journal of european integration history revue … · committee of historians and of the jean monnet...

JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HISTORY

REVUE D’HISTOIRE DE L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DER EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION

edited by the Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire contemporaine

auprès de la Commission européenne

2000, Volume 6, Number 2

The Liaison Committee of Historians

came into being in 1982 as a result of an important internationalsymposium, that the Commission had organized in Luxembourg in order to launch historical researchon European integration. It consists of historians of the European Union member countries, who havespecialized in contemporary history.

The Liaison Committee:– gathers and conveys information about works on European history after the Second World War;– advises the European Union in the matter of scientific projects to be carried through. Thus, the

Liaison Committee was commissioned to make publicly available the archives of the Communityinstitutions;

– enables researchers to make better use of the archival sources;– promotes scientific meetings in order to get an update of the acquired knowledge and to stimulate

new research: six research conferences have been organized and their proceedings published, aseventh conference will take place in Essen (Germany).

The Journal of European History – Revue d’histoire de l’intégration européenne – Zeitschrift fürGeschichte der europäischen Integration

is totally in line with the preoccupations of the Liaison Com-mittee. Being the first journal of history to deal exclusively with the history of European Integration,the Journal intends to offer the increasing number of young historians devoting their research to con-temporary Europe, a permanent forum.

At the same time, the Liaison Committee publishes the

Newsletter

of the European

Community LiaisonCommittee of Historians and of the Jean Monnet Chairs in History of European Integration.

TheNewsletter publishes in particular an important current bibliography of theses and dissertations, booksand articles dealing with European integration and presents the syllabuses of research institutes andcentres in the field of European history.

The Liaison Committee is supported by the European Commission and works completely independ-ently and according to the historians’ critical method.

❋

Le Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire auprès de la Commission des Communautéseuropéennes

s’est constitué en 1982 à la suite d’un grand colloque que la Commission avait orga-nisé à Luxembourg pour lancer la recherche historique sur la construction européenne. Il regroupedes professeurs d’université des pays membres de l’Union européenne, spécialistes d’histoire con-temporaine.

Le Groupe de liaison a pour mission:– de diffuser l’information sur les travaux portant sur l’histoire de l’Europe après la Seconde Guerre

mondiale;– de conseiller l’Union européenne sur les actions scientifiques à entreprendre avec son appui; ainsi

le Groupe de liaison a assuré une mission concernant la mise à la disposition du public des archi-ves des institutions communautaires;

– d’aider à une meilleure utilisation par les chercheurs des moyens de recherche mis à leur disposi-tion (archives, sources orales...);

– d’encourager des rencontres scientifiques afin de faire le point sur les connaissances acquises etde susciter de nouvelles recherches: six grands colloques ont été organisés et leurs actes publiés,un septième colloque aura lieu à Essen (RFA).

L’édition du

Journal of European Integration History – Revue d’histoire de l’intégration européenne –Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration

se situe dans le droit fil des préoccupations duGroupe de liaison. Première revue d’histoire à se consacrer exclusivement à l’histoire de la construc-tion européenne, le

Journal

se propose de fournir un forum permanent au nombre croissant de jeuneshistoriens vouant leurs recherches à l’Europe contemporaine.

Parallèlement le Groupe de liaison édite la

Lettre d’information du Groupe de liaison des profes-seurs d’histoire auprès de la Commission européenne et du réseau des Chaires Jean Monnet enhistoire de l’Intégration

. La

Lettre d’information

publie notamment une importante bibliographie cou-rante des thèses et mémoires, livres et articles consacrés à la construction européenne et présente lesprogrammes des instituts et centres de recherche en matière d’histoire européenne.

Le Groupe de liaison bénéficie du soutien de la Commission européenne. Ses colloques et publicati-ons se font en toute indépendance et conformément à la méthode critique qui est celle des historiens.

JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HISTORY

REVUE D’HISTOIRE DE L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DER EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION

2000, Volume 6, Number 2Marc TRACHTENBERG, coordinator

Hommage à Raymond Poidevin (1928 – 2000)

....................................

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Marc TRACHTENBERGAmerica and Europe, 1950-1974........................................................ 7

Marc TRACHTENBERG, Christopher GEHRZAmerica, Europe, and German Rearmament, August-September 1950 ..................................................................... 9

Paul M. PITMAN «Un Général qui s’appelle Eisenhower»:Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community ....................................................................................... 37

Francis J. GAVIN, Erin MAHANHegemony or Vulnerability?Giscard, Ball, and the 1962 Gold Standstill Proposal ...................... 61

Hubert ZIMMERMANNWestern Europe and the American Challenge: Conflict and Cooperation in Technology and Monetary Policy, 1965-1973 ........ 85

Georges-Henri SOUTOULe Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l'Europe............................................................... 111

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen................ 147

Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen ................................. 167

Contributors - Auteurs - Autoren.................................................... 175

Books received – Livres reçus – Eingegangene Bücher................. 177

Editorial notice

Articles for inclusion in this journal may be submitted at any time. The editorial board will thenarrange for the article to be refereed. Articles should not be longer than 6000 words, footnotesincluded. They may be in English, French or German.

Articles submitted to the Journal should be original contributions and not be submitted to anyother publication at the same time as to the

Journal of European Integration History

. Authorsshould retain a copy of their article. The publisher and editors cannot accept responsibility forloss of or damage to author’s typescripts or disks.

The accuracy of, and views expressed in articles and reviews are the sole responsibility of theauthors.

Authors should ensure that typescripts conform with the journal style. Prospective contributorsshould obtain further guidelines from the Editorial Secretariat.

Articles, reviews, communications relating to articles and books for review should be sent to theEditorial Secretariat.

Citation

The Journal of European Integration History may be cited as follows: JEIH, (Year)/(Number), (Page).

ISSN 0947-9511

© 2000 NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden and the Groupe de liaison des professeursd’histoire contemporaine auprès de la Commission européenne. Printed in Germany.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, ortransmitted in any form or by any means, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise,without prior permission of the publishers.

Beilagenhinweis:

Dieser Ausgabe liegt ein Prospekt der Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft bei. Wir bitten freundlichst um Beachtung.

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Hommage à Raymond Poidevin (1928 – 2000)

La Revue d'histoire de l'intégration européenne est en deuil: Raymond Poidevin,l'un des membres les plus éminents de son comité de rédaction, nous a quittés enjuin dernier. La communauté des historiens spécialistes des relations internationa-les reconnaissait en lui une personnalité particulièrement attachante, par l'étenduede ses connaissances, l'ampleur de ses travaux, sa rigueur scientifique, ses grandesqualités humaines, son autorité morale, son sens des responsabilités, sa conscienceprofessionnelle jamais en défaut, dans son enseignement, dans le suivi des jeuneschercheurs travaillant sous sa direction, dans la conception et l'animation de pro-grammes de recherche, dans ses activités au sein de nombreux comités, commis-sions, institutions qui avaient sollicité son concours.

Raymond Poidevin faisait partie du groupe d'historiens rassemblés depuis 1973par Jean-Baptiste Duroselle et Jacques Freymond, autour de la revue Relations inter-nationales, pour développer et approfondir les conceptions de Pierre Renouvin sur lerenouvellement de l'histoire des relations internationales. Par ses recherches, sespublications, les colloques qu'il organisait, ceux auxquels il participait activement,par la place qu'il tenait dans de nombreuses instances scientifiques, Raymond Poide-vin s'était imposé comme une autorité incontournable pour l'histoire contemporainede l'Allemagne, des relations franco-allemandes, de la construction européenne.

Né en 1928 dans une commune du Haut-Rhin, il doit avec sa famille se réfugieren 1940 dans la région parisienne, et poursuit des études d'histoire à la Sorbonne. Iloccupe plusieurs postes dans l'enseignement secondaire, passe en 1957 l'agrégationd'histoire. Attaché de recherche au CNRS puis assistant à la Faculté des Lettres deStrasbourg, il se consacre à la préparation, sous la direction de Pierre Renouvin,d'une thèse de doctorat ès-lettres sur Les relations économiques et financières entrela France et l'Allemagne de 1898 à 1914, soutenue en Sorbonne et publiée en 1969chez Armand Colin, travail monumental qui demeure aujourd'hui un ouvrage deréférence indispensable. C'est aux Archives de Potsdam, où nous travaillions l'un etl'autre pour préparer notre thèse, thèses dirigées par Pierre Renouvin, que nousavons fait connaissance, en août 1961, et de ce moment date une amitié qui n'a faitque se renforcer au fil des années.

Sa thèse soutenue, Raymond Poidevin est nommé à l'Université de Metz, où ilest l'un des fondateurs et le premier doyen de la Faculté des Lettres; il y exercejusqu'en 1980 les fonctions de professeur d'histoire contemporaine et de directeurdu Centre de Recherches Relations internationales, centre qu'il a créé en 1971 etqui acquiert vite la notoriété par ses activités et ses publications (actes de collo-ques, thèses de doctorat, collection Travaux et Recherches).

A partir de 1980, Raymond Poidevin professe à l'Université de Strasbourg III; ily dirige le Centre de recherches d'histoire des relations internationales et le troi-sième cycle Histoire contemporaine, anime de nombreux séminaires. Année aprèsannée il forme une longue cohorte de jeunes historiens qui resteront marqués par

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l'ampleur de ses connaissances, ses dons pédagogiques, sa rigueur scientifique,l'attention qu'il leur portait dans le suivi de leurs travaux.

Comme le montrent ses nombreuses publications - la liste en figure dans sondernier ouvrage, Péripéties franco-allemandes (Euroclio; Peter Lang, 1995), quirassemble vingt-six de ses principaux articles - ainsi que les recherches collectiveset manifestations scientifiques qu'il a suscitées ou auxquelles il participait active-ment, Raymond Poidevin était un grand spécialiste de l'Allemagne contemporaineet des relations franco-allemandes. Son apport est reconnu comme essentiel, car endépouillant une quantité impressionnante de fonds d'archives en France et en Alle-magne, il a exploré de nouveaux domaines, renouvelé nos connaissances, ouvertdes perspectives neuves.

Mais la relation franco-allemande s'inscrit dans le cadre plus vaste de l'Europeoccidentale. Dans les années 1970, Raymond Poidevin avait organisé des colloquessur les relations de la France avec la Belgique, le Luxembourg, la Suisse. En entre-prenant sa grande biographie de Robert Schuman, homme d'Etat, publiée en 1986,il avait placé l'étude des rapports franco-allemands au cœur de l'histoire de la cons-truction européenne qui est devenue, à côté du franco-allemand, son autre domainede prédilection. Son enseignement et les recherches qu'il dirigeait à l'Université deStrasbourg III avaient d'ailleurs pour cadre l'Institut des hautes études européennesde cette université. Parmi ses œuvres majeures, citons son Histoire de la HauteAutorité de la CECA, publiée chez Bruylant en 1993, et écrite en collaborationavec Dirk Spierenburg.

Une grande leçon que nous lègue Raymond Poidevin, c'est que la recherche scien-tifique est inséparable des contacts humains, de la constitution de réseaux rassem-blant des historiens de divers pays, lieux d'échanges, de discussions, de confronta-tions de points de vue, d'enrichissement mutuel. Il est l'un des fondateurs du Groupede liaison des historiens auprès des Communautés, créé en 1982, et l'organisateur, àStrasbourg en 1984, du premier de la série des colloques internationaux de ce groupe.Un autre projet qui lui tenait à cœur, était de rassembler dans un organisme perma-nent des professeurs et chercheurs français et allemands, pour une meilleurs connais-sance et compréhension réciproques de l'histoire contemporaine des deux pays. Saténacité, jointe à celle du professeur Josef Becker, a été récompensée: en 1987 s'estconstitué le Comité franco-allemand de recherches sur l'histoire de la France et del'Allemagne aux XIXe et XXe siècles, dont il suivait de près les activités.

Raymond Poidevin est devenu professeur émérite en octobre 1993. Cela nesignifiait pas pour lui la retraite, car il a continué de diriger de jeunes chercheurs,d'animer des recherches collectives, de participer aux réunions et colloques des ins-tances dont il était membre, un membre actif, respecté, et dont les avis faisaientautorité. En France comme à l'étranger, il avait tissé un dense réseau d'amitiés et derelations. Tous seront durablement marqués par son magistère scientifique, ses qua-lités morales, son sens des responsabilités.

Pierre Guillen

Professeur émérite à l'Université de Grenoble II

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America and Europe1950 – 1974

Marc Trachtenberg

The five articles appearing in this issue of the

Journal

deal with U.S.-Europeanrelations in the quarter-century from 1950 to 1974. For the Europeans at that time,the relationship with America was obviously of fundamental importance: the“America factor” played a far-reaching role in shaping their policies, and indeed inshaping their relations with each other. The United States was the protector ofWestern Europe; the freedom of Europe, it was generally believed, depended onAmerican military power. But a relationship of dependence was always a source ofunease: how could Europe depend so heavily on a non-European power, no matterhow well-intentioned, for the defense of its most vital interests? Wouldn’t it makesense for the European countries to come together as a political unit – for Europe toorganize itself, so that Europe would not be so dependent on America? This prob-lem was of absolutely fundamental importance; the “America factor” was thusbound to play a major role in the history of European integration.

But the particular role it played turned on the specific policies the U.S. govern-ment pursued, and those policies, it turns out, had a profound effect on what wasgoing on within Europe. The articles presented here were all written independentlyof each other; there was no overall agenda that laid out the themes the various au-thors were to develop. It is therefore striking that practically all the authors stressthe way dissatisfaction with America affected – one is tempted to say, lay at theheart of – the European integration process. Paul Pitman, for example, stresses theway dissatisfaction with the United States had been building up in many areas – po-litical, economic and strategic – in the mid-1950s; he argues that those feelingsplayed a key role in the process that led to the Treaties of Rome. Hubert Zimmer-mann and Georges-Henri Soutou both emphasize the impact of America’s rathercavalier monetary policy during the Nixon period on the European integrationprocess at that time. And the article Christopher Gehrz and I wrote discusses theway in which a bare-knuckled American policy in late 1950 led the French and theGermans to see that they had major interests in common, interests somewhat dis-tinct from those of the United States; what this episode suggested was that by com-ing together, the Europeans might be able to provide something of a counterweightto American power within the Western alliance.

Perhaps the most fundamental point to emerge from this series of articles is thatthere is a real story to U.S.-European relations during this period: the basic struc-ture of U.S.-European relations was not set in concrete in the late 1940s; what wethink of as fundamental policies were by no means sacrosanct; attitudes could shiftdramatically, and far-reaching changes of policies could rarely be ruled out. AsFrancis Gavin and Erin Mahan show, for example, the Kennedy administration was

Marc Trachtenberg

8

by no means committed to the Bretton Woods monetary regime as a fundamentalelement of a U.S.-dominated system, but was instead inclined to view BrettonWoods as a kind of albatross; it was far more open to fundamental change in thiskey area than people have generally recognized. They also show how, during theKennedy period, the French government (or at least the French minister of finance)was not out to destroy this dollar-based monetary system, this supposed symbol ofAmerican hegemony, but was instead quite interested in shoring up the system andpursuing a policy of monetary cooperation with the United States.

And Soutou, in an article drawing on new French and American archival sourc-es, shows how different both the Pompidou and the Nixon-Kissinger policies werefrom the policies that had preceded them. Perhaps the most remarkable finding herewas how far things had moved during the Pompidou-Nixon period in the area ofnuclear weapons cooperation – a very important development that reflected funda-mental shifts in basic political thinking in both countries.

One might think, given the many books and articles that have been published onU.S.-European relations during the Cold War period, that not much remains to besaid on the subject. But taken as a whole, what these articles show is how mislead-ing that sort of assumption can be. Archival research, even on the early Cold War,can still yield important new insights; and work on the later period, especially theearly 1970s, can profoundly reshape our understanding of what was going on. Andwith the opening in recent years of important new archival sources on both sides ofthe Atlantic, one can safely predict that we will be learning a good deal more aboutthe subject in the near future.

9

America, Europe and German Rearmament, August-September 1950

Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz

In September 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson met in New York with the Britishforeign secretary, Ernest Bevin, and the French foreign minister, Robert Schuman. Achesonhad an important announcement to make. The United States, he declared, was prepared to“take a step never before taken in history”. The American government was willing to send“substantial forces” to Europe. The American combat force would be part of a collective forcewith a unified command structure, a force which would ultimately be capable of defendingWestern Europe on the ground. But the Americans were willing to take this step only if theEuropean allies, for their part, were prepared to do what was necessary to “make this defense ofEurope a success”. And his government, he said, had come to the conclusion that the wholeeffort could not succeed without a German military contribution. So if the NATO allies wantedthe American troops, they would have to accept the idea of German rearmament – and theywould have to accept it right away. The U.S. government, he insisted, needed to “have ananswer now on the possible use of German forces” in the defense of Western Europe.

1

The position Acheson took at the New York Conference was of quite extraordinary histori-cal importance. The American government was finally committing itself to building an effec-tive defense of Western Europe and to playing a central role in the military system that was tobe set up. But the Americans were also trying to lay down the law to their European allies: theU.S. government wanted to force them to go along with a policy that made them very uneasy.

It was not, of course, that the Europeans disliked the whole package Acheson was now pro-posing. They knew that an effective defense of Western Europe would have to be based on Amer-ican power and therefore welcomed much of the American plan. The offer of a major Americantroop presence in Europe, the proposal to set up a strong NATO military system, the suggestionthat an American general would be sent over as NATO commander – all this was in itself music totheir ears. The problem lay with the final part of Acheson's proposal, the part relating to Germanrearmament, and even here the issue had more to do with timing than with ultimate objectives.

The allied governments were not against the very idea of German rearmament. Of all theNATO allies, the French were the most reluctant at this point to accede to Acheson's demands.But Schuman was not dead set against German rearmament as a matter of principle.

2

He in factnow admitted that it was “illogical for us to defend Western Europe, including Germany, with-out contributions from Germany”.

3

The French government, he told Acheson, was “not irrevo-

1. Minutes of foreign ministers' meetings, September 12-13, 1950, U.S. Department of State,

ForeignRelations of the United States

[FRUS], 1950, vol.3, Washington: GPO, 1977, pp.1192, 1208.2. This claim is somewhat at variance with the conventional wisdom on this point. See, for example,

L. MARTIN,

The American Decision to Rearm Germany

, in: H. STEIN (ed.),

AmericanCivil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies,

University of Alabama Press, Birmingham,1963, p.658: “To the end of the New York meetings, however, the French representative refusedto accept even the principle of German rearmament”. But the real story is not nearly that simple.

3. Foreign ministers' private meeting, September 12, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:1200.


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cably opposed to German participation” in the NATO army. Indeed, he thought it was likelythat “some day” Germany would join the Western defense force.

4

The problem from Schuman's point of view was that Acheson wanted to move tooquickly. The Americans were insisting on immediate and open acceptance of the principle ofGerman rearmament. But Schuman could go along with the U.S. plan, he said, only if thiswere kept secret. It was politically impossible for him to accept the plan publicly at thatpoint.

5

Only a minority in France, he pointed out, appreciated “the importance of Germanyin Western defense”.

6

The French public could probably be brought along and would ulti-mately accept the idea of a German defense contribution, but only if the West moved aheadmore cautiously – only if a strong European defense system had been built up first.

Domestic politics was not the only reason why Schuman took this line. Theeast-west military balance was perhaps an even more fundamental factor. In late1950 the Western powers were just beginning to rearm. In military terms, they feltthey could scarcely hold their own in a war with Russia. General Omar Bradley, theChairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], for example, thought in Novem-ber 1950 that if war broke out, the United States might well lose. The Soviets, onthe other hand, seemed to be getting ready for a war: the sense was that they werepoised on the brink and might be tempted to strike before the West built up its pow-er. In such circumstances, people like Schuman asked, was it wise to move aheadwith the rearmament of Germany, something the Russians were bound to find high-ly provocative? Rather than risk war now, at a time of Western weakness, didn't itmake sense to put off the decision until after the West had rearmed itself and wouldthus be better able to withstand the shock?

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4. Acheson to Truman and Acting Secretary, September 16, 1950, ibid., pp.312-313.5. Acheson-Schuman meeting, September 12, 1950, and meeting of British, French and American

foreign ministers and high commissioners, September 14, 1950, ibid., pp.287, 299-300.6. Acheson-Schuman meeting, September 12, 1950, ibid., pp.287-288.7. Schuman and Bevin in meeting of British, French and American foreign ministers and high com-

missioners, September 14, 1950, ibid., pp.296-297. This fear of provoking a Soviet attack had beenan important element in French policy since early 1948. The concern at that time was that theRussians would interpret movement toward the establishment of a West German state as a majorstep toward German rearmament, which, it was felt, might provoke preventive military action. See,for example, Chauvel to Bonnet, March 18 and May 19, 1948, Bonnet Papers, vol.1, and Massiglito Foreign Ministry, May 3, 1948, Massigli Papers, vol.67, both French Foreign Ministry Archives[FFMA], Paris. In 1950, this factor continued to play a fundamental role in French policy on theissue, even before the German rearmament question was pushed to the top of the agenda by theevents in Korea in June. See, for example, a Quai d'Orsay memorandum from April 1950, pub-lished in H. MÖLLER and K. HILDEBRAND,

Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Frankreich:Dokumente 1949-1963

, vol.1, K.G. Saur, Munich, 1997, p.376: “Nous pouvons nous attendre à ceque les Américains posent le problème d'une contribution allemande éventuelle à l'armement despuissances occidentales. Un programme de ce genre ne pourra être accepté par nous que dans lamesure où il ne constituerait pas une provocation vis-à-vis de l'U.R.S.S”. On these issues ingeneral, and for the Bradley quotation in particular, see the discussion in M. TRACHTENBERG,

A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963

, Princeton UniversityPress, Princeton, 1999, pp.96-100, 111-112; and in M. TRACHTENBERG,

History and Strategy

,Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1991, pp.118-127, 130-131.

America, Europe and German Rearmament

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These were perfectly reasonable arguments, and were in fact supported by theU.S. government's own assessments of the risk of war with Russia at the time. TheU.S. High Commissioner in Germany, John McCloy, thought, for example, in June1950 that “the rearmament of Germany would undoubtedly speed up any Sovietschedule for any possible future action in Germany and would, no doubt, be regard-ed by [the Soviets] as sufficiently provocative to warrant extreme counter-measures”.

8

In December, the CIA concluded that the USSR would “seriouslyconsider going to war whenever it becomes convinced that progress toward com-plete Western German rearmament”, along with the rearmament of NATO as awhole, had reached the point where it could not be “arrested by other methods”.

9

Itwas of course possible that the Soviets might choose to live with a rearmed Germany,especially if there continued to be major limits on German power, but certaingroups within the U.S. government – Army intelligence, for example – believedthat if the West moved ahead in this area, it was more likely “that the Soviets woulddecide on resort to military action rather than make the required adjustment”.

10

So if even American officials were worried about what a decision to rearmGermany might lead to, it is not hard to understand why the Europeans, andespecially the French, were so disturbed by the U.S. proposal. The NATO allieswould have to accept the whole package, Acheson told them. They would have toagree, publicly and immediately, to the rearmament of Germany. They would haveto go along with what they honestly viewed as a very provocative policy vis-à-visRussia and risk war at a time when no effective defense was in place – either that,Acheson said, or the Americans would simply not defend them.

The fact that the U.S. government had chosen to deal so roughly with its allies hadone very important effect: it helped bring France and Germany together. It helpedbring about a certain change in perspective – a change in the way the Europeansviewed America and thus in the way they viewed each other. Up to this point, theFrench, for example, had tended to think of the policy of “building Europe” in essen-tially manipulative and instrumental terms. It was, to use Raymond Poidevin's phrase,a way “to seduce and to control” Germany.

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But now the idea was beginning to takehold that the Europeans – that is, the continental West Europeans – were all in thesame boat in strategic terms. The Europeans had interests of their own – interests thatoverlapped with, but which were in important ways distinct from those of the UnitedStates. The fact that the Americans could adopt a highly provocative policy towardRussia, with scant regard for European interests, meant that the Europeans could notafford to be too dependent on the United States. Yes, there had to be a strong counter-weight to Soviet power in Europe, and yes, that counterweight had to rest largely on

8. McCloy to Acheson, June 13, 1950, President's Secretary's Files [PSF], box 178, Germany, folder2, Harry S Truman Library [HSTL], Independence, Missouri.

9. “Probable Soviet Reactions to a Remilitarization of Western Germany”, NIE 17, December 27,1950, both in PSF/253/HSTL.

10. “Soviet Courses of Action with Respect to Germany”, NIE 4, January 29, 1951, PSF/253/HSTL.11. R. POIDEVIN,

Robert Schuman, Homme d'État: 1886-1963

, Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, 1986,p.220.


12

American power. The American presence in Europe was obviously essential and anAmerican combat force would have to be the heart of an effective NATO defensesystem. But there needed to be some counterweight to American power within theAtlantic alliance. And given the fact that Britain held herself aloof from Europe, thatcounterweight had to be built on a real understanding between France and Germany.

We do not want to overstate the argument here. This sort of thinking was justbeginning to take shape in 1950 and things obviously had a long way to go.

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Butthe importance of what was going on at the time should not be underestimatedeither. The line Acheson took at the New York Conference was quite extraordinary,and what was at stake was of enormous importance. The events of late 1950 weretherefore bound to make a profound impression. They were bound to lead manyEuropeans to begin thinking more seriously about the importance of comingtogether as a unit in order to give Europe more of a voice in setting the policy of theWest as a whole.

Consider, for example, the reaction of the German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, tothe American plan. Shortly after the New York Conference, Adenauer had his top advisor,Herbert Blankenhorn, tell Armand Bérard, the French deputy high commissioner inGermany, that he did not want Germany to simply provide forces for an American army –that is, an army in which the Americans would have all the power. The two men soon metagain and Blankenhorn returned to the charge. “With great emphasis”, Bérard wrote,Blankenhorn “repeated what he had already told me a couple of weeks ago, namely, howdesirable it was that an initiative come from the French side. Germany did not want totake her place in an American army”. “If France”, Blankenhorn continued, “proposed thecreation of a European army under allied command, an army whose supreme commandermight even be a Frenchman”, his government “would support that solution”.

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Bérard's comment on this is worth quoting at length:

“The chancellor is being honest when he says he is worried that what the German[military] contribution will boil down to is simply German forces in an Americanarmy. He is afraid that his country will end up providing foot soldiers and shocktroops for an anti-Communist offensive force that the United States might build inEurope. People in our own country are worried about the same sort of thing. Ade-nauer is asking for a French initiative that would head off this American solution,which he fears. I think he is sincere in all this, just as sincere as he was, and still is, in

12. For the best study of the subject, see G.-H. SOUTOU,

L'Alliance incertaine: Les rapportspolitico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954-1996

, Fayard, Paris, 1996. Soutou begins his storyin 1954, which, as he points out (for example, on p.22), is when a real bilateral Franco-Germanstrategic relationship began. This is true enough; the point here is simply that the thinking hadbegun to take shape a number of years earlier.

13. “Puis, avec beaucoup d’insistance, il [Blankenhorn] m’a répété ce qu’il m’avait dit il y a unequinzaine de jours déjà, combien il paraissait désirable au Chancelier qu’une initiative vînt du côtéfrançais. L’Allemagne ne voulait pas prendre sa place dans une armée américaine. Si la Franceproposait la création d’une armée européenne sous commandement allié, dont le chef suprêmepourrait même être un Français, le gouvernement fédéral se rallierait à cette solution”. Bérard toForeign Ministry, mid-October 1950, series “Europe 1949-55”, subseries “Allemagne”, volume70, folio 7, French Foreign Ministry Archives, Paris.


13

his support for the Schuman Plan [for a coal and steel community in WesternEurope]. He believes that the problems of Western Europe have to be resolved on aFranco-German basis, the military problem as well as the economic problems”.

14

The important point here was that France and Germany had major interests in common,not just vis-à-vis Russia, but vis-à-vis America as well. There was, Bérard noted,

“a certain parallelism between the position of France and that of West Germany withregard to the defense of the West. Both of them are concerned above all with makingsure that they are not invaded and that their territory does not serve as a battleground;they both feel very strongly that the West should hold back from provoking theSoviets, before a Western force, worthy of the name, has been set up”.

15

To go from that point to the conclusion that the Europeans had to act more as a strategicunit – that European integration had to be real, and not just a device to keep Germanyfrom becoming a problem – did not require any great leap of the imagination.

Reading these and related documents, one thus has the sense of a new way of think-ing beginning to take shape – of French leaders rubbing their eyes and waking up to thefact that they and the Germans had more in common than they had perhaps realized, ofan important threshold being crossed, of France and Germany just starting to think ofthemselves as a strategic unit. And if this kind of thinking was beginning to emerge, itwas in large part in reaction to the heavy-handed way in which the U.S. governmenthad chosen to deal with its European allies in September 1950.

But had the American government, in any real sense, actually

chosen

to deal with theallies in that way? It is commonly argued that the policy that Acheson pursued in September

14. “Le Chancelier dit vrai quand il affirme son souci d’éviter que la contribution allemande se traduise parune participation à une armée américaine. Il redoute que son pays n’ait à fournir l’infanterie et les troupesde choc d’une force offensive anti-communiste que les Etats-Unis mettraient sur pied en Europe. Lesmêmes préoccupations existent dans notre opinion en ce qui concerne notre pays. M. Adenauer solliciteune initiative française qui écarte la menace de cette solution américaine qu’il redoute. Je considère qu’ilest sincère dans l’expression de ce souhait, comme il l’a été et comme il le reste dans son adhésion au PlanSchuman. Il croit à une solution franco-allemande des problèmes qui se posent à l’Europe Occidentale, duproblème militaire comme des problèmes économiques”. Bérard’s next sentence is also worth noting, be-cause it shows how French officials were already thinking in terms of balancing between Germany andAmerica within the Western alliance: “Ce n’est pas à dire que l’on doive concevoir une armée occidentaledont les Américains seraient exclus et dont Français et Allemands fourniraient les forces principales.Pareille solution risquerait un jour de nous contraindre à nous battre, sinon pour le roi de Prusse, du moinspour la reconquête de la Prusse”. Bérard to Foreign Ministry, October 17, 1950, Europe 1949-55, Alle-magne, vol.70, ff.16-17, French Foreign Ministry archives. These documents shed light not only on thebeginnings of European integration (and on the origins of the EDC project in particular), but also on theevolution of Franco-German relations. Adenauer, for example, is often portrayed as pursuing a verypro-American policy at this point; the standard view is that his attitude toward France at this time wasrelatively cool. Note the tone, for example, of the discussion in H.-P. SCHWARZ,

Adenauer: Der Auf-stieg, 1876-1952

, 3rd ed., Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1986, p.836. But it is clear from theseFrench sources that the roots of his later policy were already in place in 1950.

15. “Il existe une analogie certaine entre la position de la France et celle de l’Allemagne Fédérale concernantla défense de l’Occident. L’une et l’autre ont le souci d’écarter à tout prix de leur territoire la possibilitéd’une invasion et d’éviter de servir de champ de bataille; elles sont préoccupées de s’abstenir de toute pro-vocation à l’égard des Soviétiques, avant que ne soit constituée une force occidentale véritablement dignede ce nom”. Bérard to Foreign Ministry, October 17, 1950 (as in n. 14).


14

1950 is not to be understood as a choice freely made at the top political level, but is rather tobe seen as the outcome of a bureaucratic dispute in which Acheson ultimately had to giveway to pressure from the Pentagon.

16

The State Department, according to this argument,understood the need for an effective defense of Western Europe; now, following the outbreakof the Korean War in June, the need for action was obvious. It therefore wanted to beginbuilding an effective defense by sending an American combat force over to Europe. But thisgave the military authorities the leverage they needed to achieve their “long-standing objec-tive of German rearmament”.

17

They were willing, they now said, to go along with the planto send over the U.S. combat divisions, but only as part of a “package": the JCS “wantedcategorical assurances that they could count on German assistance in the shape they desiredand that they would be able to make an immediate start on raising and equipping theGerman units"; they insisted that the offer to deploy the U.S. force “be made strictlyconditional upon iron-clad commitments by the Europeans to their own contributions, and inparticular, upon unequivocal acceptance of an immediate start on German rearmament in aform technically acceptable to American strategists”.

18

The State Department, the argument runs, resisted the Pentagon's efforts to bring theGerman rearmament question to a head in such a blunt and high-handed way. The twosides debated the issue for about two weeks in late August, but the “Pentagon stoodunited and unmovable”. Acheson, according to his own widely-accepted account,“agreed with their strategic purpose”, but “thought their tactics murderous”.

19

At theend of August, however, Acheson had reluctantly decided that he had to give way. Hehad earlier felt that insisting on the inclusion of Germany at the outset “would delay andcomplicate the whole enterprise”, and that a more flexible approach made more sense,but, by his own account, he was almost totally isolated within the government andtherefore had no choice but to back off from that position. “I was right”, he said, “but Iwas nearly alone”.

20

Most of the State Department, and even the president himself,seemed to be on the other side. So somewhat against his better judgment, he acceptedwhat he later recognized as a mistaken policy.

21

He accepted not only the “package”approach – that is, as one scholar put it, a formula which “tied German rearmament tothe State Department package much more rigidly than the State Department had

16. See, for example, MARTIN,

Decision to Rearm Germany

, pp.656-657; R. McGEEHAN,

TheGerman Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defense after World War II

,University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1971, pp.41, 47; D. McLELLAN,

Dean Acheson: The StateDepartment Years

, Dodd, Mead, New York, 1976, pp.328-329; J. CHACE,

Acheson: TheSecretary of State Who Created the American World

, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1998, p.324;D. C. LARGE,

Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era

, Universityof North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1996, pp.84-85; S. DOCKRILL,

Britain's Policy for WestGerman Rearmament, 1950-1955

, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp.32-33.17. McLELLAN,

Acheson

, p.328.18. MARTIN,

American Decision to Rearm Germany

, p.656.19. D. ACHESON,

Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department

, Norton, New York,1969, p.438; McLELLAN,

Acheson

, p.329; McGEEHAN,

German Rearmament Question

, p.41.20. D. ACHESON,

Present at the Creation

,

p.438.21. Ibid., p.440; D. ACHESON,

Sketches from Life of Men I Have Known

, Harper, New York, 1961,pp.26, 41; McGEEHAN,


, p.41.


15

intended”

22

– but a plan that would allow Germany to rearm on a national basis, whichwas also very much at variance with what the State Department had originally want-ed.

23

But this was the only way he could get the Pentagon to accept the rest of the plan.If all this is true – if the American government just stumbled into the policy it

pursued in September 1950, if the policy, that is, is to be understood essentially asthe outcome of a bureaucratic process – then the episode might not tell us muchabout how the American government, at the top political level, dealt with its Euro-pean allies. But if that standard interpretation is not accurate, then the story mighttell us something fundamental about the nature of America’s European policy, andindeed about the nature of U.S.-European relations in general.

The goal here, therefore, is to examine this interpretation of what happened inAugust and September 1950 in the light of the evidence. But is there any point, onemight wonder, to conducting an analysis of this sort? If so many scholars wholooked into the issue all reached essentially the same conclusion, that conclusion,one might reasonably assume, is probably correct. There is, however, a basic prob-lem with this assumption: the standard interpretation rests on a very narrow eviden-tiary base. It rests, to a quite extraordinary extent, on Acheson's own account andon scholarly accounts that depend heavily on Acheson's story.

24

A self-servingaccount, however, should never be taken at face value; given the importance of theissue, the standard interpretation really needs to be tested against the evidence. Anda good deal of archival evidence has become available since Acheson's memoirsand the first scholarly accounts were published. But what light does this newmaterial throw on the issue?

22. MARTIN,

American Decision to Rearm Germany

, p.657.23. McGEEHAN,


, p.41. This aspect of the argument is emphasized inT. SCHWARTZ,

America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany

,Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1991, p.134.

24. The two published accounts Acheson gave –


, pp.437-440, and

Sketchesfrom Life

,

pp.25-27, 41-43 -are cited frequently in the historical literature relating to this issue.Scholars sometimes also relied on information Acheson provided in personal interviews. SeeMartin,


, p.665, and McLELLAN,

Acheson

, p.viii. Other sources aresometimes cited, but this additional evidence turns out upon examination to be quite weak. McLel-lan, for example, cites a memorandum of a conversation between Acheson and JCS ChairmanBradley on August 30 from the Acheson Papers at the Truman Library as supporting his contentionthat Acheson had at this point “given in to the military point of view” (p. 329). But according tothe archivists at the Truman Library, no such document exists in that collection. The press accountscited in n. 41 in the Martin article also do not prove the point they are meant to support. They arecited to back up the claim that the JCS was insisting on including German rearmament in the pack-age, but the picture they give is that the German rearmament issue was a relatively minor issue(“only an incidental part of a much larger American program”) and that the U.S. government hadnot embraced the package concept (“Acheson has not definitely made it a condition without whichthe United States would refuse to send troops to Europe”).

Western Europe

(editorial), in:

Wash-ington Post

, August 31, 1950, p.8, and

Schuman Got Little Warning on U.S. Plans

, in:

WashingtonPost

, September 17, 1950, p.10.


16

German Rearmament: On What Basis?

The State and Defense departments did not see eye-to-eye on the German rearma-ment question in mid-1950. On that point, the standard interpretation is indeedcorrect. But the differences between the two departments were not nearly as greatas they sometimes seemed, and the area of disagreement had virtually disappearedby the time the New York Conference met in early September.

The military authorities had favored German rearmament since 1947. On May2, 1950, they had officially called for the “early rearming of Western Germany”,and had formally reiterated this call on June 8. But the State Department had takena very different line and on July 3 had flatly rejected the idea that the time hadcome to press for German rearmament.

25

It was not that top State Department offi-cials felt that Germany could never be rearmed. Acheson himself had noted, even in1949, that one could not “have any sort of security in Western Europe without usingGerman power”.

26

But until mid-1950, it was thought for a variety of reasons that itwould be unwise to press the issue.

In July 1950, however, a major shift took place in State Department thinking.Acheson told President Truman at the end of that month that the issue now was notwhether Germany should be “brought into the general defensive plan”, but ratherhow this could be done without undermining America's other basic policy goals inEurope. He pointed out that the State Department was thinking in terms of a “Euro-pean army or a North Atlantic army"; that force would include German troops, butthe German units “would not be subject to the orders of Bonn.”

27

A whole series ofkey State Department officials, both in Washington and in the major embassiesabroad, had, in fact, come to the conclusion at about this time that some kind ofinternational army that included German troops would have to be created, andAcheson's own thinking was fully in line with this emerging consensus.

28

This shift in State Department thinking is not to be viewed in bureaucratic politicsterms as an attempt by the State Department to reach some kind of compromise withthe JCS on the German rearmament issue. It was instead a quite straightforward conse-quence of the outbreak of the Korean War in June. As Acheson later noted, after theNorth Korean attack:

25. "Extracts of Views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with Respect to Western Policy toward Germany,”NSC 71, June 8, 1950, and “Views of the Department of State on the Rearmament of Western Ger-many,” NSC 71/1, July 3, 1950, in FRUS 1950, 4:686-687, 691-695.

26. Policy Planning Staff meeting, October 18, 1949, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-53,box 32, RG 59, U.S. National Archives [USNA], College Park, Maryland.

27. Acheson memo of meeting with Truman, July 31, 1950, FRUS 1950, 4:702-703. President Trumanhad earlier opposed the JCS call for German rearmament. See Truman to Acheson, June 16, 1950,ibid., pp.688-689.

28. Bruce to Acheson, July 28, 1950; Acheson-Truman meeting, July 31, 1950; McCloy to Acheson,August 3, 1950; Douglas to Acheson, August 8, 1950; Kirk to Acheson, August 9, 1950; in FRUS1950, 3:157, 167-168, 181-182, 190-193.


17

“We and everybody else in Europe and the United States took a new look at the Ger-man problem. It seemed to us that it was now clear that Germany had to take a part inthe defense of Europe; it seemed clear that the idea that we had had before that thiswould work out through a process of evolution wasn't adequate – there wasn't time,the evolution had to be helped along by action. It was quite clear by this time, as aresult of the staff talks in NATO, that the Western Union idea of defense on theRhine was quite impractical and foolish, and that if you were going to have anydefense at all, it had to be in the realm of forward strategy, which was as far east inGermany as possible. This made it absolutely clear that Germany had to be con-nected with defense, not merely through military formations, but emotionally andpolitically, because if the battle was going to be fought in Germany it meant that theGerman people had to be on our side, and enthusiastically so”.

The U.S. government “immediately went to work” on “this German matter” – atleast as soon as it could, given the need to deal, in July especially, with even moreurgent problems relating to the Korean War.

29

So there was now a certain sense of urgency: an effective defense of WesternEurope had to be put in place and, indeed, put in place rather quickly. It was obvi-ous from the start that this would “require real contributions of German resourcesand men”. But the German contribution could not take the form of a Germannational army; the Germans could not be allowed to build a military force able tooperate independently. The only way the Germans could make their defense contri-bution was thus to create some kind of international army that included Germanforces – but forces not able to conduct military operations on their own.

30

A plan based on this fundamental concept was worked out by a key StateDepartment official, Henry Byroade, at the beginning of August. Byroade, theDirector of the State Department's Bureau of German Affairs, discussed his ideaswith the Army staff officers most directly concerned with these issues on August 3.(The Army, for obvious reasons, took the lead in setting policy on this issue for themilitary establishment as a whole). Those officers were pleased by the fact that theState Department now appeared “to be looking with favor toward the controlled re-armament of Western Germany”; they “felt that great progress had been achievedon the question of German rearmament, since both the State Department and theDepartment of Defense are now attempting to work out a suitable plan whichwould make possible a German contribution to the defense of Western Europe”.

29. Princeton Seminar, pp.910-911, 921, Acheson Papers, HSTL. Soon after he left office, Achesonand some of his former collaborators got together at Princeton to discuss what had happened duringthe Truman administration; tapes were made of those discussions and a transcript was prepared.Microfilm copies of the transcript of this “Princeton Seminar”, as it was called, are available at anumber of university libraries in the United States. But the microfilm is often illegible and the bestsource is the original transcript at the Truman Library. All the references from this source citedhere come from the transcript of October 11, 1953 discussion.

30. See the sources cited in n. 28 above, esp. pp.157, 181 (for the quotation), 190, 193.


18

These Army officers had in fact just come up with their own plan for a “controlledrearmament of Germany”.

31

There were, however, major differences between the two plans, or so it seemed toboth sides at the time. The Byroade plan called for the establishment of a highly inte-grated “European Army”; that army would include practically all the Western militaryforces – American and German as well as West European – stationed in Europe; itwould have a “General Staff of truly international character”, and a single commander,an American general, with “complete jurisdiction” over the whole army. The forcewould have as much of an international flavor as possible. The goal, Byroade said, wasto apply the Schuman Plan concept to the military field; the aim was to enable theGermans to contribute to the defense of the West, without at the same time becomingtoo independent – that is, without getting a national army of their own.

32

The Army, on the other hand, was not in favor of setting up a highly integrated“European Army”. The Army staff did not call explicitly for a “German national ar-my”, but key officers did seem to feel that any plan the U.S. government came upwith would need to “appeal to the nationalistic tendencies of the German people”.The Army plan, moreover, called for “controlled rearmament”, but the officers whodrafted it were reluctant to state formally what the “nature of the controls” wouldbe. In short, the State Department called for a truly international force, while themilitary authorities, it seemed, wanted a less highly integrated force composed ofnational armies. The two plans, in Byroade's view, were “miles apart”. Or as theArmy staff put it: the State Department proposal would reduce the “military sover-eignty status” of the European countries down “to the level of Germany in order tosecure her contribution”, while the Army proposed “to raise Germany's status” tothe level of the NATO allies.

33

So there was clearly a major difference of opinion on this issue at this point – atleast at the level of rhetoric. But in practical terms were the two sides really so farapart? The great goal of the State Department was to make sure that there was nonew German national army – that is, an army capable of independent action, and

31. The Byroade Plan, “An Approach to the Formation of a 'European Army'”, was drafted on August3; the text is included in Byroade to McCloy, August 4, 1950, 740.5/8-350, Department of StateCentral Files [DSCF], RG 59, USNA. For the record of Byroade's talks with the Army officers onAugust 3, see Memorandum for General Schuyler, August 5, 1950, Army Operations General Dec-imal File 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1c, Case 12, Book II, RG 319, USNA.For the Army plan, see “Staff Study: Rearmament of Western Germany”, August 2, 1950, andBolté Memorandum for General Gruenther on Rearmament of Germany, August 10, 1950 (con-taining a systematic comparison of the State and Army plans), both in same file in RG 319.

32. Byroade meeting with Army staff officers, August 3, 1950, in: Memorandum for GeneralSchuyler, August 5, 1950, and Army “Staff Study: Rearmament of Western Germany”, August 2,1950, both in Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS,Sec 1c, Case 12, Book II, RG 319, USNA. “An Approach to the Formation of a ‘European Army’”,in Byroade to McCloy, August 3, 1950, 740.5/8-350, DSCF, RG 59, USNA.

33. Army “Staff Study: Rearmament of Western Germany”, August 2, 1950; Byroade meeting withArmy staff officers, August 3, 1950 (document dated August 5); Bolté to Gruenther, August 10,1950 (with attached “Comparison of Plans”); all in Army Operations General Decimal File1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1c, Case 12, Book II, RG 319, USNA.


19

thus able to support an independent foreign policy. The military authorities under-stood the point, and it was for this reason that they, from the start, favored the “con-trolled” rearmament of Germany. And when one examines the sorts of controls theyhad in mind, and when one notes that certain key military controls in their planwould apply to Germany alone, it becomes obvious – the rhetoric notwithstanding– that military leaders had no intention of giving the Federal Republic the same“military sovereignty status” as the NATO allies. In the Byroade plan, not justallied headquarters, but also field army and corps headquarters were to be “interna-tional"; in the plan worked out by the officers in the Pentagon, “Army and Corpsshould be national”, except that the Germans would be “allowed none”. In bothplans, the Germans would contribute only ground forces, and not air or naval forc-es; in both plans there would be German divisions, but no larger purely Germanunits; in both plans, the German forces would be under allied control; in both plans,the Germans would not be allowed to manufacture certain kinds of weapons(“heavy ordnance, etc.”); and both plans implied German participation in NATO.

34

The real difference thus had to do not with Germany but with how the NATOforces were to be treated. Byroade was not too explicit about this part of the pro-posal, but his plan called for virtually all the allied forces in Europe to be integratedinto the proposed European defense force. There would be no distinct British,French or even American army on the continent, only an international army with asingle commander served by an integrated international staff. The U.S. militaryauthorities did not like this proposal at all, even though the whole force would havean American general as its commander. Byroade, it seemed to them, wanted to gotoo far in pushing the allies down to the German level; the Chiefs also felt thatsomething that radical was not essential, and that instead of creating an entirelynew institution, the “European Defense Force”, it made more sense to build on theone basic institution that had already been created: the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization. Both NATO and the Western Union military organization set up bythe Brussels Treaty of 1948 were already in existence; to create a new internationalforce would “tend to complicate an already confusing structure”.

35

And there wasno point in doing so, because NATO itself could provide the necessary degree ofintegration; a German force integrated into the NATO system – especially astrengthened NATO system--would be incapable of independent action.

34. Bolté to Gruenther, August 10, 1950 (with attached “Comparison of Plans”), Army OperationsGeneral Decimal File 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1c, Case 12, Book II, RG319, USNA. See also Byroade meeting with Army staff officers, August 3, 1950, Memorandumfor General Schuyler, August 5, same file in RG 319, and, for the Byroade plan, see Byroade toMcCloy, August 3, 1950, 740.5/8-350, DSCF, RG 59, USNA.

35. Byroade meeting with Army staff officers, August 3, 1950, in Memorandum for General Schuyler,August 5, 1950, and Army “Staff Study: Rearmament of Western Germany”, August 2, 1950, bothin Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1c,Case 12, Book II, RG 319, USNA.


20

This logic was quite compelling. It did not matter if the international force wascalled EDF or NATO. The name was not important. What really mattered waswhether you had an international structure within which the Germans could maketheir contribution, but which at the same time would prevent them from becomingtoo independent. And if an institution that had already been created – that is, NATO– could achieve that result, then so much the better.

36

Even Byroade himself, who by his own account was quite conservative on theseissues in comparison with other State Department officials, was quick to see thepoint. His original plan, in any event, had not really been put forward as a practicalproposal; his aim there had been to sketch out a “theoretical solution from whichone could work backwards” with an eye to working out a “compromise betweenthe theoretical and what is already in existence”. So when a top Army officerexplained to him on August 10 how NATO could do the trick, he at least temporar-ily dropped his objections and basically accepted their approach: he agreed that“German divisions, organized as such, might well be integrated into the NATOforces as now planned, provided only an American commander for these forceswere set up in the near future”. The differences between the two departments wereclearly narrowing. Indeed, it turned out that Byroade's earlier objection to the Armyplan had “stemmed entirely from a misunderstanding of terms”. Byroade hadthought that when Army officers referred to “controlled rearmament”, they had inmind only a “limitation on numbers and types of divisions”. When he was told thatthe Army “also contemplated as part of the control a very definite limit as to thetypes and quantities of materiel and equipment which Germany should manu-facture, Byroade said he was in complete accord”.

37

By the end of the month, it seemed that a full consensus had been reached. ForAcheson, far more than for Byroade, only the core issue was really important. Forhim, it was not a problem that the Germans would have a national army in anadministrative sense – that is, that they would recruit their own troops, pay them,provide them with uniforms, and so on. The only important thing was to make surethat things did not go too far – that the “old German power”, as Acheson put it, was

36. The idea that NATO could do it – that one did not need to create a new institution but could relyon a strong NATO structure to solve this whole complex of problems – reemerged in 1954 as theEuropean Defense Community project was collapsing and people were looking for alternatives.The military authorities, especially the NATO commander, General Alfred Gruenther, played akey role at that point in pushing for the NATO solution; see M. TRACHTENBERG,

ConstructedPeace

, p.127. But they were drawing on basic thinking that had taken shape in 1950. At that time,both Gruenther – then Deputy Army Chief of Staff for Plans – and General Schuyler, another topArmy officer who would end up as Gruenther's Chief of Staff in 1954, were already pressing forthe NATO solution.

37. Byroade to McCloy, August 4, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:183-184; Bolté to Gruenther, July 25, 1950(account of Byroade's meeting with Schuyler the previous day), and memorandum ofByroade-Schuyler-Gerhardt meeting, August 10, 1950, in Army Operations General Decimal File1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1c, Case 12, Books I and II, RG 319, USNA.


21

not resurrected.

38

If an arrangement could guarantee that, he was prepared to bequite flexible on the secondary issues. Acheson was certainly not going to go to thewall to defend those parts of the Byroade concept that would tend to strip theNATO forces, including the American force in Europe, of their national character.

Acheson had an important meeting with JCS Chairman Bradley on August 30 towork things out, and he discussed that meeting with his principal advisors later thatmorning. He did not complain that the military wanted to go too far toward creating aGerman national army; his real complaint was that the JCS was “confused” and hadsomehow gotten the idea that the State Department position was more extreme than itreally was. The Pentagon's own position, Acheson thought, was just not clear enough:“he did not know what was meant by 'national basis' and 'controlled status'”.

39

But the military authorities were now willing to be more accommodating onthis point and were prepared to state more explicitly what they meant by thoseterms. This represented a certain shift from the line they had taken at the beginningof the month. In early August, they had preferred not to outline formally the sortsof controls they had in mind.

40

But by the end of the month, the Army leadershiphad concluded that it needed to be more forthcoming.

This was because President Truman had intervened in these discussions onAugust 26. On that day, he had asked the two departments to come up with a com-mon policy on the whole complex of issues relating to European defense and WestGerman rearmament. Given the president's action, a simple rejection of theByroade plan was no longer a viable option. Leading military officers now felt thatthey needed to come up with a more “positive approach” to the problem. A “Planfor the Development of West German Security Forces” was quickly worked out andapproved by the Army leadership at the beginning of September. That plan spelledout the controls the military had long favored: the NATO organization would bestrengthened; Germany would not be allowed to have an air force or a navy; thelargest German unit would be the division; there would be no German general staff;German industry would be permitted to provide only light weapons and equipment.The military authorities were thus not pressing for the creation of a German nation-al force that would have the same status as the British army or the French army or

38. Acheson-Nitze-Byroade-Perkins meeting, August 30, 1950,

Official Conversations and Meetingsof Dean Acheson (1949-1953),

University Publications of America microfilm, reel 3.39. Ibid. The references are probably to various JCS documents from this period that contained these

terms. See, for example, JCS 2124/18 of September 1, 1950, p.162, in CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49),JCS Geographic File for 1948-50, RG 218, USNA.

40. See the Army “Staff Study: Rearmament of Western Germany”, August 2, 1950, paragraph 8,Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1c, Case12, Book II, RG 319, USNA.


22

the American army. Indeed, by the beginning of September, there was no funda-mental difference between their position and that of Acheson on this issue.

41

The Origins of the Package Plan

So the State Department and the Pentagon had clashed in August 1950 on thequestion of German rearmament. That conflict had focused on the question of theextent to which the German force would be organized on a “national” basis – or, tolook at the issue from the other side, the degree of military integration needed tokeep Germany from having a capability for independent action. But by the end ofthe month that conflict had essentially been resolved. Misunderstandings had beencleared up and differences had been ironed out. There would be a German militarycontribution, both departments agreed, but no German national army. The Germanforce would be fully integrated into the NATO force; the German force would notbe able to operate independently. This was all Acheson really required, and the JCShad never really asked for anything more by way of a German national force.

But even if the conflict had been sharper, even if the Pentagon had been intran-sigent on this issue, and even if the State Department had capitulated to the JCS onthis question, all this would in itself tell us very little about the most important is-sue we are concerned with here: the question of the origins of the “package plan”.This was essentially a separate issue. The American government, at the New YorkConference in mid-September, demanded that the NATO allies agree, immediatelyand publicly, to the rearmament of West Germany; if they refused to accept that de-mand, the Americans would not send over the combat divisions and would not sendover an American general as NATO commander. Everything was tied together intoa single package, and it was presented to the allies on a “take it or leave it” basis. Itwas this policy, this tactic, that created the whole problem in September 1950.

41. Gruenther to Davis, Duncan and Edwards, September 1, 1950, enclosing the “Plan for the Devel-opment of West German Security Forces”. The plan had been worked out “pursuant to verbal in-structions” Gruenther had given General Schuyler on August 31; the feeling in military circles wasthat after the president's letter, the JCS needed to take a more accommodating line in their discus-sions with the State Department than they had taken thus far. Gruenther, Bolté and Army Chief ofStaff Collins were briefed on the plan on September 1, Collins approved it, and it was officiallypresented to the JCS that same day. Miller memorandum for record, September 1, 1950, Bolté toCollins on Rearmament of Western Germany, August 31, 1950, and Ware to JCS Secretary, Sep-tember 1, 1950. All in Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Ger-many TS, Sec 1c, Case 12, Book II, RG 319, USNA. The old conventional argument – laid out, forexample, in McGEEHAN,


, p. 41 – was that the U.S. government,by early September, had decided to press for a German national army “with no particular controlarrangement other than that which would have resulted simply by virtue of the German troops be-ing under NATO command and without their own general staff”. But this, it turns out, was incor-rect: the controls the Army was now calling for were quite far-reaching.


23

How exactly did the issue of German rearmament get tied to the question of sendingover American combat divisions and to appointing an American general as NATO com-mander? The standard view is that the JCS was responsible for the package plan. Themilitary authorities, it is commonly argued, simply refused to accept the deployment ofthe American combat force unless the Europeans, for their part, agreed to the rearma-ment of West Germany. Acheson supposedly thought these tactics “murderous” andtried hard to get the Pentagon to change its mind. But the JCS was intransigent, thisargument runs, and to get the troops sent, Acheson gave way in the end and reluctantlyaccepted the tactic the military leadership had insisted on.

42

But does this basic interpre-tation hold up in the light of the archival evidence now available?

First of all, did the military push throughout August for the package approach?The military leaders certainly felt that a German military contribution was essen-tial. The West European NATO allies, in their view, could not generate enoughmilitary force by themselves to provide for an effective defense; German troopswere obviously necessary for that purpose; German rearmament was therefore seenas a “vital element” of an effective defense policy.

43

The military authorities alsosupported the idea of beefing up the U.S. military presence in Europe and of send-ing over an American general as NATO commander.

44

But the key point to notehere is that these were treated as essentially separate issues. Military leaders did notsay (at least not in any of the documents that we have seen) that U.S. troops shouldbe sent only if the allies accepted German rearmament. They did not say that theway to press for German rearmament was to tell the allies that unless they wentalong with the American plan, the U.S. combat divisions would be kept at home.

Indeed, in the formal policy documents on the defense of Europe, the JCS didnot make the German rearmament issue its top priority. The Chiefs instead tendedto play it down. The basic JCS view in those documents was that NATO Europe –the “European signatories” of the North Atlantic Treaty – needed to “provide thebalance of the forces required for the initial defense” over and above what the UnitedStates was prepared to supply.

45

West Germany, which at this time, of course, wasnot a member of NATO, was not even mentioned in this context. What this suggests

42. See especially McLELLAN,

Acheson

, pp.328-330; MARTIN,


,pp.656-657; and ACHESON,


, pp.437-438, 44043. See, for example, Joint Strategic Survey Committee report on Rearmament of Western Germany, July

27, 1950, JCS 2124/11, JCS Geographic File for 1948-50, 092 Germany (5-4-49), RG 218, USNA.44. Bolté to Collins, August 28, 1950, Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 20, file G-3 091

Germany TS, Sec 1, RG 319, USNA. Note also the initial draft that the military had prepared of a joint replyto the president's “Eight Questions” letter, given in JCS 2116/28 of September 6, 1950. The original draft,according to another document, was given to the State Department on September 1. See Bolté to Collins,September 2, 1950. Both documents are in Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 21, file G-3091 Germany TS, Sec 1c, Case 12, Books II and (for the September 6 document) III, RG 319, USNA.

45. This key phrase found its way into a whole series of major documents in early September. See ap-pendix to memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “United States Views on Measures for theDefense of Western Europe”, JCS 2073/61, September 3, 1950, JCS Geographic File for 1948-50,Box 25, RG 218, USNA. The same document, after being approved by the Secretary of Defense,was forwarded to the State Department on September 12 and appears in FRUS 1950 3:291-293. Avery similar phrase was included in NSC 82; see FRUS 1950 3:274.


24

is that the military leadership was not pounding its fist on the table on the Germanrearmament question. The German issue was important, of course, but the choice ofthis kind of phrasing suggests that the Chiefs were prepared to deal with it in arelatively reasonable, gradual, businesslike way.

What about the State Department? How did it feel about the package approach?Did it agree to the inclusion of German rearmament in the package because thiswas the only way to get the Pentagon to go along with its plan to send additionaltroops to Europe? Some scholars suggest that this was the case, but the real pictureis rather different.

46

The outbreak of the Korean War was the key development here, and State Departmentofficials understood from the start that if Europe was to be defended, a German force ofsome sort would be required. As McCloy wrote Acheson on August 3: “to defend WesternEurope effectively will obviously require real contributions of German resources andmen”.

47

This was simply the conventional wisdom at the time: neither McCloy nor anyoneelse in the State Department needed the JCS to remind them that an effective defense meanta German military contribution. But they were also dead set against the idea of allowing theGermans to build up an army of their own – a national army, able to operate independentlyand thus capable of supporting an independent foreign policy. It followed that some kind ofinternational force would have to be created: the Germans could make their contribution, aneffective force could be built up, but there would be no risk of a German national army. Thewhole concept of a multinational force – of military integration, of a unified commandstructure, of a single supreme commander supported by an international staff – was thusrooted in an attempt to deal with the question of German rearmament. It was not as thoughthe thinking about the defense of Western Europe and the shape of the NATO militarysystem had developed on its own, and that it was only later that the German rearmamentissue had been linked to it by the JCS for bargaining purposes.

