j_raguz.pdf

7172019 J_Raguzpdf

httpslidepdfcomreaderfulljraguzpdf 110

143

UDK 930(49711)321(4975) Izvorni znanstveni članak Received October 26 2011 Accepted December 14 2011

ldquoTHE CROATS HAVE NO RIGHTS TO A

STATErdquo 983085 SERBIAN HISTORIOGRAPHYAUTOBIOGRAPHERS AND PUBLICISTS ON

CROATIAN STATE INDEPENDENCE

Jakša RAGUŽ

By analyzing a number of authors from the body of contemporary Serbianhistoriography memoirs and current aairs writing the author provides aninsight into the standpoints on the establishmentrenewal of Croatian stateindependence

Key words Croatian state independence Serbian historiography memoirsand current aairs writing Homeland War

The genocide in the Independent State of Croatia during World War II perpetrated against Serbs Jews and Roma was the responsibility of all ldquowhowere at that moment Croats their children grandchildren and great-grandchil-dren all and forever regardless of whether they were fascists or antifascistsand even regardless of whether their loved ones were killed together with theSerbs Jews and Romardquo Anyone who believes that this is a quote from thework of some zealous Greater Serbian ideologue is mistaken This is a citationfrom the book Otac (lsquoFatherrsquo) by Miljenko Jergović a person who publiclydeclares himself a Croat1 Why begin a text dealing with Serbian historiogra-

phy memoirs and current affairs writing with a quote from a book written bya person considered a Croatian writer In order to engender an understandingthat these and other debased theories about the collective guilt of the Croa-

tian people which among other things preclude their right to their nationalfreedom and state independence ndash which shall be portrayed herein - are notspecic to the written word of a single (in this case Serbian) people ratherthey are the product of a mental outlook which is odd to the say the least and

Jakša Raguž Ph D Croatian Institute of History Zagreb Republic of Croatia1 Miljenko Jergović Otac (Belgrade Rende 2010) p 16

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J RAGUŽ ldquote Croats Have no Rights to a Staterdquo - Serbian Historiography Autobiographers and

144

which may be found among individuals and smaller groups in all peoples ofthe world

Serbian historiography memoirs and current aairs writing on the estab-

lishmentrenewal of Croatian state independence may be described as nega-tivistic ie the dominant position is that the Croatian nation had no right tothe establishment of statehood in 1991 However even within this stance thereare three theories as to the extent to which the Croatian nation did not havethis right and why

1 e rst provisionally called the most hard-core is that the Croatiannation as such did not have the right to an independent state at alland had to remain in the federal Yugoslavia or some other form ofthis Yugoslav state

2 e second somewhat soer but the most pervasive is that theCroatian nation was entitled to depart from Yugoslavia and form anation state but that it should not have been established within theexisting borders of the Republic of Croatia which within this line ofthought also encompasses Serbian ethnic territories

3 e third is that Croatia as a federal unit of Yugoslavia theoreticallyhad the right to constitute itself as an independent state albeit withtwo major caveats rst its internal order could not be structuredas a nation state of the Croatian people but as a civic state andsecond this right to independence was restricted and even lost bythe chauvinistic policies of the Croatian state authorities vis-agrave-vis itscitizens of Serbian ethnicity

Several of the most prominent examples of these three positions from theelds of historiography memoirs and current aairs writing are presented aswell as the reasons specied as the grounds for these views

An exemplar of the rst most hard-core group which negates the rightof the Croatian nation to a state is historian Nikola Žutić from the Instituteof Contemporary History in Belgrade and his book Rimokatolička crkva ihrvatstvo ndash od ilirske ideje do velikohrvatske realizacije 1453-1941 (Te RomanCatholic Church and Croatianism ndash From the Illyrian Idea to Greater CroatianRealization 1453-1941) which was published by this Institute In it Žutić setsforth from the thesis that the Croats do not exist as a nation rather they arethe result of a vast virtually worldwide conspiracy against the Orthodox SerbsŽutićrsquos thesis is that in the early Middle Ages there was a small state of a Slavicpeople called Croats However both this state and that nation disappeared inthe tidal wave of the Ottoman incursions in Europe or more accurately theyremained ldquoin tracesrdquo in some parts of todayrsquos Croatia During the early modernperiod the Catholic Church attempted to convert the Orthodox Serbs whichsucceeded only partially us together with pan-German anti-Slav Austria it

