journal of modern african studies 2002

8/6/2019 Journal of Modern African Studies 2002

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J. of Modern African Studies, , (), pp. . # Cambridge University PressDOI: .\SX Printed in the United Kingdom

Shop windows and smoke-filled

rooms: governance and the

re-politicisation of Tanzania

Tim Kelsall*

In the s politics in Tanzania was substantially a bureaucratic affair.Since the s, however, economic liberalisation, multiparty democracyand governance reforms have on the one hand introduced measures con-ducive to building a legal-rational bureaucracy and a liberal civil society,and on the other accelerated political struggle for economic resourcesthrough personalised regional networks. Paraphrasing Emmanuel Terray,

the first trend is described in this article as the manufacture of air-conditioned politics, the second as the growth of veranda politics. Thearticle argues that donor reforms are not leading in a straight line to liberalgovernance, but neither is civil society simply being colonised by patri-monial networks. Rather, both air-conditioned politics and verandapolitics are advancing simultaneously, inundating a previously bureaucratisedpolitical sphere. The dual character of this re-politicisation makes the fateof governance reforms exceedingly difficult to predict.

[The people we see,] the Permanent Secretaries, those people who speak thelanguage of good governance, those who can talk the talk even if they dont

walk the walk, are like a shop-window what is put on public display. But ofcourse the real decisions are made behind the shop-window, in the smoke-filled rooms of the CCM."

This is an article about the politics of the governance agenda inTanzania. Governance, as a project in its broadest sense, attempts tointroduce a series of political, economic, and administrative reformsinto Africa with the ambition of improving the continents dismalrecord of development. It rests on the idea that at the heart of Africasdevelopment crisis lies a crisis of the state. It is believed that personalised

* Lecturer in African Politics, University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne. The author wishes to thankThe Nuffield Foundation, which provided a small grant for research in Tanzania between June

and September . He also thanks Geir Sundet, Graham Harrison, Sara Rich and twoanonymous referees for comments on the paper, the limitations of which are all his own.


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and clientelistic African states need to be transformed into legal-rational Weberian states with liberal polities and market economies.Emmanuel Terray has used the metaphor, the politics of the verandato describe the patrimonial share-outs that characterised the ricketyand personalistic structures of Africas pre-reform polities. In thedonors view, the politics of the veranda must be replaced by thepolitics of the air-conditioner. The air-conditioner, which signifies amodern administration governed by a modern constitution thatempowers liberal institutions, is presently a mere fac:ade, screening theoutside world from the humidity of patrimonial politics. The intentionof governance is to extend air-conditioned politics out onto theveranda itself. The aim is to cool the political temperature with themanufactured breeze of liberal democracy, efficient administration,and benign capitalism (Terray : , cited in OBrien : ;World Bank , ).#

The interesting thing about Tanzania from this perspective, is thatprior to the period of economic and political liberalisation, politics out

on the veranda was not very hot. Pace Goran Hyden () arguablyTanzanias most influential scholar political clientelism was notespecially debilitating. Politics was so centralised under the dominanceof a socialist-style single party, that the struggle for preferments rarely,if ever, disturbed its outward tranquillity.$ Pretenders to power wereunable to call upon the idioms of class, ethnicity or even religion torouse popular movements in their support. Factional conflict amongthe political elite was present yet muted. On-stage politics was largelysnuffed out. Importantly, the number of air-conditioned offices inTanzania was also, undoubtedly, rather few.

Yet this is beginning to change. The advent of structural adjustmentand multiparty politics appears to have encouraged the rapid

construction of a political veranda, as indigenous elites, in a liberalisedclimate, throw up structures on which to pursue their interests.Meanwhile, the increasing number of donors advising on civil servicereform and the proliferation of governmental and non-governmentalbenefactors seeking NGOs to fund, has begun the building of an ersatz,air-conditioned civil society. Together, these trends amount not to thedisplacement of patrimonial politics by civil politics, nor to the triumphof good government over misrule.% Rather, both types of politics areadvancing simultaneously, re-politicising, in the process, a previouslybureaucratised political sphere.& In this sense, the situation may not beas cynically straightforward as the quotation which opens thisarticle andwhichbears a striking resemblance to Terrays metaphor


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might seem to suggest. At risk of overextending the image: the roomsare getting smokier, while some shop dummies are acquiring a life oftheir own. The aim of this article, then, is to illustrate these trends, andto outline some of their contradictory effects.

Transforming Tanzania into a market economy with a legal-rationaladministration and a liberal polity involves action by external countrieson a broad range of fronts. Tanzania has received donor support forreforms to its political system and changes to its political society (seebelow), as well as reforms to its public service. Ideally, the politicalchanges are expected to act as a support to the economic reformprocess, in addition to being intrinsically desirable (Moore ). Botheconomic reform and an effective democratic politics require a newtype of public service. The civil service in Tanzania has been slimmed

down, it is somewhat better paid, and attempts are underway to makeit more professional and more efficient (Harrison ; Temu &Due ; Therkilsden ). To this end, an array of projects andprogrammes reaches into every sector of Tanzanian public life.Therkilsden (), for example, has identified at least twenty-onedifferent donor-funded programmes that involve public sector reform.They include structural adjustment reforms, road sector reform,banking sector reform, agricultural sector reform, land sector reform,and tax reform. The centrepiece of the reforms has been the CivilService Reform, now referred to as the Public Sector ReformProgramme (PSRP).

