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2007 37: 51Journal of European StudiesSheila Fitzpatrick

The Soviet Union in the twenty-first century

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FITZPATRICK: SOVIET UNION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 51Journal of European Studies

The Soviet Union in the twenty-first century

SHEILA FITZPATRICKUniversity of Chicago

The subject of this article is how historians and others have understoodSoviet history since the demise of the Soviet Union. It is argued that,despite the opening of archives, changes in interpretation have been drivenas much by external political and disciplinary developments as by greateravailability of data. Important external considerations have been theCold War and the collapse of the Soviet regime in 1991. The main his-torical schools examined are the totalitarian (whose heyday was the 1950s);revisionist (1970s); and post-revisionist (1990s). Interpretations of theSoviet Union in the Russian media and popular opinion, ranging fromcondemnation of communism to nostalgia, are also discussed.

Keywords: archives, communism, historiography, nostalgia,totalitarianism

The Soviet Union used to be associated with the future, at least inthe minds of its admirers. Now it belongs to the past, and it is the viewof the Soviet Union in retrospect that is the subject of this essay. Onthe death of individuals, we usually follow the maxim of speakingnothing but good (De mortuis nil nisi bonum). The death of regimes,however, produces the opposite response. When a regime dies, ob-servers take this as a proof of its inadequacy (not fit to survive), so theconvention for speaking of recently deceased regimes is nothing but bad.This is basically how both Western and Russian (former Soviet) area

specialists dealt with the Soviet Union in the decade after its demise,though historians, as we shall see, followed a somewhat differentpath. The mantra of Western commentators could be summarized

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52 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN STUDIES 37(1)

as What Went Wrong with the Soviet Union and How the SovietSystem Failed to Work.

Of course, the nothing but bad approach was overdetermined in theSoviet case. The Cold War produced strongly unfavourable opinionsof the Soviet Union (alive or dead) in the West. Moreover, the SovietUnions grandiose claims for itself meant that even relatively neutraloutsiders would be tempted to celebrate its comeuppance. Accordingto the Soviet version, Lenins political revolution, and then Stalinseconomic one, had precipitated Russia out of its historic backwardnessinto the vanguard of history. No longer a latecomer to capitalism, theSoviet Union was now bypassing it to go straight to socialism. The

West was no longer the model to be imitated; rather, it was the Sovietmodel (the great socialist experiment) that prefigured the future ofthe degenerate capitalist West.

The vanguard claim was taken most seriously in the 1930s. Thiswas the time when foreigners came to the Soviet Union to observethe socialist experiment in the worlds greatest political laboratory.In the Second World War, the Soviet Unions vanguard sense wastemporarily shaken by defeats but then reinvigorated by victory. In thepost-war period, the vanguard nation was recast as a superpower ina sense a step up, except that there were two superpowers, and theSoviet Union was the second. By the Khrushchev period, the Sovietstance had become somewhat schizoid: on the one hand, yet moreinsistent claims of vanguard status, with communism achievablewithin 20 years; on the other hand, playing catch-up with the Weston consumption and living standards (a non-vanguard position, evenif ultimate victory was assured).

The catch-up game failed; communism failed to materialize. Bythe time the Soviet regime collapsed in 1991, the belief that the SovietUnion led the world was retained by even fewer of its citizens thanheld to the old faith on the leading role of the Party. The inevitablemarch of history was still in the picture after 1991 but now it wasgoing in the opposite direction: not away from capitalism, but towardsit. Thus reconfigured, Russia dropped from superpower to somethingnot very different from a Third World country, hopelessly trying tocatch up with the West. It was back to being a latecomer to capitalismfor Russia except that now, a century after its first delayed entrance,it was reallylate.

1991 and interpretation of Soviet history

In the mid 1990s, John Gaddis entitled his book on Soviet diplomatichistory and the Cold War We Now Know, meaning that with archives

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FITZPATRICK: SOVIET UNION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 53

opened, historians questions had received definitive answers(Gaddis, 1997). But it is not always that simple. Archives rarely give

unambiguous answers to the questions historians ask, even when thequestions are simple factual ones: for example, to the question WasStalin responsible for Kirovs murder?, the archives answer turnsout to be: Probably not, but theres no definitive documentary proofeither way.1Moreover, data are not the only driving force, perhapsnot even the main one, in the evolution of historical interpretation.Perhaps an essential, complete and true history of mankind exists,

but if so, it is accessible only to God; what we normally call historyare stories made by historians according to professional conventions

and their interpretation of available data. Thus the story I will out-line of changing historical interpretation after 1991 is only partly astory of what we found in the archives. Equally important are his-torians reactions to the current political and cultural environmentand to changing methodological and interpretative fashions withintheir profession.