The fundamental idea that the different elements in the equation – the U.S. divi-sions, the unified command structure, the forces provided by NATO Europe, andthe German contribution – were all closely interrelated and needed to be dealt withas parts of a unified policy thus developed naturally and organically as the basicthinking about the defense of Europe took shape in mid-1950. This idea – in asense, the basic idea behind the package concept – took hold quite early in August1950, and it was the State Department that took the lead in pressing for this kind ofapproach. The Byroade plan, for example, explicitly tied all these different ele-ments together: in this plan, which in mid-August became a kind of official StateDepartment plan, German units could be created if and only if they were integratedinto an allied force with an American commander.

48

46. See, for example, McLELLAN,

Acheson, p.328.47. McCloy to Acheson, August 3, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:181.48. Byroade-Schuyler-Gerhardt meeting, August 10, 1950, Army Operations General Decimal File

1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1c, Case 12, Book II, RG 319, USNA. For thefinal Byroade plan, and for its adoption as the official State Department position, see Matthews toBurns, August 16, 1950, with enclosure, FRUS 1950, 3:211-219.

America, Europe and German Rearmament 25

The State Department was thus the driving force behind this kind of approach. For theentire month of August, its officials pressed for a unified policy. But the military authori-ties, because of their dislike for the Byroade plan, tended to drag their feet in this area.49

The State Department, in frustration, and aware that a policy needed to be worked out be-fore the NATO ministers met in mid-September, then got the president to intervene. OnAugust 26 (as noted above), Truman asked the two departments, State and Defense, tocome up with a common policy. He laid out a series of eight questions that the two depart-ments were to answer by September 1, a deadline that was later extended to September6.50 The “Eight Questions” document was actually drafted in the State Department by twoof Acheson's closest advisors. The State Department goal, in getting Truman to sign it,was to prod the Pentagon into accepting a common plan.51

The tactic worked. Military leaders understood that the Eight Questions docu-ment was based on the State Department plan.52 Given the president's intervention(again, as noted above), they now felt they could no longer simply “disregard” thatplan, but instead needed to take a more accommodating and “positive” line.53

The military authorities now drafted a document which, they felt, might serve asa basis for a joint reply to the president. That draft was given to the State Depart-

49. See, for example, P. NITZE, with A. SMITH and S. REARDEN, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At theCenter of Decision, Grove Weidenfeld, New York, 1989, p.123; and Princeton Seminar, p.914. Notealso the tone of Secretary of Defense Johnson's initial reply to State Department letter asking for com-ments on the August 16 Byroade plan: Johnson to Acheson, August 17, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:226-227.

50. Truman to Acheson and Johnson, August 26, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:250-251.51. Draft memo by Nitze and Byroade, August 25, 1950, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, Country and

Area File, Box 28, RG 59, USNA. Some scholars – Martin, for example, in The Decision to RearmGermany, p.659 – portray the JCS as “prodding” the State Department to take “prompt diplomatic action”.And Acheson, in Present at the Creation (p.428), also portrays himself as having been pushed forward,especially by pressure from the president, and actually cites the “Eight Questions” document in this con-text. But in reality – and not just at this point, but throughout this episode – it was the State Departmentthat was pushing things forward, and it was Truman who followed Acheson's lead. The president, for ex-ample, had been against German rearmament when the JCS had pressed for it in June. But when Achesontold him on July 31 that it no longer was a question of whether Germany should be rearmed, that the realissue now was how it was to be done, and that the State Department was thinking in terms of creating “aEuropean army or a North Atlantic army”, Truman immediately “expressed his strong approval” of thiswhole line of thought. Truman to Acheson, June 16, 1950 (two documents), and Acheson-Truman meet-ing, July 31, 1950, FRUS 1950, 4:688, 702.

52. Bolté to Collins, August 28, 1950: “The questions listed in the President's letter are apparentlybased upon the State Department's proposal for the establishment of a European defense force”.Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 20, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1, RG319, USNA. The point was clear from the text of the letter. The two departments were not simplyasked, for example, to consider what, if anything, should be done on the German rearmament ques-tion; they were asked instead to consider whether the U.S. government was prepared to support“the concept of a European defense force, including German participation on other than a nationalbasis” – which was not exactly a neutral way of putting the issue. Truman to Acheson and Johnson,August 26, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:250.

53. Bolté to Collins, August 31, 1950, and Gruenther to Davis, Duncan and Edwards, September 1,1950, enclosing the “Plan for the Development of West German Security Forces”, both in ArmyOperations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1c, Case 12,Book II, RG 319, USNA.

Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher Gehrz26

ment on September 1; Acheson had been shown a preliminary version a couple ofdays earlier.54 Events now moved quickly. In a few days of intensive talks, a jointreply acceptable to both departments was worked out. The final document wasapproved by the president and circulated to top officials as NSC 82 on September11, a day before the New York Conference was due to begin.55

This period from August 26 through September 8 – from the Eight Questionsletter to the joint reply – is thus the most important phase of this whole episode, andthe evidence relating to this period needs to be examined with particular care. Doesit support the view that the military insisted on the package approach and that theState Department opposed it, but gave in reluctantly at the end?

By far the most important document bearing on these issues is the record of ameeting Acheson had on August 30 with his three top advisors in this area, thethree officials who, in fact, were conducting the negotiations with the Defense De-partment: Byroade, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Perkins, and PaulNitze, head of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. Acheson (as noted inthe previous section) had just met with JCS Chairman Bradley earlier that morning.He had also just seen the draft reply the JCS had prepared to the president's EightQuestions letter. At the meeting with his advisors, Acheson discussed the JCS draftsection by section and found most of it acceptable. The few small problems he hadwith it did not involve any issue of principle. At no point did Acheson complainabout, or even comment on, any insistence on the part of the military that all theelements in the program were to be tied together in a single package. The conclu-sion to be drawn from this is absolutely fundamental for the purposes of the analy-sis here: if the JCS had been insisting on the package concept and if Acheson andthe State Department had been opposed to that concept, it is scarcely conceivablethat the issue would not have come up at this meeting.

Nor is it very likely that a conflict over the package issue developed suddenly overthe next few days. Nitze's recollection (in 1953) was that following theAcheson-Bradley meeting things moved very quickly.56 He says nothing about adispute over the package question suddenly emerging at that point, and it is in facthighly unlikely that things could have moved so quickly if a serious dispute had de-veloped. Indeed, Perkins and Nitze spoke in those 1953 discussions of the commonpolicy document – the document that later became NSC 82 – as though it essentiallyreflected their views, and which, through great efforts on their part, they had finallymanaged to get the military authorities to accept. “We had great difficulty”, Perkinsrecalled, “in finally getting the Pentagon to sign on to the common policy”.57 Nitzeagreed: he remembered going over to the Pentagon after Acheson had worked “thisthing” out with General Bradley on August 30, and “we trotted out the specific

54. Bolté to Collins, September 2, 1950, Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 21, fileG-3 091 Germany TS, Sec 1c, Case 12, Book II, RG 319, USNA; Acheson-Nitze-Byroade-Perkinsmeeting, August 30, 1950, cited in n. 38 above.

55. Acheson and Johnson to Truman, September 8, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:273-278.56. Princeton Seminar, pp.920-921.57. Princeton Seminar, p.914.


piece of paper which spelled out the package proposal with the Pentagon peopleand got their agreement to this document”.58 It was scarcely as though the StateDepartment was going along with the package plan reluctantly or against its betterjudgment.

An analysis of the drafting history points to the same general conclusion. Thepassage in NSC 82 that served as the basis for the package policy – indeed, the onlypassage in the document that called for such a policy – was part of the answer to thesixth question:

“We recommend that an American national be appointed now as Chief of Staff andeventually as a Supreme Commander for the European defense force but only uponthe request of the European nations and upon their assurance that they will providesufficient forces, including adequate German units, to constitute a command reason-ably capable of fulfilling its responsibilities”.59

That final document was based on the draft the JCS had turned over on September 1;the key phrase “including adequate German units” did not appear in the originalJCS draft.60 It scarcely stands to reason that the military authorities, having decidedto be cooperative, would harden their position in the course of their talks with StateDepartment representatives, above all if State Department officials had arguedstrongly against an intransigent policy.

None of this means, of course, that the JCS was opposed to including a call forGerman rearmament in the package. This was in their view a goal that the U.S.government obviously had to pursue. But this does not mean that the Chiefs weregoing to try to dictate negotiating tactics to the State Department – that they weregoing to insist on a diplomatic strategy that Acheson and his top advisors rejected.

State Department officials, in fact, did not really blame the JCS for what had hap-pened at the New York Conference. Nitze, for example, although he said in 1953 thatthe Chiefs would not agree to send additional forces until they got assurances from theBritish and the French about a German military contribution, did not actually hold themprimarily responsible for the confrontation with the Europeans in mid-September.61 Hepointed out at that time that the German rearmament issue could have been dealt withvery differently. The issue, he said, could have been presented “to the British andFrench in a way which emphasized the supreme commander and the American com-mitment”; the “question of German participation” could have been “put in a lower cate-gory and kind of weaved in gradually”.62 Nitze did not blame the JCS for vetoing thatapproach. In his view, the real responsibility lay elsewhere. “We were fouled up on

58. Princeton Seminar, p.914.59. NSC 82, FRUS 1950, 3:276.60. See JCS 2116/28, September 6, 1950, which gives the final draft and shows changes from the

earlier draft; Army Operations General Decimal File 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 Germany TS,Sec 1c, Case 12, Book III, RG 319, USNA. For another copy, see JCS to Johnson, September 5,1950, Records of the Administrative Secretary, Correspondence Control Section Decimal File:July to Dec 1950, CD 091.7 (Europe), box 175, RG 330, USNA.

61. Princeton Seminar, p. 915.62. Princeton Seminar, p. 916.


this”, he said, by press leaks primarily coming from McCloy, “who agreed entirely withthe tactical importance of doing it the other way” – that is, of dealing with the Germanrearmament issue head on.63

But Acheson was not fundamentally opposed to the blunt approach, and(contrary to his later disclaimers) he himself, on balance, thought that the U.S.government had chosen the right course of action at the time. Would it have beenbetter, he asked in that same discussion, to have opted for quiet talks with theBritish and the French, when a plan had just been worked out, when a NATO for-eign ministers' meeting was about to be held, and when the issue was being “talkedabout everywhere”? “It seemed to me then”, he said, “and it seems to me now, thatwe did the right thing”.64

And indeed, in his reports to Truman from the New York Conference, Achesongave no sign that he was pursuing the package plan strategy reluctantly or againsthis better judgment. He gave no sign that he was looking for a way to soften thegeneral line and deal with the allies in a more conciliatory manner. He explained tothe president on September 15 how he had laid out the American demands, how hehad discussed the issue “with the gloves off”, how he had “blown” some of theallies' objections to the American plan “out of the water”, and how it might well bea question of “whose nerve lasts longer”. He was clearly pleased with his ownperformance and was not at all unhappy about the line he had taken.65

As one of its top officials pointed out at the time, the State Department was con-ducting a “hard-hitting kind of operation” in this area – and was proud of it.66

63. Princeton Seminar, p. 916; see also p.912. The archival evidence confirms the point that McCloyfavored a very tough line at this time. See especially the handwritten letter from McCloy to Ache-son, September 20, 1950, in the Acheson Papers, Memoranda of Conversations, September 1950,HSTL. A high French official, McCloy reported, had just “referred again to the delicacy of Frenchopinion” on the German rearmament issue. “I think the time has come”, he wrote, “to tell thesepeople that there is other opinion to deal with and that U.S. opinion is getting damn delicate itself.If there should be an incursion in January and U.S. troops should get pushed around without Ger-man troops to help them because of a French reluctance to face facts, I shudder to think how indel-icate U.S. opinion would suddenly become”.

64. Princeton Seminar, p.913.65. Acheson to Truman, September 15, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:1229-31. For more information relating

to the part of the story from the New York Conference on, see C. GEHRZ, Dean Acheson, the JCS,and the 'Single Package': American Policy on German Rearmament, 1950. Diplomacy and State-craft (forthcoming).

66. Under Secretary Webb, in telephone conversation with Acheson, September 27, 1950, AchesonPapers (Lot File 53D 444), box 13, RG 59, USNA. Webb was comparing the State Department“operation” with the way the Defense Department under Marshall was handling the issue.


Dean Acheson: The Man and the Statesman

There is one final set of considerations that needs to be taken into account in anassessment of U.S. policy in September 1950, and this has to do with what weknow about Acheson in general – about the sort of person he was and the kind ofpolicy he favored throughout his career. Was he the type of leader who believed incompromise, especially with America's most important allies, and was inclined totake a relatively moderate and cautious line? Or was he, as General Bradley latercalled him, an “uncompromising hawk”, aggressive both in terms of his goals andhis tactics?67

The great bulk of the evidence points in the latter direction.68 In 1950 in particular,he tended to take a very hard line. He was in favor of a rollback policy at that time. Thiswas the real meaning of NSC 68, an important policy document with which Achesonwas closely associated.69 American scholars generally tend to portray U.S. policy as es-sentially defensive and status quo-oriented, and NSC 68 is commonly interpreted assimply a “strategy of containment”.70 But the aggressive thrust of this document is clearfrom its own text: NSC 68 called explicitly for a “policy of calculated and gradual coer-cion”; the aim of that policy was to “check and roll back the Kremlin's drive for worlddomination”. The whole goal at that time, as Nitze recalled in 1954, was to “lay thebasis”, through massive rearmament, for a policy of “taking increased risks of generalwar” in order to achieve “a satisfactory solution” of America's problems with Russiawhile the Soviet nuclear stockpile “was still small”.71

This extraordinary aggressiveness was not out of character for Acheson, and itswellspring was not simply anti-Communism or extreme distrust of the Soviet Un-ion. His general hawkishness can in fact be traced back to the summer of 1941,when, as a mid-level State Department official, he played a major role in shapingthe policy that put the United States on a collision course with Japan. Acheson wasone of a handful of officials who helped engineer the oil embargo in mid-1941 – a

67. O. BRADLEY and C. BLAIR, A General's Life, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983, p.519.68. The idea that Acheson was an exceptionally aggressive statesman is scarcely the consensus view.

American writers tend to treat Acheson rather gently, but this, we think, is to be understood inessentially political terms. Acheson's reputation profited enormously from the fact that during hisperiod in office he had been the target of a great deal of ill-informed criticism from right-wingRepublicans; Richard Nixon's famous reference at the time to the “Acheson College of CowardlyCommunist Containment” is a good case in point. And with enemies like that, it was not hard tofind friends--among liberal academics, at any rate.

69. M. TRACHTENBERG, History and Strategy, pp.109-110.70. See, for example, E. MAY (ed.), American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68, St. Martin's, New

York, 1993, and J. L. GADDIS, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar AmericanNational Security Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 1982, chapter 4.

71. NSC 68, April 7, 1950, FRUS 1950, 1:253, 255, 284; Nitze quoted in M. TRACHTENBERG,History and Strategy, p.112n. Nitze, the principal author of NSC 68, was quite close to Achesonthroughout this period. See, for example, D. CALLAHAN, Dangerous Capabilities: Paul Nitzeand the Cold War, HarperCollins, New York, 1990, pp.95-96, 155, and S. TALBOTT, The Masterof the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace, Knopf, New York, 1988, p.51.


development that led directly to a sharp crisis in U.S.-Japanese relations andultimately to the attack on Pearl Harbor in December.72

His aggressiveness was also apparent in the early 1960s. During the Berlin andCuban missile crises especially, he pushed for very tough policies. In 1963, he evencalled (in a talk to the Institute for Strategic Studies) for what amounted to a policy ofarmed intervention in East Germany.73 When he was attacked for taking this line, helashed out at his critics: “Call me anything you like, but don't call me a fool; everybodyknows I'm not a fool”. “I will not say that Mr. Acheson is a fool”, one of his criticsreplied. “I will only say that he is completely and utterly reckless”.74

Acheson often sneered at those he viewed as soft and indecisive. After Eisen-hower took office in 1953, Acheson complained repeatedly to Truman about the“weakness” of the new administration.75 After the Democrats returned to power in1961, President Kennedy allowed Acheson to play a major role in the making ofAmerican policy, but Acheson viewed the young president with barely-concealedcontempt. The Kennedy administration, in his view, was weak, indecisive, and ob-sessed with appearances.76 He even criticized the administration in public, going sofar at one point that he was virtually forced to apologize.77

72. See J. UTLEY, Upstairs, Downstairs at Foggy Bottom: Oil Exports and Japan, 1940-41, in: Pro-logue, vol.8 (Spring 1976), pp.17-28; J. UTLEY, Going to War with Japan, University of Tennes-see Press, Knoxville, 1985, pp.153-156, 180; I. ANDERSON, The 1941 de facto Embargo on Oilto Japan: A Bureaucratic Reflex, in: Pacific Historical Review, vol.44 (1975), pp.201-231; and I.ANDERSON, The Standard Vacuum Oil Company and United States East Asian Policy,1933-1941, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1975.

73. Acheson speech at annual meeting of the Institute of Strategic Studies, September 1963, in AdelphiPaper No. 5, The Evolution of NATO. See also D. BRINKLEY, Dean Acheson: The Cold WarYears, 1953-71, New Haven: Yale University Press, p.153. Note also Acheson's comment in 1961about the need for the sort of forces which would enable the western powers to intervene in theevent, for example, of a new uprising in Hungary: Acheson-de Gaulle meeting, April 20, 1961,Documents diplomatiques français, 1961, vol.1, p.494.

74. B. BRODIE, War and Politics, Macmillan, New York, 1973, p.402. The critic in question was theformer Defense Minister in the Macmillan government, Harold Watkinson.

75. See, for example, Acheson to Truman, May 28, 1953, box 30, folder 391, and Acheson memoran-dum of conversation, June 23, 1953, box 68, folder 172, in Acheson Papers, Sterling Library, YaleUniversity, New Haven, Connecticut. Note also Nitze's complaint at the very end of the Trumanperiod that the U.S. government had adopted for a purely defensive policy. America, he was afraid,was in danger of becoming “a sort of hedge-hog, unattractive to attack, but basically not very wor-risome over a period of time beyond our immediate position”. Nitze to Acheson, January 12, 1953,FRUS 1952-54, 2:59.

76. See especially Acheson to Truman, June 24, July 14, August 4, and September 21, 1961, AchesonPapers, Box 166, Acheson-Truman Correspondence, 1961, Sterling Library, Yale University;some extracts are quoted in M. TRACHTENBERG, History and Strategy, p.230. See also M. BE-SCHLOSS, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963, Edward Burlingame, NewYork, 1991, p.410; and H. CATUDAL, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis: A Study in U.S. De-cision-Making, Berlin-Verlag, Berlin, 1980, p.182n.

77. W. ISAACSON and E. THOMAS, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made, Simonand Schuster, New York, 1986, pp.612-613; see also BRINKLEY, Acheson, pp.138.


At another point, he practically told the president to his face that he was indeci-sive. Kennedy had asked Acheson to look into the balance of payments problem,and in early 1963 he presented his report to the president. It was a

“very strong, vivid, Achesonian presentation. And the President thanked him and said,‘Well, we have to think about that'. Acheson said, 'There's nothing to think about, Mr.President. All you have to do is decide. Here it is, and why don't you decide’”?

Kennedy turned red, and then broke up the meeting. He was furious. “It's a long timebefore Dean Acheson's going to be here again,” he remarked to an aide.78 As for Acheson,he continued to criticize Kennedy as weak and indecisive, even after Kennedy's death.79

Acheson treated President Johnson the same way he had treated PresidentKennedy. When he met with Johnson in 1965, he was so irritated by the president'swhining and indecisiveness that he “blew [his] top” and told him to his face that allthe trouble America was having in Europe “came about because under him andKennedy there had been no American leadership at all. The idea that the Europeanscould come to their own conclusion had led to an unchallenged de Gaulle”.80

These stories reveal a lot about Acheson. A man who could deal with presidentsthat way was not the type of person who would allow himself to be pushed aroundby mere military officers on an issue of central political importance – above all at atime when he was at the height of his power and had the full confidence ofPresident Truman. Nor was he the type who would be understanding if he thoughtallied leaders were reluctant to face up to fundamental problems and make thereally tough decisions.

Acheson, in fact, did not believe in taking a soft line with the allies or in treatingthem as full partners. In 1961, he played the key role in shaping the new Kennedyadministration's policy on NATO issues; the goal of that policy was to get the Euro-peans “out of the nuclear business” (as people said at the time) – that is, to concen-trate power, and especially nuclear power, in American hands.81

Acheson, moreover, was not the sort of statesman who viewed consultation andcompromise as ends in themselves. At one point during the Berlin crisis in 1961, hecomplained that the U.S. had been trying too hard to reach agreement with theEuropeans. The U.S. government did not need to coordinate policy with the allies,he said, “we need to tell them”.82 “We must not be too delicate”, he said at anotherpoint, “about being vigorous in our leadership”. It was America’s job, practically

78. Carl Kaysen oral history interview, July 11, 1966, p. 85, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston. We aregrateful to Frank Gavin for providing this reference.

79. See, for example, BRINKLEY, Acheson, pp.174, 202.80. Acheson to Truman, July 10, 1965, in D. ACHESON, Among Friends: Personal Letters of Dean

Acheson, ed. D. McLELLAN and D. ACHESON, Dodd, Mead, New York, 1980, p.273.81. See M. TRACHTENBERG, Constructed Peace, pp.304-311. Acheson, however, deliberately

gave the Europeans a very different impression. Note especially his discussion of the issue in anApril 20, 1961, meeting with de Gaulle, and especially his reference to a system which “permettraità l'Europe de prendre sa décision en matière nucléaire”. Documents diplomatiques français, 1961,vol.1, p.495.

82. White House meeting, October 20, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:518-519. Emphasis in original.


America's duty, to lay down the law to the allies. The United States – and he actual-ly used this phrase – was “the greatest imperial power the world has ever seen”.83

“In the final analysis” he told McGeorge Bundy, “the United States [is] the locomo-tive at the head of mankind, and the rest of the world is the caboose”.84

American interests were fundamental; European concerns were of purelysecondary importance. Paul Nitze, who was very close to Acheson throughout thisperiod, made the point quite explicitly in 1954. The “primary goal”, he said, wasthe “preservation of the United States and the continuation of a 'salutary' worldenvironment"; the “avoidance of war” was of secondary importance. “Even if warwere to destroy the world as we know it today, still the US must win that war deci-sively”. He then again stressed the point that “the preservation of the US” was “theoverriding goal, not the fate of our allies”.85

People like Nitze and Acheson were thus not inclined to take European intereststoo seriously or to deal with the Europeans on a basis of mutual respect. And Ache-son himself was clearly not the kind of person who would have found it difficult todeal roughly with the allies in September 1950.

The Meaning of the Story

The goal here was to test a particular interpretation of what happened in the latesummer of 1950. According to that interpretation, the military authorities hadessentially forced the package plan on Acheson, who had accepted it reluctantly,and only after a struggle. The basic conclusion here is that that interpretation sim-ply does not stand up in the light of the evidence from late 1950 and in the light ofwhat we know about Acheson in general. The policy the U.S. government pursuedat the New York Conference is not to be understood as a more or less accidentalby-product of a bureaucratic dispute in Washington. The way Acheson dealt withthe allies at the New York conference – the bare-knuckled tactics he pursued, theway he tried to lay down the law to the Europeans, the way he dismissed their mostfundamental concerns out of hand – has to be seen as deliberate: he knew what hewas doing, and he had not been forced by the Pentagon to proceed in that way.There is certainly no evidence that he thought those tactics were “murderous”: hedid not give way on this point after a long battle; he never complained at the time

83. Quoted in F. COSTGIOLA, LBJ, Germany and the 'End of the Cold War', in: W. COHEN and N.TUCKER (eds.), Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy, 1963-1968,Cambridge University Press, New York, 1994, p.195. Acheson was complaining about what heviewed as Johnson's weak response to de Gaulle's decision in 1966 to take France out of the NATOmilitary organization.

84. BRINKLEY, Acheson, p.133.85. Notes of Council on Foreign Relations Study Group on Nuclear Weapons and U.S. Foreign Policy,

November 8, 1954, meeting, p.12, Hanson Baldwin Papers, box 125, folder 23, Yale UniversityLibrary. Emphasis in original.


about the military's (alleged) insistence on this strategy; he never raised the issuewith Truman or expressed misgivings about the policy as he was carrying it out.

Does this mean that the Acheson interpretation was a complete fabrication? Thetruth is probably not quite that simple. For Acheson, as for many people in publiclife, honesty was not the top priority, and he was fully capable of deliberatelymisleading the public on these issues.86 But that in itself does not mean that theAcheson story about the package plan was manufactured out of whole cloth.

Indeed, in a certain sense at least, there was probably some basis to the story. After all,the military authorities were willing to send over the American troops only if the Europe-an allies agreed to provide the balance of the forces needed to make an effective defensepossible, and the JCS did believe that German forces would be needed for that purpose.So in that sense, from the military point of view, German rearmament was certainly a vitalpart of the package. But this was at the level of fundamental objectives, not at the level oftactics, and the basic JCS view was consistent with a relatively soft negotiating strategy: ifthe State Department (to paraphrase Nitze) had called for emphasizing the U.S. troopcommitment and only then gradually “weaving in” the question of a German defensecontribution, it is hard to believe that the JCS would have objected. But an agreement onthe part of the JCS that all the elements of the problem were interconnected could be inter-preted as a call for presenting the allies with a single package: the basic policy could beinterpreted as translating directly into a particular negotiating strategy. The basic militarypoint of view, in other words, could serve as cover – that is, as a kind of license for pur-suing the sort of negotiating policy State Department officials considered essential at thispoint.87 The fact that the military view could be interpreted (or misinterpreted) in this way– whether deliberately or not is not the issue here – made it easier for Acheson and hisadvisors to do what they probably really wanted to do in any case.

This is all quite speculative, of course, and there is really not enough evidenceto get to the bottom of this particular issue. But these uncertainties should not beallowed to obscure the facts that the documents are able to establish. And one thing,at least, is very clear: the State Department did not fight the military over the pack-age plan. If Acheson actually thought the tactics the U.S. government adopted were“murderous”, he certainly had a very odd way of showing it.

Why is this story important? Partly because it shows how easy it is for scholars toget taken in by self-serving memoir accounts, and thus how crucial it is to test claimsagainst the archival evidence; partly because of what it tells us about civil-military rela-

86. An account Acheson gave in 1952, implying that the issue emerged only in the course of the NewYork meeting, was particularly misleading. For the quotation and a discussion pointing out howinaccurate that account was, see McGEEHAN, German Rearmament Question, pp.48-49.

87. This point is suggested by the structure of the discussion of this issue in the Princeton Seminar:after establishing the basic point that the Pentagon had insisted on the package plan and was thusresponsible for what happened in September (pp. 911, 915), Acheson and Nitze then felt free toease up and talk about how the real reason why the German rearmament issue could not have beenplayed down and “kind of weaved in gradually” had to do not with the JCS but rather with whatMcCloy was doing (p.916). They then went on to say that McCloy, in fact, probably performed aservice in forcing people to face the issue then and there (pp.922-925).


tions in the United States, about the willingness and ability of the military leadership toimpose its views on issues of great political importance, and about the validity of thebureaucratic politics theory of policy-making in general; but mainly because of the lightit throws on the political meaning of what happened in September 1950. The Americangovernment did not just stumble along and adopt a policy against its better judgmentbecause of pressure from the military; the package policy was adopted quite deliberately;and that fact has a certain bearing on how American policy toward Europe during theearly Cold War period is to be interpreted.

There has been a certain tendency in recent years to idealize U.S.-Europeanrelations during the Cold War period. The argument is that the NATO system workedbecause, no matter how lopsided power relations were, the Americans did not simplyinsist on running the show. Instinctively the democratic countries dealt with the prob-lems that arose in their relations with each other the same way they dealt with domesticissues: not through coercion, but through persuasion and compromise, “by cutting dealsinstead of imposing wills”.88 The democratic habit of compromise, of give and take,was the bedrock upon which the Atlantic Alliance was built. The Americans treatedtheir allies with respect, and this, it is said, was one major reason why the Europeanswere able to live with a system that rested so heavily on American power.89

The story of how the U.S. government managed the German rearmament issuein late 1950 suggests that things were not quite so simple. The Americans werecapable of dealing rather roughly with their European allies, even on issues of ab-solutely central political importance. If the package plan story tells us nothing else,it certainly tells us that. And the fact that the Americans were capable of treatingtheir allies that way had a certain bearing on how many people, especially inEurope, thought about core political issues.

In 1880, after a remarkable electoral campaign, William Gladstone was sweptback into office as prime minister of Great Britain. Gladstone, in that campaign,had laid out a series of principles on which British foreign policy was to be based;one fundamental aim was “to cultivate to the utmost the concert of Europe”. Fiveyears later, Gladstone's policy lay in ruins. He had managed to alienate every othermajor power in Europe – even France and Germany had come together in 1884 in ashort-lived anti-British entente – and in 1885 his government fell from power. TheGladstone government had achieved its “long desired 'Concert of Europe'” all right,Lord Salisbury noted bitterly at the time. It had succeeded in “uniting the continentof Europe – against England”.90

The parallel with American policy during the early Cold War period is striking. TheU.S. government very much wanted the European countries to come together as a polit-ical unit, and support for European unification was one of the basic tenets of American

88. J. L. GADDIS, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, Clarendon, Oxford, 1997, p.201.89. GADDIS, We Now Know, pp.199-203, 288-289.90. R.W. SETON-WATSON, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914, Cambridge University Press, Cam-

bridge, 1938, p.547; Lady G. CECIL, Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury, vol.3, Hodder andStoughton, London, 1931, p.136.


foreign policy in this period.91 But it was not American preaching that led the Europe-ans to cooperate with each other and begin to form themselves into a bloc. The UnitedStates played an important role in the European integration process, but America had animpact mainly because of the kind of policy she pursued – a policy which, on occasion,did not pay due regard to the most basic interests of the European allies.

Acheson's policy in late 1950 is perhaps the most important case in point. Achesonwas pressing for a course of action that would have greatly increased the risk of war at atime when Western Europe was particularly vulnerable. The U.S. government couldtreat its allies like that – it could pursue a policy that might well have led to total disasterfor Europe – only because the United States was so much stronger than any singleEuropean country. It followed that there had to be a counterweight to American powerwithin the Western alliance, a counterweight based on the sense that the Europeans hadmajor strategic interests in common and that those interests were distinct from those ofthe United States. The events of late 1950 helped push the Europeans – especially theFrench and the Germans – to that conclusion: it helped get them to see why they had toput their differences aside and come together as a kind of strategic unit. This episodethus plays an important role in the history of European integration, and indeed in thehistory of the Western alliance as a whole.

Marc TrachtenbergUniversity of Pennsylvania

Christopher GehrzYale University

91. See especially G. LUNDESTAD, “Empire” by Integration: The United States and European In-tegration, 1945-1997, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, and P. MELANDRI, Les Etats-Unisface à l'unification de l'Europe, 1945-1954, A. Pedone, Paris, 1980. Note also an important seriesof interpretative articles on the subject by K. SCHWABE: Die Vereinigten Staaten und die eu-ropäische Integration: Alternativen der amerikanischen Außenpolitik, in: G. TRAUSCH (ed.), Dieeuropäische Integration vom Schuman-Plan bis zu den Verträgen von Rom, Nomos, Baden-Baden,1993; The United States and European Integration, in: C. WURM (ed.), Western Europe and Ger-many: The Beginnings of European Integration, 1945-1969, Berg, Oxford, 1995; and AtlanticPartnership and European Integration: American-European Policies and the German Problem,1947-1969, in: G. LUNDESTAD (ed.), No End to Alliance: The United States and Western Eu-rope: Past, Present and Future, St. Martin's, New York, 1998.

The Challenges of Pluriculturality in Europe

Susanne Baier-Allen/Ljubomir ¨u•cic (eds.)

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Schriften des Zentrum für Europäische IntegrationsforschungCenter for European Integration Studies

European integration has primarily been driven by rationalthinking and a functional dynamic. In this process ofuniting Europe politically and economically the question ofhow this unity can be sustained beyond functionalism hasgained increasing importance given the cultural diversityof an enlarging Europe.

The authors assembled in this volume are addressing thisquestion from the perspective of EU member states,aspiring member countries, and European organisations.The common thread that runs throughout this book is therecognition that the unity of Europe does not lie simply inthe further deepening of existing structures, but in thediversity of identities and cultural pluralism.

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Table of ContentsIntroduction: Pluriculturality – Concepts and Challenges •Pluriculturality and the Challenges for Europe • Pluri-culturality – Dealing with Diversity • Pluriculturality andthe Danger of Social Pathology • Pluriculturality and itsEducational Consequences • Conclusion: Pluriculturality –New Directions

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37

“Un Général qui s’appelle Eisenhower”:Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community

1

Paul M. Pitman

In January 1957 the French government staged a parliamentary debate to buildsupport for its conduct of the negotiations on the common market (or EuropeanEconomic Community [EEC]). Referring to the Suez Crisis, which had unfoldedover the previous months, one speaker who favored the common market sardonic-ally thanked Egyptian Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser and Soviet Marshal NikolaiBulganin for helping the West Europeans understand need for unity. In response, aleftist deputy shouted “is there not also a General named Eisenhower” (N’y a-t-ilpas aussi un général qui s’appelle Eisenhower)? Indeed, in the winter of 1956-57,many in France felt that tensions with the country’s allies had contributed morethan conflicts with its enemies to the impetus behind economic integration.

2

Already during the summer and fall of 1956, observers of the European scene hadnoted that dissatisfaction with Atlantic ties had helped revive the European move-ment. In October, Janet Flanner, Paris correspondent for the

New Yorker

, had writ-ten in her diary that the Europeans appeared to be moving together not onlybecause of the challenge from Egypt but also because of frustration with America:

“Secretary Dulles’ … semi-idealistic press remarks that good might even come ofthe Suez difficulties if they stimulated European federation brought a grim smilefrom French politicians. It is true that lately there has been revived talk on the conti-nent about a united Europe, but the feeling of union unfortunately seems to befounded largely on a common dislike of Mr. Dulles”.

3

Then in early November, the spectacular climax of the Suez Crisis, along with thebloody suppression of the Hungarian revolution, highlighted Europe’s weakness in aworld dominated by the two superpowers and demonstrated the unreliability of the Brit-ish and the Americans. Publicists and politicians alike argued that one of the main les-sons of Suez was that the European governments should unite their forces in the EEC.

But did Suez really tip the balance towards the formation of a six-country cus-toms union instead of alternate designs for the European economic order? For dec-ades, the idea that one of the results of the Suez Crisis was the establishment of thecommon market has been received wisdom. First expounded in authoritative con-temporary analyses, the link between the Suez Crisis and the common market has

1. This article originated as a presentation at the June 1996 meeting of the Society for Historians ofAmerican Foreign Relations in Boulder, Colorado. I thank James Ellison, Douglas Forsyth,Lawrence Kaplan, Lorenza Sebesta, Hubert Zimmermann, and two anonymous reviewers forhelpful suggestions.

2.

Journal officiel

, Assemblée nationale, Débats, 17 January 1957, p.107.3. J. FLANNER,

Paris Journal, 1944-1965

, Atheneum, New York, 1965, p.324.

1

Paul M. Pitman

38

become a regular element in general histories of postwar international relations.

4

And in the first archive-based account of the negotiation of the EEC treaty, whichwas based primarily on the papers of the German delegation to the EEC talks aswell as oral history interviews, Hanns Jürgen Küsters claims that, by prompting theFrench government’s realization that geopolitical imperatives required that it dropits long-standing objections to the common market, the Suez Crisis opened the wayfor the conclusion of the EEC Treaty.

5

A more recent contribution by Küsters bald-ly states that “the successful outcome of the EEC negotiations was an historical ac-cident, initiated by Nasser’s Suez crisis in November 1956”.

6

In the most fruitful challenge to such views, Alan Milward and his students haveargued that Suez hardly mattered for the EEC negotiations. This was not to say thatgeopolitics was always irrelevant to the evolution of the European economic order.French efforts to contain West Germany’s industrial potential and military revival hadshaped earlier integration schemes such as the European Coal and Steel Community(ECSC) and the European Defense Community (EDC).

7

But Europe’s security prob-lems had mostly been settled in October 1954, when the Paris Accords sanctionedGerman rearmament within an Atlantic framework. From this point on, the only re-maining “security” concern relevant to European integration was how to guide WestGermany’s industrial exports into channels that would benefit social and economicadvance throughout Western Europe. According to Milward and his associates, afterthe winter of 1954-55 it was not geopolitical factors but the political and economicimperatives of the postwar social settlements that accounted for decisions to pursueeconomic integration. They have traced the process by which the customs union trea-ty emerged logically (but not inevitably) from debates on the future of the Europeaneconomic order that began in the early postwar years and came to focus on a customsunion in the early 1950s. Decisions about economic integration did not result frommere historical accidents. Rather, national negotiating positions reflected long-termeconomic choices made by top elected officials and high-level bureaucrats, whosought export-led growth, technical modernization, full employment, and social

4. See for example A. GROSSER,

Suez, Hungary and European Integration

, International Organi-zation, 11(1957), pp.470-480; D. REYNOLDS,

One World Indivisible: A Global History Since1945

,

The Global Century

, Paul Kennedy (ed.), Norton, New York, 2000, pp.128-129.5. See H. J. KÜSTERS,

Fondements de la communauté économique europénne

,

Office des publica-tions officielles des Communautés européennes and Ed. Labor, Brussels, 1990, esp. pp.211-216,356; this is an updated edition of Küsters’ original study,

Die Gründung der Europäischen Wirt-schaftsgemeinschaft

,

Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1982. In a parallel study on Euratom, Peter Weile-mann also underlined the importance of the Suez Crisis for French policy. See P. WEILEMANN,

Die Anfänge der Europäischen Atomgemeinschaft: Zur Gründungsgeschichte von EURATOM.1955-57

, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1983, p.131.6. H. J. KÜSTERS,

West Germany’s Foreign Policy in Western Europe, 1949-1957: The Art of thePossible

, in: C. WURM (ed.)

Western Europe and Germany: The Beginnings of European Inte-gration

, Berg, Providence, 1995, p.69.7. See A. S. MILWARD,

The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51

, University of CaliforniaPress, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1984, ch.12; F. LYNCH,

Resolving the Paradox of the MonnetPlan: National and International Planning in French Reconstruction

, in:

Economic History Review

,2nd ser., 37, no.2 (May 1984), pp.229-243.

Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community

39

welfare through controlled trade liberalization. More fundamentally, foreign econom-ic policy-making reflected the new postwar determination to pursue economic andsocial goals that would strengthen political coalitions that included the organizedworking class, farmers, and the lower middle class.

8

As for the supposed influence ofthe Suez Crisis on French policy, Frances Lynch’s trenchant account shows that Par-is’s crucial decision to endorse the common market came in early September 1956 –at a time when the French were still formulating the plan to seize the Suez Canal withtheir British and Israeli partners, two months before the humiliations that supposedlyswung France’s governing class behind the European cause. Instead of Suez, Lynchpoints to the British proposal for a Free Trade Area, which strengthened the view inFrance that the country could not depend on existing arrangements to protect Frenchinterests.

9

Recent work in political science has likewise tended to de-emphasize geo-politics. Andrew Moravcsik, for example, argues that commercial interest, as articu-lated by major producer groups, was the main factor that drove the integration proc-ess in the 1950s; in his analysis, “geopolitical ideology” and “security externalities”were only influential at the margin.

10

What role did geopolitical considerations in fact play in the process leading tothe establishment of the EEC? This article deals with the question by examining thelong-term policy developments that shaped the French and German decisions to es-tablish the common market. Instead of arguing that either economic goals or strate-gic ambitions were the primary drivers of foreign economic policy in themid-1950s, it attempts to show how both sets of concerns acted together to shapepolicy-making in both France and Germany. The first section sets the stage: it ana-lyzes the politics of European trading and monetary arrangements, surveying theforces behind alternative regional designs. The basic point here is that as late as thesummer of 1956, the future of the common market plan, and more generally, theform that European integration was likely to take, remained anything but certain.The second section analyzes the role of geopolitical considerations well before Suez.The focus in that section will be on continental responses to Atlantic strategic develop-ments in the mid-1950s, especially on the implications of the nuclearization ofAtlantic strategy. The basic point here is that the security issue had by no meansbeen resolved by late 1954: policy-makers in France and Germany began to explorethe possibility of a European nuclear force, independent of the United States, very

8. A. S. MILWARD,

The European Rescue of the Nation-State

, 2d. ed., Routledge, London and NewYork, 2000; idem,

The Springs of Integration

, and

The Social Bases of Monetary Union?

, in: P.GOWAN and P. ANDERSON (ed.),

The Question of Europe

, Verso, London and New York,1997, pp.5-20, 149-161; A. S. MILWARD, et al.,

The Frontier of National Sovereignty: Historyand Theory, 1945-1992

,

Routledge, London and New York, 1993.9. F. LYNCH,

Restoring France: The Road to Integration

, in: A.S. MILWARD (et al.),

The Frontierof National Sovereignty

, esp. pp.59-60, 86. For another argument that Suez had little effect on thenegotiation of the Rome Treaties, see W. LOTH,

Vertragsverhandlungen bei abklingender Europ-abegeisterung: eine zeitgeschichtliche Einordnung

, in:

Integration

, 3(1987), esp. pp.110-111, 113.10. See A. MORAVCSIK,

The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina toMaastricht

,

Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1998, ch.2; cf. H. ZIMMERMANN’S review of

TheChoice for Europe

, in:

Journal of European Integration History

, 2(1999), pp.142-145.

Paul M. Pitman

40

early on. The third section retraces the French and German decisions to establishthe common market in the fall and winter of 1956. It argues that the Suez Crisis,which both symbolized and deepened tensions between the continental powers andthe “Anglo-Saxons”, triggered the establishment of the common market; but thekey decisions were not taken in a vacuum: long-term policy goals played a funda-mental role in determining what happened during this crucial phase of the Europeanintegration process.

The Politics of European Trade

Until January 1959, when the common market treaty came into effect, Europe’strade was regulated through intergovernmental cooperative arrangements, the mostimportant of which were sponsored by the Organisation for European EconomicCo-operation (OEEC). The OEEC trading system rested on two main pillars, grad-ual trade “liberalization”, i.e., the removal of quantitative restrictions (but nottariffs) on imports from other OEEC countries, and the more important EuropeanPayments Union (EPU), which arranged multilateral settlement of bilateral pay-ments imbalances between the same countries. By making trade with the rest of theworld, especially the United States, less attractive, the OEEC countries had con-structed a discriminatory trading system that embraced more than half of the freeworld’s trade, including that of the West European countries, the members of theSterling Area, and the various elements of the Franc Zone. This framework hadnurtured Western Europe’s economic miracle, the trade-driven growth that had low-ered unemployment while accommodating increases in both wages and workplacedemocracy. But the solidarities and disputes that emerged in this structure wouldshape the debate over Europe’s economic future.

11

Starting in early 1950s, as the European economy emerged from the rearma-ment boom sparked by the Korean War, discontent with the perceived shortcomingsof the OEEC system stimulated discussions of the future of the region’s economicorder. While existing structures continued to provide an indispensable frameworkfor the European political economy, many on both sides of the Atlantic saw them astemporary expedients whose continued functioning threatened the realization oftheir long-term goals. On the continent, the Dutch government put forward plansfor a customs union that would give the smaller countries access to the markets inFrance, Germany and the United Kingdom, which were still shielded by high tar-iffs. At the same time, the British government began to campaign vigorously for therestoration of currency convertibility, as a way not only to revive Sterling’s prewar

11. For the OEEC background to the process of European integration, see especially R. T. GRIF-FITHS,

The European Integration Experience, 1945-58

, in: K. MIDDLEMAS (et al.),

Orchestrat-ing Europe: the Informal Politics of European Union, 1973-95

, Fontana, London, 1995, ch.1;idem, ed.,

Explorations in OEEC History

,

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-ment, Paris, 1997.


41

role as a reserve currency, in particular for the Commonwealth countries, but alsoto block the emergence of a customs union on the Continent. In contrast, the Frenchcabinets of this period opposed both regional tariff reductions and convertibility,favoring instead a customs union with the Franc zone buttressed by bilateralcommercial agreements with France’s major trading partners, especially WestGermany.

12

The West European governments faced choices between three contendingvisions of the future of the region’s economic order: the further consolidation of theEuropean market centered on the six ECSC countries; a liberalized free-world mar-ket in which currencies would be freely convertible; or a reconstitution of theFrench and British colonial economic blocs. As a result of the teleological bias inthe academic literature, accounts of these debates have focused almost exclusivelyon the emergence of the common market and ignored support for Atlantic or imperialalternatives. Although there have been attempts to argue that the Free Trade Areastood some chance of adoption, no study has attempted to weigh political supportacross Europe for the other main alternatives under discussion. For the purposes of thisarticle, it suffices to note that all three alternatives were taken seriously enough toinfluence policy in both France and Germany.

In the 1950s European policy-makers still paid special attention to signals fromWashington. Like its Democratic predecessor, the Eisenhower Administration,which took office in January 1953, stoutly backed the formation of a West Europe-an political and economic bloc capable of anchoring Germany to the West andcountering Soviet influence on the continent.

13

But the new administration soughtto cut military spending and foreign aid in order to protect America’s long-termeconomic health and civic vitality, which it identified with decentralized govern-ment and a competitive market order. The administration also sought to direct agreater share of US aid to the Third World, where Soviet economic initiatives in-creasingly appeared to threaten Western influence. These considerations, which in-spired the famous “New Look” in military strategy, also drove efforts to take a newapproach to economic relations with the Allies. But just as the Eisenhower admin-istration would end up maintaining its ground forces in Europe, it would also con-tinue to give European economic unification priority over a world-wide liberal mar-

12. See P. M. PITMAN III,

France’s European Choices: The Political Economy of European Integra-tion in the 1950s

, Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, New York, 1997, ch.1; W. ASBEEKBRUSSE,

Tariffs, Trade and European Integration, 1947-1957: From Study Group to CommonMarket

,

St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1997.13. G. LUNDESTAD, “

Empire” by Integration: The United States and European Integration,1945-1997

,

Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, ch.4-5.

Paul M. Pitman

42

ket order.

14

However, the mixed messages that emerged from the Washingtonpolicy process cast serious doubt on America’s willingness to tolerate continuedEuropean discrimination against imports from the dollar zone. Ironically, the im-pact of rumors about political battles in the administration and Congress may havebeen more significant than the United States government’s steadfast policies.

In the summer of 1953 Eisenhower sponsored the first serious review of foreigneconomic policy since the debate on the Marshall Plan. Published in early 1954, the re-port of the bipartisan Commission on Foreign Economic Policy (CFEP) declared that itwas time to end the Marshall Plan settlement – which had always been seen as a tempo-rary expedient – under which the Europeans had come to trade more intensively witheach other but systematically discriminated against imports from the United States de-spite receiving substantial economic aid. The CFEP called for a return to something likethe Bretton Woods program of multilateral trade and currency convertibility. Logicallyenough, it also accepted that in order to overcome the world-wide dollar shortage whichhad blocked progress towards liberalizing international trade and payments, the Ameri-can market should be opened to imports from the rest of the free world economies.Likewise, the government should encourage increased private direct investment insteadof continuing to provide foreign aid.

15

The Eisenhower Administration endorsed the CFEP’s call for “Trade, not Aid”.But the American government failed to follow through either at home or abroad.The President made considerable efforts to convince Congress to reduce quota andtariff barriers that excluded European products from the American market, but thevictorious commander on the European Front in World War II was no match forhome-grown protectionism. And despite public endorsements of convertibility,Washington repeatedly put off the magic day when currencies would be exchangedfreely.

16

Likewise, although much aid was redirected towards developing countries,the Administration continued to provide massive amounts of military and economicassistance to the Europeans – it seemed necessary, inter alia, to push the Germansto rearm quickly and to encourage the French to meet their NATO obligationsdespite the drain imposed by the war in Algeria.

14. On the Eisenhower Administration’s grand strategy and its domestic rationales, see especially M.TRACHTENBERG,

A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963

,Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999, pp.147-156; J. L. GADDIS,

Strategies of Contain-ment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy

, Oxford UniversityPress, Oxford, 1982, ch.5; R. GRIFFITH,

Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Corporate Common-wealth

, in:

American Historical Review

, 87(1982), pp.87-122; A. L. FRIEDBERG,

In the Shadowof the Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism and its Cold War Strategy

, Princeton Studies in In-ternational History and Politics and Princeton Studies in American Politics: Historical, Internation-al, and Comparative Perspectives, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2000, ch.2-3.

15. F. ROMERO,

Interdependence and Integration in American Eyes: From the Marshall Plan toCurrency Convertibility

, in: A.S. MILWARD (et al.),

The Frontier of National Sovereignty

,op.cit., pp.155-181; COUNCIL ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY,

Report to the Presidentand Congress

, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1954.16. See B. I. KAUFMAN,

Trade and Aid: Eisenhower’s Foreign Economic Policy, 1953-1961

, JohnsHopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1982, ch.2-3; F. ROMERO,

Interdependence and Integra-tion

…, op.cit., pp.160-165.


43

Although its policy came under fire from the Treasury, Congress, and the pub-lic, the Eisenhower Administration was clearly willing to live with European tradepreferences in the interest of achieving the greater strategic goal of building asecond great power mass within the West capable of resisting the Soviet threat. In1955 and 1956 American diplomacy focused on supporting the proposal for asix-power European Atomic Energy Community (or Euratom), which appeared tooffer a way to channel continental nuclear ambitions into a supranational frame-work. It paid relatively little attention to the common market negotiations, presum-ably because most observers expected protectionist forces in France to block eco-nomic integration. Still, Washington quietly backed the formation of a six-membercustoms union, hoping it would adopt a liberal external policy. American analystsdid note the danger that the common market might form a protectionist trade bloc,especially if French preferences determined its external stance, but many hopedthat increased intra-European trade would allow the weaker economies to modern-ize and eventually drop their opposition to freer trade with North America. Certain-ly the common market offered a better way to tie German industry to the West thanan OEEC-wide Free Trade Area such as that proposed by the British. For theBritish scheme would have lead to even greater losses for American exporters with-out deepening Europe’s political integration.

Thus, although American policy-makers often declared their interest in a moreliberal world economic system, this had no real effect on Washington’s actual poli-cy towards further economic integration on the Continent. But America’s continueddiplomatic support for European unification did not carry as much weight on theContinent as the mixed signals that regularly emerged from Washington policy de-bates. There is room here for just one example, drawn from the realm of monetarypolitics. The Americans repeatedly declined to pony up the cash needed to backBritish plans to make the pound convertible. Such an action would have set off achain reaction leading to the dissolution of the EPU and thus a cut in credits toFrance that would force the Fourth Republic to choose between improvements insocial welfare, investments in industry and paying for the war in Algeria.

17

Although French policy-makers were no doubt relieved each time a convertibilityplan was vetoed, they continued to hear rumors of secret negotiations between Brit-ish and American Treasury officials.

18

Given that the Americans had frozen aidpayments to the French as a punishment for the rejection of the European DefenseCommunity, who could say what they might do in some later fight?

19

17. See MILWARD,

European Rescue of the Nation-State

, op.cit., pp.383-420; P. M. PITMAN

, TheFrench Crisis and the Dissolution of the European Payments Union, 1956-58

, in: R. T.GRIFFITHS (ed.),

Explorations in OEEC History

, pp.219-27.18. Cf. O. Wormser, Note a.s. convertibilité de la livre, 19 January 1953, Ministère des affaires

étrangères [MAE], Paris, Direction économique, Service de coopération économique [DECE] 197;idem, Note pour l’Ambassadeur, Secrétaire général, a.s. nouvelles perspectives dans le domainede la coopération économique et financière internationale, 4 May 1954, DECE 197.

19. On American attempts to apply financial pressure see I. M. WALL,

The United States and theMaking of Postwar France, 1945-1954

, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991,pp.286-295.

Paul M. Pitman

44

The Eisenhower Administration’s grand strategy called for the establishment ofa six-power common market, which would provide the economic underpinnings fora “united Europe as a third great force in the world”.

20

In contrast, successive Brit-ish governments stubbornly opposed the consolidation of “Little Europe”, becauseit would threaten the United Kingdom’s economic and political standing in theworld by undermining the City of London’s role as a financial center, weakeningthe Commonwealth’s already attenuated trading ties with the British Isles, and in-creasing the danger that France and Germany would become America’s primarypolitical partners, thereby reducing the chances that Washington would continue toaid Britain’s “independent” atomic forces.

21

However, as events would show, nei-ther the British nor their allies and clients on the Continent were in a position tostop integration projects backed by Paris and Bonn. And American support andBritish weakness meant that the only real question was whether the differences be-tween the French and German visions of the New Europe could be overcome.

The French government’s policy on economic integration reflected the requirementsof its modernization plans, its commitment to the welfare state, and its ambitions for thereconstitution of the empire. Thus the proposal for the ECSC was designed to guaranteethe success of the Monnet Plan; the EDC met the needs of the French aircraft and elec-tronics industries; and the Green Pool grew out of the decision to aim for permanent ag-ricultural surpluses. More broadly, the policy-making community in Paris opposed theclassical view that trade should lead to further specialization in those products in whicheach country enjoyed a comparative advantage. Instead, the French sought to negotiatepolitical agreements to fix a favorable structure for key industries before trade controlswere lifted. Given that France’s advanced social legislation put the country at a disad-vantage in export markets, French leaders also made the harmonization of regulationson collective bargaining, paid vacations, women’s wages, and social welfare a conditionfor their acceptance of a new trading system. Moreover, to compensate for the loss ofdirect political control over its empire, the French sought to reformulate the trade andmonetary links between the members of the “Union française” which would then jointhe European community as a unit. This arrangement promised to increase France’sweight in Europe and, so the argument went, Europe’s role in world politics.

22

West German attitudes towards the European economic order balanced liberalideological preferences against the need to guarantee economic ties with Germany’smain trading partners, France and the Benelux countries. Earlier accounts of theFederal Republic’s policy on the common market emphasized that the country’strading interests extended well beyond the Six and that industry, represented by

20. Eisenhower quoted in M. TRACHTENBERG,

A Constructed Peace

, op.cit., p.150.21. See J.R.V ELLISON,

Threatening Europe: Britain and the creation of the European Community

,Macmillan and St. Martin’s, London and New York, 2000.

22. This account of French policy follows Frances Lynch’s pathbreaking analysis, supplemented bythe results of my own research on military-industrial and imperial projects. See F. LYNCH,

Franceand the International Economy: From Vichy to the Treaty of Rome

, Routledge Explorations inEconomic History, 5, Routledge, London and New York, 1997; and M. PITMAN,

France’s Euro-pean Choices

.


45

Professor Ludwig Erhard, the Minister of Economics, supported an OEEC-wideFree Trade Area while waiting for the restoration of currency convertibility. How-ever, many business leaders remained skeptical about their prospects in the worldmarket, preferring the security of established trade ties with their closest neigh-bors.

23

A striking example of this attitude emerges in the Foreign Ministry’s refuta-tion of an attack on the common market issued by the Economics Ministry:

“The Foreign Ministry does not completely share the Economics Ministry’s plan foreconomic conquest of the world, because such a rash … thrust in free space musteventually reach its limits, whether in an economic downturn or another type ofshock. At that point, the only thing that will be left will be whatever has beenpolitically organized, namely the community of the Six (or Seven if Great Britainjoins); otherwise Germany’s economic expansion will fall in on itself”.

24

The competent German authorities, including the central bank, quietly protected thetrading arrangements that had grown up since 1949, and especially the special econom-ic relationship with Germany’s largest trading partner, France.

25

Of course, both indus-try representatives and government officials agreed on opposing French proposals toharmonize wages and benefits, which would eliminate what many saw as key sourcesof Germany’s export competitiveness. Thus even while supporting the common marketscheme, Bonn’s negotiators fought Paris’s specific demands regarding social policy,agricultural imports, and subsidies to France’s imperial dependencies. At the same time,the conflicts within the German policy-making community meant that, when it cametime to decide whether to go ahead with the common market, Chancellor Konrad Ade-nauer would be able to impose his own preferences, which by all accounts were coloredmore by geopolitical thinking than by economic arguments.

26

The first year and a half of the common market negotiations demonstrated theconflict between French and German visions for Europe’s economic future. In thefall and winter of 1954, the Dutch had renewed the push for a customs union, inpart out of fear of the consequences of the confidential Franco-German trade agree-ment that accompanied the Paris Accords. In May 1955, once the Federal Republic

23. See T. RHEINISCH,

Europäische Integration und industrielles Interesse: Die deutsche Industrieund die Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft

, in:

Beihefte der Vierteljahrschriftfür Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte

, no.152, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 1999.24. “Gemeinsamer Markt”, 4 October 1956, 210-225-30-01/1208/56, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen

Amts [PAAA], Bonn, Büro Staatssekretär 155, vol.2. For further explication of this document, see W.ABELSHAUSER, “

Integration à la carte”. The Primacy of Politics and the Economic Integration ofWestern Europe in the 1950s

, in: S. MARTIN (ed.),

The Construction of Europe: Essays in Honour ofEmile Noël

, Kluwer Academic Publications, Dordrecht, 1994, pp.17-18.25. See the superb study by M. DICKHAUS,

Die Bundesbank im westeuropäischen Wiederaufbau.Die internationale Währungspolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1948 bis 1958

, in:

Schrift-enreihe der Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte

, , Oldenbourg, Munich, vol.72(1996).26. On Bonn’s European policy, see H. J. KÜSTERS,

Der Streit um Kompetenzen und Konzeptionendeutscher Europapolitik, 1949-1958

, in: W. BÜHRER, L. HERBST, and H. SOWADE (ed.),

VomMarshallplan zur EWG. Die Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die westliche Welt

,Oldenbourg, Munich, 1990, pp.335-370; for Adenauer’s dominant role in West German foreign policy,see G. NIEDHART,

Außenpolitik in der Ära Adenauer

, in: A. SCHILDT and A. SYWOTTEK (ed.)

Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau

, Dietz, Bonn, 1993, pp.805-818.

Paul M. Pitman

46

had formally joined NATO, the Dutch common market proposal, combined with aFrench proposal for an atomic energy pool, kicked off a new set of negotiations onsix-power integration, the so-called

relance européenne

. But over the summer, thecommon market initiative got off to such a rocky start that the Dutch submitted fur-ther trade liberalization proposals to both the OEEC and the General Agreement onTrade and Tariffs.

27

The main sticking point in the common market talks wasGerman opposition to French demands. The French delegation’s only real interestwas in Euratom – it did not even receive instructions regarding the customs unionuntil early October, shortly before the negotiations had to be suspended because theEdgar Faure government decided to call new elections.

28

The Mollet government, which took power following parliamentary elections inJanuary 1956, supported European integration much more strongly than any cabinetsince early 1952 (when the first “Europeanist coalition” in the National Assembly col-lapsed). Its leading members had impeccable Europeanist credentials, and many schol-ars have accepted their later claims to have secretly planned to push through the com-mon market treaty from the moment they entered office.

29

But during the spring of1956, Socialist influence in internal debates resulted in a negotiating position thatthreatened to block the common market negotiations once and for all. France’s new po-sition did not just strengthen earlier calls for the harmonization of labor regulations andsocial policy, which was only to be expected given the Mollet government’s center-leftorientation. The French now made a push for common macroeconomic policies andlong-term industrial plans. In effect, the French now sought to use the common marketto lock in expansionist Keynesian policies and sectoral planning throughout continentalEurope.

