the Number 2 mainlanding gear outer wheel bearing wasdiscovered after the aircraft had been washedand was being lubricated.

Previous taxiing and towing of the aircraftappeared normal, and there was no indicationof bearing problems. Due to “scoring of therace” and the complete destruction of thecage, it is believed that the bearing(P/N 13600-LA3685) cage assembly failed first.The bearing appears to have been properlylubricated, and there was no evidence of heatdamage. The inner bearing was intact, fullylubricated, and displayed no signs of damage.The axle showed no signs of damage orexcessive heat, and this was confirmed by a


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dye-penetrant inspection. Sixty hours prior tofailure, the bearing was cleaned and thenlubricated with “Aeroshell #5” grease. Thepart total time was 350 hours.

Another report was received on a like aircraft.On this aircraft, air traffic control reported tothe pilot that a wheel had departed theaircraft during takeoff. The aircraft was safelylanded, and maintenance personnel weresummoned. Inspection revealed the Number 3main outer wheel bearing had failed. Thewheel assembly slid over the axle nut and thecotter pin, and the brake line broke. Thebearing cone was found seized on the axlewhich was severely galled. The part total timewas 125 hours.

These bearings should be thoroughly inspectedwhen they are received and when they areinstalled.

Beech Engine ExhaustModel 200 DefectKing Air 7810

During a preflight inspection, the pilotdiscovered a crack in the left engine exhauststack (P/N 101-950019-1).

The crack was located at the flange area andwas approximately 6 inches long. Thesubmitter suggested that the exhaust stacksshould be closely checked during preflight andpostflight inspections. Beech has an improvedexhaust stack (P/N 101-950022-1) which isavailable as a replacement part. The submitterstated the improved stacks have shown to bemore durable.

Part total time-356 hours.

CESSNA

Cessna Cleveland WheelsModels 180, 185, and Brakesand 206 Series Aircraft 3246 and 3242

The tie bolt torque instructions were notincluded in Supplemental Type Certificate

(STC) SA63GL and other Clevelandreplacement wheel and brake STC’s.Twenty-one service difficulty reports havebeen submitted to the FAA for the periodfrom 1974 to 1997 for brake disk(P/N 164-03600) tie bolt holes which eithercracked, pulled out, or broke. Clevelandreports over 10,000 wheel and brakeassemblies (P/N’s 40-75D and 164-03600) havebeen placed in service in accordance with STCSA63GL since 1974.

Cleveland Product Reference Memo PRM61,Revision A, dated 7-1-95 identifies thetwo-piece welded brake disk (P/N 164-03600)which has been superseded by a single-pieceforged brake disk (P/N 164-03601).

Users and installers should be aware that therequired torque, as listed on the wheelnameplate, plus the torque required to turnthe nut, known as running torque, must beused in torquing the wheel tie bolts. Dry orLubtork procedures must be followed or thetie bolt may be overtorqued or undertorqued.This condition may lead to loss of clampingtorque, tie bolt hole distress, and ultimatefailure during brake operation.

Cleveland is including a copy of PRM69,dated 2-1-97, in STC replacement wheel andbrake kits. PRM69 provides availableinformation on general maintenance andproper tie bolt torque procedures. PRM69refers to Cleveland Component MaintenanceManual (CMM), “Off Aircraft Maintenance(section),” and Cleveland Memo PRM64,“Technicians Service Guide,” which identifiesthe correct torque values and procedures forthese assemblies. Copies of PRM64 andPRM69 may be obtained by contactingCleveland Customer Support at1-800-272-5464.

Cessna Rudder StopModel 182N Bulkhead CrackingSkylane 5531

During a scheduled inspection, cracks werefound in the upper left bulkhead flange radius


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just above the mounting point for the rudderstop.

This subject is covered in Cessna ServiceLetter 72-3 and by Airworthiness Directive(AD) 72-07-09. The submitter speculated thatthis damage was caused by “years ofrudder-stop contact.” This would include timeswhen the aircraft was parked on the rampduring gusty and/or high wind conditions.To stop wind damage, use the external controlsurface lock when the aircraft is parkedoutside.


Cessna Autopilot AttachmentModel T210N FailureCenturion 5550

While preparing to repair a skin crack atFuselage Station (FS) 166.4, an inspectionrevealed hidden damage. FS 166.4 is thelocation of the autopilot pitch servo(P/N ARC400B) attachment which thesubmitter speculated may have contributed tothe following defects. The pitch servoinstallation had been accomplished by theaircraft manufacturer.

A “tear-shaped crack” was found on the outerskin, and two other cracks were discovered onthe bulkhead at FS 166.4. The submitter statedthat no doublers or reinforcements were usedin conjunction with the pitch servo mounting,and this caused the defect. It was suggestedthat the manufacturer issue a “ServiceBulletin” and kit to allow this area to bereinforced. The possibility of a hazard to flightcontrol operation was cited by the submitter.This report has been sent to the responsibleFAA aircraft certification office forappropriate action.


Cessna Main Landing GearModel T303 FailureCrusader 3230

After takeoff, the pilot selected the landinggear to the “up” position. The gear retractednormally until the end of the cycle when an

abnormal “banging” sound was heard. The gearwas then extended, and only the right maingear and the nose gear attained the“down-and-locked” position. All attempts toextend the left main gear failed, and theaircraft was landed with the landing gearretracted. The landing was made with bothengines feathered.

An investigation disclosed that the meteringtube (P/N 2541083-5) inside the left main gearstrut had broken at a machined hole in theshaft. This allowed the lower portion of theshock strut barrel to overextend and bepushed out of the upper barrel by the chargeon the strut. The left gear was found “jammed”into the wheel well. The submitterrecommended the metering tube and shockstrut be checked using a nondestructivetesting technique at some reasonable interval.