Nevertheless we can begin by reviewing what we found in thearchives.2 The material newly available to Western scholars in the1990s included central and local party archives3and the Comintern,

but not the KGB and its precursors4or, by and large, the archive ofthe Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A substantial segment of the Partyarchives, moreover, was removed under Gorbachev to a separatePresidential Archive which remains off limits to almost all researchersand all foreigners. As to the state archives, most of GARFs unclassifiedmaterials had already become available by the mid to late 1980s, butits classified section, which turned out to be large, was opened only(and not completely securely) with the collapse of the Soviet Union.The same is true of the state economic archive, RGAE.5

These new materials were particularly illuminating for high politicsfrom the revolution to the mid 1950s, especially after the PresidentialArchive released to RGASPI the personal archives of Stalin, Molotov,Kaganovich and other key political figures of the Stalin period. Thefirst area to be illuminated was Gulag and the scale of repression inthe Stalin period that old warhorse of the 1980s numbers argumentwhich could finally be more or less satisfactorily answered onthe basis of archival data (Getty and Naumov, 1999: 58794; Gettyet al., 1993). The archives showed that neither the high-end estimate

of numbers in Gulag (tens of millions) nor the low-end (hundredsof thousands) were accurate: in 1939 the number of prisoners in Gulaglabour camps was 1.3 million, with a total incarcerated population(including prisons and labour colonies) of around two million




(Getty and Naumov, 1999: 590; Getty et al., 1993: 1019). Another archivaldiscovery (albeit known in general form to any readers of Gulag

memoirs) was that only about a third of the prisoners in Gulag werepoliticals, sentenced for counter-revolutionary offences (Getty et al.,1993: 1030). Most important for understanding the scale and formsof repression was the discovery of large-scale executions during theGreat Purges (almost 700,000) (Getty and Naumov, 1999: 591), andincreasing understanding that the many forms of administrative exileconstituted a major form of repression in the Stalin period. (The numbers,in complicated and dispersed records, have not yet been sorted out,unlike Gulag, where there was a central institution that had to know

its own numbers for budgetary and supply purposes.)The most interesting finding about the Great Purges was that there

were several terror campaigns going on at the same time, only oneof which (that directed primarily against the Communist elite) wasvisible. The largest invisible one was a remarkable cleansing campaigndirected against social marginals (de-kulakized peasants returnedfrom exile or escaped from Gulag, habitual criminals, sectarians, horsethieves), with each region of the country receiving targets in the tensof thousands for executions and Gulag sentences (by administrative

troiki, outside the normal judicial process) which, to quote the titleof a major work on the topic, was what really made the terror great(Iunge and Binner, 2003). Also notable was the terror against diasporanationalities in the Soviet Union: that is, those like Poles, Germans,Finns and Greeks with a national state outside the Soviet Union whichwas a potential competitive focus of loyalty (Martin, 1998; 2001).

The archives revealed much that was interesting and new abouthigh politics.6Revelations about Lenins tough-mindedness and wil-lingness to shed blood made less plausible the old argument7that his

rule was qualitatively different from Stalins in this respect (Pipes,1996; Volkogonov, 1994), while biographical details from the archivesshowed him a more sensitive and neurotic personality, prone to dis-couragement and troubled by ill health, than had been recognized

before (Service, 2000). On Stalin, the revelations were of a different order(since his tough-mindedness and willingness to shed blood were notin question): successive archive-based biographies showed, in additionto the well-known paranoid streak, an intellectual who continued toread seriously even in power, dominated his associates partly simply

by intellectual power as well as political skills, had trouble with hisdifficult wife and took her suicide hard, and after her death lived ina largely transplanted-Georgian social milieu which dissolved whenmany of its members were arrested presumably with his consent,




though it left him personally isolated and lonely in the Great Purges(Montefiore, 2004; Service, 2004; Volkogonov, 1989).

