jsa law journal
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Random Thoughts on
Real Evidence
Justice Buwaneka Aluwihare, P.C.
Judge of the Supreme Court
Somewhere in mid 1980s, I was assigned a prosecution pending in the circuit court of
Panwila, a sleepy town nestling in the valley of the cities, Kandy and Matale. The Attorney
General‘s Department circulars did not permit travel beyond 75 miles (the distances were
still referred to in ―miles‖ during those days in spite of the country having gone metric in
the 70s) by private vehicle and we were compelled to rely on public transport. I dreaded the
trip and was determined to see to the conclusion of the case for no other reason than the
travails of the journey. To start with, one has to take a bus to Kandy and then take another
to Wattegama. From Wattegama you have to squeeze into a single door bus carrying
passengers easily twice the capacity the vehicle could accommodate.
The case in question was a case of obstructing a public servant in the discharge of
his duty as succinctly defined in Section 183 of the Penal Code. The case I was saddled with
was not obstruction of ―his‖ public duty, but ―her‖ public duty, the Complainant being a
Lady.
The obstruction complained of was to this effect: One fine morning while the lady
officer was seated at her desk the accused, a minor employee of the same office, bathed her
with human excreta which he had brought to the office in a ―Lakspray‖1 bag.
The court was in session when I arrived and I had to push my way through the
litigants who had thronged to court, to reach the bar table. The nature of the case made me
somewhat nervous. I was mindful of the fact that I have to rely on public transport for my
return journey and wanted to make sure the accused was not carrying another ―Lakspray‖
bag, for I wanted to avoid being the second target of the accused.
I was impatiently waiting for my case to be taken up and my impatience made me
concentrate on each case that was called by the Mudliar. The nature of applications made on
behalf of the parties when their cases were called, were wide and varied. Amongst those
1 A brand of powdered milk
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applications, there were a quite a few applications that were made by counsel on behalf of
the accused, moving to have their clients discharged on the basis that the productions were
either ―destroyed‖ or were not ―available‖. Surprisingly, some applications did secure the
discharge of the accused. I wondered! What significance the material things or the lack of it,
would have in establishing a criminal charge. Neither the bag in which the accused allegedly
to have carried excreta nor any remnants of the substance in the bag, certainly were part
of the prosecution case that I was called upon to prosecute. This practice, of making
applications to have suspects discharged due to non-availability of productions was not
confined to the magistrate‘s court of Panwila but a common feature in every Magistrate
court I appeared.
A few years back a case was reported from a Magistrate‘s court which reminded
me of the famous drama, Henry Jayasena‘s “Hunuwate Kathawa”, in which two ladies were
claiming rights to a child, each one asserting the child is hers. The accused was charged with
stealing a calf. Both the accused and the complainant claimed that the calf was born to the
respective cows they owned. An order was made directing that to have all three animals be
produced before the veterinary surgeon and to have a report submitted upon analysis of the
blood samples of the two cows and the calf in order to identify the mother cow of the calf.
Then, came the reply from the veterinary surgeon ―Nowhere in the world, is there a facility
to carry out such a test save for Australia‖. For some odd reason incidents relating to cattle
keep popping up from the same Magistrate Court. Another case was reported a few years
back when a man was charged with stealing a cow. Fortunately for the animal, police acted
with alacrity and managed to recover her. The cow was eventually released to the virtual
complainant who lived some ten kilometers from the court, on a bond with the condition that
the cow should be produced in court on every day the case was being heard.
I cannot vouch for the number of occasions the owner would have had to shepherd
the cow 20 kilometers, to and fro before the case reached finality so much for preventing
cruelty to animals. In the same case, not only did the owner give evidence and identified the
cow which was tethered in the court compound, but he also became the proud recipient of
the marking... P1.
I am sure the cow would have happily flaunted this new label bestowed on her all
along the 10 kilometers before finally traversing back to grazing. Although this may sound
amusing there had been occasions in which an accused had succeeded in being acquitted due
to non-production of a carcass…! The case of Anderson vs. Laverock2decided by the High
Court of Scotland is one such case. This was a case where the accused was charged for
possession of 26 Salmon, illegally caught. Naturally, due to the perishable nature of the fish,
the salmon was not produced at the trial. The High Court quashing the conviction held, that
the appearance of the fish was an essential part of the defendant‘s case and inspection should
have been granted.
21976 CLYB 455
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There appears to be something wrong somewhere in the manner in which we treat
material things, (animate or inanimate), as Real evidence.
One has to bear in mind that every fact that is presented as an item of evidence
cannot be part of the record unless the said fact is relevant under one or more of relevancy
provisions of the Evidence Ordinance or it is not shut out by evidentiary policy.
If I may illustrate it in this way; as much as ―a fact connected with the fact in issue
as to form part of the same translation‖ is made relevant in terms of Section 6 of the
Evidence Ordinance (Res Gestae), communication made by a client to his Attorney in the
course of and for the purpose of his employment is made inadmissible by evidentiary policy.
What then is evidence?
According to the definition in Section 3 of the Evidence Ordinance-
"Evidence" means and includes
(a) All statements which the court permits or requires to be made before it
by witnesses in relation to matters of fact, under inquiry: such statements
are called oral evidence:
(b) All documents produced for the inspection of the court ; Such
documents are called documentary evidence.
One need not have the knowledge of rocket science to appreciate that evidence, therefore
only includes oral evidence and documentary evidence. If the meaning of evidence is
confined to these two aspects, did Fitz James Stephen make a mistake in not including ―Real
evidence‖ within the definition of ―Evidence‖ in Section 3 of the Ordinance?
What then is Real evidence? Among many definitions of the term by various jurists
the broad description given by Cross appears to be reasonably comprehensive. ―Anything
other than testimony, admissible hearsay or a document the contents of which are offered as
testimonial evidence examined by the tribunal as a means of proof.‖
Many writers have criticized Stephen for ignoring ―Real evidence‖ and for limiting
the term evidence to statements of witnesses (oral evidence) and documents. The criticism is
based on the fact that the definition (of the term evidence) is too narrow. Chamberlayne is
one such critic who remarked that ―it is one of the few fundamental errors of Stephen‘s
classification that it entirely omits perception as a medium of evidence‖.
Many were the occasions, I myself wondered as to the reasoning behind this
apparent omission on the part of Stephens to bring Real evidence within the scope of the
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term evidence. Here we go…... It's not there…, bound by the provisions of the Evidence
Ordinance we have no option but to conduct our affairs in court on the premise that Real
Evidence is outside the scope of the meaning of the term ―Evidence‖ under the Evidence
Ordinance.
If Real evidence is not ―evidence ―why do we have to refer to it as ―evidence‖ at
all? It goes back to classification attached to such evidence by early writers on the subject of
evidence. It was Bentham, who first classified evidence into personal and real. Subsequently
Phipson and Best adopted the term ‗Real Evidence‘ and gave it an extended meaning.
In my view, this exclusion of Real Evidence by Stephen is deliberate rather than an
omission.
Even in Stephen‘s commentary on the Indian Evidence Ordinance (which is more or
less identical to ours) he makes no reference to Real Evidence. However, the two
illustrations he has given, give us a hint as to the reason for the non-inclusion of Real
Evidence. The illustrations are as follows:-
The captain of a ship, a thousand miles from any land, and with no other
vessel in sight, is seen to run into his cabin, pursued by several mutinous
sailors. The noise of a struggle and a splash are heard. The sailors soon
afterwards come out of the cabin and take the command of the vessel. The
cabin windows are open. The cabin is in confusion, and the captain is
never seen or heard of again. (End of illustration 1)
A person looks at his watch and returns it to his pocket. Immediately
afterwards a man comes past, and makes a snatch at the watch, which
disappears. The man being pursued, runs away and swims across a river;
he is arrested on the other side. He has no watch in his possession, and the
watch is never found. (End of illustration 2)
Stephen goes on to say ―in these cases it is morally certain that the murder and theft
respectively, were committed, though in the first case the body, and in the second case the
watch, is not producible‖.
Simply stated, in Stephen‘s view the non-availability of the body of the deceased and
the watch respectively is no bar to establish criminal liability.
Stephen remarks3 that he wished to avoid needless intricacy as the condition of
material things is usually proved by oral evidence.
What seems to be deducible from this thinking is that any fact should be capable of
being proved either by oral or documentary evidence or by a combination of the two.
3 Introduction to Indian Evidence Act 1872
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If that is the case, non-availability of a material thing cannot be fatal to the proving of
a fact. In my view, it is in this context, that applications in the nature of “productions are
destroyed and the accused may be discharged your honour”, should be viewed.
What are the provisions in our ordinance that deal with Real Evidence? In fact, such
provisions are non-existent save for the passing reference made to Real evidence in section
60 and 165 of the Ordinance.
The first reference to real evidence is found in the 2nd
proviso to section 60 of the
Evidence Ordinance, which states:-
“Provided also that, if oral evidence refers to the existence or
condition of any material thing other than a document the court
may, if it thinks fit, require the production of such material thing
for its inspection”.
The other reference is in section 165. This section deals with a Judge‘s power to
put questions or order production of any document or thing. That part of the Section which
makes reference to real Evidence states: ―The judge may…. order the production of any
document or thing‖…….
What would be of real significance in relation to Real evidence is, the impact the
non-production of material objects may have, in deciding, whether the existence or
nonexistence of a fact has been established.
The first principle that has to be borne in mind is that production of a material
object is not as a rule compulsory or legally required.
The dictum of Abbott C.J in the case of R vs. Hunt4 has been consistently followed
by English Courts with regard to non-production of material objects.
The accused was indicted for conspiracy and in the course of the trial witnesses
spoke from their memory, that flags and banners bearing inscription and devices of sedition
and inflammatory tendency were paraded, but were not produced.
Objection was taken that the flags and banners should have been produced.
Chief Justice Abbott said:-
―I think it was not necessary either to produce the flag or to give
notice to the defendants to produce them. The case requiring the
production of a writing itself will be found to apply to writings of
a very different character… inscriptions used on such occasions
are the public expression of the sentiments of those who bear and
4 1884-1823 AER 450
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adopt them, and have rather the character of the species than of
writings. If we were to hold that the words inscribed on a banner
so exhibited could not be proved without the productions of the
banner, I know not upon what reason a witness should be
allowed to mention the colour of the banner or even to say he
saw a banner displayed, for the banner itself may be said to be
the best possible evidence of its existence and its color…”
In the case of Hockin vs. Ahlquist Brothers Ltd5, the defendants were accused of
infringing certain statutory restrictions on the method of making garments and the offending
garments were not produced at the trial and it was argued on behalf of the defendants that
evidence could not therefore be given by witnesses who had inspected them. The court held
that this argument is erroneous.
The observation made by Viscount Caldecotte L.C.J in the case of Hockin referred
to above, explains the rationale.
“….In my judgment it is much too late, even if it were ever
possible, to suppose that evidence about the nature of
chattels(things) cannot be given by people who have seen them
and speak to their condition. To suppose that there ought to be
produced in court all the articles about which issues are raised in
a great variety of cases would lead to consequences which would
show how impossible the rule would be in practice...”
What then is the impact of Real Evidence as to proof?
Coomaraswamy6points out that there is no rule or principle of law that Real
evidence is best evidence in any sense which compels production of a thing or renders it the
only admissible evidence and goes on to say it is generally not necessary to account for the
no-production of a thing before giving other evidence. The practical impossibility of
producing all material things referred to by witnesses appear to be the most germane for the
rationale aforementioned.
The thing may be nonexistent at the time of the trial due to the perishable nature of
the thing, the transformation of the thing due to effluxion of time, if the murderer has
destroyed the body of a dead person, and the list is endless!.
However, non-production of a thing when it is available and can be produced, may
affect the weight of oral evidence, especially in instances when the thing is in issue. It must
5 1943 2 AER 722 6E.R.S.R Coomaraswamy, The Law of Evidence Vol II
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be stressed that oral evidence cannot be shut out due to non-production of a thing, but
certainly can be a matter for criticism impacting on the weight of the other evidence.
One other issue that needs to be considered is as to whether the court is entitled to
draw an adverse inference as to the credit of the evidence given by a witness. I am of the
view that the court can draw an adverse presumption in terms of Section 114 of the
Evidence Ordinance reads thus-. ―The court may presume the existence of any fact which it
thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events,
human conduct, and public and private business in their relation to the facts of the
particular case.‖
The illustration ―f” to the above provision of the Evidence Ordinance states that
―Evidence which could be and is not produced would if produced, be unfavorable to the
person who with-holds it”
When a thing is in existence, failure to produce it will adversely impact on the
cogency of other evidence produced in the case. Undoubtedly, in discovering the truth, Real
evidence or material things that is physical non documentary evidence is a potent factor.
However a clear nexus needs to be established between the material objects sought to be
produced at the trail and the fact- in- issue. The Court of Criminal Appeal observed in the
case of The Queen vs. Kularathne7 “We wish to observe that in a criminal case the identity
of productions must be accurately proved by the direct evidence, which is available, and not
by way of inference. There are many known instances where mistakes have been made in
regard to productions in cases.”
It would be prudent to have some oral evidence led in introducing and explaining
the Real evidence that is intended to be produced in the case and there by establish a nexus
between the Real evidence and the facts –in –issue of the case or other relevant fact. For
instance just because a knife has been discovered in consequence of information received
from an accused in a case of stabbing, the part of the accused‘s statement may not be
relevant in terms of Section 27 of the Evidence Ordinance unless a connection is established
between the knife so discovered and the act of stabbing. The prosecution would be entitled
to produce the knife as Real evidence only upon establishing that nexus and not otherwise.
As Best observes8 ―sometimes the most innocent men cannot explain, or give any
account whatever of, facts which seem to criminate them‖.
Author‟s Note: This article is intended only to highlight some misconceptions with regard to Real
Evidence and by no means comprehensive on the subject matter.
7 71 N.L.R 529 8 Best - The principles of Law of Evidence. 12th Edition Sections 202-209
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Judges like Caesar’s Wife
Should Be above Suspicion ?
Seevali Amitirigala1, LL.M (King‟s College
London), Attorney-at-Law
The yardstick of a fair trial measures the success of a legal system2. At the very core of the
fair trial rests the impartiality of the decision maker. Without impartiality, the public
confidence in the legal system will diminish. The rule against bias (nemo iudex in sua
causa) ensures that the decision maker has no interest in the outcome of the proceeding.
This is a rule of Natural Justice, and a fundamental tenet of Public Law. Under this rule, a
judge is disqualified from making judgment /order if the judge is fairly suspected to be of
bias.
Judges are human beings. The social background and their upbringing very often influence a
human‘s thinking. The Realist 3advocates that law consist of the decisions of the judges,
which come into existence by ascertainable facts. Included among these facts are the
personalities of the individual judges, their social environment, and the economic conditions
in which they have been brought up, business interests, trends and movements of thought,
emotions, psychology, and so forth.4
According to natural law human beings are capable of differentiating what is good and bad.
Amongst the naturalists, a secular belief exists that the good and the bad could be derived
from nature through a process of reasoning. While the theological theory of natural law
believes that the good and the bad is derived from the revelations of the god.
The expectation of a bias free decision making process stems from the above-mentioned
good virtues. The Buddha in the Dhammapada states ―the impartial are called the true
justices‖5 Thus the rule against bias finds a place in the ancient philosophies, religions and
moral standards.
1 The author is a lecturer at the Sri Lanka Law College 2 Article 6 Of The ECHR 3 A theory of jurisprudence 4 Jurisprudence by R.W.M.Dias 469 5 The Dhamapada by Ven. K.Sri. Damananda 471.
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The importance of the rule against bias is said to prevail over an act of parliament6.
At the very heart of the discussion of bias is the division of it into financial and
―ideological‖7 interest. Both these interest will make the decision of a decision maker tainted
with bias or suspicion of bias amounting to a disqualification.
What is important to note is that the court does not warrant that bias be proved in order to
invalidate the decision. Instead, it requires merely a suspicion of bias. In other words, there
is no need to establish actual bias8. This rule depicts a minimum standard of justice that is
expected to be maintained by an adjudicatory system.
Financial or Proprietary Interest
If a judge has financial or proprietary interest in the outcome of a judicial proceeding, it
amounts to a breach of the rule of nemo iudex in sua causa. In the case of R vs. Rand,9 it
was held that ‗any pecuniary interest however small in the subject matter of the inquiry does
disqualify a person from acting as a judge in the matter. Further, in the case of Dimes vs.
Grand Junction Canal10
the Lord Chancellor presided in a case involving a company of
which he owned shares. The judgment was set aside. The court held. ―It is of the last
importance that the maxim that no man is to be a judge in his own cause should be held
sacred‖. This will be a lesson to all inferior tribunals to take care not only that if they are
influenced by their personal interest but to avoid the appearance of labouring under such an
influenced.11
The mere existence of a financial interest, even where it does not, in fact result in actual bias
but may present the appearance of bias will be sufficient to disqualify a judge from
adjudication.12
If the financial or pecuniary interest in the outcome of the proceedings is an obvious one it
should have been disclosed, then there is no need to investigate if there was a reasonable
suspicion or likelihood of bias13
it is sufficient for disqualification.
This rule is applicable to magistrates14
as well as arbitrators15
. Thus even public bodies are
bound by this rule. In the case of R v Cambridge Recorder16
the decision maker was
disqualified as he had pecuniary interest by being a member of a local community. If the
6 Egerton Vs Lord Derby (1613) 12 Co.Rep 114. 7 Constitutional,Administrative Law And Human rights 5th Edition By Ian Loveland 8 Neidra Fernando vs Ceylon Tourist Board and Others 2002 2 SLR 169. 9 (1866) L.R. 1 Q.B. 230. 10 (1852) 3HL cas 759, 10 ER 301 HL. 11 10 ER 301 at 315,HL. 12 Constitutional And Administrative Law 6th Edition Hilaire Barnett 683. 13 De Smith‘s JudiciaL Review 6th edition 509. 14 R vs Cheltenham Commissioners 1841 1 Q B 466, 15 Rangers vs Great Western Ry 1854 H.C.L 72. 161857 8 E&B 637
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pecuniary interest arose as a trustee of a body of ratepayers, it was held that he was not
disqualified.17
If the condition upon which the pecuniary interest in the outcome of the
proceeding is removed by a statute the adjudicator will not be disqualified.18
On the contrary
even if a statute removes the condition which amounts to a disqualification, subsequent
developments of the law has stressed the need still to examine if it is possible to give rise to
a possibility of bias.19
If the financial interest in a proceeding does not go beyond the financial interest of any
ordinary citizen it does not disqualify the judge. In the case of Bromley London Borough
Council vs. Greater London Council20
the fact that judges were tax payers and users of
Public Transport did not disqualify them from adjudicating, as it did not amount to a
financial interest.
It is important to note that financial interest in the outcome of a case amounts to automatic
disqualification.21
The trivial nature of the financial interest 22
and the financial interest in the
spouse of the judge does not however automatically disqualify the judge23
.
Ideological and Other Interest
Judges as with any other may exhibit bias by virtue of race, sex, politics, background,
association and opinions.24
However in adjudicating, the judge must be free from all the
above mentioned interest. The judge must give equal attention to the arguments of both
parties and thereafter conclude irrespective of his/her personal views. Whatever his personal
belief, the judge should seek to give effect to the common values of the community, rather
than any sectional system of values to which he may adhere.25
In the Pinochet case26
Lord Browne –Wilkinson defining ideological or other interest held
―the second application of the principle is where a judge is not a party to the suit and does
not have a financial interest in its outcome, but in some other way his conduct or behavior
may give rise to a suspicion that he is not impartial for example because of his friendship
with a party. This second type of bias is not strictly speaking an application of the principle
that a man must not be a judge in his own cause, since the judge will not normally be
himself benefiting, put providing a benefit to another by failing to be impartial.‖
17 R vs Middlesex justices 1908 72 JP 251. 18 R vs Essex justices 1816 5 M & S 513. 19 R vs Barnsley Licensing justices ex p Barnsley And District Licensed Victualler‘s Association 1906 2 QB 167. 20 1983 1 AC 784, 1982 2WLR 62. 21 Constitutional And Administrative Law 6th Edition Hilaire Barnett 683. 22 R Vs Mulvinhill 1990 1 WLR 438 23 Pinocet (no2)( 2000) 1 A C 119 24 Griffith 1997; Devlin , 1978. 25 Bell, 1983 p 8. 26 Pinocet (no2)( 2000) 1 A C 132-133
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In the case Locabail (UK) Ltd vs. Bayfield Properties Ltd27
Bingham CJ suggested factors
that may give rise to a presumption of bias. The factors, which will give rise to a
presumption of bias, are personal friendships, or animosity, close acquaintance and other
―real grounds for doubting the ability of the judge to ignore extraneous consideration,
prejudices, and predilections and bring an objective judgment to bear on the issue before
him.
Factors, which will not give rise to a presumption of bias, are religion, ethnic or national
origin, gender, class, means, sexual orientation of the judge.28
(These factors seems to have
negated the realist thinking that judges act through what is referred to as their
idiosyncrasies)
In the case of Feld vs. Barnett LBC29
the Court of Appeal held that the judge was wrong not
to recuse himself from a trail when he discovered that one of the potential witness was a
long-standing friend. In Gough,30
the fact that a juror was a neighbour of the defendant‘s
brother was held to have been indicative of bias.
In the case of Jones vs. Das Legal Expenses Insurance Co Ltd,31
the Court of Appeal held
that the husband of the judge was a barrister in chambers that undertook work for one of the
parties did not in the circumstances of that case lead to an implication of bias.
Family relationship between judges and counsel does not appear to be exceptionable, but it
has been suggested that judges are disqualified from sitting in cases where near relatives are
witnesses.32
Thus, relationship between the lawyers, the judge and the litigants must be seen in the light
of the facts of each case and the prevailing culture.33
Normally a decision will be invalidated based on bias of the decision maker who presides on
one of his/her own decisions which is now in appeal. This would be depicted as a judge of
his own cause. In general, a decision maker must not participate or indeed give the
impression of participating in such an appeal.34
Further a judge who has given a decision
against a person should refrain hearing any subsequent case of the same party since either
consciously or unconsciously the judge may form a kind of prejudice against a party.35
27 [2000] QB 451. 28 [2000] QB 451. 29 [2004]EWCA Civ 1307. 30 [1993]A.C 646. 31 [2003]EWCA Civ 1071. 32 ―The Independence and Impartiality of the Judges‖ by sir Alfred Denning (1954) 71 S A L J 345-355. 33 De Smith‘s JudiciaL Review 6th edition 521 34 De Smith‘s JudiciaL Review 6th edition 516. 35 Siriwardane Vs Provincial Public Service Commission 2012 BLR 373
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Automatic Disqualification
Direct pecuniary interest automatically disqualifies the decision maker.36
This position was
asserted in the case of R vs. Gough37
this rule was applied strictly38
. Initially it was thought
that automatic disqualification extended only to direct financial bias. However, in the
Pinochet case39
Lord Browne Wilkinson held ―If the absolute impartiality of the judiciary is
to be maintained, there must be a rule which automatically disqualify a judge who is
involved, whether personally or as a director of a company, in promoting the same cause in
the same organization as a party to a suit. There is no room for a fine distinction.‖
Thus after the Pinochet case decision automatic disqualification extends to any bias which
arises in promoting a particular cause. The principle of automatic disqualification has been
extended beyond the Pinochet case in the case of AWG Group Ltd vs. Morrison40
where
Mummery LJ held that because of the connection of the witness and the judge and that fact
that the withdrawal of the witness would not be practically to remove him from the events,
the judge ought to have recused himself under the rule of automatic disqualification.
Confining the automatic disqualification rule to direct pecuniary bias is a thing of the past.
Tests of Bias
In cases where there is no automatic disqualification, it has to be determined whether the
judges‘ or decision-makers interest in the matter is sufficient to justify the disqualification.41
Various tests have been adopted by the court in determining the limits of the principle of
bias. On the one hand, the courts have utilized the real suspicion test of bias. Under this test,
suspicion is derived from the circumstances of the case from the point of view of a
reasonable man.42
On the other hand, the courts have applied, a test known as the real likelihood of bias43
. This
refers to either possibility or probability of bias.
In the case of R vs. Gough,44
it was held that the correct test in determining bias is the ―real
danger of bias‖. In other words upon the consideration of all the circumstances of the case
the court should determine if there is a real danger of bias. In this case, the reasonable
36 Administrative law 10th edition wade and forsyth 381 37 [1993]A.C 646. 38 R vs Cambridge recorder 1857 8 E & B 637. 39 Pinochet no 2 [2000]1 AC 119 40 [2006]EWCA Civ 6. [2006]1 WLR 1163 41 Administrative law 10th edition wade and forsyth 382 42 R vs Sussex justices ex parte McCarthy 1924 1 KB 256, Metropolitan Company properties co Vs Lannon 1969 1
QB 577, R vs Uxbridge justices ex parte Burbridge. The Times june 21 1972. 43 Samarasinghe vs Samarasinghe 1991 (1) SLR 259 44 [1993]A.C 646
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suspicion test of bias was rejected. The real danger of bias test is used from the point of view
of the court and not a reasonable person.
In the Pinochet case, 45
Lord Browne Wilkinson stated that the real danger of bias test needs
to be reconsidered. It was queried that the rule involves the confidence of the public and it
was necessary to evaluate the interest of the decision maker from the point of view of the
public.
The real danger test of bias did not attract support from the Commonwealth jurisdictions. In
Re Medicaments and related cases of goods (No2)46
it was held that according to Article 6 of
the ECHR47
bias needs to be determine objectively upon the consideration of all the
circumstances of the case. Thus, the court found that the real danger test was not an
objective test and therefore needed to be modified. In this case, the court held ―the court
must first ascertain all the circumstances which have a bearing on the suggestion that the
judge was bias. It must then ask whether those circumstances would lead to a fair minded
and informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was
bias.‖
In the judgment of the case of Porter vs. Magill48
(now applied by the Sri Lankan courts)49
Lord Hope adjusted the Gough test50
.
The real danger test was replaced by ―fair minded and informed observer‖. The court upon
the investigating of all facts and circumstances of the case must ascertain if there is bias as a
fair minded and informed observer would.
This test shifted the yardstick of bias from the court to an objective fair-minded and
informed observer. This test cannot be applied in a mechanical sense. Much depends on the
fact and circumstances of each case.
Waiver
A party can waive his objection to a decision maker who would instead be disqualified from
adjudicating51
. The objection is said to be waived if the party or his counsel knew of the
interest but continued without the objection been take at the earliest.52
It is appropriate if the
court discloses any interest at the outset of the proceeding. In the case Jones vs. Das Legal
Expenses Insurance Co Ltd53
the Court of Appeal laid down the following guidelines in
dealing with interest and disclosing it. ―The first step involves the judge seeking a
45 Pinochet no 2 [2000]1 AC 119 46 [2001] 1 WLR 700. 47 European Convention On Human Rights 48 [2001]UKHL67,[2002]2 AC 357. 49 H.M.Dingiri Banda Vs The Land Commissioner General And Others CA 293/2007. 50 [1993]A.C 646 51 R (Grant‘s Causeway Etc ,Tramways Co) Vs Antrim Justices[1895]2 IR 603. 52 R vs Richmond justices (1960)24 J P 422. 53 2003 EWCA Civ 1071.
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replacement if possible, if this is not possible the time should be taken to prepare the full
explanation of the extent of bias that will be explained to the parties. To avoid controversy
and the matter becoming a ―festering sore‖ the explanation should be carefully recorded.
Thereafter a full explanation should be given to the parties as to the matter which might give
rise to possible conflict of interest and the possibilities of moving the case , options should
be explained to the parties if necessary time for reflection may be given to the claimant to
seek advice.‖
Trust and confidence seems to be the hallmark of a good and efficient legal system. The
above analysis establishes that Judges are the guardians of the law and the preservers and the
protectors of it. Judges cannot perform the above tasks unless they are beyond suspicion.
Justice is not a mere perception it is rather an essential standard of a fair legal system.
Judges are the custodians of justice. If they are not impartial it will destroy the public
confidence in the legal system and make a mockery of it.
“Justice is justly represented blind, because she sees
no difference in the parties concerned. She has but one
scale and weight, for rich and poor, great and small”.
William Penn, „Some Fruits of Solitude‟
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An Introduction to
Bail Jurisprudence
Indika Attanayake, BA (Econ) (Spl), LLM (Colombo)
District Judge, Anuradhapura.
Introduction
The Judicial system of Sri Lanka is a legacy left behind for us by the British who ruled
this country for about 150 years and bade farewell to the country in 1948. The various strata
of our court system, the law we administer therein, the prison, the police etc. are valuable
gifts given by the foreign rule which no one can deny has created an indelible mark on our
present day judicial system.
Bail Jurisprudence which is an integral part imbibed into our judicial system which is also
inherited from the British plays a vital role in the administration of criminal justice in our
country. In criminal justice jurisprudence, the right to bail forms part of the due process of
the law and requires the application of principles of rationality by the courts in order to
temper the rigors of positivism.1 Hence, bail jurisprudence is a very important branch of
criminal jurisprudence. The question of bail always arises when a person is either taken into
custody or produced before the court. Bail jurisprudence which impacts on the individual
and the society, involves, as it administered, the balancing the rights of the individuals and
the rights of the public. Accordingly, this study is very important as it may be helpful to
overcome issues and challenges that may arise when bail proceedings are initiated in the
court house. Justice Bhagwathi, when speaking on bail jurisprudence in India has stated
that ―bail system as we see it administered in criminal courts today, is extremely
unsatisfactory and need drastic changes. In the first place, it is virtually impossible to
translate risk of monetary loss as the only deterrent for the accused from fleeing from
justice. There are several considerations which deter an accused from running away from
justice and risk of financial loss is only one of them and that too not a major one‖.2
1 Samuel Kwesi Amoo, The Bail Jurisprudence of Ghana, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia,
http://forumonpublicpolicy.com/summer08papers/archivesummer08/amoo. 2 R. Sharma, Human Rights and Bail, http://books.google.lk/books.
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Therefore, in this article I endeavor to highlight and analyze Sri Lankan legal framework
related to bail jurisprudence with other jurisdictions, especially with international law and to
identify the significance of Sri Lankan law related thereto. I further focus on the
jurisprudence related to concept of bail in the administration of criminal justice. I further
submit that in this article, I use the literature review method as methodology to explain the
facts. In this article, I do not put forward my point of views, clarifications or comments. My
effort is to present something to the reader so that he can analyze the facts related to bail
jurisprudence himself.
The Concept of Bail and its Evolution
Bail is the release of a person who is in the custody of police on money or other security
provided to court with the assurance of their appearance in court. Traditionally, bail is
considered as some form of property deposited or pledged to the court of law to persuade it
to release a suspect from jail, on the understanding that the suspect will return for trial.3 In
accordance with the law dictionaries, what is considered by bail is to "procure the release of
a person from legal custody, by undertaking that he/she shall appear at the time and place
designated and submit him/herself to the jurisdiction and judgment of the court."4 According
to the Stroud‘s Judicial Dictionary, bail is when a man taken or arrested for felony, suspicion
of felony or any such case so that he is restrained of his liberty. The law lexicon, in this
context, defines bail as the security for the appearance of the accused person on which he is
released pending trial or investigation.5 Further it is described in the case of Anwer Hussain
v. State of Orissa as follows; 'Bail' remains as undefined term in the Cr.P.C. Nowhere else
the term has been statutorily defined. Conceptually, it continues to be understood as a right
for assertion of freedom against State imposed restraints. Since the U.N. Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948, to which India is a signatory, the concept of bail has found a place
within the scope of human rights. The dictionary meaning of the expression 'bail' denotes a
security for appearance of a prisoner for his release. Etymologically, the word is derived
from an old French verb 'bailer' which means to 'give' or 'to deliver', although another view
is that its derivation is from the Latin term 'bajulara' meaning 'to bear a burden'. Bail is a
conditional liberty; Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (Fourth Edition, 1971) spells out certain
other details. It states: "When a man is taken or arrested for felony, suspicion of felony,
indicted of felony, or any such case, so that he is restrained of his liberty. And being by law
bailable, offered surety to those which have authority to bail him, which sureties are bound
for him to the kings use in a certain sum of money, or body for body, that he shall appears
before the Justices of Goale delivery at the next sessions etc. Then upon the bonds of these
3http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bail 4Black's Law Dictionary, http://www.legalserviceindia.com/articles/bail_poor.htm, Indian System of Bail, Anti
Poor. 5Law lexicon by Ramanth Iyer, http://www.legalserviceindia.com/articles/bail_poor.htm, Indian System of Bail,
Anti Poor.
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sureties, as in aforesaid, he is bailed that is to say, set at liberty until the day appointed for
his appearance."6
When this topic is discussed, the concept of bail can be traced back to 399 BC. That is when
Plato tried to create a bond for the release of Socrates. The modern bail system evolved from
a series of laws originating in the middle ages in England.7 In medieval England, the sheriffs
originally possessed the sovereign authority to release or hold the suspects or accused. It is
learnt that some sheriffs had exploited the bail for their own gain. Hence the Statute of
Westminster (1275) limited the discretion of sheriffs with respect to the bail. Although
sheriffs still had the authority to fix the amount of bail required, the statute stipulates which
crimes are bailable and which are not.8Magna Carta, in 1215 was the first step taken in the
history of modern legal system in granting rights to citizens. It says that ―No freeman shall
be taken, imprisoned, disseized, outlawed, banished, or in any way destroyed, nor will we
proceed against or prosecute him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law
of the land."9 In the early 17th century, King Charles ordered noblemen to issue him loans
and those who refused to obey the order were imprisoned. Thereafter five of the prisoners
filed a habeas corpus petition arguing that they should not be held indefinitely without trial
or bail. In the Petition of Right (1628) Parliament argued that the King had flouted Magna
Carta by imprisoning people without just cause.10
The Habeas Corpus Act was introduced in 1679 and it states that ―a Magistrate shall
discharge prisoners from their Imprisonment taking their Recognizance, with one or more
Surety or Sureties, in any Sum according to the Magistrate's discretion, unless it shall appear
that the Party is committed for such Matter or offences for which by law the Prisoner is not
bailable." Later, in 1689, The English Bill of Rights was introduced and it states that
"excessive bail hath been required of persons committed in criminal cases, to elude the
benefit of the laws made for the liberty of the subjects. Excessive bail ought not to be
required."11
This principle was further admitted by the Eighth Amendment to the US
Constitution. The Eighth Amendment was adopted in 1791, as part of the Bill of Rights. It
is almost identical to a provision in the English Bill of Rights of 1689, and it provides that
“excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.‖12
However, there is no provision in both acts to provide or
indicate that a person in custody is entitled to get bail as a right.
6http://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/Browse/ShowCase.aspx?CaseId=514991980000, 7http://www.legalserviceindia.com/articles/bail_poor.htm, Indian System of Bail, Anti Poor, Urvashi Saikumar. 8http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bail 9http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured_documents/magna_carta/ 10
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bail, http://www.legalserviceindia.com/articles/bail_poor.htm, Indian System of
Bail, Anti Poor, Urvashi Saikumar. 11
http://www.legalserviceindia.com/articles/bail_poor.htm, Indian System of Bail, Anti Poor, Urvashi Saikumar 12 http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/eighth_amendment
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Objects of the concept of Bail
The object of keeping a suspected person or an accused in custody during investigation or
trial is not considered as a punishment. Bail jurisprudence is contemplated to serve the
concept of presumption of innocence until the guilt is proved under the due process of law.
―Every man is entitled to the due process of law. This principle is so ancient that can be
traced back to the Magna Carta.”13
By imposing bail conditions such as appearance in the
court in pending investigation or trial also serve to protect the presumption of innocence
until the accused person is charged and convicted in accordance with the due process of
law.14
Further it is established that keeping an accused in detention should not be treated as a
punishment. This rule is upheld in several judgments in different jurisdictions. In the case of
State v. Acheson, the Court has decided that ―an accused person cannot be kept in detention
pending his trial as a form of anticipatory punishment. The presumption of the law is that he
is innocent until his guilt has been established in Court. The Court will therefore ordinarily
grant bail to an accused person unless this is likely to prejudice the ends of justice.‖15
As
stated in the case of Anwer Hussain v. State of Orissa, ―Bail may thus be regarded as a
mechanism whereby the State devolutes upon the community the function of securing the
presence of the prisoners and at the same time involves participation of the community in
administration of justice. Personal liberty is fundamental and can be circumscribed only by
some process sanctioned by law. Liberty of a citizen is undoubtedly important but this is to
balance with the security of the community. A balance is required to be maintained between
the personal liberty of the accused and the investigational right of the Police. It must result
in minimum interference with the personal liberty of the accused and the right of the police
to investigate the case. It has to dovetail two conflicting demands, namely, on one hand, the
requirements of the society for being shielded from the hazards of being exposed to the
misadventures of a person alleged to have committed a crime, and on the other, the
fundamental cannon of criminal jurisprudence, viz., the presumption of innocence of an
accused till he is found guilty. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint, the more
restraint on others to keep off from us, the more liberty we have. The law of bail, like any
other branch of law, has its own philosophy, and occupies an important place in the
administration of justice and the concept of bail emerges from the conflict between the
police power to restrict liberty of a man who is alleged to have committed a crime, and
presumption of innocence in favour of the alleged criminal. An accused is not detained in
custody with the object of punishing him on the assumption of his guilt.‖16
―The concept of
bail is the recognition of the liberty of a person between the time of his arrest and verdict
subject to the condition that he re-appears in Court for his trial until its conclusion or until he
13 Smith V. Attorney General 1984 1SA182,
http://forumonpublicpolicy.com/summer08papers/archivesummer08/amoo.pdf 14 Samuel Kwesi Amoo, The Bail Jurisprudence of Ghana, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia,
http://forumonpublicpolicy.com/summer08papers/archivesummer08/amoo 15 State v. Acheson 1991 2 SA 805, http://forumonpublicpolicy.com/summer08papers/archivesummer08/amoo.pdf 16http://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/Browse/ShowCase.aspx?CaseId=514991980000
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is sentenced.‖17
Hence, it is important to note here that, in the criminal justice jurisprudence,
the philosophy of concept of bail is always discussed in the context of the presumption of
innocence and the right to liberty.
Further to above, it is crucial to address the society‘s point of view in determining bail.
Samuel Kwesi Amoo in his article on the Bail Jurisprudence, points out how the values of
the society dictate the content of bail jurisprudence.18
Further he quotes, in his article, a
statement made by Stuart S. Nagel in his publication titled ‗The Rights of the Accused in
Law and Action‘ as follows; ―The basic purpose of bail, from the society‘s point of view,
has always been and still is to ensure the accused reappearance for trial. But pretrial release
serves other purpose as well, purposes recognized over the last decade as often dispositive of
the fairness of the entire criminal proceedings. Pretrial release allows a man accused of
crime to keep the fabric of his life intact, to maintain employment and family ties in the
event he is acquitted or given a suspended sentence or probation. It spares the family the
hardship and indignity of welfare and enforced separation. It permits the accused to take an
active part in planning his defense with his counsel, locating witnesses, proving his
capability of staying free in the community without getting into trouble.‖19
On the other
hand, ―the purpose of refusing bail inter alia is to protect the community and to reduce the
likelihood of further offending.‖20
While understanding the objects of bail and its new
phenomenon, it is more important to address the international legal framework relating to
bail.
International Legal Framework relating to the concept of
Bail
Since the right to bail is concerned, there cannot be seen any specific international human
rights standards on the concept of bail. However, there are general provisions relating to the
right to liberty and due process of law in international law. Among them, international
instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The African Charter on
Human and Peoples‟ Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights provide provisions protecting the rights of the personal liberty of the individual both
during the investigation and trial proceedings.
17Attorney General VS Ariyapala and others, CA(PHC)APN No: 133/12, Hon.Justice A.W. Abdus Salam, BAIL-
CONCEPT-APPLICATION, http://www.awasalam.net/2014/04/bail-what-is-it-article-w-salam.html#!/2014/04/bail-what-is-it-article-w-salam.html 18 Samuel Kwesi Amoo, The Bail Jurisprudence of Ghana, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia,
http://forumonpublicpolicy.com/summer08papers/archivesummer08/amoo. 19Stuart S. Nagel in his publication of The Rights of the Accused in Law and Action. (Beverly Hills (Calif) Sage
Publications, 1972), Samuel Kwesi Amoo, The Bail Jurisprudence of Ghana, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia,
http://forumonpublicpolicy.com/summer08papers/archivesummer08/amoo. 20Attorney General VS Ariyapala and others, CA(PHC)APN No: 133/12, Hon.Justice A.W. Abdus Salam, BAIL-
CONCEPT-APPLICATION, http://www.awasalam.net/2014/04/bail-what-is-it-article-w-
salam.html#!/2014/04/bail-what-is-it-article-w-salam.html
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In accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the provisions have been
adopted to protect the right to personal liberty of the individuals. Those articles are
reproduced as follows;
Article 9
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.
Article 10
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and
obligations and of any criminal charge against him.
Article 11
(1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent
until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the
guarantees necessary for his defence.
(2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or
omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or
international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty
be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was
committed.21
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides provisions for
international standards as follows;
Article 9
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty
except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established
by law.
2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for
his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him.
3. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly
before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and
shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the
general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may
21 http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/
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be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial
proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution of the judgment.
4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to
take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay
on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not
lawful.
5. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an
enforceable right to compensation.
Article 10
1. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.
2. (a) Accused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be segregated from
convicted persons and shall be subject to separate treatment appropriate to their
status as un-convicted persons;
(b) Accused juvenile persons shall be separated from adults and brought as
speedily as possible for adjudication.
3. The penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim
of which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation. Juvenile offenders
shall be segregated from adults and be accorded treatment appropriate to their age
and legal status.22
Under the African Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights, following provisions are
incorporated.
Article 6
Every individual shall have the right to liberty and to the security of his person. No
one may be deprived of his freedom except for reasons and conditions previously
laid down by law. In particular, no one may be arbitrarily arrested or detained.23
Under international law, the parties to international conventions are States, the United
Nations organization and other international organizations. Hence, international instruments
such as conventions and treaties become binding on member states to introduce new local
laws to meet the requirements of international standards and norms either through the
constitutional changes or legislative incorporation. ―However, it must be added that under
international law, as a general rule, there is no formal obligation on States to ratify a
particular international covenant or a protocol.‖24
22http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx 23http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/#a6 24 Samuel Kwesi Amoo, The Bail Jurisprudence of Ghana, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia,
http://forumonpublicpolicy.com/summer08papers/archivesummer08/amoo.
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A Comparative Analysis on Sri Lankan Legal Framework on
Bail
In Sri Lanka, the procedural law in respect of most of criminal offences is contained in the
Code of Criminal Procedure Act No.15 of 1979 (hereinafter referred as Cr.P.C.). Under the
said act, there is no provision to define the term ‗bail‘, although the terms bailable offence
and non-bailable offence have been introduced. The term ‗bail‘ has been defined in the case
of Kanapathy Vs Jayasinghe as ―the release or setting at liberty of a person arrested or
imprisoned either on his own recognizance or upon others becoming sureties for his
appearance on a future date‖.25
Prior to the enactment of the Bail Act No. 30 of 1997, Cr.P.C
applied in respect of bail applications. Currently, the Bail Act applies and therefore I do not
detail the provisions in the Cr.P.C at this juncture.
The Constitutional measures which have been introduced into Sri Lankan legal system by
the 1978 Constitution would meet the international requirements to protect the right to
personal liberty and the presumption of innocence. Article 13 of the Constitution of 1978
provides the right to freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention and punishment, and
prohibition of retrospective penal legislation. Article 13 of the Constitution is reproduced as
follows;
13. (1) No person shall be arrested except according to procedure established by law. Any
person arrested shall be informed of the reason for his arrest.
(2) Every person held in custody, detained or otherwise deprived of personal liberty shall be
brought before the judge of the nearest competent court according to procedure established
by law and shall not be further held in custody, detained or deprived of personal liberty
except upon and in terms of the order of such judge made in accordance with procedure
established by law.
(3) Any person charged with an offence shall be entitled to be heard, in person or by an
attorney-at-law, at a fair trial by a competent court.
(4) No person shall be punished with death or imprisonment except by order of a competent
court, made in accordance with procedure established by law. The arrest, holding in custody,
detention or other deprivation of personal liberty of a person, pending investigation or trial,
shall not constitute punishment.
(5) Every person shall be presumed innocent until he is proved guilty.
Under the bail system, ―there is the phenomenon of constitutional bail.‖26
Even in Sri Lanka,
the constitutional bail concept is applied by the Supreme Court. For example, the Supreme
Court of Sri Lanka applied this concept for those who were detained under the Immigrants
and Emigrants Act for a long period of time. This model is applied by the other jurisdictions
such as Zambia and Ghana as well. The said provision of the Constitution deals with the
25Kanapathy Vs Jayasinghe 66 NLR 549 26 Samuel Kwesi Amoo, The Bail Jurisprudence of Ghana, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia,
http://forumonpublicpolicy.com/summer08papers/archivesummer08/amoo.
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right to liberty and the presumption of innocence. In the case of Queen v. Liyange, the court
has emphasized on the relationship of bail to the presumption of innocence and the right to
personal liberty as follows; ―This Court will never cease to safeguard the liberty of the
citizen. The favour shown to freedom will always influence judges to approach questions
affecting the liberty.‖27
In 1997, the Bail Act was adopted and it came into force in same year. It sets out the current
and the basic legal framework relating to bail prevailing in Sri Lanka. In accordance with
the preamble, the intention of the Legislature is to consolidate the law relating to bail, to
introduce the new concept of anticipatory bail and to adopt provisions for matters connected
thereto. Under the section 2 of the Bail act, granting bail is the guiding principle. Refusal of
bail is the exception. In the case of Anuruddha Ratwatte v. Attorney General,28
the
Supreme Court has emphasized on the section 2 of the Bail Act. The same principle has
been laid down in England by the Bail Act of 1976. It lays out that there is a general right to
bail, except as provided for under the First Schedule of the Act. Similar view has been taken
by Indian judges as well. In the case of Moti Ram and Others. v. State of Madya
Pradesh, Justice Krishna Iyer has emphasized that the judges should be more inclined
towards bail and not jail.29
It is well established rule that bail should not be punitive. As aforesaid, mainly offences are
classified into ―bailable‖ and ―non-bailable‖ offences under the Criminal Procedure Code
and the Bail Act. That depends on whether the offence committed is bailable as of a right or
not. Under section 4 of the Bail Act, a person accused or suspected for a bailable offence is
entitled to bail subjected to the provisions hereinafter provided in the Bail Act. In the case of
OIC Nittambuwa v. Pathirana,30
the Court has taken the view that wherever the offence
committed is bailable, the court can make an order releasing the suspect on bail. Under
section 5 of the Bail Act, where an accused person is arrested or detained for a non-bailable
offence, his release on bail is at the discretion of the court of law and subject to the
provisions of common guidelines. However, in accordance with the provisions of section 13
of the Bail Act, a suspected person shall not be released on bail by the magistrate courts if
there are reasonable grounds to believe that he is guilty of committing an offence punishable
with death or life imprisonment.
Before the enactment of the Bail Act, there were no statutory provisions which laid down
the guiding principles for releasing a suspect on bail at the discretion of the court. Under the
earlier law, the court relied on the case laws when determining bail applications. In the case
of Rex v. Toussaint,31
the Court adopted three grounds for consideration when determining
27Queen v. Liyange 65 NLR 289 28 2003 (2) SLLR 39 29
Moti Ram and Others. v. State of Madya Pradesh,AIR 1978 SC 1594,
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f4b8d657.html 30 1998 1 SLLR 84 31 12 NLR 65
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bail at its discretion. They are as follows; 1. Nature of offence 2. Seriousness of the
sentence 3. Possibility of absconding.32
By the adoption of the Bail Act in 1997, the statutory provisions were introduced on how to
exercise the judicial discretion in determining bail in respect of bailable or non bailable
offences. Section 14 of the Bail Act provides the guidelines applicable for all cases in
granting or refusing bail. Section 14 of the Bail Act is reproduced as follows;
14. (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the preceding provisions of this Act,
whenever a person suspected or accused of being concerned in committing or having
committed a bailable or non-bailable offence, appears, is brought before or surrenders
to the court having jurisdiction, the court may refuse to release such person on bail or
upon application being made in that behalf by a police officer, and after issuing notice
on the person concerned and hearing him personally or through his attorney-at-law,
cancel a subsisting order releasing such person on bail if the court has reason to
believe :"
(a) that such person would "
(i) not appear to stand his inquiry or trial;
(ii) interfere with the witnesses or the evidence against him or otherwise
obstruct the course of justice; or
(iii) commit an offence while on bail; or
(b) that the particular gravity of, and public reaction to, the alleged offence may
give rise to public disquiet.
(2) Where under subsection (1), a court refuses to release on bail any person
suspected or accused of being concerned in or having committed an offence or
cancels a subsisting order releasing such person on bail, the court may order such
suspect or accused to be committed to custody.
(3) The court may at any time, where it is satisfied that there has been a change in
the circumstances pertaining to the case, rescind or vary any order made by it under
subsection (1).
In the case of Anuruddha Ratwatte v. AG, the Court has addressed the applicability of
section 14 of the Bail Act. Whereas the cardinal principle that bail should not be treated as a
punishment is settled in Sri Lankan legal system, these guidelines play a vital role in
granting or refusing bail.
At this juncture, it is important to consider the guide lines of other jurisdictions since the
analysis is comparative. The guiding principles titled as ‗SUBORDINATE COURTS‟
32 Indatissa, Kalinga, Law Relating to Bail in Sri Lanka, 1st Edition June 2005
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BAIL GUIDELINES‟33
have been adopted in Singapore for determination of bail
application. Those guidelines appear very broad and cover all areas which the courts should
consider in granting bail on each case. Subsection (II) of the said guidelines under the
heading of ‗Principles and Methodology in Granting Bail‟ is reproduced as follows;
―In determining whether to grant bail to an accused, the factors that the court would consider
include the following;-
(a) Probability of appearance at trial
(i) whether the accused has a fixed place of abode within the jurisdiction;
(ii) whether the accused is domiciled or is a permanent resident in the country;
(iii) the nature and seriousness of the offence, the punishment prescribed and the likely
sentence to be imposed upon conviction i.e. whether there is a provision for a fine or
mandatory custodial
sentence or other punishment such as caning;
(iv) the nature and the strength of the evidence in support of the charge e.g. where the
evidence comprises confessions, admissions, material eye-witness accounts, or is supported
by medical or scientific evidence such as HSA reports;
(v) whether the accused, if released on bail, is likely to abscond;
(vi) whether the accused has made an attempt to leave the jurisdiction without the
permission of the court or the investigating officer;
(vii) the extent of the accused‘s ties and roots in Singapore.
(b) Likelihood of interference with the judicial process
(i) whether there is evidence of a likelihood that the accused will tamper with prosecution
evidence;
(ii) whether the accused is likely to procure false evidence either in support of his defence or
to exonerate other accused persons involved in the commission of the offence;
(iii) whether the accused is likely to convey information acquired during the investigations
to other accused persons not yet arrested or charged for the offence.
(c) Public safety considerations
(i) where offences against the person are involved, whether the attack was deliberate,
provoked, triggered by frustration or motivated by vengeance.
(ii) whether the attack was by a group/secret society, gang or triad;
(iii) the nature of violence inflicted on the victim and the extent of injuries suffered;
(iv) the type of weapon or corrosive substance used;
(v) whether the accused is likely to repeat the offence while on bail;
33SUBORDINATE COURTS‘ BAIL GUIDELINES issued by Bail Administrator, Bail Centre, Subordinate Courts
1 December 2005, https://app.statecourts.gov.sg/Data/Files/File/BailGuidelines.pdf
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(vi) whether the accused has displayed a propensity towards violence and can be regarded
(possibly after psychiatric assessment from IMH) as one who has no respect for life and
property;
(vii) the number of charges preferred against the accused;
(viii) whether the accused is a persistent offender with previous criminal convictions for
serious or violent offences. In such cases, the previous conviction or record of the accused
shall not be
referred to in a manner that will prejudice his or her right to a fair trial. Furthermore, the
court may in its discretion either hear the proceedings in camera or exclude from the
proceedings all those other than the officers of the court, persons directly concerned with the
proceedings and the press and such other persons if any as the court may permit to remain. It
should be noted that when the press is allowed to remain, no information relating to the
criminal record of the accused applying for bail should be published in a written publication
or be broadcast.
(d) Preparation of the defence
(i) whether in the circumstances of the case, and the nature of the alleged offence, a refusal
of bail would deprive the accused of the opportunity to adequately prepare his defence;
(ii) whether there is a likelihood of the prosecution withdrawing or reducing the charges;
(e) Likelihood of obtaining further evidence by remand
(i) whether sufficient evidence has been obtained to raise a reasonable suspicion that the
accused may have committed the alleged offence and it appears likely that further evidence
may be obtained by investigators during a short period in remand;
(ii) whether the period of remand requested by the police is reasonable in the circumstances
of the case.
(f) Humanitarian grounds
(i) the long period of detention of the accused and probability of further period of delay in
the accused‘s trial;
(ii) the likelihood of the trial being protracted resulting in a long period in remand;
(iii) age, sex and state of health of the accused in remand.
(g) Other factors
(i) whether the accused had previously been refused bail by another court and is awaiting
trial;
(ii) the accused‘s previous conduct and behaviour in court;
(iii) whether the principal accused, accomplices and co-accused (if any) have been offered
bail;
(iii) whether the accused surrendered himself to the authorities;
(iv) whether the accused co-operated with the authorities and assisted in the investigation to
recover evidence or misappropriated other property;
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(v) whether the accused had made restitution in part or in full;
(vi) whether the accused had shown any remorse for the commission of the offence/s;
(vii) whether the accused is addicted to a controlled drug or other intoxicating
substance/s.‖34
Accordingly, it appears that many grounds are to be considered in determining bail at
judicial discretion. Hence, granting or refusing bail should be considered very carefully as
the concept of bail is always related to the concept of presumption of innocence and the
right to personal liberty as aforesaid. In Sri Lanka, the courts are mainly guided by the case
laws on the issues relating to granting or refusing bail. The judgments of apex courts have
directed as to how judicial discretion should be exercised in determining bail. The judicial
discretion has been discussed in the case of Queen v. Liyanage.35
In the cases of S v Dlamini, S v Dladla and Others; S v Joubert; S v Schietekat,36
the
Court voiced the bail jurisprudence of South Africa. The granting bail is the guiding
principle in South Africa as well. In accordance with the judgment, the refusal to grant bail
and the detention of an accused in custody shall be in the interests of justice where one or
more of the grounds in the said case are established.
Further, in this article, it is important to address the area of bail amounts. In the case of In
Re Athurupane, the Court held that ―the fixing of bail calls for the exercise of judicial
discretion and for-the most anxious care in each case.‖37
Section 8 to 12 of the Bail Act deal
with the nature of Bail bonds, liability of sureties, and the quantum of bail.38
Section 7 of the
Bail Act provides the ‗manner in which a person suspected or accused of a bailable or non-
bailable offence may be released on bail.‘39
Under section 11 of the Bail Act, amount of bail
shall be fixed with due regard to the circumstances of the accused and shall not be excessive.
The section provides three factors, i.e. nature of the offence, punishment for the offence, the
means of the suspect to be considered in fixing the amount of bail. The factors which should
be taken into consideration in granting bail were discussed in the case of Queen v.
Liyanage. In the case of Delaney v. Shobe,40
―The courts have indicated certain factors that
should be taken into consideration in fixing bail. These are: (1) ability of the accused to give
bail, (2) nature of the offense, (3) penalty for the offense charged, (4) character and
reputation of the accused, (5) health of the accused, (6) character and strength of the
34SUBORDINATE COURTS‘ BAIL GUIDELINES issued by Bail Administrator, Bail Centre, Subordinate Courts
1 December 2005, https://app.statecourts.gov.sg/Data/Files/File/BailGuidelines.pdf 35Queen v. Liyange 65 NLR 289 36
S v Dlamini, S v Dladla and Others; S v Joubert; S v Schietekat (CCT21/98, CCT22/98 , CCT2/99 , CCT4/99)
[1999] ZACC 8; 1999 (4) SA 623; 1999 (7) BCLR 771 (3 June 1999) , 1999 (4) SA 623,
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1999/8.html 37 In Re Athurupane 51 NLR 21 38 Indatissa, Kalinga, Law Relating to Bail in Sri Lanka, 1st Edition June 2005 39Hon.Justice A.W. Abdus Salam, BAIL-CONCEPT-APPLICATION, http://www.awasalam.net/2014/04/bail-
what-is-it-article-w-salam.html#!/2014/04/bail-what-is-it-article-w-salam.html 40218 Or. 626(1959)
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evidence, (7) probability of the accused appearing at trial, (8) forfeiture of other bonds, (9)
whether the accused was under bond in other cases, and (10) whether the accused was a
fugitive from justice when arrested. See cases cited in Annotation, 72 ALR 801.‖41
In
addition to the above, the bail principles have been discussed in Indian cases such as
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,42
State of Rajasthan v. Balchand,43
Hussainara
Khatoon and others v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar.44
The guiding principles titled as ‗SUBORDINATE COURTS‟ BAIL GUIDELINES‟ have
been adopted as aforesaid in Singapore for determination of bail application. Subsection
(III) of the said guidelines deals with the ‗Bail Amounts‘ and it directs that ―The suggested
bail quanta listed below are intended only to serve as general guidelines. They may be
adjusted upwards or downwards depending on the facts and circumstances of the case,
bearing in mind considerations such as:
a) the seriousness of the offence(s) – including the likely sentence upon
conviction and any mandatory sentences;
b) the number of charges involved;
c) the accused‘s antecedents (if any);
d) the accused‘s individual circumstances, including his means of raising bail;
e) where the offence relates to property, the benefits obtained or loss caused by
the accused, including the value of any unrecovered property;
f.) whether the accused surrendered himself.
The court will also evaluate, based on available evidence, the likelihood of the accused
absconding if he is released on bail and consider what would be an appropriate amount to
secure his attendance.‖45
―In ordering bail and deciding on the quantum of bail the Court
should look into all aspects of the matter and exercise the discretion vested in them
judicially. Undoubtedly, the application of the concept pertaining to the grant of bail,
cancellation, forfeiture etc. requires a greater command of the legal principles. It is an
established principle of law that the grant of bail or refusal is a judicial discretion and not a
mere discretion.‖46
41
Delaney v. Shobe218 Or. 626 (1959), http://law.justia.com/cases/oregon/supreme-court/1959/218-or-626-3.html 42AIR 1978 SC 571 43 AIR 1977 SC 2447 44 AIR 1979 SC 1360 45SUBORDINATE COURTS‘ BAIL GUIDELINES issued by Bail Administrator, Bail Centre, Subordinate Courts
1 December 2005, https://app.statecourts.gov.sg/Data/Files/File/BailGuidelines.pd 46Hon.Justice A.W. Abdus Salam, BAIL-CONCEPT-APPLICATION, http://www.awasalam.net/2014/04/bail-
what-is-it-article-w-salam.html#!/2014/04/bail-what-is-it-article-w-salam.html
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Conclusion
The concept of bail plays a vital role in the administration of criminal justice. Since this
concept directly deals with the concept of presumption of innocence and the right to liberty,
the court is duty bound to consider the legal and guiding principles in the criminal justice
jurisprudence in granting or refusing bail. The discretion vested in the judiciary should be
exercised judicially in determining bail for a person who has committed an offence either
bailable or non-bailable.
―For there is but one essential justice which cements society, and one law which establishes
this justice. This law is right reason, which is the true rule of all commandments and
prohibitions. Whoever neglects this law, whether written or unwritten, is necessarily unjust
and wicked.‖
― Marcus Tullius Cicero, On the laws
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Domestic Laws and
The 1958 New York Convention1
Domenico Di Pietro2
Unlike other successful international conventions on arbitration, the New York
convention is not a self-contained instrument. It is permeated by several domestic laws that
may be of relevance at different stages of the arbitral process. As is well known at times the
Convention is clear about (i) whether a certain issues is to be dealt by a domestic law and
(ii) if that is the case, which law should be looked at. On certain issues, unfortunately, the
Convention is silent both on whether a domestic law should be applied and which one such
law should be. This paper is aimed at identifying the main issues that the Convention leaves
it open for domestic laws to regulate.
Introduction
It is well known that the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Arbitral Awards Rendered Abroad is one of the most successful International multilateral
treaties.3 While it is not the scope of this paper to praise qualities and achievements of the
Convention it must not be forgotten that the Convention has played a fundamental role in
making arbitration the most popular means of dispute resolution in international trade.
The New York Convention, despite its undeniable success, is not a perfect tool. Some
aspects of the Convention have indeed been the objects of heated debate that does not seem
to subsidise. There are indeed a number of issues relating to the very structure and the
1This paper is a combined collection of thoughts first published in the following two articles: Applicable Laws Under
the New York Convention, in ―Conflicts of Law in International Commercial Arbitration‖, Franco Ferrari and
Stefan Kröll eds 2011 and Forum Shopping and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: Notes on Public Policy
in ―Forum Shopping in the International Arbitration Context‖Franco Ferrari ed 2013. 2Lecturer, International Arbitration, University of Rome ―Roma Tre‖, Avvocato (Italy) and Solicitor (England and
Wales). International Arbitration Group, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer. The views contained in this article are
the author‘s only and should not be attributed to the institutions which the author is affiliated to. 3 Generally on the New York Convention see inter alia, Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and International
Arbitral Awards: The New York Convention in Practice, Emmanuel Gaillard & Domenico Di Pietro eds,2008.
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mechanics of the Convention that surprisingly as one might suggest after fifty years – have
not been thoroughly analysed and fully understood.
The Convention‘s objective of building an international legislative network for the
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards rendered abroad could only be achieved by
attracting the highest possible number of Contracting States.
In order to attain broad consensus, the draftsmen of the Convention had to devise a legal
instrument which would facilitate international arbitration without clashing with the
different fundamental legal principles of each Contracting State. Their task, therefore, was
one of ensuring compatibility between furthering the objectives of international arbitration
and protecting the public policies of the Contracting States. Such compatibility was achieved
in the final draft of the Convention by performing what could be defined as a ―balancing
act‖. On one hand, the Convention imposes on the Contracting States a general obligation to
enforce arbitration awards as well as arbitration clauses and agreements. On the other hand,
it creates an exception to this obligation in circumstances where recognition and
enforcement are incompatible with the fundamental principles of law at the place of
enforcement.4
The adopted system is detectable by looking at the text of the main provisions of the
Convention. The tension is indeed rather evident between the goal of establishing an
arbitration-friendly, harmonising system and the concern that the Convention would allow
most, if not all, legal systems to mould the application of the Convention to render it
compatible with local rules and therefore suitable for ratification.
This system seems to be responsible for the perceived inconsistency in the application of the
Convention. However at a closer analysis, it seems that, at least in the majority of cases, the
issue is one of different degrees of application – which is allowed by the Convention itself –
rather than one of inconsistency. This is not to say that misapplication or misinterpretation
of the Convention has never occurred in the past and it will never occur again in the future.
What is important to stress however is that:
– most of the decisions that are pointed at as being inconsistent with the
Convention are, in fact, the consequence of the above-mentioned structural
device adopted in the Convention;
– the decisions that genuinely seem to misinterpret or misapply the Convention
are a tiny percentage of the remarkable number of cases throughout the world
where the Convention is duly applied and abode by.
4 An example of such a technique can be found at Article I (the Reservations), Article II (on arbitrability and
substantial validity of the arbitration clause) and Article V. See on this subject Domenico Di Pietro, Are the
Principles of the New York Convention realised consistently? in ―Achieving Justice Through International
Arbitration‖, Report of the Society for Advanced LegalStudies,2004.
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As it has been mentioned above, the system adopted by the drafters of the Convention, to
make it appealing to the highest number of States, can be identified in the textual thread of
the Convention‘s core provisions. Such provisions will be briefly identified and analysed in
the following chapter.
One of these challenging issues is the rather surprising question about what is an arbitral
award falling within the scope of the New York Convention. Indeed the question is even
broader. Before we come to that point we might perhaps ask ourselves what should be
regarded as ―arbitration‖ for the purposes of the New York Convention. In other words,
what is the means of dispute resolution which can produce a decision falling within the
scope of the Convention? How do we establish this? Should we look at the text and the spirit
of the convention or by looking at a domestic law?
The New York Convention is not a perfect instrument. However, it is much better an
instrument than some think. What is sometimes regarded as inconsistency and uncertainty is
in fact the result of skilful legal craftsmanship which may be difficult to replicate should the
project of a new New York Convention ever be attempted. The Convention was indeed built
knowing that in order to succeed it had to find a place for the different legal backgrounds
and domestic constraints of such variety of Contracting States. By simply looking at the
number (and variety) of Contracting States one should wonder whether it would be possible,
today, to re-create an instrument of such breath and scope.
The Convention made its Contracting States to respect and protect international arbitration
without having to abdicate the core principles of their respective legal cultures.
This reflection was perfectly described in one of the works of the late Dr Robert Briner
where the preeminent lawyer wrote:
Rather than attempting the impossible, the conference sensibly
sought to address the most pressing practical problems experienced
by the post war business world. In so doing, it took the path of
moderation and pragmatism by producing an exhaustive list of basic
requirements for the recognition and enforcement of awards. It gave
effect to the will of the parties without asking States to renounce
their legal systems. This approach may have been modest and
cautious, but it was above all judicious, for not only did it ensure the
effectiveness and acceptability of the convention but also gave it a
far-reaching legacy.5
5Robert Briner and Virginia Hamilton,The Creation Of An International Standard To Ensure The Effectiveness Of
Arbitration Agreements And Foreign Arbitral Awards, in ―Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and
International Arbitral Awards: The New York Convention in Practice‖, Emmanuel Gaillard & Domenico Di
Pietroeds, 2008.
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1. What Constitutes an Arbitral Award Under the New York
Convention?
1.1 Setting the scenario
What constitutes an arbitral award under the New York Convention is an issue that has been
sporadically taken into account. However, it is arguable that this issue has never received the
interest that it actually deserves.
An attempt was made during the negotiation of the Convention by the delegate for Israel.
The definition proposed read as follows:
Arbitral award” means an award made by an arbitral body, whether
permanent or constituted for any particular case, in pursuance of an
agreement in writing by which the parties named in the award have
voluntarily submitted to the arbitration by such arbitral body of any existing
or future disputes between them in any matter susceptible of arbitration.6
The absence of any relevant definition in the draft convention as to what constitutes an
arbitral award prompted the following interesting comment by the Austrian delegate:
The term arbitral award is not defined. Consequently, it will depend on the
law of the State in which it is to be enforced whether a particular decision is
to be regarded as an arbitral award. From the practical point of view, it is
probably not necessary to define the term in the text of the convention … The
convention should perhaps be expanded to include arbitral settlements.7
No definition was eventually adopted. The only indication as to what may constitute an
award under the Convention, is the less-than-helpful (in this respect) provision of the
Convention‘s Article I (2) according to which:
The term „arbitral awards‟ shall include not only awards made by arbitrators
appointed for each case but also those made by permanent arbitral bodies to
which the parties have submitted.
The little information contained in the Convention and in the Travaux Préparatoires has left
the question as to what constitutes an arbitral award unresolved. This lack of definition,
however, is not a peculiarity of the Convention. Indeed, even the UNCITRAL Model Law
refrains from describing what constitutes an arbitral award even though the adoption of a
definition was considered during the drafting stages. The proposed definition stated that:
6Travaux Préparatoires, E/CONF. 26/L, 18, 26 May 1958, available on-line at http://
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_travaux.html. 7Travaux Préparatoires, E/2822, 31 January 1956, available on-line at http://
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_travaux.htm.
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[…] „award‟ means a final award which disposes of all issues submitted to
the arbitral tribunal and any other decision of the arbitral tribunal which
finally determine[s] any question of substance or the question of its
competence or any other question of procedure but, in the latter case, only if
the arbitral tribunal terms its decision an award.8
However, because the suggested text gave rise to considerable disagreement – especially
with regard to the issue as to whether decisions on the tribunal‘s own jurisdiction amounted
to an arbitral award – the attempt to codify a definition was eventually abandoned.
As it has been mentioned above, it has been discussed whether the analysis aimed at
establishing the nature of both a given dispute resolution process and the decisions taken
therewith should be carried out with reference to the relevant domestic law(s) or whether an
analysis centred on the international nature as well as the harmonisation goals of the
convention should be preferred.
More precisely, on one hand, it has been argued that the nature of a dispute resolution
process should be identified and assessed with reference to the provisions of the law which
creates and regulates such process. This law may clarify, for example, either expressly or
implicitly, whether the process undertaken by the parties should be considered as a true
alternative to the jurisdiction of national courts and therefore whether such process is
capable of producing decisions which may be enforced abroad under the convention.
On the other hand, other authors believe that the analysis should be carried out with
predominant focus on the scope and purpose of the convention rather than the provisions of
the relevant domestic law. This latter point of view is certainly appealing and does not seem
to be inconsistent with the approach advocated in a considerable number of cases, according
to which the convention should be interpreted and enforced having in mind its
‗international‘ character and the need to refrain from any inflexible interpretation which may
be suggested under the provisions of domestic law.
The solution to this question is perhaps found in between the two mentioned views. It seems
possible to agree with the view that the convention, as an international legal instrument,
should be interpreted having in mind its peculiar nature and scope in accordance with the
rules for the interpretation of international conventions provided by the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. This view, however, should not automatically rule out
any reference to the relevant domestic law(s). It is here suggested that – in assessing the
nature of a dispute resolution process and the nature of orders issued therewith – domestic
courts should form an independent view on the nature of both the process and the relevant
award, irrespective of the definitions or categorisations employed in the jurisdictions where
the award was made.
8 See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Report of the Working Group on International
Contract Practices on the Work of its Seventh Session, UN Doc. A/CN.9/246, 6 March 1984.
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The domestic courts may, however, also look at the provisions of the relevant domestic law
and use them as ‗facts‘. Such facts would obviously provide a strong indication as to the
actual nature of the means of dispute resolution under analysis. However, they should bear
neither binding force nor a definitive answer to the problem. Admittedly, it may be possible
to object that the acceptance of this view would provide the courts at the place of
enforcement with broad powers which might be inconsistent with or could go beyond the
provisions of Article V of the convention according to which enforcement can only be
denied only in the presence of one or more of the circumstances described under the same
Article. To this objection it may however be possible to reply that the limitation imposed
through Article V presupposes the existence of a genuine arbitral award falling within the
scope of the Convention.
1.2 Identification of arbitral tribunals: the ‘alternativity’ test
As we have mentioned above, the first step towards the identification of the decisions which
can be enforced under the New York Convention, should be the identification of the judicial
bodies which qualify as proper arbitral tribunals. As is well known, disputes can be settled in
many different ways other than by court proceedings. Indeed, international dispute
resolution practice has experienced, for example, a remarkable surge in ADR processes such
as mediation and conciliation. These processes can bear striking similarities to arbitral
proceedings. However, there seems to be general agreement that the Convention is only
intended to cover dispute resolution processes which can be regarded as a truly definitive
alternative to the jurisdiction of domestic courts and whose awards have the same legal force
as a court judgment. It follows that the Convention should not apply to orders and decisions
rendered in processes which are not a genuine alternative to the jurisdiction of the domestic
courts. This apparently comfortable path of analysis might in fact prove rather perilous not
least because the terminology employed in practice can be confusing. Mediation
proceedings may well be described as arbitrations and the mediators could well be described
as arbitrators. However, if the process as a whole does not provide the individual in charge
of the process with the power finally to settle the dispute through the delivery of a binding
and enforceable decision characterised by the same status as a court judgment, then
Convention should not be applied.
The uncertainty is sometimes striking and unexpected. In more than one occasion the
question whether final decisions rendered by adjudicators under English law could be
enforced under the New York Convention received no answer. As is well known in the
United Kingdom the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act (the ‗Act‘)
provided amongst other things for a fast mechanism (adjudication) for the settlement on an
interim basis of disputes arising out of construction contracts. The Act requires the decisions
of adjudicators to be enforced pending the final determination of disputes by arbitration or
litigation, depending on the choice made by the parties in the relevant contract.
Under normal circumstances is, therefore, clear that the jurisdiction of the adjudicator is not
―genuinely alternative‖ to that of domestic courts. There are however circumstances in the
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presence of which the nature of the decision of the adjudicator is not as clear-cut. Indeed, the
Act provides the parties with the option to agree that the decision of the adjudicator would
finally determine the dispute between the parties. It seems at least possible to argue that, in
such circumstances, the agreement of the parties might have the effect of transforming
adjudication into – effectively – some form of informal arbitration, the outcome of which
could be enforced abroad under the New York Convention. How do we settle the issue
whether adjudication should be considered as arbitration for the purposes of the Convention
under those circumstances? Should a domestic law be applied to decide such issue? Which
one?
2. The Territorial Criterion and its Exception
Article I (1) of the Convention provides that:
This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the
recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought, and arising out of
differences between persons, whether physical or legal. It shall also apply to
arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their
recognition and enforcement are sought.
It is clear that the Convention not only applies to the recognition and enforcement of an
arbitral award made in another State but it also applies to the recognition and enforcement of
an arbitral award which is not considered as a domestic award in the State where recognition
and enforcement are sought. It is therefore left to the legislation of a Contracting State to
decide if and in the presence of what circumstances an award should not be considered as
domestic even though, on application of the territorial criterion, it should fall under that
category. This is another level of interaction between the Convention and domestic law that
may bring about a considerable expansion of the Convention‘s scope of application.
3. The commercial reservation
Article I (3) provides that:
[…] any State may on the basis of reciprocity declare that it will apply the
Convention to the recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the
territory of another Contracting State. It may also declare that it will apply
the Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether
contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under the national
law of the State making such declaration.
This reservation was adopted at the Conference as it was feared that in its several civil law
countries that distinguish between commercial and non-commercial transactions would not
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entered into the Convention.
As regards actual application of the reservation, very much depends on the relevant
domestic law as well as the application of such law by the relevant judge. An explanatory
case can be found in Bureau WijsMüller v United States of America9, where a US district
court considered an award dealing with the salvage of a US warship outside the scope of the
Convention. The court held that ‗relations arising out of the activities of warships have never
been regarded as ‗commercial‘ within the context of sovereign immunity.‘ Interestingly, the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York held in another case that an
employment contract must be considered as commercial within the meaning of the
Convention.10
Some other decisions in this regard have been openly criticised for the strict
approach taken in assessing the nature of the dispute in Société d‟Investissement Kal v.
Taieb Haddad and Hans Barett11
for example a dispute had arisen out of a contract for the
designing of a resort in Tunisia which contained an ICC arbitration clause. When it came to
enforcement of the relevant arbitral award, The Tunisian trial judge, Court of Appeal and
Supreme Court all agreed that enforcement should be denied, finding that Tunisia had made
the commercial reservation of Article I(3) of the convention and architectural and
urbanisation works are not considered as ―commercial‖ under Tunisian law.
It must also be signalled that the domestic courts of some countries which have entered into
the commercial reservation have given the term ‗commercial‘ a broad interpretation bearing
in mind the needs and principles of international trade. Indeed many courts tend to depart
from the stricter provisions of domestic law to interpret ‗commercial‘ in line with the Model
Law definition.
4. Arbitration agreements: arbitrability, formal and
substantive validity
a. Arbitrability
Article II (1) of the Convention provides that:
Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which
the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which
have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal
relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable
of settlement by arbitration.
9Bureau WijsMüller v United States of America 356 F.Supp. 1 D.C.N.Y., 1973; Yearbook, Vol. III (1978), p. 290. 10Fabergé International, Inc v. Mr Felice Di Pino, New York Law Journal of 15 July 1985; Yearbook, Vol. XII
(1987), pp. 536. 11Société d‟Investissement Kal v. Taieb Haddad and Hans Barett Yearbook, Vol. XXIII (1998), p. 770.
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It is for the relevant national legislator to regulate arbitration as a means to resolve disputes
alternative to State courts and to establish within which limits and under which conditions
arbitration is accepted by the national system. Increasingly, arbitration is perceived as a
suitable means of dispute resolution for all kinds of disputes.
The growing favour towards arbitration is being recorded in national rules and court
decisions which are increasingly allowing recourse to arbitration in relation to subject matter
that used to be considered non-arbitrable by reason of underlying public issues.12
b. Formal Validity
As is well known, the first two paragraphs of Article II of the Convention identify what are
frequently described as ―threshold‖ requirements for the formal validity of arbitration
agreements.
Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which
the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which
have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal
relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable
of settlement by arbitration.
The term “agreement in writing” shall include an arbitral clause in a
contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an
exchange of letters or telegrams.
This means that Contracting States are at freedom to adopt more liberal requirements for the
validity of arbitration agreements than those contained in the Convention. Therefore,
Contracting States would be in breach of the obligations arising out of the Convention if
they introduced requirements of validity that are more burdensome than those contained in
the Convention.
The court of a contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the
parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the request of
one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is
null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.
c. Substantive validity
Article II (3) deal with the relationship between arbitration clauses and domestic courts. It
provides that
12 Loukas Mistelis and Stavros Brekoulakis, Arbitrability: international & comparative perspectives 2009.
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The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in
respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of
this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to
arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed.
Article II (3) does not offer any guidance as to what should be the meaning of the words
‗null and void‘. One solution would be to refer to the applicable national law. The Article,
however, does not provide for the rules of conflict permitting to identify the national law
applicable to the ‗null and void‘ clause, contrary to Art. V (1)(a) which refers to the law
chosen by the parties or, failing such choice, to ‗the law of the country where the award was
made‘ i.e., as a rule, the law of the seat.
At least three different laws might in theory be taken into account to establish the validity of
arbitration agreements. Such laws might be:
The law applicable to the main contract
This approach, which is mainly based on a choice-of-law basis, would favour the
application of the domestic law governing the contract which the arbitration
agreement is inserted in.
The law of the place of arbitration
This is the law which is believed by the majority of commentators and domestic
laws to apply to the arbitration agreement. Article V (1) (a) of the Convention itself
refers to the law chosen by the parties or, failing such choice, to ‗the law of the
country where the award was made‘ i.e., as a rule, the law of the seat. This view is
also supported by the fact that a good number of the New York Convention‘s
contracting States have entered into the 1961 European Arbitration Convention.
The latter Convention, at Article VI(2) states that in taking a decision concerning
the existence or the validity of an arbitration agreement, courts of contracting States
shall examine the validity of such agreement with reference to the capacity of the
parties, under the law applicable to them while with reference to other issues with
reference to the law which the parties have subjected their arbitration agreement to.
Failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country in which the award is
to be made. Failing any indication as to the law to which the parties have subjected
the agreement, and where at the time when the question is raised in court the
country in which the award is to be made cannot be determined, under the
competent law by virtue of the rules of conflict of the court seized of the dispute.
International uniform rules
According to this approach the validity of arbitration agreements should be
performed without any reference to any domestic laws but rather with reference to a
uniform international standard. It is advocated by the supporters of this approach
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that Article II (3) should be interpreted autonomously and the power to review by
domestic courts should be limited to the few internationally recognised grounds for
invalidity, such as fraud and duress.
5. Article v(1) – setting the circumstances in the presence of
which recognition and enforcement may be refused
As is well known, Article V introduces the grounds which may lead to refusal of recognition
and enforcement, in the presence of an application to that effect by the interested party, as
follows:
Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of
the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the
competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof
that:
Two of the grounds for refusal of enforcement that, more than others, may be affected by the
application of a domestic law can be found under Article V(1)(a). These are: incapacity of a
party and invalidity of the arbitration agreement.
a. Incapacity
Enforcement may be refused in the presence of evidence that:
The parties to the agreement referred to in Article II were, under the law
applicable to them, under some incapacity
The ―law applicable to them‖ is often referred to as the ‗personal law‘. This law would
normally be determined through the conflict of laws rules of the lex fori. Most of such laws
normally would point to the law of domicile or habitual residence, in case of individual
parties, and to the law of the place of incorporation or the principal place of business, in case
of legal persons.
b. Invalidity
Enforcement may be refused in the presence of evidence that the arbitration agreement:
is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any
indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made
The first conflict of law rule under that Article is connected to party autonomy. The second
one relates to a subsidiary rule providing that in the absence of a choice of law by the
parties, the arbitration agreement is governed by the law of the country where the award was
made. There seem to be little doubt that these conflict rules are international in nature
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superseding the domestic conflict rules of the country where the award was made.
c. Irregularity in the composition of the arbitral tribunal or
procedure
Under Article V(1)(d) enforcement may be refused in the presence of evidence that:
The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not
in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement,
was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration
took place; or
Pursuant to this provision, enforcement of the award can be refused if the respondent proves
that the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance
with the agreement of the parties, or, in the absence of an agreement on these matters, was
not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place. It must be
stressed in this regard that not all changes necessarily amount to an issue leading to refusal
of recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award. Indeed, the composition may
legitimately as a result of several factors, including, for example, the provisions of the law
applicable to the arbitration agreement catering for that result..
Under the English Arbitration Act 1996, for example, if one of the parties fails to appoint its
arbitrator then the arbitrator appointed by the other party may well be confirmed as sole
arbitrator.13
Any such change in the composition of the arbitral tribunal would however be
consistent with the arbitration agreements since the choice of the place of arbitration, either
by the parties themselves or by the arbitrators, has the effect of incorporating the provisions
of the relevant arbitration statute into the arbitration agreement,
d. The Award ‘Has not yet Become Binding’
Pursuant to Article V(1)(e) enforcement may also be refused in the presence of evidence
that:
The award has not yet become binding on the parties or has been set aside
or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the
law of which, that award was made.
Ground e of Article V(1) provides in the first place that enforcement of an award can be
refused if the party against whom the award is invoked proves that the award has not yet
become ‗binding‘.
The Convention‘s predecessor, the Geneva Convention of 1927, required that, for
enforcement to be allowed, the award had to become ‗final‘ in the country where it had been
13
English Arbitration Act 1996, Section 17.
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rendered. This was believed to entail the need for an ―exequatur of finality‖ to be approved
by the courts at the place of arbitration.
The drafters of the New York Convention, in order to facilitate and accelerate enforcement,
removed the need for any such exequatur. Accordingly, no leave for enforcement in the
country of origin is required under the New York Convention.
Domestic courts, however, tend to inconsistently interpret the issue whether the binding
force is to be determined under the law applicable to the award or in an autonomous manner
independently from any domestic law. Indeed, a number of courts have investigated the
issue with reference to the lex arbitri while others have given effect to the word binding
without reference to any applicable law.
An argument in support of the autonomous interpretation is that if the applicable law
provides that an award becomes binding only after a leave of enforcement is granted by the
court, the ‗double-exequatur‘ is in fact reintroduced into the convention, thus defeating the
attempt of the drafters of the convention to abolish this requirement.
6. Grounds for refusal actionable by domestic courts
Under the second paragraph of Article V enforcement may be refused in the presence of
evidence, which may be identified by the judge of his own motion, that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by
arbitration under the law of that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public
policy of that country.
Since arbitrability is generally regarded as part of the broader category of public policy, our
analysis will focus on the general mechanics of application of Article V (2)(b).
Under Article V(2)(b) enforcement may be refused in the presence of evidence, which may
be identified by the court of its own motion, that recognition or enforcement of the award
would be contrary to the public policy of that country.
Compliance with public policy is to be assessed with reference to the law of the place of
enforcement. This is a safeguard provision aimed at preventing enforcement of an award the
content of which would be in clear contrast with the core principles of that jurisdiction.
It is outside the intended purpose of this article providing an overview of what would be
contrary to the public policy of each Contracting State of the New York Convention.
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However, some reflections on the scope of public policy might be in place. For example,
some Contracting States have clarified which limited set of domestic law provisions dealing
with public policy apply where assessing the enforceability of foreign arbitral awards.
In summary, the public policy provisions to be taken into account should be those falling
within the category of international public policy i.e. the public policy provisions of
domestic law dealing with cases characterized by an international element or a degree of
detachment from that jurisdiction. Domestic international public policy is commonly
distinguished from ―truly‖ transnational public policy, which might be described as the
limited set of public policy principles common to all States (or the vast majority of them).
It is frequently observed that, if we were to give a pictorial description of the relationship
amongst those three categories we could draw it in the shape of a pyramid. Domestic public
policy, which is characterized by the highest number of provisions, would make the base or
bottom of our imaginary pyramid. Domestic international public policy, being composed by
the core provisions of public policy of a domestic law, amounts to a narrower corpus of
provisions. In our pyramid, therefore, it would be placed in the middle of the building.
Transnational public policy, being the narrowest corpus of provisions would be the top layer
of the pyramid. In this structure each layer would contain also the provisions of the smaller
layer. In other words, the lower layer also contains the provisions of the higher layer.14
Therefore, in identifying what constitutes public policy for the purpose of Article V(2)(b) of
the New York Convention, reference should be made to the international public policy of the
domestic law of the country where enforcement is sought. Therefore the core provisions of
domestic public policy, to the exclusion of those having a more domestic and less
compelling character.
It is interesting to note that, during the negotiation of the Convention, it was suggested a
wording that is pretty illustrative of the concept of public policy that was common to the
majority of the Convention‘s drafters. Under draft Article IV(h) it was indeed suggested that
recognition and enforcement may be denied where ―the recognition and enforcement of the
award, or the subject matter thereof, would be clearly incompatible with public policy or
with fundamental principles of the law‖.15
It has been observed in this respect that ―by using
restrictive words like clearly and fundamental the Committee intended to limit this ground to
cases in which the recognition or enforcement of a foreign arbitral tribunal would be
14 Loukas Mistelis, ‗Keeping the Unruly Horse in Control‟ or Public Policy as a Bar to enforcement of (Foreign)
Arbitral Awards, 2 Int‘l Law Forum Du Droit Int‘l, 248, 252 (2000); Julian D. M. Lew Comparative
International Commercial Arbitration, 723, (2003); Pierre Lalive, Transnational (or Truly International) Public
Policy and International Arbitration, in Comparative Arbitration Practice And Public Policy In Arbitration,
ICCA Congress Series No. 3, 295, Pieter Sanders ed., 2005. 15 Report of the Committee E/2704, Annex, page 2.
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distinctly contrary to the basic principles of the legal system of the country where the award
is invoked.16
In one of the leading commentaries, it has been suggested on Article V(2)(b) that:
The provision certainly refers to international public policy, and not
domestic public policy. Not every breach of a mandatory rule of the host
country could justify refusing recognition or enforcement of a foreign
award. Such refusal is only justified where the award contravenes
principles which are considered in the host country as reflecting its
fundamental convictions, or as having an absolute, universal value.17
Some of the most arbitration-friendly countries, such as France, make clear in their domestic
legislation how public policy for the purpose of recognising and enforcing foreign arbitral
awards should be interpreted. Article 1514 of the 2011 French Arbitration Reform states
that:
Les sentences arbitrales sont reconnues ou exécutées en France si leur
existence est établie par celui qui s'en prévaut et si cette reconnaissance
ou cette exécution n'est pas manifestement contraire à l'ordre public
international (emphasis added).18
Furthermore, some authors have suggested that the application of domestic public policy
should be performed under the limitation driving from international concepts. It has been
observed in this respect that:
Although Article V(2)(b)'s public policy exception focuses on national
public policy, the structure and objectives of the New York Convention
(and other international arbitration instruments) should be interpreted as
imposing some limits on Contracting States' applications of national
public policy. The Convention's structure and objectives argue strongly
against the notion that Contracting States would be free to effectively
repudiate their obligations under Articles III and V by means of reliance
on parochial local public policies, without international limitation. It
would, for example, make no sense to interpret Article V(2)(b) as
permitting a Contracting State to require that all disputes be resolved in
local courts or in accordance with local substantive laws or local
procedural rules; equally, it would make no sense to interpret Article
V(2)(b) as allowing a Contracting State to forbid the arbitration of tort
claims or future disputes. In each case, these national law rules would
16 Reinmar Wolff, Grounds for refusal of Recognition and Enforcement, Public Policy, in ―New York
Convention‖, Reinmar Wolff ed., at page 403 17 Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage (eds), Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial
Arbitration, 1999, at page 995 18 Décret n° 2011-48 du 13 Janvier 2011 Portant Réforme de L'arbitrage
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essentially annul a Contracting State's ratification of the Convention and
cannot have been intended.19
In the international context, an attempt to identify the provisions of public policy has been
made by the International Law Association in its Recommendations on the Application of
Public Policy as a Ground for Refusing Recognition or Enforcement of International
Arbitral Awards (hereinafter referred to as the ―ILA Recommendations‖).20
The ILA Recommendations suggest that the finality of awards rendered in the context of
international commercial arbitration should be respected save in exceptional circumstances
and that such exceptional circumstances may, in particular, be found to exist if recognition
or enforcement of the international arbitral award would be against international public
policy. According to letter 1(d) of the ILA Recommendations:
the international public policy of any State includes: (i) fundamental
principles, pertaining to justice or morality, that the State wishes to
protect even when it is not directly concerned (ii) rules designed to serve
the essential political, social or economic interests of the State, these
being known as “lois de police” or “public policy rules” and (iii) the duty
of the State to respect its obligations towards other States or international
organisations.
Finally, it should be noted that public policy is a developing concept which, as such, is likely
to give rise to different outcomes in different times. As stated by the Court of Appeal in
New Zealand:
Even within any given common law country the courts cannot by the
doctrine of precedent stereotype public policy; what was once the rule
need not be accepted as required by current conditions … “Since public
policy reflects the mores and fundamental assumptions of the community,
the content of the rules should vary from country to country and from era
to era.” This does not mean that prior decisions based on public policy as
judicially conceived at the time are lightly to be abandoned and the issue
automatically approached anew. I think it means rather that the court
should not automatically assume that past public policy is sacrosanct.
Changes in society or attitudes prevailing internationally may show that
apprehensions once seen as real and weighty are obviously no longer
so.21
19 Gary Born , International Commercial Arbitration, 2009, page 2837 20 Available at www.ila-hq.org. 21CBI v. Badger Chiyoda, [1989] 2 NZLR 669, at 674 as quoted in Article V(2) Dirk Otto and Omaia Elwan, in
Herbert Kronke, Patricia Nacimiento, et al. (eds), ―Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: A
Global Commentary on the New York Convention‖,2010at page 367.
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7. More favourable provisions available outside the
convention
The so-called pro-enforcement bias of the Convention is also enhanced by making sure that
the application of the Convention does not prevent the application of international or
domestic legislative instruments providing for a more favourable legislative regime.
Article VII provides that the application of the Convention should not affect:
[…] the validity of multilateral or bilateral agreements concerning the
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards entered into by the Contracting
States nor deprive any interested party of any right he may have to avail himself
of an arbitral award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the law or the
treaties of the country where such award is sought to be relied upon.
The late Professor Philippe Fouchard described this provision as:
„the treasure, the ingenious idea‟ of the convention that ensured its durability while
permitting states and judges to improve upon it.”22
Conclusion
The fact that the New York Convention, despite having been around for more than fifty
years, is attracting increasing interest is testament on one hand to the fact that international
arbitration is growing and on the other that a deeper, common understanding of its
provisions is desired. What seems particularly necessary in that respect is an informed
understanding of the mechanics of the Convention which are behind the Convention‘s
remarkable success.
The Convention, on one hand imposes a general obligation to recognise and enforce arbitral
awards rendered abroad. On the other hand, it qualifies such a general obligation where
recognition and enforcement would clash with the core provisions of domestic law at the
place of enforcement. Domestic laws, therefore, play an important role in the attainment of
the overarching goals of the Convention.
22 Philippe Fouchard, Suggestions pour accroître l‟efficacité internationale des sentences arbitrales, Rev. Arb. 653,
663 (1998) as quoted by Emmanuel Gaillard in Article VII And The Relationship Of The New York Convention
With Other Treaties And With Domestic Law As Regards The Recognition And Enforcement Of Foreign
Awards, in ―Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and International Arbitral Awards The New York
Convention 1958 in Practice‖, Emmanuel Gaillard and Domenico Di Pietro (eds) 2008.
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Domestic legislators and domestic courts should exercise their powers in that regard bearing
in mind the role played by arbitration in international business and the expectations of all
international business people and entities that States will respect their reliance on arbitration
as the preferred and necessary means for the fair and neutral resolution of international
disputes.
―Human progress is neither automatic nor inevitable... Every step toward the goal
of justice requires sacrifice, suffering, and struggle; the tireless exertions and
passionate concern of dedicated individuals.‖
― Martin Luther King Jr.
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Salient Features of
Apartment Ownership Law
Mahanil Prasantha De Silva, LLM (Aberdeen)
High Court Judge of the Provincial High Court,
North Western Province.
The law applicable to the property in Sri Lanka is non-statutory Common Law based on a
mixture of the principles of Roman Dutch Law. In terms of Roman Dutch Law, a person
who owns a piece of land, owns not only the surface of land but also an unlimited space
above it and the surface underneath to the center of the earth. Therefore it is submitted that a
person who owns a piece of land, owns all the land underneath it and all the space over it,
thus structures and plantations acceded to the soil and endured to the benefit of the owner of
the soil, according to the maxim superficies Solo cedit. This law did not allow separate
ownership of parts of a building.
The said principle was decisively abrogated by statute. The apartment ownership Act of
1973, which was introduced repealing the Condominium Property Act No. 12 of 1970.
The significant innovation introduced by the apartment ownership law No. 11 of 1973,
which enables private ownership of certain parts of a building by individuals, while other
parts of the same building are treated as owned in common, in apartment ownership
schemes.
In terms of the Sri Lankan Apartment Ownership Act, any person claiming to be an owner
of a condominium property, semi condominium property or provisional condominium
property shall make an application to the Registrar for the registration of a plan of the
condominium property1.
Upon the registration of the condominium plan or the semi condominium plan or provincial
condominium plan, the owner of any condominium parcel(Apartment) of the condominium
property shall be deemed to be the owner of his parcel and his share in the common
elements, subject to the encumbrances, if any registered or notified in the relevant register2.
1 Sec. 3, Apartment Ownership (Amendment) Act No. 39 of 2003. 2 ibid, Sec. 7
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In this instance a person can acquire a title or interest or benefit in any condominium
property, if such title or interest or benefit is registered under the provisions of Registration
of Title Act No. 21 of 1988.
When a person becomes an owner of a condominium parcel, in an apartment ownership
scheme, he enters into a threefold relationship, thus first he acquires the ownership or the
title of the condominium parcel (Apartment) second, he becomes the joint or the common
owner of the land and parts of the building pertaining to the common property and third, he
becomes a member of the owners association named as the management corporation. As
such, the legal rules applying to the Apartment Ownership Law, straddle with the law of
property and also with the law of association.
It is to be noted that when an owner becomes a member of the management corporation, he
continues to be a member until the apartment is alienated or the management corporation is
dissolved. Consequently, no owner can rescind his membership from the management
corporation, thus a member is compelled to corporate in the management and has an
obligation to share the expenses of the apartment ownership scheme. It shows that becoming
a member of the management corporation is not voluntary but obligatory.
Management Corporation as an Organ Which Enforces
Obligations
After registering the condominium plan, the owners of the condominium parcels, shall
become a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal and shall be called
the management corporation3. One of the most important functions of the management
corporation is to establish a management fund for the purpose of controlling, managing and
administering the common elements to pay rent, rates premium of insurance and to
discharge any other obligations of the management corporation4. Funds can be raised by the
contributions levied by the corporation and paid by the owners proportionately to their share
of the condominium parcel and also fines, interest, penal charges, premiums, reconnection
charges and deposits levied by corporation and paid by the owners. Apart from the
management fund, the management corporation shall establish a sinking fund for the
purpose of emergency expenses of any major repair to the common elements or discharge
any other similar obligations of the corporation5.
An apartment owner can use his apartment exclusively and the common property or
common elements are designed to be used collectively by all the apartment owners. The
apartment owner has greater rights to use and enjoy in respect of his apartment than a
3 Apartment Ownership (Amendment) Act No. 45 of 1982, Apartment Ownership (Amendment) Act No. 39 of
2003, s20 B(1) 4 ibid, 45 of 1982. , S 20B(1). 5 ibid, s 20H(1).
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common property. The Apartment Owner is mostly considered master of his Apartment, as
such the cost of maintaining the apartment rests with the owner, but the up keeping and
maintenance of the common property depends on the management cooperation with the
contributions of all the apartment owners. Therefore it can be construed, that an apartment
owner can alter, decorate or equip his apartment according to his own taste. However the
alterations should not cause a risk of damage to the structure of the building6.
In addition to the common law restrictions, the Apartment Ownership Act has imposed the
following restrictions on the use and enjoyment of an apartment.
Firstly, the apartment owner is compelled to repair and maintain the apartment and keep it in
a state of good repair.
Secondly, he has to permit the management corporation, at all reasonable times and on
reasonable notice being given to enter his apartment for the purpose of inspecting the
apartment to ensure that the rules of the scheme are complied with.
Thirdly, apartment owner must forthwith carryout all work ordered by any government,
public or statutory authority in respect of his apartment, apart from such work for the benefit
of the building he has to pay all assessment charges and outgoings which are payable in
respect of his apartment7.
If these obligations are not fulfilled by an apartment owner, he violates the rules of the
scheme thus perpetrating a wrong doing for which he has to face the consequences.
Therefore it is submitted that according to the aforesaid by laws apartment owners right to
use and enjoyment of his apartment is constrained.
Further to the above mentioned restrictions, an apartment owners has to use his rights, when
enjoying and using his apartment with due consideration for the rights of the other apartment
owners in the scheme. In the same way an apartment owner cannot exercise his rights in a
manner, which cause any inconvenience or annoyance to the other legal occupiers of the
scheme.
Moreover, the following by laws came into effect thereby restricting the rights of the
apartment owner. Part two of the second schedule of the Act states;
1. An apartment owner shall not use his apartment for any purpose illegal or
otherwise which may be injurious to the reputation of the building. For an example,
owner may not be allowed to convert his residential apartment to a commercial
apartment to set up a health centre or a betting center or a liquor shop in his
apartment.
2. An apartment owner shall not use inflammable substance or material which may
cause smoke or fumes or obnoxious smell; throw or allow to fall any refuse or
6 ibid, s 20H(3A) 7 Part 1, 2(B), Ibid, Act No. 45 of 1982.
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rubbish of any description on the common elements or any part thereof. In this
instance, despite the real owner being able to collect garbage in his garden to
destroy it by burning or make compost, an apartment owner is not allowed to use
the common property for the said purpose.
3. Under the by-laws, an apartment owner should not rear any animal in his apartment
or the common property which may cause annoyance to any other occupant thus he
is restricted in keeping pets according to his whims and fancies.
The effectiveness of an apartment ownership scheme will rest or constitute upon the
necessary co-operation and support of the apartment owners in complying with their social
and financial obligations imposed upon them. As such without complying with these
obligations can the apartment owners enjoy their concurrent rights? If the financial
obligations are not complied with, can the management body maintain and effectively
administer the scheme? In such a situation what would happen to the stability of the
building?
The success of an Apartment Ownership scheme will depend on the mutual understanding
and the necessary co-operation of its members in complying with these obligations. If not
the efficient procedures for the enforcement of financial and social obligations are a
condition sine qua non of a successful scheme.
Recovery of money due to the Management Corporation
The management corporation can recover all the levy contributions assessed against the
parcel (Apartment) owner in accordance with his quota8. Apart from these levies, any
expenses incurred by the management corporation for performing any repairs, work or act
also can be recovered from owner as well as the prospective purchaser9. All these levies can
be claimed as a civil debt in an action in ay court of competent jurisdiction10
. The crucial
question is whether this measure of enforcement is practicable to the management or
administration of the scheme.
(a) A charge on the condominium parcel (Apartment) for outstanding
contributions.
However the management corporation is not given any protection in the case of an
apartment owner being unable to pay his contributions. For this purpose the Act has created
an automatic lien in favour of the management corporation against the condominium parcel.