Cessna Elevator BellcrankModel 310R Support Failure

2730

During a 100-hour inspection, excessive freeplay was found at the elevator control surface.

Further investigation revealed that theelevator bellcrank pivot bolt holes wereelongated where they pass through thebellcrank support brackets (P/N’s 0814000-10and -11). These support brackets were locatedat the “most aft” empennage bulkhead. Thepivot bolt holes were elongated approximately.75 inch. The submitter believed this defectwas caused by misrigging of the elevatorcontrol system and excessive cable tension.It was suggested that the manufacturer issuetechnical data to allow reinforcement of thesupport brackets.


Cessna Nose BaggageModel 310R Compartment Fire

2140

During ground operation, smoke and fire wereobserved coming from the nose baggagecompartment. All aircraft systems were shut


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down, and the aircraft was evacuated. The firewas brought under control, and damage wasconfined to the aircraft nose section.

An investigation disclosed that the heater fuelsupply line failed, the fuel ignited, and the firewas intensified by additional fuel. The firesubsided when the system was shut down. Inthis case, the heater was a Stewart-Warner,Model 8259JR2. Examination of the fuelsupply line (P/N 0800400-239) revealed itfailed due to corrosion. The submitter statedthe heater assembly was in good condition.Airworthiness Directive (AD) 81-09-09requires inspection of this area on the basis of“heater operating time” instead of the basis of“calendar time.” The heater had been operatedapproximately 19 hours since the lastcompliance with AD 81-09-09, but many yearshad elapsed over the accumulation of 19 hoursof operation. The submitter recommended thatthe AD be revised to make requiredinspections using the basis of “calendar time.”The AD does not prohibit inspection on thebasis of “calendar time.” It was recommendedthat operators establish a reasonable schedule,based on “calendar time” for inspections inaccordance with the AD, in addition to theheater operating time inspection requirementsof the AD.


Cessna Rudder Torque TubeModel 401A Failure

2720

The aircraft was in for maintenance due to areport of ineffective left rudder action.

An inspection revealed the rudder cableattachment fitting was torn loose from the leftrudder bar torque tube assembly(P/N 5015006-8). The cable attachment fittingseparated from the torque tube adjacent to aweld. A “magnaflux” inspection of the righttorque tube assembly (P/N 5015007-5)disclosed a crack at the same location. Thecause of these defects was determined to be“gusty” wind conditions on the rudder surfacewith the cockpit rudder control lock(P/N’s 5215027-1, -11, and -13) installed. The

submitter stated wind forces can exertexcessive stress on the rudder torque tubewhich was transmitted to the failure point inthis case. One of the problems in detecting thisdefect is that the location is not easilyaccessible. A great deal of labor is involved inremoving the torque tube for properinspection. The submitter recommended thatthe FAA issue an Airworthiness Directive(AD) to require inspection and repair/replacement of these parts. This defect can beeliminated by the use of an external controllock on the rudder control surface.

This information and report were sent to theresponsible FAA aircraft certification office forappropriate action. This defect may occur inmany other models of Cessna twin engineaircraft; therefore, this problem deserves yourattention at the earliest possible opportunity.


Cessna Wing Flap SplitModel 425 2750Conquest

During a landing approach, the pilot selected“full” flaps. A loud, abnormal noise was heardas the flaps approached the “full-down”position. At the same time, the aircraft rolledviolently to the right. The wing flaps wereimmediately retracted, control of the aircraftwas regained, and a safe landing was made.

The right wing flap was found loose andhanging down. An investigation disclosed thatthe right flap extend cable (P/N 5000008-02)was broken at the “preselect” cable attachmentpoint. The flap gear box was severelydamaged, and the limit switch actuating armwas broken. All of the flap push rods werebent. The submitter speculated that the pushrods were bent during retraction of the flaps.The submitter did not offer a cause for thisdefect. Maintenance personnel and operatorsare urged to thoroughly inspect, repair, andmaintain the wing flap system in accordancewith the manufacturer’s technical data.



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Cessna Broken Cabin DoorModel 441 HingeConquest 5210

The lower cabin entrance door failed as aperson of moderate weight was exiting theaircraft.

During an investigation, the lower cabin dooraft hinge (P/N 5111515-15) was found broken.It appeared the hinge had suffered a previouspartial crack as indicated by a dark fracturesurface which extended from one edge of thehinge through the nearest rivet hole. This doorinstallation had been modified in compliancewith Service Bulletin (SB) PJ81-21. SB PJ81-21adds three rivets to the six original fastenerpattern. (Refer to the following illustration.)


Cessna Rudder Skin CrackModel 560 5542Citation

During a scheduled inspection, a crack wasfound in the rudder skin.

The crack was approximately 3 inches longand extended through three rivet holes. Thedefect was located on the right side of therudder skin (P/N 5533000-54) along the aft ribat water line (WL) 58. The submitter statedthis was the eighth occurrence of this defect

found in the operator’s fleet. Operators andmaintenance personnel using like aircraft areurged to pay special attention to this areaduring inspections and maintenance.


DASSAULT-BREGUET

Dassault-Breguet Wing FlapModel Falcon 10 Malfunction

2750

The pilot informed the maintenance personnelthat the wing flap circuit breaker “popped”when the flaps were operated. The circuitbreaker was reset, and the system functionedproperly for the remainder of the flight.