As for Stalins form of rule, the archives have shown several previoushypotheses to be untenable. He was not anyones puppet, nor was hea lazy charismatic leader on the Hitler pattern, but rather a hands-onhardworking, well-informed ruler who (with Molotov, his politicalalter ego in the 1930s) was personally involved in almost all importantpolicy decisions. After the defeat of the right at the beginning of the1930s, there were no stable factions based on policy positions in hisPolitburo, although the representation of institutional interest wasallowed. The status of the Politburo as an independent institution

declined steadily, especially after the war, as Stalin substituted avariety of ad hoc groups of Five and groups of Nine as advisors andsounding boards (Khlevniuk, 1996). In the provinces, regional partyleaders had their own little fiefdoms and mutually protective politicalfamilies, despite the centres constant efforts to break them up (Harris,1999). After the war, Stalins health, as well as his paranoia, worsenedand his workload dropped. The authoritative archive-based study ofpost-war high politics gives a picture of bifurcated rule, with StalinsPolitburo/Presidium on one side, functioning more or less on the model

of court politics, while on the other side the government bureaucracyheaded by the Council of Ministers (long Molotovs sphere) becameincreasingly complex, efficient and rule- and expertise-governed: inshort almost Weberian (Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, 2004).

In Stalins last years, his associates (and heirs apparent) in theleadership seem to have developed a surprising degree of collegiality,generally resisting Stalins efforts to play them off against each other,as well as a kind of silent consensus on the desirability of some majorreforms that, it was recognized, were probably unrealizable while

Stalin lived. (Gorlizki and Khlevniuk, 2004: 1667). As for the lowerlevels of government, hints are starting to emerge of enlightened

bureaucrats (shades of Nicholas I!) (Hessler, 1998); and recent studiesof a range of social-policy issues suggest that 1953 is by no means asclear-cut a turning point as had earlier appeared (Frst, 2006). Thissuggests that when researchers get down to serious work on pol-itics and government in the Khrushchev period, some interestingdiscoveries about bureaucratic reform initiatives (as well as the always-to-be-assumed bureaucratic resistance to reform) may be made.

In the realm of social history research (which had been partiallyarchive-based, even for foreigners, for some time before 1991), theopening of the archives tended both to confirm existing hypothesesand suggest new lines of enquiry. The basic conclusions of social




historians work from the 1970s stood up well under the new archivalevidence: for example, on working-class support for Bolsheviks in 1917

and a more ambiguous situation thereafter; on peasantization of theworking class through massive out-migration from the villages duringcollectivization; on the formation of a new elite via working-classand peasant upward mobility; on the privileges of this New Class;on the hostile response of peasantry to collectivization; on the phoninessof the kulak label, especially as applied punitively during de-kulakization. At the same time, the new accessibility of the provincesand regional archives to historians broadened perspectives and servedas a corrective to the previous dominance of the capitals in historians

imagination (Baberowski, 2003; Harris, 1999; Kotkin, 1995; Kuromiya,1998). It became possible to trace the complex patterns of Soviet tradein the legal and informal economy (Hessler, 2004) and illuminate thewretched situation of many workers in the post-war period, whichmay have permanently alienated many who entered the blue-collarworkforce in the 1940s (Filtzer, 2002).

There were surprises for social historians in the archives. Onewas the discovery of huge numbers of letters to authority (petitions,denunciations, appeals) from individual citizens, which the archives

of the institutions concerned had routinely classified as secret (incontrast to the formal group letters from schools, collective farms andso on, thanking comrade Stalin, which were in the open archives).8One researcher discovered tens of thousands of 1930s petitions tothe Supreme Soviet from disenfranchised citizens reposing in an obscuredepository in Yalutorovsk in Western Siberia (Alexopoulos, 2003). Thepetitions are a magnificent social history source, providing insight intoordinary peoples lives and preoccupations hitherto unavailable, aswell as giving interesting glimpses of bureaucratic responses. At the

same time, their unexpected prevalence and what appears to be thesystemic importance of individual communication with the authoritiesas a means of problem-solving has led to some new thinking aboutthe nature of Stalinist society, which some now label neo-traditional

because of the prominence of practices like petitioning and patronage(Fitzpatrick, 2005: 153202; Lenoe, 2004: 24854; Martin, 2000).