The sheer volume of programmes in Tanzania, and their association

with different donors, has generated what Therkilsden ( : )terms a syndrome of reformitis, in which lack of coordination,duplication, and excessive reporting requirements themselves act as anobstacle to improving services. An indication is that the Tanzanianpublic service typically produces , quarterly reports a year forexternal donors, and is visited by , donor missions.' Partly inrecognition of this problem, and partly in response to internationaldevelopments such as the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative,vigorous attempts are now underway to streamline the reform process.

Four major policy planning initiatives can be identified. The mostgeneral of these is Vision . Vision is a Government ofTanzania document that broadly outlines Tanzanias hopes for the


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future. It is a response to a perception that development policy sincethe mid-s has suffered from a lack of direction, its excessive short-termism resulting in a long-term drift. What kind of society will havebeen created by Tanzanians in the year ? it asks. What isenvisioned is that the society Tanzanians will be living in by thenwill be a substantially developed one with a high quality of livelihoodis the heroic answer (United Republic of Tanzania [URT] a : ).It envisages wide-ranging institutional reforms with the aim ofunleashing the power of the market and the private sector, strikinga balance between the state and other institutions, and promotingdemocratic and popular participation . Good Governance, itdeclares, must permeate the modalities of social organisation (ibid. :).

A second long-term vision is the National Poverty EradicationStrategy (NPES), published in , which addresses objectives forpoverty eradication up to the year . The Tanzania AssistanceStrategy (TAS) outlines the medium-term role of the international

donor community in facilitating and financing the implementation ofVision .( Finally, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) formulated in the context of HIPC is a medium-term (-year)strategy of poverty reduction consonant with NPES. These initiatives,it should be noted, are contingent on other policy reforms, undertakenin accordance with IMF and World Bank programmes to securemacroeconomic stability and economic efficiency, namely the PovertyReduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), as well as the ProgrammaticStructural Adjustment Credit (PSAC-) (United Republic of Tanzaniab). One such reform is the privatisation process, currently overseenby the Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PPSRC).The initiatives also depend upon sector-specific strategies developed by

other donors. For instance, the PRSP is closely linked to the LocalGovernment Reform Programme (LGRP).)

In general, administrative reform embodies both hard and softcomponents. Hard components involve the insertion of new tech-nologies of surveillance and control into the administration. Softcomponents, such as training and workshops, are targeted at personnel(Harrison : ). For instance, a range of measures has beenintroduced with the aim of attaching new and sophisticated strings tothe public purse. They address the amount of money the governmentspends, and the uses to which it is put. On the hard side, the Ministryof Finance has acquired the ability to monitor the spending of otherMinistries. A cash-budgeting system is in operation, as is a Medium


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Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), which relies on trackingexpenditure by means of the Platinum System computer softwarepackage. Other reforms are legally empowered by the PublicProcurement and Public Finance Act () (ibid.).* On the soft side,Ministry officials receive training in a modern management canon.Meanwhile, much of the money flowing into the Ministry comes via theTanzania Revenue Authority, to which tax collection has been farmedout. The TRA offers high quality training and relatively high salariesto its staff, who are subject to an incentives regime in which they canbe disciplined or dismissed with relative ease. The aim is to improveefficiency and reduce corruption (ibid.; Temu & Due : ). Suchmeasures, which are jointly intended to alter the psychology ofTanzanian civil servants, will be extended to the society as a whole.Vision urges that, high priority must be given to education andcontinuous learning, and speaks of effective transformation of themindset and culture (URT a : ). Programmes in this vein,apolitically termed capacity-building by donors, aim to press the

subjectivity of Tanzanians into a liberal-developmental mould.Technical solutions, and political-cultural solutions, are inscribed eachwithin the other. The interventions are techno-cultural, or to use aFoucauldian term, bio-political."!

Reform also involves intervention in political society. In , withdonor support, Tanzania began a transition to a multiparty system.Elections were held in and . The ruling CCM party wasreturned to power with large majorities on both occasions, although itfaced a stiff challenge in some areas. The impact of a liberalisedpolitical system of which the small strength of opposition parties inParliament is not a good indicator, and the nature of which appears tobe hidden to many economists is discussed below. Other develop-

ments have occurred in the sphere of civil society. In contemporarydonor discourse, civil society is assigned a key role in transformingpolitical culture (Diamond ; Hyden ). Vision alsoacknowledges the importance of civic organisations (URT a : ),and recognises the need to empower the people and catalyse theirdemocratic and popular participation (ibid. : ). However, as recentlyas four years ago, the prospect that Tanzanian civil society might playthis role appeared poor. It was harassed by government, riddled withcorruption, divided by in-fighting, and was institutionally weak. Thepresent author wrote at the time (Kelsall : ):

It seems then that Tanzanias tiny NGO sector is some way from playing therole ascribed to it under the Governance Agenda. It is squeezed between a


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state with an equivocal agenda, a rural society which operates along differentprinciples, and is itself composed of an insecure and often opportunistic middleclass.

While this judgement remains largely accurate, there are some signsthat an elite stratum of civil society is now beginning to emerge, theimpact of which on national policy is not insignificant. A large part ofthe change can be attributed to the HIPC initiative and theinternational civil society mobilisation by which it was preceded. Thepromise of debt relief operationalised in HIPC has been a lodestarfor the Tanzanian government. Often in the teeth of internal criticism,it has done almost everything in its power to earn the forgiveness ofexternal creditors. Of late, this has extended to a more accommodatingattitude to civil society. Part of the catalyst for this new attitude hasbeen the PRSP.