A thorough investigation on the ground couldnot duplicate the defect, and the aircraft wasreturned to service. Ten days later, theincident happened again. Still, the defectcould not be duplicated on the ground. Theaircraft was moved into a hangar and the wingflap reduction gear motor (P/N AUIAC6014-4)was disassembled. A setscrew(P/N ATQED 040005UL) and nut (P/N 936-003)were found loose and lying in the bottom of thehousing. There was damage to the clutchsprings and other signs of contact inside thegear box. The submitter did not offer a causefor the loose parts. Evidently, binding in thegear box assembly, caused by the loose parts,produced an electrical overload on the controlcircuit. The gear box assembly has a “timebefore overhaul” (TBO) of 2,400 hours.

Part time since overhaul was 1,107 hours.

GLOBE SWIFT

Globe Swift Wheel Brake SystemModel GC-1B Failure

3242

The following article contains informationwhich may be helpful to owners of this andother makes and models of general aviationaircraft.


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After approximately 3 years of storage, theaircraft was inspected and returned forservice. Very severe directional controlproblems were encountered during groundoperations.

It was determined that the problem wasrelated to the wheel brake system. Theaircraft had retractable landing gear and anonsteerable tailwheel which required properwheel brake action for directional control.When one of the flexible brake lines wasdisconnected from the wheel cylinder andbrake pressure was applied, a “gooey”substance was excreted from the line. Thissubstance was originally MIL-5606 hydraulicfluid which had congealed. The congealedhydraulic fluid caused a delay in brakingaction when pressure was applied and acorresponding delay when the pressure wasreleased.

This problem may affect any aircraft with ahydraulic brake system which has been storedfor a long period of time. It may also bepresent in other aircraft systems using ahydraulic system for actuation.

Globe Swift Landing GearModel GC-1B Malfunction

3230

While an annual inspection was beingconducted, the left main landing gear jammedat approximately midtravel during aretraction test.

The short landing gear extension cable(P/N 11-532-3054-2) was kinked and causedthis malfunction. The cable was severelycorroded and was abnormally stiff. Thesubmitter suggested that “older” aircraft beclosely inspected for this type of defect duringscheduled inspections. This particular cablewas approximately 50 years old!


LAKE

Lake Hydraulic HoseModel LA 4-200 LeaksBuccaneer 3230

When the aircraft landing gear hydraulicsystem developed several leaks, a new hose kit(P/N 180000-5) was ordered from themanufacturer and installed.

Two of the six hoses leaked profusely duringthe first retraction test. The leaks originatedat the hose end fittings. When the lines wereremoved and disassembled, the fittings werefound improperly installed. The ferrules wereattached to the hose by only one threadinstead of three. The inside fitting wasapparently installed without the proper tool,and the tool cut the inside of the hose. Thehose stock used was from Aeroquip and thefittings were MS24590-4.

Part total time-.6 hours.

LEAR

Lear Defective AileronModel 35A Balance Tab PushCentry Rod

2710

During a postflight inspection, a small “paintblister” was found on one of the left aileronbalance tab push rods (P/N NAS358-60-900).

The “paint blister” was located at the bottomcenter and approximately 3.5 inches forwardof the aft rod end bolt center. When probed,the “paint blister” opened to reveal a holethrough the tube wall thickness. The hole wasapproximately .25 inch long and .125 inchwide. Inspection through the hole disclosedsevere corrosion inside the tube. The corrosionproducts fell out of the hole when the tube wasshaken. Both of the rivets used to plug thecorrosion treatment holes were still in placeand were secure. The source of thecorrosion-producing contaminates, which


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acted on the inside diameter of the tube, couldnot be determined. The remaining aileronbalance tab push rods were inspected, as wellas those on another like aircraft, and nodamage was found. Wisely, this operator choseto replace all of the push rods on both aircraft.


PIPER

Piper Engine CompartmentModel PA 23-250 FireAztec 2822

During takeoff, the pilot experienced anengine compartment fire. The takeoff wassuccessfully aborted, and the fire wasextinguished.

An investigation disclosed that the fuel pump(P/N RG17980J) was leaking at the “case topump” seam. The fuel spray was directed ontothe turbocharger, and this was determined tobe the cause of the fire. The fuel pump gasketflange appeared to be the leak source.


Piper Unserviceable FuelModel PA 24-250 HosesComanche 2820

During an annual inspection, all of the flexiblefuel hoses in the engine compartment werefound to be unserviceable.

None of the hoses were leaking; however, all ofthe hoses were very stiff and brittle.It appeared these hoses were installed asoriginal equipment when the aircraft was new.This aircraft was manufactured in 1963. Thehose identification tags indicated they weremanufactured in 1962. That was 35 years ago,and is entirely too long to expect a flexiblehose to remain functional! Owners, operators,parts distributors, maintenance personnel,and anyone else that may have knowledge ofoutdated hoses are strongly urged to check

and change these hoses before they cause acatastrophic accident.

Aircraft total time-2,884 hours.

Piper Seat Rail CorrosionModel PA 28-140 2510Cherokee

During an annual inspection, severe corrosionwas discovered on the pilot’s outboard seatrail.

The corrosion was located under the “lip” ofthe seat rail (P/N 62557-004) and had affectedthe floor structure and the rail. The submitterbelieved this damage was caused by water, andpossibly other contaminates. The water wastrapped by the carpeting and was held incontact with the seat rail and floor panel. Thesubmitter described the aircraft carpeting as“home-type shag carpet.” It was speculatedthat moisture originated from the feet andclothing of occupants, and during humidweather conditions. The submitterrecommended that the seat rails be inspectedfor corrosion as frequently as possible, andthat the carpet be kept as dry as possible.Also, it would be wise to replace any“nonstandard” carpeting.


Piper Alternator DriveModel PA 28RT-201T Coupling FailureTurbo Arrow 2410

During a scheduled inspection, the alternatordrive coupling (P/N 635796) was founddefective.