Another area of enquiry that has come into prominence since theopening of the archives is social marginals (tramps, beggars, prostitutes,exiles, released prisoners, runaway deportees and other uprooted or

homeless people). This is to some extent a function of the opening ofthe archives (since marginals are often a police concern, and policearchives of all kinds were formerly closed), though it also followsnaturally from an interest in social classification that developed in the




field as confidence in the analytical utility of Marxist class categoriesdeclined (Fitzpatrick, 2005: 387). Kulak deportees have received

serious scholarly attention (Viola, 2001 and forthcoming), as has thetopic of policing, with particular reference to the treatment of marginals(Hagenloh, 2000; Shearer, 2001). This new work reminds us that thereare large regions in the Russian north, Siberia and Kazakhstan wherethe population of convicts, ex-convicts, exiles and deportees was solarge, absolutely and in relation to the free population, that it is notpossible to relegate them ( la Solzhenitsyn and earlier social history)to the other side of an invisible line separating them from the every-day Soviet world: the social history of regions like Kazakhstan simply

cannot be written without them (Pohl, forthcoming).

Disciplinary developments: totalitarianism, revisionism,post-revisionism

Access to new data was not the only thing influencing change in his-torians choice of subject matter and interpretations. Equally importantwere shifts in the general political climate (the end of the Cold War)and developments within the academic discipline of history (historians

embrace of theory, the cultural turn).From the 1950s to the 1980s, the Cold War had a significant influence

on Soviet studies in the West, especially in the United States. As theSoviet Union succeeded Nazi Germany as the ideological enemy andpolitical competition for the liberal democracies, many Western scholarsembraced totalitarianism as a framework for understanding the Sovietsystem (Gleason, 1995: 12142). The totalitarian model highlightedthe similarities of regimes that appeared to be polar opposites on theleftright continuum, in particular the similarity of the Nazi regime

in Germany to Stalinism in the Soviet Union. Its heyday in the UnitedStates corresponded with the dominance of political science over otherdisciplines in Soviet studies; and given the Soviet Unions status asthe putative enemy it was also closely linked with security studies.Soviet ideology and propaganda, high politics (approached viaKremlinology), and shifts in centrally articulated policy in variousareas were its major concerns, and Pravda and other authoritativemouthpieces for the regime its major sources.

In the 1970s, the totalitarian school came under challenge fromso-called revisionists, who objected to its Cold War bias, the assumptionof monolithic control from above and neglect of social forces. Manyof the revisionists were in fact social historians, whose problems withtraditional Sovietology arose partly just out of disciplinary differences




with political scientists: it is the social historians trade to look athistory from below, whereas political scientists and political his-

torians are much more likely to focus on the centres of power, i.e. fromabove. However, the debate between the two groups was conductedwith maximum rancour for many years, the revisionists calling theiropponents Cold Warriors while their opponents retorted withaccusations of fellow-travelling and pro-Sovietism. In the 1970s and80s, revisionist social historians concerned themselves mainly withissues of social support for the regime (and sometimes also its opposite,resistance), labour and peasant history, and social mobility. For many,though not all, of their research topics, it was already possible to use

Soviet archives by the 1980s, though Soviet political archives, notablythat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, remainedfirmly closed to Western scholars.

The central question for the totalitarian-model scholars was howregimes could enslave populations, restrict civil society and deprivecitizens of individual freedom; state terror and propaganda were amongtheir major preoccupations. Revisionists, by contrast, doubted thatterror alone could have kept the regime in power, especially duringthe Second World War, and wanted to find out about the regimes

social support. Among the various possible loci of support discussedin the 1970s and 80s were the industrial working class (with particularreference to the revolutionary period); the new administrative andprofessional elite formed in the 1930s largely by recruitment fromthe working class and the peasantry; the poor peasants (bedniaki)that the regime considered its natural rural allies in the 1920s; andyouth. The first two lines of enquiry proved the most fruitful, thoughcritics challenged the assumption that working-class support for theBolsheviks in 1917 could be extrapolated into some sort of permanent,

open-ended commitment (Brovkin, 1994). With respect to upwardmobility as a process generating support for the regime, the focuson workers and peasants of the 1970s (Fitzpatrick, 1979) has recently

been supplemented by a new interpretation of the experience of Jewsin the Soviet Union that suggests that the upward mobility of Jewsout of the shtetl and into big towns and the new Soviet intelligentsiaafter the revolution constituted an equally important source of socialsupport (Slezkine, 2004).