The drafting of The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper a pre-requisite for inclusion in the HIPC initiative began in October .It was steered by a committee of twelve ministers, together with the

governor of the Bank of Tanzania and a technical committeecomprising experts from several ministries. From an early stage, theformulation of the policy involved inputs from civil society organisa-tions. For example, an interim PRSP, completed in January , wasdiscussed at a consultative technical meeting that included stake-holders from civil society. Fifty-three representatives from NGOs werealso invited to discussions at zonal workshops around the country.NGOs were also present at a National Workshop in which an initialdraft was debated. The finished paper acknowledges the concern ofstakeholders with issues of governance, accountability and trans-parency, cultural phenomena and attitudes to gender: the bread andbutter of Tanzanias urbane NGO sector (URT b).

A key component of PRSP is the development and monitoring ofnew poverty indicators. This aspect of the strategy, designed to makeTanzanian society more legible, entails the introduction of institutionalinnovations to allow the government, paraphrasing James Scott(), to see like a state :

Capacity-building is needed at all levels. For the data collecting agencies,there is a need to strengthen existing data collecting mechanisms. Lineministries will need support to enhance their routine surveillance andadministrative data systems. The National Bureau of Statistics will need extrasupport Local government, civil society organisations and research institutionswill need support to build their capacity to implement the participatorypoverty assessments. (URT b : , my emphasis)


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The scope of capacity-building interventions required, is, according tothe Paper, vast.

A number of NGOs in Tanzania have begun to organise themselvesto take advantage of this opportunity. In , in the context of Jubilee, representatives from international NGOs in Tanzania, and someindigenous NGOs, formed an NGO network called the TanzaniaCoalition on Debt and Development (TCDD). TCDD has aroundsixty member organisations. Its intention was to raise international anddomestic awareness and to lobby for debt cancellation. The networkhas been re-activated in the context of PRSP. It has a number of broadaims, which include lobbying for a total cancellation of debt, raisingawareness about the PRGF (and agitating for a consultative role forcivil society in PRGF negotiations), and monitoring governmentsprogress in poverty reduction in accordance with PRSP. Morespecifically, it aims to monitor the extent to which debt paymentcancellation under HIPC is translated into concrete improvements inliving standards. To this end, it is beginning to develop a strategy for

tracking government expenditure. Focusing on health and education,the aim is to match budgetary allocations at a national level withdisbursements through district councils at local level. It will begin bytracking expenditure in two District Councils. In order to do this, itintends to draw on the expertise of local research foundations and theresources of external donors. A meeting to discuss the strategy revealedthat the capacity of the network was at present extremely thin,insufficient, in fact, to play this limited monitoring role. Memberattitudes, lack of resources, and relations with donors also attenuatedits capacity: We are the civil society people! the Chair exclaimed atone point, We need to start changing ourselves!""

Initiatives such as that being pursued by TCDD are able to build on

the experience of other Tanzanian NGO networks. FEMACT, forexample, is a network of thirty organisations and NGOs concernedwith womens issues. Hakiardhi marshals a number of NGOs involvedwith the issue of land. TANGO an umbrella NGO recently stagedTanzanias first national NGO\Civil Society Forum, its theme beingCollaboration and Participation for Transformation. The number ofregistered NGOs in the country has increased from in to morethan , in (URT: c). Tanzanian newspapers detailreports, workshops and press conferences by NGOs on a daily basis.Prominent are groups such as the Tanzania Gender NetworkingProgramme (TGNP), the Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC),Lawyers Environmental Action Team (LEAT), and Journalists


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Environmental Association of Tanzania (JET). All of these NGOshave close links to donors and tend to articulate a broadly liberalpolitical philosophy which emphasises democracy, human rights,gender equality, sustainable development, and respect for the rule oflaw.

In , this author commented that, It is far from clear that thiskind of workshopocracy has a significant impact on the lives of ordinary, in particular, rural, Tanzanians (Kelsall : ). Andthat scepticism remains. However, what is clearer is that civil societyhas made its impact felt at a national level in certain pieces oflegislation. The Land Act, for example, is claimed by NGOs to containgroundbreaking provisions that allow the inheritance of land bywomen. The Sexual Offences Special Provisions Act contains aremarkably progressive definition of sexual harassment, which isinformed by womens specific experience in Tanzania. Clause a :Cruelty to Children, outlaws female genital mutilation. The extent towhich this legislation is enforceable remains open to question. The

Land Act appears to have been drafted in such a way as toinstitutionalise inertia. It seems unlikely that the sweeping provisions ofthe Sexual Offences Act will be used, except perhaps in politicallyexpedient circumstances. As one observer said to me, These are verymuch Dar and Dodoma Acts, lobbied for by interest groups here, andthey will probably do hardly anything to help the people in the ruralareas who need them most. There have, however, been someprosecutions under Clause a."#

In sum, there are indications that with donor backing, civil societyis a sector which sections of government are neither keen nor able toignore. In , for example, several NGO representatives werearrested by an order-conscious police force after demonstrating against

debt outside a World Bank meeting. The president later defended inpublic the right of civil society to peaceful protest. But opinion on theNGO sector is far from uniform. In the wake of the TANGO conferencereferred to above, The Express newspaper launched a scathing attack onNGOs."$ Then in November, the president of the Lawyers En-vironmental Action Team, Rugemeleza Nshala, together with Tanza-nia Labour Party leader Augustine Mrema, were arrested and chargedwith sedition after pressing for an investigation into the forced evictionof artisanal miners from gold mines at Bulyanhulu in . In addition,civil society continues to wait with bated breath for the governmentsNGO Bill, the final form of which, after five years of consultation, is stillnot public.