7172019 J_Raguzpdf


R C H -

145

created a conspiracy ie a far-reaching project which had at its core to imposeupon the Catholic Serbs the name of that extinct nation ndash the Croats ndash andthereby shatter the unity of the Serbian national body is conspiracy suc-

ceeded and the Croats emerged But this was only the beginning of this con-

spiracyrsquos actualization e next phase was to implement the Greater Croatianidea ie the creation of a large Croatian Catholic nation state in the territorieswhich the Catholic Church wanted to place under its domination e expan-

sion of the Croatian state also signied the expansion of the Catholic Churchie this state became the tool the means in the Catholic Churchrsquos missionaryactivities aimed at the unyielding Orthodox Serbs In order to fabricate certainrights in the implementation of this conspiratorial project Croatian Catholichistoriography was created which employed unreliable and most oen forgedhistorical data and creative ideological constructs to formulate a historicalmyth ie an entire quasi-history of a ctitious nation ndash and Žutićrsquos book is

dedicated to exposing it2

us Žutić considers the Croats non-existent as a nation an articial na-

tion created by the Catholic Church and pan-German political circles in orderto serve their march toward the east ie to establish the domination of theCatholic Church and the German nation over the Orthodox Slavs primarilythe Serbs us the Croatian state as the tool of this criminal conspiracy isneither permissible nor possible and the Serbian nation if it wishes to pre-

serve its religious and national identity had to and still must oppose it

Another historian Kosta Čavoški also advocates the view that the Cro-

ats have no right to an independent nation state Unlike Žutić he does notdelve into questions of ethnogenesis rather he attempts to nd support forhis views in international and state law In the foreword to the monograph Re-

publika Srpska Krajina (lsquoRepublic of Serbian Krajinarsquo ndash a work by a large groupof authors)3 Čavoški provides a chronological overview of the emergence ofthe so-called Republic of Serbian Krajina and he claims that the reason forthe Serbian rebellion and secession from Croatia is that Croatia forcefully andillegitimately that is ldquounconstitutionally withdrew from Yugoslavia and pro-

claimed its state independencerdquo4 ereaer his text contains a rather extensiveexposition in which he negates the right of the Croats and Croatia to self-determination including secession from Yugoslavia His assertion rests in thedeclaration made by UN Secretary General U Tant in 1970 that the UnitedNations will not acknowledge the secession of a portion of any UN memberstate Furthermore he points out that the Constitution of the Socialist Federal

2 Nikola Žutić Rimokatolička crkva i hrvatstvo - od ilirske ideje do velikohrvatske realizacije1453-1941 Belgrade 19973 Kosta Čavoški ldquoNastanak Republike Srpske Krajine i njen međunarodni položajrdquo in Repub-lika Srpska Krajina (Knin ndash Belgrade Srpsko kulturno društvo ldquoSava Mrkaljrdquo ndash Topusko andSrpsko kulturno društvo ldquoZorardquo ndash Knin 1996) pp 11-244 Ibid pp 11-12

7172019 J_Raguzpdf



146

Republic of Yugoslavia from 1974 stipulates that the countryrsquos borders can-

not be altered without consensus among all members of the federation whichCroatia allegedly violated with its unilateral and unconstitutional secessionirdly he argues that Croatia had already consummated its right to self-de-

termination when it joined Yugoslavia and that this right no longer existserefore Croatiarsquos referral to the right to self-determination when it with-

drew from Yugoslavia was neither valid nor justied and this in turn prompt-ed the Serbs to rebel against this abuse of valid legislation5 Čavoški attempts toexplain the fact that Croatia was nonetheless recognized by the internationalcommunity by claiming it was an international diplomatic subterfuge Accord-

ing to him the worldrsquos states feared a replay of the Yugoslav case within theirown borders and the secession of individual provinces so these events werenot ldquopresented as a consequence of unilateral and unconstitutional secessionrather as an ancillary outcome of Yugoslaviarsquos collapse whose genuine reasons