The social support arguments of the 1970s were highly controversial

and exposed their authors to a great deal of criticism in the Cold Waryears. By the mid 1980s, perhaps as a result, revisionists appeared to

be drawing in their horns on questions of social support. This was nodoubt partly because of a shift in attention to the peasantry, where




social support for the regime was hard to find after the 1920s becauseof the intense unpopularity of collectivization.9 After 1991, social

support dropped off the social historians scholarly agenda almostentirely, its place as the main focus of investigation in social historybeing taken by resistance (Fitzpatrick, 1994; Rossman, 2005; Viola, 1996;Viola, 2002) and aspects of the everyday (Thurston, 1996; Lebina, 1999;Fitzpatrick, 1999; Vikhavainen, 2000; Alexopoulos, 2003). Resistancewas a from below topic, but much less provocative and controversialthan social support.10 It became one of the pervasive themes in thestudy of everyday life that took off in the late 1990s, which focusedparticularly on survival strategies such as petitioning, denunciation,

blat(reciprocity arrangements for getting scarce goods) and patronage(Alexopoulos, 2003; Fitzpatrick, 1999; Nrard, 2004). The problems anddiscomforts of Soviet everyday life were also highlighted, particularlywith reference to communal apartments (Obertreis, 2004; Utekhin,2004). The historians work on the everyday was no doubt influenced

by the burgeoning of anthropological studies of post-Communistchange in everyday practices in the former Soviet Union (Humphrey,2002; Shevchenko, 2002), as well as Eastern Europe and the GDR. Oralhistory a possibility which, like anthropological fieldwork, opened

up only with the collapse of the Soviet regime has become animportant resource for historians (Engel and Posadskaya-Vanderbeck,1997; Kovalev, 1996; Ransel, 2000; Vitukhnovskaia, 2000).

It is debatable whether scholarly arguments in the humanities andsocial sciences are ever definitively won in an intellectual sense. Thereare paradigm shifts, to be sure, but these often have more to do withexternal changes of perspective and fashion and demographic changethan with the definitive demonstration via data (experiment) that oneargument was right and the other wrong.11In the case of the revisionist

v. totalitarian argument in Soviet studies, the argument was won bysocial historians by the late 1980s, meaning that the conventionalwisdom of the field now embraced many of their propositions, and themajority of young scholars in the field focused on their questions. Atthe same time, many of the revisionists who had been young Turks inthe 1920s had become full professors and trainers of graduate students,while the older totalitarian generation was gradually disappearingfrom the scene. Totalitarianism became yesterdays concept as far asWestern Soviet studies were concerned.

In Russia, however, things were different: the collapse of the SovietUnion and the overturning of values associated with it meant thatthe formerly proscribed concept of totalitarianism had great appeal(Gleason, 1995: 21116); indeed, according to one commentator in




Russia, the term ever more clearly claims the status of chief explanatorymodel of our recent past (Kara-Murza and Voskresenskii, 1989: 5). To

be sure, there was confusion about what totalitarianism actually meant:although it was completely clear to any man in the street in any city inour country [that] totalitarianism is what we used to have, a symbolof the bad in all senses, nevertheless nobody knows exactly whatthat bad consisted of (Verchenov and Igritskii, 1993: 7, 15). Whereasin earlier Western scholarly usage, state terror, ideology and the Partyas a mobilizing force (that is, basically the Stalinist model) were at theheart of the analysis of the Soviet Union as a totalitarian regime, post-Soviet Russians seemed more interested in the interference in private

life and invasion of privacy (Zamkovoi, 1994: 2) that was actually morecharacteristic of the Khrushchev period than its predecessor.12

When the Soviet Union collapsed, some of the surviving totalitarians notably Richard Pipes, Martin Malia and Robert Conquest claimedthat their view of Soviet history had been vindicated by the collapseof the Evil Empire and its condemnation by post-Soviet Russians.13This, however, had only a marginal influence on developments withinthe discipline. By the 1990s, the heyday of social history was overin the modern Russian (Soviet) field, as it was in history in general.

But in the West (in contrast to the former Soviet Union) it was notback to totalitarianism. A new generation had arrived to challengethe paradigms of both the parents and the grandparents.14

For this new generation, cultural and intellectual history was thename of the game, and ideology often now in the guise of discourse was back at centre stage. This partly reflected a shift within the wholediscipline of history in the 1980s which hit Soviet history later than inmany other areas. Michel Foucault was a major intellectual influence,especially the Foucault of Discipline and Punish, whose interests in

surveillance and various forms of external and internal disciplinewere reflected in a number of influential works (Halfin, 2003; Holquist,1997; Kharkhordin, 1999). KotkinsMagnetic Mountain, arguing thatneglecting ideology (as the revisionists had done) made no sense fora period so suffused by ideological concern as the Stalinist one, setthe agenda for a cohort of younger historians. Kotkin saw Stalinismas a utopian project, descended from the European Enlightenmentand creating an alternative modernity to the liberal modernity oftwentieth-century Western Europe and North America. He rejected

the idea of any Great Retreat in the 1930s (Timasheff, 1946), since itwas the Stalin period that was in his picture the real-life instantiationof the Revolution. Kotkin used Foucaults understanding of power assomething diffused and constantly renegotiated to good effect as a




way of escaping from the old from above or from below argument.In his view, Stalinism was not simply a regime project imposed on