8 ibid, s 20A (2) (c ) 9 ibid, s 20(c )(5) 10ibid, s 20C (7)
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Where any contribution is levied or any amount is to be recovered by the management
corporation a written demand has to be sent to the apartment owner. If the owner fails to
comply with the written demand, within 14 days of the date of such demand, the
contribution or amount including any interest due thereon shall constitute a first charge on
the condominium parcel in favour of the management corporation11
. In this instance the
management corporation becomes a registered mortgagee and has the power of selling the
apartment and recovering the money due.
It is interesting to note that the management corporation cannot proceed to sell the
condominium parcel unless, a special resolution has been passed by the management
corporation to have the condominium parcel sold; a notice of the intended sale has to be
published once, in one or more daily newspapers; during the period of six weeks after the
date of such publication, if no payment has been made for the amount of contribution
including any interest thereon due and cost of publication as well as any other incidental
charges, and there is no legal action pending in court to restrain the management corporation
proceeding with the sale, the management corporation can proceed with the sale12
.
(b) Liability of purchaser on transfer of the condominium parcel.
The management corporation is empowered to recover the outstanding contributions from
the owner as well as the prospective purchaser. According to this section any arrear levies
can be recovered from the successor to the title that is the prospective purchaser. Thus in the
absence of a provision of an embargo on alienation, this section by providing for recourse
against a purchaser, protects the management corporation effectively against non- payment
of levies by the seller of a condominium parcel.
It appears to be that the Legislatures have not intended to place a provision of embargo on
alienation, thus this remedy is only effective if the parcel is not heavily mortgaged and the
former owner has sufficient funds left over after the sale, to pay off the arrears.
Under section 20 C (6) of the Apartment ownership Act, the prospective owner can make a
requisition to inquire about the amount recoverable by the management corporation. In this
instance if the management corporation certifies that no amount is recoverable or fails to
reply to the requisition, prospective owner is not liable to pay any amount.
This provision is advantageous from the point of the management corporation, as no room
has been kept for any owner or the prospective purchaser to creep from evading the liability.
But on the other hand is it reasonable to recover levies from the prospective owner after
paying the purchase price to the former owner who is responsible for the liability?
11 ibid, S 20H(5) 12 ibid, S20J(2)
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(c) The powers to disconnect the supply of services.
the powers of the management corporation regarding the enforcement of obligations have
been widened by the recent amendment of the Act authorizing to disconnect the supply of
services such as water, electricity or any other utilities provided to the individual
condominium parcel through the management corporation, by the National Water Supply
and Drainage Board, the Ceylon Electricity Board or any local authority or any other
authority or licensee, if the owner of the condominium parcel fails to pay any of the amounts
demanded. In this instance, in fairness to the owner, Management Corporation must make
sure that the discontinuance of such services would not affect the health of the occupants in
the parcel.
It is to be noted that the management corporation could proceed to disconnect such supplies
by passing a special resolution approving the discontinuance of such service and also giving
fourteen days‘ notice of the intended discontinuance along with the copy of the resolution so
passed, and parcel sent by registered mail to the owner of the particular condominium
parcel.
This is a welcome amendment to the Act, since the absence of a provision in this nature in
the earlier Act created a lacuna in the law in relation to the effective enforcement of
financial obligations.
Albeit, it appears to be strict provision, as the management corporation has been given wide
powers to disconnect the main services such as water and electricity on the failure of the
owner to pay any of the amounts demanded, under section 20 H of the Act. Therefore it is
needless to say that if this provision is enforced in its true spirit it would have the effect of
effective enforcement of financial obligation as no one would like to live without water and
electricity supply.
The role of the Condominium management authority with
regard to the enforcement of obligations
Apart from the above mentioned measures, which are stipulated in the Apartment
Ownerships Act in respect of the enforcement of financial obligations, in terms of the
common Amenities Board (amendment) Act No. 24 of 2003, has established a public
authority called the condominium management authority, for the control management,
maintenance and administration of the condominium property.
The object of the authority has been mentioned in the Act which ensures that the
management corporation of the Condominium property is properly functioning13
, managing
and thus administer the activities of the management corporation in its functions.
13 Common Amenities Board (Amendment) Act No. 24 of 2003, S5.
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The condominium management authority is empowered to exercise powers to recover levy
fees or charges for the services rendered by the authority; recover any premium from owners
in proportion to their interest in the condominium management authority; recover from any
person including an owner, expenses incurred in making good any damage caused by him to
the common amenities or common elements of the condominium parcels; providing to any
condominium management parcel, any series including its refurbishment, repair and
maintenance at the request of the management corporation or owner, occupier of the
condominium management parcel and levy charges. Therefore it is a duty of the
condominium management authority to undertake to control maintain, manage and
administer the common elements and common amenities, where the authority is satisfied
that the owner or owners or the management corporation are incapable of properly,
maintaining or administrating the same14
.
In terms of the Act, the authority is empowered to inquire into the activities and the financial
stability of the management corporation on its own motion or on the application of a
majority of the member of the management corporation or of not less than one third of the
owners of the condominium parcels of condominium property15
.
In addition to the powers vested in the authority, monies due to the authority can be
recovered from the owner of a parcel. In this instance, a certificate has to be issued by the
general manager stating the sum of money, which is due to the authority, before a District
Court16
. The Court shall issue an Injunction restraining the acts specified in section 15(A) of
the Act and shall direct a writ of execution to be issued to the fiscal authorizing and
requesting him to seize and sell or any of the property movable and immovable of such
person as may be necessary for the recovery of dues.
The recent amendment has been introduced as a method of recovery of money liable to be
paid to the authority by a person, out of the remuneration of such person. This method of
recovery can be exercised by an employee of the government service, judicial service or any
corporate body17
.
It is to be noted that as a measure of enforcing the financial obligations, the Act stipulates,
―Every employer who contravenes any of the relevant provisions of section 15, shall be
guilty of an offence and shall on conviction after summary trial before a magistrate, be liable
to a fine not exceeding ten thousand rupees or to imprisonment of either description for
period not exceeding one year as to both such term and imprisonment.‖
It is apparent that the Condominium management authority is empowered to settle disputes
between the management corporation and the owner or owners and occupier or purchaser or
owner and mortgagee or mortgagees and the Condominium parcel of the Condominium
14 ibid, S,6 15 ibid, S,9. 16 ibid, S,15. 17 ibid, S, 15B(1)
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property, thus the Condominium management authority is functioning as a tribunal to
resolve the disputes between the parties18
.
Conclusion
Due to the foregoing reasons, establishing Condominium management authority would no
doubt strengthen the procedures laid down in the Apartment Ownership Act with regard to
the enforcement of obligations.
Apparently the Apartment Ownership Act does not provide stringent or harsh measures with
regard to the enforcement of obligations. The measures provided by the Act seems to be
adequate for the time being, with regard to the effective enforcement of obligations, since
there have not been major disputes in apartment ownership schemes up to now.
By and large the provisions enumerated in the apartment Ownership Statute can be applied
practicably with regard to the enforcement of financial obligations. It is desirable to
introduce provisions to forestall the problems likely to arise in this field, neglect to do so
may lead to many complications.
―Justice will not be served until those who are unaffected are as outraged as those who are.‖
― Benjamin Franklin
18 ibid, S,6(M)
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Combating Torture in Sri Lanka
Through International Human Rights Law
M. Elancheleyan, LL.B (Col), LL.M (Col), LL.M(Hongkong)
High Court Judge, Kalmunai
Introduction
In Sri Lanka, Torture is not only the violation of fundamental rights under Art 11 of the
Constitution (1978), but also a Criminal Offence under the Torture Act. No: 22 of 1994. The
Supreme Court has sole Jurisdiction to hear the Violations of torture under Art 11 read with
Art 126 (2) of the Constitution. The Court of Appeal shall have the jurisdiction to refer the
matter of infringement of fundamental rights to Supreme Court for determination under Art
126(3) of the Constitution. The High Court has jurisdiction to hear the offence of torture
under the Torture Act No.22 of 1994.
Ratification of International Human Rights Convention By
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka has acceded to the covenant on Civil and Political Rights on the 11th of June,
1980, and acceded Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment on the 3rd of January, 1994. Sri Lanka has enacted Legislation
Torture Act No. 22 of 1994. Sri Lanka has acceded the Optional Protocol to the covenant on
Civil and Political rights in 1997. In Banda Vs S.I.Gunaratne1 Justice Amarasinghe has
analyzed the UN Convention against Torture with Torture Act No. 22 of 1994 Sri Lanka.
Justice Amarasinghe stated that
"Judicial Condemnation and the imposition of sanctions by way of requiring transgressors
to personally contribute toward compensation assessed by the Court as being just and
1 [1995] 1 S.L.R. Page. 244
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equitable in the hope that other persons may be deterred from violating Art 11 of the
Constitution has meant very little. The Court's sense has been openly expressed.............I
had in Saman Vs Leeladasa [1989] 1 SLR 1 at pp-42-43 raised doubts about the
appropriateness and effectiveness of awarding compensation as a punitive measure ....I am
of the view that a comprehensive approach must be adopted if satisfactory results are to be
achieved. Art 2.1 of the United Nations Convention on Torture, which entered into force for
Sri Lanka with effect from 2nd February,1994, requires the state to take "effective
Legislative, administrative, Judicial, or other measures to prevent acts of torture. Sri Lanka
has enacted Legislation (Act No.22 of 1994) making 'torture' an offence. The united Nations
Convention stresses the need for education and certain procedural steps the state should
adopt"
Torture in Sri Lanka
Introduction
The constitution of Sri Lanka (1978) declares the provisions of fundamental rights in chapter
III. The prohibition of torture is guaranteed under Art 11 of the constitution. Art 11 of the
constitution reads as follows:
―No person shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment‖.
Justiciability
Art 17 of the constitution refers the legal remedy under Art 126 of the constitution, in
respect of the infringement or imminent infringement by ―Executive or Administrative
action‖. It is justiciable. Art 17 interprets that the violation of fundamental rights guaranteed
under the constitution shall be inquired by the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka under Art 126.
Velmurugu Vs AG. Sharavananda J2 (Minority judgment) held ―this court has been
constituted as the protector and guarantor of fundamental rights against infringement by
state action of such right‖
Ratification of international human rights conventions
Sri Lanka ratified the ICCPR and optional protocol in 1980 and 1997 respectively. Sri Lanka
has ratified the Convention against Torture and enacted the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Act No.22 of 1994 Sri Lanka.
2 Velmurugu Vs AG. 1981, SLR 406 at 422 cited in justice S. Sharavananda, fundamental Rights in Sri Lanka (A
commentary) Sri Lanka 1993 page 20
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Sri Lanka parliament has enacted the Torture Act in 1994. Any person who tortures any
other person shall be guilty of an offence, trial by the High Court.
Sect. 2 (4) of the Act clearly indicates that a person guilty of an offence under this Act shall,
on conviction after trial by the high court be punishable with imprisonment of either
description for term not less than seven years and not exceeding ten years and fine.
Sect. 2 of the Act states that ―offence was committed on an order of a superior officer or
public authority shall not be a defense to such offence‖.
Invoking international and regional human rights conventions
Sri Lankan appellate courts have invoked international human rights convention, and
regional human rights conventions.
In Velmurugu Vs AG3 Sharavananda J referred to the following comment of the European
Commission on Human Rights in the Greek case.
―There are certain inherent difficulties in the proof of allegations of torture or ill-treatment.
First, a victim or a witness able to corroborate his story might hesitate to describe or reveal
all that has happened to him for fear of reprisals upon himself or his family. Secondly, acts
of torture or ill – treatment by agents of the police without witnesses and perhaps without
the knowledge of higher authority. Thirdly, where allegations of torture or ill- treatment are
made, the authorities, whether the police or armed services or the ministries concerned must
inevitably feel that they have a collective reputation to defend, a feeling which would be all
the stronger in those authorities that had no knowledge of the activities of the agents against
whom the allegations are made in consequence, there may be reluctance of higher authority
to admit or allow inquiries to be made into facts which might show that the allegation are
true. Lastly traces of torture or ill-treatment may, with Lapse of time, become
unrecognizable, even by medical experts, particularly where the form of torture itself leaves
fear external marks (Vide Journal of Universal Human Rights Vol-1, No.4, Oct –Dec 1979
of page 42).
In the case of P.Balasekeram Vs O.I.C Joossp Army camp and others4 S.N. Silva CJ held;
―The United Nations Declaration on Torture adopted by the General Assembly in December
1975, the Convention Against Torture adopted in December 1984, and Sect. 12 of Act No
22 of 1994 being the law enacted by parliament to give effect to the convention, define the
actus reus of the offence of torture as ―any act which causes severe pain whether physical or
mental…..‖.
3 1981 ISLR 406 at 438 4 S.C. (FR) Application No 547/98
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The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka has delivered judgment in Sirisene Cooray Vs Tissa
Bandaranayake,5 justice Dheeraratne used Art 21(1) of the UDHR to support the view that
the right to take part in the governance of one‘s country was as important as any of the other
rights.
Act 27 (15) of the constitution was referred in the Weerawansa Vs AG6 and supreme court
held that the state must afford the benefits of international law to its citizens in the case of
illegal detention.
I dealt with preventive detention during public emergency in the case of Vinayagamoothy
AAL (on behalf of Wimalendran) Vs. the Army Commander and Others.7 The police filed
the affidavit to the Court that the person has been involved with an offence of conspiracy of
association to kill the President of Sri Lanka. (President Premadasa)
The petitioner claimed that he was arrested on 2nd October 1993. However the law
enforcement officials stated that the petitioner was arrested on 29th October 1993. The
question was detention order for the disputed period. The Court believed the Amnesty
international report8 and finalized that the petitioner was arrested on 2
nd of October 1993.
The Prevention of Terrorism Act was passed by Parliament in 1978. In the case of
Pathmanathan Vs Sub.Inspector Paranagama, OIC, NIB Vavuniya and others9 the court
analyzed that the emergency regulation exempted the international organization. However
Sri Lanka Red Cross Society might not strictly fall within that provision. The organization is
involved with humanitarian assistance on behalf of government and the people of Sri Lanka.
The Court stated that the state has facilities ―To investigate, detect and prosecute crime‖
rather than to harassment of the petitioner.
Human rights committee
The human rights committee10
(1995 Sri Lanka) stated that the derogation of fundamental
rights during the emergency was not fulfilled the requirement of Art 4 of the ICCPR. The
committee expressed its concern, that the Sri Lanka court has no power to review the
Emergency Regulation. The committee pointed out that the order of preventive detention
which is issued by secretary defense is violation of ICCPR. The Committee criticized that
the Government of Sri Lanka has not fulfilled the requirement of right to liberty in prisons
and other places of detention under the Article 10 of the Covenant.
5 1999 (SLR) cited Mario Gomez the supreme court in the 1990 controlling public power through the law. BASL
JOURNAL 2000 6 SC Appl.730/96, SC. Minutes of 3rd Aug -2000 7 1997, SLR pages-113 -140 8 Report of Amnesty international of Feb. 1994, entitled ―Balancing human rights and security, abuse of arrest and
detention powers in Colombo. 9 1999 2 SLR 225-240 10 Human rights committee, comments on Sri Lanka. U.N.Doc .CCPR/C/79/Add.56-1995
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Special Rapporteur and working group
The special rapporteur Nigel Rodley (1996) criticized that the Vijeyan Wimalendran11
was
detained unauthorized detention camp and person was not handed over to the Police custody
within twenty four hours. The detainee was tortured and blindfolded for the most of his
detention.
The special rapporteur Mr.Bacre waly N.Diaye12
(1997) stated in his Sri Lanka visit that
Emergency Regulation and the PTA allows incommunicado detention for one year and 18
months respectively without production before the Court.
The Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (1999) pointed out in its
report Sri Lanka13
that the detainees were detained in secret detention camps. The
government has not fully implemented the requirements of officially Gazetted detention
camps and Human Rights safeguards such as registers of the detainees, central register etc.
Habeas corpus
Art 141 of the Constitution of Sri Lanka refers the jurisdiction to issue writ of habeas corpus
before Court of Appeal and High Court of Sri Lanka.
In the landmark judgment of Leeda Violet and others Vs Vidana pathirana OIC, police
station Dikwella and others14
.S.N Silva J analyses with international law and other national
jurisdictions. Justice S.N.Silva refers Charter of justice of 1833 law of England, judgment of
inter-American Court of Human Rights, Human Rights Committee, United Nations
Commission on Human Rights Res-20 of 29th Feb 1980, working group to inquire into
enforced or involuntary disappearances and Indian judgment.
Deepika Udagama stated in her article15
that ―Sri Lanka‘s judiciary has consistently drawn
inspiration from India‘s activist judiciary and exposure to international human rights
standards and international criticism of Sri Lanka‘s human rights record appears to have
influenced the judiciary…..
11 Report of the special rapporteur Nigel Rodley 1996, para -625 12 Report of the Special Rapporteur Mr.Bacre Waly Ndiaye -1997/61-visit to Sri Lanka 13 Disappearance, working group on enforced or involuntary E/CN.4/1999/62-paras 3, 9,12 14 (1994) 3 Sri.L.R pages 377 -387 15 Deepika Udagama, Taming of the Beast: Judicial responses to state violence in Sri Lanka 11,
Harv.Hum.Rts.Journal 269 spring 1998 (www.Lexis.com)
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Jurisprudence on Fundamental Rights in Sri Lanka
a) Conflicting Interest between Art 126(2) and Art 126(3) of the
Constitution (1978) on the Question of Locus Standi
Art 126(2) of the Constitution provides that
"Where any person alleges that any such fundamental right or language right relating to such
person has been infringed or is about to be infringed by executive and administrative action,
he may himself or by an Attorney-at-Law on his behalf........
According to this provision Victim or an Attorney-at-Law on his behalf can file the action in
Supreme Court. It is amply proves in Somawathi vs. Weerasinghe and others16
It was held;
that where an application was filed by the Petitioner on behalf of her husband for violation
of Art 11 and 13 of the Constitution. In that case the majority held that Art 126(2) of the
Constitution, when construed according to the ordinary, Grammatical, natural and plain
meaning of its language, gives a right of complaint to the person affected or to his Attorney-
at-law and to no other person.
b) Conflicting Interest & Jurisdiction of Locus Standi Art.126(3)
Art 126(3) of the Constitution provides that "where in the course of hearing in the Court of
Appeal in to an application for orders in the nature of a writ of Habeas Corpus, Certiorari,
Prohibition, Procedendo, Mandamus or Quo warranto, it appears to such Court that there is
prima facie evidence of an infringement or imminent infringement of the provisions of
Chapter III or Chapter IV by a party to such application, such Court shall forthwith refer
such matter for determination by the Supreme Court."
Art 141 of the Constitution provides that the 'Habeas Corpus application can be filed by the
relatives of the person, who is under detention or disappeared. According to the Art 141 of
the Constitution, the relative of the defence or Corpora has the jurisdiction to file the habeas
corpus before the Court of Appeal. According to the Art 126(2) of the Constitution, Victim
or an Attorney-at-Law on his behalf has the jurisdiction to file infringement or imminent
infringement of fundamental right before Supreme Court. The Locus Standi and Jurisdiction
of the Court is very clear in Art 126(2) and Art 141 of the Constitution.
What is the philosophy behind that the Court of Appeal has to refer the matter for
determination to the Supreme Court under Art 126(3) that there is prime facie evidence of an
infringement or imminent infringement of fundamental right.
16 (1990) 2 Sri.L.R 121
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According to the Art 126(3) of the Constitution; the relatives of the defence or corpora is
entitled to receive the determination from Supreme Court through an application for orders
in the nature of a writ of habeas Corpus. It is amply proves in Shanthi Chandrasekaram's
Case17
in the course of hearing of the habeas corpus applications filed by three petitioners,
the Court of Appeal Considered that there was prime facie evidence of the infringement of
fundamental right of the Constitution and made the reference to the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court held ―that the defence had been arrested in violation of Art 13 (1) and 13 (2)
of the Constitution.
According to the Shanthi Chandrasekaram's Case, relatives have filed the action in Court of
Appeal under Art 141 of the Constitution and received the successful remedy from the
Supreme Court under Art 126(3) of the Constitution.
This is the main loophole and conflicting interest of Locus Standi of the fundamental rights
Petitions. According to the constitution there are two ways to receive remedy from
fundamental rights violation, (a) Victim or his Attorney-at -Law can file fundamental rights
petition.(Somawathi Case) (b) Relatives can receive remedy from Supreme Court under Art
126(3) of the Constitution.
What is the philosophy between Art 126(2) and Art 126(3) of the Constitution? In
Somawathi's Case (Supra) Art 126(2) of the Constitution is interpreted in very strict sense.
On the other hand Shanthi Chandrasekaram's Case (Supra) the intelligent Petitioner other
than the Victim received successful remedy from the Supreme Court under Art 126(3) of the
Constitution.
Judicial Activism in Sri Lanka
Indian Judiciary has established judicial activism in India. Justice Bagawathi and Justice
Krishna Iyer are the God-fathers of Judicial Activism in India. The Supreme Court of Sri
Lanka has established New birth of judicial activism in Sriyani Silva Vs Iddamalgoda and
others18
It was held ; that " the deceased detenu who was arrested , detained and allegedly
tortured and thereby died acquired a right under the constitution to seek redress from the
Court for violation of his fundamental rights. Hence where there is a casual link between
the death of a person and the process, which constitutes the infringement of such person's
fundamental rights anyone having a legitimate interest could prosecute that right in terms of
Art 126 (2) of the Constitution. There would be no objection in limine to the wife of the
deceased instituting proceedings in the circumstances of this case.
The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka has specifically indicated that "It could never be contended
that the right ceased and would be ineffective due to the intervention of the death of the
17 Shanthi Chandrasekaram Vs. D.B.Wijeyatunga and Others (1992) 2 Sri. L.R 293 18 [2003] 1 Sri. L.R pages 14 – 29
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person, especially in circumstances where the death in itself is the consequence of injuries
that constitute the infringement. If such an interpretation is not given it would result in a
preposterous situation in which a person who is tortured and survives could vindicate his
rights in proceedings before the Court, but if torture is so intensive that if results in death,
the right cannot be vindicated in proceedings before this Court. In my view a strict Literal
Construction should not be resorted to where it produces such an absurd result."
The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka has distinguished the Somawathie vs. Weerasinghe and
others19
with this instant case. It was held that; "In Somawathie's Case application was
made by the wife of the Virtual Complainant alleging the infringement of her hauband's
fundamental rights guaranteed by Art 11,13(1),13(2),13(5),13(6) of the Constitution. At the
time the said application was filed, he was in the Remand Prison Mahara. But this instant
Case the detainee (deceased) had died in Remand Prison."
Art 126(2) of the Constitution provided that the infringement or imminent infringement of
fundamental right, he may himself or by an Attorney-at-Law on his behalf files the action
before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka has established new
Jurisprudence through Judicial activism in Sriyani Silva Case.
Judicial Restraint
In Sriyani Silva (above) Case, Justice Edusuriya has delivered dissenting Judgment. Justice
Edusuriya has stated that "the International Convention Against Torture was ratified by Sri
Lanka in1994 where as the Constitution was promulgated in1978. It certainly cannot be said
that one can read into Art 126(2) of the Constitution of 1978 a Legislative intention in 1978,
to grant relief to a widow of a person whose fundamental rights have been infringed,
because Sri Lanka ratified the International Convention Against Torture sixteen years later
in1994, containing a provision to grant relief to dependants of victim of torture in the event
of the death of a victim as a result of torture."
Justice Edusuriya has delivered dissenting Judgment with Judicial restraint. Justice
Edusuriya has stated that ―the right to relief and the right to apply for relief are vested only
in the person whose fundamental rights have been infringed and are personal rights which
accrue to him and him alone , and therefore those rights must necessarily die with him."
Another land mark Judgment delivered by The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka in
Machchavallavan Vs. OIC, Army Camp, Trincomalee. It was held that "In Shanthi
Chandrasekaram's case20
in the course of hearing of the habeas corpus applications filed by
three Petitioners, the Court of Appeal considered that there was prima facie evidence of the
infringement of Art 11, 13(1) and 13(2)of the constitution and made reference to the
19 (1990) 2 Sri L.R. 121 20 (1992) 2 Sri. L.R.293
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Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the detainee had been arrested in violation of
Art 13(1) and had been detained in violation of Art 13(2)."
The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka has referred above-mentioned Case in the
Machchavallavan's case and delivered (1) There was prima-facie evidence of violation of
fundamental rights contrary to Art13(4) of the Constitution. (2) The Court of Appeal should
have referred the entire matter to the Supreme Court under Article 126(3). (3) As the
evidence showed that the corpora had been removed by the Army, the state was liable for
the acts of the army officers and the state could be ordered to pay compensation and costs, to
the appellant.
Judicial Revolution in Sri Lanka on Violation of Torture
Sri Lanka has ratified the ICCPR, ICESCR, CAT, CEDAW, CERD and CRC.
Sri Lanka Judiciary has created "the jurisprudence" in Art 13(4) read with Art 126 of the
Constitution of Sri Lanka. In Sriyani Silva Vs. Iddamalgoda, Officer-in-Charge, Police
Station, Paiyagala and others21
Justice Fernando held; (1) The deceased died of torture by
the Police and that prevented him from seeking relief personally under Art 126(2) (2) Art 11
and 13 (4) by necessary implication recognize the right to life. Hence if a person died by
reason of torture or unlawful death (by the executive) the right of any person to complain
against violation of a fundamental right guaranteed by Art 17 read with Art 126(2) , should
not be interpreted to make the right illusory, but Article 126(2) should be interpreted broadly
especially in view of Art 4(d) which requires the Court to 'respect, secure and advance'
fundamental rights. Fernando .J further stated that
"Art 11 guarantees freedom from torture and from cruel and inhuman treatment or
punishment. Unlawfully to deprive a person of life, without his consent or against his will
would certainly be inhuman treatment, for life is an essential pre-condition for being human.
In any event , if torture or cruel treatment or punishment is so extreme that death results, to
hold that no one other than the victim can complain will result in the same anomalies,
inconsistencies and justice, as in the case of Art 13 (4) and 17. Here, too Art 126(2) must be
interpreted expansively‖. Fernando.J held that; "Art-11[read with Art 13(4)] recognizes a
right not to deprive of life." Fernando.J further analyzed the International torture
Convention. Justice Fernando stated that "the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment provides that the
―Each state party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains
redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate Compensation, including the means
21 [2003] 2 Sri. L.R. 63 - 79
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for a full rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an
act of torture, his dependants shall be entitled to compensation."
This is the Landmark Judgment in Sri Lanka. Judicial activism and Judicial Revolution is
created by Justice Mark Fernando. Justice Mark Fernando has created "jurisprudence on
right to life through torture" in Sri Lanka. In another Judicial Revolution is established by
The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka in Lama Hewage Lal (Deceased) Rani Fernando (wife of
deceased Lal) and others Vs. Officer-in-Charge-Minor Offences, Seeduwa Police Station
and others22
The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka stated that Art 13(4) and in particular Art
126(2) of the Constitution should also be read widely to enable the lawful heirs and or
dependants to bring an action where death has occurred as a result of violation of Art 11.
The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka has invoked the International Human Rights Conventions
into its Judgment. The Court has referred that ―In Thomas vs. Jamaica23
where a Prisoner
who was awaiting execution was assaulted with a rifle butt and stabbed with a bayonet by
soldiers conducting a search of a prison. His clothes were also torn and were thrown back
into his cell. No Medical treatment was given to him. It was held by the UN Human Rights
Committee that the treatment to be degrading and contrary to Art 7 as well as Art 10 of
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,"
The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka has referred "the standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners. It was held: that there have been several International Covenants
and Declaration concerned with the rights of the Prisoners. The General Assembly
Resolution 43/174 of 9th December 1988 adopted the UN Body of Principles for the
Protection of All Persons under any form of Detention or Imprisonment.
The United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of offenders
had adopted the standard minimum rules for the treatment of Prisoners [adopted at the
Congress held in Geneva in 1955 and approved by the Economic, Social Council by its
resolution 663(c)(XXIV) of 31st July,1957 and 2076 (LXII) of 13th May 1997] , These
standard Minimum Rules refer to Discipline and Punishment.
The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka has concluded that the "Art 13(4) should be interpreted
broadly to mean that the said Article recognizes the right to life impliedly and that by
reading Art 13(4) with Art 126(2) of the Constitution which would include the lawful heirs
and /or dependants to be able to bring in an action in a situation where death had occurred as
a result of violation of Art 11 (Torture)‖.
In another Landmark Jurisprudence was established by The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka in
Machchavallavan vs. OIC, Army Camp Trincomalee24
, it was held; that " this Court must
consider the kind of relief that should be granted to the appellant. In a similar situation Dasai
22 [2005] 1 Sri.L.R. Pages 40-55 23 Communication No.366/1989 Views of UN Human Rights Committee, 2nd Nov. 1993 24 2005 1 Sri. L.R. Page 357
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J in Sebastian M. Hongray vs. Union of India25
had held that exemplary costs from the
respondents and permissible in such cases. The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka has specially
indicated that
―The Commanding Officer has the authority to arrest and to detain and was in overall charge
of such operations. In the circumstances, the state is responsible for the infringement of the
fundamental rights of the corpora governed in terms of Art 13(4) of the Constitution.
It is to be borne in mind that respect for the rights of individuals is the true Bastian of
democracy and state has to take steps to redress the infringement caused by its officers to the
Corpora.
Landmark principle was created in this case. The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka has stated in
its Judgment that "the Court of Appeal should have referred the entire matter for
determination to the Supreme Court under Art 126(3) of the Constitution"
The above mentioned Judgments have created Jurisprudence in fundamental rights in Sri
Lanka and further Sri Lankan Appellate Courts have freely invoked the International Human
Rights Conventions and Regional Human Rights Conventions in to the Domestic
Jurisdiction.
Compensation and Cost for Violation of Torture
The compensation and costs have been ordered by the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka for
violations of torture. Justice Mark Fernando has delivered the Judgment in Sanjeewa, AAL
[on behalf of G.M.Perera] Vs. Suraweera, OIC, Police Station, Wattala and others26
It was
held that; ―the duty imposed by Art 4(d) to respect, secure and advance fundamental rights
.........extends to all organs of Governments and the Head of the Police (The Inspector
General of Police) can claim no exemption......... A prolonged failure to give effective
directions designed to prevent violations of Art 11, and to ensure the proper investigation of
those which nevertheless take place followed by disciplinary or criminal proceedings, may
well justify the inference of acquiescence and condonation if not also of approval and
authorization." It was further held; (1) The Petitioner was subjected to torture and to cruel
and inhuman treatment. (2) The Petitioner is entitled to compensation for infringement of his
rights and further to re-imbursement of medical expenses attributable to torture. Justice
Mark Fernando has referred the International Convention into his Judgment. It was held that
" the Citizens have the right to choose between State and Private medical care, and in the
circumstances the Petitioner's wife's choice of the latter was not unreasonable and was
probably motivated by nothing other than the desire to save his life. Art 12 of the
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights recognizes the right to
25 (AIR) 1984 SC 1026 26 [2003] 1 Sri. L.R. 318 - 330
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everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health."(Page - 330). It is the highest amount of compensation and Medical Cost Ordered by
the Supreme Court in Sri Lanka. This is the Precedent Judgment for the compensation of
Torture Victims.
Conclusion
a) No State Defenders for Torture
Attorney- General is the state supreme Legal Officer to Indict, Prosecute and defend for
state. Torture is the Offence under Torture Act in Sri Lanka. Attorney-General has decided
to not to appear for perpetrators of Violation of Torture.
b) Torture as Criminal Offence
Sri Lankan Government has ratified the convention Against Torture and enacted Torture Act
in Parliament. Torture is not only violation of fundamental right under Art 11 of the
constitution but also it is punishable offence under the Torture Act No.22 of 1994.
The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka has emphasized the above mention Laws and Acts in
Kumara Vs. Silva, Sub-Inspector of Police, and Others27
. It was held that " It is to be noted
that Art 11 refers to torture separately from cruel, Inhuman or degrading treatment or
Punishment similarly to Art 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Art 7 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well as Art 3 of the European
Convention which had referred to torture separately from inhuman , degrading treatment or
punishment. The importance of the right to protection from torture has been further
recognized and steps had been taken to give effect to the universally accepted safeguards by
the Convention Against Torture And Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment signed in Newyork in 1984, which has been accepted in Sri Lanka by the
enactment of Act No.22 of 1994 on the Convention Against Torture And Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment."
The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka has further indicated that; ―thus it is evident that
notwithstanding the provision made in the constitution, regarding fundamental right on
freedom from torture , in terms of Act No.22 of 1994, torture is to be an offence and any
person who tortures any other person shall be guilty of an offence under the said Act."
27 [2006] 2 Sri.L.R. pages 236-252
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c) Compare the View of The Human Rights Committee Geneva & the
Supreme Court Judgment In Sri Lanka
In Jegatheeswara Sarma Case28
Human Rights Committee Geneva delivered its view that;
―Committee considers that, for purposes of establishing state responsibility, it is irrelevant in
the present case that the officer to whom the disappearance is attributed acted ultravires or
that superior officers were unaware of the actions taken by that officer. The Committee
therefore concludes that, in the circumstances, the state party is responsible for the
disappearance of the Author's son‖. When we compare the view of the Human Rights
Committee Geneva with The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka's Judgment in Machchavallavan's
Case29, The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka stated that ―the Commanding Officer has the
authority to arrest and to detain and was in overall charge of such operations. In the
circumstances the state is responsible for the infringement of the fundamental rights of the
Corpora governed in terms of Art 13(4) of the Constitution. It is to be borne in mind that
respect for the rights of individuals is the true bastian of democracy and state has to take
steps to redress the infringement caused by its Officers to the Corpora.
The view of the Committee of Sarma's Case is that the state is responsible for the
disappearance of the author's Son. In the Judgment of Machchavallavan's case is that the
state is responsible for the infringement of the fundamental rights of Corpora. The view of
the Human Rights Committee is not binding nature. However Judgment of Supreme Court
is binding.
A blind Justice is merely an impartial Justice. True Justice would have eyes in the back of
her head and a pair of mismatched shoes.‖
― Eli Ashpence
28 Views of the Human Rights Committee, in Comunication No.950/2000 (Sri Lanka - 31.07.2003)
CCPR/C/78/D/950/2000 29 Machchavallavan Vs. OIC, Army Camp, Trincomalee (2005) 1 Sri L.R. page 357
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Charge
Palitha Fernando, P.C. Former Attorney General
An accused before a Magistrate‘s court can be either convicted or acquitted of the
offence charged with, unless proceedings are terminated during the course of the trial.
However, a Magistrate is entitled to discharge an accused at any stage of a trial, and also
would be entitled to acquit an accused at any stage of the trial, if he is of the view that
proceeding with the case would not result in a conviction of the accused.1
Generally, an accused is either convicted or acquitted of the charges in the charge sheet.
There can however, arise a situation where the evidence led by the prosecution does not
establish the charges set out in the charge sheet, but sufficient evidence to convict the
accused of another charge is elicited by the prosecution. In such a situation, two courses of
action are available to the Magistrate:
1. Amend the charge sheet and convict the accused of the offence established by
evidence;
2. Convict the accused of the charge established, without amending the charge sheet.
Where a Magistrate wishes to amend the charge sheet, during the course of the trial, there
are several steps he is expected to take. The request for a suitable amendment can come
from the prosecutor. The Code of Criminal Procedure Act contains provisions permitting
such amendment.2 The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are clear that the court
should permit such amendment and the only consideration left to the discretion of court is
whether the trial should be proceeded with immediately thereafter or an adjournment or a
fresh trial should be ordered.3 In making such a decision court should consider the prejudice
such amendment could have on the accused and the prosecution. If however, Magistrate
forms the opinion that there is evidence to convict the accused for a different offence, at the
end of the trial, court should consider the prejudice that it would cause to the accused, Our
courts have always taken the view that an amendment which serves the cause of justice
should be permitted.4 The fact that the prosecutor has been negligent in framing the charge
has been held not to be a basis for refusing an amendment to an indictment.5 In the case of a
1 Section 186 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act 2 Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act 3 Sections 167 and 168 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act 4 Aron Appuhamy v. The Queen 51 NLR 358, Doole v. The State 1978/1979 2 SLR 33 5 Perera v. Weerasinghe 53 NLR 158
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charge sheet before a Magistrate‘s Court, it should be noted that the primary responsibility
for the accuracy of the charge is on the Magistrate. The complainant files a report before the
Magistrate‘s Court informing the Magistrate that an offence he could try summarily has
been committed within his jurisdiction. Thereupon, if satisfied the Magistrate is required to
frame the charges according to law.6
A Plaint filed before a Magistrate‘s Court is addressed to the Magistrate and signed by the
complainant. The charge sheet on the other hand is addressed to the accused and is signed by
the Magistrate. Therefore, it is the duty of the Magistrate to ensure that the charge is a
legally tenable charge. Though it has been held that where an accused appears in court after
the police filed a report stating the facts to court and the Magistrate explains the charge on
the basis of the report, the failure to frame a charge would not affect the legality of the
proceedings,7 our courts have consistently held the view that the Magistrate‘s failure to
frame a charge and sign it, is a fatal irregularity.8 In practice however, the complainant files
a charge sheet along with the plaint. This is a method adopted for the sake of convenience,
without any legal basis. Therefore it is necessary to bear in mind that it is the responsibility
of the Magistrate to have the charges read out and also to sign the charge sheet and file it of
record. It is customary for the complainant to mention the charges in the plaint. However, a
Magistrate is not required to follow the plaint in framing charges. Magistrates are perfectly
at liberty to refuse to issue process if they are not satisfied with the facts disclosed in the
plaint. In practice however, Magistrates sign the charge sheet filed with the plaint even
without reading the plaint. There is no alternative in view of the lack of time. In order to
overcome this situation, a useful method would be to appoint a legal registrar to every
Magistrate‘s court. The legal Registrar should be an Attorney at law, with around 2 years‘
experience, and it should be his function to attend to all calling cases before the Magistrate
and also fixing them for trial when the case is ready for trial. He should also examine all
plaints and approve them for the Magistrate‘s signature. He should recommend to the
Magistrate cases in which process should be refused.
I would recommend that every new recruit to the judiciary should serve as legal registrar for
a minimum of 18 months before appointment to the judiciary. In New South Wales Australia
there is a similar system where the officer is designated the listing judge. He attends to all
calling matters and fixes cases for trial and sends up the brief to the Judge who hears the
cases. No postponements are granted where a case is fixed for trial
Where the evidence led at the trial discloses the commission of a different charge, the
Magistrate is entitled to amend the charge and convict the accused of that charge. However,
if the amended charge requires the following of a special procedure before instituting
proceedings, then the trial cannot be proceeded with, without following that procedure. If for
6 Section 182 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act, see also Attoney General v. Baskaran 64 NLR 62, Rex v.
Rodrigo 55 NLR 49 7 Tennekoon v. Dahanayake 40 NLR 36 8 Abdul Sameen v. Bribery Commissioner 1991 1SLR 76,David Perera v. Attorney General 1997 1SLR 390,
Fernando v. Attorney General Srikantha‘s Law Reports, Vol. II Part 1 page 1, Godage and others v. OIC Kahawatte
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example the amended charge is one of furnishing false information to a public servant,
punishable in terms of section 175 of the Penal Code, since the institution of proceedings
need the sanction of the Attorney General,9 the trial will have to be postponed until such
sanction is obtained.
During the course of a trial, if a Magistrate decides to amend the charge, there are several
steps that have to be taken:
1. The amended charge should be read to the accused;
2. His plea to the amended charge should be recorded;
3. The Magistrate should decide whether he should proceed with the trial or a
postponement should be granted or a fresh trial should be ordered.
In a case of misappropriation, where the Magistrate found that the amount mentioned in the
charge as the amount misappropriated was different to the amount established as the
misappropriated amount disclosed by the evidence led at the trial and altered the charge to
read the correct amount and convicted the accused but did not read the amended charge to
the accused before proceeding to convict him. In appeal it was argued that it was a fatal
irregularity. However, court held that the alteration was not an amendment contemplated in
the section and held that the failure on the part of the Magistrate to read out the alteration to
the accused would not vitiate the conviction.10
The course of action discussed above is the step that could be taken by a Magistrate to
amend a charge sheet in order to fall in line with the evidence elicited during the course of
the trial where the evidence fails to establish the charge with which the accused is charged,
but establishes a different charge. That is to amend the charge sheet. However, the code of
Criminal Procedure Act also contains provisions that permit the finding of an accused guilty
in similar circumstances of a charge different from the one with which he was charged
without amending the charge sheet.11
The provisions of section 177 should always be read with the provisions of section 176 of
the Act. Section 176 provides for a situation where it is possible to have alternate charges in
a charge sheet. Section 176 provides for a situation where a single act or a series of acts are
of such a nature that it is doubtful what offence the facts proved would constitute since on
the proved facts it is possible that a court may find the accused guilty of more than one
offence. It would be extremely important to note that the provisions of section 176 will
apply only to a situation where there is a doubt about the offence of which the accused might
be found guilty and not the facts that the prosecution would be able to prove. The provisions
of section 176 cannot be utilised to prefer alternate charges where there is a doubt on the
facts the prosecution would be able to prove.12
9 Section 135 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act 10 Siyambalagastanne v. OIC Kandy 1998 1 SLR 78 11 Sections 177 to 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act 12 Salgdo v. Mudali Pulle 43 NLR 94
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When deciding to include alternate charges in a charge sheet, a prosecutor should first be
certain of the facts that could be established. Thereafter, on the basis of such facts, the
prosecutor should decide whether there is a doubt as to of what offence court might find the
accused guilty, if such facts are established. A simple example that could be cited is a case
where a person is found having in his possession stolen goods soon after a theft. The
prosecution should establish that the suspect was found having in his exclusive possession
stolen goods soon after the theft. However, there is a doubt as to the offence of which the
accused might be convicted by court. It could be of the offence of retention of stolen
property punishable in terms of section 394 of the Penal Code, or of the offence of theft
punishable in terms of section 367 of the Penal Code on the basis of a presumption drawn in
terms of section 114 of the Evidence Ordinance.
In view of this position the accused can be charged with theft or retention of stolen property,
or both charges could be included as alternate charges in the same charge sheet13
If the
accused is charged with theft and the evidence discloses that the offence committed by the
accused is retention of stolen property, court can convict the accused of the offence of
retention of stolen property on the basis that it was a charge that could have been preferred
against the accused as an alternate charge on the basis of the material in the possession of
the prosecution at the time the charges were framed. It should however be reiterated that
alternate charges are possible only where, on the available facts, it is doubtful as to the
offence of which the accused would be found guilty. If in the above example, in addition to
the property found in the possession of the accused there was evidence of finger prints of the
accused found at the scene, alternate charges of retention would not be possible as according
to the evidence, the only offence of which the accused could be found guilty would be theft.
Stolen goods would not be stolen property for the purpose of a charge of retention of stolen
property so long as they remain in the possession of the thief. It has been observed that
sometimes before the Magistrate‘s court, alternate charges of theft and retention are
preferred with the intention of giving the accused an opportunity of pleading guilty to a
charge of retention so that the charge of theft can be withdrawn. It should be mentioned that
this procedure is clearly wrong.
Yet another important matter that should be mentioned is that where an accused is charged
with alternative charges, he can be convicted only of one of them.14
The simple logic behind
it is that when alternate charges are preferred the prosecution proceeds on the basis that the
accused is guilty of one of those charges and not both.
In terms of section 177 of the Penal Code an accused charged with one offence can be
convicted of a different offence if that offence is one that could have been preferred against
the accused as an alternate charge with the original charge. If not, the correct course of
action would be to amend the charge sheet and add the new charge before convicting the
accused of it.
13 Section 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act 14 Wimalasena v. IP Hambantota 74 NLR 176, Stephen v. IP Fort 69 NLR 42, Rex v. Seymour 1 WLR 678
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Where an accused was charged with murder, during the course of the trial it was established
that he could be found guilty only of abetment. The accused was found guilty of abetment of
murder without amending the indictment. Court held that it was possible, as, according to
the facts of the case, it was possible to have a charge of abetment as an alternate charge. The
evidence of the case in the possession of the prosecution established that the accused abetted
the commission of the offence of murder and also the accused was present at the scene at the
time the offence was committed. In the circumstances, in terms of section 107 read with
sections 296 and 102 of the Penal Code, it was permissible for court to convict him either of
murder or abetment of murder.15
However, it has been held that a person indicted on a
charge of abetment of attempted murder cannot be convicted of voluntarily causing hurt
without an amendment to the indictment.16
It has also been held that a person charged with
causing hurt cannot be convicted of rioting in terms of this section,17
and that a person
indicted with murder cannot be convicted of disappearing evidence of a capital offence by
utilising the provisions of this section.18
In certain instances where Information Book Extracts in cases of rape are forwarded to the
Attorney General‘s Department for the consideration of indictments, State Counsel are faced
with a difficulty as the evidence on record does not clearly establish penetration or since
there is conflicting evidence between the prosecutrix and the Judicial Medical Officer on the
issue of penetration. In such instances it would not be permissible to forward indictment
having Rape and Grave Sexual abuse as alternate charges since the doubt is in respect of the
facts that could be proved by the prosecution. In a recent unreported case, the Court or
Appeal has set aside a conviction on the offence of Grave Sexual abuse of an accused
originally indicted with rape but convicted of Grave Sexual abuse, without an amendment to
the indictment.19
The Code of Criminal Procedure Act provides that when a person is charged with an offence
consisting of several particulars and when some of such particulars are established, it
constitutes a different offence, the accused could be convicted, without amending the charge
sheet, of the offence that is constituted when some of those particulars are proved.20
This
situation has been described as a situation where the offence proved is included in the
offence charged. Where an offence consists of several ingredients and where some further
ingredients are proved a different offence is established, these provisions could be utilised to
convict the accused of the offence which is established, without amending the charge sheet
even though the proof of additional ingredients would be required to convict the accused of
the offence with which he is charged. Some simple examples that could be cited are where
an accused is charged with the offence of public property or where an accused is charged
with Criminal Breach of Trust. In the first example, in addition to the ingredients of theft,
15 King v. Hendric Appu 7 NLR 97 16 Rex v. Dharmapala 67 NLR 450 17 King v. Mendis 39 NLR 182 18 Wellasamy v. The Queen 63 NLR 271 19 Gratien Perera v. The Attorney General, CA 88/2002, decided on the 19th of8 June 2007, see also Kankanamge
Upatissa v. The Republic CA 188/02 decided on 27th March 2008 20 Section 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act
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the prosecution should also establish that the property in question was public property. If
this ingredient is not established, it would be permissible for court to convict the accused of
the offence of theft, without an amendment to the charge sheet. In the second example, in
order to establish a charge of Criminal Breach of Trust, the prosecution would have to
establish the ingredients of Criminal misappropriation of property and in addition the
ingredient of entrustment.
If in a case where an accused is charged with Criminal Breach of Trust, the prosecution fails
to establish the ingredient of entrustment, court would be entitled to convict the accused of
the offence of Criminal Misappropriation of property without amending the indictment. In
both those instances court would be acting in terms of the provisions of section 178 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure Act.
The rationale of these provisions is that the accused had notice of the offence with which he
was convicted as it was included in the offence with which he was charged. It should
however be noted that it would not be possible to convict the accused of the offence which
requires the proof of additional ingredients, without amending the charge sheet. For
instances if an accused is charged with theft and during the course of the trial it is proved
that the property was in fact public property, it would not be possible to convict the accused
of theft of public property without amending the charge sheet.
Section 178 of the Code of Criminal procedure provides for yet another instance where a
court can convict an accused for a different offence other than the one with which he was
charged, without mending the charge sheet. That is where evidence of certain circumstances
that reduces the offence is led during the course of the trial, the accused can be convicted for
the reduced minor offence without amending the indictment. The provisions of this section
are quite frequently utilised in the High Court. It should be noted that Section 164(5) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure Act provides that the fact that a charge is made is equivalent to
a statement that every legal condition required by law to constitute the offence charged was
fulfilled in the case. Thus when an accused is indicted with murder, it is equivalent to a
statement that the death was caused intentionally in the absence of any of the mitigatory
circumstances such as provocation or private defence.
However, during the course of the trial, if evidence of circumstances that mitigate liability is
established, court would be entitled to convict the accused of the lesser offence without
amending the charge sheet. Where an accused is charged before the Magistrate‘s court with
having committed voluntarily causing grievous hurt, punishable in terms of section 317 of
the Penal Code and during the course of the trial, evidence is elicited to establish that the
offence was committed under provocation, court would be entitled to convict the accused of
an offence punishable in terms of section 326 of the Penal Code without amending the
charge sheet. However, if the offence, of which court is entitled to convict the accused on
the available evidence, is an offence in respect of which a special procedure has to be taken,
before the institution of proceedings, such as securing the sanction of the Attorney General,
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it would be necessary to follow such procedure before convicting the accused.21
Section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act provides that where a person is charged
with an offence and at the trial it is established that the offence was not committed but there
was only an attempt to commit the offence, it is possible to convict the accused of the charge
of attempt without an amendment to the charge sheet. A possible example would be a case
of cheating. Deception is an essential ingredient of the offence of cheating. If the victim on
whom the deception was attempted was not deceived, the offence would be attempted
cheating. A fact that should be noted is that the provisions of section 179 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure Act could be utilized only if attempt to commit the offence is an offence
in Sri Lanka. This however would not be applicable to offences punishable in terms of the
Penal Code, as attempt to commit any offence punishable in terms of the Penal Code is an
offence in Sri Lanka. Even if the Penal Code does not contain specific provisions in respect
of such offences section 490 of the Penal Code provides for the punishment of attempt to
commit all offences under the Penal Code.
Where a person is charged before a court, the duty of the prosecution is to lead evidence to
establish the ingredients of the offence. It is the duty of the Magistrate to consider whether
the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the ingredients of the offence beyond a
reasonable doubt. Failure to establish even one ingredient is fatal to the prosecution and the
Magistrate should acquit the accused without even calling for a defence.22
However, as
discussed earlier, even though, the evidence led, fails to establish the ingredients of the
offence with which the accused is charged, if it establishes the ingredients of any other
offence, the Magistrate should consider whether he should amend the charge sheet, or
whether it is possible for him to convict the accused of the offence disclosed, without
amending the charge sheet. What I have attempted above is to discuss the provisions of law
that would be applicable in such a situation.
21 Section 178 (2) read with section 135 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act 22 Nallarakku Pillai v. Khaleel 72 NLR 114, Mahafoor v. S de S Gunasekera Healh Inpector 60 NLR 286, Weerai v.
Samarakoon 62 NLR 212, Ariyaratnam v. SI Police 62 NLR 451, Kachcheri Mudaliyar v. Mohomadu 21 NLR 369
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A Fundamental Insight Into
Criminal Appeals and
Essential Principles of Law
To Be Followed By Trial Judges
Dr. Ranjit Fernando
Attorney-at-Law
The writer, who does not claim to be a “Jack of all Trades” and certainly not a “Master of
One”, will attempt a fundamental insight into two main areas of Criminal Jurisprudence he
may be familiar with, namely: criminal appeals and matters of law, to be borne in mind by
Judicial Officers conducting criminal trials.
Criminal Appeals
AN APPEAL is a procedure by way in which you can seek a remedy, redress or relief if
one is unhappy or dissatisfied with an Order, one has been subject to. It is a fair process and
the law recognizes it to be so. Without this process of appeal, individual rights can be
subject to unfairness, unreasonableness or sometimes even genuine mistakes of human
beings, who are not infallible. Human beings make mistakes not one but many. It is for this
reason that sometimes there is more than a single right of appeal in a given situation. It is
normally the practice in the law of any land to afford a litigant a Right of Appeal whether it
is in any civil or criminal matter. It is also observed that in serious matters where the life and
liberty of an individual is involved there are provisions for more than one Appeal; primarily
to ensure that eventually justice and fair play will prevail. This type of facility helps to
ensure the compliance of the maxim ―Justice should not only be done but must appear to be
done”.
In Sri Lanka we have various stages where the Right of Appeal is given to
litigants. During the time prior to becoming a Republic we had a Right of Appeal where the
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Law Lords of the U.K. sat in final judgment over matters referred to it by Common Wealth
Countries. After the Republican Constitution the Right of Appeal to the Privy Council was
done away with and the final Appeal was before the most superior court in Sri Lanka having
the jurisdiction to entertain criminal appeals. However it must be remembered that
judgments of Privy Council cases relevant to Sri Lanka are still binding and are being
followed by the Courts to date.
Appeal Procedure itself very broadly takes the form of two types of applications,
i.e. Judgment or an Order of a court can be changed in part or in whole by a superior court,
either by way of a ―Regular‖ Appeal or by way of an application for Revision. One must
remember that an Appeal lies to a superior court and there is no Right of Appeal to a court
of same jurisdiction and power.
Appeals take one of two forms. It can be a “Regular Appeal” or it can be in the
form of a “Revision” Appeal. Regular Appeals are opportunities given to litigants as of
right. E.g. If a person is dissatisfied with an Order of a High Court, he is given the right to
appeal against such an Order to the Court of Criminal Appeal. The Petition of Appeal must
be lodged with the High Court Registry within 14 days of the date of the order appealed
against. The Petition should be addressed to the Court of Appeal although lodged with the
High Court Registry. The Appeal can be on matters of fact and/ or on matters of Law. It
must also indicate what aspects of the High Court Order the Appellant is complaining about.
It can be signed by the Accused himself or an Attorney-at-Law on his behalf. An Appeal in
this manner may be lodged against conviction and sentence or sentence alone. Irrespective
of merit, once a Petition of Appeal is lodged, a brief on appeal is prepared by the original
court and submitted to the higher appellate court for hearing. The merits of the matter would
be considered and decided by the appellate court. The Right to Appeal is a right given by
law to all litigants and once a Petition of Appeal is lodged within the stipulated time and
according to the procedure, the Appellate Court is obliged to hear the Appeal. In fact this
right is recognized to such an extent that even if an Accused is not present during the trial
and has been tried and convicted in absentia, an Accused although may have even ―jumped
bail‖, is still entitled to lodge an appeal against his conviction and sentence and have his
appeal heard and determined by a Superior Court as of right, although he had absconded
from trial. After hearing such Appeal, even an absconding Accused Appellant, tried in
absentia, is entitled to relief.
The other types of appeals are Applications in Revision. There is a fundamental
difference between regular Appeals and Applications in Revision. A Revision Application is
called in law an ―extra-ordinary discretionary remedy‖. It is not available to litigants as a
matter of right, unlike normal appeals. The discretion to exercise revisionary jurisdiction is
with the relevant superior court. Usually when there is a right of Appeal within 14 days an
application for revision is not made. A revision application is made by way of a Petition and
Affidavit with supporting documents and is filed in the relevant superior court whose
jurisdiction invoked, unlike in a regular appeal, where the Petition (without an Affidavit) is
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lodged in the original court from whose order one is appealing. A revision Application must
have merit on the face of such application, i.e. there must be an apparent ― error on the face
of the record‖ for the superior court to act in revision. Further, although 14 days may have
lapsed since the order of the original court one must move in revision within a ―reasonable‖
period of time. The term ―reasonable‖ period might vary from case to case but generally, is
calculated in months and not years. In a revision application, valid and acceptable reasons
must be given as to why a regular appeal was not filed in the first instance and also if the
delay in making the application is inordinate, reasons must be given for such. As mentioned
the Court will act in Revision by using its discretion where circumstances are extra ordinary
and calls for remedial action by Court. In fact a Petition for revision is not entertained as a
matter of course but, has to be supported in open court and if the court is satisfied, notice is
issued on the Respondent. Even after notice the State can file their objections to the
application.
The Relief that can be prayed for and obtained in both regular Appeals and
Revision Applications are the same. For instance, after hearing arguments of both sides
(aggrieved party/ Attorney General) the Court sitting in Appeal could grant one of the
following reliefs.
Appeal allowed: Accused Appellant Acquitted
Appeal dismissed: Lower Court Order/ Judgment affirmed
Acquitted on original charge but convicted for offence of lesser culpability.
Where Appellant succeeded on technical point although there was an abundance of
incriminatory evidence, the Court sitting in Appeal may order a re-trial (Trial de
Novo), before the original Court on the same charge.
It should be noted that an Appeal against the sentence is also permitted and
entertained even where an accused has pleaded guilty to the charge. An Appeal against
sentence only, is permitted if the sentence passed by the lower court is either, not according
to the law or appears manifestly excessive. In such instance the Court of Appeal will
interfere.
Appeals to the Court of Criminal Appeal usually come from the High Court trials
which may have been with or without a jury. After the Petition of Appeal is lodged in the
High Court, and once the brief on appeal is prepared and sent to the Registry of the Court of
Appeal by the High Court, it is listed, called in open Court and date given for argument. The
Attorney General is also represented by one of its senior officers. The Accused Appellant is
also brought into Court at the hearing of the appeal. The time taken to argue an appeal
depends on the volume of brief and how complicated the case might be. The brief contains
all proceedings of the trial in the High Court and the arguments in the appeal, strictly
speaking are confined to the four corners of the brief i.e. no extraneous matter which has not
been recorded at hearing at the High Court trial can be referred to or considered at an Appeal
stage. There is however provision under very exceptional and rare circumstances where new
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evidence has been led or matters outside the brief referred to, during arguments in Appeal.
These are rare occasions, very few and far between and usually frowned upon and not
encouraged by Court unless very strictly according to Law
After a ruling by the Court of Appeal there is still provision to move the Supreme
Court on an important matter of law which the Court of Appeal may not have considered
adequately. This is not as a matter of right but by way of Special Leave granted either by
Court of Appeal itself or by the Supreme Court on an Application made for Special Leave to
Appeal. This is also by way of Petition/ Affidavit with a copy of the Court of Appeal Order
and other relevant proceedings annexed thereto. The procedure proper for such application is
set out in the Rules of the Supreme Court/ Court of Appeal in force presently. It should be
mentioned that Special Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court is granted only if there is an
important question of law to be considered by the Supreme Court or which has not been
considered by the Court of Appeal. Usually, the Court of Appeal deals with matters before
it, so exhaustively that there is hardly any room, opportunity or occasion left to invoke the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave.
It has been said herein-before that appeals which come from the High Court may be
from a Jury Trial or non-Jury Trial. With regard to non-Jury Trials it is the Order of the
Trial Judge which is canvassed before the Court of Appeal. To obtain relief it must be
demonstrated to the Court of Appeal that the Trial Judge erred in fact or in law or in both.
Relief as of appeal that the Trial Judge had so erred. In the case of Trial before a Jury the
Court of Appeal must be satisfied that the Jury had been misdirected on the facts or the law
or both, by the Trial Judge. Also, even if there are no such misdirections or non-directions if
the verdict of the Jury is unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the
evidence, then the Court of Appeal will interfere and grant appropriate relief as the
circumstances of the case demands. The right to go to the Supreme Court even thereafter is
present whether it be a Jury or a non-Jury Trial in the High Court.
Before the Court of Appeal matters of fact are hardly canvassed unless the
misdirections and non-directions on the evidence are so great that the verdict cannot be
support on the evidence led. On the other hand matters of law are more frequently canvassed
and for instance if a proper procedure has not been followed or a statutory obligation not
complied with by Judge or Jury, the Court of Appeal will take a very serious view of such an
omission unless where the obligation is not mandatory and no prejudice has been caused to
the Appellant. (Illustrations *exercising of Jury option *permissible division of Jury verdict
and *contents of Judgment etc.).
It should be noted that all provisions relating to Appeals/Revisions by and large,
apply generally to the State (the Attorney General) as well; giving the Attorney General the
right to Appeal against any acquittal or sentence imposed by a Court.
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Principles of Law
A Trial Judge should necessarily deal with offences viz;
Murder
Culpable Homicide not amounting to Murder
Attempted Murder
Rape
Preferably in the following manner:
Re: Murder / Culpable Homicide not amounting to Murder / Attempted Murder
- Section 294 of the Penal Code and its 4 limbs with the punishment for murder
stipulated in Sec. 296.
- The punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder as set out in
Sec. 297 of the P/C.
- The question of INTENT which would have to be deduced and inferred from
deeds and words. Also consideration would have to be given to the weapon
used/ location and number of injuries/ motive (if any)/ prior and subsequent
conduct which would assist in deducing any pre-meditation/ pre-plan.
- A “Murderous Intent” would be a necessary ingredient in a charge of Murder
where a mandatory death sentence follows.
- However even if a ―murderous intent‖ is entertained it could still fall under the
special exceptions set out in the Penal Code viz: Grave and Sudden
Provocation (GSP) Exceeding the right of private defence which are offences
inviting lesser culpability Amounting to the offences of culpable homicide not
amounting to murder which could be visited with a maximum sentence of 20
years rigorous imprisonment. These exceptions have been spelt out under Sec.
294 of the Penal Code and should be read together with the provisos and
illustrations set out therein.
- Where there is no ―Murderous Intent‖ but only “Knowledge” – it would still
be culpable homicide not amounting to murder but the punishment would go
up to maximum of 10 years rigorous imprisonment under Sec. 297 of the
Penal Code.
- It is also to be noted that there are General Exceptions stipulated in the Penal
Code. e.g. Where intoxication is relevant, consideration the state of
intoxication and whether it would amount to such a state that an accused would
have been more susceptible
- Further sections 89, 90, 92 and 93 of the Penal Code deals with the exercise
of the right of private defence whether in respect of self or another. However,
the sections require a reasonable apprehension to be entertained as a vital
ingredient to have the benefit of this exception which would invite total
exculpation.
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Knowledge” and the absence of “Intent” would arise in circumstances where
the evidence indicates absence of a motive/ injury located in a non-vital area/
single injury/ previous and subsequent conduct of the accused/ apparent
restraint and even assistance offered after incident.
Also presently our Law has recognized the concept / principles making
applicable the Doctrine of Cumulative and Continuing Provocation. The
authorities relating to this concept has been set out in the following Texts and
Authorities.
Prof. G. L. Peiris on the Penal Code
Ceylon Law Journal June 1971 – pg. 101 (M. Sonaraja)
It should also be remembered that even if the indictment is for the offence of
Murder, Culpability could be eventually arrived at for the offences of not only
Culps NAM but even Grievous/ Simple Hurt provided that the question of
Intention / knowledge and other ingredients are satisfied.
Re: Rape
The areas of evidence for consideration in the background of our Case Law would be related
to;
Belated Complaint – with no reason given for belatedness
Medical Evidence – Whether hymen tear is contemporaneous with date of the
incident
Question of “Consent” – where consent is irrelevant (under 16 years – Statutory
Rape) a Jury Trial cannot be opted for in view of subsequent amendment to
Judicature Act.
Corroboration of certain material aspects of the evidence to be looked for if the
situation so demands.
Credibility of the victim on the basis of her spontaneity/ consistency in the
absence of any compelling motive to falsely implicate
Medical evidence could be corroborate a sexual act/ posture/ nature of injury/
duration and likely force used
The trials before any court would also have to necessarily deal with the following concepts
of law.
a) Circumstantial Evidence
b) Common Intention
c) Section 27 of Evidence Ordinance statements – Recovery
d) Evidence of Accomplice
e) Divisibility of Credibility
f) Dying depositions
g) Dock statement/ Alibi Defence
Presumption under Sec. 114 of Evidence Ordinance
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a) Circumstantial Evidence
Likened to a rope where even if one strand is missing the strength of the rope
would remain intact. This would be the modern approach as opposed to the old-
approach of a chain illustration where the case fails if one link is missing. Mere
cloud of suspicion would not suffice. The inference eventually drawn must be
irresistible, not only consistent with guilt but inconsistent with innocence. It should
be an inference from which there should be no escape.
b) Common Intention
―Common Intention‖ must be distinguished from a ―similar intention‖ further a
―mere presence‖ is insufficient and a ―participatory presence‖ is required. The case
of each accused involving section 32 of the Evidence Ordinance must be
considered separately.
In a charge of Murder the common intention should be necessarily a ―Common
Murderous Intention‖.
c) Section 27 of the Evidence Ordinance Statements on Recovery
Where there is a ―discovery‖ or a ―recovery‖ consequent to a statement given by
the accused under Sec. 27 of the Evidence Ordinance, the principle feature which
follow such a recovery to be noted is that a Section 27 Recovery gives rise only to
a ―Knowledge of whereabouts‖ and not necessarily the guilt or that object in
question had been used in commission of the crime. The Accused should also be
under custody at the time the statement is recorded.
d) Evidence of an Accomplice
When considering the probative value of the evidence of an accomplice who gives
evidence under a conditional pardon in particular, the principles which have been
followed are that the evidence of an accomplice is generally viewed with suspicion
and should be considered carefully and even cautiously and accepted and acted
upon only when it is corroborated and found to be convincing. As such witnesses
are considered testifying with ―Halters around their necks‖.
The English Law and Sri Lankan Law are more or less identical regarding the
approach to accomplice evidence; and in England it is more a rule of law that an
accomplice‘s evidence must be at the very least be intrinsically credible before
corroboration is looked for. In fact corroboration becomes necessary only when the
accomplice is a reliable and credit worthy witness.
It would be a serious misdirection or a self non direction amounting to a
misdirection if the Court considers as corroboration what is in law is not
corroboration.
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e) Divisibility of Credibility
The principles followed in the application of the maxim ―falsus in uno falsus in
omnibus‖ have been laid down over the years by Case Law on the premise that ―he
who speaks falsely on one point will speak falsely upon all‖ and the evidence of
such witness if it appears truthful in part, even such part if it could be distinguished
from the part which is false, a probative value will be attached only if there are
compelling reasons for acting on such evidence.
f) Dying Depositions
The Law relating to Dying Depositions encompasses situations where the
declaration could be in writing or verbal. It must at least relate to the proximal
cause of death and contemporaneous with the occurrence of death and in
situations where the deceased could have reasonably anticipated the event of death
occurring. The deponent must be competent physically and medically capable of
making such a dying deposition. This is inferred principally through the medical
evidence led and surrounding circumstances which may or may not indicate
whether the deponent was sufficiently conscious and capable of making such an
utterance.
The Court should necessarily be cautious of their inability to have the deponent
cross examined. Consequently the extent to which the deposition is corroborated or
contradicted by other facts and surrounding circumstances proved in evidence
would have a bearing on the probative value of a dying deposition.
g) Dock statement / Silence of the Accused and Alibi Defence
It is Trite Law that although the English Legal System does not recognize the right
of an Accused to make a statement from the Dock, Sri Lankan Law has entrenched
this right over a period of time. The principles which have to be followed basically
are that a dock statement though without on oath or under cross-examination
should be considered as evidence in the case. If it is accepted and believed the
accused is entitled to an acquittal. Even it is disbelieved and rejected in toto the
burden of the prosecution to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt remains.
Further our law also recognizes an intermediary position where the dock statement
could neither be believed nor be disbelieved.. In such circumstances the benefit
should be given to the accused.
It should also be noted to take into account the content of a dock statement of one
accused against a co-accused.
A defence of alibi can be raised either on oath or through dock statement. Basically
the position of an accused who raises an alibi amounts to the fact that he was
elsewhere at the time of the alleged criminal act. It is an evidentiary fact by which
it is sought to create a doubt whether the Accused was present at the time of the
offence was committed. Where the defence is that of an alibi there is no burden on
the accused to establish that fact to any degree of probability. He merely has to
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create a doubt in the case of the prosecution.
An alibi defence does not require proving or corroborating by an accused in
anyway. It merely has to raise a doubt in the case for the prosecution with regard to
the likelihood or unlikelihood of the accused‘s presence at the scene and at the time
of the crime. The geographical location and physical impossibility to be at both
places at the same time would be relevant when considering the probative value
taken up by an accused.
Some Areas Where Trial Judges Inadvertently Fall Into Error
Application of the Facts to the Law and Vise-Versa
A general statement of the law followed by a statement of facts is undesirable and the
Trial Judge should apply the relevant Law to the relevant facts in the course of analysis
of the facts. Otherwise this would be a serious non-direction amounting to a
misdirection which would necessarily vitiate the verdict.
A trial judge would also fail in his duty if he does not refer to items of evidence
which are favourable to the accused however trivial it may seem.
It has also been noted that there have been many an instance where the High Court
Judge comments on the evidence of witnesses and/ or accused with reference to
proceedings of testimony of such persons given before the Magistrate‟s Court
at the Non Summary inquiry. This would constitute consideration of
―inadmissible evidence‖ and should be frowned upon. Similarly is a case where a
Magistrate refers to Police information book extracts in arriving at a final
decision..
Where the Accused opts to remain silent This is a right given to him under the
law, the adverse inferences that are presently being drawn – whilst recognizing the
right of the Accused to remain silent – i.e. the application of the Ellenborough
Principle and also the Lucas Principle (Utterances of falsehood) must be very
carefully set out without complicating the issue as otherwise the golden thread
which runs through the fabric of our Criminal Law relating to the presumption of
innocence and burden of proof would cease to exist.
A Court must also be cautious about the infirmity of relying upon “Voice
Identification‖ and also to the ―Turnbull Guidelines‖ relating to fleeting glance/
identification in trying circumstances.
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Conclusion
Apart from matters stated hereinbefore, it would be incomplete if no mention is made of the
words of advice the writer always gives his Juniors, which would also assist Judicial
Officers to understand the outlook and thinking of the Members of the Bar who appear
before them.
In the Profession - learning never stops. It goes on, as long as we continue in the Profession.
This is the key to success. The day we feel we know everything or that we have learnt
enough, it is the beginning of the end. The ladder has to be ascended rung by rung. There are
no short cuts. Humility, Respect, Willingness to learn and taking correction in the proper
spirit are the qualities for the success. What we learn from books will help upto an extent.
Courtesy, Court Language, Decorum and Respect for the Bench, is of paramount
importance. If the Judges observe your hard work, dedication and respect, they will
reciprocate. Knowing your Judge, his moods, temperament and his ―pulse‖ is half the battle
won. Never be arrogant or have a superior attitude. It never pays. Be humble: Humility does
not cost anything.
The writer has attempted to cover matters which are not found in any text or statute. As we
should be dedicated by our conscious; keep our hands clean; never be short sighted. The
profession is very noble and gives one more than money- it gives job satisfaction, name and
fame has to be earned by honest dedicated, hard work. In the private Bar, the cake is big
enough for all to share. The writer speaks with experience and knowing its value, shares it
with all.
My thanks to my able and industrious legal research assistant attached to the Chamber, for
the assistance given me to prepare this note.
Minna Sanoon,
LL.B (Hons.) Cambridge; LL.B (Hons.) Oxford, LL.B (Hons.) Uni. Of London
LL.M (Hons.) Cambridge; LL.M (Hons.) Oxford, LL.M (Hons.) Uni. Of London
ACIS (UK) – Chartered Secretary
There is a higher court than courts of justice and that is the court of conscience. It
supersedes all other courts.
- Mahatma Gandhi
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Copyright Infringement on the Internet
And Internet Service Provider Liability:
Sri Lankan Law in the Context of English Law
Ruwan Fernando
LL.M. (Commercial Law), Cardiff, U.K.,
Post Attorney Diploma in Intellectual Property Law (S.L.)
High Court Judge & Director, Sri Lanka Judges‟ Institute,
Abstract
The exclusive right enjoyed by the owner of copyright to reproduce his protected
work in any material form, including any permanent or temporary storage of such
work in electronic form will have a direct impact on the lawful activities of an
internet service provider (ISP). It would be unjust, unreasonable and impracticable
to equate the position of an ISP with that of the traditional copyright infringer for the
reproduction of temporary copies which are transient or incidental when the
essential part of the technological process is to facilitate or enable the transmission
of the work in a network between third parties by an ISP. The making of temporary
copies exception was developed in the copyright law to safeguard the legitimate
interests of ISPs, exempting them from liability for copyright infringement on the
internet initiated by their subscribers and facilitated by their system subject however,
to certain conditions. Sri Lankan ISPs do not enjoy the same privilege against
infringing copyrighted material initiated by their users on their networks and
therefore any transmission of temporary copies of copyrighted material on their
networks without the consent of copyright authors may amount to unauthorised
reproduction of protected work that constitutes an infringement of copyright. The
liability may however, depend on a number of factors including the type of liability,
the nature of liability, the nature of work used by the ISP or the third parties,
possible defences available within the copyright law etc. It is high time for Sri Lanka
to carefully examine the issue of potential copyright liability of ISPs and strike a
balance between these two rights holders.
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Introduction
The rapid increase of on-line activities in the digital world has posed complex legal issues
in the area of intellectual property mainly due to the fact that these activities involve works
protected by intellectual property laws. Among them, the liability of internet service
providers (ISPs) for copyright infringement that takes place on their networks is a major
legal issue to emerge from cyberspace.
Wrongful activities on the internet are by no means limited to the activities of the work
protected by the intellectual property and the activities of those who provide internet
facilities. The unrestricted access to the internet has created problems to persons with
internet-based defamation publications by third parties via the services provided by internet
service providers.
The content that is distributed through the internet includes software, text, music, films that
are part of the copyright law. The works protected by the copyright law are easily
reproduced and distributed by unauthorised persons by using the internet technology. This
affects the reproduction, distribution and communication rights of copyright owners since
―The infringing act may occur when certain files containing copyright material such as text,
pictures, or sounds are posted on a web from which they may be downloaded all over the
world.‖1
In the context of infringement of copyrighted material on the internet and the tortious
liability for the publication of defamatory material on the internet, the main areas of concern
are:
1. the liability of direct infringers of copyrighted material;
2. the liability of direct publishers of defamatory material;
3. the liability of secondary publishers for the infringement of copyrighted material by
using their facilities provided by them;
4. the liability for secondary publisher/s such as ISPs and website proprietors for
proving the conduit for such publication and dissemination of such material.
Purpose of the Article
The article will first identify the nature of an ISP and the deferent types of services rendered
by internet service providers. Secondly, it will consider the types of liability for the
infringement of copyrighted material on the internet. Thirdly, it will consider the liability of
1 Rosa Julia-Barcelo, ―Liability for On-line Intermediaries: A European Perspective‖ (1998) E.I.P.R. 453 at 455.
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internet service providers for copyright infringement in relation to infringing items carried
on their networks in Sri Lanka in comparison with the law of the United Kingdom. It will
also consider the liability issue in the context of the implementation of the Electronic
Commerce Directive in the United Kingdom in providing limitations to the liability of
information society service providers. This article however, examines only the copyright
infringement that takes place on the networks of ISPs and it does not examine the peer-to-
peer copyright infringement and the liability of ISPs for the dissemination on defamatory
materials on their networks.
Definition of ISP
An internet service provider (ISP) is an entity that connects people to the internet and
provides other related services such as web site building and hosting.2 Some ISPs describe
themselves as online service providers (OSPs) however, the terms ―internet service
provider‖ and ―online service provider‖ are synonyms. 3The term ―internet service provider‘
is ―originally referred to a vendor who provided access for customers to the internet and the
World Wide Web, as well as e-mail services and other services. The term has been
significantly expanded over time and presently encompasses a wide array of different types
of service providers. An ISP may provide internet access services on a retail basis to
residential and/or business customers. An ISP may operate only a backbone network and
provide access services to that backbone network on a wholesale basis to other ISPs. Some
ISPs provide hosting services. Some ISPs provide server caching. Other ISPs do not provide
any of these services and only operate portals. An ISP may provide only a search engine or
some other e-commerce tool.‖4
A service provider under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)5of the United
States is defined in two different ways. The narrow definition is that an internet service
provider is ―an entity offering transmission, routing, or providing connections for digital
online communications, between or among points specified by a user, of material of the
user‘s choosing, without modification to the content of the material as sent or received.‖ 6
The broad definition refers to a provider of online services or network access or the operator
of facilities thereof‖7 The definition includes network services companies such as internet
service providers (ISPs), search engines and bulletin board system operators.8 The definition
2 Chaubey, An introduction to the Cyber Crime and Cyber Law, (2nd ed. 2012), 965 3 Ibid 4 Timothy D. Casey ISP Liability Survival Guide (2000 ed. Wiley Publications) p. 244 5 Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 6 Section 512 (a) 7 DMCA, sections 512 (k) (1) (A-B) 8 Chilling Effects, ―Frequently Asked Questions )and Answers) about DMCA Safe Harbor Provisions‖ at 4
http://www.chillingeffects.org/dmca512/faq.cgi
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is specifically tailored to encompass the basic functions and services needed by users to
access the internet and enjoy its benefits.9
In the broader sense, the definition includes the owners and operators of corporate intranets,
university networks and interactive websites, in addition to more traditional service
providers.10
Sine it encompasses merely those persons that perform the task that make the
internet available to users, it does not encompass any and all persons using the internet.11
Thus a person doing business using the internet such as sell books, fresh fruits or provide
auction services would not qualify as a service provider by the mere fact that their business
uses the internet to solicit business, conclude transactions and deliver products or services
by means of telecommunications networks.12
The Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 of UK, which gave effect to the
European Electronic Commerce Directive, defines the ‗service provider‘ as ―any person
providing an information society service‖13The ‗information society service‘ referred to in
this definition is given the same definition as that in Article 1 (2) of the European Directive
as covering ―any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by means of
electronic equipment for the processing (including digital compression) and storage of data,
and at the individual request of a recipient of a service ‖14
In the Sri Lankan Computer Crimes Act, No 24 of 2007 the term ‗service provider‘ is
defined in section 38 as (a) as a public or private entity which provides the ability for its
customers to communicate by means of a computer system; and (b) any other entity
processes or stores computer data or information on behalf of that entity or its customers.‖
In the Sri Lanka Electronic Transactions Act, No. 19 of 2006, the term ‗internet service
provider‘ is not specifically defined in the interpretation section. However, the term
‗certification service provider‘ is defined as a person providing certification services within
the meaning of the Act. 15
Further the term ‗network service provider is defined as a person,
who owns, possesses, operates, and manages or controls a public switched network or
provides telecommunication services.16
However, the term ‗intermediary‘ is defined as a
person acting as a service provider on behalf of another person in relation to the sending,
receiving, storing or processing of the electronic communications or the provision of other
services in relation to it.17
Hence, it appears that an ISP can be included within the definition
of the term ‗intermediary.
9 Batur Oktay and Grey Wrenn, ―A Look back at the Notice-Takedown Provisions of the U.S. Digital Millennium
Copyright Act One Year after Enctment‖ WIPO Workshop on Service Provider Liability, Geneva, December 8 & 10, 1999 http://www. Wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/1999/osp/doc/osp_lia2.doc
10 Ibid at 3 11 Ibid at 3 12 Ibid at 3 13 Reg. 2 (1), The Electronic Commerce ( EC Regulations 2002) , Reg. 2 (1) 14 Vide, Reg. 2 (1), The Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 15 Section 26, Electronic Transaction Act. 16 Ibid 17 Ibid
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Roles of ISPs
In the first place, it is necessary to understand why internet service providers are involved in
internet transactions. When a digital work is transmitted from one place to another or made
available for the public to have access, many parties are involved in this process. The
principal actors who are involved in transmitting of information from one place to another
are the sender and the recipient of that information. 18
However in the digital world, the
internet technology makes it impossible for individuals such as users to have access and
copy the protected works without internet-based intermediaries. ―Intermediaries, in the
internet context are organisations whose services are used to facilitate a transaction between
communicating parties. In our on-line software sale for example, the website host and the
download site host are both intermediaries without whom the transaction could not be
effected‖ 19
Intermediaries who are involved in facilitating infrastructure of the internet
consist of transmission services such as Telecommunications carriers, communication
services such as internet service providers and transaction facilitation services such as
domain name and certification authorities. 20
An internet service provider ―provides internet access and other services to its subscribers.
Subscribers will connect to the ISP through various means, including dial-up connection
across the public telecommunications network, and once connected will have access to such
internet resources and facilities as the ISP provides‖21
ISPs are therefore actively involved
in providing services that facilitate a transaction between the sender and the recipient,
without them no internet transaction can be effected in the digital world.
ISPs provide wide range of services through different functional roles. In order to
understand the liability, it is necessary to distinguish the different roles they play in the
transmission of digital work from one point to another. This distinction is crucial, as the
liability will depend in most instances on the different roles of internet service providers.
Internet service providers ― in their various roles as hosting, access providers and as well as
in their function as mere conduits play a key role as they provide the means to enable the
individuals to store, access and transmit the data packages containing unauthorized music
files. Hosting ISP‘s play a considerable role in providing web space in order to upload
Internet sites offering unauthorized music files: Web pages can typically be posted by means
of a dial-up connection to the internet ( via the local SP) …..The SP issues a username and
password at sign-up time, which are used to log on to the directory where the page, graphics
and sound files will be placed. In fact, simple websites can be created in minutes.‖22
The
18 Christopher Reed, Internet Law : Text and Materials(2000, Butterworths ) 22 19 Ibid, p. 25 20 Ibid, pp.25, 29, 33-34. 21 Christopher Reed, Internet Law: Text and Materials ( 2000, Butterworths ) 29 22 Dr. Nils Bortloff and Janet Henderson, ― Notice and take-down agreements in practice in Europe Views from
the internet service provider and the telecommunications and the recording Industry‖- WIPO workshop on
service provider liability- 1999 Geneva at p.4.
http://www.wipo.Int/documents/en/meetings/1999/osp/doc/osp_lia3.doc
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four major categories of network system offered by the world-wide internet service
providers are basically the following:
1. Conduit communications services – This refers to acting as a conduit between the
content provider and the user providing the transmission to the network or routing of
information such as e-mail.23
2. System caching services – This refers to automatic, intermediate and temporary
storage of material on its network by the ISP for the purpose of efficiently
transmitting information to other recipients.24
3. Hosting services – This refers to storage of information on their networks, provided
by a recipient of the services.25
4. Information location tools- This refers to services such as search engines, directories
or hyperlinks.26
The reason why an ISP risks the liability is ―by nature of their service, ISPs provide users of
the Internet with the means for potential infringement of all four of the basic copyrights-
right to reproductions, transformation, distribution and the right of public communication‖ 27
The nature of the services provided by the ISPs is such that they provide a potential infringer
with all the services and facilities such as transmission, routing of information and storing of
copyrighted material on their networks to be infringed by the unauthorised persons. And
also ―…most ISPs provide website space to their subscribers and run web server software
which allow other users to gain access to the site‘s resources‖ 28
Infringing acts such as copying, distribution and communication rights are infringed by the
users who make use of the services provided by the ISP. ―The transmission of a work over
the internet will normally result in several acts of reproduction. First, the work is copied
onto the server of the hosting service provider. Then, it will be temporarily reproduced, in
whole or in part and during transmission, digitised packets are repeatedly ‗stored‘ and
forwarded.‖29
The copyrighted work that is copied is easily distributed all over the world by using the
internet technology in preventing the copyright owner from exploiting his economic rights.
23 Claus Kohler and Kai Burmeister, ― Copyright liability on the Internet today in Europe (Germany,
France, Italy and the E.U)‖, (1999) E.I.P.R 485,498. 24 Claus Kohler and Kai Burmeister, ― Copyright Liability on the Internet Today in Europe (Germany, France,
Italy and the E.U.)‖, (1999) E.I.P.R. 485.499 25 Claus Kohler and Kai Burmeister, ― Copyright Liability on the Internet Today in Europe (Germany, France, Italy and the E.U.).‖ (1999) E.I.P.R. 485, 498 26 Rosa Julia- Barcelo, ―Liability for On-line Intermediaries: A European Perspective‖, (1998) E.I.P.R.
453, 454. 27 Miriam Yakobson, ―Copyright Liability of online service providers. After the Adoption of the
E.C. Electronic Commerce Directive. A Comparison to U.S.Law‖ (2002) 11 Ent.LR.144, 146. . 28 Christopher Reed, ―Internet Law: Text and Materials (2000, Butterworths) 25, 26. 29 Kamiel Koelman and Professor Bernt Hugenholtz, ― Online service provider liability for copyright
Infringement‖ (1999) WIPO workshop on service provider liability, Geneva.OSP/LIA/1 Rev, 9 R/
INTRANER/www/ENG/MEETINGS/1999/osp/doc/osp_lia.doc
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Therefore, the dissemination of copyrighted works online by unauthorised persons by using
the services provided by the internet service providers affects the rights of copyright owners.
The internet service providers (ISPs) play various roles in the dissemination of digital works
on the internet from one place to another and therefore the material that is carried by the
ISPs can infringe the rights of the copyright owner. In this context, the pertinent question is
whether the ISPs should be held liable for copyright infringement initiated by a third party,
and if so, under what circumstances in the context of the English law and the law of Sri
Lanka?
Liability of ISPs for Copyright Infringement in Sri Lanka
There are laws in force in many countries to limit the liability of ISPs for the infringement of
copyright that takes place on their networks. In Sri Lanka, there is no specific provision in
the Intellectual Property Act, No. 36 of 2003 which would address the issue of ISP liability.
There is no special law in Sri Lanka to provide adequate protection for the legitimate
activities of ISPs in an attempt to minimise the vulnerability against copyright infringement
claims.
However, in 2006 Sri Lanka Parliament enacted the Electronic Transactions Act, No. 19 of
2006 and adopted very clear measures aimed at shielding Certification Service Providers
from both civil and criminal liability under section 19 of Electronic Transaction Act. This
Act was introduced to (i) recognise and facilitate the formation of contracts; (ii)the creation
and exchange of data messages, electronic documents, electronic records and other
communications in electronic form in Sri Lanka; (iii) provide for the appointment of a
certification authority and accreditation of certification service providers; and (v) provide for
matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.30
The main objectives of the Act are to (1)
facilitate domestic and international electronic commerce by eliminating legal barriers; (2)
encourage the use of reliable forms of electronic commerce; (3) facilitate filing of
documents with Government and to promote efficient delivery of Government services by
means of reliable forms of electronic communications; and (4) promote public confidence in
the authenticity, integrity and reliability of data messages and electronic communications.
The Act shields the Certification Service Providers who provide certificate services within
the meaning of the Act. Section 16 of the Act deals with the liability of certification service
providers and it reads as follows:
―16 (1) A Certification Service Provider shall not be subject to any civil or criminal
liability for any transaction under this Act in respect of third party information in
the form of data messages, electronic documents, electronic records or other
communications to which he merely provides access, if such liability is founded
30 Preamble to the Electronic Transactions Act, No. 19 of 2006
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on- (a). the making, publication, dissemination or distribution of such information
or any statement made in such information; or (b) the infringement of any rights
subsisting in or in relation to such information.
(2). Nothing in this section shall effect-
(a) any obligation founded on contract;
(b) the obligation of a Certification service Provider providing such services
under a licensing or other regulatory regime established under any
written law; or
(c) any obligation imposed under any written law or by a court to remove,
block or deny access to any information.‖
Section 26 of the Act defines a ‗Certification Service Provider.‘ A certification service
provider‖ means a person providing certification services within the meaning of this Act.‖
Section 26 of the Act defines the meaning of ‗certification services.‘ ―Certification services‖
means any service which is provided to the senders or recipients of information in electronic
form, or to those storing such information and is designed to facilitate the use of
cryptographic techniques for the purpose of ascertaining that the confidentiality, authenticity
and integrity of such information is secured.‖ It appears therefore that certificate service
provides provide services facilitating the use of cryptographic techniques for the purpose of
ascertaining that the confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of information sought by the
senders or recipients in electronic form or to those storing such information only.
On the other hand section 26 of the Act defines ‗network service providers‘ and
intermediary separately. A network service provider means a person who owns, possesses,
operates, manages or controls a public switched network or provides telecommunication
services. Moreover, the term ‗intermediary‘ is defined in the Act as ―a person acting as a
service provider on behalf of another person in relation to the sending, receiving, storing or
processing of the electronic communication or the provision of other services in relation to
it.‖
The question is whether an ISP that provides various categories of internet services would
come within these definitions. it does not seem that all types of intermediaries are given the
protection from any civil or criminal liability under the Electronic Transactions Act.
Accordingly, section 16 of the Electronic Transaction Act shields only such certification
service providers that provide certification services from civil and criminal liability for any
transaction under the said Act in respect of third party information in the electronic medium
to which he merely provides access services. However, internet service providers that
provide backbone services to an internet such as hosting, conduiting and caching to the users
for a monthly fee are left out of the operation of the said Act for the purpose of exemption
from liability.
WIPO Copyright Treaty and Right of Communication to the
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Public
It is important to refer to refer to WIPO Copyright Treaty31
which is a special agreement
within the meaning of Article 20 of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works. Under Article 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty, 32
authors have the exclusive
right of authorising any communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless
means including the making available to the public in their works in such a way that
members of the public may access these works from a place and at a time individually
chosen by them. Thus, Article 8 specifically extends the right of copyright owners to works
made available on the internet.33
Section 9 (k) of the Sri Lankan IP Act grants owners of copyright exclusive right to
communicate their work to the public. The communication to the public under the Sri
Lankan Act means the transmission to the public by wire or without wire of the images or
sounds or both of a work, a performance or a sound recording including the making
available to the public of a work, performance or sound recording in such a way that
members of the public may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by
them. 34
It can be argued that this definition may extend the right of copyright owners to
protected works made available on the internet as well.
In any event, an ISP may be entitled to argue that the mere provision of physical facilities
for enabling or making a communication does not in itself amount to communication within
the meaning of section 9 (k) of the IP Act. Any ISP whose country is party to the WIPO
Copyright Treaty and has implemented Article 8 relating to the right of communication to
the public in its national legislation may succeed in this argument in view of the agreement
statement concerning Article 8 of the Treaty. The agreed statement concerning Article 8 of
the WIPO Copyright Treaty states ―It is understood that the mere provision of physical
facilities for enabling or making a communication does not in itself amount to
communication within the meaning of this Treaty or the Berne Convention subject to Article
11bis (2) of Berne Convention.‖ However, Sri Lanka is not a party to the WIPO Copyright
Treaty and the definition of the ―communication to the public‘ in section 5 of the Sri Lankan
IP Act relates to the transmission to the public by wire or without wire relates to images or
sounds or both of a work, a performance or a sound recording. Whereas Article 8 of the
WIPO Treaty relates to any communication to the public of their work without limiting to
images or sounds or both of a work, a performance or a sound recording It is submitted
therefore the question whether the works of the internet service providers will also be fully
covered by the definition of section 5 is yet to be tested in Sri Lanka. Accordingly, the
31 WIPO Copyright Treaty, 1996 32 WIPO Copyright Treaty, 1996 33 Mirim Yakobson, ―Copyright Liability of Online Service Providers After the Adoption o the E.C. Electronic
Commerce Directive: A Comparision to U.S. Law‖ (2000) EN. T.R. 145 at. 146 34 Section 5
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liability of ISPs for copyright infringement that takes place on their networks needs to be
decided by other provisions of the Intellectual Property Act no. 23 of 2003.
Why ISPs risk liability in Sri Lanka
However, unlike the right of communication of the work to the public, the right of
reproduction which has a significant relevance to the activities of ISPs will have a direct
impact on ISPs in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka is neither a party to the WIPO Copyright Treaty nor
provided an exemption from liability of ISPs when making temporary copies which are
transient or incidental for the transmission of a work in a network between third parties by
an intermediary.
In Sri Lanka there are no specific legislative safeguards for ISPs to exempt them from
liability for copyright infringement for the transmission of infringing material by their
subscribers. The introduction of the reproduction right and the right of communication of the
work to the public in section 9 of the Act will make ISPs of Sri Lanka in an awkward
position. The Sri Lankan Act defines the word ―reproduction‖ in section 5 of the Act. The
definition of ‗reproduction‘ means
―the making of one or more copies of a work or sound recording in storage of any
material form, including any permanent or temporary a work or sound recording in
electronic form‖ would amount to infringement of copyright when carried out
without the consent of the author.‖
In view this definition, the reproduction right may fully apply in the digital environment, in
particular to the use of works in the digital form. It is argued therefore that the storage of a
protected work in digital form in an electronic medium constitutes a reproduction within the
meaning of section 5 of the Sri Lankan Act. When the right of reproduction is available to a
copyright holder, he will be able to prevent others from reproducing of their protected works
in digital form in an electronic medium without consent. It appears that this provision was
made to prevent internet users from gaining access to copyright material on restricted
websites without authority. Thus, Sri Lankan Act provides for the exclusive right to
authorise or prohibit the making of the one or more copies of a work or sound recording in
any material form, including any permanent or temporary storage of a work or sound
recording in electronic form.
Thus, under the intellectual property Act of Sri Lanka, making of one or more copies of a
work or sound recording in any material form, including any permanent or temporary
storage of a work or sound recording in electronic form would amount to infringement of
copyright when carried out without the consent of the owner of copyright. Thus, it is seen
that the Sri Lanka Act includes temporary copies of copyright as described earlier, within
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the reproduction right and thus the activities of ISPs would be seriously affected by these
provisions since storage of temporary copies are an essential part of a technical process of
making or receiving a communication in the operation of the internet Thus, it facilitates and
enables a transmission of work in a network between third parties by an intermediary. The
transmission of temporary copies of copyrighted material on the networks of ISPs without
the consent of copyright authors thus may amount to unauthorised reproduction of protected
work that constitutes an infringement of copyright under the Intellectual Property Act of Sri
Lanka. In the absence of an exemption from liability for making temporary copies from
infringement, it can be argued that ISPs are required in Sri Lanka to obtain the consent of
copyright owners or pay for transient copies made on their networks during the course of the
transmission. Thus, they may risk liability for making transient copies on their networks
without obtaining prior permission of copyright owners
This position is completely different from the UK‘s position as regards the intermediate
internet carriers where section 28A of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act states that
―copyright in a literary work, other than a computer program or database or in a dramatic,
musical or artistic work, the typographical arrangement of a published edition, a sound
recording or a film, is not infringed by the making of a temporary copy which is transient or
incidental, which is an integral and essential part of a technical process and the sole purpose
of which is to enable-
a. a transmission of the work in a network between third parties by an intermediately
or
b. a lawful use of the work;
and which has no independent economic significance.
Thus, under the Intellectual Property Act of Sri Lanka, making of one or more copies of a
work or sound recording in any material form, including any permanent or temporary
storage of a work or sound recording in electronic form would amount to infringement of
copyright when carried out without the consent of the author of copyright.
European Approach for ISP Liability
The European approach to the liability of ISPs and intellectual property rights is reflected in
E-Commerce Directive35
and the Copyright in Information Society Directive36
These
directives have ultimately become a part of the domestic law of each Member States of the
European Union which includes the United Kingdom. The Copyright in the Information
Society Directive was passed by the European Union to harmonise certain aspects of
35 The Electronic Commerce Directive, 2000/31/EC 36 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 May 2001 on the harmonization of
certain aspects of Copyright and related rights in the information society.
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copyright and related rights in the information society as they relate to the online
environment. The Directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related
rights in the information society grants a number of new rights to copyright holders. These
rights include:
1. the reproduction right. (Article 2)
2. the right of communication to the public (article 3)
3. the distribution right. (Article 4).
In order to implement the Copyright in the Information Society Directive, the United
Kingdom introduced the Copyright and Related Right Regulations 2003 which amended
section 20 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. New section 20 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act reads as follows:
20 (1) The communication to the public of the work is an act restricted by the
copyright
in (a) a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work; (b) a sound recording or
film; or
(c) a broadcast.
(2) References in this part to communication to the public by electronic
transmission
and in relation to a work include-
(a) the broadcasting of the work;
(b) inclusion of the work in an on-demand service or other interactive
service.
The aforesaid rights granted to copyright holders put ISPs in a difficult position as these
rights would affect the nature of their services such as providing services and facilities such
as transmission, routing of information and storing of material on their networks. Once these
exclusive rights are given to copyright holders, they would be able to prevent others from
reproducing, distributing or communicating of their works without their consent.
However, the Copyright Directive provides exemptions from the reproduction right where
the ISP is acting merely as a pass through provider, passing on or transmitting the
information provided by a third party.37
The Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the
information society in Article 5 (1) states that
37 Gavin Sutter, ―FE/HE Institutions and Liability for Third Party Provided Content‖, Legal Information Service at
p.15. http://www.jisclegal.ac.uk.publications.thirdpartycontent.htm
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―Temporary acts of reproduction referred to in Article 2 which are transient or
incidental and an integral and essential part of a technological process and whose sole
purpose is to enable-
a. a transmission in a network between third parties by an intermediary, or
b. a lawful use;
of a work or other subject-matter to be made and which have no independent
economic significant, shall be exempted from the reproduction right provided for
in Article 2.‖
The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of U.K. was amended to implement Article 5 (1) of
the Information Society Directive. The new section, 28 A, which comes within acts
permitted in relation to copyright works, exempts intermediate internet carriers including
ISPs from liability for copyright infringement. It reads as follows:
Section 28A- Making of temporary copies
―Copyright in a literary work, other than a computer program or database, or in a
dramatic, musical or artistic work, the typographical arrangement of a published
edition, a sound recording or a film, is not infringed by the making of a temporary
copy which is transient or incidental, which is an integral and essential part of a
technological process and the sole purpose of which is to enable-
a. a transmission of the work in a network between third parties
by an intermediary or
b. a lawful use of the work and which has no independent economic
significance.‖
Thus, the UK Act in terms of the Directive provides an exemption for copyright liability
where the reproduction is transient or incidental in the following situations.38
1. the transient copies are an integral and essential part of a technological process
whose sole purpose is to enable a transmission in a network between third
parties by an intermediary or a lawful use of a work or other subject-matter to
be made and
2. They have no independent economic significance.
Thus, intermediaries such as ISPs and telecommunications operators subject to the
conditions set out in Article 5 (1) are not required to seek the consent of copyright holders or
pay for transient copying made on their networks during the course of the transmission. This
38 Article 5 (1)
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position is in keeping with the logic that imposing liability for the creation of transient
copies would make the internet unworkable39
and would make wide range of lawful services
provided by ISPs impossible to function.
Electronic Commerce Directive and Defences40
Unlike the Copyright Directive, the Electronic Commerce Directive however, provides for
the civil and criminal liabilities of online service providers when acting as intermediaries in
more detailed manner. In introducing this Directive, European Commission thought it fit to
ensure that OSPs would not be held in any legal field applicable to their services, where the
application of strict liability standard would damage the expansion of e-commerce within
EU.41
This Directive refers to service provider as ―any natural or legal person providing an
information society service‖42
Intermediaries are referred to as ‗information society services‘
within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Directive 98/34/EC as amended by Directive
98/48/EC43
Accordingly, an ‗information society service‘ is defined as ―any service
normally provided for remuneration at a distance by electronic means and at the individual
request of a recipient of services‖44
Articles 12 to 15 of the Directive deal with the liability of ISPs when acting as
intermediaries of third parties‘ transfer of information. They describe the conditions required
to exempt ISPs from monetary and criminal liability. The Directive recognises only three
categories of services eligible for exemption from liability. They include ―mere conduit‖
(including automatic, intermediate and transient storage), ―caching‖ and ―hosting.‖
EC Regulations, implementing the EU E-Commerce Directive as the UK law came into
force on 31.07.2002.45
Resembling the exemptions provided by the E-Commerce Directive,
these Regulations identify three activities which are exempted from liability under certain
conditions. The relevant parts of the Regulation apply to the ‗service providers‘ of the
‗information society service‘ dealing with the mere conduit, caching and hosting
39 Martin J Hayes, ―Internet Service Liability‖ Legal Information Service at p.11
http://www.jisclegal.ac.uk/ispliability/ispliability.htm 40 The Electronic Commerce Directive, 2000/31/EC 41 Miriam Yakobson, ―Copyright Liability of Online Service Providers after the Adoption of the
E.C. Electronic Commerce Directive: A Comparison to U.S. Law‖ (2000) E.N.T.R. 145, at 148 42 Article 2 (b) 43 Directive 98/34/EC as amended by Directive 98/48/EC of the European Parliament of the Council Laying
Down a Procedure for the Provision of the Information in the Field of Technical Standards and Regulations
and Rules on Information Society Services. 44 Article 2 (1) 45 The Electronic Commerce ( EC Directive) Regulations 2002
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The E-Commerce Directive exempts ISPs from liability arising of the following activities of
internet service providers:
Mere conduit exception (related article in the UK‘s Regulations is Article 17)
Article 12 provides that when acting as mere conduit an ISP will not be liable for the
information transmitted on their networks provided the ISP
- does not initiate the transaction
- does not select the receiver of the transmission and
- does not select or modify the information in the transmission.
