Jou rnal of Scientific & Industrial Research Vol. 58 , February 1999, pp 63-75

Imperial Policy and Travails of Indigenous Enterprise: A Study in Bengal Chemical Pharmaceutical Works

A nuradha Roy Sen

Cupperbel t Shoes Ltd, POBox 71644, Ndula, Zambia

Imperi al policy hy it s very nature was not conducive to the growth of an industriali zed state. Thi s paper shows how an indi genous enterprise, Benga l Chemical PharmJceuti ca l Work s (BCPW) batt led against incredible odds to remai n an uperative and profit making enterpri se in coloni al India. The cO lllpany time and Jgain eJme to the ass istance or the government in hour of cri sis, bllt , government policy was co ntinuously hostile tu it s growth . Despite offi cial antipathy, BCPW managed to prosper, although its potentials could not be optimised. Its growth curve could never reach the spectacular heights as that is poss ibl e only in J free indus trial climate. Born in a co loni al economy. coluniJI indust ry by it s very nat ure could never attain the supreillacy uf a world leader.

Introduction

Upt ill 191 4, it was laissez faire that was the guiding princi ple of Great Brita in 's po licy towards Ind ia ' s in­du striali zat ion I. Interpreted in actual terms, it implied the deliberate intenti on to subvert a co lony into a raw materi al exporting country, at the same time taking advantage of it s vas t marketing tracts to fu el Briti sh industry and her ex porti ng potenti als.

In the case of the chemical and pharmaceutical indus­try, the general pattern that evo lved up to World War I was a high export ratio of raw material s that chemicals and pharmaceutical firms of the world were uti li zing (e. g. all mi nerals - manganese, magnes ite, chromi te, sa lt ­petre, wo lfarm, monazite sands, cattl e bones2, vegetabl e herbs like nu x vomica, asafoetida, bel ladonn a, senna, camph or, cinchona bark , tea waste] , oil and oil seeds4)

and an import tab le that was consistentl y read ing India as one of the largest markets of all man ufacturing cou n­tries, for fini shed products of the chemical industry . Furthermore, most of this import-ex port trade was con­trolled by Europeans who were organi sed in chambers of commerce wh ich zealously guarded their interes ts in eliminating unnecessary competiti on and looked with suspicion towards any intrusion on what they regarded as their rightS. Right th rough the prewar peri od Great Britain remained the largest exporter of chemi ca ls and chemical preparations, with Germany suppl ying mere 12 per cent ( 19 13-14) and Ital y a 5 per cent of India's h . I ' 6 c emlca requIrements.

If keeping the colony underdeveloped was what the metropoli s was construing, at the same time by the end of the 19th century economic nationalism was 'develop­ing something like a rea l movement7. Sl\'adeshi encour­aged the appl icati on of sc ience and modern technology for industri al ac hievement under indigenous control. En terp rising Ind ians were coming forward to try and build new industries on the western model. Such indus­tri es from incepti on met with offi c ial disfavour. Tn the case of Bengal Immu n i ty , another Sit 'udesh i effort 0 r the time, IMS official s were reluctant even to test the effi­cacy of the serum they were manufac turing, something that was mandatory before it could be marketed . The Reports orthe Indian Chemi cal Manufacturers Assoc ia­ti on ampl y revea l that the entire official system worked through gross ly discrimin atory tariffpo licies, as well as a va ri ety of structural constraints through a system of exc ise, rai I pol icies, stores purchase systems, import regul at ions to impede these indigenous industri al ef­forts .

As the industry strugg led agai nst innumerable hur­dles of gove rnment anti pathy, tec hnolog ical paucity and capital limitations and strove to make a ni che for itself in the market, the imperial order wooed the same indus­trial efforts with nonchalance and gross in sensibility, ex ploiting these indigenous efforts to the full in time of the Great Wars and whenever it suited the parochial interest of Great Britain .

This paper shows how an indigenous enterpri se, Ben­ga l Chemi ca l Pharmaceutical Works (henceforth BCPW) battled against apparentl y incredible odds and

64 J SCI IND RES VOL 58 FEBRUARY 1999

how they optimi zed producti on and effort for imperial

ass istance in the hour of crisis. And when the stress

passed so did the mirage of governmental assistance

disappear. Despite offic ial malevo lence such indige­

nous efforts managed to prosper, although the ir growth curve could never reac h the spectacular he ights that is

possible only in a free industrial c limate. Born in a

co lonial economy, colonial indu stry by its very nature

could neve r attain the supremacy of a world leader.

Birth of BCPW

BCPW was founded with the vision of one individual ,

was nurtured in incubati on by a small cote ri e of nation­alist Indi ans, mainly doctors and sc ienti sts and matured

into the largest pharmaceutical ente rpri se in entire Asia. Beginning with a paltry capital of Rs 700/- (ref. 9), in

less than two decades it had grown into a self contained

unit and if it was not exactly emerg ing as a competitor to fore ign products-was striving forth for import substi­

tution and had a gradually spiraling pro fit on sa les 10, an

increas ing li st of products I and grow ing populariza­tion 12.

World War I and Indian Chemical Industry

With the outbreak of World War I and as normal

supply lines snapped, the British for the first time rea l­

ised the dangers that the ir industri a l policy in the colony

ex posed them to. To add to the ir discomfiture it was

expected o f India to supply essentials in the entire East­

ern front of the war. The necess ity of produc ing muni­ti ons forced for the first time, a genera l recognition that

indu strial sc iences - particul arly chemi stry and engi­neering had been serious ly neglected. But se lf-condem­

nation as expected was ve ry mild. Lord Rayl e igh in a conference in May 1916, 'The Neglect of Science' -noted, "very little has een done in respect to an eco­

nomic development on sc ientific lines and if there was a critici sm which one could bring justl y again st the

otherwi se excellent government of India by the British Raj , it is that while we have dea lt out justice impartially

to the country, it had no scientific scope at all, and the who le of the poss ibilit ies in that respect have hitherto been neglec ted 13. " In official c irc les, however, ] ndi a' s non-deve lopment of chemical indu stry was blamed on

the pe rfunctory knowledge of Indians on the chemica l poss ibilities of the country and the general lack of en­trepreneurs hip in providing capital for new untried in-d · .. I .. d l4 ustnes requiring ong gestatIon peno .

There was serious shortages in chemicals and phar­

maceutical products. In India, it was noted with alarm

that the re were less than half a dozen fi rms that could

supply war essentials. As franti c efforts were made by

the Muniti ons Board to fulfil war t ime requirement ,

indi genous firm s like BCPW were wooed to come to

the ir aid to bail them out of the imminent crisis. For

in stance, when government patronage to a specific in­

dustry was important, government po licy did not dither

in extending favour and making post-dated promises. A

large tract of land was sanctioned to the company to

optimise production and assurance given of assistance

and protection after the war.