30

For the government in Bonn, Paris’s new position, which directly challengedthe principles of Germany’s

soziale Marktwirtschaft

, was simply unacceptable. As soonas the French delegation presented its new position in Brussels, the common market

27. On Dutch policy see R. T. GRIFFITHS,

The Beyen Plan

, and

The Common Market

, in: R. T. GRIFFITHS(ed.),

The Netherlands and the Integration of Europe, 1945-1957

, NEHA, Amsterdam, 1990, pp.165-182and 183-208.

28. See Letter, Pinay to Félix Gaillard, chief of the French Delegation to the Intergovernmental Com-mittee, 12 July 1955, enclosing “Instructions pour la Délégation”, Archives nationales, Paris [AN]:Secrétariat général du comité interministériel pour les questions de coopération économiqueeuropéenne [SGCI], Box 121.9; O. Wormser, “Note pour le Président [Pinay],” 10 October 1955,MAE: Office Files of Oliver Wormser, Directeur des affaires économiques et financières [DE] 11;

L’Instauration d’un marché commun en Europe

, in:

Le Monde

, 13 October 1955.29. For example, see Moravcsik’s accounts of the Mollet government’s European policy, which depend

almost exclusively on evidence from memoirs and interviews. See A. MORAVCSIK,

Why the Euro-pean Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation

, HarvardUniversity Center for European Studies Working Paper, no. 52, CES, Cambridge, ca. 1994, pp.30-36,and the more cautious version in idem,

The Choice for Europe

, pp.103-122, 137-150.30. Curiously enough, although the thrust of the internal French debate appeared in the press, previous

accounts have ignored the significance of the resulting negotiating position. Key archival sourcesinclude: “Projet de mémorandum du gouvernement français sur l’établissement d’un marché com-mun (deuxième rédaction)”, A. Savary Papers, Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, Paris,SV 19; Présidence du Conseil, “Résumé des décisions du comité interministériel du lundi, 28 mai1956”, 28 May 1956, SGCI 121.9.


47

negotiations deadlocked. France’s new dirigist design made it less likely than ever that acustoms union would come into being.

What would have happened if the conflict between the French and Germanplans for the European economy had not been overcome? It is unlikely that theBritish government would have pursued the Free Trade Area seriously, becauseLondon’s main goal was to avoid being shut out from the EEC. Trade could havecontinued to expand within the OEEC framework, with whatever neo-imperial ex-tensions the French and the British were able to cultivate. And there probablywould have been further progress towards convertibility, presumably through“hardening” settlement terms in the EPU. But it seems likely that the German gov-ernment would have backed emergency credits to France whenever a pinch came,both to safeguard its main trading interests and for more general political reasons.

31

In short, without the emergence of a new understanding between the French andGerman governments, it would have been unlikely that “Little Europe” would haveemerged as a defined economic bloc.

The Debate over European Defense

As noted above, recent accounts of the origins of the common market have tended tostart with the proposition that the key security issues that had divided the Westernnations during the first postwar decade were settled when West Germany joinedNATO. In fact, intra-alliance arguments remained as lively as ever after May 1955.The Western powers were still divided over defense for one simple reason with manycomplicated consequences: the nuclearization of NATO strategy. The other problemsthat had troubled Atlantic relations since the late 1940s, such as burden-sharing, con-trols over armament levels, or competition over the production of technologicallyadvanced armaments, never simply went away. They persisted, but the implicationsof the various solutions proposed for them changed, often with dramatic practicalresults. And all of these problems came to a head at once in the summer and fall of1956, primarily because of a sharp controversy caused by Anglo-American plans tosubstitute atomic weapons for troops stationed in Germany.

In retrospect, disputes over European defense can be seen as a long struggle toreach a compromise around sensible Atlanticist policies that effectively meshedNATO’s conventional “shield” and its atomic “sword”. But in the mid-1950s, West-ern capitals had just begun to struggle with basic political choices imposed by thespread of atomic weapons, and the conclusions of these debates were anything butforegone. On the continent, it seemed that three distinct strategic options were stillopen. The first option, known as “forward defense”, called for stopping any Sovietattack in Central Europe as far east as possible, preferably along the West German

31. Compare P. PITMAN, The French Crisis and the Dissolution of the European Payments Union,1956-58.

Paul M. Pitman48

border. While forward defense remained official NATO doctrine, skeptical Europe-ans perceived signs that the United States and the United Kingdom wished to revertto a second option, the “peripheral strategy”, according to which the Western pow-ers would allow Soviet forces to overrun most of the Continent before trying toreconquer whatever was left after a month of armored operations accompanied bynuclear strikes.32 The European allies tended to feel that economic concerns (forthe British, the defense of Sterling and Commonwealth economic ties; for theAmericans, the need to roll back the garrison state) drove the efforts at strategic re-vision and conventional retrenchment. In response to the threat that the “maritimepowers” would withdraw their ground forces or decouple their deterrent forcesfrom the Central Front, some continental strategists favored a third option: the es-tablishment of a “Eurafrican” bloc, armed with an autonomous nuclear deterrentand able to draw on the depth offered by France’s North African territories.33 Theimportant point to note here is that the broad directions European strategy couldpursue in the mid-1950s – forward defense, peripheral strategy, or Eurafrican coali-tion – roughly corresponded to the three alternate schemes for regional trade andmonetary relations that were under consideration in policy circles at the same time.

Washington’s commitment to “forward defense” was far from certain in themid-1950s. As part of its grand strategy, the Eisenhower administration tried to fos-ter the consolidation of a European power base that would allow a reduction inAmerica’s efforts to defend the Old World. But the main policy pursued by theAmericans, the deployment of large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons in West-ern Europe along with schemes for “sharing” control of these weapons, ironicallymade it more difficult to withdraw US troops.34 In the end, despite the attractive-ness of British strategic proposals and the pull of isolationism, the EisenhowerAdministration did maintain established force levels in Europe.35 At the same time,as in economic affairs, it may have been not so much official American policy as

32. For the terms “forward defense” and “peripheral strategy,” see M. TRACHTENBERG, Historyand Strategy, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics, Princeton University Press,Princeton, 1991, pp.153-160.

33. On the development of the Eurafrican idea in postwar strategic thought, see C. D’ABZAC-EPEZYand P. VIAL, In Search of a European Consciousness: French Military Elites and the Idea ofEurope, 1947-54, in: A. DEIGHTON (ed.), Building Postwar Europe: National Decision-Makersand European Institutions, 1948-63, St. Martin’s Press for St. Antony’s College, London, 1995,pp.1-19.

34. See M. TRACHTENBERG, History and Strategy, op.cit., pp.160-168.35. The best account of Atlantic strategic affairs in the 1950s is M. TRACHTENBERG, A Constructed

Peace, op.cit., ch.4-6. National perspectives appear in J. MELISSEN, The Struggle for Nuclear Part-nership: Britain, the United States and the Making of an Ambiguous Alliance, 1952-1959, Styx Pub-lications, Groningen, 1993; and I. CLARK, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship,Clarendon, Oxford, 1994; G. H. SOUTOU, L’Alliance incertaine: les rapports politico-stratégiquesfranco-allemands, 1954-1996, Fayard, Paris, 1996, ch.2-3; B. THOß, Der Beitritt der Bundesrepub-lik Deutschland zur WEU und NATO im Spannungsfeld von Blockbildung und Entspannung(1954-1956), in: MILITÄRGESCHICHTLICHES FORSCHUNGSAMT (ed.), Die NATO-Option,vol.3 of Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik, 1945-1956, Oldenbourg, Munich, 1993, pp.1-234.

Atlantic Crisis and the Origins of the European Economic Community 49

continental fears based on unsubstantiated but plausible rumors about Pentagonpriorities that gave the biggest push to Franco-German understanding.

The French response to the nuclearization of Atlantic strategy was straightfor-ward. To defend the Metropole, to have a say in Western strategy, France needed tofield an independent nuclear force. But to build a deterrent force, the French neededtechnical, industrial and financial assistance. Given that the British and the Americansrefused to help, the French turned to West Germany. In sum, the nuclearization ofNATO strategy led the French to spearhead efforts to build a European bomb.36

Although France’s strategists had been grappling with the implications of nuclearweapons for over a decade, it was in August and September 1954 – just before and afterthe French parliament’s vote to reject the European Defense Community – that thecountry’s military authorities and political leaders first drew conclusions about the needfor continental nuclear cooperation. The ideas that emerged in these months are worthreviewing, for they provided much of the strategic impetus behind Paris’s Europeanpolicies down to the end of the Fourth Republic, if not beyond. And the development ofFrance’s policy towards cooperation in atomic energy shows that, rather than opposingEuropean integration, military leaders often pointed the way.

The debate opened in response to a draft “Possibilities Plan”, put forward by Gen-eral Alfred Gruenther, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR).The “Possibilities Plan” provided the basis for the Alliance’s new strategic doctrine,which the NATO Council would formally adopt as MC-48 in December 1954.37 In ahard-hitting response to Gruenther’s plan, France’s representative in NATO’s Stand-ing Group, General Jean Valluy, laid down a line that appears to have swayed thecountry’s political leadership.38 Valluy first pointed out that Gruenther assumed thatany war fought in Europe would be decided quickly by a brief but intense atomic ex-change. If the Central Front could be held during the crucial early days of a conflict,the West’s overall superiority in strategic weapons would prevail. Thus NATO’schances for victory depended as never before on blocking Soviet efforts to launchrapid air strikes against tactical nuclear forces in Western Europe. To meet this chal-lenge, Gruenther’s new strategy called for “unconditional and instantaneous” atomicstrikes that would destroy Soviet nuclear weapons on the ground. Provided theycould be shielded from air strikes, the Central Front’s “covering forces”, armed withtactical atomic weapons, stood a good chance of repelling a Soviet ground assault.

36. On the Fourth Republic’s atomic policy, see M. VAÏSSE, Le choix atomique de la France(1945-1958), in: Vingtième Siècle, no.36 (December 1992), pp.21-30 and D. MONGIN, La Bombeatomique française, 1945-1958, Bruylant and Librarie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, Brus-sels and Paris, 1997), esp. pt.4. An account of Paris’s quest for partners appears in P. PITMAN,France’s European Choices,op.cit., ch.6.

37. On MC-48 see M. TRACHTENBERG, La Formation du système de défense occidentale: LesEtats-Unis, la France, et MC-48, in: M. VAÏSSE, P. MÉLANDRI and F. BOZO (ed.), La Franceet l’OTAN, Editions complexe, Brussels, 1996, pp.115-27.

38. Letter, Valluy to Guillaume, No. 542/DFGP/TS, “Plan de possibilitées”, 13 August 1954, Papersof P. Mendès France, Institut Pierre Mendès France, Box CED 2. For further material on the “pos-sibilities plan”, see other documents in the same box, including H[ervé] A[lphand], “Note pour lePrésident [Mendès]”, 14 August 1954.

Paul M. Pitman50

According to Valluy, the new NATO strategy would cause a major transforma-tion in France’s strategic situation. Forward defense of Western Europe, previously“affirmed somewhat academically”, had not only become a technical necessity, itwould soon be a practical possibility. But as a key staging ground for NATO’satomic attacks, Western Europe would also become a primary target for Sovietnuclear strikes. France’s ground forces would have to prepare for operations in anatomic environment, while France’s future nuclear forces would need to coordinateoperations with the United States Strategic Air Command.

Whatever the military and budgetary implications, the new strategy’s keydifficulty was political. In order to preempt Soviet atomic strikes, it would benecessary to authorize NATO to launch attacks at the earliest possible moment. Butthe predelegation of authority to initiate atomic strikes, presumably to SACEUR,threatened to leave Europe’s defense in the hands of an American general. ForValluy, the consequences were clear:

“The defense of the West, now concentrated around atomic weapons, will dependentirely on America’s will. The only corrective for this subordination would be theconstitution by the European nations of an atomic arsenal that would allow them tointervene with their own forces in such a new war and consequently resume a keyrole in the leadership of the coalition”.39

In sum, NATO’s adoption of a nuclear strategy did not simply mean that France hadto adapt its conventional forces and acquire atomic weapons. It also meant thatFrance, in association with its continental allies, needed to build and deploy a Euro-pean deterrent force.

During the fall of 1954, the French high command amplified Valluy’s message.For example, in a response to a Foreign Ministry proposal for an armaments poolthat would replace the industrial side of the EDC, the top military aide to DefenseMinister Emmanuel Temple, General Jacques Faure (one of the leaders of thecoterie of military officers who had openly campaigned against the European Armyplan), argued that imposing restrictions on the German arms industry would onlybenefit British and American producers. Instead, within an Atlantic framework andpreferably with British participation, France should produce atomic weapons withGermany in “secure” zones such as French North Africa.40

What did France’s military leaders actually have in mind? The political implica-tions of their proposals are clear: a European deterrent force, developed under Frenchcontrol on the basis of German industrial potential, could at once improve Europe’sstanding within the Atlantic Alliance and anchor the American nuclear guarantee. Butdespite their generous Europeanist rhetoric, it is unclear how far the French intendedto go in sharing control of the force with the Germans. Perhaps French leaders hadnot as yet reached any firm conclusions in this fundamental area.

During the fall and winter of 1954, the French government cautiously acted onthe proposals for a European deterrent put forward by the military. In September,

39. This quotation appears on pp.5-6 in the letter cited above.40. J. Faure, “Fiche”, ca. 12 September 1954, DE 10.


the Comité de défense nationale, France’s highest authority in military matters,debated the expense of a national deterrent force and the possibility that six-poweratomic cooperation might help France pay for atomic weapons.41 In the spring of1955, the government sought German assistance in constructing an isotopic separa-tion plant to produce the enriched uranium needed for the French bomb program.But the Germans, still waiting to join NATO, choose not to respond to French over-tures at this time. The French then pursued the same goals as part of the Euratomnegotiations, the real focus of which was an isotopic separation plant.42

Once again, Paris’s main problem was to overcome opposition within the Bonn gov-ernment. Although the German Foreign Ministry stood behind the Euratom initiative, theminister responsible for atomic energy, Franz-Josef Strauß did not. Backed by industrialinterests, Strauß strongly opposed key elements of the plan such as supranational controlsand monopoly ownership of fissile materials, favoring instead direct ties with British andAmerican industry.43 In July 1956 the Euratom talks became even more difficult as a re-sult of the debates in the French Parliament, during which the Mollet government af-firmed that Euratom would not interfere with France’s still officially unacknowledged ef-forts to produce atomic weapons. In Bonn, this raised once again the fear that France’sEuropean policy sought to limit Germany’s military options.

Although the Germans had worried about the nuclearization of NATO strategy forsome time, the Bonn government did not directly address its political consequences untilthe summer and fall of 1956.44 In June 1956, German worries were stimulated when theBritish, determined to reduce the largest drain on the balance of payments by withdrawingtroops from Germany, proposed that NATO develop a new Political Directive to endorse afurther reliance on nuclear weapons.45 Then in July the New York Times reported planssupposedly under consideration by Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff, to reduce conventional forces and withdraw troops from Germany.46

41. This account follows the version of the minutes published by Roger Wybot, one of the principalsin the “affaire des fuites”, a scandal sparked by press reports of leaks from the Comité de défensenationale. Facsimile of “Procès-verbal du Comité de défense nationale”, 10 September 1954, in:P. BERNERT, Roger Wybot et la bataille pour la DST, Presses de la Cité, Paris, 1975, annex.

42. P. GUILLEN, La France et la négociation du traité d’Euratom, in: Relations internationales,44(Winter 1985), pp.391-412.

43. P. FISCHER, Atomenergie und staatliches Interesse: die Anfänge der Atompolitik in der Bun-desrepublik Deutschland. 1949-1955, Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, Bd.30, Nuclear Histo-ry Program, 3, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1994, pp.201-223, 274-282.

44. For the development of West German policy on atomic energy and nuclear weapons see P. FISCHER, DieReaktion der Bundesregierung auf die Nuklearisierung der westlichen Verteidigung (1952-1958), in: Mil-itärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 52(1993), pp.105-132; idem., Atomenergie und staatliches Interesse; A.F. GABLINK, Strategische Planungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1955-1967: Politische Kon-trolle oder militärische Notwendigkeit?, Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, Bd.30, Nuclear History Pro-gram, 5, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1996; and H.-P. SCHWARZ, Der Staatsmann, vol.2 of Adenauer, Deut-sche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1991; reprint, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, Munich, 1994.

45. See Record of Dulles-Makins Talks, 29 June 1956, Foreign Relations of the United States,1955-57, 4, pp.84-88; Record of Dulles-Makins Talks, 13 July 1956, ibid., 4, pp.89-90; Letter,Eden to Eisenhower, 18 July 1956, ibid., 4, pp.90-92.

46. Radford Terms New Arms Vital to Service Cuts, New York Times, 14 July 1956.

Paul M. Pitman52

News of the “Radford Plan” had tremendous repercussions in Bonn. Leading Germanpoliticians, not least Chancellor Adenauer, expressed fears that the maritime powers mightabandon their allies on the continent. The controversy came at a particularly awkwardtime, just days after the government had defended the need for eighteen months’ militaryservice before a skeptical Bundestag.

The so-called Radford Crisis generated huge tensions in the relations betweenBonn and Washington. It also provided a political excuse for a thoroughgoingreconsideration of the Federal Republic’s rearmament plans. West Germany’s polit-ical leadership acted as if it had suddenly grasped the practical implications of thestrategic situation they had accepted by joining NATO. In the cabinet discussion on20 July 1956 ministers agreed that the Federal Republic should seek to increase itsinfluence in NATO in order to pressure its allies to maintain conventional forcelevels. Chancellor Adenauer stated that if Western strategy continued to switch overto nuclear weapons the Federal Republic would have to reconsider its 1954 renun-ciation of the production of atomic, bacterial and chemical weapons. And Straußtold the cabinet that “today a nation that does not produce atomic weapons itself isdéclassé”.47 Of course, the West German government never openly admitted its in-terest in atomic weapons. But during the fall of 1956, the dynamic new defenseminister, Strauß, oversaw the shift from large conscript forces towards a smaller,more professional military capable of deploying tactical nuclear weapons.48

The tensions between Washington and Bonn provided an opening for those withinthe French government who sought backing for a “European” deterrent. The Frencharranged for a high-ranking German representative, General Adolf Heusinger, topresent his government’s response to the Radford Plan at a special meeting ofNATO’s Standing Group. During the meeting, Heusinger first noted that press cover-age of the Radford Plan weakened public support for NATO and threatened his gov-ernment’s efforts to raise troops. He then discussed the importance of strong “shield”forces, stressing the danger that NATO might lose a “small” conventional war if theBritish and Americans withdrew significant forces from Germany. Supporting theFrench war effort in Algeria, Heusinger also referred to the importance of holdingNorth Africa as NATO’s southern flank. The French member of the Standing Group,General Valluy, strongly backed Heusinger’s criticisms of Anglo-American proposalsto depend on atomic forces to defend Europe. He also attacked the United States’policy of withholding nuclear technology from its continental Allies.49

47. See Gespräche über Rüstungsbeschränkungen in den USA und England, 20 July 1956, in: F. P.KAHLENBERG (ed.), comp. U. HÜLLBÜSCH, Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung,vol.9, 1956, Oldenbourg, Munich, 1998, pp.484-89. The passage cited from Adenauer appears onp.486, that from Strauß on p.487. Compare the further discussion of the same themes, “Rad-ford-Plan”, 26 July 1956, in: Kabinettsprotokolle 1956, pp.501-502.

48. For a fine survey of the Umrüstung crisis, see Ch. GREINER, Die militärische Eingliederung derBundesrepublik Deutschland in die WEU und die NATO. 1954 bis 1957, in: MILITÄR-GESCHICHTLICHES FORSCHUNGSAMT (ed.), Die NATO-Option, vol.3 of Anfänge west-deutscher Sicherheitspolitik, 1945-1956, Oldenbourg, Munich, 1993, pp.707-786.

49. “Aufzeichnung über die Sitzung der Standing Group am Freitag, den 27.7.56, 10.30 Uhr”, Bundes-archiv Militärarchiv (BAMA), Freiburg, BW 17/37, ff.84-87.


In a subsequent private talk between Valluy and Heusinger, at which a numberof other French and German officers were present, the fundamental compatibilitybetween French and German views became evident. Valluy stressed that the WestEuropean continental powers should unite their forces in order to avoid completedependence on the Anglo-Saxons. In particular, as the two strongest Europeanpowers, France and Germany needed to cooperate to break the Anglo-Americannuclear monopoly. Valluy also emphasized the significance of North Africa forEurope’s defense – a point that Heusinger had included in his presentation to theStanding Group. In the course of their conversation, the two generals also discov-ered that they shared similar views on a wide range of operational and commandproblems in NATO.50

France’s support for Germany in NATO debates, along with Valluy’s discreetapproach regarding atomic weapons, may have encouraged the Bonn authorities toreconsider the Mollet government’s repeated efforts to revive bilateral cooperationin the production of conventional armaments.51 At any rate, in the summer of 1956,just at the time when the common market talks had reached an impasse overGerman opposition to French proposals regarding industrial planning, welfare poli-cy and labor relations, French and German strategists were discovering that theyshared not only reasonable fears regarding Anglo-American tendencies to revert toa peripheral strategy but also an interest in establishing a Eurafrican defense bloc.

Atlantic Crisis and European Market

The Suez Crisis, which began when the Egyptian government nationalized the SuezCanal in July 1956 and ended with a failed Anglo-French attempt to retake thecanal by force, produced intense tensions between the United States and its mainEuropean allies. Recent historical studies have provided a detailed picture of thecrisis itself, although its effects on international and transnational relations remain

50. Heusinger, “Aufzeichnung über ein Gespräch mit General Valluy von der Standing Group und Mr.Allan Dulles vom CIA”, BW 17/37, ff.93-96. (Note that Heusinger met Valluy and Dulles sepa-rately.) For an account of this exchange that draws on additional classified German sources, see G.von GERSDORFF, Westeuropäische Verteidigungskooperation und atlantische Bündnis-präferenz: Wege westdeutscher Zielsetzungen, 1949-1958, in: Aus der Ohnmacht zur Bündnis-macht: Das Machtproblem in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1945-1960, F. KNIPPING andK.-J. MÜLLER (ed.), Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn, Munich, Vienna and Zürich, 1995, p.227.

51. In April and September the Mollet government put forward memoranda calling for intensive Fran-co-German collaboration in the armaments sector. See Documents diplomatiques français [DDF]1956, 2, p.394, n.2; “Mémorandum”, 25 September 1956, DDF 1956, 3, pp.201-202.

Paul M. Pitman54

to be explored.52 For the purposes of this essay, it suffices to note that it was notMoscow’s threats of atomic reprisals but Washington’s moves against Sterling thatconvinced the British government to abandon its French (and Israeli) partners in themiddle of an otherwise successful military operation. French and German leadersreacted to Soviet threats, American sabotage, and British withdrawal with bitteranger at Great Britain’s fecklessness and dark speculations regarding the possibilitythat the two superpowers might find condominium mutually beneficial.53 As Chan-cellor Adenauer reportedly said during his visit to French Premier Guy Mollet atthe turning point in the crisis on 6 November, the only way the European powerscould play a decisive role in world affairs would be to build Europe. No doubt seek-ing to play on French resentment towards the English and the Americans, the Chan-cellor added, “Europe will be your revenge”.54

The German statesman’s remarks apparently hit the mark. But what did suchgeopolitical perspectives have to do with mundane negotiations on European trade?Conclusive documentary evidence shows that the basic decisions on the commonmarket and Euratom were taken in September and October 1956, well before thehigh point of the Suez Crisis in early November. One could argue, with scholarssuch as Milward, that geopolitical factors in general, and Suez in particular, did notcount for much in these decisions. I submit that a review of the full range of Frenchand German foreign policy-making shows that a number of overlapping disputesover both economic and security issues, several of which came to a head as Parisand Bonn were reformulating their European strategies, provide a better explana-tion for the new diplomatic alignment that resulted in the negotiation of the com-mon market treaty.

Suez triggered sharp political reactions, but these reactions were not the funda-mental cause of the political shift in Europe that occurred in the fall of 1956. Poli-cy-makers in Paris and Bonn interpreted the perfidious behavior of the “maritime”powers in light of years of bruising fights over international economic relations,Atlantic strategy and policy towards the Third World. Suez certainly did not changecontinental views of Atlantic ties; rather it symbolized their complaints about the

52. Unfortunately, most recent studies concentrate almost exclusively on Anglo-American relations.While these are easy to research, they are not the only significant sides of the affair. Representativeworks include K. KYLE, Suez, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1992; D. KUNZ, The Eco-nomic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1991; and T.RISSE-KAPPEN, Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. ForeignPolicy, in: Princeton Studies in International History and Politics, Princeton University Press, Prin-ceton, 1995, ch.4. For efforts at broader approaches, see B. MCCAULEY, Hungary and Suez,1956: The Limits of Soviet and American Power, in: Journal of Contemporary History,16(1981),pp.777-800 and W. (eds.), Das internationale Krisenjahr, 1956: Polen, Ungarn, Suez, in: Beiträgezur Militärgeschichte, 48, Oldenbourg, Munich, 1999).

53. See “Procès-verbal des entretiens franco-allemands [6 November 1956]”, DDF 1956, 3,pp.234-237.

54. Ch. PINEAU, 1956, Suez, Robert Laffont, Paris, 1976, p.91. Compare the account of this meetingin W. G. GREWE, Rückblenden, 1976-1951, Propyläen, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Vienna, 1979,pp.283-290.


“Anglo-Saxons” and strengthened their existing determination to lessen the conti-nent’s strategic and economic dependence on the United States. British and Ameri-can stalling over Suez no doubt played some role, but other developments such asthe transnational repercussions of the war in Algeria, rumors about convertibility,the Free Trade Area proposal, and the controversy about revising NATO strategyclearly weighed more heavily in France’s acceptance of a liberal customs union andGermany’s support for the “European” bomb program.55

This is not the place for a full account of the domestic and international bar-gains that resulted in the formation of the European Communities.56 But a briefoverview of the shifts in French and German policy towards Europe in the latesummer and early fall of 1956 can illustrate how the crisis in Atlantic relationscleared the way for the consolidation of Little Europe.

The Mollet Government was run by “good Europeans”, but they failed to pursuetheir designs for the regional economic order until early September 1956, whenthey quietly accepted the principle of liberal trade integration and dropped theirearlier demands regarding industrial planning and demand management. In subse-quent interministerial negotiations, the French elaborated further demands regard-ing subsidies for imperial development, agriculture, and safeguard clauses designedto make the treaty acceptable to producer groups and parliament.57 France’s nego-tiating partners sometimes interpreted these new demands as fresh evidence thatParis might never be ready to accept the common market. But in France, a page hadbeen turned.

What accounts for the French decision to reverse course on Europe at thisparticular time? Although many factors may be adduced, the decisive cause was therealignment in domestic politics that resulted from the war in Algeria.58 The Social-ist-led government’s vigorous prosecution of the war destroyed the center-leftalignment that had emerged from the January 1956 elections and led to the recon-stitution of the “Europeanist coalition” in parliament, which included the maincenter and right parties.59 The Mollet government’s intransigent stand in Algeriaalso fed into ongoing conflicts in NATO over policy towards the Third World andbrought new tensions with Washington.60 Ironically, what critics termed “Nation-

55. See W. HEINEMANN, 1956 als das Krisenjahr der NATO, in: W. HEINEMANN and N.WIGGERSHAUS, op.cit., pp.615-637.

56. Further detail appears in P. PITMAN, France’s European Choices, op.cit., ch.8.57. This process is well-documented in SGCI 122.21.58. For more detail, see P.PITMAN, France’s European Choices, op.cit., pp.304-320; compare the

late R. GIRAULT’S stimulating essay, La France entre l’Europe et l’Afrique, in: E. SERRA (ed.),Il Rilancio dell’Europa e i trattati di Roma, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1989, pp.351-378.

59. For these political developments, see J. CHAPSAL, La Vie politique en France, ch.15; J.-P.RIOUX, L’Expansion et l’impuissance, 1952-58, vol.2 of La France de la Quatrième République,rev. ed., Ed. du Seuil, Paris, 1983, pp.117-127; G. ELGEY, La République des tourmentes,1954-1959, in: Histoire de la IVe République, pt.3 , Fayard, Paris, 1992, pp.407-456.

60. See W. HEINEMANN, 1956 als das Krisenjahr …, op.cit., p.616 and, more generally, M.CONNELLY, Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the AlgerianWar for Independence, in: American Historical Review, 105(2000), pp.739-769.

Paul M. Pitman56

al-molletisme”, the socialist government’s play for nationalist support, opened theway for economic liberals such as Foreign Minister Christian Pineau and econo-mist Robert Marjolin, acting in accord with organized business and the farminglobby, to seize the initiative on the common market. The Mollet government’s de-cision to put the empire and Europe ahead of socialism coincided with a renewedpush for military cooperation with West Germany, which won additional supportfrom the conservatives, including Gaullists such as Defense Minister MauriceBourgès-Maunoury who had earlier sponsored the Euratom proposal.61

As always, for the pro-European government in Paris the key question was howto line up support from Bonn. After putting forward his government’s new line inBrussels, European Affairs Minister Maurice Faure travelled to Berlin and Bonn topresent his case to German ministers. In talks with German Foreign MinisterHeinrich von Brentano, Faure linked progress in European integration toFranco-German armaments collaboration. He apparently surprised von Brentanoby suggesting that Euratom might also be extended to military uses of atomic ener-gy. Faure also noted that the French would not oppose German acquisition of tacti-cal nuclear weapons.62 In short, Faure was suggesting that cooperation with Francewould help, rather than hinder, German efforts to acquire atomic weapons.

Meanwhile, in the run-up to the Suez operation, Mollet apparently attempted toreinforce ties with London before settling on rapprochement with Bonn. In a meet-ing with British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, the French Premier proposed reviv-ing Jean Monnet’s June 1940 proposal to merge the British Commonwealth and theFrench Union.63 But during a visit to Bonn at the end of September, he agreed withAdenauer about the need for European unification and cited the danger that the An-glo-Saxons would return to the “peripheral strategy”. Mollet argued for Fran-co-German cooperation both in completing the negotiations on the EEC andEuratom, the success of which would encourage British participation in Europeanaffairs, and in reviving armaments cooperation. Based on this exchange, it appearsthat France’s policy-makers, long aware of London’s lack of support for Frenchpolicies in Europe and now frustrated by London’s dithering preparations for theSuez invasion, had decided to bet on the Franco-German axis. Adenauer closed theconversation by noting that his government would weigh France’s proposals re-

61. Although Bourgès pursued a career as a Radical party politician, he maintained significant linkswith the Gaullists. See P. MARCUS, Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury: un républicain indivisible,Doctoral thesis, Ecole pratique des hautes études, 1992; Année politique, 1956, Presses universi-taires de France, Paris, 1957, pp.69, and 71.

62. Earlier accounts of these talks have followed the published French records, which censor Faure’skey comments on atomic weapons. See “Conversation entre M. Maurice Faure et M. Erhard à Ber-lin, le 16 septembre 1956”, DDF 1956, 2, pp.384-387; T, Bonn to Paris, 17 September 1956, DDF1956, 2, pp.387-388; “Conversation entre MM. Maurice Faure, von Brentano et Hallstein, lundi17 septembre, à 16 heures”, DDF 1956, 2, pp.392-394; “Conversation entre MM. Faure, le chance-lier Adenauer et Hallstein, lundi 17 septembre, à 17 h. 15”, DDF 1956, 2, pp.395-396; Bouverat,“Aufzeichnung [on Faure-von Brentano-Hallstein talks, 17 September 1956]”, 19 September1956, PAAA: Abt. 2, bd.922.

63. See the extensive documentation in Public Record Office, Kew: PREM 11/1352.


garding military cooperation in deciding on the directives for its representatives tothe talks on Euratom and the common market.64

Paris’s campaign for German support soon paid off. Chancellor Adenauerfollowed the EEC and Euratom negotiations closely, staunchly supporting “LittleEurope” against those such as Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard who argued thatGermany should pursue a new economic Weltpolitik.65 In public, the Chancellorcontinued to stress the need for full British participation in European affairs,66 butin government deliberations on the EEC and Euratom he strongly backed ententewith France. Even scholars who argue that the common market was establishedprimarily as an extension of domestic economic policy or in the pursuit of commer-cial advantage have acknowledged that the German stance on Europe reflected geo-political considerations.67 But they have not noted that the West German discus-sions of the EEC and Euratom really turned on two issues: Europe’s place in theAtlantic Alliance and questions of nuclear strategy. First, the Europeans needed tounite in order to maintain support from the Americans and attract participationfrom the British. Thus Adenauer argued in early October that if the Europeans didnot conclude the EEC and Euratom treaties quickly, American isolationism mightgain the upper hand; when an economic downturn came, Washington might decideit could no longer bear the burden of European defense.68 Second, Europe ratherthan NATO might be the best way for Germany to regain the right to produce atom-ic weapons. As the Chancellor put it to a cabinet meeting on 19 December 1956,

64. Telegram, Paris to Représentants diplomatiques de la France à l’étranger, 2 October 1956, DDF1956, 2, pp.493-496; Carstens, “Kurzprotokoll über die Besprechungen zwischen dem Herrn Bun-deskanzler, dem Herrn Bundesminister des Auswärtigen und dem Herrn Staatssekretär des Aus-wärtigen Amtes und dem Herrn französischen Aussenminister und Staatssekretär Faure am 29.September 1956”, 1 October 1956, PAAA: Abt.2, bd.VS-3666. I wish to take this occasion tothank the archivists who helped process my request to declassify this document.

65. In addition to D. KOERFER’S classic account of the Adenauer-Erhard feud, Kampf ums Kanzler-amt: Erhard und Adenauer, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1988, see H. J. KÜSTERS, Ade-nauers Europapolitik in der Gründungsphase der europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, in: Vier-teljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 42(1994), pp.646-673 and U. ENDERS, Integration oderKooperation? Ludwig Erhard und Frantz Etzel im Streit über die Politik der europäischen Zusam-menarbeit, 1954-1956, in: Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 45(1997), pp.143-171; B. THOß,Die Doppelkrise von Suez und Budapest in ihren Auswirkungen auf Adenauers Sicherheits- undEuropapolitik. 1956/57, in: Das internationale Krisenjahr, 1956, op.cit., pp.573-588.

66. Cf. Adenauer’s 25 September 1956 speech to the Grandes conférences catholiques in Brussels, in:H.-P. SCHWARZ, (ed.), Konrad Adenauer. Reden, 1917-1967: Eine Auswahl, DeutscheVerlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1975, pp.327-332.

67. See, e.g., A. S. MILWARD, European Rescue of the Nation-State, op.cit., p.201; F. LYNCH,Restoring France, op.cit., p.84; A. MORAVCSIK, Choice for Europe, op.cit., pp.90-95, 136.

68. “Weiterentwicklung Europas”, 3 October 1956, Kabinettsprotokolle 1956, p.610. Adenauer’sargument responded to the same press conference that Janet Flanner had commented on in her dia-ry (see note 3 above). See also Adenauer’s 19 December 1956 comments on British and Americandisengagement from NATO, “Tagung des Atlantikrates in Paris”, 19 December 1956, Kabinetts-protokolle 1956, p.776.

Paul M. Pitman58

“Europe will have a longer life than NATO. It is now necessary to push ahead withthe unification of Europe and to produce atomic weapons in the Federal Republic”.69

The basic message was clear: the weakness of transatlantic ties required the inten-sification of European economic and military cooperation. The strategic issues andthe economic issues were thus very tightly bound up with each other.

The showdown over Bonn’s European policy came on 5 October 1956. Adenauer im-posed acceptance of a negotiating position that took account of the main French demands,overriding opposition from Economics Minister Erhard and Atomic Energy MinisterSiegfried Balke. In one of his many efforts to block the common market, Erhard suggest-ed that the six-power talks should be postponed pending further consultations with theBritish regarding the Free Trade Area. The Chancellor, seconded by the representative ofthe Foreign Ministry, opposed any delay on the grounds that the British were only inter-ested in the Free Trade Area because of the danger that they would be excluded from thecommon market. Led by the Chancellor, the cabinet rejected Erhard’s objections one afterthe other. When the discussion turned to Euratom, Balke argued that the atomic energycommunity would represent more of a sacrifice than an advantage for the Germans. Ade-nauer’s response, as recorded in the cabinet minutes, was unequivocal: “[The Chancellor]wanted to use Euratom as the quickest way to gain the option to produce nuclear weap-ons”. This was just the sort of possibility that the French had been hinting at since thesummer. Adenauer further argued that Euratom would be worthwhile even though Ger-many would not be able to catch up with the French lead in research for some time.70

Despite decisions by the French and Germans to favor six-power integration,the negotiations on the EEC and Euratom continued to face difficulties. Indeed, theOctober Paris Foreign Ministers conference reached an impasse because the Frenchand German representatives were unable to reach a workable compromise onharmonization of social policies and ownership of fissile materials. Mollet andAdenauer overcame this deadlock during a meeting held in Paris on 6 November, atthe high point of the Suez Crisis. The French dropped their demand that regulationson overtime pay be harmonized in exchange for the right to invoke safeguard claus-es on behalf of industries harmed by competition from countries with longer workweeks. And the Germans finally accepted the idea that Euratom would enjoy amonopoly over fissile materials unless the community was unable to provide

69. Adenauer cited in Ch. GREINER, Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland als “Machtfaktor” in derNATO, 1954-57, in: Aus der Ohnmacht zur Bündnismacht, op.cit., p.210. Note that a more recentlypublished version of the 19 December 1956 cabinet minutes replaces the reference to producingatomic weapons with an euphemism. See “Tagung des Atlantikrates in Paris”, 19 December 1956,Kabinettsprotokolle 1956, p.775.

70. “Gemeinsamer Markt und Euratom”, 5 October 1956, Kabinettsprotokolle 1956, pp.620-629. Thequote from Adenauer appears on page 626. Further details on the cabinet debate appear in “Ergeb-nisprotokoll über die Ressortsbesprechung im Auswärtigen Amt am 6. Oktober über die Problemedes Gemeinsamen Marktes und Euratom”, Bundesarchiv [BA], Koblenz, B 138/722.


sufficient supplies, in which case member states would be authorized to make pur-chases from third parties.71 Negotiating over the heads of their European partners,the two governments formulated a compromise settlement on the main outstandingissues, a settlement that found its way almost unchanged into the Treaties of Rome.At the same moment, the Germans also agreed to French proposals regarding clos-er cooperation in weapons development, under WEU auspices if possible, on a bi-lateral basis if necessary.72

Conclusions

The Suez Crisis did matter for the negotiations leading to the establishment of theEuropean Communities, but only as a trigger, not as a fundamental cause. The spe-cial circumstances of the Suez Crisis spurred the decision by the leaders of Franceand Germany to cooperate in establishing European structures that would form anautonomous zone of economic policy and strengthen the continent’s influence inAtlantic Affairs. Suez also pushed public and parliamentary opinion in both Parisand Bonn towards European integration as an alternative to Atlantic cooperation,making it possible to strike a deal with little worry about the domestic repudiationthat had proven fatal for the EDC. But the package deal agreed by the French andGermans in November 1956 – a liberal customs union flanked by sectoral agree-ments for agriculture, imperial development and, last but not least, strategic indus-tries – represented a compromise between long-term French and German policygoals. The reorganization of the European economic order was thus the result notjust of a single incident, no matter how dramatic, but of persistent tensions withinthe Atlantic system acting upon domestic economic policy processes.

Continental perspectives on European integration reflected the experience of years ofdisputes with the “Anglo-Saxon” powers within NATO. Fundamental questions regardingthe durability of Atlantic economic ties and the reliability of extended deterrence pushed theFrench and German governments towards a new strategic and economic partnership wellbefore Colonel Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal. As part of its grandstrategy, Washington consistently supported the unification of Europe, but it was not thatpolicy that brought the Europeans together. If the Americans played a role in the integrationprocess, they did so by pursuing other national goals in ways that led to the feeling that, asChancellor Adenauer put it in November 1956, Europe needed to “unite against America”.73

71. Adenauer and Mollet approved a package deal on the EEC and Euratom that had been hammeredout by Robert Marjolin and Karl Carstens. The secondary literature contains several versions ofwhat the deal supposedly included; for the actual text of the agreement, see Enclosure to Letter,Adenauer to Balke, 7 November 1956, BA: B 138/723.

72. Ariane Illig, “Aufzeichnung”, 9 November 1956, PAAA: Büro Staatssekretär, Bd.278; [JeanFrançois-Poncet], “Note à l’attention de M. Jurgensen”, 20 November 1956, MAE: Europe,Généralités, 1945-60, dossier 185.

73. See “Procès-verbal des entretiens franco-allemands [6 November 1956]”, DDF 1956, 3, p.235.

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5osCe

61

Hegemony or Vulnerability?Giscard, Ball, and the 1962 Gold Standstill Proposal

Francis J. Gavin, Erin Mahan

What was the character of America’s international monetary relations with Europeduring the early 1960’s, and how were they related to the larger power politicalquestions of the day? There is a standard interpretation of this question. During thispre-Vietnam war period,

the argument runs, the United States strove to maintainhegemonic power vis-à-vis Western Europe “based on the role of the dollar in theinternational monetary system and on the extension of its nuclear deterrent toinclude its allies”.

1

Since this economic dominance resulted from the structure andrules of the Bretton Woods monetary system, the Americans had no interest inreforming arrangements that were “a prerequisite for continued American globalhegemony”.

2

“Because it was interested in preserving the privileges it derived fromthe operation of the Bretton Woods regime”, the United States would not “condonea structural reform” of the system that threatened “the continued preeminence ofthe dollar”.

3

And while most of “America’s allies acquiesced in a hegemonic sys-tem that accorded the United States special privileges to act abroad unilaterally topromote U.S. interests”, the French did not.

4

The Fifth Republic government, ledby Charles de Gaulle, deeply resented the privileges they believed the system con-ferred upon the American dollar and actively exploited America’s balance of pay-ments position in an attempt to force the United States to abandon the BrettonWoods system. The United States, the conventional wisdom holds, was able to

1. R. GILPIN,

The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations

, Princeton UniversityPress, Princeton, 1987, p.134.

2. D. KUNZ,

Butter and Guns: America’s Cold War Economic Diplomacy

, The Free Press, NewYork, 1997, p.99. For similar interpretations, see W. BORDEN,

Defending Hegemony: AmericanForeign Economic Policy

, in: T. PATERSON (ed.),

Kennedy’s Quest for Victory: American For-eign Policy, 1961-1963

, Oxford University Press, New York, 1989, pp.83-85; D. CALLEO,

TheImperious Economy

, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1982, p.23; D. CALLEO,

BeyondAmerican Hegemony: The Future of the Western Alliance

, Basic Books, New York,1987, p.13,44-52; F. COSTIGLIOLA,

The Pursuit of Atlantic Community: Nuclear Arms, Dollars, andBerlin

, in: PATERSON (ed.), pp.24-56; P. KENNEDY,

The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers:Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000

, Random House, New York, 1987,p.434. For interpretations that see Kennedy’s monetary policy as a conservative approach designedto maintain the privileged place the dollar held in the postwar “capitalist world-system”, see Bor-den, p.57-62, 84; D. CALLEO and B. ROWLAND,

America and the World Political Economy:Atlantic Dreams and National Realities

, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1973, pp.88-89;J. ODELL,

U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as a Source of Change

,Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1982, p.88; S. STRANGE,

International Monetary Rela-tions

, Oxford University Press, London, 1976, p.82, 207.3. J. GOWA,

Closing the Gold Window: Domestic Politics and the End of Bretton Woods

, CornellUniversity Press, Ithaca, 1983, p.52.

4. B. COHEN,

Organizing the World’s Money: The Political Economy of Dominance and Depend-ence

, Basic Books, New York, 1977, p.97.


62

thwart this French effort, until the American deficit ballooned in the late 1960’s andearly 1970’s as a result of massive “guns and butter” inflation.

5

The real story is rather different.

American policymakers had no great love forthe Bretton Woods system. It was associated in their minds not with Americanhegemony, but with American vulnerability. The United States was running a pay-ments deficit; the Europeans were in effect financing that deficit and were thusenabling the Americans to live beyond their means. But the Americans did not viewthis as a source of strength: the growing European dollar balances, which, under therules of the system, could be cashed in for gold at any time, were a kind of sword ofDamocles hanging over their heads. The U.S. government felt vulnerable and it didnot like it. Kennedy feared that if the system was not reformed, then the Europeansmight come to the conclusion that “my God, this is the time … if everyone wantsgold we’re all going to be ruined because there is not enough gold to go around”.

6

The most surprising fact to emerge from French and American documents isthat for a brief period in 1962, the French appeared willing to help the UnitedStates out of its monetary difficulties. Instead of hostility towards the dollar, Minis-ter of Finance Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, was, for a time, cooperative. Inspired byGiscard’s hints of support, Under-secretary of State George Ball and key membersof the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) crafted a monetary plan that wouldhave essentially ended Bretton Woods while providing the Americans

with timeand protection to end their balance of payments deficits. The key provision of thisplan was a gold standstill agreement, whereby the European surplus countrieswould agree to hold US deficit dollars and formally limit their gold purchases fromthe American Treasury. In return, the United States would move aggressively to endits balance of payments deficit. At the end of the agreement (likely to be two years),a new international monetary arrangement would be negotiated with the Europeans.Surprisingly, many within the Kennedy administration were willing to sacrifice thecentral role of the dollar and its “seigneuriage” privileges in any new system, aposition that would have had much appeal for the Europeans.

While elements of the administration were enthusiastic about Giscard’s hintsand Ball’s plan, the more financially orthodox members from the Department of

5. It is quite true that by 1965, de Gaulle claimed the system allowed for “

l’hégémonie américaine

”.See Press Conference, February 4, 1965, from Charles DE GAULLE,

Discours et messages

, vol.4,

Pour l’effort, Août 1962-Décembre 1965

, Omnibus/Plon, Paris, 1993; see also R. ARON,

LaRépublique Impériale

, Calmann Levy, Paris, 1973; G.H. SOUTOU,

L’alliance incertaine: Lesrapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954-1996

, Fayard, Paris, 1996, p.287. But thekey point that this article makes is that the views of 1965 were not the basis for French policy in1962, which is implied in J. LACOUTURE,

De Gaulle: The Ruler, 1945-1970

, W.W. Norton, NewYork, 1992, p.380-82. Most French scholarly interpretations about de Gaulle’s criticisms againstthe dollar begin with the mid-1960s. For a significant but brief exception, see H. BOURGUINAT,

Le général de Gaulle et la réforme du système monétaire international: la contestation manquéede l’hégémonie du dollar

, in:

De Gaulle en son siècle

, vol. 3, Paris, 1992, pp.110-118.6. Discussion between President John F. Kennedy, William McChesney Martin, Chairman of the

Federal Reserve and Theodore Sorensen – August 16, 1962, 5:50-6:32 p.m., tape 13, President’sOffice Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston MA.

Hegemony or Vulnerability?

63

Treasury and the Federal Reserve vehemently opposed the arrangement. Given thepoor state of Franco-American political relations in the summer of 1962, the Presi-dent was himself unsure of French motives, and in the end formal negotiations nev-er began. Was Giscard’s offer a missed opportunity? U.S. officials at the time wereperplexed and scholars since then have neglected it entirely.

The analysis here will be broken down into

three parts. The first section willprovide a brief overview of the monetary problems that plagued the Kennedyadministration and the efforts in 1961 and the first half of 1962 to solve them. Itwill also explore the motivations for France’s international monetary policy in theearly 1960’s. The second section will deal with

Giscard’s visit to the United Statesin July 1962. The final section will explore the furious debate within the Kennedyadministration over the French finance minister’s seemingly cooperative statementsduring his visit, and investigate why nothing came of Giscard’s apparent willing-ness to help ease the dollar and gold outflow problem.

American and French Monetary Policy

Most historians and political scientists identify Richard Nixon as “the destroyer ofBretton Woods”.

7

In reality, however, the Bretton Woods system was inherentlyunstable and began experiencing potentially fatal difficulties as early as the late1950’s. Economists now recognize that the system lacked an effective mechanism toadjust and settle the inevitable payments imbalances caused by shifting real currencyvalues arising from differential national monetary policies and savings rates.

8

Post-war policymakers eschewed the two most effective means of adjustment –“flexible”exchange rates and a pure gold standard - on principle. Mindful of the competitivedevaluations during the 1930’s, they believed that flexible exchange rates - where therelative value of currencies is determined by purchases and sales in an open market -were erratic, allowed destabilizing capital flows, and gave far too much control overthe economy to bankers and speculators.

9

A pure gold standard, which required stateswith a payments deficit to transfer gold, was seen as no better. In a country that lostgold, the domestic monetary base would be decreased and aggregate domestic

7. KUNZ,

Butter and Guns

, p.192.8. Excellent discussions of these questions can be found in R. COOPER,

The International MonetarySystem: Essays in World Economics

, MA: The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1987, and P. de GRAUWE,

International Money: Post-War Trends and Theories

,

Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989.9. P. VOLCKER and T. GYOHTEN,

Changing Fortunes: The World’s Money and the Threat toAmerican Leadership

, Random House, New York, 1992, p.7-8.


64

demand would shrink. Imports would fall, exports would rise, and the paymentswould balance. But the cost was deflation.

10

In an era where full employment androbust social spending were promised, it was politically inconceivable that nationalgovernments would accept a process that depressed national income and led to unem-ployment in order to balance international payments.

11

At the time, however, American and European policymakers were less concernedwith the flaws of the Bretton Woods adjustment mechanism per se and instead fo-cused on the growing outflow of dollars and gold from the United States as the big-gest problem in the system. A whole series of factors – including the move to currentaccount convertibility by the Europeans and the foreign exchange cost of America’sNATO commitments – had dangerously enlarged the American balance of paymentsdeficit in 1959 and 1960. Many observers worried that the large deficit could lead to acrisis of confidence in the dollar and spark a mass conversion into gold, rendering thedollar unusable as a reserve currency and in the process destroying a large portion ofthe world’s liquidity. This problem had come to be known as the “Triffin Dilemma”,after the Yale economist Robert Triffin published a book highlighting the confidenceproblem in his 1960 book,

Gold and the Dollar Crisis.

12

Fearing the potential dangers, political and economic, of a ballooning deficitand gold outflow, the new Kennedy administration pursued an aggressive strategyto correct the problem.

13

Political allies, particularly the Federal Republic of Ger-many, were pressured to spend surplus dollars purchasing military equipment madein the United States. Trade liberalization became a key element of the administra-tion’s foreign policy. The federal budget was scrutinized for ways to reduce U.S.government expenditures abroad. Most importantly, the Undersecretary of theTreasury for International Monetary Affairs, Robert Roosa, negotiated a whole se-ries of “

ad hoc

” arrangements to defend the dollar and limit the flow of gold fromthe US Treasury. Currency swap arrangements and standby borrowing arrange-

10. See B. EICHENGREEN,

Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System

,Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996, pp.7-44. In practice, gold inflows and outflows wereoften “sterilized” under the gold standard, which just meant that gold was added or subtracted fromthe national treasuries without changing the domestic monetary base. But even with some sterili-zation, the gold standard was nowhere near as stable as was once thought. See G. GALLAROTTI,

The Anatomy of an International Monetary Regime

,

Oxford University Press, New York, 1995.For the economic and political volatility of the “gold standard” during the late 19

th

and early 20

th

century, and the American propensity to “sterilize” gold flows, see M. FRIEDMAN and A.SCHWARTZ,

A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960

, Princeton University Press,Princeton, 1963, pp.89-188; see also M. FRIEDMAN,

Money Mischief: Episodes in Monetary His-tory

, Harcourt Brace, New York, 1994, especially the essays

The Crime of 1873

and

William Jen-nings Bryan and the Cyanide Process

.11. See especially D.E. MOGGRIDGE,

Keynes: An Economist’s Biography

, Routledge, London,1992.

12. R. TRIFFIN,

Gold and

the

Dollar Crisis: The Future of Convertibility

,

CT: Yale University Press,New Haven, 1960.

13. See T. SORENSEN,

Kennedy

, Harper and Row, New York, 1965, p.406. See also J.K. Galbraith’sletter to the President from October 1960, in his

Letters to Kennedy

, Harvard University Press, Har-vard, 1998, pp.29-31.


65

ments were implemented that allowed deficit countries to stave off attacks on theircurrencies.

14

The most important currency arrangement was the gold pool, a con-sortium of industrial nations who intervened in the London gold markets wheneverthe price of the dollar seemed threatened.

Roosa’s efforts were quite successful in limiting the amount of gold purchased bycentral bankers holding US dollars. But the administration’s efforts to reduce the overallpayments deficit were far less successful, which was a source of great frustration toPresident Kennedy, as this exposed the Achilles heel of America’s international mone-tary policy. If the surplus countries of Europe – namely France and West Germany – co-operated with the United States by limiting their gold purchases, then the dollar couldbe protected. But if this cooperation collapsed for either political or economic reasons,then the countries holding surplus dollars would have enormous leverage over the Uni-ted States. “I know everyone thinks I worry about this too much” he told advisor TedSorensen. But the balance of payments was like “a club that de Gaulle and all the othershang over my head”. In a crisis, Kennedy complained, they could cash in all theirdollars, and then “where are we”?

15

This meant that France’s attitude on international monetary issues was critical.As with all questions of French policy, the first place to look was the attitude of thePresident, Charles de Gaulle. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, de Gaulle merelyposed the overall framework for French economic policy. He realized that militarypower required economic strength. During this period, when the United States beganexperiencing balance-of-payment difficulties, France was enjoying an economic mir-acle of financial stability, industrial progress, and an annual growth rate of four and ahalf percent. The Fourth Republic had already done the groundwork for the upwardsurge in the economy when de Gaulle came to power, but prosperity had often beenmarred by monetary crises.

16

In December 1958, de Gaulle appointed a group of economic experts under JacquesRueff, magistrate for the European Coal and Steel Community and a previous minister offinance, who drew up the plans that put the French economic house in order. The success-ful reforms, however, were carried out at political cost. Implemented by two successivefinance ministers, Antoine Pinay and Wilfrid Baumgartner, the program was based on aformula of austerity and strict financial and monetary orthodoxy. Measures included high-er taxes, a devaluation of the franc by seventeen and a half percent, strict budgetary policy,

14. The swap arrangements were standby credit lines that allowed participants to draw on otherparticipants currencies in order to defend their own exchange rates. The increased IMF credit wasarranged through a procedure called the General Arrangements to Borrow, which were negotiatedat the end of 1961. While connected to the IMF, these arrangements were unique in that they gavethe lending countries some discretion over the size and use of the loans. For an excellent discussionof these innovations, see H. JAMES,

International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods

,Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, pp.159-165.

15. R. REEVES,

President Kennedy: Profile of Power

, Touchstone, New York, 1993, p.431.16. W. HITCHCOCK,

France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership inEurope, 1944-1954

, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1998, pp.12-71. See, also, R.KUISEL,

Capitalism and the State in Modern France: Renovation and Economic Management inthe Twentieth Century

, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1981.


66

removal of the automatic tying of wages to a cost-of-living index, and reduced govern-ment subsidies. Selective liberalization of trade allowed more foreign goods into the coun-try. The currency was replaced with a new franc, worth a hundred of the old variety. Andin the years that followed, the French government restricted the growth of credit in orderto slow inflation. This practice of

encadrement du crédit

, however, discouraged invest-ment because it limited industry’s access to capital. The finance ministry also imposed a

coefficient de trésorerie

that required banks to hold thirty percent or more of their assets intreasury bonds or medium-term re-discountable credits.

17

In the spring of 1961 Rueff began his eight-year campaign against what he saw asthe subtle and insidious effects of the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit on the Frencheconomy. Rueff and many French officials, including French Prime Minister MichelDebré, believed that the United States relied on “easy money” and an expansionarymonetary policy that exported inflation abroad to countries such as France. They alsobelieved that a major consequence of the U.S. capital outflow was encouragement ofAmerican investment in the French economy.

18

Gaullist

officials held what Robert Solomon has described as a “schizophrenic view”toward multinational investment. On the one hand, French officials sought such investmentbecause they welcomed the technological advances and influx of capital. On the other hand,they wished to see more national, and less foreign, investment in the French economy andwanted the EEC to adopt a common policy toward multinational investment. They alsourged the United States to change its tax code to eliminate deferrals on taxation of overseasfacilities. What the French government resented was the development of U.S. monetary“seigneuriage” that allowed the buying of European companies with dollars.

19

Rueff had little patience with U.S. complaints about bearing the burden of Cold Warsecurity commitments. Before the Rueff plan in December 1958, many French politiciansblamed the weakness of the French franc on the draining wars in Algeria and Indochina.Even though

le fardeau algérien

continued, the French franc became one of the world’sstrongest currencies after the Bank of France stopped increasing its domestic money sup-ply. Rueff argued that U.S. foreign economic and military aid programs were a smallproportion of GNP, hardly an intolerable burden. A practitioner of strict fiscal and mone-tary orthodoxy, he believed that a sharp increase in discount rate would eliminate the U.S.deficit overnight, as the French government did in 1958. The French government plannedto raise its discount rate to four percent and the

coefficient de trésorerie

to thirty-sixpercent to combat its own inflationary cycle.

20

17. S. BERSTEIN,

The Republic of de Gaulle, 1958-1969

, translated by P. MORRIS, CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge, U.K., 1993, pp.101-124; LORIAUX,

France after Hegemony: Inter-national Change and Financial Reform

, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, pp.168-174.18. See, generally, J. RUEFF,

Balance of Payments: Proposals for the Resolution of the most PressingWorld Economic Problem of our Time

, trans. by J. CLÉMENT, Macmillan Co., New York, 1967. See,also, F. BOURRICAUD and P. SALIN,

Présence de Jacques Rueff

, Plon, Paris, 1989, pp.243-314.19. R. SOLOMON,

The International Monetary System, 1945-1981

(New York, 1982), p.54. J. LEE,

Kennedy, Johnson, and the Dilemma of Multinational Corporations: American Foreign EconomicPolicy in the 1960s

, in:

Essays in Economic and Business History

14, 1996, p.322.20. Rueff to Wilfrid Baumgartner, 26 June 1961, papers of Wilfred Baumgartner, box 3BA34, folder

DR 7, FNSP, Paris.


67

In a series of lengthy letters to de Gaulle, published in

Le Monde

in early June 1961,Rueff encouraged the French president to take measures that would end the dollar’s role asan international reserve currency. He implored de Gaulle to bypass Parliament and invokethe presidential emergency powers provided by the Constitution of the Fifth Republic so thathe could pursue polices which might force the devaluation of the dollar. Rueff consideredthe gold exchange standard a “prodigious collective error that allowed the United States toavoid the consequences of its economic profligacy”. His views resonated with the national-istic de Gaulle, who longed to abolish the privileges of the dollar and sterling as reservecurrencies within the Bretton Woods system. Rueff also began to urge conversion ofFrance’s dollar reserves into gold as an indication of displeasure with U.S. abuses of thereserve-currency system, which accelerated French inflation.

21

Rueff’s views were shared by several high-ranking French officials close to deGaulle. Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, an

inspecteur des finances

who hadworked with Rueff at the Ministry of Finance between 1936 and 1939, echoed hispolemic against the hegemony of the dollar. Étienne Burin des Roziers, whobecame secretary general of Élysée in the spring of 1962, was also well placed tobegin shaping de Gaulle’s outlook on international monetary relations.

22

OlivierWormser, director general of economic affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,argued that Kennedy and Harold Macmillan’s strong desire to stabilize the poundand the dollar was connected to Britain’s bid to join the Common Market. America’sinternational monetary policy was a convenient target for France’s complaintsabout the relationship between Britain’s application for the EEC and“Anglo-Saxon” balance-of-payments difficulties.