This exemption of liability extends to the automatic, intermediate, and transient storage of
the information, provided this takes place for the purpose of carrying out the transmission in
the communication network and it is not stored for any period longer than is reasonably
necessary for the transmission.
Caching exception (related article in UK‘s Regulations is Article 18)
Article 13 provides that when caching, an ISP will not be liable for the automatic and
temporary storage of the information that is carried out for the sole purpose of making more
efficient the information‘s onward transmission to other recipients of the service upon their
request, on condition that the ISP
- does not modify the information,
- complies with conditions on access to the information,
- complies with rules regarding the updating of the information specified in a
manner widely recognised and used by the industry,
- does not interfere with the lawful use of the technology, widely recognised and
used by industry, to obtain data on the use of the information and
- acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information it has stored
upon obtaining actual knowledge of the fact that the initial source of the
transmission has been removed from the network, or access to it has been
disabled or that a court or an administrative authority has ordered such removal
or disablement.
Hosting exception (related article in UK‘s Regulations is Article 19)
Article 14 provides that an ISP will not be liable for the information stored at the request of
the recipient of a service, on the condition that an ISP on condition that the ISP
- does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information and as regards
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claims for damages is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal
activity or information is apparent or
- upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness acts expeditiously or to disable
access to the information.
- the recipient of the service was not acting under the authority or the control of
the ISP.
There is no time limit given under the Directive as to how soon the ISP should act upon
receiving notice of the offending material which is accessible through their service.46
It only
requires for the ISP upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness to act expeditiously or
disable access to the information.
These provisions will be used by ISPs as defences for copyright liability when sued both for
monetary and criminal liability. Since these liability exceptions do not affect the rights of
any party from applying for an injunction to prevent or stop infringement of copyright, the
effect of liability exceptions is limited to preventive injunctions by a court of law in a
Member States.47
This is in keeping with the objectives of the Directive that Member States
should ensure that court actions by way of interim measures such as injunctions against ISPs
are designed to terminate any infringement and to prevent any further impairment of the
interests involved.48
This position is in keeping with the logic that imposing liability on the
ISP where the ISP does not act as a content provider, but plays a passive role of secondary
transmitter of third party information, would seriously affect the legitimate activities of the
ISP. Therefore, court actions against ISPs should be limited to the prohibitory injunctions.
The Directive exempts ISPs from the obligation to monitor the information which they
transmit, store or actively seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity on their
networks49
The no obligation to monitor exemption has been included in the Directive for
the purpose of protecting the privacy of the customers of the ISP, who play a major role for
the development and expansion of E-Commerce in EU. Hence, the obligation to monitor is
limited to the conditions for eligibility stated in Article 15 of the Directive.
However, Member States are allowed to establish obligations to inform the competent
authorities of alleged illegal activities undertaken or information provided by the recipient of
their services or obligations to communicate to the competent authorities, at their request,
information enabling the identification of recipient of their service with whom they have
storage agreements.50
Although the ISP has no general obligation to monitor, under catching
46 Martin J Hayes, ―Internet Service Provider Liability‖ Legal Information Service at 13 http://www.jisclegal.ac.uk/ispliability/ispliability.htm 47 Regulation 20 of UK Regulations clearly provides that liability exceptions do not apply to injunctions. Hence,
the liability exceptions in UK law is subject to Regulation 20. 48 Article 18 49 Article 18 50 Article 18 (2)
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and hosting exceptions, an ISP is obliged to remove or disable access to the infringing
material upon knowledge or awareness of such infringing material.
In determining whether an ISP has actual knowledge, for the purpose of Article 13 and 14, a
court has to take into account among other things any notice which includes the details of
the unlawful nature of the activity or information, details of the sender and the location of
the information. Under Article 13 and 14, an ISP is required to remove or disable access to
the infringing material upon obtaining actual knowledge of illegal activity or infringing
material. Therefore it is arguable that once a copyright owner notifies or a court or
administrative body orders such removal or disablement, an ISP obtains actual knowledge of
illegal activity or infringing material on its network. Hence, an ISP is obliged to act
expeditiously to remove or disable access to such material.
Thus, the Directive has provided Notice and Take down procedure as a condition to be met
before relying on the exemption from liability in relation to Articles 13 and 14. However,
the Electronic Commerce Directive does not have specific provisions for a notification
system for a Notice and Take down procedure and counter notice procedure. Thus,
considering the cross-border nature of internet access, a harmonised system for notification
would facilitate the eradication of copyright infringement and illegal activity on the internet. 51
As a result it is left to the legislator of Member States to establish procedures and provide
for applicable rules governing the removal and disabling of access to infringing material and
illegal activity on the network of an ISP.
Copyright Infringement and ISP Liability in Sri Lanka
The Intellectual Property Act makes out two types of copyright infringements, namely,
primary and secondary infringements. The liability of an internet service provider will
depend on the type of the copyright infringement and the type of the infringement will
depend on the kinds of restricted acts performed by an alleged infringer.
The Sri Lankan Intellectual Property Act does not provide for any similar exemption to the
right of reproduction in part 11 of the Act since it was not meant to provide for adequate
protection to ISPs to facilitate the development of electronic communication and introduce
norms to hold the infringing activity initiated by third parties and facilitated by systems of
ISPs. Thus, in the absence of special laws or adequate protective measures to determine the
copyright liability of ISPs, the traditional copyright liability criteria set out in the Intellectual
Property Act will have to be examined.
51 Miriam Yakobson, ―Copyright Liability of Online Service Providers After the Adoption of the E.C. Electronic
Commerce Directive: A Comparison to U.S. Law‖ (2000) E.N.T.R. 145 at 1151
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Types of Liability
It is submitted that the Sri Lankan IP Act makes out two types of copyright infringements,
namely, primary and secondary. It is to be observed however, that the traditional principles
of copyright liability in the United States are threefold namely, direct infringement,
contributory infringement52
and vicarious infringement. Thus, the liability will depend on
the existence of the three types of infringement. These pre-legislation decisions in the
United States demonstrate the willingness of the US Courts to extend the traditional
principles of copyright liability to cases involving the internet with necessary modifications.
Unlike in civil law countries, the copyright liability in the United Kingdom does not divide
the forms of infringement into direct and indirect infringements. However, some elements of
direct and indirect infringements may be incorporated into primary or secondary
infringement in the English law.
Primary Infringement
a) Actual Infringement
Primary infringement is the activities of those involved in infringing the copyright owner‘s
exclusive rights.53
The primary infringement occurs when the direct infringer (the direct
actor) who, with or without a specific intent to infringe, is the primary party that violates one
of the copyright owner‘s exclusive statutory rights. 54
Primary infringement occurs in Sri
Lanka when a person does or authorises another person to do any of the restricted works set
out in section 9 of the IP Act without the licence of the copyright owner. The restricted acts
set out in section 9 are:
1. reproduction of the work
2. translation of the work
3. adaptation, arrangement or other transformation of the work
4. the public distribution of the original and each copy of the work by sale, rental,
export or otherwise.
5. rental of the original or a copy of an audio-visual work embodied in a sound
recording, a computer program, a data base or a musical work in the form of
notation, irrespective of the ownership of the original or copy concerned.
52 Thus, a person is liable for contributory infringement where he with knowledge or reason to know of the
infringing activity of another causes or materially contributes to the conduct of the direct infringement 53 Lionel Bently, Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law, 2nd ed. 2004) at 161 54 Gerald R. Ferrera, Stephen D. Lichtenstein, Marga E. K. Reder, Ray August & William T. Schieno, Cyber Law,
2001 West Thomson Learning at 74
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6. importation of copies of the work, (even where the imported copies were made
with the authorisation of the owner of the copyright)
7. public display of the original or a copy of the work
8. public performance of the work.
9. broadcasting of the work.
10. other communication to the public of the work.
Thus, with the inclusion of the right of reproduction and the right of communication of the
work to the public, ISPs in Sri Lanka may be in an awkward position since these rights have
an effect on the legitimate activities of ISPs. An ISP may be liable for actual copyright
infringement if the ISP is actually or directly involved in violating any of the exclusive
rights given to copyright owners in section 9 of the Act. However, as discussed earlier,
professional ISPs are only acting as passive carriers of automatic transmission of works
posted by a third party on their networks. Thus, unless they are taking any affirmative steps
to cause the copies to be made, they cannot be held liable under section 9 of the Sri Lankan
Act.
The standard under the primary infringement is strict liability and the strict liability is a
general term used to describe forms of liability that do not depend upon proof of fault. 55
Thus, the factors such as mental element, recklessness or carelessness are not required to
constitute the liability. Consequently, innocent unintentional copying of protected work
may be sufficient to hold the infringer liable.
The primary infringement has two main elements, actual or authorising infringement. The
issue whether an ISP should be regarded as direct infringers has been addressed in several
US cases. Although the cases were decided under the US law, some of the principles set out
in these cases are valid under the English law and the Sri Lankan law as well. In the
landmark Netcom decision 56
Netcom, an ISP whose customer had posted infringing copies
of the works owned by the Church of Scientology on an internet newsgroup through a news
group server controlled by Netcom. The user who placed the files on the internet actually
utilised a local Bulletin Board (BBS) that provided internet access through Netcom. The
church requested Netcom and the BBS to deny access to the individual involved and remove
all documents containing Church materials from the servers. When Netcom and the BBS
refused, the Church filed action against Netcom and the BBS. Court found that neither
Netcom nor BBS had directly infringed the Church‘s copyright since they had not taken any
affirmative steps to cause the copies to be made. Court said ―the mere fact that Netcom‘s
system incidentally makes temporary copies of plaintiff‘s works does not mean Netcom has
caused the copyright.‖ 57
55 Michael A. Jones, Textbook on Torts, (3rd ed. 1991) at 231 56 Religious Technology Centre v. Netcom on-line Communication Services Inc (1995 N.D Cal) 907 F Supp. 1361 57 Ibid, p.1368
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It appears therefore that an ISP could only be held liable for primary infringement under the
Sri Lankan law if the ISP causes an actual infringement by doing any of the restricted acts
set out in section 9 of the Act.
b) Authorising Infringement-
Section 9 of the Act providers that the owner of copyright of a work shall have the exclusive
right to carry out or to authorise the following acts in relation to the work….The primary
infringement under the Sri Lankan Act can also include authorising infringement under
section 9 since the copyright in a work is infringed by a person who without the licence of
the copyright owner either does or authorises another to do any of the acts restricted by the
copyright. Therefore ―Copyright may be infringed primarily where a person without the
permission of the copyright owner authorises another to do a restricted act.‖ 58
In this
context, copyright ‗authorisation‘ means ―to sanction, countenance or approve, or
alternatively, to grant or purport to grant to a third person the right to do an act complained
of‖59
The copyright authorisation in this context would mean the grant or purported grant
which may be express or implied of the right to do the act complained of.60
The issue of copyright infringement by authorisation was decided in the Australian Case of
Moorhouse and Angus and Robertson (Publishers) ltd v University of New South Wales 61
In this case, Justice Gibbs said ―A person who has under his control the means by which an
infringement of copyright may be committed- such as a photocopying machine and who
makes it available to other person knowing or having reason to suspect that it is likely to be
used for the purpose of committing an infringement and omitting to take reasonable steps to
limit its use to legitimate purposes, would authorise any infringement that resulted from the
use.‖ 62
In applying the same control test in Amstral Consumer Electronics Plc v British Phonograph
Industry Ltd, 63
the House of Lords held that supplying machines which would be likely to
be used unlawfully to copyright infringement was insufficient to make the manufacturer or
supplier a primary infringer of copyright nor could this be seen as authorising infringement
of copyright because the supplier had no control over the way the machines were used once
sold. In CBS Sons Ltd v. Amstrad Consumer Plc, 64
Lord Templeman said that in the
context of copyright, authorisation means ‗…the grant or purported grant which may be
express or implied, of the right to do the act complained of ` In this case it was held that
58 Bainbridge, Intellectual Property (5th ed 2002, Pearson/ Longman) 117 59 Falcon v. Famous Players Film Co.(1926) 2 K.B.474, at 491 60 CBS Sons Ltd v. Amstrad Consumer Electronics Plc. (1988) A.C 103. 61 Moor house and Angus and Robertson (Publishers) Ltd v University of New South Wales ( 1976) R.P.C. 151 62 Moor house and Angus and Robertson ( Publishers) Ltd v University of New South Wales (1976) R.P.C. 151 at
p.40 63 Amstral Consumer Electronics Plc v British Phonograph Industry Ltd ( 1986) F.S.R 159 64 CBS Songs Ltd v. Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc, (1988) AC 1013.
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Amstrad was not authorising infringement of copyright by the sale of its twin cassette tape
machines, since it was merely facilitating copying. Therefore, an ISP is not liable for
authorising infringement merely because of the fact that the ISP has provided physical
facilities for enabling the infringer to commit the infringement.
The same control test was applied in Netcom to hold an ISP for contributory infringement
where the ISP with knowledge or reason to know of the infringing activity of another
encouraged or facilitated the conduct of the direct infringer. If the Netcom test is applied in
Sri Lanka, then an ISP that knew or should have known about the presence of the
copyrighted material on its network, but failed to remove them, then, that failure can amount
to authorising infringement.
In Netcom, Court found that Netcom knew or should have known about the presence of the
copyrighted material on its server, but failed to remove them, that failure was held to be
equivalent to contributory infringement. The Court applied the control element and found
that the defendants who were ISPs did have the right, ability and the capacity to control their
users. It can thus be said that an ISP could be held to authorise infringement if it fails to
inform subscribers of copyright law and the importance of not infringing copyright and
additionally or alternatively, fails to monitor the material made available through its
service.65
In both Moor House and Amstral cases, the control test was used to determine the copyright
infringement by authorisation. In Netcom, the control test was used to decide the
contributory infringement under the US law. Nevertheless, ―contributory infringement can
be linked to authorising infringement, but it is not so extensive.‖ 66
For example,
contributory infringement in the USA requires actual knowledge, whereas authorising
infringement in the UK can be inferred where a person is indifferent as to whether infringing
material is involved.67
However, Sri Lankan courts may not apply the theory of contributory infringement under
the primary infringement because the degree of liability is different. It is to be noted that in
the case of the primary copyright infringement, the strict liability principle applies where the
mental element such as the degree of knowledge, recklessness or carelessness are not
required. However, in the case of contributory infringement, the degree of knowledge or
reason to know is required. Therefore, a Sri Lankan court may find it difficult to apply the
extensive version of contributory infringement theory within the primary infringement.
However, a Sir Lankan court may be able to apply the degree of control and the degree of
indifference exhibited by acts of commission or omission by ISPs to determine whether an
ISP is liable for authorising infringement initiated by their subscribers and carried on their
65 Bainbridge, Intellectual Property (5th ed. 2002,Pearson/Longman) at 241 66 Ibid 67 Ibid
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networks Thus, if it can be shown that the ISP had some measure of control over
unauthorized material on their networks and the ISP showed indifference and failed in their
duty to ascertain as to whether infringing material is involved on their networks, then it is
possible to argue that the ISP authorised and encouraged or facilitated infringing posting on
its networks by its users. In such a situation, an ISP may be liable for authorising
infringement.
If the Netcom test is applied in Sri Lanka, then an ISP that knew or should have known
about the presence of the copyrighted material on its network, but failed to remove them,
then, that failure can amount to authorising infringement. Thus, it has been said that
―indifference, exhibited by acts of commission or omission, may reach a degree from which
authorisation or permission may be inferred‖68
For example, the authorisation could be
established by applying the degree of exhibiting indifference by turning a blind eye, by
allowing to place the infringing material on the network or by using or attempting to use a
published material for commercial purposes.
The authorising infringement can also be extended to situations where an ISP has control
over the service and has a common design to infringe as a joint infringer. Joint infringers can
be described as two or more persons who act in concert pursuant to a common design to
infringe.69
Thus, an additional liability by authorising infringement can be inferred where an
ISP having control over its network acts in concert pursuant to a common design to infringe.
Unlike in the case of control over its network where an ISP can check and erase infringing
material once notified by a copyright owner, the test of common design is hard to apply to a
professional and efficient ISP. It is common that a professional ISP may not act with a direct
infringer in concert pursuant to a common design. Nevertheless, if an ISP encourages, even
tacitly, others to place infringing material on its network, it could be said that there is a
common design, being dissemination of infringing material.70
The element of common design was developed on the premise that an ISP in terms of
services provided enjoys a greater deal of control over unauthorised material on their
networks and therefore it may be in a better position to monitor and limit its use for
legitimate purposes. If they fail in their duty and authorise users to use its networks for
copyright infringement, will be liable for authorising infringement under section 9 of the Sri
Lankan Act.
A Sri Lankan court can also extend the theory of authorising infringement to situations
where an ISP has both the control over the network and a common design to infringe. These
two elements are the features of a joint liability of an ISP. The two elements of this liability
are the control test and the common design test.71
Therefore, if a content provider can
satisfy following two elements:
68 PRS v. Ciryl(1914) 1 K.B.1 at 9 (W.R.Cornish, Intellectual Property , (1999, 4th ed. Sweet & Maxwell) at 423 69 Bainbridge at 241 70 Ibid, at 242 71 Ibid
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1. that the ISP has control over its service or the network. In this situation, the ISP
will be able to check the infringing material transmitted through their network and
erase the infringing material quickly.
2. that there was a common design between the ISP and the infringer. In this situation,
the ISP and the infringer should act in concert pursuant to a common design to
infringe,
then, it can be shown that the ISP encouraged, even tacitly, others to place infringing
material on its network, there can be a common design for the dissemination of infringing
material on their network72
Therefore, if the Sri Lankan courts are prepared to recognise this broader theory of joint
infringement to determine the liability of ISPs in this situation, an additional liability under
the primary infringement may be formed. However, the applicability of the element of
common design to internet environment may be hard to prove since professional ISPs are
not expected to act in concert pursuant to a common design to infringe copyrights. A
professional ISP is only a passive carrier involved in automatic transferring of material
posted by third parties. So, in many instances they cannot be said to act in concert pursuant
to a common design to infringe copyright of its owners. Nevertheless, if an ISP has
encouraged or facilitated others to post infringing material on its network being one of
control and having a common design, then, an ISP as a joint infringer may be liable for
authorising infringement.
Unlike in the case of control over its network where an ISP can check and erase infringing
material once notified by a copyright owner, the test of common design is hard to apply to a
professional and efficient ISP. It is common that a professional ISP may not act with a direct
infringer in concert pursuant to a common design. Nevertheless, if an ISP encourages, even
tacitly, others to place infringing material on its network, it could be said that there is a
common design, being dissemination of infringing material.73
Even in the absence of the strict proof of the element of common design, if it can be shown
that the ISP had control over unauthorised material on its network and showed indifference
to ascertain whether infringing material is involved, but failed to erase them by using an
effective system, then the said ISP, thereby encouraged or facilitated the infringing material,
the ISP may be liable for authorising infringement under the Sri Lankan law. This does not
mean that in order to establish the liability by authorising infringement that both these tests
are required. It may be still possible to establish the authorising infringement in the absence
of the strict proof of the element of common design when it is shown that:
1. the direct infringer was some other person.
72 Ibid 73 Ibid
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2. the ISP had control over such infringing material.
3. the ISP failed in its duty of checking and erasing such infringing material
in exhibiting indifference by acts of commission or omission and
4. thereby encouraged or facilitated such infringement.
However, in both situations, the liability may be subject to fair use defence recognised in the
IP Act or receipt of copyright notices or failure to provide necessary documentation by the
copyright holders to show that there is a likely infringement.
Secondary Infringement
Secondary infringement is concerned with activities of commercial nature such as dealing
with infringing copies of a work or facilitating their production without the licence of the
copyright owner. Under this level of liability, one is liable for consciously causing or
assisting to cause infringement by other persons. 74
The secondary infringement is concerned
with people in a commercial context who either deal with infringing copies, facilitates such
copying or facilitates public performance 75
including providing premises or apparatus for
such infringement with knowledge or reason to believe that the activities in question are
wrongful.
The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of the United Kingdom clearly identifies acts of
secondary infringement such as importing infringing copies, possessing or dealing with the
infringing copy, providing means for making infringing copies, permitting use of premises
for infringing performances, provision of apparatus for infringing. 76
In the Sri Lankan Act
acts of secondary infringement are not separately defined. The distinction between primary
infringement and secondary infringement is that the former involves making the infringing
copy or making the infringing performances, while the latter involves dealing with those
copies, providing the premises or apparatus for the performances or making an article for the
purpose of making infringing copies. 77
When a secondary infringement is committed,
however, there will almost certainly have been a corresponding infringement of one or more
of the acts restricted by copyright78
(e.g. acts restricted by section 9 of the Act).
For a secondary infringement, the person responsible must have knowledge or reason to
believe that the copies are infringing.79
The liability depends on the defendant knowing or
having reason to believe that the infringing activities are wrongful. Under the Act, there
74 J.A.L.Sterling, World Copyright Law (1998), ( Miriam Yakobson, ―Copyright Liability of Online Service
Providers After the Adoption of the E.C. Electronic Commerce Directive: A Comparison To U.S. Law‖ (2000) ENT.L.R. 145 at 146)
75 Lionel Bently & Brad Sherman, above note 53, at 186 76 Sections 22- 26 77 Bainbridge, p. 137-138 78 Ibid 79 Bainbridge, p. 138
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must have actual knowledge or constructive knowledge on the part of the infringer to
constitute infringement.
Although there is no specific reference to acts of secondary infringement in the Act, section
23 refers to unlawful activities that amount to secondary infringement of the rights of the
owner of copyright. A copyright in a work may be secondarily infringed by a person who,
without the licence of the copyright owner under the following circumstances:
1. the manufacture or importation for sale or rental of any device or means
specifically designed or adapted to circumvent any device or means intended to
prevent or restrict reproduction of a work or to impair the quality of copies made
(the latter device or means hereinafter referred to as ‗copy protection or copy
management device or means)
2. the manufacture or importation for sale or rental of any device or means that is
susceptible to enable or assist the reception of an encrypted program, which is
broadcast or otherwise communicated to the public, including reception by satellite,
by those who are not entitled to receive the program.
The infringing activities of copyright are also recognised under section 23 (3) of the Act.
Thus, an owner of copyright in a work will have a remedy for infringement of copyright
where
(a) authorised copies of the work have been made and offered for sale or rental in an
electronic form combined with a copy protection or copy management device or
means and a device or means specifically designated or adapted to circumvent the
said device or means, made or imported for sale or rental;
(b) the work is authorised for inclusion in an encrypted program, broadcast or
otherwise communicated to the public, including by satellite and a device or means
enabling or assisting the reception of the program by those who are not entitled to
receive the program made or imported for sale or rental.
Thus, the activities mentioned in section 23 (1) refer to the manufacture or importation for
sale or rental of designed to circumvent the form of copy protection and 23 (2) refers to
apparatus for infringing of copyright referred in the section. Thus, the activities mentioned
in section 23(1) refer to the manufacture or importation for sale or rental of apparatus for
infringing of copyright referred to in the section.
However, it can be seen that ISPs are not involved in the activities mentioned in section 23
(1) (a). First, the legitimate activities of an ISP are not involved in manufacturing or
importing for sale or rental of any device or means specifically designed or adapted to
circumvent any device or means. Secondly, the legitimate activities of an ISP are not
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intended to prevent or restrict reproduction of a work or to impair the quality of copies
made.
Similarly, it can also be seen that ISPs are not involved in activities mentioned in section 23
(1) (ii) The legitimate activities of an ISP is not connected with the manufacture or
importation for sale or rental of any device or means that is susceptible to enable or assist
the reception of an encrypted program that can be broadcast or otherwise communicated to
the public. An ISP acts merely as an intermediary in transmitting information directed by its
subscribers. Thus, it is not possible to hold an ISP for secondary infringement of copyright
under section 23 (1) (i) or (ii) of the Sri Lankan Act.
Thus, these sections have been specifically designed to overcome the challenges posed by
the modern copying technology by way of unauthorised copying of work that are copy
protection. Although section 23 of the Sri Lanka Act has introduced some anti-
circumvention provisions that are designed to implement the WIPO Copyright and
Phonograms Treaty, it does not deal with the extent of liability of intermediate service
carriers for copyright infringement in relation infringing items carried on their networks.
These provisions are not intended to deal with the activities of ISPs that act merely as
intermediaries in transmitting information directed by their subscribers.
Defences
In determining whether a service provider has actual for the purpose of this infringement, a
court shall take into account all matters which appear to it in the particular circumstances to
be relevant including any fair use defence in section 12 of the Act. In the absence of special
legal provisions to exempt an ISP for copyright infringement, the consideration of the
following matters are relevant: (a) whether a service provider has received a notice through
a means of contact made available to it by the content provider with regard to the nature and
the extent of infringement in question; (b) the reasonable effective measures taken by an ISP
having received such notice to prevent their services being used to infringe copyright on
their networks; (c) contractual agreement if any with the subscribers; and (d) fair use
defence in section 12 of the Act; (e) in the case of secondary infringement, whether the ISP
had knowledge or reason to believe that the copies are infringing. The burden shall be on the
service provider to demonstrate that he has fulfilled his duties and to demonstrate that he has
complied at all material times and in all material respects with the voluntary code of practice
being followed by the internet community. An ISP can also demonstrate that the
infringement complained of took place despite such compliance, and then the service
provider may be deemed to have fulfilled his duty.
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Conclusion
It is submitted that Sri Lanka should afford limited protection to ISPs from liability for
providing access to third party copyrighted material on their networks. The limitation of
their liability is required to protect the legitimate interests of ISPs and copyright owners and
to ensure a fair balance between the copyright holders, ISPs and others involved in the
internet technology in a technologically developing country like Sri Lanka.
The first thing is to bring an amendment to section 5 read with section 9 (1) (a) of the
Intellectual Property Act of Sri Lanka and exempt ISPs from copyright infringement within
the reproduction right for making temporary copies of copyrighted material where such
copies are an essential part of a technical process of making or receiving a communication in
the operation of the internet. This would exempt intermediate internet carriers such as ISPs
from liability for copyright infringement provided however, this exemption would apply
only if such ISPs provide mere access to such materials acting in a passive role. This would
shield ISPs from copyright liability for transmitting copyrighted work for their legitimate
work between third parties and an intermediary which is an integral and essential part of a
technological process. However, Sri Lanka need not introduce a blanket exemption to ISPs
in relation to all temporary copies from liability. Sri Lanka can identify the range of
temporary copies that are made as part of the technical process of making or receiving a
transmission or communication done by an ISP.
These exemptions should be limited to acts of temporary reproductions that form an integral
and essential part of a technical process and take place in a network as part of the lawful
work of a transmission process. This means that the ISP should not have received direct
financial benefits from the infringing activity or such infringing activity should not have
enhanced the value of the services to subscribers or attracted new subscribers. This shows
that even if an ISP has not received a direct financial benefit from the transmission of the
infringing activity, if the infringing activity has contributed to enhance the overall
commercial activity of the ISP and benefits for the ISP, the exception should have been
made not applicable.
Secondly, Sri Lanka can provide defences to copyright liability in the IP Act itself where
temporary reproductions made in the course of acting as mere conduit, caching or hosting of
third party material online. In this situation, Sri Lanka can also consider whether to limit the
exceptions to non-infringing communications such as browsing or viewing copyright
material online and in certain types of caching. However, these exceptions can be subjected
to certain conditions as recognised in the present UK law.
In order to protect the rights of copyright owners to retain control over the communication
and reproduction of their works on the internet and to protect the operation of an ISP, it is
necessary to introduce the notice and take down procedure which obliges an ISP to remove
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or disable access to the infringing material upon knowledge or awareness of such infringing
material. On the other hand if such ISPs play an active part in the publication, reproduction,
dissemination of such material or the infringement of rights which subsisted on such
materials, the exemption would be lost. In the process of protecting the interests of ISPs, the
legitimate interests of copyright holders should also be safeguarded. Sri Lanka should
attempt to strike a balance between the rights of copyright owners and the internet service
providers.
―Justice can sleep for years and awaken when it is least expected. A miracle is nothing more
than dormant justice from another time arriving to compensate those it has cruelly
abandoned. Whoever knows this is willing to suffer, for he knows that nothing is in vain.‖
― Mark Helprin, Winter's Tale
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Buddhist Perception
On Social Justice and Healing Justice
Maniccavasagar Ganesharajah LLM (USA), LLM (Colombo),
PGD (Conflict Resolution), PGD (International Law),
PGD (International trade law), DIP. (Management), DIP(Adv. English).
District Judge, Mullaitivu
Buddhism has a reputation in the modern world as a religion encouraging peace and social
justice. Broadly speaking, the term ‗social justice‘ implies fairness and mutual obligation in
society: That we are responsible for one another and that we should ensure all have equal
chances to live free and succeed in life. Since an individual can experience freedom only in
a moral society, the rights and duties of such individual may be held as inter-connected.
The concept of social justice, which was central to the political thought generating and
sustaining the French Revolution in the late 18th Century, is over two centuries old.
Interestingly, over 2,500 years ago, Gautama Buddha raised the issue of liberty, equality and
fraternity against the tyrannical and hierarchical social system in India at the time.
The Buddha understood the deeper significance of human existence. He said that no super
human or divine entity, other than one‘s own deeds, would change one‘s destiny. His
practical philosophy is concerned with the ways that would help in the elimination of human
suffering. He presented His doctrine which explained clearly the human suffering, and also
the way to its elimination.
If we investigate the Buddha‘s teaching on the Sublime States: Metta, Karuna, Mudita and
Upekkha (Loving-kindness, Compassion, Sympathetic Joy and Equanimity) towards living
beings, then we will realize that we ourselves are responsible for our own well-being and
that of society as well.1
1 http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2013/11/17/imp01.asp
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Right livelihood
The modern social scientists proclaim that for a healthy society, two components - freedom
and morality - are essential. According to the Buddha, morality is not only the foundation of
our social path, but the axis upon which the whole of our spiritual development revolves.
Buddhism encourages people to develop their minds and purify them through the practice of
morality, concentration and wisdom.
In the Buddha‘s moral teachings, Right Livelihood (Samma Ajiva) figures prominently. In
His first sermon after attaining Enlightenment, the Buddha explained that the way to peace,
wisdom and finally, Nirvana is the Noble Eightfold Path.
The fifth ‗fold‘ of the path is Right Livelihood, which is the way to earn a living that does
no harm to others. In the Vanijja Sutta, the Buddha said, ―A lay follower should not engage
in five types of business, business in weapons, business in slaves, business in meat, business
in intoxicants and business in poison.‖
The Buddhist concept of ‗livelihood‘, therefore, implies not only a pure and transparent
means of earning one‘s living, but it is also to be morally responsible towards the society. If
we do not take any responsibility for society, then our minds will be overpowered by self-
interest and we will become selfish and uncaring.
Eventually, this would result in us not behaving in a moral or just and righteous way in our
day-to-day dealings with other people. The precept about Right Livelihood was designed to
bring true happiness to the individual and society and to promote unity and proper relations
among people.
Happiness
We find several modes of ‗true‘ happiness in Buddhist literature. In one mode, the Buddha
speaks about four types of happiness. A person who lives in the society without retiring into
a life of seclusion may enjoy four kinds of happiness:
* The happiness of earning (Atthi-sukha) wealth by just and righteous means
* The happiness of using (Bhoga-sukha) wealth liberally on family, friends and on
meritorious deeds
* The happiness of being without debt (Anana-sukha)
* The happiness of blamelessness (Anavajja-sukha), to live a faultless and pure life without
committing evil in thought, word and deed.
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According to this mode, true happiness is to enjoy material welfare, monetary or economic
security through fair and righteous means.
Happiness can also be enjoyed by using the wealth liberally for one‘s self, for one‘s family,
friends, and relatives and by wholesome deeds. Happiness likewise can be enjoyed from
becoming debt-free. Then, there‘s happiness that is enjoyed through blamelessness resulting
from the avoidance of unwholesome deeds.
As evident from the discourse, true happiness of ownership, wealth and being debt-free refer
to economic security and stability whereas happiness of blamelessness refers to a higher
level of happiness which is spiritual or psychological.
Potential
Buddhists view all human beings as equal; therefore Buddhism is committed to the principle
of human equality. The Buddha criticized the caste system which divided the society in to
upper and lower castes, thereby depriving the lower castes of certain rights. Repudiating the
superiority by birth, He said: ―No Brahman is such by birth, no outcaste is such by birth, an
outcaste is such by his deeds, and a Brahman is such by his deeds.‖
The Buddha also condemned exploitation of labour in every form. He asserted five ways in
which an employer should serve his employees:
* Work should be assigned in proportion to the employees‘ health
* Proper food and wages be given to them
* Proper care should be taken in their sickness
* Specially, tasty luxuries should be shared with them and
* Holidays should be given to them at intervals.
The Buddha was so compassionate to the working class that He stressed that they be
treated with as much consideration as a member of one‘s own family.
The Buddha saw the spiritual potential of men and women and founded the Order of
Bhikkhunis, one of the earliest organizations for women. The Sasana consisted of the
Bhikkhus, Bhikkhunis, laymen and laywomen so that the women were not left out of any
sphere of religious activity.
The highest spiritual states were within the reach of both men and women and the latter
needed no masculine assistance or priestly intermediary to achieve them. We could
therefore, conclude that Buddhism accorded to women a position approximating to equality.
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Although there are no vows or rituals involved in the event of a marriage, the Buddha has
laid down in the Sigalovada Sutta the duties of a husband and wife: ―In five ways should a
wife be ministered to by her husband; by respect, by courtesy, by faithfulness, by handing
over authority to her and by providing her with ornaments.
The wife‘s duties are well-performed by hospitality to the kin of both, by faithfulness, by
watching over the goods he brings and by skill and industry in discharging all business.‖
The significant point here is that the Buddha‘s injunctions are bilateral; the marital
relationship is a reciprocal one with mutual rights and obligations.
Justice and punishment
The history of punishment is in some respects like the history of war; it seems to accompany
the human condition almost universally, to enjoy periods of glorification, to be commonly
regarded as justified in many instances, and yet to run counter to our ultimate vision of what
human society should be."2
Why do we punish? It seems a silly question, but only until we try to answer it. To punish is
to harm, and harming must be justified. Three types of justification are usually offered: the
harm of punishment is outweighed by some greater good (e.g., it deters others); punishment
does not really harm offenders (because it reforms them); and harming offenders is good in
itself (because retribution "annuls the crime"). However, each of these reasons becomes
problematical when we examine it.
The first argument is a utilitarian one, but it seems immoral to harm someone because we
want to influence others' behavior; such a principle could also be used to justify
scapegoating innocents. This is not just an abstract point, for there is the uncomfortable
possibility that offenders today have become scapegoats for our social problems. And if
punishment warns other would-be offenders, why does the United States, which punishes a
larger percentage of its population than any other Western country, continue to have the
highest crime rate?3
The second argument, that punishment reforms rather than harms the offender, obviously is
not true now. The Quakers may have intended the penitentiary to be a place of penitence, yet
there is little doubt that today incarceration makes most offenders worse. A RAND study
found that recidivism is actually higher for offenders sent to prison than for similar
offenders put on probation. That should not surprise us, for the predatory societies found in
most prisons make them more like hell than places to repent and reform. Prison settings
2 Deirdre Golash, "Punishment", 11-12. This provocative paper presents the three main justifications for
punishment, argues that each is flawed, and concludes that we should abolish our institutions of punishment.
3 http://www.zen-occidental.net/articles1/loy2.html
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dehumanize, divert offenders' attention from victims, and reinforce their low self-esteem. As
often happens, an institution which does not fulfill its original purpose continues to exist for
other reasons - in this case because, to tell the truth, we have not known what else to do with
most offenders.
The third argument, that harming offenders somehow annuls the crime, incorporates several
types of justifications. The most common is the desire for vengeance, which is
understandable but morally dubious and socially destructive. Another version sees
punishment as God's retribution; the Buddhist equivalent understands punishment more
impersonally, as an effect of one's karma. Neither is a good argument for human
punishment: neither God nor an objective moral law needs our help, especially since it is
inevitable that humans will occasionally make mistakes (e.g., execute innocents).
The important point is that all versions of this third justification build upon the intuitive
belief that something must be done to "make right" the harm that offenses cause to victims
and the social fabric. What motivates the restorative justice movement is the increasing
recognition that our present judicial system is not doing this well enough. The problem, we
are beginning to realize, is a deep one: we sense that there may be something wrong with
our atomistic understanding of the social contract and its presumptions about "the good life",
but we are not sure which way to look for an alternative paradigm - which is why it is
essential to get perspectives on this paradigm that can only be provided by the worldviews
and values of other cultures.
Approach of Buddhism
The Buddhist approach to punishment, like any other approach, cannot really be separated
from its understanding of human psychology and its vision of human possibility. This
suggests that criminal justice is not solely a secular issue, for questions of fairness and
justice cannot be completely separated from the religious perspectives they historically
derive from: for the vast majority of humankind, crime, punishment and reform are still
inextricably bound up with religious views about sin, judgment and forgiveness. Justice is
one of those ultimate issues that bridge whatever distinction we try to make between sacred
and secular, and our criminal justice system will always be subordinate to our larger vision
of how people should relate to each other. Then is penal failure a barometer of our social
failure in this larger respect - of our inadequate vision of what personal and social
possibilities there are? This would explain our discomforting suspicion that criminals have
become scapegoats, readily exploited by ambitious politicians (a fourth justification for
punishment, unfortunately).
It is difficult to generalize about crime, because there are different types, committed by
different types of people, which require different responses. The same is true for Buddhism:
there is no such thing as the Buddhist tradition, for Buddhism has been extraordinarily
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adaptable in its spread to different places and cultures. Thailand, Tibet, China and Japan and
Sri Lanka have had very different political and judicial systems, although some similar
threads have been used in weaving their various patterns: especially the beliefs that all of us,
offenders and victims alike, have the same Buddha-nature, which is not to be confused with
our usual sense of self, an ever-changing collection of wholesome and unwholesome mental
tendencies; that we are usually dominated by our greed, ill-will and delusion, but it is
possible to change and outgrow them; and therefore the only reason to punish is education
for reformation.4
The Angulimala Sutta
Angulimala5 was a merciless bandit, who murdered many people and wore their fingers as a
garland (hence his name, literally "finger-garland"). Although warned about him, the
Blessed One (Sakyamuni Buddha) walks silently into his area. When Angulimala tries to
catch him, however, the Buddha performs a supernatural feat: Angulimala, walking as fast
as he can, cannot catch up with him, even though the Buddha is walking at his normal pace.
Astonished, Angulimala calls out "Stop, recluse!"
Still walking, the Buddha answers: "I have stopped, Angulimala; you stop too." In response
to Angulimala's puzzlement, he explains: "I have stopped forever, abstaining from violence
towards living beings; but you show no such restraint." This impresses Angulimala so much
that he renounces evil forever and asks to join the sangha; and the Buddha accepts him as a
bhikkhu.
Meanwhile, people had gathered at the gates of King Pasenadi's palace, demanding that
Angulimala be stopped. King Pasadeni goes forth with five hundred men to capture him.
When he meets the Buddha and explains his quest, the Buddha responds: if you were to see
that he is now a good bhikkhu, who abstains from killing, etc., how would you treat him?
The king replies that he would pay homage to him as a good bhikkhu, and is surprised when
the Buddha points out Angulimala seated nearby. The King marvels that the Buddha was
able to tame the untamed and bring peace to the un-peaceful. "Venerable sir, we ourselves
could not tame him with force or weapons, yet the Blessed One has tamed him without force
or weapons." Then he departs.
Soon after, the venerable Angulimala realizes the supreme goal of the holy life and attains
nirvana, Later, however, during an alms round, he is beaten by townspeople, but the Buddha
tells him to bear it, for it is a result of his past karma. The sutta concludes with some verses
4 There are many excellent works in English that provide an introduction of Buddhist teachings. For early
Buddhism, see Rahula 1959; for Mahayana Buddhism, see Williams 1989.
5 Majjhima Nikaya ii, 98ff, in The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, 710-717.
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by Angulimala, for example: "Who checks the evil deeds he did/ By doing wholesome deeds
instead,/ He illuminates the world/ Like the moon freed from a cloud."
The point of this sutta is not difficult to see: we need only contrast Angulimala's fate with
what our retributive justice system would do to him. The importance of this story within the
Buddhist tradition highlights the only reason Buddhism accepts for punishing an offender: to
help re-form his or her character. Then there is no reason to punish someone who has
already reformed himself.
The Lion's Roar Sutta
The Cakkavatti-sihanada Sutta6 addresses the relationship between criminal justice and
social justice, especially the connection between poverty and violence. The Buddha often
summarized his teachings into four noble truths: life is duhkha (unsatisfaction); the cause of
duhkha; the end of duhkha; and the way to end duhkha. According to this Buddhist
approach, the way to control crime naturally follows from correctly understanding the
causes of crime. In this sutta the Buddha tells the story of a monarch in the distant past who
initially venerated and relied upon the dhamma, doing as his sage advised: "Let no crime
prevail in your kingdom, and to those who are in need, give property." Later, however, he
began to rule according to his own ideas and did not give property to the needy, with the
result that poverty became rife. Due to poverty one man took what was not given and was
arrested; when the king asked him why, the man said he had nothing to live on. So the king
gave him some property, saying that it would be enough to carry on a business and support
his family.
Exactly the same thing happened to another man; and when other people heard about this
they too decided to steal so they would be treated the same way. Then the king realized that
if he continued to give property to such men, theft would continue to increase. So he decided
to get tough on the next thief: "I had better make an end of him, finish him off once and for
all, and cut his head off." And he did.
At this point in the story, one might expect a moralistic parable about the importance of
deterring crime, but it turns in exactly the opposite direction:
"Hearing about this, people thought: 'Now let us get sharp swords made for us, and then we
can take from anybody what is not given, we will make an end of them, finish them off once
and for all and cut off their heads.' So, having procured some sharp swords, they launched
murderous assaults on villages, towns and cities, and went in for highway-robbery, killing
their victims by cutting off their heads.
6 Digha Nikaya iii, 65 ff, in The Long Discourses of the Buddha, 395-405.
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"Thus, from the not giving of property to the needy, poverty became rife, from the growth of
poverty, the taking of what was not given increased, from the increase of theft, the use of
weapons increased, from the increased use of weapons, the taking of life increased . . ."
Despite some fanciful elements, this myth has important implications for our understanding
of crime and punishment. The first point is that poverty is presented as the root cause of
immoral behavior such as theft, violence, falsehood, etc. Unlike what we might expect from
a supposedly world-denying religion, the Buddhist solution has nothing to do with accepting
our poverty karma. The problem begins when the king does not give property to the needy -
that is, when the state neglects its responsibility to maintain distributive justice. According
to this influential sutta, crime, violence and immorality cannot be separated from broader
questions about the justice or injustice of the social order. The solution is not to "crack
down" harshly with severe punishments but to provide for people's basic needs. "The aim
would be, not to create a society in which people in general were afraid to break the law, but
one in which they could live sufficiently rewarding lives without doing so" (Wright 7).
That brings us to the second point of the Lion's Roar Sutta, its understanding of violence.
Instead of solving the problem, the king's violent attempt at deterrence sets off an explosion
of violence that leads to social collapse. If punishment is sometimes a mirror-image of the
crime, in this case the crimes are a mirror-image of the punishment.The emphasis on
nonviolence within so much of the Buddhist tradition is not because of some otherworldly
preoccupations; it is based upon the psychological insight that violence breeds violence.
This is a clear example, if anything is, of the maxim that our means cannot be divorced from
our ends. If there is no way to peace, peace itself must be the way. Since the state is not
exempt from this truth, we must find some way to incorporate it into our judicial systems.
The Vinaya
The Vinaya Pitaka7 is, in effect, a canonical compendium of the rules that Bhikkhus and
Bhikkhunis are expected to follow. The vinaya is based upon sila morality, which, although
only one part of the three-part path (the others are samadhi-concentration and pragna-
wisdom), provides the ethical foundation essential for all Buddhists. The five basic sila
precepts are to abstain from killing, stealing, improper sexual behaviour, lying, and
intoxicants. These precepts help us eradicate the three roots of evil: "As lust, malice and
delusion are the basis of all undesirable volitional activity done by means of thoughts, word
and body, the disciplinary code or Buddhist Laws are regarded as a means established for
the rise of detached actions which finally result in pure expressions of body, speech and
thought" (Ratnapala 42).
7 This section draws heavily on Ratnapala's Crime and Punishment in the Buddhist Tradition
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Although now rigidly codified, the vinaya approach is quite practical. Almost all rules
originate from actual events (what we would call case law) rather than from hypothetical
possibilities of wrong-doing. "The spirit of the law suggests that the laws act more or less as
sign-posts or 'danger zones' indicating that one should be careful here, keeping in mind the
example or examples of individuals who fell into trouble by this or that stratagem"
(Ratnapala 42). Since not derived from God or any other absolute authority, these rules are
always open to revision, except for the four parajikas (sexual intercourse, stealing, killing a
human being, and lying about one's spiritual attainment) which constitute automatic self-
expulsion. Following the rules well is not in itself the goal; the reason for rules is that they
promote personal and spiritual development.
The vinaya approach is very practical in another way too: in its realistic attitude towards
human weakness. It is the nature of unenlightened human beings to be afflicted by greed, ill-
will and delusion; that is, all of us are somewhat mad. As long as human beings are
unenlightened, then, there will be crime. The extent of crime can be reduced by improving
social and economic conditions, but no human society will ever be able to eradicate crime
completely. This is consistent with the Buddhist attitude towards self-perfection: we
improve only gradually, step by step, which implies that offences should be evaluated with
tolerance and compassion.
If we are all somewhat insane, the insanity defense is always somewhat applicable, for there
can be no presumption of free will or simple self-determination. Freedom is not a matter of
liberating individual self-will (often motivated by greed, etc.) but overcoming such
willfulness; not gained by removing external restraints, but by self-control and spiritual
awakening. This denies the distinction we are usually quick to make between an offender
and the rest of us. The rehabilitative model of secular therapy denies the offender's dignity
and responsibility, as Conrad Brunk points out, but Buddhism avoids this problem by
emphasizing the continuity between offenders and us: the difference is only a matter of
degree - at most. According to Buddhism, the issue is not punishment but correction, and the
best antidote to crime is to help people realize the full consequences of their actions
(Ratnapala12-13).
In determining the nature of an offence against the vinaya, everything about an offender's
situation is taken into consideration in order to make the best possible judgment about what
should be done: one's past, character and intelligence, the nature and conduct of one's
associates, as well as whether or not one has confessed. This may be contrasted to our own
judicial preoccupation with the black-or-white question of guilty/not guilty. "Degrees of
severity of the offense may vary, but in the end there are no degrees of guilt", which teaches
"the hidden message that people can be evaluated in simple dichotomies." From a
perspective that takes the offender's self-reformation (and is there any other type?) seriously,
such an approach is seriously flawed:
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"Much evidence suggests that offenders often do not act freely or at least do not perceive
themselves as capable of free action. . . . Ideas of human freedom and thus responsibility
necessarily take on a different hue in such a context." (Zehr 70)
The vinaya supports the notion that our preoccupation with guilt is based on an erroneous
understanding of human nature and how it changes. "Guilt says something about the quality
of the person who did this and has a 'sticky,' indelible quality." (Zehr 69). Buddhist
emphasis on the transience of everything means there is nothing indelible about our
unwholesome mental tendencies; deep-rooted ones may be difficult to eradicate, but that is
because they are an engrained result of past habits, not an "essential" part of us.
The main concern of the vinaya is not ruling on guilt but determining the intention, because
one's intention decides the nature of the offence. If there is no consent to commit an act one
is not guilty of it; and the lighter the intention, the less grave the offence (Ratnapala 5, 93,
192).
Intention is also the most important factor in the operation of the law of karma, which
according to Buddhism is created by volitional action: "I am the result of my own deed . . .
whatever deed I do, whether good or bad, I shall become heir to it."8 A modern approach is
to understand karma in terms of what Buddhism calls sanskharas, our "mental formations"
especially our habitual tendencies. These are very important for Buddhism because they are
not tendencies we have but tendencies we are. Instead of being "my" habits, their interaction
is what constructs my sense of "me". Then we are punished not for our sins but by them.
People suffer or benefit not for what they have done but for what they have become, and
what we intentionally do is what makes us what we are. My actions and my intentions
build/rebuild my character just as food is assimilated to build/rebuild my physical body. If
karma is this psychological truth about how we construct ourselves, or about how our selves
are constructed by "our" greed, ill-will and delusion, then we can no longer accept the
juridical presupposition of a self-determined subject wholly responsible for its own actions.
Once we understand the mental tendencies that afflict all of us, desire for vengeance must be
replaced with compassion that emphasizes reformation.
The system of punishments used within the sangha shows how these principles work in
practice. The emphasis is on creating a situation that will help an offender to remember and
reflect upon the offence, in order to overcome the mental tendencies that produced it. Most
penalties involve what we now call probation. Probation is usually regarded as a modern
method of treatment derived from English common law, but it has been widely used in
Buddhism for 2500 years, because consistent with the Buddhist concern not to punish but to
reform. Once the probation was successfully finished, the bhikkhu returned to his previous
position and status, so "the social image of the offender‖ was not harmed. After the penalty,
he was received back and he enjoyed the identical position he had earlier without stigma or
8 . Anguttara Nikaya iii, 59.
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contempt. Human dignity thus was always regarded as important in the court and in the
society, while under a penalty or after rehabilitation" (Ratnapala 77). This contrasts with the
humiliation built into our present retributive approach. A major factor in many offences is
low self-esteem, and a restorative system must address this explicitly by focusing on ways to
help offenders build self-esteem in the act of accepting responsibility for their actions.
This does not contradict the Buddhist teaching that there is no separate self. "Reintegration
requires that we view ourselves (and others) as a complex measure of good and evil, injuries
and strengths, and that while we resist and disparage the evil and compensate for our
weaknesses, we also recognize and welcome the good and utilize our strengths" (Van Ness
and Strong on re-integrative shaming, 118). This is precisely the Buddhist view of human
nature, which does not presuppose a unitary soul or self-determining subject, but
understands the self to be a composite of unwholesome and wholesome tendencies.
To sum up, the vinaya approach suggests that, if we are serious in our desire for a judicial
system that truly heals, we must find a way to shift our focus from punishing guilt to
reforming intention. Buddhism is a pragmatic teaching based on certain fundamental
propositions about how we experience the world and how we act in it. From the evidence of
the Buddha‘s discourses, it is clear that early Buddhists were very much concerned with the
creation of social conditions favourable to the individual cultivation of Buddhist values.
Just as the treasures are uncovered from earth, so virtue appears from good deeds, and
wisdom appears from a pure and peaceful mind. To walk safely through the maze of human
life, one needs the light of wisdom and the guidance of virtue.
- Lord Buddha
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Application and relevance of
Res Ipsa loquitur
In motor accident cases (civil) in Sri Lanka
With reference to South Africa and United Kingdom
Chinthaka Srinath Gunasekara (L.LB-Colombo)
District Judge- Embilipitiya.
Background
Within the scope of civil judicial system of Sri Lanka, significant amount of cases can be
identified damage claims raised due to motor vehicle accidents .Unfortunately, the number
of fatal and non-fatal accidents is increasing day by day, resulting in an increase of court
cases. According to the statistics of Police Department, it is reported that the amount of
pending criminal court cases based on motor traffic accidents were 142750 in 2011.1
According to the police, within the period of 10-20th
of April 2014, 108 people have died
due to 89 accidents.2 The reports further reveal that 627 persons were killed due to fatal
accidents in the first three months of this year. Further, statistics reveal that nearly five
persons lose their lives daily due to injuries sustained, owing to a road accident and it was
noted that these accidents involved motor bikes, trishaws and buses3.
One of major concerns associated with these cases is inability of the victim to prove the
case due to non-availability of direct evidence. It is evident that in most of the occasions
claimants are not in a position to explain the exact nature of such accidents as they take
place un expectedly, leaving the victims , mental and physical condition less able to recall
about the accident. The court system remains the only course of action for a victim of motor
vehicle accident. The court system in Sri Lanka has no authority to decide cases brought
1 Traffic statistics , www.police.lk , the official web site of Sri Lanka police Department ,visited on 10.08.2014 2 Menaka Indrakumar, The Times of Sri Lanka( E-magazine published in Canada),posted on 26th april 2014,
www.timeslanka.com, visited on 03.08.2014 3 Supun Dias and Olindhi Jayasundara on Road Accidents, Deaths and regulations, Daily Mirror 10.08.2014 at
www.dailymirror.lk visited on 03rd 08.2014
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before the courts on humanitarian grounds, but to deliver judgments based on available laws
and evidence relating to such cases.
In a civil suit of an accident claim, under the Aquilian action plaintiff has the burden to
prove the elements by adducing evidence. This is very difficult in motor vehicle accident
cases given circumstances of the incident. The victim is given the burden of proving the case
while the perpetrator is relieved of any responsibility in the proceedings. Failure to prove the
case on preponderance of probability case may result in dismissal of the case. This is not a
desirable situation. This does not mean that burden of proof should be taken as defendant‘s
responsibility. But Res ipsa loquitur (the event speaks for itself) rule allows court to infer
negligence of a defendant on the basis of circumstantial evidence of a particular case, where
there is no direct evidence to prove negligence. It is enough for the plaintiff to show prima
facie case of defendant‘s negligence to make such inference. Then defendant can refute that
inference by adducing evidence that he is not negligent. When there is an existing rule like
res ipsa loquitur, which could play very important rule, effectiveness of application of same
will strengthen the best interest of justice.(instead of the term „res ipsa loquitur‟, the word
“maxim” has been used hereinafter for the convenience).
History of the maxim
An interesting story behind the formulation of res Ipsa Loquitur, the plaintiff of the
case of Byrne vs Boadle4 while walking along the public street, was struck by a barrel of
flour falling from a window of a house. The plaintiff could not testify the accident as he had
suddenly been injured by said barrel. Because the plaintiff sought to recover on the grounds
of negligence and there was no evidence of negligence. In the Court of Exchequer, it was
unanimously held that the plaintiff had in fact offered evidence, by proof of the injury under
the circumstances, to sustain a verdict of damages.
The court thought that a barrel could not roll out of a warehouse without some
negligence, and to say that the plaintiff who is injured by it must call witness from the
warehouse to prove negligence was preposterous.5
Similar incident based in the case of Kearney v. London, B. & S.C.R.R.Co.6 Here it
was found that the circumstances of a brick falling from a wall in a bridge upon the plaintiff
causing him injury amounted to sufficient evidence of negligence to apply the res Ipsa
Loquitur. Then this doctrine has been originated under the English Courts.
4 1863 (2) H & C 722 5 Ibid at 728 6 1870 L.R. 5 Q.B.411
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Basic theory
When considering the interpretations given to the res Ipsa Loquitur, some have
considered it as an evidentiary rule. Some have considered it as a maxim. Some have
interpreted it as a legal principal. Therefore it is noteworthy to examine the theoretical
background of the norm through literature review briefly and the application of same in the
court.
According to B.S. Markesinis and D.F.Deaking, negligence will be presumed where the
means by which the damage was inflicted were under the defendant‟s sole control or where,
on first sight, no explanation other than carelessness by the defendant is possible.
The main idea of them is that the burden does not shift to the defendant. Then in such a
situation what is the duty cast upon the defendant? The answer is defendant may rebut the
prima-facie finding of fault by showing that he was not in sole control of the means of the
accident.7
Any way it seems that burden of proof still on the Plaintiff. That version is
corroborated with the views of Burshell , as he is on the opinion that in order for the
inference of negligence to be drawn ,the plaintiff must first prove(1) the injury was caused
by a thing which was under control of the defendant (2) the nature of the occurrence it self
leads to an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant or his servants because it is
some thing which usually does not happen without negligence and (3) the cause of the
occurrence is unknown .Then the court would be entitled to draw an inference of negligence
on the part of the defendant or his servants.8
According to the said theory burden of proof is still with the plaintiff. But some
researchers are taking contrary view thus, with regard to the version of Shailander Raj
Goswami,
“Generally in a case it is the plaintiff who has to provide
evidence to prove the defendant‟s negligence. The
burden of proof shifts to the defendant. There is a
presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant and
it is up to him to prove his non-liability and that it was not
his act which caused the plaintiff‟s injury. The defendant
leads the evidence.9
7 Ibid, p.161 8 J.Burchell, Principles of Delict, Juta and company,2010,P.106 9 Shailander Raj Goswami ,, Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya national university ,Lucknow, Res Ipsa Loquitur with
reference to case laws, www.legalserviceindia.com visited on 7th .08.2014
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His view is similar to old approach of burden shifts to the defendant and also much broader
than others as he speaks about the presumption of negligence under the maxim, whilst
others speak about the inference of negligence.
It was arguable that under the res Ipsa Loquitur, whether the burden of proof is
shifted to the defendant or not. However Shailander also accepts that maxim does not apply
if the cause of harm is known.
It is said by some courts that maxim may be invoked only where the facts of the
occurrence warrant the inference of negligence, and the pleader, because of the nature of the
case, is unable to point out the specific acts which caused the injury.10
On the other hand, at
least one jurisdiction restricts its application to situations wherein therein absolute duty or
obligation amounting to that of an insurer in which case, it is said, a presumption of
negligence is raised. Ordinarily, of course, a contractual relationship between plaintiff and
defendant is not necessary for the application of res Ipsa Loquitur.11
Then it is seen that in a case based on negligence 3 types of situations could be identified.
(1) Though the plaintiff must produce some evidence of negligence, if he doesn‘t do
so, he has not made a case. Any way if he does so, he has made a prima facie case.
(2) When it is required to presume by the law, until the contrary is proved, that is to be
considered as a presumption. This is another situation when the presumption is not
rebutted judgment will be against that party.
(3) When burden of proof rests upon a party and no evidence is offered to satisfy it, the
judgment will be delivered against such party.12
But it is noteworthy at the 1st instance in the above; in such a situation (when
plaintiff establishes prima facie case) Question of Presumption will not arise. Then court can
make inference on it. The difference between inference and presumption is the ―inference‖
could be neglected by the court but presumption cannot be neglected.13
Though the theoretical background has been explained by several jurists in various
ways, the rationale is same. Before applying the maxim there must be sound understanding
about the theory. It should be carefully examined that what sort of circumstances has
indicated through the evidence. Under the basic theory of the maxim, in an accident case if
the plaintiff‗s evidence indicates that :(1) the defendant had exclusive control of the
10 King vs Davis (1924)296 fed. 986(this quotation is taken from the article ―Effect of Doctrine of res Ipsa Loquitur
by Fowler v. Harper and Fred E Hackel) 11 Bloom vs Cullman 1916(197) Ala 490 (this quotation is also taken from the article ―Effect of Doctrine of res Ipsa
Loquitur by Fowler v. Harper and Fred E Hackel) 12
These situations have been clearly categorized by Fred E. Heckel and Fowler as 3 presumptions, and court also
focused in the case of Sulliven vs Crabtree 36 Tenn.App 469 13 Cogdell v. R. R. 1903( 132) N C 852, this has been illuminated , in Wigmore on ―evidence‖2490 at p.450. This is
also quoted in the article of Effect of Doctrine of res Ipsa Loquitur by Fowler v. Harper and Fred E Hackel,
Illionis Law Review(1928),P.730
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instrumentality that produced the injury and (2) the event that occurred was not likely to
have occurred without defendants negligence (3) non availability of the direct evidence
court can make inference of the negligence of the defendant‘s part unless he offers an
acceptable explanation of his innocence.
Further, some doubts, problems of the maxim have been cleared by the courts when
applying it. Then it is seen that res Ipsa Loquitur is not a doctrine but a mode of inferential
reasoning applies only to accidents of unknowing cause under the above 3 circumstances.
Then it is not difficult to understand the maxim.
There are some instances that due to specific provisions of enactments, application
of res Ipsa Loquitur will be limited. The effect of res Ipsa Loquitur is so shift the standard of
care towards a form of stricter liability, and it is therefore appropriate that its main
application lies in areas such as road traffic, an employers‘ liability where a high standard of
care has in any case been imposed. In principle, though, it is connected with inferences from
the facts and not with the legal imposition of a stricter standard. In the area of common law
liability for defective products which cause injury or other loss to ultimate consumers, courts
from Donoghue v Stevenson onwards have rejected the application of res Ipsa Loquitur and
required proof of fault by the manufacturer to be established. Statute, in the form of the
Consumer Protection Act 1987, has now imposed a form of stricter liability for certain kinds
of damage caused by defective products which in many respects is akin to a legal reversal of
the burden of proof. 14
Prof. Savitri Goonesekere also expressed that, while it is
impossible and also unnecessary to demarcate the types of
situation in which the plaintiff can point to his damage and
the event, and say “res Ipsa Loquitur”, it is clear that the
requirement that the ordinary experience of mankind should
associate the occurrence with negligence on the part of
those in control, operates as a limitation or the use of this
maxim. If the effect of the maxim is to create a presumption
of law affecting onus so that the plaintiff can maintain a
silent the defendant proceeds to prove that he was not
negligent, it because the more necessary to limit the areas
in which the plaintiff can effect a radical change in the law
on burden of proof.15
Lord Justice Fletcher Moulton, in the case of Wing v London General Omnibus Co.
Ltd16
has mentioned that this maxim has no application with regard to the street accidents.
But, Professor Mckerron‘s view is too broad and absolute a statement and in he is of the
view that,
14 B.S. Markesenis & S.F. Deakin, Tort Law, 3rd edition,oxford1995, p.162 15 Prof. Savitri Goonesekere, Res ipsa loquitur, Colombo Law Review 16 (1909) 2 KB 652
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“It true that the maxim has only a limited application to
collisions between moving vehicles, because, as is observed
by Scrutton L.J. in McGowan v Stott,17
where both parties
are moving and have a right to move, prima facie the mere
fact that these moving bodies run into each other is not
evidence of negligence‟. But, subject to this reservation,
there is no reason why the maxim should not apply to road
accidents, and it has been held to be so applicable in a
number of cases, both English and South African.18
Thus in Arthur v Bezuidenhout 19
, the plaintiff sued for damages for the loss of a motor
vehicle which had been wrecked in a collision with another vehicle. As a result of the
collision the drivers of both vehicles were killed. The evidence was that the defendant‘s
vehicle suddenly swerved on its incorrect side and collided head-on with the plaintiff‘s
vehicle. It was a common cause that after the accident the steering sector shaft was found to
be broken and that the vehicle was thereby rendered uncontrollable. It was held that,
“the maxim applied, that as on the evidence the
probabilities were that the severance of the shaft was due to
the impact and not, as alleged to torsional fatigue, the
inference of negligence had not been displaced, and
accordingly the defendant was liable”.20
After considering the cases such as Kuranda vs Sinclair 21
, Gordon vs Mathies
estate22
, Hamilton vs Mackinon23
he took the view that, the application is applied even for
such accidents.
With regard to the above discussion, it is clear that there may be several incidents
connected to motor accidents. Some authorities regard the doctrine as a principle of
evidence,24
while others insist upon treating it as a rule of the substantive law of tort.25
The
results of its application have been varied and the theories upon which it is applied are by no
means in harmony.
Anyway now it is clear whether in a Criminal case or a Civil case, based on
negligence of the defendant, when there is no direct evidence under the earlier discussed
circumstances the doctrine of res Ipsa Loquitur is given much effect for the plaintiff to
17 (1923) 143 L.T.217 at 219‘ 18 R.G.McKerron, The Law of Delict, 7th Edition, Juta and Company,1971.p.44,45 19(1962) 2 S.A.566 (A.D.), 20 Ibid.p.45 21 1932 WLD1 22 1958 (4) SA 149, 23 1933 CPD 353 24 Fred E. Heckel and Fowler V. Harper Effect of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 22 illionis Law review, 724,
(1928), http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu, 25 Ibid, P.727
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present his case as a special situation to the normal routine. The other use of res Ipsa
Loquitur is to create strict liability.26
Res Ipsa is one type of circumstantial evidence that
allows a reasonable fact finder to determine that the defendant s‘ negligence caused an
unusual event that subsequently caused injury to the plaintiff. As it has developed since
then, Res Ipsa allows judge and jury to apply common sense to a situation in order to
determine whether or not the defendant acted negligently.27
According to the above mentioned theoretical background there is no conclusive
concrete authority to say that , whether res Ipsa Lopuitur is a evidentiary rule or not.
There are several schools on topics of whether the burden of proof shift to the defendant or
not and presumption of negligence to be rebutted by the defendant.
Any way such confusion may lead to application it in various ways as said earlier.
But after analyzing above views and application in court cases it could be said, that burden
of proof does not shift to the defendant. Anyhow, if the plaintiff is able to create prima facie
case, defendant has to give a reasonable explanation to vacate the inference created by the
plaintiff. Then there is a similarity between the res Ipsa and doctrine illuminated by the case
of Rex v Cochrane28which is called today as ―Ellenborough Dictum”. Hence, application of
the rule is legally fit doctrine in accordance with the evidentiary rules. On the other hand it
is practical and fair to consider it as a rule of law. In the case of Silva vs North western
Transport Board 29
Court of Appeal of Sri Lanka has recently observed that, the two views
of res Ipsa Loquitur thus, ―(1) it is not a rule of law its own. Ultimate burden of proof rests
on the plaintiff. (2) It represents a rule of law. But second view is more practical and fair.
Take increasing road accidents for example. An accident occurs and sometimes find it
difficult to identify the person actually negligent. In such situations, depends on facts and
circumstances, this rule may be useful as a rule of law.‖30
Then at the end of the day, considering the fact of impact of res Ipsa Loquitur, it
could be concluded that, it is a rule of law in which the burden of proof is with the plaintiff
on the one hand and a rule that safeguards the victims of accidents on the other. Every other
cause of actions other than the accidents (which reason is unknown) is well known to the
plaintiff. As examples thus, in a divorce action, plaintiff has the knowledge over his
marriage life. Even in a Rei Vindicatio action, Possessory action, Partition suit or Money
recovery action plaintiff has all the materials prior to the action with his means of
knowledge. But in an accidental matter that is not such. Then such cases must be considered
separately. The maxim res Ipsa Loquitur is essential to be applied correctly for the sake of
justice due to above reasons. When considering other jurisdictions it is unable to trace any
country which totally rejects the maxim.
26 Eeshani Sharma, Res Ipsa Loquitur with respect to the Tort of Negligence. Published on 19.01.2013(She has
quoted the case of Ward vs. Tesco), http://jurisonline.in visited on 08.07.2013 27 Res Ipsa Loquitur, http://injury.findlaw.com/accident-injury-law/res-ipsa -loquitur.html ,visited on 11.09.2013. 28 1814 Gurneys Law reports 479 29 CA 543/1998(f),Date of the Judgment:12.01.2012. 30 per, Justice Anil Gooneratne, at p.9
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Applicability of the maxim in motor accident cases (civil) in
Sri Lanka
It is also noteworthy that only selected judgments are reported. As there is no
mechanism to publish the first instance court decisions up to date, we have to focus on
higher court decisions.
Effect of Res ipsa Loquitur has discussed in the case of Safena Umma vs Siddik31
.
Dalton J. was of the view that when the maxim was invoked by the plaintiff the burden
shifted to the defendant. In an action to recover damages for injuries caused by a motor bus,
which was driven in high speed, suddenly went out of the road and knocked down a boy
standing on the doorstep of a house. Plaintiff‘s evidence was enough to show the negligence
and story of the defendant with regard to the accident was not satisfactory. Then the action
succeeded. Though the Supreme Court judgment is delivered before 7 decades (77 years), it
is very significant up to now as the Supreme Court applied the maxim effectively by
refusing trial court judgment also by granting relief to the plaintiff after rejecting mere
explanation given by the defendant.
Anyway, mere application of the maxim does not mean that in each case plaintiff
must be given reliefs. There may be cases in which victims of motor accidents are at fault.
But if somebody victimized unexpectedly, with a reason beyond his (victims) control, in
such a situation there must be more responsibility to the wrongdoer to explain his innocence.
The impact of the above judgment reveals one facet of the legal system. If the plaintiff is
able to conclude in the trial court rather coming to higher forum, cost of litigation and
expenditure of government may be minimized. In several cases appellate courts has refused
trial court decisions based on burden of proof by applying the maxim. One classic example
could be in this nature is Abeypala vs Rajapaksa32
,
Facts in brief; there are a collision between a bus (which had been stopped) and a
motor car. The bus owner sued against motorist .The main issue was who has to discharge
the burden of proving negligence. Supreme Court held that the presumption proving
negligence arose from the facts and he has to explain the absence of negligence. It was
further held that in an action founded upon a collision between plaintiff‘s omnibus which
was at a standstill and defendants motor car which ran into it from behind there is a
presumption of negligence and it is for the defendant (the car driver) to offer an explanation
in not having negligence. Keunaman J. is of the view that,
― there is a prima facie proof of negligence, and it is for
the defendant to offer an explanation which court may or
may not accept, or regard as reasonably true, in negating
negligence. The District Judge has failed to appreciate this
31 (1934) 37 NLR 25 32 (1943) 44 NLR 289
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matter of the burden of proof, and the shifting of the burden
to the plaintiff. Because of this, his judgment cannot be
sustained.”
He set aside the judgment of the District Judge, and ordered that a new trial be held
before another District Judge in which all relevant matters will be fully considered including
any explanation tendered by the defendant.
Considering the first case, court was of the view that Burden of proof shift to the
defendant. But in the latter it has been clearly mentioned that the defendant owed a duty to
offer explanation and not speaks about burden of proof. But in the first occasion mere
explanation given by the defendant was not reasonable, hence there is no any defect of
applying the maxim based on burden of proof in my view. When it pays attention with
regard to second case, if the District Court applied the maxim, plaintiff does not warrant an
appeal. Therefore this case is very important on effective application of the maxim.
In an another incident based on an accident, an omnibus stopped at a halting place
to enable passengers including the plaintiff to alight and the plaintiff was later found run
over by the rear wheel of the bus. It was held that the maxim res ipsa loquitur applied and
that in the absence of an explanation the defendant was liable.33
Supreme Court is of the view that in the ordinary course of things the rear wheels
of an omnibus which is carefully and competently handled do not run over a person who has
just alighted from the vehicle at a prescribed halting place. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
clearly applies to such a case, because ―where the accident was such as does not normally
happen if those that have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in
the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care‖. In
the present case the driver has signally failed to give or even to suggest an explanation
which can be regarded as sufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence raised against
him. Indeed, he unblushingly confessed to almost complete ignorance of what had
happened. The drivers‘ mere explanation was that he did not know what has happened,
when plaintiff get off from the bus, he started to proceed the bus as conductor gave signal to
travel the bus. Anyway he has seen that plaintiff alighted from the bus and after bus
travelled two three feet he has stopped the bus as people shouted. Then he has seen that
plaintiff had been run over. Justice Gratiaen further held that,
“Far from serving to rebut the presumption of negligence,
this frank admission by the driver seems to me to strengthen
the case against him. If the driver of an omnibus is content
to surrender his judgment to the conductor on the question
whether it is safe to drive on without risk to the person who
were known, in an atmosphere of chaos and confusion, to
be in very close proximity to the vehicle, he does so at his
33 Perera vs Gamini Bus co Ltd, (1949) 51 NLR 328
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peril. To drive “in blinkers” on such an occasion is to my
mind an act of gross and unpardonable negligence. It
shows callous disregard for the safety of others.”34
Facts reveal that accident happened on June 22, 1945, before 69 years, But Even
today after an accident, what does negligent driver say? The answer is ―same‖. Most of them
don‘t care about their duty owe to passengers, pedestrians and other vehicles. Then maxim
provides greater duty of questioning their duty of care towards other. This case is also
evident to that effect. In a case of motor accident claim, it is not enough to say by the
defendant that the accident occurred due to mechanical defect. He must be explained how
said defect had arisen and must show that it is beyond his control. This has been discussed in
the case of Cabraal vs Albaratne35
. In a case where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
applicable, the burden on the defendant is not only to give a reasonable explanation of the
accident in question but also to show that the specific cause of the accident does not connote
negligence on his part.36
Then it is clear that a specific explanation is required from the defendant. In a case,
where maxim applies plaintiff‘s duty is also very important. One thing seems certain and
must be born in mind when there is reference to the maxim, and that is that it does not mean
that a plaintiff alleging negligence is ever absolved from establishing it. This is the view of
justice Soertz expressed in the case of Fraser Nursing Home vs Olney.37
When considering old judgments, though the maxim has been applied in motor
accident cases honorable justices have based their views on the basis that burden of proof
with the defendant. As mentioned above there was an uncertainty of the burden of proof.
That may be affected to Sri Lankan judgments also. In the case of Punchi Signgno vs Bogala
Graphite Co. Ltd38
Supreme Court applied the maxim with same view. According to the
facts, plaintiff claimed damages caused to his lorry by a collision between his lorry and the
1st defendant‘s lorry. The evidence showed that the 1
st defendant‘s lorry, which was being
driven by the 2nd
defendant, was on the wrong side the road when it was struck the
plaintiff‘s lorry and that the accident was due to a sudden disorder in the steering mechanism
of the defendant‘s lorry. It was held that the maxim res ipsa loquitur was applicable. The
burden was on the 1st defendant (owner of lorry) to satisfy the Court that he caused
periodical checks and had necessary repairs attended to and did everything in his power to
ensure the mechanical soundness of his lorry.
Dr. Wickrema weerasooriya is of the view that, this is an important decision on the
principle of res Ipsa Loquitur sometimes also referred to as ―inevitable accident‖ which
often comes up in motor accident cases and also another Supreme Court decision which did
not follow an earlier decision on the same topic of law. He has made an observation that
34 Justice Gratien (Justice kanakaratne has agreed) 35 (1955) 57 NLR 368 36 Justice K.D De Silva, (Justice Swan has agreed) 37 (1944) 45 NLR 77 38 (1967) 73 NLR 66
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Current day lawyers involved in Motor Traffic damages claims should study this decision
carefully for the topic of res Ipsa Loquitur and inevitable accident. 39
The court of appeal of Sri Lanka has applied the maxim in the case of
Subawickrema vs Samaranayake 40
.It was held that, the burden on the defendant where the
maxim res ipsa loquitur is applicable is not only to give a reasonable explanation but also to
show that the specific cause of the accident did not connote negligence on his part. The onus
is on the defendant to show positively that there was no want of care on his part to attend to
periodical checks, necessary repairs and doing everything in his power to ensure the
mechanical soundness of the vehicles. In this case, the defendant had failed to do this and
the plaintiff was therefore entitled to damages.41
There is another recent example for rejecting trial court decision after applying the
maxim. In the case of Salma Amanawattiya vs Thissa Kasthuriarachchi 42
justice Anil
Gooneratne has set aside the judgment of the original court by saying that he would prefer to
fortify his views to be applied to the facts of the case in hand by considering the maxim of
res ipsa Loquitur‖43
The facts of this case according to the judgment were, on or about
14.08.1990 plaintiff‘s husband died as a result of an accident, caused by an Omni bus driven
by the 1st defendant and the 2
nd defendant who was the owner of the bus bearing No 22 sri
9150. The deceased was a passenger in the bus at the time of accident and the issues suggest
that the deceased at the point of impact jumped out of the bus and died as a result of the bus
over turning. It suggests that death was caused due to the negligence of the deceased. The
learned District judge dismissed the plaintiff‘s case due to the fact that plaintiff has not
proved the case by direct or circumstantial evidence. Any way it was revealed at the trial
that the bus was not roadworthy. The Plaintiff-Appellant argued that this was a fit case to
apply the maxim of res ipsa loquitur and that therefore in the absence of proper explanation
by the defendants, they would be liable. The Court of Appeal said that the defendants were
liable and held as follows.
“Res Ipsa loquitur represents a rule of law. The rationale
for a rule of this nature to emerge or to be adopted was
because the plaintiff was unable to give details of the true
cause of accident and provide precise details about it. In
other words, the knowledge of the true cause of accident
lies with the defendant. As such, the plaintiff needs to prove
39 Dr.Wickrema Weerasooria, Law governing insuarance negligence damages and third party claims, july
2013,p.678,680 40 1992 (1) SriLR p.142 41 Justice Ismail. 42 CA767/1997(f),(decided on 13.12.2011), 2012 Bar Association Law Reports 323 43 At p.5 of the judgment.
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a prima facie case of negligence. It is more or less a rule of
evidence44
.”
Reasons for applying the maxim are, the evidence placed before the original court
by the 1st and 2
nd defendants regarding the mechanical condition of the bus to be
unroadworthy would permit court to infer negligence on the part of the defendants. It has
been further held that,
“in the case in hand there need not be expert evidence to
rely on liability or the condition of the vehicle, unless
complications are apparent.45
”
Then it is clear that the application of the maxim in recent matters based on the
inference of negligence and not with the ground shifting of burden to the defendant. It is
emphasized in the above case that when there is no reasonable explanation, where there are
no complications there is no need of calling expert evidence. It is noteworthy that the
approach of the court is more positive as the court has focused on the fact that the
‗knowledge of the true cause of accident lies with the defendant‘. In previous cases that fact
has not discussed yet. Then this would be a very important case for the development of the
maxim in Sri Lanka. Any how it seems that maxim has not applied nor refused at the
original Court.
When the maxim never pleaded or raised as an issue in the original court, appellate
court is reluctant to permit such a plea for the first time in appeal. This situation has
elaborated in a recent case, R.G.L De Silva vs North Western Transport Board 46
by the
Court of Appeal. Facts of the case were that the plaintiff (appellant) filed an action in the
District Court of Kuliyapitiya claiming damages in consequence of injuries suffered by him
due to collision between the vehicle in which he traveled and bus belonging to 1st defendant
driven by the 2nd
defendant. Plaintiff‘s action was dismissed. Plaintiff appellant drew
attention of Court of Appeal to the maxim. But court made following views.
―This position never pleaded or raised as an issue in the
original court. If the plaintiff relied on same an issue should
have been suggested to enable the defendants to give an
explanation and give the cause relevant to the accident. In
the absence of it being raised in the original court, I am not
inclined to accept same. At the best the Appellate Court
could refer to same only if the facts itself speak or apparent
from evidence, provided the defendant had opportunity to
explain. To permit such a plea for the first time in appeal
44 Ibid at p.6There is no defense or an acceptable explanation put forward by the defendant‘s to get them selves
absolved from the case. Facts itself speak the truth of the case make the defendant liable in negligence. There is
no material to establish that the accident occurred due to a cause beyond the c 45 Per Justice Anil Gooneratne, see p.9 46 CA 543/1998, decided on 12.01.2012
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would be unreasonable /unfair and lead to a travesty of
justice especially in the absence of representation of the
respondent though they cannot be excused for their absence
in the Appellate Court.”47
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal has
considered the maxim in detail with reference to decided English and Sri Lankan authorities
and concluded that maxim cannot apply by reason of plaintiff has not made a case against
the defendant . One of the reasons of non-application of the maxim was due to plaintiff‘s
inability to adduce independent evidence to show defendant‘s negligence. Contemplating the
mentioned reasons Court was of the view that though the maxim is adopted it cannot apply
haphazardly. Otherwise definitely maxim could be applied.
This case explores the importance of pleading and raising the maxim in the original
courts and also adducing evidence to enable to make inference to the court. Further it reveals
that the mentioning about the maxim in written submission is insufficient. Hence this
judgment has given guideline to the application of maxim. In Sri Lankan perspective, there
may be some questions of applying the maxim thus, whether plaintiff should plead/raise it?
or whether court can apply the maxim ex mere motu as an evidentiary rule?. Though that is
arguable, for the time being, this judgment has provided the answer that plaintiff has the
duty to raise /plead the maxim in proper forum and proper stage.
According to the Prof. Savitre Goonesekere, it is of course arguable that once the
maxim Res ipsa loquitur is not deemed to shift the burden of proving from plaintiff to
defendant it ceases to be of any special significance, and indeed may be accommodated
within section 114 of the Evidence Ordinance which deals with presumption of fact.48
In my
view the maxim cannot be considered as a presumption. Though the inference can be
neglected, presumption cannot neglect by the courts. Basic elements of the maxim should be
fulfilled by adducing evidence when direct evidence is not available. Then circumstances
may different case to case. This has been settled by recent Sri Lankan judgment49
and also in
the English cases.50
Applicability of res ipsa loquitur in motor accident cases in
South Africa
Jonathan Burchell explains the effect of the application very carefully and sharply,
47 Justice Anil Goonaratne,at P.7 and 8 48 Res ipsa loquitur, Colombo Law Review. 49 R.G.L De Silva vs North Western Transport Board, Salma Amanawattiya vs Thissa Kasthuriarachchi 50 Sulliven vs Crabtree. 36.Tenn.App 469 per Felts J. The effect of res ipsa loquitur , like that of any other case of
circumstancial evidence ,varies from case to case , depending on the particular facts of each case; and therefore
such effect can no more be fitted in to a fixed formula or reduced to a rigid rule that can the effect of other
cases of circumstantial evidence. The only generalization that can be safely made is that,in the words of the
definition of res ipsa loquitur , it affords ―reasonable evidence‖, in the absence of an explanation by defendant
,that the accident arose from his negligence.
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“no burden of proof is shifted from the plaintiff to the
defendant. The defendant may seek to rebut the inference by
adducing evidence that he was not negligent but he is not
obliged to do so. However, if the defendant remains silent
in the face of negligence on his part, he takes the risk of
judgment being given him.51
Then it demonstrates the duty of plaintiff and defendant when applying the maxim.
The word ―maxim‖ has been used in the court decisions and by the South African jurists
such J.C. Macintosh and C. Norman to introduce the res ipsa loquitur. Moreover, the maxim
is commonly applied where the plaintiff is not in a position to produce direct evidence of the
conduct of the defendant. This has been illustrated by the Millin j., in the case of Watt v. van
der Walt52
quoting Lord Shaw in as follows,
“It is the expression in the form of a maxim of what in the
affairs of life frequently strikes the mind, that is ,that a thing
tells its own story- not ballard vs North British railway
always but some times. But although a thing tells it own
story. That is not necessarily the whole story. Accordingly
when the story would seem to be relevant to infer liability
for some occurrence out of the usual, the remainder of the
story may displace the inference. But if the remainder of the
story does not do so, the inference remains res ipsa
loquitur.”
It is clear that under the said circumstances the maxim is applicable in South
Africa. However in the recent past, it was argued that res ipsa loquitur is not considered as a
principle and not even a rule in South Africa53
. South Africa too was an opinion that under
the maxim Burden of proof shifts to the defendant.54
Nonetheless, in the case of Arthur vs
Bezuidenhout and mieny 55
this has been rejected and Thompson J was of the view that.,
―That is not, however to say that the onus rests on the
defendant to establish the correctness of his explanation on
a balance of probabilities. The maxim res ipsa loquitur,
where applicable, gives rise to an inference rather than to a
presumption .Nor is the court or jury necessarily compelled
to draw the inference.”
Same view has been taken by later courts in recent cases. There is no onus on the
defense to prove an innocent explanation on balance of probabilities. But, in the light of the
51 Principles of Delict, Juta and company, 5th impression, 2010 (emphasis added by me) 52 1947 (2) SALR 1221 53 Hamilton vs Mackinnon, 1935 AD 364 54 Naude No vs Transval Boot and Shoe manufacturing co 1938 AD 379 55 1962 (2) SA 566 (A)
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nature of the occurrence a duty was imposed on the defendant to lead evidence which was
sufficient to restore the equilibrium which by now had swung in the plaintiff‘s favor by
reason of the inference which arose res ipsa loqutur.56
This case is also related to a motor
accident. The court applied the maxim and imposed liability on the defendant as there was
no explanation of the accident by stating that,
―Still do not know how the vehicles came to be and to remain in the road‖57
The explanation of the defendant must be a reasonable, true and sufficient one thus,
credible and reasonable and practical explanation.58
The Court of Appeal of Sri Lanka also
held that defendant is required not only to give a reasonable explanation but also to show
that the specific cause of accident did not connote negligence on his part.59
When the maxim
applies in a case an inference of negligence can be drawn from the evidence. The defendant
has to provide an explanation why the driver was not negligent60
. The maxim applies where
a motor car collides with a parked car, as a result of losing a wheel.61
Proof that a motor
vehicle in a stream of traffic stopping suddenly. A following driver is thus under a duty to
regulate his speed and his distance from the vehicle ahead as to be able to avoid a collision
should the vehicle ahead stop suddenly. If the driver of the following vehicle is unable to do
so and a collision results the inference is that he was either travelling too closely to the
vehicle ahead or too fast or that he was not keeping a proper look-out. Hence, proof of
negligence in fact res ipsa loquitur.62
This version has been accepted by Zondi j. in a recent
case of south Africa Garth Russel Blaauw vs Katrina Gertrudia Veenman63
. That is a case
where an action for damages arising out of a motor vehicle accident, defendant was
travelling at a high speed and too close behind the plaintiff. The defendant had been
following (tailgating) plaintiff, suddenly the plaintiff applied brakes to avoid a collision with
a front petrol vehicle which travels between two lines of the road and no way to overtake the
vehicle. The defendant who had been following plaintiff suddenly moved to the left of the
plaintiff‘s vehicle to avoid colliding with a barrier rail on the left shoulder of the road. Then
he moved to right and collided with plaintiff‘s vehicle. It was held that,
“driver must anticipate the possibility of a vehicle
travelling ahead in a stream of traffic. There is no evidence
by the defendant to rebut the inference of negligence. A
reasonable driver in the position of the defendant would
foresee the reasonable possibility that if drove too closely it
would be unable to avoid a collision.”
56 In the matter between The Road Accident Fund and Zilandie Mehlomakulu 2009 (5) SA 390, www.saflii.org 57 Per Jones j 58 J.C Macintosh & C.Norman, Negligence in Delict, 3rd edition,(Reprint 2003)p.367 59 Subawickrema vs Samaranayake1992 (1) Sri LR p.142 60 Bock vs Motor vehicle accident Fund of Namibia 2008 NAHC 93 61 Clements vs Esmeraldo 1946 CPD 964 62 Cooper, Motor Law, Vol.2 P101 63 2012 ZAWCHC 124
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Then maxim applied, plaintiff succeeded. Effectiveness of that case is very
important to Sri Lanka as many people use express ways presently. As consequence it is
clear that the maxim applies in South Africa in motor accident cases under the
circumstances stressed in the judgments.
Applicability of res ipsa loquitur in motor accident cases in
United Kingdom
In England, once it was admitted that there was a support for the view that once res
ipsa loquitur applied the legal burden of proof shifted to the defendant and he was liable
unless he proved on a balance of probabilities that the event was due no fault on his part.64
Some Sri Lankan judgments also took same view.65
But the current English view is
completely different. In the case of Ng Chun Pui vs Lee Chuen Tat66
there is no shift in the
formal burden of proof, which remains throughout on the claimant. Supposing the South
Africa too, the burden of proof does not shift to the defendant. Lord Griffiths said that,
―Although it has been said in number of cases, it is
misleading to talk of the burden of proof shifting to the
defendant in a res ipsa loquitur situation. The burden of
proving negligence rests throughout the case on the
plaintiff and so in an appropriate case the plaintiff
establishes primafacie case by relying upon the fact of the
accident. If the defendant adduce no evidence there is
nothing to rebut the inference of negligence and plaintiff
will have proved his case.”
English courts also accepted the point that the defendant may rebut the prima facie
finding that he was not in sole control of the means of the accident. In the case of Henderson
vs Henry E. jenkins and sons67
“a judge sitting alone ,however , cannot separate his
function as tribunal of law and fact in this way and sensibly
say in one breath that it is case of res ipsa loquitur and then
go on to find for the defendant. If he is not prepared to say
that, in the absence of evidence from the defendant, the
claimant has proved his case by pointing to the
circumstances of the accident he will not hold that it is a res
ipsa loquitur case in the first place. If the defendant chooses
not to respond by offering an explanation consistent with
64 Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, 16th edition by W.V.H. Rogers, p.207 65 Safena umma vs siddik (37 NLR 25), Cabraal vs Albaratne (57 NLR 368), Punchisgngno vs Bogala Graphite Co
(73 NLR 66), Subavickrama vs Samaranayake (1992(1) Sri LR 142) 66 1988 R.T.R. 296 pc 67 1970 A.C.282
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due care, then the claimant will win. This was not
necessarily so in the days of trial by jury, for the question
then was whether there was sufficient evidence to leave the
case to the jury and if the judge did so a verdict for the
defendant was not necessarily perverse. In most cases
where the claim gets as far as trial, however, the defendant
has something to say in response and the question arises of
what he has to do rebut the prima facie case”68
.
When there is ―no control‖ of the thing which caused the accident, over the
defendant, res ipsa loquitur cannot apply. This has been decided by the English courts in the
case of Easson vs L.N.E. Ry69
. Subject to that, under the definition given in the case of Scott
vs London and St. Katherine Docks co.70
, res ipsa loquitur applies in the English law in
motor accident cases. They have courage enough to impose liability on drivers even where
the driver has been found liable for injuries caused whilst suffering a heart attack.71
The case of Sulliven vs Crabtree72
exhibits the present scope of maxim in English
law. It was held that the maxim does not apply for all motor accidents. But it may apply to
such an accident where the circumstances causing it were within the driver‘s control and the
accident was such as does not usually occur without negligence. So where a motor vehicle,
without apparent cause, runs off the road and causes harm, the normal inference is that the
driver was, negligent, and res ipsa loquitur is usually held to apply.
Evaluation
In South Africa it has been restricted applying the maxim in medical negligence
cases73
and Negligence of the Attorneys74
.But that situation does not effect for the motor
accident case since they apply it effectively. Classic example in this regard is recent case of
Anna Elizabeth vs Pharmcare Ltd and Rita Elizabeth vs Pharmcare Ltd75
(connected
case)based on product liability. Though it is based on product liability the Supreme Court
Appeal made following comment.
―True, the maxim only comes to play if the plaintiff‟s
evidence is such that it can be said that event would not
occur without their having been negligent manufacture, but
it is perfectly conceivable that the courts may develop
reasons being readier in some cases of alleged defective
68 Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, 16th edition by W.V.H. Rogers, p.207 69 1944 (2) KB 421 70 1865 (3) H & C 596 71 Robberts vs Rams bottom 1980(1) WLR 823 72 36 Tenn.App 469 73 Van Wyk vs Lewis 1924 AD 438, Castle vs de Greef 1993 SA 501, Pringle vs Administrator 1990 (2) SA 379 74 Elizabeth Steyn No vs Ronald Bobroff 2012 SASCA 184 75 Supreme court of appeal of South Africa, case No 32/2002, decided on 28.03.2003,
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manufacture to draw the necessary primafacie inference of
negligence, where expert evidence is extremely difficult for
the plaintiff to acquire…”76
They have taken positive approach on the maxim and they apply it in all the
situations of motor accident cases which the basic requirement of the maxim fulfills. In
United States of America res ipsa Loquitur may applied when multiple defendants and
instrumentalities may have caused the accident, provided there is a finite group at which to
point the blame.77
But, as mentioned earlier motor accident cases based on negligence should be
considered separately due to difficulty of proof negligence. Therefore in my view defendant
is responsible for explain the accident. Reason for that, most probably knowledge of cause
of accident and control over the vehicle is with the defendant. There is an evidentiary rule
that, when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving
fact is upon him.78
But res ipsa loquitur does not expand so far. It reveals the fairness of the
maxim. Then, now law is very clear in all jurisdictions pertaining to the explanation of the
defendant. Supposing above, It balances the rights of both parties plaintiff and defendant
under the maxim as it casts duties upon plaintiff as well as defendant. That is also good
impact of the application.
Conclusion
In the past there was a tendency to elevate res ipsa loqitur to a special rule of the
law of negligence. One had disputes as to whether res ipsa loquitur ―could‖ apply to
complex matters like surgery or the operation of an air craft, but modern eyes these
controversies are misplaced, because matters of drawing inferences from particular facts
cannot be subject to rule of law and it is not possible to identify in advance categories of fact
situations to which res ipsa loquitur will applicable.79
It is evident that, some negligent acts
may beyond the control of defendant. In such a situation non application of the maxim is
fair. Considering above, it is clear that the maxim could be used in Sri Lanka as a rule of
proving negligence as South Africa and United Kingdom applies it effectively and also
appreciated by the superior Court decisions of Sri Lanka.
Apart from above my suggestion is to incorporate a separate chapter to the civil
procedure code80
with regard to the motor accident claims. Presently there are separate
chapters for various actions.81
Likewise specific provisions pertaining to the jurisdiction82
,
applicability of the maxim could be inserted. Present civil procedure code is old more than
76 P Howie J at p.12,13 77 Ybrra vs Spangard, www.lawnix.com visited on 27.08.2014 78 Sec.106 of the Sri Lankan evidence ordinance. 79 Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, 16th edition by W.V.H. Rogers, p.204 80 02 of 1889 (severally amended) 81 Testamentary, money recovery, Divorce. 82 Per sec 9 of the civil procedure
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120 years. Under the section 9 of it, territorial jurisdiction has been limited, since an action
shall be instituted in the court within the local limits, if a party defendant resides or the
cause of action (the accident) arises within the locality. This may be badly affected the
litigants who live in different localities. This is another barrier to access to the justice.
The execution of the decree is also affected to the plaintiffs. Current system of execution is
also too old and not much efficient. Therefore it is the high time to bring an amendment to
the civil procedure code or special provisions act pertaining to motor accident claims. Until
such a codification, it can be adopted positive approaches as observed in other jurisdictions
when applying the maxim.
The fight for justice against corruption is never easy. It never has been and never will be. It
exacts a toll on our self, our families, our friends, and especially our children. In the end, I
believe, as in my case, the price we pay is well worth holding on to our dignity.
- Frank Serpico
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Winding Up Law in Sri Lanka
Need of a Corporate Rescue Culture
Nuwan Tharaka Heenatigala
Additional District Judge, Polonnaruwa
Introduction
Companies are legal personalities and have perpetual succession. Their existence cannot
cease as that of human beings. There may be several appropriate reasons for the existence of
a company to cease. The end of a company comes when it is dissolved. ―Winding up‖ or
―Liquidation‖ is the process that prepares the company for dissolution, whereby, the assets
of a company are collected and realized, the proceeds of such realization are utilized to settle
the debts and liabilities of the company and, any balance that remains after meeting the costs
and expenses of the winding up and settlement of such debts and liabilities is distributed
among the members of the company or distributed as the constitution of the company
directs. However, when an insolvent company is being wound up there will be no assets left
for distribution among the members of the company.
The legal definition of the word ―Winding Up‖ can be defined as follows. ―The process of
dissolving a partnership or corporation by collecting all assets and outstanding income,
satisfying all the creditors‘ claims, and distributing whatever remains (the net assets). These
may be distributed as cash or in kind, first to preferred stockholders, if any, and then to
remaining shareholders, if any, pro rata. Winding up is in anticipation of a company‘s
dissolution‖.1
Since the companies are legal personalities, their winding up is regulated by law. In Sri
Lanka, winding up of companies is regulated by the Companies Act No.07 of 2007 and the
Winding up Rules of 1939.In the case where the winding up of a company commenced prior
to the introduction of the new Companies Act and the completion of which is still pending,
1 http://law.yourdictionary.com
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the applicable laws are the Companies Act No.17 of 1982 and the Winding up Rules of
1939.
This essay will analyze weaknesses in winding up law in Sri Lanka and suggestions to
overcome those weaknesses and also examine options available for companies in a financial
difficulty, other than liquidation.
Brief overview about the current winding up law in Sri Lanka
Winding up of companies could be carried out voluntarily or by court or under the
supervision of court, on various grounds2. It could be done voluntarily by the company when
it is solvent. When a company is insolvent, its winding up could be initiated by the company
itself through court or by its' creditors-voluntarily or through court. It could also be initiated
by the Registrar General of Companies or by the Official Receiver of court/ Liquidator of
the company, under voluntary winding up or winding up under court supervision, when such
winding up cannot be continued with due regard to the interests of the creditors or
contributories.
The jurisdiction of winding up cases under the 1982 Companies Act was vested in the
District Court of the area where the Registered Office of the company was located. The
jurisdiction of new winding up cases however is vested in the Commercial High Court of
Colombo (High Court of the Western Province exercising civil Jurisdiction hold in
Colombo), under the new Companies Act No.07 of 2007.
A company may be wound up by the court, if— [Section 270 of the Companies Act
No.07 of 2007]-
(a) The company has by special resolution resolved that the company be wound up by the
court;
(b) The company does not commence its business within a year from its incorporation or
suspends it business for one year;
(c) If the number of the members falls below the minimum number required under
subsection (2) of section 4 of this Act;
(d) The company has no directors;
(e) The company is unable to pay its debts; or
2 Section 267 (1) of the Companies Act No.07 of 2007
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(f) The court is of opinion that it is just and equitable that the company should be wound up.
A Director of a company who believes that the company is unable to pay its debts as they
fall due shall forthwith call for a Board Meeting to consider whether the Board should
apply to court for the winding up of the company and the appointment of a Liquidator or an
Administrator or carry on further business of the company, as required under Section 219 of
the Act. Therefore, when a company is making continuous losses and is unable to pay its
debts as they fall due, the company could adopt a Special Resolution for winding up in
compliance with Section 219 and make an application to court to wind up the company
under Section 270 of the Act. After an inquiry, if the court is satisfied with the application
and is of the opinion that it is just and equitable that the company should be wound up, it
will make the Winding up Order and appoint a Liquidator.
When a company is unable to pay its debts as they fall due, a creditor of the said company
could bring an application to wind up the company by court by proving the company‘s
inability to pay its debts. According to Section 271, a company‘s inability to pay its debt is
proved, when a creditor to whom the company owes a sum exceeding Rs.50, 000/= serves a
letter of demand in writing on the company, requiring the company to pay the sum due, and
the company fails to settle the said sum within three weeks from the date of serving such
letter of demand. Under these circumstances, a creditor could make an application to court
to wind up the company on the grounds that the company is unable to pay its debt, and the
court, after an inquiry, if satisfied with the application and is of the opinion that it is just and
equitable that the company should be wound up, will make the Winding up Order under
Section 270 of the Act and appoint a Liquidator as provided under Section 285.3
According to the Section 277 of the Act date of commencement of winding up by court is
the date of presentation of the Petition for Winding up in Court.
Court may appoint a Provisional Liquidator, on or after receiving the Petition for Winding
up filed either by the company or by a creditor, for the management and protection of the
assets owned by the company, until such time the court makes the Order on the application
for Winding up.4 The court may appoint a liquidator provisionally at any time after the
presentation of a winding up petition and before the making of a winding up order and either
the official receiver or any other fit person, may be so appointed. Where a liquidator is
provisionally appointed by the court, the court may limit and restrict his powers by the order
appointing him.5
3 ibid Section 272(1) 4 ibid Section 285 5 ibid Section 286
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The liquidator in a winding up by the court shall have power, with the sanction
either of the court or of the committee of inspection6
(a) To bring or defend any action or other legal proceeding in the name and on behalf of the
company;
(b) To carry on the business of the company so far as may be necessary for the beneficial
winding up of such company;
(c) To appoint an attorney-at-law to assist him in the performance of his duties;
(d) To pay any classes of creditors in full;
(e) To make any compromise or arrangement with creditors or persons claiming to be
creditors or having or alleging themselves to have any claim, present or future, certain or
contingent, ascertained or sounding only in damages against the company or whereby the
company may be rendered liable;
(f) To compromise all calls and liabilities to calls, debts, and liabilities capable of resulting
in debts and all claims, present or future, certain or contingent, ascertained or sounding only
in damages, subsisting or alleged to subsist between the company and a contributory or
alleged contributory or other debtor or person apprehending liability to the company, and all
questions in any way relating to or affecting the assets or the winding up of the company, on
such terms as may be agreed and take any security for the discharge of any such call, debt,
liability or claim and give a complete discharge in respect thereof.