BCPW geared itse lf to meet the offered opportunity

to ex pand its sa les. New lines of production were taken

up on government's request. The company for the f irst

time began produc tion in sodium thiosulphate, caffe ine,

surg ica l dress ings, magnes ium sulphate, thymol, refin ed

saltpetre, potash carbonate, sulphate of iron 15, etc. Pot­

ash nitrate and nitric acid were suppl ied to government .. f . 16 L I ammunItIon ac ton es . arge-sca e manufacture was

taken up of sulphate of iron , bi sulph ites , silver nitrate,

caustic potash, oxide and chloride of z inc; chlorides and

bichlorides of mercury, carbonates, ox ide and chloride

of magnes ia, acetates of potash and ammonia. The in­

creasing volume of manufacture and sale of spirituous

preparations demanded the establishment of a bonded

laboratory in 1916 (ref. 17). The government was ab­

sorbing as much as 95 per cent of the total produce of

BCPW which was supplied to the entire Eastern theatre of warl 8. Moreover, BCPW could price its products at

rates prevailing in the country and sometimes indeed

much lower than that and those of imported produc ts 19

BCPW made no mean contribution to Great Britain 's

war effort . The war demonstrated, for the first time, a grow ing

des ire within India to increase her manufacturing indus­

try , to deve lop an indigenou s technolog ies and to im­

prove her fundamental economic position. It showed the

path of independent economic achievement, signifi cant

enough to come to the aid of the metropoli s. Be in g fed

on the myth of the supe ri ority of the wes t and wes te rn

product, the war he lped in boos ting the confidence of

people in colonial science and technol ogy (S&T). The

fact that the ir product was accepted worldwide, in­

creased confidence in the ir manufacturing ability and

technological skill. War-time orders had opened im­

mense possibilities for the company but due to uneven

imports and government restri c ti on in shipping space,

,

ROY SEN: IMPERIAL POLICY & TRA V AILS OF ENTERPRISE 65

machinery and technology could not be imported. Ad­ditional chambers were constructed in the sulphuric acid pl ant (to meet the increasing demands of acids and other chemica ls) applying technology developed in-house20 .

Large-sca le chemi ca ls manufacture was undertaken by indi genously developed processes. In the company's works hop apart from several apparatus, chemi ca l bal­ances and fire extingu ishers were constructed21. BCPW was suppl ying its Fire Ext inguisher at half the price of the imported one at a rate of more than 500 of them per week to the Government Military Stores . Compress ing and packi ng machines for bandages and steri I ised dress­ings were made appl ying loca l ingenuity. Compressing and packagi ng required fairly sophist icated machines and impo rt was not poss ible due to war cond itions. At the same time the Government orders for such items were rapidl y forthcoming. The problem was solved. No less than four machines were constructed to do the work . A simple hacksaw was converted to an automatic knife to cut the roll s into required length . Oil drums were subjugated to disinfecting chamhers. Steel bars and screws were manipul ated to a compressing machine. The end result was very sat isfactory. Two-and -a-ha l f yards of gauge in length and ]6 in. wide was com pressed

to a packi ng of 2.6 x 1.6 x I. ] in for the Government Military Stores. Al l this was quite remarkable. since BCPW sc ienti sts had no idea of a packing mac hine and , in fact , not seen one. Business, an Anglo- Ind ian Journ al wrote, "BCPW have shown what Indian intelli gence and local training can do and they should be considered the true pioneers of a new industrial era in which enterprise is not supported by the charity of the govern ment or of unpractical philanthropic enthusiasts .. .. . BCPW have shown what enterprise and resource fu lness can do ..... it is a wonderful example of an eager nation clamouring for recogniti on , industri al growt h and a greater partic i-

. . I j'f ' f' I . ,,?2 pa tl on In t le a airs o ' t le empi re - . The govern ment , of course, showed its grat itude. The

knighthood or Dr P C Ray, immediately after the war, cou ld not have been a recogniti on of hi s scientific or scholast ic achi evements. PC Roy was never promoted as a permanent cadre of the Indian Education ServiceD. Rays knighthood, it could be well assumed came in recogniti on of the services rendered by BCPW during the war. Receiv ing govern men t patronage for the first time and the war affording a protection of kind , the growth of sale by the end of 1914 shot up to 9. 8 per cent wi th a 18. 4 per cent Net Profit on sale. In 19 16, fresh issue of share. were dec lared by the company. Sa les for

the year increased to 27. 8 per cent and by 19 18, a 24 whooping 51. 8 per cent .

The Indian Industrial Com miss ion was fo rmed in 19 16 to go into the question of India's industri al deve l­opment. Promi ses of protecti on were made during the height of the war when economic control and state ass istance were seriously being considered in Great Britain . But with the end of the war orthodox economic libera li sm was reasserting it se lf. In terven ti onist argu­ment to safeguard colonial industri a li za ti on in the pos t­war pe ri od was no longer acce ptabl e to British officialdom25 .

Post War Crisis for Chemical Industry

The country's mood, however, was expectant and opt imisti c. India' s po li tical and military loyalty and material and monetary contri bution to the wa r, created a sense of fee ling that her services would be re'vva rded, pol iticall y and econo mi call y. Pol iti call y the government came down heav il y in rep ress ion , suspendi ng the right of habeas corp/{s which had been the foundation of civil liberties in Britai n. The Rowlat Act. the1alianwala Bagh massacre left Indi a disillusioned and brought forth changes in the fo rm of struggle against the Raj. The nature as we ll as the style of pol it ical st ruggle henceforth wou ld be different.

Economically, despite some commi ssions and re­ports, I itt Ie effort was made to brillg fo rth an y systemat ic change in gove rnment policy to aid India 's industria li ­zation. In fact the reverse was true. Efforts were made to wi n back lost markets and to revert back to pre-war

.. 26 position .

Post War Adaptations by Europe

Foreign compan ies in their effort to capture the ma r­kets los t during the war began dumpin g operations. The war had seen a sudden and abnorma l growth of chemical factor ies in the west for the manufacture of explosives and other war material s. These factori es after the war were utili zing their enl arged machinery and plant capac­ity for the produc ti on of chemi ca ls more cheaply than before. There was over producti on and over stock ing of fini shed products in all the manufacturing countri es in the west. With the end of the war these over-producing western nati ons were vy ing with one another to capture the unprotected or ineffic ientl y protected markets like India, cutting prices and under selling in a race of fi erce

66 J SCI IND RES VOL 58 FEBRUARY 1999

Table I - Comparative table of imported duties levi ed by different manufacturing countri es after world war I

Chemica ls Germany USA Japan It aly per cent per cent per cent per cent

Alum 21.73 38.6 13.5 52 . 85

Alum in um 2 1.73 15. 42 20 2 1. 14 su lphate

Copperas 4.08 Free 20 26.43

Zinc 4. 95 20. 76 20 chloride

Copper 3. 95 Free 20 7. 7.+

su lph:lle

Sod ium 9. 6 27.2 20 , ulphide

Epsom salt 27 .94 4 1. I 20 54. 35

Glauber<; 3 1. 16 46. 0 20 17.62

salt

Source: ITB Enqu iry on Heavy Chemicals, Vol. 1. p. 146.

co mpetiti on27 . All the deve loped countries had closed their market to import by hi gh tariff wa ll s (Table I).

To buttress their ow n economy from the manufactur­in g excess of other countries - the US. Germany, France and England had all introduced statute measures. In Great Britain was passed the Protecti on of Dyestuff (Impo rt Regulat ion) Act in 192 1 for a period of lOy to safeguard th e Briti sh dye industry. In Britain , among purchasers there was an affinit y for the more sophi sti ­cated German dye. By the safeguard of Key Industries Act of 1921, an ad valorem import duty of 33 1/3 per cent was lev ied on all synthetic organi c chemicals other than dye and intermediari es dealt in the former Act. "'The Board of Trade I isted some thousands of organic chemicals to which the duty was applicable. A large number of inorganic products were also subj ected to such duty28 . Under the safeguard of Key Industries Act, in fact, any artic le manufactured for the first time aut o­matically began to enj oy protection from foreign com­petiti on, a duty on imports being imposed, representing the difference between the price of the imported article and the domestic product.

*It was the aftermath of the waf which , in fac t, had seen the development of Briti sh Chemica l and Pharmaceuti cal Indust ry. Ger­many was the world leader III sy ntheti C chelnJcais ,and il was the ullequivocal surrender of Germany and great Bnt a111 S access to her chemical industry th at spearheaded her own 11ldustn al growth In the rel:lled fie ld , (Haber L F, Chelllica llndUSI/T DI/ring the 19th CentUl ), Oxford , 1969, p. 20).