23

The Ministry of Finance, however, did not share these views during the early1960s. The Ministry was a bastion of “Atlanticism” that believed in cooperating withthe United States. Wilfrid Baumgartner resisted the insistence of Rueff’s coterie onending the use of the dollar as a reserve currency. Baumgartner had that quaint senseof gratitude toward the United States for its help to France under the Marshall Planthat was becoming increasingly out-of-fashion in

Gaullist

France. He had alsodeveloped a close professional and personal friendship with Douglas Dillon duringhis ambassadorship to France under President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Baumgartnerand Dillon often began their letters with the salutation “dear friend”.

24

21. Jacques Rueff to Charles de Gaulle, 5 May 1961, papers of Wilfrid Baumgartner, box 3BA34, folderDr 5, Fondation des sciences politiques, Paris, France. For Rueff’s articles, see,

Un danger pour l’occi-dent: Le Gold-Exchanges standard

, in:

Le Monde

, 27 June 1961;

Deux Pyramides du crédit sur le stockd’or des Etats-Unis

, ibid., 23 June 1961; and

Comment sortir du système?

, ibid., 29 June 1961.22. On French bureaucratic schism, see, Entretien biographique de Claude Pierre-Brossolette, inter-

view 4, 32-33, Comité pour

l’histoire économique

et financière de la France, Ministère de l’Écon-omie, des Finances, et d’Industrie, Paris France.

23. Note, Olivier Wormser, 30 May 1961, Baumgartner papers, box 3BA48, folder Dr 2. See also C.W. Sanders (British Board of Trade), “Points for Meeting”, 26 June 1961, FO 371/158179, PublicRecords Office, Kew, England.

24. See, for example, Douglas Dillon to Baumgartner, 4 May 1961, Archives de Baumgartner, box3BA48, folder Dr 1. On Baumgartner’s attitude toward cooperating with the United States, see,Entretien biographique de Claude Pierre-Brossolette, number 4, 23, Comité pour l’histoireéconomique et financière de la France.


68

During his tenure as finance minister, Baumgartner managed to mute Rueff’s in-fluence. Before 1962, France was one of the few European countries that

did not

convert the bulk of its dollar reserves into gold. In 1961, the United States sold nogold to France but 970 million dollars of gold to other countries.

25

And althoughBaumgartner refused to capitulate to the Kennedy administration’s demands forexpanding international liquidity, he participated in Roosa’s

ad hoc

measures, in-cluding swap arrangements and a gold pool, which temporarily eased the recurringmonetary crises.

26

In December 1961, shortly after the creation of the gold pool, Baumgartnerannounced his resignation, effective the following month. Finance officials recall thateven though he was not forced per se to retire, he felt too old to fight the political battlesemerging within the French government over international monetary relations. To theAmericans, his retirement suggested that the halcyon days of Franco-Americanfinancial cooperation might be over.

27

U.S. Fears and French Motives

Indeed

,

in May 1962, it seemed that the French might be considering a policy of puttingpressure on the dollar for political reasons. Douglas Dillon told the President that aBank of France official made a statement “which could indicate possible difficultiesahead with France. He said that it must be realized that France’s dollar holdings repre-sented a political as well as an economic problem”. One of President Kennedy’s greatfears was that a nation or group of nations might exploit American monetary vulnera-bility for their own political purposes. If the French, alone or in collaboration with othersurplus countries, decided to cash in all of their surplus dollars, they could run down theAmerican gold supply. Irregardless of any economic motives, a French-led bloc mightbelieve their larger political objectives were worth the cost. The United States might beforced to take politically unpopular measures in order to prevent a complete monetarymeltdown, such as trade and capital controls, troop withdrawals, or an embarrassingdevaluation or even a suspension of dollar-gold convertibility.

28

A widely circulated State Department memo summarized an article that appeared in

The Statist

warning of a possible attack on the dollar by the French. President de Gaullewas “fully prepared to play [the] diplomatic trump card he holds in form of substantial

25. For Baumgartner’s reaction to Rueff’s views, see, for example, Baumgartner to Rueff, letter, 27June 1961, papers of Baumgartner, box 3BA34, folder Dr 7. For figures on French conversion ofgold, see “Tableau des transactions en or des Etats-Unis avec les pays étrangers”, given by BOUR-GUINAT, Le général de Gaulle et la réforme du Système monétaire international: la contestationmanquée de l’hégémonie du dollar, in: De Gaulle en son siècle, p.125.

26. R. TRIFFIN, The World Money Maze: National Currencies in International Payments, p.249. Seealso, C. COOMBS, The Arena of International Finance, Wiley Press, New York, 1976, pp.61-62.

27. Entretien biographique de Claude Pierre-Brossolette, number 4, 18-22.28. Dillon, Memo for the President, May 25, 1962, National Security Files, Departments and

Agencies: Treasury , Box 289, JFKL.

Hegemony or Vulnerability? 69

French holdings of dollars”. In other words, if U.S policy towards Europe clashed withFrench interests, de Gaulle would pressure Kennedy by continuing to purchase goldfrom the United States.29 The article went on to say that unless France were accepted asan equal power, “he would not hesitate to make himself felt by resorting to devicesliable to cause grave embarrassment to the United States”.30

What made this scenario even more alarming was the possibility that the in-creasingly strong Franco-German bloc was looking to weaken the U.S. grip onWestern policy. It was no secret that both de Gaulle and West German ChancellorKonrad Adenauer were apprehensive about elements of the Kennedy administra-tion’s military and political policy in Europe. If both France and Germany colla-borated on monetary policy, they could use their considerable supply of dollars toinitiate a crippling gold crisis. Without the help of the two largest surplus countries,the U.S. might find it impossible to defend the dollar. This bloc could force theAmericans to end negotiations with the Soviets over Berlin, or bring about achange in American military policy toward Europe. Maybe the French could bar-gain for technology to advance their nuclear ambitions. A French-led bloc couldalso have considerable say in designing a new international monetary mechanismon its own terms.

Were Kennedy’s fears exaggerated? Franco-American relations had become sostrained that the president’s advisers believed the possibility of a French-inspiredmonetary attack could not be ruled out. In mid-May 1962, the extent of this strain,and the linkage between military and monetary policy, was revealed in a provo-cative discussion between President Kennedy and the French Minister of State forCultural Affairs, André Malraux.31 Kennedy complained that France was delayingthe United Kingdom’s entry into the Common Market. According to Kennedy, theU.S. supported the application, despite the negative impact U.K. entry would haveon the American payments deficit, because it would serve the far more importantpurpose of creating a Franco-British counterweight to the Germans in the EEC.Kennedy declared that if the French preferred “a Europe without Great Britain andindependent of the United States”, it would create a situation in which America wasbearing the enormous costs of defending Europe without any voice. If that were thecase, Kennedy would bring the troops home and save $1.3 billion, an amountwhich “would just about meet our balance of payments deficit”.32

When de Gaulle learned the details of Kennedy’s conversations with Malraux,the French leader dismissed the possibility that the U.S. could withdraw fromEurope, since America recognized that it would be lost if Western Europe were

29. Jones to State Department, June 13, 1962, UPA, POF, Treasury, 25.30. Ibid., p.131. Memo of Meeting between the President, Ambassador Hervé Alphand, André Malraux, and

McGeorge Bundy, May 11, 1962, FRUS, 1961-63, vol.XIII, pp.695-701.32. The whole tone of this meeting calls into question the idea that Kennedy wanted to create a Pax

Americana regardless of cost. “The goal of U.S. policy was to support and sustain nations whichdesired independence. If France wanted to lead a Europe independent from the United States, thenKennedy “like nothing better than to leave Europe”. Ibid., p.697.

Francis J. Gavin, Erin Mahan70

conquered.33 De Gaulle accused the U.S. of dictating to its allies a line of policythat was undermining its leadership. He claimed that by entering into negotiationswith the Soviets over Berlin and by publicly stating that France should not have anatomic force, the administration risked a breakdown in the alliance.

Given the climate of mistrust, U.S. officials initially suspected a veiled threatwhen French finance minister Valéry Giscard d’Estaing reminded them that onlycooperation 2on a grand scale” could help the Americans with their dollar drainand prevent a speculative attack.34 Giscard claimed that the United States could nothandle a real run on the dollar by itself, even with the help of the IMF. Only withthe collaboration of those European central banks that held large quantities of dol-lars could such a run be handled. What was Giscard proposing? He would not say,and the Americans did not want to appear weak by asking. Although the Americandeficit had decreased, gold purchases had increased, and the dollar market wasweak. Giscard’s hints fed into the administration’s suspicions of French intentions,and combined with worsening gold outflow figures to stimulate a massive in-ter-governmental effort to develop plans to meet a monetary crisis.

Responding to rumors of French blackmail over the dollar, Undersecretary ofState George Ball sent a memo to President Kennedy recommending that the ad-ministration take preemptive action in an upcoming meeting with Giscard. “I amseriously concerned about the tendency of our allies to view the present worldfinancial problem as a case solely of dollar weakness rather than as a commonproblem for the Atlantic partnership …”.35 It was time to move away from the posi-tion that the payments deficit was a narrow, technical problem to be negotiated be-tween Treasury and European central bankers, whose views Ball described as“pre-Herbert Hoover”.36 In its efforts to move towards payments equilibrium andarrest the gold outflow, American policy was increasingly “reminiscent of Dr.Schacht” - that is, of the series of bilateral deals and clearing arrangements that theNazi government had negotiated in the mid-1930s. Unless an explicit link wasmade between American military policy and the balance of payments, the U.S.would be vulnerable to “blackmail” by the Europeans. Ball believed it was time forfundamental multilateral systemic reform of the Bretton Woods edifice and notsimply more ad hoc measures, even if that meant overruling the objections of theTreasury department.

Would France cooperate? Before Giscard’s July 1962 visit, contact betweenKennedy administration officials and the finance minister had sent mixed signals.In May 1962, faced with an economic slump at home, Kennedy marveled at theperformance of the French economy and considered transposing aspects of Frenchdirigisme to the United States. The president sent Walter Heller and James Tobin of

33. Gavin to the State Department, May 28, 1962, FRUS, 1961-63, vol.XIII, pp.705-707.34. Gavin to Rusk, July 12, 1962, UPA, NSF, W. Europe, France. See also Heller, Memo to the

President, July 16, 1962, UPA, POF, CEA, 9.35. Ball, Memo for the President, “Visit of French Finance Minister”, July 18, 1962, UPA, NSF, W.

Europe, France.36. Ibid., p.2.


the Council of Economic Advisers to Paris where they met with Giscard andfinance ministry officials for a study of the French economic planning process.Heller and Tobin concluded that France and other West European economies grewfaster than the United States for multiple reasons. These included consistentlyhigher levels of demand, a higher level of government investment, greater reinvest-ment of business earnings, a larger body of skilled labor, higher levels of capitalformation, technology, productivity, and smaller defense expenditure.37 To generateinterest in economic planning within the United States, Kennedy arranged forFrench officials to speak to labor and business groups. The financial counselor ofthe French embassy, for example, gave addresses touting his country’s economicplan as a successful path to increased growth.38

Heller and Tobin’s study of French economic planning was also undertaken toconvince Gaullist officials that Kennedy was serious about making the U.S. eco-nomy sound so that they would be less worried about the devaluation of the dollarand less inclined to convert France’s dollar reserves into gold. Bundy told Hellerbefore his departure for Paris that “in the current state of Franco-Americanrelations, any friendly contact is a good thing”.39

Although Heller and Tobin had established a good rapport with Giscard during theirParis trip, the finance minister’s attitude toward U.S. investment in the French economyworried Ball. On several occasions, Giscard complained that American investment inFrance was leading to the loss of control over key segments of the economy. Withoutspecifying what, he had implied that “measures might be taken by the French govern-ment to establish safeguards against such a possibility”.40 The French governmentwanted to pressure the Kennedy administration to dissuade American companies frominvesting in the French economy. However, the Ministry of the Economy had no inten-tion to exert that pressure by moving against the dollar.41

37. Conversation between Giscard d’Estaing and James Tobin, 1 June 1962, Heller papers, reel 24: Europeanbudget study file. For Heller’s study of French economic planning, see, e.g., Heller, “Capital BudgetingExperience in Five European Countries”, May 1962, Walter Heller papers, reel 21: Budget (federal) file;and memorandum, Bundy to Heller, 14 May 1962, ibid., reel 24: European budget study file.

38. Remarks by René Larre (Financial advisor at French embassy, Washington) at a meeting of theAFL-CIO Research Directors, Washington, D.C., 15 May 1962, Fonds trésor: Tome 15, Relationsbilaterales avec les Etats-Unis, B 10917, folder: balance des paiements, Archives économiques etfinancières, Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances, Savigny-le-Temple, France. Giscard’s ownwritings extol the benefits of economic planning. See, for example, “The Management of the Econ-omy and Social Development” and “The New Growth” in: V. GISCARD D’ESTAING, FrenchDemocracy, Doubleday, New York, 1977, pp.75-92.

39. Memorandum, Bundy to Heller, 14 May 1962, Heller papers, reel 24; file European budget study.For French perception of Kennedy’s motives, see Jacques Rueff to Philip Cortney, 31 May 1962,ibid., Ribicoff file.

40. Jacques Reinstein (Minister-Counselor, U.S. Embassy Paris), circular telegram, 29 June 1962, RG84, France, box 64, folder: Investment of Capital.

41. See, for example, Larre to Giscard, “Investissements des Etats-Unis à l’étranger”, 18 May 1962,Fonds Trésor: Vol.15, Relations bilatérales avec les Etats-Unis B10915, folder: Politique financière,1958-1965, Archives économiques et financières. See, generally, J.J. SERVAN SCHREIBER, TheAmerican Challenge, trans. by R. Steel, New York, 1968.


The young finance minister, who combined technocratic skill with politicalsavvy, tried to navigate a difficult middle course between de Gaulle’s increasinganti-Americanism and Atlantic monetary cooperation.42 Like his predecessor,Giscard did not share de Gaulle’s animosity toward the United States. Giscard feltthat it was in France’s national interest to stabilize the international monetary situa-tion. The May stock market crash in the United States had worried the Frenchfinance minister. If the U.S. deficit persisted or worsened, the Kennedy administra-tion might devalue the dollar, which would decrease the value of France’s foreignexchange reserves and make dollar exports more competitive in Europe. Accordingto de Lattre’s memoirs, his subordinates, namely Claude Pierre-Brossolette, Andréde Lattre and Pierre Esteva, practiced guerrilla tactics to combat Rueff’s influenceon French foreign economic policies.43

At the same time, however, Giscard was politically ambitious and dutiful to-wards de Gaulle. André de Lattre, who worked closely with him at the Ministry ofFinance, recalls that “il obéissait”. For Giscard, obeying meant converting dollarreserves into gold at the rate of seventy percent. In the first quarter of 1962, Franceconverted forty-five million dollars worth of gold, and in the second quarter, thatamount increased to ninety-seven and a half million dollars. He also saw to it thatFrance repaid its post-World War II debt of 211 million dollars.44

Giscard recognized that de Gaulle regarded the U.S.-dominated IMF as an “alienand objectionable organization”. The French government preferred to deal with inter-national monetary problems within the framework of the Organization of EuropeanCooperation and Development [OECD]. This preference had been evident even in1961: the Kennedy administration had got the message that the French might not bewilling to cooperate on monetary stabilization “except perhaps through a restrictedOECD undertaking outside of the IMF”.45

It was not that Giscard, in adopting this approach, was trying to pursue a rela-tively “pro-American” policy for political reasons. He may have been willing tocooperate with the United States, but his basic idea was that “cooperation” could

42. J.R. FEARS, France in the Giscard Presidency, London, 1981, pp.1-18. See, also, Entretien bio-graphique de Claude Pierre-Brossolette, interview 5, p.28.

43. For Giscard’s views on the Bretton Woods system, see, for example, Giscard, Speech before theNational Assembly, 17 May 1962, sur le projet de loi relatif au renforcement des ressources duFMI, Direction des Affaires économiques et financières, papiers directeurs: Olivier Wormser,vol.63: 388-404. On French concerns about the U.S. stock market crash, see Note d’information,René Larre (Conseiller financier, Embassy in Washington), 15 June 1962, Fonds Trésor: Vol.15,Relations bilatérales avec les Etats-Unis, cote B10915, folder: Budget, 1956-1965. On Giscard’sdelicate balancing act, see de LATTRE, Servir aux finances, 150.

44. For figures on French dollar conversion, see United States Net Monetary Gold Transactions withForeign Countries and International Institutions, 1 January 1962-30 June 1962, Fonds Trésor: Vol.15,Relations bilatérales avec les Etats-Unis, cote B10915, folder: Budget, 1956-1965. On debt repay-ment, see Note pour le ministre, 3 July 1962, Direction des Affaires économiques et financières,papiers directeurs: Olivier Wormser, vol.119: 252.

45. Memorandum, Walter Heller to President Kennedy, 16 May 1961, Heller papers, Heller/JFK1960-1964 series, box 5, folder: memos to JFK, 5/61, JFKL. Couve had met with Heller at the firstmeeting of the expanded OECD and had conveyed de Gaulle’s disdain of the IMF.


not be a one-way street. In exchange for French cooperation, the Americans wouldhave to accept certain limits on their freedom of action - a kind of “surveillancemultilatérale”.46 Among other things, Giscard calculated that using Working Group 3within the OECD instead of the IMF would give the French government a platform tocriticize an overly expansionist U.S. domestic budget, which he identified as theprimary cause of the American payments deficit.47

Although Giscard’s visit to Washington in late July 1962 was at PresidentKennedy’s request, the timing was propitious. De Gaulle was personally preoccupiedwith strategic issues and strengthening the Franco-German entente. After meeting withAdenauer in early July, de Gaulle was trying to persuade the chancellor that their twonations should develop formal lines of cooperation, a courtship that had began in 1958and would culminate in January 1963 with the signing of the Franco-German Treaty ofFriendship.48 De Gaulle and Adenauer also were preoccupied with the resignation ofSupreme Allied Commander of Europe Lauris Norstad.49

Rueff later obtained great influence on de Gaulle’s economic philosophy. Butwithout an official capacity to implement policy and with de Gaulle immersed indefense issues, Giscard had a relatively free hand to negotiate with the UnitedStates during the summer of 1962. To the Kennedy administration’s surprise,Giscard was in a cooperative mood when he visited Washington. Furthermore, hewanted any arrangements to be conducted with minimal publicity because it wouldstrengthen his hand and not draw de Gaulle’s attention.50

On July 20 and 21, 1962, Giscard met alone with Kennedy and later with Ball,Bundy, and Tobin. The president and these advisers conveyed their concern overthe deficit and gold outflow, and their desire to “manage” these issues on the “polit-ical” level. Ball said the administration did not have any formal plan, but felt that inprinciple some sort of political agreement should be reached to stabilize payments

46. André de Lattre, Servir aux finances (Paris: Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de laFrance, 1999), p.150.

47. Maurice Perouse (Directeur du Trésor) to Giscard d’Estaing, Compte-rendu de la 8ème réunion duGroupe de Travail No.3 du Comité de politique économique de l’O.C.E.D., 16-17 April at Châteaude la Muette, Fonds 9: Institutions Financières Internationales, cote B54754.

48. De Gaulle to Adenauer, Secrétariat général, Entretiens et messages, 1956-1966, 15 July 1962, 16:218-219. For a concise summary of the Franco-German rapprochement, see P. MAILLARD, DeGaulle et l’Allemagne: le rêve inachevé, Plon, Paris, 1990, pp.169-202.

49. For de Gaulle’s preoccupation with Norstad’s resignation, see Le général Norstad serait démis-sionnaire, in: Le Monde, 21 July 1962, p.1. De Gaulle met with Norstad’s named successor, LymanLemnitzer on July 23, 1962, and criticized US nuclear policy within NATO. See, Entretien deGaulle-Lemnitzer, 23 July 1962, Secrétariat général, Entretiens et messages, 1956-1966, 16:206-209, Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, France.

50. H. ALPHAND, L’étonnement d’être, p. 381. See, also, Entretien biographique de Alain Prate,entretien 4, Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France. Rueff’s other strong ally,Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville, was also preoccupied with strategic issues. WhileGiscard was in Washington, Couve was in Geneva for talks with the Soviets on Laos and Berlin.See, Entretien Couve-Gromyko in Geneva, 21 July 1962, Secrétariat général, Entretiens etmessages, 1956-1966, 16: 179-181. Dinner of the four ministers of foreign affairs in Geneva, 21July 1962, Secrétariat général, Entretiens et messages, 1956-1966, 16: 190-195.


among the major industrial countries. A multilateral, political solution to this issuewould not only squelch calls for protectionism in the U.S., it would also demon-strate the solidarity of the Atlantic partnership. What the U.S. had in mind, Ballsaid, was an agreement regarding the ratio of gold to dollar holdings.51

The administration was surprised when the French finance minister agreed withmost of what the Americans said about the problem and appeared to want little inreturn. Even so, Giscard tried to explain that the President should be as irked at theBritish, who, before 1962, converted more dollars into gold than France. As long asother European countries continued to convert their reserve dollars, France wouldfeel compelled to follow suit. Giscard declared that the key was to avoid any uni-lateral action by either side. He thought that it was important for the creditorcountries to establish a common payments policy while the U.S. reduced its pay-ments deficit. Such an agreement might suspend gold takings and establish fixedreserve ratios. France was certainly willing to hold its dollars for a time, as long asothers agreed as well. He thought the U.K. might protest, but even they might coop-erate, given their desire to join the Common Market.52

The administration was delighted that Giscard appeared to understandAmerican difficulties. Giscard’s statements alleviated the fear of a Franco-Germanmonetary bloc. A French-led initiative to reform the payments system would savethe U.S. the embarrassment of continued ad hoc measures that made the U.S. lookweak. In order to be prepared for such negotiation, the administration launched anenormous effort to study and debate exactly what form an international monetaryagreement should take. An inter-departmental committee on the balance of pay-ments was created, and a “gold budget” established.53

Giscard was hopeful that he could convince de Gaulle to accept a gold standstillarrangement because it could potentially meet the general’s long-term objective ofcurbing the hegemony of the dollar. The indications that he received from Ballsuggested that after a two-year grace period, the G-10 nations could modify or con-struct a new international financial structure . Giscard did not intend to end the useof the dollar as a reserve currency. But he hoped to give the franc a place in abroadened monetary scheme that used additional currencies as reserves. He wishedto establish a unité de réserve composite (CRU), which would be tied to gold. The

51. No record of Giscard’s meeting with Kennedy alone has been found in either U.S. or French archives.Kennedy mentions some of the points he discussed in a later meeting with Federal Reserve ChairmanWilliam Martin. Discussion between President John F. Kennedy, William McChesney Martin,Chairman of the Federal Reserve and Theodore Sorensen – August 16, 1962, 5:50-6:32 p.m., tape 13,Presidential Recording, International Monetary Relations, Presidents Office Files, JFKL, Tran-scribed by F.J. Gavin. For the meeting with multiple participants, see memcon, “Payments Arrange-ments Among the Atlantic Community”, July 20, 1962, FRUS, 1961-63, vol.XIII, p.733. And mem-con (luncheon meeting), 21 July 1962, JFK NSF, reel 2: pp.154-155.

52. Ibid.53. Memo, the President for the Secretary of the Treasury and Administrator, Aid, June 20, 1962,

UPA, POF, Treasury, 25; Memo, Bundy for the President , June 22, 1962, UPA, POF, Treasury,25; Memo, the President for the Secretary of the Treasury, June 22, 1962, UPA, POF, Treasury, 25.


creation of a CRU would address French concerns of curbing global inflation whilemeeting demands for expanded international liquidity.54

The Debate over Monetary Reform within the Kennedy Administration

From the discussions with Giscard, the Kennedy administration hoped that therewas now an opportunity to solve the gold outflow problem within a political, multi-lateral context. Giscard seemed to accept the need for a standstill agreement to givethe U.S. time to bring its payments into equilibrium and begin systemic reform ofthe international financial system. The Treasury held over $16 billion of gold, butlegally $12 billion was required to back domestic currency. There was much talkabout rescinding the laws behind the domestic cover, and the Federal Reserve couldtake certain actions in a crisis that would release the gold without legislative action.But Congress would want a protracted debate on the issue, and that debate mightupset the markets and might quite possibly set off another gold crisis.

More important than the gold cover issue was the supply of dollars held bysurplus countries, both officially and in private hands. These liabilities totaled over$20 billion, which could be turned in at any time. While this was more than thegold supply backing them, it was not, by the historical standards of gold-exchangeregimes, a dangerous ratio. Interest rate policy and central bank cooperation couldhandle any run on the dollar. But if this cooperation were not forthcoming, then thedollar liabilities were a loaded gun aimed at the American gold supply. If aFranco-German bloc formed, these overhang dollars could be used to expose Amer-ican monetary weakness, and perhaps force political concessions. Therefore, it wasimportant to take the opportunity afforded by Giscard’s suggestions to create amechanism to prevent a large American gold outflow.

Encouraged by the French finance minister’s cooperative spirit, Kennedy’s clos-est advisers began considering dramatic departures from traditional monetary poli-cy to solve this problem. Gold guarantees, gold standstill agreements, and raisingthe dollar price of gold, either in concert with others or unilaterally, were all debat-ed. The Department of State even prepared a draft memo for the President’s useshould he want to end the American policy of redeeming gold on demand.55 CarlKaysen sent Kennedy an essay by J. M. Keynes proposing an international pay-ments system that dispensed with gold altogether. Kaysen wrote the President:

54. In September 1962, Giscard began talking about a CRU, a proposal which was debated intermit-tently until 1965. See, for example, LORAIX, France after Hegemony, pp.185-186. See, also, S.COHEN and M.–C. SMOUTE, La politique de Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Fondation des sciencespolitiques, Paris, 1985, pp.146-148; and BOURGUINAT, Le général de Gaulle et la réforme dusystème monétaire international: la contestation manquée de l’hégémonie du dollar, in: De Gaulleen son siècle, pp.116-117.

55. Memo, Coppock to Johnson, August 1, 1962, DDC 1993.


“The great attention paid to gold is another myth ….As you said of the Alliance forProgress, those who oppose reform may get revolution”.56

Perhaps the most discussed proposal was from George Ball. In his memo to thePresident, “A Fresh Approach to the Gold Problem”, Ball maintained that the prob-lem was at heart about politics, not economics.57 Unfortunately, claimed Ball, fewpeople in Europe, Wall Street, or even the U.S. Treasury department understoodthis. For them, the gold outflow and payments deficit were signs of American prof-ligacy, correctable through deflationary policies at home and massive cuts in mili-tary aid expenditures abroad. By pursuing Roosa’s policy of “improvised expedi-ents” and taking the posture of supplicants seeking credits, offsets, and debtpre-payments, the administration created a picture of weakness that eroded Ameri-ca’s authority and bargaining power with the Europeans. Ball warned “this is noway to run the government of any nation - much less to exercise the leadership ofthe Free World”.58

Ball argued that the answer to this problem was simple. The strength of the dol-lar should not be dependent on the “daily whims of private and official ‘confidence’but to a structure of long-run reciprocal assurances by governments”. The Europe-ans must be made to understand that such an agreement was in their best interest aswell as ours. The Europeans, Ball claimed, would be just as hurt by a dollar crisisas the U.S. More importantly, they must recognize that the continued American de-fense of Europe is dependent upon safeguarding the dollar.59 Without such reforms,President Kennedy would be forced to take aggressive, unilateral action to improvethe balance of payments, such as withdrawing American troops from Europe or im-posing controls on capital and restrictions on tourism. Ball argued that such poli-cies would not be in America’s interest.

Instead, Ball advocated a multilateral agreement at the political level, whichwould “insulate ourselves from the danger of excessive gold losses while we areworking, by less costly measures that will, over a reasonable period of time restoreequilibrium”. If the latter policy was not pursued, the U.S. would continue to bevulnerable to the ‘confidence’ game. More importantly, as long as the current ruleswere maintained, the U.S. would remain “subject to the blackmail of any govern-ment that wants to employ its dollar reserves as political weapons against us”.60

Ball told the President if the United States were to “become more heavily involvedin Southeast Asia” the “West Coast of South America” or the “Congo”, the Europe-

56. Memo, Kaysen to the President, July 6, 1962, FRUS, 1961-63, vol.IX, p.138.57. Memo, Ball to the President, “A Fresh Approach to the Gold Problem”, July 24, 1962, the Papers

of George W. Ball, Box #15b, “Memorandum to the President on the Gold Problem”, Seeley G.Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University.

58. Ibid., pp.4-5.59. Ibid., p.5. Ball argued that “what we must tell our European allies is, therefore, clear enough: if we

are to continue to carry our heavy share of the Free world burdens we can do so only under theconditions where our exertions in the common cause do not imperil the dollar and in fact, the wholeinternational payments system. To create those conditions is the first and most urgent task for theAtlantic partnership”.

60. Ibid., p.10.


ans might be tempted to “exploit our own problems, NATO’s difficulties, and ourown problem with the gold flight for political purposes”.61 A multilateral goldstandstill arrangement would limit America’s vulnerability to this kind of pressure.Why would the Europeans agree to such a plan? Ball hinted that the United Statescould exploit its own political leverage. “Central bankers may regard our expendi-tures to defend the Free World as a form of sin”, he argued, “but the political lead-ers of our Western allies do not”.62

Ball provided a general outline of a temporary arrangement to stop the gold out-flow. Its provisions included a massive increase in Treasury swaps with foreigncentral banks, a long-term loan with a consortium of European allies, large with-drawals from the IMF, and fixed gold ratios for central bank portfolios. The U.S.would have to redistribute some of its gold and perhaps guarantee dollar holdingsin gold. Ultimately, Ball believed the U.S. should seek a “thorough-going” revisionof the Bretton Woods system, “multilateralizing” responsibility for the creation ofliquidity as Giscard indicated during his visit. The Undersecretary of State wasfully prepared to sacrifice the “hegemonic” role of the dollar if a new systemreduced America’s vulnerability.

The key to any plan was getting the Europeans to maintain the same or a smallerproportion of their reserves in gold. James Tobin of the Council of Economic Ad-visers (CEA) produced a plan to accomplish this.63 To meet Giscard’s demand forsimilar conversion policies among the European nations, Tobin suggested that theleading industrial countries determine a uniform ratio of gold to foreign exchangeto which all countries would have to adhere. This would require countries with goldin excess of this ratio to sell a part of their gold for foreign exchange. Instead ofonly using the dollar and sterling as reserve currencies, the currencies of all partici-pating countries (assumed to be the Paris Club) would be equally acceptable. Thatprovision would satisfy French demands that the franc be treated as a reserve cur-rency on par with the dollar. Each country would provide a gold guarantee for theircurrency against devaluation. Tobin laid out several different ways this could bedone, but they would all involve the U.S. selling gold for foreign exchange andretiring dollar liabilities. Some European countries would also have to sell or buygold. Over time, the non-gold component of reserves would decrease, and the cur-rencies of the participating countries would increasingly share the burden bornesolely by the dollar. Removing the wide variations in gold ratios would make theinternational monetary mechanism more predictable and manageable.

The President was keenly interested in these plans, and commissioned a small, in-ter-departmental group from State, the CEA, and Treasury to come up with an outlineof an interim international monetary agreement based on Ball’s and Tobin’s ideas. Thegroup produced a plan that focused on protecting the American gold supply and

61. Presidential Recording, Tape 14, August 20, 1962: 4:00-5:30, International Monetary Relations,Presidents Office Files, JFKL, Transcribed by F.J. Gavin.

62. Ball, “A Fresh Approach to the Gold Problem”, p.14.63. James Tobin, “A Gold Agreement Proposal”, July 24, 1962, Acheson Papers, State Department

and White Adviser, Report to the President on the Balance of Payments, 2-25-63, HSTL.


strengthening the dollar. The report claimed that cyclical forces would combine withmeasures already taken to bring America’s balance of payments into equilibrium withina few years. The heart of the plan was a proposed standstill agreement between the tenmembers of the Paris Club and Switzerland whereby the participants would agree not toconvert the official dollar balances they held at the start of the agreement into gold. Inorder to accommodate increases in the dollar balances of the participants over the twoyears of the plan, $10 billion would be mobilized from a variety of financial sources.This would include $1 billion of American gold sales, a massive $5 billion drawing onthe IMF, $2.5 billion in swaps and direct borrowings from Europe, and up to $1.5billion in forward exchange operations taken by the Treasury department.64

The purpose of this agreement was two-fold: to get the countries of WesternEurope to “extend more credit to the U.S. than they might voluntarily” and todampen speculative attacks on the dollar. Even with the plan in place, there were allsorts of potential difficulties. The two years had to be used to eliminate the “basic”deficit, and there would certainly be large-scale reshuffling and uncertainty whenthe arrangement ended. To make the plan work, it had to be acceptable to the Euro-peans, and in fact, had to be initiated by the Europeans, so that it did not look likean act of American weakness. The report did not suggest how the Europeans couldbe brought to accept let alone propose such a plan.

Walter Heller, the CEA chair, was extremely enthusiastic about the inter-depart-mental plan. It would “eliminate the whims and prejudices of currency speculatorsand bankers from the making of U.S. policy”.65 The administration could end thebasic deficit in an orderly way, without deflation or drastic cuts in programs crucialto American foreign policy. An international interim agreement would give the U.S.far more protection than the techniques used by the Treasury department, whichwere employed on a “secret, day-to-day, piecemeal, ad hoc basis”.66 An interimagreement would also give world leaders time to scrap the Bretton Woods regimeand come up with a world payments system which defended all currencies againstspeculative attack, internationalized the burdens of providing international money,and provided for an orderly increase in liquidity. Carl Kaysen, the National SecurityCouncil officer responsible for international monetary affairs, and Kermit Gordon,a member of the Council of Economic Advisers, went so far as to argue that deval-uation could remain a potentially profitable action to the United States, even afterthe guarantee was paid off.67

Douglas Dillon was infuriated by these analyses. In a cover memo to a reportwritten by Henry Fowler, Dillon claimed that Ball’s interim reserve scheme was

64. Memo for the President, “An Interim International Monetary Arrangement”, August 9, 1962,Acheson Papers, State Department and White Adviser, Report to the President on the Balance ofPayments, 2-25-63, HSTL.

65. Memo, Heller to the President, “Why we need an interim international monetary agreement”,August 9, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol.IX, p.139.

66. Ibid., p.140.67. Carl Kaysen and Kermit Gordon, Memo for the President, “Gold Guarantees”, July 18, 1962, UPA,

POF, Treasury, 25.


simply a reflection of the State Department’s “reluctance to squarely tackle themore difficult but fundamentally necessary job of obtaining a more adequate shar-ing of the burden by our European friends”.68 The Treasury Department argued thatBall was treating the symptom, the gold outflow, and not the disease, the continuingbalance of payments deficit. The interim reserve scheme would give a green light to“loosen up” on all the disciplines that the administration had established to cure thepayments imbalance. Fowler agreed that international balance of payments discus-sions should be raised to the highest political level, but the focus should be onincreased burden sharing within NATO, not reserve composition. The U.S. balanceof payments would never move to equilibrium until the Europeans started paying agreater share of NATO’s military costs.69

Dillon was even more caustic in his attack on the interim agreement, despite thefact that a Treasury representative, John Leddy, had helped write the report. In es-sence, the actions proposed would close the gold window for $7.9 billion of officialdollar balances, an abandonment of traditional gold policy similar in scope to theU.S. devaluation of 1933.70 The Kennedy administration would be reneging on itspromise not to change its gold policy, which would shake private financial marketsand scare those countries not participating in the agreement. Dillon believed thatusing the word “stand-still”, would evoke memories of the German standstill agree-ment of 1931, an event associated with the world economic collapse. A formal goldstandstill arrangement would mean that “it would no longer be sensible” to “expectforeign monetary authorities to continue to hold dollars as an international reservecurrency”, thereby eliminating the “important substantive advantages” the UnitedStates enjoyed under the Bretton Woods system.71 The plan assumed that the Euro-peans would agree to such a scheme, an idea Dillon found preposterous despiteGiscard’s cooperation. The Secretary of the Treasury found an ally in FederalReserve Board Chairman William Martin, who said the plan for a standstill mone-tary agreement would “hit world financial markets as a declaration of U.S. in-solvency and a submission to receivers to salvage”.72

68. Dillon, Memo for the President, August 7, 1962, Acheson Papers, State Department and WhiteAdviser, Report to the President on the Balance of Payments, 2-25-63, HSTL.

69. Fowler, Memo for Dillon, “The Need to Couple High Level Political Negotiations for more Equi-table Burden Sharing Designed to Correct the U.S. Balance of Payments with any Political Nego-tiations for Interim Arrangements Designed to Defend U.S. Gold Reserves”, August 7, 1962,Acheson Papers, State Department and White Adviser, Report to the President on the Balance ofPayments, 2-25-63. These memos indicated that the Treasury department had no idea how impor-tant the American troops stationed in West Germany were to the stability and security of Europe.

70. Appraisal of Problems in the Proposal for an ‘Interim Monetary Arrangement’, August 16, 1962,(no author given but included with a cover letter to Ball from W, N. Turpin, Dillon’s SpecialAssistant), Acheson Papers, State Department and White Adviser, Report to the President on theBalance of Payments, 2-25-63.

71. Ibid., p.4-5.72. William McChesney Martin, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System,

“Commentary on ‘An Interim International Monetary Arrangement’, Presented by ChairmanMartin”, UPA, POF, Treasury, 25, p.1.


Dillon also forwarded a report by his Under-Secretary, Robert Roosa, to rebutthe charge that Treasury’s actions had been ad hoc. Roosa argued that the agree-ments that had been reached in the past two years between the U.S. and its allieshad been very successful. It had not been a policy of ad hoc expedients, as manyhad claimed, but a well thought out and innovative plan to strengthen the BrettonWoods system. It only appeared ad hoc because many of the discussions held be-tween financial officials were secretive. But the global payments system was muchbetter prepared to absorb the shocks of any future financial disturbance. The goldpool, swap agreements, forward exchange operations, and increased IMF borrow-ing privileges prepared the U.S. to meet any attack on the dollar. According toRoosa, some of the ideas being discussed, both inside and outside the administra-tion, were foolish. Devaluation, gold guarantees or a gold standstill would damageor destroy a world payments system that had greatly benefited the U.S. and itsallies.73 Dillon believed these policies more appropriate for the currency of athird-world country, not the U.S. and publicly tried to sabotage the idea. Kaysenwas infuriated when Dillon testified before the Joint Economic Committee on Au-gust 17 and called gold guarantees a “dangerous experiment”. The Secretary of theTreasury called them “a poor idea and not to be seriously considered”. Dillon alsoruled out changing the value of the dollar. McGeorge Bundy was worried thatDillon’s public statements would preclude the changes in international monetarypolicy that they were considering.74

Surprisingly, the reformers were unconcerned about Dillon’s contention that theUnited States might lose the benefits of “seigneuriage” in a new internationalmonetary system. During a meeting on August 20, 1962, Ball told the Presidentthat “we’re not persuaded that it is at all vital to the United States that we do returnto a situation in which the dollar would be the principal reserve currency …. Wecan see many disadvantages as well as advantages”. Kennedy appeared to agreewith Ball’s analysis. “I see the advantages to the Western world to have a reservecurrency, and therefore it’s an advantage to us as part of the Western world, butwhat is the national, narrow advantage”? When Dillon tried to spell out these be-nefits, Kaysen pointedly asked “you wouldn’t describe this as an advantage rightnow, would you Doug”?75

The President seemed to side with the reformers against Dillon. Kennedy argued thatnow was the time to negotiate a monetary agreement with the Europeans because “wehave much more political strength with them now then we’ll probably have two yearsfrom now”. The Europeans “are much more dependent upon us militarily than they mightbe” before they “get together” to organize their own defense.76 The administration had to

73. Roosa, “The New Convertible Gold-Dollar System”, and Roosa, “International Liquidity”.74. Bundy to Kaysen, August 21, 1962, NSF, Departments and Agencies, Treasury, 6/62 - 4/63, 289,

JFKL. Bundy asked Kaysen “Is Doug Dillon pinning us to his position by such public statements"?75. Presidential Recording, Tape 14, August 20, 1962: 4:00-5:30, International Monetary Relations,

Presidents Office Files, JFKL, Transcribed by F.J. Gavin.76. Presidential Recording, Tape 11, August 10, 1962: 11:20 – 12:30 p.m., International Monetary

Relations, Presidents Office Files, JFKL, Transcribed by F.J. Gavin.


get the Europeans to agree that for “a two year period that they’re not going to ask” forgold while “our balance of payments situation improves and while we work on otherarrangements”.77 The President concluded that the administration should “pursue” thegold standstill arrangement, “because I think this is really the area where we may be ableto make some progress”. Kennedy wanted the Europeans to agree that “they are all goingto go easy on the taking of gold”.78

Kennedy dispatched Assistant Secretary of State C. Griffith Johnson and AssistantSecretary of the Treasury John Leddy to sound out the possibilities of a European initia-tive to limit foreign purchases of U.S. gold and to strengthen the international monetarysystem. Kennedy suggested that an acceptable arrangement would be for the CommonMarket countries and the U.K. each set an absolute target for gold holdings, as opposedto a ratio, which could be controversial and might involve increasing the amount ofgold held by certain countries. Another solution would be to limit the amount of goldtaken from the U.S. to a small percentage, perhaps thirty percent, of the overall pay-ments deficit. But regardless of the plan, Kennedy insisted that it should look like a vol-untary European initiative. Any evidence of U.S. pressure could shake the confidence offinancial markets and lead to a run on American gold.79

Giscard appeared ready to negotiate. While always wary of the British and any“deals” between les Anglo-Saxons that excluded France, he did invite the G-10finance ministers to participate in discussions at the upcoming IMF/World Bankmeeting. Anxious to maneuver without arousing de Gaulle’s intervention, he askedthe G-10 ministers to limit accompanying officials to two persons and to conducttheir meetings without publicity.80 But even with these precautions, Giscard and theAmericans found it hard to engage in serious negotiations. For example, when Led-dy and Johnson asked Giscard what British Chancellor of Exchequer Maudling’sthoughts were on the subject, Giscard replied that “the two were in agreement thatthere should be high level secret discussions of the subject”.81 Giscard did not tellJohnson and Leddy what the “subject” actually was. Was it the hoped for initiativeto limit gold takings? Giscard would not say, and the American representativesthought it imprudent to ask. Later, British representatives asked the Americanswhat Giscard had said, and after being told, observed that “the whole affair wasmysterious”. ”.The next day, French officials said the same thing!

President Kennedy was scheduled to speak to the central bankers and financeministers of the G-10 at the IMF/World Bank meeting. The purpose of the meetingwas to tell the Europeans that the underlying cause of the American deficit was itsdisproportionate share of Western military and aid expenditures. This group had

77. Tape 14, August 20, 1962.78. Ibid.79. Memo, President for the Secretary of the Treasury, The Under Secretary of State, and Chairman of

the CEA, August 24, 1962, NSF, Department and Agencies, Treasury, 6/62 - 4/63/ 289, JFKL.80. Giscard d’Estaing to the finance ministers of the Group of 10, 12 September 1962, Direction des

Affaires économiques et financières, papiers directeurs: Olivier Wormser, vol.132: 347-350.81. Memo from Dillon and Ball to the President, September 12, 1962, with attachment, Memo for

Dillon and Ball from Johnson and Leddy, September 10, 1962, FRUS, 1961-63, vol.IX, p.146.


heard this message many times before, but the meeting would give the Presidentthe chance, as Kaysen put it, to “give them a real feeling of how central it is to yourthinking. This is something that you can convey directly in a way no one elsecan”.82 Kaysen urged the President to tell his audience that the administrationrecognized the fact that “there is more than one way the system might evolve inrelation to the central role of the dollar, and we do not foreclose consideration ofalternative schemes of improvement for the payments system”.83 In other words,the U.S. was not wedded to the Bretton Woods system and its supposed privileges.A better system could be created that reflected the new economic strength of theEuropeans. This new system would give the Europeans an “expanded role in the in-ternational monetary system”.84

But could the administration act without the hoped for French or European initi-ative suggested by Giscard? Dillon thought Kaysen’s strategy was far too risky.

“A statement by you that we are prepared to study new ideas and welcome new initiativeswould in all probability be misinterpreted … as indicating a lack of confidence on your partin our ability to handle our balance of payments problem within the framework of the exist-ing monetary system. This could have dangerous and immediate effects this fall”.85

Without a formal proposal from the French, Kennedy’s speech was closer toDillon’s than Kaysen’s approach, hinting that the administration was open to interna-tional monetary discussions but offering no concrete American plans. The Americanteam adopted this position because of the fear that “open pressure on the Frenchmight lead them to think that political questions could be successfully interjected”.86

The momentum for monetary reform subsided considerably after the IMF meet-ing. In the weeks ahead, the Kennedy administration’s attention turned to the farmore pressing matter of Soviet missiles in Cuba. By the time Kennedy returned tothe dollar and gold outflow issue, America’s political relations with France haddeteriorated markedly.87 It no longer seemed that monetary cooperation was in thecards. Kennedy again feared that a Franco-German political bloc would use itssurplus dollars to compel changes in America’s political strategies in Europe.88

82. Memo, Kaysen to the President, September 18, 1962, FRUS, 1961-63, vol.IX, p.149.83. Ibid., p.149.84. Ibid., p.149.85. Memo, Dillon to Kennedy, September 18, 1962, FRUS, 1961-63, vol.IX, p.152.86. Ibid., p.146-147.87. For details of the post-Nassau Franco-German revolt, see M. TRACHTENBERG, A Constructed

Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963, Princeton University Press, Princeton,1999, pp.355-379.

88. For these fears in 1963, see F. GAVIN, The Gold Battles within the Cold War: American MonetaryPolicy and the Defense of Europe, 1960-1963, in: Diplomatic History, forthcoming.


Conclusion

France’s international monetary policy was, at least through 1962, far more cooper-ative than the conventional wisdom holds. But this cooperative spirit was not tolast. Without assurances that other European nations would restrict “hoarding” ofgold, the French government began increasing its conversion of dollars. For each ofthe first two quarters of 1963, the sale of U.S. gold to France was $101.1 milliondollars.89 More importantly, after 1962, Rueff and others who were against mone-tary cooperation with the Americans increased their influence with de Gaulle. InFebruary 1965, de Gaulle launched his famous attack on the dollar and its pri-vileges within the international monetary system. By January 1966, Giscard’sinfluence had waned considerably and de Gaulle, who had come to view him asinsubordinate, forced him to resign.

Ironically, during the same period official American attitudes towards Americanmonetary reform became less timid. In 1962, the financially orthodox members ofhis administration successfully slowed any bold American move towards interna-tional monetary reform. But by 1963 and beyond, American officials became farmore interested in a whole-scale restructuring of the system. This striking shift inAmerican foreign economic policy was made evident in a speech Lyndon B. John-son’s Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Fowler, gave before the Virginia Bar Asso-ciation on July 10, 1965.

“I am privileged to tell you this evening that the President has authorized me to announcethat the United States now stands prepared to attend and participate in an internationalmonetary conference which would consider what steps we might jointly take to securesubstantial improvements in international monetary arrangements”.90

The Treasury Department, which three years earlier had gone to great lengths tosuppress any program of monetary reform, now warmly embraced it.

But with France and the United States in vehement disagreement over how to changethe global payments system, meaningful change was elusive. This Franco-Americanmonetary dispute during the 1960’s created a legacy of bitterness between the two coun-tries that lasted well beyond the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in August 1971. Itis quite possible that this enmity might have been avoided if the Kennedy administrationhad embraced Giscard’s cooperative suggestions during the summer of 1962, or ifGiscard had offered a less vague proposal to reform international monetary relations.

In the long run, these disagreements may not have mattered, because the BrettonWoods system was inherently flawed and not fixable. Given the explosion of interna-tional capital flows during the 1960’s, market determined exchange rates were probablyinevitable. But it is important to note that the Kennedy administration was not wedded

89. United States Net Monetary Gold Transactions with Foreign Countries and International Institu-tions, 1 Jan. 1963-30 June 1963, Fonds Trésor, Vol.19, Relations monétaires - Etats-Unis,1962-1978, cote Z9984, folder: Transactions d’or monétaire avec l’étranger.

90. "Remarks by the Honorable Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of the Treasury, before the Virginia StateBar Association at the Homestead, Hot Springs, Virginia, Saturday, July 10, 1965, 6:00 p.m.”, Pa-pers of Francis Bator, box 7, LBJ Library, p.10.


to the Bretton Woods system and felt more vulnerable than hegemonic under its rules.While they were not sure what they wanted exactly, key officials, including PresidentKennedy, were willing to contemplate fundamental changes to the system, even if thismeant sacrificing the dollar’s central role in the global payments system. What isperhaps even more surprising is that the French were not monolithically determined tooppose the Americans in this area in the early 1960’s. Even de Gaulle was open tooptions that went beyond a pure gold standard, as long as the “exorbitant privileges” ofthe dollar were curtailed.91 In the end, to characterize America and France’s attitudestowards the Bretton Woods system in terms of hegemony or empire is a vast over-simplification. There were ambiguities and contradictions in policies on both sides ofthe Atlantic, as both sides struggled to understand how to pursue their narrower nationalinterests without precipitating a worldwide monetary calamity. The story behind thegold standstill forces us to reconsider not just Franco-American relations, but also theoften misunderstood relationship between international monetary policy and transat-lantic political developments during the “crucial decade” of the 1960s.

91. See G. GRIN, L’évolution du système monétaire international dans les années 1960: les positionsdes économistes Robert Triffin et Jacques Rueff, in Relations Internationales, no. 100, winter1999, p.389.

85

Western Europe and the American Challenge: Conflict and Cooperation in Technology and Monetary Policy, 1965-1973

Hubert Zimmermann

I. Disenchantment and Défi

1

During his brief presidency, John F. Kennedy spent almost as much time in WesternEurope as his two immediate successors combined. His tours through Europeancapitals invariably drew cheering crowds and created a lasting image in which theAmerican leader incorporated not only the American dream but also the inclusionof Europe in a transatlantic community which was symbolised by modernity, tech-nological progress and economic prosperity. Lyndon B. Johnson and RichardNixon rarely went to Europe, and if they did so, the reception was often cool. Fre-quently they were greeted by protesters. When Kennedy affirmed in a ringingspeech in Philadelphia on Independence Day 1962 that America was “prepared todiscuss with a United Europe the ways and means of forming a concrete Atlanticpartnership, a mutually beneficial partnership between the new union now emerg-ing in Europe and the old American union founded here 173 years ago”, politiciansall over Europe (except for France) congratulated the president.

2

Henry A. Kiss-inger’s grandiose pronouncement of a “Year of Europe” in 1973 was mostly metwith disbelief and scorn.

3

Certainly, personality goes a long way in explaining sucha difference; however, the contrast also denotes a dramatic change in Europeanattitudes towards the United States. Of course, serious European-Americanconflicts also existed during the Kennedy administration, but they paled in compar-ison with the mutual disenchantment of the 1970s.

How is this shift to be explained? Many analysts assume that it was a conse-quence of basic structural change, that is the re-emergence of a Europe which wasmore inclined and able to pursue its own interests, even if this resulted in a conflictwith the U.S. Additionally, they point to an alleged American decline. Such an in-terpretation justifies Nixon’s and Kissinger’s assertive policy towards Europe as adefensive reaction.

4

Other commentators stress the impact of more specific reasonssuch as LBJ’s and Nixon’s mistakes in handling their allies,

5

the consequences ofVietnam or the American neglect of Europe in favour of great power diplomacy

1. For comments and helpful suggestions I would like to thank M. Trachtenberg, G. Schmidt and L. Sebesta.2. Kennedy,

Public Papers

(thereafter: PP), 1962, p.538.3. Text of the speech, in:

Department of State Bulletin

, I/1973, pp.593-598. For the European reactionsee, R. E. POWASKI,

The Entangling Alliance. The U.S. and European Security

,

1950-1993

,Westport, 1994, pp.102-104.

4. C. HACKE,

Die Ära Nixon-Kissinger

, Stuttgart, 1983, pp.178-179.5. J.R. SCHAETZEL,

The Unhinged Alliance

, New York, 1975.

Hubert Zimmermann

86

with the Soviet Union and China.

6

The argument here is not that these factors wereunimportant, but rather that such interpretations do not adequately capture the es-sence of what was going on in European-American relations at that time. The early1970s were a period of major reshuffling in the relations between the Westerncountries. The cards were re-mixed and the rules of the game were reformulated.

These changes become very clear when one shifts one’s emphasis away fromthe usual concentration on the ‘high politics’ of defense and grand strategy to thesupposed ‘low politics’ of monetary relations and technology. Structural change inthose two fields, and the way it was handled in Europe and the U.S., was decisivefor the shifting power relations of the 1970s and beyond. These fields are notmerely to be considered as of secondary importance, that is, as epiphenomenawhich reflected what went on at the high political level

7

; on the contrary, theseprocesses often led to major political reorientations, such as the Europeanisation ofFrench and British foreign policies in the late 1960s or the dissolution of transat-lantic cooperation at the same time. Different methods in the way monetary andtechnological issues were handled and intensified cooperation in these two fieldsmight have led to a qualitatively different relationship between the United Statesand the economically re-emerging Europe. There might even have been a directtrade-off between the two realms, as Washington struggled with a dollar deficit andthe Europeans worried about their technological dependence. In 1966, for example,the Italian foreign minister Fanfani presented the idea of a technological Marshallplan in which European payments for American advanced technology would havewiped out a substantial part of the American balance of payments deficit.

8

How-ever, neither transatlantic monetary nor technological cooperation advanced after1966; things in fact moved in exactly the opposite direction.

The closing of the gold-window by Nixon in August 1971 signalled the end of theso-called Bretton Woods monetary system. Already in the mid-1960s, the system hadbalanced on the verge of collapse. European and American views on monetary affairsdiverged increasingly, and when, at the European summit in The Hague at the end of1969, the EC-countries decided to embark on the road to a common currency, thiswas a clear sign that they strove for more independence from the dollar and that thetransatlantic monetary system was about to be abolished. How and why did Ameri-cans and Europeans allow the system to disintegrate?

The publication of Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber’ s best-seller Le Défi améric-ain (Paris 1967) was another event which stands as a symbol for a fundamental

6. ”Western Europe had to remain an ally because its safety and prosperity provided the United Stateswith essential trump cards in dealing with the USSR, but even this suggested that an end-in-itselfhad become a tool”. S. HOFFMANN,

Uneven Allies

, in: D. LANDES (ed.),

Critical Choices forAmericans, VIII: Western Europe

, Lexington, 1977, p.64.7. See for example: S. HERSH,

The Price of Power,

New York, 1985;

S

.

BROWN,

The Crises ofPower,

New York, 1979; R.S. LITWAK,

Détente and the Nixon Doctrine,

Cambridge, 1984

.

8. Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten Meyer-Lindenberg: Italienische Initiative für internatio-nale Zusammenarbeit auf dem Gebiet der Technologie, 29.9.1966; Politisches Archiv – Auswärti-ges Amt (thereafter: PA-AA), I A 6/83.

Western Europe and the American Challenge

87

change in transatlantic relations. Servan-Schreiber urged European politicians toreact vigorously to American technological superiority; otherwise Europe wouldsoon be completely dependent on the U.S. in the most advanced fields of moderntechnology. He proposed that the Europeans join their national programs in anattempt to match American pre-eminence. However, was it not more rational forEuropean nations to collaborate with the powerful partner across the Atlantic and tobenefit from technological spin-off? And yet, at the end of the 1960s, all Europeancountries exhibited a clear preference for European programmes.

What had happened to Kennedy’s vision of transatlantic interdependence? I arguethat the lost chances in monetary and technological relations were the results of con-scious policy decisions which signalled the end of a specific framework of transat-lantic partnership based on cooperation and produced a new quality for mutualrelations, now based on competition. This had major consequences beyond the1970s. One of the most important of those was a new impetus to European integra-tion. The American challenge in the monetary and technological field helped to rein-force Europe’s identity. Or in other words, the assertive American policy in the late1960s, culminating in the Nixon-Kissinger period, had the same kind of effect on theEuropean unification process as the hegemonic U.S. policy in the early 1950s.

9

II. The Erosion of the Transatlantic Partnership

a) Changing Patterns of Transatlantic Monetary Policy

The central features of the post-war monetary order in the Western world, usuallycalled Bretton Woods system

10

, are well-known: the core role of the dollar to thevalue of which the other currencies participating in the system were pegged; thedollar-gold link which provided a guarantee of the dollar’s value and was coupledwith the promise that other nations could cash in their surplus dollars for $35/ounceat the U.S. treasury; institutionalised cooperation among the major industrial econ-omies to keep exchange rates stable and shield their domestic economies from theimpact of unexpected movements in financial markets. Less well-known is thestrongly political character of this system. It was based on an unintended ‘bargain’between Europe and the USA.

11

Whereas in the 1950s the U.S. profited from the

9. On the latter argument, see the article by M. TRACHTENBERG and C. GEHRZ in this issue.10. In fact, the monetary system of the post-war period differed in important aspects, particularly re-

garding the core role of the dollar, from what had been agreed at Bretton Woods. See: R.I.MCKINNON,

The Rules of the Game: International Money in Historical Perspective

, in:

Journalof Economic Literature

, March 1993, pp.1–44.11. On the notion of a bargain, see also: B. COHEN,

The Revolution in Atlantic Economic Relations:A Bargain Comes Unstuck

, in: W. HANRIEDER (ed.),

The U.S. and Western Europe

, Cambridge,1974, pp.116-118. A very good discussion of these links is H. van B. CLEVELAND,

The AtlanticIdea and its European Rivals,

New York et al., 1966, pp.72-87.

Hubert Zimmermann

88

reserve role of the dollar insofar as it allowed the Americans to finance its hugeCold War effort without having to worry about its external balance, Europeacquired credit for the huge post-war investment needed to re-build its industries.The resulting American balance of payments deficits were no problem as long asthe Europeans had an economic interest in accumulating surplus dollars. This situ-ation changed in the late 1950s and a serious problem emerged. If the Europeanstransferred back to the U.S. treasury the surplus dollars which accrued to them (dueto an undiminished American military presence in Europe, growing investments byU.S. industries in the Common Market and a diminishing American trade surplus),the American dollar gold exchange guarantee, and with it confidence in the dollaras the world’s core currency, would soon be undermined. A real reversal ofAmerican deficits, however, would have required from the U.S. government suchunpalatable policies as a retrenchment of the military effort in Europe, limitationson U.S. investments or restrictive trade policies. Only very few politicians inEurope wanted to provoke such reactions. They still agreed with the basic thrust ofAmerican economic and security policies. Therefore, they acceded to Americanrequests to prolong the ‘bargain’ by continuing to hold surplus dollars. This coop-eration, however, rested on two conditions: that the Americans, as issuer of thereserve currency, managed their domestic economy and their external commit-ments in a way which would not undermine the dollar’s value, and that there was alarge degree of agreement on basic economic and political goals among the part-ners on both sides of the Atlantic.

The American commitment to get their balance of payments under controlrequired difficult negotiations with their partners and costly interventions in curren-cy markets. However, the advantages of the system were considered large enoughto offset the inconvenience of regular consultation. On the burden and benefits ofhaving a reserve currency, Secretary of Treasury Dillon wrote to Kennedy:

“To date, foreign countries and their nationals acquired nearly $20 billion in dollaraccounts. This is, in effect, a demand loan to us of $20 billion which has allowed usto pursue policies over the years that would have been utterly impossible had not thedollar been a key currency”.

12

In a discussion with the president, undersecretary of Treasury Robert V. Roosa waseven more explicit when he emphasised that the role of the dollar made

“it possible for us to, year in and year out, and apart from situations that get completelyout of whack such as we’ve had year in and year out, to finance every deficit we mayrun very readily, because you have the world accustomed to holding dollars. When yourun behind for a year you don’t have to negotiate a credit, they just hold dollars”.