Soviet citizens; it was also a project of Soviet citizens themselves.Like some of the revisionists, Kotkin had a strong sense thatpeoples behaviour is guided by their individual self-interest; thus,on the question of the motivation for learning to speak Bolshevik,he put the question of belief or unbelief to one side as unknowable(Kotkin, 1995: 22530). Some of the younger historians influenced

by him reproached him for this and for his neglect of the subjectiveaspect of Stalinism (Halfin and Hellbeck, 1996). A whole school ofstudies of Stalinist subjectivity sprang up in Kotkins wake, much of

it examining what it meant in experiential terms to be Soviet in the1930s, with emphasis on the individual internalization of Sovietvalues (i.e. belief) and learning Bolshevik as an individual project(Halfin, 2000; Hellbeck, 2006; Hoffmann, 2003). On a different track,British scholars in the field of cultural studies were making their ownimportant contribution to Soviet cultural and social history.15

It is somewhat ironic that the study of Stalinist subjectivity whichbecame popular among young scholars in the second half of the 1990swas an area of scholarship where archives now finally open to Western

scholars were secondary and archival discoveries comparativelyunimportant. As with the old ideology studies, the press and otherpublished sources like memoirs can provide the texts for discourseanalysis; the exception is diaries, whose collection (generally outsidethe state archive system) was one of the benefits of the post-1991period.

An even greater irony, however, lies in the fact that, just as therevisionists were backing off from their arguments about social support

because of the political heat it engendered, a post-revisionist generation

was coming in to make a considerably bolder and more global argumentof the same kind and getting away with it, thanks to the end of theCold War. While the revisionists focused on resistance in their workof the 1990s, post-revisionists were pursuing the old revisionist socialsupport line with a new vocabulary and theoretical underpinning.Kotkins subtitle, Stalinism as a Civilization, was one that in earlier yearsno revisionist would have dared to use for fear of being accused(however inaccurately and unfairly) of being a Stalinist. In fact, theclaims now being made about popular identification with Soviet values

are much broader (and, some might think, less well focused) thanthe revisionists earlier investigations of the support from particularsocial groups; indeed, much of the Stalinist subjectivity work could

be reframed in terms specifically ofyouthsupport for the regime. This




consonance of interpretative thrust helps to explain the otherwisepuzzling fact that revisionists have generally welcomed the work of

the post-revisionists, even when the latter presented themselves asthe revisionists critics and challengers.

Nostalgia

If much Russian commentary of the 1990s dwelt on the failings of theold Soviet Union, a significant discourse of nostalgia for the oldorder, or at least for some of its artefacts, has appeared in Russia (andprobably in other former Soviet republics as well) since 1991. Since its

demise, the Soviet way of life has acquired a nostalgic appeal to manypeople in the former Soviet Union, undoubtedly including some whoearlier railed against its boredom and restrictiveness. In this Sovietworld remembered, a job was guaranteed, as well as a living wageand a roof over ones head, and one did not have to work hard for it.There was camaraderie at the workplace and guaranteed support andloyalty from friends (uncomplicated by the cash nexus) and family;children honoured their parents; the streets were safe; science andculture were respected and generously funded; education was a core

value; and the state protected its citizens from pornography and otherforms of moral corruption. The Soviet Union was a proud multinationalstate with a civilizing mission, organized at home on the principle offriendship of peoples and extending a big brotherly hand abroadto the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and the Third World. Itwas a superpower respected by the whole world, whose successes inspace exploration were envied even by America.

Reversing the values of the late Soviet period, when Western con-sumer goods were prized over Soviet ones, the post-Soviet era produced

at least a partial reaction in favour of local products and a nostalgia forthose that had disappeared (Shevchenko, 2002). This was not quite atthe GDR level, as depicted in the movie Goodbye Lenin: the Moskvichdid not retrospectively acquire the same cachet as the Trabant. Still,throughout the 1990s the immensely popular television series Staraiakvartira (The Old Apartment) revisited the Soviet past and the thingsassociated with it (from sausage to carpets to popular songs) year byyear, with enthusiastic participation from its studio audience. OldSoviet films were shown and watched by millions; songs from theSecond World War were reissued on CD.