Drop in Sales and Manufacturing Activi ty

BCPW, after the war found a sudden and abrupt diminution in sales. Annual rate of growth of sales had sp iralled from 4.2 per cent in 191 3 to 3S per cent, S I per cent and 56 per cent between 1917-1 9 respectively. But by 1920 with increased imports, sale had plummeted to 13.7 per cent (ref. 29). It is significant that, the com­pany ' s chief compet itors were not within the country but were internati ona l combines - the Farben Industries of Germany and the Imperial Chemical Industr ies of Great Britain .* Backed by big capital these combines cou ld successfully se ll their produce at much lowered rates than BCPW. These international combi nes in fact regu­lated prices in such a fashi on that prices var ied according to object i ve conditi ons of a count ry, depending on nature and extent of competiti on. Giant operating units could very effectively reduce the cost of manufacture per unit of production .

BCPWs unit of production in comparison was much smaller and its cost of producti on much hi gher. The work cost of heavy chemica ls per ton of fini shed product of the company in an average betwe n 1926-29 was30 :

Magnesium su lphate: Rs 109-50; Al um: Rs 125-15 ; and Aluminium su lphate: Rs 76-07.

The corresponding cif price of imports calculated in rupees of the above art icles were :

Magnesium sulphate Rs 301-; Alum Rs 601-; Alu­minium sulphate Rs 52/-.

Unrestricted cheap imports meant that BCPW could neither exploit the Indian market (not to think of ex port potentials) to its advan tage and as a consequence nor it could work its units to fu ll capac ity. Unab le to maximi se production and therefore profit , co lon ial technol ogy was bound to remain archaic, compared to the development in the West. Western nati ons had effecti ve ly cut down on prices essentially through technological improve­ment and advancement effecting economies of sca le through bulk production.

These chemica l combines were very often quoting a lower pri ce for the Indian market than in the continent (Table 2).

With prices often cut down production cost, reducing price was often proportional to increased imports .

* .. * The European and American chemical markets had undergone revolutionary changes since the war. By a process of voluntary or forced amalga mat ions the industry was brought under single man­agement and fin ancial control. The small and ineffi cient units were closed down and manufac ture was concentrated in convenient cen­tres and production carri ed on with large units.

r

')

,

ROY SEN: IMPERI AL POLICY & TRA VAILS OF E TERPRISE 67

Table 2 - Comparati ve study of price in U K and c i f price in Bombay (£-s-d)

Chemicals Engli sh quotat ion per tonne CI F pri ce Bombay port

1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928

Copperas 2-15-0 3-6-0 4-0-0 4- 12-6 4- 12-6 5- 12-9 5-16-0 5- 15-0 5- 16-3 5-1 5-0

Zinc chlori de 24-7-0 23- 15-0 23- 15-0 24-15-0 24- 15-0 24- 10-0 27-1)- 0 22- 15-0 22-0-0 20- 10-0

GI:lUbers sa lt 3- 18-0 4-0-0 4-0-0 4-0-0 4-0-0

Source: ITS t :llql/ irv Oil H erl".\' Chelllicals, Vol. 1, pp 2 16-23 1.

ICI was the main importer of heavy chemical s into Indi a. The combine was, in fact, voc iferously express ing it s strategic aim of keeping the deve lopment of chemi ca l industry within the Briti sh empire and in British hands. The choice of the name, Imperi al Chemica l Industry, was to reiterate th at the bed rock of all its poli cies was in the interes t of Briti sh imperi ali sm3 1. The Engli sh and German comb ines remai ned the chief competitor of BCpW32 . To meet thi s unequal competiti on BCPW was forced to se ll its produce at a price which vi rtuall y wiped off profits . Manu fac ture of certain items had to be cur­tailed. Magnes ium sulphate (Epsom salt) is a case in point. This sa lt was produced by BCPW but with the decelerating price of the imported sa lt , producti on no longer proved profitabl e. Su lphates which was so ld at Rs 5-8-0 per cwt in 1927-28, to keep the price competi ­ti ve with imports , had to be fu rther reduced to Rs 4- 12-0 per cwt in 1928.

Protection to the Industry

To sati sfy the industry's c lamour for ass istance, a Tariff Board Enquiry went into the question of protec­ti on to India's chemical industry. The Indian chemi cal indust ry was optimistic. A protec ti ve duty ono per cent fo r a peri od of lO y could help in securing the founda­ti on of the industry in stable grounds33 . The Tariff Board recommended protect ion for a peri od of 7 y, to be ex tended later. When finall y however the Act was passed (Act XXIII of 193 1), an ineffectua l protect ion of 15 per cent was passed on a small number of chemi ca ls, for a max imum period of 18 months. The protec ti ve duty was to have effect onl y up to 31 March 1933. These were then li able to the ordinary duty imposed under the Indian Tariff Act , 1894, purely for revenue purposes.

Sales Promotion by BCPW

To meet the unfair competiti on and rea li sing Govern­ment reluctance in effecting any positi ve legislation BCPW dec ided to act on its own.

5-0-0 4-10-3 4-15-0 4-6-3 4-0-0

Advertisement

An intensive adverti sement campaign was launched. The annual adverti sement ex penditure averaged Rs 17, 367 between 19 19 to 1926127. Average annu al sa les during the peri od were Rs 2, 082, 284. In the subsequent period, till the outbreak of World War II , in 1939, adverti sement cost went lip to Rs 65, 45 I. Annual sa les in 1939 were Rs 6, 6 15, 660. The percenti Ie increase of adverti sement ex penditure over sales durin~ thi s pe ri od had ri sen by 20 per cent as indicated above' 4

Apprec iating the necess ity of a doctor in the develop­ment of the drug trade, one was appointed to be in­charge of promotional work . H is job, among others, was to make occas ional visits to the chemists , doctors, attend medical confe rences, in struct medical representat ives on how to interact with doctors35 . Competiti on within India depended largel, on ri val companies link with a greater number of doctors36. These representat ives were sent to Medi ca l Conferences and to participate in the accompanying ex hibiti ons . Such participation helped to continuousl y upd ate the work done within the country as well as to analyse the future poss ibilities by sc rutiniz­ing the ex hibits, both Indi an and more importan tl y, the foreign. Significantl y, such conferences and ex hi bit ions grabbed the attenti on of the medica l world to the work conducted by the part ic ipating companies. In the Fifth All India Medica l Conference, 27 December 1938 held at Meerut. Dr B C Roy eulogized the progress of BCPW in the fi eld of chemical and medicinal preparati ons. Needless to say, sllch laudati on in a doctors conference did wo nders for th e promoti on and publi c it y of BCPW37.

Shares

As a part of the adverti sement campaign and equall y important to ex pand the financial base of the company, BCPW, in 1932-33, issued shares exc lusive ly fo r the medical profess iona ls. 'There is a grow ing competi tion

68 J SCIIND RES VOL 58 FEBRUARY 1999

in the country(not to speak of forei gn competition)in respect of manufacture and sale. In view of thi s fact , it is necessary to secure greater sympathy and cooperat ion of the members of the med ical profess ion with the worki ng of the company .. ... Your directors are now sub­mitting a sc heme which is primaril y intend ed to strengthen the position of the company. At the same time, it will serve to reli eve the financial strain of the company,,38. As BCPW prod ucts were adequate ly popular in Bengal and to popul ari se and expand itse lf, the issue of the shares was concentrated in Punjab, Bombay and Madras. BCPWs policy in thi s instance was not on ly dynamic and ambitious but a significant departure from the genera l working of the Indi an indus­tries. There was no unified financial market in India . Most Indian banks preferred to work on a regior,al sca le and in nearly all the cases Joint Stock Companies raised shares from within the boundaries of one region39

Exports

Equally remarkable was the appointment abroad of medical &ual ifi ed men as th e company's repre­sentati ve4 . These men succeeded in obtaining the serv­ices of local doctors in foreign countries, mostl y Singapore, Bangkok, Malay and Palestine41 . Such dy­namic and ambitious campaign programme geared up BCPWs ex port market.