13

Of course, the U.S. government shared with the Europeans a major interest in pre-serving the dollar-consuming security commitment in Europe, though certainly notfor eternity and in a size it considered excessive. However, as long as the Europeanssupported the dollar there would be no immediate need to change this situation. This

12. Memorandum of 11.2.1963; FRUS 1961-3, IX, p.164.13. John F. Kennedy Library, Tape No.14, Meeting on International Monetary Relations, 20.8.1962.


89

was the background of those numerous multilateral initiatives which were taken bythe major industrial countries (including France)

14

in the early 1960s to shore up thesystem. Proposals by the European Commission (1962) or by French finance ministerGiscard d’ Estaing for a European currency (1964) were either ignored or dismissedas completely unrealistic.

15

Both the German and the French government made nosecret of their disapproval for such plans, and Giscard even lost his post in 1966.Thus, the working of the international monetary system still rested on a basic politicalunderstanding among the countries of the transatlantic alliance.

However, the policy of ‘peripheral defences’ for the dollar, which was devisedby the Kennedy administration,

16

did not resolve the problem. In the mid-1960s, itbecame increasingly difficult to keep the balance of payments deficits under con-trol. The first reason for this was Vietnam. In February 1965, President Johnson or-dered the bombing of North Vietnam. In July of the same year he decided that anadditional contingent of 50.000 men would be sent to South East Asia. The Warwas americanised and continued to absorb more and more of the government’s at-tention in the years that followed. America’s European allies reacted with alarm tothis development. They had great doubts about the theory that the new Cold Warborder lay in South East Asia and feared that the conflict diverted American ener-gies away from Europe which to them still was the principal theatre of theEast-West conflict.

17

Therefore they were rather dismissive when the Americanscalled for direct help on the battlefield, especially since the war proved to be ex-tremely unpopular not only with the European governments but also with the elec-torate. Even the country which publicly supported the Vietnam War most emphati-cally did not react to a strong call by the Johnson government for direct help.

18

Asked by LBJ in January 1966 what contribution Germany had made, Secretary ofDefence Robert McNamara grumbled: “Not a damn thing except a hospital ship”, –although the Americans had made strong efforts to get at least a token contingent ofcombat troops.

19

The U.S. government soon realised that direct European involvement was out ofthe question. However, that led them to insist with growing vigour on co-operation ininternational monetary policy. The war effort had led to a sharp increase in militaryexpenditure abroad (which had always been a major factor in American balance ofpayments deficits).

20

Even more detrimental to the external balance was Johnson’s

14. See the article by F. GAVIN and E. MAHAN in this issue.15. K. DYSON and K. FEATHERSTONE,

The Road to Maastricht. Negotiating Economic andMonetary Union

, Oxford, 1999, pp.101-102; 274-276

.

16. On this policy, by one of its principal architects: R. ROOSA,

The Dollar & World Liquidity

, NewYork, 1967.

17. A. GROSSER,

The Western Alliance. European-American Relations since 1945

, London, 1980,pp.237-243.

18. U.S. Aide-Memoire to the FRG, 6.7.1964, G. McGhee Papers (Georgetown University), 1988add., Box 1.

19. FRUS 1964-68, II, Telephone Conversation Johnson – McNamara, 17.1.1966, p.80.20. For figures see: C.E. SHEPLER and L.G. CAMPBELL,

United States Defense ExpenditureAbroad

, in:

Survey of Current Business

, December 1969, p.44.

Hubert Zimmermann

90

unwillingness to increase taxes in order to neutralise rising public expenditure in con-nection with the war and the Great Society programs. Thus, inflation started to under-mine the dollar. Paul Volcker, Nixon’s undersecretary of the Treasury for MonetaryAffairs, later wrote that Vietnam “was the period when inflation really gained mo-mentum in the United States and threatened to spread to Europe too, and if we wer-en’t willing to finance the war properly, then maybe we shouldn’t have fought it atall”.

21

Another serious problem for the monetary system was the seed of discord thewar planted in the Atlantic Alliance at a crucial moment. Confronted with Europe’sunwillingness to extend direct support in Vietnam, the U.S. government in private andCongress in public increasingly questioned the continuation of America’s troop com-mitment in Europe.

22

The basic common political understanding among Europeansand Americans was coming unstuck.

Furthermore, there was the ‘de Gaulle problem’. In February 1965, the Frenchpresident in his campaign against American domination had thrown down thegauntlet in the monetary field. He denounced the transatlantic monetary system asan unfair deal, which allowed America to finance its external commitments and tobuy up European industries by simply printing dollars. Therefore he invited all in-dustrial countries to follow France and exchange all of their dollars for gold in or-der to bring the system down.

23

Nobody followed his example, but the impressionthat America was not doing enough to bring its own house in order and thus end-angering the international monetary system was widespread in Europe.

In 1965, the Americans realised that it was not possible to save the post-war in-ternational monetary structure by small piecemeal steps, especially because theyknew that Vietnam was wrecking U.S. external balances for the foreseeable futureto a degree which better remained hidden to the public.

24

A comprehensive reformwas necessary. A major political issue relating to this reform was how such a newsystem would accommodate the call of a resurgent Europe for a greater voice in thecreation and management of international reserves. This would have been an ex-tremely contested issue even in times of a perfectly working alliance. The growingdistrust about future U.S. policy in Vietnam and the suspicion voiced in many quar-ters that Washington was financing the war by printing dollars made that task evenmore difficult. Secretary of Treasury Henry Fowler had the ingenious idea of pro-posing a standstill agreement as long as the Vietnam conflict was going on:

“I propose that we give serious consideration to asking the key dollar-holdingnations (…) to pledge not to convert dollars they presently hold and not to convertany additional dollars [emphasis in original] that may accrue to them as long as theVietnam struggle continues. To accomplish this, we will have to state in the strongestpossible terms that: 1. We most emphatically do intend to bring our balance of pay-ments into equilibrium. 2. The Vietnam War, with its attendant direct and indirectbalance of payments costs, has made it difficult for us to do this as soon as we hoped.

21. P. VOLCKER and T. GYOOHTEN,

Changing Fortunes

, New York, 1992, p.62.22. P. WILLIAMS,

The Senate and U.S. Troops in Europe

, New York, 1985.23. C. DE GAULLE,

Discours et Messages

, vol. 4, Paris, 1970, p.332.24. FRUS 1964-68, VIII, Memorandum by Fowler to Johnson, 10.5.1966, pp.269-270.


91

But we will do it. 3. We are bearing virtually the entire burden of the Vietnam con-flict. We view this as commitment on behalf of all free nations. We do not ask othersto see it this way, but we do ask that they not act in a manner that will prevent usfrom meeting our commitments and/or destroy the international financial institutionsthat are such a vital part of the world we are attempting to defend”.

25

This meant that Europe would have to continue extending credit to the U.S., andwould have to forego its principal element of control over America’s managementof its reserve currency. Instead it was asked to trust to an unbinding promise thatthe Americans would manage to control their deficits in a way which avoided abreakdown of the system. There is no evidence that a formal proposal along theselines was made in early 1966 but the Americans left no doubt that this was thepolicy they expected their allies to follow.

Indeed, hardly eight months later, a core country had to decide whether it wouldsign such a temporary limitation of its monetary authority. In the context of negotia-tions about the cost of American troops in Germany, the U.S. side proposed that theFederal Republic sign a pledge not to exchange dollars for gold. Since the early1960s it had been one of the most important mechanisms of monetary help for theU.S. that Bonn, in the so-called ‘offset’ agreements, bought American weapons tooffset the foreign exchange losses occasioned by the U.S. military presence in theFRG.

26

When the German government decided in 1966 that it no longer needed tobuy American weapons, this practice ran into enormous difficulties. Relentless pres-sure by LBJ and McNamara to continue ‘offset’ , and the serious threat of Americantroop withdrawal, played a considerable role in chancellor Erhard’s fall from powerin October 1966. The trilateral negotiations at the beginning of 1967 (which includedthe United Kingdom, which also had a major balance of payments problem linkedpolitically to the British troop presence in Germany) essentially concerned the ques-tion of whether the transatlantic bargain in which the Americans provided militarysecurity and the Germans monetary support would be reaffirmed once more. Due tothe overriding importance of American military protection, the German governmentpressed Bundesbank president Blessing to agree to what the Americans were askingfor; he reluctantly went along with government policy, and in the so-called Blessingletter, the Bundesbank pledged to continue supporting the dollar.

27

This episode of brinkmanship doubtlessly created deep resentment in Germany,as later remarks by Blessing show. Blessing stated that he rather should have start-ed cashing in dollars for gold at that time, until the U.S. Treasury was driven to des-peration.

28

The ministers in the German cabinet were unanimous in their critique ofWashington’s monetary policy; however, they also agreed that the French policy

25. Ibid., pp.274–275.26. For a detailed history of these agreements see: H. ZIMMERMANN,

Money and Security. Mone-tary Policy and Troops in Germany’s Relations to the U.S. and the United Kingdom, 1955-71

,Cambridge, 2001 (forthcoming).

27. Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Harkort, 6.3.1967, PA-AA, B 150/1967.28. L. BRAWAND,

Wohin steuert die deutsche Wirtschaft?

, München, 1971, p.61.

Hubert Zimmermann

92

was not viable.

29

Therefore, they stuck to the transatlantic bargain in the hope that aquiet reform of the monetary system might still be in the cards.

30

Frustrated byAmerican policy as well as by the rigidity of the French position, the Germansdeveloped an increasing penchant for unilateral action in the monetary field.Frustration with the U.S. also ran high in other European countries but, apart fromFrance, cooperation with the Americans was still the preferred option.

31

The Britishwere completely wedded to the defence of the pound as a reserve currency and thiscaused an increasing dependence on American monetary support.

32

The smallerindustrial states were closely linked either to the U.S. or to England in security oreconomic terms, and in any case were too weak to advocate an alternative mone-tary system.

Despite the increasingly tense situation on currency questions from late 1967onward, the Johnson administration did not start a vigorous and acceptable pro-gramme for international monetary reform.

33

Waiting out the Vietnam War and thecorresponding inflation was the strategy, always in the hope that the Europeanswould continue to play the game. During the trilateral negotiations, presidential ad-visor Francis Bator outlined the thrust of the American policy at the end of theJohnson-administration:

“There is no hope for any sort of new 100 % military offset deal with the Germans. How-ever, we may be able to get them to agree to financial steps which would be far more val-uable. Specifically: – that they will not use their dollars, old or new, to buy gold; – thatthey will join us in pushing the other Europeans, ex-France, to agree to the same sort ofrules; – to support us against France in negotiations on longer-range monetary reform; –to neutralise the military imbalance by buying and holding securities which would countagainst our balance of payments deficit. If we can also get the Italians, Dutch and the Bel-gians, as well as the U.K., Canada, Japan, to play by such rules we will have negotiatedthe world onto a dollar standard. It will mean recognition of the fact that, for the timebeing, the U.S. must necessarily play banker of the world …”.

34

The consequence of such a step was that

“… we will no longer need to worry about reasonable balance of payments deficits.This arrangement will not give us an unlimited printing press. But as long as we runour economy as responsible as in the past few years, it will permit us to live with

29. Auszüge aus dem Protokoll der Kabinettssitzung vom 27. März 1969, PA-AA, IIIA1/611. In early1967, the German government discussed the possibility of supporting de Gaulle’s call for a changein the price of gold as expressed in dollars and very guardedly informed the French that they werenot dead set against consideration of such a step. The Blessing letter prevented this policy frombeing further explored. See: Wirtschaftsminister Schiller an Kanzler Kiesinger, 12.1.1967,PA-AA, IIIA1/180.

30. AA Aufzeichnung zur Internationalen Währungspolitik, 5.2.1969, PA-AA, IIIA5/610.31. Finanzminister Dahlgrün to Außenminister Schröder: Ergebnis des EG-Finanzministertreffens am

20./21. Juni 1966, 7.7.1966, ibid.32. H. ZIMMERMANN,

The Sour Fruits of Victory: Sterling and Security in Anglo-German Relationsduring the 1950s and 1960s

, in:

Contemporary European History

, 2/2000, pp. 225-43.33. R.M. COLLINS,

The Economic Crisis of 1968 and the Waning of the American Century

, in:

Amer-ican Historical Review

, April

1996, pp.396-422.34. Bator to President: U.S. Position in the Trilateral Negotiations, 23.2.1967, LBJL, Bator Papers, Box 4.


93

moderate deficits indefinitely. It will be the ideal transition arrangement until JoeFowler’s major liquidity reform goes into effect”.

35

The actual transformation of the system to a pure dollar standard happened inMarch 1968 when, after a heavy wave of gold speculation, the major industrialcountries decided to split up the gold market in an official and a private market.Belgium, Germany, Britain, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland agreed to nolonger demand gold from the U.S. The transatlantic system was on the brink of col-lapse because the Europeans were increasingly relegated to a policy of merelyreacting to what the U.S. was doing; Europe was unable to play a major role in theco-management of the system, a role which corresponded to its economic weight.The hopes of saving the system concentrated on the liquidity reform which Batorhad mentioned. These talks had been initiated in 1965, and were to result in theso-called Special Drawing Rights, a form of reserve currency which was to relievethe pressure on the dollar.

36

However, the conflict between Europe and the U.S.regarding decisions about the new reserve medium and voting rights in the IMFimpeded any fast progress. Washington refused to accord Europe a veto right on thenew reserve medium, fearing that this would give France the ability to block anyAmerican initiative.

37

Essentially, the U.S. was not ready to give up the role of thebanker of the world, as long as the Europeans had no means to force them to do so.When the SDR agreement was finally signed in 1968, the result amounted to muchless than a real overhaul of the system.

Thus in 1968, the transatlantic monetary bargain was in deep trouble and theEuropeans began to look for alternatives. Certainly, their internal divisions, andparticularly the uncompromising position of France, had played a big role in thefailure of reform. Still, the major responsibility lay with the U.S. Less by deliberateaction than by neglect and due to the inflexibility caused by the Vietnam War, theJohnson administration had allowed the system to disintegrate almost to a point ofno return. The year 1969, however, seemed to open the prospect of a fresh start. Anew president, Nixon, was installed in January; in April, the main adversary of thetransatlantic monetary system, de Gaulle, left the stage. The core question now washow the reform of the monetary system (or the transition to a new system) wouldbe managed: in a cooperative manner or in a way which was setting both sides on acollision course?

b) A Transatlantic Technological Community?

The Grand Design of a European-American transatlantic community contained thenotion of progressiveness which in the 1960s was clearly associated with the fieldof high technology. It is therefore quite striking how limited the actual extent of

35. Bator to President, 8.3.1967, LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories: Trilaterals, Box 50.36. On these negotiations: S. COHEN,

International Monetary Reform 1964-1969

,

London, 1977.37. Embassy Washington to AA, 27.6.1967, PA-AA, B 150/1967.

Hubert Zimmermann

94

technological cooperation between Europe and America was at the end of the dec-ade and beyond. What were the reasons?

Probably the most sensitive issue in transatlantic relations of the 1960s was theproblem of European participation in American nuclear planning and its access toadvanced U.S. nuclear weapons. The debate concerned not only questions of na-tional power and international security. It was in its essence also a contest for ac-cess to the most prestigious technology of the time. In the second half of the centu-ry nuclear technology was seen as the key for the wealth of nations. America’s topposition in every aspect of this technology was a core element of its pre-eminencein international political life. As a result, Washington’s partners depended onAmerican decisions on the most vital questions of their national existence. Nowonder, that this situation caused deep apprehensions, even during the honeymoonyears of the alliance. The attempt by countries such as Britain, France, Germany orItaly to forge deals with the U.S. in order to close this yawning technological gapwas at the core of the nuclear debate in the alliance.

38

During Eisenhower’ s presidency, nuclear cooperation with the allies was en-couraged by the government. Collaboration with the United Kingdom was in anycase well developed, though beset with misunderstandings on both sides.

39

TheBritish attempt to preserve its nuclear autonomy led, however, to increasing de-pendence on American technology, particularly regarding launchers. Nuclear shar-ing with France, Germany and the smaller members of the alliance was a muchmore contested issue, although the Eisenhower administration was ready in princi-ple to move forward in this area, too.

40

Doubts in the State Department about thewisdom of a policy supporting several independent nuclear capabilities, particular-ly if this meant German access to atomic weapons, led to the proposal of a nuclearforce assigned to NATO. Negotiations about what would later be called the Multi-lateral Force (MLF) were begun in 1960; the U.S. goal was ultimately to give aunited Europe a nuclear force under its own control. The American readiness toshare know-how and resources also included the civil uses of nuclear energy.Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace program of 1953 was an ambitious proposal for thecontrolled dissemination of know-how regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

41

In 1958, the U.S. signed an agreement with EURATOM (the newly founded Euro-pean organisation for collaboration in nuclear research), which ensured the supplyof American enriched uranium for European reactors. However, there was a littlesnag to this deal: most of those reactors were built under American licence and de-pended on American supply of uranium. For this reason France, which developed

38. On this well-covered topic: B. HEUSER,

NATO, Britain, France and the FRG. Nuclear Strategies& Forces for Europe

,

London, 1998; M. TRACHTENBERG,

History & Strategy

, Princeton, 1991.39. In 1958, both countries signed an agreement for ‘Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for

Mutual Defence’. Cmnd. 537, HMSO 1958.40. This whole story is extensively analysed by M. TRACHTENBERG,

A Constructed Peace

, Princ-eton, 1999, particularly chapters V and VI.

41. J. MANZIONE,

Amusing and Amazing and Practical and Military: The Legacy of Scientific Inter-nationalism in American Foreign Policy, 1945-1963

, in:

Diplomatic History

,

24/2000, pp.47-49.


95

its own line of reactors based on natural uranium, saw no use in this agreement andsoon came to consider EURATOM a failure.

42

This was an early instance of themix of political rivalry, commercial interest and industrial competition which wasto plague transatlantic technological cooperation all through the 1960s.

With the advent of the Kennedy administration a decisive policy changeoccurred: the readiness in principle of the U.S. to share civil and military nucleartechnology was slowly reversed. The risks of nuclear proliferation, especially toGermany which propagated an anti-Status-Quo policy towards the Eastern bloc,were deemed too high. Initially, Kennedy and McNamara were not sure about thewisdom of a strict non-proliferation policy because of its corrosive effect on thealliance

43

and because the sale of hardware might bring in considerable economicbenefit, for example balance of payments gains.

44

In effect, the above-mentionedoffset agreements with Germany were to a large extent a deal trading German mon-etary help for the sale of U.S. advanced military technology. Nuclear weapons wereexcluded despite discreet German requests.

45

Finally, however, in 1964, non-pro-liferation became official government policy.

46

What was ruled out included “ex-changes of information and technology between the governments, sale of equip-ment, joint research and development activities, and exchanges between industrialand commercial organisations …”.

47

The shift in policy that started in 1961 had avery negative effect on cooperation in a number of other fields, as the U.S. ambas-sador in Paris, Gavin, explained in a letter to Kennedy:

“France will spend at least $700 million to build a gaseous diffusion plant which willproduce enriched uranium by 1965. We sell enriched uranium to the United King-dom. We have failed to give France any assistance in building a nuclear submarinedespite secretary Dulles’ offer to do so to de Gaulle in 1958. We are asking France tohelp us in redressing our balance of payments by making more military purchases inthe United States, but we will not sell the very items France wants because they areassociated with modern weapons systems”.

48

Gavin cited the danger that this pattern of non-cooperation might spill over to thewhole economic field. The subsequent American decision to refuse the sale of an

42. R. GILPIN,

France in the Age of the Scientific State

, Princeton, 1968, p.406.43. The famous Nassau meeting in December 1962 resulted in an offer of U.S. nuclear help to both the

U.K. and France. For the key documents see: FRUS 1961-63, XIII. However, due to deep doubtswithin the American administration about this policy and de Gaulle’s press conference of 13 Janu-ary 1963, in which he openly challenged the U.S., this option was not carried through.

44. See for example the discussion among JFK, McNamara, Rusk and Bundy on April 16, 1962; FRUS1961-63, XIII, pp.377-80.

45. For German interest in advanced rocket technology and nuclear warheads: H. ZIMMERMANN,

F.J. Strauß und der deutsch-amerikanische Währungskonflikt

, in:

Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitges-chichte

, 47/1999, pp.63-67.46. M. TRACHTENBERG,

Constructed Peace

, p.307-308.47. Declassified Documents Reference System (thereafter: DDRS), 1999, Doc. 2312, National

Security Action Memorandum 294: U.S. Nuclear and Strategic Delivery System Assistance toFrance, 20.4.1964.

48. FRUS 1961-63, XIII, Gavin to JFK, 9.3.1962, p. 687. Gavin was promptly rebuffed by the Depart-ment of State. See: ibid., Ball to Gavin, 14.3.1962, p.688.

Hubert Zimmermann

96

advanced computer system which might have helped France’s nuclear programmemade the new American policy very obvious.

49

Though this policy was directedmainly against France, the other members of the Alliance received no better treat-ment. In early 1965, a government committee, chaired by former Deputy Secretaryof Defense Gilpatric, recommended in a classified report to tie the strings attachedto all exports related to nuclear technology even tighter.

50

The MLF receded moreand more into the background and was kept alive only by the need to assuageGermany. The long-term objective was to force even the British out of the nuclearbusiness, or at least getting a NATO cover for its atomic arsenal.

Soon the Americans started negotiations with the Soviet Union to implementthis restrictive policy on a global level. The nuclear test ban treaty of August 1963was the first step. However, far more important was the Nonproliferation Treaty(NPT) of 1968. Non-nuclear members of the alliance realised that this treaty wasdestined to keep them permanently out of the nuclear weapons business. But apartfrom the political aspects of the possession of nuclear weapons – a key element ofthe question for hard-liners in Germany not willing to give up the idea of a nationalnuclear capability–another serious issue was technology. Would the NPT also in-hibit the spread of nuclear technology in the civil field? Would it endanger at somelater point the continuation of the 1958 agreement between EURATOM and theUnited States which presently ran until 1975?

51

This turned out to be one of themajor worries of countries such as Germany and Italy which were completely de-pendent on American deliveries of enriched uranium. Very quickly, these countriesstarted to look for alternatives.

Thus, in this key technological area, the NATO allies had turned away from realcollaboration during the 1960s. This situation was to spill over into other fields. Animportant case in point is the development of advanced military technology. Thepriority the Pentagon under McNamara accorded to the sale of military equipmentfor balance of payments reasons impeded every possibility of large-scale techno-logical cooperation between the U.S. and Europe. The huge project of the F-104GStarfighter, the principal fighter of the Alliance built from 1959 on under American

49. On this and other episodes illustrating the restrictive policy of the American government vis-à-visFrance, see: E.A. KOLODZIEJ,

French International Policy under De Gaulle and Pompidou. ThePolitics of Grandeur, Ithaca, 1974, pp.79-82.

50. NEW YORK TIMES, 12.2.1965. This policy was emphasised in a programmatic article by the Di-rector of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency who argued for a “more widespread, andstricter, application of controls to the traffic in fissionable material and to the technology whichmay be useful either for peaceful or military purposes”; see: W. C. FOSTER, New Directions inArms Control, in: Foreign Affairs, 43/1965, p.592.

51. On these doubts: Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (thereafter:AAPD) 1967, bearb, J. KLÖCKLER et.al., III, Doc. 419, Kiesinger to LBJ, 7.12.1967,pp.1606-1607; AAPD 1968, bearb. M. LINDEMANN/M. PETER, I, Doc. 140, Aufzeichnung vonMinisterialdirektor Ruete: NPT; Belieferung von EURATOM mit spaltbarem Material, 24.4.1968,pp.508-509; see also: AAPD 1968/II, Doc. 242, Gespräch zwischen Außenminister Brandt unddem italienischen Außenminister Medici, 1.8.1968, p.946.

Western Europe and the American Challenge 97

licence by a group of European countries, found no successor in the 1960s.52 Onthe contrary, the American policy was to “move promptly to make sure that Euro-pean countries place orders now for U.S. manufactured equipment, rather thanmake plans to meet their needs from their own production or from other foreignsources”.53 The sales offensive was mainly directed towards Germany, the most im-portant arms market of the 1960s. In effect, German armed forces became increas-ingly dependent on U.S. weapons. The need to continue the offset agreementssharply curtailed German funds for shared weapons developments with other part-ners.54 Despite the enormous amounts involved in these deals, no successful jointGerman-American project was agreed to. The only significant project, the jointdevelopment of a main battle tank for the 1970s (agreed in 1964), was stopped in1970 due to the mutual lack of funds and interest.55 This was no exception: therewere no major American collaboration projects with other allies either. The com-mercial interest of the arms industry and the Pentagon, as well as the lack of politi-cal initiative in the U.S. government, were the major factors in the conspicuousabsence of American proposals.

Apart from nuclear weapons, space technology was the most prestigious field ofscientific exploits in the 1960s. Again, collaboration between European and Ameri-can programmes was extremely sketchy. Although the Europeans had set up a Eu-ropean Space Research Organisation (ESRO) in 1962,56 it was the Soviet Union towhich, in September 1963, in a speech before the UN General Assembly, Kennedyproposed a joint effort in space research, – with few practical consequences.57 Inmeetings of LBJ with the German chancellor in 1965 and 1966, the desirability ofjoint projects in space research was given prominent mention; however, this clearlyderived from American hopes to explore new ways of offsetting the foreign ex-change cost of American troops in Europe, and thus the idea was not pursued whenit became clear that the prospects of commercial and monetary benefit for the U.S.were small.58 The close links between the nuclear and the space programme limitedthe available options anyway.59 American restrictions on the export of key technol-

52. The missile systems "Hawk" (1959-1965) and "Sidewinder" (1960-1965) were further Europeanconstructions licensed from the Americans; H.O. SEYDEL and H.G. KANNO, Die Rüstung, in:K. CARSTENS, D. MAHNCKE (eds.), Westeuropäische Verteidigungskooperation, München,1972, p.163.

53. Dillon to Kennedy, 13.5.1963, John F. Kennedy Library, Presidential Office Files: Treasury, Box 90.54. Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Ruete, 15.9.1964, PA-AA, B 150/1964. This was explicitly

in U.S. interest. See: National Archives, RG 59, DEF 19US-WGER, DOS/DOD Message to BonnEmbassy, 15.7.1963.

55. H.O. SEYDEL, H.G. KANNO, op.cit., p.205.56. An archive-based history of the European space effort is J. KRIGE, A. RUSSO, Europe in Space,

1960-1973, Nordwijk, 1994.57. E. SKOLNIKOFF, Science, Technology, and American Foreign Policy, Cambridge 1967,

pp.23-41. For documents on the history of this initiative see: FRUS 1964-68, XXXIV, Doc. 21-62.58. AAPD 1965, bearb. M. PETER, H. ROSENBACH, II, Doc. 466, Conversation LBJ/Erhard,

20.12.1965, pp.1925-1927; LBJL, NSF, NSC Histories, Box 51, Treasury Background Paper: Tri-lateral talks, 5.11.1966.

59. FRUS 1964-68, XXXIV, Memorandum for the Record: Space Cooperation, 23.3.1966, esp. fn. 3, p.85.

Hubert Zimmermann98

ogies meant that offers by the Johnson administration to expand its cooperationwith ELDO were received rather coolly in Europe.60

These examples are representative of the general trend. In 1966, during severalOECD meetings, the Europeans took up the question of the widening technologicalgap between America and Europe. Their delegates lamented the American policywith regard to technological exports and expressed the hope that this policy wouldbe revised so that a kind of transatlantic technological community might develop.Italy took a much publicised initiative at NATO and proposed a technological Mar-shall Plan.61 However, these attempts came to naught. The Americans replied thatonly “if Europe [was] prepared [to] make progress in economic integration,Kennedy round and on monetary reform,” could progress could be made “in theirobtaining new technology”.62 This policy was reaffirmed at the top-level of theState Department: “… a technological subsidy would, I think, be doubtful wisdom,since it might serve to perpetuate bad European practices. Moreover, a substantialpart of our favourable trade balance with the world depends on our technologicalsuperiority and we should not give it away for nothing”.63 In a 1967 memorandumfor the National Security Council this position was re-affirmed:

“We cannot afford to see our international strength reduced further through contin-ued deficits (…). Correction of this balance of payments gap between North Americaand Western Europe is of much greater importance than a reduction of the ‘techno-logical gap’ which would work in the reverse direction, enlarging the existing imbal-ance between the two areas (…). Thus, we should not encourage the strengthening ofEurope, and especially that of the EEC, until the EEC demonstrates that it can carryout the responsibilities of a surplus area wisely and co-operatively”.64

The strains in the transatlantic monetary system spilt over to the area of technolog-ical cooperation impeding progress in this field.

An additional problem was the different relationship between state and industryin U.S. and European society. The decade-long struggle about the organisation ofIntelsat, a world-wide regulatory regime for telecommunication by satellites, is agood example. Founded on American initiative in 1964, Intelsat was managed in itsfirst years by a private American company (Comsat), created specifically for thispurpose by the U.S. government. However, the Europeans were apprehensive thatIntelsat would make the creation of European satellites very difficult because it wasso closely linked with industrial interests. In fact, Intelsat orders for the construc-tion of satellites and their components went almost exclusively to American firms.

60. L. SEBESTA, The Availability of American Launchers and Europe’ s Decision ‘to go it alone’ ,in: ESA History Study Reports, 18/1996, p.21.

61. Aufzeichnung Meyer-Lindenberg, 29.9.1966; Deutsche Vertretung bei der NATO an AA,7.12.1966, both in: PA-AA, I A 6/83. For an analysis of this initiative see: L. SEBESTA, Un NuovoStrumento Politico per gli Anni 60. Il Technological Gap nelle Relazioni Euro-Americane, in:Nuova Civiltà delle Macchine, XVII, 3/1999, pp.11-23.

62. FRUS 1964-8, XXXIV, Telegram from the Embassy in France to Department of State, 14.1.1966, p.2.63. Ibid., Ball to Rusk, 6.6.1966, p.3.64. Memorandum on U.S.-European Relations, 23.5.1967, LBJL, National Security Files, NSC Meetings,

Box 2.


This, of course, tended to enlarge the already existing technological gap in thisfield.65 The Europeans demanded that Comsat would be replaced by an intergov-ernmental body in which Europeans and Americans had equal voting rights. TheAmericans, however, refused to accede to this request. This reflected the Americanapproach to the management of high technology in which government agencies(usually the Pentagon) provided initiative as well as start-up funds, and later on be-came the main clients. However, the development, control, and marketing of hightechnology products was left to private firms whereas in Europe the links betweenthe government and (often state-owned) firms were much closer, particularly inhigh-tech sectors. American firms were not eager to strengthen potential competi-tors by collaborating with them.

Thus, a mix of competitive strategies, commercial considerations, the Americanbalance of payments situation, and finally the feeling that the U.S. did not havemuch to gain from extended cooperation with small countries was responsible forthe lack of American interest in the development of a technological communitywith the Europeans. Kennedy, in his Philadelphia speech, had spoken of a UnitedEurope as a possible partner of the U.S. In the technological field, this possibilityseemed rather remote as long as France and Britain pursued an expensive strategyof privileging national programmes. However, already in the mid-1960s the tidewas turning against national autonomy – but also against cooperation with theUnited States. Faced by America’s unresponsiveness and by the escalating cost oftheir national champions in high technology, one European country after the otherturned to an alternative solution to the technological problem: European coopera-tion, directed explicitly against American superiority.

III. The American Challenge and the Reaffirmation of Europe

a) The Hague Summit 1969 and the Plan for a European Monetary Union

A sigh of relief was audible all through Europe when Richard Nixon took overfrom LBJ. It was expected that the new president would end the fatal involvementin Vietnam and that he would restore Europe to its former central place in Ameri-can diplomacy. In fact, the start of the new administration was auspicious. Rightafter his inauguration, Nixon announced that he intended to improve relations withEurope. He mentioned in particular technological questions.66 In February 1969, hetoured European capitals with the message that the new administration would fightagainst Congressional initiatives for a reduction of the American military commit-

65. W. UNGERER, Satellitenprobleme und Intelsat-Verhandlungen, in: Außenpolitik, 2/1970,pp.78-79.

66. AAPD 1969 (bearb. F. EIBL, H. ZIMMERMANN), I, Doc. 47, Pauls (Ambassador in Washing-ton) to AA, 6.2.1969, p.157.

Hubert Zimmermann100

ment in Europe. He also announced that he was ready to talk with the Europeansabout their complaints in the monetary area.67

However, these positive signs were illusory. As it turned out, with the departureof the Johnson administration the still undecided contest within the U.S. govern-ment between advocates of the transatlantic community and those who opted for amore unilateral policy was won by the latter. A major diplomatic effort to restorethe privileged partnership with Europe was not part of the new administration’sstrategic concept. Nixon’s core objective was to regain for America its freedom ofaction in the pursuit of its national interests instead of getting entangled in a moreinterdependent transatlantic community. The United States would cease to assumeunnecessary responsibilities, pursue great power diplomacy and leave it to regionalpowers to sort out regional problems.68 Europe, in particular, should concentrate onits own internal problems. This part of Kissinger’s "Year of Europe" speech wasparticularly galling for the Europeans.69 It explains why Germany’ s Ostpolitik – inits essence a reformulation of Germany’ s national goals and an attempt to gainfreedom of manoeuvre for the Federal Republic – was regarded very sceptically byWashington. East-West diplomacy was the prerogative of the U.S. Other countrieswere “welcome to participate” in the East-West dialogue,70 but they should notplay the role of initiators. Already in November 1969, one month after Brandt hadbeen elected chancellor, the American government was telling the Germans that“things are happening too fast” and that there was widespread disquiet in Washing-ton regarding the activities of the new government.71

For Nixon, Europe was but one element in a global balance of power, and notnecessarily a privileged partner. If American interests conflicted with those of Eu-rope, America would use its full weight instead of embarking on long tortuous ne-gotiations with an often discordant chorus of Europeans. The Nixon administrationalso did not receive with enthusiasm the re-affirmation of the European communitywhich was to be so strongly accentuated in the second half of 1969. The immediateworry was that Europe would develop into a protectionist bloc, comprising not onlythe Six but, by concluding a series of preferential agreements with African andAsian countries, extending beyond the borders of Europe.72 Certainly, the Europe-ans were still important allies insofar as they were vital to counterbalance theSoviets (after Nixon’s China trip this function was reduced too). Beyond East-Westpolitics, the Europeans were simply regarded as rivals. The Nixon doctrine’s em-phasis on the future unwillingness of America to shoulder “every burden” spilt over

67. Ibid., Doc. 81, Gespräch zwischen Nixon und Kiesinger, 26.2.1969, p.286.68. This was the essence of the so-called Nixon doctrine, announced by the President at a news con-

ference on Guam on 25.7.1969. See: PP Nixon 1969, p.549.69. Kissinger himself later doubted the wisdom of this assertion; H. KISSINGER, Years of Upheaval,

London, 1982, pp.151-156.70. H. KISSINGER, The Year of Europe, in: Department of State Bulletin, I/1973, p.598.71. AAPD 1969/II, Doc. 377, Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Ruete, 27.11.1969, p.1339.72. Botschaft Washington an AA: U.S. Haltung zur Entwicklung der EG, 25.11.1969, PA-AA, I A 2/

1440.


to the monetary and technological field. Since Kennedy’s times the support of themonetary system had been portrayed by American governments and the Congressas a burden they were assuming for the benefit of the Western World. The conse-quence of the new policy was that this support was to be stopped and that in casethe Europeans had a problem with the resulting dollar glut it was their responsibili-ty to develop remedies. Similarly, if they had a problem with their technological in-feriority, it was their task to reform their industrial structures in order to becomecompetitive.

The new policy was nowhere more visible than in the monetary field, a formercrown jewel of transatlantic co-operation. The core objective was to regain national au-tonomy in monetary policy, if necessary by flagrant unilateral action.73 Nixon was notinterested in multilateral negotiations in the framework of the Bretton Woods institu-tions. His Secretary of Treasury Connally was fundamentally of the opinion: Foreignersare out to screw us. Our job is to screw them first.74 A recently declassified 1971 letterof Connally to Nixon shows the basic outlook. He warned that “there is a strongelement of thinking within Europe that would take advantage of weakness or clum-siness on our part to promote the Common Market not as a partner but as a rival eco-nomic bloc, competing vigorously with the dollar and reducing or shutting out, as bestit can, U.S. economic influence from a considerable portion of the world”.75 At thesame time he exhorted Nixon to put pressure on chancellor Brandt during his forthcom-ing visit; Brandt was to be told “that the continuation of Germany’s present policy ofholding dollars and not buying gold is absolutely fundamental to US-FRG relations…”.76 This recommendation was particularly delicate in so far as the U.S. were alreadypreparing for a step which would undoubtedly reduce the European dollar reservesquite drastically in their value:

“If things come to the pass of a U.S. suspension of gold sales and purchases, weshould do all we can – both substantively and cosmetically – to make it appear thatother governments have forced the action on us. We want to portray suspension as alast resort and to present a public image of a cool-headed government responding toill-conceived, self-defeating actions of others”.77

Things came to that pass three months later, when, on 15 August 1971, Nixon,without any consultation with the allies, closed the dollar-gold-window andimposed a 10% surtax on all U.S. imports. The transatlantic monetary system wasdead, and this caused growing rifts in the alliance and a rapid loss in the control ofstates over financial markets. This was not inevitable; it was caused in the firstplace by the absence of the political will of its core country to preserve the systemor to manage a cooperative transition to a new international financial structure, and

73. H.R. NAU, The Myth of America’s Decline, Oxford, 1990, pp.160-164.74. H. JAMES, International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods, Washington, 1986,

pp.209-210.75. The letter is dated 8.6.1971; DDRS 1999, Doc. 385.76. Ibid., Doc. 378, Connally Memorandum for the President, 12.6.1971.77. Ibid., Doc. 2317, Arthur F. Burns to Nixon, 19.5.1971.


maybe in the second place by the inability of Europe during the 1960s to reach acommon stance which might have forced the U.S. to reconsider its policy.78

At that time, the Europeans had embarked on the long road towards Europeanmonetary integration. At the Hague Summit Meeting in December 1969, the ECmember countries announced their intention to create a common European curren-cy.79 At the same meeting, they invited the United Kingdom to join the community.By accepting the invitation, London also accepted the goal of monetary union. TheHague declaration was a sensational and unexpected leap forward in the history ofEuropean integration. It has to be recalled that in 1967/68 the UK still stuck to theworld role of sterling, France showed no signs of abandoning its policy of mone-tary autonomy, and Germany was torn between the continued defence of thedollar-gold-system and a more nationalist monetary policy. The explanation for therapid reorientation is to be found in the American monetary challenge. By taking anattitude of benign neglect towards the dollar glut the U.S. was reneging on the es-sential condition of the transatlantic bargain and permitted a freeing of financialmarkets which turned out to be extremely disruptive to European domestic econo-mies. It also undermined any attempt to pursue a policy of national monetaryautonomy in Europe. The increasing mobility of capital and the absence of a politi-cal will and activity on a world-wide level to control the corresponding effectsmade autonomous policies increasingly costly for the Europeans.

The most spectacular expression of the futility of national monetary autonomywas the Bonn monetary conference of 1968. Prior to the meeting, massive specula-tive capital fled from Britain and France and moved to Germany. Faced by a drasticloss of their reserves, employed in order to defend the exchange value of their cur-rencies, both France and Britain massively demanded a revaluation of the DM.Prime minister Wilson called in the German ambassador, Herbert Blankenhorn, inthe middle of the night to impress on him the need for an immediate action by theFRG.80 The French were no less outspoken. In May 1968, student and workersunrest had undermined the French currency. In November, French reserves werereduced to about 50% of their value before the crisis.81 Most of the speculativemoney went to Germany which according to France for no legitimate reason stuckto an undervalued currency. On 9 November 1968, prime minister Couve deMurville, in a letter to chancellor Kiesinger, warned the German government of theconsequences of continued inactivity:

78. One of the most active participants in the monetary negotiations of these years, Bundesbank vice-president Emminger, said in a speech he gave in Basle on 16.6.1973: “There can be no doubt thathad all the major countries pursued appropriate policies and fully lived up to the rules of the gamethe system or for that matter, any system – would have functioned well”. O. EMMINGER, Vertei-digung der DM, Frankfurt, 1980, p. 228.

79. Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung 148, 4.12.1969, pp.1262-1263.80. AAPD 1968/II, Doc. 385, Botschafter Blankenhorn, London, an Brandt, 20.11.1968,

pp.1498-1500.81. KOLODZIEJ, French International Policy, pp.206-207.


“[La France] ne peut pas voir sans de grandes appréhensions le maintien d’ un pareilétat des choses. Les mesures extrêmes qu’ elle serait appelée à prendre si celui-ci seperpétuait auraient naturellement de graves conséquences, notamment pour sespartenaires immédiats. Le gouvernement français s’ est gardé de mettre en causedans cette grave affaire la responsabilité de la République fédérale”.82

Despite this pressure and the fact that at the Bonn conference the U.S. joined thechorus of the demanders, the FRG was not willing to take the requested step. Byspeculating on the necessity of a French franc devaluation, finance minister Strausseven ignited new speculation against the battered French currency. The pride of deGaulle rendered it impossible for him to accept defeat, and, after the conference, herefused to devalue. However, this heroic act could hardly hide the fact that the mon-etary conference had clearly demonstrated the failure of de Gaulle’ s policy. Theidea of national autonomy had been severely undermined, and the reverberations ofthe austerity measures which now were adopted to enable France to sustain thefranc had a huge impact on many areas of French policy. This also included France’ sambitious technological programmes.

In 1969 the French balance of payments remained at the mercy of the Bonngovernment which was pursuing an increasingly unilateral monetary policy. Evencautious remarks by German politicians regarding the DM-Franc exchange ratesparked speculation against the French currency, and the protests by the French am-bassador in Bonn had an increasing air of helplessness.83 The French realised thatthey had not only been unable to dethrone the dollar, but ended up in a situation inwhich they were at the mercy of German decisions (or non-decisions), at least aslong as both countries pursued a policy of monetary autonomy. In addition, themonetary turmoil threatened to destroy the Common Agricultural Policy, one of thecore objectives of France’s European policy. This realisation paved the way for theacceptance of the European solution which became government policy after deGaulle stepped back in April 1969. It was pushed in particular by Valéry Giscardd’Estaing, who became finance minister in the new French government of GeorgesPompidou.84 The question was whether the Germans now would finally abandonthe transatlantic system and their new unilateral strategy, and agree to the Europe-anisation of their stable currency.

Once more, the Bonn monetary conference played a central role in this context.It made very clear that a monetary policy based mainly on narrow considerations ofthe Federal Republic’s national interests would lead to an increasing alienation ofits most important partners. Furthermore, successive speculative waves in 1969 hadshown that the pursuit of an anti-inflationary policy under conditions of increasedcapital mobility and rapidly decreasing political control of financial markets wasextremely difficult. And finally, the French devaluation of August 1969 and theGerman revaluation two months later threatened to lead to the disintegration of one

82. AAPD 1969/I, Doc. 13, fn. 9.83. Ibid., Doc. 147, Gespräch zwischen Kiesinger und Botschafter Seydoux, 7.5.1969, pp.559-562.84. Von Braun (Ambassador in Paris) to AA: Zukünftige französische Währungspolitik, 24.7.1969,

PA-AA, III A 1/612.


of the most important pillars of German foreign policy, the EC. Although theBundesbank and large parts of the governmental bureaucracy still hoped for areform of the transatlantic system, the political leadership considered the chancesfor such a reform increasingly sceptically, particularly in view of the passivity ofthe Nixon team in international monetary policy.

The key figure in this context is Willy Brandt. His most important project wasOstpolitik which had been conceptualised already in detail in the Auswärtiges Amtwhere Brandt had been minister until he became chancellor. The concept was basedon a long-range perspective leading to the reduction of the influence of the super-powers in Europe.85 However, the goal was not German unilateralism. A strength-ening of European institutions, which would be widened to include Britain, was anessential complement to Ostpolitik. The new government in France and its proposalfor a summit of the EC heads of government in late 1969 opened a realistic chancefor a huge step forward in this field before formal talks of the Brandt governmentwith the Eastern countries had even started. Trading British EC-membership forlarge concessions to France in the agricultural domain assured the success of thesummit and ended the long stagnation of the EC during the previous years. Howev-er, Brandt also was looking for a project which would provide Europe with a posi-tive incentive for deeper integration. Virtually days before the Hague Summit be-gan, Brandt seized on the idea of a European monetary union which also found theapproval of Pompidou.86 Under the chairmanship of the prime minister of Luxem-bourg, Pierre Werner, a high-level committee began to work on the steps whichwere necessary to achieve this ambitious project. It presented its final report al-ready one year later. In the form of the Werner Plan the EC countries disassociatedthemselves from the reform of the transatlantic system as the final goal of their in-ternational monetary policy. The difficulties which lay ahead on the way towards aEuropean currency were certainly underestimated at the time; however, the ideawas there and although almost thirty years passed until it was implemented, mone-tary union was to remain the ultimate objective of European monetary policy.

It was no accident that the final declaration of the Hague summit also containeda paragraph on technological cooperation, although it did not have the symbolicand political significance of the monetary project. Disillusionment with the Ameri-cans and the huge costs of the attempt to develop national capabilities in high tech-nology forced the Europeans to seriously consider the European road.

85. AAPD 1968/II, Doc. 207, Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Bahr, 27.6.1968, pp.796-814.86. The genesis of this step is difficult to reconstruct. The suggestion by A. WILKENS that a proposal

by Jean Monnet in November 1969 had caused this sudden initiative is hard to believe. See: West-politik, Ostpolitik and the Project of Economic and Monetary Union, in: Journal of European In-tegration History, 1/1999, p.81. The Economics Ministry at that time had already presented plansfor a monetary union in stages which later formed the German negotiating position. See: PA-AA,Joint Memorandum by AA/Ministry of Economics: Preparatory Meeting for Hague Summit,14.11.1969.


b) Towards a European High-Tech Community?

We have seen how initiatives for a closer and more systematic collaboration ofEuropean countries with the United States failed. However, by the late 1960s, italso became clear that in most fields of advanced technology single European stateshad no chance to compete successfully with America. This quickly developed intoa major political topic. On 5 July 1966, the former German defence ministerFranz-Josef Strauß wrote a long letter to chancellor Erhard in which he decried theextent of American investment in advanced sectors of European industry. He wasalso critical of the fact that the Federal Republic was buying most of its modernweaponry in America, thus undermining any chance for successful European coop-eration in this field. According to Strauß, American technological superiority in allimportant sectors, backed by a cheap dollar which allowed U.S. firms to buy upEuropean industries, threatened “to turn Europe into an intellectual and scientificvacuum”.87 It was no surprise that one year later, Strauß also wrote the foreword tothe German edition of Servan-Schreiber’ s best-seller Le Défi américain, in whichthe author made a passionate call for European collaboration in the face of Ameri-can technological and managerial superiority. Otherwise, Europe would decline tothe status of an American colony. Servan-Schreiber’s major example was the fate ofthe European computer industry which was about to be completely dominated bythe Americans.88 The book was a huge success and European governments whichhad been thinking along the same lines quickly took up the call.

As early as 1964, the French government had commissioned a report whichcame to similar conclusions.89 France proposed the creation of an intergovernmen-tal European body which was to explore possibilities for technological cooperation.The EC Council set up a high level working group, the Maréchal group. The Ger-man foreign ministry noted with satisfaction that with this initiative Europe hadembarked on a new field of common activity.90 However, it soon turned out that ul-timately de Gaulle’ s France clearly preferred national strategies for the most prom-ising technologies. Another problem which impeded every progress in this commit-tee was that the conflict between France and the other five member states aboutU.K. membership in the EC spilt over. Britain still had the most advanced techno-logical sector of all European countries and it was hard to imagine how Europecould confront the American challenge without its potential. However, de Gaulledid not bend. He suspected that proposals to include Britain in European techno-logical projects were just strategies to get it into the EC by the backdoor, and thatthe British would ultimately prefer American offers if those were forthcoming.91 In

87. PA-AA, II A 7/1191.88. J.J. SERVAN-SCHREIBER, Le Défi américain, chapter 14. Written in a similar vein, and also

very influential, was the analysis by C. LAYTON, European Advanced Technology. A Programmefor Integration, London, 1969.

89. ”Recherche Scientifique et Indépendance”, Le Progrès Scientifique, 1.9.1964.90. AAPD 1968/I, AA Memorandum, 3.11.1967, p.277, fn.19.91. AAPD 1969/I, Doc. 100, Conversation De Gaulle – Kiesinger, 13.3.1969, p.371.


February 1968, the Dutch blocked further deliberations in the Maréchal groupwhich had achieved almost no results.92

The British for their part had given clear signs that they were interested in Euro-pean cooperation. In November 1966, prime minister Harold Wilson proposed “tocreate a new technological community to pool with Europe the enormous techno-logical inventiveness of Britain and other European countries, to enable Europe ona competitive basis to become more self-reliant and neither dependent on importsnor dominated from outside, but basing itself on the creation of competitive indige-nous European industries”.93 He repeated this proposal, which was enthusiasticallybacked by the smaller European countries, frequently in the following months,echoing Servan-Schreiber:

“… there is no future for Europe, or for Britain, if we allow American industry, andAmerican business so to dominate the strategic growth industries of our individualcountries, that they, and not we, are able to determine the pace and direction ofEurope’ s industrial advance (…) this is the road not to partnership but to an indus-trial helotry”.94

Britain until then had pursued a policy which privileged national technologicalindependence and, if this was not possible, collaboration with the Americans (astrategy followed by almost all European governments until 1968/69).95 The fewprojects it had undertaken with European countries such as the construction of thesupersonic aircraft ‘Concorde’ and the fighter ‘Jaguar’ with France had been ratherfrustrating experiences. A series of defeats on world markets for British productswhich were in competition with American developments led to a re-orientation ofthis policy. Instances in which the United States for commercial reasons refused tosell the U.K. advanced technology cast additional doubt on the special relation-ship.96 Furthermore, a long series of failures with national developments of hightechnology tools led the U.K. to abandon the strategy of national autarchy. In 1965,the government approved the Plowden report on the British aircraft industry, whichrecommended that Britain should abandon its attempt to pursue an independentaeronautic programme and that it should instead collaborate with the rest of Europein this area.97 The major reason for the new openness towards Europe, however,was that the U.K. considered its technological expertise a major bargaining chip inits campaign to enter the European Communities.98 This strategy failed. Yet, evenafter de Gaulle had made clear in late 1967 that he was not prepared to admit Brit-ain into the Community, the idea of intensified technological cooperation with the

92. AAPD 1968/I, Doc. 135, fn. 10, p.486.93. See: Into Europe with Industry’s Help, in: THE TIMES, 15.11.1966, p.1.94. Speech in the Guildhall, London, 13.11.1967, PRO, PREM 13/1851.95. H. NAU, Collective Responses to R&D problems in Western Europe: 1955-1958 and 1968-1973,

in: International Organisation, 29/1975, pp.632-636. See also: AAPD 1967/I, Doc. 8, Conversa-tion of Brandt with the Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani, 5.1.1967, pp.39-40.

96. R. GILPIN, France, p.53.97. Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Aircraft Industry, Cmnd. 2853, HMSO 1965.98. Burke-Trend to Wilson, 27.2.1968, PRO, PREM 13/1851; S. SCHRAFSTETTER, Die dritte

Atommacht, München, 1999, pp.200-202.


rest of the EC was pursued.99 A series of important projects were initiated. Amongthe most significant of those were the planned construction of a gas centrifuge forthe production of enriched uranium and the development of a Multiple Role Com-bat Aircraft (MRCA).

The former project was a consequence of European doubts regarding thelong-term supply of European civil nuclear plants with enriched uranium from theU.S. Already in April 1967, the German government had approached London for asolution to this problem. Would the British government be interested in the con-struction of a European enrichment plant?100 Germany was particularly keen onsuch a project because, first, the development of a domestic enrichment capacitywas too expensive, second, previous French offers had led to nothing because theenrichment plant at Pierrelatte was too closely involved with the Force de Frappeand, most importantly, the complete dependence on U.S. deliveries had to bereduced.101 In July 1968, the U.K. proposed a trilateral working group for the de-velopment of a uranium enrichment plant which should also include the Nether-lands.102 In November 1969, the three countries reached an agreement. Negotia-tions regarding the participation of Italy and Belgium started. All participantsconsidered the project as “of an economic, technological and political importance(…) comparable to EURATOM”.103 France was initially very critical of these pro-posals. When de Gaulle was in Washington for Eisenhower’s funeral in 1969, heexplicitly referred to the project in his talks with Nixon and warned that it mighthelp Germany to get closer to the nuclear club.104 This attitude changed only withthe re-orientation of French policy after the General had left the stage.

A similar pattern developed regarding the second project, the MRCA. In 1968, agroup of European countries (reduced in the end to Britain, Germany and Italy)agreed to jointly develop a European fighter as replacement for the Starfighter.105

The project was extremely ambitious and plagued by conflicts about the final con-figuration as well as unexpected cost explosion. Nonetheless, the governmentsstuck to it until completion. Once more, the French made it clear that they did notapprove of these projects, mainly because they were developing a similar aircraftwhich they hoped to sell to other European countries.106

The French mistrust of Britain, however, was not unfounded because Britain’ scommitment to joint European projects remained ambiguous. In April 1968, for ex-

99. AAPD 1967/III, Doc. 449, Gespräch Brandt mit dem britischen Botschafter Roberts, 28.12.1967,p.1713.

100. AAPD 1967/II, Doc. 126, Gespräch Brandt mit dem britischen Außenminister Brown, 13.4.1967,p.584.

101. Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirektors Frank, 28.4.1967, PA-AA, I A 6/72.102. AAPD 1968/II, Doc. 220, Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten von Staden, 12.7.1968, p.868.103. R. LOOSCH, Kernenergie und internationale Zusammenarbeit, in: Aussenpolitik, 7/1969, p.395.104. H. KISSINGER, White House Years, p.384. French Foreign Minister Debré voiced the same sus-

picions to the German ambassador in Paris, von Braun; AAPD 1969/I, Doc. 133, von Braun toBrandt, 24.4.1969, pp.515-516.

105. AAPD 1969/I, Doc. 408, Aufzeichnung VLR I Behrends, p.1456.106. Ibid., Doc. 69, Arnold (Ambassador to the Netherlands) to AA, 20.2.1969, p.238.


ample, the United Kingdom suspended payments for the European LauncherDevelopment Organisation (ELDO), founded in the early 1960s with the aim ofdeveloping a launcher for European satellites.107 This was a hard blow for the Euro-pean space effort because Britain had been the most important contributor. Thewhole project entered a deep crisis. After the lunar landing in 1969, the Americansinvited the Europeans to participate in the development of a reusable space trans-portation system (the later Shuttle). However, they refused to guarantee the availa-bility of American launching facilities for satellites which were not operated withinthe framework of Intelsat.108 Again, commercial interest impeded transatlantic co-operation from the very start. This wedded the Europeans together, and they carriedon with their own launcher development. In the mid-1970s, Britain which due toclose connections of British firms to ELDO had never been completely excluded,officially rejoined the effort. In 1979, the first European rocket, ‘Ariane’, waslaunched into the orbit, and it became a serious competitor for the American spaceshuttle. The development of a European jet-liner, Airbus, also showed Britain’ s in-itial ambiguity. In 1967, it had signed an agreement with France and the FRG forthe development of an alternative to the almost complete U.S. dominance on civilaircraft markets. Already in 1968, Britain cancelled its participation. Once more,France and Germany laboured on, carrying the project to final success (togetherwith Britain which re-entered in 1979).

All these projects share three characteristics. First, they were explicitly directedagainst U.S. dominance. Second, they demonstrated the great difficulty of reconcil-ing notions of national autonomy with the necessity of collective projects, particu-larly in the first years. In 1968 and early 1969, the MRCA, Airbus and ELDO wereall in deep crisis, and it is only due to the reaffirmation of European cooperation in1969/70 that they survived despite those great difficulties. Third, all of theseprojects were in the end successful. Thus, the late 1960s and early 1970s was adecisive period for European collaboration. It was not only those intergovernmentalprojects which were given a new vigour. Collaboration on community level alsoreceived renewed impetus. The Maréchal group was reactivated and in November1971 a programme for ‘Cooperation in Science and Technology’ (COST) wasadopted which was to coordinate joint European projects and eventually trans-cended the narrow confines of the EC.

On the whole, the course of technological and monetary cooperation in the transat-lantic alliance exhibited a similar pattern. European countries had three basic options(transatlantic cooperation, national autonomy, Europeanisation) whereas the UnitedStates had the choice between the first two possibilities. The analysis has shown a cleartrend in American policy towards increasing autonomy in the period studied here. TheEuropeans, for their part, moved away from a policy of favoring transatlantic andnational solutions toward a marked preference for European collaboration.

107. J. KRIGE, A. RUSSO, L. SEBESTA, A Brief History of the ESA, in: J. KRIGE, L. GUZZETTI(eds), History of European Scientific and Technological Cooperation, Luxembourg, 1997,pp.199-200.

108. Ibid., p.202.


IV. The Price of Disunity

In 1973, in an edited volume on the foreign policy of the Nixon administration,Robert Osgood predicted a process which, as this article has shown, had alreadybeen completed:

“If the United States abandons its role, it will probably be by neglect rather thandesign; and it will result in the erosion of the present structure of relationships, not inthe construction of another”.109

What has been argued here is that in the field of monetary policy a framework oftransatlantic cooperation consisting of a series of tacit rules and common assump-tions about how mutual problems were to be tackled, came unstuck. Regarding tech-nology, after timid efforts during the Eisenhower period, such a framework did noteven develop and no major initiatives were undertaken in the 1960s and early 1970sdespite the fact that it was a time of enormous technological advance. Whereasduring the 1960s the Europeans gradually came to appreciate the role technologicaland monetary collaboration might play in fostering a closer relationship betweentheir countries and in enhancing competitiveness as well as their domestic economicwelfare, the United States decided it would be better off pursuing a more independentpolicy, renouncing – not in theory, but in practice – the concept of a close transatlan-tic partnership. The reasons were manifold. The most important one was that theUnited States, battered by Vietnam and its balance of payments deficits, perceiveditself in a kind of decline and saw in the preservation of its national autonomy to thelargest degree possible the best way to reverse this trend. Certainly, dealing with adisunited Europe was a difficult problem for American diplomacy. Privileged rela-tions with single European countries such as they existed with Britain and as theywere wished by General de Gaulle, were extremely divisive for the alliance. How-ever, a more determined effort, particularly after de Gaulle had left, might have pre-vented the mutual disenchantment of the early 1970s.

Thus, around 1969, in monetary as well as in technological matters, a transatlanticoutlook was replaced by a Europe-centered view in most European countries. Theresult of the American challenge was highlighted by the decisions of the Europeansummit in The Hague in December 1969. European, not transatlantic, cooperationwas given top priority in the future. Of course, this was a muddy process with count-less setbacks, and numerous attempts during the 1970s to assert once more the auton-omy of national governments or to strike new bargains with the United States whichstill had a lot to offer, most importantly military security. In a short-term perspectivethe Europeanization of the late 1960s and early 1970s even may seem a failure, par-ticularly regarding the fate of the plans for monetary union. However, the ultimateobjective of European cooperation remained paramount for a huge part of the politi-cal establishment (with the exception of the U.K.) and for public imagination. In thissense, the years 1965 to 1973 were decisive for the future course of Europe and the

109. R.E. OSGOOD et.al, Retreat from Empire? The First Nixon Administration, Baltimore/London,1973, p.18.


American challenge did play a very considerable role in this process. It is probablyinstructive to speculate what would have happened had the United States been morewilling to pursue real collaboration with Europe in the 1960s. Maybe the EuropeanUnion we know now would not have come into existence.