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If we extract from this story only the trends that are positive from theperspective of Governance, we might anticipate that Tanzaniandevelopment will be increasingly governed in a liberal, legal-rationalmode. Policy will be publicly debated by a plurality of interest groups,and the government will discharge its commitments in an efficient,publicly accountable way, assisted in this endeavour by better-coordinated external assistance. The flaw in this expectation asidefrom its inversion of the power relations between government anddonors is that the inefficiencies in the state which the above-discussedreforms are designed to address are not only due to lack of donorcoordination and to civil service incapacity. Another reason for poorgovernance is that the government often has conflicting politicalpriorities (Harrison ; Temu & Due ; Therkilsden ). Thereforms do not take place in an air-conditioned, administrative bubble,isolated from the political atmosphere. Some of them threaten toundermine the interests of significant sections of Tanzanias politicalelite. Where they do this, they tend to be resisted or subverted. The

governments consistent reluctance to reduce expenditure on teacherssalaries is a case in point. The reason is that teachers are key figures inlocal elections (Therkilsden : ). Another very clear example isthe halting pace of local government reform."% The arena of localgovernment, as we shall see below, is of critical importance to theinterests of the political elite. One way of explaining this, figurativelyspeaking, is to point out that behind the air-conditioned offices thatresound to the argot of NPM- and civil-society speak, there stands averanda of shady deals and clientelist politics. As well as a shopwindow in the words of our donor there are smoke-filled rooms.

When President Benjamin Mkapa came to power in October , hisThird Phase government began with strong reformist credentials. Itseemed serious about the introduction of air-conditioned politics.During its first year, a new Cabinet was appointed that excluded manyof the political heavyweights of the previous regime. In addition, anumber of initiatives an Ethics Secretariat , a Prevention ofCorruption Bureau, and a Presidential Commission on Corruption were strengthened or begun with the aim of fighting corruption. Butits seriousness has not, in the view of some critics, been sustained. Itsoon became clear, for example, that none of the really big fish would


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be netted by the anti-corruption initiatives. In fact, there areindications that they fairly rapidly began to re-assert their influence. Aclear sign of the latter development was the resignation of ProfessorSimon Mbilinyi, the minister for finance, in a tax-exemption scandal.Although trumpeted at the time as a sign of increased transparency andaccountability in Tanzania, it quickly became clear that Mbilinyi, acommitted reformer with a reputation for competence, had been fittedup by members of the old guard ousted from Cabinet.

The old guard includes the people of whom Julius Nyerere spokewhen he said that Tanzania stinks of corruption. They are known tobe rich, having amassed private fortunes during the era of PresidentMwinyi (see below). While much of the corruption in that periodappeared to be of a market-based rather than a clientelistic nature, atleast one of the old guard is known to have a personal and financialinfluence that permeates the party."& President Mkapa, it seems, wouldhave found it difficult to secure the presidential re-nomination in without him. Moreover, in a context of multiparty democracy, the

party finds these individuals useful in securing re-election. Thus the old guard has continued to exercise influence behind the scenesthroughout the Third Phase government, and more recently some of itsmembers have found their way back into Cabinet. While the presidentsown integrity is rarely called into question, the stance of severalmembers of the government with respect to reform is now ambiguous."'

Many MPs are unhappy with the government, and their unhappinessis increasingly expressed through regional blocs. The conjuncturalexplanation for this begins with the fact that representatives from theSouth feel that it is the turn of their relatively underdeveloped regionto benefit from a period in office. President Mkapa, after all, is asoutherner from Mtwara Region. Many observers expected that on

accession to power he would steer increased resources in the directionof the South. Consistent with this, a massive development schemeencompassing coal, iron, port development, and a rail extension isplanned for the area, although it will not be completed during Mkapasten year term. In addition, Professor Mbilinyi was a close friend andhome-mate of Mkapa."( However, following his resignation, he wasreplaced by a northerner: Daniel Yona from Kilimanjaro Region,another friend of Mkapa and home-mate of Mkapas wife. The factthat Mbilinyi was thrown away in this manner, is rumoured to havelost the president support among some of his closest allies from theSouth. Mkapa is said to be extremely intolerant of personal criticism,and two prominent Southern Highland MPs, with comparatively clean


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reputations, were dropped from the Cabinet in . Members of theold guard replaced them. Yona, meanwhile, was replaced by BasilMramba, an even closer home-mate of Mama Mkapa.")