were not explained but rather concealedrdquo6

Something of a transition between the rst and second position ie be-

tween the rst that the Croats have no right to a state and the second that theyhave this right within a limited territorial scope can be found in the theoriesof historian Vasilije Krestić In his book Genocidom do Velike Hrvatske (lsquoToGreater Croatia by Genocidersquo) Krestić explains why the Croats cannot cre-

ate their own nation state7 e rst reason he says is that the Croatian stateand historical right is an ordinary falsehood8 A second much worse claim isactually aimed against the natural right of the Croatian nation to a state whichneed not be linked to the historical right Krestićrsquos thesis is that the Croats as

a nation essentially are entitled to a state However for him the problem isthat they opted for a nation state model that is not a classical state but rathera criminal project an ldquoogre-staterdquo for apparently the component calling forthe extermination of the Serbs in the territories which must become a part ofthis state rests in its foundations as an integral inextricable part According toKrestić the creators of Croatian national consciousness systematically gener-ated anti-Serbian hatred keeping in mind that just the existence of the Serbiannation constituted the greatest hindrance to the achievement of the idea of aCroatian state In this book he devises a historical hypothesis whereby theCroats from the revolutionary year 1848 to the very moment of the bookrsquos

publication ldquointended to create a large ethnically pure and Catholic Croatianstate us the Serbs not prepared to forsake their national distinctivenessand their Serbian Orthodox faith were constantly in the crosshairs of Croa-

tian political parties and many very distinguished individuals who based theCroatian state idea on the so-called state and historical righthellip e idea of the

5 Ibid pp 13-146 Ibid p 147 Vasilije Krestić Genocidom do Velike Hrvatske (Jagodina 2002)8 Ibid pp 23-61

7172019 J_Raguzpdf


R C H -

147

genocidal annihilation of the Serbs of a large ethnically-pure and CatholicCroatian state has outlasted all statehood frameworks and political and socialsystems As a unifying thread it runs from Ante Starčević Eugen KvaretnikMihovil Pavlinović Josip Frank Frano Supilo Stjepan Radić and Ante Pavelićto Franjo Tuđmanrdquo9 As a picturesque conrmation of Tuđmanrsquos genocidal in-

tent he cites the fabricated testimony of David Fisher the president of theWorld Aairs Council of Northern California According to this testimonyat a diplomatic corps conference in Germany in 1989 Tuđman declared ldquothatwhen he becomes ndash and not if he becomes ndash president of Croatia the groundin Krajina would become red with bloodrdquo10

erefore Krestić concludes the Croats could not create a state in 1991because it necessarily entailed the crime of genocide In his book he furtherasserts that unfortunately despite everything this lsquoogre-statersquo was brought to

life and its character and stance toward the Serbs and overall political life trulyconrms that it should not have been created and that its very existence is adestabilizing factor in this part of Europe Krestić states that upon the close ofthe war in Croatia in 1995 only the method of genocide was altered slightly asit was ndash so he claims ndash perfected ldquois policy is still as it was a century earliercomprehensively rooted in the lsquostate and historical rightrsquo on the institution ofthe Croatian lsquopoliticalrsquo (constitutive) nation on the aspiration to create a largeethnically and religiously (Catholic) pure Croatia As long as this is the caseit should be known that Croatia will not be capable of freeing itself of geno-

cide and that it will not back down from its long-held aspiration to expand

its state borders at the expense of neighbouring ethnic and state territories inorder to improve its not very fortunate geopolitical positionrdquo When readingKrestić one gains the impression that the Republic of Croatia was conceivedand organized as a gigantic concentration camp with the primary objective ofexterminating the Serbs as a nation

e most prominent proponent and advocate of the second position ndash thatthe Croatian nation had the right to leave Yugoslavia and form its nation statebut without those parts of the Republic of Croatia deemed Serbian ethnic ter-ritory ndash is writer Dobrica Ćosić a member of the Serbian Academy of Arts andScience Among the enormous body of works by this spiritual father of mod-

ern Serbian political thought particularly notable are his decade-spanningmemories called ldquoWriterrsquos Notesrdquo a work which even today has cult status inSerbia and which was recently put to lm by Serbian national television Forthis paper I cite the notes written by Ćosić for the third volume which pertainto the 1981-1991 period11