The drive coupling is constructed of rubberwhich is bonded to the shaft and the outerhousing to dampen vibrations. The rubber hadseparated from the outer housing. Thesubmitter stated this was the second failure onthis aircraft and the third failure discoveredby this repair station in the past 12 months.It was suggested that the manufacturerconsider going back to the previous designwhich used (magneto style) drive blocks.


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It was inferred that the rubber bonding doesnot endure the operational environment verywell.


Piper Annunciator SystemModel PA 31T FailureCheyenne 3110

After starting the engines, arcing and smokecame from under the “glare shield.”

An inspection disclosed that the wire bundlecontaining the annunciator system wiring hadchafed on the “glare shield.” The “A+” wireinsulation had been penetrated, and the barewire shorted to ground. The wire bundle was“unprotected” at the feed through, andgrommets had not been installed in theinstrument panel. The short circuit alsocaused the annunciator control box to smokeand become inoperative. The submitter statedthere is no circuit protection between theannunciator control box and the control panel.


Piper Crew Door OpenedModel PA 31-350 In FlightChieftain 5210

The crew entrance door opened in flight, andthe pilot was not able to get it closed. A safelanding was made, and the aircraft wasdelivered to maintenance.

An inspection of the door assembly disclosedthat the upper latch actuating rod(P/N 44633-02) broke; the upper latchdisengaged and caused the door to open. Thesubmitter stated: “The rod should be made ofthicker stock or stronger material.” No othercause for this defect was given.


Piper TurbochargerModel PA 31-350 SecurityChieftain 8120

During a scheduled inspection, two of theturbocharger mount bolts were found loose.

The lower inboard and outboard bolts wereloose, and the submitter stated this is acommon occurrence. The bolts usually becomeloose after approximately 100 hours ofoperation. The submitter recommended the“course-threaded” bolts (P/N LN31S4.44) bereplaced with a “fine-threaded” bolt using alocknut. This recommendation has been sentto the responsible FAA aircraft certificationoffice for appropriate action.


Piper Control Yoke DefectModel PA 32-300 2701Cherokee Six

In the process of replacing the flight controlcolumn universal joint (P/N 62834-02), theshaft was found “misdrilled.”

The control column shaft (P/N 62716-xx), whichfits into the universal joint, was apparentlyimproperly drilled during manufacture. Theimproperly drilled hole is used to attach theshaft to the universal joint. The hole wasdrilled at the end of the shaft withapproximately half of the hole being in themetal and the other half exposed. (Refer to thefollowing illustration.) The submittercautioned operators to check the “feel” of thecontrol yoke and have any abnormalityinvestigated by maintenance personnel.



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Piper Main Landing GearModel PA 34-200T DefectSeneca 3211

During a scheduled inspection, the right mainlanding gear forward trunnion plate was foundto have excessive wear at the four attachmentpoints.

The bolts (P/N AN4-10A) used to secure thetrunnion plate (P/N 67040-13) to the aircraftstructure were loose, and the lower two boltsbacked out. (Refer to the followingillustration.) All four attachment holes in thetrunnion plate had been elongated due to theloose fasteners. At the time of this inspection,the two upper bolts had not backed out;however, they were well below the prescribedtorque value. Piper Service Bulletin (SB) 956,Part 2, had been complied with. Part 1 ofSB 956 requires a recurring check of the bolttorque at 100-hour intervals. Part 2 of SB 956terminates the recurring torque check byenlarging the four holes to accommodate alarger bolt (P/N AN5-10A). Refer to SB 956 forspecific instructions.

The submitter recommended that all trunnionplate attachment bolts be checked for propertorque, bolt or plate wear, and security duringscheduled inspections.


HELICOPTERS

AMERICAN EUROCOPTER

American Eurocopter Tail Rotor Hub BoltModel AS350BA Hard To RemoveEcureuil 6420

While removing the tail rotor hub, it wasnoted that the hub retaining bolt was verydifficult to remove. Upon further inspection itwas discovered that there were signs that thebolt had been coated with “Red Loctite”instead of “Blue Loctite 242.”MWC 65.20.00.401, paragraph 4, states that“Blue Loctite 242” is to be applied to the hubretaining bolt threads just prior toinstallation.

The submitter spoke with an employee of amajor helicopter repair station. According tothe repair station employee, 80 percent of thetail rotor gear boxes they overhaul/repair have“Red Loctite” instead of “Blue Loctite 242.”The submitter stated that this goes against theaircraft manufacturer’s overhaul/repairprocedures.

Part time since overhaul-102 hours.

BELL

Bell Skid Tubes CrackedModel 206L3 3213Long Ranger III

Information for the following article wasfurnished by the FAA’s Flight StandardsDistrict Office located in Baton Rouge,Louisiana.

Cracks were discovered during the skid tubedaily inspection. The cracks extended throughtwo of the Rivnut holes for the first skid shoe(P/N 206-324-003) aft of the forward cross tube.The operator reported that this is the fourthskid tube that they have found cracked in thissame area.


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(Note: All of the skid tubes found cracked werenot manufactured by Bell Helicopter. Thisskid tube was produced by AeronauticalAccessories under a PMA.)


Bell Tear In HorizontalModel 222U Stabilizer

5342

A tear was discovered on the right inboardside of the horizontal stabilizer during aroutine inspection. The submitter stated thatthe damage was probably caused by improperinstallation. The damage was repaired as perthe manufacturer’s instructions, and an FAAForm 337 was filed for this particular aircraft.The submitter further stated that a “NOTE” inthe installation instructions of themaintenance manual could possibly preventothers from repeating this same mistake.