According to Section 292[2] of the Companies Act No.07 of 2007 the Liquidator in
a winding up by the court shall have power:-
(a) To sell the movable and immovable property and things in action of the company by
public auction or private contract, with power to transfer the whole thereof to any person or
company or to sell the same in parcels;
(b) To do all acts and to execute in the name and on behalf of the company, all deeds,
receipts, and other documents and for that purpose to use when necessary, the seal of the
company, if any;
(c) To prove, rank and claim in the bankruptcy, insolvency or sequestration of any
contributory for any balance against his estate, and to receive dividends in the bankruptcy,
insolvency or sequestration in respect of that balance as a separate debt due from the
bankrupt or insolvent, and rateably with the other separate creditors;
6 ibid Section 292[1]
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(d) To draw, accept, make and endorse any bills of exchange or promissory note or like
instruments in the name and on behalf of the company, with the same effect with respect to
the liability of the company as if the bill or note or such instrument had been drawn,
accepted, made, or endorsed by or on behalf of the company in the course of its business;
(e) To raise on the security of the assets of the company any money required;
(f) To take out in his official name letters of administration to any deceased contributory,
and to do in his official name any other act necessary for obtaining payment of any money
due from a contributory or his estate which cannot be conveniently done in the name of the
company, and 230 Companies Act, No. 07 of 2007 in all such cases the money due shall, for
the purpose of enabling the liquidator to take out the letters of administration or recover the
money, be deemed to be due to the liquidator himself : Provided that nothing herein
empowered shall be deemed to affect the rights, duties, and privileges of the Public Trustee
appointed under the Public Trustee Ordinance (Cap. 88);
(g) To appoint an agent to do any business on behalf of such liquidator;
(h) To do all such other things as may be necessary for Winding up the affairs of the
company and distributing its assets.
Some of the main consequences of the Winding up Order are given below:
Action stayed in winding up:
According to Section 279(1), when a Winding up Order is made or a Provisional Liquidator
is appointed by court, no action or proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced
against the company except by leave of court, and subject to such terms as the court may
impose.
Section 279(2) states that the execution process or attachment against any property owned
by the company, by or for the benefit of a creditor who is entitled to a duly registered charge
against such property, will not be affected by the said provision under Section 279(1).
Avoidance of disposition:
Any disposition of company property, including things in action, transfer of shares etc., after
the commencement of the winding up, shall be void unless the court orders otherwise as
provided under Section 275.
Where a company is being wound up by court, any attachment or sequestration or execution
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enforced after the commencement of winding up (the date of presentation of the Petition for
Winding up), shall be void under Section 276. However, the execution process or
attachment of a property by a creditor who is entitled to a registered charge over the said
property is exempted under Section 276(2).
Restriction of rights of a creditor as to execution or attachment
Where a creditor has issued an execution against the goods or land of a company or has
attached any debt due to the company, and the company is subsequently wound up, he shall
not be entitled to the benefit of such execution or attachment unless he has completed
according to Section 378.
Custody of company property
According to Section 290 where a Winding up Order has been made or a Provisional
Liquidator has been appointed by court, the Liquidator or the Provisional Liquidator shall
take into his custody or under his control, all the property and the things in action which are
owned by the company or appears to be entitled to the company.
All persons, including the bankers, officers and agents of the company, shall deliver the
money or any property of the company held by them, forthwith or within a specified period,
as directed by court, to the Liquidator. It shall be a criminal offence if any such person
refuses to hand over the company property to the Liquidator.
Power of Court to order repayment of money and return of company property7
On an application made by a creditor, the Liquidator or a shareholder, the court may order
under Section 376, any Promoter or any past or present Director, Manager, Liquidator or
Receiver of the company, who has misapplied or retained or become liable or accountable
for any money or property of the company, or is guilty of negligence, default, or breach of
duty or trust in relation to the company, after an inquiry on such person‘s conduct,
a. To pay or restore the money or property or any part of it with interest, or
b. To contribute such sum to the assets of the company as compensation, or
c. In case of an application made by a creditor, to pay or transfer money or property or any
part of it with interest, to that creditor.
These provisions enable any unsettled creditor of a company under winding up, to recover
his claim from the Directors of the company who carried on the business under the said
circumstances.
7 ibid Section 376
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According to Section 365, the net realization of all unencumbered assets (which are not
subject to any charge/ mortgage) shall first be applied to settle the preferential claims in the
order of priority as specified in the 9th Schedule of the Act No. 07 of 2007.
As per the 9th Schedule, the Liquidator‘s costs and fees rank 1st among the preferential
claims, in addition to the reasonable costs incurred by the person who applies to court for
winding up and the actual costs incurred by the Liquidation Committee8
After settling the above claims, the Liquidator shall pay the following claims:
i. EPF, ETF and gratuity dues of any employee
ii. Income Tax charged or chargeable for any one complete year prior to the commencement
of the winding up, as selected by the Commissioner General of Inland Revenue,
iii. Turnover Tax charged or chargeable for one complete year prior to the commencement
of the winding up
iv. VAT charged or chargeable for four taxable periods prior to the commencement of the
winding up, as selected by the Commissioner General of Inland Revenue
v. All rates or taxes (other than income tax) due from the company within a period of 12
months prior to the commencement of the winding up
vi. All dues to the Government as recurring payments for any service given or rendered
periodically (electricity, water supply etc.)
vii. Industrial court awards and other statutory dues payable to employees
viii. Unpaid salaries or wages of employees for the services rendered to the company during
the last four months immediately preceding the commencement of the winding up
ix. Holiday pay payable to any employee
x. Any liability for compensation accrued prior to the commencement of the winding up
under the Workmen‘s Compensation Ordinance
All other claims, including the unsettled balance due to the secured creditors and the
Commissioner General of Inland Revenue on account of Income Tax and VAT, and the
balance Turnover Tax, Rates and other taxes payable, are treated as unsecured claims. They
rank equally among themselves and are settled in equal proportions, depending on the
availability of funds on net asset realization, after settling the secured and preferential
claims.
8 ibid Section 365[2]
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Where the affairs of a company have been completely wound up, the court shall where the
liquidator makes an application in that behalf make an order that the company be dissolved
from the date of such order and the company shall be dissolved accordingly.9
Voluntary Winding up
As per the provisions in Section 319[1] of the Companies Act a company may be wound up
voluntarily:-
(a) When the period if any, fixed for the duration of the company by the articles expires or
the event if any, occurs on the occurrence of which the articles provide that the company is
to be dissolved, and the company at a general meeting has passed a resolution requiring the
company to be wound up voluntarily;
(b) Where the company resolves by special resolution that the company be wound up
voluntarily;
(c) Where the company resolves by special resolution to the effect that it cannot by reason of
its liabilities continue its business and that it is advisable to wind up.
When the company has passed a resolution for voluntary winding up, it shall within fourteen
days from the date of the passing of the resolution, give notice of the resolution by
publication in the Gazette.
A voluntary winding up shall be deemed to commence at the time of the passing of the
resolution for voluntary winding up. The provisions of sections 343 to 350 (both inclusive)
shall apply to every voluntary winding up, whether a shareholders‘ or a creditors‘ winding
up.
Winding up subject to supervision of court
When a company has passed a resolution for voluntary winding up, the court may make an
order that the voluntary winding up shall continue but subject to such supervision of the
court, and with such liberty for creditors, contributories or others to apply to the court, and
generally on such terms and conditions as the court thinks just.10
Rules and regulations governed the Winding up Law in Sri Lanka are the Company Winding
up Rules in 1939. These rules are still valid and in force, even the Companies Act had been
amended and repealed many times.
9 ibid Section 316[1] 10 ibid Section 351
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Weaknesses in winding up law & rules in Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka has a fairly well-developed legal and judicial system. In some areas of the
corporate sector, its legal framework is rather modern and sophisticated. Over the past
twenty years, the legal framework has been regularly updated, and a host of new
amendments have been passed. Though this framework provides an adequate foundation for
a modern financial system, it suffers from a number of weaknesses affecting most
developing countries such as antiquated concepts, absence of laws for new developments,
and unconsolidated and overlapping laws.
In Sri Lanka, the legal framework for commercial insolvency provides only for liquidation;
there are no provisions in the laws for re-organization of businesses or companies. Therefore
some argues that the winding up law of companies in Sri Lanka is outdated and inefficient.
The liquidation of companies is a long drawn-out affair with no significant return from
assets to the stakeholders. It takes years to obtain statements of affairs, books of account,
realization of debts and sales of assets, distribution of assets to creditors, etc. before a
company is finally dissolved with the sanction of the court.
In the process, substantial corporate assets remain unrealized and undistributed. The
inordinate delay in proceedings mars the potential for the productive and rapid use of
dormant assets throughout the country. The key features of a sound insolvency system are
absent, and no material aspects of the law and process are observed. The law does respond
to the needs of modern industry. The process of seizure of assets is cumbersome. The
absence of effective tools and instruments to supervise and manage the insolvency process
renders the liquidation process an insignificant part of market dynamics. For instance in Sri
Lanka Company winding up rules are still governed by the company winding up rules of
1939, whereas the Companies Act had been amended, repealed and replaced by new acts in
1982 and 2007.
In Sri Lanka there are some provisions for compromise and schemes of arrangement under
companies act, but they are neither directed at nor facilitate the rehabilitation of companies.
For instance:
Provisions in respect of appointing an administrator11
Creditors do not use these provisions for restructuring debts or settling dues with debtors. A
compromise or arrangement can be proposed between a company and its creditors, or
between the company and its members, or between the company and both its creditors and
members. If a majority, representing three-fourths of the value of the creditors or members,
agrees to a compromise or arrangement, the compromise or arrangement will, if sanctioned
11 ibid Section 401
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by the court, be binding on creditors, the members, and the liquidator. A court order
sanctioning the compromise or arrangement is only effective once it is registered with the
Registrar of Companies. Efforts to restructure banks have been made by adopting special
initiatives from time to time.
There is little use of the provisions for arrangements and amalgamations to rescue
businesses and undertake restructurings under the Companies Act No.07 of 2007 in Sri
Lanka. Under the current provisions of winding up law, there is little opportunity to preserve
the business as a going concern to maximize value and enhance recovery for creditors.
Generally, compromises and arrangements are used mainly for mergers and acquisitions,
and not for restructurings. The non-availability of a restructuring law in Sri Lanka does not
provide an option for banks to explore in the turnaround of businesses that face difficulties.
A successful restructuring system in Sri Lanka can result in assets remaining a part of the
economic system and that restructuring enhances returns on assets; there is, therefore, a need
for a restructuring law in Sri Lanka in respect of current provisions in winding up law under
the Companies Act No.07 of 2007.
An efficient insolvency system requires the bodies responsible for regulating or supervising
insolvency administrators to be independent of individual administrators. They should set
standards that reflect the requirements of legislation and public expectations of fairness,
impartiality, transparency and accountability. Insolvency administrators should be
competent to exercise the powers given to them and should act with integrity, impartiality
and independence.
In Sri Lanka, no developed regulatory framework is available, nor is there a supervisory
body responsible for regulating the conduct of official receivers and liquidators. This role is
left to the courts, which oversee the liquidation process. The registrar of companies has
some control over the liquidator. The liquidator is required to submit audited accounts to the
registrar of companies. The registrar can monitor the liquidator and, where a liquidator does
not perform his duties and duly observe the requirements imposed on him, or if any
complaint is made to the registrar by any creditor or contributory, the registrar can inquire
into the matter and, if necessary, report to the court under the provisions of the Companies
Act. The liquidator can obtain release from the court only if he satisfies the court by filing a
final report confirming the disposal of assets, distribution of sales proceeds and the status of
settled and unsettled claims.
The office of the Registrar of Companies lacks the capacity to administer the official
receivers and the liquidation process. They are not exposed to any education and training
and are not schooled in best practices. However, their integrity, impartiality and
independence are not in doubt. There is a need to create a specialized insolvency
administration office that would be responsible for administering the liquidation process and
overseeing the liquidator‘s functions.
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Although the lack of resources and infrastructure is a constraint, Sri Lanka has a well-
regarded court system. The creation of the Commercial High Court has improved the
situation in the area of insolvency law, but delays in the disposal of cases and appeals are
common. The judiciary in Sri Lanka is fairly independent and impartial. The judges are held
in high esteem in society and are under constant pressure to maintain transparency in
imparting justice. Even though judges are highly regarded, the insolvency rules and
regulations may not be firm, thus allowing for the potentially unfair exercise of discretion.
There are no specialized bankruptcy courts in Sri Lanka. Under the Companies Act No 17 of
1982, the district court, within whose jurisdiction the registered office of the company is
situated, has the jurisdiction, among other things, to make orders in respect of winding up,
amalgamation and compromises. A district court is a court of general jurisdiction, with
unlimited civil jurisdiction in all civil, revenue, family, insolvency (of natural persons) and
testamentary matters. In present context Commercial High Court [Which established mainly
for commercial litigation] has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determines company
liquidation matters under the provisions of Act No.07 of 2007, but the absence of a
specialized bankruptcy court and effective tools to supervise and manage the insolvency
process makes the whole liquidation process an insignificant part of market dynamics.
Presently, winding up cases are heard by the Commercial High Court in Colombo12
, as most
winding-up cases take place there. Most of the judges do not have sufficient exposure to
commercial law. Lack of facilities and insufficient competent staff affect the insolvency
process. No established standards exist for evaluating the performance of the commercial
courts and the judges that supervise the liquidation process. The quality of judges can be
enhanced by providing for transparent, predictable and efficient rules of procedure that leave
little room for corruption. The company court rules that govern the liquidation process
require review to incorporate modern practices.
Need of a corporate rescue culture in Sri Lanka
The defining characteristic of insolvency law is therefore the imposition of a collective
approach to the way in which a debtor‘s assets are realized and in which they are distributed
to claimants against the debtor. Corporate rescue mechanisms are not intended to maintain
inefficient firms that are not economically viable, or to protect debtors from creditors except
for time-limited and short periods to facilitate the orderly restructuring of the corporate
entity and/or its business.
In simple terms; taking some action to continue to carry on business and eventually extricate
the Companies from their financial problems - commonly referred to as Corporate Rescue -
is one of the important matters which attract the attention of every government. All
companies cannot be rescued. First, there are those which enter some process in order to see
12 ibid Section 529
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if rescue is possible but they continue to fall deeper into debt or simply cannot make any
headway and meet their responsibilities under terms of any rescue package.
The desire to encourage the enterprise culture by promoting the corporate rescue has
culminated in a number of legal reforms being made to the law of insolvency in a few
countries. For example, as discussed in the chapter 4 of this thesis in Singapore, scheme of
arrangements has been introduced by Companies Act [Chapter 50]13
with the objective of
furthering timely rescue of ailing corporate entities. It was designed to strengthen the
foundations of an enterprise economy by establishing an insolvency regime that encourages
honest but unsuccessful entrepreneurs to persevere despite initial failure. In other words, the
aim was to promote a culture in which companies that could be rescued were, in fact,
rescued.
Traditionally, Sri Lanka‘s insolvency procedures which also followed the English system
were considered to be ‗creditor wealth maximization‘ processes, and were seen as methods
of obtaining the best possible returns for creditors. In attempting to achieve this end, our
system, like the English system, has narrowly focused on the interests of creditors, mainly
secured creditors, and ignored the interests of other important stakeholders, such as
shareholders and employees.
Under the law prior to 2007 there was no adequate legal procedure to facilitate the rescue
and rehabilitation of companies experiencing financial difficulties. Instead, a company in
financial trouble was generally subject to the process of winding up. However, when Sri
Lanka enacted the new Companies Act in 2007 a simplified procedure for administration
was introduced enabling the Board of Directors of the company concerned to resolve to
appoint an Administrator without an order of Court but subject to creditors‘ approval within
two weeks.14
The Commercial High Court has been vested with jurisdiction to intervene
only if a creditor or shareholder of the company seeks relief to protect his interests during
the period of administration. At the same time a salutary provision has been included in the
Act in that the Administrator can seek the assistance and guidance of Court by obtaining
directions in relation to any matter arising in connection with the carrying out of his
functions.
An administrator should within ten working days of being appointed, send a written notice
to all creditors of the company so far as he is aware of their addresses:-15
(a) Advising them of the appointment of an administrator; and
(b) Calling a meeting of creditors to consider whether the appointment should be confirmed.
13 Part VII ARRANGEMENTS, RECONSTRUCTIONS AND AMALGAMATIONS 14 Section 401 of the Companies Act No.07 of 2007 15 ibid Section 404 (1)
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Where no meeting of creditors is held before the expiry of the initial period the administrator
shall cease to hold office at the expiry of that period16
Where a meeting of creditors under this section does not confirm the appointment of the
administrator, the administrator shall cease to hold office with effect from the close of the
meeting17
Where a meeting of creditors under this section confirms the appointment of the
administrator, the administrator will continue in office and should prepare proposals in
accordance with the provisions of the Act.18
During the period for which an administrator holds office after the expiry of the initial
period:-19
(a) No resolution may be passed or order made for the winding up of the company;
(b) No receiver of the property of the company may be appointed;
(c) No other steps may be taken to enforce any security over any property of the company or
to re-possess any goods in the company‘s use or possession under any hire-purchase
agreement, except with:-
(i) The consent of the administrator; or
(ii) The leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court may impose;
(d) No other proceedings and no execution or other legal process may be commenced or
continued and no distress may be levied against the company or its property, except with:-
(i) The consent of the administrator; or
(ii) The leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court may impose;
However, such consent of the administrator or the leave of the court is not required for:-
(a) Filing a petition to wind up the company; or
16 ibid Section 404 (2) 17 ibid Section 404 (3) 18 ibid Section 404 (4) 19 ibid Section 405
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(b) Giving notice in relation to a default under a charge over property of the company or
under an agreement relating to property in the use, possession, or occupation of the
company.
Administrator‟s Proposals
Within two months after the end of the initial period or such longer period as the court may
allow, the administrator should prepare a statement of his proposals for achieving the
purpose or purposes specified in the order appointing him20
Powers of Administrator21
(a) An administrator:-
i. Should manage the affairs, business and property of the company;
ii. May do all such things as may be necessary or desirable for the management of the
affairs, business and property of the company;
iii. Without limiting the powers specified in paragraphs (a) and (b), shall have all the powers
that could be exercised by a receiver of the whole of the property and undertaking of the
company under sections 443, 445 and 446.
(b) The administrator may apply to the court for directions in relation to any matter arising
in connection with the carrying out of his functions.
(c) Where the exercise of any power conferred on the company or its board or officers by
this Act or by the company‘s articles could interfere with the exercise by the administrator
of his powers, such power should not be exercised by the company, its board or officers, as
the case may be, except with the consent of the administrator, which may be given generally
or in relation to particular cases.
(d) Without limiting the generality of (c) above any disposal or other dealing with the
property of the company without first obtaining the consent of the administrator, which may
be given generally or in relation to particular cases, shall unless the court otherwise orders,
be void.
(e) In exercising his powers the administrator is deemed to act as the company‘s agent and a
person dealing with the administrator in good faith and for value, should not be required to
inquire whether the administrator is acting within his powers.
20 ibid Section 406 21 ibid Section 416
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The creditors or shareholders of the company can apply to court and obtain order to protect
the interests during any time at which the administrator holds office under the provisions of
Section 425.
It is relevant to refer to a few other provisions in the Act which assist the corporate rescue.
These provisions include compromises with creditors, arrangements and amalgamations.
A Company trying to avoid winding up could attempt to enter into an informal arrangement
with its creditors, but the chances of such an agreement being successful is precarious. A
formal scheme of arrangement has long been possible with the sanction of the Court.
This type of arrangement may be useful to a Company in financial trouble but due to its
being procedurally complex and expensive it has only really been available to large
undertakings.
However, the new Companies Act No. 7 of 2007 also does not adequately deal with
restructuring of Companies or business recovery. Administration only applies to companies
and was originally intended to provide a breathing space for the company free from hassle
from its creditors. The idea was to allow the company a set period of time to try to get its act
together and come up with a plan for its rescue or at least a beneficial disposal of its assets.
Administration has, as its origins, the idea that the imposition of a professional to manage a
company‘s business can lead to the business being turned around and saved.
Business Recovery and Insolvency Practitioners‘ Association of Sri Lanka which is the Sri
Lanka Chapter of the global organization INSOL) has been advocating the enactment of
suitable legislation in Sri Lanka for corporate turn-around and insolvency in line with the
current legislation of other developed jurisdictions.
Therefore, Business Recovery and Insolvency Practitioners‘ Association of Sri Lanka has
submitted an amendment by way of an additional new Part XIIIA for Revival and
rehabilitation of Companies, [aforesaid draft described in the Appendix hereto] which is
to empower the Commercial High Court to entertain applications to consider and approve a
scheme for Revival and Rehabilitation of the company on application made by the Board of
Directors of the Company and at the same time giving an option for the Registrar-General of
Companies, a creditor or a shareholder to make such an application if such applicant has
satisfied the Court that the Board of Directors should have made the application as the
company is or is likely to become unable to pay its debts as they fall due and or the net
assets of the company are less than half of the Stated Capital of the company and can be
revived and rehabilitated. This proposed amendment to the Companies Act No.07 of 2007
has not been enacted and passed as a piece of legislation yet.
This draft prepared by Business Recovery and Insolvency Practitioners‘ Association of Sri
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Lanka is now before the Authorities and it is hoped that the new legislation will pave the
way for a meaningful corporate rescue in Sri Lanka. The Executive Committee of Business
Recovery and Insolvency Practitioners‘ Association of Sri Lanka has recently appealed to
the Government to give speedy attention to the proposed amendment and its‘ enactment
thereof. Therefore it is a must to have a specific legislation in respect of Corporate Rescue
and Restructuring in Sri Lanka in the present context.
Conclusion
The Companies Act No. 7 of 2007 marks a significant milestone in the development of
company law in Sri Lanka. Many of its features are improvements to what existed
previously. This is particularly true in respect of what has been introduced in relation to the
treatment of capital, directors duties and stakeholders rights. However, at the same time
there are certain features in the law that could be cause for concern and therefore would
deserve further development especially in areas such as winding up, liquidation and
corporate rescue and restructuring.
Provisions for arrangements to rescue businesses and undertake restructurings have to be
introduced to the Companies Act No.07 of 2007 in Sri Lanka. The availability of a
restructuring law in Sri Lanka will provide an option to turnaround of businesses that face
difficulties.
The office of the Registrar of Companies has to be enhanced by education and training to
create a specialized insolvency administration office that would be responsible for
administering the liquidation process and overseeing the liquidator‘s functions.
Specialized bankruptcy courts have to be introduced to the judicial system in Sri Lanka to
increase the effectiveness in supervision and management of the insolvency process. This
kind of arrangement will makes the whole liquidation process a significant part of market
dynamics. There is a need for training, continuous education and greater interaction of
judges with insolvency experts to hear and determine cases in these kind of specialized
bankruptcy courts.
There is also a need of the recognition of the concept of insolvency practitioners and
suggested effective engagement of professions in the insolvency process to maximize
resource use and the application of skills. The better option will be an introduction of
professional education such as Chartered Insolvency and Restructuring Professional22
to
Sri Lanka.
22 The Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals (CAIRP)
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Further, the draft prepared by Business Recovery and Insolvency Practitioners‘ Association
of Sri Lanka as an amendment by way of an additional new Part for Revival and
rehabilitation of Companies has to be enacted and implemented without much delay. The
Government must give speedy attention to the proposed amendment and its‘ enactment,
which will pave the way for a meaningful corporate rescue in Sri Lanka.
These changes will have to be recognized, acknowledged and addressed appropriately.
Certain measures would necessarily have to be in the form of amendments to the Companies
Act No.07 of 2007. Additionally, several measures will be required to harmonize the various
regulations, such as the rules of the Stock Exchange and the Central Bank, with the
provisions of the Companies Act. Also, there is a need for more creative and commercial
approaches to corporate entities in financial distress, and greater efforts to revive them rather
than applying the more traditional and conservative approach of liquidation or bankruptcy.
Freedom and justice cannot be parceled out in pieces to suit political convenience. I don't
believe you can stand for freedom for one group of people and deny it to others.
- Coretta Scott King
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Art of Writing Judgments
LAW AND LITERATURE
Gayantha Hemachandra
LLB (Hons) (Colombo), LLM (Queensland)
District Judge Bandarawela
Introduction
Judgment is a decision made by a court in respect of the matter before it.1 They may be
interim (interlocutory), deciding a particular issue prior to the trial of the case; or final,
finally disposing of the case. In partition cases, there are interlocutory and final judgments.
Decree is a court order and it may be nisi or absolute depending on the nature of the case. In
divorce cases, after the judgment given dissolving the marriage, a decree nisi is entered and
on the expiration of the time period, it is made absolute.
Section 5 of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter referred as the CPC) interprets judgment
as a statement given by the Judge on the grounds of a decree or an order whereas decree is a
formal expression of adjudication upon any right claimed or defence set up in a civil court.
Writing judgments and decrees are governed by provisions of the Chapter XX of the CPC.2
The case law and legal literature have developed giving guidelines in writing judgments.
The Judgment is the final determination of the court at most instances and therefore, trial
Judges are required to follow relevant statutory provisions in the CPC, case law and
developed legal literature whenever handing down judgments. This paper intends to
examine both relevant case law and legal literature developed with regard to writing of
judgments. Identical provisions can be found in the Indian Civil Procedure Code governing
writing of judgments3 and this paper expects to look into the Indian case law as well.
1 Oxford Dictionary of law (6th ed, 2006) 296. 2 Civil Procedure Code (LK) ss 184- 188. 3 Sudipto Sarkar and V R Manohar, Code of Civil Procedure (11th ed , 2010)pp 1511- 1525.
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Requisites of Judgment
Section 187 of the CPC extensively deals with the requisites of writing judgments. It says
that a judgment shall contain a concise statement of the case, the points for determination,
the decision thereon, and the reasons for such decision. Therefore, judgments handing down
under the CPC should fulfill these requirements specifically stipulated in S.187 of the CPC.
It covers three main stages in a judgment, a concise statement of the case, the points for
determination and the decision, the reasons for such decisions.
Statement of the Case
Giving a brief and comprehensive statement of the case is the first requisite in writing a
judgment. It is expected that the trial judge should concisely state the facts of the case and
on the basis of that statement, subsequent requisites are duly followed. Comprehensive
statement of the case amounts to the window of opportunity that opens up for the trial Judge
to build up his arguments, decision and reasons for it, finally adjudicating rights of the
parties in the case.
In Cellular Operators Association of India v Union of India, the Indian Supreme Court held
that a judgment of a court or a tribunal should contain a concise statement of the case.
Omission of it is a reason for the appellate court to set aside the judgment.4 Concise
statement of the case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings.5
Some Judges have beautifully developed the ways of presenting the concise statements of
the cases; and Lord Denning‘s opening statements of the cases are considered best among
them. In Hinz v Berry,6 Lord Denning began the judgment in the following way.
It happened on 19 April 1964. It was bluebell- time in Kent. Mr. and Mrs.
Hinz had been married some ten years, and they had four children, all
aged nine and under. The youngest was one. Mrs. Hinz was a remarkable
woman. I addition to her own four, she was foster mother to four children.
To add to it, she was two months pregnant with her fifth child.
On this day they drove out in a Bedford Dormobile van from Tonbridge to
Canvey Island. They took all eight children with them. As they were
coming back they turned into a lay- by at Turnham to have a picnic tea.
The husband, Mr. Hinz, was at the back of the Dormobile making the tea.
Mrs. Hinz had taken Stephanie, her third child, aged three, across the
road to pick bluebells on the opposite side. There came along a Jaguar
car driven by Mr. Berry, out of control. A tyre had burst. The Jaguar
4 (2003) SC 899. 5 Trojan & Co v Nagappa (1953) SC 235. 6 (1970) 2 QB 40,42.
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rushed into this lay- by and crashed into Mr. Hinz and the children. Mr.
Hinz was frightfully injured and died little later. Nearly all the children
were hurt. Blood was streaming from their heads. Mrs. Hinz, hearing the
crash, turned round and saw this disaster. She ran across the road and
did all she could. Her husband was beyond recall. But the children
recovered.
An action has been brought on her behalf and on behalf of the children for
damages against Mr. Berry, the defendant. ....
Lord Denning‘s opening statements arrests the attention of the reader.They borrow their
simplicity of the language from the American tradition. The use of continuous narrative in
which the facts and the law are woven together to form a story is both undemanding of the
reader and extremely effective.7 Lord Denning in ‗Family Story‘ explains his way of
approach to give a concise statement of the case:
I start my judgment, as it were, with a prologue- as the chorus does in one
of Shakespeare does- each with its scenes- drawn from real life. But I do it
by dividing my judgment up into main headings (corresponding to the
scenes)-each with a caption- so as to catch the eye. I draw the characters
as they truly are- using their real names- so that I never get them mixed
up. Never plaintiff or defendant, or appellant or respondent. In telling the
story, I set out the merits- I rely on them- I do not scorn them. Because the
merits go to show where justice lies.8
Lord Denning says that in giving judgment the Judge should not be cold and impassive,
impersonal and inhuman. He has criticized Judges who drily set out the pleadings: and the
orders already made, giving a detailed recital of facts, omitting nothing, relevant or
irrelevant.9 Lord Denning has in his most sarcastic and ironic manner referred those Judges
as ‗Heedless of hardship to one side or the other‘.10
As discussed above, it is the task for the trial Judge vested in terms of S.187 of the CPC to
give a brief and comprehensive statement of the case. On the basis of well structured and
outlined concise statement of the case, a trial Judge can discuss the points for determination,
the decision thereon, and the reasons for such decision. It should be pointed out that the
judgment including a concise statement of the case has specific but different audiences. First
it addresses the parties themselves, second, their legal teams, then, if an appeal is preferred
to the appellate courts.11
Therefore, giving a concise statement of the case at the opening of
the judgment is vital in writing judgments.
7 Andrew Goodman, How Judges Decide Cases: Reading, Writing and Analysing Judgments (2005) 112. 8 Lord Denning, Family Story (2nd ed, 1982) 207. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Goodman, above n 7, 55.
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Determination and Decision
If the parties are agreed as to the question of fact or law to be decided between them, they
may state the same in the form of an issue, when not in agreement, the court should proceed
to record the issues.12
Therefore, in civil cases, trial Judges have to identify issues for
determination. The judgment is often prepared after the trial, and discretion is given to the
trial Judge to amend the issues or frame additional issues in terms of s 149 of the CPC
before passing judgment. These statutory provisions gives a trial Judge wide discretion and
power to decide issues for the determination and decision thereon.
In Aziz Ahmed v I. A. Patel,13
the Court held that while pronouncing judgments the court
should apply its mind to the facts of the case and the points at issue, and give a reasoned
judgment thereon after duly evaluating the evidence adduced and after considering the
contentions of the parties. In Swaranlata v Harendra,14
the Court discussed that in a suit in
which the pleadings raised substantial issue of fact for trial, the trial court merely decreed
the claim without delivering a judgment and the High Court in appeal merely recorded the
plaintiff had sufficiently proved the case, it was held that there had been no real trial of
defendant‘s case. The Court was of the opinion that a judicial determination of a disputed
claim where substantial questions of law or fact arise is satisfactorily reached, only if it be
supported by the most cogent reasons that suggest themselves to the judge; a mere order
deciding the matter in dispute not supported by reasons is no judgment at all. It was held in
Kuldip & Co v Pratap that where in a judgment it is not apparent what the points for
determination are, there is no discussion of oral or documentary evidence on points in
controversy, the judgment does not fulfil the requirement of law.15
It is not necessary that
each and every argument made by the parties‘ counsel to be dealt with and decided in the
judgment. It is up to the trial Judge to see if the point has any merit or any relevance and
then only it will be dealt with.16
It was further held in Aziz Wani v Director that the
judgment, without discussion of issues raised by the parties, is not judgment in the eye of
law.17
In the light of the above cases, it is submitted that a judgment, consists with the points for
determination and the decision thereon, is well balanced and reasoned one in the eye of the
law. Therefore, a task is cast upon the trial Judge to apply his mind to the issues for
determination and the decision thereon in terms of s 187 of the CPC.
Some practical guidelines can be found how to identify the issues for determination and on
the basis of identified issues, how to reach decisions. It is recommended to have a formal
summary of the point or argument or a paragraph or section in which the argument is
12 Civil Procedure Code (LK) s 146(1)(2). 13 (1974) AP1 FB. 14 (1969) SC 1167. 15 (1959) A 505. 16 Amir Hasan v Dr. Harikishan (1996) AIHC 434, 435,(Raj). 17 (1971) J & K 67.
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recapitulated. If the trial judge summarizes his points for determination, the decision for
each argument can easily be built up and identified.18
Reasons for Decision
It is a cardinal principle in justice that the reasons for the decision should be clearly given in
the judgment. It helps the loser to understand why he lost, and of course, the winner why he
won. If the losing party prefers an appeal, it will also help them to prepare their appeal and
argue accordingly, and appellate courts to decide merits in each party‘s arguments. In view
of this, the judgment without reasons for decision is bad in law and, in fact not a judgment in
the eyes of the parties concerned and the public in general.
A judgment of a court or tribunal should contain, inter alia reasons for its decisions; on
omission judgment would be set aside.19
In Kachekalyna v Kachivijaya the Court held that it
is imperative that all arguments must contain the reasons for the decision.20
Where in a
judgment it is not apparent what the points for determination are, there is no discussion of
oral or documentary evidence on points in controversy, nor is the conclusion that the
plaintiff‘s suit shall stand decreed supported by any reasoning whatsoever, the judgment
does not fulfil the requirements of law.21
In Rattah v Dallchand, the Court pointed that mere
reliance upon notes of arguments submitted by lawyers is not in consonance with law and
the court should give its reasons for the decision reached.22
In Kamat v K, the Court held that
where no reasons are given for the conclusion arrived at, they cannot be accepted as legal
finding of fact in second appeal.23
The trial Judge should give his reasons for decisions on
each and every point and argument. In Warnakula v Ramani Jayawardene,24
the Court said
that bare answers to issues without reasons are not in compliance with the requirement of
S.187 of the CPC. The evidence germane to each issue must be reviewed or examined. The
Judge must evaluate and consider the totality of the evidence of the parties and witnesses
and stating that he prefers to accept the evidence of one party without giving reasons are
insufficient, the Court further held. The Court held in Babun Appu v Seetin and other that
the trial Judge has been in compliance with S.187 of the CPC and addressed the issue of
prescription and given his reasons accordingly.25
In Neemabai v Gyanbi,26
the Court said
that a mere order deciding the matter in dispute not supported by reasons is no judgment at
all. The same view was expressed in Om Prakash v State of Himachal Pradesh and the
Court held that a judgment which does not contain reasons for the decision is not a judgment
in the eye of law.27
18 Goodman, above n 7,120. 19 Ibid 4. 20 11 WR 33 PC. 21 Kuldip & Co v Pratap (1959) A 505. 22 (1954) HYD 39. 23 8 B 368. 24 (1990) 1 SLLR 206. 25 (unreported, Court of Appeal, Sri Lanka, Gooneratne J, 21 November 2007) 26 (1993) AIR 193. 27 (2001) AIR 18.
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Under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, all courts are now required
to give reasons for their rulings and judgments to demonstrate that a fair hearing has been
conducted by an independent and impartial tribunal. It is pointed that reasons have to be
given in plain language so that a party to a case, can understand what has happened and
why, demonstrate that the trial Judge has used a process of structured decision- making
rather than reached a decision arbitrarily. It shows that the losing party is more likely to
accept the judgment of the court and if challenged on appeal, assist the appellate court in
supporting where possible the conclusion of the court below.28
Judgments and Judicial Literacy Style
It is worthwhile to examine aspects about the judicial literacy style in judgment writing. The
language has become a well sharpened and handled tool at the hand of some great judges.
Their judgments have been considered distinctive and beautiful in giving well- constructed
and well- reasoned judgments. Much can be learned from the judicial literacy style from
those giants of juristic style, Benjamin Cardozo, Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States 1932- 1938, Sir Own Dixon, Chief Justice of Australia 1952- 1964 and Lord Denning,
Lord of Appeal in Ordinary from 1957 and Master of the Rolls 1962- 1982. Each judge still
retains an immense following, respect and affection among both lawyers and brother judges
in their own jurisdictions and beyond.
Justice Cardozo used alliteration, antithesis, proverbs and maxims to give persuasive force
to a judgment. He formed his sentences to make his points either terse or sincere. Lord
Roger explains Justice Cardozo‘s literacy style thus:
He thought of an opinion as to „win its way‟. In other words, he saw his
opinions as being in a competitive struggle with other opinions on the same
topic. That would, I think, be natural for a judge in the United States with a vast
number of individual State systems, and, at the time when he wrote, a federal
system of common law. The law reporting system was well established and so
lawyers and judges had ready access to competing decisions from all over the
country. In that situation Cardozo rightly saw that, if attractive or somehow
arresting, the style in which he wrote might make his opinion, and hence the
doctrine which it contained, more persuasive to courts and practitioners. And
in this he was not wrong. Cardozo‟s opinions continue to be among those most
cited in America to this day.29
Sir Owen Dixon (1886-1972) who was an exceptionally distinguished Australian judge,
famous for his interpretation of the Australian constitution. He presided over the legal
system of the Australian Commonwealth at a time when there was a tension between
following English law and creating a domestic law shaped more by the American Model.
28 Goodman, above n 7, 10, 11. 29 Lord Roger, The Form and Language of Judicial Opinions (2002) 118 LQR 239-241.
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His judgments are still followed and his judicial literacy style a live discussion among the
academics and the law students in the Australian Universities.
Andrew Goodman describes Lord Denning‘s way of handling the language in judgment
writing in his work on judgment writing.30
The distinctiveness of Lord Denning‟s technique came from his narrative style
constructed in short sentences which suggests to the reader he is delivering a
homily; he uses an almost child-like idealism when discussing legal principles,
and deliberately suppresses any over intellectualising. His aim was always to
do justice, rather than apply the law strictly, and he did not shrink from
undermining established doctrine that he found inconvenient in arriving at a
just solution to the problem. The simplicity of his style enabled his critics,
particularly in the House of Lords, to overturn many of his decisions.
The language in judgment demonstrates not only the linguistic skills of the trial judge but
also his school of thought and social values. Simplicity and neatness in handling the
language are required to be literacy qualities for judges.31
Conclusion
Section 187 of the CPC has set out a broad outline as to what the ideal judgment should be.
It covers the three main components in a judgment: a concise statement of the case, the
points for determination and the decision thereon and the reasons for such decision. This
paper discussed the case law and the literature developed on these areas. It shows that the
appellate courts and some jurists have shaped these areas with a view of building up a well-
structured, balanced and reasoned art of judgment writing.
It is submitted that the mandatory statutory provisions have now come into operation in
respect of the requisites of judgments. Not only the case law and legal literature, but also the
introduction of new legislation in many jurisdictions in the United States and Europe has
now shaped the art of judgment writing in compliance with universal idealisms such as fair
trial, right to appeal and balanced judiciary. If a judgment of a trial court reflects all the
requisites discussed above the judgment has contributed in one way or other to enhance
these universal ideals. Finally it gives its citizenry a reason to be proud of their judiciary.
A great burden has been put on the trial Judges to deliver ‗fair‘ judgments to the parties. The
winner as well as loser can understand what had happened in their case if the judgment is
delivered in compliance with s 187 of the CPC. If even one of the requisites in s 187 of the
CPC is missed, it is not a judgment in the eye of law. Therefore, it is submitted that
delivering judgments written with following all these time tested requisites paves the way
for a vibrant judiciary in this modern age of common law.
30 Above n 7,110,111. 31 Ibid.
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Evaluation of Evidence
In a Criminal Trial
Nalinda Indatissa
Attorney-at-Law
Evaluation of evidence produced before a court of law is a sacred duty cast on a judicial
officer. It is a very difficult task where judicial officers will have to blend their experience
with their knowledge of men and matters. Over the years courts too have developed
guidelines or rules that will be applicable in assessing the credibility of witnesses. The tests
that are applicable in evaluating witnesses are as follows;
(1). Test of probability
1.1 Often Judges are called upon to consider whether a narration given by a
witness stands the test of probability. When a witness narrates an incident
the Judge will have to consider the totality of such witness‘s evidence and
see whether the incident would have happened in the manner witness
describes. Or the Judge would have to consider whether a particular
incident had happened in the manner the prosecution witness has testified
or in the manner defence has suggested and or in the manner the defence
witnesses have unraveled. In other words - which version is more probable?
In such a situation the court should accept the more probable version and
reject the less probable version.
1.2 However, it must be borne in mind that the more probable version might
sometimes be the untruthful version.
1.3 The experience of the judge with regard to the manner in which things
happen in the world, the manner in which different people react to
situations, the cultural background of the witness, the educational
background of the witness, the religious background of the witness are
some of the things that will be helpful to a judge to apply the test of
probability to the testimony of that particular witness.
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1.4 In other words the judge has to be satisfied that the version of the witness is
not intrinsically improbable.
(2). Test of Consistency
2.1 This means whether the testimony of a witness is consistent from the
beginning of the investigation up to the end of the trial. The test of
consistency has many facets to it,
Consistency per-se 2.2 What is meant by consistency ―per-se‖ is that a witness has to be consistent
about material facts and or relevant facts throughout his testimony in court.
In other words a witness should not deviate or contradict his own evidence
given at the trial. Sometimes a witness, who describes an incident in one
way in the examination in chief, may materially contradict his own position
in cross examination, when he is subjected to intense drilling by the adverse
party. In such a situation if the witness‘s evidence is ―self-contradictory‖
and that too on vital or material matters it is unsafe to rely on such witness.
Consistency “inter-se”
2.3 Here, the entire testimony in a case must be taken together. For
example if the prosecutor relies on the evidence of two lay witnesses,
the evidence of a medical officer, evidence of a police officer, and the
evidence of a ballistic expert, all the evidence of prosecution witnesses
should match with each other. There should not be material
contradictions between the evidence of the two eye witnesses. The
testimony given by the eye witness should not contradict with the
medical evidence, ballistic experts‘ evidence and the investigating
officers‘ evidence.
2.4 For instance if in a murder case the two eye witnesses for the
prosecution testify that they saw an incident of shooting where the
accused came up to the deceased and fired at him at close range, the
medical officer‘s evidence too must corroborate that evidence by
confirming that he observed tattoo marks or blackening marks on the
body of the deceased which are consistent with a close range shot. If
the medical officer does not speak of blackening or tattoo marks on the
body of the deceased there would be a conflict between the evidence of
the eye witness and the medical evidence.
2.5 Similarly, if the eye witness states in his testimony that he saw the
deceased being shot at by the accused from a high elevation to that of
the deceased and if the angle of the entry wound on the deceased and
the exits wound does not tally with the lay witnesses‘ evidence it could
be reasonably concluded that there exists an inconsistency inter-se
between the evidence of the prosecution witnesses.
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2.6 If there is inconsistency inter-se between witnesses in regard to
material particulars a Judge should exercise caution in accepting such
evidence.
2.7 If two witnesses‘ evidence tally with each other on material particulars
the court has to look in to their cross examinations carefully to see
whether they are independent and non-collusive witnesses. In the case
of such witnesses if collusion and deception can be ruled out they are
witnesses whose evidence can be acted upon.
2.8 However, even though the evidence of witnesses tally on material
particulars but a close and a minute agreement can be shown to exist
between the witnesses a suspicion of fraud and confederacy is
generated about their testimony which then necessitates the rejection of
such evidence.
2.9 It must be noted that the reason behind sending the witnesses for the
prosecution out of the court-house when one prosecution witness is
giving evidence is to prevent the other witnesses training themselves
for cross examination after listening to the cross examination of the
witness in the stand.
2.10 However, merely because two witnesses contradict each other it cannot
be said that one or the other of them is a false witness, because the
discrepancy could be accounted for otherwise. In evaluating
contradictions inter-se of two witnesses, the judge must bear in mind
and probe whether the said discrepancy is due to dishonesty or due to
defective memory or lack of power of observation (Bandaranayake v.
Jagathsena 1984 (2) SLR 397, Republic v. Perera , Colombo H/C
Case 243/84 B minutes dated 15.07.1991)
Contradiction between the testimony of a witness and the statements and depositions made by such witness regarding the same matter on other occasions
2.11 Another way of testing the credibility of a witness is to contradict the
testimony of a witness given in court with his previous statements
made to the police under section 110 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure Act no 15 of 1979 or with his previous depositions made in
the Magistrates Court. This is permitted under section 155(c) of the
Evidence Ordinance.
2.12 When highlighting a previous statement made by a witness which is
contradictory to his present testimony before court a Judge should be
mindful of sections 145(1) and 145(2) of the Evidence Ordinance.
2.13 Firstly, it is necessary to question the witness whether he/she made
such a statement. If the witness admits making of the statement,
making of the statement need not be proved further as section 420 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure Act would then apply.
2.14 However, if the witness denies making the statement the party cross
examining will have to later prove the making of the statement through
the investigating officer.
2.15 However, after questioning the witness whether he made a previous
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statement, if he/she still denies making of the statement, attention of
the witness should be drawn to the contradictory portion of the
statement and he should be asked whether he made such a statement or
not. Even after the attention of the witness is drawn to the contents of
the previous statement which is contradictory to his present testimony,
if he denies the making of the statement , the contradictory portion
should be marked as a contradiction and such marking should be given
a number. In practice very often attorneys attempt to mark the entire
statement made by a witness in order to prove a contradiction. This is
the common practice though it grievously offends section 110(3) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure Act. Thus if non contradictory portions of
the statement too are permitted to be marked those portions would
sometimes corroborate the evidence given by that witness. Therefore, a
presiding Judge should be very vigilant when contradictions are sought
to be marked. They should be mindful only to permit the contradictory
portion in the statement to be marked as a contradiction and the rest
should be left out from the contradiction.
2.16 Furthermore, a judge should look at the evidence of the witness and the
statement of the witness and see for himself whether what is sought to
be marked is in fact a contradiction or whether it is in actual sense out
of the context as a contradiction.
2.17 It is also important for a trial Judge to check the original Information
Book extracts and find out whether the so called contradictory portion
recorded in the certified copy is correctly recorded as per what is
contained in the original Information Books. In our experience the
certified copies issued to the defence are sometimes inaccurate and
although there exists a contradiction as per the certified copy, in fact
there is no contradiction according to the original Information Book.
2.18 Once a contradiction is marked by the adverse party, the party calling
the witness should be permitted to re-examine the witness drawing the
attention of the witness to the contradiction and to give him (the
witness) an opportunity to explain the contradiction. Sometimes some
witnesses may satisfactorily explain vital contradictions. For example a
witness who had undergone immediate surgery after the incident may
not be in a position to give a statement like a normal person
witnessing an incident.
2.19 A witness need not be disbelieved merely because there is a
contradiction between her evidence and her previous statements made
touching the same issue.
2.20 Sometimes the contradictions are satisfactorily explained by the
witness.
What is a Vital Contradiction?
2.21 Sometimes the contradictions are not important contradictions on a material
point. (Boghi Bhai Hirji Bhai v. State of Gujarat A.I.R1983 S.C. 753
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(para 5) Discrepancies that do not go the root of the matter and shake the
basic version of the witness cannot be given too much importance. If the
contradiction is an important one on a material point it will go to the root of
the evidence of the witness. Such a contradiction if it remains unexplained
the credibility of the witness is affected.
Things that a trial judge should bear in mind in evaluating a contradiction
2.22.1 By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic
memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a video tape
is replayed on the mental screen.
2. Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness
could not have anticipated the occurrence which so often has an element
of surprise. The mental faculties therefore cannot be expected to be
attentive to absorb the details.
3. The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may
notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image
on the person‘s mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of
another.
4. By and large people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce
the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the
main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be
a human tape recorder.
5. In regard to exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an
occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork on the spur
of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people
to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it
depends on the time sense of individuals which varies from person to
person.
6. Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence
of events which take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A
witness is liable to get confused, or mixed up when interrogated later on.
7. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court
atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination made by counsel and out
of nervousness mix up facts, gets confused regarding sequence of events,
or fills up details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The sub-
conscious mind of the witness sometimes so operates on account of the
fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved though the witness is giving a
truthful and honest account of the occurrence witness by him- perhaps it is
a sort of psychological defence mechanism activated on the spur of the
moment.
2.23 Where prosecution witnesses contradicted their earlier police statements
on material points, and the contradiction suggest that the defence version
might be true, a legitimate doubt is cast on the truth of the prosecution
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story. (Bhanjan Singh v. State of Punjab A.I.R 1977S.C 674)
2.24 Even if a prosecution calls a number of such weak witnesses one cannot
corroborate the other. (Mulluwa v. State of Madya Pradesh A.I.R. 1976
989 (para18)
2.25 What is the evidentiary value of a previous inconsistent statement?
It is important to note that a previous inconsistent statement is not
admissible to prove the fact in issue in a criminal case. It is admissible
only to cast a doubt on the credibility of the witness. (Rex v. White 1922
17 C.A.R. 60 at page 64) But it becomes evidence if the witness admits
the truth of the earlier statement.
What is an omission?
2.26 Omission is a fact a witness has testified in court , but had failed to
mention in his or hers previous police statement and other depositions.
2.27 If the omission is about a vital or an important matter, such omission too
would affect the credibility of the witness. For example a witness
testifying in court identifies the accused as the assailant on him. He also
states that the accused had been known to him for some time and that at
the time he made the police complaint he knew the name of the accused as
―Rex‖. However, it is noted that t the witness has not mentiond about a
person called ―Rex‖ assaulting the witness in his complaint. Such failure is
called an omission.
Can you mark omissions in Court?
2.28 Unlike a contradiction an omission cannot be marked. The reason being a
contradiction is available in black and white in the police statement or any
other statement, whereas the omission is not a thing that exists in the
statement.
How do you draw the attention of court to an omission?
2.29 Often lawyers of the present day attempt to mark omissions, which is a
wrong practice and a procedure. The attention of the court is drawn to an
omission by suggesting to the witness that ―what the witness has told the
court has not been stated by him to the police when he made the police
complaint‖.
2.30 If when the omission is suggested the witness admits the failure to
mention to the police what is mentioned by him in court, omission need
not be proved.
2.31 However, if the witness denies the omission, the party suggesting the
omission should call the person who recorded the witness‘s police
statement and prove the omission.
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2.32 An omission on a material point too could affect the credibility of a
witness.
2.33 When omissions are suggested to a witness by a party cross examining a
witness, the party calling the witness could ask questions in re-
examination which could explain the reason for the omission.
2.34 An omission could take place due to the lapse on the part of the
investigator, to question the witness on material points at the time the
statement of the witness is recorded, or to due to the failure of the
investigator to take down all the material things that the witness has
spoken of at the time the complaint is recorded. In our experience when a
complainant makes a statement to the police some police officers tell the
complainant that some of things that he mentions are not necessary to be
mentioned .The police do this as they are inundated with work and
therefore want to discourage witnesses to make lengthy statements which
would mean more writing for them. But when the trial commences only
the complainant would realize that most of the things police have omitted
to write would be marked as omission in the case. So if the witness
explains the omissions in re-examination stating that he/she told the
matters that have been omitted in the police statement, but the police
officer did not record such matters stating they are irrelevant, then the
trial judge should consider the impact of the omission in his evaluation of
the evidence. . In other words whether such explanation by witness
satisfactorily explains the omission is a matter the trial judge should
consider.
2.35 When material omissions which go to the root of the credibility of the
witness are present the court must consider whether such omissions are
satisfactorily explained by the witness. If not, such witness‘s evidence
should be rejected by courts.
(3). Test of Spontaneity
3.1 The promptness in making a statement to the police soon after the incident
is a matter that should be taken in to consideration in the evaluation of a
particular witness. Belatedness in making a statement to police is a matter
which will affect the weight of the witness‘s evidence. The underlining
rationale being, that if a witness makes a prompt statement immediately
after an incident, he doesn‘t have time to get advice from outsiders in
regard to the manner in which the statement should be made. Thus, a
prompt statement would be a statement made by a witness of his own free
will. If the statement is made belatedly, generally it is viewed as a
statement made after getting proper legal advice or after planning his
strategy.
3.2 Whether a statement has been made promptly or not is a matter the court
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will have to decide on the facts and circumstances of each case.
For example : A statement made to a police station four hours after an
incident of murder might not be considered belated if
the police station is situated about twenty kilometers
from the place of the incident, and if there is no regular
transport service between the place of the incident and
the police station. However if both the place of incident
and the police station are situated in close proximately a
delay of 4 hours is a serious delay which makes the
statement a belated statement.
Statements made about persons who went missing during
the 1988/1989 insurgency period even though made
after several months were not treated as belated as there
was no atmosphere in the country during 1988/1989 to
make complaints against police officers.
3.3 In some cases witnesses do not go to the police station to make a
complaint immediately after the incident because either the accused have
threatened them with death if they complain to police or the accused are
politicians of the area wielding power and having influence on the police.
In such circumstances witnesses make the police complaints only after the
suspects are arrested by police and when they realize police is taking
action against the suspects.
In a situation like that too if the witness gives that explanation in
explaining the delay the learned trial judge should consider such
explanation in his evaluation of the witness‘ evidence.
Sometimes the sole witness to an incident might receive injuries from an
incident and become unconscious. In such a situation a statement made
several days after he/she regains consciousness will not be treated as
belated.
In certain circumstances police investigators record statements at the place
of the incident when they visit the scene. Such notes are pasted in the
information book after the investigator returns to the police station. In
such situation sometimes the date of the statement and the date on which
the notes are pasted could differ. Therefore, the court has to be very
cautious in determining the date of the statement. It is always advisable to
examine the original Information Book in order to ascertain the actual date
of the statement.
3.4 Even if the statement is belated the witness should be given an opportunity
to explain the reason for the delay. If the explanation for the delay is
satisfactory, court should not reject such witness‘s evidence merely
because it is belated.
3.5 In some instances although the statement of a witness is belated where no
apparent reason can be alleged against the witness for false testimony or
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animosity between the witness and the accused also cannot be shown the
courts have held that evidence of the witness should not be rejected merely
because it is belated. ( Pauline De Croos v. . The Queen 71 NLR 169.
(4). The test of interest and disinterestedness
4.1 Very often trial courts would encounter witnesses who are biased towards
one party to the litigation. Some witnesses have an enmity or an anger
against the accused developed over a period of time. It may well be that
the witness himself has had a fight with the accused before the incident in
issue in the case before court.
4.2 Some witnesses have a motive to falsely implicate the accused to a case. It
may well be that due to some monetary or any other benefit the particular
witness might derive by implicating the accused.
4.3 Some witnesses are very friendly with the prosecution witnesses and
therefore want to help them win the case.
4.4 All such witnesses are called interested witness and or biased witnesses. In
cross examination material about the witness‘ motive, anger/animosity,
friendship, interestedness might transpire.
4.5 In such situation court has to be very cautious in evaluating the evidence
of such witnesses. In most murder cases in Sri Lanka the deceased is
attacked by the assailants either when the deceased is at home or when he
is in his paddy field. In such a case one can only expect his family
members to be witnesses. In that case the testimony of a wife or child
should not be rejected merely because witness is a relation.. In such a case
court also should consider the evidence of tht particular witness along
with the evidence of other independent witnesses.
For example: A witness might testify that the assailant came to their
house and attacked their father with a knife. She further
testifies that the accused gave two blows with the knife.
This evidence could be corroborated by the medical
evidence which is independent evidence. The medical
officer could testify that the injuries found on the
deceased are consistent with those done with a knife.
Should there be corroboration of an interested witness?
4.6 In accepting the evidence of an interested witness there is no rule which
requires the court to look for corroboration. The evidence of an interested
witness should be scrutinized with a little care. After doing so if the court
is satisfied that the evidence of such witness has a ring of truth in it, it
could be relied upon even without corroboration. (Ishwari Prasad v..
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Mohomed Isa A.I.R. (1963) S.C. 1728, Punjabrao v.. Mesharam A.I.R.
(1965) S.C. 1179)
4.7 Relationship by itself is not a ground to discredit the testimony of a
witness if it is otherwise found to be consistent and true (Sarawan Singh
v.. State of Punjab A.I.R. (1976) S.C. 2304)
4.8 Enmity by itself is also not a sufficient ground for rejecting the testimony
of a witness. (Ramankahai v.. State of Gujarat A.I.R. (1979) S.C. 1261
(para I) 4.9 However in appropriate cases the court can look for corroboration
although corroboration is not a must in the case of interested witnesses‘
evidence. Where the evidence of an interested witness is, neither wholly
reliable nor wholly unreliable (State Vs. Tula Ram A.I.R. (1960) All
585), where the witness appears to have exaggerated things (Vaikuntham
Chandrappa v.. State of Andhra Pradesh A.I.R. (1960) S.C. 1340),
Where there is corroboration in essential particulars by disinterested
persons, court could look for corroboration.
4.10 The weight of the evidence of interested witnesses may be affected by the
degree of their interest in the litigation (Hasker v.. Summers (1884) 10
V.I.R. (Eq) 204 Aust)
(5.) The test of demeanour
5.1 In early days evaluation of the demeanour and deportment of a witness has
been considered as an important test.
5.2 In short demeanour means anything which characterizes the witness‘
mode of giving evidence. Demeanour includes the witness‘ conduct,
manner, bearing, delivering and inflection.
Best says that in estimating the intention of a witness to narrate the truth,
one matter to be attended to is his manner and deportment in delivering his
testimony.
Starkie wrote:
―An over forward and hasty seal on the part of the witness, in giving
testimony which will benefit the party whose witness he is, his
exaggeration of circumstances, his reluctance in giving adverse evidence,
his slowness in answering, his evasive replies, his affectation of not hearing
or not understanding the question, for the purpose of gaining time to
consider the effect of his answer; precipitancy in answering, without
waiting to hear or to understand the nature of the question, his inability to
detail any circumstances wherein, if his testimony were untrue, he would
be open to contradiction, or his forwardness in minutely detailing those
where he knows contradiction to be impossible; an affectation of
indifference ,- are all to greater or less extent obvious marks of insincerity.
On the other hand, his promptness and frankness in answering questions
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without regard to consequences, and especially his unhesitating readiness
in stating all the circumstances attending the transaction, by which he
opens a wide field for contradiction if his testimony be false, are, as well as
numerous others of a similar nature, strong internal indications of his
sincerity.‖1
5.3 The judge may record the demeanour of a witness in terms of section 173 of
the Criminal Procedure Code and Section 273(4) of Code Criminal
Procedure Act.
5.4 The Judge who hears the case has the advantage of witnessing the
demeanour of the witness for himself. The Appellate Courts are therefore
slow to interfere with the decisions of the lower Courts on questions of fact
or oral testimony as they do not have the advantage of seeing the demenour
of the witnesses.
5.5 In order to observe the demeanour of a witness a judge should be in a
detached position. If the judge takes part in the examination of the witness
he/she will not be in an independent position to observe the demeanour of a
witness. (Yuill v. Yuill (1944) 29 C.L.W. 97)
5.6 In the evaluation of the evidence of a witness the trial judge could refer to
the witness‘ demeanour too. However, in order to refer to the demeanour of
the witness in his evaluation it is necessary for the trial judge to record the
demenour of the witness when the trial is in progress.
(6). the Test of Deliberate Falsehood
6.1 This arises from the maxim ―falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” (what is false
in one is false in all). In other words when a witness utters a false statement
in regard to one matter, his entire testimony is affected by such falsehood.
Courts used to adopt the theory that credibility is indivisible.
6.2 However, the application of the above rule has been subjected to the
following conditions;
1) The maxim is dangerous and generally not valid or useful- It is
not a mandatory rule.
It is dangerous to apply the rule as a general rule. In countries like
India and Sri Lanka a witness should not be totally disbelieved
merely because he has uttered falsehood in regard one or more points.
There is always a falsehood on some points in the testimony of the
majority of the witnesses due to a fringe or embroidery to the story.
However, if it is truthful in the main such testimony should not be
rejected.
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In the case of Ugar v. State of Bihar A.I.R (1965) S.C. 277 the
Indian Supreme Court has held that falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is
neither a sound rule of law nor a rule of practice, and that one hardly
comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of
untruth or at any rate exaggerations, embroideries or embellishments.
2) The main consideration is whether there is proved falsehood on a
material point.
Where a witness has lied on a material point, it is impossible for a
court to act on the other parts of the same witness‘s testimony.
(Chauharja Singh v. Bhuneshwari Prasad Pal 161 1 C 881 (p.c.)
When a witness gives false evidence on a material point, a judge must
be satisfied, before accepting other portions of his evidence as true,
that there are compelling reasons to do so, such as corroboration of
the evidence. (State v. Dawari Behera (1976) Cr.L.J.262)
3) If the false evidence is only an embellishment or on matters not
germane to the litigation or on immaterial points, the evidence
can be acted upon
If the evidence is rejected against one accused, the same evidence
cannot be generally used against another accused or to corroborate
another witness.
In the case of Banangi Kui v.. Emperor A.I.R (1942) P 321,
if a court disbelieves a witness, it cannot use his evidence to
corroborate another witness.
Same principle has been followed in Nalliahv. Herath 54 N.L.R 473
This principle has been discussed in the case of R v. Munidasa 58
N.L.R 180 C.C.A.
4) The court must sift the evidence and separate the truth from the
false, if possible.
The Court must always make every effort to disengage the truth from
the falsehood and sift the grain from the chaft rather than take the
easy course of rejecting the entire prosecution case merely because
there are some embellishments.
Abdul Ghani v.. State of Madya Pradesh A.I.R (1954) S.C. 31
It is only where the testimony of a witness is tainted to the core, the
falsehood and truth being inextricably intertwined that the court must
discard his evidence in toto. State of Uttar Pradesh v.. Shankar
A.I.R (1981) S.C 897 (para 32)
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Please also refer,
i. Gadiris Appu v. The King (52 NLR 344
ii. Rex v. Vellasammy 63 NLR 265
iii. Queen v.. Julis 65 NLR 505
iv. Francis Appuhamy v.The Queen 68 NLR 437
(7). The Test of means of knowledge
Another important matter to be decided in the evaluation of the evidence of
a witness is whether the witness at the time in question had a means of
gaining correct information.
The party calling a witness should establish that the particular witness had
the means to acquire the knowledge that he is testifying on. The adverse
party too can challenge the means of knowledge and prove that the witness
is uttering false testimony.
(8). The character evidence of a witness
In most case when a witness testify in court on behalf of a particular party to
the litigation the adverse party will cross examine the witness and will try to
demolish the credibility of such witness. One of the tools that the adverse
party would employ is to bring out material about the character of the
witness.
However, what the judges must bear in mind is that merely because the
witness has previous convictions, and or a previous bad character it cannot
be held that the witness is an untruthful witness. Some witnesses who have
previous convictions are more reliable persons than ordinary witness.
But if the previous bad record is in connection with a case of giving false
evidence in court, or submission of a forged document to Court, the Court
should exercise caution when accepting the evidence of such witnesses.
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Critique
Of the Concept of Dock Statement
In Sri Lanka
Sarath Jayamanne
Deputy Solicitor General,1
A careful examination of legal provisions in Sri Lanka reveals that the statute law of Sri
Lanka does not permit an accused in criminal proceedings to make a statement from the
dock. Yet throughout the years, the courts in Sri Lanka have recognized the practice of
making dock statements. Further, such statements are considered as ―evidence‖ and given
undisputed recognition in criminal proceedings. That itself shows the extent to which the
practice of making dock statements is embedded in the Sri Lankan legal culture. The
admission of such statements by the courts is considered to be lawful, proper and fair by the
legal fraternity. Thus it is highly relevant to engage in a critical analysis of the drawbacks of
this practice and to consider whether it should be retained and allowed to be continued in to
the future.
The objective of this paper is to consider whether the legislature or judge-
made law of Sri Lanka have recognized the practice of making dock statements, whether the
dock statement is relevant in terms of evidence and whether its admission would be contrary
to the scheme and principles of the Evidence Ordinance. It will also be examined whether
the jurisdictions which initially recognized the practice of making dock statements have
continued to recognize it or have abolished it. In addition, the advantages and disadvantages
of continuing the practice in Sri Lankan courts will be examined. Finally, the suggestions
that are proposed in this respect will be given.
The ways in which the accused can give his evidence at the
court
The popular view held by the Sri Lankan judges, lawyers and the law students
is that the presumption of innocence operates in favor of the accused. It could only be
rebutted by evidence led by the prosecution that would prove the guilt of the accused beyond
1 Lecturer (Law College), Hubert Humphrey Fellow (USA), M.Sc. in Criminology and Criminal Justice (Oxford),
B.Sc. in Applied Science (Sri Jayawardenapura), Diploma in Forensic Medicine ( Colombo).
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reasonable doubt. Therefore, there would be no compulsion for accused to speak. He can
remain silent in the dock. After the case for the prosecution is over, if the judge considers
that sufficient evidence has been adduced against the accused, he would call for the defence.
It is to be understood that thereby the accused would not be compelled to break his silence in
any way whatsoever.
(1) The accused may choose to give evidence from the witness box. In this
situation, the accused may have chosen to give evidence upon oath from the
witness box. Here the counsel for the accused would conduct the
examination-in-chief and thereafter the counsel for the prosecution can cross-
examine him.
(2) The accused may choose to abstain from giving evidence from the witness
box. Instead, he may adduce evidence on his behalf through other witnesses.
In this situation, the accused is also allowed to give evidence from the witness
box. In both these situations, evidence will be given on oath and the counsel
for the accused would conduct the examination-in-chief.
(3) The accused may also choose to abstain from giving evidence from the
witness box or through witnesses on his behalf. Instead, he may simply
choose to make a statement from the dock. In this situation, the accused will
not be required to take an oath or an affirmation. The accused will neither be
subjected to examination-in-chief nor cross examination. The judge is also
prevented from questioning the accused while he is giving a statement from
the dock. The accused is not to be imposed with restrictions, conditions or
prohibitions in making his statement from the dock. Such a statement is
known as a statement from the dock.
(4) The accused may also choose to remain silent without resorting to any of the
options mentioned above.
Is there any legislative provision which facilitate the making
of a statement from the dock?
The previous paragraph discussed the options which are available for the accused
in adducing evidence on his behalf. Therefore it becomes necessary for us to examine
whether there are any legislative provisions that facilitate the making of a statement from the
dock.
(a) At the Magistrates Courts.
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Once the case for the prosecution is over at the Non Summary inquiry at the
Magistrates Court, if the accused wishes to make a statement regarding the
charges leveled against him, it is the duty of the Magistrate to allow him to
proceed with it. Section 151 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act No. 15 of
1979 has provided for such statement. Before the accused makes any
statement in answer to the charge, it will be the duty of the Magistrate to
inform the accused that the statement which he is going to make can be used
as evidence at his trial.
Thereafter the accused can make his statement. Since the accused will be
making his statement from the dock, it could be defined as a statement from
the dock. The accused will not be under oath and would not be subjected for
any questioning. This statement is also known as ―statutory statement‖.
According to section 219 of the Code, all statements of the accused recorded
in the course of the inquiry, if any, at the Magistrates Court shall be put and
read in evidence before the close of the case for the prosecution in High
Court.
After the case for the prosecution is over at the Summary trial, either the
accused himself can give evidence or he can adduce evidence through
witnesses for his behalf2
. Yet the provisions in the Code of Criminal
Procedure or Evidence Ordinance do not expressly state that the accused can
make a statement from the dock.
(b) At the High Court.
At the end of the case for the prosecution in a trial by judge without a jury at
the High Court, if the Judge considers that there are grounds for proceeding
with the trial he shall call upon the accused for his defence3.Yet according to
section 200(2), if the accused or his pleader announces his intention not to
adduce evidence, the prosecuting counsel may address the court for the
second time in support of his case for the purpose of summing up the
evidence against the accused. However, section 201(1) lays down if the
accused or his pleader announces his intention to adduce evidence, the
counsel for the defense should lead evidence for the defense. It would mean
that the evidence of the witnesses should be led by way of examination in
chief. In such a situation, the counsel for the prosecution may have the right
to cross-examine all the witnesses4.
In a Trial by Jury, once the case for the prosecution is over if the Judge
considers that there is sufficient evidence pointing to the conclusion that the
2 Section 184 Code of Criminal Procedure Act No. 15 of 1979 3 Section 200 4 Section 201(2)
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accused has committed the offence, he shall ask the accused if he wishes to
produce evidence5. Yet this provision does not expressly state that the
accused has the right to make a statement from the dock. Section 221(1)
merely states that defense can call its witnesses and section 221(2) states that
the prosecuting counsel is entitled to cross-examine all the witnesses called
by the defence to testify on oath or affirmation.
After a careful consideration of the legal provisions relating to the Criminal Courts in
Sri Lanka, it is evident that although the making of a dock statement is expressly permitted
at the stage of Non Summary Inquiry, it is not permitted at any stage of the summary trial
either in the Magistrate Court or High Court.
In the absence of legislative provisions permitting the accused to make a statement
from the dock, it is of utmost importance that an examination should be made regarding the
rationale upon which such statements are being made.
The history of the right to make a statement from the dock
The Code of Criminal Procedure Act No. 15 of 1979 does not contain any
provision regarding dock statement. An examination of the Administration of Justice Law
No. 44 of 1973 (AJL), which had laid down the procedure in criminal cases during 1973 to
1978, did not contain any provision regarding dock statements. Statutory statements in
Magistrate ccourts did not arise as AJL did not have any provisions to have Non Summary
Inquiry. Therefore it becomes necessary for us to consider the provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure Act No. 15 of 1898 which was in force before the AJL came in to force.
Under section 155 of 1898 Code, after the case for the prosecution is closed in a non-
summary inquiry, if the accused wishes to make a statement from the dock, the Magistrate
should allow it. This was the same position under the AJL and under the Code of 1979.
Under the Code of 1898, the District Court had jurisdiction to try criminal cases and
therefore the Code specifies that a dock statement made by the accused at the Preliminary
Examination should be put and read in evidence before the close of the case for the
prosecution at the trial in District Court.
In addition, section 156(3) of the Code of 1898 stated that at the close of the
Non Summary Inquiry if the Magistrate is of the opinion that a prima facie case has been
made against the accused, he will be entitled to question the accused. Section 295(1) of the
Code stated that the Magistrate will question the accused in order to enable the accused
personally to explain any circumstances appearing in evidence against him. It is indeed a
very special situation where the Magistrate will be able to question the accused while he is
in the dock or in the witness box. Evidently this situation is very different to that of the
5 Section 220(2)
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existing position. In addition the section stated that answers given by the accused to the
magistrate at the Non Summary Inquiry can be put in as evidence by the prosecution at the
subsequent trial.
The relevant provisions relating the District Courts which had jurisdiction to
try criminal cases stated that once the case for the prosecution is over, the trial judge has the
duty to explain to the accused regarding the salient and important evidence against him, if
the accused is not being represented by a lawyer. According to section 296(1) of the 1898
Code, in any event the accused is entitled to give evidence from the witness box at a
criminal trial at the court.
After considering the above provisions, it is evident that from 1898 onwards
the right to make a statement from the dock has not been expressly permitted by the
legislature, except at the stage of Non-Summary Inquiry.
The next step in this analysis would be to examine whether the Criminal
Procedure law in England, which was the foundation of Common Law, has recognized the
right to make a dock statement and if it has been recognized, under what circumstances it
was done.
The history of the right to make a dock statement in England
The history of the right to make a dock statement in England is important for
this survey since it would enable us to discover the root of this subject.
The evolution of the legal principles of administering justice could be traced
to the early 18th
and in the 19th
century. During the reign of the monarchy, confessions were
elicited from accused persons through methods of torture in ‗Star Chambers‘ which were
located either in palace or court room. Based on such confessions suspects were convicted
and punished. This practice was severely criticized by the jurists and the society. Thus,
important legal concepts were developed by eminent legal scholars in relation to various
issues in the criminal justice system. These concepts are being jealously guarded and applied
up to this day. One such concept is the right against self-incrimination.
The right against self-incrimination would mean that if the accused makes an
involuntary confession, it cannot form the basis of his conviction. It would also mean that
the accused should not be compelled to give evidence against him. Based on this concept,
distinguished legal scholars formed the view that the accused is not a competent witness on
his own behalf even if the accused wishes to give evidence from the witness box. Jurists
perceived a danger that the accused may implicate himself during the trial and it would
contravene principle of right against self-incrimination. Therefore a principle was developed
to the effect that an accused is incompetent witness even if he is willing to give evidence on
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his own behalf at the trial. Thus he was prevented from giving evidence at the trial.
In addition, the accused had been deprived of legal representation in respect of
certain offences. The combination of the inability of the accused to give evidence on his
behalf and the denial of legal representation, pushed the accused to a very disadvantaged
position. Jurists perceived that the accused was prevented in every way from telling his side
of the story to the court.
As a mean of remedying this situation, the judiciary in England allowed the
accused to make a statement from the dock if he wishes so. Yet it was only recognized as a
practice at the Courts and has not given legislative recognition. It has thereafter evolved as
customary element in English legal procedure. This is the beginning of the enjoyment of our
right to make dock statement.
We shall consider circumstances under which the English Law allowed legal
representation and the impact of such principle had on the right to make dock statement. For
example, the enactment of the Prisoners' Counsel Act of 1836 in England provided the
provision that an accused charged with felony was entitled to retain a counsel. Thus it
seemed that one of the logical arguments for allowing an accused to make a dock statement,
has been removed. Therefore some argue that Courts should have prohibited the accused to
make a dock statement. While some judges have subscribed to this view, some judges have
not. Therefore we perceive an inconsistent approach of English courts in this regard.
Examination of series of judgments shows the varied opinions courts in England had on the
issue.
In R. vs. Boucher6 and R. vs. Beard
7 the accused was not allowed to make a
dock statement when he was represented by a counsel.
In R. vs. Mailings8 and R. vs. Walking
9 courts followed a contrary approach.
The accused was not allowed to make a dock statement even when he was not represented
by a counsel.
In R. vs. Rider10
the court has reverted back to the original position, in which
it was held that the accused was not allowed to make a dock statement if he is represented
by a counsel.
In R. vs. Dyer11
which was decided 6 years later, the accused was allowed to
make a dock statement even when he was represented by a counsel.
6 1837 8 C. & P. 142 7 1837 8 C. & P. 243 8 1838 8 C. & P. 242 9 1838 8 C. & P. 243 10 1838 8 C. & P. 539 11 1844 8 Cox. C. C. 113
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In R. vs. Taylor12
which was decided 15 years later, the accused was not
allowed to make a dock statement when he is represented by a counsel.
In R. vs. Shimmings13
which was decided 23 years later, the accused was
allowed to make a dock statement even if he was represented by a counsel.
The Criminal Evidence Act of 1898 of England, conferred competence to the
accused to give evidence on his behalf and at the same time preserved the right of the
accused to make a dock statement. However, the Act did not specifically mention whether
the same right can be enjoyed or not if the accused had legal representation.
In this context we should also consider the cases decided after the Criminal
Evidence Act was passed. In R. vs. Pope14
decided in 1962 and R. vs. Sheriff15
decided in
1903 held that the accused was allowed to make a dock statement even when he is
represented by a counsel.
The English courts have also considered the weight that should be attached to
a dock statement. The Coleman's trial16
decided in 1878 held that the dock statement of the
accused did not have any value at all.
Between 1836 and 1898, when the accused did not have competence to give
evidence on his own behalf but had the right to legal representation, three cases have
considered the weight that should be attached to a dock statement. In R. vs. Beard17
, it was
held that the jury is entitled to consider the dock statement of the accused in reaching their
verdict. In R. Rider18
decided one year later the contrary approach was followed and it was
held that the dock statement cannot be considered at all.
In R. vs. Shimmings19
decided 44 years later it was held that the dock
statement is not entitled to receive the same weight as that of sworn evidence but the jury is
entitled to consider such statements in reaching its verdict.
In cases decided after 1898, when the accused had both competence to give
evidence for his behalf and the right to legal representation, we perceive a contradictory
approach of the courts in this regard.
In Shankley vs. Hodgson20
, the dock statement was denied of any value when
it was contradicted by sworn evidence.
12 1859 1 F & F. 535 13 1882 15 Cox C.C. 122 14 1962 18 T.L.R. 717 15 1903 20 Cox. C. C. 394 16Joseph Woodfall Ebsworth, Dictionary of National Biography 1885-1900, volume 11 17 1837 8 C. & P. 243 18 1838 8 C. & P. 539 19 1882 15 Cox C.C. 122 20 1962 Crim L.R. 248
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In Frost and Hale21
decided 2 years later it was held that the dock statement
should not be considered as evidence in the sense that it is not made on oath and subjected to
cross-examination but it should be received in to the body of proof and the jury is entitled to
give it any weight which they consider it to be fit.
In D.P.P. vs. Walker22
decided 10 years later it was held that the jury is
entitled to give the dock statement some weight which they consider it to be fit.
In Coughlan23
decided 3 years later it was held that the effect of a dock
statement is persuasive rather than evidential and it cannot prove facts that are not otherwise
proved by evidence before the jury and it may make the jury see the proved facts in a
different light.
In Campbell24
decided 2 years later it was commented that the dock statement
has achieved a shadowy character half way in value and weight between sworn evidence and
mere hearsay. A jury cannot be told to disregard it altogether. They must be told to give it a
weight as they consider being fit.
Fifteen years prior to the 1898 Act, prominent legal scholars such as Sir
James Stephens expressed the view that it is unfair to treat accused as an incompetent
witness to give evidence on his own behalf.
Sir Fitz James Stephens in his History of Criminal Law in England said
(1883) "I am convinced by much experience that questioning (the accused) or the power of
giving evidence is a positive assistance, and a highly important one to innocent men and I do
not see why in the case of guilty there need be any hardship about it."
Sir James Stephens passed away in 1894. However the authorities in England
respected Stephens‘ views and they considered that a change of law in this respect was
necessary. Accordingly for the first time in history, the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898
recognized that the accused was a competent witness to give evidence on his own behalf.
Section 1(g) of the Act states that "Every person called in pursuance of this Act shall, unless
otherwise ordained by the court, give evidence from the witness box or other place which
other witnesses give evidence."
Similarly the same Act had another Section that recognized and allowed the
traditional practice of making dock statement. In this context it becomes necessary for us to
consider the basis upon which the legislature decided to retain the practice of making a dock
statement while recognizing the competence of the accused to give evidence from the
witness box. Section 1(h) of the Act states that "Nothing in this act shall affect the
provisions of section 18 of the Indictable Offences Act of 1848 or any right of the person
21 1964 48 Cr. App. Rep. 248 22 1 W. L. R. 1090 23 1977 Cr. App. R. 11 24 1979 69 Cr. App. R. 221
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charged to make a statement without being sworn‖. Evidently, no clear reason has been
adduced for the retention of the right of the accused to make a dock statement alongside of
the right of the accused to give evidence for his behalf. A considerate mind would however
realize that the abolishing such a longstanding practice would have provoked severe
criticism. Therefore legislators and jurists may have thought that abolishing it overnight
would not be a proper thing to do. The ultimate effect of this statute was to give legislative
recognition to a practice of making dock statements which was unwritten up to that stage
and to make accused a competent witness to give evidence from the witness box. Therefore
the accused could use the opportunity to make a dock statement as of a right.
In this context it becomes necessary for us to consider the reaction of the
English Courts to this amendment. Generally, the Judges have considered the retention of
the practice of making a dock statement alongside with the right of the accused to give
evidence on his behalf will result in a conflict of policy25
. In Shankley vs. Hodgson26
it was
held that a statement from the dock is not evidence but equated it to arguments made by
lawyers in a court house. It meant that the statement from the dock had only argumentative
value rather than evidentiary.
In R. vs. Campbell27
it was held that a statement from the dock has taken
somewhat a shadowy character, half way in between sworn evidence and mere hearsay. In
R. vs. Rider28
it was held that the jury should not consider a statement made from the dock if
such statement has not been proved by independent evidence.
Yet in certain judgments it has been signaled that statements from the dock
should also be considered as evidence. It is evident that this particular amendment received
considerable criticism and that it also had to overcome a number of obstacles in its
implementation. The discussion shows us clearly that even in England where the concept of
dock statement had been conceived, it clouded with controversy.
Reception of the practice of making a statement from the
dock in Sri Lanka.
The position under the Code of Criminal Procedure Act of 1898
The practice of making a statement from the dock was not recognized under the
Ceylon Code of Criminal Procedure Act of 1898. There was no legal provision or procedure
recognizing the concept of ‗dock statement‘ or allowing accused to make a dock statement
in a trial. Yet the effect of this concept was commented upon in an important case of King
25 R. vs. Pope 26[1962] Crim. L. R. 248. 27 (1979) 69 Cri. L.R.11 @ 225 28 (1838) 8. C. & P. 539
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vs. Sittambaram29
, which was decided in the year of 1920. The facts of the case are as
follows:
At the end of a non-summary inquiry, the magistrate allowed the accused to
make a statement from the dock, as provided for in the statute. The magistrate thereafter
committed the case to District Court for the trial. At the end of the trial at the District Court
the defense counsel made a request that the accused be allowed to make a dock statement.
However, the trial judge decided that even though statute recognized the right to make a
statement from the dock at the end of the non-summary inquiry, it is not recognized as such
at the end of the trial. In appeal, the Supreme Court deeply analyzed the legal position
regarding a statement from the dock and decided that the right of the accused to make a
statement from the dock at the end of the trial is not recognized by the statute. Yet it further
held that section 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898(Ceylon) provides that English
Law of criminal procedure would apply in a situations where legal provisions in Ceylon are
silent on any procedural issue. In addition the Section stipulated that it could be done only if
the English law does not conflict with any of the laws in Ceylon. Accordingly the Supreme
Court decided that the practice of making a statement from the dock, which was recognized
by the UK Criminal Evidence Act of 1898, is also a part of the law in Ceylon because our
law was silent. It is evident that the law in this respect was developed not by a statute but by
the courts in exercising its powers of interpretation. Therefore it teaches us the valuable
lesson that law could also be developed by the Supreme Court. It is through this judgment
that was decided in 1920 that Ceylon adopted the practice to make a statement from the
dock.
In a number of cases decided thereafter, the extent and the scope of the right
to make a statement from the dock was considered. In R. vs. Buddarakkitha Thero30
the main
issue was whether the statement from the dock can be considered as ‗evidence‘ in the case.
The Supreme Court commented that since the practice of making a dock statement was
given recognition by the courts for a long time, it has become an established law. The court
further held that even though the statement from the dock is not made on oath or affirmation
and is not subjected to cross examination, it should be considered as ‗evidence‘ in the case.
The court formed the view that the concept of allowing the dock statement becomes
meaningless if it is not going to be considered as evidence. It has to be borne in mind that
the court made these observation in obiter and not as a part or ratio decidendi.
The same approach was adopted in King vs. Arsa31
. It was held in this case
that the statement from the dock should be considered as evidence on the basis that such
statements are included in the term ―matter‖ in section 3 of the Evidence Ordinance. It is
respectfully submitted that this decision seems to have been arrived at without considering
the scheme and the symmetry of the Evidence Ordinance.
2920 N.L.R. page 257 3063 N.L.R. page 433 3170 N.L.R. page 403
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The next important question is whether it is proper for High Court judge to
direct the Jury in his summing-up that the accused deliberately refrained from giving sworn
evidence and the statement from the dock has a lesser value. This issue has been decided in
the case of R vs. Kularathna32
, in which the Supreme Court decided that such statements
should be considered as evidence, and it is proper and legal to tell the jury that it has lesser
value and that the accused has deliberately refrained from giving sworn evidence. In
addition, the Court laid down several guidelines that can be used in analyzing the statement
from the dock. These guidelines have evolved to be principles of law and operative as the
law in the country. If these guidelines were not observed by the trial judge in his summing
up to the jury or in delivering the judgment in a non-jury trial, the appellate courts would
vitiate the conviction. The non-observation of these guidelines would compel the appellate
courts to either acquit the accused or order a retrial. It is extremely difficult to secure a
conviction following a retrial. Such outcome would be unfair and detrimental to the victims
and wider society. It is equally unreasonable for the accused to face a retrial as a result of
the lapse on the part of the trial judge.
According to the judgment the legal effect of a dock statement can be as
follows:
1. If the court believes the dock statement, the accused should be acquitted.
2. Merely because the court disbelieves the statement from the dock, the court cannot
determine that the accused is guilty. When the prosecution is unable to prove its case
through evidence called by the prosecution, even if the court rejects the dock
statement, the accused should be acquitted.
3. If the dock statement is neither believed nor disbelieved, the accused must be
acquitted.
4. The only situation in which the accused can be found guilty is where the prosecution
has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and the dock statement is rejected.
5. The statement from the dock cannot be used as evidence against a co-accused. The
reason for maintaining this principle is due to the inability to subject the dock
statement for cross examination.
We have now analyzed that the statement from the dock has a lesser value due
to the fact that it is not made on oath or affirmation and it is not subjected to cross-
examination. In Queen vs. Kularatna it was held that the High Court Judge is entitled to
direct the Jury regarding the fact that the evidential value of the statement from the dock is
less. In Punchirala vs. The Queen33
the Trial Judge has directed the Jury that the evidential
value of the statement from the dock is less since it is not made on oath and since it is not
3271 N.L.R. page 529 3375 N. L. R. 174
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subjected to cross-examination. However the Supreme Court held that while the infirmities
of the evidence should be pointed out to the jury, the jury should be allowed to decide as to
what value should be attached to the dock statement and they should not be unduly
influenced by the trial judge.
It is evident from these decisions that it is not illegal for trial Judge to explain
the legal position of the dock statement; he cannot directly or indirectly influence the
decision of the Jury by emphasizing the infirmities of the dock statement. The criticism is
the manner in which the trial Judge gives directions to the Jury, his mode of pronunciations
and his indirect signals to the Jury. Therefore the High Court judge should take care not to
give clues through body language as those might be wrongly interpreted by the jury.
The position under the Administration of Justice Law of 1973
In Sugathadasa vs. the Republic of Sri Lanka34
the Supreme Court considered the
position of a dock statement under the Administration of Justice Law of 1973(AJL). Section
213(2) of AJL stipulates that the trial judge shall inform the accused that he has the right to
give ‗evidence‘ for his defense. The Supreme Court decided that the right to make a dock
statement was not abolished by the law and the term ―evidence‖ in this section would also
include a statement from the dock.
The ratio of this case is that none of the sections in the AJL has expressly abolished
the long-standing practice of making a dock statement. Accordingly, the court allowed
continuing with the long-standing practice of making a dock statement, which then had a
history of over 70 years.
The position under the Code of Criminal Procedure Act No.15 of 1979
The next issue is whether the Code of Criminal Procedure Act No.15 of 1979 which
was enacted after abolishing the AJL has facilitated the making a statement from the dock.
As stated earlier in this paper, it expressly recognizes the right of the accused to make a
statement from the dock at the Non-summary inquiry. Yet it does not expressly provide for
the making of such a statement at the High Court or Magistrate Court summary trial.
As a result of becoming a Republic in 1972, Sri Lanka has shed its legal relations
with England. Section 6 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 had provided that in a
situation where the Domestic Law relating to Criminal Procedure is silent, the law relating
to Criminal Procedure for the time being in force in England shall be applied.
Yet in the Code of 1979, there is no provision to a similar effect. Section 7 of the Code
provides that,
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“As regarding matters of criminal procedure for which special provisions may
not have been made by this code or by any other law for the time being in force
such procedure as the justice of the case may require and as in not inconsistent
with this code may be followed.”
According to this provision it is evident that whenever there is a lacuna in the local law
relating to Criminal Procedure, the courts are not bound to follow the law in England.
However we are reminded that even though the statutory law of Sri Lanka did not expressly
recognize the right to make a statement from the dock, since it had been expressly
recognized under the English Criminal Evidence Act of 1898, it had become a part of our
local law. This argument was accepted in the case of R. vs. Sittambaram, decided in
1920.The judgment was based on the law in England. Since Sri Lanka has shed all its legal
relations with England, it could be argued that the practice of making a dock statement
should not be allowed in Sri Lanka as it did not have a legal validity any more. The
argument is that after 1972, the practice of making a statement from the dock should not
have been permitted in Sri Lankan courts. The counter argument would be that merely
because Sri Lanka shed all its legal ties with England in 1972, that it would not invalidate all
the laws that have been received, developed and established in Sri Lanka from England. It
would mean that laws that were received from England which have been followed as a
custom, tradition or a norm will not be automatically rendered invalid by reason of Sri
Lanka becoming a Republic.
Another argument that can be made is section 100 of the Evidence Ordinance No.
14 of 1895 would also applicable in this respect. Even though Sri Lanka became a Republic
in 1972, the link between England and Sri Lanka in respect of law of Evidence remains
unchanged. Section 100 of the Sri Lankan Evidence Ordinance provides that in respect of
matters of evidence which have not been provided for by the Ordinance, the law relating to
evidence in England shall apply. This section remains unchanged up to this date. Therefore
the argument would be that since English courts have recognized the right to make a dock
statement in England at that time, it should also apply to Sri Lanka. It would be made
applicable in Sri Lanka in spite of the fact that 1979 Code of Criminal Procedure Act of Sri
Lanka is silent on the issue.
The issue in this situation is whether the practice of making a statement from the
dock is a matter relating to evidence or to that of criminal procedure. If it is an issue relating
to criminal procedure, then section 100 of the Evidence Ordinance cannot be used as means
of asserting that the right to make a dock statement applies to Sri Lanka as well. If it is a
matter relating to evidence, then section 100 can be used to insist that the right is applicable
to Sri Lanka also.
The modern law of evidence in England does not permit the practice of making a
statement from the dock. Therefore if section 100 has been acted upon, the practice of
making a statement from the dock should not be allowed by the Courts in Sri Lanka.
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The evolution of English Law relating to dock statements
In England, the law relating to Evidence and Criminal Procedure was
contained in one enactment – the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898. Since it expressly
recognized the right of the accused to make a statement from the dock, the practice of
making such a statement was permitted in the courts. Yet by 1972, there were strong
criticisms regarding the practice of making statement from the dock. Therefore a Criminal
Law Revision Committee of UK was appointed in 1972 to examine the issue and other
criminal justice issues, and report to the government.
After in depth analysis, the Commission prepared a report which included the
recommendation that the right of the accused to make statement from the dock, without
taking an oath or an affirmation and without being subjected to cross examination does not
serve the ends of justice and therefore it has to be abolished.
The analysis and the reasons given by the committee are as follows:
―Whatever justification there may have been for preserving the
right in 1898, we think that nowadays the accused, if he gives evidence, should do so in the
same way as other witnesses and be subjected to cross-examination. It is now in the interest
of justice that the accused should have the advantages, for that they may be worth,
mentioned…[T]he present rule has another disadvantage in that, if the accused is
unrepresented, the court should explain to him that he has the choice between these courses.
Since in the great majority of the cases the accused, if he intends to give evidence, intends to
do on oath, the explanation is most unnecessary anyhow; and it has the practical
disadvantages in the case of an undefended person who is at all nervous, that just at the time
when he has to make his defense and should be concentrating on this, he may be put off by
the legal technicality of an invitation to consider doing something which he had no thought
of doing.‖
The crux of this passage is that it would be an obstacle for the administration
of justice if the accused is allowed to make a statement from the dock instead of giving
evidence from the witness box. Further, when an accused person who is willing to give
evidence from the witness box is informed by the Judge that he has the option of giving
evidence from the dock, and he may get confused. It would most probably occur in a
situation where the accused decides to conduct his case without obtaining the services of a
lawyer. The crux of this report is that if the accused chooses to provide evidence, then he
should provide it on oath or affirmation and should also be subjected to cross-examination.
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International Trends
The Position in England
Once the Criminal Law Revision Committee made its recommendations, it
gave rise to a long discussion on this matter in England. Accordingly, the Criminal Justice
Act of 1982 was introduced and it abolished the right of the accused to make a statement
from the dock. Section 72 of the Act postulates that,
Section 72: Abolition of the right of the accused to make an unsworn
statement.
(1) Subjected to subsection (2) and (3) below, in any criminal proceedings the
accused shall not be entitled to make a statement without being sworn and
accordingly, if he gives evidence, he shall do so (subject to section 55 and of
the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act of 1999) on oath and be liable
to cross examination; but this section shall not affect the right of the accused,
if not represented by counsel or solicitor, to address the court or Jury
otherwise than on oath on any matter on which, if he were so represented,
counsel or a solicitor could address the Jury on his behalf.
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) above shall prevent the accused making a statement
without being sworn -(a) if it is one which he is required by law to make
personally; or (b) if he make it by way of mitigation before the court passes
sentence upon him.
(3) Nothing in this section applies – (a) to trial or (b) to proceedings before a
magistrates‘ court acting as examining justices, which began before the
commencement of this section.
The meaning of this section is that the accused will not have the opportunity
of making a statement unless he makes it from the witness box on oath or affirmation and is
subjected to cross-examination. Accordingly, the long standing practice of making a
statement from the dock, which later received legislative recognition, was abolished from
the entire judicial apparatus in England subject to the exceptions mentioned in the section 72
of the Criminal Justice Act of 1982. For example, if the accused is not represented by a
lawyer at the court, the accused has the right to address the court. It would only mean that he
can address the court like a lawyer who analyzes the facts and he would not be allowed to
provide evidence when making oral submissions. Since the root of our law is in England and
when they have disposed of the right, one could ask whether it is lawful and moral for Sri
Lanka to retain it further. I wish to analyze this matter later in detail.
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The position in Australia
Similar to the position in England, the belief of the legal fraternity in the State
of New South Wales (NSW) from 16th
century onwards was that the accused is an
incompetent witness to give evidence on his own behalf. Further he was denied of the right
to legal representation. Therefore the courts allowed the accused to make a statement from
the dock as a practice. Even the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1883 of NSW recognized
that the accused has a right to make a statement from the dock. Yet in certain situations, the
higher courts have criticized the practice and the provision in the said law. In R. vs. Tyford35
,
it was held that historical justifications for permitting the accused to make a statement from
the dock are no longer valid since the statute already recognizes the accused as a competent
witness to give evidence from the witness box. It should be noted specially, that in 1883,
even before England recognized accused as a competent witness, the state of New South
Wales has recognized it.
In the case of R. vs. McKenna36
decided in Queensland, it was held that since
the accused has been recognized as a competent witness by statute, the accused should not
be allowed to make a statement from the dock. Yet legal scholars have recommended in the
Criminal Law Report in 1977 in Queensland that the right of the accused to make a
statement from the dock should be abolished. What should be stressed in this situation is that
Australia was a dominion state of England at this time and therefore they were quite aware
of the developments of the law taking place in England.
Accordingly, different States in Australia abolished this right in different
years. In 1975 the state of Queensland abolished it and in 1976 Western Australian state
abolished it. In 1993 South Australian state abolished the right to make a statement from the
dock.
In fact, the legal scholars in Australia seem to be well aware of the
recommendations of the Criminal Law Revision Committee of 1972 made in England. In
most instances Australia have followed and adopted development of law in England.
Accordingly, the state of New South Wales abolished the right to make a dock statement in
1994. Crimes Legislation (Unsworn Evidence) Amendment Act No. 26 of 1994 of NSW
abolished the dock statement. Section 404(A) of the said statute is as follows:
(1) Section 404(A)
Before section 405, insert:
Abolition of the accused‟s right to make an unsworn statement or to give
unsworn evidence.
35(1893) 14 N.S.W.L.R. 51 36(1951) Q.S.R. 299
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404(A) (1) any rule of law or procedure or practice permitting a person who is
charged with the commission of a criminal offence to make an unsworn
statement or to give unsworn evidence in answer to charge is abolished.
United States of America.
Similar to the position in England, there was a practice in USA of allowing the
accused to make a statement from the dock. This position changed when it was recognized
by statute that the accused is a competent witness to give evidence on his own behalf. Most
states thereafter recognized that the accused persons no longer have the right to make a
statement from the dock. In State vs. Louviere37
it was held that since the accused has been
recognized by statute as a competent witness to give evidence on his own behalf, the right of
the accused to make a dock statement should be abolished and it should not be admitted as
evidence. Yet the state of Massachusetts has decided to retain it. This was evident in the
decision of Commonwealth vs. Steward38
.
The Canadian position
The Canadian Evidence Act of 189339
has expressly recognized that the
accused is a competent witness to give evidence from the witness box on his own behalf.
Yet, unlike in England and South Africa, the statute did not recognize that the accused has a
right to make a statement from the dock also. In fact, the Canadian Supreme court ruled that
the accused no longer has the right to make a dock statement. It was upheld in a number of
cases.
R. vs. McNabb (1945) 1 D.L.R. 583
R. vs. Kelly (1916) 34 D.L.R. 583
R. vs. Rogers (1888) 1 B.C.R. (pt. 2) 119
R. vs. Campbell (1919) 33 Can. C.C. 364
The basis for these decisions is that the statute only recognized competency of
the accused to give evidence but the statute did not recognize that he has a right to make a
statement from the dock.
In R. vs. Krafchenko40
the court compared section 1(h) of the Criminal
Evidence Act of 1898 of UK with the Canadian law. It was held that if not for section 1(h),
37 169 La at 119 38(1926) 151 N.E.R. 74 39RSC 1985, c,C-5 40[1914] 17 D.L.R. 244, 250 (Man.K.B.)
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England would also have considered that the right to make a statement from the dock has
been abolished.
The South African position
Similar to the position in England, the right of the accused to make a
statement from the dock was retained by a statute in South Africa. In R. vs. Cele41
it was held
that the accused has an undisputed right to make a statement from the dock. However, South
Africa abolished this right in 1977.
The Indian position
India seems to have adopted a very unique position regarding the statements
from the dock. It is therefore of utmost importance to analyze the origin of Indian law in this
respect.
The Evidence Ordinance of 1872, drafted by Sir James Stephens, did not
recognize that the accused is a competent witness to give evidence from the witness box on
his own behalf. Therefore in practice India allowed an accused person to make a dock
statement. It was indeed fair procedure. However the Sri Lankan Evidence Ordinance
(1895), enacted 23 years later and based on Sir James Stephens‘ Indian Ordinance,
recognizes that the accused is a competent witness on his own behalf -Vide section 120(6).
Three years thereafter, in 1898 England recognized that the accused is a competent witness
to give evidence on his own behalf and also that the accused has the option of giving
evidence from the dock. Sir James Stephens thinking seems to be behind this amendment as
well though he passed away in 1894. Evidently the English statute has intentionally given
the option to the accused to make a statement from the dock. Thereafter no jurist has
attempted to change the Indian or Sri Lankan law in this respect.
Yet under section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code of India which was
enacted in 1898, the Judge is entitled to ask questions from the accused who is in the dock.
It is done in order to enable the accused to explain personally of any circumstance that
appears in evidence against him. According to section 342(2), if the accused failed to answer
such questions or gave false evidence, the court is entitled to draw adverse inferences from
it.
According to Article 20(3) of the Indian Constitution which was promulgated
in 1950, the accused has the right against self-incrimination.
The Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act No. 26 of 1955 of India retained
section 342 and section 342(2). In addition, section 342(A) was introduced to it. It stipulated
that, for the first time in the Indian History, the accused is competent to give evidence on his
own behalf. It further stated that failure to give sworn evidence shall not be subjected to
41 [1959] 1 SA 255
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comment by the court or by any party. The rationale behind this provision seems to be not to
compel an accused to give sworn evidence. It is in order to keep compliance with Article
20(3) of the constitution. Yet the provision stating that the court could draw adverse
inferences from accused being remained silent from the dock in response to questions asked
by the court was retained.
The Criminal Procedure Code No. 2 of 1973 has abolished the earlier Code
and has introduced two provisions in relation to this respect. Section 313 in the new Code is
similar to section 342 of the earlier Code and therefore the provision that the court can ask
questions from the accused was retained. Yet, drawing adverse inferences from his silence in
response to such questions has been removed.
Section 315 is similar to section 342(A) of the old Code. It stipulated that the
accused is a competent witness to give evidence on his own behalf and neither the court nor
the parties can draw adverse criticism for the failure to give such evidence.
These Indian provisions evidently create confusion in our minds. A number of
anomalies will arise especially from the provision where the Judge can question the accused
who is in the dock. The scope of such questioning, whether he can cross-examine the
accused, whether the counsel for the accused and the prosecution can ask questions from
him, whether the parties can clear a doubt regarding a question asked by the Judge which
can be considered as partial to either party are not determined by statute. Therefore this
practice has been criticized in a number of judgments.
However, the accused can make a statement from the dock also if he desires
so. Even if he does not opt to make a statement as such, the judge can still question the
accused.