Promotions in l110fussil

BCPW was a nationalist enterpri se, more so it was a s\\'adesli i effort *- If profit and adventurous inroads into fo reign market was a motivatin g fact or more so was a committment to the nation42 . Specia l attention was given to the marketing in the vi ll age and ex tra funds sanctioned for such propaganda. It is significant that ad ve rt isement campa ign in the vil lage and mofu ss il very often took the fo rm of awareness campaign. Growth of public hea lth pol icies in India had been neg li gentl y slow. BCPW began publication and free distribution of a book le t SlI'ast liya Pras(lIlga (in formation about health). It dealt with common ail ments and thei r corre­spondi ng remedies. In attempting to educate and en­li ghten th e rural interiors, BCPW was not merely making adverti sement campa ign. It wu~ trying to bridge

*Sumil Sarkar has a made a di slinclion bel ween the lWO. The fonner

was broader in scope lhan the laller. Nalionalisl enlerp ri se o fte ll

followed oven comprJdore lines while the iJller depended on i ndige­

nous raw malerials , lechnology, manpower (SarkaI' S, The S\\'udeshi

M(m!IIICIII / 11 B CII!;a/ /903-08, New Del hi, 1973 p. 92).

to an ex tent the duali sm that had come to ex ist in the Indian soc iety43. Allopathy was essent ially an im­planted medical system. A large section of the rural mass could not as yet relate and identify with it and continued to depend on vaids or more often quacks , wi th di sastrous consequences. BCPW was manufacturing a large nu m­ber of products which were Ayurvedic medicines and some very effect ive combinat ion drugs which helped the rura l population to identify with suc h medicines.

Expanded Range of Products

To meet foreign competit ion head long, advertise­ment apart, BCPW signi ficant ly expanded its range of manufac tured items. Larger sums were kept aside for Research and Development and techno logy updatecl44.

By 1929, BCPW, apa rt from manufacturin g heavy chemica ls were preparing pharmaceutical preparati ons, surgical dress ings, toilet dressings , scientific inst ru­ments and also nearly 300 to 400 kinds of fine chemicals. By late 1930s BCPW had placed in the market a wide range of 244 medical products (Table 3)45. Bes ides, there was a range of near ly 40 items of purely indigenous variety (Table 4) .

Research and Development

A separate Research Laboratory was created and BCPW widely ex perimented with combination drugs. Western and indigenous drugs were combi ned to market very successfu l and widely accepted products like Kas­abin, for bronchitis (a combination of ephedrine hydro­chloride, ammo ni a benzoate, sulphaguaico late and ayurved ic medicine v<lsaka); Asvan for nervous depres­sion (Sodium formulae, ethyl alcohol combined with va rious ayurved ic medicines)46.

A specia l laboratory was set up to study the property of various raw materials. Ephed rine was ex tracted from the indigenous herb Ephedra I'll/ga ris, emetine and san­tonine was iso lated fro m Indian ipecacuanha and Indi an artemesia, respect ively. Strychnine was produced from nux vomica seeds. India ex ported nearly 50, 000 cwts of nu x vomica seeds to Britain alone while producing a pa ltry 15, 000 Ib of strychnine in the country . Tannic ac id was ex tracted from Mymha/an required essent ially by the printing ink industry and ga lli c acid from ga lnut. Liquid Ergot fortis was manu factured by ex tracti on from ergot by a method developed inhouse different from the B P and con taining more alkalo ids than the imported Hewletts and P&D Co.47 . In 1934, ethyl e ther

ROY SEN: IMPERIAL POLICY & TRAVAILS OF ENTERPRIS E 69

Tab le 3 - BCPW : Nu mbcr of drug product s in thc 1930s

Category No. of products

Medi cinal specialities 36

2 Application II

3 Coll oidal preparati ons 6

4 Gland preparations 21

5 Maroglobin preparations 8

6 Malt preparations II

7 Tablets 18

8 Vitamin preparations 8

9 Prophylactic vaccine 8

10 Plain vaccine 13

II Mixed vaccinc 9

12 Special vaccine 26

13 Chemo vaccine 12

14 Injections II

15 Phycatens 6

16 Anti virus 9

17 Bacteriophages 6

18 Sera 17

19 Toxoids 2

20 Jexins 96

2 1 Veterin ary products 3

22 Antisepti cs and insecticides 7

Total 244

Source: BCPW Therapeutic Hints (n. d. )

was manufactured for the first time in India and created . . h . I . I 48 a sensatIon 111 C emlCa clrc es .

BCPW took up the manufacture of therapeutic se ra,

vacc ines, injectable drugs which have been in short

supply during World War I and with very disastrou s

consequences . The BCPW sera was put to test at the

State Serum Institute of Copenhagen and found to pos-h . d ' . I 49 sess t e reqUIre II1te rnatlOna potency .

In 1938, BCPW pursued the idea of providing em­

pl oyment to an eminent bacteriol ogist from Europe.

Thi s was feasib le probably in view of the repress ion of

the Jewi sh sc ientists in Nazi Gernlany. It reflects the

level attained by the company. It was decided to adver­

ti se for the post in Th e LOlldoll Tim es and other fore ign

newspapers and to seek the he lp of Jawaharlal Nehru

and Subhas Bose in thi s context50.

Commercial pharmacologi cal and biological manu­

fac ture requires exacting level of control and analysis .

Tablc 4 - BCPW : Indigenous preparations

Liquid ex trac t of abroma augusta.

2 Liquid extract of alstonia scolaria.

3 Anu makarad hwaja.

4 Aqua ptychotis.

5 Aqua ptychotic concentrates.

6 Liquid ex tract of arjun a.

7 Liquid extract of as hoka.

8 Asvan .

9 Liquid ex tract of aswagandha.

10 Liquid extrac t of bael.

II Syrup of brahmi .

12 Essence of chi rata.

13 Chyavanpras.

14 Liquid ex tract of dashamul.

15 Datura coll odin.

16 Elixir papain .

17 Liquid extracl of gokh ru .

18 Liquid extract of gulancha.

19 Liquid ex trac t of hemidesmu s.

20 Indigenous remedies.

2 1 Liquid ex trac t of jambolan.

22 Liquid extract of kalmegh.

23 Liquid extract of kamala.

24 Liquid ex trac t of khet papra.

25 Kurchi so l.

26 Liquid extract of kuth .

27 Liquid extract of lod h.

28 Syrup of lodh.

29 Lecivin .

30 Makaradhwaja

31 Myrobalan Co. tincture.

32 Essence of neem.

33 Ptychopapin.

34 Ptychotis tab lcts.

35 Liquid extract of punarnava.

36 Uteron.

37 Syrup of vasaka.

38 Syrup of vasaka with hypophosphites of lolu . Source: BCPW: Indigenous Preparations, Price Li st 194 1

BCPW very successfull y matched the inte rnational

standards. Its products comparing favourably with for­

e ign competitors of Eng land and America51 .

In 1932, a Bioc he mi cal Department was initiated for

the study of vi tamin and the manufacture of vitamin

products under the guidance of Dr B N Guha (re f. 52).