ENSTROM

Enstrom Mounting Webs ForModel F28F Control RodFalcon Bushings And

Universal Joint OfLower SwashplateCracked6230

Four Malfunction or Defect Reports (M or D’s)were submitted by this operator. TheseM or D’s described an ongoing problem withswashplate cracking. The mounting webs forthe control rod busings and universal joints ofthe lower swashplate seem to crackfrequently. This is a primary flight controlpart with a retirement life of 17,700 hours. Thesubmitter stated there were problems with allfour of the universal housings(P/N 28-16119-1). These housings werenonrepairable and had to be returned. Thispart number is installed on all Enstrom

aircraft with the exception of the TH-28and 480 models.

The submitter stated that Enstrom issuedSDB 0088 on May 28, 1997. SDB 0088 coversinspection and possible rework to thesecracked areas. The submitter recommendedthat SDB 0088 be taken a step further byremoving the swashplate and performing a“zyglo” inspection on P/N 28-16119-1 in lieu ofthe recommended visual inspection due to thefact that some cracks were not “visually”evident.

The four most recent universal housings havehad 641, 3,710, 6,672, and 8,780 hours at thetime of failure.

McDONNELL DOUGLAS

McDonnell Douglas Trim SwitchModel 369E Inoperative500E 6710

While in normal flight, the trim systemcontinued to drive the left lateral cyclic stop.Attempts to bring the trim back to the neutralposition were unsuccessful using both thepilot’s and copilot’s trim switches. The systemcircuit breaker was pulled to prevent anyfurther problem. The aircraft was flown backto the home field.

The submitter stated that great force wasexerted to overcome the trim-spring capsule inthe process of flying the aircraft back to thehome field. Maintenance personnel replacedthe pilot’s trim switch, and the circuit breakerwas reset. All ground and flight tests “checkedgood.” A query of Service Difficulty Reporting(SDR) data base showed that there had beenseven other incidents of trim switch failures.Including this failure, there was an “averagehours at failure” of 350 hours.



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McDonnell Douglas Fuel Nozzle FilterModel 396D Screen Restricted(Hughes 500D) 7313Engine Allison 250-C20

Information for the following article wasfurnished by the FAA’s Flight StandardsDistrict Office located in Honolulu, Hawaii.

On January 12, 1997, a McDonnellDouglas 369D (Hughes 500D), incorporating anAllison 250-C20, crashed due to fuelstarvation. The fuel starvation appears to havebeen caused by contamination which collectedon the fuel nozzle filter screen, thusrestricting the flow, and subsequentlycollapsing the filter screen under high enginepower settings. These power settings requirehigher fuel pressure and volume. The screen(P/N 5233414) was a 104-micron mesh filter.

In the past 3 years, there have been threeHughes 500 accidents due to a collapsed nozzlefilter (P/N 5233414), and one crash was fatal.All three of these accidents were in theHawaiian Islands. The fuel nozzle screenswere impregnated with a potassium/siliconeresidue on the inlet side of the filter screen.

None of these three helicopters had a “fuelpump filter bypass indication” when they wereclogged. The three helicopters were flown onand off their home base airport, occasionallyrefueled at field sights, and subjected to acorrosive and volcanic environment whichrequired daily engine flushes.

A ramp inspection of these helicoptersrevealed the following. One helicopter had afilter screen (P/N 5233414) installed in the fuelnozzle with approximately 800 hours of totaltime, and there was an approximate10 percent buildup of contamination. Anotherhelicopter had a filter screen (P/N 47086)installed with approximately 700 hours of totaltime, and there was no visible contamination.When the supply of filter screen (P/N 5233414)is exhausted, the replacement screen is(P/N 47086).

All three helicopters were serviced and fueledby the same vendor. The submitter stated thatthe McDonnell Douglas maintenance manual

does not require a periodic inspection foreither screen; however, the manual doesrequire an inspection for checking the screenfor contamination if the fuel bypass lightilluminates.

The submitter recommended that operatorsverify the part number of the fuel nozzle filterscreen installed in their aircraft. If the filterscreen is (P/N 5233414), it should be replacedwith (P/N 47086). There should be at least a300-hour visual inspection of the 104-micronfuel nozzle filter screen for contamination andserviceability.


AGRICULTURAL AIRCRAFT

GRUMMAN

Grumman Erratic Fuel QuantityModel G-164D IndicationsAg Cat 2841

The pilot reported that the fuel quantityindicator was erratic.

An investigation determined that the float armwas extremely stiff and difficult to operate.The cause was found to be the bearing/bushing,on the lower gauge shaft, which was too tight.This condition would cause the fuel quantitygauge to stick at various positions when thefuel tank was empty.


AMATEUR, SPORT, ANDEXPERIMENTAL AIRCRAFT

LONG-EZ

Long-EZ Propeller Split6110

While the aircraft was in stable flight at 7,500feet MSL and smooth air, the wooden


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propeller came apart. The separation occurredlengthwise down one blade of the two bladedpropeller. Prior to the separation, there wasno sign of any object striking the propeller.The breakage occurred lengthwise down theblade midway between the leading and trailingedges. The break did not follow along anylaminated pieces of wood.


LYCOMING

Lycoming Spark Plug WiringModel IO-540* Harness Nut Seizure

7421

This report was received from an amateuraircraft builder who had installed a TextronLycoming Model IO-540 engine in his aircraft.