Hubert ZimmermannRuhr-Universität Bochum

111

Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe

Georges-Henri Soutou

Depuis l’organisation de la solidarité occidentale et les débuts de la politique d’unifica-tion européenne dans les années 1947-1950, une structure essentielle de la politiqueextérieure française était déterminée par le triangle constitué entre l’Europe occidentale,les Etats-Unis et la France. Afin de rétablir son rôle international malgré la défaite de1940 et la rupture de la deuxième guerre mondiale, Paris devait à la fois prendre la têtede l’Europe occidentale et maintenir des relations bilatérales étroites avec lesEtats-Unis. Il y avait un lien dialectique entre les deux orientations, dans la mesure où laFrance aurait plus de poids face à l’Amérique si elle se présentait avec l’appui del’Europe occidentale, et dans la mesure où son leadership sur l’Europe occidentaleserait plus facile à faire accepter si elle bénéficiait d’une relation privilégiée avec lesEtats-Unis. En outre cette position, à l’intersection de l’ensemble atlantique et del’ensemble européen, serait celle qui permettrait le mieux à la France de maintenir sonrôle mondial et de discuter avec les Américains des problèmes hors zone OTAN qui laconcernaient particulièrement (Afrique, Moyen-Orient, Asie). Elle permettrait égale-ment d’échapper aux inconvénients ressentis à Paris dès les années 50 d’une intégrationatlantique trop étroite (pour les dirigeants français le modèle à imiter fut longtemps larelation spéciale anglo-américaine et le but à atteindre la constitution d’une sorte dedirectoire à trois de l’Alliance). D’autre part il y avait les très importantes questionsd’armements et de hautes technologies, nucléaires et autres: c’est toujours en prioritéavec les Etats-Unis que dans ces domaines la France a souhaité coopérer, pour des rai-sons d’efficacité évidentes. Cette orientation fut celle de la IVe République.

1

Ce futcelle du Général de Gaulle jusqu’en 1962, contrairement à ce que l’on pense souvent.

2

Certes de Gaulle s’en écarta ensuite, mais son successeur Georges Pompidou devait yrevenir de façon massive. Le triangle France-Europe-Etats-Unis devait même jouerpour lui un rôle absolument déterminant et se situe au cœur de sa politique étrangère.

Il est essentiel de comprendre que la politique extérieure du Président Pompi-dou, et en particulier sa politique américaine, se trouvaient dans l’ombre portée dugénéral de Gaulle et soumises à une vérification constante de leur «orthodoxie»,

1. G.-H. SOUTOU,

La France et l’Alliance atlantique de 1949 à 1954

, in:

Cahiers du Centred’Etudes d’Histoire de la Défense

, 3(1997).2. G.-H. SOUTOU,

L’Alliance incertaine. Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands,1954-1996

, Paris, Fayard, 1996.


112

jusqu’au sein de l’administration et du gouvernement.

3

C’était un domaine particu-lièrement sensible, où le nouveau Président ne pouvait introduire de nouvellesorientations qu’avec prudence; lui-même restait d’ailleurs profondément gaullienen matière de politique extérieure, plus sans doute qu’on ne l’a cru souvent à l’épo-que. Or il faut bien mesurer à quel point, à partir de 1963-1964, le général deGaulle avait poussé la rupture avec les Etats-Unis: la conférence de presse du 14janvier 1963, la querelle de la MLF en 1964, la crise de la Chaise vide en 1965, ledépart du commandement intégré de l’OTAN en 1966 avaient manifesté très claire-ment que pour le Général l’Europe devrait se développer sur tous les plans (écono-mique mais aussi politique et stratégique) indépendamment des Etats-Unis, et nonpas en coopération avec eux comme cela avait été le cas pour les dirigeants de laIVe République.

4

On ne sait pas en général que lors de sa visite à Moscou en juin1966 de Gaulle accepta le principe d’une conférence européenne de sécurité sansles Etats-Unis, ce qui revenait à vouloir construire un nouveau système de sécuritéeuropéen sur la base d’une entente franco-soviétique et sans Washington, confor-mément d’ailleurs aux conceptions internationales d’ensemble du Général danscette période.

5

D’autre part dès le 24 janvier 1967 le Général, par une «Instructionpersonnelle et secrète», fixait le cadre de la programmation militaire pour la décen-nie 1970-1980: alors qu’auparavant la défense de la France était conçue «dans lecadre de l’Alliance atlantique», elle serait désormais établie en fonction du «triplecaractère d’ubiquité, d’instantanéité et de totalité» du péril, sans qu’il ne soit plusquestion d’une alliance privilégiée.

6

C’était la stratégie dite «tous azimuts», qui futannoncée par le général Ailleret, chef d’état-major des Armées, dans un article dela

Revue de Défense Nationale

de décembre 1967. Elle fut confirmée par une allo-cution prononcée par le Général devant le Centre des Hautes Etudes Militaires, le27 janvier 1968.

7

C’était évidemment la fin de toute velléité de collaboration straté-gique et nucléaire franco-américaine, comme de Gaulle en avait pourtant évoqué lapossibilité à différentes reprises entre 1958 et 1962.

Avant de parvenir à la Présidence en 1969, Georges Pompidou (Premier minis-tre de 1962 à 1968) était incontestablement gaulliste en matière internationale,mais déjà avec de très sérieuses nuances, également en ce qui concernait lesEtats-Unis. On pourrait parler d’un gaullisme pragmatique, rationalisé. Certes, ilavait été très hostile aux accords de Nassau et à la MLF, deux des grandes pierres

3. Pour la politique extérieure de Georges Pompidou et ses rapports avec les Américains cf. E. ROUSSEL,

Georges Pompidou

, Paris, JC Lattès, 1994;

Georges Pompidou et l’Europe

, Bruxelles, Complexe, 1995,en particulier la contribution de P. MELANDRI,

Une relation très spéciale: la France, les Etats-Unis etl’Année de l’Europe, 1973-1974

; sur la collaboration militaire franco-américaine à l’époque de Pompidoucf. P. MELANDRI,

Aux origines de la coopération nucléaire franco-américaine

, in:

La France et l’Ato-me

, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1994. On utilisera évidemment les mémoires essentiels de H. KISSINGER,

Whi-te House Years

et

Years of Upheaval

, Boston, Littel, Brown and Cy, 1979 et 1982, et de M. JOBERT,

Mé-moires d’avenir

et

L’autre regard

, Paris, Grasset, 1974 et 1976.4. G.-H. SOUTOU,

L’Alliance incertaine

, op.cit

.

5.

Ibid.

et archives privées.6. Archives nationales, 5AG2/1040.7. Institut Charles de Gaulle,

L’aventure de la Bombe

, Paris, Plon, 1985, pp. 210-211.


113

d’achoppement des relations franco-américaines dans ces années.

8

Certes, il sou-haitait que l’Europe reste indépendante des Etats-Unis et il redoutait la perspectived’un rapprochement américano-soviétique aux dépens de l’Europe, comme il ledéclara au journaliste américain C. L. Sulzberger le 23 janvier 1968, annonçant lethème très gaulliste qu’il reprendra souvent comme Président de la République,celui du danger d’un «condominium américano-soviétique» sur l’Europe.

9

Mais enmême temps il se disait prêt à envisager des relations beaucoup plus positives avecWashington, y compris sur le plan économique, et dans une conversation avec C. L.Sulzberger le 21 octobre 1965, il exposa à propos de l’OTAN un point de vuebeaucoup plus modéré que celui que de Gaulle devait imposer en 1966.

10

En accédant à la Présidence en juin 1969, Georges Pompidou était décidé à lafois à maintenir l’héritage de la politique gaulliste et à le faire évoluer de façon à ledébarrasser de ce qu’il considérait comme des éléments tenant trop à la personna-lité très forte et parfois impulsive du Général, et à tenir compte des moyens réels dela France, afin de pouvoir ainsi ancrer le gaullisme dans la durée. Citons ici unelettre du nouveau président à Philippe de Saint Robert le 10 juin 1969:

«… Mon ambition est d’essayer de fonder sur des réalités solides, économiques,sociales, humaines, la poursuite d’une certaine politique qui ne se soutenait jusqu’icique grâce au prestige d’un homme».

11

D’autre part la candidature présidentielle de Georges Pompidou, qui n’avait pasla stature historique du Général, et ensuite son action politique comme chef del’Etat reposaient sur la notion de «majorité présidentielle», allant au-delà des gaul-listes et comprenant les Républicains indépendants et les Centristes du CDP. Or cesdeux derniers groupes ne partageaient absolument pas l’anti-américanisme fré-quent dans les milieux gaullistes. Aussi du point de vue de la politique intérieure(surtout après le choc des événements de mai 1968 et l’occupation de la Tchécoslo-vaquie en août, qui avaient ravivé l’opposition au communisme et à l’URSS) unrecentrage par rapport à Washington était donc nécessaire. Or celui-ci fut facilitédans la mesure où en 1969, après l’arrivée au pouvoir du Président Nixon et avantmême la démission de De Gaulle en avril, les rapports franco-américains s’étaientsubitement améliorés. La visite de Nixon en France fin février se passa bien, mêmesi, sur le fond, le Général n’abandonna rien de ses thèses habituelles.

12

Malgré toutles diplomates américains à Paris, d’après leurs contacts au Quai d’Orsay, perce-vaient une inflexion de la politique française, déçue par les Soviétiques et désireused’améliorer les relations avec les Etats-Unis.

13

Le Président Nixon décidait même

8. A. PEYREFITTE,

C’était de Gaulle

, T.I., Paris, de Fallois/Fayard, 1994, p.339, et C. L. SULZ-BERGER,

An Age of Mediocrity

, New-York, Macmillan, 1993, p.133 (un témoignage particuliè-rement utile).

9. SULZBERGER, op.cit., p.406.10.

Ibid.

, pp. 216-217.11. P. de SAINT ROBERT,

Le secret des jours

, Paris, JC Lattès, 1995, p.33.12. Cf. H. KISSINGER,

White House Years

, op.cit., pp.106-111.13. Télé. de l’ambassade américaine à Paris du 3 avril 1969 et note de Sonnenfeldt pour Kissinger du

8 avril, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC [National Security Council] CF[Country Files]/674/France vol.I.


114

le 15 avril de faire étudier tous les aspects d’une éventuelle coopération militairebilatérale avec la France et d’en évaluer la possibilité sans a priori si les Français ledemandaient.

14

Le Département d’Etat et Nixon s’attendaient à la poursuite decette amélioration à la suite de la démission du Général le 28 avril, ainsi qu’à unrapprochement, au moins sur le plan pratique, entre la France et l’OTAN.

15

Il estvrai que Kissinger était pour sa part moins optimiste, craignant la montée del’influence de la Gauche sur la politique extérieure française.

16

Les premiers contacts entre le Président Pompidou et les Etats-Unis.

Les premiers contacts de Georges Pompidou, devenu Président, avec les Américainsfurent dans l’ensemble positifs. Il reçut l’ambassadeur Shriver le 23 juillet 1969 et luitint un langage qui tranchait nettement sur la période précédente: il reconnaissaitcomme une évidence que l’Europe avait besoin de la couverture stratégique américaineet que la France avait besoin de l’Alliance atlantique; la politique militaire françaised’indépendance nationale n’était pas tournée contre l’Amérique mais pouvait faciliterun certain allégement des charges des Etats-Unis en Europe ainsi que favoriser leurpolitique de détente avec l’Est. Une entente était également possible dans le domaineéconomique, en particulier en matière agricole, le Président français laissant mêmeentendre qu’il serait disposé à revoir la politique agricole commune européenne pourrevenir à des prix plus compatibles avec ceux du marché mondial et plus conformes auxintérêts américains et aux intérêts bien compris de la France (c’était en effet la RFA quiavait exigé des prix élevés pour le blé, pas Paris).

17

D’autre part Pompidou n’était paspar principe hostile aux investissements américains en France (grande différence parrapport à la période précédente); il faudrait seulement attendre que l’industrie électriqueet électronique française soient d’abord restructurées.

18

Michel Jobert, secrétaire général de l’Elysée, déclara le 6 novembre à Shriverque Georges Pompidou était très content de pouvoir améliorer les rapportsfranco-américains. Il donna comme raison la crainte d’un renouveau du nationa-lisme allemand et le souci d’un appui américain pour contrebalancer cettemenace.

19

Je ne suis pas du tout convaincu que le Président, dont la politique alle-mande était beaucoup plus complexe, était sur ce dernier point exactement sur lamême longueur d’onde et voyait les choses de façon aussi simpliste,

20

mais les res-

14. Note de Kissinger du 15 avril approuvée par le Président et note de Kissinger pour le Secrétaired’Etat le 22 avril, NSC CF/674/France vol.II.

15. Note de Martin Hillenbrand (Assistant Secretary for European Affairs) du 29 avril et lettre deKissinger du 3 mai lui transmettant les félicitations de Nixon, NSC CF/674/France vol.II.

16. Note de Kissinger pour Nixon du 28 avril, ibid.17. Compte-rendu de l’entretien avec Shriver, le 23 juillet 1969, AN, 5AG2/1022.18. Entretien Pompidou-Rogers le 8 décembre 1969, 5AG2/1022.19. NPM, NSC CF/676/France, vol.IV.20. G.-H. SOUTOU,

L’attitude de Georges Pompidou face à l’Allemagne

, in:

Georges Pompidou etl’Europe

.


115

ponsables américains étaient satisfaits du changement d’atmosphère dans les rela-tions entre les deux pays.

21

Indiquons au passage, sans pouvoir nous étendre ici, que les Français apportè-rent sous Pompidou une aide diplomatique appréciable aux Américains à propos dela guerre du Vietnam, en particulier dans la phase finale en 1972, et se montrèrentdans ce domaine nettement plus coopératifs que dans la période précédente, ce quicorrespondait à un changement d’attitude considérable.

22

En outre Pompidounomma en 1970 comme directeur du SDECE (le service secret) Alexandre deMarenches, dont les amitiés américaines étaient connues et qui collabora étroite-ment avec la CIA et les autres services occidentaux.

23

Cela dit, il y avait évidemment des désaccords entre les deux capitales, que nousallons d’ailleurs retrouver tout au long de ce récit. Tout d’abord les questionsmonétaires (eurodollars et déficit de la balance américaine des paiements) quiallaient poser des problèmes entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe dès lors que l’on vou-drait mettre sur pied une union monétaire européenne. Egalement les négociationsstratégiques américano-soviétiques, qui risquaient de réduire la garantie nucléaireaméricaine à l’Europe et de conduire Washington et Moscou à considérer les puis-sances nucléaires tierces comme des facteurs de déstabilisation, à contrôler en casde crise. D’autre part Paris était hostile à la proposition faite par l’Alliance atlanti-que fin 1969, proposition à laquelle tenait les Américains, d’une conférence sur laréduction équilibrée des forces en Europe. Outre que la France était par principehostile à toute négociation «de bloc à bloc» (on retrouvait là un élément essentieldu gaullisme) Georges Pompidou craignait que cela ne conduise à aggraver le désé-quilibre entre forces conventionnelles et n’aboutisse à une sorte de neutralisationde l’Europe. En revanche Paris était favorable à la réunion d’une conférence sur lasécurité en Europe (vieille proposition soviétique renouvelée en mars 1969) d’unepart parce ce que l’on ne pourrait pas toujours s’opposer à la volonté de détente dela plupart des pays européens, d’autre part par ce que cela permettrait à des payscomme la Pologne ou la Roumanie de retrouver une petite marge de manœuvre.Sur ce projet de conférence les Américains étaient beaucoup plus réticents. Néan-moins Paris était tout à fait disposée à causer, à renouer avec Washington un dialo-gue approfondi sur toute ces questions.

24

D’autre part on remarquera que les réti-cences françaises à l’égard de la politique américaine portaient essentiellement surles points qui risquaient d’affaiblir la cohésion occidentale face à l’URSS, ce quiétait évidemment nouveau. Et en particulier pour Pompidou, à la différence de De

21. Cf. par exemple la conversation entre le Secrétaire d’Etat Rogers et André Fontaine du

Monde

, le15 décembre 1969, NPM, NSC CF/676/France vol.IV.

22. H. FROMENT-MEURICE,

Vu du Quai. Mémoires 1945-1983

, Fayard, 1998, pp.321 ss; entretienKissinger-Maurice Schumann le 22 septembre 1972, note de Kissinger pour Nixon à propos d’unentretien entre le général Walters et Pompidou du 30 octobre 1972, NSC CF/679/France vol.X.

23. C. OCKRENT, Comte de Marenches,

Dans le secret des princes

, Paris, Stock, 1986, pp.100 ss.24. Entretien Pompidou-Rogers du 8 décembre 1969, AN 5AG2/1022 et RG59/67-69/Box 2103; notes

de Jean-Bernard Raimond, conseiller diplomatique à l’Elysée, pour le Président des 18 novembre1969 et 21 janvier 1970, 5AG2/1041.


116

Gaulle, les Etats-Unis participeraient «naturellement» à une conférence sur la sécu-rité en Europe: il reconnaissait, point capital, qu’ils n’étaient pas «étrangers auxproblèmes européens».

25

C’est dans le domaine des questions de défense que le dégel par rapport à lapériode parut d’emblée le plus marqué. En particulier les Français exprimèrent toutde suite et au plus haut niveau le souhait de renouer des contacts bilatéraux avecWashington sur les questions militaires et la coopération en matière d’armements.

26

Cela suscita immédiatement l’attention et l’intérêt du Président Nixon et de HenryKissinger et déclencha tout un processus de réflexion à Washington.

27

Kissinger enrésuma les conclusions pour le Président le 23 février 1970, juste avant la visite dePompidou. Il conseillait d’écarter d’emblée toutes les questions théologiques con-cernant l’intégration atlantique, d’accepter la position particulière de la Francedans l’Alliance et de s’engager dans un rapprochement pragmatique. Les domainesde coopération, dans la mesure où les Français seraient intéressés, pourraient con-cerner une planification en commun ou coordonnée des objectifs des forces straté-giques; une planification du même genre pour les forces nucléaires tactiques, étantdonné que la France allait disposer bientôt de telles forces; la question de la coopé-ration en matière d’armes nucléaires et de missiles était plus complexe, à cause duCongrès, mais si les Français en faisaient la demande on pouvait indiquer que l’onétait prêt à l’envisager, sur des points spécifiques.

28

En revanche d’autres secteursde l’administration, comme par exemple le Département de la Défense, étaientbeaucoup plus réticents.

29

La visite de Pompidou aux Etats-Unis en février 1970.

On sait que la visite de Georges Pompidou aux Etats-Unis en février 1970 fut mar-quée par de vifs incidents à Chicago, le 28 février, avec des manifestations protes-tant contre la décision française de vendre des armes à la Libye.

30

Pourtant les aver-tissements n’avaient pas manqué;

31

à mon avis l’Elysée et Georges Pompidou ont

25. Lettre de Pompidou à Nixon du 1

er

juillet 1972, AN, 5AG2/1021.26. Déclarations de Pompidou à Shriver le 23 juillet 1969, AN, 5AG2/1022, et propos de Beaumar-

chais, directeur politique au Quai d’Orsay, le 29 juillet, à Shriver, National Archives, RG59, Sub-ject-Numeric Files 67-69/Box 2103. Déclarations de Michel Jobert, le secrétaire général de l’Ely-sée, le 6 novembre, télé. de l’ambassade à Paris du 8 novembre, NPM, NSC CF/676/France vol.IV.Note de Michel Debré, ministre de la Défense, pour Pompidou en février 1970, 5AG2/1021.

27. Memorandum of conversation, 27 juin 1969, NPM, NSC CF/675/France vol.III.28. NPM, NSC CF/916/France-Pompidou Visit February 1970.29. Mémorandum pour le Président du Secrétaire à la Défense adjoint David Packard le 12 février

1970, conseillant de réclamer aux Français le paiement des frais occasionnés par le départ des for-ces américaines en 1966-1967, le droit d’utiliser les installations réalisées par l’OTAN en France(comme les oléoducs) en cas de crise et mettant en garde contre les transferts de technologie élec-tronique au profit des Français, NPM, NSC CF/676/France vol.V.

30. Récit très complet du voyage dans E. ROUSSEL, op.cit., pp.349-367.31. Cf. le dossier du voyage, 5AG2/1022.


117

été victimes d’abord de l’incompréhension du fait qu’aux Etats-Unis la sécurité etl’ordre public dépendent des autorités municipales et que le voyage devait doncaussi être préparé de ce point de vue au niveau local; or le dossier montre que si lesconsuls à New York et à San Francisco furent très actifs dans ce domaine, celui deChicago le fut apparemment moins. D’autre part il est clair que Georges Pompidoun’avait pas mesuré la gravité des passions soulevées dans la communauté juiveaméricaine par l’affaire des ventes d’armes à la Libye; il n’accepta que très peu dedemandes d’audience d’organisations ou de personnalités juives américaines, ilrefusa, malgré la suggestion de l’un de ses conseillers, de prononcer une déclara-tion générale rétablissant l’équilibre en faveur d’Israël;

32

en fait Pompidou, commeil le déclara à des représentants d’organisations juives à San Francisco le 27 février,estimait qu’il fallait distinguer soigneusement entre Israël en tant qu’Etat et laquestion du judaïsme; selon lui Israël n’avait de chance de régler ses problèmes desécurité que lorsqu’il se considérerait comme un Etat parmi les autres Etats duMoyen-Orient et non plus comme une «communauté religieuse».

33

Mais ce lan-gage, à l’époque, n’avait aucune chance d’être entendu. Or en fait Pompidou, touten poursuivant et même en développant la «politique arabe» de son prédécesseur,avait fait évoluer la position française sur deux points importants par rapport à lapériode antérieure: dès le 29 juin 1969 il s’était déclaré prêt à abandonnerl’embargo intégral sur les armes à destination d’Israël décidé par Paris le 1er jan-vier 1969 et à revenir à l’embargo sélectif proclamé en 1967, et donc à fournir àIsraël des pièces de rechange pour les armement déjà vendus, ce qui fut fait.

34

D’autre part il avait accepté (grande rupture avec le Général!) que les Etats-Unis etl’URSS commencent à explorer de façon bilatérale la possibilité d’une solution auMoyen-Orient, reconnaissant explicitement le rôle des Etats-Unis comme protec-teur d’Israël.

35

Il s’agissait donc en partie d’un malentendu. Les témoins et acteurs de l’époquefurent partagés sur la question de savoir si ces incidents durcirent la position deGeorges Pompidou envers les Etats-Unis et influencèrent ou non sa politique enverseux par la suite.

36

A mon avis ce ne fut pas le cas: les rapports franco-américainsdépendaient de facteurs structurels et non pas accidentels. Les entretiens des 24 et26 février avec Nixon en particulier furent positifs: les deux hommes tombèrent engros d’accord sur l’évolution des relations internationales vers un système multipo-laire (Etats-Unis, URSS, Europe occidentale, Chine, Japon), sur la prudence àobserver à l’égard de l’URSS, sur l’importance de ne pas isoler la Chine, sur lanécessité de demander aux Allemands d’informer très exactement leurs partenairesoccidentaux de l’évolution de l’Ostpolitik.

37

Nixon reconnut la volonté française

32. Annotations sur une note de Jean-Louis Lucet du 11 février 1970, 5AG2/1022.33. Cité par E. ROUSSEL, op.cit., pp.362-364.34. Annotation sur une note du 29 juin 1969 et ensemble du dossier, 5AG2/1040.35. Entretien avec Shriver le 23 juillet 1969.36. Cf. ROUSSEL, op.cit., pp.366-367.37. Dans ses entretiens privés après la rencontre Nixon se déclarait fort satisfait, cf. SULZBERGER,

op.cit., pp.614-615.


118

d’indépendance. Le plus intéressant fut que les deux hommes abordèrent carrémentles questions militaires: ils se déclarèrent d’accord pour autoriser des conversationsconfidentielles bilatérales entre militaires des deux pays à propos de leur coopéra-tion dans le cadre de l’OTAN, mais en dehors des structures intégrées, et éventuel-lement pour préparer des plans en commun; Pompidou était disposé à étendre lesaccords Ailleret-Lemnitzer de 1967 à toute la Ière Armée et pas seulement aux divi-sions stationnées en Allemagne; il était prêt à ranimer le «comité directeur» établientre les deux pays en 1962 pour discuter de la coopération dans le domaine desarmements conventionnels; il suggéra que la France pourrait souhaiter deux outrois ans plus tard élargir cette coopération au domaine nucléaire, quand entreraienten service ses sous-marins lanceurs d’engins et ses armes nucléaires tactiques. Lesdeux hommes confirmèrent que de telles conversations ne remettraient nullementen cause la liberté de décision des deux pays en cas de crise. Ils établirent d’autrepart des lignes de communication confidentielles entre eux: Kissinger et Jobertpour les questions civiles, les généraux Goodpaster (commandant les forces améri-caines en Europe et SACEUR) et Fourquet (Chef d’état-major des Armées) pourles questions militaires.

38

On peut considérer que les dégâts de la période1963-1968 étaient en voie d’être réparés; en outre, implicitement, Nixon avaitreconnu à la France le même rôle international et le même type de relation intimeavec Washington que pour la Grande-Bretagne, ce qui était une très anciennerevendication française.

L’évolution des rapports franco-américains en 1970-1971.

On était d’accord à Paris et à Washington en 1970-1971 pour considérer que, glo-balement, les relations franco-américaines évoluaient favorablement, en particuliersur les questions européennes.

39

On était d’accord pour suivre avec vigilance l’Ost-politik de Willy Brandt; les craintes à ce sujet ne concernaient pas la résurgenced’un danger allemand que l’on estimait de part et d’autre dépassé, mais l’éventua-lité de concessions excessives de la RFA à l’URSS. Comme le dit Kissinger àl’ambassadeur à Washington Charles Lucet le 13 avril 1970, on craignait queBrandt ne lâche aux Russes «des choses essentielles»;

40

s’il devait y avoir unaccord entre l’Est et l’Ouest, poursuivait Kissinger, «il serait fait entre lesEtats-Unis et l’URSS et non pas entre les Allemands et l’URSS», ce qui rejoignaitune préoccupation constante à Paris. En effet à Paris on soutenait l’Ostpolitik danssa première phase, telle que Bonn l’affichait, celle qui conduisait à la signature detraités avec les pays de l’Est reconnaissant de fait la division de l’Allemagne et les

38. E. ROUSSEL, op.cit., pp.350 ss.39. Mémorandum de Kissinger pour le Président le 11 novembre 1970, avant la rencontre de celui-ci

avec Pompidou, à l’occasion des funérailles du général De Gaulle, et mémorandum de Kissingerpour Nixon du 25 janvier 1971, NPM, NSC CF/677/France vol.VII.

40. Lettre de Lucet à Maurice Schumann du 14 avril 1970, 5AG2/1021.


119

frontières de 1945. Mais on se méfiait beaucoup des arrière-pensées ultérieures deBonn, que l’on soupçonnait d’être prêt à rechercher la réunification de l’Allemagnedans un nouveau système de sécurité européen qui aurait en fait reposé sur unaccord germano-soviétique. Car Georges Pompidou était très satisfait de voir l’Ost-politik conforter dans un premier temps la division de l’Allemagne. Mais il redou-tait un deuxième temps éventuel, celui d’un rapprochement en profondeur entrel’Allemagne et Moscou en échange de la réunification, situation qui bouleverseraitles conditions de la sécurité de la France. Paris s’en tenait depuis les années 50 auconcept de la «double sécurité»: la sécurité de la France à l’égard de l’Allemagneserait assurée par la division de cette dernière, la sécurité de la France enversl’URSS serait assurée par l’alliance avec les Etats-Unis mais aussi par l’intégrationétroite de la RFA à l’Europe occidentale et à tout l’Occident. En 1966, à l’occasionde son voyage à Moscou et parce qu’il était déçu du peu de suites réelles du traitéfranco-allemand de janvier 1963, De Gaulle avait envisagé quelque chose de diffé-rent: un nouvel ordre de sécurité en Europe reposant fondamentalement sur uneentente franco-soviétique pour contrôler l’Allemagne et marginalisant l’Amérique.Pompidou était revenu sur ce point à quelque chose de plus classique et de pluscompatible, dans sa vision géopolitique de l’avenir de l’Allemagne, de l’URSS etde l’Europe, avec de bons rapports franco-américains.

41

D’autre part au cours de son voyage en URSS en octobre 1970, le PrésidentPompidou résista à Brejnev qui voulait l’amener à répéter les propos tenus à Mos-cou par le Général en 1966 «en faveur d’une élimination progressive de l’influencedes Etats-Unis en Europe». Certes, l’Europe devrait pouvoir se «dégager del’influence des Etats-Unis» et «être pleinement l’Europe», mais l’influence del’Amérique sur le Continent découlait de la menace militaire soviétique et de lanécessité de contrer celle-ci avec la puissance militaire américaine et l’Allianceatlantique. Seule une véritable détente permettrait de sortir de cette situation, maisla responsabilité en incombait d’abord à l’URSS. En outre il n’était pas question deremplacer ce que Pompidou se refusait à qualifier pour son compte de «tutelle amé-ricaine» par une «tutelle soviétique».

42

On voit que sur cette question absolumentcentrale à propos du triangle Paris-Washington-Moscou la position de Pompidouétait très différente de celle de De Gaulle, même si lui aussi souhaitait l’émergenced’une «Europe européenne». Le Président s’en expliqua dans une conversation fortsignificative avec le journaliste américain Cyrus Sulzberger le 1er décembre 1970:

«La base de ma réflexion est que la France se rapproche des Etats-Unis dans lamesure où la supériorité des Etats-Unis par rapport à la Russie diminue. C’est pour-quoi ma politique est moins anti-américaine dans son expression que celle de DeGaulle, parce qu’il ressentait fortement la supériorité américaine sur l’Union soviéti-que et d’autres pays et estimait qu’il devait s’y opposer».

43

On constate également, et là aussi c’était nouveau, que Georges Pompidou étaitdésireux d’un contact approfondi avec Washington à propos des points de tension

41. G.-H. SOUTOU,

L’attitude de Georges Pompidou

…, op.cit.42. Compte-rendu de l’entretien Pompidou-Brejnev du 13 octobre 1970, 5AG2/1018.43. SULZBERGER, op.cit., p.690.


120

en Europe, par exemple à propos des menaces éventuelles soviétiques sur la Rou-manie et la Yougoslavie, qui préoccupaient fort les Occidentaux en 1971.

44

LesSoviétiques s’en rendaient d’ailleurs compte, qui régulièrement soupçonnaient lesFrançais de s’écarter de la ligne d’"indépendance» de De Gaulle.

45

A la fin de l’année 1970, le seul véritable problème entre les deux pays était laquestion monétaire internationale. En décembre la France reprit ses achats d’or etles Français recommencèrent leurs critiques contre l’inflation américaine et la poli-tique monétaire et économique américaine et son impact négatif sur l’Europe.

46

En revanche sur le plan militaire les choses évoluaient favorablement. Dès le 10

mars 1970, à la suite de la visite du Président français, Nixon approuvait, sur lesconseils de Kissinger, toute une série de décisions: le général Goodpaster étaitautorisé à explorer avec le général Fourquet toutes les possibilités pratiques d’amé-liorer la coopération avec les forces françaises, y compris en ce qui concernait lesarmes nucléaires tactiques et les forces navales, ainsi que la possibilité de coordon-ner les plans de frappe des forces stratégiques respectives, tout en respectant lerefus français de revenir à l’intégration atlantique et étant entendu que la décisionfinale dépendrait d’un accord entre Nixon et Pompidou; le comité franco-américainsur les armements conventionnels créé en 1962, mais en sommeil depuis 1966,serait réactivé; on étudierait la possibilité de venir en aide aux Français pour leursprogrammes de missiles; on mettrait entre parenthèses une décision de l’adminis-tration Johnson en 1964 (NSAM 294) qui interdisait toute aide aux Français con-cernant les armes nucléaires et les missiles.

47

Il ne faut pas penser que tout le monde à Washington était aussi prêt à renouer la

collaboration militaire avec les Français que Nixon et Kissinger. Le Secrétaire à laDéfense Melvin Laird répondit à Kissinger le 2 avril 1970 de façon apparemmentpositive mais en fait très réservée à propos des programmes de missiles. Il souli-gnait les difficultés possibles avec le Congrès et des répercussions possibles sur lesnégociations SALT avec les Soviétiques. En outre, selon Laird, les échanges éven-tuels «ne devraient fournir aucune accélération significative aux capacités françai-ses», ce qui en réduisait évidemment l’intérêt! En outre il fallait exiger en contre-partie que les Français acceptent de participer à l’étude stratégique que l’OTANavait commencée à propos des années 70.

48

Or c’était ce genre de participation àl’OTAN que les Français justement récusaient dans leur crainte constante d’êtreramenés indirectement à l’intégration qu’ils avaient quittée en 1966. Comme le

44. Annotation de Georges Pompidou sur un télégramme du 26 juillet 1971, 5AG2/1041; cf. un dossiercomplet sur les possibilités d’intervention soviétique en Yougoslavie, le 21 février 1972, 5AG2/1040.

45. Cf. par exemple l’entretien entre l’ambassadeur à Paris Zorine et Michel Debré, ministre de la Dé-fense, le 16 janvier 1971, 5AG2/1018.

46. Mémorandum de Fred Bergsten pour Kissinger sur les achats d’or par la France le 10 décembre1970, et série de documents sur des entretiens d’Hervé Alphand, secrétaire général du Quaid’Orsay, à Washington, en particulier avec Kissinger, les 10 et 11 décembre, NPM, NSC CF/677/France vol.VII.

47. NPM, NSC CF/676/France vol.V.48. NPM, NSC CF/676/France vol.VI.


121

nota Georges Pompidou le 24 avril, Paris était prêt à s’entretenir sur un plan bilaté-ral avec les Américains sur les questions de défense et de sécurité des années 70,mais pas dans un cadre OTAN multilatéral.

49

On ne pouvait pas mieux illustrer lesouci français constant d’une situation privilégiée à Washington, d’un rôle decharnière entre l’Amérique et l’Europe, à l’instar de la Grande-Bretagne, comme jel’ai souligné au début de cette étude.

Kissinger préféra aller de l’avant sans trop tenir compte des restrictions deLaird. Il décida le 24 avril 1970 d’envoyer à Paris pour des conversations explora-toires John Foster, secrétaire adjoint à la Défense, chargé des questions d’arme-ment. Celui-ci reçut pour instructions de tenir certes compte des préoccupations deLaird à l’égard du secret, du Congrès, des SALT, mais on soulignait que lePrésident voulait aider les Français; en outre Foster ne devait pas laisser croire à sesinterlocuteurs que l’assistance américaine dépendrait d’un rapprochement de laFrance avec l’OTAN.

50

Kissinger (et Nixon) avaient parfaitement compris qu’ilfallait écarter tout préalable théologique concernant l’Alliance.

Dès l’été 1970 les choses avaient pris tournure: le général Goodpaster avait eude premiers entretiens avec le général Fourquet; on avait progressé dans le domainede la planification de la coopération en cas de guerre avec les forces françaises enAllemagne, même si les Français n’étaient pas encore disposés à parler de leurs(futures) armes nucléaires tactiques; le secrétaire adjoint à la Défense John Fosteravait eu une première conversation privée avec le délégué ministériel à l’ArmementJean Blancard sur les souhaits des Français concernant les missiles. (Parallèlementon constatait que les échanges scientifiques de toute nature entre la France et lesEtats-Unis se multipliaient: ils dépassaient ce qui existait avec tout autre pays).

51

Le 3 août 1970, Sonnenfeldt fit remarquer à Kissinger que jusque-là on avait pro-cédé au coup par coup: il fallait désormais systématiser les choses, disposer d’unedoctrine présidentielle, créer à Washington un groupe de coordination pour leséchanges avec les Français, prendre d’autre part une série de décisions de fond:voulait-on soutenir l’effort stratégique des Français et donc annuler la décision del’administration Johnson d’avril 1964? Quel serait alors la répercussion de cetteassistance sur les SALT? Les arguments et la présentation de ceux-ci par Sonnen-feldt impliquaient que pour lui il était souhaitable de soutenir l’effort français, neserait-ce que parce qu’il serait nécessaire de coordonner entre l’OTAN et Parisl’emploi des forces nucléaires tactiques en Europe le cas échéant, sous peine deconséquences catastrophiques pour l’OTAN; que les forces françaises ne seraientpas suffisamment importantes pour compromettre vraiment les SALT; que le mieuxserait sans doute que l’assistance américaine intervienne dans le cadre d’un effortnucléaire et stratégique commun à la France et à la Grande-Bretagne, comme lesdirigeants britanniques le suggéraient.

52

49. 5AG2/1041.50. Note de Sonnenfeldt pour Kissinger du 23 juin 1970, NPM, NSC CF/677/France vol.VI.51. Note de Sonnefeldt pour Kissinger du 11 décembre 1970, NPM, NSC CF/677/France vol.VII.52. NPM, NSC CF/677/France vol.VI.


122

Les réflexions se poursuivirent durant les mois suivants et jusqu’en mars 1971entre le NSC et les Départements d’Etat et de la Défense dans le cadre d’un groupe

ad hoc

chargé de la préparation du NSSM 100 (National Security Study Memoran-dum) sur les relations militaires avec la France. Elles furent très difficiles, à cause desréticences des militaires à toute concession à la France tant qu’elle n’aurait pasrejoint, au moins en pratique, le commandement intégré de l’OTAN, également àcause des réticences prévisibles du Congrès, et elles exigèrent l’engagement sansfaille de Kissinger.

53

Un souci important à Washington était d’éviter, en développantla coopération bilatérale avec les Français, de risquer des réactions négatives de lapart d’autres membres de l’Alliance atlantique (évidemment en particulier de la RFA)qui affaibliraient l’unité de l’OTAN.

54

Finalement on aboutit fin mars à des recom-mandations assez limitées, qui furent entérinées par Nixon (NSDM 103 et 104) etcommuniquées aux Français: un certain assouplissement en ce qui concernait les cal-culateurs très puissants, indispensables pour l’étude des armes nucléaires; en matièrede missiles, une aide limitée aux questions liées à la fiabilité des composants dessystèmes existants et à l’exclusion des domaines qui pourraient améliorer la précisiondes fusées françaises (les demandes de Paris portaient également sur ce dernierpoint); en matière nucléaire, on se contenterait de reprendre les échanges interrompusen 1963 sur la sûreté des armes nucléaires (procédures et systèmes).

55

Sur la base de ces décisions l’ambassadeur Watson remit le 5 mai 1971 auxFrançais un mémorandum proposant l’ouverture de conversations pour la techno-logie des missiles, la sécurité des armes nucléaires et les ordinateurs de grandepuissance.

56

En conséquence John Foster rencontra à Paris Jean Blancard, le 12mai 1971. Ils parlèrent des missiles et Blancard fut tout à fait d’accord pour que leséchanges portent uniquement sur la fiabilité des systèmes existants: sa priorité étaiten effet de faire fonctionner correctement les systèmes en cours de développement,qui apparemment rencontraient certains problèmes, et non pas de demander auxAméricains de l’aider à mettre au point une génération de missiles plus avancés.Sur ces bases l’accord se fit pour une nouvelle rencontre le 15 juin.

57

Au cours decelle-ci Foster remit à Blancard un projet d’accord pour des échanges sur les missi-les et la sûreté des armes nucléaires. Le 22 juillet, Blancard fut autorisé à signer cetaccord et à commencer des discussions dans les deux domaines prévus. On remar-quera que cet accord allait en fait plus loin que ce qui avait été décidé à Washingtonau départ: il concernait également les domaines du guidage et de la précision desmissiles ainsi que le durcissement des charges nucléaires (face aux défensesanti-missiles à base d’ogives nucléaires correspondant au système ABM soviétiqueGalosh), même si ces domaines étaient soumis à des conditions limitatives particu-

53. Note de Sonnenfeldt pour Kissinger du 9 janvier 1971, NPM NSC CF/677/France vol.VII.54. Note de Kissinger pour Nixon du 25 janvier 1970, ibid.55. Note de Kissinger pour le Président du 25 mars 1971, ibid., et note de Kissinger pour le Secrétaire

d’Etat et le Secrétaire à la Défense du 15 avril 1971, NPM, NSC CF/678/France vol.VIII.56. Note de Michel Debré, ministre de la Défense, pour Pompidou, début 1972, 5AG2/1040.57. Lettre de David Packard, secrétaire d’Etat à la Défense adjoint, à Kissinger, du 25 mai 1971, NPM,

NSC CF/678/France vol.VIII.


123

lières.

58

On a l’impression que certains à Washington voulaient aller un peu plusloin que ce que comportait le consensus minimum réalisé au sein de l’administra-tion. Blancard eut de nouveaux entretiens avec Foster à Washington en novembre1971. Le 12, celui-ci lui écrivait pour proposer l’ouverture de discussions sur lasécurité des armes nucléaires.

Cependant le souci d’indépendance poussait Paris également à mettre de soncôté de strictes limites aux échanges: il s’agissait uniquement d’améliorer la fiabi-lité et les capacités des missiles existants, en réalisant des gains de temps etd’argent sur les programmes; mais en aucun cas il ne fallait que les conversationspermettent aux Américains de se faire une idée de la valeur opérationnelle desengins français ni des modalités de contrôle des missiles et des têtes nucléaires etdes réseaux de commandement gouvernementaux. En outre, il ne fallait en aucuncas que les Américains puissent dire aux Soviétiques qu’ils contrôlaient technique-ment l’effort français. En fait, la prudence américaine, quoique pour des raisonsdifférentes, rejoignait la prudence française, liée aux préoccupations permanentesd’indépendance nationale.

59

D’autre part, si les conversations Goodpaster-Fourquetsur la coordination des plans d’emploi des Forces françaises avec celles de l’OTANet la modernisation des accords Ailleret-Lemnitzer de 1967 se poursuivaient (unenouvelle rencontre avait eu lieu le 27 janvier 1971) elles ne signifiaient nullementun retour de Paris au commandement intégré et gardaient un caractère hypothétiqueet non automatique: la liberté de décision de la France en cas de conflit restaitentière. Enfin on ne souhaitait pas à Paris évoquer tout de suite pour ces discussionsle passage du cadre des seules FFA à celui de l’ensemble de la Ière Armée, car celaaurait posé de façon «prématurée» le problème du Pluton et des conditionsd’emploi des armes tactiques françaises.

60

Les limites de Paris en matière de coopération militaire:

Hardware

oui,

Software

non!

En effet en matière stratégique et nucléaire on était disposé à Paris à parler avec lesAméricains des matériels (et encore avec les réserves que nous venons de voir),c’est-à-dire du

Hardware

, mais pas des conceptions d’emploi des armes nucléaires(le

Software

). On n’était pas prêt non plus à remettre en cause la décision de 1966concernant le départ de la France de l’organisation intégrée de l’OTAN. Par exem-ple un conseil de Défense à l’Elysée le 26 février 1971, après une discussion appro-fondie et même vive entre toutes les administrations concernées, décida d’en resterà la décision française de 1967 concernant les oléoducs construits par l’OTAN surle territoire français: en temps de paix Paris acceptait que ces oléoducs continuent àravitailler les forces de l’OTAN en Allemagne, mais en temps de guerre, la France

58. Note de Debré à Pompidou du début 1972 déjà citée.59. 5AG2/1040.60. Note de Debré à Pompidou du début 1972 déjà citée.


124

réservait sa liberté de décision. Cette affaire apparemment technique posait tout leproblème de l’interprétation de l’article V du Pacte atlantique: Paris réaffirmait enfait sa volonté de conserver sa totale liberté d’action, même pour une actiond’assistance (la mise à disposition des oléoducs) qui n’impliquait pas une participa-tion armée au conflit, ce qui était une lecture très restrictive de l’article V, contestéed’ailleurs sur le plan juridique par certains diplomates français. Pompidou mainte-nait donc l’interprétation française la plus stricte de la liberté d’appréciation et dedécision de la France en cas de crise.

61

Or, outre bien sûr ses implications généralespour la position de la France envers l’OTAN (le refus maintenu de toute automati-cité dans l’engagement des forces françaises), cette affaire contrariait beaucoup lesAméricains: ils considéraient en effet que cette question (ainsi que celle de la miseà disposition de l’ensemble des moyens logistiques français en cas de guerre) étaitla conséquence la plus grave du retrait français de 1966 et ils espéraient bien que lerapprochement militaire avec Paris permettrait, dans un deuxième temps, de revenirsur ce problème.

62

D’autre part certains responsables français (comme François de Rose, représen-tant de la France auprès de l’OTAN) estimaient que l’évolution de la stratégie amé-ricaine (de plus en plus réticente à l’égard de l’emploi des armes nucléaires straté-giques mais aussi tactiques et de plus en plus soucieuse d’alléger la présencemilitaire des Etats-Unis en Europe et de voir les Européens accroître leur effortdans le domaine conventionnel) devrait conduire Paris à rechercher un dialogueavec Washington sur la doctrine d’emploi des armes nucléaires et en particulier surles armes nucléaires tactiques françaises, comme les fusées tactiques Pluton dontl’entrée en service était prévue pour 1973-1974 et qui poseraient un problème decoordination avec les armes tactiques de l’OTAN.

63

Mais Georges Pompidou s’yrefusa absolument: la France devait marquer clairement son «indépendance», touteperspective de conversations avec Washington sur les doctrines d’emploi nucléaireséveillait sa «plus grande méfiance"

64

car les Américains «chercheraient à nous atti-rer dans une discussion sur nos rapports avec eux dans le domaine de la défense etde l’arme nucléaire».

65

Quant aux Plutons, alors qu’en 1970 on avait prévu de lesstationner avec les Forces françaises en Allemagne (le cœur fissile restant stocké entemps normal en France), on s’orientait dès le début de 1971 vers un stationnementen France: cela réduirait les problèmes avec les Allemands, qui commençaient às’inquiéter des cibles et modalités d’emploi de ces engins de 120 kilomètres deportée seulement, et cela préserverait davantage la liberté de décision de Paris dansl’engagement des forces françaises et retarderait la (difficile) discussion avec lesAméricains sur la doctrine d’emploi de ces armes.66

61. Cf. tout le dossier dans 5AG2/1041.62. Note de Sonnenfeldt pour Kissinger du 3 août 1970; NPM, NSC CF/677/France vol.VI.63. Notes de François de Rose des 1er février et 22 septembre 1971, 5AG2/1041.64. Annotation de Pompidou sur la note de François de Rose du 22 septembre 1971, ibid.65. Annotation sur une note de Jean-Bernard Raimond du 28 janvier 1971, ibid.66. Note de l’état-major particulier du Président, 22 février 1971, ibid.

Le Président Pompidou et les relations entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe 125

Georges Pompidou et les perspectives de négociations militaires avec les Soviétiques (SALT et MBFR).

Georges Pompidou maintenait donc le dogme gaulliste de l’indépendance nationale,malgré son rapprochement militaire avec Washington. Mais nous allons voir que sonsouci d’indépendance rompait avec certaines des arrière-pensées du Général et sesituait dans un contexte différent. On va voir apparaître en particulier dans le domainedes négociations militaires avec Moscou (SALT et MBFR) des divergences de vuesavec Washington qui iraient s’aggravant surtout à partir de 1972-1973, mais dans uneperspective qui n’était que partiellement gaulliste et qui répondait d’abord au souci demaintenir la cohésion stratégique entre l’Europe et les Etats-Unis face à l’URSS, cequi n’était pas la conception fondamentale du Général.

Tout d’abord à partir de 1971 Paris prit conscience du fait qu’un accord améri-cano-soviétique sur les armements stratégiques devenait probable. Il fallait être trèsattentif quant aux conséquences d’un tel accord pour la France, en particulier quantà la valeur politique et militaire de sa propre force nucléaire dans le nouveau con-texte stratégique et quant à d’éventuelles pressions de la part des Américains et desSoviétiques pour la prise en compte, explicite ou implicite, des forces nucléairesfrançaises dans le décompte des arsenaux en présence.67 Mais si les SALT inspi-raient à Paris de la méfiance, les MBFR suscitaient un rejet absolu. On craignaitqu’elles ne conduisent à un retrait des troupes américaines stationnées en Europe(crainte constante à Paris à l’époque de Pompidou) et à une neutralisation del’Europe centrale permettant à l’URSS d’exercer des pressions politiques perma-nentes sur l’Europe, ce qui n’était pas une vue «gaulliste» des choses.68 On crai-gnait qu’elle ne rende impossible une option que Pompidou ne voulait pas écarter apriori pour l’avenir, celle d’une défense européenne.69 Mais surtout la grandeinquiétude de Georges Pompidou était que les MBFR, à cause des tendances audésengagement que l’on prêtait à Washington, ne conduisent à une évacuation desforces étrangères des deux Allemagne; ce fait, couplé avec les perspectives de réu-nification contenues dans l’Ostpolitik, conduirait rapidement à l’ascension d’uneAllemagne réunifiée, libre de ses mouvements et dotée sans doute de l’armenucléaire.70 Pour Pompidou en effet si l’Occident, et en particulier les Américains,ne veillaient pas à canaliser l’Ostpolitik et étaient imprudents dans les négociationsde désarmement avec l’URSS, de deux choses l’une: ou bien la RFA finirait partomber sous l’influence soviétique, ou bien l’Allemagne réunifiée reprendrait unrôle international indépendant, y compris un rôle nucléaire. Dans les deux cas ceserait désastreux pour la France. Ce n’était pas la même position, on le voit, que deGaulle, qui estimait que la France pourrait contrôler l’Allemagne par un accordimplicite avec l’URSS et en établissant avec elle un nouveau système de sécurité en

67. Annotation de Georges Pompidou du 13 mai 1971, 5AG2/1041.68. Note de Jean-Bernard Raimond pour Pompidou le 8 octobre 1971, 5AG2/1018.69. Note de Jean-Louis Lucet pour le Président du 12 janvier 1972, 5AG2/1041.70. Conversation de Pompidou avec Brejnev le 29 octobre 1971, 5AG2/1018, et confidence de Pom-

pidou au journaliste André Fontaine, citée par E. ROUSSEL, op.cit., p.394.

Georges-Henri Soutou126

Europe, dans lequel les Américains ne joueraient plus qu’un rôle périphérique.71

Les deux hommes se rejoignaient dans le refus de la réunification de l’Allemagne(comme la plupart des hommes politiques français), mais Pompidou concevait laquestion allemande dans un contexte beaucoup plus «occidental» et méfiant àl’égard de l’URSS que de Gaulle.

Le sommet des Açores (décembre 1971) et ses suites décevantes.

Le sommet des Açores entre Nixon et Pompidou en décembre 1971 se déroula dansun contexte international bouleversé par le «choc Nixon": l’annonce de la visite duPrésident américain à Pékin, le 15 juillet, et la suspension de la convertibilité du dol-lar, le 15 août. Si Paris saluait la décision américaine concernant la Chine, qui parais-sait justifier a posteriori la reconnaissance de Pékin par la France en 1964 et dontl’intérêt géopolitique paraissait évident,72 si les négociations militaires se poursui-vaient efficacement, trois grands sujets de mésentente existaient alors entre les deuxcapitales: les questions monétaires; la conférence sur la sécurité en Europe que sou-haitait Paris mais à laquelle Washington était toujours opposée; les MBFR, pour les-quelles les positions étaient inverses.73 Il n’est pas question d’entrer ici dans le détaildes conversations complexes qu’eurent Pompidou, Nixon et Kissinger les 13 et 14décembre.74 Le Président français avait sollicité ce sommet, auquel il se présenta unpeu comme le porte-parole de l’Europe. Toute la stratégie de Pompidou, acceptéeapparemment par Nixon et Kissinger, consista à placer le problème monétaire, essen-tiel à ses yeux d’ancien banquier qui s’était fixé comme première tâche de moderni-ser la France et de l’inscrire pleinement dans l’économie mondiale, dans le cadre pluslarge de la solidarité politique occidentale: «la France est un pays occidental et donc,aussi bien pour des raisons de sentiments historiques, elle est déterminée à maintenirl’alliance et l’amitié avec les Etats-Unis». On est là au cœur de la politique extérieurepompidolienne: la France voulait développer la Communauté économique euro-péenne et l’influencer de façon décisive, mais dans une collaboration raisonnable etéquilibrée avec Washington, collaboration dont elle serait d’ailleurs le point de pas-sage privilégié, et non pas dans une rivalité avec l’Amérique qui ne pouvait que con-duire à l’échec, car personne alors en Europe ne suivrait Paris.

On tomba d’accord assez facilement sur les questions politiques: nécessité de laDétente, mais prudence indispensable à l’égard de l’URSS et aussi de l’Ostpolitik,nécessité du maintien des forces américaines en Europe malgré les pressions duCongrès, intérêt du rapprochement sino-américain. Sur le plan monétaire les négo-

71. G.-H. SOUTOU, L’Alliance incertaine, op.cit., pp.301-305.72. Note d’Henri Froment-Meurice, directeur d’Asie au Quai d’Orsay, du 19 juillet 1971, 5AG2/1021.73. Note de Raimond pour Pompidou le 7 décembre 1971, 5AG2/1022.74. Les comptes-rendus s’en trouvent aux AN, 5AG2/1022; ils ont été reproduits dans E. ROUSSEL,

op.cit., pp.464 ss., et dans W. BURR (éd.), The Kissinger Transcripts, New York, The New Press,1998, pp.33 ss.


ciations furent très difficiles, mais on aboutit à un compromis: le dollar serait déva-lué (étant donné que la balance commerciale française avec les Etats-Unis étaitdéficitaire de 50%, c’était pour Paris une concession importante) mais on revien-drait à un système de parités fixes entre les monnaies, dont les valeurs seraient réa-justées mais désormais défendues, ce qui était pour la France une revendicationessentielle, liée au maintien de son équilibre économique interne et également auproblème très délicat du rapport entre le franc et le mark allemand. En outre par unaccord secret les Américains s’engageaient à terme à revenir à la convertibilité dudollar, ce qui était évidemment capital si on voulait réellement revenir définitive-ment à un système de parités fixes et que les Etats-Unis contribuent effectivementau fonctionnement du nouveau système. Mais en fait Washington ne tint que par-tiellement ses engagements: l’accord dit du Smithsonian du 18 décembre 1971,destiné à faire entrer dans les faits les décisions des Açores, décidait bien une modi-fication des parités (le dollar était dévalué de 7,9%, la livre et le franc conservaientleur valeur antérieure et étaient donc de fait réévalués de 8,57% par rapport au dol-lar, le mark était réévalué de 13,58% par rapport à sa parité d’avant le 5 mai et ces-sait de flotter, le yen était réévalué de 16,88%). Mais le dollar restait inconvertibleet les Américains ne prenaient aucun engagement de défendre la nouvelle parité deleur monnaie. Le maintien de celle-ci supposait donc que les autres banques centra-les fussent disposées à acquérir des quantités illimitées de dollars. L’accord duSmithsonian était donc très fragile. Le flottement du dollar était inévitable désor-mais, car à partir du moment où Washington avait proclamé l’inconvertibilité dudollar, la dévaluation de celui-ci par rapport à l’or n’avait plus de sens. Et d’ailleursdès 1972, avec le flottement de la livre, l’accord du Smithsonian montrait ses limi-tes. Une nouvelle crise éclata en février 1973 et provoqua une dévaluation supplé-mentaire de 10% du dollar, avant d’aboutir le 16 mars à la décision historique deflottement conjoint des monnaies européennes par rapport au dollar: c’était l’aban-don de fait du système de Bretton Woods et des parités fixes (même «ajustables»comme on essaya un temps de le dire pour tenter de réduire l’importance du désac-cord entre Français et Américains) avant leur abandon officiel à la conférence de laJamaïque en janvier 1976. Les Américains étaient arrivés à l’objectif que certainsde leurs responsables en tout cas s’étaient fixé depuis 1971: débarrassés des con-traintes d’un système de parités fixes, les Etats-Unis pouvaient désormais laisserévoluer le dollar en fonction de leurs intérêts commerciaux, tout en conservant lebénéfice d’une monnaie transnationale, c’est-à-dire la possibilité de ne pas corrigerle déficit chronique de leur balance des comptes sans même devoir limiter leursexportations de capitaux.75 Les thèses monétaires égoïstes du secrétaire au TrésorJohn Connally l’avaient donc emporté sur celles de Kissinger, qui estimait que lemaintien de la solidarité occidentale devait être, pour des raisons politiques, la con-sidération prioritaire. C’était un très profond bouleversement dans la politique sui-vie par les Américains depuis 1947: désormais, sur un point essentiel, les intérêts

75. Sur ces questions le meilleur récit reste celui de J. DENIZET, Le Dollar, Paris, Fayard, 1985.


strictement nationaux des Etats-Unis prenaient le pas sur leurs responsabilitéscomme chef de file du Monde libre.76

L’échec en fait de la conférence des Açores était un échec pour la conceptionpompidolienne d’une Europe conduite par la France et collaborant sur un piedd’égalité avec l’Amérique, dans une bonne entente occidentale. Pompidou, quis’était montré plus accommodant en matière monétaire que de Gaulle, en étaitconscient; il écrivit à Nixon le 4 février 1972 que les Etats-Unis ne tenaient pas lesengagements pris:

«Lors de nos entretiens des Açores, j’avais bien compris qu’il ne pouvait pas être ques-tion de la convertibilité intégrale de votre monnaie (c’est-à-dire le retour à la converti-bilité en or, la thèse française antérieure), mais je m’étais permis de vous indiquer quesi vous acceptiez de contrôler les mouvements de capitaux, de mettre au point un sys-tème permettant de consolider les balances dollar et aussi de défendre votre monnaieen l’échangeant, le cas échéant, contre d’autres devises, les balances dollar mises àpart, cela signifiait pratiquement une convertibilité de monnaie à monnaie».77

Or dans le rapport qui accompagnait le message adressé au Congrès le 27 janvier1972 par Nixon, il «était fait état d’un accord croissant en faveur d’une plus grandeflexibilité des changes. Ceci ne paraît pas conforme aux engagements que nous avi-ons pris vous et moi». En outre Washington n’avait pris aucune mesure pour le con-trôle des mouvements de capitaux, question essentielle aux yeux des Français quireprochaient aux Américains, grâce au rôle international du dollar, de continuer àracheter des entreprises européennes malgré le déficit de leur balance des comptes etsans contre-valeur réelle. On remarque, point capital, que Pompidou n’exigeait pas leretour à l’or, comme l’avait fait de Gaulle en 1965, ce qui ouvrait la voie à un com-promis. Mais Nixon répondit de façon parfaitement vague le 16 février. Revenant surcet échange le 28 mars 1973 et à la lumière de ce qui s’était passé ensuite, Jean-RenéBernard, qui suivait les questions financières internationales à l’Elysée, notait: «cesdocuments montrent que les Américains ne considèrent pas qu’ils aient réellementpris des engagements monétaires sérieux aux Açores».78 Cette conviction à laquelleParis était parvenue devait selon moi beaucoup contribuer à la détérioration des rap-ports franco-américains que l’on constate à partir de 1973.

On était en effet parfaitement conscient à Paris de ce que l’accord du Smithso-nian avait de fragile et de provisoire. Un conseil restreint eut lieu le 7 février 1972sur les questions monétaires. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing exposa la situation: ou bienon faisait fonctionner vaille que vaille l’accord du Smithsonian, ou bien on profite-rait de la crise pour franchir une nouvelle étape dans la voie de l’Union économi-que et monétaire européenne. Pompidou exprima avec beaucoup de force sa préfé-rence pour la deuxième solution, car la première reviendrait à «admettre que les

76. R. S. LITWAK, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine, Cambridge UP, 1984, pp.136-137; W. BUNDY,A Tangled Web. The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency, Tauris, Londres, 1998,pp.261-269; J. DENIZET, Le Dollar. Histoire du système monétaire international depuis 1945,Paris, Fayard, 1985, pp.109-125.