While some of the current Soviet nostalgia involves an unmistakablewhitewashing and idealization of the past, other versions feature anunregretful but, in retrospect, affectionate recollection of the past




and its hardships and embarrassments. The migr literary scholarSvetlana Boym leads the way here, with an unforgettable reminiscence

of embarrassment in the communal apartment in her first book anda whole volume on the topic of nostalgia in her second (Boym, 1994:12167; Boym, 2001). Nostalgia for the circumstances of ones youthis a near-universal sentiment; as is nostalgia for ones original place inan increasingly diasporic world. As far as the scholarly community isconcerned, it is a world in which the old sharp delineation betweenRussian (Soviet) and Western scholars in the humanities and socialsciences no longer exists as a result of the retraining of youngRussians in Western theory and academic practices, emigration and

the appointment of Russians to academic jobs in Europe and NorthAmerica, and collaborative projects. Moreover, Western scholars canhave their own rueful nostalgia for the bad old days, when internationalexchange students roughed it in Moscow student dormitories, foughtwith bureaucrats about archival access and field trips, made friendswith Russians (always with a wary glance over the shoulder to seeif anyone was watching) and learned to drink vodka and join inthe Russian talk around kitchen tables (Baron and Frierson, 2003;Fitzpatrick, 2003; Graham, 2006).

While there is some work like Boyms and Shevchenkos, the nostalgicmood and insights associated with it are otherwise not much reflectedin scholarship. One possible exception to this, however, is the suddenemergence in scholarship of the Soviet welfare state, taken as a given(as we all know) rather than a discovery. No doubt we did all knowabout the Soviet welfare state in a way, but it was rarely written about

before 1991; and the interest of social historians in entitlements andthe entitlement claims made by various groups such as veterans is aphenomenon of the post-Soviet era.16This is not to suggest that the

entitlements scholarship is itself nostalgic, only that its emergence asa theme probably owes something to the prominence of the welfarestate motif in the nostalgia (world we have lost) discourse since 1991.(A similar interplay of real-world developments and scholarship may

be observed with the term empire, used only sparingly, and often inan anti-Soviet context, before the Soviet Unions collapse before 1991,

but universally afterwards.)

How the past may look in the futureIt is unlikely that in the next couple of decades we will have big newdiscoveries and accessions of data of the type that were almostroutine in the early 1990s. As I have argued in this essay, however,




new data, even when abundant, are not necessarily the main enginesof change in historical understanding. That historical understanding

willchange is a given. There will be new historical fashions and newparadigms. Historians will challenge current conventional wisdomand rediscover what?

No sensible historian engages in prediction, since historiography aswell as history is a chaotic system. So I offer a few concluding remarksabout the shape of the historiographical future purely in a spirit ofspeculation. If our present preoccupation is, crudely expressed, to findout what was wrong with the Soviet Union, the cyclical (dare one saydialectical?) nature of historical enquiry suggests that what was right

with it may be next on the agenda. Already one can see a few earlysigns, especially in the work of Russian scholars who, happily, arenow part of the international scholarly community, whether workingin Russia or abroad: for example, in work explicitly or implicitly chal-lenging Western assumptions about the Soviet Union, such as that allSoviet citizens in the Brezhnev period were secret dissidents whosepublic allegiance to Soviet values was pure hypocrisy (Yurchak, 2006),or that the history of Jews in the Soviet Union can be told purely as avictim story (Slezkine, 2004).17Another interesting sign comes in the

economic field. After a couple of decades of reading the Soviet economyin terms of malfunctioning and dependence of the first (official)economy on the second (unofficial) (Kornai, 1992), we now find aRussian economic historian claiming that the high point of Sovieteconomic performance came in the post-war 1950s and was a productof state planning in the days when it was still bolstered by unabashedrepression (Khanin, 2003).