The engine ignition wiring harness nut, usedto attach the harness to each spark plug, wasfound seized to the spark plug threads. It wasnecessary to hold the wiring harness ferrule inorder to remove the nut from the spark plug.The submitter speculated the nut was “plated”too heavily during manufacture which caused“galling” when the nut was installed. Also,during installation of the nut, it is possiblethat particles of the plating could be shaved offand fall into the spark plug ceramic opening.It was recommended that all operators andbuilders closely examine the wiring harnessnuts to ensure they will function properly.The use of “anti-seize” compound duringinstallation is recommended.

Although this problem occurred on anexperimental built aircraft, it may beapplicable to any new wiring harnessinstallation.


NORTH AMERICAN

North American Landing Gear FailureModel SNJ-5 3230Texan

Information for this article was furnished byMr. John H. Lane, Jr., of Jerome, Idaho.Mr. Lane is employed by Airpower Unlimited.

After the third flight of the day, the aircraftwas stopped on the taxi way and the wingflaps were retracted. Then while the aircraftwas “S-turn” taxiing toward the parking ramp,the left main landing gear collapsed.

An inspection revealed the lockpin(P/N 55-33525) was retracted. The right mainlanding gear lockpin was found fully in thelocked position. An examination of the leftmain gear lockpin disclosed it was slowlyworking its way toward the locked position.Later, when the aircraft was moved intoa hangar and placed on jacks, the left gearlocking mechanism functioned properly. Afterremoving the lockpin and spring, small flakesof what appeared to be hard chrome werefound around the aft housing bore andlocking pin.

The submitter stated that in the morningbefore these flights, the aircraft had beentaken out of a warm hangar and was thensubjected to flight altitude temperatures aslow as -20 degrees Fahrenheit. Althoughproper lubrication was present, it wasspeculated the temperature differential mayhave contributed to this failure. There was nomention of moisture on or in the area of thelocking pin which could have frozen the pininto the “retracted position.” (Refer to thefollowing illustrations.)



15

VARIEZE

Varieze Modified Cockpit AirIntake2150

The cockpit fresh air intake, located on thenose section of the aircraft, had been sealed offwith “masking tape.” This was done to preventairflow to the cockpit while operating in a coldenvironment. The operator found that whenthe aircraft landing light door was opened, anunknown amount of “fresh air” was supplied tothe cockpit.

On one occasion, when the aircraft was on atrip to a warmer climate, the cockpit fresh airintake was still blocked with masking tape.For some unknown reason, the landing lightwas left closed. The lack of oxygen effected thepilot and the passenger during this flight.

The aircraft operator may have temporarilyimproved the temperature comfort of thecockpit; however, was it worth theconsequences? This type of MODIFICATIONcan have fatal results. All builders andoperators are cautioned to thoroughlyinvestigate the consequences of their actionswhen changing any design or modification.


ZENAIR

Zenair Main Landing GearModel CH-2000 Brake Assembly

Failed3240

While a student was being given taxiinginstructions, the right main landing gear brakeassembly failed. Inspection of the brakepressure determined that the 0.25 nylon tube(clear) had a bubble forming in the line andhad ruptured at that point. The submitterstated that during taxi instruction, it isbelieved that the student maintained too muchpressure on the right brake causing the brakedisk to build up excessive heat which was


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transferred to the nylon line. This line isrouted in close proximity to the disk. Also, thisparticular aircraft has wheel fairings installedmaking preflight inspection of these lines verydifficult. The submitter further stated thatthis brake line is similar to that used on otheramateur aircraft.


PROPELLERS ANDPOWERPLANTS

HAMILTON STANDARD

Hamilton Standard Blade FailureModel 12D40 6111

This propeller was installed on aPratt & Whitney Model R1340 engine ina Grumman Model G164B aircraft.

During the takeoff roll, a propeller bladeseparated from the hub. The pilot was able toabort the takeoff and stop the aircraft.

The Number 2 blade had broken inside thepropeller hub. The manufacturer of thispropeller has established a “time beforeoverhaul” (TBO) of 1,000 operating hours. TheTBO had been exceeded. The submitterrecommended that all propellers be removedfor overhaul at or before the manufacturer’sestablished TBO has been met.


ALLISON

Allison Possible DefectiveModel 250-C20 Oil Seals

7260

Approximately 3 hours after engineinstallation, an oil leak was found in the areaof the “starter-generator.” The leakage ratewas 12 drops per minute.

The “starter-generator” was removed, and theseal (P/N A6854424) was found half way out ofthe seal bore. During the prior engineinstallation, this seal was installed, inspected,and verified to have been properly installed.The seal was removed, and the outer diameterwas measured at three separate depths on themetal band. Each measurement was found tobe less than the minimum required by theengine manufacturer. The submitterrecommended that all seals (P/N 6854424) bemeasured for proper dimensions prior toinstallation.


TELEDYNE CONTINENTAL

Teledyne Continental Cylinder Stud FailureModel IO-520-D 8530

This engine was installed in a CessnaModel A185F aircraft at the time of thisfailure.

Approximately 10 minutes after takeoff, thepilot both heard and felt an abrupt change inengine performance. A successful landing wasmade at the departure airport.

An inspection disclosed that all eight studs onthe Number 4 cylinder had sheared. Thiscylinder had separated from the engine caseapproximately .5 inch. A review of themaintenance records revealed this engine hada “propeller strike” in its history, and theengine had been disassembled 460 hours priorto this occurrence.

Cylinder total time-779 hours. Engine totaltime-2,433 hours.

TEXTRON LYCOMING

Textron Lycoming Poor EngineModel O-235-L2C Performance

8530

At the time of this occurrence, this engine wasinstalled in a Cessna Model 152 aircraft.


17

This aircraft was delivered to maintenancewith a report of poor engine performance.