Thus, it is evident that when compared with Sri Lankan law, the application of
a dock statement in India has caused injustice to the accused. Similarly it could cause
damage to the prosecution as well since the prosecution is unable to obtain clarification from
the accused regarding the answers he gave to the judge. Therefore adopting the Indian
position in Sri Lanka would not provide a solution to this issue.
The position in Singapore
Singapore has usually adopted the English legal concepts and principles.
Therefore the impact of the recommendations made by the UK Criminal Law Revision
Committee of 1972 must have influenced Singapore. Though UK was slow to act upon the
recommendation of the Committee, Singapore was prompt to introduce necessary
legislation. Accordingly, the right to make a dock statement was abolished in Singapore
through the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act of 1976.
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Section 186(A) postulates that,
(1) In any criminal proceedings except an inquiry preliminary to committal for
trial, the accused shall not be entitled to make a statement without being sworn
or affirmed, and accordingly, if he gives evidence, he shall do so on oath or
affirmation and be liable to cross-examination; but this subsection shall not
affect the right of the accused, if not represented by an advocate to address the
court otherwise than on oath or affirmation of any matter which, if he was so
represented, the advocate could address the court on his behalf.
The purpose of this section is to completely abolish the right of the accused to
make a dock statement.
Thus it is evident that when the recommendations were made by the
Committee in England to abolish dock statement, other countries also followed suit by
repealing their respective laws. We see how the trend which started off from England spread
throughout the world in epidemic proportion. The prominent legal scholars in those
countries may have thought beyond the academic boundaries and may have considered the
practical implications of retaining this right. They may have thought that it is the opportune
moment to dispose of archaic and unfitting laws to the museum of history. They may have
been brave enough to undertake the challenge of amending the law when it becomes
necessary to do so. The legislature also in such countries seems to have been well aware of
such a need.
Should the right to make a stament from the dock be
retained in Sri Lanka?
In giving a final answer to this question, a deep analysis should be made in
this respect. Part of this analysis has been already done in my discussion in respect of the Sri
Lankan law. Yet some other important legal concepts and principles should also be
considered.
The law relating to Criminal Procedure in Sri Lanka is contained in the Code
of Criminal Procedure Act No. 15 of 1979. The admissibility, relevance and the manner of
leading evidence are stipulated in the Evidence Ordinance.
Let us now consider logically whether our written laws or developed law
permits accused to make a dock statement and whether such practice has raised many other
legal issues in this respect.
1. If an item of evidence is to be led, the court should be satisfied about the
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logical and legal relevance of such evidence. Section 136 of the Evidence
Ordinance postulates that before a particular fact is produced as evidence, the
party who intends to call it should state it to the court and obtains permission
to adduce it. When the Judge asks from such party the manner in which it is
relevant, they should convince the court about its relevance. It is to be done
on the basis that such ―fact‖ would come within ―relevant facts‖ as defined in
the Evidence Ordinance. For example, if the accused intends to give evidence
from the witness box, the court should be convinced about its legal relevance.
In such a situation, relevance of the evidence which the accused intends to
produce and whether the accused is a competent witness should be
established to the satisfaction of the court. It is done with the intention of
preventing the jury from taking irrelevant facts in to its consideration. Once
an irrelevant fact is led in evidence in court, it would be impossible to erase
the impact of such evidence from the minds of the jury.
2. Section 118 of the Ordinance states that a witness should be a competent
witness. A person who is not of tender age, of extreme old age, physical or
mental infirmity is considered as a competent witness. In addition, section
120(6) states that the accused is a competent witness on his own behalf. It
also states that if the accused chooses to give evidence, he should give it like
any other witness. It would mean that the accused should also give evidence
under oath or affirmation and he should be subjected to cross-examination.
3. According to section 4(1) Oath and Affirmation Ordinance No. 9 of 1895, the
witness should take an oath or affirmation before he gives evidence. This
means that even if an accused is considered as a competent witness, he should
give evidence only under oath or affirmation, if his evidence is to be
considered by the court. It could only be done when he is in the witness box.
There is no provision in the Evidence Ordinance that displaces this provision
in the Oath and Affirmation Ordinance. Since the Evidence Ordinance was
enacted after the enactment of the Oath and Affirmation Ordinance, Sir James
Stephens and his followers may have been well aware of the legal position in
Sri Lanka. Therefore drafters of Sri Lankan Evidence Ordinance of 1895 may
not have intended to allow dock statements. Otherwise they could have
conveniently included a provision in the Evidence Ordinance that would
circumvent the provisions of the Oaths and Affirmations Ordinance. It has to
be borne in mind the development that took place in UK also during the same
period. The English Criminal Evidence Act of 1898 specifically provides that
the accused has a right to make a dock statement. Sir James Stephens may
have influenced such a provision prior to his death in 1894. Therefore if Sir
James Stephens intended that the right should also be preserved in Sri Lanka,
he may have expressly provided so in the Evidence Ordinance drafted by him
and enacted in Sri Lanka in 1895. Therefore it is clear that the draftsman of
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the Evidence Ordinance did not intend to retain the right to make a dock
statement in Sri Lanka.
While England was following a practice which was firmly established on its
soil by virtue of custom and practice, the draftsman of the Sri Lankan Evidence Ordinance
has specifically stated in section 120(6) that the accused is a competent witness to give
evidence on his own behalf. Therefore the accused seems to have had a forum in which he
can tell the court about his side of the story. Evidently what Sir James Stephens had done in
respect of Sri Lanka is to remove the legal basis upon which the right to make a dock
statement could be justified. He may have been compelled to do so because of the negative
impact received in the application of dock statement. Thus it is very clear that the draftsman
of the Evidence Ordinance did not have the least idea of introducing the right of the accused
to make a statement from the dock.
Importantly, in drafting the Indian Evidence Ordinance in 1872, Sir James
Stephens did not include a provision that would make the accused a competent witness to
give evidence on his own behalf .The evolution of his creative thinking is shown by the fact
that twenty three years later in drafting the Evidence Ordinance for Sri Lanka in 1895 he has
included section 120(6) that recognizes the accused as a competent witness on his own
behalf. Moreover, England has recognized the competence of the accused as witness in
1898. The creative force behind the thinking of Sir James Stephens has enabled the
Evidence Ordinance to remain unchallenged over such a long period. The reason behind his
excellence seems to be his willingness and humbleness to alter his views according to his
experiences in India and England.
4. When the accused gives evidence from the dock, the requirement that he
should give evidence on oath or affirmation and that he should be subjected to
cross-examination will not be fulfilled. We should be mindful of the fact that
according to section 138(1) of the Evidence Ordinance, once evidence is
elicited from a witness at the Non-summary inquiry, the other party has the
right to cross-examine him. This right will not be available in a situation
where the accused gives evidence from the dock since it has not been
provided for under the Ordinance. Professor G.L. Peiris42
makes a valuable
contribution in this respect.
―A statement from the dock confers an undue advantage on the accused in so
far as he is equipped with the means, at least potentially, of achieving the
desired impact on the jury without incurring the jeopardy of cross-
examination as to character and credibility.
Professor G.L. Peiris continues as,
42G. L. Peiris, Recent Trends in the Commonwealth Law of Evidence, 1st edition, Sarvodaya Book Publishing
Services, Sri Lanka (1989)
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―These considerations support the conclusion that statements from the dock
represent an anomaly in the administration of criminal justice and the
abolition of the right of the accused person to make unsworn statements is
welcome.‖- page 195.
5. When a witness gives evidence from the witness box, such evidence should
comply with the requirements of the Evidence Ordinance. Firstly, such
evidence should be those which he perceived through his senses. He is
prevented from giving hearsay evidence, which can be defined as those which
a witness has perceived through another person. In addition, a lay witness is
not allowed to give his opinion on a particular matter. The Judge is entitled to
prevent the accused from giving evidence if his evidence contravenes these
provisions, since he is allowed only to give evidence which is relevant.
Therefore if the accused contravenes section 60 of Evidence Ordinance Judge
can stop the accused from giving such evidence.
6. If the accused gives evidence on any fact which he has perceived through his
senses, it could be relevant under section 7 and 11 of the Evidence Ordinance.
Under section 7 it could be the cause or the effect of the crime. For an
example, the accused may admit that he committed the crime but state that he
did it under grave and sudden provocation or self-defense. If the accused
produces evidence of an alibi it would make the prosecution case highly
improbable and such evidence is relevant under section 11 of the Ordinance.
Relevancy under section 7 and 11 are regarded as logical relevancy. If such
logically relevant evidence fulfills the requirements of section 60, then such
evidence becomes legally relevant evidence as well. If the trial judge is not
satisfied with regard to admissibility, he can stop the defense counsel asking
irrelevant questions. Therefore when the accused gives evidence from the
witness box, judge has the power to regulate the admissibility.
On the other hand if the accused chooses to give evidence from the dock, he
cannot be stopped by any force whatsoever. The provisions of the Evidence
ordinance has not laid down such a procedure. Even the scheme and the
symmetry of the Ordinance do not give any indication that the judge could
prevent such irrelevant evidence emanating from the dock. The accused may
make statements regarding facts which he did not even perceive through his
senses and may also express opinions in his statement from the dock. The
Judge is not entitled to stop the accused from doing it. One can argue that
since the Judge can ignore such statements in considering the overall
evidence of the case, it may not cause any prejudice to the prosecution. Yet
there is also an inherent disadvantage in such illegal evidence. The statement
from the dock may still influence the mind of the judge and also the jury even
such evidence is not admissible. It is very hard for a judge to direct the jury to
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not to consider the dock statement and even if such direction is given jury
might not seriously consider it. This would have damning effect on the entire
administration of criminal justice.
7. When the accused gives evidence, the court has to decide whether to believe
such evidence or to disregard it. If such evidence is neither believed nor
disbelieved, there would be a reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the
accused. The credibility of the accused will be determined on the basis as to
whether his evidence created a reasonable doubt in the mind of the judge
regarding his guilt. For this purpose, his statement should be considered in the
context of the entire evidence of the case. Since the prosecution will not be
able to draw the attention of the court to the contradictions and omissions in
his statement from the dock, and plead the court to disregard such a
statement. Since the court is unable properly analyze such statement it might
lead to confusion.
8. The prosecution can, with the permission of the judge, lead evidence of
witnesses in rebuttal to challenge the statement made by the accused from the
dock. Such witnesses have to give evidence from the witness box under oath
and while being subjected to cross examination. In such a situation, the judge
may conclude the credibility of such witnesses is in a greater degree than the
statement from the dock which is neither made on oath nor subjected to cross-
examination. This would cause prejudice to the accused.
9. We need to focus our attention to another aspect too. Just because the accused
states a fact in his evidence, the prosecution cannot call evidence in rebuttal.
The legal provisions relating to evidence in rebuttal are contained in section
202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act. In addition, the courts have
developed certain principles that would apply in this respect. One such
principle is not allowed to call evidence in rebuttal unless the prosecution is
surprised by the defense put forward by the accused. For example if the
dossier of investigation reveals a particular defense then, it is deemed that the
prosecution is not surprised and therefore prosecutions cannot call evidence in
rebuttal once the defense case is over. If the accused gives evidence from the
witness box then the prosecution might be able to challenge the line of
defense and demolish the credibility of the defense through cross
examination. In such situation the necessity of calling evidence in rebuttal
does not arise. On the other hand if the accused makes a dock statement the
prosecution has no way of challenging the credibility of the defense. As
discussed previously evidence rebuttal cannot be called in every instance, the
prosecution is at a highly disadvantaged position. Therefore principle of dock
statement has certainly caused chaos in the scheme of the criminal procedure
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in the country.
According to the above analysis, court is placed in a predicament as it cannot
properly evaluate the credibility of the dock statement. Permitting the accused to make a
statement from the dock has caused an anomaly in the law. It has unduly affected not only
the prosecution but the defense also. In addition, some practical difficulties may also arise if
the accused is permitted to make a dock statement. Those can be summarized as follows:
1. As happened in a very famous case, if the accused opts to drag the dock
statement for several days, the judge would not be able to stop to it. An
emotional accused may resort to make the dock statement in an unreserved
manner without understanding the legal implication. In such a situation, it
might cause prejudice to the accused as well. Especially, when the accused
gives evidence from the witness box, counsel for the accused would elicit
evidence that are relevant. He would do it in a very methodical, reserved
manner. In a recent workshop organized by the Bar Association in relation to
this subject, a very distinguished lawyer in this country explained a case in
which the accused, without understanding lawyer‘s instructions, has
proceeded to make a very lengthy statement from the dock and it had been to
the advantage of the prosecution. The accused in such situations would try to
analyze the case like a lawyer rather than explaining the facts of the case.
Therefore the distinguished lawyer sarcastically questioned as to why the
State want to amend the law since it is advantageous to the prosecution. This
illustration shows how a dock statement has paved the way for injustice to the
accused.
2. If the accused attacks the character and reputation of the witnesses, a court
may not be able to stop him. It will be very unreasonable and damaging to the
prosecution. Similarly, the court would form an adverse opinion about the
accused also as he had attempted assassinate the character of the witness who
is very likely to be the victim. In such event the dock statement would be
detriment to the accused. There can be an instance where the accused might
make a dock statement revealing his bad character without understanding the
ramification. Then the jury may arrive at a conclusion that is disadvantageous
to him. On the other hand if the accused tries to elicit his bad character from
the witness box, the judge or the counsel for the prosecution may stop him.
This prevention cannot be done if the accused makes a dock statement.
3. The steps that should be followed when a document is produced from the
witness box are contained in section 61 to section 73 of the Evidence
Ordinance. A question arise as to what the court should do if the accused
seeks to produce documents while making a dock statement. There is no legal
provision for the court to admit such documents. Similarly, if the accused
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takes out a document out of his pocket and reads from it while giving
evidence from the dock, none of above provisions will apply. There is no
legal value to such a document and the contents of such document cannot be
analyzed.
4. The accused is not allowed to refresh his memory by looking at a document
or note when he is giving evidence from the witness box unless the document
itself is admitted as evidence. If the accused makes a dock statement by
refreshing his memory from a document or note, it would be a disastrous.
Then the judge will not be able to stop him. One can argue that when the
prosecution had presented a large volume of evidence, it is difficult to keep
track of all such evidence in one‘s mind and therefore it is fair by the accused
to take down notes and refer to them while he is making a statement from the
dock. The counter argument is that the document may have been prepared by
a lawyer and not by the accused. The judge may not be able to stop such
fabricated statements.
5. The prevailing position as per Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) No
14 of 2005 in relation to alibi is that the accused will not be able to give
evidence of it for the first time in his defense. The accused should have raised
alibi either in his statement to the police or in the non-summary inquiry.
However there is a danger that without complying to the said law the accused
could raise alibi position for the first time in his dock statement and the judge
is not able to stop the dock statement. This would create a number of
questions leading to chaos.
6. Demeanour of a witness during cross examination is a vital tool in evaluating
credibility of such witness. Since the statement from the dock is not subjected
to cross-examination, the Judge will not be able to come to a specific
conclusion regarding demeanor or deportment of the accused.
7. According to several decided cases, if an accused implicates a co-accused in
his dock statement, it cannot be used in evidence against such co-accused. Yet
if the co-accused makes such a statement from the dock, the judge may not be
able to stop it. This anomaly will have a telling effect especially in jury trial.
8. If the accused makes a contradictory statement from the dock to that of his
earlier statement to the police or at the non-summary inquiry, the prosecution
will not be able to point it out to the court. Section 144 of the Evidence
Ordinance states that in order to mark contradictions, attention of the accused
should be drawn to his previous statements. If the statement is made from the
dock, none of these provisions can be resorted to.
9. If the accused makes a dock statement sometimes judge might not place great
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credence and therefore reject the defense version. On the other hand if the
accused gives evidence from the witness box he might be able to create a
reasonable doubt in the mind of the judge. Accused wrong perception about
the value of the dock statement ultimately operate against his interest. The
confusion is disadvantageous to the accused. We do not possess research
reports or data to see what the judges think about a statement from the dock.
It is uncertain as to whether the judges in fact place any reliance on such
statements. Rarely, accused is able to create a reasonable doubt from his dock
statement. One could generally say that there is a pattern in the way in which
the judges disregard dock statement
There had been several instances in which the accused persons were acquitted
by considering his statement from the dock. Sometimes judges have placed
excessive reliance which is disproportionate in the circumstances of the case
upon the statement from the dock. Some courts tend to think whenever
accused make a dock statement it always create a reasonable doubt on the
prosecution case. Such misguided approach is disadvantageous to the
prosecution.
10. In Hon Sarath Ambepitiya‘s murder case43
it was decided by a five judge
bench that the Ellenborough dicta is a part of the law of Sri Lanka. The Ellen
borough dicta postulates that when a strong case has been made against the
accused and if the accused refrains from explaining the facts when he
possessed the means of doing it, an adverse inference can be drawn against
him. This is indeed a major step that is taken by the judiciary in order to
develop the law in Sri Lanka. It did not happen overnight but rather a
culmination of a long standing practice in to proper law. This judgment could
be considered as the case that formally accepted the principles in
Ellenborough dictum in Sri Lanka. The importance of it lies in the fact that it
was decided by our own judges. We should respectfully admire the fact that
Ellenborough dicta were properly received in Sri Lanka. It is not necessary
look for a photocopy of the dicta that had been introduced by UK courts. The
most important aspect is that our courts on their own established such a
principle. According to the dictum it may not be prudent for the accused to
remain silent if there is a possibility that an adverse inference could be drawn
against him. Sometimes accused may mistakenly think that merely making a
dock statement is sufficient enough to explain his position even though
prosecution has a very strong case. The option of making dock statement
confuses the accused to a great extent. If he did not have the option of making
a statement from the dock, he would have decided to give evidence from the
witness box. It is indeed fair from the perspective the accused. Therefore one
43Naufer vs AG SC (Appeal) TAB 01/2006
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could argue that having the option of dock statement may sometimes mislead
and confuse the accused.
11. If the practice of making a statement from the dock is abolished, the accused
may have to give evidence from the witness box. In such situations, the
counsel for the prosecution can mark contradictions from his statement to the
police. One may argue that during the investigation police may have elicited a
statement by force from the accused and therefore it is unfair to allow the
prosecution to mark and produce contradictions. Therefore it can be argued
that the practice of making a statement from the dock should be retained in
which event contradictions and omissions cannot be marked or proved.
The counter argument would be that since the prosecution is not allowed to
mark contradictions or show omissions from the confessionary parts of his
statement given to the police, the accused is not in a disadvantaged position.
The prosecution is also prohibited from cross-examining the accused in
respect of such confessionary statements as the court would not permit such
questioning. This legal position has been developed with the aid of section 25
of the Evidence Ordinance, section 110(3) of the Code of criminal Procedure
Act and decided cases. Even the parts of the statement that are not
confessionary can only be used for the purpose of marking contradictions
only. It can never be used as substantive evidence or corroborative evidence.
Therefore giving evidence from the witness box does not cause prejudice to
the accused.
12. One may argue that when the accused gives evidence from the witness box,
he may be frightened due to the gravity of the offence as he is charged with a
serious offence and therefore it is unfair to subject him for coercive cross-
examine. However section 120(6) of the Evidence Ordinance lays down, that
the judge has the discretion to regulate and limit the scope of the questions
that are put to the accused during cross-examination. Therefore the accused
giving evidence from the witness box will not cause prejudice to him.
Sec 120(6) reads as follows:
―provided that so far as the cross-examination relates to the credit of the
accused, the court may limit the cross-examination to such an extent which it
thinks proper, although the proposed cross-examination might be permissible
in the case of other witnesses.‖
We strongly believe and advocate that the accused should have a right to a fair trial.
Therefore all of us should commit ourselves to discover the aspects of our law that should be
altered order to ensure a fair trial to the accused. We should also device laws that would
protect the accused persons. These are matters that should be deeply analyzed in another
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paper. The intention behind preparing this paper is to explain the difficulty of administering
justice in a context where dock statements are permitted to be made. Countries like England
allowed the accused to make a statement from the dock then for a variety of reasons. One
such was that the accused was not a competent witness to give evidence from the witness
box. The other reason was to allow the accused to tell his side of the story when he was
denied of legal representation in certain cases. Since these disabilities were removed in
many countries, dock statements were consequently abolished. The origin of this
development commenced in England. Being the fountain of Common Law, England itself
has abolished the right to make a statement from the dock by statute in 1982. The basis for
this shift is the recommendations of the Criminal Law Revision Committee of 1972. Once
these recommendations were made, other countries have also reviewed their laws in relation
to dock statements and consequently even before England abolished the right in 1982, many
other countries had abolished it.
South Africa has abolished the right in 1977. Almost all the states in Australia have
abolished it. For example the State of New South Wales of Australia abolished it in 1994.
Almost all the states in United States of America have abolished it. New Zealand has
abolished it in 1966. Canadian law does not contain any express provision to make a dock
statement. It only states that the accused is a competent witness to give evidence on his
behalf. This position is much similar to the position in Sri Lanka. Yet the Canadian courts
have interpreted that since the right to make a dock statement is not expressly recognized by
statute, it is not available to the accused. Evidently Canada has not decided to adopt English
law in order to fill the lacuna in their statutory law with regard to dock statement. After
contrasting the law in Sri Lanka with that of Canada, Professor G.L. Peiris comments as
follows:
―Notwithstanding the consistency with which this view has been acted upon,
it is submitted that the tainted origin of the principle currently established
detracts from its validity. The reasoning of the Canadian Courts, construing a
statutory provision analogous with that in force in Sri Lanka, could well have
been adopted with advantage in the latter jurisdiction and in other Asian
Countries governed by similar legislation.‖- page 178
Singapore which had been a dominion state of England also abolished the
opportunity to make dock statement. This was done by introducing an amendment to
procedural law.
According to the statute law in India, the accused can give evidence from the
witness box. Then all the parties involved in the case could question him. On the other if the
accused remains in the dock he can answer such questions posed by the judge. The
procedure adopted in India is an unusual as such procedure is not followed by any other
country. The judge is entitled to question the accused when he is in the dock and what would
evidently happen is that the judge will try to ascertain the position of the accused in relation
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to the main points of the prosecution case. In this situation the counsel for the prosecution
will not be able to cross-examine the accused and the counsel for the accused will not be
entitled to re-examine him either. The accused will not take an oath or an affirmation. This
approach has been criticized by the Indian courts since the scope of the questions which the
judge can ask is not defined and this approach seems to be even more confusing than that of
the Sri Lankan position. Therefore it could be said that the accused in India is at more
disadvantageous position than his counterpart in Sri Lanka. If there are no guidelines
regarding the scope of the questions that could be asked from the accused, the judges at
various courts will interpret their role differently. The prosecution and the defense are bound
to raise criticism against such procedure. Therefore the Indian approach is not suitable to Sri
Lanka.
Many eminent legal scholars have expressed different views regarding the
practice of dock statement in Sri Lanka. Professor G.L. Peiris considers the practice of
making dock statements to be an anomaly in our judicial system since the accused will be
unduly advantaged by not being subjected to cross-examination. Therefore he believes that
the practice should be abolished. According to the law of evidence in Sri Lanka, the
accused is a competent witness to give evidence on his own behalf from the witness box. In
addition, he has the right of legal representation. Therefore there is no legal basis to justify
concept of dock statement. In addition as discussed earlier, a number of anomalies have
arisen as a result of allowing statement from the dock.
In concluding the long analysis that I have made above, I suggest that the right
to make a statement from the dock should be abolished in Sri Lanka. The legal basis for this
suggestion has been deeply analyzed in this paper. Since this practice is widespread and
deeply rooted in the judicial system of our country, one way suggested to do this is to raise
the issue in the Supreme Court in an appropriate case. One may consider this approach to be
cumbersome and difficult. The alternative way is to bring an amendment as section 278(a) to
the Code of Criminal Procedure Act. If this is to be done, an amendment similar in the
nature to that of New South Wales would be more appropriate.
Following is the suggested amendment:
Section 278(A)
“ANY RULE OF LAW OR PROCEDURE OR PRACTICE PERMITTING
A PERSON CHARGED OR INDICTED WITH THE COMMISSION OF
A CRIMINAL OFFENCE TO MAKE AN UNSWORN STATEMENT OR
TO GIVE UNSWORN EVIDENCE AT THE TRIAL IS ABOLISHED”
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Appellate and Revisionary Powers
Of Provincial High Courts
S.T.Jayanaga LL.B. (Ceylon); LL.M. (Colombo)
1. What Is An Appeal?
Definition
“An appeal is the right of entering a superior court and invoking its aid and
interposition to redress the error of the court below.” [ Law Lexicon 1997 Edition]
The term appellate jurisdiction means “the power vested in an appellate court to review
and revise the judicial action of an inferior court, evidenced by an appealable order or
appealable judgment.” [Vide Black‘s Law Dictionary, 5th
Edition page 90] The right of
appeal must be expressly and statutorily stated.
Eg. Section 320 of the Criminal Procedure Code
Maintenance Act –Section 14
Industrial Disputes Act- section 31(D)
Act No.19 of 1990 read with Article 154 of the Constitution
Although the appellate jurisdiction would conceptually include both appellate and
revisionary jurisdiction, the latter is distinct from the former.
2. Revisionary Jurisdiction:
―The power of revision is an extraordinary power which is quite independent of and distinct
from the appellate jurisdiction of this court. Its object is due administration of justice and
the correction of errors, sometimes committed by this court itself, in order to avoid
miscarriage of justice. It is exercised in some cases by a judge of his own motion when an
aggrieved person who may not be a party to the action brings to his notice the fact that,
unless the power is exercised, injustice will result.‖ Meeriam Beebee v. Seyed Mohamed
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68 NLR 36 @ 38
―It is a jurisdiction to safeguard and promote the due administration of justice in general,
and to avoid miscarriage of justice and not merely to ensure that the rights of the parties
are correctly determined. Any uncertainty as to its scope must unhesitatingly be resolved
in favour of a wider, than a narrower jurisdiction.‖ Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike v.
Times of Ceylon Ltd. 1995(1) SLR 22;
‗Revision like an appeal is directed towards the correction of errors but it is supervisory in
nature and its object is the due administration of justice and not primarily or solely the
relieving of grievances of parties.‟ I hold that this mistake committed by the High Court
judge can be considered as an exceptional ground to invoke the revisionary jurisdiction –
Court cannot turn a blind eye when an illegal order has been made by a trial court‘.
Seelathevan v. Attorney general [2011] 2 SLR 243
3. Distinction between Appellate and Revisionary Powers:
1. The main distinction is that revisionary powers are wider in scope than those
of appeal. Sirimavo Bandaranaike (supra)
2. Only a party to an action or a proceeding in an inferior court can invoke the
appellate jurisdiction of a superior court. [ There are however some exceptions
– vide section 754(2) of the Civil Procedure Code]
Revisionary powers may be exercised even on the application of a person who
is not a party to the proceeding in the lower court, if such party is aggrieved by
the order. – Appuhamy v. Weeratunga 23 NLR 467
3. A party seeking to invoke the appellate jurisdiction must have a right of appeal
expressly created and granted by statute. Such right can never be implied. –
Martin v. Wijewardana 1989 (2) SLR 409
Eg. Section 3 & 4 of the High Court of The provinces (Sp. Pro.) Act No. 19 of
1990.
Gunaratna v Thambinaygam & Others [1993] 2 SLR 355
Malegoda v Joachim [1997] 1 SLR 88
Sumanadasa v. Hathurusingha [1995 ] 2 SLR 17
Revision is a discretionary remedy. As such revision is not available as a
matter of right.
4. In certain instances the law specifically has taken away the right of appeal.
Eg. Section 74(2) of the Primary Courts Procedure Act No.44 of 1979
Or sometimes it is restricted
Section 31 (D) of Industrial Disputes Act restricts the right of appeal to a
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question of law; Note sections 317 and 318 of the Cr.P.C ( Criminal Procedure
Code)
Revisionary powers remain intact unless taken away by the constitution. Even
when the law says that in a given situation there is no right of appeal, still
relief may be granted in revision. Even when the law says that the judgment of
the lower court is final and conclusive a superior court having revisionary
jurisdiction can interfere with the judgment by way of revision.
Sunil Chandra Kumar v. Veloo 2001 (3) SLR 91
Srimavo Bandranaike case cited above
Somawathie v. Madawala 1983 (2) SLR 15
5. Time limits for preferring the appeal is also generally specified by the statutes
which grant the right of appeal. If the time limits are not adhered to, the appeal
is out of time and is liable to be rejected.
eg. 14 days for an appeal from an order made by the magistrate‘s court [vide
section 320 (1) of the Cr.P.C]
Since revision is a discretionary remedy there is no prescribed time limit.
The general rule is that the petitioner must make the application at the first
available opportunity or within a reasonable time or without unnecessary
delay. These are issues depending on the circumstances of each case.
Biso Menike v. Cyril de Alwis (1982) 1 SLR 368
Ganapandithen & another v. Balanayagam & Another (1998) SLR 391
6. Procedure for filing valid appeals is laid down by the statutes which grant the
right. If the proper procedure is not followed there is no valid appeal.
Judges of the Supreme Court have prescribed the manner in which a revision
application should be made. These rules are known as Court of Appeal
(Appellate Procedure ) Rules of 1990. If a person failed to comply with these
rules he will not ipso facto lose his application. The court has power to allow
that person to cure the defect in his application,
Kiriwanthie and another v. Navaratna and another, 1990 (2) SLR 393
Read v. Samsudeen [1895] 1 NLR 292
‗it is not the duty of a judge to throw technical difficulties in the way of
the administration of justice, but where he sees that he is prevented from
receiving material or available evidence merely by reason of a technical
objection, he ought to remove the technical objection out of the way upon
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proper terms as to costs and otherwise.‘ The reference is clearly and
indication that where the spirit of the law is vanquished the law itself is
diminished to that extent.
7. The revisionary powers are so wide that the superior court by exercising its
superior power can call for the record of the lower court on its own volition, to
satisfy itself as to the legality of the proceedings, even if there is no application
made by a petitioner.
Relief by way of revision is available even when there is no right of appeal or
when such right has been specifically taken away. –Ranasingha v. Henry 1
NLR 303
Where the appeal has been rejected on technical grounds relief may be granted
by way of revision. Soysa v. Soysa 2000 (2) SLR 235
Power of revision is available even when an appeal lay but for some reason not
taken. A.G. v. Podisingho 52 NLR 536
Supreme Court acting in revision can vary or set aside its own decision made in
appeal. Potaman v. J.P.Dodangoda 74 NLR 115
8. Powers of revision will be exercised only in exceptional circumstances. The
existence of such circumstances is a precondition for a revision and the absence
of such circumstances may result in the dismissal of the application. It is
available in exceptional circumstances even though the law provides alternate
remedies.
Jonita v. Abeywickrama V Sris. L.R. 22
Cadiramanpulle v. Ceylon Paper Sacks Ltd. 2001 (3) SLR 112
Dharmaratna v. Palm Paradise Cabanas Ltd. 2003 (3) SLR 24
9. Where an appeal is preferred by a party in the exercise of a right of appeal is
pending, revisionary powers can be exercised if it appears that the result of the
appeal would be rendered nugatory, if relief by way of revision is not granted.
Athokorala v. Samynathan 41 NLR 165
4. Appellate Jurisdiction of the Provincial High Court
The 1978 constitution enacted that the highest Court of First Instance exercising
criminal jurisdiction and created by law shall be called and known as the ‗High Court of The
Republic Of Sri Lanka‘. By the 11th
amendment to the constitution Article 111(1) was
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amended to read as ‗There shall be a high court of Sri Lanka which shall exercise such
jurisdiction and powers as parliament may by law vest and ordain‘. Thus the 11th
amendment paved the way for Parliament to confer appellate and revisionary jurisdiction on
the High Court.
The 13th
amendment to the constitution by article 154 P (1) brought into existence
a Court known as the ‗Provincial High Court‘ [154P(3) (b)] which conferred appellate and
revisionary jurisdiction,- the starting point of the provincial high courts appellate and
revisionary jurisdiction.
i. Right of Appeal to PHC against orders entered or imposed by
Magistrates Courts and Primary Courts
This right is given by Act No19 of 1990 when read with article 154(P),
Section 4 of the above Act stipulates that „ A party aggrieved by any conviction ,
sentence or order, entered or imposed by a magistrate‟s court, a primary
court etc………appeal therefrom to the High Court established under article
154 (P)‟
154P(3)(b) reads as follows:
―Notwithstanding anything in Article 138 and subject to any law, exercise,
appellate and revisionary jurisdiction in respect of convictions, sentences
and orders entered or imposed by Magistrates Courts and Primary Courts
within the Province.‖
ii. Right of Appeal to PHC against orders of the Labour Tribunal:-
Parliament by the High Court of the Province (Special Provisions) Act No.
19 of 1990 conferred on the PHC jurisdiction to hear and decide appeals and
revision applications against the orders of Labour Tribunals situated within the
Province. This law came into operation on the 15th
of May, 1990.
Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act No.32 of 1990 repealed section
31(d) of the original Act and introduced a new section and thus removed
jurisdiction of the Court Of Appeal in respect of such orders and vested appellate
jurisdiction exclusively on the PHC. (Note: below-Civil Appellate High Courts)
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iii. Agrarian Services Law:
Act No.19 of 1990 vests the Provincial High Court with the appellate
jurisdiction in respect of orders made under section 5 & 9 of the Agrarian Services
Act. However, Agrarian Services amendment Act No.4 of 1991 removed the
appellate power vested in the PHC against the orders made under section 5 & 9 and
the new agrarian services act No.46 of 2000 expressly conferred a right of appeal to
the court of appeal. Accordingly, PHC does not now have appellate or
revisionary jurisdiction in respect of agrarian matters.
iv. Workmen’s Compensation (Amendment) Act No.15 of 1990
This Act provides that an appeal against the order of the commissioner of
Workmen‘s Compensation can be made to the PHC within whose jurisdiction the
aggrieved party resides.
v. Maintenance Act No. 37 of 1999
Any person dissatisfied with any order made by Magistrate under section
2 & 11 of the Act, may prefer an appeal to the PHC. Now the Court of Appeal has
no appellate jurisdiction in respect of the orders in maintenance cases. Section
14(1) of the Act gives the right of appeal. An order under section 2 is an interim
order which nevertheless can be appealed against.
vi. High Courts Hearing Civil Appeals:
Article 154P (3) (c)
―PHC (Provincial High Court) shall ‗exercise such other jurisdiction and
powers as Parliament may by law provide‖
This sub article empowered the parliament to confer any other jurisdiction
on the PHC without having to amend the constitution.
High Court of the Province (Special Provisions) (Amendment) Act No. 54
of 2006. This amending Act further amended Act No.19 of 1990 and vested the
provincial High Courts with the appellate and revisionary jurisdiction in respect of
judgments etc., made by the District Courts and family courts within the province.
These courts are popularly known as ‗Civil Appellate High Court of the Province‘
These courts currently hear appeals against orders made by the District
Courts of the provinces and the bench comprises of two judges.
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Revisionary Jurisdiction of provincial High Courts:
Article 154 P (3) referred to above and section 3 of PHC (Sp.Pr.) and Act 19 of
1990 conferred upon the Provincial High Court revisionary jurisdiction in respect of the
decisions of the Magistrates Courts, Primary Courts and Labour Tribunals situated
within the province and in respect of orders made under section 5 and 9 of the agrarian
services Act in respect of lands situated within the province. As pointed out earlier both
appellate and revisionary jurisdiction in respect of orders made in terms of section 5 & 9 of
the Agrarian services Act have been removed by the Agrarian Services Act No. 46 of 2006
Article 138 of the Constitution specifies the Appellate and Revisionary Jurisdiction
of the court of appeal. However, article 154 P of the constitution stipulates that,
‗notwithstanding anything in article 138 and subject to any law, High Courts established
under article 154 P shall exercise, appellate and revisionary jurisdiction in respect of
convictions, sentences and orders entered or imposed by Magistrates Courts and primary
Courts within the province‖
High Court of the Provinces (Special Provisions) Act No 19 of 1990 was passed to
make provision regarding the procedure to be followed and to give the right of appeal to and
from the high court established under 154 P. Section 5 of this Act n states that,
―Provisions of written law applicable to appeals to the Court of Appeal, from the
convictions, sentences or orders entered or imposed by a magistrates court, and to
the applications made to the court of appeal for revision of any such conviction
sentence or order shall mutatis mutandis, apply to the appeals to high court
established under article 154 P and to application made to such high court for the
revision of any such conviction or sentence or order.‖
Thus the procedure that was followed in relation to the appeals and applications for
revisions to the court of appeal shall mutatis mutandis apply to appeals and revisions to the
PHC.
Consequence of filing an Appeal or An Application for
Revision
The ordinary rule is that once an appeal is taken from the judgment and decree of
an inferior court, the jurisdiction of that court in respect of that case is suspended except of
course, in regard to matters to be done and directions to be given for the perfecting of the
appeal. ‗ The effect of a right of appeal is the limitation of the jurisdiction of one court and
the extension of the jurisdiction of another‘ It follows as a corollary that on that right being
exercised the case should be maintained in status quo till the appeal court has dealt with it.
and given its decision‘.
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Edward V. de Silva 46 NLR 342
This decision was followed in
Waseela Umma v. C.S.M.Sally 56 NLR425
It was observed in Waseela Umma‘s case that the same principles apply even when a
revision is preferred against an order of an inferior court.
Kanthilatha v. Wimalaratna (2005) 1 SLR 411 in this case Justice Gamini Amaratunga
extended the above principle to an application for revision in no uncertain terms as follows:
―Several Revision applications that have come before this court indicate that in
such situations some original court judges have taken the view that in the absence
of a direction from the court of Appeal directing the stay of execution pending
appeal the order appealed against is executable, With respect, this is an erroneous
view‖
This case was overruled by a decision of a divisional bench of the court of appeal in the
case of Jayantha Wickramasingha Gunasekara v. Jayathissa Wickramasingha and
others CA (PHC) Appl. 17/2006 Order delivered on 30/9/2011
Their lordships have adverted to the position of the law before the PHC was given
revisionary jurisdiction and noted that any person aggrieved by the order of the primary
court could invoke the revisionary jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal. Any person
dissatisfied with the order of the Court of Appeal acting in revision had to seek special leave
to appeal from the supreme-court within 42 days. Party aggrieved by the judgment of CA
had to apply for stay of proceedings till special leave is granted. Thus mere lodging an
application for special leave to appeal invoking the jurisdiction of the supreme-court, does
not ipso facto, stay the order of the Court of Appeal. It does not stay the execution of the
judgment. This shows that even prior to the recognition of the revisionary powers of the
High Court in terms of article 154 P (3) (b) of the Constitution the rule was to execute
the judgment and exception was to stay proceedings.
The ratio decidendi of this judgment (exclusively) limits itself to the matters set out
in chapter VII of the Primary Court Procedure Act.
Therefore the law as it stands today could be summarized as follows:
An appeal is the termination of the jurisdiction of one court and extension of the
jurisdiction of another
Filing of an appeal to PHC from the exercise of the criminal jurisdiction of the
Magistrate‘s court will ipso facto stay the execution of proceedings. S.323 of the
Criminal Procedure Code
The filing of an appeal in other matters will generally suspend the execution of the
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order appealed from, unless there is express statutory provision which
empowers the original court to execute the order in spite of the appeal.
Eg:
1. Maintenance Act No.37 of 1999 section 14(1) Unless the high court directs
otherwise the mere fact of filing the appeal will not ipso facto suspend the
operation of the order of the magistrate.
2. Section 31 D of the Industrial Disputes Act (Chap 152) as amended by Act
No.11 of 2003, which requires the employer to deposit any compensation
ordered with the President of the Labour Tribunal as a prerequisite to file the
appeal.
In any case filing of an application for revision will not Ipso facto suspend the
order of the original court.
Procedure of Appeals and Revision Applications
Section 5 of the HCP (Sp. Pr.) Act No.19 of 1990 stipulates that the provisions of
written law applicable to appeals to the Court of Appeal shall apply mutatis mutandis to all
appeals and to revision applications. The procedure for filing appeals is to be found in
statutes creating or granting a right of appeal. Eg. Act No.15 of 1979 and Industrial Disputes
Act etc. With regard to revision applications the rules applicable are the Court of Appeal
(Appellate Procedure) Rules of 1990.
A person seeking to invoke the appellate or revisionary jurisdiction of the
provincial High court must fundamentally satisfy himself on three basic facts.
1. Whether such PHC has territorial jurisdiction to entertain and hear such appeal
of application?
2. Whether the appellant has a right of appeal?
3. Whether the procedure laid down for preferring an appeal and making an
application for revision has been properly and accurately followed.
Form of a petition of Appeal and Revision Applications:
Form of a petition of appeal is given in second schedule form 16 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure Act No.15 of 1979. This could be used as a guide. Petition must bear
an uncancelled stamp to the value of Rs.10/-. An important question that has arisen in recent
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times is that, whether a lawyer‘s certificate, stipulated in section 322(2) of the above Act is
mandatory? Old Criminal Procedure Code 15 of 1898 which was last amended by Act
No.11 of 1954 (which resembles the present Act substantially and was repealed by
Administration of Justice Law in 1974. The present Act was passed in 1979 by repealing the
Administration of Justice Law) the form of a petition of appeal was given in form 12. In
which a certificate from the lawyer stating that
―I certify that the matter of law stated in the ……. Ground of appeal is a fit
question for adjudication by the supreme court.‖
was included. Thus, it was then a necessary ingredient of a petition of appeal. However in
form 16 which is found in Act No.15 of 1979 this requirement is deliberately omitted.
This change must be given effect to. Recently this matter became a subject of contention in
a number of appeals. As was pointed out earlier in some instances the right of appeal is
restricted to a point of law [eg. Industrial Disputed Act]. It was argued that in such instances
the certificate is mandatory. It was also held in some cases that in all appeals the certificate
is mandatory. There is a lengthy Cursus Curiae on this issue. A judicial trend could be seen
by studying the decided cases to do away with the requirement of the certificate. The
following cases are important.
United Workers Union v. Ceylon Fisheries Corporation and another 2 Srisk.
L.R.62
This was an appeal against the order of a Labour Tribunal. Objection was taken that
the petition of appeal should be rejected as it did not bear the certificate. Objection was
overruled. Justices L.H. de Alwis and J.Abeywardana held that a certificate is not necessary.
Thavarayan and Two Others v. Nalakrishnan [1984] 1 SLR 189
‗In terms of the requirements of S 322(2) Of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act
read with S 31 D 2 and 5 of the Industrial Disputes Act an appeal from an order of the LT
must be on a question of law only, certified by an Attorney At law as a question of law fit
for adjudication by the Court of Appeal. The petition of appeal did not bear such a certificate
by an Attorney At Law and on this ground alone must be rejected.‘
General Manager Ceylon Electricity Board & Another v. V.P.Gunapala BASL
News 1991 March -Justice Gunasekera held as follows
―In regard to the second objection it is my view that there is no legal requirement to
state the question of law in the petition as long as on a reading of the petition it is clear that
there are points of law to be determined‖
T.G.N.Vasantha v. OIC Police Seeduwa BASL News March/August 2007
In this case Justices J. Balapatabedi and Eric Basnayake held that ―the certificate is
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needed only on a situation where an appeal could be made on a point of law. Any party is
entitled to appeal against any judgment on any error of facts as well. In such a situation no
certificate need be filed.‖
It is respectfully submitted that the view taken by justice Gunasekera and Justice de
Alwis is the better view. It is also compatible with the fact that Act No.15 of 1979 has
deliberately omitted the certificate from the form of the petition of appeal and also the fact
that our courts are reluctant to dismiss matters that are brought before them without a
hearing being given. One does not know whether the above two cases have been cited
before their lordships in Vasntha‘a case (which is the latest in point of time). It appears that
those two cases have not been cited. To summarize the law as it stands today, although the
certificate is not necessary, but in the light of the decision in Vasantha‘s case, it is safe to
include the certificate in matters where the right of appeal is restricted to a point of
lawonly. In other instances such certificate would not be necessary.
Final Order
An appeal from an order of a magistrate‘s court shall be made within fourteen days
from the date of the order. An appeal could only be made against a „judgment‟ or a „final
order‟ by a person aggrieved who was a party to the case.[ section 320(1)] Computation of
time is given in section 321 (1) An appeal against an order of a Labour Tribunal shall be
made within thirty days of the date of the order. In computing the time the date on which the
order was made is included Sundays and Public holidays are excluded. If the appeal is
preferred by the employer and compensation has been ordered the full amount should be
deposited in cash as security at the tribunal and a certificate issued by the president to that
effect should not only be annexed to the petition of appeal but should also be averred
therein. When reinstatement is ordered equivalent of a year‘s salary or wages at the date of
termination of services must be deposited [section 31(D) of the Industrial Disputes Act]
When an appeal is filed, it is numbered and listed for hearing. The appellant will be
heard first and the respondent thereafter. If the appellant is not present court is required to
consider the appeal and make such order as it deems fit [section 325] Thus court cannot
dismiss an appeal for want of appearance.
In considering whether an order is a final order or not regard must be had to
the effect of the order. An order which does not dispose of the case, but merely suspends
the date of hearing is not a ‗final order‘. There is no definition of ‗judgment‘ given in the
Act. Some idea can be obtained as to what ‗order‘ constitutes a final order, by studying the
case of Anuruddha Ratwatthe & another v. The Attorney General 2003(2) SLR 39 In
this case the accuseds were remanded by the High Court on the day the trial commenced.
The appellants lodged an appeal against the order remanding them. High Court rejected the
appeal on the ground that the order was an ―interim Order‖ against which there is no right of
appeal. It was held by a bench of five judges that the order was a ‗final order‘ (in respect of
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bail) appealable under section 451(3) of the code. His lordship Chief Justice Sarath N
Silva made the following observation
―The word ‗order‘ is not defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure Act. In the
circumstances it should in its ordinary sense be taken to mean a formal expression of
decision made by Court in respect of any matter together with the reasons for such decision.
An interim order is one made pending a final order in the same matter. Whether a
decision is to be considered as an order operating as an interim order or not has to be
considered from the perspective of the effect that order has, in respect of the matter pending
before Court and the parties to whom it relates.
In this instance the order of the High Court refusing the application for bail has the
effect of the accused being incarcerated and thereby deprived of their personal liberty.
Every day spent in incarceration constitutes deprivation of personal liberty. Looking at
the matter, from this perspective it is clearly seen that the order is final in its
effect………………….An appeal addressed to a superior court should as a rule be
submitted to that Court except where specific provision is made empowering the original
court to reject such an appeal.‖
Until recently, a view was held that the order of conviction is not a ‗final order‘.
The appeals lodged after conviction before sentence were rejected or sent back for
sentencing. This has resulted in a serious injustice. The conviction may be blatantly
wrongful. If the accused waits for the sentence he may entail a custodian sentence. Some
magistrate‘s as a rule do not grant bail pending appeal. Thus the accused will have to prefer
an appeal from jail. By the time appeal is disposed of the accused has spent the jail term. At
the end if the high court decides that the conviction was bad and acquit the appellant, is of
no avail. Who will compensate for the time the accused spent in jail? What about the
damage sustained by going to jail? The loss of reputation and ignominy suffered not only the
accused but also his children and family members. An irreparable damage is eventually done
in a matter where the learned magistrate has erred and had made a perverse, wrongful and
illegal order. This controversy was put right by Justice Thilakawarda in a recent case. In
here exhaustive judgment she made the following observations.
‗The purpose and ambit of section 4 of the High Courts of the Provinces (Special
provisions) Act No. 19 of 1990 is to grant a party aggrieved by any conviction,
sentence and /or a substantive right to appeal therefrom‘
‗the right of appeal is a fundamental human right enshrined by domestic and
international law. Article 12 of the Universal declaration of Human rights has
guaranteed the right to a fair trial, which includes the right for a review of that trial.
‗In terms of international law there is a right of appeal both after conviction as
well as after sentence and when such cases came as two separate appeals should
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be consolidated and treated as one case‘.
Her ladyship also referred to section 31 of the judicature Act which states that „Any
party aggrieved by any conviction, sentence or order entered or imposed by a
magistrate‘s court may subject to the provisions of any law appeal there from to the court of
appeal in accordance with any law, regulation of rule governing the procedure and manner
for so appealing.‟ Gunasekara v. A.G SC Appeal No.114 A/2011 ; Sc Appeal 115/2011
Hc Chilaw and Mc Marawila [This case is reported in The Bar Association Law Journal
2012 at page 215]
Thus the law is now settled, that an appeal lies from a conviction of a
magistrate court before sentence is passed. Eventually when the sentence is passed which
if according to law is excessive the accused can prefer a second appeal against the sentence.
Appeals from orders made by PHC
A party aggrieved by an order made by the PHC in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction may now appeal there from to the Supreme Court with leave obtained either
from the PHC itself or from the Supreme Court. See Abeywardana v. Ajith de Silva 1998
(1) SLR 134. (This is a decision by a bench of five judges of the Supreme Court) An appeal
from an order of the PHC in the exercise of its revisionary jurisdiction should be made to the
Court Of Appeal. The petition of Appeal should be filed of record in the PHC. See also
Gunaratna v. Thambinayagam (1993) 1 SLR 134
Time frame for appeal to the supreme Court-
Question arose in fixing the time within which the appeal is to be filed in the
Supreme Court from PHC after obtaining leave. The rules were found to be silent on this
matter.
In the case of Polwatta Gallage Samantha Kumara v. Illandari Devage Inoka
Manohari SC Appeal No. 44/2005 [HC Kalutara 118/2003 & MC Mathugama Case
No.13390] Justice Raja Fernando, having observed the lacuna (regarding the time frame),
pronounced the following judgment regarding the period of time within which a petition of
appeal should be filed in the Supreme Court after obtaining leave.
―An appeal to the Supreme Court from an order of the provincial High Court
can be either with the leave of the Provincial High Court or with special leave obtained
from the Supreme Court upon a refusal of leave by the High Court.
……………………………………………….…………. A question arises in fixing the
time within which the appeal is to be filed in the Supreme Court for the reason that the
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Rules are silent on the matter…………………… In determining the time for an
aggrieved party to lodge an application for special leave to the supreme Court where
no time limit is fixed either in the statute or rules ; this court has in the case of Tea
Small Holders Ltd. v. Weragoda (1994) 3 SLR 353 and in the case of Mahaweli
Authority of Sri Lanka v. United agency Construction (Pvt.) Ltd. (2002) 1 SLR 8 held
that the petitioner should make his application within a reasonable time, and relying on
the time period prescribed in the rules for similar applications has held that 42 days is
reasonable time ―
―On the same reasoning I am of the view that the time frame for a
petitioner to file an appeal should be 42 days from the date leave to appeal is
granted.”
Thus a longstanding lacuna with regard to the time frame of filing the appeal from
the PHC to the Supreme Court has now been settled.
Applications for Revision:
An application for revision consists of a petition and an affidavit. The petitioner
is the person making the application. He may also be called the applicant. As was pointed
out earlier one cannot invoke revisionary jurisdiction as a matter of right. The applicant has
to satisfy court that there is a prima facie case which justifies interference by the appellate
court. The applicant has to make every party that would be affected by the order of the
appellate court, respondents in the application. Why an affidavit? It is the evidence that is
placed by the applicant before court for it to consider the application. If the court holds that
there is no merit in the application, it may dismiss the application without notice to the
respondents. It is important that in these maters too the courts expect from the applicant
Uberrimae Fidei. That is, he must disclose all the facts. As explained earlier revision is a
discretionary remedy. The applicant can ask for interim relief if he can show court that
without the interim relief the final order will be rendered nugatory. He must also show the
exceptional circumstances and should be able to convince the PHC that the order of the
magistrate court if allowed to stand would result in a serious failure of justice, and therefore
intervention of the PHC is necessary. The procedure when interim relief is asked for is
different and the applicant is required to take some extra steps as found in the Appellate
Procedure Rules (cited below).
The procedure in making revision applications is given in The Court Of Appeal
(Appellate Procedure) Rules 1990. See Rule 3(b). Failure to comply with these rules may
result in the application being dismissed. Justice Mark Fernando after analyzing all the past
cases on the issue decided in the case of Kiriwanthie & another v. Navaratna & another
(1990) 2 SLR 393 that the rules must be normally complied with at the time of filling.
These rules should not be mechanically applied. It is sufficient if there is substantial
compliance. This being judged in the light of the object and purpose of the rule. It is in the
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discretion of court to excuse the non- compliance or to impose sanction. Dismissal was not
the only sanction. This aspect was dealt in full in para 3(6) above.
An important averment that must be included in a revision application is that the
petitioner had or had not invoked the jurisdiction of the appellate court previously on the
same matter. If it had been invoked then the petition must contain an averment disclosing
relevant particulars of the previous application.[ Rule 3 (2) of The court of appeal
(Appellate Procedure ) Rules 1990].
Conclusion
Whatever be the rules that may have been promulgated the power of revision is so
wide and varied that, it is entirely in the discretion of court whether to disregard the rules
and proceed with an application if the court feels that justice according to law demands its
intervention and nothing less. This view has been affirmed in Kiriwanthi‘s case (op.cit.) in
which their lordships have, in effect held that the rules are directory and not mandatory.
Justice Sharvananda observedin the case of Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. v. Grindlays
bank Ltd. (1986) 2 SLR 273 that ‗the rules of procedure have no other aim than to
facilitate the task of administering justice.‘ In the case of Distilleries Company Ltd. v.
Kariyawasam & others (2001) 3 SLR 119 Justice Nanayakkara held that ‗ The object of
the civil procedure Code is to prevent civil proceedings from being frustrated by any kind of
technical irregularity or lapse which has not caused prejudice or harm to a party. A rigid
adherence to technicalities should not prevent a court from dispensing justice. The court
should not approach the task of interpretation of a provision of law with excessive
formalities and technicality. A provision of law has to be interpreted contextually giving
consideration to the spirit of the law.‘ Afortiori then, when the PHC in the exercise of its
revisionary jurisdiction cannot ignore and allow an injustice to prevail for non-compliance
with the rules, when the order complained of is so patently illegal, vexatious, arbitrary and
has caused a failure of justice. When one weighs rules on the one hand and justice on the
other, scales will naturally tilt in favour of justice.
There really can be no peace without justice. There can be no justice without truth. And
there can be no truth, unless someone rises up to tell you the truth.
- Louis Farrakhan
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Administration of Justice
Basic Institutional Arrangements
Justice P.W.D.C. Jayathilake
Judge of the Court of Appeal
The Courts of first instance for the administration of justice in the Republic of Sri Lanka
(as provided by the Judicature Act No: 2 of 1978) shall be;
a) The High Court of the Republic of Sri Lanka
b) The District Courts
c) The family Courts
d) The Magistrate Court
e) The Primary Court
Sri Lanka is divided into Judicial Zones, Judicial Districts and Judicial Divisions for the
purpose of the administration of justice and territorial limits of those Zones, Districts and
Divisions shall be determined by the Minister of Justice from time to time in consultation
with the Chief Justice and the President of the Court of Appeal. A judicial zone may
comprise of one or more judicial districts whilst a judicial district comprises with one or
more judicial divisions. There may be one or more judicial zones within a province.
The High Court of Sri Lanka became the Provincial High Court with the introduction of the
Provincial Council System by the 13th
amendment to the Constitution of the Republic of Sri
Lanka in order to devolve the powers of the state. The High Court of the Republic of Sri
Lanka consisted of not less than ten and not more than sixteen judges at its commencement
in 1978. The number of judges was subject to change from time to time resulting in a rise to
75 at present. However, since no amendment was brought to change the minimum number,
ten shall still be considered the minimum.
There shall be a High Court for each province and each such High Court shall be designated
as the High Court of the relevant province as provided by article 154 P (1) of the 13th
amendment. i.e. The ‗High Court of Western Province‘. Such number of judges as may be
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necessary to each such Provincial High Court shall be nominated from among judges of the
High Court of Sri Lanka by the Chief Justice.
Section 5(1) of the Judicature Act provides that there shall be in each Judicial District in Sri
Lanka, a District Court and a Family Court and in every judicial division a Magistrate‘s
Court and a Primary Court. The same section further provides that each such court shall be
holden by and before one person to be called the ―District Judge‖, ―Judge of the Family
Court‖, ―Magistrate‖ and ―Judge of the Primary Court‖ respectively. It is the Minister of
Justice who shall by regulations from time to time determine such convenient place or
places within such judicial district or division where each court to be held. But the power
possessed by every judge to hold court at any convenient place within his territorial division
has not been restricted.
Judicial Officers
The term, ―Judicial Officer‖ is defined in chapter 22 of the Constitution of the Republic of
Sri Lanka. Accordingly, judges of the Supreme Court and judges of the Court of Appeal,
judges of the High Court and any judge, presiding officer or member of any other court of
first instance are judicial officers in addition to other presiding officers or members of the
institutions created and established for the administration of justice.
The powers of appointment, promotions, transfers, disciplinary control and dismissal of
judicial officers have been entrusted with the Judicial Services Commission by article 111 H
of the Constitution. But the judicial officer referred to in the above article defined by article
111 M (a). According to the said interpretation, judicial officer means any person who holds
office as ―judge‖, ―presiding officer‖, or member of any court of first instance, tribunal or
institution created and established for the administration of justice or for adjudication of any
labor or other dispute but does not include a judge of the Supreme Court or of the Court of
Appeal or of the High Court. Accordingly, the judicial officers of the court of first instance
other than the High Court are appointed by the Judicial Service Commission.
The Judicial Service Commission may make rules regarding the schemes for recruitment
and training appointment, promotion and transfer of judicial officers. As per the regulations
made under such power, the judicial officers of the court of first instance other than the High
Court are appointed to Sri Lankan Judicial Service by the JSC. Such officers belong to five
ranks of classes and grades, namely, special class, class I grade I, class I grade II, class II
grade I and class II grade II. Prior to the establishment of Sri Lanka Judicial Service in
above manner, appointments were made according to the designation and the grade of the
particular Court. Those designations were namely, District Judge – special grade, District
Judge – grade I, District Judge – grade II, Magistrate and Judge of the Primary Court. The
classes and grades mentioned above were crated as to be parallel to the following
designations.
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District Judge - Special grade - Special class of the judicial service
District Judge – grade I - Class I grade I of the judicial service
District Judge – grade II - Class I grade II
Magistrate - Class I grade II
Judge of the Primary Court - Class II grade II
In practice, class II grade II appointments are at present not made. The reason for this is that
separate courts, do not operate by the name of ―Primary Courts‘. It has been provided in the
Judicature Act that when there is no Primary Court Judge appointed, the Magistrate of such
division shall exercise all jurisdiction of the Judge of the Primary Court. Therefore
appointments of judicial officers are made by recruiting to class II grade I of the judicial
service. Even though said grade is parallel to the designation of Magistrate, such officers are
directly appointed to the courts of higher grade, namely, District Magistrate Court and
District Court as the occasion may require. Judicial Service Commission is empowered to
make such appointments under section 6(1) of the Judicature Act.
While the number of Judges of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal is determined by
the Constitution, the number of High Court Judges is determined by the Judicature Act. The
salaries of the Judges of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Court are charged on
the consolidated fund, but those of the other judicial officers paid under the vote of the
ministry of justice. Therefore, there shall be a cadre approved by the management service
department of the treasury for necessary funds to be allocated. As it is the Minister of Justice
who determines the number of judicial districts and divisions, the ministry of justice is
aware of the carder to be existed. But the Judicial Service Commission has been empowered
to appoint as many Additional District Judges, Judges of the Family Court, Magistrate or
Judges of the Primary Court to the same District Court, Family Court, Magistrate‘s Court
and Primary Court respectively as the occasion may require. According to this, an approved
cadre of the Judicial Officers cannot prevail unless the Judicial Service Commission and
Ministry of Justice Act with mutual understanding and collaboration. There are instances
that Judicial Service Commission appoints ―Super Numery Judicial Officers‖ in excess to
the Additional Judicial Officers of the same station.
Acting Judges
When the Chief Justice or the President of the Court of Appeal temporarily unavailable to
discharge duties and functions of his office, President of the Republic of Sri Lanka shall
appoint another judge of the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal as the case may be, to
act in the office of the Chief Justice or the President of the Court of Appeal respectively for
such period according to article 109 of the Constitution. If any judge of the Supreme Court
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or of the Court of Appeal is temporarily unable to discharge duties and functions of his
office, the President may appoint another person to act as the judge of the Supreme Court or
the Court of Appeal during such period. The difference of those two provisions is that in the
first provision, appointing of an acting Chief Justice and an acting President of the Court of
Appeal is mandatory where as in the second, it is optional. As necessity has so far not arisen,
the second provision has not come into effect in practice. In the case of High Court Judges
there is no provision for acting appointments. Instead, the Minister of Justice has been
empowered to make recommendation to the president for appointments of High Court
Commissioners for a period of one year which could be extended so long as it is necessary.
Therefore when a High Court Judge takes leave for a short term and if there is no other High
Court Judge to cover up duties, Registrar of the High Court postpone cases as a practice.
When District Judges and Magistrates are on leave for short terms, acting appointment shall
be made. Even when the said officers are away from their respective stations on weekends
and public holidays, said necessity arises.
There were acting panels of lawyers approved by the Judicial Service Commission for each
Court. It was the practice that when District Judges and Magistrates apply for leave, they
recommended members from the acting panel to be appointed as the Acting District Judges
or Acting Magistrates for the particular stations during the absence of the permanent judge.
Even though there were no hard and fast rules governing the conduct of such Acting Judges,
traditionally they behave themselves in honorary manner. They used to refrain from
accepting cases and their fees from clients and even presenting themselves at their own
offices during such period. Later, it appeared that those traditions were not followed at times
and being a member of an acting panel was used to draw prominence amongst their
colleagues. This situation resulted in the dissolution of acting panels in District Courts and
Magistrate‘s Courts across the island. Therefore, Acting panels of lawyers do not exist at
present unless the JSC circular No: 307 of 12.06.2007 have been followed annually.
Court Staff
Prior to the 1978 Constitution, members of the Court staff were appointed from combined
service recruited by the Ministry of Public Administration. They were attached to the
Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Justice did the attachment to the court staff and
transfers among and out of the courts. 1978 constitution created the new service namely,
―the Scheduled Public Officers Service‖ for the court staff. It was provided that
“scheduled public officers” shall appointed by the Judicial Service Commission.
Accordingly, appointments, promotions, transfers, exercising disciplinary control and
dismissals of the members of the court staff came under the preview of the Judicial Service
Commission. The term, ―scheduled public officer‖ is defined in article 111 M (a) of the
constitution and their categories in addition to the Registrars are specified in the fifth
schedule, namely, clerks, fiscals, interpreters, stenographers, typists and binders.
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In 2006, a change was made in the public combined service, converting clerks, typists and
stenographers into a new service called ―Public Management Assistant Service‖ where they
were supposed to discharge a multiple duty including duties of all three categories. In the
PA circular 6-2006 issued revising the salaries of government servants, the said Public
Management Assistant Service was kept on a higher salary scale than the Scheduled Public
Officers Service which was on a higher salary scale prior to the said circular. The reason
given by the Salaries and Cadre Commission to placement of the Public Management
Assistant Service on a higher salary scale was that it was a newly established multiple duty
service. When the officials of the Judicial Service Commission secretariat had discussions
with the Treasury and the Salaries and Cadre Commission in regard to the lower salary scale
given to Scheduled Public Officers Service, it was suggested to convert the categories of
clerks, interpreters, stenographers and typists of Scheduled Public Officers Service to a
multiple duty service to place them on a higher salary scale. Subsequently the Judicial
Service Commission decided to create Court Management Assistant Service incorporating
all those four categories of Scheduled Public Officers and placed them on a higher salary
scale two steps above the Public Management Assistant Service by issuing J.S.C. circular
no. 301. Accordingly, clerks, interpreters, stenographers and typists of the Scheduled Public
Officers are on the same salary scale and are bound to discharge the duties of all those four
categories as the service requirement demand.
Accountants were appointed to High Courts after several decades of establishing the
Scheduled Public Officers Service. Prior to the appointment of Accountants to High Courts,
Registrars of High Courts handled the duties of Accountants. Sometime after the
appointment of Accountants, the Ministry of Justice appointed an Account Assistants to
assist the Accountants. After some time, the Ministry of Justice again appointed the officers
called Development Assistants to the court staff. Therefore, presently, there are officers
appointed by the Ministry of Justice in the court staff in addition to the members of staff
appointed by the Judicial Service Commission. But, according to the interpretation given
to the term “Scheduled Public Officer” in the Constitution, it has to be any Public
Officer employed in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal or High Court or any Court
of first instance included in the category specified in the fifth scheduled (of the
Constitution) or such other categories as may be specified by order made by the
minister in charge of the subject of justice and approved by Parliament and published
in the gazette.
Justice in the life and conduct of the State is possible only as first it resides in the hearts and
souls of the citizens.
- Plato
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The Qualities
Required of a Judge
Nishshanka Bandula Karunarathna LL.M ( Wales )
Solicitor and Barrister (New Zealand)
High Court Judge, Civil Appellate High Court, Gampaha
The judge is "the pillar of our entire justice system," and the public has a right to demand
virtually irreproachable conduct from anyone performing a judicial function. Judges must
strive for the highest standards of integrity in both their professional and personal lives.
They should be knowledgeable about the law, willing to undertake in-depth legal research,
and able to write decisions that are clear and cogent. Their judgments should be sound and
they should be able to make informed decisions that will stand up to close scrutiny. Judges
should be fair and open-minded, and should appear to be fair and open-minded. They should
be good listeners but should be able, when required, to ask questions that get to the heart of
the issue before the court. They should be courteous in the courtroom but firm when it is
necessary to rein in a rambling lawyer, a disrespectful litigant or an unruly spectator.
The Role of the Judge
Judges play many roles. They interpret the law, assess the evidence presented, and control
how hearings and trials unfold in their courtrooms. Most important of all, judges are
impartial decision-makers in the pursuit of justice. We have what is known as an adversarial
system of justice - legal cases are contests between opposing sides, which ensures that
evidence and legal arguments will be fully and forcefully presented. The judge, however,
remains above the fray, providing an independent and impartial assessment of the facts and
how the law applies to those facts.
Many criminal cases - and almost all civil ones - are heard by a judge sitting without a jury.
The judge is the "trier of fact," deciding whether the evidence is credible and which
witnesses are telling the truth. Then the judge applies the law to these facts to determine
whether a civil claim has been established on a balance of probabilities or whether there is
proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases to establish the guilt of the accused.
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Defendants facing serious offences such as murder, opt to have a jury hear their case. The
jurors become the triers of fact and assess the evidence while the judge takes on the role of
legal advisor, explaining the law to the jurors.
If the defendant is convicted of a crime, the judge passes sentence, imposing a penalty that
can range from a fine to a prison term depending on the severity of the offence. In civil cases
the judge decides whether a claim is valid and assesses the damages, grants injunctions or
orders some other form of redress to the plaintiff. The way in which a judge conceives his
judicial role is the most significant single factor in the whole decisional process.
Role orientations are beliefs about ―the kind of behaviour proper for a judge‖. The attributes
of a good judge include professional, personal, and administrative components. Professional
attributes include knowledge of the law, legal analytic skills, ―good judgment,‖ and
intellectual concentration, whereas personal attributes include such qualities as integrity,
objectivity, and temperament. Many other judges have provided summaries of the qualities
of a good judge, and these usually include professional competence on legal abilities and
intellect, integrity, and judicial temperament. It means the judge should be neutral, decisive,
respectful, and composed. But these qualities are hard to define. Yet we all have a
conception of what a judge should be - a distinguished person presiding over a trial.
The classic image of judge as a neutral arbiter has its roots in the adversary system. The very
conception of courts, and the expectations we have of them, is derived from the adversary
process, especially the criminal trial. Trials are just too slow and costly for resolving the vast
volume of ordinary cases. They are, however, the last resort when all other efforts at
reaching agreement have failed.
Despite their relative scarcity, trials are still used for the ―important‖ high-stakes cases and
―notorious‖ cases. Criminal cases with a considerable public interest would be covered in
the news and perhaps televised. From these television reports, as well as movies, the public
derives its conception of what a judge should be. Full-blown trials exist today, but for a very
small percentage of cases. Yet this image of a judge in trial provides the standard for
measuring all judges.
The role of the judge in the adversary process is to preside over the proceedings and
maintain order. During a trial, the judge rules on whether the evidence the parties want to
use is illegal or improper. If the trial is before a jury, the judge gives instructions about the
law that applies to the case; if the trial is before the court, the judge determines the facts and
decides the case. In a criminal trial, the judge metes out the sentence to those convicted.
Note the role of the judge in this idealized conception, a passive umpire enforcing
procedural rules. For courts to be impartial, judges must be free to decide cases based upon
the laws and facts of the case uninfluenced by either external pressures or internal
preferences. Impartiality is impossible unless judges are independent and free from external
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threats, intimidation, or fears of sanctions based upon their decisions. In some places in the
world, threats to impartiality can range from direct and drastic, such as threats on a judge‘s
life, to more subtle, such as denial of salary increases, promotions, staff, or equipment
needed to do the job.
Impartiality is also threatened to the extent that judges permit their personal conceptions of
justice to influence their decisions, rather than setting aside personal pre-dispositions in
deference to law as written.
The role of the judge is to apply the law to different sets of facts raised in various cases and
to rule accordingly. This ―law applier‖ role is important to litigants because following
precedent leads to consistency in decision making and, therefore, makes outcomes more
predictable, dispassionate and impersonal, communicating mainly through counsel and
viewing litigants as ―parties‖ in cases. Judges in trials in serious cases must listen intently to
testimony and ensure procedures are fair and impartial, including deciding what evidence to
admit.
The Qualities of a Good Judge
1. Judicial Temperament
This character trait encompasses both the ability to apply the law to the facts and to
understand how a judicial decision will affect the human beings appearing before the court.
It is the ability to communicate with counsel, jurors, witnesses and parties calmly and
courteously, as well as the willingness to listen to and consider what is said on all sides of a
debatable proposition.
A judge should exhibit the following aspects of proper judicial temperament: Patience,
open-mindedness, courtesy, tact, courage, punctuality, firmness, understanding, compassion,
humility and common sense. Those qualities should be demonstrated consistently. These
qualities should have consistently manifested themselves to all the court‘s ―stakeholders‖
interacting with the judge regardless of station in life, profession, type of case,
representation by counsel or lack thereof.
A judicial officer should be able to exercise forbearance under provocation, to deal with
others with sensitivity and without giving offense, and to assimilate data outside the judge‘s
experience without bias and without undue difficulty or stress. A judge should be able to
handle personal stress without unloading it on others; he or she should recognize that the
position is not only stressful but an official governmental position of public trust, with its
business conducted largely in full view; and that criticism and scrutiny are inherent in the
position.
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2. Intelligence:
This is the ability to know and apply legal rules, analysis and procedures to different facts
and circumstances, and the ability to perceive and comprehend new concepts and ideas
quickly.
3. Ethics:
There should be no doubt about the judge‘s personal or professional ethics.
A judge should have demonstrated a personal standard of ethical conduct that stands out
among both the general citizenry and the fellow practitioners.
4. Courage and Integrity:
Legal ―Courage‖ is ―the willingness to do what the law requires the judge to do even though
the course the judge must follow is not the popular one‖. ―Integrity‖ is not being influenced
by the identity, race, gender, political status, wealth or relationship of the party or lawyer
before the judge. More basically it is not doing what the judge knows to be wrong. A judge
should possess both courage and integrity.
5. Experience and Education:
Prior professional activities, legal education, teaching, bar activities, and publications are
very important. The type and amount of experience necessary varies depending on the
judicial position.
Education and experience might be defined differently for appellate positions. For this
reason, careful attention should be paid when trial court judges apply for appointment to an
appellate court. The qualities which have led to success as a trial court judge may not predict
equal success at the appellate level. Appellate judicial candidates generally should have
credentials as appellate lawyers, both in brief writing and oral argument.
6. Suitability to Workload:
A judge should demonstrate his or her compatibility with the workload of the court. Those
who dislike writing opinions should not be recommended for appellate positions. Those who
dislike domestic cases or traffic cases would similarly be poor choices for the District and
Magistrate courts, respectively.
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7. Continuing Legal Education:
A judge‘s history of attendance at continuing legal education programs should be considered
as a good indicator or a person‘s interest in remaining vigilant of the law. This factor is
perhaps the best indicator of whether a judge will be motivated to improve his or her
knowledge, willing to continue with his or her ―legal education‖ and be open to new ideas,
evolving attitudes, legal developments, and change in general.
8. Ability to Communicate:
This is the ability to express oneself clearly, concisely, and grammatically, whether orally or
in writing. It includes the ability to listen. All judges must have strong oral and written
skills. Candidates for appellate position require superior writing skills. A candidate for the
trial bench must be able to express him or herself well both orally and in writing.
9. Civic and Professional Responsibility:
This is contribution to the public and the legal profession through organized Bar and non-
Bar service organizations, volunteer activities, civic and cultural organizations.
10. Health:
A judge should be in sufficient physical and mental health to perform the duties of the
office, such that he or she will be able to render vigorous and effective service for the
foreseeable future. A prior history of stress-induced illnesses, migraine headaches, chronic
fatigue syndrome, or poor attendance in the present job should be warning flags and a judge
who is having such a background should not serve as a judge, as the ability to tolerate
conflict, pressure, and stress are essential
11. Character:
This most important overall quality is a key intangible. The judge should be of the best
character. He or she should have a positive reputation in every professional and residential
community. His or her background should be free of references to immorality or
indiscretions. He or she should be free of a history of substance abuse or substance
dependence, and free of indications domestic violence, publicly unacceptable conduct and
the like. Judges should be financially stable.
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Judicial Role
The criminal justice system would simply break down if most cases went to trial. As case
volume increased, a more streamlined, disposition-oriented process supplanted the adversary
process for ordinary cases. The role of the judge as umpire gives way to reality for observers
more familiar with actual court processes. The reality is the judge in these cases, often does
not adjudicate, but rather compromises, teaches or reconciles the parties before him. The
Judge ratifies the compromise reached by prosecutor or defendant. This latter role is not
trivial because it provides a safeguard that the plea agreement was reached using a fair
process.
Misdemeanour cases have always been handled quickly and summarily without much
technicality. Approximately 80 percent of criminal cases are misdemeanours, and more than
70 percent of them are handled by magistrates in limited jurisdiction courts. These lower
criminal courts hear the bulk of criminal cases, including disorderly conduct, drunkenness,
prostitution, petty theft, and simple assault, and they are the courts with the most contact
with offenders; it is in these courts that the stereotype of ―assembly line‖ justice was created.
The biggest problem with our court system is the volume of cases. The volume is so large
that the courts have to rely on assembly line justice. It really is an assembly line. The police
officer prepares the initial papers and files them with the clerk. The clerk gives the papers to
the prosecutor. The paper then goes to the judge. The judge calls the case. There‘s a brief
discussion at the bench.
Think about this: If a court has 100 cases and each case takes 15 minutes that would take 25
hours. If each case takes only 5 minutes, it still takes 8 hours, so that‘s still not going to
work. Most courts end up at about 1-2 minutes per case. That‘s call assembly line justice.
These types of cases require facts to be established so that the law can be quickly applied;
sentences and financial penalties are limited so that dispositions can be expeditious. It is
better to divide this judicial role into two complementary parts, the ―adjudicator,‖ who
emphasizes deciding cases, and the ―task performer,‖ who emphasizes processing litigation
and maintaining smooth court operations. The ―disposition-oriented‖ or ―administrator‖ role
of this judge is to skillfully apply judicial procedures to achieve swift and consistent case
disposition. Clearing the docket then becomes very important, and the task is processing a
large number of individual cases, a more bureaucratic process not unfamiliar to executive-
branch administrative agencies. Judges must decide large numbers of lower-stakes cases
every day, rather than spending days or weeks on one case at trial, and so the procedures
must be streamlined. Consequently, judges may take a more active role in all phases of case
processing to move the case along while ensuring that the Lawyers, who are devoting the
proper attention to their clients.
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Judges simply cannot rely on parties to frame disputes. Overcrowded dockets and
―overzealous litigants‖ lead judges to take a more ―active, largely discretionary approach to
pre-trial case management‖. Also it is interesting to find that judges who emphasized the
―administrator‖ role indeed, take a shorter amount of time, on average, to resolve cases.
Timely resolution is a positive outcome if it does not inhibit litigants from seeking
information, including clarification and follow-up questions, or make them feel that their
concerns are not taken seriously.
Judges do not have much time to spend reflecting and contemplating before making
decisions and are impersonal because there is not much time for communication with
litigants, even those who are not represented by counsel.
With the advent of more treatment-oriented problem-solving court processes, judges who
are assigned or more likely volunteer, for those courts assume a more active role as
treatment team leader. Spurred by the perceived inadequacies of the adversary process, some
legal leaders have promoted a more cooperative approach to dispute resolution. Particularly
in family law, once a fertile source of trials, there have been calls to abandon adversarial
proceedings.
Special Courts
Some types of cases, such as those involving juveniles, have never fit comfortably within
the traditional law-court framework. Separate courts for juveniles were created first in
Chicago in 1899 and served as a model for specialized family courts, which have
jurisdiction over not only juvenile cases, but also other cases affecting the family from
divorce to domestic violence. More recent ―problem-solving‖ courts originated from the
efforts of practical, creative, and intuitive judges and court personnel, grappling to find an
alternative to revolving door justice, especially as dispensed to drug-addicted defendants.
From the opening of the first drug court in, Florida in 1989, drug courts spread rapidly based
upon anecdotal reports of success in reducing recidivism and the infusion.
By the end of 2009, there were 2,459 drug courts and an additional 1,189 problem-solving
courts in the United States, such as mental health, domestic violence, truancy, child support,
homelessness, prostitution, re-entry, and gambling courts. The term ―problem-solving
courts‖ has passed into the language, even though most are not separate courts but separate
dockets or calendars of larger courts or divisions. In most instances, they involve a single
judge periodically handling a single type of case.
Problem-solving courts require judges to be more active, less formal, and personally
engaged with each offender, which creates a tension with the traditional role of the judge as
a detached, neutral arbiter. Indeed, the problem-solving judge going beyond ―situation
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oriented‖ judge not only by taking into account the impact of their decisions on the litigants,
and perhaps the public at large, but also by becoming a partner in a ―therapeutic-oriented
response‖ to the litigants‘ underlying problems. The tension of these ―polar-opposite roles‖
provides the base for the charge that problem-solving judges become ―social workers‖ or
―therapists.
The judges often have an unusual amount of information about the people who appear
before them. These people, who are often called clients, rather than defendants, can talk
directly to the judges, rather than communicating through lawyers. And the judges monitor
these defendants for months, even years, using a system of rewards and punishments, which
can include jail time. Judges also receive training in their court‘s specialty and may have a
psychologist on the staff.
These judges are interested in the litigant‘s welfare, often making direct inquiries of
the litigant. Decisions are made in language understood by the parties, and there is open
communication because litigants can tell their stories. The judge may have direct dialogue
with the litigants, in direct opposition to the traditional conception of judge as passive
recipient of information from Lawyers. For example, problem-solving judges need to praise
and sanction defendants, rather than remain aloof, but this active engagement could create
the perception that they are not impartial. The problem-solving judge role is most
appropriate for special-jurisdiction courts.
Judicial Independence
The judiciary is independent from other branches of government. Therefore, judges are in "a
place apart" from the other institutions of our society. Governments appoint and pay judges,
but once appointed judges are shielded from bureaucratic control. Judges must be able to
make courageous, even unpopular decisions knowing that no one - a chief justice, another
judge, a government official or even the most powerful politician - can fire them or cut their
salaries as retaliation. Justice is not a popularity contest, and judicial independence also
protects judges who make controversial decisions that spark public outrage. The concept of
judicial independence is enshrined in the Charter, which guarantees everyone accused of
crimes that their case will be heard by "an independent and impartial judge". Independence
is vital to fostering public confidence in the fairness and objectivity of the justice system.
A number of measures are taken to protect this independence. Judges oversee the
administration of the courts and the government does not set hearing dates or assign a judge
to a particular case. An independent body should be there, to reviews judges' salaries,
benefits and retirement annuities and recommends improvements and changes. Judges also
enjoy security of tenure - superior court judges can remain on the Supreme Court bench until
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age 65 and can be removed from office only after an independent investigation determines
they are unfit or guilty of misconduct and Parliament vote to remove the judge from the
bench. Finally, judges enjoy legal immunity and do not have to worry about being sued for
something they say or do while carrying out their duties.
Impartiality
It is not enough for the judiciary, as an institution, to be independent - individual judges
must be seen to be objective and impartial. In their personal lives, judges must avoid words,
actions or situations that might make them appear to be biased or disrespectful of the laws
they are sworn to uphold. They must treat lawyers, clients and witnesses with respect and
must refrain from comments that suggest they have made up their minds in advance. Outside
the courtroom, judges do not socialize or associate with lawyers or other persons connected
with the cases they hear, or they may be accused of favouritism. Judges typically declare a
conflict and withdraw from a case that involves relatives or friends.
Judges often choose to avoid most forms of community involvement. A judge may
undertake community or charitable work but cannot offer legal or investment advice. Judges
cannot take part in politics, either as a party member, fundraiser or donor, and many choose
to relinquish their right to vote. While judges have been more willing in recent years to
make public speeches or agree to media interviews, they refrain from expressing opinions on
legal issues that could come before them in a future case. Judges are forbidden from being
paid to do anything other than their judicial duties, but can accept appointments to serve on
royal commissions, inquiries and other official investigations.
It is important that judges should maximize the assistance they receive from counsel. There
are various techniques that experienced judges adopt in this regard. For example, in cases
involving the assessment of damages, judges, as a matter of routine, should require the
opposing counsel to provide them with detailed submissions as to the calculations for which
they respectively contend. Similarly, when it comes to formulating the orders in a particular
case, both sides should be required to specify, in detail, what they seek. Unless it is
unavoidable, counsel should not be permitted to thrust lengthy written submissions before a
judge with a casual observation that the judge can read those submissions later in chambers
and counsel will move on to some other subject. We are constantly told that counsels are
there to assist the judge. Obtaining maximum benefit from such assistance is part of the
judicial technique. Developing that skill will greatly improve the quality of your judicial
lives.
Reasons for judgments are not legal essays, or articles prepared for a law journal.
The purpose of a judgment is to make a decision about the issues that have been presented
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for decision, and to express the reasons for such decision. Just as a judge who presides at a
murder trial does not undertake to provide the jury with a dissertation on the law of
homicide, but should confine his or her directions to such principles of law as the jury must
understand in order to decide the particular case, so the reasons for judgment of a trial judge
should address, and address only, the issues that require determination. The question: "Why
write judgments?" prompts another question: "Who reads them?" Your style of judgment
composition might be affected if, you ask yourselves who wants to hear or read what you
propose to say, and for what purpose. A succinct method of expressing judgments will be
valued by your audience just as you, as the audience, value the same quality in an advocate.
These observations are not intended to carry the suggestion that you suppress your
individuality or that you should conform to some tedious and inflexible routine. On the
contrary, the most important piece of practical advice I can give you is that you should enjoy
being a judge. The work of administering justice according to law is important and
honourable. The task of preparing reasons for judgment, oral or in writing, is often
demanding but it is also capable of giving intellectual satisfaction. Responding to the
challenge of being a just and efficient judge is a task worthy of any lawyer's mettle.
Justice and power must be brought together, so that whatever is just may be powerful, and
whatever is powerful may be just.
- Blaise Pascal
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Status of Proceedings in the
Magistrate’s Court
When an Incompetent Appeal is Lodged
Priyantha Liyanage LL.B, LL.M (Colombo)
Additional Magistrate, Colombo
―The trial of an offence triable summarily is to commence more than two
years after its commission. The fact indicated above give some idea of the
rate of progress of criminal trial in this country. But it‟s only fair by the
accused in this case to say that the delay in its disposal has been
occasioned more by the slothfulness of the prosecution than by any tactics
adopted by the defense‖.
Per T.S. Fernando C.J. in Banda V Purasingha1
The tactic adopted by the defense which contributed to the delay of the disposal of the
above case as observed by His Lordship T.S. Fernando C.J is an incompetent appeal
preferred against an order for which there is no right of appeal. This judgment was delivered
in 1958.Yet we still experience that albeit the right of appeal is internationally recognized2
the aim of an appeal every time is not to challenge the legality of the order or judgment but
to delay the fruit of the proceedings of the trial court. Therefore aim of this writing is to
examine what remedies that are available for a magistrate to have undisturbed proceedings
in circumstances where an appeal is lodged at an inappropriate time. This discussion
requires examining the statutory provisions and the case law.
Sec 320 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) states that any person who is dissatisfied
with any judgment or final order pronounced by a magistrate may prefer an appeal to the
High Court for any error in law or in fact in the said judgment or final order. In terms of sec
316 no appeals can be filed except as provided by the CPC or any other law. Therefore no
appeal lies against an order which is not a „final order‟.
1 56 CLW 106 2 Art. 14 (5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights says ―Everyone convicted of a crime shall
have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law”
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A final order is an order which terminates the proceedings of the trial court3. Accordingly
interlocutory orders during the trial are not final orders. The problem here is that when an
appeal is lodged against such interlocutory order for which the right of appeal has not
recognized by express provisions by CPC or any other law4 does the filing a petition of
appeal itself terminate the proceedings of the trial court?
The general rule and the practice in criminal cases is that once an appeal is preferred against
an order or judgment the proceedings are suspended unless otherwise is provided by any
particular law.5 In AG V Sillem (11 English Reports 1208) Lord Westbury observed that
the effect of a right of appeal is the limitation of the jurisdiction of one court and the
extension of the jurisdiction of another. The general rule was perfectly articulated in the
local case of Edward V De Silva where it was held that ―once an appeal is taken from the
judgment or decree of an inferior court , the jurisdiction of that court in respect of that case
is superseded except in regard to the matters to be done and directions to be given for the
perfection if the appeal and the transmission to the court of appeal‖6Sec 323 (6) of the CPC
also provides that on the petition of appeal being lodged the magistrate shall transmit the
case record to the High Court.
The general rule applies subject to the qualifications provided in Sec 320 and accordingly it
has no application when the appeal is against an interlocutory order .In other words petition
of appeal may not disturb the trial or other proceedings of the original court. This situation
has been dealt with in few local judgments. In Banda V Purasinha(supra) the magistrate
refused the plea of autrefois acquit raised by the defense counsel and directed that the trial
should proceed. The accused appealed against this order to the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court held that an appeal lies only from a judgment or final order pronounced by a
magistrate Court, and an interlocutory order is not an appealable order. T.S.Fernando J.
observed that the remedy available to a magistrate in such circumstance as follows;
“The magistrate should have continued the trial and after its conclusion forwarded the
record to this court as an appeal had been filed against his order rejecting the plea. The
decision to postpone the trial till this court had time to consider an interlocutory appeal has
resulted in delaying the trial of a case which had already been delayed to the point of
exasperation…..it is found the appeal is not competent the next step for the magistrate to
continue the trial.”
In Re Nancy De Silva7 where N appealed from an order of the Magistrate directing a motor
car which was produced by the police in connection with a complaint of robbery, to be
3 Cassim V Abdurasak 38 NLR 428. 4 For instance an appeal lies against interim payments made under Sec. 11 of the Maintenance Act. 5 For deviation of the rule See Proviso to Sec. 14 of the Maintenance Act which provides that maintenance orders
made under Sec 2 shall not be stayed for the reason that an appeal is preferred against such final order. However
interim orders made under Sec 11 are subject to the general rule since the legislature has omitted Sec 11 from that
proviso. However it is limited to the continuity of interim payment but not to proceed to the inquiry. 6 46 NLR 342 at page 343 7 70 CLW 80
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returned to the alleged owner, the Supreme Court found that there is no right of appeal
against that order. It was also held that the proceedings can be instituted and continued even
where an appeal is pending and the record has been sent up to the Supreme Court, all the
Magistrate has to do in such an event is start another record. Since the Magistrate is not
entitled to refrain from transmitting the case record to the High Court as it has been held in
Application re appeal in P. C. Hambantota No. 43428it is advisable and safe to follow the
procedure prescribed in Re Nancy De Silva judgment.
Appeal against conviction before the sentence
As aforesaid an appeal lies only against a judgment or a final order. The judgment
constitutes the conviction, the reasons for conviction and the sentence9. In Kershaw V
Rodrigo10
it was held that findings of a verdict coupled with sentence is the judgment.
Therefore any appeal before sentence is premature. In Ukku Bandage Thilekarathna V
O.I.C. Kekirawa11
it was held that an appeal should be preferred after the sentence is passed.
Accordingly an appeal against a conviction was dismissed and sent back the record to enter
the sentence.
However in Gunesekara V A.G12
it was held more recently that there is a right of appeal
both after the conviction as well as after the sentence. The court came to this conclusion
after considering the international laws. For instance Art 14 (5) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights says that everyone convicted of a crime shall have
the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to
law. Art 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has guaranteed right to a fair trial
which includes the right for a review of that trial.
In the light of these authorities it is opined that in any event where an appeal has been
preferred after the conviction, the Magistrate is not refrained by any procedural law from
proceeding to pass the sentence since transmitting the case record will only contribute to
delay the proceedings and if the record is transmitted the higher forum will have to send it
back in order to pass the sentence. Therefore the record may be sent only after the sentence
in order to pursue the appeal. Had an appeal being lodged after the sentence as well the two
appeals may be consolidated and determined by the High Court in view of the Gunesekara V
A.G judgment (supra)
The execution of orders of the High Court under the Primary
Court Procedure Act
8 22 NLR 187 9 See Hendricus V Wijesooriya 47 NLR 378. 10 3 C.WR. 44 11 C.A 346/81 decided on 16.12.1992 12 SC Appeal No. 114A/2011 Decided on 09.07.2012
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A practical difficulty faced by original court judges is that when an application, to execute
the order of the High Court Judge acting in revision, is made there is no way of knowing
whether an appeal has been lodged against the order of the High Court. Generally the party
resisting the execution furnishes a certified copy of the petition of appeal. The question that
arises here is whether a writ of execution can be issued when a petition of appeal has been
filed against the High Court order.
Again it is important to keep in mind that the general rule above referred to is applicable in
criminal matters. The proceedings under Sec. 66 of the Primary Court Procedure Act are
considered as quasi criminal in nature yet matters with regard to the execution of orders of a
Primary Court is very much civil in nature as per Sec 78 of the Primary Court Procedure Act
which deals with casus omissus.
In Kusum Kanthilatha V Indrasiri13
the Court of Appeal held that upon proof of an appeal
being preferred to the Court of Appeal against a judgment of the High Court acting in
revision in respect of an order made under Part VII of the PCPA, the original court should
stay its hand until the determination of the appeal. This view was held to be erroneous by
Ranjith Siva J. in R P Nandawathie V Mahindasena14
where it was held that mere lodging of
an appeal does not automatically stay the execution of the High Court order. It was also
observed that orders given by Primary Court Judges under Chapter VII should be executed
or implemented as possible without undue delay unless there is a stay order currently in
operation and there should be no automatic stay of proceedings for whatever reason,
otherwise that would negate and frustrate the very purpose for which these provisions were
enacted.
This conflict was resolved by a divisional bench of the Court of Appeal in O.I.C. Police
station Eheliyagoda V Jayantha Wickramasingha15
where His Lordship Justice Abdus
Salam (Sisira de Abrew J and D.S.C. Lecamwasam J agreeing) inclined to follow the
decision in R P Nandawathie V Mahindasena (supra). The divisional bench emphasized the
want of expeditious execution of orders made under Chapter VII of the PCPA since the
legislature expected only temporary orders from the PCJ in order to preserve the peace.
Accordingly the law that prevails now is filing of an appeal against the order of the High
Court does not ipso facto operates to suspend the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to execute
the order appealed against.
13 2005 1 SLR 411 14 CA CAPHC 242/06 15 2011 1 SLR 284
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Membrum pro membro - An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.
Law of Hurt and Grievous Hurt
For Medico-Legal Purposes
R.S.M. Mahendrarajah
District Judge/Magistrate, Kebitigollewa.
Whoever causes bodily pain, disease, or infirmity to any person is said to ‗cause Hurt‘ the
penal code enumerates eight kinds of Hurt, which are designated as Grievous Hurt. Hurt
which does not amount to ‗Grievous Hurt‘ is not described by any special term in the penal
code, but the expression ‗Simple Hurt‟ is used in practice.
In normal sense Hurt means to cause bodily injury and/or pain to another person in our penal
code defines Hurt as follows:
Section
310. Whoever cause bodily pain, disease, or infirmity to any person is said to ‗
cause hurt‘
311. The following kinds of hurt only are designated as grievous
a) Emasculation.
b) Permanent privation or impairment of the sight of either eye.
c) Permanent privation or impairment of the hearing of either ear.
d) Privation of any member or joint.
e) Destruction or permanent impairment of the powers of any member of joint.
f) Permanent disfiguration of the head or face.
g) Cut or fracture, of bone, cartilage or tooth or dislocation or sublimation of
bone joint or tooth.
h) Any injury which endangers life or in consequence or which an operation
involving the opening of the thoracic abdominal or cranial cavities is
performed.
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i) Any injury which causes the sufferer to be in severe bodily pain or unable to
follow his ordinary pursuits for a period of twenty days either because of the
injury or any operation necessitated by the injury.
. Indrasena vs welikada police (1948) 49 NLR 319.
Dingihamy vs Jansz, Chif Inspector,Anuradhapura police (1951) 46 CLW 16
And Indian penal code defines Hurts as follows
Section 319:- whoever causes bodily pain, disease, or infirmity to any person is
said to cause hurt based on this, the essential ingredients of Hurt are
1. Bodily pain, disease or infirmity must be caused – Bodily pain, except such
slight harm for which nobody would complain is hurt for example, pricking a
person with pointed object like a needle or punching somebody in the face, or
pulling a woman‘s hair.
The duration of the pain is immaterial infirmity means when any body organ is not
able to function normally. It can be temporary or permanent. It also included state
of mind such as hysteria or terror.
2. It should be caused due to a voluntary act of the accused.
Grievous Hurt
Causes of severe hurt are classified under grievous hurt. The authors of the code
observed that it would be very difficult to draw a line between hurt and grievous hurt
but it was important to draw a line even if it is not perfect so as to punish the cases
which are clearly more than hurt. Thus section 320 of IPC defines Grievous hurt as
(Indian penal code section 320)
Section 320:- the following kinds of hurt only are designated as ―Grievous‖
1. Emasculation
2. Permanent privation of the sight of either eye
3. Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear
4. Privation of any member or a joint
5. Destruction or permanent impairing of powers of any member or joint
6. Permanent disfiguration of the head or face
7. Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth
8. Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to he, during the
space of twenty days, in severe body pain or unable to follow his ordinary
pursuits.
Ramala vs state of Rajasthan 1963 CrLJ 387
Jagdish Chand vs state of HP, 1922 CrLJ 3076 (HP)
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To make out the offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt, there must be a specific
hurt, voluntarily inflicted, and coming within any of the eight kinds enumerated in this
section. A simple hurt cannot be designated as grievous simply because it was on a vital
part of the body, unless the dimensions or the nature of the injury or its effects are such.
That it actually endangers life.
To make out the offence of causing grievous hurt, there must be a specific hurt
coming within any of the eight kinds enumerated in this section. A simple hurt cannot
be designated as Grievous simply because it was on a vital part of the body, unless the
dimensions or the nature of the injury or its effects are such that (in the opinion of the
doctor) it actually endangers life.
The evidence of the medical is not indispensible for conviction. The court is not
absolved of the responsibility to form its own conclusion regarding the nature of the
injury, expert‘s opinion notwithstanding.
Hurt is much Narrower then ―injury” Hurt does not include mental harm, and is
can fined to such harm that causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity
Whereas ―injury” denotes any (bodily) harm in reputation or property is clearly
outside the definition of ―Hurt”
Anis Beg vs. Emperor A.I.R (1924) Act 215 (2) - If bodily pain caused as a direct
result of any act it is Hurt.
Emperor vs Maung po nayan 17 Cr. L.J 465
The King vs Dayaratne (1945) 31 CLW 68
The King vs Alahakoon (1942) Times of Cey.138
No 24/469 D.C (Criminal) Tangalle (1906)2 Leem.Rep.35
Injury
Any harm done to a person by the acts or omissions of another injury may include
physical hurt as well as damage to reputation or dignity, loss of a legal right, or breach of
contract. If the party causing the injury was either willful (Internationally causing harm) or
negligent then he/she is responsible (liable) for payment of damages for the harm caused.
Section 43 of our penal code defines injury as follows.
The word ―injury‖ denotes any harm whatever illegally caused to any person in body,
mind, reputation, or property.
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Hurt must be distinguished from ―Assault” as defined in section 342.
Section 342 our penal code read as follows.
Assault
Whoever makes any gesture of any preparation, Intending or knowing it to be
likely that such gesture or preparation will cause any person present to apprehend that
he who makes that gesture or preparation is about to use criminal force to that person, is
said to commit ―an assault‖
Singapore penal code defines, Criminal force and assault as follows,
Criminal force and assault
Criminal force – A person uses criminal force to another person when he or
she intentionally uses force to the other person, without that person‘s consent,
in order to cause the committing of any offence, or intending by the use of
such force illegally to cause, or knowing it to be likely that by the use of such
force he will illegally cause injury, fear or annoyance to the person to whom
the force is used. The penalty for using criminal force to another person is
imprisonment for up to three months, or a fine of up to S$500, or both.
Assault – Whoever makes any gesture or any preparation, intending or
knowing it to be likely that such gesture or preparation will cause any person
present to apprehend that he who makes that gesture or preparation is about to
use criminal force to that person, is said to commit an assault. The penalty for
assault is the same as that for using criminal force.
Assault or use of criminal force with intent to outrage modesty – Whoever
assaults or uses criminal force to any person, intending to outrage or knowing
it to be likely that he will thereby outrage the modesty of that person, shall be
punished with imprisonment for up to two years, or a fine, or caning, or any
two of such punishments. This offence is sometimes inaccurately termed
'molest' by the media. If, in order to commit or to facilitate the commission of
the offence, a person voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to that person
death, or hurt, or wrongful restraint, or fear of instant death, instant hurt or
instant wrongful restraint, the punishment is imprisonment of not less than
two years and not more than ten years with caning. If the offence is
committed in a lift in any building, or against any person under 14 years of
age, the punishment is imprisonment for not less than three years and not
more than ten years and caning.
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Explanation: - Mere word do not amount to an assault But the words which a person
uses may give to his gestures or preparation amount to an assault.
Simple hurt / cause hurt
Section 310 of our penal code defines hurts as follows.
Whoever causes bodily pain, disease, or infirmity to any person is said to ―cause hurt”
Simple hurt does not endanger to life. It is not serious
Simple hurt includes bodily pain, disease and infirmity. It may also include
mental shock.
Hurt is punishable, when r it is accompanied with other offence. Such as
voluntarily causing hurt .etc
Where the knife injury though was on the vital part of body, but the depth of
the injury was not given x-ray reports also did not show any bone cut the
injury was held simple.
An injury which cannot be endangering to life, is not a grievous hurt, but is a
simple hurt.
The accuser‘s act must cause bodily and not mental pain, in order that his
conduct constitutes hurt.
If bodily pain is caused as a direct result of any act.
Samul vs Rodrigo, SI, Jaffna Police (1948)38 CLW 77
Indrasena vs Welikanda Police (1948) 49 NLR 319
James vs Silva (1934) 44 NLR 300
The King vs Salamon (1936) 38 NLR 113
Hurt (wounding)
This is explained in section 310 of the penal code of Sri Lanka. Hurt us causing bodily
pain, disease or infirmity to a person. Hurt is broad category. Pain could be caused by
injuries on the surface of the body, such as, abrasion, contusions, lacerations, cuts, stabs
and internal injuries. A disease could be introduced to a person by administering a
poison willfully causing illness or even by introducing infective agents such as bacteria
or virus. Infirmity is the inability to do activities; the person was capable of performing
before being hurt in the absence of visible or detectable injuries or disease.
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Non grievous
This is hurt minus grievous hurt
Grievous hurt
This is given in section 311 of the penal code and the amendment Act No 22 of 1995.