9 Ibid pp 5-610 Ibid p 9111 Dobrica Ćosić Piščevi zapisi (1981-1991) vol III (Belgrade Filip Višnjić 2002)

7172019 J_Raguzpdf



148

In them Ćosić contemplating political events in Croatia in 1990 the elec-

toral victory of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) the ascendancy ofFranjo Tuđman to the presidency and the ensuing changes assessed that Cro-

atia was becoming a ldquochauvinist staterdquo in which the ldquocontinuation of Pavelićrsquospolicy of creating an ethnically cleansed state of Croatiardquo would be implement-ed12 To back his assessment he cites Tuđmanrsquos statement which he character-

izes as an admission made in March 1990 that ldquothe NDH (Independent Stateof Croatia) was not an historical excess by the Croatian nation Pavelićrsquos NDHwas a historical continuation of the Croatian national ideologyrdquo13 e politi-cal changes which followed aer the HDZ assumed power signied for Ćosićthe establishment of ldquoTuđmanrsquos Ustashoid staterdquo14 while he assessed the statusrelegated to the Serbs by Croatiarsquos ldquoChristmas Constitutionrdquo (promulgated justbefore Christmas 1990) as the same status they had ldquounder Ante Pavelić dur-ing Hitlerrsquos time e consequences of this Constitution will be disastrous for

the Serbian people ey will now be compelled to use all necessary means tostruggle for their national and civil rights or to ee from Croatia And theymay also be compelled to convert to Catholicism and become assimilated asCroatsrdquo15 erefore ldquoout of fear of legalized Ustasha ideology and anti-Serbi-anism which has assumed a general and terrorist characterhelliprdquo16 and becauseldquoCroatia with its new Constitution has entirely deprived the Serbian people oftheir rights provoking their bitter resistancerdquo the rebellion by Serbs in Croatiabroke out17 Ćosić commented on the Serbian rebellion thusly ldquoe Serbs inCroatia are once more ghting for Yugoslavia And the Croats donrsquot want itBut the Serbs have no other staterdquo18 us according to Ćosić the situation of

the Serbs in Croatia in 1990 was scarcely endurable e impression is createdthat the Serbs in Croatia were in limbo with mere days before the gates of Hellopened before them

In early 1991 Ćosić asserted that Yugoslavia was breaking apart and hemade peace with the fact that the Croats and Slovenes no longer wish to live init which he saw as a legitimate right of these nations us in January 1991he wrote ldquoRegardless of motive the Serbs should not oppose the political willof the Croats and Slovenes to create their independent states but within theirethnic territoriesrdquo He then demanded that Croatiarsquos borders be altered suchthat the territories in Croatia which he deemed Serbian ethnic zones be at-

tached to Serbia19 As to how this territory should be determined Ćosić wrote12 Ibid p 14513 Ibid p 28714 Ibid p 29415 Ibid pp 298-29916 Ibid p 29417 Ibid p 34918 Ibid p 29419 Ibid p 303-305

7172019 J_Raguzpdf


R C H -

149

that during the so-called ldquoBarricade Revolutionrdquo the Serbs ldquoblocked roads todelineate the borders of their ethnic territoryrdquo20 e view that the Croatian na-

tion can establish a state in its ethnic territory and the demand that Croatiarsquosborders be changed to Serbiarsquos benet tied to insistence upon the biological en-

dangerment of the Serbs in Croatia henceforward became the ldquomantrardquo whichĆosić repeated in note aer note

Besides the aforementioned views in his notes up to the summer of 1991and the declaration of Croatiarsquos independence on 25 June Ćosić also renedhis thesis as to why the Serbs could not remain in the new states which wereabout to be created us he explained that the Serbian nation as a collectivefound it unacceptable to live outside of Yugoslavia ie to live in any potentialnew states21 In a note from April 1991 he even stated that the Serbs withtheir right to create a state that would gather all of them in a single state ie

in Greater Serbia would not threaten the rights of any other Yugoslav nation

22

On the other hand in a note from February 1991 he accused the Croats ofldquoaspiring to create an ethnically pure Croatia and a lsquoGreater Croatiarsquordquo which inhis view was the essence of primal evil23