During a check of the valve clearance, theNumber 2 cylinder exhaust valve wasdetermined to have a clearance of .083 inch.When the push rod (P/N 73806) was removed,it was found to be “mushroomed,” and the ballend was loose. The submitter suggestedinspecting all push rods for loose ball ends anytime valve clearance is found greater than theallowable limit and when low engine power isreported.

Part time since overhaul-1,892 hours.

Textron Lycoming Catastrophic EngineModel O-320-H2RD Failure

8520

This engine was installed in a CessnaModel 172 aircraft at the time of this failure.Just after takeoff, a catastrophic engine failurewas experienced. The pilot had sufficientaltitude to glide back to the departure airport.

An inspection revealed that a cylinder(number not identified) had completelyseparated from the engine case. The remainingpistons, rods, and crankshaft were destroyed.After disassembly, the cause of this failure wasdetermined to be a broken piston pin(P/N SL-13444-1). (The piston pin brokeapproximately in the middle.)

Part time since overhaul-700 hours.

AIR NOTES

EAA OSHKOSH ’97

Once again, the Experimental AircraftAssociation (EAA) will host the annualaviation celebration known as Oshkosh ’97.This event is known around the world for itsexcellence, size, number of attendees, numberof aircraft, as well as many other statisticalcategories. This year Oshkosh ’97 will begin onJuly 30 and end on August 5. It will be held at

the Wittman Regional Airport in Oshkosh,Wisconsin.

The Oshkosh community has always been verygracious in its acceptance of the large numberof people who fill the hotels and eatingestablishments for weeks before and after theairshow and convention.

Officials from EAA, FAA, and virtuallyeveryone having an interest in aviation will bepresent to answer questions and presentinformation to the public. Throughout theevent, information will be provided usingforums, seminars, and workshops.Manufacturers, vendors, and other groups willprovide the opportunity to view and buy bothnew and existing aviation products of allkinds. Whatever your aviation interest may be,there will be many items which will grab yourattention and possibly spark a new idea.

The staff of this publication will occupy abooth in the FAA hangar to provide handoutmaterial and answer questions concerning theService Difficulty Reporting (SDR) program.The SDR program has many products andbenefits which are available to the public.Many of the SDR program products are free,and others have a nominal cost to cover theprinting and mailing charges.

We hope to see you!

APPROVED PARTS SEMINARS

The Designee Standardization Branch,AFS-640, had previously presented anApproved Parts Seminar. However, the FAAconvened a task force to conduct a thoroughreview of the Suspected Unapproved Parts(SUP) issue, and the seminar was discontinueduntil the review was completed. As a result ofthe task force recommendations, a newnational SUPs Program Office, AVR-20, wasestablished to standardize national policy.Now that standard policy is completed, theApproved Parts Seminar will again bepresented by AFS-640.


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Attendance at these seminars is open toeveryone in the aviation community; however,the material and content is mainly directed toRepresentatives of the Administrator, bothforeign and domestic; FAA inspectors; CivilAviation Authority (CAA) representatives;aircraft engine and propeller manufacturers;parts manufacturers; distributors; suppliers;air carriers; mechanics; and repair stations.It is expected that the seminars will beapproved to be used as an acceptable means ofrenewal for Inspection Authorization (IA). Theseminars can also be used as acceptabletraining in conjunction with the AviationMaintenance Technician Award.

The major areas which will be covered in these8-hour seminars are: type design, conformity,different methods to obtain approval on partsthat are eligible for installation on U.S.-typecertificated products, quality systems, andexamples of litigation as a result of theinstallation of fraudulent/unairworthy parts.

The seminars are tentatively scheduled tobegin after October 1997. You may contactAFS-640, your local Flight Standards DistrictOffice (FSDO), or your local ManufacturingInspection District Office (MIDO) for aschedule of seminar locations. The seminarschedules will also be available on theInternet. The Regulatory Support Division,AFS-600, has established a “HomePage” at thefollowing Internet address:

http://www.mmac.jccbi.gov/afs/afs600

CRITTERS

An article entitled “Spring is Coming!”appeared in the May 1997 edition of thispublication. The article concerned theprevention and/or eviction of “critters” fromyour aircraft. In the article we stated: “If youdiscover a method that works, send it to us,and we will publish your method in thispublication.”

One of our readers, Mr. Richard Collins ofPortola Valley, California, replied to ourrequest with the following method for theprevention and/or eviction of “critters” fromyour aircraft.

“One thing that seems to work fairly well ismoth balls. They can be put in a plasticcontainer, such as a used margarinecontainer, punched full of holes and placedin the cockpit, tail cone, and in each wing.”

We cannot attest to the success of this method;however, it may work very well. If you do trythis method, make sure that all of thecontainers are removed before flight. A redstreamer attached to each container and “leftin view” may be a good reminder.

Our thanks to Mr. Collins for submitting thisinformation. Now, he has told the 27,000 +readers of this publication about this “novel”idea. If anyone else has a different solution oridea, please send it in so we can tell everyone.

AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES (AD’S)

AD’S ISSUED IN MAY 1997

AD 97-09-08 Nomad Models N22S, N22B, andN24A require inspecting controlwheel subassemblies for cracks.

AD 97-09-09 Beech (Raytheon) 58P and 58PArequire inspecting right handupper and lower longerons.

AD 97-10-05 Jetstream HP137 Mk1,Jetstream series 200,Jetstream 3101 and 3201require inspecting MLG pintle.

AD 97-10-10 Nomad N22 and N24 seriesrequire replacing attachmentfittings of upper fin rear sparand fin/horizontal stabilizer.


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AD 97-10-13 Fairchild SA226 and SA227series require elevator torquetube inspection.

AD 97-10-14 Beech (Raytheon) 1900D requiresinspection stabilon attachmentangles.