77. 5AG2/1021.78. Ibid.


Etats-Unis dirigent la politique économique et monétaire mondiale». Il faudraitmettre les Allemands au pied du mur, ils ne pourraient pas aller contre l’Europemalgré leur propension à suivre les Etats-Unis.79 Mais à partir de ce moment-làPompidou avait franchi un pas décisif: finalement, pour résister à l’emprise du dol-lar, un accord européen était plus important que de forcer la monnaie américaine àrester dans le cadre de parités fixes. Ce retournement conceptuel ouvrait la voie àl’accord monétaire européen de 1973 (flottement conjoint des monnaies européen-nes par rapport au dollar).

D’une façon plus générale, la question monétaire allait être l’un des facteursessentiels du recadrage de la politique américaine de Pompidou à partir de 1973,cherchant désormais moins à servir d’intermédiaire privilégié entre les Etats-Uniset l’Europe et davantage à regrouper l’Europe pour contrebalancer la prépotenceaméricaine, ce qui était un certain retour au gaullisme. L’ambassade américaine àParis pour sa part constatait dès septembre 1972 les dégâts que les questions moné-taires produisaient dans les relations franco-américaines et sentait cette réorienta-tion européenne de la politique française.80

Les rapports militaires et politico-stratégiques franco-américains en 1972.

Malgré la forte déception due à l’échec du sommet des Açores, sur le plan militaireet politico-stratégique les rapports franco-américains continuèrent à se développeren 1972. Le 11 mars, Debré écrivait à Pompidou à quel point il était satisfait desconversations Foster-Blancard: les renseignements techniques américains étaientdu plus haut intérêt:

«Nous sommes en droit de considérer que les dirigeants américains entendent nousfournir une aide très précieuse, c’est-à-dire qu’ils estiment de leur intérêt de souteniret d’améliorer le développement de notre force nucléaire. Il n’a été question, enaucune façon, de la moindre contrepartie».81

Il est clair que les Américains allaient en fait plus loin que ce que comportaientles décisions officiellement arrêtées à Washington.

Les 7 et 12 juillet Debré eut une série de conversations à Washington avec Kis-singer, Laird et Nixon.82 Ces conversations se déroulèrent de façon particulière-ment positive et dénotèrent une réelle intimité. Debré demanda des informationssur les radars et les défenses ABM des Soviétiques, point essentiel pour la capacitéde pénétration de la Force de frappe française; Kissinger promit de les lui faire par-venir directement si les services administratifs et les départements ministériels con-cernés refusaient de le faire, ce qui confirme l’impression déjà soulignée selon

79. 5AG2/1011.80. Télé. de Paris du 20 septembre 1972, RG 59/Num 70-73/Box 2278.81. 5AG2/1040.82. Compte-rendu du 11 juillet 1972, NPM, NSC CF/678/France vol.IX, et lettre de Debré à Pompidou

du 13 juillet, 5AG2/1040.


laquelle le conseiller du Président était prêt à aller plus loin que le consensus pru-dent au sein de l’administration. Laird s’engagea à interpréter de façon libérale laloi MacMahon sur le secret atomique après la réélection de Nixon en novembre. Ala suite de ces entretiens, en septembre, le général Walters, directeur adjoint de laCIA, devait avoir un entretien avec Debré pour lui fournir les informations deman-dées sur les défenses ABM soviétiques, ce qui impliquait des renseignements extrê-mement confidentiels et hautement techniques obtenus par les services américainset leurs moyens d’observation.83

Paris était en revanche plus inquiet à propos des accords SALT du mois de mai 1972 etde leurs implications possibles pour la France. Le 13 juin, le Président français sedemanda devant Gromyko, le ministre des Affaires étrangères soviétique, si les accordsSALT «ne correspondaient pas plus ou moins à une espèce de volonté d’établir un condo-minium sur le reste du monde». Ce thème du condominium devait revenir fréquemmentpar la suite.84 En outre la France risquait d’être au moins indirectement impliquée pour sespropres forces nucléaires. Le 9 juin, Nixon avait écrit à Pompidou pour lui relater sonvoyage à Moscou et évoquer les SALT. Les Soviétiques avaient exigé de pouvoir augmen-ter le nombre de leurs sous-marins nucléaires si la France et la Grande-Bretagne dépas-saient leur total programmé de neuf SNLE (quatre britanniques et cinq français; il étaitfortement question d’un sixième SLNE français, pour pouvoir en avoir toujours au moinsdeux à la mer). Nixon s’était absolument refusé à admettre cette exigence, mais il necachait pas que Moscou y reviendrait lors de la prochaine phase des négociations et qu’ilfaudrait que Paris et Washington se concertent à ce sujet. Pompidou répondit le 1er juilletd’une façon qui soulignait la très grande prudence de la France sur ce point.85

Un autre point qui préoccupait beaucoup les Français était un projet de traité,d’origine soviétique, par lequel les Etats-Unis et l’URSS s’engageraient mutuelle-ment à ne pas utiliser l’un contre l’autre l’arme nucléaire. Les Américains n’étaientévidemment pas disposés à accepter quelque chose qui contredisait totalement lastratégie de l’OTAN, mais ils ne pensaient pas pouvoir répondre de façon purementnégative, car ils ne voulaient pas compromettre la ligne de détente que poursuivaitBrejnev malgré, à leur avis, des oppositions au sein du Politburo.86 Cela inquiétabeaucoup les Français, qui estimaient que l’Occident devait se réserver la possibi-lité de l’emploi du nucléaire en premier, ainsi qu’un autre point du projet de traitésoviétique qui prévoyait que les deux pays «s’efforceraient de prévenir les situa-tions où l’action de tiers pourrait les amener à une collision nucléaire», ce qui ris-quait d’impliquer indirectement la France et annonçait le thème du «condomi-nium» qui allait prendre une telle importance l’année suivante.87 Pompidou devaitexprimer ces inquiétudes à l’occasion d’une visite de Henry Kissinger, le 15 sep-tembre 1972, qui l’assura que les Etats-Unis n’accepteraient de signer qu’une

83. Note de Sonnenfeldt pour Kissinger du 7 septembre 1972, NPM, NSC CF/HAK Office Files/24.84. Compte-rendu de l’entretien dans 5AG2/1018.85. 5AG2/1021.86. Conversation de Kissinger avec l’ambassadeur de France le 7 septembre 1972 et note du 3 septem-

bre, NPM, NSC CF/HAK Office Files/Box 24.87. Note de Raimond pour Pompidou du 12 septembre, 5AG2/1021.


déclaration très générale visant l’interdiction de l’emploi de la force militaire con-tre tout pays.88

D’autre part Paris maintenait bien entendu son opposition résolue aux MBFR etétait préoccupée de constater que Washington, sous la pression du Congrès et de l’opi-nion, était de plus en plus disposée à envisager des réductions de forces en Europe.89

Paris continuait à refuser toute participation aux négociations, même indirectes.

Washington était début 1973 consciente du fait que si les relations bilatéralesfranco-américaines étaient bonnes et les meilleures depuis longtemps, avec en particu-lier une disparition de l’anti-américanisme officiel et dans les médias contrôlés par legouvernement, il existait d’importantes divergences de vues sur certains problèmesmultilatéraux. En particulier les négociations SALT et MBFR ainsi que la préparationde la Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe (CSCE), les Français,comme nous l’avons vu, étant réticents quant aux SALT et aux MBFR et plus ardentsque les Américains pour la CSCE. Mais on avait à Washington identifié les trois gran-des zones de conflit qui allaient effectivement marquer les années 1973-1974: les ques-tions monétaires; la protection des intérêts économiques européens (y compris la PACet les accords particuliers avec l’Afrique) face aux demandes américaines de libéralisa-tion du commerce international; et surtout la volonté américaine de structurer les rela-tions entre les Etats-Unis et l’Europe occidentale de façon à

«permettre de discuter de façon globale et étroitement intégrée toutes les questions -de sécurité, politiques, monétaires, commerciales et concernant les investissements -qui regroupent l’ensemble de nos intérêts en Europe».90

Or c’était bien à une telle structuration transatlantique, autour d’un programmeaméricain, que Paris allait s’opposer avec tant de force en 1973-1974. De leur côtéles Etats-Unis étaient très décidés à résoudre en 1973 les questions internationalespendantes: en particulier la poursuite de la détente avec les Soviétiques et l’établis-sement avec eux d’une relation bilatérale stable et durable, et la nouvelle définitionde leurs rapports avec l’Europe. Ils étaient également fermement décidés à amenerla France à accepter ces objectifs, ou alors à l’empêcher de les contrecarrer.91 Leclash avec Paris était dès lors programmé.

88. E. ROUSSEL, op.cit., pp.524-528.89. Entretien Debré-Kissinger du 7 juillet 1972, déjà cité, et annotation de Pompidou du 28 décembre

1972, 5AG2/1041.90. Télé. de synthèse très important de l’ambassade américaine à Paris du 1er janvier 1973, RG 59/

70-73/Box 2278.91. Ibid., le télégramme du 1er janvier étant très clair à ce sujet.


La conférence de Reykjavik (31 mai et 1er juin 1973).

Au printemps 1973 les choses avaient évolué comme l’envisageait Washington audébut de l’année: le 23 avril Kissinger avait annoncé «l’année de l’Europe», aucours de laquelle les relations transatlantiques devraient être redéfinies autourd’une nouvelle Charte de l’Atlantique.92 Notons ici que Pompidou fut indirecte-ment à l’origine de cette initiative: Kissinger en eut l’idée à la suite de l’une de sesconversations avec lui et d’une interview du Président français à James Reston duNew York Times suggérant d’instaurer des consultations occidentales «au plus hautniveau». Mais la façon très maladroite dont Kissinger mena cette initiative, et sesarrière-pensées, qui furent parfaitement comprises à Paris, conduisirent à une crisemajeure avec la France.93

Pendant ce temps les Américains préparaient avec les Soviétiques l’accord «surla prévention d’une guerre nucléaire» que Brejnev devait venir signer en Californiele 22 juin. D’autre part, comme il en avait été convenu entre Kissinger et les Sovié-tiques en septembre 1972, des négociations sur la sécurité en Europe avaient com-mencé à Helsinki le 22 novembre, tandis que les MBFR avaient commencé àVienne le 30 janvier 1973. En juillet les ministres des Affaires étrangères devaientse retrouver à Helsinki pour une CSCE préparatoire. Le système international étaiten pleine ébullition.

Georges Pompidou et Michel Jobert, devenu ministre des Affaires étrangères aumois d’avril et très gaulliste d’inspiration, s’inquiétaient de cette évolution: les Améri-cains n’allaient-ils pas s’entendre avec l’URSS aux dépens de l’Europe? Le 23 avril,Kissinger avait parlé de l’Europe comme «d’un ensemble régional» aux intérêts limités.Washington ne voulait-elle pas s’octroyer un véritable leadership, sous couvert de struc-turer les relations transatlantiques et de les «globaliser», en reliant par un évident mar-chandage questions économiques (où Washington était demandeur) et questions desécurité (où c’étaient les Européens)? Jean-Bernard Raimond, le conseiller diplomati-que de Pompidou, qualifiait le discours de Kissinger de «texte impérieux, qui exprimefondamentalement la volonté de puissance des Etats-Unis», qui rappelait le discours deKennedy à Philadelphie le 4 juillet 1962. Le danger était que les partenaires européensde la France seraient tentés: «leur préférence allait à un monde atlantique à directionaméricaine».94 Quant à Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet, l’ambassadeur à Washington, ils’inquiétait de l’accord en cours de négociation entre Américains et Soviétiques sur laguerre nucléaire: il risquait de conduire à la dénucléarisation de l’Europe, «les Améri-cains cherchant en fait à écarter tout usage de l’arme nucléaire, tandis que les Russess’appliquaient à dénucléariser et à neutraliser l’Europe occidentale, en la coupant desEtats-Unis et en démantelant le système de l’Alliance atlantique».95 Début maiJean-Bernard Raimond partageait ses craintes et allait même au-delà: le «renforcement

92. Sur la problématique de l’«Année de l’Europe» dans les rapports franco-américains, cf. P. MELANDRI,Une relation très spéciale …, op.cit.

93. W. BUNDY, A Tangled Web, op.cit., pp.415-419.94. Note du 3 mai 1973 pour Pompidou, 5AG2/1021.95. Lettre de Kosciusko-Morizet à Jobert du 4 mai 1973, 5AG2/1021.


de la coopération entre l’URSS et les Etats-Unis» remettait en cause «l’équilibre politi-que mondial», et pouvait aboutir «au dessaisissement politique des puissances tierces».Il conseillait au Président de prendre une initiative politique majeure en direction despartenaires européens pour amorcer une discussion de fond avec les Etats-Unis.96

Ces craintes au sujet de ce que l’on allait appeler de plus en plus couramment le«condominium américano-soviétique» (expression également utilisée parfois parGeorges Pompidou, on l’a vu, mais qui dans son esprit était tournée au moinsautant contre l’URSS que contre les Etats-Unis) n’étaient pas les seules: les fonc-tionnaires français relevaient les questions monétaires, le refus américain de se sou-mettre à la moindre discipline dans ce domaine, et ils continuaient à croire possiblele retour à l’or; on prenait note du Nixon Round et en particulier de la volonté deWashington de remettre en cause la PAC; d’autre part on soulignait la détermina-tion des Américains, évidente dès le message de Nixon sur l’énergie du 18 avril etdevant les tensions croissantes sur le marché international des hydrocarbures dèsavant la guerre du Kippour, à regrouper les pays consommateurs en face desproducteurs, ce qui paraissait très dangereux.97 Cela dit, les responsables françaisparaissaient divisés quant à la conduite à tenir sur les questions monétaires etéconomiques. L’ambassade à Washington recommandait la négociation et suggéraitdes compromis possibles.98 D’autres, comme Olivier Wormser, gouverneur généralde la Banque de France, pensaient qu’il fallait rester ferme: les Etats-Uniseux-mêmes reviendraient un jour à l’or comme base du système monétaire inter-national.99 On a vu que Georges Pompidou pour sa part ne partageait pas cetteillusion.

Une conversation très importante entre Kissinger et Pompidou le 18 mai allaitpermettre de préciser les choses et d’éliminer certains malentendus en prévision dusommet prévu à Reykjavik à la fin du mois.100 Dans cet entretien, à mon avis leplus ouvert et le plus important qui ait jamais eu lieu entre Pompidou et un respon-sable américain, Pompidou se montra accommodant: à propos de «l’année del’Europe», il n’était pas choqué par la notion exposée par Kissinger le 23 avril del’Europe comme puissance régionale (en y comprenant toutefois la Méditerranée etl’Afrique), il n’était pas contre le fait de parler de l’ensemble des problèmes entreEuropéens et Américains et donc d’établir un cadre politique pour la discussion desproblèmes économiques transatlantiques (la «globalisation» des problèmes) ce quicorrespondait au projet de la nouvelle charte de l’Atlantique. Il était prêt à parler dublé au prochain sommet franco-américain de Reykjavik et à proposer une ententeentre les pays exportateurs de céréales; il faudrait certes parler du système moné-taire international, on ne pouvait pas en rester là où on en était, mais visiblement ilserait sur ce point aussi fort pragmatique. Il fut ferme sur un point: il ne devait pas

96. Note Raimond pour Pompidou du 10 mai 1973, 5AG2/1021.97. Dossier envoyé par Kosciusko-Morizet à Jobert le 11 mai, 5AG2/1023.98. Ibid.99. Note d’Olivier Wormser du 10 mai (le retour à l’or ne serait pas plus difficile pour Washington que

d’aller voir Mao!), 5AG2/1023.100. 5AG2/1022.


être question de mêler le Royaume-Uni en tiers aux conversations militaires bilaté-rales franco-américaines. Et il posa une excellente question à propos du prochainaccord américano-soviétique sur la guerre nucléaire: le problème n’était pas tant lerisque d’une guerre que d’une progression soviétique en-dessous du seuil d’uneguerre, comme en Tchécoslovaquie en 1968, comme peut-être en Yougoslavie à lamort de Tito ou en Chine à la mort de Mao. «Brejnev (est) un homme sympathiqueet bon vivant mais qu’il n’est pas facile d’arrêter quand il avance (…). Y a-t-il unetactique américaine pour arrêter une avance soviétique camouflée, sans recours à laforce, mais comme un torrent progressiste"? Il mit également son interlocuteur engarde contre une éventuelle tentation de choisir l’URSS contre la Chine.

Kissinger répondit en dévoilant la stratégie réelle des Etats-Unis: il ne s’agissaitpas du tout d’établir un condominium américano-soviétique ou de choisir Moscouau détriment de la Chine, mais il s’agissait de soutenir Pékin contre l’URSS pourempêcher celle-ci d’écraser la Chine, ce qui lui permettrait ensuite de «finlandiser»l’Europe et d’isoler les Etats-Unis. Mais, pour empêcher que le rapprochementaméricano-chinois qui devait aller s’approfondissant dans les années suivantes neserve de prétexte à une attaque soviétique contre la Chine, il fallait parallèlementpoursuivre la Détente avec Moscou, afin «de gagner du temps, de paralyserl’URSS». La stratégie américaine était «peut-être complexe, mais elle n’était passtupide; (elle n’était) pas un abandon à l’URSS, mais une tentative pour la prendredans des rets». Disons ici que l’explication que donnait Kissinger de la politiqueaméricaine rejoignait tout à fait le contenu de ses conversations avec les Chinois àl’époque.101

Une Europe forte, ajoutait Kissinger, où la France jouerait «un rôle de pivot» (etnon pas une Allemagne trop sensible aux pressions soviétiques), convenait dans cecontexte très bien aux Etats-Unis qui étaient prêts à aider Paris à accroître ses capa-cités militaires. Il souligna que l’on n’avait jamais été aussi franc avec un dirigeantétranger. Georges Pompidou répondit en soulignant l’importance de ces déclara-tions et en assurant «qu’il y réfléchirait beaucoup».

Le fait que Kissinger ait été sincère le 18 mai avec le Président français et aitvraiment envisagé un grand accord euro-américain politique et économique danslequel la France jouerait un rôle essentiel me paraît totalement confirmé par lesdocuments internes de la Maison Blanche en vue du sommet de Reykjavik. Outrela stratégie fondamentale envers la Chine et l’URSS que nous avons vue, ces docu-ments soulignent l’importance d’une relance des relations transatlantiques pour lut-ter contre les courants isolationnistes de part et d’autre de l’Atlantique. (Rappelonsici que l’administration américaine était très inquiète d’un amendement du sénateurMansfield qui proposait de réduire de 75.000 à 100.000 hommes les effectifs amé-ricains en Europe). Il faudrait commencer par constituer un groupe informel dehaut niveau entre les Etats-Unis, la Grande-Bretagne, la France et la RFA quidébroussaillerait les principaux problèmes politiques et économiques. Kissinger,

101. Cf. par exemple le meeting de Kissinger avec Mao le 12 novembre 1973, in: W. BURR, op.cit.,pp.179-199.


après sa conversation du 18 mai, estimait que Georges Pompidou, avec les élec-tions du mois de mars derrière lui, avec un nouveau gouvernement formé d’hom-mes à lui et débarrassé du poids des gaullistes de stricte observance serait certes unpartenaire difficile mais pragmatique et prêt à un accord sur ces bases à conditionque celui-ci ne remette pas en cause l’autonomie de la politique française et l’émer-gence d’une «personnalité européenne». On pourrait faciliter l’adhésion françaiseen proposant de développer la collaboration en matière militaire et dans les hautestechnologies (en particulier les réacteurs d’avions).102

A la suite des explications apportées par Kissinger le 18 mai, une certainedétente se produisit, en tout cas à l’Elysée (où Edouard Balladur avait remplacéMichel Jobert comme secrétaire général). Le prochain accord soviéto-américainapparaissait désormais surtout inutile, voire dangereux dans la mesure où il donne-rait des possibilités de manœuvre à l’URSS en-dessous du seuil d’une guerre, cequ’elle savait faire par tous les moyens de la stratégie indirecte et avec l’appui despartis communistes et des mouvements révolutionnaires. Mais on ne le considéraitpas comme un instrument d’une volonté américaine de puissance: il apparaissaitplutôt comme contraire aux intérêts bien compris des Etats-Unis. Quant à «l’annéede l’Europe» et la Charte transatlantique, il fallait éviter de se laisser réintégrer parce biais dans les structures intégrées de l’OTAN, mais on pouvait accepter la«déclaration de principes» qu’avait proposée Kissinger le 23 avril.103

Le Quai d’Orsay avec en particulier Michel Jobert me paraît être resté beaucoupplus raide, soutenu en cela par une partie de la presse et des milieux gaullistes quivoyaient dans l’évolution de Washington la confirmation des analyses gaullistes surl’impérialisme américain.104 A partir du printemps 1973 Georges Pompidou rece-vait donc des conseils assez contradictoires à propos de l’attitude à tenir face auxAméricains. Toutes ces questions étaient à l’époque extraordinairement chargéesde passion et il n’est pas toujours facile de savoir quelle position le Président, enoutre gravement malade, prenait quant à lui.

Le Président français lui-même paraissait intéressé par les propos de Kissinger.Il rencontra Heath le 21 mai. Dans cet entretien Pompidou se montra désireux d’unaccord avec les Américains, qu’il estimait possible. Visiblement, après les explica-tions fournies par Kissinger il n’était pas aussi pessimiste que certains de ses colla-borateurs. L’essentiel à ses yeux était que les Etats-Unis ne pouvaient pas se per-mettre de se désintéresser de la sécurité de l’Europe. En même temps il était clairqu’il n’accepterait pas n’importe quoi de leur part. Pompidou et Heath, tout enétant conscients de la contribution indispensable des Etats-Unis à la défense del’Europe et tout en ne pensant pas que le sénateur Mansfield parviendrait à imposerun retrait des troupes américaines en Europe, évoquèrent néanmoins la possibilitéde collaborer pour la prochaine génération de leurs systèmes nucléaires stratégi-

102. Note de Kissinger pour le Président Nixon avant Reykjavik, NPM/NSC CF/949/Pompidou-NixonMeeting.

103. Deux notes de Raimond pour Pompidou des 18 et 29 mai 1973, 5AG2/1021.104. Cf. les mémoires caractéristiques de P. de SAINT ROBERT, Le secret des jours, Paris, JC Lattès,

1995.


ques, à l’horizon 1985.105 Pompidou était cependant très prudent: plutôt quecomme quelque chose de dores et déjà décidé, il considérait la collaborationfranco-britannique dans ce domaine comme une option que l’on explorerait de plusprès le moment venu, quand il faudrait définir la génération suivante d’arme-ments,.106

On présente en général le sommet de Reykjavik comme un échec. Ceci me paraîtexcessif et je voudrais en donner un bilan plus nuancé. Certes, ce sommet donna sur-tout lieu à un large échange de vues, tournant d’ailleurs un peu en rond, sur les ques-tions internationales. Certes, on ne progressa pas sur les questions monétaires. Pom-pidou devait d’ailleurs écrire à Nixon le 25 juin pour essayer de relancer la question,insistant sur la nécessité de la lutte contre l’inflation, de la défense des nouvelles pari-tés définies en mars 1973, du contrôle des mouvements de capitaux à court terme. Ence qui concerne le problème de l’or, Pompidou pensait débloquer la situation en per-mettant aux banques centrales d’acheter ou de vendre de l’or sur le marché libre, cequi aurait mis fin au prix parfaitement devenu théorique de 35 dollars l’once d’or(rappelons qu’un double marché de l’or existait depuis 1968, un marché libre et unsystème d’échanges entre banques centrales au taux officiel de 35 dollars l’once).Mais cela revenait quand même à reconnaître un rôle éminent à l’or comme instru-ment de réserve, cela favorisait la France (qui avait de considérables réserves d’or),l’Afrique du Sud et l’URSS, cela pénalisait les pays européens qui avaient gardé leursréserves en dollars. Il n’y avait aucune chance pour que Washington accepte. Nixonrépondit d’ailleurs le 6 août de façon parfaitement évasive.107 On notera que Pompi-dou était là en recul par rapport au sommet des Açores, où l’on n’avait pas posé leproblème de l’or, et en recul par rapport aux positions françaises de 1967-1969, épo-que à laquelle Paris avait été prête à imaginer un système monétaire international quine reposerait pas sur l’or, à condition d’être structuré, discipliné et rééquilibré parrapport au dollar.108 On constate là (nous en verrons d’autres exemples) un certainretour à une version plus dure du gaullisme.

En ce qui concerne la Charte de l’Atlantique, ce fut un demi-échec. Pompidouse montra beaucoup plus réservé que le 18 mai, refusant en particulier la proposi-tion américaine d’une préparation confidentielle à quatre.109 En fait Pompidouinsista pour que la préparation de la Charte se déroula d’abord au moyen de conver-sations bilatérales et non pas dans un cadre multilatéral trop proche à ses yeux del’OTAN. Cependant les conversations se poursuivirent, comme nous le verrons,entre Kissinger (devenu Secrétaire d’Etat en août) et Michel Jobert; ce n’était pas leblocage. Ajoutons que le Président, en fonction des équilibres complexes de sa

105. E. ROUSSEL, op.cit., pp.548-549.106. Lettre de Pompidou à Heath du 29 juin 1973, 5AG2/1040.107. 5AG2/1021.108. Cf. mes remarques dans R. ARON, Les articles de politique internationale dans Le Figaro de 1947

à 1977, Tome III, Les Crises (février 1965 à avril 1977), présentation et notes par G.-H. SOUTOU,Paris, Editions de Fallois, 1997, pp.29-31.

109. Les comptes-rendus se trouvent dans 5AG2/1023. Cf. E. ROUSSEL, op.cit., pp.549-571.


majorité, devait sans doute beaucoup plus tenir compte des positions très négativesdes milieux gaullistes intransigeants que ne le pensait Kissinger.

En revanche le sommet fut un franc succès pour les questions militaires: Pompi-dou déclara à la presse à la suite des entretiens qu’il était partisan du maintien destroupes américaines en Europe (ce qui correspondait à sa conviction profonde etconfortait le Président Nixon face au sénateur Mansfield, mais qui était un engage-ment public nouveau pour la Ve République!). En outre, mais cela resta bien sûrabsolument secret, ce qui contribua sans doute à l’impression d’échec du sommet,on se mit d’accord (au cours d’un troisième entretien spécialement consacré à cettequestion)110 pour étendre les conversations sur les armements aux questions tou-chant les armes nucléaires proprement dites, c’est-à-dire le saint des saints, au-delàdes informations sur la technologie des missiles et les capacités ABM des Soviéti-ques auxquelles s’étaient limités les échanges jusque-là. «J’accepte donc volontiersque nos experts se rendent à Washington et que l’échange s’accélère», déclaraPompidou. Kissinger centraliserait du côté américain ces conversations.

Il est tout à fait évident que pour les Américains l’offre de développer la colla-boration militaire franco-américaine était destinée aussi à faciliter l’acceptation parParis de l’ensemble du programme que nous avons vu: les Français auraient eneffet la certitude de bénéficier, en matière politico-stratégique, de la même positionprivilégiée que les Britanniques dans le grand ensemble euro-atlantique qui corres-pondait à la vision de Nixon et Kissinger.111 Il n’y manquait pas non plus l’assu-rance, répétée à Reykjavik, que les Etats-Unis ne laisseraient pas la RFA acquérirl’arme nucléaire, sujet qui préoccupait beaucoup Georges Pompidou. Celui-ci com-prit parfaitement la signification des offres américaines et annonça qu’il ne se lais-serait pas faire facilement:

«Naturellement, notre principe, compte tenu surtout des progrès que nous commen-çons à faire dans le domaine de la défense, est de ne pas vendre notre âme pour unplat de lentilles, quelle que soit la qualité de celles-ci».112

Finalement Pompidou refuse le «plat de lentilles»: le blocage des conversations militaires.

Conformément à la décision prise à Reykavik, des conversations d’ordre militaireeurent lieu lors de deux voyages aux Etats-Unis de Robert Galley, ministre de laDéfense, et de Jean Blancard, fin juillet et fin août 1973.113 Les Français demandè-rent d’étendre les conversations, jusque-là strictement limitées aux problèmes desmissiles français existants et à l’état des défenses ABM soviétiques, on l’a vu, aux

110. Le 1er juin à 10 heures, 5AG2/1023.111. Voir la note de Kissinger pour Nixon avant Reykjavik, déjà citée.112. Troisième entretien, le 1er juin à 10 heures, déjà cité.113. Comptes-rendus de deux entretiens avec Kissinger, le secrétaire à la Défense Schlesinger et le gé-

néral Walters, les 27 juillet et 31 août, 5AG2/1040.


futurs systèmes de missiles encore en développement et aux armes nucléaires pro-prement dites. Tout en reconnaissant que les échanges déjà réalisés avaient été trèsprécieux pour améliorer la fiabilité des fusées françaises et prendre conscience dela fragilité des armes nucléaires en service face aux contre-mesures soviétiques, lesFrançais souhaitaient désormais une aide pour la mise au point de la nouvelle géné-ration: missiles à têtes multiples indépendantes (MIRV), ogives thermonucléairesdurcies, ogives tactiques «propres». Comme le déclara Robert Galley,

«de nombreuses solutions sont possibles, mais toutes coûteront infiniment de tempset d’argent. Il serait donc très précieux pour les scientifiques et les techniciens fran-çais de savoir quelles de ces voies sont les plus fécondes pour faire progresser lesarmes stratégiques et les armes tactiques propres».

Les Américains se montrèrent en fait assez réticents devant l’ampleur de cesdemandes. Ils n’acceptaient pas de parler tout de suite des programmes avancés,comme la fusée M4 prévue pour les années 80, avec une tête MIRVée transportantsix ogives thermonucléaires durcies, mais uniquement des programmes en cours ouà échéance rapprochée (années 70). Ils mettaient en doute l’utilité pour la France deposséder des têtes MIRVées, capables d’attaquer à la fois plusieurs objectifs dis-tants les uns des autres, et estimaient que des têtes multiples simples MRV (sanscapacité de guidage indépendant pour chaque ogive) devraient lui suffire. En fait ilsne cachèrent pas qu’ils ne voulaient pas encore compliquer la suite des négocia-tions SALT avec Moscou, en cas de révélation de la collaboration franco-améri-caine sur ces armes très déstabilisantes. D’autre part ils insistaient pour que lesFrançais poursuivent leurs expériences sur le site du Nevada (comme les Britanni-ques) et soulignaient la nécessité de disposer d’un système d’alerte face aux pro-grès des Russes, qui à la fin des années 70 disposeraient d’ogives MIRVées et pour-raient éliminer d’un seul coup toutes les armes françaises. Or pour les Français cessuggestions ne pouvaient avoir qu’une seule signification: les Américains, enéchange de leur assistance technique, souhaitaient malgré tout établir un certaincontrôle sur l’effort français (l’offre de procéder aux tests au Nevada et l’allusion àla nécessité d’un dispositif d’alerte anti-missiles qui à l’époque ne pouvait êtrequ’américain allaient dans ce sens) afin de ne pas compliquer les SALT.

Du coup les échanges s’arrêtèrent là, du moins pour l’époque de la présidencePompidou. Le 20 décembre 1973 Kissinger proposa à Georges Pompidou de lesreprendre, mais le Président français se montra parfaitement évasif.114 Même frei-nage, à la même époque, pour les conversations entre le chef d’état-major desArmées (désormais le général Maurin) et le commandant des forces américaines enEurope, général Goodpaster, pour préparer les conditions de l’engagement duCorps de bataille français aux côtés des alliés. Un Conseil de Défense avait con-

114. Compte-rendu dans 5AG2/1023, publié par E. ROUSSEL, op.cit., p.611. Pour toute cette affairecf. MELANDRI, Aux origines …, op.cit. Il pose la question de savoir si malgré ce blocage la col-laboration ne se poursuivit pas en grand secret, encore du temps du Président Pompidou; les docu-ments français et américains auxquels on a accès maintenant m’amènent à conclure que les échan-ges en matière de missiles et d’ogives nucléaires subirent bien un arrêt, lié également à ladégradation générale des rapports franco-américains à partir de l’été 1973.


firmé le principe de ces conversations et le Président, dans un premier temps, dési-rait que fût préparé cet engagement éventuel. Pourtant le 30 octobre Georges Pom-pidou fit retarder les conversations prévues, le temps que la situation induite par laguerre du Kippour s’éclaircisse, et imposa une procédure très prudente: contactpréliminaire d’information entre Maurin et Goodpaster, contact politique ensuite,et après seulement une «éventuelle» discussion technique. Même prudence àl’occasion de la venue en France en décembre de l’amiral Moorer, président desJoint Chiefs of Staff.115

En fait Georges Pompidou avait durci ses positions en matière stratégiquedepuis l’été et en revenait à une certaine «orthodoxie gaulliste». J’en veux pourpreuve un document dont on connaissait l’existence mais pas le contenu: le fameux«testament stratégique» du Président. Il s’agit d’un texte rédigé par lui le 1erfévrier 1974, dont seuls le Premier ministre Pierre Messmer et le ministre de laDéfense Robert Galley reçurent un exemplaire.116 Certes, ce document écartait cer-taines conceptions extrêmes du texte équivalent précédent, l’Instruction person-nelle et secrète de De Gaulle en 1967, comme la défense tous azimuts et l’acquisi-tion de missiles intercontinentaux. Mais sa vision internationale d’ensemble étaitpessimiste: l’affrontement américano-soviétique persistant, mais en même temps latendance de Washington et Moscou à s’entendre en dehors des Européens, lespoussées imprévisibles ou très calculées mais toujours «impérieuses» de la politi-que américaine, couplées avec une tendance au repli stratégique au détriment del’Europe, les problèmes monétaires et ceux de l’énergie, tout cela contribuait àcréer «un état permanent d’incertitude et d’inquiétude». Il n’était pas question derevenir à l’intégration atlantique qui obérerait la liberté de décision de la France,même s’il était probable que la France interviendrait le cas échéant aux côtés del’Alliance, d’autant plus que l’attitude allemande en cas de crise était très incer-taine. Une force nucléaire franco-britannique ne représenterait nullement une solu-tion, à cause de l’absence de liberté d’action de la Grande-Bretagne par rapport auxEtats-Unis et des réactions négatives prévisibles de la part de l’Allemagne et del’URSS. La seule solution restait donc de renforcer la dissuasion nationale fran-çaise: on passerait à six sous-marins nucléaires lanceurs d’engins, au lieu des cinqprévus, on renforcerait l’arme nucléaire tactique, qui donnait toute sa crédibilité àla dissuasion (ceci correspondait à la doctrine de «l’ultime avertissement» exposédans le Livre blanc sur la Défense de 1972). Le Corps de bataille serait égalementrenforcé; son intervention la plus probable serait en réserve de l’Alliance mais ildevrait être engagé avec ses moyens nucléaires (la France refusait une guerre pure-ment conventionnelle en Europe); là aussi, on peut remarquer que la coordinationavec l’OTAN, qui avait une doctrine différente de l’emploi des armes nucléairestactiques, poserait des problèmes difficiles.

115. Deux notes du général Thenoz, chef de l’état-major particulier de l’Elysée, des 30 octobre et 5 dé-cembre 1973, avec annotations du Président, 5AG2/1040.

116. 5AG2/1040.


La conclusion du document en confirmait l’inspiration dans l’ensemble trèsgaullienne (quoique, une fois de plus, d’un gaullisme rationalisé) et confirmait lecoup d’arrêt porté aux discussions avec les Américains ou du moins leur freinage:

«Nous devons poursuivre cet effort seuls, et sans compromissions, jusqu’au moment oùse posera de façon aiguë le problème de l’alerte, encore que les alliés et en particulier lesAméricains aient tendance à grossir l’importance de ce problème pour les raisons quel’on imagine. Aucune indication sur nos programmes, aucune négociation avec qui quece soit ne devra être donnée ou entreprise sans mon autorisation personnelle».

La détérioration des rapports politiques avec Washington à partir de l’été 1973.

Ce coup d’arrêt à une coopération militaire bilatérale qui avait commencé de façonprometteuse s’expliquait à mon avis essentiellement pour des raisons de politiquegénérale, comme le laisse d’ailleurs entendre le «testament» du 1er février 1974.Rappelons d’abord que, à l’occasion d’une visite de Brejnev aux Etats-Unis, lesdeux pays signèrent le 22 juin 1973 un «accord sur la prévention d’une guerrenucléaire"; les deux signataires ne se menaceraient pas mutuellement ni n’utilise-raient la force l’un contre l’autre; ils se consulteraient en cas de danger de guerrenucléaire ou s’il existait un danger qu’un conflit entre deux autres puissancesdébouche sur une guerre nucléaire. Ce fut ce dernier point surtout qui suscital’inquiétude de Paris (on se souvient que le 15 septembre 1972 encore Kissingeravait assuré Pompidou que l’accord proposé par Moscou n’aurait qu’une portéetrès générale; Washington était en effet consciente de la tendance au condominiumque recelait la proposition soviétique. Mais en fait les Soviétiques tenaient à untexte plus précis, et lors d’une rencontre avec Brejnev à Moscou début mai 1973 lesAméricains avaient cédé et accepté que les deux pays se concertent et fassent toutpour prévenir le risque d’une guerre nucléaire découlant d’un conflit entre paystiers).117 Devant un texte qui allait ainsi beaucoup plus loin que ce qui était prévuau départ, Pompidou vit le danger «d’une sorte de tutelle sur l’Europe», comme ill’écrivit à Nixon le 13 juillet.118 Les soupçons de condominium américano-soviéti-que que son entretien avec Kissinger le 18 mai avait en partie apaisés revenaient enforce. D’autant plus que Paris voyait une certaine cohérence inquiétante entrel’accord du 22 juin, les SALT qui conduisaient à une réduction de la garantienucléaire américaine à l’Europe, les MBFR qui risquaient de donner un droit deregard important à l’URSS en Europe centrale:

«Tout se passe comme si Russes et Américains étaient en train de définir les règles d’unjeu mondial dont ils seront les seuls vrais partenaires (…). Chaque superpuissance paraîtdans ce cadre accorder à l’autre le droit de réorganiser son propre camp».119

117. H. KISSINGER, Years of Upheaval, op.cit., pp.274-286.118. 5AG2/1021.119. Note du ministère des Affaires étrangères du 20 juin 1973, 5AG2/1019.


Décidément, on revenait à Paris à certains réflexes très «gaullistes».

Mais d’autres problèmes vinrent immédiatement se greffer sur celui de l’accorddu 22 juin. En particulier le projet américain de «Déclaration commune de princi-pes pour l’Alliance atlantique». Washigton commit là une erreur d’appréciation,estimant que les Français, depuis Reykjavik, étaient d’accord sur le principe et sou-haitaient seulement que l’affaire n’apparût pas comme relevant de l’OTAN mais fîtl’objet d’une série de conversations bilatérales. (D’une façon générale d’ailleurs,Henry Kissinger avait tendance à penser que les réticences du gouvernement fran-çais à l’égard de l’accord américano-soviétique du 22 juin ou de la Charte del’Atlantique étaient à l’usage de l’opinion publique, mais ne reflétaient pas la posi-tion officielle).120 Pour Paris le problème posé par la Déclaration atlantique n’étaitcependant pas seulement une question de procédure, mais de fond. Jean-BernardRaimond souligna pour le Président le 4 juillet 1973 que le projet de déclarationpréparé par Kissinger donnait un rôle dirigeant aux Etats-Unis dans tous les domai-nes dans un grand ensemble atlantique, comportait un retour de fait de la Francedans l’OTAN, amènerait la CEE à renoncer «à définir progressivement son autono-mie et sa personnalité politique par rapport aux Etats-Unis». Certes, le souci deKissinger était de maintenir le leadership américain dans une période de boulever-sement des relations internationales, mais son projet de Déclaration n’était pas«acceptable». Cependant on ne pouvait pas répondre de façon purement négative,car «le maintien d’une solidarité occidentale nous est nécessaire». La solutionpourrait être de présenter un contre-projet français de Déclaration; on pouvait espé-rer en effet qu’une négociation était possible. En effet, les services du Départementd’Etat avait préparé un autre projet qui était «assez raisonnable», moins «mauvais»pour la France, que celui de Kissinger. La position américaine n’était peut-être pasfigée sur le texte «démesuré» de Kissinger.121

Et de fait Michel Jobert remit un contre-projet français de Déclaration à Quinzele 3 octobre 1973 au Conseil de l’Alliance atlantique, après s’en être entretenu avecGeorges Pompidou la veille.122 Le texte français répondait à toutes les préoccupa-tions parisiennes à l’époque: il réaffirmait la nécessité de la solidarité atlantique etdu maintien des troupes américaines en Europe, mais il réaffirmait également lanécessité de la dissuasion nucléaire (contre les tendances à la dénucléarisation dontà Paris on soupçonnait les Américains et pour réagir contre une éventuelle dérivedes SALT). Il affirmait que les Etats-Unis ne laisserait pas l’Europe être soumise «àune pression extérieure politique ou militaire susceptible d’aliéner sa liberté», cequi visait bien entendu les conséquences redoutées à Paris de l’accord améri-cano-soviétique du 22 juin (le «condominium»). Il affirmait la «spécificité» de ladéfense de l’Europe ainsi que la contribution conventionnelle et nucléaire (pourdeux d’entre eux) des pays européens de l’Alliance. Cela correspondait à la volontéde faire reconnaître la valeur pour l’Alliance de la Force de frappe et aussi de faire

120. Note de Kissinger pour Nixon du 29 juin 1973, NPM NSC CF/679/France vol.XI.121. 5AG2/1021.122. 5AG2/1021.


prendre en compte, pour l’avenir, l’hypothèse de l’émergence d’une personnalitéeuropéenne en matière de défense, comme Michel Jobert devait le faire à l’occa-sion de son fameux discours devant l’Assemblée de l’UEO le 21 novembre 1973.

Soulignons ici que ce contre-projet français fut un grand succès, ce qui futocculté à l’époque par les crises de l’automne 1973 et de l’hiver 1973-1974, ainsique par la très médiatisée rivalité entre Kissinger et Jobert (à mon avis trop souli-gnée par Kissinger dans ses mémoires): on le retrouve à peu près tel quel dans lesdix premiers articles de la «Déclaration sur les relations atlantiques» qui fut finale-ment entérinée par le Conseil de l’Alliance, à Ottawa, le 19 juin 1974, après la mortdu Président Pompidou. Les Français avaient réussi une brillante opération: d’unepart ils avaient fait disparaître le projet à leurs yeux beaucoup plus gênant de Kis-singer. Ils avaient profité de l’occasion pour faire entériner par l’Alliance certainesde leurs thèses essentielles sur la dissuasion nucléaire et sur la détente, et contre le«condominium». Et enfin, ce qui est moins connu, ils avaient réaffirmé la solidaritéde l’Alliance alors que depuis le mois de juin 1973 le gouvernement allemand (toutau moins le chancelier Brandt et son ministre des Affaires étrangères Scheel) réflé-chissait à l’émergence d’un nouveau système européen de sécurité permettant dedépasser la division de l’Allemagne et proposait à Paris d’envisager une défenseeuropéenne en dehors de l’OTAN.123 On a donc dans cette affaire une quintessencedu gaullisme rationalisé de Georges Pompidou: défense sourcilleuse de l’indépen-dance française mais solidarité fondamentale avec les Etats-Unis face à la menacesoviétique et au risque d’une dérive neutraliste de la RFA.

Bien entendu les Américains perçurent parfaitement les arrière-pensées au fond trèsgaullistes de Paris, mais ils comprirent que le texte français était le maximum de ce quel’on pouvait espérer et qu’il représentait «l’immense avantage de venir du principaldissident au sein de l’OTAN». Ils décidèrent en fait immédiatement de retirer le projetKissinger de Déclaration et donc de laisser la voie libre au projet de Jobert.124

Mais le débat avec les Etats-Unis, calmé sur ce point, allait se transporter sur unautre, d’ailleurs connexe, celui du type de rapports à établir entre les Etats-Unis etla CEE. En effet au cours de l’été les Belges et les Allemands, inquiets du blocagede la Charte de l’Atlantique provoqué par les réticences françaises, avait proposéd’élaborer parallèlement un document sur les relations entre la CEE et lesEtats-Unis, expliquant d’ailleurs que certains problèmes transatlantiques ne rele-vaient pas de l’Alliance.125 Les Américains embrassèrent cette idée, pensant en faitpouvoir rattraper par là leur version très exigeante de Charte atlantique à laquelleils avaient dû renoncer, en faisant pression sur la France dans le cadre des Neuf parl’intermédiaire de ses partenaires européens. En particulier Washington souhaitaitque ce document réaffirme «le caractère central de la relation transatlantique» et

123. G.-H. SOUTOU, L’attitude de Georges Pompidou …, op.cit. Je ne peux pas entrer ici dans les dé-tails de la position allemande à l’époque, fort complexe et même contradictoire, prise entre l’atlan-tisme et une tentation neutraliste. Mais ces contradictions mêmes inquiétaient beaucoup Paris.

124. Note de Sonnenfeldt pour Kissinger du 3 octobre 1973, NPM/NSC CF/679/France vol.XI.125. H. KISSINGER, Years of Upheaval, op.cit., pp.183 ss.


prévoie une consultation préalable avec les Etats-Unis avant toute décision écono-mique de la CEE.126

Les Français acceptèrent pourtant que l’on préparât une déclarationEtats-Unis-CEE, à condition que parallèlement on mît au point un texte sur «l’iden-tité européenne», afin que celle-ci ne risquât pas de se diluer dans le dialogue tran-satlantique.127 En effet à l’automne 1973 une relance européenne paraissait à Pariscomme le seul moyen de réagir face aux incertitudes de la situation internationaleet en particulier face aux ambiguïtés allemandes.128 Dans sa conférence de pressedu 27 septembre 1973 Pompidou avait proposé que les chefs d’Etat et de gouverne-ment se réunissent régulièrement pour traiter de la coopération politique, reprenantprobablement une idée de Jean Monnet. Le 31 octobre, à l’issue d’un conseil desministres consacré à cette question, Pompidou adressa à Brandt une lettre qui préci-sait sa pensée: les chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement devraient se réunir seuls, sansordre du jour, pour des conversations très ouvertes en vue «d’harmoniser leur atti-tude dans le cadre de la coopération politique».129 Cette relance devait aboutir ausommet des Neuf à Copenhague les 15 et 16 décembre 1973: ce fut l’ancêtre duConseil européen des Chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement. A cette occasion on pro-clama une «Déclaration sur l’identité européenne». Le texte réaffirmait «les liensétroits» entre les Neuf et les Etats-Unis et la volonté de développer la coopérationavec eux, mais en même temps il réaffirmait, conformément à la thèse française,que les Neuf formaient une «entité distincte et originale». Le document exposait lesgrandes lignes d’action de l’Europe face aux différents problèmes mondiaux, ycompris la détente, le Moyen-Orient, la Chine, le sous-développement, de façontrès générale mais en marquant bien que l’Europe n’était pas seulement unepuissance régionale.

La guerre du Kippour en octobre 1973 et ses conséquences (le choc pétrolier)vinrent comme on le sait compliquer les rapports franco-américains, Paris étant endésaccord avec Washington sur la crise du Moyen-Orient et hostile aux initiativesaméricaines en vue de constituer un groupe des pays consommateurs de pétrole. Iln’est pas question de s’étendre ici, mais je voudrais souligner que pour les Françaisl’invitation faite par Nixon le 9 janvier 1974 à une conférence sur les problèmes del’énergie à Washington était aussi une nouvelle façon de relancer le projet deDéclaration atlantique de Kissinger: elle revenait pour eux en fait à créer sousdirection américaine «une communauté Etats-Unis/Europe/Japon». Les conseillersde l’Elysée étaient divisés: certains estimaient que Jobert ne devait pas se rendre àWashington, d’autres qu’il pouvait le faire mais qu’il faudrait se contenter d’échan-ges de vues et en aucun cas n’aboutir à une organisation des pays consommateurs.Finalement, au Conseil des ministres du 6 février, Georges Pompidou suivit lesconseils de modération que lui donnait Edouard Balladur et on décida que Jobert serendrait à la conférence de Washington cinq jours plus tard, mais pour un simple

126. Note de Walter Stoessel pour Kissinger du 5 octobre 1973, RG 59/70-73/Box 2278.127. Note de Sonnenfeldt pour Kissinger du 20 septembre 1973, NPM/NSC CF/679/France vol.XI.128. G.-H. SOUTOU, L’attitude de Georges Pompidou …, op.cit.129. 5AG2/1009.


échange de vues. D’autre part on publia une déclaration selon laquelle «la décisiondu gouvernement ne saurait être interprétée comme impliquant l’accord de laFrance à la création d’un organisme institutionnalisant l’ensemble des relationspolitiques et économiques entre un certain nombre de grands pays industriali-sés».130 Il est vrai que la France était à la suite du choc pétrolier en particulièreposition de faiblesse: le 19 janvier Paris avait dû quitter le serpent monétaire euro-péen créé l’année précédente et annoncer que le franc flotterait pendant six mois.131

C’était un coup sensible porté à la politique européenne de la France, dont larelance, à l’automne 1973, avait paru comme la seule réponse possible aux difficul-tés qui montaient avec Washington mais aussi avec Bonn et Moscou.

Au mois de mars 1974 la discussion sur la déclaration Etats-Unis-CEE revintsur le devant de la scène. Washington repartit à la charge pour qu’avant toute déci-sion importante les Neuf consultent les Etats-Unis et que l’on conclue un «arrange-ment consultatif organique» entre les deux parties. C’était inacceptable pour Paris;Michel Jobert et le directeur politique au Quai d’Orsay François Puaux penchaientvers un refus très ferme, ou tout au plus une acceptation très limitée de consulta-tions au cas par cas, quitte à provoquer une crise. Gabriel Robin, à l’Elysée,conseillait certes de s’entourer de précautions mais de choisir une attitude moinsnégative. Ce fut l’avis de Pompidou, qui tout en étant partisan de la «fermeté»acceptait «le principe de la consultation».132 Finalement on renonça à la déclarationEtats-Unis-CEE et on se contenta d’en reprendre la substance dans l’article 11 de laDéclaration d’Ottawa de l’Alliance atlantique du 22 juin 1974. Cet article annon-çait une «étroite consultation» entre les partenaires, la prise en compte des événe-ments survenant dans d’autres parties du monde et de l’interaction, dans leurs rap-ports, entre les questions de sécurité et les questions économiques. C’était ce quirestait de l’ambitieux projet de Kissinger de «globalisation» et de structuration del’Alliance atlantique, mais sous une forme édulcorée acceptable par Paris. Là aussi,l’accord final n’intervint qu’après la mort de Pompidou mais il avait préparé lecompromis en acceptant la notion de consultation transatlantique et en résistant à latentation de l’escalade qui parfois animait le Quai d’Orsay.

Néanmoins, malgré cette solution au problème de la déclaration Etats-Unis-Europe, ilest clair que les rapports franco-américains s’étaient détériorés depuis l’été. Mais parallè-lement, on était de plus en plus inquiet à l’Elysée des progrès de la puissance et del’influence de l’URSS, on constatait la détérioration des rapports avec Moscou, l’accrois-sement des pressions soviétiques sur la France, le fait que les vrais partenaires de l’URSSà l’Ouest étaient désormais les Etats-Unis et la RFA.133 Et pourtant Pompidou, parce qu’ilétait méfiant à l’égard de la RFA et mécontent des Etats-Unis, restait fixé dans son lan-gage avec les Soviétiques sur des formules d’indépendance et d’équidistance de la France

130. 5AG2/1021, note de Gabriel Robin, successeur de Jean-Bernard Raimond, du 10 janvier pour Bal-ladur, avec des annotation de Balaldur, et annexes.

131. M. JOBERT, Mémoires d’avenir, op.cit., pp.283-287.132. Notes de Puaux des 19 et 20 mars et de Robin du 28 mars et annotations de Pompidou, 5AG2/1021.133. Notes de Gabriel Robin des 13 février et 6 mars 1974, 5AG2/1019.


entre les blocs qui étaient très gaulliennes mais qui indirectement témoignaient d’une cer-taine impasse de la politique française, d’un certain isolement.134

Le 30 octobre 1973 le Département d’Etat constatait l’éloignement croissantentre Paris et Washington, critiquant en particulier l’attitude de la France dans lacrise du Moyen-Orient. Il recensait à l’intention de Kissinger toute une série de«points de pression possibles» sur la France, sans se dissimuler qu’ils étaient d’unmaniement délicat, en particulier dans la mesure où Paris pouvait y trouver, auprèsde ses partenaires européens, des arguments pour justifier sa politique d’indépen-dance européenne.135 En juin 1974, après la mort de Pompidou, le Départementd’Etat résumait l’évolution récente des rapports franco-américains d’une façonabrupte mais pas tout à fait fausse en soulignant leur détérioration depuis le débutde 1973, le durcissement de l’attitude de Paris, le regain du néo-gaullisme, lavolonté de renforcer l’identité européenne et pour y parvenir une «attitude plus dis-tante et parfois hostile de Pompidou envers les Etats-Unis».136

Conclusion.

Georges Pompidou avait donc recherché une amélioration profonde des relationsfranco-américaines, dans le cadre d’un ensemble triangulaire Amérique-France-Europeoù la France aurait joué un rôle privilégié. En 1970-1971 un grand accord franco-améri-cain dans cette direction, avec des conséquences importantes sur les trois plans, politi-que, économique et militaire ne paraissait pas, on l’a vu, hors de portée. Nixon en effetétait prêt à accepter le gaullisme pragmatique de son partenaire et à considérer la Francecomme un relais important des Etats-Unis vers l’Europe. Cependant cet accord aéchoué (la conférence des Açores de décembre 1971 fut là un tournant essentiel) pourdes raisons structurelles: outre la complexité intrinsèque de certains problèmes commeles questions monétaires ou nucléaires, qui ne facilitaient pas les compromis, Pompidouétait quand même plus «gaulliste» qu’on ne l’a cru souvent à l’époque, et nullementdisposé à faire la moindre concession en matière d’indépendance nationale ou à serapprocher de l’OTAN au-delà de très étroites limites, ou encore à accepter une accordmonétaire international entérinant la supériorité américaine sans contreparties. Quant àNixon et Kissinger ils étaient certes plus constructifs à l’égard de la France queKennedy et Johnson, mais, malgré leur vision proclamée d’un monde multipolaire oùl’Europe jouerait son rôle, ils ne renonçaient tout de même pas au leadership américaindans le cadre atlantique.

Mais il y eut aussi des causes conjoncturelles: les crises de l’automne 1973, etaussi le fait qu’à partir de cette année-là, avec la fin de la guerre du Vietnam et à lasuite du bouleversement international dû au choc Nixon de 1971 et aux SALT, les

134. Le compte-rendu de ses entretiens avec Brejnev à Pitsounda les 12 et 13 mars 1974 est à ce sujettrès significatif, 5AG2/1019.

135. RG 59/70-73/Box 2278.136. RG 59/Briefing Books 1958-1976/Box 190.


Etats-Unis avaient moins besoin de la France pour faire triompher leurs conceptionsen Europe et dans le monde et pouvaient donc se montrer plus exigeants envers elle.Désormais leur politique envers la Chine et l’URSS dominait tout et dans ce boule-versement mondial ils éprouvaient le besoin de contrôler étroitement non seulementl’Alliance atlantique, mais aussi le développement d’une Communauté européennede plus en plus puissante sur le plan économique et qui commençait à vouloir déve-lopper une identité politique. Tandis que Georges Pompidou, devant les incertitudesinternationales et les inquiétudes que lui inspiraient Moscou et Bonn, revenait à uneconception plus strictement gaulliste de sa politique extérieure.

Cependant Georges Pompidou ne rechercha jamais la rupture avec Washington.Même aux pires moments (automne 1973 et hiver 1973/74) il resta partisan deformules de compromis et se montra moins raide que Michel Jobert. Du coup lerapprochement avec Washington voulu par Pompidou eut des fruits posthumes: lacoopération nucléaire reprise par ses successeurs, la déclaration d’Ottawa de juin1974, les accords Valentin-Ferber du 3 juillet de la même année qui étaient ennégociation depuis 1972. Conclus entre le chef de la Ière Armée française et lecommandant OTAN Centre-Europe, ces accords élargissaient à toute la Ière Armée,et plus seulement au seul corps d’armée stationné en Allemagne, les accords Aille-ret-Lemnitzer de 1967.137 Les rapports entre la France et l’OTAN restèrent définispar ces textes jusqu’aux années 80. D’autre part il me semble que l’équilibre voulupar Georges Pompidou entre les différents axes de la politique extérieure française,vers Washington, vers Moscou, vers Bonn, vers l’Alliance, vers l’Europe, ainsi qued’une façon générale sa vision d’un gaullisme rationalisé ne rejetant pas le principede bons rapports avec Washington, mais sur un plan bilatéral et non pas atlantique,ne furent pas profondément remis en cause par ses successeurs avant la fin de laGuerre froide. Jusque dans certains réflexes et certaines formulations typiques de ladiplomatie française des années 70 et 80 Georges Pompidou avait imprimé unemarque discrète, mais durable.

Georges-Henri SoutouProfesseur à l’Université de Paris IV Sorbonne

137. F. BOZO, La France et l’OTAN, Paris, Economica, 1914, p.117.

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Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen

Nicholas AYLOTT –

Swedish Social Democracy and European Integration. The people’shome on the market.

Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999. ISBN 0-7546-1028-4. - 42,50 £.

For a long time it seemed that there could be nothing better in the world than to bea Swedish social democrat. At least that was how it felt like in Sweden. The Swed-ish social democratic party (SAP) enjoyed decades of practically uninterrupted andlargely unchallenged reign and in the meantime helped to build the nation’s wealthand welfare into unprecedented heights. While perfecting their own society andhelping poorer third world countries to stand on their own feet, Sweden remainedaloof of the more troublesome aspects of contemporary Europe. The Cold War waswaged elsewhere by somebody else, it seemed, and the process of political integra-tion in Western Europe concerned a group of nations Sweden did not belong to, andwas motivated by problems Sweden did not have.

In 1989-90 their fortunes changed. For some in the West the end of the Cold Warmeant that history was over. For the Swedish social democrats history was about tobegin. From a position of sceptical detachment, Ingvar Carlsson’s social democraticgovernment suddenly made a U-turn in the fall of 1990 and announced their intentionto apply for membership in the European Community (EC). After a narrow victory inthe referendum in 1994, Carlsson’s SAP led Sweden into the European Union (EU)in 1995, but subsequently Sweden has experienced difficulties in adapting to its newrole. The source of the troubles has mainly been a domestic one.

There is no other political party in Sweden, and perhaps in Northern Europe as awhole, that may have felt to the same degree what a divisive issue the question ofEuropean integration can be. In 1990, in a matter of months, the SAP became aquarrelling, divided party, its internal discipline having gone, its appeal amongstthe electorate being in steep decline and its power-base, the mighty trade unions, infull revolt. Further, the so called Swedish model of welfare society managementwas heading towards financial and economic turbulence that forced the socialdemocrats into painful introspection.

Why should a highly successful political party so completely lose its internal unityand discipline? What is it that makes the politics of European integration so difficult fora party like the SAP? Nicholas Aylott adds to the body of literature that claims that fromthe point of view of traditional political parties, there is something qualitatively differ-ent in the politics of European integration. The way in which political parties represent-ing old societal cleavages find it difficult to come to terms with new ones concerningsupranational integration is well illustrated by the Swedish experience.