As for the Serbs in Croatia Ćosić believed that their survival in an inde-

pendent Croatia state meant their national and civic disenfranchisement foraccording to him Croatia was a Nazi chauvinistic militarized party state cre-ated by the HDZ under the leadership of Franjo Tuđman24 who ldquois preparingCroatiarsquos armed secession and the subjugation and expulsion of the Serbsrdquo25

and Stjepan Mesić then Croatiarsquos representative in the Yugoslav collective

presidency whom Ćosić described as a ldquoprimitive cynic and common Croa-tian chauvinistrdquo26

According to Ćosić in May 1991 when the referendum on Croatiarsquos inde-

pendence was held ldquothe Croatian-Serbian war began is is not only a civilwar it is an international war provoked by the Croatsrdquo27 for ldquoa war for theborders of seceding states is beginningrdquo His assessments of the situation inCroatia were even more damning He stated that Croatiarsquos primary objectivebesides seceding from Yugoslavia is to transform the local Serbian populationinto a national minority into ldquoa nationally disenfranchised Serbian nationcreating the right of the Ustasha to expel them as a lsquodestabilizing factorrsquo from

20 Ibid p 29421 Ibid p 303-36322 Ibid p 320-32123 Ibid p 31124 Ibid p 34225 Ibid p 35026 Ibid p 34827 Ibid p 340

7172019 J_Raguzpdf



150

their centuries-long domainsrdquo and even worse28 He stated that ldquoTuđmanrsquosCroatia like Pavelićrsquos will solve the Serbian question in Croatian fashion lsquoin acivilized wayrsquo it will eliminate this lsquolitter of mongrelsrsquordquo and he insisted that theRepublic of Serbia will have to defend this part of the Serbian nation by forceof arms and implement its ldquoethnic and territorial integration into the staterdquo29

e imminent creation of the Croatian state for him signied the requirementthat the Serbian nation ldquoforsake its state the state which it created throughcombat in the Balkan and World Wars ose who secured their own nationstates through the Serbian nationrsquos battles are now depriving the Serbs of theirnation staterdquo or as he put it in his note of 17 May 1991 the creation of the Croa-

tian state is a ldquohistoric tragedy for the Serbian nationrdquo30 In his ldquoWriterrsquos Notesrdquoand in a series of other works such as for example his texts in a series on theldquoSerbian questionrdquo Dobrica Ćosić stood out as one of the leading opponents ofCroatian state and national independence31

Following Ćosićrsquos lead one may nd many other works dealing with thewar In the eld of current aairs writing there is the book Građanski rat uHrvatskoj 1991 ndash 1995 (lsquoCivil War in Croatia 1991-1995rsquo) by Mihajlo Vučinićthe president of the Association of Serbs from Krajina and Croatia32 Vučinićbelieves that the core of the problem lay not in the aspiration of the Croatiannation for an independent state but rather in two associated components erst is that the Croats wanted to create a state in territories that were ethnicallySerb but were inside what he considers Croatiarsquos solely administrative borderse other problematic component is the nature of this state ie the manner inwhich Croatian leaders conceived and implemented its creation and this was

a large ethnically pure state which would be achieved by means of genocideof non-Croats particularly Serbs With this goal Croatian political leadersamong whom he cites Ante Stačević the Radić brothers Vlatko Maček AntePavelić Andrija Hebrang Vladimir Bakarić Savka Dapčević Miko TripaloIvica Račan Franjo Tuđman and Stipe Mesić accused the Serbs for all of theCroatian nationrsquos troubles basing their policies on lies and deceptions dissem-

inating hatred and threatening the rights and existence of the Serbs in CroatiaFor these two reasons the Croats should not have been allowed to create theirstate within the 1990 borders of the Republic of Croatia