AD 97-10-15 Sikorsky Model S-64Fhelicopters require inspectionof main gearbox second stagelower planetary plate.

AD 97-10-16 Hiller UH-12, UH-12A/B/C/D/E,CH-112, H-23A, H-23B, H-23D,H-23F, HTE-1, HTE-2, andOH-23G helicopters requireblade spar tube or cuff installed.

AD 97-11-04 Bell 412 and 412EP helicoptersrequire creation of componenthistory card.

AD 97-11-11 Nomad N22B, N22S, and N24Arequire inspecting horizontalstabilizer upper and lower skin.

AD 97-11-12 Nomad N22B, N22S, and N24Arequire inspecting stub wingupper front spar cap flanges forcracks.

AD 97-11-13 Fairchild Aircraft SA226 andSA227 airplanes requiremodifying electrical powergeneration system.

AD 97-12-02 Priority letter forMcDonnell Douglas MD900helicopters requires inspectionof link assembly.

CORRECTION: AIRLINE SUPPLIERSASSOCIATION CONFERENCE

An article, under the above title, waspublished in the June 1997 edition of thispublication. In that article the telephone

number given was incorrect. The correctnumber is (410) 715-9300. Our apologies forany inconvenience this error may have caused.

ALERTS ON LINE

We have received several requests to make theinformation contained in AC 43-16, GeneralAviation Airworthiness Alerts, availableelectronically. Therefore, this publication isnow available through the FedWorld BulletinBoard System (BBS), via the Internet.

You can access the FedWorld BBS directly attelephone number (703) 321-3339. To accessthis publication through the Internet, use thefollowing address.

http://www.fedworld.gov/ftp.htm

This will open the “FedWorld File TransferProtocol Search And Retrieve Service” screen.Page down to the heading “Federal AviationAdministration” and select “FAA-ASI”. The filenames will begin with “ALT”, followed bythree characters for the month, followed bytwo digits for the year (e.g. “ALTJUN96.TXT”).The extension “TXT” indicates the file isviewable on the screen and also available todownload.

Beginning July 1996, we are using the AdobeAcrobat software program format to uploadthis monthly publication. This change isnecessary to include the illustrations whichare associated with various articles. The filenames will still begin with “ALT”, followed bythree characters for the month, followed bytwo digits for the year; however, the extensionwill be “PDF” (e.g. “ALTJUL96.PDF”).The extension “PDF” indicates it will benecessary to download the files for viewing.The Adobe Acrobat Viewer is available fordownload from the Internet (free of charge)and will allow the files to be read.

You can still access the “TXT” extension forissues of this publication prior to July 1996.


20

Also, available at this address are the ServiceDifficulty Reports which may be of interest.

The Regulatory Support Division (AFS-600)has established a “HomePage” on the Internet,through which the same information isavailable. The address for the AFS-600“HomePage” is:

http://www.mmac.jccbi.gov/afs/afs600

Also, this address has a large quantity of otherinformation available. There are “hot buttons”to take you to other locations and sites whereFAA Flight Standards Service information isavailable. If you have any questions, our“E-mail” address follows.

Other requests have been received indicatinga need to make the staff of this publicationmore available to our readers. To providegreater and more flexible access for you tooffer information and ask questions, you maycontact us by using any of the followingmethods.

Editor: Phil Lomax, AFS-640

Telephone Number: (405) 954-6487

FAX Number: (405) 954-4570 or (405) 954-4748

Internet E mail address: [email protected]

Mailing Address: FAA ATTN: AFS-640 (Phil Lomax) P.O. Box 25082 Oklahoma City, OK 73125-5029

We hope this will allow you to contact us bya means which will be convenient and savesome of your time. We welcome the submission

of aircraft maintenance information via anyform or format. This publication provides anopportunity for you to inform the generalaviation community of the problems you haveencountered. The Service Difficulty Reporting(SDR) program also brings the problems to theattention of those who are able to resolve theproblems. Your participation in the SDRprogram is vital to ensure accuratemaintenance information is available to thegeneral aviation community.

FAA FORM 8010-4, MALFUNCTION ORDEFECT REPORT

For your convenience, FAA Form 8010-4,Malfunction or Defect Report, will be printedin every issue of this publication.

You may complete the form, fold, staple, andreturn it to the address printed on the form.(No postage is required.)

SUBSCRIPTION REQUEST FORM

For your convenience, a Subscription RequestForm for AC 43-16, General AviationAirworthiness Alerts, is printed in everyissue.

If you wish to be placed on the distributionlist, complete the form, and return it, in astamped envelope, to the address shown onthe form.

Use this space for continuation of Block 8 (if required).

Federal Aviation AdministrationAFS-640 (Alerts)P.O. Box 25082Oklahoma City, OK 73125-5029

SUBSCRIPTION REQUEST FORMADVISORY CIRCULAR (AC) 43-16, GENERAL AVIATION AIRWORTHINESS

ALERTS

Please use this request to subscribe to AC 43-16 or to change your address if you are presently on the mailinglist. Once your name has been entered, you will continue to receive this publication until you request your namebe removed or a copy is returned because of an incorrect address.

Because this mailing list is independent of other FAA mailing lists, it is necessary that you notify us when youraddress changes. (Our address is on the following subscription request.) If you are presently receiving thispublication it is NOT necessary to send another subscription request. The following subscription request may beduplicated, as necessary. TELEPHONE REQUESTS WILL ALSO BE ACCEPTED; THE TELEPHONENUMBER IS (405) 954-6487. THE FAX NUMBERS ARE: (405) 954-4748 and/or (405) 954-4570.

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If you require more than one copy of AC 43-16, it may be reproduced.

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