Grievous hurt is a legal concept that is operative in Sri Lanka and India. The
English criminal law uses the term ―grievous bodily harm‖ but in a different sense
in the term grievous bodily harm, the seriousness of the offence is judged not by
the gravity of injury but solely by the intention of the assailant. In fact this should
be the criterion in every case but such step would put great burden on the police.
The Indian and the Sri Lanka law ease this burden by having two categories such as
non-grievous (simple) hurt and grievous hurt. The entity of non grievous hurt is not
defined in the penal code but is obtained, by removing the entity of grievous hurt
form the entity of hurt. The medical practitioner has to decide whether the injury or
the wound comes within the category of grievous hurt. In addition to this
differentiation between grievous and non-grievous hurt the circumstances
accompanying on the nature of the weapon used. It is a matter of law to be decided
by the judge, whether the wound is grievous or non-grievous. It is the duty of the
medical officer to describe the wound and indicate to the court whether it fell into
one of the categories constituting grievous hurt. The judge would then decide
whether it is grievous or non-grievous. In giving medical evidence the doctor
should be careful not to mention hearsay evidence which would not be accepted in
courts unless it is confirmed by the person giving direct evidence.
The notes made by the surgeon on the bed head ticket and the radiologist‘s report
would we considered as hearsay. X-ray films taken under the supervision of the
medical officer would be direct evidence. Where a x-ray did not play an important
part in the diagnosis, which could confidently. Be made without it, it is not
necessary to mention the x-rays in the reports or when giving evidence. If however
the x-ray is a material piece of evidence relating to a foreign body or a deep-seated
injury in the bone, it is necessary to produce the x-rays.
Emasculation
This is the deprivation of a man of his virility or masculinity and any injury, which
does so, falls in to the category of grievous hurt. It refers to injuries resulting in loss
of one or more of the male external genitalia or other injury, which results in
impotence. A severe squeezing of the testicles completely cut injury of the shaft of
the penis or testicles or stab injury of spinal cord in the lumbo-sacral spine may
cause impotence.
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Permanent privation of the sight of either eye.
The cardinal feature is that the privation should be permanent. Privation means
loss. Therefore only permanent loss of sight of whatever degree would amount to
grievous hurt. Temporary impairment of vision such as black eye or throwing of
irritant substance into the eyes would not be considered grievous.
The medical officer should be reasonably sure that the privation of sight did not
exist before the injury when declaring an injury as causing permanent privation of
sight. It is necessary to ascertain the lesion in the eye and decide whether such a
lesion could have been caused by tae assault committed for an example
hemorrhages form diabetic retinopathy could not have been caused by a blow on
the eye. However dislocation of the lens, retina or hemorrhage in to the eyeball
may result from a blow. Opacity of the cornea of the eye could have been caused
by acid being thrown at the eyes.
Privation of any member or joint
These are serious injuries resulting in loss of a member of the body. An example of
this type of injury would be cutting off a finger, toe, hand, foot, limb, nose, and ear
lobe. By privation of a joint is a place where is certain amount of unrestricted
movement such as flexion and extension, abduction and adduction and rotation.
Any of these movements could be restricted by complete fixation of the joint. Cut
injuries of the joint capsule resulting in alkalosis by fibrous tissue or excessive
bone formation would come under this category.
Destruction or permanent or impairing of the power of any member or joint
This covers much wider range of injuries than the previous one and the injuries in
the previous clause are more serious than those covered by this clause. Destruction
of the powers of the member entails the complete loss of function of that member
without however entailing its loss. This may occur in damage to bone, nerve,
muscle, or artery or vein. Permanent impairment of the powers of a member or
joint may result from wide variety of injuries such as cut injuries of the nerves,
joint capsules, blood vessels and muscles which can cause permanent stiffness,
limitation of movements or weakness of the limb. Even superficial injuries if
extensive may result in scar formation, which would finally cause contraction
resulting in limitation of movement or stiffness of a member or joint. The
impairment should be permanent and not temporary. Therefore it may be necessary
to review the patient several weeks later. By such time it may be possible to assess
the amount of recovery and decide whether there would be or would not be
permanent impairment or that the disability would have lasted for more than 20
days so that the condition would be Grievous under clause under the section.
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Permanent disfiguration of the head or face
The cardinal features are disfiguration and permanency. Asymmetry of the face,
nose, eyes, ear lobes and asymmetrical lesions of the face such as scars, cuts,
discolorations, pigmentation, de-pigmentations, and thickenings would be
considered as disfiguration and could be included in the category of grievous hurt.
The important feature is that the individual. The age, sex, occupation and the
marital status of the individual may influence in making the decision of
disfiguration of the face. A scar, which would hardly be noticeable in middle-aged
laborers, may be considered as disfiguration in a young unmarried girl, film star
and in a television announcer. This is one category where the medical officer has to
use discretion. Extensive lacerated wounds caused by acid throwing and branding
with firebrands usually cause permanent disfiguration apart from the obvious
mutilation caused by cutting off a nose or ear. The possibility that the injury may
become less noticeable is inconsistent in making it grievous.
Cut or fracture, of bone, cartilage or tooth or dislocation or sublimation of
bone, joint or tooth.
Usually it is fairly easy to make the decision on this type of injury because in most
of the instance there is no doubt as to its nature. The diagnosis can be made
clinically or by x-ray examination. The cut or fracture of bone Cartilage or tooth or
dislocation or sublimation of bone to the duration between the assault and
examination. In recent dislocations there are raw bleeding areas in the tooth socket.
Attention to be paid to the lips because a blow sufficient to the victim had severe
protruding teeth. The margins of a recently fractured tooth are sharp and the surface
shows the pulp cavity. The margins of a tooth which have been fractured long time
ago, are smooth the discoloration of the non-fractured teeth is in contrast to the
freshly broken surface of habitual betel chewers and in hard smokers. The presence
of pyorrhoea and receding gums does not make a dislocation of tooth non-grievous
but would be an important factor in helping the court to decide on the amount of
forced used. Mere loosening of a too thin the of severe pyorrhoea cannot be
considered as a grievous injury. Many of these difficulties do not arise in the case
of fracture or dislocation of a bone. The diagnosis of a fracture of a bone may be
made clinically and confidently confirmed by x-rays.
The approximate age of the fracture can also be assessed from x-rays. Difficulties
are observed in the diagnosis of skull x-rays. Skull x-rays should be taken in
standard positions such as antero-posterior, lateral and town‘s view and in doubtful
cause it is necessary to obtain the interpretation of a radiologist. The marking made
by blood vessels on the cranium may be mistaken for fissure fractures by an
inexperienced medical officer.
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Any injury which endangers life or in consequence of which an operation
involving the opening of the thoracic, abdominal or cranial cavities is
performed
a) Any injury which endangers life
For life to be in danger there must be an immediate danger as a direct
result of the injury. Shock form any cause and damage to vital organs
cause immediate danger to life. Mere presence of infection without shock
would not endanger life. Mere breach of the skin, which could be a
potential site of entry for tetanus and gas gangrene organism by itself,
would not endanger life. Generalized peritonitis, extra-dural hematomas,
severe haemothorax or pneumothorax, severe lung contusions, leading to
respiratory failure are some of the conditions, which could be considered
as endangering life.
It is incumbent on the part of the grade medical officer or the part of the
grade medical officer or the surgeon or obstetrician treating the patient to
make arrangements to take a dying declaration or a dying deposition if the
patient‘s life is in danger.
b) Operation involving the opening of the thoracic, abdominal or cranial
cavities is performed
Any patient has undergone Craniotomy, thoracotomy or laparotomy as a
result of injury would be considered to be a case of grievous hurt. It
should be noted that the decision to perform craniotomy, thoracotomy,
Insertion of an inter-costal drainage or laparotomy is a decision made on
medical grounds. Inclusion of this section removed the difficulty that the
medical officers had in deciding whether an injury was grievous or non-
grievous or non-grievous in patients who had intra-cranial, intra- thoracic
and intra- abdominal lesions without endangering life
Any injury which causes the sufferer to be in severe bodily pain or unable to
follow his ordinary pursuits, for period of twenty days either because of the
injury of any operation necessitated by the injury
The medical officer should be careful not to be misled by patients who are
malingering when considering these two sections. Wounds can be deliberately
aggravated by patients and kept fresh and prevented from healing. The medical
officer must assess at the initial examination whether the wound is likely to take
more 20 days to heal and should ask the patient to report in 14 days time to assess
the degree of healing. The difficulty is removed if the patient is hospitalized
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because he is under observation at all the time. A patient remaining in the hospital
for 20 days or more for a wound on the orders of the medical officer would be
considered to be a case of grievous hurt.
The injuries that should be considered under this section should be the injuries
other than those in the operation in this section are those operation excluding
craniotomy, thoracotomy including insertion of aintercostal tube and laparatomy
such operation would be cleaning of a wound or arresting bleeding points, repair
of tendons and muscle, manipulation, reduction and immobilisation of fractures or
dislocation etc. under general or local anaesthesia.
The injuries, which prevent a person carrying out normal duties for 20
days are those that would not fall in to any of the above categories from the
decision to make an injury this category is purely a medical one.
NO 2594 D.C kurunegala (1899) Koch rep 41
Pre withers –j, it is not for the medical witness to say whether hurt is grievous or
not, he has to describe the nature and character of the injuries and it is for the
judge to find whether they are grievous.
Classification of wound
1. Abrasion
Abrasion is destruction of the epidermis of the skin. Abrasion are of immense
value in forensic medicine and are produced when a rough object or a sharp edge
scrapes the superficial portion of the skin (epidermis) as when a person falls,
slides on a rough road or when a sharp knife is drawn across the epidermis. Most
abrasions bleed slightly and from a scab when healed and do not leave a
permanent mark. There are three types of abrasions. Abrasions may be
accompanied by other minor or major internal injuries. Ante-mortem abrasions
have to be differentiated from post-mortem abrasions. Post-mortem abrasions lack
congestion, bleeding and the floor is pale white whereas in ante-mortem abrasion
the floor is red. Post-mortem abrasions are caused by ants, insects, Crustaceans
etc. abrasion may be self-inflicted, produced by blow, application of pressure or
due to falls.
2. Contusion
Contusion extravasations of blood into the following rupture of small
blood vessels (arterioles/veins). They can occur on the skin, in muscles,
connective tissues and internal organs. Bruises are produced when blunt
mechanical forces such as compression, traction and shearing are applied to skin,
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tissues and organs. Bruises in the living appear as tender, red bluish red or brown
swellings on the body surface. Bruises in internal organs cannot be detected by
tenderness on palpation and the person complains of pain in the area of bruise.
Bruises occur more readily in lax tissues than in firm and tissues, e.g. eyelid,
breast, vulva, buttocks etc. Bruises occur less frequently in scalp, palms and soles.
Females, elderly people, those with bleeding disorders and those who are
unaccustomed to physical work (clerks or office workers etc)bruise occurs easily
than manual labourers and athletes. The colour of the bruise changes with time
and are seen clearly in fair skinned people. Contusions are rarely self inflicted and
most often produced by direct blows or falls. Bruises in dead bodies may appear a
day or two after death. Hence the necessity for a repeat examination of bodies in
cases of assault is important.
3. Lacerated wounds
Laceration is splitting, tearing and stretching of tissues on the application of blunt
mechanical force. Lacerations are often accompanied with bruising. Lacerated
wounds are not produced by sharp cutting weapons. Lacerated wounds are
identified by the irregularity and the undermining of the margins, splitting of the
ends (fishtail appearance), and abrasion of the margins and the presence of tissues
across the edges. Often the area surrounding and underlying tissue are contused. It
is easy to differentiate ante-mortem laceration from post-mortem lacerations
because the latter will not have any vital reaction. Lacerations caused by blunt
weapons like clubs etc. are usually uncontaminated where as lacerations produced
by falls and in rode traffic accident are usually contaminated with sand, grit or
mud. Lacerated wounds are rarely self inflicted most often produced by direct
blows or falls. Lacerations may be accompanied with severe internal injuries
(scalp laceration with intra-cranial haemorrhages, chest laceration with
haemothorax, abdominal laceration with injuries to abdominal viscera etc.
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4. Fractures of long bones
Fracture is a break in the continuity of a bone or tooth. Fractures can be produced
by direct or indirect violence. In direct violence, Fractures takes place at the site of
impact of the blow. In indirect violence, Fracture takes place at a site, which is not
the site of impact of mechanical force.
Bone Fractures & Joint Dislocation
Two of the most common bone and joint injuries are fractures and dislocations. Both injuries
should be considered emergency situations and set into place as soon as possible by a trauma
specialist. Moving a fractured or dislocated bone may cause further damage to the bone and
surrounding blood vessels, nerves and tissue.
Types of Bone Fractures
Bone fractures can happen in a variety of ways, including accidents, repetitive stress
injuries, osteoporosis and tumors.
The most common types of bone fractures are:
Closed or simple bone fracture: a break in the bone in which the skin is still intact.
Open or compound bone fracture: a break in the bone in which the skin is
perforated by the bone or by a blow at the time of the fracture.
Segmental or multiple bone fracture: a break at two or more places on the same
bone.
Comminuted bone fracture: a break in which the bone is shattered into pieces.
The line of the bone fracture may be:
Transverse: Forms a right angle with the axis of bone.
Oblique: Runs slanted to the axis of the bone.
Longitudinal: Runs along the line of its axis.
Joint Dislocations
Joint dislocation is the displacement of a joint from its normal position, usually caused by a
blow, fall or other trauma. In addition to displaced bones, there may be damage to the joint
capsule and surrounding muscles, blood vessels and nerves. Symptoms of joint dislocations
include loss of motion, swelling and pain and sometimes a joint visibly out of place.
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Dislocation or sublimation of bone or joint
Dislocation and ‗sublimation‘ of a bone or joint are two different clinical entities. The
dislocation of bone means to ‗put out of joint‘ and could be easily diagnosed. Sublimation of
bone means ‗displacement of bone at a joint which is of a lesser degree than a dislocation.
(Luxate means dislocate; thus a subluxation is short of a dislocation)
However under the 1995 amendment both are considered to be Grievous injuries. All
dislocations and subluxations must be supported by X-rays. The procedure adopted will be
the same as for fractures.
What is important to note is that a fracture will still appear on the X-ray once reduced while
a dislocation will not appear on the X-ray once reduced.
In doubtful cases the opinion of an orthopaedic consultant must be obtained.
Cut or fracture of tooth.
Fracture of tooth refers to either a Fracture of the crown or a Fracture of the toot. The latter
results in mobility of the tooth. It also refers to a part of the crown getting chipped off.
Crown infraction means incomplete crack in the enamel with no loss of tooth substance.
There is 100% recovery without treatment,but yet grievous.
Even a Fracture of a carious tooth is a grievous injury. However the medical officer must
contend that the intensity of the blow was of a lesser degree.
A diagnosis of a Fracture of the root is made from dental X-rays.
MLR, MLEF AND PMR (H 1135,1135A)
The medico-legal report in compensation claims, (what is MLR)
The standard Medico legal report H 1135 (MLR) cannot be issued in cases of compensation
as the MLR is designed only to issue reports ‗Hurt‘ cases.
Further, most of these compensation claims are civil or private actions and in issuing private
reports, a medical officer cannot use forms issued by the government. Therefore, a medical
officer may prepare his report in a manner he thinks is most suitable for the case on his
letterhead or a half sheet of paper stating his credentials.
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The format of the report could be:
Part A-original injuries
Report as in Medico-legal report (H1135)
- Name, age, sex, address of injured person.
- Date of admission, date of examination & date of discharge.
- Bed head ticket or OPD/clinic reference number.
- Short history given by the patient.
- Detailed description of the injuries (size, site, shape, disposition etc) as in page 2 of MLR. Investigation findings like X-rays etc. (with reference numbers)
- Category of hurt (as in page 2 of MLR)
- How each injury was caused (as in page 3 of MLR)
a) Reference to weapons
b) Reference to the incident like traffic accident, fall, machinery etc.
c) Are the injuries sustained compatible with history given by patient, if not
given reasons.
d) Was the person smelling or under influence of alcohol or drugs.
Part B-summary of the nature of treatment given such as
Application of crepe bandages and plaster casts, surgical procedure, pain killers, antibiotics
and other drugs given, physiotherapy, duration of treatment in hospital, follow-up treatment
in clinic up to full or partial recovery.
Opinions of other consultants like Eye, ENT, Dental, Orthopedic, Neurosurgeon etc should
also be included.
Part C-past medical history
Any natural illnesses suffered by the patient at the time of the initial examination diabetes
mellitus, hypertension, liver disease, renal diseases etc should be mentioned including its
medical management and its effects on the injuries.
Part D- condition of patient at time of discharge
- Fully or party recovered.
- Injuries healed, partly healed or infected.
- What instructions given to patient by medical officer like dressing of wound
continuation of drugs, attending clinic, attending local hospital etc.
Part E-Review of patient
- Date & time of review.
- Condition of injuries on review with reference to each injury observed by your
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initial examination.
- Has the injured person carried out instruction given at the time of discharge?
a) Completely healed without any disablement.
b) Completely or partially healed with temporary total disablement.
c) Completely or partially healed with temporary partial disablement.
d) Completely or partially healed with permanent partial disablement.
e) Completely or partially healed with permanent total disablement.
Part F-Disablement (incapacitation)
In respect of injuries, mention the injuries falling under the following categories.
a) Permanent total disablement.
b) Permanent partial disablement.
c) Temporary total disablement.
d) Temporary partial disablement.
In respect of disablement indicate:
1) Is the disablement the direct of injury?
2) Were there any natural diseases that would have contributed to the injury? If so
what were those diseases and how and to what extend did they contribute?
3) Did alcohol or drugs result in or contribute to the injury? If so how?
4) Are there any factors on the part of the patient that could have contributed to the
disablement? If so what are they and how and to what extent did they contribute?
5) Was the patient suffering from any natural illness which could have contributed to
the disablement? If so what were they and how and to what extent did they
contribute?
6) The duration of each type of disablement.
7) Percentage loss of earning capacity.
Injury Pattern in fall
Injury pattern in falls depends mainly on:
1. Weight of the victim.
2. Distance of the fall.
3. Nature of landing surface such as hard or soft, smooth or rough, irregular with
projections, sloped down or a fluid medium.
4. Intervening objects between the places of the landing surface.
5. Anatomical area/ areas of the body hitting intervening object and the landing
surface.
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Thus, a fall by a heavy person over a long distance on to a hard surface with several hard
projections and hitting intervening objects and surfaces in its descent will leave severe
injuries.
In such a scenario, if the heads hits the landing surface, will result in fatal head injuries so
wound be injuries to the trunk and limbs on impact.
Description of injuries for Medico-Legal Purposes
Injuries should be accurately described in the Medico Legal report (MLR) and other
medico-legal documents. The form health 1135A may be used to draw the injuries.
Photographs may also be taken.
A general and a systemic examination should be done when examining a person for injuries.
There may be injuries in areas other than those that are not shown by the patient. Therefore a
complete examination should be done though out the body.
Non-technical simple descriptive terms should be used as often as possible on medico-legal
document as they are mostly handled by non-medical persons.
The following details should be noted.
1. Nature of the injury (and shape): e.g. liner abrasion, laceration, sutured
cut, oval shaped contusion.
2. General position in the body: e.g. front of left forearm, right side of face.
3. Exact dimensions (and shape): e.g. 5cm long, 5‖x2‖, circular with a
diameter of 1.5cm.
The depth should be noted measured in relation to tissue planes, in clinical cases. E.g.
superficial or skin deep, involving muscles, penetrating into abdominal cavity. It should be
measured in centimetres when it is for a PMR. This is especially important in stab injuries.
4. Exact position & direction
This is referred to in relation to anatomical position of the body or landmarks. The words
used by the general public should be used as much as possible. E.g. root of neck, bridge of
nose, tip of nose, tip of shoulder, outer end of eye brow, left angle of the mouth, 3rd
intercostals space, lower angle of scapula, bony prominence of elbow, inner border of
forearm.
The exact position on a surface should be referred to in two dimensions at right. E.g. 2cm
outward and 3 cm above the left nipple,4cm vertically above the root of ear, 3cm to the left
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of the midline and 1 cm above the eyebrow, 2 cm horizontally to the left from upper end of
the natal cleft.
The direction of a stab, gunshot or other penetrating injury should be given in three planes.
E.g. upward, inward and backward
(2) Significant positive and negative factors; e.g.
indicating
a. timing-healing, infection, active bleeding,
b. weapon-both sides sharp,
c. force-point or plane of maximum comminuting and maximum
depression, extending to the inner table of the skull and
d. Complications or effects of injury (when relevant) – involving the
middle meningeal artery, inability to move finger when tendons are
cut, whether there is an underlying haemothorax or not in a stab
injury of the chest.
Example of a description:
Grazed Abrasion in the left side of face, 3cm x 1 cm. The inner end is situated 4cm away
and 2cm above the angle of the mouth, and it is directed outward and to the left. A scab is
present. There is no evidence of infection. There is no evidence of underlying injury.
Medico-legal examination form (MLEF) and medico legal
report (MLR)
The MLEF is a police referral form. It has 3 parts out of which 2 parts (copies) are sent to
the doctor. The doctor fills and returns the ‗police copy‘ and retains the ‗medical officer‘s
copy. Any person who has allegedly been assaulted and sometimes alleged assailants are
produced with the MLEF (e.g. examination for drunkenness, injuries, rape assailants etc. If
the doctor comes across cases that have a criminal involvement (e.g. assault, road accidents,
abortion, rape etc) such cases should be reported to the police. So that they can take action
including issuing a MLEF. Accidents per se need not be informed (e.g. simple fall). A
doctor has a legal duty to inform attempted suicide. However his ethical duty may be
otherwise.
Based on the information provided by the doctor in the Medico-legal Examination Form
(MLEF), the police decide whether to and under what offence the assailant should be
prosecuted. An MLEF is NOT sent to court.
If there is a court case the doctor may be ordered to submit a Medico-Legal Report, since
summons for a MLR may take many month, the doctor when filling the MLEF should
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document all information needed to fill a MLR in the back of the MLEF or another paper
and keep it with him or her. The MLR should be sent to the court under registered post, or
personally handed over and a receipt obtained. This is a form of documentary evidence
courts. The doctor is usually not summoned to the Magistrates Court to give oral evidence
but only asked to submit reports. He or she may be required to give oral evidence in the
High Court.
The Medical Officer is personally criminally responsible for maintaining copies of the
reports of persons he or she has examined. Failure to obey summons can lead to a warrant of
arrest. This duty and responsibility lies until the doctor dies. He should take all copies of
such documents with hum he is transferred from one station to another and when he retires.
The institute in which a doctor has worked earlier may keep copies and send certified copies
of reports deposited there on behalf of its former medical officers when they are summoned.
But this is a matter of courtesy and should not be assumed as a right.
Some question the doctor may be asked in courts *what injuries contributed to the
death*cause of death/category of hurt*amount of force used*whether injuries are consistent
with a pattern (e.g. fall, defence, self-inflicted/friendly hand etc) *How and when they were
caused *probable weapon*whether a given weapon could have caused such an injury
*volitional activity the person could have done after sustaining such an injury.
The doctor‘s interpretation of injuries may help the police investigation and the ISD to
decide whether a death was natural, accidental, suicidal, or homicidal. His evidence may
also help the judge/jury to reconstruct the crime. The doctor may also have to examine and
report on injuries for civil purposes such as compensation of victims who have been
subjected to industrial and road traffic accidents.
However the ideal situation would be to judge the seriousness of the offence from the
intention of the assailant by studying the weapon used number of blows inflicted and the
area of the body to which blows have been dealt.
After the examination of a victim of the medical officer is called upon to indicate to the
police in the medico-legal examination form (MLEF-Police) the seriousness of an injury
from a legal point of view so that the police may charge the assailant under the relevant
section of the penal code. This is referred to as the category of hurt.
The categories of hurt mentioned in column 12 of the M.L.E.F. are as follows
1) Non-Grievous.
2) Grievous.
3) Endangering life.
4) Fatal in the ordinary course of nature.
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Injuries that are ―necessarily fatal‖ do not come under the category of hurt,
for the victim is implied to be dead. In such circumstances the charge will be one of
―Homicide‖
In an early anonymous case, withers J. declared ―it is not for the medical officer to say
whether a hurt is Grievous or not. He has to describe the nature of the injury and the
character of the injuries, and it is for the judge to find out as to whether the injuries are
Grievous or not (1899) D.C Kurunegala 2594 Koch‟s Rep 41.
In spite of the above judgment and similar views expressed by judges of the Supreme Court
later, the medical officer is called upon to express an opinion as regards the category of hurt
both in the M.L.E.F. which is given to the police and in the medico-legal report (MLR-H
1135) which is submitted to the court for the trial.
Conclusion
It would be better for the doctor to stick to the scientific facts of the case while opening
about the nature of the said injuries and leave it to the Court to form their opinion based on a
holistic view of the case. Finally, it should always be borne in mind that the doctor‘s opinion
as to the nature of the injury, whether simple or grievous, is to guide the investigative
agencies only and the final decision rests with the Courts.
―An unjust law is itself a species of violence. Arrest for its breach is more so. Now the law
of nonviolence says that violence should be resisted not by counter-violence but by
nonviolence. This I do by breaking the law and by peacefully submitting to arrest and
imprisonment.‖
― Mahatma Gandhi, Non-violence in Peace and War 1942-49
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Issues Arising at the Enforcement of
Interim Measures of Protection
In International Commercial Arbitration
Kaweendra Iranthie Nanayakkara1
Introduction
Efficiency, Finality, Inexpensiveness and Confidentiality are the main four facets, which
make Arbitration a commendable Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) system and parties
have ever more placed their reliance on Arbitration to resolve their disputes. As an
alternative to the judicial system, arbitration has become more popular among business
community in solving their cross-border commercial disputes.
The process of arbitration is always conducted in an informal atmosphere giving
parties required confidentiality. Unlike in situations where judicial discretion is exercised,
party autonomy plays a major role in the course of arbitration. Since it is the parties who are
setting the wheels in motion, it is not uncommon to see that they do everything within their
capacity to have a favourable award.
Even though arbitration is said to be a speedy method of dispute resolution than the
judicial system, it also has its inherent drawbacks. Sometimes many reasons would intervene
and make the procedure slow and prolonged. However, due to the passage of time between
the initiation of arbitral proceedings and the granting of the final award, interim measures
invariably and often form an important instrument to prevent irreparable harm to a party and
make the outcome a mere pyrrhic victory.
During the course of arbitration, it may be necessary for the parties to obtain
interim orders intended to preserve evidence, to protect assets, or in some other way to
maintain the status quo, pending the outcome of the arbitration proceedings and such orders
1 Additional District Judge/ Add. Magistrate – District Court of Attanagalla. LL.B (Colombo), LL.M (Wales),
Diploma in Forensic Medicine and Science (Colombo).
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could be obtained from arbitral tribunal as well as from the national courts.2 Hence, interim
orders for the successful final award has become a necessity.
It is important to note that such orders are identified by different names in various
legal entities. However, the obvious intention of them is to facilitate reaching a meaningful
final award in arbitration. UNCITRAL Model Law3 , UNCITRAL Rules
4 and WIPO
Arbitration Rules5 identify them as ―interim measures of protection‖ while in the Arbitration
Act 1996 [of England] it is known as ―provisional awards‖6. ICC Arbitration Rules 1998
recognize these as ―conservatory and Interim Measures‖ and in France – Code of Civil
Procedure as ―mesures provisoires ou conservatoires‖. However, it is interesting to note that
main institutional rules, such as UNCITRAL and WIPO used the term ―interim measures of
protection‖. This choice of words clearly denotes the fact that the intention of these interim
orders is to act as a protector of the arbitral process.
1.1 Types of interim measures
As interim measures have been identified by different names, there exist different
types of interim measures. Those types mostly determined by the usage and as well as by the
methods of obtaining such measures.
The foremost type of interim measure is the measure for preserving the status quo.
If there was no such protection available, most of the time, the final award would be useless
for the winning party. Likewise, measures for preservation of evidence are also of great
importance for the arbitration procedure. This can include the safety of material evidence
and securing evidence from witnesses who would not be able to present at crucial times. [i.e.
very sick or dying person]. Measures to regulate and stabilize, secure enforcement, provide
security for costs and orders for interim payments can be consider as other types of interim
measures commonly used in arbitration proceedings.7 When interim orders are to deal with
seizure of property they are often called attachments or holding orders. Sometimes ex parte
orders such as Mareva Injunctions8 and Anton Piller Orders
9 could be obtained from
national courts in support of arbitration10
.
2 Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration – By Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter 4th edition –
2006 at pg.332 3 Article 9 and 17 4 Article 26 5 Article 46 6 Section 39 7Interim Measures in Arbitration Proceedings – Justice Saleem Marsoof, P.C. (Article submitted for the LL.M
students by the Advanced Legal Studies Unit – Sri Lanka) 8 Ex Parte Mareva Injunction prevents defendant from dealing with his assets pending award. See William Wang‟s Article International Arbitration: The Need for Uniform Interim Measures of Relief- Available at
http://www.brooklaw.edu/students/journals/bjil/bjil28iii_wang.pdf 9 Anton Piller orders issued to preserve evidence. It allows applicant or his representative to enter the premises of
defendant to search for and retain in safekeeping documents or other materials relevant which are in the threat. 10 International Arbitration: The Need for Uniform Interim Measures of Relief – William Wang – Available at
http://www.brooklaw.edu/students/journals/bjil/bjil28iii_wang.pdf
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1.2 Need for interim protection in international commercial arbitration
As cement holds bricks together preventing them from falling apart, interim
measures help in safeguarding the position of the parties until such time the dispute is
determined and by doing that make certain that the final award can be enforceable and
meaningful.
Amendments adopted in 2006 to Article 17 (2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law
expressly provide a list of functions for which interim measures are apt.11
According to
Article 17 (2):
An interim measure is any temporary measure, whether in the form of an award or in
another form, by which, at any time prior to the issuance of the award by which the dispute
is finally decided, the arbitral tribunal orders a party to:
(a) Maintain or restore the status quo pending determination of the dispute;
(b) Take action that would prevent, or refrain from taking action that is likely to cause,
current or imminent harm or prejudice to the arbitral process itself;
(c) Provide a means of preserving assets out of which a subsequent award may be
satisfied; or
(d) Preserve evidence that may be relevant and material to the resolution of the
dispute.
1.2.1 Maintaining the status quo
Maintaining the status quo in arbitration until such time the final award is delivered
is of utmost importance and vital to the successful outcome of the arbitration. If not for
necessary steps taken at the correct moment, no amount of reimbursement would be
sufficient to repay the injured party. As Marsoof J‘ states, possible damages would
include12
-
… damages to reputation, loss of business opportunities and similar heads
of claim, which are real enough but difficult to prove and to quantify, even
if they are considered to be legally admissible.
Such order could be obtained either from Courts or from the arbitration tribunal
itself. However, there is some debate as to whether it is appropriate for the court to grant
such relief. In Channel Tunnel Group v. Balfour Beatty Ltd.,13
this issue was discussed at
length. The Court of Appeal decided that it had no power to grant an injunction in the light
11 Transnational Dispute Management – Vol. 3 Issue 5 Published in December 2006 by L. E. Foster and N. Elsberg,
- ‗Two new initiatives for provisional remedies in International Arbitration‘ 12 Interim Measures in Arbitration Proceedings – Justice Saleem Marsoof, P.C. (Article submitted for the LL.M
students by the Advanced Legal Studies Unit – Sri Lanka) 13 [1993] 1 All E.R. 664
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of the arbitration agreement. However, the House of Lord‘s decision was that though it has
power to grant the requested injunction such granting is inappropriate. Nevertheless, an
interim order obtained in time would indeed be helpful in maintaining the status quo.
1.2.2 Preserving evidence and assets
To reach their final decision arbitrators would have to weigh and measure the
evidence placed before them. What would be the result if the crucial evidence were
unavailable for them to consider? It would invariably hamper the outcome and damage
would be irreparable. Therefore, it is imperative to preserve relevant and material evidence
and assets, which are essential in resolving the final dispute.
Sometimes one party to the arbitration might find it necessary to obtain evidence of
a person who is suffering from a terminal illness and not expecting to live long. Or else that
party might come to know or have a reasonable suspicion that the other party is about to
destroy some crucial evidence or going to sell or transfer the ownership of their assets,
which are crucial for the outcome of the final award. Since international commercial
arbitrations more often deal with matters worth more than several million dollars, it is
necessary to take every precautionary method to safeguard the validity of the final award. In
such situations, interim orders preventing such actions are necessary for a meaningful final
award.
1.2.3. Preventing doing things likely to cause harm or prejudice to the arbitral
process
‗Inexpensiveness‘ said to be one of the main qualities of arbitration. However, in
the commercial arena this situation has now changed. In view of the fact that the
international commercial disputes are dealing with millions or billions of dollars, arbitrators‘
fees have also become very high. For this reason, accuracy of the determination and
impartiality of reaching the final award is paramount. If a party to arbitration becomes aware
that something is about to happen or already happening to cause harm to the arbitral process,
that party should be able to take some precautions to prevent it. In such situations if a party
to the arbitration has to suffer and bear the consequences without any recourse, he will lose
faith in this system.
There may be instances where one party to arbitration sometimes intentionally or
unintentionally does things, which would damage the whole process. Likewise, one party
might come into possession of very strong evidence to the effect that the arbitrators are
biased and the final award invariably would be in other party‘s favour. Or else there may be
situations where the arbitrators are acting arbitrarily abusing their powers. With the
availability of interim measures of protection, the affected party is in a better position. Thus,
availability of interim relief in such situations to prevent likely or apparent harm definitely
has enhanced the credibility of the arbitration process. The aggrieved party can seek interim
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protection either from the arbitral tribunal or from the local court.
Mere availability of interim measures would not help a party who is in urgent need
of such protection. Parties who opt for arbitration for resolving their disputes must be aware
of their rights for which they are entitled to during the arbitral process and where they can
seek them. By being aware of the difficulties that they invariably would face, one could save
lot of unnecessary expenditure and time.
Interim Measures of Protection by Arbitral Tribunals and
Local Courts and Difficulties in Granting / Obtaining Such
Measures
2.1 Interim Measures of Protection by Arbitral Tribunals and Local Courts
Interim measures are an absolute necessity to protect what is at stake in the
arbitration. Regardless of whether evidence, real property, personal property or financial
assets need to be preserved, there must be an effective procedure for maintaining the status
quo. Without the protection of such provisional remedies, the outcome of the arbitration
could become meaningless to the winning party.14
A party to Arbitration, who is in need of an interim relief could either, seek it from
the arbitration tribunal itself or from the Courts. By inserting necessary clauses when
drafting the arbitration agreement, parties can confer broad discretionary powers to the
tribunal to award interim measures of any nature. At the same time, using the same method,
parties can opt to exclude the arbitrators‘ power to grant interim measures explicitly
reserving such rights only to the local courts. Nevertheless, almost all the major arbitration
institutions recognize the simultaneous powers of the arbitration tribunals in granting interim
relief.15
Similar to the instances where parties seek interim measures from the courts, a
party that turns to the arbitral tribunal for an interim remedy may expect the same standard
as applicable in the courts in granting an interim order. Thus, anyone who place reliance on
the arbitral tribunal in granting interim orders, should take precautions to set guidelines at
the time of drafting the arbitration agreement.
14 International Arbitration: The need for Uniform Interim Measures of Relief by William Wang – Available at
http://www.brooklaw.edu/students/journals/bjil/bjil28iii_wang.pdf 15 Article 21 of the AAA-ICDR International Arbitration Rules, Section 22of the AAA International Arbitration
rules, Rule 34 of the Commercial Arbitration Rules, Article 23(1) of the ICC Rules, Article 26 of the UNCITRAL
Rules, Article 15.4 of the LCIA Rules.
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2.1.1 Involvement of Courts
Albeit, parties who wish to avoid judicial intervention to their disputes opt for
Arbitration, involvements of Courts have become essential for successful Arbitration.
Inexorableness of the support from the courts is now been largely accepted throughout the
commercial world.
When a party to arbitration finds it necessary to have an interim remedy prior to the
establishment of the arbitral tribunal, certainly their recourse would lie with the local court16
.
Invariably the appointing of arbitrators and compromising of the seat and the other
jurisdictional issues, which are necessary for arbitration, will consume considerable time. In
such a situation if a party has to wait until such ordeal comes to an end that party will be in a
very disadvantageous position within the arbitration process. Sometimes the damage would
be irreparable making the final award forever meaningless.
In Naval Gent Maritime Ltd. vs. Shivnath Rai Harnarain,17
the respondent Indian
company has all its assets located in India and arbitration proceedings initiated in England.
Issue was whether interim injunction could be granted in India. It was held that so long as
the territorial jurisdiction of the court is present, relief should not be declined on
technicalities, which are not representative of any equities in favour of the respondents.
Since the Respondent‘s properties are located in India, the umbilical cord of territoriality is
clearly visible. Recently the Indian Supreme Court in Bhatia International vs. Bulk
Trading S.A. and another,18
interpreting the Sec. 2(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act held that the section does not limit the applicability of Part I of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act to international arbitration inside India. According to Jyoti Sagar, in his
article, Interim measures by Local Courts in arbitration held Overseas – Developments in
India,19
as a result of the above mentioned decision, now if the parties to arbitration
agreement do not specifically opt out Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the
Indian Courts can order interim or conservatory measures provided for by sec. 9 even where
arbitration is pending overseas [outside the India].
The Paris Court of Appeal in Terex v. Banexi,20
had held that it has authority to
order interim relief pending arbitration on substantive issues. In Rotem Amfert Negevv.
16 In M/s. Sundaram Finance Ltd.V. M/s. NEPC India Ltd. [ AIR 1999 Supreme Court 565] at pg. 571 held that High Court had erred in coming to conclusion that it does not have jurisdiction to entertain application under sec. 9
of Arbitration and Conciliation act because the arbitration proceedings had not been initiated. The above case has
been followed by Delhi High Court in M/s. Buddha Films Pvt. Ltd.V. Prasar Bharati[AIR 2001 Delhi 241] 17 2000 (4) RAJ 512 (Del) 18[2002 (4) SCC 105] 19[Published in News and Notes from the Institute for Transnational Arbitration, 3 Vol. 16, No. 4 (Autumn 2002)] 20 CA Paris, Dec. 12, 1990 [1991 BULL. JOLY 595] see FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Part IV Ch. III Para 1309 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John
Savages eds., 1999)
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Grande Paroisse21
, the Rouen Court of Appeal held that it has jurisdiction to order
protective measures ―regardless of whether or not the arbitral tribunal is constituted‖.
Another instance where the court intervention would be necessary is situations in
which the tribunal has no power to grant interim orders. When the interim order sought is
against a third party, the tribunal does not have jurisdiction to grant interim orders. Thus in
those circumstances one can request assistance from the national courts in support of
arbitration.
Sometime at the request of the arbitral tribunal itself, court assumes jurisdiction
over the arbitration. When the tribunal finds it necessary to record some vital statements or
take evidence from the people over whom the tribunal does not entertain its jurisdiction,
such requests seem to be made to court, to facilitate calling witnesses and recording their
evidence.
In addition, when a party to the arbitration finds that the tribunal is bias or corrupt
and that he will not get justice by requesting interim order from the tribunal, he can apply to
the local courts.
There are other instances where the arbitration tribunal may not have necessary
powers in granting interim orders as a result of the application of the domestic legislations.
The Greek Code of Civil Procedure22
states ―The arbitrator may not order, amend or revoke
interim measures of protection‖ while Italian Code of Civil Procedure23
states "The
arbitrator may not grant attachment or other interim measures of protection‖24
.
However, in India after the decision of the Delhi High Court in Arun Kapur vs.
Vikram Kapoor and Others,25
a decision delivered having considering the Channel Tunnel
Group Ltd. vs. Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd.,26
case, held the present law is that-
…the parties should be advised to approach the arbitrator for interim
relief unless and until the nature of relief intended to be sought falls
outside the jurisdiction of the arbitrator or beyond terms of the agreement
or reference of disputes.
In that judgment, it was further held that-
A party should always be discouraged to knock the door of the Court particularly when
the arbitrator is seized of all the relevant or even ancillary disputed.27
21 CA Rouen, Sept. 7, 1995, [1996 REV. ARB. 275] see FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Part IV Ch. III Para 1309 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John
Savages eds., 1999) 22 Article 889 23 Article 818 24 Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration – Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter – 4th Ed. Pg. 334
Sweet and Maxwell (7- 13) 25 [2002 (1) ARB. L.R. 256] 26[1993 (1) All E. R. 664]
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Most legislation worldwide has accepted the intervention of courts when dealing
with arbitration. Some have accepted the wide jurisdiction meanwhile others have allowed a
restricted intervention28
.
2.1.2 Interim Orders by the Arbitration Tribunal
Powers of arbitral tribunal in granting interim / protective measures mainly depends
on the legislation of the seat of arbitration. Unless a party chooses institutional arbitration29
which can look after most procedural and jurisdictional questions through the institution‘s
procedural rules, in ad hoc arbitration, when party has a freedom of choice, arbitral
tribunal‘s powers would largely depend on the choice of procedural rules.30
In situations where a party to arbitration is in need to apply for an ex parte order
(without any notice to the other party) the arbitral tribunal would not be in a position to
entertain such application. The laws of the most popular arbitration seats and the rules of the
leading institutions do not currently expressly envisage such a power for arbitrators.31
27 Ibid at 27 28 Arbitration Act 1996 (of England) § 44, sets out a list of instances where the court exercise its powers in support of arbitral proceedings, Arbitration and Conciliation act 1996 (India) § 9 – A party may, before or
during arbitral proceedings or at any time after making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced ………, apply
to a court for (ii) for an interim measure of protection …..‖. France, New Civil Procedure Code Article 809 [This Article dealt with protective measures available from the Courts and can used in Arbitration]– ―The president may
at any time, even where confronted with serious objections, provide by way of summary interlocutory proceedings
for such protective measures as to keep the status quo of the matter as required……..‖. Singapore – Arbitration
Act, 2001 § 6 (3) – ―………, the court may for the purpose of preserving the rights of parties, make such interim or
supplementary orders as the court thinks fit in relation to any property which is or forms part of the subject of the
dispute to which the order under that subsection relates‖, Swiss Statute on International Law Article 183 (3) – ―The arbitral tribunal or the court may grant provisional or conservatory measures subject to the receipt of adequate
security from the requesting party‖. German Civil Procedure Code § 1033 – ―It is not incompatible with an
arbitration agreement for a court to grant, before or during arbitral proceedings, an interim measure of protection relating to the subject matter of the arbitration upon request of a party‖. Netherland Arbitration Act Article 1074
(2) – ―The agreement mentioned in paragraph (1) shall not preclude a party from requesting a court in the
Netherlands to grant interim measures of protection….‖. 29 Amendments in 1998 to the ICC Rules brought in addition which states that ―at the request of a party, [the
tribunal should] order interim or conservatory measures it deemed appropriate” see Yves Derains & Eric
Schwartz, A GUIDE TO THE NEW ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION (1998) / AAA International Arbitration
Rules § 22 – ―At the request of any party, the tribunal may take whatever interim measures it deems necessary in
respect of the subject matter of the dispute, including ……‖ / AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules Rule 34 –
―[t]he arbitrator may issue such orders for interim relief as may be deemed necessary to safeguard the property that is the subject matter of the arbitration without prejudiced to the rights of the parties or to the final determination of
the dispute‖. / LCIA Rules - under Article 13.1 the arbitrator can order the preservation, storage, or sale or other
disposal of any property or thing under the control of any of the parties and under Article 15.4 the tribunal also have power to order any party to provide security / UNCITRAL Rules [which can be adopted in ad hoc arbitration as
well in institutional arbitration] Article 26 (1) – ―At the request of either party, the arbitral tribunal may take interim
measures it deems necessary in respect of the subject matter of the dispute,…….‖ / ICSID Rules – ICSID
Convention, Article 47 – ―At any time during the proceeding a party may request that provisional measures for the
preservation of its rights be recommended by the Tribunal‖ 30 International Arbitration: The need for Uniform Interim Measures of Relief by William Wang – at
http://www.brooklaw.edu/students/journals/bjil/bjil28iii_wang.pdf 31 Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration – Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter – 4th Ed. Pg. 335
Sweet and Maxwell (7- 17)
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However, according to the wording in article 17 B (1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law it
appears that the above situation has now been changed. According to article 17 B (1)-
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a party may without notice to any
other party, make a request for an interim measure together with an
application for a preliminary order directing a party not to frustrate the
purpose of the interim measure requested.
Yet, reference of subsequent articles will show that the ex-parte application only
allowed for the preliminary orders which only has a life span of twenty days32
and which
will never be enforced by a court.33
Nevertheless, through the arbitration agreement, parties
can confer immense powers to the arbitrators in granting of interim orders or leave the sole
jurisdiction to local courts.
2.2 Difficulties in granting / obtaining interim measures
Granting an interim order is not without risks and difficulties. The granting
authority whether it is the arbitral tribunal or Courts, should always be mindful of the fact
that the party who is successful in obtaining an order might use it merely to harass the other
party.
One such risk is that the interim order might represent the factual victory in the
main proceedings for the petitioner. However, the main intention of interim order is to make
the final award a meaningful one. If such order could decide the fate of the final award, the
consequences can often be irreparable. Additionally a party who is successful in obtaining
provisional remedy might use it as an offensive weapon to exert pressure on the opponent.
Likewise, it may also could be used as dilatory tactics to delay the general progress of the
arbitration.34
Article 17 A of the UNCITRAL Model Law clearly show that the drafters were
well aware of the risks in granting interim measures. Thus, they have imposed conditions for
granting interim measures in the following manner.
17 (1) The party requesting an interim measure under article 17 (2) (a) (b)
and (c) shall satisfy the tribunal that:
(a) Harm not adequately reparable by an award or damages is likely to
result if the measure is not ordered, and such harm substantially
32 Article 17 C (4) 33 Article 17 C (5) 34 International Arbitration: The need for Uniform Interim Measures of Relief by William Wang citing Provisional
Remedies in International Commercial Arbitration by Alex Bosch ed., 1994 – at
http://www.brooklaw.edu/students/journals/bjil/bjil28iii_wang.pdf
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outweighs the harm that is likely to result to the party against whom
the measure is directed if the measure is granted; and
(b) There is a reasonable possibility that the requesting party will
succeed on the merits of the claim. The determination on this
possibility shall not affect the discretion of the arbitral tribunal in
making any subsequent determination.
(2) With regard to a request for an interim measure under article 17 (2) (d), the
requirements in paragraphs (1) (a) and (b) of this article shall apply only to the
extent the arbitral tribunal considers appropriate.
Apart from the above conditions, by way of Article 17 F, the requirement of
disclosure had been introduced to the Model Law. According to the Article 17 F:
(1) The arbitral tribunal may require any party promptly to disclose any
material change in the circumstances on the basis of which the measure was
requested or granted.
(2) The party applying for a preliminary order shall disclose to the arbitral
tribunal all circumstances that are likely to be relevant to the arbitral tribunal‟s
determination whether to grant or maintain the order, and such obligation shall
continue until the party against whom the order has been requested has had an
opportunity to present its case. Thereafter, paragraph (1) of this article shall
apply.
Above-mentioned conditions and requirements introduced by the 2006 amendment
ensure two things. One is that it prevents the party who is seeking an interim measure
making frivolous applications unnecessarily prolonging the arbitral process. The other is that
it guarantees the necessity of an interim measure in reaching a meaningful final award.
Thus, it could be said that this amendment has immensely facilitated the process of granting
interim measures.
Apart from the above-mentioned risks which have to be considered carefully, there
are many unavoidable difficulties in granting of interim measures.
One such main difficulty arises when the interim order involves a third party and
the order has a direct impact on that party. Such a situation invariably warrants involvement
of court in granting interim orders as the tribunal does not exercise jurisdiction over people
who are not subjected to the arbitration agreement. (E.g. when recording of evidence of a
third party is essential in resolution of the dispute). The Model Law makes it plain that an
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arbitral tribunal may only ―order any party to take such interim measures of protection as the
arbitral tribunal may consider necessary…‖35
In Lance Paul Larsen v. Kingdom of Hawaii,36
arbitration was conducted by the
Permanent Court of Arbitration in Hague. The dispute stemmed from a federal lawsuit filed
in the United States Federal Court, District of Hawaii by a Hawaiian national, Lance Paul
Larsen, against the United States Government and the Hawaiian Kingdom Government as
co-defendants. The Arbitral Tribunal is asked to determine, on the basis of the Hague
Conventions IV and V of 18 October 1907, and the rules and principles of international law,
whether the rights of the Claimant, Mr. Lance Paul Larsen, under international law as a
Hawaiian subject are being violated, and if so, does he have any redress against the
Respondent Government of the Hawaiian Kingdom.37
Arbitral tribunal without any
ambiguity held that it has no jurisdiction against non-parties.
Likewise, when the interim order extends to a property, which is not the subject
matter of the dispute, the tribunal‘s powers are automatically restricted.
Parties to an arbitration agreement by their consent can confer sole authority to
arbitrators in granting interim measures and opt out the involvement of courts. In such a
situation if an interim order is required against the other party at a stage where the tribunal is
not being established, the party who is seeking the order would find it difficult to fulfill his
need. Although the Courts are bound to respect the party autonomy in the arbitration
agreement, it does not prevent the Court from entertaining the applicant‟s request for
an interim order.38
However, attitude of national Courts with regard to the interim orders
when parties have preferred arbitration has to be carefully considered. In McCreary Tire &
Rubber Co. v. CEAT Spa,39
U.S. Federal Court has held that the provisional reliefs are not
available from a Court when parties have provided for arbitration and further held that
seeking relief in Court amounts to a waiver of arbitration. Such attitude of Courts would
certainly put the seeking party in to difficulty. Nevertheless, at present, the above decision in
McCreary has been rejected by number of subsequent cases.40
Courts are of the view that
they should facilitate the arbitration rather than denigrate it. However, involvement of courts
also have its drawbacks likes the loosing party‘s right of appeal and that will definitely delay
the arbitration procedure making the whole scenario a difficult one.41
35 Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration – Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter – 4th Ed. Pg. 334 Sweet and Maxwell (7-15) 36 Available at http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Larsen_vs._Hawaiian_Kingdom_2000-05-22 37"Lance Paul Larsen vs. the Hawaiian Kingdom" Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Hague, Available at: http://www.alohaquest.com/arbitration/synopsis.htm 38 Emphasis added 39 501, F. 2d 1032 (3d Cir. 1974) 40Carolina Power & Light Co. Ltd. v. Uranex 451 F. Supp 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1977 41 International Arbitration: The need for Uniform Interim Measures of Relief by William Wang – at
http://www.brooklaw.edu/students/journals/bjil/bjil28iii_wang.pdf
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In Baksons Textile Industries Ltd. v. Hybro Industries Ltd.,42
Court of Appeal of
Sri Lanka had held that the parties have rights to come to Court and obtain an interim order.
2.3 Observations
Except in few occasions,43
reference of national laws and institutional rules with
regard to arbitration demonstrate that those laws and rules have clearly recognized the
arbitrators‘ powers in granting interim orders. However, the main question is whether the
party against whom the interim order granted would agree to abide by the order. In the event
that party is declining to obey the order that can be taken as a clear indication of prospective
conduct of that party and the aggrieved party would find it necessary to opt out from the
arbitration. Lack of necessary powers to compel the parties to abide by its orders ultimately
would lead to the failure of arbitration and time and money spent on initiation of arbitral
proceedings would become futile. Thus, there should be some procedure available to ensure
success of arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution method.
Issues, at the Time of Enforcement Of Interim Orders.
1. Public policy issues.
2. Lack of consistency between different legal systems.
3. Enforcement against non-signatories to the Arbitration agreement.
Since International commercial arbitration deals with commercial disputes
regardless of the nationality of parties, effectiveness of arbitration awards has a great value.
Unless those orders [awards] could be easily enforced, the financial impact on the party who
is seeking enforcement would be sometimes colossal and more often the damage would be
irreparable. In State Timber Corporation v. Moiz Goh (Pte) Ltd.,44
Sarath N. Silva CJ held
that ―….the phrase ‗arbitration proceedings‘ is not synonyms with proceedings before court
of justice for the enforcement of an arbitral award‖. This thinking of the Superior Court of
Sri Lanka demonstrate that if a party to arbitration does not accept the award / order with
consent, that the winning party‘s recourse will lie within a different set of procedure. If that
enforcement procedure were always prone to make it impossible for the applicant to get the
necessary result easily, the whole time spent on arbitration to come to the finding would
become a failure.
42 CA L.A. App. No. 51 / 97 43 Such as Sec. 38 of Arbitration Act [of England] 1996 – which confers the powers to the arbitrators only when the
parties have not agreed otherwise. / According to Italian Code of Civil Procedure Article 818 and Argentine Code
of Civil Procedure Article 753, arbitrators do not have necessary powers to grant interim orders. 44 [2002] BASL Law Report (BALR) pg. 44 at pg 49.
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As Redfern and Hunter describe, getting an order enforced in the jurisdiction where
that order becomes meaningful is not always an easy task and a dissatisfied party may resist
any attempt by the winning party to obtain recognition and enforcement of the award.45
―Recognition‖ is a judicial decision which recognizes the legal validity of an
arbitral decision whereas ―Enforcement‖ is a judicial decision which gives practical effect to
an arbitral decision by imposing legal sanction against non-compliance with the recognized
award46
.
Recognition and Enforcement of foreign arbitral awards have proven to be a
difficult task. The winning party would most of the time find himself in a disadvantageous
position because of the lacuna of a uniform procedure. Sometimes even though there are
methods for recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments, those methods might not extend
to arbitral awards.47
The above-mentioned difficulties seem to have been identified by almost all the
laws and institutional rules dealing with arbitration. Most of those rules and laws have
separate chapters dealing with the issue of ―recognition and enforcement‖ of arbitral awards
[orders]. A perusal of these sections [Articles] reveal that they set out grounds for refusing
the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award.
According to Article 36 (1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law (hereinafter: MAL), Recognition
or enforcement of an arbitral award, irrespective of the country in which it was made, may
be refused only:
(a) at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, if that party
furnishes to the competent court where recognition and enforcement is sought
proof that:
(i) a party to the arbitration agreement referred to in article 7 was
under some incapacity; or the said agreement is not valid under the law to
which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under
the law of the country where the award was made; or
(ii) the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper
notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or
was otherwise unable to present his case; or
45 Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration – Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter – 4th Ed. Pg. 334
Sweet and Maxwell (10-02) 46 Winnie (Jo-Mei) Ma, Public Policy in the Judicial Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: Lessons for and from Australia, citing Julian Lew, Loukas Mistelis and Stefan Kroll, ―Comparative International Commercial
Arbitration‖ (2003) 690 para 26-10 and Domenico Di Pietro and Martin Platte, ―Enforcement of International
Arbitration awards: The New York Convention of 1958 (2001) 22”. 47 The Judgments Regulation [EC 44/2001], the Brussels Convention [1968] and Lugano Convention provide for
recognition and enforcement of judgments [in England and Wales], but exclude arbitration from their scope. [Rix
and Kay Solicitors, www. rixandkay.co.uk power point presentation by Francis Wallace – 2008]
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(iii) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling
within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on
matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if
the decisions can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the
award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be
recognized and enforced; or
(iv) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure
was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties or, failing such
agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the
arbitration took place; or
(v) the award has not yet become binding on the parties or has been set
aside or suspended by a court of the country in which, or under the law of
which, that award was made; or
(b) if the court finds that:
(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by
arbitration under the law of this State; or
(ii) the recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to
the public policy of this State.
Application of above-mentioned provisions to interim orders in arbitration have
proven a somewhat difficult task. Many jurisdictions have refused to identify interim or
provisional orders as awards [for the purpose of recognition and enforcement] as identified
by above-mentioned provisions.
According to Di Pietro48
-
It is clear that even though the content of interim measures of protection may at times
coincide with the content of the final award settling the disputes between the parties, interim
measures differ radically from final awards. By definition, interim measures are temporary
in nature, while one of the main features of awards is that they decide definitively one or
more of the disputes submitted to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. The enforceability
of interim measures under the Convention [New York Convention] should therefore be
dismissed out of hand.
Hence, the party, though he received an order in his favour, would ultimately
become the loser.
48 Di Pietro Domenico [in his Article – What Constitute an Arbitral Award Under the New York Convention?] –
Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and International Arbitral Awards – The New York Convention in Practice
by Emmanuel Gaillard and Domenico Di Pietro [Reference editor – Nanou Leleu –Knobil] Cameron May
Publishers Chapter 5 at Pgs. 155 & 156
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When one looks at the UNCITRAL Model Law and the amendments adopted in
2006,49
it is abundantly clear that the Model Law has acknowledged the above-mentioned
problem and brought in some relief in the following manner.
Article 17 H. Recognition and Enforcement
(1) An interim measure issued by an arbitral tribunal shall be
recognized as binding and, unless otherwise provided by the arbitral
tribunal, enforced upon application to the competent court, irrespective of
the country in which it was issued, subject to the provisions of article 17 I.
(2) The party who is seeking or has obtained recognition and
enforcement of an interim measure shall promptly inform the court of any
termination, suspension or modification of that interim measure.
(3) The court of the State where recognition or enforcement is sought
may, if it considers it proper, order the requesting party to provide
appropriate security if the arbitral tribunal has not already made a
determination with respect to security or where such a decision is
necessary to protect the rights of third parties.
Article 17 I. Grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement
(3) Recognition or enforcement of an interim measure may be
refused only:
(a) At the request of the party against whom it is invoked if the court
satisfied that:
(i) Such refusal is warranted on the grounds set forth in article
36(1) (a) (i), (ii), (iii) or (iv); or
(ii) The arbitral tribunal‟s decision with respect to the provision of
security in connection with the interim measure issued by the arbitral
tribunal has not been complied with; or
(iii) The interim measure has been terminated or suspended by the
arbitral tribunal or, where so empowered, by the court of the State in
which the arbitration takes place or under the law of which that interim
measure was granted; or
(b) If the court finds that:
(i) The interim measure is incompatible with the powers conferred
upon the court unless the court decides to reformulate the interim
measures to the extent necessary to adapt it to its own powers
and procedures for the purposes of enforcing that interim
measure and without modifying its substance; or
49 The Model Law was amended by UNCITRAL on 7th July 2006, at the 39th session of the Commission.
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(ii) Any of the grounds set forth in article 36 (1) (b) (i) or (ii), apply
to the recognition and enforcement of the interim measure.
(2) Any determination made by the court on any ground in
paragraph (1) of this article shall be effective only for the purposes of the
application to recognize and enforce the interim measure. The court
where recognition or enforcement is sought shall not, in making that
determination, undertake a review of the substance of the interim measure.
Public Policy issues
Almost all legislation and institutional rules dealing with arbitration identify the
Public Policy Exception as one of the grounds for refusing the recognition and enforcement
of an order or an award. As per Seriki, H50
-
…public policy is an elusive concept that is difficult to define, because it manifests the
fundamental economic, legal, moral, political, religious and social standards of every
States. Accordingly, the degree of fundamentality of moral conviction or policy varies in
every case in various nations.
Hong Xiao J‘51
states, “The public policy exception to enforcement has two folds.
On the one hand, it serves as safeguard to the unbridled power given arbitrators; On the
other hand, it might be used as considerable latitude in refusing enforcement”. Many
scholars and Judges have identified ―Public Policy‖ as an ―Unruly Horse‖.52
According to
Lord Denning MR53
-
..the unruly horse of public policy can, and must, „come down on the side of justice‟
…with a good man in the saddle, the unruly horse can be kept in control.
This statement of Lord Denning MR illustrates that one must not make use of the
public policy exception merely to escape from giving due recognition to an arbitration order/
award and to refuse the enforcement.
Even though arbitration is a private dispute resolution method between two parties,
at the time of the recognition and enforcement of an order / award it always has to undergo
50 Seriki, H., Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and Public Policy – a Note of Caution, The Arbitration and Dispute Resolution Law Journal (2000) 9, pp. 195-196 [Extracted from below mentioned article] (Emphasis mine) 51 Judge of the People‘s Court of Chengdu Hi-tech Development Zone, Sichuan Province of China in her article
―Refusing Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards under Article V (2) of the New York Convention in China : From the Judicial Experience of Europe and USA‖ – US – China Law Review, ISSN 1548 -
6605, USA , July, 2005. Volume 2. NO.7 (Serial No. 8) – Available at
http://www.jurist.org.cn/doc/uclaw200507/uclaw20050707.pdf 52 In Richardson v. Mellish [1824] 2 Bing. 228; [1824-34] All ER 258 held ―… a very unruly horse, and when
once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you. It may lead you from sound Law. It is never argued
at all, but when other points fail‖. [Available at http://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/samples/freearticles/tv1-1-article_67.h... Visited on 11/02/2009] 53Enderby Town Football Club Ltd. v. The Football Association Ltd.[1971] Ch 591, 607 (Extracted from Winnie
(Jo-Mei) Ma, Public Policy in the Judicial Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: Lessons for and from Australia)
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the scrutiny of the State where it sought the recognition and enforcement. During such time,
one of the main challenges the arbitral award or an interim order has to face is that whether
it is contrary to the public policy of that State. Even the award/ order is devoid of any defect
which would render it fit for refusal of recognition or enforcement, if such award/ order is
contrary to public policy, the recognizing State would refuse the recognition and
enforcement however much disadvantage it cause to the winning party. Nevertheless, this
depends on the method uses by the national court in interpreting the issue of public policy.
One Court might take a very liberal approach in interpreting whilst the other taking a
narrower view. Thus, this inconsistency and uncertainty would also contribute to decide the
fate of the party who is seeking recognition and enforcement.
Some legal scholars in USA have expressed their doubt that the public policy
defence could become a ―catchall‖ means for parties seeking to vacate an international
arbitral award. In the same way the American Arbitration Association worries that, the
public policy clause would give the court system ‗considerable latitude in refusing
enforcement‘.54
According to Di Pietro and Martin Platte, public policy affects almost all
areas of law including arbitration. Public policy can restrict the types of disputes which can
be referred to arbitration and thereby determine which disputes are ‗arbitrable‘.55
Sri Lankan perspective56
Sec. 32 (1)(b)(ii) and Sec. 34 (1)(b)(ii) of Arbitration Act No. 11 of 1995 specify
the ‗public policy‘ defence in Sri Lanka with regard to the recognition and enforcement of
arbitral awards. Sri Lanka Arbitration Act follows the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration.
In Kristly (Pte) Ltd v. State Timber Corporation,57
application made to the High
Court by the State Timber Corporation to set aside the award and the High Court made the
order based on the following grounds:
1. that the application for enforcement was not accompanied by a duly certified
copy of the award.
2. that the award was based on a forged certificate, hence it was contrary to
public policy; and
54 Bouzari, E. H., The Public Policy Exception to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards: Implications for Post – NAFTA Jurisprudence, Texas International Law Journal (1995) 30, p. 208. [Extracted from ―Refusing
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards under Article V (2) of the New York Convention in China
: From the Judicial Experience of Europe and USA‖ by Hong Xiao J] 55 Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards – The New York Convention of 1958 by Domenico Di Pietro
and Martin Platte (Chapter V pg. 179) 56 Content extracted from the Article by Justice Saleem Marsoof PC – Recognition & Enforcement of Arbitral Awards [Arbitration Law in Sri Lanka – by K. Kanag-Isvaran PC and S. S. Wijeratne 2nd Edition 2007 at pg. 161
onwards The Institute for the Development of Commercial Law and Practice publication] 57 [2002] 1 Sri. L. R. 225
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3. that the claimant had been de-registered and lacked legal capacity at the time
of the reference to arbitration.
During the arbitration proceedings allegation with regard to the forged document
was discussed at length and the unanimous ruling of arbitrators was that the forgery should
be established beyond reasonable doubt. Genuineness of the impugned certificate was never
in issue.
An appeal was made to the Supreme Court against the order of the High Court.
Fernando J‘ in his judgment has held that the ‗refusing to consider the question of forgery
without a specific issue‘ by the arbitrators is justified and ‗therefore the High Court was not
entitled to review the decision on the ground of public policy in terms of sec. 32 (1)(b)(ii) of
the Act.58
According to Justice Saleem Marsoof, this case was an extremely curious case and
he questions as to why the tribunal has permitted evidence to be led on the issue of forgery if
there is no specific issue. He further notes that the Supreme Court also had adopted an
unnecessarily restrictive view of the powers of the High Court with regard to enforcement
because the language of Sec. 32 (1) (b) only requires the finding of High Court about the
public policy defence. He further states that even evidence regarding the forgery issue
produced before High Court for the first time, it is open to High Court to determine the issue
and to set aside the award on the ground that it is contrary to the public policy.59
According to Justice Marsoof‘s observations it is clear that now it is within the
jurisdiction of the High Court to determine whether the arbitral award / order is against the
public policy of Sri Lanka.
Lack of consistency between different legal systems
It is a common knowledge that each country is governed by different sets of laws
and rules. There are instances where one country possesses more than one set of legal
system to govern its nationals. Hence, uniformity between different legal systems seems
unheard of.
Globalization has made the world a small place. New technology, daily renewing
communication skills, rapidly developing travelling speed, have create many business
opportunities between different countries regardless of distance. Those interactions between
different counties in commercial transactions have automatically enhanced the risks of
misunderstandings and illegal activities among the parties. Naturally these things have
paved the way for legal actions. When a party to an international commercial transaction
58 [2002] 1 Sri L. R. at 227 59 Article by Justice Saleem Marsoof PC – Recognition & Enforcement of Arbitral Awards [Arbitration Law in Sri
Lanka – by K. Kanag-Isvaran PC and S. S. Wijeratne at pg. 162 and 163] - [2nd ed. 2007] – The Institute for the
Development of Commercial Law and Practice publication
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seeks the protection of law he definitely has to deal with at least two different legal systems.
Even where parties have submitted their dispute to arbitration, during the course of
recognition and enforcement procedure, they will have to face the inconsistencies between
the different legal systems.
There may be many instances where this problem of inconsistency between legal
systems could arise. One main instance is the ―arbitrability‖ of the dispute. As Redfern and
Hunter describe in their book,60
generally the term ‗arbitrability‘ used to ―determine which
types of disputes may be resolved by arbitration and which belong exclusively to the domain
of the courts‖.
Arbitrability of a dispute may differ in each jurisdiction. A matter considered
arbitrable in country ―A‖ might not recognized as an arbitrable issue in country ―B‖. Such
inconsistency between different jurisdictions definitely frustrates the whole process of
arbitration.
Inconsistencies with regard to the requirements of contract law between different
jurisdictions may also affect the recognition and enforcement of arbitral order. While in
some countries a person below 18 years be recognize as a minor and there may be others
where the age limit would be 21. If two people from each of the above category enter into a
contract and submit their dispute to arbitration, the inconsistency with regard to the
contractible age between two jurisdictions would affect them at the time of the recognition
and enforcement of the arbitral order.
Sometimes, government policies with regard to tax concessions, different standards
about investments and investors, government quotas, time limits set out by different
legislations, could be considered as barricades to the development of business activities
between parties. Different standards within jurisdictions are in existence simply because the
competition between the countries. These competitions paved the way for inconsistencies
and as long as these competitions prevail, no harmonization would be possible.
In view of the fact that there is no equal distribution of basic resources throughout
the world, each country is compelled to depend on the other. Globalization has made it
impossible for a country to maintain a closed economy anymore. Commercial transactions
between countries have become a must. No government any more can prevent its citizens
from having international commercial dealings. Moreover, a government cannot make rules
and regulations as to how its citizens should live. Therefore, it is imperative to maintain
harmonization at least in the area of commercial transactions to ensure the smooth
functioning of the country‘s economy. Availability of such procedure would definitely
enhance the credibility of the arbitration process in international commercial world and
bring down the problems at the time of the enforcement of an interim order or a final arbitral
award, which has occurred simply due to the inconsistencies between legal systems.
60 Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration – Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter – South Asian
Edition 2006, Chap. 3-12
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Enforcement against non-signatories to the Arbitration
agreement
Can arbitrators make an award against a party who is not a party to the arbitration
process? The answer is ―no‖. Arbitration is a private process between the parties who agreed
to submit their dispute to be resolved by arbitration. Final award therefore will be only
addressed to the parties of the arbitration.
There might be a situation where the arbitrators find it necessary to make an
interim order against a third party. Question is whether they have necessary powers to do so.
As an example, the arbitrators want a third party to stop destroying some of his own
property, which is crucial to the outcome of the final arbitration award. Or else, they may
want a third party to hand back something which is the subject matter of the arbitration and
without which the final award would be meaningless. Besides, a party may want to stop a
bank from paying a sum of money or freeze an account. In such situations, the party who is
seeking the interim order of the nature mentioned above must apply to the court.
In MD Army Welfare Housing Organization v. Sumangal Services Pvt Ltd,61
held
interim order issued by the tribunal may be addressed only to a party to the arbitration and
cannot be addressed to third parties. Moreover, in Lance Paul Larsen v. Kingdom of
Hawaii62
arbitral tribunal without any ambiguity has held that it has no jurisdiction against
non-parties.
According to the above-mentioned Court decisions, it is clear that the arbitrators do
not enjoy powers, which affects third parties. Likewise, they do not have power to enforce
orders.
When a party seeks an interim measure against a third party from a court, after
considering the seriousness and necessity of the relief, court would issue such order. Since it
is an order issued by a competent court, the party against whom the order delivered should
comply with that order. Even though present day courts are reluctant to interfere with the
arbitration process, they are always there to extend a helpful hand in matters, which are
outside the jurisdiction of arbitrators.63
However, for the courts to involve in the process of the enforcement, the particular
Court in the country where the enforcement being sought must have jurisdiction over the
parties. In the arena of international commercial arbitration the New York Convention has
acquired faith among many nations as an engine for recognition or enforcement of arbitral
awards. Hence, it is necessary to have an evaluation on the New York Convention regarding
the enforcement of interim measures in arbitration.
61[2003 (3) RAJ 447 (SC)] 62 Available at http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Larsen_vs._Hawaiian_Kingdom_2000-05-22 63 See above Chapter 2, Sub para 2.1.1.- Involvement of Courts
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Applicability of the New York Convention on Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, to interim
measures
Article I paragraph 1 of the NY Convention sets out the application of the
convention.
This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in
the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such
awards are sought, and arising out of differences between persons, whether physical or legal.
It shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where
their recognition and enforcement are sought.
Since the NY Convention does not define the term ‗arbitral award‘ one can argue
that any type of award, [irrespective of the fact that whether it is a final, partial or interim
award as long as it is identified with the word ‗award‘] rendered by an arbitral tribunal
should fall within the ambit of the Convention. If that is the case, all what the party seeking
recognition and enforcement with the aid of the NY Convention has to do is, to get the word
‗award‘ appear in the order rendered by the tribunal and by doing so he will very easily be
able to bypass all the obstacles created by an absence of a definition.
As Gary Born in his book International Commercial Arbitration describes, ―A
principal purpose of the Convention was to make it easier to enforce an arbitral award made
in one country in other nations‖. Nevertheless, controversy regarding the term ‗arbitral
award‘ had definitely seemed to impede the intention of establishing the New York
Convention being fulfilled.
Adequacy of Sri Lankan Arbitration Act, to deal with the issues of enforcement of
interim measures
Arbitration Law of Sri Lanka is governed by the Arbitration Act No. 11 of 1995, which
entered in to force on 01st August 1995. According to Hon. Wijeratne
64-
Arbitration Act of 1995 was the first Arbitration Law in South Asia to be based on the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration and inspired by the then draft Swedish Arbitration
Act.
However, Sri Lanka Arbitration Act is still based on the original version of the
Model Law and so far, no attempt had been taken to make amendments to incorporate the
changes adopted in 2006 to the Model Law.
64 Kanag-Isvaran K. (P.C) and Wijeratne S. S. - Arbitration Law in Sri Lanka – 2nd Edition 2007 – Article
―Arbitration in Sri Lanka‖ at pgs. 5, 6
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The area of ‗Interim measures of protection‘ covers by the Sec.13 of the Arbitration
Act. The section states:
13 (1) An arbitral tribunal may, at the request of a party, order any
other party to take such interim measures as it may consider necessary to
protect or secure the claim which forms the subject matter of the dispute.
The arbitral tribunal may also order the party making such request to
provide the party ordered to take such interim measures, with security for
any expense, loss or damage that may be caused in taking such interim
measures:
Provided however that, other than in exceptional cases no such order
shall be made except after hearing the other parties.
13 (2) An order of an arbitral tribunal requiring the taking of interim
measures may be enforced by the High Court, on an application made
therefore(sic), by the party requesting the taking of such interim measures.
13 (3) An application to the High Court, under sub section (2), for the
enforcement of interim measures, shall be deemed not to be incompatible
with section 5 or the arbitration agreement or a waiver of the agreement.
Even though Sri Lanka ratified the New York convention on April 9, 1962 until
such time the Arbitration Act No. 11 of 1995 being enacted there were no legislations
available to implement the Convention within the country.
Nevertheless, unlike many States, Sri Lanka had acceded to the New York
Convention without any reservation. According to the new Arbitration Act, foreign arbitral
awards, irrespective of the country to which it was made shall be enforced by the High Court
subjected to the provisions of sec. 34 of the Act.65
Thereby, the drafters of the Act has made
Sri Lanka a country which is favourable to arbitration proceedings. Hence, it could be said
that Sri Lankan Courts have worked to ensure the success of the New York Convention.
“The need for Justice grows out of the conflict of
human interests. That is to say, if there were no
conflict of interests among mankind we should never
have invented the word justice, nor conceived the idea
for which it stands”.
Thomas Nixon Carver, Essays in Social Justice
65 Sec. 33 of the Arbitration act No. 11 of 1995
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The Implications and Enforcement of
Competition Law in the South Pacific
Salvin Nand
Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University of Fiji*
Abstract
The economic characteristic of an economy, importantly its size and its remoteness from
trading partners greatly affects the competiveness and performance of a country‟s market.1
Accordingly, small insulated economies such as South Pacific Countries (SPCs) need to
formulate suitable policies that could compensate for at least some of these economic
concerns. This paper examines the application of competition law in the South Pacific
Region. It is recommended that in order for the SPCs to effectively implement regional
cooperation on competition law they need to enforce effective competition legislation and
efficient enforcement body. The enforcement authority must exemplify specific rules that can
successfully operate competition policies and represent the overall economic policies of the
South Pacific Region. To adapt to the restructuring of an economy, it is important for SPCs
to make necessary changes in their competition policy and competition legislation.
Keywords: Competition Law Policy, Development Impediments, Regional Cooperation.
Introduction
Even after gaining independence, South Pacific countries (SPCs) have remained dependent
on developed countries to benefit from export and import trades. Despite their limits of
natural and human resources, SPCs have an increasing desire to achieve optimum market
Mr. Salvin Saneel Nand LLM, (VUW), LLB, PDLP (USP), PGDPPG (UOF) is a Senior Lecturer in Law at the School of Law, the University of Fiji. His areas of interest lie in Intellectual Property, international competition
policy;Corporate Securities Laws and Public Policy issues. Email: [email protected] 1 Michal Gal ―The Effects of Smallness and Remoteness on Competition Law – The case of New Zealand‖ (2007)
14 Competition & Consumer LJ 16: available at http://www.lexisnexis.com (last accessed 02 April 2014).
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efficiency. In order to get this efficiency, the SPCs Governments have opted for single firm
approaches and granted exclusive rights to a number of companies for its services. The
increasing number of single firms started to cause market inefficiency as consumers were
feeling the rise in prices and short supplies and poor quality products. In short the Pacific
markets started to experience the presence of monopoly conduct and other anti-competitive
practices.
Recently the Pacific Island Forum Secretariat (PIFS) Ministers, during the 2007 Forum
Economic Ministers meeting (FEMM) at the Republic of Palau agreed to facilitate
Regulation and Regional economic Integration to improve regulation of foreign investment,
competition consumer protection and fair trading. These resolutions are clear reflection of
regional collaboration on prohibiting and suppressing anti-competitive practices at least in
the future. It was also noted that each of these themes suffer a number of problems, for
example; regulatory rules, weak institutions and implementation and regulatory processing
difficulties. However, the ministers failed to address in detail the challenges Pacific
countries will face in implementing competition law.
In light of the above conclusion, this paper attempts to analyze and examine the nature of
competition law in the SPCs and acts as an introductory guide by explaining the regional
cooperation of the South Pacific Region on competition law. Special attention is given to the
implications and effects of geographical, social and economic characteristics on the overall
economic development strategies of the SPCs.
The first part analyses the current competition regimes of the Pacific countries and shows
the influence of monopolies. Then the paper explains basic economic vulnerabilities
affecting economic performance of Pacific countries. The third part recommends a regional
cooperation for economic integration on competition law. This paper questions whether,
competition law is possible, but recommends that Pacific countries should first consider
accurately, whether and to what extent such complex law will be feasible. It is proposed that
SPCs should adopt either the Fijian or Papua New Guinea (PNG) competition law regime
for regional or sub-regional cooperation on competition law.
The Great Debate of Competition
A consumer thinks competition law is the means by which prices are controlled
while for a business competition it is the means of increasing turnover and profit.2
At the same time, in a market economy competition it is the means of sustaining
the efficient operation of markets and resources.3 Therefore competition ‗is better
than less‘ if allocative efficiency and consumer perspective of greater choice and
welfare is considered. One of the fundamental objectives of competition law is to
2 Jon Feil "Competition L a w and Policy: The Enforcement Role‖ in David and Goliath Competition Policy
(New Zealand Institute of Public Administration Seminar, 1 9 9 2 ) vol IX, 20. 3 Ibid.
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promote competition by addressing anti-competitive behaviors and by ensuring that the
benefits of trade liberalization are not undermined by anti-competitive conducts.4
Competition law and trade liberalization have common goal to promote efficiency and
economic development. On one hand, competition law/policies control anti -competitive
practices of companies, on the other ―trade policy fosters this goal primarily through
the reduction of government imposed barriers to international commerce.‖5
Competition law is a difficult issue and it will be some time before SPCs will be
able to develop and implement appropriate competition law. Although introducing
competition laws can be rather a long term goal for most SPCs. The SPCs should
commence the socialization process for competition law at a medium term.6 Michal
S.Gal in her book, ―Competition policy in Small Market Economics‖, and Rory
McLeod in his report to Global Forum on Competition(―Competition policy in Small
economics: Issues Arising for New Zealand‖), argued that small economies face an
inherent tension in the development of their competition policy. For example‖ small
economy can only support a small number of competing firms and that many of the
firms in a small economy will struggle to attain minimum efficient scale when
catering to domestic only.7 Smallness is comparative notion. For example, New-Zealand
sometimes describes New-Zealand‘s economy as small, yet it seems large when
viewed from the perspective of Fiji. However, ―there will often be limited competition
in the domestic market because remoteness discourages foreign producers and
services, and the domestic market may be too small to support more than one
producer.‖8
Furthermore, Gal pointed out that small economies have three main economic
characteristics. That small economy has ―high industrial concentration levels, high
entry barriers and has inefficient levels of production.‖9 These completion problems
are aggravated when SPCs inherent disadvantages (geographical) are viewed together.
More importantly, Michal Gal explains that for a small economy it is important that
the ―goals of competition policy should be clearly defined and that economic
efficiency should be given primacy over other goals.‖10
While McLeod suggests that
4 Price Water House Coopers "Competition L a w for Developing E c o n o m i e s ‖ (Asia-Pacific E c o n o m i c Cooperation Trade and Investment Commit tee , S i n g a p o r e , August 1 9 9 9 ). 5 WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy Synthesis Paper on the
Relationship of Trade and Competition Policy to Development and Economic Growth (WTIWGTCPIW80,
Geneva, 1998) Para 29. 6 Spier Consulting Regulation and Regional Economic Integration: A Benchmark Study and Way Forward (Prepared for Pacific Island Forum Secretariat, 2006). www.forum.org.fi (last accessed, 15 April 2 0 1 4 ). 7 Michal Gal "Competition Policy for Small Market Economies" (Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
2001) 46-48; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Competition Policy in Small Economies: Issues Arising For New Zealand (Paris, 2002) 8. 8 Geoff Leane Barbara Von Tigerstrom (Ed) International Law Issues in the South Pacific (Ashgate
Publishing L i m i t e d , England, 2005) 235. 9 Michal Gal "The Effects of Smallness and Remoteness on Competition Law - The case of New Zealand"
(2007) 14 Competition & Consumer LJ 16; available at http://www.lexisnexis.com (last accessed 10 April
2014). 10 Ibid.
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small economies like SPCs completion law needs a ―flexible set of instruments that
can be applied on a case-by-case basis to reduce competition concerns while
promoting efficiency.‖11
Finally both Gal and McLeod recommended that for small
economies to benefit from competition law they need to consider many issues. Firstly
small economies should fully consider the efficiency consideration.12
Secondly small
economy should avoid adopting simple rules as market indicators and should not
include rigid per se rules in competition law.13
All in all small economies need to be
more cautious than bigger economies when enforcing competition law because market
efficiency comes at a higher price.
South Pacific Approach to Competition Law
At present Fiji (Commerce Act 1998)14
and PNG (Independent Consumer and Competition
Act 1992)15
are the only two SPCs which have complex competition legislation and
administering bodies for competition law, namely the Commerce Commission (Fiji) and the
Consumer and Competition Commission (of PNG). Countries such as Samoa, Solomon
Islands, Tonga and Palau have competition legislation which only monitors specific issues,
while they are yet to be proclaimed. Also the competition legislation of these countries fails
to monitor and prevent basic anti-competitive behaviors. Moreover, there are regional
understandings on anti-competitive behaviors mainly through PICTA trade agreements.16
Nearly all SPCs have legislation to protect consumer welfare and promote fair trading
among traders. Due to the scope and limitations of this research paper only competition
related legislation will be considered and discussed.
Fiji and PNG have existing authoritative legislation on competition law, while other Pacific
Countries have specific legislations prohibiting specific anti-competitive conduct. This is
because most SPCs only experience ―significant problems in specific sectors or only
periodically and that business conducts such as ‗mergers and acquisitions occur
infrequently‘.‖17
Rather more important problems for the South Pacific market are that,
traders create market manipulation and deceive the uninformed consumers through
inadequate labeling of products and by selling poor quality products.18
However, these
challenges are addressed by fair trading and consumer regulations. Therefore, lack of
11 OECD Global Forum on Competition ― Competition P o l i c y in Small Economies: Issues Arising For New
Zealand‖ 2002, Paris. 12 Gal above n 9. 13 Ibid. 14 Commerce Act 1998 (FJ). 15 Independent Con su mer and Competition A c t 1992 (PNG). 16 Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement ( Nauru, 2001) art 2 (c), 7(7), 8 (4), 14 (3). 17 Castalia Strategic Advisors Regulation and Regional Economic integration: Regional options/or
Economic Regulation (prepared for Pacific Island Forum Secretariat, 2007) 15 www.forum.org.fj
(last accessed 5 March 2014). 18 Ibid.
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competition regulations does not concern many SPCs economies because their small market
for goods and services are controlled or distributed by the governments themselves.19
More
competition is better than less. The Pacific countries should implement their regional
integration on competition law. Even though it will be a long time before regional
cooperation will be transferred from paper, SPCs should act closely to limit the effect of
anti-competitive firms like monopolies.
South Pacific Monopolies
Monopolies have in recent years attracted considerable Governmental and academic debate
due to its nature and its effect on Pacific markets. While the concept of monopoly and its
effect on the efficient market is complex, the present research only explains the basic
reasons why monopolies are preferred and accommodated in the SPCs. A monopoly is
usually described as a single seller selling a unique good or services with ‗no close
substitutes‘. Also a monopolist has a high degree of control over the price at which the
product is sold and has the ability to exclude competition.20
In Burns Philip Company
Limited v Lees Trading Company Limited, the court held that ―…while monopolistic
companies are providers of vital goods or services monopolies can also increase or set
virtually their own price at will.‖21
There are a number of important reasons or barriers to
entry which can be used to explain why there is only one firm in a market selling a product
while other firms are excluded. Firstly, often companies have control over key
resources/input. For example the mining companies in Fiji and PNG, as these companies
have control over the gold and copper supplies which gave them monopoly over the sale of
these resources.
Secondly, to set up a particular company requires a high amount of capital and usually on
firm tends to afford such costs. A good example is the oil producers, ―as it would be
impossible for a few firms to break into the industry unless it had vast sums of money to
spend on the necessary infrastructures.‖22
Thirdly, there exists what is known as ‗legal
monopoly‘, where a Government grants a particular firm exclusive right to produce or
supply goods or services.23
Many of the SPCs Governments have granted exclusive rights to
public franchises such as the Post Office for delivering letters. Finally, most SPCs have
granted exclusive licenses to companies to provide goods or services for which these
19 Castalia Strategic above n 17. 20 George Schaffer Monopoly and Competition ( 2Ed, Longman Group Limited, London,
1970) II. 21 Burns Philip Company Limited v Lees Trading Company Limited (25 November 1997) CA 643/1985
(HC Fiji) Scott 1. (The court gave examples of sugar or public transport in the Fijian context). 22 Douglas McTaggart, C h r i s t o p h e r Find ly, Michael Parkin, Economics (4ed, Pearson Education Australia, Australia, 1953,220. 23 Ibid.
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companies have monopolies.24
For example the electricity authority, the water utilities, and
is some SPCs, the telecommunication companies are granted long term contract licenses to
enjoy monopolistic profits. Therefore, the presence of anti-competitive firms greatly affects
the competitiveness and performance of the SPCs markets.
Pacific Island Countries do not suffer from large mergers or takeovers, among firms, but the
existing monopolies have recently provoked a number of judicial rulings in different island
states. In National Capital District Interim Commission v Crusoe Pty Limited25
the court
held that ―the opposite of competition is monopoly, oligopoly and autocracy.‖ In recent
years the government owned telecom monopolies in most SPCs have experienced
competition. Thus the existences of competition policies have challenged the Pacific
Governments to grant operation licenses to new competitors. This is evident in Fiji, Vanuatu
and PNG through the recent court decision against the government protected telecom
monopolies, while in other SPCs, there are strong public concerns to deregulate such
monopolies.
The leading decision on promoting fair competition in Vanuatu was declared through
Telecom Vanuatu Limited v Minister for Infrastructure and Public Utilities.26
The court by
explaining the public policy of consumer welfare concluded that ―…the telecommunication
services… were not available to as wide a section of the Vanuatu public… as possible,
subject to paying the applicable general fee.‖27
In Fiji (most technologically developed
amongst SPCs) the telecommunication industry is made up of three major monopolies which
have exclusive license protection. They are Telecom Fiji Limited, Vodafone Fiji Limited
and the Fiji International Telecommunication Limited (Fintel). Both ―FINTEL and Telecom
Fiji operate under the umbrella of Amalgamated Telecom Holdings; a company set up under
the privatization of the state‘s telecommunications holdings.‖28
In 2003 the American info-tech company (TELPAC) launched a lawsuit against the Fijian
Government which amounted to US$100 million in damages. However the court declined to
ruled in favour of FINTEL, since FINTEL was a foreign owned company and was only
operating to provide internet Kiosk services.29
When FINTEL changed its nature of business
by introducing a call back service, a Government license was required. However exclusive
licenses were granted only to selective protective telecommunication companies. In
Summation, this case showed the Government‘s preference to keep telecom as a monopoly.
24―Economics” above n 22. 25 National C a p i t a l District Interim C o m m i s s i o n v Crusoe Pty Limited 1993] PNGLR 1 3 9 (NC) Brunton J. 26 Telecom Vanuatu Limited v Minister/or Infrastructure a n d Public Utilities (S Apli12007) C A 32/2006 (CA Vanuatu). 27
Ibid. 28 "Big Law Suit Challenges Fiji bid to keep Telecom monopoly‖ (12 April 2002) Pacific Magazine
Suva 1; http://www.paciticmagazine.net (last accessed 2S April 2014). 29 State v Fiji Island Trade & Investment Bureau , Ex parte T E L P A C (9 October 2003) HBJOO120/2002 ( HC
Fiji) Jitoko J.
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This is because ―sometimes there is a need to induce the providers to invest, which can often
be substantial and that it is unlikely to occur in a fully competitive business environment.‖30
Moreover in PNG the legal battle between Telikom PNG Limited v Independent Consumer
and Competition Commission31
concluded on a high note by promoting competition in the
PNG market and once and for all ended the government supported Telikom Monopoly. This
case is the leading legal authority for the PNG legal system which gives effect to the newly
enacted competition legislation (Independent Consumer and Competition Commission
Act32
). This legal authority is a good precedent, as it explains the effectiveness of
competition law and misuse of market power in small economies.
Overview of the South Pacific Economy and Challenges
Developing SPCs jointly occupy an area of over 30 million square kilometers of the
Pacific Ocean, but in fact have a total land area of about 525 thousand square
kilometers. Given the small size of the SPC domestic market, their limited level of
economic development and the high level of technological difficulties in production
processes, SPCs have significant dependence on imports for processed and
manufactured products.33
Pacific Countries are vulnerable to many obstacles, which
considerably affect their economic Development. One might say that these SPCs are
disadvantaged three times over‘.34
The latest Asian development Bank survey shows that
seven of the SPCs are regarded as weak performers countries (FSM, Kiribati, PNG, the
Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu), while Nauru, Tonga and Tuvalu
were characterized as fragile and in particular are at significant risk.35
Although the
Cook islands , Fiji Islands, Palau, and Samoa have performed stronger overtime
however due to their geographical, environmental, social, and political factors, even
these countries are at particular risk.36
There is no exact definition of a ‗small‘ state or economy, but an appropriate
definition depends on the context and the particular issues being examined.37
In the
context of trade and economic development the size of a country can be measured
by its population, by measuring a country‘s GDP, by calculating the total land area,
30 The Telecom Fiji Limited.com www.tfl.com (last accessed 28 April 2014). 31 Telikom PNG Limited v Independent Consumer and Commission (22 June 2007) WS1599/2006 (NC Papua
New Guinea). 32 Independent Consumer and Competition Act 1992 (PNG). 33 Paula Ciriklyasawa, Senior Economist ―Fiji Island Background Country Report: Winning National Strategies for
Export Development‖ (Paper presented to the World Export Development Forum, Monteux Switzerland, 8-11 October 2007). 34 Geoff Lane Barbara Von Tigerstrom (Ed) International Law Issues in the South Pacific (Ashgate Publishing
Limited, England, 2005) 233. 35 Asian Development B a n k Working in Fragile Environments A Mid Term Review of the Pacific Strategy
2005-2009 (Manila, 2008) 20. 36 Abid. 37
Leane above n 34, 234.
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or by taking a comparison of all of these four variables to consider the size of the
particular economy.38
However many, researchers prefer to use the population as the size
indicator variable.39
Nevertheless for the SPCs, it does not matter which variables are
used to consider its economic size because whatever variables are considered, SPCs
can be judged small. There are many disadvantages associated with being economically
and geographically small. Firstly, small geography means countries have limited natural
resources and in the SPCs these limited resources are not fully utilized for production
and export. For instance, the land ownership problems and political instabilities are
the two major inhibiting factors. Therefore, the smallness of an economy significantly
affects a country‘s comparative advantage.
Most of the SPCs are physically remote and isolated from their trading partners, as
SPCs struggle to benefit from export and import trades.40
Since SPCs are mainly
isolated from their trading partners and are scattered far apart from each other, the
only means of transport available for SPCs is either by sea or by air, which is quite
expensive.41
Above all the smallness of the SPCs only allows them to accommodate
small and fragmented cargoes which increase the per unit cost of production.42
Since
SPCs are mainly located out of major sea or air transport routes they fail to benefit
from modern and technologically advanced means of transport.43
In addition, SPCs are highly dependent on foreign sources to aid their economic
deficit caused by high import expenditure compared to low export revenues.44
For
example Pacific Island Countries receive bi-lateral grant assistance from developed
countries such as Australia, New-Zealand, United States, Japan, and the European
Union. Also Financial bodies like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund
have significantly provided financial assistance to the SPCs. In addition the Asian
Development Bank alone provided $462.4 million dollars for the SPCs during the
period of 2005 to 2007 known as official development assistance in order to help
SPCs bridge their annual fiscal deficits.45
Despite such aid SPCs countries have failed to
experience high economic growth. An empirical study on the South Pacific titled ―Aid
has failed the Pacific‖ highlighted that most of the aid, which totaled US$50 billion
during 30 years (1951-2000).46
The study showed that the aid was spent on
government consumption by elites and bureaucracy, and often diverted from the
38 Ibid, 234. 39 Lino Brigulio "Small Island Developing States and their Economic Vulnerabilities" (1995) 23 World
Development 1615, 1617. 40 Ibid. 41 Brigulio above n 39. 42 Brigulio above n 39. 43 ibid, 1678. 44 Brigulio above n 39, 1679. 45 Asian Development B a n k above n 13, 2. 46 Jayaraman and Evan Lau Does External Debt lead to Economic Growth in the Pacific island Countries:
An Empirical S tu dy . (Working p a p e r , University o f the South Pacific Department of Economics, 2008.)
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intended purposes, despite the fungible nature of foreign aid.47
Although, external
borrowing brings economic growth its fungible nature increases the external debts for
the SPCs.
Consequently, the characteristics of smallness and isolation from major world markets
have been exacerbated by a number of a man made challenges. Among the
common examples are ―increasing globalization, limited market access, political
insatiability, a deteriorating security situation, poor governance, limited access to land
and slow public sector reforms.48
If all these factors are added then the once labeled‖
Pacific Paradox‖ becomes true and the figures in table two are justified. As to why
SPCs have very little GDP per capita growth for the past three years compared to
other Asian countries. Overall, vulnerabilities in this context means ―exposure to
exogenous shocks‖ over which the PSCs have very little or no control and have
―relatively low resilience to withstand and recover from these shocks.49
The Case for Regional Cooperation
The SPCs are small and have limited human and natural resources , to function
effectively on the world trading arena. Therefore the SPCs decide to create regional
cooperation among Pacific countries. In 1947 the SPCs agreed to form the South
Pacific Commission, as this marked the first sign of Pacific regionalization.50
The
main purpose of the Commission was to ―provide research and counseling services in
health, social, and economic development to island governments.51
However, due to
political reasons the South Pacific Commission failed. To fill the political gap the South
Pacific Forum (SPF) was established in 1971. Later the SPF established the South
Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation, now the South Pacific Forum Secretariat
(SPFS).
In July 2006 during the Forum Economic Ministers Meeting (FEMM), the Pacific Islands
Forum Secretariat (PIFS) introduced a proposal to have regional economic integration on
Competition law.52
Then one year later, the Ministers of PIFS in July 2007 agreed to
reaffirm their support for the ―establishment of regional or sub-regional Competition,
Fair Trading and Pricing and Access regulatory Authority.‖53
The Minister‘s relied on
47 Ibid. 48 Regulation a n d Regional Economic Integration: Regional Opt ions for Economic Regulation above n 6. 49 Leane above n 34, 235. 50 Pacific Islands www.britannica.com (last accessed 22 February 2014). 51 Norman Padelford "Regional Cooperation in the South pacific: Twelve Years of the South Pacific
Commission" (1959) 13 International Organization 383-384, 52 Regulation an d Regional Economic Integration: A Bench Mark Study and Way Forward above n 31. 53 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat Regulation and Regional Economic Integration: Regional Options for
Economic Regulation (PIFS(07) FEMP.04, Koror, 2007) Para 3 www.forum.org.fj (last accessed 5 April 2014).
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two individual reports to implement a long term regional goal on competition and
other economic priorities. During the FEMM in 2006, the Spier Consulting group
submitted the report titled;(Regulation and Regional Economic Interaction: A
Benchmark study and Way Forward). During the FEMM in 2007, the Castalia
Strategic Advisor submitted a report titled; (Regulation and regional Economic
Integration: Regional Options for Economic Regulations). Therefore, these two reports
will be heavily relied on to explain the approach the SPCs have decided for
Competition Law.
At the outset of these two reports it shows that SPCs are inviting their respective
governments to encourage ―fair and effective competition in order to provide
consumers with the greatest range of choice among products and services at the
lowest cost.‖54
It is the desire of the SPCs to implement a medium to long term
Regional or Sub-Regional Regulatory and Advisory Authority. As the authority will
advise and implement competition, pricing, access, fair trading and consumer protection
matters for the SPCs. However each Pacific Government‘s should work collectively
and independently in making real the goal of regional integration.
The reports proposed that the Regional Regulatory and Advisory body will advise the
SPCs by deploying a cost-effective combination of full-time and contracted staff or
by seeking assistance from Australia or New Zealand to train regulatory staff.55
Also
the report shows that the current difficulties of regulatory rules, organizations,
processes and implementation issues will be eliminated through regional cooperation.56
As a result, The SPCs can create a workable frame on economic integrations for
future regional integrations. Moreover, the PIFS recommends implementing a regional
regulatory body either by duplicating the New-Zealand Commerce Commission or the
Papua New Guinea Independence Consumer and Competition Commission. In addition,
the report illustrates that SPCs will only benefit from competition law if they adopt
a model law which is specially developed for the region. Therefore, the SPCs
governments can easily modify the rules if necessary in light of their specific
circumstances.57
By recognizing that smaller countries have specific policy needs and
have certain economic vulnerabilities, the PIFS totally disagreed with simply copying
a competition legislation model from larger jurisdictions.58
However, the PIFS agreed
54 Pacific Island Forum Secretariat Regulation and Regional Economic Integration: A Bench Mark Study and
Way Forward (PlFS (06) FEMH.07, Honiara, 2006) 4 55 Pacific Forum Secretariat Consumer Protection ( SPFS (00) FEMN.21, A l o f i ) 17 www.forum.org.fj (last accessed 5 April 2014). 56 Castalia Strategic Advisors Regulation and Regional Economic integration: "Regional options for Economic Regulation" (Prepared for Pacific Island Forum Secretariat, 2007) 40 www.forum.org.fj (last
accessed 1 5 April 2014). 57 Ibid. 58
Castalia Strategic above n 62.
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to consider the New Zealand, Australia, Papua New Guinea or Fijian Competition
Regimes.
Competition Model
Since Fiji and Papua New Guinea has somewhat the same economic and social
features of other SPCs, this paper recommends that adopting either the Fijian or
PNG competition regime will best suit the needs of other countries at a regional
level. In Fiji the policy objective of promoting competition is principally affected
through two main legal instruments: The Fair Trading Decree59
and The Commerce
Act.60
The Commerce Act established an independent statuary authority (Commerce
Commission) to monitor and deter anti-competitive actions. The prime objective of the
Commerce Commission is to promote effective competition in the interest of the
consumers.61
The Commission also ensure non-discriminatory access to monopoly and
near monopoly infrastructure. Moreover the Commission allows authorization and
notification of certain restrictive trade practices and recommends appropriate prices in
markets where competition is limited.62
At the same time the Fair Trading Degree
seeks to promote consumer welfare by prohibiting anti-competitive behaviors and
unfair business practices in the Fijian market.63
The Papua New Guinea Government took a different approach compared to Fiji and
enacted the Independent Consumer and Competition Commission Act (ICCC Act). The
ICCC Act introduced a new competition regime to regulate a number of State owned
utilities.64
The Act declared electricity services, telecommunications services, ports and
harbours services, postal services and third part vehicle insurance to be regulated.65
The ―Act‖ also introduced a statutory regulatory body, the Independent Consumer
and Competition Commission. The Commission aims to enhance and the protect
consumer welfare of Papua New Guinea citizens by promoting competition, fair
trading and economic efficiency.66
The Act also promotes the regulation of product
price, quality reliability of significant goods and services.67
While competition rules are
complex, the FEMM declared that the Fiji and PNG competition regime have
achieved some success in terms of its applicability and understanding by
stakeholders.68
Therefore, it is essential for small economics like SPCs to adopt or
59 Fair Trading Decree 1992 (FJ). 60 Commerce Ac t 1998 (FJ). 61 Fair Trading Decree 1992 (FJ). 62 Commerce Ac t above n 60, s9. 63 Fair Trading Decree above n 61. 64 Independent Con su mer a n d Competition A c t 1992 (PNG). 65 Ibid. 66 Independent Con su mer and Competition a b o v e n 64, 8 4. 67 Ibid, s4. 68 Regulation a n d Regional Economic In tegra t ion : A Bench Mark Study and
Way Forward above n 31,3.