As a result, a group of MPs from the South, centred on the SouthernHighlands, is vocal in its condemnation of the Mkapa government."*

They resent the fact that northerners, through the suspected influenceof Mama Mkapa, continue to hold key positions of power, and arecritical of the return to influence of politicians with a reputation forcorruption. The increased visibility of the southern bloc has acted inpart as a spur to the consolidation of other blocs. Particularly vocal hasbeen a group of MPs from the Lake Zone, which in August threatened to delay the Finance Bill if its constituencies were notgranted royalties from international mining activities.#! The threatnever materialised, and it is rumoured that the MPs were privatelypersuaded to drop their action. The northern bloc is rather moreamorphous, but is occasionally mentioned, while the Coast has longbeen associated with Islam.#"

One individual about whom Parliamentarians are particularlyunhappy is Iddi Simba, minister for trade and industries. He is aMuslim, and an in-law of Daniel Yona, who is close, as noted earlier,to the Mkapas. He gained popularity as a spokesman for indigenousinterests, advocating joint-ownership arrangements between foreignand African capital. He is known to be rich by Tanzanian standards,and to be politically ambitious. All of these reasons have been advancedto explain his seat in Cabinet. But particularly important is the ideathat the CCM needs his money, and that of people like him, in orderto contest elections. Indeed, in the general election, he was amember of Mkapas campaign team. In August , in what seemedto be a classic rent-seeking scam, a storm of speculation surrounded

alleged improprieties in the handling of sugar import licences by hisMinistry, as well as in the divestiture of NASACO, the nationalshipping company. In the face of strident calls for his resignation Simbarefused to quit. Parliamentarians then demanded a probe into the issue,but were persuaded by CCM heavyweights to make it a government,rather than a parliamentary investigation. The probe, when iteventually reported, stopped short of condemning Simba personally.However, it did not restore the confidence of the CCM parliamentarycaucus, and in November Simba resigned, to the chagrin, it isrumoured, of the president.##

Whether these protesting MPs would be any less corrupt were theythemselves in power is open to question. Parliamentary ructions and re-


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alignments are imbricated in complex ways with long-term structuralchanges in Tanzanian society. These changes increase the pressure toengage in corruption. In fact, there is reason to think that the oldbureaucratic-centralist pattern of politics is being replaced by anincreasingly patrimonial system. If this is the case, the threat of regionalor religious instability, itself liable to be exacerbated by successioncrises, presents the possibility of serious reversals in the linear directionof reform.

Crucial to understanding this upsurge of veranda politics, and theconsequent re-politicisation of Tanzanian public life, is an appreciationof the formation and dissolution of the single party state. The period to witnessed the consolidation of the Tanzanian state underMwalimu Julius Nyereres leadership. Trade unions, cooperatives,women the civil society groups that sped the nationalist movementto power were all co-opted and transformed into organs of the rulingparty. Opposition parties were banned or harassed out of existence,defiant leaders were exiled or jailed. District councils, and finally

primary cooperative societies, were also abolished. Political expressionoutside the channels of Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the single party,was stifled (Bienen ; Coulson ; Gibbon ; Havnevik ;Pratt ; Sterkenberg & van Velzen ).

That said, few organised groups seemed to want to express viewsoutside the party. The major instances of focused repression againstthe Ruvuma Development Association in , and against militantworkers in were directed, indeed, at groups which followedparty policy with a little too much enthusiasm (Coulson ).#$

Political quiescence among the rest of the population owed a great dealto the fact that the government, an expanded parastatal sector, and arevamped cooperative sector, offered employment to national and local

elites. National elites, domiciled in Dar es Salaam, Dodoma andregional capitals, had only to speak the language of ujamaa socialismand provide indications that they were making vigorous attempts toimplement its policies.#% Local elites, at district level and below, couldafford to be much less ideologically compliant, and often ran localcouncils and cooperatives much as they had been run in the latecolonial period. Crucially, the connections between national and localelites were weak. Key national positions were dispensed by the centre,either at Ministry level or by the National Executive Committee(NEC) of the CCM. National figures subject to local election, such asregional party chairmen and members of Parliament, were subject to


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central screening. Thus for the national elite, cultivation of a localclientele was less important than securing central approval (Bienen ; Finucane ; Ingle ; Kelsall a, b; Samoff).

In terms of managing communal conflict, Nyerere staffed hisCabinet with individuals who were either ideologically committed orpersonally very loyal to him. He also made gestures in the direction ofregional and religious balancing. Regional cleavages were not,however, particularly difficult to manage, since the parastatal sectorserved as a sufficient reservoir of patronage with which to satiate theeducated elite of Tanzanias various regions (Hyden ; Okema ; Pratt , ; Van Donge & Liviga ). This did not,however, restrain communal and regional inequalities completely.There was a perception that religious disparities were growing, sinceemployment at high levels in the parastatal sector necessitatededucational qualifications, held disproportionately by Christians.There was also a feeling that the North benefited more than the less-educated South. But these perceptions were never translated into

explosive political capital.The system did not satisfy everyone. Oscar Kambona, a key figurein the nationalist movement, went into exile in , and two coupplots were subsequently linked to him. In other cases, leaders andsocietal sections gave public recognition to the governments ideologyof ujamaa, while working in private to undermine it. Meanwhile aproportion of the peasantry was herded into planned villages andsubjected to enforced agricultural regulations familiar from the colonialera. But those with most to lose under this system found it most difficultto organise, and any efforts to do so were likely to be spotted by anefficient intelligence service (Boesen ; Cliffe ; Hyden ;Kelsall b; McHenry ; Okema ; von Freyhold ). In

consequence, Tanzania remained a model of stability.By the late s the conditions for this stability were beginning to

unravel. Unfavourable external conditions combined with policymistakes shook the Tanzanian economy, and the formal planningsystem never very efficient in the first place began to feel the strain.The war with Uganda proved the final straw, and brought theeconomy to the brink of collapse. Informal clientelist arrangementsfrequently filled the gap, and then proved impossible to eradicate(Bryceson ; Svendsen ). By the early s, formal sectorsalaries were insufficient to meet living expenses. Short-lived attemptswere made to revive the socialist economy, but only a small section of