Exemplars of the third position ndash that Croatia as a federal unit had thetheoretical right to become constituted as a state in its existing borders only as anindependent civic rather than nation state but that this right was lsquosquanderedrsquo

28 Ibid p 35129 Ibid p 35430 Ibid p 35131 Dobrica Ćosić Srpsko pitanje I (Belgrade Filip Višnjić 2002) and Dobrica Ćosić Srpsko

pitanje II (Belgrade Filip Višnjić 2004)32 Mihajlo M Vučinić Građanski rat u Hrvatskoj 1991 ndash 1995 (Belgrade Udruženja Srba izKrajine i Hrvatske i Srpsko kulturno društvo ldquoZorardquo 2005)

7172019 J_Raguzpdf


R C H -

151

by the chauvinistic policies of the Croatian state authorities toward its Serbiancitizens ndash are the fewest in number One may cite military analyst MiroslavHadžić as an example In his book Jugoslovenska narodna agonija (lsquoYugoslavPeoplersquos Agonyrsquo) he claims that the Croatian authorities had only themselvesto blame for the Serb rebellion and the aggression of the Yugoslav PeoplersquosArmy (JNA) According to him Tuđmanrsquos stoked Croatian chauvinism anddeepened Croatian frustrations over their permanent lack of a state whichprovoked fear among the Serbs over ldquoa repetition of tragic experiences withCroatian rulerdquo ie ldquoa new genociderdquo and then armed rebellion as well33 te

Croatian authorities responded to this rebellion ldquowith terror against the Serbsand an attack on their territory Croatian forces made genocide if not certainthen very likelyrdquo34 ey thereby forced the JNA to intervene in the war inCroatia for the primary purpose of safeguarding the Serbs To conrm thisthesis Hadžić cited a statement by General Radovan Radinović from August

1991 that ldquothe secessionist aim of the Croatian authorities was not feasiblewithout the complete pacication of the Serbian people in that republicand pacication under these circumstances practically means the physicalannihilation of the Serbsrdquo35 Readers of Hadžićrsquos text cannot discern whetherthe Croatian authorities truly intended to perpetrate genocide against theSerbs or if the peaceful formation of an independent Croatian state failed dueto a series of erroneous and malicious moves by the Croatian authorities Inany case Zagreb bore the blame for the outbreak of war

Conclusion

Even though these few authors and their works presented herein may seemonly a limited probing of the eld of Serbian historiography memoirs and cur-rent aairs writing many years of research on the Homeland War which in-

cluded examination of the literature on this topic written by Serbian authorshas led me to conclude that intellectual circles in that milieu have a generallynegativistic position on Croatian statehood For most of them the Croatianstate emerged if not on the basis of genocide and war crimes then at the veryleast on the basis of injustice against and suering of the Serbian people and

within borders and in territories which if not Serbian should have been grant-

ed the status of autonomous provinces If they do not in fact accord collectiveguilt to the Croatian people for the war and the suering of the Serbs they atthe very least ascribe a markedly negative role and character to the foundersof the Croatian state erefore one may conclude that Serbian historiogra-

phy memoirs and current aairs writing when dealing with Croatian national

33 Miroslav Hadžić Jugoslovenska narodna agonija (Belgrade DANGRAF and Centar za civil-no-vojne odnose 2004) pp 134-13534 Ibid p 13635 Ibid 151

7172019 J_Raguzpdf



152

and state independence have not progressed much since the beginning of the1990s when they served as a war-mongering means for the achievement ofthe Greater Serbian project Taking into consideration the political and socialclimate in Serbia and the painful transformations which are under way or haveyet to commence in that society such assessments are not surprising

ldquoDie Kroaten haben kein Recht auf eigenen Staatrdquo ndash serbischeHistoriographie Memoirenliteratur und Publizistik uumlber