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implement such a competition regime which can be easily amended to suit the
changing circumstances of Pacific countries.
Conclusion
South Pacific Island nation‘s economies are unique and vulnerable and therefore need
special care from both their own Governments and by international trading partners.
Economic difficulties through geographical complexity are aggravated by manmade
difficulties which adversely affect the fragile SPCs economies. This paper argued that
SPCs need better and strong competition law since only two of the fourteen Pacific
Island Countries have stronger competition law. In light of the recent regional
economic integration on competition, foreign investment, pricing, access, consumer
protection and fair trading showed the regional caliber of SPCs.
Despite the efforts of regional cooperation, SPCs are faced with inherent tension in
small economy industries, as Gal described this as the ―basic conflict‖ created by
smallness. Therefore, SPCs will have to pay greater attention on specific issues when
implementing competition law and competition policies. One of the many immediate
considerations for SPCs is choosing the appropriate competition model and calculating
its effect to their small markets. However , the knowledge, approach and resource -
sharing forms of regional cooperation could benefit the SPCs. As the advantages of
regional cooperation among the Pacific countries are evident from previous regional
integrations.
―I believe [...] that while all human life is sacred there‘s nothing wrong with the death
penalty if you can trust the legal system implicitly, and that no one but a moron would ever
trust the legal system.‖
― Neil Gaiman, American Gods
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Application of Expert Evidence
In the Criminal Justice Arena
Purnima Parana Gamage,
Magistrate, Negombo.
A man of science, nevertheless he performed a series of experiments can refuse to come to
a conclusion, might he find no inter connection of his theory and practice.
But can a Judge say non liquet and refrain from deciding the case?
Even where the material placed before him is totally out of the spheres of his knowledge and
understanding, a Judge nevertheless has to determine the guilt or the innocence of the
accused.
As the criminal Justice system in any given jurisdiction concentrates in convicting
the guilt while ensuring the acquittal of innocence, the rules of evidence indubitably
provides for tribunals to resort to in such instances, to Expert Evidence, subject to further
and other rules of evidence.
Forensic Science is the scientific method of gathering and examining information about the
past.
In criminal law enforcement, Forensics is done to congregate specimens from the
scene of crime which the investigator deems essential to reconstruct the crime before the
jury and the tribunal. Interestingly before the tribunal, the crime is reconstructed through the
evidence of the expert who is the person of special skill and knowledge in the field to
explain the nature of existence, who will explain the cause and the effect inter connected
with the specimen.
One of the fundamental principles of Forensics is the Locards principle which
assumes that the every criminal leaves a trace at the crime scene. As Dr. Edmond Locard
supposes
….When he wants it, wherever he touches, whatever he leaves, even
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without consciousness, will serve as a silent witness against him his
finger prints or his foot prints , but his hair, the fibers from his cloths,
the glass he breaks, the tool mark he leaves, the paint he scratches, the
blood or semen he deposits or collects. All of these and more bear mute
witness against him. This is evidence that does not forget. It is not
confused by the excitement of the moment. It is not absent because
human witnesses are. It is factual evidence. Physical evidence cannot
be wrong. It cannot perjure itself, it cannot be wholly absent. Only
human failure to find it study and understand it can diminish its
value….‖1
However with the passage of time some forensic techniques, believed to be scientifically
sound at the time they were used, have turned out to have much less scientific merit or none.
Some such techniques include,
a) Comparative bullet-lead analysis was used by the FBI for over four
decades, starting with the John F. Kennedy assassination in 1963. The
theory was that each batch of ammunition possessed a chemical makeup
so distinct that a bullet could be trace back to a particular batch or even a
specific box. Internal studies and an outside study by the National
Academy of Sciences found that the technique was unreliable, and the FBI
abandoned the test in 2005.
b) In at Least two cases bite - mark evidence has been used to convict people
of murder who were later freed by DNA evidence.
Hence the criminal justice administration in various jurisdictions has evolved over time to
receive expert evidence in emerging bio-technological fields through rules of evidence
aimed at a fair justice.
In this exercise three factors relevant to determining the admissibility of expert opinion
evidence were summarized by King CJ in the Australian case of Bonython.2
(1) Whether the subject matter is such that a person without
instruction or experience in the area would be able to form a sound
judgment on the matter without the assistance of a witness possessing
special knowledge or experience in the area.
(2) Whether the subject matter forms part of a body of knowledge or
experience which is sufficiently organized or recognized to be accepted as
a reliable body of knowledge or experience, a special acquaintance with
which by the witness would render his opinion of assistance to the court.
1 Dr. Edmond Locard 1942 Crime Investigation: physical evidence and the police laboratory. Interscience
Publishers,Inc. : New York 2 (1984) 38 SASR 45, 46 to 47 (Supreme Court of South Australia).
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(3) Whether the witness has acquired by study or experience
sufficient knowledge of the subject to render his opinion of value in
resolving the issues before the court.
A fourth requirement is that the expert must be capable of providing an impartial
opinion in recognition of the fact. An expert‘s overriding duty is to the court and not to the
party calling him to testify as stated in Field v Leeds City Council 3.
The Law Commission for England and Wales in its Consultation paper no 190 of 2010
reflects the basic premise that expert evidence must satisfy a minimum standard of
evidentiary reliability to be admissible in criminal proceedings, whether the party adducing
it is the prosecution or the accused. Indeed, the common law, though vague in this area,
already recognizes that expert evidence of insufficient reliability should not be admitted.4
The question, as to its view, then is not whether there should be an admissibility
threshold for expert evidence in criminal proceedings but: what is the best way to address
the problem of determining sufficiency of evidentiary reliability?
The Commission proposes four realistic options:
(1) Exclusionary discretion without guidance.
Expert evidence would simply be treated like other evidence generally, so
permission to adduce expert evidence could be refused if its probative
value is outweighed by the danger that its admission would mislead,
distract or confuse the jury5.
(2) Exclusionary discretion with guidance.
Permission to adduce expert evidence could be refused on the general
ground that its probative value is outweighed by the danger that its
admission would mislead, distract or confuse the jury, but specific
guidance would be provided to assist the trial judge in his or her
determination of reliability.
(3) An admissibility rule requiring consensus amongst experts in the field.
This option would introduce a preliminary admissibility test for expert
evidence which would equate evidentiary reliability with expert
consensus.
(4) An admissibility rule requiring the trial judge to assess the evidentiary
reliability of the tendered evidence.
The legal perception on Expert evidence in Federal Court of the United States of America
can be summarized as follows.
3 [2001] 2 CPLR 129 4 Ciantar [2005] EWCA Crim 3559, 5 Any admissible prosecution evidence may be excluded as a matter of judicial discretion by the application of s
78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
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Rule 702 of Federal rules of Evidence: Testimony by Expert Witnesses
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert‘s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts
of the case.
On 25th
June 2009 the US Supreme Court issued a 5-TO-4 DECISION IN Melendez-diaz vs.
Massachusetts6 stating that crime laboratory reports may not be used against criminal
defendants at trial unless the analysts responsible for creating them give testimony and
subject themselves to cross-examination. Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia
referred to the National Research Council report in his assertion that ―Forensic evidence is
not uniquely immune from the risk of manipulation‖
Followed by this the Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules amending the Rule 702 has
observed following facts in its report submitted in December 2011.7
Rule 702 has been amended in response to Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,8
and to the many cases applying Daubert,
including Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael9. In Daubert the Court charged
trial judges with the responsibility of acting as gatekeepers to exclude
unreliable expert testimony, and the Court in Kumho clarified that this
gatekeeper function applies to all expert testimony, not just testimony
based in science.
Daubert set forth a non-exclusive checklist for trial courts to use in
assessing the reliability of scientific expert testimony. The specific factors
explicated by the Daubert Court are
6www.supremecourt.gov./opinions cited as 557 U.S. 305 (2009) 7 http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_702 8 509 U.S. 579 (1993), cited at opcit 39 9 119 S.Ct. 1167 (1999). cited at opcit 39
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(1) whether the expert's technique or theory can be or has been tested—
that is, whether the expert's theory can be challenged in some objective
sense, or whether it is instead simply a subjective, conclusion-nary
approach that cannot reasonably be assessed for reliability;
(2) whether the technique or theory has been subject to peer review and
publication;
(3) the known or potential rate of error of the technique or theory when
applied;
(4) the existence and maintenance of standards and controls; and
(5) whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted in the
scientific community.
Courts both before and after Daubert have found other factors relevant in
determining whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable to be considered by the Trier of
fact. These factors include:
(1) Whether experts are ―proposing to testify about matters growing
naturally and directly out of research they have conducted independent of
the litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions expressly for
purposes of testifying.‖10
(2) Whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted
premise to an unfounded conclusion.11
, noting that in some cases a trial
court ―may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap
between the data and the opinion proffered.
(3) Whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious alternative
explanations as in Claar v. Burlington12
where the testimony excluded
where the expert failed to consider other obvious causes for the plaintiff's
condition and in Ambrosini v. Labarraque13
where the possibility of some
un-eliminated causes presents a question of weight, so long as the most
obvious causes have been considered and reasonably ruled out by the
expert.
10 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995) 11 General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) 12 N.R.R., 29 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 1994) 13 101 F.3d 129 (D.C.Cir. 1996)
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(4) Whether the expert ―is being as careful as he would be in his regular
professional work outside his paid litigation consulting.‖as held in
Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc.,14
since Daubert requires the trial
court to assure itself that the expert ―employs in the courtroom the same
level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the
relevant field‖.
(5) Whether the field of expertise claimed by the expert is known to reach
reliable results for the type of opinion the expert would give. Daubert's
general acceptance factor does not ―help show that an expert's testimony is
reliable where the discipline itself lacks reliability, as, for example, do
theories grounded in any so-called generally accepted principles of
astrology or necromancy.‖ Similarly in Moore v. Ashland Chemical,
Inc.15
, a clinical doctor was properly precluded from testifying to the
toxicological cause of the plaintiff's respiratory problem, where the
opinion was not sufficiently grounded in scientific methodology and in
Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp.16
, rejecting testimony based on ―clinical
ecology‖ as unfounded and unreliable.
The Code of Criminal Procedure Act governs the procedure in admitting expert evidence in
criminal proceedings, in Sri Lanka , particularly by section 414.
Interestingly the section permits certain reports to be admissible in evidence, without calling
the person making such report unless there is an issue regarding the identity of subject of the
examination and as long as the defense does not require the testimony in open courts by the
Analyzer.
However do such reports presented in court acquire the same credibility and evidential
value as much as evidence testified in courts acquire ?
This issue has been severally discussed in Sri Lankan Courts.
In Perera Vs. Dharmarathne, Excise Inspector 17
the Court held that it is the duty of the
Court under section 414(6) proviso of the Criminal Procedure Code to summon the
Government Analyst if either party to a case makes application that he should be summoned
to give evidence with regard to his report.
On the other hand this decision was distinguished in the case of King Vs. Gunawardena 18
on the subject holding as follows.
14 104 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 1997) 15 151 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998) 16 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988) 17 (1946) 47 NLR 381 18 (1951) 52 NLR 103
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The provisions of section 414(6) of the Criminal procedure Code which
makes admissible in evidence the report of the Government analyst
upon any matter or thing duly submitted to him for examination or
analysis, are not confined to matters or things submitted to him for
―chemical Analysis‖. Therefore his report on a question of ballistic is
admissible in evidence without calling him, subject to the proviso
……………….
It is the duty of the Trail judge in such cases to tell the jury that they
should appreciate that in considering the weight to be attached to the
report it had been admitted without being tested by cross examination.
It is also the duty of the Judge to draw attention to any surrounding
facts or circumstances which may tend to support or negative the
correctness of the facts or inferences stated in the report………….
Where the AG has committed a case for trial before a higher Court ,
merely placing the report of the Government analyst as an exhibit in the
list of productions without adding the name of the Government analyst
to the list of witnesses, it is open to question whether the prosecution
can request the court to summon the Government analyst as a witness
for prosecution ( as oppose to above case Perera Vs. Dharmarathne,
Excise Inspector ) 19
the right of the defense to request the court under
the section…………… to summon that officer as a witness for the
defense cannot be questioned.
Similarly in a prosecution for possession of unlawfully manufactured liquor under the
Excise Ordinance where the sole evidence relied on by the prosecution was the report of the
Government analyst that the liquor in issue does not fall within the categories of excisable
articles as specified in the Act, the Court in Ebert Fernando Vs. Goonawardena 20
held that
the Government Analyst report was not sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubts that
the liquor in question was unlawfully manufactured.
Although the section 414(3) defines any Medical Officer within the section 414(1), in
Darmasena Vs. OIC Kadugannawa Police21
in a prosecution for causing grievous hurt, a
medico-legal report of Lecturer in Forensic Medicine who is not employed under the
Government as a Medical Officer was held to inadmissible in evidence.
Further in Gamini Dolawatte Vs. AG22
it was held that while a medico-legal report is
admissible under section 414(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code , hearsay evidence by way
19 emphasize added 20 (1957) 58 NLR 22 21 (1971) 73 NLR 359 22 1988 (I) SLR 221
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of case history embodied in such a report is not admissible as such history is information not
ascertained by the Doctor from his own examination of the injured.
An interesting point regarding the evaluation of expert evidence given in the lower court by
a Appellate Court was discussed in the case of The Queen Vs. Baron23
which was followed
in Karunathilake Vs. Karunathileka 24
. Accordingly in examining witnesses it is the duty of
the Judge to elicit from him and record who he is, what his station in life is, and where he
lives so that the Appeal Court may have some material to form an opinion as to their means
of knowledge and credibility.
The Evidence Ordinance governs the admissibility and relevance of Expert Evidence given
in the criminal proceedings.
Although in one hand the Ordinance provides for admission of opinions and on the
other hand provides Expert opinion to be relevant under the section 45 and 46 of the
Ordinance as required by the ordinance to be relevant in order to legitimize the reception of
such opinion, reception of opinion is strictly limited by the parameters of the same section.
A) For example in the light of the section the matters in respect of which expert
opinion is admissible are any one or more of foreign law, science , art, the identity
or genuineness of handwriting or finger impressions , palm impressions or foot
impressions. Although one may feel that term ―science‖ and ―art‖ shall be
interpreted to intrude almost everything and anything under the sun and moon, The
Sri Lankan Courts clearly suggests boundaries of the subject matter.
Accordingly in Regina Vs. Pinhamy 25
where the expert opined that skull produced
in the case was that of the deceased by super imposition of an enlarged photograph
of the deceased on the photograph of the skull, the Court of Criminal Appeal
rejected the evidence on the basis that identification of deceased persons by super
imposition of photographs has not been established as a science or art within the
purview of section 45.
Similarly the expert evidence of behavior of tracker dogs is ousted where in an
earlier case Regina Vs Meerasaibo 26
the Court has refused to accept opinion of the
police witness as to the behavior of the police cannel since it is not an established
science or art. Further in Kanapathipillei Vs. The Queen 27
the Court of Criminal
Appeal elaborated that very convincing expert evidence is required to bring in
behavior of the police dog to the case as a relevant fact and this view was followed
in Gunawardena Vs. The Republic 28
where the accused a police sergeant was
23 (1874- 1915) 02 NLR 192 24 (1951) 52 NLR 300 25 (1955- 1956) 57 NLR 169 26 Evidence Ordinance with selected cases . Ekanayaka Jayawardena 2008 27 (1955) 56 NLR 397 28 1981 (II) SLR 315
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charged with Murder of his alleged mistress at Galenbidunuwewa, acquitting the
appellant.
Interestingly this position expanded in the famous case of The Queen Vs.
Kularathne 29
where conflicting opinions of both experts depend on an examination
of potassium content in the seven deceased‘s stomachs whose antecedents were
unknown. Both witnesses agreed that they would not contribute an article to any
scientific paper commanding any inference on the basis of the experiment made
with the seven stomachs. The Court held among other points, that expert evidence
led in this case did not amount to any scientific method of ascertaining a fact and
would have tended to misled the jury and its effect would have been damaging and
prejudicial to the first accused.
B) The section also requires that the person offering the opinion should be especially
skilled in the relevant field.
Whether the witness is especially skilled within the purview of the section is a
question of fact to be decided by the courts as held in Charles Perera Vs. Motha 30
.
Accordingly in the case of Fernando Vs. SI Kalubowila 31
it was decided where the
conviction was based on opinion of Sub Inspector specially trained by the Excise
Department for identifying excisable articles that the particular SI is not an expert
in terms of section 45 and hence his evidence is not relevant.
Quite opposing in the case of Solicitor General Vs. Victoria Fernando 32
where the
issue was whether the liquid is fermented toddy or not, T S Fernando J. regarded as
relevant the opinion of an Excise inspector who had 10 years experience in the
detection of similar offences. Similarly in Somalingam Vs. Jayawardena 33
, in a
prosecution for selling masoor dhal in excess of the maximum retail price, an
Inspector of Food who has sufficient experience and knowledge was held to be
competent to give evidence as an expert in order to establish the subject matter.
Hence it is not essential that the person should be proved to have series of
professional training to be regarded as an expert, rather the experience and practical
knowledge may serve to distinguish as an expert. However it is to be noted that the
fact that the witness has not been testified in a Court house before is no bar at all to
receive his expert evidence34
.
29 1976 CLW 01 30 (1964) 65 NLR 295 311959 CLW 93 32 (1964- 1965) 67 NLR 159 33 (1968) 70 NLR 214 34 1937 CLW 51
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It is established practice that when an Expert is called upon to express his opinion,
the party calling him should elicit from him his qualifications and experiences in
order to establish his expertise. For example it was queered in the case of
Banddappuhamy Vs. Ekanayaka 35
whether failure to prove the competency of the
witness called as an expert renders his evidence irrelevant. This was further
elaborated in Solicitor General Vs. Podisira 36
where the Court held that it is the
duty of the prosecution to establish the expertise of the crown witness before
leading evidence.
On the other hand although the party calling the witness establishes his expertise, it
is the duty of the court to satisfy itself as to the expertise of the witness as done in
the above case.
As held in The Queen Vs. Kularathne in evaluating expert evidence, it is of crucial
importance that proper and correct directions to be given to the jury as to the expert
evidence and nothing should be passed to them as the opinion of the expert which is in fact
not.
E R S R Coomaraswamy37
identifies three purposes which are to be served by expert
evidence in a criminal case in the light of an English case.38
I. To establish that a crime has been committed, as in the case of a
fire , to determine whether it was accidental or caused by arson
II. To indicate how a crime was committed and when it was done ,
for example a murder or homicide done in self defense and the
time of death
III. To prove the guilt of the accused, though the case is seldom
decided by scientific evidence alone. The scientific evidence
must be consistent with the other evidence to make an overall
assessment.
Apparently there is few case law principals developed in the Sri Lankan legal system
regarding evaluation of expert evidence or the weight which may properly be attached to the
opinion of experts which remains to be considered by the tribunal to guarantee that evidence
in fact relied on by the forum is reliable perse.
(i) The primary responsibility of deciding the matters in dispute is that of the
Judge. In Gratian Perera case39
, Sinnathambi J. observed that it is the
function of the Court to decide on a matter of such nature with the
35 1959 CLW 93 36 (1964- 1965) 67 NLR 592 37 E R S R Coomaraswamy, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE ( With special reference to the Law of Sri Lanka)
Volume I : 2nd Edition , Stamford Lake, Pannipitiya : 1989 38 1974 Crim. Law Review at 276 39 Gratian Perera Vs. The Queen (1960) 61 NLR 522
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assistance of an Expert, but it is not proper to act solely of the opinion of
the Expert and the decision being the judge‘s, he should not delegate his
function to the Expert, the opinion of the Expert is relevant, but decision
must nevertheless be the judge‘s.
This line of thought has been constantly upheld by Superior Courts of Sri
Lanka and in Jagathsena Vs. G D D Perera 40
Ranasinghe J. observed
following Lily Perera Vs. Chandani Perera 41
that approach of the Court
which should be for Expert Evidence is regulated by authorities and that
it is the duty of the Court to form its own opinion on the issue which to
sought adduce such evidence.
(ii) Since the ultimate decision is that of the Court the expert should give
reasons in support of his opinion, so that the Court may have the
opportunity of evaluating the reasons and assessing their validity. For
example in the case of Charles de Silva Vs. Ariyawathie de Silva 42
Abeyweera J. observed that Examiner of Questioned Documents EQD
should be able to, while testifying whether the signature in issue is placed
by the same person in both documents, to justify his conclusion giving
reasons that his signature may show a slight difference with factors such
as time , place and circumstances under which it is placed, along with
physical and mental states of the person placing it.
(iii) The opinion of an Expert is relevant but not conclusive. In pinhamy43
case it was observed that ―the medical witnesses‖ evidence alone is not
conclusive of the identity of the deceased. It can only be taken as an item
in the chain of evidence that was led to establish the deceased‘s identity‖.
It was held in Charles Perera Vs. Motha44
that the Experts opinion is only
relevant fact to be taken in to account in forming the opinion of the Court.
On the other hand the trial judge would not be justified in brushing aside
the expert‘s opinion lightly without adequate reason though it does not
mean that the trial judge is prevented from bringing an independent mind
to bear on the question. This view was upheld in Samarakoon Vs. Public
Trustee 45
by Weerasooriya J with who HNG Fernando J agreed.
(iv) Sri Lankan Courts have a propensity to accept the view of that expert
testimony be accepted only if it is supported by independence evidence. In
Soyza Vs. Shunmugam46
Hutchinson CJ observed that with his wide
experience he is inclined to treat the expert‘s opinion as nothing more than
40 1992 (I) SLR 371 41 1990 (I) SLR 246 42 1987 (I) SLR 261 43 The Queen Vs. Pinhamy (1956) 57 NLR 169 44 (1964) 65 NLR 294 45 (1964) 65 NLR 100 46 (1874- 1915) 10 NLR 355
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slight corroboration of a conclusion arrived at independently and in any
event, never so strong as to turn the scale against a person charged with a
criminal act if the other evidence is not conclusive. Similarly in the case of
The King Vs. Perera47
where the isuue was identifying hand writing in a
chit alleged to written fraudulently, while no witness state that he was seen
to write or sign that chit, Jayawardena J. held that it is unsafe to convict
the Accused solely on EQD evidence. In Martines Vs. Doole48
it was held
that conviction could not be justified since the Accused found guilty solely
on the evidence of palm print which was placed at the window of the
house-broken room.
On the other hand the Court is reluctant to rely on expert evidence where
other evidence adduced is controversial regarding the genuiness of the
document as in Cader Saibo Vs Ahamed49
where the court held that it is
improper to come to a conclusion by merely comparing admitted
signatures and the document.
(v) Where an opportunity of cross examining the Expert is unavailable, the
weight attaching to his opinion is, of course, reduced. Hence in Rathinam
Vs. The Queen 50
expert evidence regarding a blast material was rejected
on the basis of hearsay evidence since the Ballistic Expert was not called
as witness before the High Court, instead produced his report submitted to
the Magistrate Court as a part of the brief.
Similarly in K C Perera and Three Others Vs. Republic Of Sri
Lanka 51
it was held that Where there is any matter that needs
clarification in the opinion of an expert witness, on a highly technical
science like Ballistics the proper course would have been to have the
expert as a witness and asked him to clarify any matters that were in doubt
or needed clarification.
The wise one fashioned speech with their thought, sifting it as grain is sifted through a sieve.
- Lord Buddha
47 (1917- 1937) 31 NLR 449 48(1917- 1937) 35 NLR 401 49 (1948- 1949) 50 NLR 303 50 (1972) 74 NLR 317 51 (1978) 79 NLR 244
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Plea of Non Est Factum
IT IS NOT (MY) DEED
Thushara Rajasinghe
Judge of the High Court,
Republic of Fiji Islands,
“A word is dead, when it is said, Some say,
I say, it just begins to live
That day,
(Emily Dickinson, 1900)
Introduction
Not only the words, but also the actions of human beings do not die or perish with its
completion. A word is completed when it is said, and an action is completed when it is
performed, however, with the completion, it creates a new form of existence base on moral
responsibilities and obligations toward the word.
Every human action is a result of a contributory function of the members of human body.
This contributory function of human body does not limit to the physical organs but also
requires the functioning contribution of human mind, which actually designs the ownership
of the said action. As Emily Dickinson wrote every completed human actions and words
begin to live a new phase of life imposing consequential moral responsibilities and
obligations upon the author of such actions and words. These consequential moral
responsibilities and obligations have been recognised and codified into the legal systems of
the societies in order to prevent people from avoiding and ignoring these responsibilities and
obligations of their completed actions towards the world.
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In order to excuse oneself from these consequential responsibilities and obligations of one‘s
action, it is required to satisfy that he does not actually perform that action. It has been
recognised that if a person was able to successful satisfy that his mind was not effectively
contributed to the completion of his physical action, he is permitted to excuse himself from
the consequential responsibilities and obligations of such an action. Accordingly a person is
allowed to claim that he is not liable for his signature or the execution of any documents on
the ground that his mind was not accompanied with his signature or his act of execution.
This claim of disown his own signature is known as the plea of non est factum, literary
known as ―It is not (my) deed.‖ The purpose of this paper is to discuss the main components
of the plea of non est factum.
What is non est factum
The plea of non est factum originally applies as a defence of a person, who sought to be held
liable but did not actually sign the document. However, this plea has been applied since the
16th
Century in certain instances where a person who actually signed a document and claims
that it is not his signature on the ground of lack of his consent. At the initial phase of the
evolution of this concept, it was applied for those who were unable to read due to blindness
or illiteracy, and therefore has to trust someone to tell them or direct them what they have
signed. Over the years, the application of the plea of non est factum has been extended to a
person of full age and understanding, who can read and write but due to no fault or
negligence of his own, forbears to read and understand the document before sign it, to
repudiate his signature under certain circumstances.
Byles J in Foster v Mackinnon52
articulately defined the plea non est factum, where his
lordship held that; “ it seems plain, on principle and on authority, that, if a blind man, or a
man who cannot read, or who for some reason ( not implying negligence) forbears to read,
has a written contract falsely read over to him, the read misreading to such a degree that
the written contract is of a nature altogether different from the contract pretended to be read
from the paper which the blind or illiterate man afterwards sign, then at least if there be no
negligence, the signature so obtained is of no force. And it is not invalid not merely on the
ground of fraud, where fraud exists, but on the ground that the mind of the signer did not
accompany the signature; in other words, that he never intended to sign, and therefore in
contemplation of law never did sign, the contract to which his name is appended”.
The judicial approach on the plea of non est factum is founded on the ground that such
exemption embodied in this defence should not unsettle the confidence of those who
habitually rely on the signatures, especially in commercial and trade activities. A more
liberal and free approach of the plea might adversely affect the confidence and the
credibility of commercial and trade activities as much of those activities are rely on signed
and executed documents.
52 (1869) LR 4 CP 704,
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The plea of non est factum constitute two conflicting objectives. The first is the relief to a
signer whose consent is genuinely lacking. The second objective is the protection to
innocent third parties who have acted on an apparently regular and properly executed
document53
. In order to achieve these two conflicting objectives, the judicial approach on
the application of plea of non est factum requires a great amount of compromise and
flexibility.
Absence of the Consent
According to the definition given by Byles J in Foster the main determining element of the
plea of non est factum is the difference between what the signer believed to be signed and
what in fact he actually signed. The test of determining of the degree of difference between
what the signer believed and what he has actually signed has elaborated by Byles J in his
abovementioned passage, where his lordship held that “ the misreading to such a degree
that the written contract is of a nature altogether different from the contract pretended to be
read from the paper which the blind or illiterate man afterwards signs”. It was held that the
absence of the mind of the signer to the actual contents of the document renders the
document void. Having articulated the legal position of the issue of difference between the
actual contents of the document and what the signer intended to be signed, Byles J further
held in Foster that; “ in the present case, the defendant never intended to sign that contract,
or any such contract. He never intended to put his name to any instrument that then was or
thereafter might become negotiable. He was deceived not merely as to the legal effect, but as
to the actual contents of the instrument‖.
In Hunter v Walters54
, having discussed the principles adopted in Foster, held that the
determining factor is not the contents of the document, but the character of the document. If
a person executed a document upon the misrepresentation of its contains or facts, not the
actual nature or character of the document, he is barred from seeking assistance of the plea
of non est factum. Lord Hatherley LC in Hunter found that; “I apprehend that if a man
executes a solemn instrument by which he conveys an interest, and if he signs on the back a
receipt for money- a document which, as the Vice – Chancellor observes, could not be
mistaken – he cannot affect not to know what he was doing, and it is not enough for him
afterwards to say that he thought it was only a form. That merely amount to saying that a
misrepresentation was made to him, under which he executed a deed; still the deed may
have been exactly what he intended to execute, though he intended it to be used for a totally
different purpose. But this does not affect the deed. The fraud of the person who used the
deed for a different purpose does not make it less the deed of the person who executed it”.
53 Saunders ( Executrix of the estate of Rose Maud Gallie ( Deceased) v Anglia Building Society (1970) 3 All ER
961 54 (1871) 7 Ch App 75,
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The principles enunciated in Hunter were further consolidated in an affirmative form in
Howatson v Webb55
. Chancery Division in Howaston has extensively discussed the legal
principles enunciated in Foster, Hunter and National Provincial Bank of England v
Jackson56
in respect of the distinction of what the signer actually signed and what he
believed to be signed. Having done such a comparative review of those leading authorities
on this issue, Warrington J in Howatson expounded that though a man might be misled as to
the nature of the deed, yet if he knew the character of the deed, he cannot succeed upon the
plea of non est factum. Warrington J held that; “he was told that they were deeds relating to
the property to which they did in fact relate. His mind was therefore applied to the question
of dealing with that property. The deeds did deal with that property. The misrepresentation
was as to the contents of the deed, and not as to the character and class of the deed. He
knew he was dealing with the class of deed with which in fact he was dealing, but did not
ascertain its contents. The deed contained a covenant to pay. Under those circumstances, I
cannot say that the deed is absolutely void”.
The abovementioned passage of Warrington J has narrowed the scope of the application of
plea of non est factum. It has specifically divided the character or class of the document with
the contents of the document. This distinction creates confusion as of the certainty of the
composition of actual character of the document against the actual contents of the document.
With the decision of Howaston, it was affirmed that the difference of actual contents of the
document and what the signer actually thought of it, was not considered as a determining
factor in the defence of non est factum.
In Gallie v Lee and Another57
the Civil Division of Court of Appeal has considered the
actual scope of the plea of non est factum in an inclusive approach. Lord Denning in Gallie
has deliberated the distinction between the character of the document and the contents of the
document in an expressive and eloquent manner. Lord Denning refused to accept this
distinction between the class and contents of the document as expounded in previous
authorities on three main grounds. The first ground is that this is not a sensible distinction. A
mistake as to contents may be just as fundamental as a mistake as to class and character.
Secondly, this is not really a distinction as a document takes its class and character from its
contents, wherefore, a mistake as to the one is often also a mistake as of the other. The third
ground is that the authorities mentioned above were actually decided not based on such a
distinction. Having refused to accept such a distinction, Lord Denning defined the plea of
non est factum as that; “whenever a man of full age and understanding, who can read and
write, signs a legal document which is put before him for signature – by which I mean a
document which, it is apparent on the face of it, is intended to have legal consequences-
then, if he does not take the trouble read it but signs it as it is, relying on the word of
another as to its character or contents or effect, he cannot be heard to say that it is not his
document”.
55 (1907) I Ch 537, 56 (1886) 33 Ch D 1, 57 (1969) 1 All ER 1062,
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The position adopted by Lord Denning in Gallie in respect of the distinction between class
and the contents, was affirmatively upheld in the House of Lords in Saunders ( Executris
of the estate of Rose Maud Gallie ( deceased) v Anglia Building Society58
, where
Viscount Dilhorne held that ; „ the difference between what a documents is thought to be
may be in substance or in kind. It will not suffice if the signer thought that in some respect it
would have a different legal effect from what it has; nor will it suffice if in some respects it
departs from what he thought it would contain. The difference whether it be in kind or in
substance, must be such that the document signed is entirely- the word use by Byles J (
1869) LR 4 CP at 711) or fundamentally different from that which it was thought to be so
that it can be said that it was never the signer‟s intention to execute the document” .
Having concurred with Viscount Dilhorne and upholding Lord Denning‘s conclusion in the
Court of Appeal, Lord Wilberforce in his speech in Saunders found that the essential
element is the consent of the signer to the purported transaction in the document either it is
in substance or in kind. It appears that Lord Wilberforce and Viscount Dilhorne while
departing from the distinction of class of the document and the contents of the document,
specifically held that the essential component in the plea of non est factum is the lack of
consent by the signer to the purported transaction in the document whether it is in character
or contents.
The test of ascertaining of the intention of the signer is more subjective rather than
objective. Lord Pearson in his speech in Saunders outlined that the test is that what is
actually in his own mind rather than the intention which he manifests to others or the
intention that a reasonable man would infer from his words and actions. However, Lord
Pearson made no attempt to formulate a rule as such. His lordship expressed in his
observation that in some instances objective test would be more appropriate than the
subjective approach.
Negligence by the Signer
The second component that constitutes the plea of non-est factum is the absence of
negligence by the signer. It appears that a person could not be able to claim the defence of
non est factum if his signing of the document was due to his own negligence. Beside the
issue of negligence, the court is further required to consider that whether the person who
negligently signed a document is estopped from claiming the plea of non-est factum against
an innocent third party.
Sir Mellish L.J. in Hunter raised his concern of estoppel between the signer and the third
person, where he stated that; “ in my opinion, it is still a doubtful question at law, on which I
do not wish to give any decisive opinion, whether, if there be a false representation
respecting the contents of a deed, a person who is an educated person, and who might, by
very simple means, have satisfied himself as to what the contents of the deed really were,
58 (1970) 3 All ER 961,
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may not, by executing it negligently be estopped as between himself and a person who
innocently acts upon the faith of the deed being valid, and who accepts as estate under it”.
The degree of negligence had been considered as carelessness or mere negligence that has
not arisen out of any specific duty of care. However, this simple approach was elevated to a
higher degree of negligence in Carlisle and Cumberland Banking Company v Bragg59
,
where Williams LJ while differentiating the consequences of bills of exchange and other
forms of deed, found that; “ I do not know whether the jury understood that there could be
no material negligence unless there was a duty on the defendant towards the plaintiff”. The
dictum of Williams LJ conditioned that the negligence must be derives from a duty of care
to the third person who ultimately relies on the document.
Buckley LJ in Bragg further extended the issue of negligence toward another dimension,
where he found that the negligence has nothing to do with the question of whether the deed
is in fact the deed of the defendant. Negligence has only to do with the question of estoppel.
Buckley LJ‘s observation creates a misperception that the issue of negligence derives out of
a duty of care, creates an estoppel, which is required to be determined separately and
irrespective of the outcome of plea of non est factum.
Lord Wilberforce in Saunders was critical on the principles laid down in Bragg, where he
refused to accept it. His lordship found that the principles enunciated in Bragg could
confuses the degree of careless conduct which could disentitle a man from denying the
effect of his signature. Such legal negligence derives out of a duty of care comprises with
different form of standard and scope than of mere carelessness. Having dismissed the
principles expounded in Bragg, Lord Wilberforce held that; “ in my opinion, the correct
rule, and that which in fact prevailed until Bragg‟s case is that, leaving aside negotiable
instruments to which special rules may apply, a person who signs a document, and parts
with it so that it may come into other hands, has a responsibility, that of the normal man of
prudence, to take care what he signs, which, if neglected, prevent him from denying his
liability under the document according to its tenor. I would add that the onus of proof in this
matter rests on him, ie to prove that he acted carefully and not on the third party to prove
the contrary.
Lord Pearson in his speech, while refusing to the accept the principles outlined in Bragg,
discussed the issue of estoppel by negligence. His lordship affirmatively held that the phrase
estoppel by negligence gives a misleading perception and not applicable in the plea of non
est factum. Lord Pearson pointed out that in the normal circumstance; the estoppel arises
from a representation and not by words or conduct, thus, the phrase estoppel by negligence
is inaccurate. His Lordship further elaborated that an estoppel must be pleaded and proved
by the party relying on it. In relation to the plea of non est factum, this could put the burden
of prove on the wrong party.
59 (1911) 1 KB 489,
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In conclusion, it appears that in Saunders, having discussed the previous position of law
which was more confusing than clarity, has rightly defined the plea of non est factum with
its essential components in an inclusive manner. The two main components that is required
to be established in order to seek the assistance of plea of non est factum are that the
document signed is fundamentally difference from what the signer actually thought of it,
either its class or the contents and that he had signed such document not due to his own
negligence.
―Justice implies knowledge of the right and proper place for a thing or a being to be; of right
as against wrong; of the mean and limit; of spiritual gain as against loss; of truth as against
falsehood.‖
― Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, Islam The Concept of Religion and the Foundation of
Ethics And Morality
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Sovereignty and Belief
Thoughts on H.L.A. Hart, the Rule of Recognition, and the Crisis in Iraq
Dr. Charles J. Reid, Jr.
Professor of Law
University of St. Thomas, Minnesota
I. The Problem Stated
The on-going crisis in Iraq is many things. But at its heart, it is a struggle to define the
Iraqi nation. Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds, Islamic extremists and committed secularists are all
contesting over basic questions of sovereignty - of what will it consist, who can legitimately
exercise it, and how shall it be exercised. But for sovereignty to work, for its commands
finally to be efficacious, the people subject to the ruling authority, or at least a sufficiently
large number of them, must believe in the sovereign. They must, in other words, look upon
the sovereign and judge its work to be good. To appreciate this connection between
sovereignty and belief, we might consider the work of the great English legal philosopher,
H.L.A. Hart (1907-1992). Hart studied the nature of sovereignty and understood it to be the
cornerstone of his concept of law.
There are two types of rules that comprised the law of modern states, he asserted;
Primary rules, which establish duties and affirm obligations1 and secondary rules, which
prescribe procedures and channel the ways in which we comply with the law.2 An example
in American law might be the requirement to obtain a search warrant under the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution. The Fourth Amendment creates the primary rule, namely,
the obligation for police officers to obtain a warrant prior to conducting a search; while the
rules that create and govern the procedures by which the warrant is obtained (the
requirement of probable cause, the presentation of evidence to the magistrate, the taking of
affidavits or other forms of proof) constitute secondary rules.3
1 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 3d. ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 91-94. 2 Id., pp. 79-99. 3 For a thoughtful discussion of the Fourth Amendment and theories of legal positivism, including Hart‘s, see
Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, UCLA Law Review (1993),
pp. 199, 283-286.
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Hart well understood the complexity of modern constitutional states and
knew that they all had in common a foundation which he termed the Rule of Recognition.4
The Rule of Recognition, which might best be called the primordial secondary rule,
empowers the entire system and all who operate within it.5 Again adverting to American
law, the Rule of Recognition, ultimately, is the United States Constitution.6 It is, after all,
from the Constitution that states derive their power vis a vis the federal government, it is to
the Constitution that the powers and duties of all governmental officials are traced back.
And it is from the Constitution that citizens derive their rights.7
How does the Rule of Recognition come into being? What is the social
glue that sustains it, that keeps the legal order from flying apart? Here, Hart becomes
vague.8 He explains that the Rule of Recognition can never be derived from other rules.
Otherwise, those other rules would become the Rule of Recognition.9
Finally, he says, the Rule must rest upon a strong notion of acceptance: as
he puts it, the Rule of Recognition ―must be generally obeyed . . . [and] its rules of change
and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public standards of official
behavior by its officials.10
And whence are obedience and acceptance derived? Obedience, he argues,
finally rests on social rules. Some social rules, he acknowledges, constitute mere etiquette,
or social expectations. But there are some social rules the violation of which arouse
sufficient concern that transgressors might be justly and publicly criticized, or in serious
cases, sanctioned by public authority.11
We might shun someone with bad table manners, we
might not invite the boorish guest to return to our home, but the true transgressor will face
4 Hart, supra, pp. 100-110. 5 Stephen Perry, Hart on Social Rules and the Foundations of Law: Liberating the Internal Point of View, Fordham
Law Review 75 (2006), pp. 1171, 1183-1184. 6 Here I take issue with Scott J. Shapiro, who asserts that there is little about the United States Constitution which
resembles a Rule of Recognition since there is nothing in the text that expressly declares itself as such. See Scott J.
Shapiro, Legality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 84-85. This misses Hart‘s point about
acceptance. The Rule of Recognition depends upon an unspoken consensus that a particular Rule or collection of
Rules should serve as the primordial foundation of all powers. There is much less about the British Constitution that
declares thou art hereby empowered, yet Hart would not deny the British Constitution Rule of Recognition status. 7 On the role of constitutions in the modern state generally, see Kaarlo Tuori, Ratio and Voluntas: The Tension
Between Reason and Will in Law (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2013), p. 207 ( The constitution contains the central
meta-norms of positive law. And again: The constitution [therefore] defines the rule of recognition of the legal
order ). Id. 8 Hart himself persistently abstains from giving any serious example of the complete rule of recognition in a legal
system. Reidar Edvinsson, The Quest For the Description of Law (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 2009), p. 16. 9 As Hart states it, the Rule of Recognition is the rule which, in the last resort, is used to identify the law. Hart,
supra, p. 111. 10 Hart, supra, p. 116. Cf., Uta Bindreiter, Why Grundnorm? A Treatise on the Implications of Kelsen‘s Doctrine
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), p. 70 (further developing Hart‘s concept of acceptance and contrasting it with Hans Kelsen‘s Grundnorm). 11 Hart, supra, pp. 55-56.
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more serious consequences (civil litigation, fines, even criminal sentencing in the most
extreme cases).12
It is acceptance, furthermore, that distinguishes the law which actors in a
particular legal system feel obliged to obey and apply from other, ―external‖ legal orders to
which they have no allegiance.13
To make the point dramatically, it is acceptance of the
binding character of its precepts and principles that distinguishes the law American lawyers
and judges use and apply from a purely antiquarian collection of laws, like the Code of
Hammurabi, or that of the Ripuarian Franks.
The authorities empowered with executing the law or with enforcing
compliance with its demands, must at some level internalize the Rule of Recognition; they
must acknowledge that it binds and confines and restrains their action within prescribed
limits.14
The Rule of Recognition becomes the Rule of Recognition, therefore, because
individuals who function within it feel they are bound to apply it and comply with it,
whether out of an internalized sense of rightness, or out of a pragmatic fear of punishment.
And where the Rule of Recognition fails to achieve acceptance, the system fails.15
Hart, however, did not push his analysis beyond the question of
acceptance and social rules. He acknowledged that morality has historically played a large
role in creating and sustaining legal orders, but he found no necessary connection between
any particular belief system and the rule of law.16
My intention in this paper is to attend to this seeming gap in Hart‘s
thought, not in order to refute Hart but to suggest a way of deepening this analysis. I contend
that the Rule of Recognition, at least a Rule of Recognition capable of sustaining stable,
enduring governments, qualifies as the Rule of Recognition because a sufficiently large
enough segment of society believes in it, trusts in it, sees it as coherent and consistent with
society‘s higher purposes and self-understanding.17
I propose to use the on-going crisis in
12Id. pp. 57-58. Cf., Kenneth Einar Himma, A Comprehensive Hartian Theory of Legal Obligations: Social
Pressure, Coercive Enforcement, and the Legal Obligations of Citizens, in Wil Waluchow and Stefan Sciaraffa,
eds., Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of Law (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 152, 169
(explaining that acceptance includes a convergence of consent and other factors, such as belief ). Id. 13 For a useful summary of this idea see James Paul Maniscalco, The New Positivism: An Analysis of the Role of
Morality in Jurisprudence, Southern California Law Review 68 (1995), 989, 1000-1010. 14 Hart, pp. 102-103. 15 Hart, p. 103 ( [W]e must distinguish a general disregard of the rules of the system. This may be so complete in
character and so protracted that we should say, in the case of a new system, that it had never established itself as the
legal system of a given group, or, in the case of a once-established system, that it had ceased to be the legal system
of the group ). Id. To be sure, Hart concedes that despotisms might also have their rules of recognition, and that
these rules might consist in dread, terror, and fear at the bottom and cruelty at the top. But we know from history
that these sovereignties are unstable and that the worst of the great dictatorships collapsed soon enough from the
weight of their own barbarism. Cf., Lynne Henderson, Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law Indiana Law Journal
66 (1991), pp. 379, 400-402 (further exploring the rule of law under authoritarian governance). 16 Hart, pp. 200-201. 17 I am here developing criticism first suggested by Neil MacCormick, Natural Law and the Separation of Law and
Morals, in Robert P. George, ed., Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays (Oxford, UK: Oxford University
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Iraq as a means of explaining what happens when these jurisprudential principles are
ignored by relevant decision-makers.
II. Belief Systems and Acceptance
My argument, therefore, is that the Rule of Recognition, to qualify as
such, must be believed in as right. Notice that I am not saying that the system must conform
to the standards of some larger, objective theory of morality. Nor am I saying that everyone
need believe in the rightness of the system. Indeed, the system itself may prove terribly
oppressive to segments of the society.18
However, without belief in its rightness, finally, the
system loses its grip on the popular imagination, and people come to regard it with disbelief,
followed by disrespect, and disobedience
Consider the ways in which societies have reinforced their Rules of
Recognition and there will be found at their core a commitment to a shared set of beliefs and
values. I am thinking first of the Roman state religion of the Antonine period. This period in
Roman history, celebrated by Edward Gibbon as the apex of human achievement until his
own day, corresponded to most of the second century, CE.19
The Empire stretched from the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers in the East to
the lower Nile in the South, north and west to the Rhine, and on to the Scottish frontier.20
It
was a large and disparate collection of distinct people, languages,21
and local religious
beliefs.22
Press, 1992), pp. 105, 113-114, who argues that laws, like other social institutions, are fully intelligible only by
reference to their ends or values and that the Hartian positivist must concede that a conception of the good usually
informs their acceptance of the legal order‘s validity. Cf., Jules Coleman, Authority and Reason, in Robert P.
George, ed., The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal Positivism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp.
287, 287-288 (proposing that moral principles might be seen as part of a legal order‘s rule of recognition). 18 In this I concur with Hart, who asserts: These painful facts of human history [slavery, totalitarianism] are enough
to show that, though a society to be viable must offer some of its members a system of mutual forbearances, it need
not, unfortunately, offer them to all. Id., p. 201. 19 Edward Gibbon, The Works of Edward Gibbon: The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, vol. I
(New York: Fred DeFau, 1906), pp. 35-105. Cf., Aldo Schiavone, The End of the Past: Ancient Rome and the
Modern West (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 18 ( for Gibbon, the age of the Antonines
remained the culmination of the Roman Empire ); and J.G.A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, vol. III, The First
Decline and Fall (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 7-16 ( The Problem of the Antonine
Moment ). 20 Patricia Southern, The Roman Empire From Severus to Constantine (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 14 ( The
Empire reached its greatest extent in the first decades of the second century AD, in the reign of Trajan ). Id. 21 Peter Garnsey and Richard Saller, The Roman Empire: Economy, Society, and Culture, 2d ed. (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 2014), p. 225 ( Hundreds of local languages were spoken across the Empire ). Id. 22 A sense of the religious diversity that prevailed can be obtained from William Van Andringa, Religions and the
Integration of Cities in the Empire in the Second Century AD: The Creation of a Common Religious Language, in
Jörg Rüpke, ed., A Companion to Roman Religion (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2011), pp. 83, 83-84.
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There were always strong centrifugal forces working against imperial
power, and the Emperors attempted to confront these forces in various ways. They promoted
the construction of good roads, of course, and aqueducts, and other public works as means
of promoting a high level of general prosperity.23
And the Emperors gave local groups wide
latitude to practice their own religions. At the same time, however, they attempted to impose
a mild, unifying feature: People were required to make periodic sacrifice to the imperial
genius and take vows of loyalty.24
Jews were exempt.25
When Christians sought to exempt themselves, they
encountered episodic difficulties with the authorities. Why? Because where Christians
insisted upon undivided loyalty to their God, 26
the Roman authorities saw a threat to the
belief and value system that underpinned their Rule of Recognition.27
Gibbon blamed Christianity, and the political other-worldliness it
promoted, for the decline of Roman authority in the West. We know now that this thesis is
untenable. Still, shared religious practice, and the belief system it embodied and promoted,
no doubt helped to inculcate the loyalty the Roman Rule of Recognition required for success
and contributed to the long-term endurance of the Roman state.28
Now, let‘s move forward in time to the British Constitution as it emerged
from the Glorious Revolution of 1689. The British certainly viewed their state religion (the
Anglican Church) as an integral feature of their constitutional order.29
After all, the Glorious
Revolution was concerned, at its heart, with the expulsion of King James II because of the
barely disguised secret that he had become Catholic.30
23 For a highly imaginative reconstruction of this world, consult generally Elizabeth Speller, Following Hadrian: A
Second-Century Journey Through the Roman Empire (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003). 24 Peter Herz, Emperors: Caring For the Empire and Their Successors, in R pke, Companion to Roman Religion,
supra, pp. 304, 312. Cf., George Heyman, The Power of Sacrifice: Roman and Christian Discourse in Conflict
(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2007), p. 29 (Cicero and generations of Roman thinkers
thereafter believed that the success of the state and the success of religion were intimately connected ). Id. 25 Jack N. Lighthouse, Roman Diaspora Judaism, in R pke, Companion To Roman Religion, supra, pp. 345, 346. 27 I have in mind in particular the correspondence between Pliny the Younger and the Emperor Trajan on Pliny‘s
arrest and execution of groups of Christians. See Lawrence J. Johnson, Worship in the Early Church: An
Anthology of Historical Sources, vol. I (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2009) pp. 83-85 (translating these
documents). 28 None of this suggests that the Roman system was moral in our sense of the word. It practiced widespread
slavery, it engaged in a form of infanticide (the exposure of infants), and it gloried in the slaughter of the
gladiatorial games. I mean only to suggest that widely shared belief in the rightness of the political order
contributes to the stability of that system‘s law. It is significant, furthermore, that Christians, when they gained control of the levers of governance over the course of the fourth century imposed many of the details of state
religion, now substituting Christian worship and Christian practice. 29 William Gibson, The Church of England, 1688-1832: Unity and Accord (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 28,
describes the Glorious Revolution as an Anglican Revolution. Cf., Peter Hinchliffe, Church-State Relations, in
Stephen Sykes, John Booty, and Jonathan Knight, eds., The Study of Anglicanism (London: SPCK, 1998), pp. 392,
392 ( The Church of England is often said to be part of the British Constitution ). Id. 30 Robert Royal, The God That Did Not Fail: How Religion Built and Sustains the West (New York: Encounter
Books, 2010), pp. 184-185.
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Still, the Anglican Church did not lie at the heart of British
constitutionalism in the way that another feature did, and that was the British devotion to
history as a normative enterprise.31
This was, after all, the age of the Ancient Constitution,
made famous by J.G.A. Pocock.32
In the course of the seventeenth century, certain
documents were seized upon and imparted with new meaning. Magna Carta was such a text.
It was an important grant of liberties in the medieval period, 33
to be sure, but it did not
become the foundational Charter of English Liberties, at least not until much later.34
Once again, we see at the core of sovereignty the component of belief. The
Ancient Constitution was not merely accepted. It was believed. It was internalized and made
a part of the legal order. Affirming the Ancient Constitution became an act of political self-
definition - a way in which the British people marked off what it meant to be British.35
And
so it became part of that great unwritten tradition – the present British Constitution.36
If we move across the Atlantic, to the United States, we find that
acceptance of the American Rule of Recognition is not grounded in history, nor even in a
state religion, but in a set of propositions.37
The Declaration of Independence was the first
articulation of these founding principles.38
All men were created equal, the Declaration
31 The foundations of this manner of thinking about history and normativity are traced in Harold J. Berman, The
Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale, Yale Law Journal 103 (1994), pp. 1651-1738. 34 Colin F. Wilder, The Importance of Beginning Over and Over: The Idea of Primitive Germanic Law, in Maarten
Delbeke and Minou Schraven, eds., Foundation, Dedication, and Consecration in Early Modern Europe (Leiden:
E.J. Brill, 2012), pp. 363, 371-372; and Andy Wood, The Memory of the People: Custom and Popular Senses of the
Past in Early Modern England (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 90. 35 For recent examples of scholarship making this point, consult, Janelle Greenberg, ‘St. Edward‘s Ghost:‘ The
Cult of St. Edward and His Laws in English History, in Stefan Jurasinski, Lisi Oliver, and Andrew Rabin, eds.,
English Law Before Magna Carta (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2010) ( the ancient constitution was the result of . . . deep-
seated beliefs about the past ); Alexander Somek, The Cosmopolitan Constitution (Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press, 2014), pp. 47-51; and David Craig, Burke and the Constitution, in David Dwan and Christopher J. Insole,
eds., The Cambridge Companion to Edmund Burke (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 104,
106 (discussing Burke‘s commitment to the ancient constitution). 36 See, for example, Peter James Stanlis, Edmund Burke and the Natural Law (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1958), p. 98 (harmony of British constitution, reverence for the past, and a dynamic approach to the future). 37 I must emphasize that I am speaking here specifically about the acceptance of the Rule of Recognition. My larger
claim, after all, is that acceptance depends upon an underlying set of values, principles, and beliefs, and that in the
American constitutional order these values and principles are derived from founding documents like the Declaration
of Independence. It is necessary to be clear on this point, since there is considerable debate over whether a Rule of
Recognition might ever consist of principles which are in their nature elastic. See, Robert J. Summers, Essays in
Legal Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 58-59 (rejecting the possibility of the Rule
of Recognition ever consisting of flexible principles); Anthony J. Sebok, Legal Positivism in American
Jurisprudence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 273-277 (reviewing the state of the debate and
offering a qualified endorsement of Summers‘ position); and Philip Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation of a
Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute, in Marshall Cohen, ed., Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence
(Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1984), pp. 3-27 (investigating the relationship of a strict rule of recognition
and flexible understandings of individual rights and liberties). 38 Scott Douglas Gerber, To Secure These Rights: The Declaration of Independence and Constitutional
Interpretation (New York: New York University Press, 1995), p. 15 (connecting the Declaration of Independence
with the statement of principles that informed the drafting of the United States Constitution).
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announced to the world, 39
and were endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable
rights, including life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
The Constitution and the Bill of Rights became their fuller, more robust
articulation.40
Freedom of speech, freedom of religion, a commitment to limited and
representative government - these are among the foundational principles given incomplete
voice in the Declaration and found more fully expressed in the American Constitution.41
A nation established and governed by a set of propositions was a
fortuitously appropriate Rule of Recognition for a land that came to be peopled by
immigrants. By immigrating to the United States, one shed one‘s old loyalties, of course, but
the nation that received these new arrivals was not closed to full participation by ancestral
ties of blood and soil.42
No, the United States was a propositional nation, and newcomers
pledged to uphold and defend these ideals on the same footing and with the same rights and
responsibilities as those whose families had lived in America for generations.43
The American Rule of Recognition has proven to be remarkably elastic
and enduring, doubtlessly because of its propositional character. The propositions embedded
in the Declaration of Independence offered a basis upon which to criticize repugnant social
institutions. Frederick Douglass set the tone with his famous oration of 1852, ―What Is the
Slave to the Fourth of July?‖44
Elizabeth Cady Stanton and the Seneca Falls Declaration of
1848 set a similar tone where women‘s rights were concerned.45
And, more recently, these
propositions have formed the backdrop against which all forms of discrimination on the
basis of immutable characteristics - racial, ethnic, even gender and sexual - have come to be
criticized and de-legitimized.46
40 Albert Rosenthal and Louis Henkin make the important point that the Constitution, at least as ratified in 1789,
omitted the principle of equality so forcefully stated by the Declaration of Independence thirteen years earlier. See
Albert Rosenthal and Louis Henkin, Constitutionalism and Rights: The Influence of the United States Constitution
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 3. It required the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified eighty years
later, to give full expression to the principle of equality. On this last point, the scholarship is prolific. See, for
instance, Rebecca E. Zietlow, Enforcing Equality: Congress, the Constitution, and the Protection of Individual
Rights (New York: New York University Press, 2006), p. 165. 41 See, for instance, Timothy E. Sandefur, The Conscience of the Constitution: The Declaration of Independence
and the Right to Liberty (Washington, DC: The Cato Institute, 2014), p. 2 (arguing that the Declaration of
Independence endorsed as the primary constitutional interpretive principle the ideal of liberty ). 43 Alan Wolfe, Return to Greatness: How America Lost Its Sense of Purpose and What It Needs to Do to Recover It
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 154 ( The other way of understanding what is at stake when
immigrants arrive is creedal; from this point of view, America is not defined by any particular culture but instead by
the beliefs to which all Americans are expected to subscribe ). Id. 44 For an analysis of this watershed speech, see James A. Colaico, Frederick Douglass and the Fourth of July (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), especially pp. 7-107. 45 Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Journey to Seneca Falls: Mary Wollstonecraft, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and the Legal
Emancipation of Women, University of St. Thomas Law Journal 10 (2013), pp. 1123, 1171-1184. 46 See, for instance, Jonathan Rauch, Gay Marriage: Why It Is Good For Gays, Good For Straights, and Good For
America (New York: Henry Holt, 2004), p. 95 (citing the equality of language of the Declaration of Independence
in favor of same-sex marriage).
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I have schematically suggested ways in which the Rules of Recognition of
three legal orders, separated greatly by time and geography depended, each in its own way,
on belief. The Romans intuited that a widely dispersed imperial power needed some
ceremony that might concentrate the minds of distant provincials on the centrality of Rome.
The British looked inward, to the history of the British people, and found there a ground for
believing in the rightness of the British Constitution. And the United States, a new nation,
founded on ideas and not on ties of conquest or kinship, became the most obvious of these
three societies in connecting belief with acceptance of the Rule of Recognition. The United
States, after all, is above all else, a propositional or ―creedal‖ nation, holding most dear
fidelity to grand constitutional principles.
III. Iraq
So far I have said a good deal about the Rule of Recognition; what it
means to accept it and the role belief plays in that process; and how belief interacted with
sovereignty to create stable Rules of Recognition in three vastly different societies - the
Roman Empire; Britain since the seventeenth century; and the United States. I have,
however, said nothing so far about Iraq. So let us see now, what I have said squares up
against the experience of that nation.
We should begin with the Ottoman period, in the latter eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. The territory that would later become Iraq was divided into three
loosely-governed provinces - Mosul in the North, Baghdad in the center, and Basra in the
South.47
The writ of Ottoman authority ran weakly there.48
These were decentralized
provinces, where much power resided in local, tribal, and nomadic groupings.49
Militarily,
the region amounted to an exposed frontier, under frequent assault from the Persian Empire
to the East.50
As in present-day Iraq, the Kurdish population tended to live in the northern
territories; the Sunnis in the center and West; and Shiites in Basra and points South.51
By the
middle eighteenth century, the British had established a trading presence in Baghdad that
would endure for the better part of two centuries.52
47 Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 8-15. 48 See, for instance, Dina Rizk Khoury, State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul, 1540-1834
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 9 (describing a system of weak administrative controls
even though Mosul grew culturally more Ottomanized over the course of the eighteenth century). 49 Thabit A.J. Abdullah, Merchants, Mamluks, and Murder: The Political Economy of Trade in Eighteenth-Century
Basra (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001), p. 99 ( If there is one word that best describes the
political situation in Iraq in the eighteenth century, it certainly must be ‗instability.‘ ) Id. 50 Bruce Masters, The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, 1516-1918: A Social and Cultural History (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 32. 51 Ebubekir Ceylan, Ottoman Origins of Modern Iraq: Political Reform, Modernization, and Development in the
Nineteenth-Century Middle East (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 35 (on the geographic distribution of
Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds). 52 Lyndon Moore, Iraq: Islamic Period, in Joel Mokyr, ed., The Oxford Encyclopedia of Economic History
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 151, 152.
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The Ottomans over the course of the nineteenth century53
attempted to exert more
centralized control over these frontier lands.54
Ottoman plans, however, were frustrated with
the outbreak of World War I.55
The so-called War to End All Wars brought mostly horror
and tragedy to the land that became Iraq. German, Russian, Turkish, and British armies vied
for control and all of them suffered grievous losses.56
Still, by 1916, the Triple Entente resolved that victory, if it should come,
must see a dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire.57
In May of that year, the British and the
French, with the quiet assent of their Russian allies, concluded the Sykes-Picot Agreement,
by which the two nations parceled out for themselves zones of control in what they hoped
would be a remade Arab Middle East.58
The French claimed Lebanon and Syria, while the
British extended their interests in the Persian Gulf and asserted control over Iraq and
modern-day Jordan.59
The twentieth-century history of Iraq can be briefly summarized as
featuring the continued efforts, now proven to be fruitless, to hold together a territory that
lacked the cohesive belief-structure required for nationhood. First the British, then a feckless
monarchy, and finally the Baathist regime led by the bloody-minded Saddam Hussein each
in its turn attempted and failed to hold the country together.60
53 The nineteenth-century efforts took the form of enforced nomadic settlements, efforts which encountered
sometimes fierce local resistance. See Yitzhak Nakash, The Shiis of Iraq (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1994), pp. 32-34. 54 The career diplomat and Grand Vizier Mustafa Reşid Pasha were primarily responsible for what became known
as the Tanzimat Reforms, which borrowed heavily and deliberately from Western models. Efforts were made to
enhance tax collection, impose military conscription, dispense impartial justice, and provide governmental assistance to the neediest. See Linda T. Darling, A History of Social Justice and Political Power in the Middle East:
The Circles of Justice From Mesopotamia to Globalization (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 162-163. By the
close of the nineteenth century, for a variety of reasons, the Tanzimat reforms lost their momentum. See Gökhan
Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890-1908 (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 10-13. 55 The Ottomans initially miscalculated the military situation and in fact mobilized their Iraqi forces for combat on
the Russian front. See Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, Iraq in Turmoil: Historical Perspectives of Dr. Ali Al-Wardi
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012), p. 61; and Tareq Y. Ismael, The Rise and Fall of the Communist
Party of Iraq (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 5. 56 On British-Ottoman fighting in Iraq, see Lawrence Sondhaus, World War I: The Global Revolution (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 368-373; on the Ottoman defeat of the Russian incursion into
Mesopotamia, see Tim J. Watts, Kh naq n (3 June, 1916), in Spencer C. Tucker, ed., The Encyclopedia of World
War I (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2005), p. 637. 57 Michael A. Reynolds, Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires, 1914-
1918 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 140-141. 58 A.S. Kanya-Forstner, The War, Imperialism, and Decolonization, in J.M. Winter, Geoffrey Parker, and Mary R.
Habeck, eds., The Great War and the Twentieth Century (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 231,
237-238. 59 J.E. Peterson, Britain and the Gulf, in Lawrence G. Potter, ed., The Persian Gulf in History (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2009), pp. 277, 288. 60 As one commentator put it, the problem faced by successive Iraqi regimes has been the multiplicity of Iraqi
nationalisms and the clashing visions of Iraq. Fanar Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq: Antagonistic Visions of Unity
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 34.
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But the twentieth-century history of Iraq made plain that sectarian and
ethnic interests were always first in the hearts of ordinary Iraqis.61
Shiites continuously
strengthened their self-identity, a process that was only fueled by their oppression at the
hands of Sunni ruling elites.62
The Kurds, who have been the victims of persecution dating
back hundreds of years,63
were also targeted for ethnic cleansing by Saddam Hussein and
were made more cohesive as a result.64
The Sunnis, who for much of the twentieth century
governed Iraq, experienced reprisals in the decade since the American invasion and now
also have a well-developed sense of grievance that is partially expressed in the on-going
violent insurrection against the Shi‘ite dominated central government in Baghdad).65
(In this
toxic mix, smaller minorities, such as Christians, barely have room to breathe).66
This returns us to the question of sovereignty. Sovereignty requires
acceptance of a commonly-agreed upon Rule of Recognition. And that Rule of Recognition,
in order to be effective, must be seen to be good. It must reflect the values and interests of
the nation and be seen to do so.
And this is the great tragedy of the American invasion of Iraq. President
George W. Bush and his closest advisors, at the time they launched the War in 2003,
imagined that they could easily transpose the American style democracy they were familiar
with to Iraq.67
They failed to appreciate that acceptance of sovereign authority arises not
61 Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division? (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 6 (observing concerning the twentieth century that Iraq never succeeded in becoming
. . . a nation thanks to often violent ethnic, tribal, economic, and sectarian divisions ). Id. 62 See, for example, Yusri Hazran, The Rise of Politicized Shi‘ite Religiosity and the Territorial State in Iraq and
Lebanon, Middle East Journal 64 (2010), pp. 521, 522-523; and Vali Nasr, When the Shiites Rise, Foreign Affairs
85, no. 4 (July/August 2006), pp. 58-71 and 73-74 (making the case that the troubles in Iraq have given rise to a
pan-Shiite consciousness that crosses borders); and Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will
Shape the Future (New York: Norton, 2006) pp. 185-210 (chapter entitled Iraq: The First Shia State ). 63 Mahir A. Aziz, The Kurds of Iraq: Nationalism and Identity in Iraqi Kurdistan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2011), p. 10 ( The Kurds claim to be the largest nation without a state ). 64 Ofra Bengio, Nation-Building in MultiEthnic Societies: The Case of Iraq, in Ofra Bengio and Gabriel Ben-Dor,
eds., Minorities and the State in the Arab World (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1999), pp. 149,
151-158. 65 Nir Rosen, Aftermath: Following the Bloodshed of America‘s Wars in the Muslim World (New York: Nation
Books, 2010), p. 245. This resistance turned especially deadly in the battle for Fallujah, fought between American
forces and the Sunni resistance. See Michael Schwartz, War Without End: The Iraq War in Context (Chicago:
Haymarket Books, 2009), pp. 233-236. 66 The perilous condition of Christians is captured in some recent news stories out of Iraq. See, for instance, Alissa
J. Rubin, ISIS Expels Last Iraqi Christians From Mosul, New York Times, July 19, 2014; Ronald S. Lauder, Who
Will Stand Up For the Christians? New York Times, August 20, 2014; Ross Douthat, The Middle East‘s Friendless
Christians, New York Times, September 14, 2014; Rana F. Sweis, Christians of Mosul Find Haven in Jordan, New
York Times, October 27, 2014. 67 See, for example, President George W. Bush‘s speech to the United Nations in 2004. The Reach of War: The
President; Bush, at the UN, Calls For Action to Widen Liberty, New York Times, September 22, 2004. As late as
the fall of 2009, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz was still claiming that he liberal democracy will
eventually triumph in Iraq. See Paul Wolfowitz, Realism, Foreign Policy, September/October, 2009, pp. 66, 72.
Paul Wolfowitz, in particular, has been described as a romantic Wilsonian who believed that democracy was a
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from the adoption of democratic processes or abstract assent to niceties of manner and form,
but from an internalized sense of rightness.68
They did not appreciate, in other words, that a
nation‘s history and culture are decisive to the kind of government the people will
eventually affirm.69
Their failure amounts to a test-case for the practical implications of
jurisprudence. Had they thought seriously about Iraq‘s history and the various competing
sectarian forces harbored within these essentially artificial boundaries, they might not have
invaded at all, or, had they still done so, they would have very different plans for what a
post-Saddam-Hussein government should look like.
What, then, to do? The situation in Iraq has deteriorated gravely over the
course of the summer and fall of 2014. The radical Islamist movement known as the Islamic
State must be defeated. This is a nihilistic group, which cannot be part of any settlement.70
Once that is accomplished, however, Iraq is a crisis that cries out for a
comprehensive international resolution.71
Such a resolution must not attempt to cement back
Iraq‘s fractured nationhood. Centrifugal forces are too powerful. Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds
must be permitted to go their separate ways. After all, as we have been discussing, the
essential prerequisite for sovereignty, for acceptance of the Rule of Recognition, is missing.
And that is a shared system of values and beliefs.
Ideally, any international involvement should engage the regional powers
most affected. Most especially, it must include Iran, which has strong ties with Shiite Iraq.
For their part, the Iranians must demonstrate responsibility and self-control. Saudi Arabia
must also be included. The Saudis have given support and succor over the years to Sunni
resistance and should now be called on to use their good offices to restrain their allies.72
universal idea. Mohammed Shareef, The United States, Iraq, and the Kurds: Shock, Awe, and Aftermath (New
York: Routledge, 2014), p. 31. 68 Michael Harland, Democratic Vanguardism: Modernity, Intervention, and the Making of the Bush Doctrine
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013), pp. 1-7 (setting out the thesis that the ideological underpinnings of the
Bush doctrine - commitment to an immediate, democratic universalism - lay at the roots of its failure in action). 69 One could do worse than consult an older line of conservative thought, typified by Sir Henry Bolingbroke (1678-
1751), who maintained that the form of government is immaterial provided that it is agreeable to the spirit of the
nation governed, and is well administered. Preserved Smith, A History of Modern Culture, vol. II (The
Enlightenment) (Cambridge University Press, 2014) (reprint of 1934 edition), p. 199. In my estimation, well
administered must include accommodations for fundamental human rights. 70 On the threat posed by the Islamic State, there is a prolific literature. One might consult, among many others, A
Very Capable Terrorist Organization, The Gulf, August 1, 2014; Ravi Joshi, Iraq and Regional Implications -
Analysis, Eurasian Review, July 5, 2014; and Katrin Kurtz and Christoph Reuter, The Disturbing Rise of the
Islamic State, Der Spiegel Online, August 11, 2014. Cf., Chris Mansur, Eliminating the Scourage of Islamic State
in Iraq, Eurasian Review September 6, 2014 (making the case for urgent and comprehensive military intervention). 71 Without a serious, regional, multi-lateral involvement, the great danger, of course, is that the Islamic State might
prevail. See Gerard M. Gallucci, What If the Islamic State Wins? Analysis, Eurasian Review (November 14,
2014). 72 At present, of course, Iran and Saudi Arabia are competitors for influence in Iraq. See, for instance, Jelle
Puellings, Fearing a ‗Shiite Octopus:‘ Sunni Shi`a Relations and the Implications for Belgium and Europe
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Finally, the Turks must be reassured that any new ―Kurdistan‖ will not become hostile to
their interests.73
What is needed, in other words, is statesmanship. And statesmanship begins
with an appreciation that legal theory matters. And if we do that, we will conclude that
sovereignty and the rule of law itself rest ultimately on the belief systems of the people.
IV. Conclusion
What have we learned from this study? I believe that several lessons are possible,
implicating not only legal theory, but its tangible application in one of the world‘s most
troubled regions.
(1) The Rule of Recognition must embody an underlying belief in its
rightness. It must be consistent with the values of those who apply it and those who must
lead their lives under its constraints.
(2) That value system must be shared by a strategically significant portion
of the population. Where there is a lack of consistency between popular value systems and
the Rule of Recognition, the possibility of instability is always present. In extreme cases, the
door is even opened to revolution.
(3) Jurisprudence, legal theory, thus has real world applicability.
Tragically, this is illustrated in the case of Iraq. In that nation, we have witnessed rejection
of the values of secular nationhood and the substitution of loyalties to faith or ethnicity.
(4) It is not always possible to build a multi-ethnic, secular state quickly
and automatically. The type of governance that should prevail in what is present-day Iraq
should be realistically suitable to prevailing value systems (provided, of course that the
extremists of the Islamic State are defeated).
(5) Iraq is a case suitable for resolution by international settlement.
Regional powers have too large a stake in the settlement to be excluded, but they must
behave properly in any settlement. The government or governments that arise from such a
settlement must be respectful of human rights, but should also be consistent with the values
and beliefs of the affected populations. The international community, ideally through the
United Nations, should serve as guarantor of the settlement that is finally achieved.
(Brussels: Egmont Papers, 2010), pp. 5-7 (stating the depth of the problem); and Simon Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Soft Power Rivalry in the Middle East (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 69 (describing the types of
competition the two states engage in with respect to Iraq). 73 See generally Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds Ascending: The Evolving Solution to the Kurdish Problem in Iraq
and Turkey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) (who remains optimistic that common ground might be found
between Turks and Kurds).
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Justiciability of Social, Economic and
Cultural Rights in Sri Lanka
Prospects and Challenges1
Wasantha Seneviratne2
Abstract
In the aftermath of the war every Sri Lankan aspires to see a rapid
development in the country and Sri Lanka to become a hub in Asia. This
aspiration is based on achieving a high level of social and economic
development in the country. Unlike civil and political rights, branded as
„negative rights‟ or „costless rights‟, realization of the „resource related‟
social economic and cultural rights in the near future is a tremendous
challenge. Sri Lanka being a state party to the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 it is bound to incorporate her
international obligations to the domestic law of the country. Although the
Constitution of the country includes important provisions on the protection
and promotion of the fundamental rights of people of Sri Lanka the
justiciability of social and economic rights remains a daunting challenge due
to a number of reasons. The research problem of this Article is to identify
these reasons and to explore ways of meeting the problem of justiciability of
social, economic and cultural rights in Sri Lanka. This paper is based on a
comparative study. Examples are drawn from well-developed legal systems.
The established jurisprudence of other countries, regional and international
bodies on this issue are analyzed. The justiciability of social, economic and
cultural rights is not a specific question to Sri Lanka but a common challenge.
Nevertheless, in recent years, an increasing number of countries have included
social and economic rights in their constitutions. Domestic, regional and
international judicial bodies have adjudicated social and economic rights
claims positively using a value coherent approach. Sri Lanka should keep a
breast with these emerging trends and take appropriate steps to introduce
necessary changes to our domestic law. Our courts should be allowed to
1This paper was presented at the International Research Conference held at the Kotalawela Defence University of
Sri Lanka in August 2013. The Chairperson of the panel was Hon. Justice Priyantha Perera, Former Judge of
Supreme Court of Sri Lanka. 2 Wasantha Seneviratne, M.Phil in Law, LL.B (Hons.) Attorney-at-Law, Senior Lecturer, Department of Public
and International Law, Faculty of Law, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka
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adjudicate and uphold social, economic and cultural rights of people in this
country by carrying out a balancing exercise and applying the standard of
reasonableness through needed legal and institutional reforms. This paper
discusses these reforms to be introduced to our country in order to realize the
aspirations of Sri Lankans in terms of having fulfilled their economic and
social rights.
Key Words – justiciability, positive rights, negative rights, social, economic and cultural
rights
Introduction
Sri Lanka is now in a transitional phase moving from war to positive peace in the aftermath
of the cessation of thirty years protracted civil war between the armed forces of the State and
the militants of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE). At present, one of the serious
challenges before the country is to achieve sustainable development through all possible
legal means to make our motherland a powerful centre in the region and the world. Assuring
a dignified life for all Sri Lankans through satisfactory realization of their basic human
rights has become an essential need of the hour. In the aftermath of the war every Sri
Lankan aspires to see a rapid development in the country and Sri Lanka to become a hub in
Asia. This aspiration is based on achieving a high level of social and economic development
in the country. For this, economic, social and cultural rights (ESCRs) of people should be
protected and promoted adequately. However, as it is discussed in this Article, realization of
the ‗resource related‘ social and economic rights in the near future is a tremendous challenge
due to various reasons. The objectives of this Article are to identify these reasons and to
explore ways of meeting the problem of justiciability of social, economic and cultural rights
in Sri Lanka.
This Article is based on a comparative study. Examples are drawn from well-developed
legal systems, i.e., Inter-American human rights protecting system, South Africa, India,
Canada and Argentina. Accordingly, the established jurisprudence of selected jurisdictions
on this issue is analyzed. The justiciability of social and economic rights is not a specific
question to Sri Lanka but a common challenge. Nevertheless, in recent years, an increasing
number of countries have included social and economic rights in their constitutions and the
courts have been proactive in deciding to uphold ESCRs of people when such rights are
infringed or under imminent threat. The below sections of the Article will examine some of
these developments.
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Indivisibility, Interdependency and Inter-relatedness of
Human Rights
Human rights are inherent entitlements of people. These are birth rights of every human
being and very broad in nature. The concept of human rights has now transformed to be a
sound legal regime due to several initiatives taken by the United Nations after the World
War Two. The Charter of the United Nations has recognized the need to protect and promote
human rights worldwide and includes a number of provisions requiring the membership of
this world organization to follow.3 The UN
4 Human Rights Commission was created in 1946
for pursuing the UN Charter and worked on drafting the International Bill of Rights. The
initial international document drafted by the Commission was named as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The UN General Assembly adopted it on 10th
December 1948.5 It was proclaimed by the UN General Assembly as ―a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations.‖
This was momentous because the UDHR being the first international instrument of human
rights and paved the way to recognize the universality of human rights.6 It basically includes
two categories of human rights: civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural
rights. The thirty articles of the UDHR can be divided into 2 parts. While first part (Articles
1-21) guarantees civil and political rights the second Part (Article 22-30) recognizes various
economic, social and cultural rights. Being a declaration the UDHR is described as a soft
law instrument. 7 Therefore, in the legal sense, it is a non-binding document on States.
8
However, it is widely accepted that the UDHR has turned to be customary international law
over the period of time through extensive state practice and strong psychological acceptance
of the rights included therein as law (opinion juris sive necesstats)9 by States. As a result, it
has become much harder than even a hard law instrument. Since its adoption, it has
developed to be a major factor in international law. Many of the rights in the Declaration
formed the groundwork for subsequent international human rights conventions, i.e., the
International Covenant on Civil, and Political Rights and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. It was the pioneering document, which led the
adoption of many regional human rights documents such as the European Convention of
Human Rights, the European Social Charter, the African Charter of Human and Peoples
3 See, Preamble and Articles 1(3),13(2), 55(3), 56, 62(2) and 68(1) of the UN Charter.
4 UN denotes United Nations.
5 See the Resolution passed by the UN General Assembly - GA Res/ 2174 of 10th December 1948.
6 The UDHR, although not a legally binding treaty, is regarded as the most fundamental expression of international
human rights standards. 7 International Conventions represent hard law whereas Declarations, Guiding principles and Guidelines include
soft law. This classification is made due to the legally binding nature of the said instrument by States through
individual action of signature and ratification. 8 Being a declaration adopted at the UN General Assembly individual states have not become state parties by
signing and ratifying the UDHR. 9 Customary international law is recognized as a primary source of international law and has included in the Article
38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. See Article 38 (1)(b) ‗International Custom, as evidence
of a general practice accepted as law‘.
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Rights, and the ‗Helsinki Accords‘. Moreover, the UDHR has been referred to by national
courts and by the International Court of Justice in numerous occasions. In Sri Lanka, the
Supreme Court of Sri Lanka has referred to the corresponding articles of the UDHR in
exercising its fundamental rights jurisdiction. For an example, in Bulankulama and Others v.
the Attorney General case10
(Eppawela case) the judges interpreted the relevant Articles of
the fundamental rights chapter of the Constitution of the country in light of the relevant
provisions of the UDHR.
After eighteen years of its adoption, it was decided that the rights in the Declaration were to
be separated into two separate covenants. Accordingly, two separate covenants in order to
give a more legal character and binding nature to the human rights stipulate din the UDHR.
The result has been the adoption of the International Covenant on Civil, and Political Rights
of 1966 (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
of 1966 (ICESCR).11
The ICCPR includes civil and political rights, which are concerned to
protect the individual from the arbitrary exercise of power by the State. Catalogues of civil
and political rights generally include: rights pertaining to the life, integrity, liberty and
security of the person, rights with respect to the administration of justice, right to privacy,
freedom of religion and belief, freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of movement
and residence, freedom of assembly and association and the right to political participation.
These rights were called as first generation rights. The realization of these rights generally
does not invoke a high financial cost for a State and actions to be taken positively.
Therefore, civil and political rights are also described as negative rights. That means the
State is basically required to refrain from action interfering with the freedom of individuals
to pursue happiness and prosperity. However, now it has been recognized that the protection
of civil and political rights requires not only State abstention from interference but also the
commitment of significant resources and the ongoing maintenance of developed
infrastructure.
The ICESCR includes economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR). This category of rights
is concerned with the economic, social and cultural well-being of persons. Some examples
for these types of rights are the right to work and to just and favourable conditions of work,
trade union freedoms, the right to an adequate standard of living, including food, clothing
and housing, the right to health, rest and leisure, the right to education and the right to take
part in the cultural life of the community. These rights were called as second generation
rights. These rights are also known as ‗positive rights‘ or ‗distributive rights‘ since States
require taking positive actions and the allocation of considerable amount of resources in
order to realize them. An active response is required by the State to devise and implement
strategies and programmes and to commit resources to promote the progressive realization
10
Bulankulama and Others v. Minister of Industrial Development (Eppawala case), S.C. Application No. 884/99
(F/R). 11
In the context of the Cold War, there were deep ideological differences between ―individualistic‖ Western and
socialist concepts of human rights. Marxist theory endorsed State dominance of economic and social life. Civil
and political rights were regarded as capitalistic concepts which accorded the individual too great prominence in
society. With the end of the Cold War, the debate over the hierarchy between civil and political and economic,
social and cultural rights has become less significant.
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of economic, social and cultural rights. It may become a burden on a country to maintain a
higher level of economic and social rights and probably link with the level of development
of a given country. Nevertheless, the Preamble to both Covenants emphasizes the
interdependence of the two categories recognizing that:
... in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free
human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and want can
only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everybody may enjoy his civil and
political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural rights...12
There were various reasons for this division, such as the different nature of the rights, and
the different measures required to secure their implementation. Nevertheless, any clear
distinctions can be made between the two categories of human rights are not accepted as
wise since both categories of rights are essential for a dignified life for all human beings.
Both categories entail legal obligations on the part of States. At least to some extent, the full
realization of civil and political rights without the enjoyment of economic, social and
cultural rights is impossible. Indian Supreme Court has diligently pointed out the integral
nature of both categories of rights and their interdependence in several cases.13
The Teheran
International Conference on Human Rights of 1968, the Declaration on the Right to
Development of 1986 and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 1993
highlight the fact that all human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and
interrelated. Therefore this Article emphasize the justiciability of economic and social rights
in countries with particular reference to Sri Lanka in order to ensure a full pledge dignified
human life for everyone.
An Overview of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
'Socio-economic rights' are defined as entitlements that 'give rise to the shared concern of
ensuring societies where everyone has a minimum decent standard of living consistent with
human dignity (the "bare necessities of life").'14
Numerous economic, social and cultural
rights are capable of immediate application by the judicial and other organs of the State such
as equal remuneration for work of equal value, rights to form and join trade unions and to
strike, protection of children from economic and social exploitation, the provision of
compulsory primary education. Protection of the full range of human rights requires for
people to have a full, free, safe, secure and healthy life. Right to live a dignified life can
never be attained unless all basic necessities of life such as work, food, housing, health care,
education and culture are adequately and equitably available to everyone. Economic, social
and cultural rights are often viewed as effectively ‗second-class rights‘ only to be fulfilled
12 See Preambles of the both the Covanants. 13 See for example Asian Games, Banduamukthmocha cases for judicial opinions to this effect. 14 See Frans Viljoen, 'The Justiciability of Socio-Economic and Cultural Rights: Experiences and Problems' (2006)
1 (unpublished, cited by , See also, 'Statement from Seminar on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights in the
African Charter (Adopted in Pretoria, 13-17 September 2004' (2005) 5 African Human Rights Law Journal 182,
('Pretoria Statement').
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progressively over the period of time. However, as mentioned above the indivisibility and
interdependence of civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights as
fundamental tenets of international human rights law are recognized widely domestically as
well as internationally. Although ESC rights have received less attention than civil and
political rights, far more serious consideration than ever before is currently being devoted to
them. Economic, social and cultural rights are designed to ensure the protection of people as
full persons.
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 (ICESCR)
provides the most important international legal framework for protecting economic, social
and cultural rights. The below discussion examines selected rights embodied in the ICESCR.
Article 1 stipulates that all peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of this
right they should be allowed to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development. Article 2 emphasizes the obligations of States
parties. Accordingly state parties to ICESCR should assure these rights to the maximum of
its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of these
rights by all appropriate means without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin property, birth or other
status. States should enact necessary laws ad should undertake legislative action in some
instances, particularly when existing laws are clearly incompatible with the obligations
assumed under the Covenant. It is important to examine the meaning of the following phrase
‗to [achieve] progressively the full realization of the rights‘. It is interpreted as
notwithstanding their level of national wealth, to move immediately and as quickly as
possible towards the realization of economic, social and cultural rights. This clause should
never be interpreted as allowing States to defer indefinitely efforts to ensure the enjoyment
of the rights laid down in the Covenant. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights says that all existing resources must be devoted in the most effective way possible to
the realization of these rights ‗to the maximum of its available resources‟. Limburg
Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights requires ensuring minimum subsistence rights for everyone regardless of the
level of economic development in a given country. The meaning of ‗available resources‘ is
applied both to domestic resources and to any international economic or technical assistance
or cooperation to assure to everyone the satisfaction of subsistence requirements, as well as
the provision of essential services.
Maastricht Guidelines elaborates the role and responsibility of the State pertains to envisage
remedies and other responses to violations of economic, social and cultural rights.
Furthermore, the Maastricht Guidelines emphasize that the overall responsibility for human
rights violations rests upon the State and the State accordingly is obliged to provide effective
and necessary remedies. The Guidelines also draw attention to the fact that economic, social
and cultural rights are justiciable, and that victims should be able to seek and have remedies
at the municipal, regional and international levels.15
Consequently all victims of violations
15 Guideline 22.
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are entitled to restitution, compensation, rehabilitation and satisfaction or guarantees of non-
repetition. 16
Very importantly this Convention highlights the equal rights for men and
women in Article 3. Accordingly both men and women should be guaranteed the same legal
entitlement to these rights. Article 4 of the ICESCR imposes limitations solely for the
purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society. Such limitations should
be determined by law. Article 6 stipulates the right to work and require everyone to be
guaranteed the opportunity to gain his/her living by work which he/she freely chooses or
accepts. Technical and vocational guidance and training programmes should be provided
and policies and techniques should be established to achieve steady economic, social and
cultural development and full and productive employment. It is significant to set the
necessary conditions safeguarding, fundamental political and economic freedoms to the
individual to achieve the full realization of the right to work. We should remember that the
right to work is fundamental to the enjoyment of certain subsistence and livelihood rights
such as food, clothing, housing, etc. Right to work embraces both the right to enter into
employment and the right not to be unjustly deprived of work. Article 7 embodies the right
to just and favourable conditions of work. To guarantee this right a fair and reasonable
salary should be paid to all workers, an equal salary should be given for work of equal value,
ad should ensure decent living for workers and their families, provide safe and healthy
working conditions, equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in their employment,
rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay and
wages for public holidays. Article 8 includes the right to form and join trade unions and the
right to strike according to the laws of the particular country. Article 9 is of particular
importance to a country like ours. It requires providing the right to social security and social
insurance in order to protecting people in circumstances such as old age, disability, ill health
or other situations not allowing them to earn a decent living. The Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights requested member States to maintain social security schemes in
the areas such as medical care, cash sickness benefits, maternity benefits, old-age benefits,
invalidity benefits, survivors' benefits, employment injury benefits, unemployment benefits
and family benefits. The Committee has devoted particular attention to women, older
persons and persons with disabilities. Since family is the natural and fundamental group unit
of society, Article 10 stipulates rights pertain to the protection and assistance for the family.
It requires inter elia to assure the care and education of dependent children, to take special
measures of protection and assistance on behalf of all children and young persons,
particularly children and young persons should be protected from economic and social
exploitation. This Article refers to the special protection needs of mothers before and after
childbirth for a reasonable period of time with required maternity benefits to be provided
with and also to ensure that marriages to be entered into with the free consent of the
intending spouses. Article 11 incorporates the right of everyone to an adequate standard of
living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing- and housing, and to the
continuous improvement of living conditions. To guarantee this right the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights obliges States to take the necessary measures. Article
16 Guideline 23.
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12 includes the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, the
reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the healthy development of the
child, improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene and the
prevention, treatment and control of epidemic and other diseases. Article 13 importantly
stipulates the right to education. It requires primary education to be made compulsory and
available free to all whereas secondary education including technical and vocational
secondary education is provided generally available and accessible to all. However, tertiary
education should be made equally accessible to all on the basis of capacity. Article 15
includes the right to culture and to benefit from scientific progress and to take part in
cultural life and to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications.
The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights is an international treaty establishing complaint and inquiry mechanisms for the
ICESCR. It was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 2008. It requires ten
ratifications in order to come into entry. It has 17 state parties and 45 signatories. It entered
into force on 5 May 2013.
Issue of Justiciability of Economic and Social Rights
Philip Alston points to the "vagueness of many of the rights as formulated in the Covenant
[on Economic, Social and Cultural rights] and the resulting lack in the clarity as to their
normative implications," as a key problem for the "underdeveloped justiciability" of such
rights.17
There has been a popular perception that economic, social, and cultural rights were
‗legal‘ rights, on the basis that they were not of ‗immediate application‘ but merely
aspirations of ‗progressive realization‘ (subject to resources). Whereas civil and political
rights were considered ‗law‘ for their ‗immediate applicability‘ (requiring from the state
negative action only-a ‗hands off‘ obligation), economic, social, and cultural rights were
seen as ‗needs‘ requiring positive action and interventionist policies. At best, economic,
social, and cultural rights were perceived as directives and not as giving rise to legally
binding duties. Even in the event that one could consider that economic, social, and cultural
rights entailed ‗obligations of some sort‘, it was pointed out that those were ‗obligations of
conduct‘ in contrast to civil and political rights which entailed essentially ‗obligations of
result‘. 18
Few interrelated features of socioeconomic rights contribute to the perception of non-
justiciability. Firstly, the vagueness with which international instruments define these rights.
Their vagueness functions as a negative feedback cycle, both resulting from and causing the
perception of non-justiciability. These prevent judges from applying them and developing a
17
Philip Alston, ‗No Right to Complain About Being Poor: The Need for an Optional Protocol to the Economic
Rights Covenant‘, in The Future of Human Rights Protection in a Changing World 86 (Asbjorn Eide & Jan
Helgesen eds., 1991). 18
Monica Feria Tinta, Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the Inter-American System of
Protection of Human Rights: Beyond Traditional Paradigms and Notions, (2007) Vol. 29 Human Rights
Quarterly, pp.433-444.
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jurisprudence that clarifies their content. The second is the view that these rights impose
imprecise positive obligations to protect and fulfill rights. The positive steps states must
take, in contrast to the negative protections extended by civil and political rights, interfere
with their justiciability in several ways. Courts have more difficulty monitoring a
government's obligation to take positive steps than its duty simply not to interfere with
individuals' existing entitlements. This problem waxes where, as with the catalog of rights
provided for in the ICESCR, no convention or other source of law explicitly defines what
sorts of positive steps a state must take to comply. 19
There are a number of advantages of enhanced justiciability of ESCRs. It would have the
effect of enhancing the domestic justiciability of the same (and indeed all) sets of rights.
This is because domestic judicial organs can scarcely ignore the developments of
international law relative to the cases before them.20
According to Alston:
…[t]he mere possibility that complaints might be brought in an international forum
is likely to encourage governments to ensure that more effective local remedies are
available in respect of economic and social rights issues (thus making it less likely
that the international forum will be able to accept jurisdiction). For the same,
reason, individuals are given an incentive to explore potential domestic remedies
with which they might not otherwise have bothered. 21
ESCR jurisprudence can be expanded in two ways. First, civil and political rights have been
shown to possess socio-economic dimensions. These rights have been interpreted to extend
the right to non-discrimination and equality into the socio-economic arena (e.g. Prevention
of forced evictions, exclusion of minorities from social programs or education). ESCRs
themselves have been directly derived from civil and political rights. (e.g. the right to life
implies the right to water and food). This form of jurisprudence is most evident in North
America, South Asia (particularly India) and in the decisions of international human rights
bodies.
In India, the development of the jurisprudence of ESCRs is inextricably linked to the
development of a new form of legal action that is the public interest litigation (PIL) a non-
adversarial approach, ESCRs in India have been defined through judicial interpretation of
the Right to Life guaranteed under Article 21, rather than any direct guarantees in the Indian
Constitution. The development of progressively justiciable socio-economic rights in the
Inter-American and European systems and the global level are noteworthy. The adoption of
the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
19David Marcua, ‗The Normative Development of Socioeconomic Rights through Supranational Adjudication‘,
Vol. 42 Stanford Journal Of International Law, 2006, p,59-60. 20 Michael Kirby, 'The Growing Rapproachement between International Law and National Law' in Antony Anghic
and Garry Sturgess (eds), The Third World and International Order: Law, Politics, and Globalization (Martinus
Nijhoff, 998) 333, 354. 21 Philip Alston, 'No Right to Complain about Being Poor: The Need for an Optional Protocol to the Economic
Rights Covenant' in Asbjom Eide and Jan Helgesen (eds), The Future of Human Rights Protection in a Changing
World: Fifty Years since the Four Freedoms, (Norwegian University Press, 1991) p, 92.
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(ICESCR) witnesses the sustained efforts towards the justiciability of ESCRs. Moreover, the
justiciability of socio-economic rights enhances the progressive development of associated
norms under the Charter and provides a means of ensuring state accountability and the
culture of justification.22
The injury-specific remedies that would result from litigation on
socio-economic rights violations would make justiciability an extremely useful and
attractive supervisory method.23
Finally, the justiciability of socio-economic rights is a
means for reclaiming equality for the marginalized and impoverished groups of people who
have no other viable avenue or financial resource to influence political decision making
processes. It is perhaps the most viable means through which they can voice their grievances
and oppose systemic exclusions that they face.24
Developments in Jurisprudence in selected jurisdictions
When the direct justiciability of socio-economic rights with the indirect approach proves
difficult South African courts have adopted an indirect approach. The interplay of the direct
and the indirect approaches to socio-economic rights justiciability is such that the former,
which is the end, can be enhanced through the use of the latter as a viable instrument.
However, in order to enhance the direct justiciability of the socio- economic rights and
freedoms of the African Charter there is a need to establish more normative clarity about the
rights guaranteed in the Charter and correlative state obligations.25
The indirect approach is
based upon the expansive interpretation of the more established and explicitly protected
rights (often civil and political or cross-cutting). The state's failure to respect, protect,
promote and/or fulfill these rights may result in violations of one or more socio-economic
rights or vice versa, and remedies to violations of one group of rights may prove effective
and adequate to redress violations of the other group. Right to equality and non-
discrimination the right to judicial protection and remedy and the right to due process are
interpreted by the South African Courts to make ESCRs justiciable. The equality guarantee
is therefore a thread that draws together all categories of human rights. The notion of
equality dictates the distribution of public resources for the protection and promotion of, for
instance, the right to health, labour rights, the right to education and other social goods and
services to everyone at equal measure.26
Therefore, the equality guarantee is not only a
fundamental right in its own right, but it is also a value that underlies the remainder of
human rights corpus. It is important to examine few cases decided by the Constitutional
Court of South Africa with a sharp focus on the justiciability of ESCR.
The Constitutional Court of South Africa has addressed the Constitution's social rights
provisions in numerous cases. Nevertheless, the core of its substantive jurisprudence has
22 Takele Soboka Bulto, ‗The Utility of Cross-Cutting Rights in Enhancing Justiciability of Socio-Economic Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights‘, (2010), Vol. 29( 2) The University of Tasmania Law
Review, p. 150. 23Ibid, p. 151. 24 Ibid, p.152. 25 Ibid, 160. 26Ibid, p. 162-65.
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typically been identified from three fundamental cases: Soobramoney, Grootboom, and
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC).27
These initial cases established how the Court will
evaluate constitutional claims under socio-economic rights, with more recent cases
expanding and clarifying the full capacity of courts as remedial bodies in the area of socio-
economic injustice.28
In Soobramoney, the Constitutional Court faced a challenge to an
established hospital policy prioritizing access to dialysis treatments.29
A terminally ill
patient excluded by the policy from life-sustaining treatment sued under Section 27, the
right of access to healthcare, and other provisions. The Court affirmed the judicial
enforceability of social rights but held that neither the right of access to healthcare nor the
right to emergency medical treatment required the Court to overturn the otherwise
reasonable medical decisions of doctors and administrators faced with limited financial
resources. The Grootboom case addressed the right to housing for squatters in an informal
settlement outside Capetown.30
Ms. Irene Grootboom, along with 510 children and 389 other
adults, made a claim under Section 26, the right of access to adequate housing, and Section
28, the rights of children, seeking provision of adequate housing for adults and children
pending permanent accommodation. The Court concluded that governmental housing
programs violated the Constitution by failing to develop and implement a ‗comprehensive
and coordinated programme‘ to advance a constitutional right; particularly programs that
failed to address the housing needs of people ‗with no access to land, no roof over their
heads, and who were living in intolerable conditions or crisis situations. The order issued by
the Court required the government to remedy the program's failings, and assigned the
Human Rights Commission, an independent national body, to monitor and report on the
status of the changes.31
In the TAC case, the Court declared unconstitutional a government
pro- gram that restricted distribution of medication that dramatically decreased the
likelihood of mother-to-child transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV).32
The
Court ordered the government to ‗implement within its available resources a comprehensive
and coordinated programme‘ to address HIV transmission issues. It also ruled that the
government must devise a program that includes reasonable measures for counseling and
testing pregnant women for HIV, immediately remove the restrictions that pre- vented the
medication from being distributed widely, and ‗permit and facilitate‘ the use of such
medication for the purpose of reducing the transmission of HIV.33
In addition to these core
judgments, the Constitutional Court decided Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road Berea Township
v. City of Johannesburg, a case that may have even more practical effect. The plaintiffs
sought to halt otherwise legal government evictions of people residing in unsafe buildings in
Johannesburg. The Court held that the comprehensive program requirement announced in
Grootboom and TAC must include a meaningful process of engagement with the affected
27 Eric C. Christianse, Using Constitutional Adjudication to Remedy Socio-Economic Injustice: Comparative
Lesson From South Africa, Vo. 13 UCLA Journal of International Law & Foreign Affairs, 2008, p.369. 28Ibid. 29 Soobramoney vs. Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC), 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) 30 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others vs. Grootboom (Grootboom) 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), 2000
(11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 31 Ibid. 32 Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign & Others (No. 2), 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC). 33Ibid.
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community. Berea Township further limited the government's capacity to evict legal and
illegal residents unless a ‗good faith‘ negotiation and consultation process had occurred and
allowance had been made for the homelessness that could result from the action.34
The judicial activism of Indian Supreme Court with regard to the justiciability of ESCRs is
commendable.
India
India's jurisprudence in terms of the protecting and enforcing social and economic rights
also demonstrate striking developments on the issue at question. The Indian Constitution, in
its desire to ensure the welfare of the Indian people and social justice protects civil and
political rights as well as economic and social rights.35
However, it does make a distinction
between the two sets of rights. Part III of the Constitution enshrines fundamental rights,
including the traditional civil and political rights. These fundamental rights are directly
enforceable and justiciable before a court of law. Economic and social rights, on the other
hand, are incorporated in Part IV as Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP) similar to
that of Sri Lanka. Article 37 of the Indian Constitution states that these DPSP shall not be
enforceable by any court but they are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the
country. Article 38 reaffirms it is the state's duty to strive to promote the welfare of the
Indian people by securing and protecting a social order of justice. An important element in
the enhancement of the protection of socio-economic rights in India was the public interest
litigation movement.36
One of the first cases in which the Supreme Court explicitly
recognized the right to health (in this case of a worker) as an integral part of a meaningful
right to life is the Consumer Education and Research Centre v. Union of India case.37
In
subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has expanded the fundamental right to life, obliging
the state to create the conditions necessary to ensure good health.38
Another important
judgment relating to the right to health is the case of Paschim Banga Khet Samity v. State of
West Bengal.39
In that case, an agricultural labourer fell off a train and seriously injured his
head. In seeking treatment, he was turned away by seven state-run hospitals because they
lacked the necessary facilities for treating that type of injury or because of a lack of vacant
beds. The Supreme Court had to address the question whether this non-availability of
facilities for emergency medical treatment resulted in a breach of his fundamental right to
life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court first stated that the
Constitution envisaged the establishment of a welfare state, at federal and state level, in
which it was the primary duty of the state to secure the welfare of the people, including the
34 Occupiers of 5 Olivia Road Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v. City of Johannesburg &
Others (No. CCT 24/07) (2008) ZACC 1 (South Africa), at paras. 20-22. 35 Jennifer Sellin, Justiciability Of The Right To Health - Access To Medicines: The South African And Indian
Experience, 2 Erasmus Law Review. 2009, p. 445. 36Ibid. 37Consumer Education & Research Centre vs Union Of India & Others on 27 January, 1995 AIR 922, 1995 SCC (3)
42. 38 Jennifer Sellin, p.445. 39Paschim Banga Khet Samity v. State of West Bengal (1996) 4 SCC 37. at para. 4
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provision of adequate medical facilities. It further stated that the preservation of human life
was of paramount importance and that, under Article 21, the state had an obligation to
safeguard the right to life of every person. The Court thus re-conceptualized the right to life
to impose a positive duty on the state. In the present case, the labourer's right to life under
Article 21 of the Constitution had been breached and he was awarded compensation by way
of redress. In addition, the Supreme Court ordered a number of remedial measures to
prevent a recurrence of such incidents in the future. In light of its case law and creative
interpretation of the fundamental right to life, the Indian Supreme Court has played a crucial
role in acknowledging the justiciable nature of the ESCRs. The Supreme Court has
interpreted the fundamental right to life in such a manner to include a number of social
elements.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court expanded the fundamental right to life to include positive
obligations for the state. It has, furthermore, issued instructions to the government to fulfill
its obligations under the Indian Constitution. Thus the Indian Supreme Court has been very
progressive by interpreting the right to life to include socio-economic rights. According to
Murlidhar of the Supreme Court of India, this expanding ESCR jurisprudence has
manifested itself in two ways. First, civil and political rights have been shown to possess
socio-economic dimensions. These more traditional rights have been employed in a fashion
to extend the right to non-discrimination and equality into the socio-economic arena (e.g.