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the ujamaa elite were believers. The fortunes of the state and the elite itsheltered became increasingly wedded to those of private, or quasi-private, capital (Campbell & Stein ; Tripp ).

saw the signing of an agreement with the IMF and the next tenyears witnessed exchange devaluation, liberalisation of internal andexternal trade, withdrawal of government support to the cooperativemovement, privatisation of numerous parastatal companies, and anincreasingly open attitude toward foreign investment. President AliHassan Mwinyi a Zanzibari presided over the changes (Campbell& Stein ). He is widely perceived to have gone some way toredressing religious imbalance by promoting Muslims in his govern-ment.#& Generally speaking, economic liberalisation increased thedesire and ability of members of the political elite to enrich themselves.The early profits were made in import-export trade, in which coastalpeoples and Zanzibaris with links to India and the Middle East,together with Tanzanian Asians, were well represented. Other lucrativeareas were to be found in land grabbing, urban real estate, and the

exploitation of tax loopholes. Divestiture of parastatals also introduceda spoils character into Tanzanian politics, as politicians positionedthemselves to receive kickbacks or to become part-owners of the newlyprivatised companies. Other, less fortunate members of the nationalelite, found themselves retrenched and sent home to the village. As weshall see, it is this development, which has served to de-structure socialclass in Tanzania, that threatens to make regional politics much moredifficult to manage (Campbell & Stein ; Chachage ; Gibbon ; Kaiser ; Kiondo , ; Maliyamkono & Bagachwa ; Temu & Due ).

Prior to the mid-s, national and local elites secured theirreproduction as elites through a mixture of patronage and privileged

access to state education, which in turn provided continued access tothe state (Samoff, ). The state has shrunk and so is no longersufficient to act as a vehicle for reproducing the elite in toto. A section,as outlined above, uses the state for private enrichment; another sectionhas entered private business or semi-retirement in local areas. Peasants,for their part, used to secure their reproduction through access to land.In heavily populated areas, there is no longer sufficient land throughwhich to do this. Instead, both retrenched elites and ordinary peasantsattempt to sustain their children by providing them access to secondaryeducation, which is believed essential to success in business. Thisincreased demand for secondary education is frequently satisfied by


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means of local, tribal trust funds, which provide money for, amongother things, the building of schools (Gibbon ; Kelsall a).District councils are also expanding their educational provision, partlythrough harambee efforts.

Typically, trust funds are managed by local elites, some of whom arethe aforementioned retrenchees. They tend to maintain links with thosenational elites who remain in the capital. National elites maintain tieswith local districts for patriotic, familial or sentimental reasons, andbecause some of the richest resources minerals, cash crops, fisheries,tourism are to be found there. In consequence, national elitespatronise local trust funds as well as other types of NGO. The politicalsection of the national elite patronises local trust funds because in acontext of political liberalisation, local support is important to securingnational power, and local elections are becoming much morecompetitive (Gibbon ; Kelsall a). The funds, which financeeducation yet also call on the symbolic presence of traditional leaders,are useful as platforms on which to build a local reputation, and as

bases from which to direct struggle. Meanwhile, local elites educatetheir children through the funds, build local prestige in them, andsometimes embezzle their finances. Thus local and national elites arelinked, more closely than ever before, by a skein of reciprocities, theideology to which is localism (Gibbon ; Kelsall a, b ;Kiondo ).

For the political elite, this type of clientelism, based on gaining officein a competitive election, acts as an incentive to corruption. For someyears, the buying of drinks and food, and the giving of gifts and money,has played a part in election campaigns in Tanzania. Such practiceswere outlawed and sometimes gave rise to allegations of corruption(Munishi & Mtengeti-Migiro ). At the first multiparty election in

these allegations were very extensive, and they led to over ahundred election petitions (URT ). In an amendment to theelection law was passed which gave official recognition to the need, inthe local parlance, to buy electorates. It permitted the provision of hospitality by candidates during campaigns. The governmentgranted incumbent MPs a gratuity of between TShs and millionat the end of their parliamentary terms in . In effect it was acampaign fund with which to fight the next election. But many MPswith whom this author spoke spent much more than this amountduring the campaign and in the preceding five years. One claimed tohave ploughed TShs million of his own money into community


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projects. This was in addition to money and organisational supportthat came from the party itself.#'

In many constituencies in , elections at CCM primary and atparliamentary level had a desperate quality to them. Reports of money,intimidation and dirty tricks were the norm. The desperation stems onthe one hand from the desire of local party cadres to eat, at a timewhen formal party funding has been scaled down, together with thehunger of a rural electorate that has failed, in most cases, to seesignificant gains from structural adjustment. On the other, it arisesfrom the appetite of politicians, who perceive that the share out of spoilsin natural resources and parastatals cannot go on indefinitely.