A sensational achievement of the department was the

70 J SCI IND RES VOL 58 FEBR UA RY 1999

photochemica l synthesis of vitamin B (ref. 53). Many vitamin products were success full y launched in the mar­ket. By extensive research BCPW vali antly strove fo r import substituti on and se lf-suffciency on a fairl y large sca le. Thiarsin was manufactured as a potent remedy against syphili s, Ambiarsoll against amoebias is and in compet iti on to the imported Atoxy!, sod ium sa lt of p­amino phenyl arsen ic ac id was manufactured, the essen­tia l ingred ient to all arsenica l preparat ions mak ing itself se lf-s ufficient in thi s important chemical. Entroken, a quin oline co mpound and an effec ti ve amoeb iac ide was produced and so ld at competiti ve pri ce with the Swiss Ciba compani es enterovioform. Chin osol, an effective anti sept ic and preserva ti ve for bi olog ical preparat ions, arta n another qu inoline compound and a wide ly used diuretic were successfull y produced and marketed by BCPW, at competitive price with the imported prod-

) -+ ucts . BCPW, was to its founder Ac harya PC Ray a sy mbol

of the grow ing se lf-respect o/" the people . Independent research should be the raiso/l d'c trc of an y worthwhile industry. This probably best ex plains the sec ret of sus­tenance of the company when so many others failed . But having to work in an ini mica l po li tico- economic cli ­mate. BCPW had to face problems th at soon proved de trime ntal to its growt h.

Drug Ad ulterat ion

Bes ides indi sc rim inate dumpi ng hy foreign firm s and an ineffectual government protection policy what made things more difficu lt for a strugg ling colonial industry was the very nature of the drug trade that ex isted in the country. With no controlling legislation, as in all the developed na ti ons of the west, and an increas ing demand on cheap drugs, there was an alarming increase in the fl ow of substandard and spurious produc ts. Agents of American, German , French, and Ita lian finns swarmed arou nd the prac titi oners, with literature furni shed by them, spread ing the merits of such products. Instances were noted of even cotton woo l made from ve ry in ferior quality cotton and poss ibly from waste linen and rags being largely ex ported to the Indian market and sold as "absorbent cotton, at very cheap rates-sometimes less than the cost of raw cotton55 . " Such c.)!tonnot onl y had no fibre strength but was being used fo r surgica l pur­poses often with grave consequences. Onl y by di nt of their low price and probably the ready acceptability of ' foreign product, could such imports capture a substan­ti al part of the market.

Long years of protes t by the industry, ri ght since the War, made little di ffe rence to the government. Honest, conscienti ous drug companies li ke BCPW, fi ghting fo r a place of its own in competiti on with low priced im­ported drugs had to work within the twi n const raints of not onl y cheap imports but with a fl ood of cheap, impure drugs from with in and outside the coun try . BCPW was active in drawi ng the attenti on of the gove rnment to the problems faced by the industry. Lack of government contro l meant that even crude drugs of ineffec ti ve strength were im ported by unscrupu lous dea lers maki ng it difficu lt for BCWP to accept any consignment before elabora te examinat ion. This needed i1 large stall of trained chemists, furth er add ing to the cost of produc­tion. Moreover, the industry apprehended that the prob­lems of adulterati on were linked with the fu ture of the pharmaceutical industry in the country. An industry stru gg ling in incubation if di sc redi ted wou ld not onl y lose in its home grounds to import but cou ld neve r hope to develop ex port potentials in the internati onal market.

It was onl y when the Civil Di sobedience movement started and the Congress took up a sta nd to boycott weste rn produce; including western medi c ine and pop­ularise Arurvcda , that the go vernment came up wit h the proposa l for the formation of a Drugs Enq uiry Commi t­tee , to go into the ques ti on of adu lteration of dru gs . S Sen , Superintendent of BCPW was appointed the co­opted member of the committee and helped it in it s arduous task, showing the eagerness of the company in effective ly regu lating the drug trade for the betterment of the industry.

The report of the committee was fair and judic ious but its proposa ls were shelved for 7y. Finall y, in 1937, when a Bill was passed, it regul ated only imported d 56 TI . d . d . I .. rugs . le entire rug III ust ry was Vlru ent 111 Its protes t aga in st this incompl ete measure. An ac t subject­ing imported drugs to leg islati on wou ld mean an added advantage to the fo reign manu fac turers who coul d se ll their produce under the hall mark of be ing pure and by implica ti on indigenous drugs woul d bear a stamp of in feri ority in eyes of the public. The government had to re lent under a storm of protest. The Bill was withdrawn but it was not till 1947 that act was passed regul ating the drug trade.

Governmental obtrusion to the dev lopment of the chemi ca l industry ac ted th rough a gamut of structural inhi biti ons- in the governments exc ise, stores purchases, and rail tariff poli cies.

ROY SEN: IMPERIAL POLICY & TRA VAILS OF ENTERPRISE 71

Excise Regulations

The Indian Industri al Commiss ion had recommended a liberal exci se policy . There was a di versity of excise regulations within the country, differing from province to province. Spirituous preparati ons were subjected to exc ise duty in every province it entered increasing the cost of goods requiring spirits. In the case of imports, however, the duty on consignment once paid at the port of entry was transported to any part of the country without any subsequent levy of duty. The ICMA *, the mouthpiece of the Indian Chemica l Industry suggested th at as in imports, so within the country the duty once paid on goods at the state of ori gin should be all owed free movement across the country, instead of reva lu ation in every province it went through. Such restricti ons on the free movement of goods were a seri ous handicap to the industry. The Drugs Enquiry Committee noted that such policy bespeaks of di scrimination in favour of imported goods and were detrimental to the interests of the Indian industrl 7. For BCPW, dea ling excess ively in spirituous preparati ons (i n 1916 it had establ ished a Bonded Laboratory to meet the increasing sale of spiri­tuous preparations) the anomaly in exc ise regul ati on was providing a very seri ous handicap. The reso lutions of the Exc ise Conference ( 1937) failed to bring forth any uniformity and instead a strange di sorder came to exist with certain states accepting the resolution and others rejecting it. The government pleaded inability for any uniform central legislation, as exc ise in accordance to the Indi a Act 1935 was a prov incial subj ec t.

Stores Purchase

In theory the Stores Purchase Rules of Government of India were stated to give greater encouragement to Indian industry58. But theory and practice in a colonial economy, rarely reconcil ed. The Stores Purchase Rules foll owed a max im of 'British is best' . The Indian indus­try had a competitor from Government Medical Depots who had continued with manufacturing acti vity since 1919- 20. The industry' s protest against thi s unwar-

*By 1938 the Indian Chemical Industry had fa irly organi sed it se lf with the formati on of the Indian Chemical Manu fac turers Associa­tion (ICMA). It was initi ated on 16 Jul y 1938, a representative body of manufacturers of chemicals, pharmaceut icals, heavy chemicals and allied products. it was affili ated to the Indian Chamber of Commerce. As P C Ray, the first president of the organi sation emphasised, with the growth of indu stry, many prob lems cropped up whi ch required concert ed actiu n on behalf of all engaged in the industry.

ranted intrusion restnctll1g the market and hindering industrial growth was unheeded.