Prevention of forced evictions, exclusion of minorities from social programs or education).
In other cases, ESCRs themselves have been directly derived from civil and political rights
(e.g. the right to life implies the right to water and food). This form of jurisprudence is most
evident in North America, South Asia (particularly India) and in the decisions of
international human rights bodies. In India, the development of the jurisprudence of ESCRs
is inextricably linked to the development of a new form of legal action, variously termed as
public interest litigation (PIL) and social action litigation together with the pioneering role
played by the Supreme Court of India. This form is characterised by a non-adversarial
approach, the participation of amicus curiae, the appointment of expert and monitoring
committees by the court, and the issue of detailed interim orders by the Supreme Court and
the High Courts. ESCRs in India have been defined through judicial interpretation of the
Right to Life guaranteed under Article 21, rather than any direct guarantees in the Indian
Constitution. The expanded notion of the right to life has enabled the courts, in its PIL
jurisdiction, to overcome objections on grounds of justiciability to its adjudicating the
enforceability of ESCRs. Subsequently, rights to work, health, shelter, education, water and
food are regularly litigated. Expressions such as ‗basic necessities of life‘ ‗bare minimum
expression of the human self‘ and ‗human dignity‘ found in several of the judgments have
explored the import of ‗life‘ in Article 21. In reading several of the related rights of dignity,
living conditions, health into the ambit of the right to life, the court has overcome the
difficulty of the justiciability of these as economic and social rights, which in their
manifestation as Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP), are considered non
enforceable. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (BMC) 4 is a case in point. The
judgment handed down in this case expanded the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of
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the Constitution to include within its scope, the right to livelihood, which in this context
translated into the right to be allowed to remain on the pavements. The Supreme Court held
that
an equally important facet of the right to life is the right to livelihood because no
person can live without the means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not
treated as a part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a
person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the
point of abrogation.
Although the final orders in Olga Tellis found that the BMC Act of eviction of pavement
dwellers was valid (under Article 14 and 19 of the Constitution) and that pavement dwellers
should be evicted, the Supreme Court also laid down that this could be done only after
arranging alternative accommodation for them. In a sense, therefore, by imposing this strong
condition of providing alternate accommodation before eviction, the Supreme Court was in
fact upholding the right of the pavement dwellers to shelter. In its interpretation of Article
21, the Supreme Court has also facilitated the emergence of an environmental jurisprudence
in India, while also strengthening human rights jurisprudence. In several decisions, the right
to a clean environment, drinking water, a pollution free atmosphere etc. have been given the
status of inalienable human rights and, therefore, fundamental rights of Indian citizens. The
Court has also hinted at recognising the environment as intrinsically worthy of protection.
This new thinking is reflected in the Court‘s reasoning in Rural Litigation and Entitlement
Kendra, Dehradun v State of Uttar Pradesh6, one of the first environmental complaints that
were addressed to it. The Court issued interim orders halting the operation of limestone
quarries in the Dehradun valley in the state of Uttar Pradesh, on the ground that mining had
a deleterious impact on the surrounding environment. Although the Court did not
specifically mention Article 21 in this case, it based its five comprehensive interim orders on
the judicial understanding that environmental rights were to be implied into the scope of
Article 21. This was later emphasized upon in L.K. Koolwal v State of Rajasthan7 where the
Rajasthan High Court recognised the right to health and clean environment. The Court held
that the Municipality had a statutory duty to remove the dirt, filth etc from the city within a
period of six months and clear the city of Jaipur from the date of this judgment. A
committee was constituted to inspect the implementation of the judgment. A noteworthy
contribution in the L.K. Koolwal judgement has been the Court‘s elaboration of Article 19
(1) (a)-guaranteeing freedom of speech-to include the ―right to know‖. In this case, the
Court extended the right to know to entitle the petitioner to full information about the
municipality‘s sanitation programme, or the lack thereof.
The proactive role played by Indian courts is further exemplified in Municipal Council
Ratlam v Vardhichand and ors case.40
This case concerned a municipality that had failed to
construct drains; filth and dirt had accumulated, and people could not remain in the locality
due to the noxious nuisance. A magistrate passed an order, saying, ‗Construct a drain‘, but
40 AIR 1980 SC 1622
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the municipality responded, ‗we have no money‘. It was appealed to the Supreme Court. The
Court held, among other things, that the ‗right to life‘ of the person is affected;
environmental pollution affects individual right to breathe fresh air, sanitary conditions are
essential for the proper enjoyment of this right. The Supreme Court through Justice Krishna
Iyer, upheld the order of the High Court and directed the Municipality to take immediate
action within its statutory powers to construct sufficient number of public latrines, provide
water supply and scavenging services, to construct drains, cesspools and to provide basic
amenities to the public. Justice Iyer observed ‗decency and dignity are non-negotiable facets
of human rights and are a first charge on the local self-governing bodies‟.
The protection and justiciability of socio-economic rights have similarly been enhanced in
numerous other jurisdictions through the use of the protection against non-discrimination.
The Canadian Supreme Court extended the protection of the equality provision (s 15) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to socio- economic rights. In Eldridge v British
Columbia (Attorney General), the failure on the part of the Medical Services Commission
and hospitals of British Columbia to provide sign language interpretation for the deaf as part
of publicly funded scheme for the provision of medical care was found to be in violation of
the equality clause (s 15(1)) of the Canadian Charter. It was held in this case that
'Discrimination can accrue from a failure to take positive measures to ensure that
disadvantaged groups benefit equally from services offered to the general public.
In the US, relying on civil and political rights and the right to non-discrimination, advocates
have challenged prison conditions, the denial of social security, the criminalisation of
homelessness and segregation in education and housing10. As noted by Mario Foscarinis,
Director of The National Law Centre on Homelessness and Poverty, ‗the trend has been to
pass laws which make it a crime to sleep in public or to sit down on public sidewalks, things
that people who are homeless end up having to do because they have no place else to be‘. In
a landmark case, Pottinger v City of Miami11, six thousand homeless people in Miami
launched a class action alleging that police arrests and destruction of their property
interfered with ‗life sustaining‘ activities such as sleeping and eating. The evidence revealed
a systematic police practice of arresting homeless individuals, destroying their personal
property and even eliminating their food resources to prevent homeless individuals from
congregating. Justice Atkins in his judgment, found the police actions unconstitutional
because they constituted cruel and unusual punishment, violated due process rights and were
violations of privacy and the right to travel under the equal protection clause. A settlement
was eventually reached with the City of Miami whereby police cannot arrest a homeless
individual if no alternative accommodation is available.
The Constitution of Argentina also is significant to guaranteeing ESCRs. In 1994, an
amendment made to the Constitution facilitated the protection on ESCRs and created new
means of legal protection through a collective amparo action, which allows individuals to
file for the protection of a group. These changes are an indication that judicial interpretations
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of international treaties handed down by relevant bodies would be binding law in Argentina.
Therefore, while the Argentine Constitution makes no explicit recognition of social rights, it
does have to take into account any ESCR decision taken by the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights or the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. A landmark case in
Argentina is the Viceconte case, which successfully compelled the government to provide a
vaccine to prevent an endemic fever.
At a Workshop for Judges on the Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in
South Asia in 2001 Chief Justice S.P. Bharucha of Indian Supreme Court referred to a South
Asian judicial phenomenon whereby courts took steps to convert certain elements of
directives/principles of State policy into enforceable fundamental rights. It was said that the
courts must be mindful of the need to ensure that their decisions are capable of enforcement,
in order to preserve the credibility of the judicial system. Justice P.N. Bhagwati, in his
keynote address, shared information about different approaches followed by courts in order
to ensure protection of economic, social and cultural rights, and also highlighted the need for
close cooperation among all members of the legal community.41
At this Judges‘ workshop
on ‗the Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in South Asia‘ the participants
agreed that the issue of the justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights was
inseparable from the question of enforceability and the existence of adequate remedies. The
judiciary was urged to make use of appropriate judicial decisions of their own and of foreign
jurisdictions. Judges were encouraged to participate in national, regional and international
workshops and seminars in the area of economic, social and cultural rights, where they
could exchange ideas with a view to strengthening capacity with regard to, and increasing
sensitivity towards, economic, social and cultural rights.42
The workshop recognized that human rights were indivisible and interdependent and that the
rights enshrined in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and,
where relevant, the directives/fundamental principles of State policy contained in some
national Constitutions represented statements of clear legal obligation for the States
concerned. It was agreed that the principles set out in those documents gave direction to the
States concerned and give content and meaning to the fundamental rights enshrined in those
Constitutions. In Sri Lanka too, ESCRs are included in the Principles of State Policy and
fundamental duties in Article 27 and 28 in Chapter VI. Nevertheless, Article 29 of the
Constitution stipulates them as non justiciable.
The provisions of this Chapter do not confer or impose legal rights or obligations
and are not enforceable in any court or tribunal. No question of inconsistency with
such provisions shall be raised in any court or tribunal.43
41 Chief Justice of India, Presidential Address, Workshop for Judges on the Justiciability of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights in South Asia, New Delhi, 17-18 November 2001.
2. Statement of Conclusions - Workshop for Judges on the Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in
South Asia . 42Ibid. 43 See Article27, 28, 29 of the Constitution of Sri Lanka.
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The workshop for South Asian judges considered the following factors as relevant to the
issue of justiciability that had a negative impact on the realization of economic, social and
cultural rights:
(i) the inability of a large majority of persons in every society to have access to
justice, and the failure of States to remedy that inability;
(ii) the lack of awareness, and in some cases the absence of interest in learning
more, about international human rights standards on the part of the legal
community;
(iii) the lack of understanding of the nature and legal and policy implications of
international commitments, including the legal obligations of international
corporations, undertaken by States;
(iv) in certain cases, the absence of awareness and the indifference of government
officials in the implementation of those commitments;
(v) inadequate follow-up to public commitments such as plans of action and
pronouncements made in international forums; and
(vi) the lack of ratification by some States of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the failure to implement it fully of
some States which had ratified it.
The participants referred to the Principles of the Bangalore Declaration and Plan of Action
and urged the members of the judiciary in South Asia to interpret domestic law in
conformity with international human rights instruments, including the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. They recalled the responsibility of
national human rights institutions to play a proactive role in monitoring the performance of
the legislative and the executive branches of the State in the area of economic, social and
cultural rights.44
To ensure the justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights, the
workshop urged courts to make a conscious effort to adopt new strategies and techniques. In
order to meet the new challenges, the judiciary was encouraged to make use of the available
innovative means, such as court- appointed fact-finding commissions, to ascertain factors
bearing a negative impact on economic, social and cultural rights.45
Inter-American System of Protection of Human Rights also presents noteworthy
developments in relation to the jusitciability of ESCRs. The Inter-American organs have
consistently developed jurisprudence following what may be called ‗the indivisibility and
interdependence of rights approach‘. The right to life or right to humane treatment appears
interwoven with the right to health, the right to livelihood, the right to food, or the right to
44 See the Statement issued at the end of the Workshop for Judges on the Justiciability of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights in South Asia, New Delhi, 17-18 November 2001. 45 Ibid.
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education. The right to existence of indigenous populations (with their own social and
cultural specificities) has appeared in the interpretation of the right to life, the right to
integrity, and the right to property, linked to the right to health, to education, and to the
social and cultural rights of such populations.46
Article 1 of the American Convention,
concerned with the obligation to respect and ensure rights within the Convention, has given
rise to obligations to develop programs that address economic, social, and cultural rights.47
Freedom of association has been construed in cases involving workers by necessary
reference to trade union rights. The right to life, in accordance with the jurisprudence of the
Court, has been construed to include the notion of a "dignified and decent existence," which
necessarily encompasses ensuring basic economic, social, and cultural rights. Equal
protection and non-discrimination have similarly been construed in light of economic,
social, and cultural rights, including the just, equitable, and satisfactory conditions of work;
the right to social security; the right to a healthy environment; and the right to have access to
basic public services.48
The Inter-American Court in a number of important cases has held that economic, social,
and cultural rights could be made justiciable by means of interpretation. For an example, the
Villagr~n Morales et al case,49
a case concerning street children and the first international
case directly concerning the rights of the child in the jurisprudence of the Court, the Inter-
American Court examined facts reflecting the drama of children living in the streets of
Guatemala. These children ‗fought to survive alone and were fearful of a society that did not
include them‘. They were subject to unspeakable systematic violence perpetrated with
impunity, including torture and willful killing, at the hands of state agents. In fact, this case
raised gross violations of the right to life. The children had been executed with extreme
cruelty and their remains were left in the woods by their assailants, showing signs of having
been tortured and being bitten by wild beasts. The Street children case compelled the Court
to reflect on the meaning and scope of the right to life (and the duties of the state) of
victimized children who had been, even prior to their killings, already ‗deprived of creating
and developing a project of life and even to seek out a meaning for their own existence.‘50
Perhaps the most sweeping aspect of the Court's decision in the Villagrin Morales et al case
was the reasoning related to the protection of the right to life of these children.51
The Court
highlighted that such deprivation of life is even graver in cases concerning children. But the
analysis of the Court went further. It reflected upon the very scope of the right to life in the
face of the reality experienced by these minors in the streets of Guatemala City. Both the
46 Monica Feria Tinta, Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the Inter-American System of
Protection of Human Rights: Beyond Traditional Paradigms and Notions, (2007) Vol. 29 Human Rights
Quarterly, pp.431. 47 See, Article 1 of the American Convention on Human Rights. 48 Monica Feria Tinta, Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the Inter-American System of
Protection of Human Rights: Beyond Traditional Paradigms and Notions, (2007) Vol. 29 Human Rights Quarterly, p. 431
49―Street Children‖ (Villagrán-Morales et-al.) v. Guatemala, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, November
1999. 50 The Villagr~n Morales et al case, The Inter American Court referred to this principle of evolutive interpretation
in its construction of Article 19 of the Convention in its first decision concerning Article 19. 51 Monica Feria Tinta, p.432.
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systematic nature of the persecution, torture, and killings of these children by state agents, as
well as the denial of a dignified existence to these children under the jurisdiction of the state
of Guatemala, were examined by the Court. From this analysis, the right to life included the
notion of the right to a dignified.52
The practice of the Inter-American organs proves that economic, social, and cultural rights
are as justiciable as any civil and political right. The jurisprudence of the Inter-American
Court on Human Rights shows that the only adequate way to redress human rights violations
is to look at rights in an integrated manner, taking full account of the fact that human rights
are indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated. 53
Conclusion
As we examined above the realization of economic, social and cultural rights is not that
easy. These are resource related rights and states are obliged to actively take several
measures for effective implementation of these rights. The justiciability of social and
economic rights is not a specific question to Sri Lanka but a common challenge. As we
examined above, domestic, regional and international judicial bodies have adjudicated
social and economic rights claims positively using a value coherent approach and an
indirect approach. The emerging trend in case law jurisprudence in a number of countries
demonstrate the enthusiasm shown by the judges of these countries to decide in favour of
the justiciability of ESCRs, which illustrate the potential for future legal action. The case
studies explored in this Article reveal an expanding ESCR jurisprudence wherein courts
have played a role in supervising positive obligations, particularly where government action
has been distressingly inadequate. Establishing ESCRs remains a major struggle in many
places where these rights are not enshrined in the constitutions or laws or where
international law is not incorporated within the domestic law. The principal strategy in such
circumstances has often been to ask courts to acknowledge the socio-economic dimensions
of civil and political rights since these are more likely to be actionable as the above
discussed case law illustrate to us.
In Sri Lanka many things yet to be done to establish strong jurisprudence with regard to the
justiciability of ESCRs. The Constitution of Sri Lanka is lacking a direct provision on the
‗Right to Life‘. Although there are decisions by the Supreme Court of Sri Lank to the effect
that acknowledging that the Right to life as impliedly in when interpreting the provisions of
the fundamental rights chapter of the Constitution of 1978 it has been established through an
exercise of overarching interpretation. Although some developments are emerged in terms
52 The Court acknowledged that ‗The right to life is a fundamental human right, and the exercise of this right is
essential for the exercise of all other human rights. If it is not respected, all rights lack meaning. Owing to the fundamental nature of the right to life, restrictive approaches to it are inadmissible. In essence, the fundamental
right to life includes, not only the right of every human being not to be deprived of his life arbitrarily, but also
the right that he will not be prevented from having access to the conditions that guarantee a dignified existence.
States have the obligation to guarantee the creation of the conditions required in order that violations of this
basic right do not occur and, in particular, the duty to prevent its agents from violating it.‘ 53 Monica Feria Tinta, p. 459.
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of locus standi we still are far behind from an expanded public interest or social action
litigation. Although certain attempts were made to introduce inherent right to life (Article 8)
in a proposed Draft Constitution Bill in 2000 August it did not become a reality. That draft
Constitution in fact has included many ESCRs, such as Article 11- Right to Equality in
broader terms, Article 22 - Special rights of children (Health, Nutrition, Education), Article
24 – Social Rights (Health, Food, Water, Social Assistance, Non-eviction, protection of the
environment and prevent environmental damages and pollution, Article 30- public interest
and Article 171 – FR Jurisdiction of the SC. Sri Lanka should keep a breast with these
emerging trends and take appropriate steps to introduce necessary changes to our domestic
law. Our courts should be allowed to adjudicate and uphold social and economic rights of
people in this country by carrying out a balancing exercise and applying the standard of
reasonableness through needed legal and institutional reforms. Therefore, as discussed in
this Article Sri Lanka should introduce the necessary reforms in order to realize the
aspirations of Sri Lankans in terms of having fulfilled their ECSRs. There is thus need to
adopt measures that elaborate the nature of responsibilities of the state in connection with
ESCRs. First, it is essential to inculcate a culture where the principle of equality is
concomitant with the progressive realisation of rights. Second, it is of crucial significance
that the principle of legitimate expectation in the ESC rights context be used especially
when a government promises something, it should be held to account. Third, the socio
economic entitlements should be developed in a way that it translates into direct benefits
thereby making ECRs enforceable.
Die when I may, I want it said of me by those who knew me best that I always plucked a
thistle and planted a flower where I thought a flower would grow.
- Abraham Lincoln
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Role of the JMO
In criminal justice system of Sri Lanka
How to get his service in an efficient manner
Dr. Ajith Tennakoon MD (USSR), DLM, MD (SL),
Dip.RCPA(Aus), MFFLM(UK)
Chief Consultant Judicial Medical Officer
Institute of Forensic Medicine and Toxicology, Colombo
Who is a Judicial Medical Officer (JMO)?
Judicial Medical Officer is an expert professional, board certified as a specialist in
Forensic Medicine by the Post Graduate Institute of Medicine (PGIM) of the University of
Colombo. He is a specialist medical officer attached to the Ministry of Health. Becoming a
Specialist in Forensic Medicine is a long and strenuous process. After graduation with the
basic medical degree one has to complete the internship, followed by compulsory working
experience for at least one year after the internship and has to get selected into the in-service
training in forensic medicine by passing the selection test. After two years of in-service
training in recognized medico legal center under the supervision of board certified specialist
has to pass the Diploma in Legal Medicine which is a prerequisite at present to get enroll
into the program leading to MD (Doctor in Medicine) in Forensic Medicine. Then candidate
has to complete another two years in service training one year of which has to be in a
Department of Forensic Medicine of a Medical Faculty to get teaching skills.
On successful completion of training the candidate has to get through a very competitive
examination to obtain the MD in which an eminent foreign forensic expert will be in the
examiners panel to maintain the standards of the examination in par with developed
countries. When successful, the candidate has to submit a research proposal and also to have
two years post MD training under supervision of experts. One year of this training should be
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in a recognized overseas center and one in a local center. Then only the candidate will be
board certified as a specialist in Forensic Medicine. Assuming that a candidate will pass all
exams at first attempt it will take minimum of seven years to become a specialist after
graduation in basic medical degree.
Specialists who are attached to the Ministry of Health are ONLY given the designated post
―Consultant Judicial Medical Officer‖. At present they are positioned in all provincial and
General Hospitals in the country except in a few in North and East, and in some base
hospitals. They are 30 odd in number at present though the identified cadre position in the
Ministry of Health is 65. Unfortunately Forensic Medicine at present is not an attractive post
graduate subject among young medical graduates. Very few take up this field as a carrier
every year.
The Ministry of Health to overcome this problem has appointed ordinary medical officers
mostly who are after internship as a Medical Officer- Medico Legal (MO- Medico Legal) to
carry out the medico legal duties. These doctors were given one month very basic training in
the Institute of Forensic Medicine and Toxicology (former known as Office of the
JMO/Colombo) on medico legal duties and allowed to work in small hospitals. These
MO/MLs are working under the supervision of the consultant of the area in peripheral
hospitals. They also work in the consultants centers. Doctors who hold Diploma in Legal
Medicine only are called ―Assistant JMOs‖. These consultants, AJMOs and MOs provide
medico legal service throughout the country.
In addition to this in teaching hospitals where medical faculties are located, board certified
specialists in Forensic Medicine attached to Ministry of Higher Education are working as
senior lectures and professors in the Departments of Forensic Medicine of the Faculties of
Medicine. These specialists also provide medico legal service to some police areas (five
police stations in Colombo) or ten days in month basis (in Karapitiya, Kalubowila,
Peradeniya and Ragama). This will help them to collect teaching materials necessary for
teaching students.
Consultant Judicial Medical Officer is the official designation given only to specialists
working in Ministry of Health in every province and districts of the country.
JMO as an impartial expert member in criminal investigation
team
He is a very important member of the team of criminal investigation. It is important to
understand his role by the other members of the team in order to get his service in most
appropriate manner. In following circumstances it is important to get his service in very
early stage of investigation.
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In a suspected death
a. Crime scene investigation:
It is important that forensic doctor visits the scene at earliest. The magistrate should instruct
the Police whenever possible to take JMO to crime scene. Delay of Magistrate‘s visit should
not be a reason not to call JMO to visit the crime scene early. JMO is the best person to
advice and supervise on certain activities to carry out in identifying and collection of vital
evidences on the dead body as well as in the vicinity. He also may advice on proper
transportation of the body to the mortuary. There is a specially equipped crime scene mobile
unit in the Institute of Forensic Medicine and Toxicology for this purpose.
b. Conducting an autopsy
Autopsy is a scientific examination of a dead body including external examination,
opening into all body cavities, evisceration and dissection of all internal organs,
taking samples for various ancillary investigations in order to find the answers to
following questions by available medical evidence. This can be done only in the
mortuary with at least basic facilities. Field post mortems are not conducted now.
Autopsies are also not conducted in night unless it is an exceptional situation.
- Identification of the deceased
- Types of injuries
- Types of weapons caused those injuries
- What is the fatal injury/injuries
- Cause of death.
- Contributing diseases to the death
- Positions of the victim and assailant
- Volitional activities.
- Consumption of alcohol or any drug prior to the death
- Presence of evidence of sexual assault
- What has not happened and what has happened.
In a case of sexual assault:
Other than the victim forensic doctor is the most important witness in a trial in sexual assault
case. It is the responsibility of the Police to get medico legal examination done at earliest. It
is important to understand the various types of opinion given by the doctor initially in the
MLEF (Medico Legal Examination Form) and later in the MLR (Medico Legal Report).
Especially with regard to the types of injuries in genital organs and types of penetration etc.
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In a case of Child Abuse
Prompt and proper medico legal examination of victim of child abuse is also very important.
It should be done preferably by a specialist whenever possible. In some cases children will
be admitted to pediatric wards and managed by a team consisting a pediatrician, psychiatrist
and JMO. Medico legal examination and sending a Medico legal report to the courts is the
responsibility of the JMO. This team with the Police investigating officer and the probation
officer sometime conducts a case conference in order to identify various issues pertaining to
best interest of the child and his physical and psychological wellbeing. JMO may indicate
some of these decisions in his MLEF and MLR as recommendations. These
recommendations may also be delivered to the knowledge of the Magistrate through the
Police or the probation. It is important that the judiciary consider these recommendations.
Referring a person for a medico legal examination by the courts
Very often people (victims or suspects of crimes) are referred by the courts to JMO for
medico legal examination. It is very important to indicate the reason for referral and
expected type of examination very clearly in a separate letter addressed to the JMO. (Please
refer circular No. 270 of 19th
December 2001 issued by the JSC)
Getting a MLR or PMR to courts
It is important to get MLR or PMR to the case file as early as possible to avoid delay in
court hearing in Magistrate level. Doctor will prepare a Medico Legal Report based on
notes he made in the Doctors copy of the Medico Legal Examination Form. In order to trace
the particular MLEF from many files the doctor needs 05 vital informations.
1. Patients name
2. MLEF number
3. Date of issue
4. Issuing Police
5. Doctors name who examined (JMO)
6. SR number (if present )
Other information like Bed Head ticket number (BHT), Date of examination and others
will not be helpfully as MLEFs are filed in such a way that above information cannot be
used to trace the particular MLEF.
It is very important that the case is filed ONLY with the Police copy of the MLEF.
After the medico legal examination this copy will be return to Police. It‘s very
unfortunate that some cases are filed with a copy of a diagnosis card issued to patient by
clinicians for treatment purpose. Clinicians (surgeons, physicians and others) do not
conduct medico legal examination on patient but only JMOs. Problem is once the case
is filled with diagnosis card summons are issued to clinician to send MLR because his
name stamp appears in the diagnosis card. Obviously he cannot send the report as he
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has not done medico legal examination or he does not have any records about the
patient. Therefore, it is important to make sure that the police copy of the MLEF is in
the case file and summons to be issued to particular JMO whose name appears in the
MLEF.
When the post mortem report (PMR) is required following information are necessary.
1. Deceased‘s name.
2. Date of performing the autopsy
3. Place of autopsy.
4. SR number (if known)
The Forum of the Consultant JMOs of the ministry of health has prepared a notice to be
sent to doctors instead of summons when a MLR or PMR is called. It has being accepted by
the Judicial Service Commission and now being used by most of the courts. It is very
important to correctly fill the notice. Registrars and the staff of courts should be educated
about these facts.
It is also important to make sure that the summons are delivered to the doctor in due time.
Very often the Police does not deliver it timely but send a police message at last movement.
If possible contacting the doctor in form of letter with the notice is the best way to avoid
unnecessary delay in getting a report.
It is important to file these reports correctly to the case records. We have found several
instances where reports are not filed properly or been missing from the files and doctors are
being issued warrants for not sending reports. It is important to send an acknowledgment for
reports (MLR or PMR) in a form of ―certificate of receipt of medical reports‖ (Health 42a)
which will be sent alone with any medical report to courts. This should be signed by the
registrar and send back to the doctor.
Tracing a doctor to get a report may be a problem at times. Best way to trace a doctor is to
contact the Police Post or the head of the institute of the hospital where the medico legal
examination or the autopsy was done. Area CJMO is also may help to trace the doctor. In
failure only the DGHS should be contacted.
It is recommended that Magistrates have a good relationship with the area consultant JMO
in order to get medico legal and various administrative advices. Names and the contact
numbers of all consultant JMOs are given below.
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No. Name of the CJMO Station Contact Nos
1 Dr. Ajith Tennakoon IFMT 0717961615,
2 Dr. H.M.S.K.Senanayake TH-Anuradhapura 0718195569
3 Dr. Keerthi Gunathilake BH Gampaha 0777575844,
4 Dr. Bandula Abeysinghe CSTH 0718153242
5 Dr. P.R. Ruwanpura TH Karapitiya 0714941412
6 Dr. Maxi Fernando TH Kaluthara 0777465605
7 Dr. M. Sivasubramanium TH Kandy 0718609434
8 Dr. D.L. Waidyarathna TH Mathale 0718423041
9 Dr. P.B. Dassanayake BH Panadura 0714064655
10 Dr. D.K. Wijewardana BH Kuliyapitiya 0714416748
11 Dr. H.T.K. Wijayaweera GH Badulla 0777900472
12 Dr. H.P. Wijayawardana CNTH 0714199951
13 Dr. Uthpala Atygalla IFMT 0773537442
14 Dr. S.P.A.Hewage IFMT 0773111753
15 Dr. D.D.Samaraweera GH Mathara 0777910860
16 Dr. Banda Y.M.G.I. BH Chilaw 0718197102
17 Dr. S.D.C.Perera On overseas leave 0718100161
18 Dr. Sumith Ambepitiya TH- Karapitiya 0718194323
19 Dr. M.N. Rhuhul Haq BH- Negambo 0771039211
20 Dr. Ajith Jayasena GH Kurunegala 0773438345
21 Dr. A. Dayapala BH Avissawella 0724158935
22 Dr. Tikiri Gunathilake GH Rathnapura 0776001496,0777705997
23 Dr. Prabath Senasinghe BH Peradeniya 0718162556
24 Dr. A.M.A.T.R. Alagiyawanna BH Kegalle 0714493323
25 Dr. Sisira Senevirathna BH Hambanthota 0772609496
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26 Dr. Sriyantha Amararathne BH Putlama 0777902337, 0719901801
27 Dr. Rajaguru C.K. BH- Monaragala 0773062964. 0718068718
28 Dr. Muditha Kudagama BH- Nuwaraeliya 0777315623
29 Dr. Kumarasiri Mahasen BH- Nawalapitiya 0773212964
30 Dr. Mayoradhan U TH-Jaffna 0772988871
31 Dr. Sujeewa Wikramarathna GH- Baticoloa 0713392730
32 Dr. W.A.S.R. Rajapaksha GH- Polonnaruwa 0714492887
God and nature first made us what we are, and then out of our own created genius we make
ourselves what we want to be. Follow always that great law. Let the sky and God be our
limit and eternity our measurement.
- Marcus Garvey
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The Shifting Facet of the
Ethical Dimension
Corporate Social Responsibility Today
Dulani Weeratunga (LL.B, LL.M)
Additional Magistrate, Colombo.
Introduction
In the modern milieu, the speed of development and change in infrastructure and
connected effects have required companies to be more flexible and responsible in different
spheres compared to the situation of a company a decade ago. The modern economic trends
have elevated the performance of a company to a new vista and companies have to deal not
only with the changing local needs but also with the rapid developments in the global
economy being constantly aware of the technological advancements, the intensification of
access to information, transformations in the international spheres of business and more
importantly perhaps, of the escalating environmental damage and degradation. Apart from
these external factors, a company has to address the changes that occur within the
organization itself. These internal changes may be due to an initiative taken by the company
to respond to the external variations or simply may be due to the need to improve. Business
outsourcing, where even the core business activities may be outsourced, is one of the key
aspects that has arisen in this context and has gained priority over the traditional business
practices.
On another level, the adoption of new technology, breakthrough research and development
procedures have contributed to upgrade and enhance the performance of the company. Thus,
companies experience reduced costs, greater flexibility and enhanced quality which results
inevitably in accelerated competition between the products and the services on offer. Most
consumers today, especially in affluent communities, are able to choose their commodities
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from a variety of products. The progress in technological advancements have not isolated
the individual consumer and therefore, the consumer today is more empowered to question
the commodity he is presented with and is more at a liberty to refuse and choose.
It is in this context that the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (hereinafter referred
to as ―CSR‖) has gained recognition and value. Business leaders have begun to appreciate
the significance of the social perception regarding the reputation of a business as a
contribution to the competitive advantage. The role played by the consumer today is
unarguably more sophisticated and more demanding in comparison to their counterparts
several years ago. The empowerment of the consumer may be due to the easy access of
information that is consequential to the economic and technological growth or to the
activities of the State itself.1
Defining CSR
It has been progressively identified that ―The social responsibilities of companies range
from compliance with health and safety regulations for employees, to environmental
protection to corporate governance. Companies too are endowed with economic, social,
ethical and environmental responsibilities, some of which require compliance with the law,
others requiring discretionary action to ensure that the company does not knowingly operate
to the detriment of the society. At the heart of the CSR movement are the issues of
transparency and accountability so that the stakeholders and the company itself audits and
reports on its ethics and financial, social and environmental affairs.‖2
The World Business Council for Sustainable Development defines CSR on similar lines as a
―continuing commitment by business to behave ethically and contribute to economic
development while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their families as well
as of the local community and society at large.‖3
The European Commission recognizes CSR as ―a concept whereby companies integrate
social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with
their stakeholders on a voluntary basis‖4 and the Institute of Chartered Accountants in
England and Wales contemplates that ―Corporate Responsibility is about ensuring that
organizations manage their businesses to make a positive impact on society and the
environment whilst maximizing value for their shareholders.‖5
It is submitted that although the definitions are not unanimous the underlying premise is that
a corporation should act beyond its business interests and should endeavour to safeguard the
interests of a wider category of persons. These definitions necessarily identify that CSR is an
1 See for example The Consumer Affairs Authority Act, No.9 of 2003 2 McIntosh, Leipziger, Jones and Coleman, Corporate Citizenship, Pitman Publishing, (1998) p284 3 http://www.wbcsd.org/templates/TemplateWBCSD5/layout.asp?type=p&MenuId=MTE0OQ [29/08/2008] 4 http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/csr/index_en.htm [29/08/2008] 5 http://www.icaew.com/index.cfm?route=127637 [07/12/2007]
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external factor that requires to be integrated into the internal activities of the organization in
order to be perceived as a socially responsible corporate citizen.
CSR and the changing face of the ethical dimension
CSR has its roots deeply embedded in corporate ethics6. As such, CSR was thought to be of
only ethical value and was considered a practice which companies undertook simply
because it was ethical to do so. There was no coercion behind it. However, this idealism
changed drastically with the inset of globalization and the developments in the information
technology contributed by providing an arena for discussion, thought and most importantly,
access. Consumers became more informed of the products and were at a liberty to choose
thereby accelerating competition among corporations. The empowerment of the consumer
placed them on a higher bargaining position and facilitated a situation to question the
products that were made available to them, which in turn elevated the relationship between
the company and the end user to a distinctive dimension. It is submitted that this
independency of the consumer who was free to question the product required the companies
to be more aware of not only the quality of the end result but also of the quality of the
associated processes and business conduct.
The State by enacting legislation, that mandates compliance, required companies to be
responsible on a more mandatory and a legal sphere. Legislation has also facilitated a forum
where the consumer is empowered to assert his rights.
Another occurrence that has a direct impact on CSR is globalisation where the acceleration
of environmental degradation, overuse of resources, over consumption and overpopulation7
cast a tremendous duty upon a corporation to be socially conscious and responsible.
Corporate ethics as well as State intervention play a vital role in carrying out CSR initiatives
to overcome these predicaments by ensuring that corporations act in a socially responsible
manner.8
The most significant result of all the above factors is the increased competition, which
prompts companies to adopt CSR at least to maintain the competitive advantage. Jack
Welch9 is of the opinion that ―social responsibility begins with a strong, competitive
company‖ and that ―Only a healthy enterprise can improve and enrich the lives of people
and their communities.‖10
Therefore, competition is a catalyst for companies practicing CSR
while CSR would undoubtedly contribute to increased market share.
6 See generally, McIntosh, Leipziger, Jones and Coleman, Corporate Citizenship, Pitman Publishing, (1998); Thilakarathne, Indeewara, ‗Indigenisation of Creative Capitalism‟, Sunday Observer, 14th September 2008, p33 7 Brown, Doug ―Insatiable is not Sustainable‖, Praeger Publishers (2002), p202 8 This is mainly through enacting social and welfare legislation, for example environmental legislation, labour
legislation etc. 9 Former CEO of General Electric, vide: Welch Jack and Byrne A. John, jack, Warner Books, (2001) 10 Ibid, p381
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It stems from the above that a company cannot be concerned only about protecting the
environment or philanthropical activities under the pretext of practicing CSR for the modern
era neither permits to adopt CSR in isolation nor recognizes it having only an ethical value.
The forces that drive CSR have diversified, multiplied and mandated that the individual
company cannot allow only ethical considerations to dominate. The broader perspective of
CSR includes human rights, child rights and labour rights, supplier chain considerations and
legislation as well. In brief, CSR is concerned with the internal environment including the
employees of the company as well as being responsible to the external environment of the
company.
The Sri Lankan perspective
In the Sri Lankan milieu, CSR continues to play an important role. Government and semi-
government organizations along with private sector organizations are incorporating good
corporate citizenship into the mainstream business activities and the need to be accepted as a
conscientious corporate citizen has resulted in numerous social welfare projects of varying
capacities.11
Despite these numerous social conscious projects carried out by various
organizations, the Sri Lankan consumer perspective in respect of CSR continues to be
marginal and the popular belief seems to be that companies are not genuinely concerned.12
However, the increasing CSR projects undertaken by organizations would help in changing
this perception to a certain extent since consumers would undoubtedly associate the socially
responsible factor with the organization product or service.
In considering CSR and philanthropy although the former may certainly have its roots in the
latter philanthropy is only one aspect of CSR. With the rapid globalization and changing
market conditions CSR has become a more challenging concept than mere philanthropical
activity and these two are essentially different perceptions in the modern global parlance to
which Sri Lanka is no exception. Sri Lankan corporations have to accept this truth.
To be successful then, CSR has to be strategically incorporated into the core business of the
company. If this is not feasible, a strategic long-term vision is required to implement CSR in
a beneficial manner. In addition to strategy, sustainability is the other key word and these
two are interconnected and inter-related with CSR. The difference between a normal social
service project and implementation of CSR effectively lies in this interconnection since a
normal social service project would certainly lack a ―sustainable development strategy.‖13
The idea therefore should not be to implement CSR as an isolated exercise or outsource this
11 See above. And also the Unilever oral health care camps in Hambantota and Malkaduwa. ‗Unilever‟s Signal a
boon to 15,000 families in Malkaduwa‟, Financial News, Sunday Observer, 14th September 2008, p44, the Dialog
Telekom PLC‘s scholarship scheme for the top scorers in physical science streams at the Advanced Level Examinations; ‗Dialog Merit Scholarship Awards ceremony‟, Financial News, Sunday Observer, 05th October
2008, p 44 12 Vide: Study by the International Alert in 2005, http://www.international-
alert.org/pdf/peace_through_profit_sri_lanka_csr.pdf
[02/09/2008] 13 Whybrow, Samantha ‗The CSR Debate‟, The Nation Economist, The Nation, 31st August 2008, p4
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activity so that the Company concentrates on its core business but to integrate CSR
strategically into the core business so that the company gains improved image, customer
loyalties, and increased market share while improving itself ultimately. Such strategic
adoption would also assist to eradicate misconceptions and mistrust associated with
companies that perform CSR.
Since a detailed evaluation of the driving forces of CSR is not required at this point, it is
sufficient to say these factors continue to be applicable in the Sri Lankan context as well. As
stated previously, a single legislation mandating CSR is not feasible in any context.
Organizations should be given the freedom to operate and legislation should not stifle their
activities but facilitate them. However, it is firmly believed that there should be a degree of
induction since according to Justice Weeramantry, ―inadequate legal policing of corporate
activity leaves enormous room for fraud and victimization of the public and tends to create
in the consumer and the citizen the feeling that the law is impotent to hold back financial
might from day to day abuses of power.‖14
The Sri Lankan experience reveals that social welfare legislation seek responsibility in
addition to compliance. Especially in the sphere of labour law, employers are required to be
responsible to the labour force. This may be by providing dispute settlement mechanisms,
recognizing the right to organize, compensation or protecting child rights and human rights
while promoting gender equality in the organization. This is further strengthened by the fact
that Sri Lanka is a signatory to all the core conventions of the International Labour
Organization.15
Hence, the responsibility cast on the State in ensuring the welfare of the
workforce ultimately mandates organizations to be responsible to its labour component to
the extent that in some occasions it has been criticized that labour legislation overly stresses
the welfare of the employee.16
The drawback in respect of environmental legislation is the absence of a separate legislation
that deals with pollution. Many countries have enacted special laws to address specific
pollution problems. For instance, the US passed the ―G.R.E.E.N Act‖ recently, which
addresses energy efficiency to promote environmental and social concerns.17
Nevertheless,
the establishment of the Central Environment Authority with wide powers under the NEA
addresses this problem to a certain extent. In respect of marine pollution, new developments
should be addressed while strengthening the compliance mechanism. There is a great
potential in this aspect and efficient monitoring would effectively implement CSR into an
organization.
The Companies Act No.7 of 2007 endorses the concept of CSR in a broader manner than
that of its predecessor. The codification of director‘s duties, the introduction of the solvency
test and the additional disclosure and reporting mechanisms have resulted in greater
14 Weeramantry C.G., ‗The Law in Crisis‟, Capemoss, (1975), p226 15 http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?(Sri Lanka) [27/07/2008] 16 Amerasinghe, Franklyn ‗Industrial Law and Relations in Sri Lanka – Meeting Contemporary Challenges‘,
www.lawnet.lk 17 As stated in http://www.enterprisecommunity.org [20/10/2008]
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transparency and enhanced flexibility of the activities of the company. A company is thus
mandated to be responsible for its activities and where the circumstances so requires, the
directors and officers of the company are held personally liable for certain offences.18
On a broader level, the role of the judiciary in interpreting legislation also has a crucial
effect since progressive thinking in this respect would enhance the responsibilities endowed
on an organization or a body corporate.
Mandating CSR – the way forward
The practice of CSR has been induced by various factors such as economic, global and
social, which have slowly begun to overshadow the singular ethical dimension it possessed
at the beginning of the century. Globalization and rapid advancement of technology has
inevitably made the consumer or the end-product user more sophisticated thereby putting the
corporations in a more vulnerable position compared with the situation in the past. In
addition, most corporations have taken up the initiative to be socially responsible by
contributing to the society in which it operates. Emerging as a responsible corporate citizen
has become the norm compared to the situation earlier where CSR was thought to be only a
marginal issue.
The mandating of CSR would necessarily depend on the inherent characteristics of CSR, the
main being the ethical flavour that is associated with it from the inception. Therefore, to
recommend the State should mandate CSR compulsory would be futile. In addition, business
autonomy should be preserved and compelling organizations to adopt CSR would
unnecessarily restrict the activities of the company. It is submitted that the solution is to
provide an induction and compel companies to be responsible for its activities on identified
areas such as environmental concerns, human rights etc. Although the existing legislation
does address these areas, in many instances the laws are archaic and therefore outdated.
Hence, it would be beneficial to evaluate the modern economic and business practices and
incorporate these modifications to the existing legislation. However, a straightforward
mechanism in dealing with pollution which reflects international thinking would be
beneficial in furthering CSR.
In addition, a significant contribution could be made by CSR in the sphere of the United
Nations Millennium Development Goals19
where the objectives deal with eradicating
poverty, eliminating gender discrimination, increasing child welfare and the sustainable use
of the environment. It is submitted that globally and locally, there is a lot of potential for the
large organizations, especially multi- national corporations, to support these objectives by
contributing to the development and welfare of poor countries or communities. This may be
by commencing business by investments thus creating employment opportunities as was the
18 See generally the provisions relating to directors, Companies Act No.7 of 2007 19http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/The%20Millennium%20Development%20Goals%20Report%202008.pdf
[20/08/2008]
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case with the Bata involvement with the Thai Business Initiative in Rural Development in
Thailand20
or providing assistance to rural supplier-communities to improve the raw material
required for production as was done by Unilever in Uttar Pradesh in India21
. It may even be
more philanthropical in nature as could be illustrated by Phillips Van Heusen‘s initiative to
fund educational programs in the highlands of Guatemala in order to support the education
of the indigenous people22
. The idea is to be more vigilant and contribute to the betterment
of the society so that the organization‘s impact on the society becomes a positive one.
In addition, consulting agencies and other monitoring mechanisms should be implemented
and encouraged to monitor CSR projects and advice companies to strategically adopt CSR.
Educating the public sentiment is equally important so that the genuine CSR projects do not
attract skepticism.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the ethical dimension of CSR has been overshadowed by
the emerging new development factors. Although legislation cannot mandate CSR it
significantly requires companies to operate within the parameters and demand compliance
on several core areas. As Cicero has stated,23
―The good of the people is the supreme law‖
and therefore the crucial element is to preserve the ethical flavour while accommodating the
growing global, market and economic forces that drive CSR which authenticates a
responsible corporate citizen.
But how is this legal plunder to be identified quite simply? See if the law takes from some
persons what belongs to them, and gives it to the other persons to whom it does not belong.
See if the law benefits one citizen at the expense of another by doing what the citizen
himself cannot do without committing a crime
- Frederic Bastiat, The Law
20 McIntosh, Leipziger, Jones and Coleman, Corporate Citizenship, Pitman Publishing,(1998) p215 21 Ibid p216 22 ibid p218 23 vide: The Bar Association Law Journal, Vol.XII (2006) p22
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Interrogation of Witnesses
By Judges in Judicial Proceedings
Not a carte blanche
Mrs. Dilrukshi Dias Wickramasinghe,
President‟s Counsel.1
In the seminal case of R. v. Sussex Justices, ex-parte McCarthy2 Lord Hewart, Lord Chief
Justice of England and Wales stated that:
“It is not merely of some importance, but it is of fundamental importance that
justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen
to be done.”
The Sri Lankan judicial system, similar to many common law systems, follows an
adversarial system, where parties to the suit have the primary responsibility of defining and
advancing the dispute which is commonly referred to as ‗party prosecution‘. This is
significantly different to the inquisitorial system or ‗judicial prosecution‘ practiced in civil
law countries, where the judge has a primary responsibility to investigate the dispute. In
both systems, intervention by the judge must be manifestly fair and appear free of bias to an
impartial and informed observer of judicial proceedings.
The judge in an adversarial system is the fact-finder of the dispute. He or she must therefore
remain neutral and passive during the proceedings. The judge must permit both sides equal
opportunity to present their respective cases, dispassionately examine the evidence and
remain uninvolved to avoid reaching a premature decision. However, since it is the duty of
the judge as the fact-finder to determine the dispute based on the evidence, section 165 of
the Evidence Ordinance empowers the judge to put questions or order production of
documents and things during judicial proceedings. Nevertheless, the said power is not
infinite, but is subject to limitations and only enables the judge to clarify facts for the
purpose of eliciting the evidence.
1 LLM (Monash); Former High Court Judge of Fiji Islands; Additional Solicitor General at the Attorney General‘s
Department of Sri Lanka. 2 [1924] 1 KB 256
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Section 165 of the Evidence Ordinance reads thus:
165. The Judge may, in order to discover or to obtain proper proof of
relevant facts, ask any question he pleases, in any form, at any
time, of any witness, or of the parties, about any fact relevant
or irrelevant; and may order the production of any document
or thing ; and neither the parties nor their agents shall be
entitled to make any objection to any such question or order,
nor, without the leave of the court, to cross-examine any
witness upon any answer given in reply to any such question:
Provided that the judgment must be based upon facts declared
by this Ordinance to be relevant and duly proved:
Provided also that this section shall not authorize any Judge to
compel any witness to answer any question, or to produce any
document, which such witness would be entitled to refuse to
answer or produce under sections 121 to 131 both inclusive, if
the question were asked or the document were called for by the
adverse party; nor shall the Judge ask any question which it
would be improper for any other person to ask under section
148 or 149; nor shall he dispense with primary evidence of any
document, excepting the cases herein before excepted.
A plain construction of the aforesaid section reveals three limbs. Firstly, the power of
questioning the witness; secondly, ordering the witnesses to produce documents and
things; and thirdly, the limitations and parameters within which the aforesaid two
limbs function.
Although the adversarial system as followed in Sri Lanka requires the judge to be a
passive listener and remain neutral during the proceedings, the above section offers
an opportunity to the judge to put questions to witnesses both relevant and irrelevant
in order to ascertain the truth. The statutory provision further enables the judge to
ask questions at any time, in any form as he or she pleases. Moreover, the judge is
permitted to request the production of any document or thing for the discovery of
proof of any relevant fact.
Albeit the apparent wide powers envisaged in section 165 of the Evidence Ordinance,
a surfeit of judicial authorities both local and foreign have interpreted the section by
limiting its scope of questioning by the judges. Additionally, the first proviso of the
section also prohibits the judge from indiscriminately using answers given to
irrelevant questions, by specifying that the judgment must be based upon facts
declared by the Evidence Ordinance to be relevant and duly proved. Judicial
questioning is further limited by the aforesaid second proviso where the judge is
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bound by the limitations extended in privileged communications set out in section
121 to 131, and section 148 and 149. These limitations exclude questioning on
evidence relating to communications during marriage, affairs of State, official
communications, information as to commission of offences, professional
communications, confidential communications with legal advisors, production of title
deeds, etc. The second proviso restricts questioning on any matter that falls within
the ambit of these limitations.
It could thus be seen that the judgment should be based on relevant facts and duly
proved, the judges interrogation cannot contravene sections 121 to 131 and 148 and
149 and, generally, primary evidence of documents must be given when ordered
production of documents.
Coomaraswamy3 discusses the role of a judge in applying section 165 of the
Evidence Ordinance as follows:
“The functions of a judge, with regard to evidence, have been declared to be
of a three-fold nature:
(a) To exclude everything that is not legitimate evidence; and then when
judgment is given,
(b) To ascertain clearly what the evidence is which he has before him, and
(c) To estimate correctly the probative force of that evidence.”
The Indian Evidence Ordinance has the identical provision and Sarkar discusses the
provision as follows:
―The true meaning, scope and object of the section will be clear from the following
extracts from the speeches and writings of SIR FITZJAMES STEPHEN, the framer
of the Act, and other commentators:
„Passing, however, from the case of English barristers, to the case of
pleaders and vakils and the courts before which they practice, I would
appeal to everyone who has experience of the subject, whether the
observations referred to are not strictly true, and whether the main
provision founded upon it there the provision which empowers the court to
ask what questions it pleases, is not essential to the administration of
justice here. In saying that the Bench and the Bar in England, cases are
fully prepared for trial before they come into court, so that the judge has
nothing to do but to sit still and weigh the evidence produced before him.
In India, in all enormous mass of cases, this neither is nor can be so. It is
absolutely necessary that the judge should not only hear what is put
before him by others, but that he should ascertain by his own inquiries
how the facts actually stand. In order to do this, it will frequently be
3 E.R.S.R. Coomaraswamy, The Law of Evidence Vol II (Book 2) (Stamford Lake Publication, 1989) 863
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necessary for him to go into matters which are not themselves relevant to
the matters in issue, but may lead to something that is, and it is in order to
arm judges with express authority to do this that s 165, which has been so
much objected to, has been framed‟. [Stephen‘s Speech on 12th
March
1872 when presenting the Report of the Select Committee]”.4
This section has been the subject of analysis wherein it has been explained as
follows:
“This Section is intended to arm the Judge with the most
extensive power possible for the purpose of getting at the truth.
The effect of this Section is that in order to get to the bottom of
the matter before it, the Court will be able to look at and enquire
into every fact whatever” and thus possibly acquire valuable
indicative evidence (v. post) which any lead to other evidence
strictly relevant and admissible. The Court is not, however,
permitted to found its judgment on any but relevant statements,
because such permission would lead to reliance on second-hand
reports, would waste time and open a wide door for fraud. And
the discretion given is exercisable subject to correction by the
Court of Appeal”.5
This article sets out a plethora of authorities on judicial intervention with the expectation
that it would be a point of quick reference for judges presiding in original courts. The author
has intentionally reproduced the obiter dicta or the ratio decidendi of the relevant
paragraphs for easy and quick reference by the judges.
As far as in 1885, in the case of Queen-Empress v Hari Lakshman6 it was held that
„under section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act I of 1872, a Judge has the power of
asking irrelevant questions to a witness, if he does so in order to obtain proof of
relevant facts; but if he asks questions with a view to criminal proceedings being
taken against the witness, the witness is not bound to answer them, and cannot be
punished for not answering them, under Section 179 of the Indian Penal Code (Act
XLV of 1860)‟.
Nagalingam J. in the case of The King V Namasivayam et al.,7 held that ‗although a Judge
has very wide powers of asking any questions he pleases in any form and at any time of any
witness, those powers should not be so used as to afford ground for the legitimate criticism
that the accused persons have not had the benefit of a fair trial‟.
4 S. Sarkar and V. R. Manohar, Sarkar on Evidence (14th edition., Wadhawa and Company Law Publishers, 1993)
2150 5 Sir J. Woodroffe, S. A. Ali and V. K. Rao Sir John Woodroffe and Syed Amir Ali Law of Evidence: Sections 115-167 (18th edition., Butterworths, 2009) 901 6 (1885) 10 Bom. 185 7 (1948) 49 NLR 289
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In the case of Sabhapathi vs. Huntley8 it was said that where a judge examines a witness
under section 165 of the Evidence Ordinance and the evidence given in answer to the
questions is adverse to either party, leave should be given to that party to cross-examine the
witness upon his answers
In King v. Dharmasena,9 Canekeratne J opined that:
“It is, of course, always proper for a Judge-he has the power and it "is his
duty at times-to put such additional questions to the witnesses as seem to him
desirable to elicit the truth. The part which a Judge ought to take while
witnesses are giving their evidence must, of course, rest with his discretion.
But with the utmost respect to the Judge, it was, I think, unfortunate that he
took so large a part in examining the appellant. Though he was endeavouring
to ascertain the truth, in the manner which at the moment seemed to him most
convenient, there was a tendency to press the appellant on more than one
occasion. The importance and power of his office, and the theory and rule
requiring impartial conduct on his part, make his slightest action of great
weight with the jury. If he takes upon himself the burden of the cross-
examination of the accused, when the Government is represented by
competent counsel, and conducts the examination in a manner hostile to the
accused and suggesting that he is satisfied of the guilt of the accused, as
some of the questions do, the impression would probably be produced on the
minds of the jury that the Judge was of the fixed opinion that the accused
was guilty and should be convicted. This would not be fair to the accused, for
she is entitled to the benefit of the presumption of innocence by both Judge
and jury till her guilt is proved. If the jury is inadvertently led to believe that
the Judge does not regard that presumption, they may also disregard it”.
(Emphasis mine)
In R v Wijedasa et al.,10
Dias S.P.J held that a judge is clearly entitled to put questions to the
witnesses under section 165 of the Evidence Ordinance as long as such questions do not
afford grounds for the legitimate criticism that the accused had not had the benefit of a fair
trial or that unfair or hostile cross-examination of the accused by the trial judge might
amount to a miscarriage of justice. Dias J. further held that ‗a trial judge must be allowed
the utmost freedom to ask questions, provided it is done fairly; and we have neither the
power nor the inclination to ignore either the letter or the spirit of section 165 of the
Evidence Ordinance‟.
8 (1935) 38 NLR 171 9 50 NLR 509 10 52 NLR 29
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In The Queen v. Hethuhamy,11
Gratiaen J. stated that “although a presiding Judge is
entitled to interrogate a witness for the prosecution, it is generally far more satisfactory to
leave the conduct of the case on any vital point of controversy in the hands of the
prosecuting counsel, who must make his own decision whether or not to apply to the Judge
for permission to cross-examine as an adverse witness a man whom he has advisedly
called”.
In the case of The Queen v Nimalasena De Zoysa,12
it was held that:
“The mere fact that the trial judge has, by availing himself of the power vested in
him by Section 165 of the Evidence Ordinance, put a large number of questions to
a witness is not a ground for quashing a conviction, even if the number of questions
is greater than that put by the prosecution or the defence. To quash the conviction
the Court of Criminal Appeal must be satisfied that the multiplicity of the question
asked by the trial Judge resulted in a miscarriage of justice‖.
Queen v Abeyratne,13
it was held that ―the words „in order to discover or to obtain proper
proof or relevant facts‟ in Section 165 of the Evidence Ordinance place a limitation on the
powers of a judge to ask any question he pleases in any form of any witness or of the parties
to a case”.
In the case of G.W.Perera et al. v Naganathan,14
Silva J. held that: „if the statements to the
Police were produced in terms of Section 165 of the Evidence Ordinance in order to
discover or obtain proper proof of relevant facts, and the Magistrate made use of such
statements which he caused to be produced of his own motion in arriving at his verdict
under Section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code, acting on such evidence was a flagrant
violation of the provisions of section 122(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code‟.
In The Queen v Sinnathamby,15
in a prosecution for murder, Sansoni J. held that
‗The medical evidence as to the unsound mental condition of the accused was
elicited by the Judge for the first time after the accused himself had given evidence.
The judge closely questioned the accused in such a way as to lead the Jury into the
belief that his evidence was totally unworthy of credit‟.
Whilst ordering the case for retrial, Sansoni J. held that the medical evidence should have
been given before the accused was called to give evidence.16
11 57 NLR 255 12 60 NLR 97 13 (1963) Vol LXIV (part 6) C.L.W. 68 14 66 NLR 438 15 68 NLR 193 16 ibid
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H.N.G Fernando CJ in the case of Sethuwa et al v. Queen,17
stated that the Judge must not
take on the examination of a prosecution witness in such a manner that the whole of the
evidence incriminating the accused is elicited in answer to questions put by the Judge. In
such a case, the Jury can scarcely resist the impression that the Judge is presenting the
evidence of the witness as being evidence in which the Judge himself has confidence.
G.P.A. Silva SPJ in the case of Senanayake v. De Silva,18
held:
“We shall now address our mind to the criticisms made by counsel in regard
to the questioning of this witness by the Court. While the widest powers in
regard to examination of witnesses are undoubtedly conferred on the Court by
section 165 of the Evidence Ordinance, these powers are not without certain
limitations. There are certain unfortunate circumstances in the particular
facts of this case which in our view bring this case within the scope of these
limitations.
G.P.A Silva SPJ referred to a number of cases in which such limitations exist.19
He further
elaborated that one of the well-recognized limitations of the powers of the Court under this
section is that the Court "must not question the witness in the spirit of beating him down or
encouraging him to give an answer”. The court referred to a number of authorities20
and
concluded that
“While in the present case there would perhaps be room for saying that the
questioning is not quite of this nature, the additional circumstances to which
we shall refer remove any uncertainty on the question whether this was not
a case…”.
In the case of The Queen vs. Mendis Appu21
it was held that powers conferred by section
165 of the Evidence Ordinance are limited and are not meant to be used for the purpose of
discrediting a witness or an accused person.
Subasinghe vs. Jayalath22
and Queen vs. Julis23
also discussed the power of the Judge to
interrogate witnesses and discussed the limitations.
Kulatilake J. in the case Wijeratne Banda vs. State,24
held that the trial judge in order to
discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts may ask any question at any time of any
witness or of any person about any fact relevant or irrelevant.
17 72 NLR 573 18 75 NLR 409 pp. 432-434 19 The Queen v David Perera (1962) 66 N.L.R. 553 at 556-7; The Queen v Mendis Appu (1960) 60 C.L.W. 11; Sunil
Chandra Roy v The State (1954) A.I.R. Calcutta 305 p. 317. 20 Monir, Evidence (4th Edition Vol. II) 949. See also Sunil Chandra Boy v. The State 1954 CAL 305 21 (LX vol. C.L.W. 11) 22 69 NLR 121 23 (LXV vol. C.L.W. 89)
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In the case of Jones v National Coal Board25
which relates to a personal injury claim, both
parties complained in the appeal that they were unable to put their cases properly before the
judge. In this case Lord Denning set out the role of the judge as follows:
“The judicial function of dealing with cases justly in an adversarial system
requires a first instance judge „to hear and determine the issues raised by the
parties, not to conduct an investigation or examination on behalf of society at
large.‟ That does not mean the judge is „a mere umpire to answer the question
„How‟s that?”.
Lord Denning MR further said: „His object, after all, is to find out the truth,
and to do justice according to law; and in the daily pursuit of it the advocate
plays an honourable and necessary role. Was it not Lord Eldon LC who said
in a notable passage that „truth is best discovered by powerful statements on
both sides of the question‟? And Lord Greene MR who explained that justice
is best done by a judge who holds the balance between the contending parties
without himself taking part in their disputations?
. . and „A judge‟s part . . is to hearken to the evidence, only himself asking
questions of witnesses when it is necessary to clear up any point that has been
overlooked or left obscure; to see that the advocates behave themselves
seemly and keep to the rules laid down by law; to exclude irrelevances and
discourage repetition; to make sure by wise intervention that he follows the
points that the advocates are making and can assess their worth; and at the
end to make up his mind where the truth lies. If he goes beyond this, he drops
the mantle of a judge and assumes the role of an advocate; and the change
does not become him well. Lord Chancellor Bacon spoke right when he said
that: „Patience and gravity of hearing is an essential part of justice; and an
over-speaking judge is no well-tuned cymbal.” (Emphasis mine)
In the case of Gunning v R26
it was held that the judge had deprived the defendant of the
opportunity of developing the defence. It was held that ―the judge is not an advocate. Under
the English system…..he is much more like the umpire at a cricket match. He is certainly not
the bowler, whose business is to get the batsman out. In this case it was reported that the
judge asked 165 questions, compared with 172 asked by the defence counsel”.
Kirby ACJ in the case of Galea v Galea27
followed a robust approached and summarized the
following guidelines to determine the extent of intervention by judges in judicial
proceedings. In the words of His Lordship:
24 (1993) SLR 86 25 (1957) 2 QB 55 26 (1980) CA 27 (1990) 19 NSW LR 263 pp. 281-282
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“1. The test to be applied is whether the excessive judicial questioning or
pejorative comments have created a real danger that the trial was unfair. If
so, the judgment must be set aside.
2. A distinction is drawn between the limits of questioning or comments by
a judge when sitting with a jury and when sitting alone in a civil trial.
Although, there is no relevant distinction, in principle, between the judicial
obligation to ensure a fair trial whatever the constitution of the court,
greater latitude in questioning and comment will be accepted where a judge
is sitting alone. This is because it is conventionally inferred that a trained
judicial officer, who has to find the facts himself or herself, will be more
readily able to correct and allow for preliminary opinions formed before the
final decision is reached.
3. Where a complaint is made of excessive questioning or inappropriate
comment, the appellate court must consider whether such interventions
indicate that a fair trial has been denied to a litigant because the judge has
closed his or her mind to further persuasion, moved into counsel‟s shoes
and “into the perils of self-persuasion”.
4. The decision on whether the point of unfairness has been reached must
be made in the context of the whole trial and in the light of the number,
length, terms and circumstances of the interventions. It is important to draw
a distinction between intervention which suggests that an opinion has been
finally reached which could not be altered by further evidence or argument
and one which is provisional, put forward to test the evidence and to invite
further persuasion.
5. It is also relevant to consider the point at which the judicial interventions
complained of occur. A vigorous interruption early in the trial or in the
examination of a witness may be less readily excused than one at a later
stage where it is designed for the legitimate object referred to in Jones,
namely of permitting the judge to better comprehend the issues and to weigh
the evidence of the witness concerned. By the same token, the judge does
not know what is in counsel‟s brief and the strength of cross-examination
may be destroyed if a judge, in a desire to get to what seems crucial, at any
stage prematurely intervenes by putting questions.
6. The general rules for conduct of a trial and the general expression of the
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respective functions of judge and advocate do not change. But there is no
unchanging formulation of them. Thus, even since [Jones in 1957 and the New
South Wales case of Tousek v Bernat in 1959], at least in Australia, in this
jurisdiction and in civil trials, it has become more common for judges to take
an active part in the conduct of cases than was hitherto conventional. In
part, this change is a response to the growth of litigation and the greater
pressure of court lists. In part, it reflects an increase in specialization of the
judiciary and in the legal profession. In part, it arises from a growing
appreciation that a silent judge may sometimes occasion an injustice by
failing to reveal opinions which the party affected then has no opportunity to
correct or modify. In part, it is simply a reflection of the heightened
willingness of judges to take greater control of proceedings for the avoidance
of the injustices that can sometimes occur from undue delay or unnecessary
prolongation of trials deriving in part from new and different arrangements
for legal aid. The conduct of criminal trials, particularly with a jury, remains
subject to different and more stringent requirements.” (Emphasis mine)
In the aforesaid judgement Priestley and Meagher JJA agreed with the judgement however,
Meagher JA stated that:
„Whereas in the present case, a judge is confronted by a witness who is
both deceitful and evasive, there is no principle that he is not at liberty to
express his measured displeasure at being trifled with. There is no
principle that he must endure the ordeal with ladylike serenity. Indeed in
Vakauta (at 611; 635; 68, 939) Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ state
that to maintain a total silence in such situations „would not represent a
model to be emulated‟. More than that, a timely intervention serves the
interest of the party leading such evidence, as it provides him with a
chance to mend the damage already inflicted. In my view, if a reasonable
disinterested bystander had heard the passage at arms complained of in
the present case he would not have reasonably apprehended that the trial
judge was prejudiced, he would only have noted that an exceptionally
irritating witness had eventually succeeded in irritating the judge‟.28
The 2004 Privy Council decision in the Cayman island case of Luis Roberto Demarco
Almeida v. Opportunity Equity Partners Ltd,29
also sets out bounds of judicial intervention.
The case entailed inter alia an action for damages brought by a dismissed employee. The
litigation involved allegations of bad faith and fraud. The judgment was entered in favour of
the defendant, where the trial judge concluded that evidence was found to be ―manufactured
28(1990) 19 NSW LR 263 pp. 283-284 29 Privy Council Appeal No 48 of 2004
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and false in all material respects‖. The plaintiff sought a new trial on the basis of bias,
alleging predominantly the judge‘s „excessive interventions during the examination of the
witnesses and usurpation of a counsel‟s role during oral evidence‟. (Emphasis mine)
Although the Court of Appeal rejected the allegation of bias, it ordered a re-trial on the basis
that ‗an informed and impartial observer could conclude that a fundamental failure of justice
had in fact occurred. Privy Council however setting aside the Court of Appeal‘s Order held
that “judge was seriously at fault in the way he conducted this trial” (Emphasis mine) and
found fault with the judge's objectionable interventions during cross-examination,
exaggerated and unnecessary references to forgery and unreasonable conclusions
about the plaintiff's evidence, but set aside the order of the Court of Appeal on the basis
that the case had no merit and that was the cause for the failure of the case and not due to the
fact of an unfair trial by the judge. (Emphasis mine)
In the above case the Privy Council also made the following observations:
“.................. The Court of Appeal rejected the judge‟s findings, it seems
[877-879] because the judge unwisely referred to “false documents” [497]
and again (still more unwisely) to “forgery and uttering false documents”
[511]. He would have been well advised to have limited his conclusion to
stating that Ms Dantas had, in consultation with her brother and with the
assistance of some of Opportunity‟s employees, embarked on a deceitful
plan to make Mr Demarco think that he owned a $500,000 investment in the
Opportunity Fund, whereas in fact it remained under the control of Ms
Dantas and her brother. ..........”30
(Emphasis mine)
“The judge was however found by the Court of Appeal to have been
responsible for a “fundamental failure of justice” [905]. Like the Court of
Appeal their Lordships have deferred this issue until the end of their advice,
but they consider that it is the most important issue in the appeal, and it
overshadows all the other issues. The parties‟ right to a fair trial is so
fundamental that any conclusion as to the judge‟s findings of fact reached
without regard to the fairness of the trial can only be provisional and
precarious”.31
(Emphasis mine)
However, the Privy Council held that the attitude towards judicial intervention has changed
a good deal since the decision of Lord Denning in 1957 in Jones (Supra), and the guidelines
set out by Kirby A-CJ in 1990 the case of Galea (Supra).
30 Ibid ¶ 80 31 Ibid ¶ 89
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More recently, in the case of Michel v. The Queen32
Lord Brown, giving the report of the
Privy Council, observed of the chairman‘s role as follows:
“Of course he can clear up ambiguities. Of course he can clarify the answers
being given. But he should be seeking to promote the orderly elicitation of the
evidence, not needlessly interrupting its flow. He must not cross-examine
witnesses, especially not during evidence-in-chief. He must not appear hostile
to witnesses, least of all the defendant. He must not belittle or denigrate the
defence case. He must not be sarcastic or snide. He must not comment on the
evidence while it is being given. And above all he must not make obvious to all
his own profound disbelief in the defence being advanced.”
Sarkar makes a comparative analysis of English Law and Indian Law and states that:
“Judge‟s Power to Interrogate Witness [English and Indian Law].-
Although this section appears to give the judge a somewhat wider latitude
than similar powers under the English Law, the provisions of this section
are in substantial agreement with that law. The judge has a discretionary
power of putting to witnesses such questions as he thinks the interests of
justice require”33
Further, Sarkar makes reference to a number of cases which enumerates the power
of a judge to interrogate a witness.34
Sarkar opines that “questions by a judge may be based, not only on matters arising
in the case, but on his own local or scientific knowledge”35
and refers to a number
of cases as to the desirable limits of judicial intervention in the examination and
cross-examination of witnesses.36
Following are few more foreign cases where the intervention by judges‘ were discussed:
R v Inner West London Coroner ex p Dallaglio37
The coroner enquiring
into the Marchioness disaster gave a press interview in which he described a
relative of one victim as "unhinged by grief" and others as "mentally unwell".
32 (2009) UKPC 41 33 Sarkar op. cit. 2153 34 Middleton v Barned (1849) 18 LJ Ex 433. See also R v Hopper (1915) 2 KB 431; R v Waston 6 C&P 653 R v
Remnant Rus & Rly 136 35 Sarkar op. cit. 2153. See also R v Antrim (1895) 2 IR 603; Shortt v Robinson 63 JP 295 36 Yuill v Y. (1945) 1 All ER 183 CA; Jones v. National Coal Board (1957) 2 All ER 155 CA. 37 (1994) 4 All ER 139, CA
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These and other relatives sought judicial review of the coroner's decision to
continue with the inquest, and it was held that the coroner's comments had
been injudicious, insensitive and gratuitously insulting giving rise to an
appearance of bias.
Locabail v Bayfield Properties38
. Guidance was laid down as to the type of
interest that might disqualify a judge, magistrate or juror from hearing a
particular case. It was held that there should be automatic disqualification if
any pecuniary interest exists. The question is not whether the judge has some
link with a party involved in a case before him, but whether the outcome of
that case could, realistically, affect the judge's interest. It was further held that
a judge should not disqualify him/herself because of religion, ethnic or
national origin, gender, age, class, means or sexual orientation of the judge,
social or educational, or service or employment, background or history, nor on
his political associations or membership of social or sporting or charitable
bodies.
R v Marylebone Magistrates' Court ex p Perry 39
The defendant was guilty
of disorderly conduct after an anti-apartheid demonstration. At his trial he
gave evidence which included a long denunciation of the evils of apartheid;
after 15 minutes the magistrate said he intended to "improve the shining hour"
with some other work, and spent the next ten minutes signing warrants. It was
held that there is a fundamental judicial duty for the court to give the case in
hand its undivided attention.
In 1852, the case of Dimes v Grand Junction Canal40
gave an
interpretation of judges‘ impartiality. Lord Cottenham (LC) held a substantial
block of shares in a canal company that brought a case in equity against a
landowner. His holding was then discovered and an application made to have
the Chancellor's decision set aside. The court held that although there was no
suggestion that the Lord Chancellor had in fact been influenced by his interest
in the company, no case should be decided by a judge with a financial interest
in the outcome. The Chancellor's orders would therefore be set aside as such,
but those of the Vice-Chancellor (to the same effect) were confirmed.
The Judges ―track record‖ of antipathy towards the defendant‘s expert
witnesses in personal injury cases, and his attitude towards them in the
38 (2000) 1 All ER 65 39 (1992) Crim LR 514, DC 40 (1852) HL
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particular case under appeal may warrant a retrial.41
It has been held that in
some instances, there may be no ―track record‖ but a judge may intervene in a
way that appears to show impatience, incredulity or hostility to one party or
his witnesses42
In Heffer v Tiffin Green,43
was set aside on the grounds that the judge has
(in Henry LJ‘s words), decided the case “without sufficient regard being paid
to the building blocks of the reasoned judicial process”.
In Jones v National Coal Board44
it was held that a retrial would have to be
ordered because the judge misconducted himself at trial by over-frequent
interventions and usurpation of the role of counsel:
The statutory provisions set out in section 165 of the Evidence Ordinance permit judges to
question witnesses and accused to elicit truth during judicial proceedings and order the
production of documents and things subject to the limitations stated therein. In essence the
judicial authorities safely conclude that the judge‘s right to intervention has limitations, and
the Judge should not consider that they have been given a carte blanche where the rules of
the evidence could be ignored when exercising the powers vested under section 165 of the
Evidence Ordinance.
The law is an adroit mixture of customs that are beneficial to society, and could be followed
even if no law existed, and others that are of advantage to a ruling minority, but harmful to
the masses of men, and can be enforced on them only by terror.
- Peter Kroptokin, Words of a Rebel
41 Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568 42 Galea v Galea (1990) 19 NSW LR 263 43 (1998) All ER (D) 750 44 (1957) 2 QB 55
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The Law of Public Nuisance
In a Nutshell
Geethani Wijesinghe (LLM Colombo)
District Judge, Mahiyangana
History of the Law of Public Nuisance runs back to couple of centuries. It is initially used
to protect the public health and the ordinary comfort and welfare of the people. Today it has
a new dimension as a popular tool of protecting the environment.
Law of Public Nuisance is widely used in Sri Lanka and in other South Asian countries,
especially in India in protecting human health and environment. Therefore, it is worthwhile
to discuss the salient features and the applicability of this law.
1. What is Public Nuisance?
The term ‗Public Nuisance‘ is defined as an offence in section 261 of the Penal Code of Sri
Lanka.
The above section defines public nuisance as any act, or an illegal omission, which causes
any common injury, danger or annoyance to the public or to the people in general who dwell
or occupy property in the vicinity, or which must necessarily cause injury, obstruction,
danger or annoyance to persons who may have occasion to use any public right.
This is the penal section under which and anybody who causes a public nuisance could be
punished. However, the public who is subjected to the injury, danger or annoyance by such
nuisance needs a better remedy than punishing the offender. In that context, Chapter IX of
the Code of Criminal Procedure Act No.15 of 1979 comes into the picture. Chapter IX (from
section 98 to 106) of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act provides for remedies for public
nuisance by empowering Magistrates to abate such nuisances.
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There are two kinds of nuisances namely Private Nuisance and Public Nuisance. As this
article focuses on the aspects of Public Nuisance, it is important to know the difference
between the two kinds.
Private Nuisance constitutes a tort or civil wrong which affects a particular individual while
Public Nuisance is considered as a criminal offence which affects a community or public at
large. The following authorities are important in understanding the difference between
private and public nuisance.
1.1 Barking of a dog which affects a single family is not a Public Nuisance
Nair vs. Costa (28 NLR 385)
Appellant is the owner of a dog and has been convicted under section 283 of the Penal Code
with committing a public nuisance. He was charged for failing to take necessary precautions
to prevent his dog barking continuously at night and thereby disturbing the repose of the
public who dwell or occupy property in the vicinity, and causing annoyance to them. The
evidence showed that the only person who complained of the barking was the Police
Magistrate of Matale.
It was held by Dalton J, that the Magistrate who tried the case has not directed his mind to
the essential difference between a private nuisance and a nuisance to the public or the people
in general as set is out in section 261.1
It was further held that a in a similar case reported long ago, known as ‗The Dog Case”
(1872 (P. C, Colombo, 3,901, (1872) Grenier's Reports, p. 25- Creasy C. J) that it is
necessary that the nuisance should be such as to annoy tire neighboring community
generally and not merely some particular person. In that case the plaint alleged that the
howling of the defendant's dog disturbed the repose of the public, but the proof adduced
established that the inmates of one house only were disturbed. That, it was held, was
insufficient to support the conviction.2
In De Silva v. De Silva. (1915) 1 (C.W.R.) 98, the Magistrate had ordered the removal of a
coconut tree as likely to fall and cause injury to persons living or carrying on business in the
neighborhood or passing by. De Sampayo J. on the same reasoning, held that, the section
provided for a case in which the part of the public living in the place where the nuisance
exists are generally affected, and that a single man and his family who complain against the
next door neighbor are not within the contemplation of the section.3
1 28 NLR 385 at pg 386 2 ibid 3 ibid
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1.2 A tree standing on a neighbour’s land which is likely to fall is not a Public
Nuisance.
Sinna Gura vs. Inspector of Police, karawanella (61 NLR 186)
The evidence in this case showed that the damage which was likely to be caused by the Jak
tree in question would be confined to the complainant and the members of his family.
It was held by Sinnetamby J. that the section 105 of the Criminal Procedure Code
(corresponding section in the old Criminal Procedure Code) applies to public, and not to
private, nuisances. A Magistrate, therefore, is not entitled to make an order under that
section in respect of a tree standing on a neighbour's land although it is likely to fall down
and damage buildings of the complainant and injure members of his family.4
1.3 Nuisance affecting one household would not amount to a Public
Nuisance.
Somapala Fernando vs. S.C. Fernando 2002 (3) SLR 389
The Complainant complained that the Respondent is about to construct a brick kiln close to
his house, and that if constructed it would emit smoke and pose a threat to the health of the
inmates of the house. And the smoke would cause loss of his property and the burning of
tyres close to his house would cause pollution of the environment. The Magistrate's Court
discharged the Respondent after an inquiry. The High Court acting in revision quashed the
order of the Magistrate's Court and directed the Magistrate to order the Respondent to
demolish or terminate operations, and remove the brick kiln.
It was held that the evidence led in the Magistrate's Court at best goes to prove a private
nuisance as opposed to a public nuisance, the only witnesses being the husband and wife.5
2. Applicability of the term ‘Public’
The definition under section 261 of the Penal Code says that the acts which are mentioned in
the section should affect the ‗public‘ or ‗the people in general who dwell or occupy property
in the vicinity‘. This reflects that the nuisance could be one which affects the public at large
or a particular community in the vicinity, which is the common scenario. Section 98 (1) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure Act stipulates the instances where a Public Nuisance could
arise and both the terms ‗public‘ and ‗community‘ used therein as well. Section 98 (4)
further clarifies that a ‗public place‘ includes property belongs to the State, a corporation or
vested in any public officer or Department of state for public purposes and ground left
unoccupied for sanitary and recreative purposes.
4 61 NLR 186 at p.187 5 2002 (3) SLR 389 at p.392
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2.1 ‘Public’ does not always mean public at large. Even the community in the
vicinity who affects by the nuisance can effectively get the remedy under
these provisions
Saram vs. Seneviratne (21 NLR 190)
The Appellant is the proprietor of an oil store at Charlce Place, Colepity, where coopering is
carried on during the day and sometimes also in the night. The noise created by the constant
hammering on barrels is calculated to injure the health and physical comfort of the person's
resident in the neighborhood. Neighbors sought relief under chapter IX of the Criminal
Procedure Code and the Magistrate ordered the appellant to abate the nuisance.
It was decided by De Sampayo J, that a nuisance which affects only those who living in the
neighborhood and not necessarily the public in general, may be the subject of proceedings
under this chapter.6
The relevant sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act reads as that any trade or
occupation or the keeping of any goods or merchandise should by reason of its being
injurious to the health or physical comfort of the community be suppressed or prohibited.
Though in some paragraphs of the same section refers to the word ‗public' here it speaks
about the community.
2.2 Placing of a bag of rice alongside the public road is not a Public Nuisance
Lewis vs. Meera Lebbe (3 NLR 138)
A person, who was unloading a boat laden with rice in bags, placed a bag of rice on the road
alongside the canal. The plaintiff's horse and carriage came along the road at a walking pace.
Just as they came near the spot where the bag was lying, the defendant tried to pull the bag
further away from the wheel track, and this act was supposed to have caused the horse to
shy. The horse turned suddenly round, the driver fell off the box, and the horse, being thus
left uncontrolled, ran away and damaged the carriage and harness.
Plaintiff claimed that this is an act of a public nuisance and negligence. Bonser, CJ held that
the mere placing of a bag of rice by the roadside is in itself an unreasonable user of the road,
or necessarily a public nuisance.7
3. Procedure stipulated under Chapter IX of the Code of
Criminal Procedure Act No.15 of 1979
While section 261 of the Penal Code broadly defines what a Public Nuisance is, section
98(1) of the Code of Criminal procedure Act (hereinafter referred to as the Code) describes
6 21 NLR 190 at pg 191 7 3 NLR 138 at pg 140
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what the types of activities which amounts to public nuisance. This section consists of five
sub sections and a Magistrate should see whether the information he receives falls within the
ambit of such five categories. Having considered so, the Magistrate is empowered to issue a
conditional order requiring the person who is causing such public nuisance to abate the
same. The nature of the conditional orders is further specified in the same section.
Once a conditional order is made, it should be served on the person against whom the order
was made, in the manner in which the summons is being served. Under section 99 (2), there
are provisions to the effect that a copy of the order to be posted in such a place as the court
may consider fittest for conveying information to such person, in the event the conditional
order cannot be served.
Upon receiving the conditional order the person against whom the order is made has two
options to be followed.
a. Comply with the conditions mentioned in the order, or
b. Appear before the Magistrate and move to have the order set aside or modified.
It is a misconception that the person who received the conditional order, has no option but to
comply with it forthwith. If he intends to move court to set aside or to modify the order, he
does not have to comply with the conditions until the conditional order is made absolute at
the end of the inquiry. If the Magistrate considers that the immediate measures should be
taken to abate the public nuisance, he is empowered under section 104 of the Code, to issue
an injunction forthwith against whom the order was made.
Upon receiving the conditional order, if such person, within the stipulated time moves court
to have the order set aside or modified, the Magistrate should fix the matter for inquiry.
After a due inquiry, in the event the conditional order make absolute, the Magistrate should
give notice to such person requiring him to comply with the conditions of the order. A
person shall be punishable under section 185 of the Penal Code in the following instances;
a. Having receiving the conditional order and without complying it, if he fails to
appear before court and moves to have the order set aside or modified,
b. If he fails to comply with the order once it is made absolute.
This is a very effective provision where the industries are involved in polluting the
environment and thereby creating public nuisances. Section 100 (2) (1) of the Code provides
that when such person is a corporate body, every Director is liable for the penalty under
section 185 of the Penal Code, unless he proves that such default is not due to an act or
omission on his part.
When the notice of the absolute order was served on a person who is creating a public
nuisance and if he fails to perform required acts within the stipulated time frame, the
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Magistrate is empowered by section 103 of the Code to cause it to be performed and recover
the cost of performing from such person. Magistrate is further empowered to order any
person not to repeat or continue a public nuisance under section 105 of the Code.
4. Important information and relevant authorities to be
considered in dispensing justice under the law of Public
Nuisance.
4.1 Can a Magistrate receive information by his own senses? Yes
Forest v. Leefe (13 NLR 119)
The Respondent was Messrs. Clark, Spence & Co., Galle who is carrying out coopering
operations in the vicinity of the Magistrate‘s Court, Galle, making it impossible for the
Magistrate, Lawyers, the staff and the witnesses to hear each other in court proceedings.
Magistrate initiated the proceedings of the public nuisance and the case was heard by
another Magistrate.
It was argued by the Respondent that the procedure is irregular as the Magistrate himself has
initiated the proceedings. Middleton J held, that a public nuisance as described in section
261 of the Penal Code is an offence under the Code, and this would enable the Magistrate to
act on his own knowledge or suspicion under section 148 (c), and that no objection to his
obtaining information direct through his own sense of hearing of the fact of its presumptive
existence and acting thereon under section 105 and making a conditional order.8
4.2 When it is prayed for a removal of an obstruction from a public place,
first it should be proved that the place is ‘public'
Sandrasegra vs. Sinnatamby (25 NLR 139)
A well was sunk about forty years ago in the outer courtyard of a Hindu temple where the
people of the Mukkuwa caste worshipped. Christian Mukkuwas had also drawn water from
the well without any objection during this period. Later the Hindu Mukkuwas refused to
allow the Christian Mukkuwas to draw water from the well, and enclosed the well with a
fence. A riot took place, and the fence was pulled down. It was re-erected by the Hindus.
The Manager applied to Court for a conditional order under section 105 of the Criminal
Procedure Code that the obstruction be removed, and that the well be thrown open for public
use until the Hindu Mukkuwas establish their exclusive right to the well.
8 13 NLR 119 at pg 124
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It was held by Jayawardene A.J, that under section 105 it was essential that the person
asking for an order should establish that the place from which the obstruction is to be
removed is a public place.9 Christian Mukkuwas were failed in proving the well is a public
place by grant executed according to the law, by immemorial usage or by dedication
otherwise than by Deed.
4.3 Particular trade and the place should be specified in the order
Cader Saibo vs. Branha ( 2 NLR 302)
Oder issued by the Magistrate in this case states that ‗to suppress or remove the tannery
within fifteen days‘
It was held by the Lawrie J. that an order by a Police Magistrate to suppress a public
nuisance must specify the particular trade or occupation, and the place in which it is carried
on10
and that it has been made to appear to the Magistrate that the trade is injurious to public
health or comfort for causes stated.11
4.4 Conditional order should specify the enactment under which it is made;
but it will not necessarily invalidate the proceedings
In the Forest vs. Leefe it was argued that the conditional order, which was afterwards made
absolute, is bad on the face of it. Order reads as follows;
‗Whereas it has been made to appear to me that you are carrying on, as Manager of Messrs.
Clark, Spence & Co., Galle, the trade or occupation of coopering, and the noise proceeding
from the coopering yard seriously interferes with the business of this Court, it being
frequently impossible to hear what is being said.‘
It does not state the enactment under which it is made. It was held by Hutchinson, CJ that it
is, of course, irregular and that it should have followed the words of the enactment by
alleging that the coopering is injurious to the physical comfort of the community.12
However, it was decided that the judgment of the magistrate should not be set aside due to
this irregularity as it does not warrant any failure of justice. It was further held that the
appellant had ample notice what the complaint against him was and he made no objection to
the form of the order then or in his petition of appeal and therefore this objection should not
prevail now.13
9 25 NLR 139 at pg 142 10 2 NLR 302 at pg 302 11 2 NLR 302 at pg 303 12 13 NLR 119 at pg 123 13 ibid
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4.5 Respondent has the right to begin at the inquiry
Greena Fernando vs. Teckla saparamadu (1990) 1 SLR 270
The complainant filed a report in terms of section 98(1), complaining that the Respondents
obstructed a water course that went across a road and their respective gardens. Thereupon
the learned Magistrate made a conditional order against respondents not to interfere with the
watercourse and to allow it to take its original course. One Respondent sought to have the
order set aside in terms of section 98(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act. The learned
Magistrate having taken evidence at the inquiry, made the conditional order absolute.
The Respondent appealed on the sole ground that the Magistrate had misdirected himself on
the question as to which party should "begin" in the proceedings under section 101(1). The
Magistrate had made order that the Respondent should begin.
It was held by P.R.P. Perera J. that on a consideration of the relevant provisions and the
scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act, No. 15 of 1979, it would appear to be clear
that the party who moves to have the order set aside or modified must in the first instance
adduce evidence to show that the order is not reasonable and proper.14
4.6 It is irregular to hold an inquiry without issuing a conditional order at the
first instance
Elal Jayantha vs. Officeri- in- Charge, Police Station, Panadura (1986) 1 SLR 334
On receiving a report by Police that appellant was committing a nuisance to the neighbours
by working a metal crushing machine which emitted a deafening noise and dust carrying
particles of metal thus creating a health hazard, the Magistrate held an inquiry and made a
finding that in fact a nuisance had been created. Upon receiving the information Magistrate
first issued notice on both parties and held an inquiry thereafter.
Seneviratne J. held that it is quite clear that the Chap. IX, under which this report was made
to Court required the Magistrate to preliminarily satisfy himself in terms of section 98(1) of
the Code, and then to make a conditional order. After such conditional order is made section
98(2) operates.15
4.7 Burden of proof of the Public Nuisance lies with the complainant
Walahenage Kularatne vs. Wipula Dharmadasa (Weligama Metal Quarry Case)
CA (PHC) No. 153/97- Decided on - 04/05/2001
14 (1990) 1 SLR 270 at p 274 15 (1986) 1 SLR 334 at p 336
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Proceedings were instituted on an information report filed in the Magistrate Court under the
section 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act. It was alleged that the quarrying
operations carried by the Respondent is injurious to the health or physical comfort of the
community. The Magistrate made a conditional order requiring the Respondent to
suppress/remove the quarrying operations acting under section 104 (1). After an inquiry the
conditional order was made absolute.
The Respondent thereupon, sought to revise the said order before the Provincial High Court
and the High Court Judge set aside the Order of the Magistrate.
Having aggrieved by the said order the Complainant appealed to the Court of Appeal. It was
argued before the Court of Appeal that the order of the learned High Court Judge was
erroneous for the reason that he has placed the burden of proving the public nuisance on the
Complainant when in terms of Section 98 (2) the burden is on the Respondent.
It was held by Jayasinghe J. that in the final order the learned Magistrate has to consider the
entire case in the light of the evidence placed by both the Appellants and the Respondent;
both at the stage the conditional order is made and evaluation of evidence before final order
and has to decide whether the acts complained of constitute a Public Nuisance. To do this he
has to have in mind the overall burden cast on the Appellant. (Complainant)
4.8 When a person asserts a bona fide claim to the property as private, an
opportunity should be given to prove the same
Hendirick Mendis vs. Sri Chandrasekera Mudliyar (12 NLR 33)
This is an appeal against an order made absolute for the removal of an obstruction to a road.
The order seems to have been intended to be made under section 105 of the Criminal
Procedure Code. There was no strong evidence to support the findings that the road is a
public way.
The appellant's objections are that he made a reasonable claim in good faith that the road is
his private property, over which the public have no rights.
It was held by Hutchinson, CJ that this is eminently a case in which the appellant should
have been given an opportunity of bringing an action against the man who is asserting his
right to use the road; in that action the question can be tried whether the defendant has a
private right, or whether he has a right as a member of the public, or whether he has any
right at all.‘ Therefore it was decided that the Magistrate ought to have given him an
opportunity of proving that claim by a civil action; and also that the road is one which is or
may be lawfully used by the public, which was chiefly directly to the question whether the
road was a public road or not.16
16 12 NLR 33 at pg 34
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5. Selected authorities on the nature of evidence of a
Public Nuisance
5.1 Disturbing noise is sufficient evidence of injurious to the health of people.
In Forest vs. Leefe, it was decided that existence of a noise which, in witnesses‘ opinion, is
a nuisance to those having duties to perform in a public Court and prevent the hearing of the
proceedings, is sufficient to show that their physical comfort is interfered with and injured.
It affects the comfort of all who have business to transact in the public Police Court, and this
is sufficient evidence of its injury to the community in general.17
5.2 In the case of a nuisance from smells, it is sufficient to prove that they are
offensive to the senses
Held in R. v. Neil [ 2 C. & P. 435.]18
5.3 Emission of noise could be a public nuisance
Al Haj M.T.M. Ashik and Four Others, trustees of Kapuwatta Mohideen Jumma Mosque,
Denipitiya weligama vs. R.P.S. Bandula, OIC Weligama (SCFR Application No. 38/2005)
Decided on – 9/11/ 2007
A Fundamental Rights Application was instituted by the Trustees of the Kapuwatta
Mohideen Jumma Mosque complaining that the Weligama police has imposed certain
restrictions on use of loudspeakers and had not imposed such restrictions on two other
mosques in the area.
It was held by Sarath N. Silva CJ, among other findings, that the emission of noise by the
use of amplifiers, loudspeakers or other equipments or appliances which caused
annoyingness to the public or to the people in general who dwell or occupy property in the
vicinity be considered a public nuisance in terms of section 261 of the penal code and that
the police should entertain complaints and take appropriate action for the abatement of such
public nuisance.
17 13 NLR 119 at pg 124 18 13 NLR 119 at pg 125
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6. Possible invalid defences taken up in Public Nuisance
cases
6.1 Particular act is being done for a long time, and the community settled in
the vicinity at a later stage
Forest vs. Leefe (13 NLR 119)
It was argued in this case for the Respondent that where a thing has been done for a great
many years, a right to go on doing it is acquired, even though it may have become a
nuisance, and that if people then go and live within reach of it, they must put up with it.
Hutchinson, CJ held that it is not the law that a man can by long continuance of his practice
acquire a right to carry on a business in such a way as to be a public nuisance. If the place
where he carried it on was at first surrounded by land on which there were no dwellings, but
houses gradually approach it so that it becomes a nuisance to the inhabitants, they have a
tight to have it abated. He cannot by making injurious noises or smells for a long time
deprive the public of the right to live peaceably and comfortably on the land near him. The
doctrine that a man who " goes to " a nuisance has no legal right to have it abated is not now
accepted; the only question is whether or not the thing complained of is a nuisance.19
6.2 Bona fide claim by the Respondent
It is argued in the same case (Forest vs. Leefe) that the Appellant set up a bona fide claim of
right, and so the Magistrate's jurisdiction was ousted. It was held that a man cannot set up a
bona fide claim of right to commit a public nuisance, unless he is empowered by statute to
do so.20
6.3 A public nuisance is not excused on the ground that it causes some
convenience or advantage
This is specifically mentioned in section 261 of the Penal Code and an accepted principle in
the law of public nuisance.
6.4 Do the provisions of National Environmental Act oust the jurisdiction of a
Magistrate acting under section 98 of the Criminal procedure Code? No
This is an invalid defence which is taken up by Respondents often in the Magistrate‘s Courts
in respect of trade or industries which possess environmental Protection Licenses. The
Judgment of Keangnam Enterprises Ltd vs. Abeysinghe and Others (1994) 2 SLR 271, is
used to substantiate the above point of law, which contains a misleading head note on the
19 13 NLR 119at pg 122 & 123 20 13 NLR 119at pg 123
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Law Report. The relevant portion of the head note of the Sri Lanka Law Report reads as
follows;
‗If the Petitioner-Company had the Environmental Protection Licence at the time when the
Informant-Respondents complained to the Magistrates' Court, then the Magistrate would
have had no jurisdiction to entertain and determine the application (section 29 of the
National Environmental Act). As the Petitioner-Company has the licence now it can make
the appropriate application to the Magistrate.‘21
But a careful reading of the contents of the judgment would reveal that Ananda Grero J. was
not of the view that National Environmental Act ousts the jurisdiction conferred on the
Magistrate under section 98 of the Code.
The Respondent Company had established a metal quarry and the Informant filed papers in
the Magistrate's Court complaining of a public nuisance created by the the operation of the
said quarry, and sought reliefs under Sections 98(1) and 104(1) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure Act. The learned Magistrate granted an injunction restraining the operation of the
quarry and also entered a conditional order for the removal of the public nuisance caused by
the said quarry.
Thereafter the Respondent-Company made an application in revision to the Court of Appeal
and the main argument was that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to make any order under
Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act in view of the provisions of the National
Environmental Act.
It is mandatory to obtain a license from the Central Environmental Authority under the
provisions of Section 23(A) of the National Environmental Act in order to carry out
operations of the quarry in question. But no license has been obtained by the Company when
it commenced of its operations.
Though the Respondent Company was without a license at the time when the case was filed
and argued before the Magistrate‘s Court, they have produced a License in the cause of the
argument before the Court of Appeal. Therefore the main issue which had been discussed in
the case was the implications of not having a license at the commencement of the
operations. That is why the court has decided that if the Respondent had a license when they
appeared before Magistrate, they could have invoked relief by using the License. It does not
mean that the Magistrate does not have jurisdiction to hear a case under section 98 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure Act. The said view is reflected from the following quotation
from the Judgment.
‗This Court is of the view that in order to invoke the provisions of the Act (National
Environmental Act), the Petitioner-Company should possess a license granted by the
Authority. It is only the license granted by the Authority in terms of the Act which paves the
21 (1994) 2 SLR 271 at pg 271
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way to the Petitioner-Company to rely upon the provisions of the Act, when it appeared
before the learned Magistrate‘22…..‘If the Petitioner-Company had the licence granted by
the Authority at the time the Informant-Respondents made their application to the
Magistrate's Court, and at the time the learned Magistrate made his orders, and when
submissions were made on behalf of the Petitioner-Company that the learned Magistrate had
no jurisdiction to entertain and make a determination on such application, then it could be
held that the Petitioner-Company was entitled to invoke or rely upon the provisions of
the Act; but not otherwise.(emphasis added) In the circumstances, it could not be held
that the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction (emphasis added) to entertain and make
orders under Chapter IX of the Code in view of the provisions of the Act; and more
particularly in view of Section 29 of the Act.‘23
Court further held that even in the instance that the company has the license and if
conditions are violated and such violation becomes a nuisance to the people living in the
neighborhood, it would then be possible for such people to make an application under the
provisions of Chapter IX of the Code to abate such nuisance.24
However, this confusing situation had been cleared by the following subsequent judgments
by the Court of Appeal, and there is no ambiguity on the point, at present.
R. Premasiri Weerasekera and four others vs. Keangnam Enterprises Limited - Court of
appeal case No. CA (PHC) APN No. 40/2004- Decided on -26th
May 2009
The Respondent has established a metal quarry and the Petitioners complained of a public
nuisance caused by the activity of the said quarry under section 98 (1) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure Act. After receiving such information, the Magistrate issued a
conditional order abating the operations of the quarry. While complying with the order, the
Respondent raised a preliminary objection quoting the decision of Keangnam vs.
Abeysinghe contending that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction as the company has obtained
an Environmental Protection License. The Magistrate over-ruled the preliminary objection
and the Respondent sought relief from the High Court and got the order of the Magistrate
quashed. Thereafter the Petitioners moved the Court of Appeal in revision against the order
of the high Court.
Anil Gunaratne J. held that the only way in which the jurisdiction of the Magistrate could be
ousted is to include clear, specific provisions to oust such jurisdiction. One cannot by
reading section 29 of the National Environmental Act conclude that the Magistrate‘s
jurisdiction has been ousted. It is further held that there is no inconsistency or repugnancy
between the provisions of the code of Criminal Procedure pertaining to nuisance and of the
National Environmental Act. The Code is geared to remove or abate nuisances whilst the
National Environmental Act seeks to control pollution and noise.
22 (1994) 2 SLR 271at pg 280 23 ibid 24 (1994) 2 SLR 271at pg 281
JSA LAW JOURNAL 2014
Judicial Service Association of Sri Lanka www.jsasl.org
390
Singalanka Standards Chemicals Limited vs. Thalangama Appuhamilage Sirisena and
others – CA 85/98 Decided on- 01/10/2009
Similar objection was taken by a Respondent Factory which was manufacturing Aluminum
Sulphate (Alum) and thereby creating a public nuisance to the neighboring community.
Ranjith Silva J. analyzed in detail the relevant legal principles and has made it crystal clear
that the National Environmental Act does not oust the jurisdiction of a Magistrate vested
under section 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Act. It is stated that ‗the jurisdiction to
try public nuisance matters should go unhampered and undeterred or untrammeled by the
ordinary rules which apply in ordinary matters to restrict the jurisdiction of the Magistrate‘s
Court.
Punishment is now unfashionable, because it creates moral distinctions among men, which,
to the democratic mind, are odious. We prefer a meaningless collective guilt to a meaningful
individual responsibility
- Thomas Szasz