With money an important determinant of electoral popularity,politicians need somehow to acquire it. Some money may come fromlegitimate business activities or private savings, or from constituencybackers. But there is also a temptation to make money throughstraddling the political and economic spheres, in a variety of practiceswhich shade from outright embezzlement through bribe-taking to

crony capitalism. Membership of the government, by providing accessto the interface with international donors and with capitalists, presentsa fast track to these opportunities. Put schematically, an MP may gainaccess to the government by several routes: through merit, throughclose relations with the president, through representing a regional blocor ethnic group, or through making a nuisance of him or herself (forexample by asking embarrassing questions of ministers). Even if notinvited into government, an MP may be awarded some otheremolument if he or she makes enough noise. It is easier to make a noiseas part of a group, and this is one of the reasons why regional groupingsare becoming more prominent in Tanzanian politics. Together, thesefactors make regional blocs increasingly focal as points of political

mobilisation.#(

In sum, a large part of veranda politics consists in local elites,operating out of ethnic trust funds, NGOs and district councils,cultivating strong personal ties, and exchanging favours with nationalelites, including national politicians. National politicians, for their part,increasingly group themselves into regional blocs, with the aim ofsecuring the attentions of government. Students of African politics willbe entirely familiar with this scenario, since it animates the politics ofmany states in the region. It is also the case that in many African states,national politicians act as ethnic big-men , able to harness localdiscontent or mobilise local support in the interests of securingpatronage pay-offs (Berman ). It remains to be seen whether the


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fact that in Tanzania, regional blocs are more recent inventions thanlocal ethnicities, will serve to mollify the types of political mobilisationtheir leaders can call forth.

It is important to stress that regionalism and clientelism are notintrinsically pathological practices. In fact, they may bring a greaterdegree of political influence to rural areas than the old systemdelivered. However, it is also important to note that they inscribe apotential for corruption and instability, and that they sit uneasily withthe impersonal, universalising imperatives of Governance. Over thepast two years, for example, Tanzania has witnessed clashes betweenpastoralists and agriculturalists that have left scores dead in MorogoroRegion, violent clashes between clans in Musoma over the farming ofmarijuana, Islamic riots on the streets of Dar es Salaam, andwidespread unrest in mining areas in Musoma, Shinyanga and Arusha.All of these eruptions are entangled with the changing structure of aneconomy undergoing marketisation, and the changing shape ofstruggles for wealth and influence, as the political elite pursues the

spoils of liberalised development.#)

In Tanzania the increasingly visible regional blocs have not yetcongealed into coherent collective actors and their dissolution is quiteconceivable. At present, they are partially cross-cut, partially over-lapped, by religious identification, affinal relations, and personalfriendships dating from secondary school, university, and time spent inthe army or in the ruling partys Youth League (Mmuya ). Thestory surrounding Professor Mbilinyi, for example, indicates some ofthis complexity. Individuals also have different ideological leanings some purportedly cleaving to the philosophy of the late president,others to a notion of social democracy, and others being ardentsupporters of a liberal economy. In the wider CCM party, other

factions are sectorally distributed: youth wingers, the bureaucraticelite, the political faction (Mmuya : ).#* Thus inscribedwithin individuals is a situational geometry of identification, making itextremely difficult to predict which way a particular individual will actor vote from one occasion to the next. It is because of this thatspeculation over who will be the next president is currently rife inTanzania, with the main contenders already shaping up for thecompetition ahead.$!

Whoever the next president is, the recent appearance of regionalblocs increases the potential for centrifugal politics. It is too soon to saywhat scope he or she will have to resist this tendency, or what desire toencourage it. Elsewhere in Africa, such forces have typically been


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neutralised by allowing regional big-men the opportunity to devour,greedily, the national pie (Medard : ). The effect of this isusually to erode the states economic foundation. The big question forthe apostles of Governance is whether air-conditioned politics willhave developed to a level that will allow it to present a crediblealternative to this dead-end solution.

In the post-independence era, public life in Tanzania was substantiallyde-politicised and bureaucratised. This did not imply the eradication ofpublic debate or political clientelism, but both these phenomena weretightly contained within the organs of a socialist party-state. Entry intoand promotion within this machine depended on a variety of factorssuch as ideological fluency and personal loyalty to the president.Communal and nepotistic considerations were not entirely absent, but

considerations of competence were arguably paramount. In addition,the party and state had well-established rules, procedures and politicalorgans that were not, at a national level, routinely flouted. Thedevelopment administration, for example, actually tried to implementdevelopment plans. The state at a local level was less robust, but itsinfluence was more than nugatory. In other words, the state wasinstitutionalised to a significant degree. It was much more than theexpression of Julius Nyereres redoubtable personality.

Recent changes have begun to transform this situation. On the onehand, political clientelism has broken the bonds of the state, and nowdraws on a combination of state and non-state resources. In addition,its rewards are more competitively fought for, and show signs of

enlisting communal and regional identities in their pursuit. On theother hand, the state itself is currently subject to numerous techno-cultural programmes that attempt to replace corrupt and clientelisticpractices with legal-rational ones. In addition, public debate of aliberal type is on the increase thanks to an invigorated press and adonor-driven civil society of professional NGOs. There is little evidenceto suggest that this civil society is edging out or transforming clientelism,in the way that proponents of governance would hope for.$" Butneither is it the case, pace Chabal and Daloz (), that civil societyis simply colonised by patrimonial logics. What we are witnessing is thereplacement of bureaucracy by competitive politics: re-politicisation ina dual key.


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Nor is it necessarily the case that one of these registers will eventuallyoverwhelm the other. Neighbouring states such as Kenya and Ugandahave for years experienced a politics that is both more liberal and morepatrimonial than that in Tanzania. The two types of politics arecapable of co-habiting, especially when one normally patrimonial-ism is the dominant partner. Given that liberal politics tends to becentred on the capital, and clientelistic politics stretches between centreand periphery, it is tempting to invoke Mamdanis () idea of the bifurcated state to describe this. The notion certainly has a superficialplausibility. But it is simply not the case that either the local chief forthere are none or the district or regional commissioner, act as quitethe obstacles to democratic politics that Mamdani seems to imply.Neither of course does democratising the state entail the erosion ofclientelism; in fact it might imply just the opposite.