Rail Policy

Government 's railway policy was perhaps the great­est handicap in the development of a industry within a colonial economy. The prohibiti ve rail freight increased cost of production, further adding to the di sadvantage of the Indian industry, vis-a-vis imports. Appeal to reduce rates to aid India's industrial efforts was effective ly counteracted with the argument that there were some well-defin ed obligati ons on rail ways by the Rail way Act, that rai I rates must be reasonable and that there should not be any undue preference or di scriminati on. "Discrimination in rates against an imported product based wholl y and solely on protecti ve considerations could not be justified under the provisions of law ,, 59. Reluctant to reduce freight charges which could have effecti vely cut down the cost of production of indi ge­nous industry, the railways however in fl agrant di sre­gard to its 'norms' gave significant benefit to imported pharmaceutical products, mov ing from the port to the hinterl and . Whil e imported fini shed products were given a preferential rate, at the same time essential imported raw drugs did not enj oy such benefit. The imperialists wanted to make sure that colonial industry did not attain the se lf-sufficiency by developing bas ic industries that could make it independent of imported products60.

Not only was rail tariff hi gh but with no laid down norms on tariff, rail companies indulged in di scrimi na­tion which overtly took the form of rac ism. BCPW was charged a higher freight rate on Bauxite (from Madras Presidency) than D Waldie and Co. 6 1. Significantl y Waldies management was entirely in the hands of Euro­peans who enj oyed a better camaraderie with their racial counterpart. Delay in deli very of goods or difficulty in transportati on was solved through in fo rmal meeti ngs between seni or executi ves of rail companies and ser-

f E . 62 vants 0 uropean companies . This hi gh arbitraril y di scriminatory transport was, to

a large extent , responsible for the increased cost of manufacture of indigenous enterprise . The hi gh pri ce level was restricting the market of indigenous enterprise in two ways . The increased price of medicines kept it beyond the reach of the common man who continued to depend mostly on quacks and charl atans and the poten­tials of the market coul d not be exploited. Moreover, high tariffs meant that firms like BCPW had to restrict

72 J SCI IND RES VOL 58 FEBRUARY 1999

the sa le of the ir produce reg ionally . Fre ight between Cal cutta and Bombay for finished indigenous pharma­

ceutical products, was in many cases higher than that

be tween London and Bombay . Alum is a case in point.

Weste rn India with its deve loping mill indu stry was a

considerab le marke t for alum. BCPW was manufactur­

ing alum in significant proportions. But the west Indian

market was out of bounds. Mill owners found it cheaper

to import alum from UK rather than transport it from

Calcutta63.

World War II and the Indian Chemical Industry

Despite de liberate obtmsion on the part of the gov­

ernment for the natura l de velopment of the industry,

when the world was in the throes of another crisis, the

co loni a l government once again sought to woo the in­

dustry. The proverbi a l carrot of protection was prom­ised . BCPW was asked to meet large government orders

of essential chemical and pharmaceutical products . Spe­cial pri ority sanc tion was allowed for the order of a new

Con tact Acid Plant to opt imi se production limits. The plant went into operation in Panihati in 1941. Export

order was procured from as far as Austra lia64. Large

orders were placed by the government for surgical dress­ings, santonine, gallic ac id, tannic ac id, pe rmanganate,

dichromate, ferro a lum and thiarsin acid. Gallic acid ,

sapon in , and tannic acid were produced from indi ge nous

raw mate rial s. Sanction was procured from the govern­ment for manufacture of qu inine ampules65 . The Bio­

log ical Department was eXfcanded and reorgani sed to meet the increas ing de mand )6. A new caffe ine plant was

estab li shed and the magnesium plant was expanded67 .

T wo new ether plants were in stalled at Panihati 68. Fear­

ing a poss ible Japanese attack on Ca lcutta, a ske leton

factory was set up in Lahore . An e the r anasesthes ia and

chloroform plants were built the re69 .

St ri ving for import substitution , BCPW in a remark­

ab le move looked for a closer cooperation among Indi an firms. Intra-indu strial pi ' nning was sought to meet for­

e ign competiti on presenting a united front. The com­pany he ld frequ ent meetings and consult at ions with

crstwhi Ie ri val I ndi an fir ms to work out loca l substitutes for imported produc ts and sort out difficulties among manufacture rs 70.

The government throughout the period remained con­

tinu ously caut ious in rendering its ass istance . Under no c irc umstances shou ld Indi a's industry be a ll owed to develop s ignifican tl y enough to make it independent afte r the war. Briti sh vested inte rests were apprehensive

of the long-term effect of the metropo lis efforts to en­

courage Indian industrialization. Under no c ircum­

stances shou ld Indian industry be allowed to deve lop to

that extent that it cou ld be a threat to Great Bri ta in 's

market in India. While the government was promising

post-war assistance as reward for war t ime support, at

the same time the finding of Guy Lacock, a repre­

sentative of the Briti sh Board of Trade was met with

re lief . Locock noted with inconsiderab le comfort that

" no steps had been taken to expand production ..... which

are essenti al for war purposes and that on the whole

post-war inte rests in India of Briti sh industry are not

likely to suffer so greatl y as was once expected71 . "

A continuous pressure was therefore kept on the

industry. Government policy was neve r de fined or con­

sistent, often shifting att itudes for short- term immedi ate

benefits. Despite the increase in fre ight rates, cost of raw

mate rial s and overheads, prices was not a ll owed to

increase (though prices on imports were sancti oned 25

per cent inc rease) de liberate ly cutting on the profit of

the indu stry . Moreover though spec ia l sancti on was

allowed with the company in case of mi litary demand,

immense difficulty was faced in meeting c ivili an re­

quirements not because of insu ffi c ient produc ti on but

because of book ing restricti ons imposed by the govern­

ment on rail companies . In certa in cases, BCPW had to

wait fo r longer, i.e. , two months to despatch a sing le

consignment . Thi s resulted in an anomaly when tJespite

market demand s and surfi c ielll produ ction capac ity,

BCPW was continuously cu tting down upon its produc­

ti on potential to prevent accumulat ion and storage of

unuti li sed goods. In some instances the re had to be a 30

pe r cent curtailment ill manufacturing activities on ac­

count of non-ava ilabi I ity of transport faci l ities 72 . Before

the war, BCPW had already an apprec iable export mar­

ket in ne ighbouring Ceylon, Straits Settl ement, Middle

East, and East African countries, wi th furt he r potential

for expansion. But due to the war the go vernment had

imposed severe restrict ion on exports further curtailing produc ti on capac ity.

The end of the war once again brought to the fore the

problems o f low priced imports . Prom ises of post-war

protec ti on faded with cessati on of hosti I iti e '. Honouri ng

government request, BCPW had started produc ti on on

variou s new lines. The te rminati on of war sa w ne it her

any import restri c ti on impos iti on nor was any effecti ve

protectionist duty imposed. Anaesthes ia, sodium th io­

sulphate, spiritu ous dru gs, medicine, and bi o log ical

products that were al l produced on governrnent demands

I

..

ROY SEN: IMPERIAL POLICY & TRAVAILS OF ENTERPRISE 73

were now found accumulating in warehouses, as cheap imports inundated the Indian market73 .

Despite the best efforts of the company and some gestures in import substituti on and new lines ofproduc­ti on, BCPW could never reach the heights that it had reached during the times of the two great wars. By 1947, some twenty synthetic drugs and isolated formulations were put in the market to substitute imports. Noted among them were thiarsin and ambiarsin against syphi­li s and amoebios is, respecti vely. But the main hurdle for synthetic drugs was lack of coal tar intermediates. Most of the essenti al raw materi al had to be imported which put BCPW product at a di stinct disadvantage vis-a-vis imports. After World War II , rate of profit sank to pre-war levels and remained more or less stagnant at 9 per cent , till 1954, when the trend was di stinctly down­ward, leading ultimately to the losses in 1969-70* (Ben­gal Chemical 1892-1977, Growth and Decline oian Indigenous Enterprise, paper by Sudip Chowdhury In­di an Institute of Management, unpubli shed work).