staatliche Unabhaumlngigkeit Kroatiens

Zusammenfassung

Der Verfasser analysiert Werke mehrerer Autoren aus dem Korpus der zeit-genoumlssischen serbischen Historiographie Memoirenliteratur und Publizistikbeschreibt ihre Standpunkte zur (Wieder)Herstellung der kroatischen staatli-chen Unabhaumlngigkeit und wie sie diesen Prozess darstellen In den genanntenTexten dominiert eine negative Sicht auf die im Jahre 1991 erreichte kroatischeUnabhaumlngigkeit und eine allgemein verbreitete Auassung dass die kroatischeNation kein Recht hatte ihren selbstaumlndigen Staat zu bilden Darin sind dreigrundlegende Blickwinkel zu betrachten Die erste Gruppe von Autoren negi-ert sogar die Existenz der kroatischen Nation und vertritt die Meinung dieKroaten seien eigentlich Serben-Katholiker und ihre Nation sei ein Resultatder Konspiration zwischen der Habsburger Monarchie und der KatholischenKirche Andere meinen dass die Kroaten allerdings Recht haben ihren na-

tionalen Staat zu bilden jedoch die von Serben besiedelten Territorien auss-

chlieszligend Die Dritten hatten in theoretischer Hinsicht nichts dagegen gehabtdass die Kroaten einen unabhaumlngigen Staat bilden aber keinen nationalensondern einen buumlrgerlichen Staat und all das hatte ihrer Meinung nach nurdann gegolten bevor die kroatischen Behoumlrden dieses Recht durch ihre chau-

vinistische Politik verwirrten

7172019 J_Raguzpdf



144

which may be found among individuals and smaller groups in all peoples ofthe world

Serbian historiography memoirs and current aairs writing on the estab-

lishmentrenewal of Croatian state independence may be described as nega-tivistic ie the dominant position is that the Croatian nation had no right tothe establishment of statehood in 1991 However even within this stance thereare three theories as to the extent to which the Croatian nation did not havethis right and why

1 e rst provisionally called the most hard-core is that the Croatiannation as such did not have the right to an independent state at alland had to remain in the federal Yugoslavia or some other form ofthis Yugoslav state

2 e second somewhat soer but the most pervasive is that theCroatian nation was entitled to depart from Yugoslavia and form anation state but that it should not have been established within theexisting borders of the Republic of Croatia which within this line ofthought also encompasses Serbian ethnic territories

3 e third is that Croatia as a federal unit of Yugoslavia theoreticallyhad the right to constitute itself as an independent state albeit withtwo major caveats rst its internal order could not be structuredas a nation state of the Croatian people but as a civic state andsecond this right to independence was restricted and even lost bythe chauvinistic policies of the Croatian state authorities vis-agrave-vis itscitizens of Serbian ethnicity

Several of the most prominent examples of these three positions from theelds of historiography memoirs and current aairs writing are presented aswell as the reasons specied as the grounds for these views

An exemplar of the rst most hard-core group which negates the rightof the Croatian nation to a state is historian Nikola Žutić from the Instituteof Contemporary History in Belgrade and his book Rimokatolička crkva ihrvatstvo ndash od ilirske ideje do velikohrvatske realizacije 1453-1941 (Te RomanCatholic Church and Croatianism ndash From the Illyrian Idea to Greater CroatianRealization 1453-1941) which was published by this Institute In it Žutić setsforth from the thesis that the Croats do not exist as a nation rather they arethe result of a vast virtually worldwide conspiracy against the Orthodox SerbsŽutićrsquos thesis is that in the early Middle Ages there was a small state of a Slavicpeople called Croats However both this state and that nation disappeared inthe tidal wave of the Ottoman incursions in Europe or more accurately theyremained ldquoin tracesrdquo in some parts of todayrsquos Croatia During the early modernperiod the Catholic Church attempted to convert the Orthodox Serbs whichsucceeded only partially us together with pan-German anti-Slav Austria it

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R C H -

145














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146














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22









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Conclusion







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Zusammenfassung





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22









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Conclusion







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Zusammenfassung





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22









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Conclusion







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Zusammenfassung





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22









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Conclusion







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Zusammenfassung





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22









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Conclusion







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Zusammenfassung





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22









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Conclusion







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Zusammenfassung





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Conclusion







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Zusammenfassung





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Conclusion







7172019 J_Raguzpdf



152




Zusammenfassung





7172019 J_Raguzpdf



152




Zusammenfassung





j_raguz.pdf

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