The above remarks notwithstanding, this co-habitation of the liberaland the patrimonial is unlikely to remain stable, for the simple reasonthat donors are vigorously promoting the former. They are applying

considerable financial power to insert a range of new technologies intoAfrican administrations with the intention of re-shaping them. Whilethere are indications that these initiatives are being accepted by somekey figures at the centre (those in the shop window), they are meetingmore serious resistance at local level, in part because of the continuingimportance of district councils to clientelist politics. And while donorsimagine that empowering the local population is the answer tomaking local democracy work, this idea fails to appreciate thedifficulties of this endeavour in the context of contemporary socialrelations (Kelsall a, b). Meanwhile, the progress of reform atthe centre is endangered, among other things, by uncertainty over theidentity of the next president. Among the favourites to win power in

are individuals who thrive on corruption and who might not beaverse to inflaming communal cleavages in the service of their ownprivate interests. Thus the future character of Tanzanian public liferemains difficult to predict. But one thing is certain: there is plenty toplay for, both in shop-windows and in smoke-filled rooms.

. Interview with aid donor (name withheld), Dar es Salaam, September .. The metaphor is liberally adapted from Terray (), insofar as the air-conditioned state

of which he spoke presented a fac:ade of bureaucratic-authoritarianism, as opposed to liberalconstitutionalism, which is the form air-conditioned politics takes in contemporary Tanzania. Inaddition, the politics of the share-out is just as much a politics of the scramble.


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. Tanzania between roughly and fits well with Allens () model of centralised-bureaucratic politics. The model is descriptively very useful.

. The term patrimonialism is used loosely: it encompasses patron-clientelism, neo-patrimonialism, and market corruption, phenomena that some authors prefer to separate. See, forexample, Medard ().

. By re-politicisation I refer to a process with two key components: First, public issuesbecome open to debate and scrutiny within the public sphere of a private realm. Second, publicand private resources become subject to more intense and open competition. Some commentators

would doubtless argue that Tanzania has always been a politicised society. In my terms,Tanzania of the s was ideologised, and in the s, bureaucratised.

. James Wolfensohn, quoted in Tanzanian Affairs , JanuaryApril , p. .. These documents are often referred to in government and donor literature, but this author

has been unable to obtain copies.. It is too soon to say whether these broad planning initiatives, together with a Governance

Co-ordination Unit, will succeed in tidying up the tangled tendrils of governance, or will addunhelpfully to their number.

. Statement of Bilateral and Multilateral partners on Governance CG Meeting, Dar esSalaam, September .

. For a lucid, Deleuzean reading of bio-power, see Hardt & Negri ().. Authors observation, TCDD meeting, Dar es Salaam, June .. Interview with aid donor, June ; Court convicts circumcisors, Daily News .. : .. NGO congestion creates chaos, The Express .. : .. Government reform programme up for review, Financial Times .. : .. Interviews, Dodoma and Dar es Salaam, June and July . On the difference between

market and clientelistic corruption, see Medard ().

. Interviews, Dar es Salaam and Dodoma, JuneSeptember .. Mbilinyi is from Ruvuma, which neighbours Mtwara.. Interviews, Dar es Salaam and Dodoma, JuneJuly .. Seefor example, Budget ignores Southern zone andfarmers, Financial Times .. :

&, in which it is reported that MPs slammed the government for ignoring the south.. MPs meet Minister over royalties, The Guardian (Dar es Salaam), .. : .. The South comprises the Regions of Mtwara, Ruvuma, Mbeya and Iringa, with Iringa

and Mbeya arguably forming a Southern Highlands sub-bloc; the North comprises Arushaand Kilimanjaro Regions, possibly also including Lushoto District constituencies in TangaRegion; the Coast refers to Lindi (also sometimes considered Southern), Pwani and coastalTanga, and also to some Dar es Salaam constituencies; the Lake Zone to Mara, Mwanza,Shinyanga and Kagera.

. MP demands probe on sugar imports, Daily News .. : .. Although the RDA was, admittedly, outside TANUs control, it was in keeping with the

spirit of ujamaa.. By national elites, I refer, on the side of the government, to ministers, regional

commissioners, and to technical staff responsible to central ministries but stationed at regional

headquarters. On the side of the Party, I refer to regional party secretaries, regional partychairmen, as well as holders of lesser party posts at regional level.

. G a group of parliamentarians who in the early s advocated a reform of the Unionwith Zanzibar can be read as the Christian reaction to this.

. Interviews, Dodoma, July .. It is also the case that MPs shut out of personal networks of power may raise a fuss in

Parliament, in order to be seen and heard to be doing something by their constituents.. See for example: CCM entering era of acquisitors, The African (Dar es Salaam),

.. : ; Government officers own bhang farms, The Guardian ..: ; Printpak:example of irresolute privatisation, The Guardian ..: ; Hell week for haven of peace,Family Mirror .. : ; Who is behind these clashes?, The East African ..: ;AFGEM implicates Lowasa, Family Mirror, ..: ; We need transparency in miningindustry, The Guardian .. : .

. CCM breaks into three groups, Family Mirror ... : &.. Omars Death Derails Groupings, The East African ..: &.. In fact some NGOs are formed merely to take advantage of donor money while others are

perverted by it (Cameron ; Igoe ).


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