Conclusions

BCPW had gathered maximum momentum during the two great wars. With onl y some amount of govern­mental cooperati on and assistance, the achievements of BCPW is a pointer to the potential of the chemical and pharmaceutica l industry in India which could have de­veloped in a more congeni al politico-economic climate. Despite the immense difficulties of war time conditions, BCPW not onl y increased producti on manifold but made deep inroads in new, unchartered areas of produc­ti on. The results were instant as was obvious. Annual rate of growth of sales increased by over 56 per cent by end of World War I and 32 per cent by 1942. Govern­ment patron age and a spectacul ar growth curve in the case of BCPW and, in fac t, the industrial development of India in the colonial peri od were direc tl y related. But Briti sh government in India, as thi s artic le stri ves to reveal, was definitely hostile to the development of the chemi cal and pharmaceutica l industry in Indi a. BCPW is a case in point. The greatest economi c development of a colony occurs when ties with the metropoli s are the

74 Th .. I' h . b ' weakest . e emergency SItuatIOn or t e tIme elllg had reduced governmental interference. A dynamic

*In November 199 I, the Mi nister of State for Public Undertaking published a li st of sick public sector undertak ings. Listed among them was BCPW. On 4 December 199 I the Sick Ind ustrial Compa­nies, (Special Provis ion) Amendment Bi ll wa~ introduced in the Lok Sabha by Fi nance Minister Manmohan Singh. Closure o f uneco­nomic uni ts was hinted at, to rejuvenate a sagging economy.

chemical and pharmaceutical company like BCPW had to be geared up for the purpose of war. And government patronage and sponsor was the need of the hour. Under such circumstances government ass istance to the indus­try could never be complete or without self interest. The non-development of a coloni al economy was the very rational e behind colonization. Ass istance, however short-term never failed to induce fear among capitali sts in Britain, that the industry in India could emerge inde­pendent after the war of British requirements. As Indian industries were asked to gear up for the war by the Roger Miss ion and the Eastern Group Supply Conference and in certain instances, as in the case of BCPW, special sancti ons were cleared to import raw material s, machin­ery and land lease, at the same time it was noted with relief by British capitali sts at the metropoli s, "that no steps had been taken to expand producti on .. ... which are not essential for war purpose and that on the whole post-war, interests of Great Britain were not likely to

'suffer so greatly as was once ex pected,,7S. In the UK the British chemical manufacturers pl ayed

an essential part in guiding the policy of the state to­ward s the industry. A close I iaison worked between research institutes and chemical firm s with the govern­ment rendering ass istance in the form of reduced duties for chemical subsidies on imported raw materi als. In India, in marked contrast, government official s and lay­men worked plans for the industry, without taking into consideration the noted opinion or grievances of specific industries. There was no working cooperati on vis-a-vis the industry and the government.

The relaxation ofImport Trade Control by Apri I 1945 created further difficulties for Indian firm s like BCPW. Import of chemical s increased by over 42 per cent between 1943-44 to 1945- 46 and drugs by 100 per cent from 1944-45 to 1946-47 . Great Britain was the chief importer. Promises of protection after the war were not honoured. To meet war time emergencies and on gov­ernment request, BCPW had undertaken manufac ture of several new products. Explicit assurance of protection had been given to the entire producti on. But the end of the war saw large quantity of cheap imported products inundating the Indian market. On January 1946, in fac t, sanction was granted for import of large quantity of chemical s from the UK including those produced in India in sufficiently large quantities, heavy ac ids, sul­phates, bichromates, spirituous drugs. Most of these were produced by BCPW in ample quantities76.

74 J SCI IND RES VOL 58 FEBRUARY 1999

The intention of the government , despite official rhetoric on the contrary, was never the complete inde­pendent development of the industry in India. What was des ired of Indian industry was temporaril y substitute and surrogate for those products that the metropoli s required for the immedi ate purpose to fight the war in the east. With the snapping of normal supply lines and to meet the increased demands, Great Britain needed a very reliable and dependent suppl ier of essential chemi­ca ls and pharmaceuticals. A chemical industry, various commissions and report s that noted time without num­ber, was essential for the Briti sh in India. But an industry that was limited in scope and dwarfed in capacity and in no way a potenti al competitor for Great Britain best suited their purpose. BCPW despite its va liant efforts ultimately fitted in to this role earmarked by the me­tropolis.

If BCPW and the Indian chemical industry survived a hostile developmental climate under a co loni al econ­omy, it paid a heavy price; its growth was permanently stunted . Improvements in tec hnology did not take place in India as it did in the west during that peri od. When in certain instances bas ic pharmaceutical products were deve loped in R&D units of enterpri sing pharmaceutical firms like BCPW, their cost-effec ti ve application in large scale factory manufacture was rarely ac hieved. Mak ing formul ations and mi xtures was not the aim at the initi ation of BCPW. Fund amental research in bas ic chemi cals was what its founder had ti me and agai n reiterated since the last years of the 19th century. BCPW, indeed had begun its long sojourn with inde­penclent research in basic chemica ls. But hav ing to stay ahead of fo reign competition and within constraints of coloni al economy, BCPW could not keep abreast with the aspirati ons of its founder. Fundamental research got a back seat and BCPW management no longer thought it necessary to expend in R&D. The down slide of BCPW was imminent.

Whi le the west was see ing very rap id changes in the formati on of huge monolithic empires ancl innovati on and development of basic chemica ls, chemotherapeuti cs and effecti ve techniques of cost reducti on for BCPW to stay in operati on with a limited profit margin was day­lo-day strugg le. And as the war ended then came a new type of' intru sion of foreign capital in the fo rm of pri vate in ves tments by mu ltinationals. Competiti on with them with their limited capi tal and innocuous product range was natu rally impotent and fru strating. Tn the rapidly

changing scenari o, industry, not backed by large trading and financial organi zati on could rarely succeed 77.

In summary, the very nature of ci rcumstances of being a colony operated to the detriment of indigenous industrializati on. Political subjugati on and economic expl oitati on were the two aspects, nay the same aspect of a single pattern . It was the logic of things that the Briti sh would seek not only the expansion of their prod­ucts in Indian market but would by overt and covert means res trict, stunt , and impede indigenous industry.

In the post co lonial period the trend continued, if not intensified. The imperia li sts sought to maintain the ir advantages and interest and to balance the loss of po l iti­cal contro l by greater economic dominance. The ex­co lonies were to continue to pl ay a sate llite ro le of supplying cheap raw materi als and purchas ing fini shed products and the increasing gap was to be met with aid on terms which wou Id make them more dependent. They continued to adv ise on how to organise sc ience and technology (S&T) and the areas of pri oriti es. Develop­ment of bas ic infrastructure of S&T and bas ic industries was to get a back seat, continuing, if n t increasing the dependence of erstwhil e colonies.

References and Notes

A l:3 agchi is or the view that it was not till 1930 that any ac tua l di scrimi nating protectioni st poli cy was rollowed by the Gov­ernment. See A Bagchi, ' European and Indian Entrepreneur­ship' , Enlreprenell rship nnd Indllsl r.\' in Indin, ed ited by R K Ray, Delhi , 1992 , pp 15 1- 196.

2 Indi an Tarirr Boa rd (Hencefo rth ITB), El1qll ir " a ll Nea ll." Chemical Indllsl lT (written evidence) Vol. J, 1929 , Calcu tta 1930, pp 7 -9.

:1 Ref!ol'/ oIlhe D mgs Enqu iry COlllll1i llee 1930-3 / , Calcutta, p. I I.