One young Russian historian of science now working in North Americatold me recently that he was planning to try reverse McCarthyism

in his next project, meaning exploring the influence of Soviet ideasand practices Big Science (Kojevnikov, 2002), the welfare state andaffirmative action for starters in the West. This was not a nostalgiaproject; rather, it was based on the premise that since Soviet influencewas for so long a prohibited area for Western scholars (afraid of in-advertently practising non-reversed McCarthyism), there should beinteresting discoveries to make.The approach is also appealing becauseit upsets the stereotype that cultural transmission necessarily goesWest to East. We have heard so much of Western influences over the

years, and held so firmly to the premise that Russia is always back-ward and Europe (America) always the international metropolis,that a little of the Provincializing the West18spirit in Soviet history




might be a welcome change. If this is the way the scholarship goes,we will have another view from the twenty-first century not just of

the Soviet Union, but also of the intellectual history of Europe andNorth America in the twentieth century.

Notes

1. See the different interpretations of the evidence in Knight (1999) and Lenoe(2002).

2. This is strictly an impressionistic survey. For detailed expert informationon Soviet archives and their accessibility, readers should consult Patricia

Grimsteds many publications, especially Grimsted (2000), also available inRussian as Kozlov and Grimsted (1997). 3. There are two central archives of the CPSU, both of which have had repeated

name changes. One, currently called RGASPI (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyiarkhiv sotsialno-politicheskoi istorii), covers the period up to 1953 and islargely open to scholars. In the other, currently called RGANI (Rossiiskiigosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii), covering the period from 1953,many materials are still restricted.

4. Note, however, that some NKVD/MGB materials, including a valuable Gulagarchive, ended up serendipitously not in the NKVD (KGB) archive but in the

state archive, GARF (Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii). 5. For no logical reason, the archives of government economic ministries

(industry, agriculture, statistical administration) held in RGAE (Rossiiskiigosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki) are organizationally separate from thearchives of other government ministries held in GARF, though the two arehoused together and share a reading room.

6. In addition to the interpretative works discussed below, there are manyRussian-language publications of archival documents on politics. For a surveyand selective list, see Fitzpatrick (2004a).

7. In the 1970s, this was an important argument of Soviet de-Stalinizers (Medvedev,

1971) and one wing of Western revisionists (Cohen, 1977; Lewin, 1968). 8. For a typology of these materials, see Fitzpatrick (2005: 15581); for an analysis

of one rich set of citizens letters, see Davies (1997). On denunciations, seeFitzpatrick and Gellately (1997).

9. In an essay written in the early 1990s (published as Fitzpatrick, 2004b), Iargue that the poor peasant support evident in the 1920s evaporated as thosepoor peasants (many of them otkhodnikiwith urban connections and youngpeople frustrated in their desire to leave by the shortage of urban industrial

jobs during NEP) took the opportunities offered by rapid industrializationand affirmative action to leave the village.

10. The assumption of the revisionists critics was that those who wrote aboutphenomena like social support and upward mobility were necessarilythemselves supporters of the Soviet regime. In presenting resistance as the




safer option, I do not mean to suggest that I or any other revisionist consciouslymade such a calculation. This explanation of what seemed at the time a naturaldevelopment of research interests occurred to me only in retrospect.

11. This, of course, is how Kuhn (1962) sees paradigm shifts in the natural sciencesalso, but many natural scientists believing their disciplines to be cumulativeand their generalizations to be falsifiable in principle and in practice by newexperimental data have problems with the Kuhn argument, whereas socialscience and humanities people love it.

12. See, for example, Harris (2006); Shlapentokh (1989). LaPierre (2006) showshow the definition of hooliganism, previously restricted to bad behaviour inpublic places, expanded to cover bad behaviour in the home in the Khrushchevperiod.

13. Much of this writing appeared in journalistic form, in publications like theTimesLiterary Supplementand Commentary; but see also Pipes (2003: 22134).

14. The excellent journal Kritikahas been the main organ for this new generation.For a new generation critique of both totalitarians and revisionists seeDavid-Fox (2004).

15. See in particular the work of Catriona Kelly (2001, 2005; Kelly and Shepherd,1998); Stephen Lovell (2003); and Susan Reid (Reid, 2002; Crowley and Reid,2002).

16. For rediscovery of the welfare-state motif, see Kotkin (1995: 1821); for anexample of recent work highlighting entitlements, see Edele (2004).

17. Yurchak grew up in Russia, went through American graduate school in the1990s and now lives and works in the United States; Slezkine, professor ofSoviet history at Berkeley, was a 1980s migr.

18. The reference is to Chakrabarty (2000).

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Sheila Fitzpatrick is Distinguished Service Professor ofHistory at the University of Chicago. Address for correspondence:

Department of History, University of Chicago, 1126 E. 59thStreet, Chicago IL 60637, USA [email : [email protected]]


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