4 Fi le M- 137 (I ) No. 5, I I1dinn Mlmilions Brallch, Chemi cal and Mineral Branch, 19 18.

5 Ray R K, Of! Cil , pp 15 1-196.

6 Fi le M-389 ParI B, Pro. No. 173. Illdian M llll i lions Bm llc/I, Chemi cal and Minera l Branch, 1919.

7 Roy McLeod. Scientiric Adv ise 1'01' Bri(ish India: Imperial Perceptions and Admini strative Gml s 1898-1 923, Mod Asian SlIid, 9 (3) ( 1975) pp 343-:1 84.

8 Biswakarma. Lliks/ll llir KnjJa /ahh. Brrgalir Sad//([n a. Cal-cutta, 1969 p. 353.

9 Adl'(lfl ce, Sunday February 20. 193X.

10 BCrW, Allll ltal Ref!OrIS, 1904-47.

I I BCrW. T/w l'(lf!('ul ic Hill Is (n d).

12 Adval1 ce Thera/))', Vol. 11 (No.2) April 193(' and Vol. II ( 0 .

2) April 1939.

13 McLeod R, M od Asian SlIid, 9(:1 ) ( 1975) Op Cil.

ROY SEN: IMPERIAL POLICY & TRAVAILS OF ENTERPRISE 75

14 File No. M 137. I. No.5 1MB, C&M Branch, 1918.

15 Chronology oflll1portant Events (Leatlet publishcd by BCPW) (n d) .

16 File No. M 243-1, Pro Nos. 20 1-24 1 Indian Mlln itions Board

1919 C & M Branch.

17 Chronologv of IlI1portant Events, 01' Cit.

18 Interview with N B, Adhikari 21. 12.91/23.01. 92 (Formerly Research Chemist BCPW, thcn Deputy M D, Adhikari was a close associate of Dr P C Ray.

19 ITB Enqllirv, Vol 1, OIl Cit, pp 240-46.

20 Ray P C, EI·.w\·s and Discourses, Madras, 1918, p. 3 16.

21 Chronology of IlI1portant Evcnts, Op Cit.

22 Essays and Discollrses, Op Cit, pp 3 15-3 16.

23 Achary{/ Pra/lllla Chandra Rav, SOll1e ASllect of His Life and Work -125 Birth Anniversary Volllllle. edited by S Chattcrjee and A Sen (Indian Science News Association , Calcutla), 1986, p.22.

24 BCPW, Annllal Rellorts, 1904-19.

25 See Gupta Part ha Sarathi , Statc and Business in India in the Age or Discriminating Protcction, pp 157-216; State and Bllsi­ness in India: A Historical Persp('ctil 'e, ed ited by D Tripathi , New Dcl hi ( 1987).

26 Cai n P J & Hopkins H G, lJri fish IlIIperia lislll: Crisis and

Deconstmction 1914-1990, New York, 1993, pp 183-88.

27 ITlJ Enqllir\' , Vol. 1, 1930, 01' Cit, pp413.

28 Hardie & Davidson , A Historr of Modem Brifish Chell1ical

Indllstn', New York , 1966, pp 8- 10.

29 BCPW, Annllal Reports. 1912-20.

30 ITB Enqllin' on Heavy Chelllicals (Ora l Evidcnce), Vol. 2, 1929, Ca lcutla 1930, Enclosurc No. 2 of BCPW.

3 1 Reader W J, IlIIperial Chelllical lndmll),: A HislOry, Vol. 2, 1926- 52. Londo n, 1<)75 pp 9-10.

32 ITlJ Ellqllirr Oil Heap\, Chclllicals, Vol. 2. Oil Cit , 1930, pp 2S 1-97.

33 ITlJ Enqllirr on Ha/l 'y Chelllimls, Vol. I, Op Cit, 1930, pp 240-46.

34 BCPW, Annllal Reports , 1920-39.

35 BCPW, M in lltes of Meeting of DireClOr.l' (Hencc rorth MMD), 27 June 193 1.

~6 Intcrview with N B Adhikari, 2 1 December 19lJ I and 23 Jan uary 1992.

37 Rellort Oil the FOllrth AI/ India Medical COllfl'rcn('c Qlloted ill Ad\'{/nce Thc/'{/pr, Jan uary 193'), Vol. 2 (l\:o. I).

38 MM/), 9 July 1932.

39 Markol' it l Claude, Indian /.I1I .Hll es.\' alld Politics 1931-39, Cambridge 1985,p.20.

40 MM/) . 26 Novcmbcr 1938 .

41 MMD, 25 Novcmber 1937.

-12 Ray P C, E~sars wltl /)i.lcollr.lcs, Oil Cil. 191 S, pp 52-7'2.

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

5 I

52

53

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

6 1

62

63

64

65

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68

69

70

7 1

72

73

74

75

76

77

Science and Elllpire: Essays in Indian Context , edited by D Kumar, New Delhi, 1991 pp 1- 5.

Research Activities of an Indian IllStitlltion: To the Delcgates of the Indian Science Congress Associa tion , 34th Session, Delhi 1947, pp 8-13.

ITB Enqllirv on Heavy Chemicals, Vol. 2, Op Cit, 1930, pp 281-97.

BCPW, Therapelltic Hints (no date) .

Indian Med J , September 1928.

50 Year of BCPW, Op Cit.

Research Activities of all Indian Institlltion. Op Cit.

MMD held on 30 Jul y 1938 and 17 November 1938, Unfortu­natel y It Could Not Be Found Out Why This Schcmc Ulti­mately Failed to Materialise.

Adv Ther (No.2), 7 April 1935, (No.4) October-December 1940.

50 Years of lJCPW, 0/1 Cit.

BCPW Chairman's Speech, AGM hcld on 7 August 1933 .

Rcsearch A Clivitics o/an Indian IJlStitlltioll, Op Cit .

Rcpo rt of the Dmgs Enqllirr COllllll illcc, Op Cit , 1930, pp 215.

Calculla Gazelle, Octoher 7 1937, Part 7, pp 11 2-115 .

Drt/gs Ellqllirl' COllllllillee, Op Cit, 1930 p. 86.

Report of Stores Pllrchasc COllllllillee, 19 19-20, p. 43 .

ITB Enqllirr , Vol. 1, Op Cit , 1930, pp 368-69.

See Rahman A, IllIel/ectllal Colollizatioll, Scicll ce alld Tcch­nology ill West East Relations, Dclhi , 1983.

ITE Enqlliry, Vol. 1, Of' Cit, 1930, pp 2 16-31: 240-46.

See Bagchi A, Europcan and Indian Entrepreneurship. in 1:'11-treprenellrshill alld IlIdllsfrr inllldia , ed itcd hy R K Ray , 1800-1947. Delhi , 1992, pp 157- 196.

ITB Ell qll irY, Vul. 1, Of' Cit, 1930, pp 240-46.

MMD , 4 January 1940.

TOllr Diw'.\' of N N Challeljee Notillg, II Novcmber 1943.

MMD, 4 Jall/wrr , 1940.

MMIJ, 12 Septeillber, 1940.

MMD, 27 Januan' , 1941.

MMD, 12 Seliteillber, 1945.

Advallce, 20 Sef'Il'lIl her. 1939.

Dutta R P, India Todcn , Calcutta. 1979 p. 177.

Rel'ort of ICMA, 1943-44.

Intcrvicw with January 1992.

B Adhikari 2 1 Dcccmhcr 1991 and 23

Rhodes Rohert. IlII jI{'/'ialislIl alltl Underdl'l'l'lojJlllellt -- A Readn, London, 1970, p. I.

Dulta, Illdia Todar , Op Cit. 1979 p. 176.

RellOI'/ offhe lJelcgalioll of ICMA, 1945-46, pp 67.

Ray R K, Ojllit, 1992, pp 151 - 196.