Why SAP should have faced all these difficulties in the 1990s has been a subjectof popular myth-making, and with a welcome work like Aylott’s, myth-breaking.Based on surveys conducted in Sweden during the most intense debate before the1994 referendum, Aylott shows how SAP’s rift over Europe cannot just beexplained as a struggle between the party’s right against its left or modernisers


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against traditionalists, even if these factors should not be overlooked. The authoralso shows how other ’contours of division’, for example ’isolationists v missio-naries’, ’neutralists v supporters of collective security’ are not alone sufficient toexplain the rift over Europe. The way in which European integration divided anddivides SAP’s activists locally and nationally does not follow a clear cut pattern,and hence explanations for the U-turn in 1990 and the subsequent trouble withinthe party has to be looked for in the sequel of events unfolding from 1990 onwards.It was as much the way in which the decision to apply for EU-membership wasmade as much the substance of the decision itself, which eventually became thesource of the difficulties.

Previous explanations of SAP’s sudden change of heart have stressed the signif-icance of industrial lobbying and in particular external changes such as the end ofthe Cold War. Aylott’s explanation is based on short term, domestic political fac-tors. In his view, the decision to apply was an act of desperation. Carlsson’s an-nouncement to apply for EC membership was a part of an attempt to manage anacute economic and financial crisis and a response to a political challenge the gov-ernment faced from the pro-European opposition parties.

When Aylott turns his analysis from the climate of opinion and party structuresto the events that led to the decision to apply and to the ensuing management of thedivided party, the book becomes a contemporary history of the way in which SAPmade its historic decision, and what happened afterwards. Methodologically thecontemporary history that comprises the latter half of the book is less satisfactorythan the treatment of the internal divisions and the intellectual and cultural inherit-ance today’s Swedish social democrats still carry with them, and which influencestheir attitudes over European integration. The author’s explanation of these eventsis plausible, but is stated rather than demonstrated. The empirical base of certainkey events in the story is too slender to be compensated by the narrative’s analyti-cal and intellectual coherence. Aylott may well be right, but before more empiricalevidence is put forward, we simply cannot be sure. A sceptical reader still leavesroom for other explanations of Sweden’s EU-decision as well.

Juhana AunesluomaPost-doctoral research fellow

Department of Social Science HistoryUniversity of Helsinki

Gérard BOSSUAT, Andreas WILKENS (sous la direction de) –

Jean Monnet, l’Europe et leschemins de la Paix.

Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999, 537 p. – ISBN 2-85944-359-2 –210.00 FF, 32,01 Euro.

Jean Monnet hat in der Geschichtswissenschaft Konjunktur. Zwei große Biographien,eine von François Duchêne 1994 (478 Seiten) und eine andere von Eric Roussel 1996(1004 Seiten) legen davon ebenso Zeugnis ab wie die vorliegende umfangreicheDokumentation eines ehrgeizigen französisch-deutschen Kolloquiums mit Historik-ern und Zeitzeugen aus dem Jahre 1997. Daneben hat Andreas Wilkens einen deut-


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schsprachigen Sammelband herausgegeben. Die Publikationen gelten einem Mann,der in der Geschichte der Nachkriegszeit nach gängigen – „harten“ - Kriterien nureine Nebenrolle spielte, keine Macht besaß, nie ein wirklich bedeutendes öffentlichesAmt innehatte, nicht als Visionär an der Spitze einer politischen Bewegung stand undauch keine einflußreichen programmatischen Schriften verfaßt hat; selbst seine vielzitierten Memoiren sind in großen Teilen von seinem Mitarbeiter François Fontainegeschrieben worden. Und als François Mitterrand 1988 seine Gebeine in das Pan-théon überführen ließ, wußte über die Hälfte der Franzosen nicht, wer zur Ehre desnationalen Altars erhoben wurde, während ein Viertel meinte, es handele sich umeinen Maler (Claude Monet).

Warum also erregt Jean Monnet das große Interesse der Historiker? Weil, solautet die These der Herausgeber, bis in die siebziger Jahre kein anderer in dereuropäischen Einigung stärkere und dauerhaftere Spuren hinterlassen habe als JeanMonnet. In der Tat, die Autoren des Bandes legen eine imponierend aussehendeListe dessen vor, was er angeregt, auf den Weg gebracht oder beeinflußt hat, und sienehmen dabei zum Fluchtpunkt sein Wirken als geistiger Vater und Geburtshelferdes Schuman-Plans bzw. der Montanunion. Damit ist das Leitthema des Bandesangesprochen, Jean Monnets Platz im europäischen Einigungsprozeß, sein Beitragzur Umwertung der französisch-deutschen Beziehungen von bitterer Feindschaftzu Freundschaft und hierdurch zur dauerhaften Befriedung Westeuropas.

In einem ersten Teil behandeln sechs Aufsätze Jean Monnets Lebensweg zwi-schen Europa und den USA als Wirtschaftsexperte im öffentlichen Auftrag vomErsten bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg. Diese Jahre formten, so schreibt René Girault, denAkteur, der im Jahre 1950 im Alter von dreiundsechzig Jahren die europäische Szenebetritt. Es folgen in zwei weiteren Abteilungen vierzehn Untersuchungen zu JeanMonnets europäischem Wirken. Es geht zum einen darum, in welchem Maße erdurch seine persönlichen Beziehungen, insbesondere zu Konrad Adenauer, aber auchzu dessen Nachfolgern bis zu Helmut Schmidt die deutsche Europapolitik beeinflußthat. Zum anderen werden seine spezifischen Beiträge zur europäischen Einigunguntersucht. Neben der EGKS gingen ja sowohl die EVG wie die Euratom auf seineInitiativen zurück, bzw. waren seiner von vielen Autoren des Bandes hervorgehobe-nen Fähigkeit zu verdanken, Projekte operationalisierbar zu machen und sie zumrichtigen Zeitpunkt verantwortlichen politischen Akteuren in die Hand zu geben. Inden sechziger Jahren agierte er für die Erweiterung der Europäischen Wirt-schafts-Gemeinschaft sowie die transatlantische Partnerschaft. Nach de GaullesRücktritt ging es ihm darum, das Projekt einer Währungsgemeinschaft auf die euro-päische Agenda zu setzen und ebenso engagierte er sich für die Einrichtung regelmä-ßiger Beratungen zwischen den Staats- und Regierungschefs, die schließlich mit dem1974 gegründeten „Europäischen Rat“ institutionalisiert wurden. Einige Aufsätzethematisieren den Gegensatz der Europavorstellungen de Gaulles und Monnets,andere die für de Gaulle hochverdächtige atlantische bzw. amerikanische Dimensiondes Denkens und Handelns von Jean Monnet und seine Fähigkeit, hochrangigeamerikanische Freunde für seine europäischen Vorhaben einzuspannen.

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Fast alle Beiträge der kompetenten Autoren stützen sich auf unveröffentlichteArchivalien. Sie präzisieren den Platz Jean Monnets in der Geschichte der europäi-schen Integration. Hinterfragen sie aber wirklich kritisch, vor allem für die Zeit ab1955, seinen realen politischen Einfluß auf die politischen Akteure und die öffent-liche Meinung der Länder, die sich am Einigungsprozeß beteiligten, wie es Giraultfordert, und tragen sie so dazu bei, ihn zu entmythologisieren? Einige ehemaligeGefährten Monnets meinten ja. Sie reagierten heftig und warfen den Historikernvor, den noch gegenwärtigen Jean Monnet wie ein Relikt der grauen Vorzeit zubehandeln, oder noch schlimmer, ihn so grausam zu sezieren, daß am Ende nurnoch Einzelteile übrig blieben. Hier nun sind wir bei der Legende Jean Monnet, derim persönlichen Umgang, wie z.B. der ehemalige Bundeskanzler Helmut Schmidtbezeugt, eine faszinierende Persönlichkeit gewesen sein muß und viele führendeMitglieder der europäischen Klasse Europas in bemerkenswertem Maße beein-druckt hat. Mit der Legende oder dem Mythos setzen sich die junge HistorikerinElsa Guichaoua und Robert Frank auseinander. Sie diskutieren die VermarktungJean Monnets als „Vater Europas“ durch die Vereinigung der Freunde Jean Mon-nets, das Bedürfnis der Streiter der frühen Jahre und der heutigen Baumeister Euro-pas nach einem identitätsstiftenden Vorbild, wenn nicht gar „Heiligen“ der europäi-schen Integration. Dagegen setzen sie die Aufgabe des Historikers, sich nicht zumGehilfen von Identitätsstiftung zu machen, sondern sich so weit wie möglich derWahrheit anzunähern. Neben den sonstigen Verdiensten des Bandes lohnt schonallein die Auseinandersetzung zwischen Zeitzeugen und Historikern die Lektüre.

Gerhard BrunnUniversität Siegen

Douglas BRINKLEY and Richard T. GRIFFITHS (editors) –

John F. Kennedy andEurope.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1999, with a foreword by TheodoreSorensen, ISBN 0-8071-2332-3, pp. XVIII-349. – 44,95 £.

The editors tell us that these essays – and the papers upon which they are based,originally delivered at an October 1992 conference at the European UniversityInstitute in Florence – show ”how activist the Kennedy administration’s Europeanpolicy truly was, how open JFK was to new approaches aimed at further cementingthe Atlantic alliance. Kennedy was a true believer in European unity” (p.XVI).

The essays actually justify their claims, and illustrate some of the dynamicsactuated by JFK’s activism and openness. The problem with the book as such isthat it does not really go beyond these rather obvious statements: after all, no oneever seriously claimed that the Kennedy administration was not interested inEurope or was solely focused on crises in the Third World. Nor is the issue ofKennedy’s belief in European unity particularly controversial.

A good third of the book deals with the main personalities and their relation-ships (Alistair Horne on Kennedy and Macmillan; Roger Morgan on Kennedy andAdenauer; John Newhouse on De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons; David L. Di Leo


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on George Ball and the Europeanists in the State Department; Walt W. Rostow onKennedy’s View of Monnet and Viceversa; Douglas Brinkley on Dean Acheson andKennedy). While illustrative of ideas and idiosyncrasies, they tend to be ratherapologetic but involuntarily end up sketching a JFK who appears as keen onEurope as he is fundamentally unable to respond to De Gaulle’s challenge and ar-ticulate a workable strategy on Euro-American partnership.

Another group of essays deals with strategy and NATO issues. Lawrence S. Kaplanrecounts the debate on the Multilateral Force. Bernard J. Firestone and Carl Kaysenfocus on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Bruce R. Kuniholm discusses the issue of theJupiter missiles in Turkey. Leopoldo Nuti deals with the diplomatic and politicalimplications of the ”opening to the Left” in Italy. José Freire Antunes debates theKennedy Administration’s relationships with Portugal.

Finally, a third batch of essays (by Thomas Zoumaras, Richard Griffiths, YnzeAlkema, and William Diebold jr.) deals with the no less intricate topics of financial,monetary and commercial initiatives to restructure the Atlantic partnership in view ofthe changing role of Europe in the world economy, and particularly of the growingAmerican balance of payments problem.

Both these latter sets of essays present interesting new research that delves intothe multiple strands and intricacies of a trans-Atlantic relationship then undergoingmajor strains and changes. Here the major feature is the interaction between struc-tural continuity and conceptual innovation, and the individual assessments ofKennedy’s various proposals are judiciously balanced. All in all, they highlight theintellectual creativity of the “best and the brightest” as well as the ineffectual char-acter of many policies that remained marred by inconsistencies and could really notcome to grips with the challenges they were meant to meet.

Specialists dealing with this period and these topics will find many interesting sug-gestions and research acquisitions in these essays. What the reader will not find isan overall assessment of European policies against the larger background of theKennedy administration’s problems and strategies. The editors did not attempt topull the various strands together in a synthetic view, and while left unexplainedtheir choice can perhaps be seen as symptomatic of the inventive but incoherentand elusive character of Kennedy’s approach to Europe. As a conclusion of sortsthe reader can thus turn to Stuart Ward’s final essay on Kennedy, Britain and theEuropean Community. It skilfully shows the “difficulties of British and Americanpolicymakers in finding a common approach to the problem of De Gaulle andEurope” (p.318), and indicates that the actual course of European integration wasprimarily set – Kennedy’s belief notwithstanding – by De Gaulle’s ability to frust-rate many of the “fundamental elements of Kennedy’s Grand Design” (p.332).

Federico RomeroProfessor of North American History

Dipartimento discipline storicheUniversità di Bologna

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Andreas WILKENS (ed.) –

Interessen verbinden. Jean Monnet und die europäischeIntegration der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.

Bouvier Verlag, Bonn, 1999, 446 p. – ISBN3-416-02851-1 (HP) – 120,00 DM.

If we are to believe Andrew Moravcsik, then the role of supranational entrepreneurslike Jean Monnet, Walter Hallstein and Jacques Delors in the European integrationprocess has been greatly exaggerated. In his monumental The Choice for Europe(1998) Moravcsik even goes so far as to claim that their efforts tended “to be futile,and redundant, even sometimes counterproductive” (p.8). The contributors to Inter-essen verbinden. Jean Monnet und die europäische Integration would, at least as faras Monnet is concerned, definitely disagree with this verdict. They are convinced,and demonstrate persuasively, that Monnet has played a very effective and crucialrole during the first twenty years of the European integration process – especiallywith respect to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community andEuratom, the preamble added by the Bundestag to the Franco-German treaty offriendship, and the initiation of the first attempt at economic and monetary union.

Interessen verbinden contains sixteen chapters. In addition to thirteen chapterswritten by different scholars, three chapters are due to Helmut Schmidt, KatherinaFocke and Rita Süssmuth. To begin with these three, Schmidt’s chapter containssome observations on Monnet, as well as some reflections on the present state ofworld politics: the European powers have no choice but to go further down the roadto ever closer union. Focke mostly limits herself to recollections of her meetingswith Monnet, especially her private visits to the Monnet household in Houjarray.Süssmuth explains that Monnet’s achievements teach us that, although we shouldnever lose sight of our objective, what really matters are the methods to reach it.

As far as the scholarly chapters are concerned, Wolf Gruner discusses the evolu-tion of Monnet’s views on the “triad France-Europe-Germany” between 1940 and1952. Monnet was one of the first leading Frenchmen to see that the realities ofpost-war politics put an end to the schemes of French Western European domi-nance based on German subservience elaborated during the war, and to advocateinstead an active Franco-German partnership for the construction of a supranation-al Europe. In a lengthy essay Andreas Wilkens analyses the relationship betweenKonrad Adenauer and Monnet with respect to the European policy of the FederalRepublic 1950–1957. He concludes that Adenauer and Monnet both agreed on thedesirability of binding the Federal Republic to the West, but that the former, asopposed to the latter, regarded supranationality as no more than a means to save theGerman nation state, and did not believe in the “progressive fusion of national sov-ereignties”. Guido Thiemeyer deals with Monnet’s position concerning the plan fora supranational agricultural community propagated by Pierre Pfimlin. Despite theplan’s supranational aspects, Monnet did not embrace it. His only concern was tosee to it that this initiative would not interfere with the negotiations on the Schu-man Plan. Hans-Erich Volkmann reports on Adenauer, France and the vicissitudesof the European Defence Community (EDC). The defeat of the EDC in the FrenchAssembly was a severe set-back for both Adenauer and Monnet, but did not lessentheir determination to go further on the way of European unification. Michael


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Hollmann writes about Monnet’s succession as president of the High Authority.Although the West German authorities were in favour of Monnet staying on aspresident, the French were dead against it. Only at Messina did the Federal Repub-lic give way, and accepted René Mayer as Monnet’s successor. Werner Bührerreports on Monnet’s non-relationship with West German industrialists. The latternever changed their view of Monnet as an “extreme central planner”. KlausSchwabe compares the American interpretations of Atlantic partnership with that ofMonnet. He concludes that both the Americans and Monnet were in fundamentalagreement. They disagreed, however, on what was the best way to deter the SovietUnion. Whereas Monnet regarded European unification as the best deterrent, theAmericans, and with them the majority of British, French and German politicians,were of the opinion that everything depended on the credibility of their nuclearforces. Wilfried Loth discusses the development of Monnet’s relationship with deGaulle in the context of the latter’s plans for a political union. Initially, Monnetwelcomed de Gaulle’s initiative, notwithstanding its intergovernmental nature, andcooperated with him. Only after the French veto on British EEC membership andthe subsequent signing of the Franco-German treaty of friendship, did Monnet turnagainst the French president. Matthias Schönwald analyses Monnet’s and Hall-stein’s ideas about Europe. According to him the two friends, “with the same anten-na”, disagreed on the role the United Kingdom and the United States could play inEuropean integration. In contrast to Monnet, Hallstein was no firm supporter ofBritish entry, and, fearful of American hegemony, he wanted to keep the Americansat a distance. Matthias Schulz writes about the political friendship between KurtBirrenbach and Monnet and their role as initiators of the “Atlantic” preamble addedto the Franco-German treaty of friendship by the Bundestag. Hanns Jürgen Küstersexamines Monnet’s relations with the German chancellors from Adenauer toSchmidt. Monnet was in close contact with Adenauer, and he also established agood relationship with Willy Brandt, but he failed to do so with Kurt Georg Kiesin-ger and Schmidt, while in the case of Ludwig Erhard a relation simply did not ex-ist. Gérard Bossuat, finally, deals with Monnet’s role in the first attempt at Europe-an economic and monetary union in the beginning of the 1970s. After Brandt’selection as chancellor in the autumn of 1969, Monnet was able to convince theformer of the necessity of a German initiative in this field. At the summit of TheHague in December, the member states agreed to commission a report on the estab-lishment of an economic and monetary union. However, as a result of the collapseof the Bretton Woods system and the nationalistic reflexes this crisis set free, noth-ing came of this.

It will be evident from my overview, that this volume is rich in information. Manyof the contributions are also highly stimulating. I particularly enjoyed the chapters byWilkens, Thiemeyer, Loth and Bossuat. A few critical remarks may nevertheless bepermitted. The first is that Wilkens has not completely succeeded in turning the bookinto a whole. It remains unclear why the chapters written by the three retired politi-cians have been included. These offer precious little with respect to the book’s maintheme, Monnet and the integration of the Federal Republic in Europe. This remark

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also applies to Schwabe’s contribution. Several historical episodes are moreoverrelated more than once, and their interpretation varies according to the authors. Thiswould not matter much, if there were cross-references, but unfortunately these arealmost non-existent. This is especially annoying where authors discuss Monnet’srelations with Schmidt and Focke, and fail to take notice of their opinions on thismatter, as expressed in their own contributions to the volume.

My second point of criticism brings me back to Moravcsik’s argument on the role ofsupranational entrepreneurs. Without exception, the contributors accept the image ofMonnet as the “the father of Europe”. As a result, those of them who deal withMonnet’s part in the Rome Treaties, lightly pass over the fact that Monnet did hisutmost to torpedo the negotiations on the economic community. Apparently they are notwilling to face the fact that, in this case at least, Monnet’s actions were indeed “counter-productive”. Their image of Monnet also prevents them from seeing that the latter’s rolein the formulation of the Pleven Plan differed completely from that of the SchumanPlan. This time Monnet was kept under close surveillance by the French cabinet. It alsokeeps them from noticing that in the Pleven Plan the supranational aspect was subordi-nated to the intergovernmental aspect. No wonder that Monnet, as Adenauer explainedto Theodor Heuss, dissociated himself from the plan. Both Wilkens and Küsters noteAdenauer’s observation, but they do not attach any value to it.

This brings me to my final point of criticism. Insufficient attention is paid toMonnet’s isolated position in France itself. It is only in Focke’s essay that the read-er catches a glimpse of the controversy that prevailed in France about both Monnetand his supranational solutions. Focke relates that when she attended the solemnreburial of Monnet’s body in the Panthéon, Monnet’s daughter explained to her thatshe had given permission, because her father’s interment in the Panthéon was a“posthume Anerkennung für einen Mann, den führende französische Politiker oftabschätzig behandelt, ignoriert oder gar wegen seines übernationalen Denkansatzesals Verräter diffamiert hatten” (p.29).

It was actually for a very short time that France saw the creation of supranationalEuropean institutions (in which it would participate on an equal footing with the Fed-eral Republic) as a means of securing its position vis-à-vis that same Federal Repub-lic. With the launching of the Schuman Plan in the spring of 1950, supranationalitycame to the fore in quite a spectacular way; but hardly five months later traditionalthinking in intergovernmental terms prevailed once again. The brief burst of suprana-tionalism must be attributed to the surprise tactics used with the launching of theSchuman Plan. Before the French cabinet knew what plan it had accepted, this had al-ready been made public. From then on the French ministers followed all of Monnet’sactivities with great suspicion, as they considered him to be the man behind this faitaccompli policy. Although some of them had great difficulty with it, the ministersaccepted that it was best to let Monnet finish the job. It was, however, out of questionthat he would get a new one. The French cabinet gratefully acknowledged Monnet’sservices as far as the formulation of the Pleven Plan was concerned, but they did notwant his involvement in this plan to go any further.


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My conclusion that Monnet was already sidetracked in the French struggle forpower in the autumn of 1950, means that I believe that there is more to Moravcsik’sargument than the authors of Interessen verbinden probably would care to admit.However, their common blind spot has not prevented them from writing a book thatwill be enjoyed by everyone interested in the history of European integration.

Robert H. LieshoutUniversity of Nijmegen

Nijmegen Centre for German Studies

Fernando GUIRAO –

Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1957.Challenge and Response.

(St. Antony’s Series), Macmillan Press, London, 1998, 240 S. -ISBN 0-333-71078-9. – 45,00£.

Spanien blieb unter der Herrschaft Francos politisch in Europa isoliert. Als einzigeswesteuropäisches Land war es von der Marshall-Plan-Hilfe ausgeschlossen; es warweder Mitglied der Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)noch in die Europäische Zahlungsunion (EZU) eingebunden, und damit aus demSystem zunehmender ökonomischer Verflechtung der westeuropäischen Volkswirt-schaften nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg ausgeschlossen. Die Ursachen und Folgender Isolierung Spaniens untersucht Fernando Guirao auf der Grundlage umfas-sender Recherchen in spanischen, französischen, britischen und amerikanischenArchiven. Herausgekommen ist eine wirtschaftsgeschichtliche Studie, die auf einerbreiten Quellengrundlage die (west)europäische Dimension spanischer Außen- undAußenwirtschaftspolitik untersucht, und zugleich einen anspruchsvollen Beitrag zueiner multilateralen internationalen Geschichtsschreibung liefert. Guirao widerlegtdabei nicht nur eine Reihe gängiger Klischees über die Außenpolitiken dereuropäischen Staaten und der USA, sondern versteht das spanische Beispiel auchals Fallstudie über Grenzen und Reichweite multilateraler Verflechtungen.

Trotz gegenteiliger Verlautbarungen Francos wurde das Prinzip der Autarkienach 1945 aufgegeben, da sie ökonomisch, politisch und militärisch nicht haltbarwar. Die spanische Politik trug der Tatsache Rechnung, daß es traditionell regeAußenhandelsbeziehungen mit den westeuropäischen Ländern und den USA gege-ben hatte. Die politische Ächtung der Diktatur ging nicht unbedingt mit deren wirt-schaftlicher Isolierung einher, und sie kann daher auch nicht - wie von der spani-schen Propaganda behauptet worden ist - für das geringe wirtschaftliche WachstumSpaniens verantwortlich gemacht werden. Aber auch das gegenteilige Argument -mangelnde Bereitschaft zu ökonomischer Liberalisierung und ein ausgeprägterStaatsinterventionismus seien verantwortlich gewesen - ist nicht haltbar. Das Ver-hältnis zwischen externen und internen Faktoren zu gewichten, ist ein Ziel der Stu-die. Für eine direkte Einflußnahme Francos auf die Außenwirtschaftspolitik hatGuirao wenig Hinweise gefunden. Vieles spricht dafür, daß er für deren Detailskein Interesse zeigte, vielmehr pragmatisch orientierte Fachleute in der Admini-stration eine große Rolle spielten.

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Im ersten Teil seiner Studie nimmt der Autor die unmittelbare Nachkriegszeit inden Blick, in der Spanien wegen der Dollarlücke auf dem europäischen Kontinentzum begehrten Handelspartner avancierte. Der Import wichtiger strategischer Roh-stoffe und Grundnahrungsmittel von der iberischen Halbinsel half den euro-päischen Wirtschaften knappe Devisen zu sparen. Überdies ließ sich eine Lückefüllen, die Deutschland nach dem Zusammenbruch der Handelsbeziehungen mitSpanien gelassen hatte. Ganz pragmatisch standen nationale ökonomische Interes-sen im Vordergrund, die es den Handelspartnern erlaubten, trotz politischer Äch-tung Spaniens partiell ökonomisch zu kooperieren. Dies galt für Frankreich - trotzdes Abbruchs diplomatischer Beziehungen und der Schließung der Grenze zuSpanien - und für Großbritannien, dessen Regierungen die ,spanische Frage’handelspolitisch pragmatisch behandelten. Die politische Ächtung hatte alsozunächst keinen tatsächlichen Effekt auf die spanische Wirtschaft.

Entsprechend groß waren die Hoffnungen, die Spanien mit der Ankündigungdes Marshall-Plans verband, der im zweiten Teil der Studie behandelt wird. Voneiner Teilhabe am European Recovery Program (ERP) versprach sich Spanien ent-gegen gegenteiliger Behauptungen neben wirtschaftlichen Vorteilen auch eineinternationale Aufwertung des Regimes. Minutiös setzt sich der Verfasser miteinem vom spanischen Handelsminister ausgearbeiteten detaillierten Import-Pro-gramm auseinander, das vor dem Hintergrund der gewünschten Teilnahme am ERPerstellt wurde. Die zur Rekonstruktion der spanischen Wirtschaft notwendigenImporte lassen Rückschlüsse auf die wirtschaftliche Struktur des Landes zu, derenbesondere Defizite erwartungsgemäß auf dem industriellen Sektor und in der Infra-struktur zu finden waren. Vorhandene Kapazitäten wurden durch einen eklatantenMangel an Rohstoffen nicht ausgelastet. Das verhinderte Innovation und ökonomi-sche Modernisierung. Die spanische Administration war sich der Untauglichkeitwirtschaftlicher Autarkie durchaus bewußt und signalisierte die Bereitschaft zurLiberalisierung der Wirtschaft des Landes, nicht aber in Politik und Gesellschaft.Den Marshall-Plan nahm Spanien fälschlicherweise als wirtschaftliches, nicht aberals politisches Instrument wahr, das zum engeren Zusammenschluß Westeuropaszur Abwehr des Kommunismus beitragen sollte. Während Portugal in den Mar-shall-Plan einbezogen wurde, war weder in der Truman-Administration noch inden meisten europäischen Staaten eine gleichberechtigte Teilhabe Franco-Spanienspolitisch erwünscht. Guirao betrachtet dies als großen Fehler, da die Handelspolitikals Hebel für eine politische Liberalisierung des Systems hätte eingesetzt werdenkönnen. Zurecht weist er darauf hin, daß Isolation auf Dauer ein untaugliches Mit-tel der Politik darstellt, da es das isolierte Regime im Innern eher stärkt alsschwächt und so dessen Öffnung und seinen Wandel verhindert. Die Ideologisie-rung des Handels als politisches Mittel vor allem durch den Marshall-Plan habeeinen pragmatischen Umgang mit Spanien verhindert.

À la longue stellte der Ausschluß aus OEEC und EZU ein größeres Handicapfür die spanische Wirtschaft dar als die fehlenden ERP-Mittel. WirtschaftlichesWachstum war auch ohne Marshall-Plan-Hilfe möglich, wenn auch verzögert undunstabil. Der dritte Teil der Untersuchung widmet sich daher den Folgen der Bilate-


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ralität für die spanische Wirtschaft, die unter den Rahmenbedingungen einer multi-lateralen Verflechtung in Europa strukturelle Benachteiligungen schuf, die dieModernisierung Spaniens verzögerten. Von der EZU, dem ersten multilateralenZahlungssystem, das die Konvertierbarkeit der europäischen Währungen ermög-lichte und der ökonomischen Entwicklung entscheidende Impulse gab, war derspanische Peso bis 1961 ausgeschlossen. Anders als die EZU-Mitglieder konnteSpanien seine Zahlungsbilanzdefizite - ein Hauptproblem der spanischen Außen-wirtschaft - nicht über dritte Staaten ausgleichen. Einen pragmatischen Umgangmit Franco-Spanien zeigten alle OEEC-Mitgliedstaaten jedoch beim Abschlußbilateraler Handelsabkommen. Sie sahen aber vor allem Agrarexporte vor, die derspanischen Wirtschaft nur geringe Gewinne in harter Währung einbrachten und sodie Import-Kapazität auf einem niedrigen Niveau stabilisierten.

Eine Beschränkung auf bilaterale Abkommen entsprach zwar nicht dem Kurs derspanischen Regierung. Unter den gegebenen Umständen handelte sie aber so effektivwie möglich und richtete sich in der Situation ein. Auf diesem Umweg fand bereits inden 50er Jahren eine „Europeanization“ (S.205) der spanischen Wirtschaft statt. DieIsolierung Spaniens war also offensichtlich nicht so ausgeprägt, wie von Guirao ananderer Stelle behauptet. Ob die Einbindung in multilaterale europäische Organisa-tionen aber tatsächlich die politische und gesellschaftliche Liberalisierung beförderthätte, ist daher durchaus zweifelhaft und bleibt letztlich Spekulation. Insgesamtliefert die instruktive Studie einen wesentlichen Beitrag zum Verständnis der RolleSpaniens im internationalen System nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg.

Dr. Claudia HiepelUniversität-GH Essen

Fachbereich 1 - Geschichte

Antonio VARSORI –

L’Italia nelle relazioni internazionali dal 1943 al 1992.

Bari,Laterza & Figli Spa, 1998, 277 p. - ISBN 88-420-5645-6. - 40.000,00 Lire.

Among the research topics of the post-war international history, Italian foreign pol-icy stays in the background. It keeps arousing interest all the more in the age ofinterdependence, as further single national pieces combine into the complex pictureof international relations. Italy was not one of the major actors still in some casesits role cannot be overlooked. Alas, such interest remains largely frustrated. Animportant reason is that proper research based on official Italian documents cannotkeep pace with that of other Western countries. Because in Italy, in total ignoranceof the “thirty years rule”, released sources of the Foreign Ministry hardly cover themiddle of the 1950s; after that period, press, secondary sources and foreignarchives allow the researcher to follow the visible traces, but leave the deci-sion-making processes and rationales in the shadows. The seizure of documentarysources is all the more damaging in view of the scarcity of private papers and theopaque and complex nature of the topic, which besides may be a further reason forthe scarcity of works on Italian post-war foreign policy. Its vanishing clue, so hard

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to catch and to define, the elusiveness of Italy’s presence in the international set-ting, are peculiar features that need to be understood.

Antonio Varsori’s essay is full of evidence of this variety of elements. The firsthalf of the volume deals in detail with the period 1943-1957, and a second partskims through three and a half decades seeking for main lines, “continuities andchange” and tentative findings. It recognises the myths encompassing Italianforeign policy at home - full-heart idealist Europeanism, subordination to the USA,rejection of power projection, and anticolonialism – as well as the anthology ofquestions, idées reçues and commonplaces currently heard about Italy’s externalprofile– inconsistency, tours de valse, and opportunism in a merely negative sense.In fact, in Italy the gap between self-awareness and the way it is perceived byothers seems deeper than in most other countries. As commonplaces have alwayssome truth in them and myths respond to needs, the author’s effort to call thingswith their “proper” names makes this a useful book as well for experts as for thegeneral public.

For some time historians have argued that Italy’s policy of the late 1940s and1950s continued on traditional lines. By seeking a place in the Western alliance andin the European construction, Italy behaved during the Cold War as a faithful heirof its ancestors, trying to capitalise on its geopolitical position, with a clear idea ofwhat to seek: equality with the Allies and a regional power status. In the pursuit ofnational interests within the logic of power politics, Varsori sees a continuity withliberal and fascist nationalism that unveiled in moments such as the founding of theBrussels Pact and the Atlantic Alliance or during the ratification of the EDC Treatyin the attempted “blackmail” over the colonies and Trieste, whilst underlying thewhole Italian position all the time. Europeanism was therefore a cool-headedchoice: it was designed to render Italy its place among the winners and secure anaccess to developed economies, but it never overcame the bonds with the US. Ita-ly’s policy therefore was not different from that of the other West European coun-tries, who all devised European integration as the best way to pursue national aimsin interdependence, and used their weaknesses as negotiating tools with the US.

Paradoxically, this “nationalism” declined when Italy abandoned the strict adher-ence to the double way of Atlanticism-Europeanism. At the beginning of the 1960s,many countries resented the rigidity of bipolarity. But, by seeking a role in the MiddleEast, in the Mediterranean, by turning towards the Third World and searching for adirect dialogue with Moscow, the emerging political and economic groups of the “cent-er-left” not only expressed the recovered ambitions and means of a regional power, butanswered domestic political problems and fuelled a rapidly expanding economy. Theoverwhelming domestic political conflict and the gap between means and ends are thebasic explanations given to the inconsistency often reproached to Italian positions.Capabilities always fell short of ambitions and, in order to satisfy the Left of the coali-tion government, the Christian Democracy attempted to emulsify deeply diverse ingre-dients. The domestic practice to reconcile opposites and avoid choosing became a mod-el for foreign policy, where Italy sought a mediating role, allowing a many-sidedposition and dignifying the impossibility to choose. Varsori inserts in the analysis of


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foreign policy a recent debate over the vanishing of Italy’s national identity in thepost-war period. By way of an explanation for the birth of movements and parties re-jecting Italy’s unity in the last decade, many historians and political scientists have ar-gued that, unlike the other European countries, post-war Italy experienced a vanishingof people’s identity with a commonly accepted set of values and shared interests. As forforeign policy, Varsori sees the vanishing of the external national identity appearingduring the 1960s, and deepening in the following decade. “In a country deeply condi-tioned by a hard ideological confrontation, the idea of national identity and the need forseeking national interests – weakened during the 1960s – appeared to a majority of thepolitical leadership and opinion makers just like fanciful old style ambitions or reac-tionary attitude” (p.191). As the domestic situation deteriorated, foreign policy appearsmore and more as a sum of episodes in an increasingly distant international context,sometimes, as mere diplomacy to seek status per se. Italy’s external policy during the1970s was therefore “often weak and ambiguous” (p.190). The Christian Democracyled by Aldo Moro tried to face the risk of economic and political collapse by seeking anentente with the Communist Party, which was seen as a guarantee of order. Italy be-came the “sick man of Europe”, relying on, or imprisoned by the “fundamentals” of theEuropean and Atlantic framework: during the nasty period 1973-78 the external dimen-sion merely mirrored the domestic convulsions. The PCI itself, well aware of the limitsof Italian sovereignty, reformulated its foreign policy doctrine in order to soften Ameri-can opposition to its accession to power and West-European distrust toward Italy’seconomic future. However, too many unknown elements remain in the relations be-tween Italy and its allies that nothing more can be achieved than suspending judgement.

Overcoming the 1970s crisis also meant recovering serenity in external rela-tions and a capacity to play a meaningful role in the international system of the“second Cold War”. Again, external conditions, among them the papacy of KarolWoytjla, are acknowledged as having deeply influenced the domestic situation, thatin turn produced a new course in foreign policy. During the whole decade, theCommunist Party returned to formal, if not always real, opposition and a five-partycoalition was in power. For the first time since 1945, leaders from the minor parties,the Republican Party and the Socialist Party, held the Prime Ministry together withkey positions such as the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Defence. A few per-sons, Giovanni Spadolini, Lelio Lagorio, Bettino Craxi, Giulio Andreotti, whowere holding the keys of foreign policy capitalised on Italy’s ability to face eco-nomic and political problems, and opened the way for a recovered role in interna-tional affairs. The peacekeeping mission in Lebanon, in particular, appears as a keymoment because it reconciled the public opinion with the military as a concept andas a body, but also showed that in the end Italy was not completely a tool in Ameri-can hands. The 1980s appear to be in Varsori’s recollection as the time of the re-birth of a confident and growing country, in striking contradiction with the manydark sides of a political season that ended in the Tangentopoli affair. The processleading to the signing of the Single European Act in the mid 1980s however was atypical example of a too common attitude, when the rare chance to play a visiblerole was put after domestic preoccupation. In fact, after leading the European

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Council at Milan to launch the intergovernmental conference on the revision of theTreaties of Rome, against the opposition of Britain, Denmark and Greece, in theautumn of 1985 the Craxi-Andreotti couple fought lonely for a federal solution,wasting the newly-won credit in a lost battle mainly for domestic purposes.

The same domestic horizon, dominated by the “Clean Hands” process, ob-scured the decline of bipolarity and the tentative emergence of a new internationalsystem after 1992. Italy was indeed one of the countries less ready to grasp theneed for a reappraisal of a whole set of attitudes and habits. Looking at the Italiancase therefore suggests in an extreme way the interdependence between domesticand international spheres and the need for closer insight and deeper analysis.

Elena CalandriUniversità Degli Studi di Firenze

Susanna SCHRAFSTETTER –

Die Dritte Atommacht.

Britische Nichtverbreitungspolitikim Dienst von Statussicherung und Deutschlandpolitik, 1952-68. (Schriftenreihe derVierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Band 79), Oldenbourg Verlag, München, 1999, 254 S.,ISBN 3-486-64579-X. - 40,00 DM.

Recent test explosions of atomic devices by France, India and Pakistan, the dissolutionof the Soviet Union which threatened to create several new nuclear powers, and theendless tug-of-war between the United States and North Korea about the latter’s nucleararsenal show that nuclear non-proliferation will remain a core issue of internationalrelations in the 21st century. Already before the atomic age actually began, the U.S. andBritain went to great length in order to prevent the diffusion of nuclear know-how andtechnology. These efforts intensified when the nuclear club began to grow in the 1950s,and numerous candidates for the possession of nuclear weapons appeared to set intomotion a general trend towards a nuclearization of national defences. It was not only thedanger of nuclear holocaust, but also the attempt to preserve their privileged statusagainst the have-nots which motivated the start of an active nuclear non-prolifera-tion-policy by Washington, Moscow and London. This was a particularly prominentmotive in the activities of the British government, as S. Schrafstetters study of Britishnon-proliferation policy in the 1950s and 1960s forcibly demonstrates. Based on a com-prehensive evaluation of archival materials in Britain, Germany and the United States,she conveys the essentially defensive character of this policy, particularly vis-à-vis theeconomically ascendant Federal Republic.

Schrafstetter presents a broad array of compelling evidence which shows thatthe German question was indeed the “core concern of Britain’s non-proliferationpolicy” (p.43). When Prime Minister Macmillan enumerated the reasons for Brit-ain’s support of the Test Ban Treaty of 1963 he emphasised that “the most vital ofall, more important than stopping contamination of the atmosphere, is stopping thespread of nuclear weapons, especially of course to Germany” (p.76). Questions ofstatus were the dominant consideration behind these statements; the fear that anuclear Federal Republic might pursue an aggressively revisionist policy towards


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the East was secondary. The victory of the Labour Party in 1964 elections broughtno change in this basic outlook.

In the end, this British policy appeared to have been crowned by success; Bonnremained non-nuclear. However, the basic intention behind this strategy, that is topreserve a privileged position among the concert of great powers, failed. Already inthe late 1950s, the United Kingdom became technologically dependent on the UnitedStates and began to feel the detrimental influence of its nuclear policy on relationswith its European neighbours. When London, in the early 1960s, tried to compensateits exclusion from the process of European integration by trading nuclear cooperationfor concessions by France, this strategy backfired. De Gaulle’s veto to Britain’s EECmembership in 1963 made that only too obvious. Privileged relations with the U.S. innuclear matters and a leading role in Europe were mutually exclusive goals. Further-more, bilateral relations with Bonn stagnated during most of the 1960s, and much ofthis was due to Britain’s nuclear policy, as the ill-fated MLF affair and the protractednegotiations about the Non-Proliferation-Treaty of 1968 show.

Ideological attachment to the symbolic insignia of world power informed London’snuclear diplomacy much more than any rational calculation of an eventual threat tonational security. Ultimately, the British strategy was based on a tragic misjudgementbecause eventually industrial capacity, economic competitiveness and the effects of Eu-ropean integration turned out to be much more powerful assets in the international fieldthan the possession of nuclear weapons which are useful only in the most extra-ordi-nary of circumstances. By its successful sponsorship of the policy of keeping the Feder-al Republic away from the nuclear club, Britain might indeed have rendered even agood service to the Federal Republic which, from the late 1960s onward and despite theprotestations of a strong coalition of conservative hard-liners, was concentrating itsenergies on ultimately more profitable fields of state activity.

In her detailed exploration of the NPT-negotiations the author presents one ofthe first archive-based international histories of this process. She shows succinctlyhow Britain’s diplomats achieved all their immediate goals in the negotiations;however, due to the basic flaw in the British approach - the idea of cementing greatpower status by owing a few nuclear weapons more than other countries - this wasa futile victory which relegated Britain for a long time to an outsider position in theEuropean region. A demonstration of the often self-defeating nature of great powerideology, the study of Schrafstetter is an important contribution towards a morecomplete understanding of the dynamics of postwar international history.

Dr. Hubert ZimmermannFakultät für SozialwissenschaftLehrstuhl Internationale Politik

Ruhr Universität Bochum

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Eberhard BIRK –

Der Funktionswandel der Westeuropäischen Union (WEU) im euro-päischen Integrationsprozeß.

Ergon, Würzburg, 1999, 298 p. – ISBN 3-933563-32-1. –58,00 DM.

In his PhD Eberhard Birk from the University of Augsburg examines the functionalchange of the Western European Union (WEU) in the process of European integration.

So far most publications on WEU were predominantly descriptive. For the mostpart they were neglecting a structural analysis and the framework necessary to fullyunderstand and assess this institution against its historical background.

Birk’s politico-historical analysis approaches WEU by examining the functionalchange that it underwent up to the present. He does so by assessing underlying in-terests and events that were fundamental for the creation of the treaties. For thatpurpose, the author not only analyses the treaties themselves (Dunkirk Treaty;Brussels Pact; modified Brussels Pact in particular) but also takes into account un-derlying interests of important actors, in particular by evaluating their memoirs (i.e.Konrad Adenauer; Anthony Eden; François Mitterrand).

Following the author’s main hypothesis, the adoption of a treaty preceding thecreation of an international organisation depends on a primary objective, shared byall partners, which can (but must not necessarily) be followed by one or severalsecondary objectives. The primary function (Primärfunktion) will be a constantfactor as long as it becomes useless or will be replaced by a new primary function(p.39). According to Birk, only by working out these primary objectives in the longrun allows an adequate understanding of any international organisation.

An important contribution lies in emphasising that WEU’s primary objective,by the time of its creation and for the following three decades, was to control Ger-many’s Bundeswehr in the making, an objective especially pursued by France andeventually accepted by Bonn. Thus, the WEU was if not literally then at least in thespirit of the modified Brussels Pact, more of an intra-oriented “weapons controlregime”, set up essentially in order to tame the German army (p.80).

In contrast and misleadingly, many historical analyses of the WEU only takeinto account its current primary function – promoting a European Security andDefence Identity (ESDI) – and take this as a criterion for judging its functions then.However, the WEU’s current function only developed by the mid-eighties, whenchanges in international politics allowed for a change of its primary objective.

Due to its relatively strict construction of a mutual assistance formula, ex-pressed in article 5 of the modified Brussels Pact, the WEU has often been said toactually imply a rigid mutual assistance towards its members. In contrast, Birkshows that mutual assistance is not even a secondary function (nor a function at all)of the WEU since it never had military structures independent from NATO to trans-late that obligation into reality. Therefore, the “formula of mutual assistance inarticle 5 remained without practical meaning” (p.82). In this regard, comparingboth institutions and their functions will always be somewhat misleading (pp.41f;pp.73ff; p.103; p.105).


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Also, Birk convincingly proves that characterising the WEU as the “modifiedBrussels Pact” is at the least problematic since the content of the initial pact hadbeen changed substantially. The unspoken objective of the Brussels Pact was tocreate NATO, not anticipating that a WEU might be established at some point. The“modified Brussels Pact", in contrast, was clearly a “weapons control regime",especially by means of the newly established Agency for Arms Control, imposingabsolute and relative constraints on its members (p.79ff). The essential function ofthe WEU appears in the protocols Nr. II - IV of the modified Brussels Pact, aimingat a political control of the German army (p.222).

Even if the secondary function(s) (Sekundärfunktionen) are not imperative forthe adoption of the treaty, they will allow to master institutionally unanticipatedsituations and tasks, thus contributing to the stabilisation of an international organi-sation. In regard to the WEU, its secondary functions made it a relatively successfulinstitution inasmuch as it provided fora for dealing with several divers topics, suchas the Saar-question or Great Britain’s interest in coordinating politico-economicalissues with members of the European Community (EC) after de Gaulle had deniedLondon admittance to the EC (p.41). The WEU was successful because it could fle-xibly handle various dissimilar issues on the secondary functions level.

According to Birk, the current primary function of the WEU – i.e. the develop-ment of the ESDI – emerging in the mid-eighties when the Rome Declaration of1984 and the Hague Platform of 1987 had pinned down WEU to the fields of secu-rity and defence (p.125). But how is this turning point to be explained?

The ESDI emerged as the new function from the changed framework conditions ofsecurity policy in international politics. Especially, frictions among NATO partners onthis side and beyond the Atlantic over security issues – SALT and ABM treaties of theseventies; SDI; an increasing bilateralism of the superpowers - accelerated the requestof some Europeans (especially the French) for a Security and Defence Identity of theirown. Besides, the WEU Parliamentary Assembly played a crucial role in urging for theESDI since the Assembly constantly stressed the European dimensions of the WEUcompared to the more intergovernmental approach of the Council.

Birk therefore emphasises not to talk about a “revitalisation” of the WEU duringthat period, since with a new function – developing the ESDI - something qualitative-ly different emerged. Instead, one should rather talk of a “political reinterpretation”(p.127) or “qualitatively changed repolitisation” (p.155). The old primary function –arms control - declined by that time down to zero since retaining it would have prov-en dysfunctional. This meant a change in quality (and not only a gradual change)since the quality of the basis of the agreement had been changed in essence. Fromthat time onward, the WEU became a specialised organisation and its “secondaryfunctions” as a feature of the “old” WEU entirely disappeared (p.127).

Concerning its new function Birk comes to the conclusion that the WEU didpromote the process of European integration, but could not substantially serve as itscatalyst. Presently, after the Eastern enlargement process, the Union’s status is thatof a “contractor” (Subunternehmer) under the EU for defence issues. The futurefunction consists in reinforcing its contribution to the ESDI and serving as a mili-

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tary / politico-military executive organ especially for carrying out the so-called“Petersberg-Missions” for the EU, including the possibility of “out-of-area” opera-tions. Consequently, the WEU will be (or better: is already being) transformedfrom a political to a military instrument (pp.217-227).

Altogether, Birk’s analysis offers a subtle and comprehensive investigation ofthe WEU’s functional change in the course of time that allows to judge its historicalfoundations as well as its current role more adequately.

Sebastian MayerResearch Fellow

Free University of Berlin

William I. HITCHCOCK –

France Restored. Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest forLeadership in Europe, 1944-1954.

Chapel Hill/London, The University of North CarolinaPress, 1998, 291 S. – ISBN 0-8078-47478-X. – 12,50 £.

Nachdem sich die Forschung über die Anfänge des Kalten Krieges und die Rekonstruk-tion Westeuropas zunächst vor allem auf die Rolle der USA und Großbritannienskonzentriert hatte, rückt seit einigen Jahren Frankreich stärker in den Mittelpunkt desInteresses. Verhielt sich die französische Seite tatsächlich so passiv, kurzsichtig oderdestruktiv, wie es die ältere Literatur nahelegt? Oder vermochte sich Frankreich,ungeachtet seiner militärischen und wirtschaftlichen Schwäche, in weit höherem Maßegegen die amerikanische Vormacht zu behaupten als bisher angenommen?

Um diese Fragen zu beantworten, zeichnet Hitchcock auf der Grundlage franzö-sischer, britischer und amerikanischer Akten die französische Rekonstruktions-,Europa- und Sicherheitspolitik während der ersten Dekade des Kalten Kriegesdetailliert nach. Drei Themenkomplexe interessieren ihn dabei ganz besonders: Das„Vermächtnis“ der Vierten Republik, der Beitrag der Vereinigten Staaten zur politi-schen und wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Nachkriegseuropas und die Anfänge dereuropäischen Einigungsbestrebungen.

Entgegen früheren Auffassungen zieht er eine insgesamt positive Bilanz derfranzösischen Politik zwischen Kriegsende und der Mitte der 1950er Jahre. Frank-reich habe die Nachkriegsordnung entscheidend geprägt, indem die französischeDiplomatie über die Verwendung der Marshallhilfe mitbestimmt, den wirtschaftli-chen Wiederaufbau Westdeutschlands eingedämmt, dessen föderalen politischenAufbau gestärkt und dessen Wiederbewaffnung gebremst, die deutsch-französischeAussöhnung forciert und eine führende Rolle in der westlichen Allianz eroberthabe: „Despite the apparent dependence on American aid, French planners weresuccesful in outlining and pursuing a national strategy that advanced Frenchinterests, cleverly skirting and at times adapting to American priorities“ (S.208).Die USA seien auf diese Weise gezwungen worden, auf die Interessen Frankreichsweit stärker Rücksicht zu nehmen, als nach dem Kräfteverhältnis zwischen den bei-den Ländern zu erwarten gewesen wäre. Auch die französische Integrationspolitik


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deutet er in diesem Sinne „as a function of an overall national strategy that soughtto enhance the nation’s influence within Europe and the Atlantic Alliance“ (S.204).

Die Geschichte des Kalten Krieges, so könnte man die Ergebnisse der Studiemit John Lewis Gaddis, der ein Vorwort beigesteuert hat, zusammenfassen, verliefwesentlich komplizierter als lange Zeit angenommen: “If there was an American‚empire by invitation’ in post-World War II Europe, this was one in which the sub-jects instructed als well as invited the emperor” (S.X). Völlig neu ist diese Erkennt-nis allerdings ebensowenig wie die These von der konstruktiven Europa- undDeutschlandpolitik Frankreichs. Nicht zuletzt die deutsche Forschung hat seitMitte der 1980er Jahre wiederholt auf die maßgebliche Rolle Frankreichs bei derEingliederung Westdeutschlands in die westliche Gemeinschaft und der IntegrationEuropas hingewiesen. Sich mit dieser Literatur auseinanderzusetzen, hat Hitchcockbedauerlicherweise versäumt – sein Buch hätte davon gewiß profitiert.

Werner BührerTechnische Universität München

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Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen

Marc Trachtenberg, Christopher GehrzAmerica, Europe, and German Rearmament, August-September 1950

In September 1950, the U.S. government demanded that the NATO allies agree to the rearmament ofWest Germany openly and immediately. The American government said it would not send over acombat force that could serve as the heart of an effective defence system for the NATO area unlessthis demand were accepted. This heavy-handed policy is traditionally interpreted as the outcome of abureaucratic conflict within the U.S. government: the military authorities, it is said, would only agreeto deploy the troops if the allies agreed to German rearmament, and Secretary of State Acheson reluc-tantly gave way to the military on this issue. Using a variety of archival sources, this article challen-ges that view. It concludes that what the U.S. government did in September 1950 has to be under-stood in political terms: Acheson deliberately decided to take a very tough line with the NATO alliesat the time. That policy choice, it is argued, had a major bearing on U.S.-European relations, and hada certain bearing even on the European integration process.

Les Etats-Unis, l’Europe et le réarmement allemand. Critique d’un mythe (août-septembre 1950)

En septembre 1950, le gouvernement des Etats-Unis demande à ses alliés européens de l’allianceatlantique de se rallier ouvertement et immédiatement au réarmement de l’Allemagne fédérale, disantqu’une acceptation du principe constituerait le préalable à l’envoi des troupes américaines de combatdestinées à constituer l’épine dorsale de l’OTAN pour la défense en Europe. Cette façon de procéderà la manière forte est traditionnellement présentée comme le résultat d’un conflit bureaucratique ausein de l’administration américaine: les autorités militaires auraient subordonné le déploiement detroupes à l’acceptation par les alliés du réarmement allemand, et le secrétaire d’Etat Dean Acheson,malgré lui, aurait emboîté le pas des militaires. C’est ce que le présent article cherche à relativiser. Enutilisant diverses sources d’archives, il démontre que l’action de Washington en septembre 1950 doitêtre envisagée en des termes politiques: Acheson a délibérément décidé d’adopter à l’égard des parte-naires de l’OTAN une ligne de conduite assez rude. Ce choix ternissait les relations américano-euro-péennes et avait aussi une certaine incidence sur le processus d’intégration européenne.

Die Vereinigten Staaten, Europa und die deutsche Aufrüstung (August-September 1950): die Kritik eines Mythos

Im September 1950 verlangte die Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten von ihren NATO-Partnern eineoffene und sofortige Zustimmung in der Frage der Wiederbewaffung Westdeutschlands. Die Ameri-kaner sagten, sie würden ihre zum Kernstück der Verteidigung Europas aufgestellten Kampftruppenerst dann entsenden, wenn diese Bedingung erfüllt sei. Der schroffe Umgang mit den Alliierten wirdgemeinhin als Auswuchs eines bürokratischen Konfliks innerhalb der US-Verwaltung interpretiert:die Spitze der Militärs, sagt man, hätte dem Truppenaufmarsch erst dann zugestimmt, wenn die Alli-ierten sich mit der deutschen Aufrüstung einverstanden erklärt hätten, und Staatssekretär Dean Ache-son habe sich widerwillen diesen Forderungen der Militärs gebeugt. Der vorliegende Artikel bestrei-tet dies. Anhand verschiedener Archivquellen zeigt er, dass Washingtons Vorgehensweise imSeptember 1950 durchaus politisch aufzufassen ist: Acheson hat ganz bewusst eine harte Gangart mitden NATO-Partnern eingelegt. Diese politische Ausrichtung, so wird argumentiert, übte einenbestimmenden Einfluss auf die amerikanisch-europäischen Beziehungen aus; sie hatte auch einengewissen Einfluss auf den europäischen Integrationsprozess.


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Paul M. Pitman“Un Général qui s'appelle Eisenhower”:


This article reconsiders the role of geopolitics in the formation of the European Economic Commu-nity (EEC). Instead of arguing that either economic goals or strategic ambitions were the primarydrivers of foreign economic policy in the mid-1950s, it shows how the two sets of concerns actedtogether to shape policy-making in France and Germany. Fundamental questions regarding the dura-bility of Atlantic economic ties and the reliability of NATO deterrence pushed the French and Ger-man governments toward a new strategic and economic partnership. The reorganization of the Euro-pean economic order was the result not of any single incident such as the Suez Crisis or the FreeTrade Area proposal but of persistent tensions within the Atlantic system, which influenced - but didnot determine - domestic economic policy processes.

«Un Général qui s'appelle Eisenhower»: la crise atlantique et les origines de la Communauté Economique Européenne

Le présent article reconsidère le rôle de la géopolitique dans la formation de la Communauté Econo-mique Européenne (CEE). Au lieu d'argumenter que soit des objectifs économiques, soit des ambi-tions stratégiques eussent été les moteurs primaires de la politique extérieure économique au milieudes années 1950, il montre combien des considérations relevant des deux domaines agissaientconjointement pour façonner les décisions politiques en France et en Allemagne. Des problèmesfondamentaux telles le caractère durable des liens économiques transatlantiques ou la fiabilite de laforce de dissuasion de l'OTAN incitèrent les gouvernements français et allemand à développer unnouveau partenariat stratégique et économique. La réorganisation de l'ordre économique européen nerésultait nullement d'un incident isolé, à l'exemple de la crise de Suez ou du projet de la Zone deLibre-Echange, mais des tensions persistantes au sein du système atlantique qui, sans être détermi-nantes, influençaient néanmoins la formulation de la politique économique dans chaque pays.

„Ein General namens Eisenhower“: Die Atlantikkrise und die Anfänge der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinsschaft

Der vorliegende Beitrag analysiert die Geopolitik bei der Entstehung der Europäischen Wirtschafts-gemeinschaft (EWG). Statt zu argumentieren, dass entweder wirtschaftliche Ziele oder strategischeAmbitionen die primär treibende Kraft der Außenwirtschaftspolitik in der Mitte der fünfziger Jahregewesen seien, zeigt der Artikel, wie die beiden erwähnten Bereiche eigentlich zusammenspieltenund den Entscheidungsprozess in Frankreich und in Deutschland gestalteten. Grundlegende Fragenwie die Dauerhaftigkeit der atlantischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen oder die Zuverlässigkeit der NATOAbschreckungsstrategie veranlassten die französische und deutsche Regierungen dazu, eine neuestrategische und wirtschaftliche Partnerschaft anzustreben. Die Umwandlung der europäischen Wirt-schaftsordnung wurde keineswegs ausgelöst durch einzelne Ereignisse wie die Suezkrise oder derVorschlag einer europäischen Freihandelszone, sondern durch die dauerhaften Spannungen imatlantischen System, welche die innere Wirtschaftspolitik zwar nicht bestimmten, aber maßgebendbeinflussten.


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Francis J. Gavin, Erin MahanHegemony or Vulnerability?

Giscard, Ball, and the 1962 Gold Standstill Proposal

What was the character of America's international monetary relations with Europe during the early1960's, and how were they related to the larger transatlantic political questions of the day? Usingnewly opened sources on both sides of the Atlantic, this essay challenges the long-held view that theUnited States was committed to maintaining its "hegemonic power" by propping up the BrettonWoods system. Similarly, the authors undermine the standard belief that French international mone-tary policy was singularly anti-American in the early 1960’s.

New evidence reveals that in 1962, to the great surprise of the Kennedy administration, French Ministerof Finance Valéry Giscard d'Estaing offered to help the United States with its balance of payments deficit andgold losses. Inspired by Giscard's hints of support, Undersecretary of State George Ball and key members ofthe Council of Economic Advisors crafted a monetary plan whose central component was a controversialgold standstill agreement. In return for a European promise to formally limit their gold purchases from theAmerican Treasury, the United States would move aggressively to end its balance of payments deficit. At theend of this arrangement, a new international monetary agreement would be negotiated with the Europeans toreplace Bretton Woods. Surprisingly, many within the Kennedy administration were willing to sacrifice thecentral role of the dollar and its "seigneuriage" privileges in any new system, a position that would have hadmuch appeal for the Europeans. This article investigates the furious debate within the Kennedy administra-tion over the plan and explains why nothing came of Giscard’s apparent willingness to help ease the dollarand gold outflow problem.

Hégémonie ou vulnérabilité?Giscard d'Estaing, Ball, et le Gold Standstill Proposal de 1962

Quelles étaient au début des années 1960 les relations monétaires internationales entretenues par lesAméricains avec l'Europe; quel était le rapport entre ces questions monétaires et les relations politi-ques transatlantiques en général? En utilisant des sources récemment ouvertes au public de part etd'autre de l'Atlantique, le présent article défie l'idée longtemps reçue que les Etats-Unis se seraientengagés à sauvegarder leur "puissance hégémonique" en soutenant le système de Bretton Woods. Enmême temps, les auteurs contestent aussi la vieille croyance que la politique monétaire internationalepratiquée en ces temps-là par la France aurait été particulièrement anti-américaine.

Les nouvelles données révèlent qu'en 1962, à la grande surprise de l'administration Kennedy, le ministrefrançais des Finances Valéry Giscard d'Estaing offrait son aide pour juguler le déficit américain de la balancedes payements et les sorties d'or. George Ball, le sous-secrétaire d'Etat et d'autres membres influents duCouncil of Economic Advisors s'inspirèrent alors des suggestions de Giscard pour développer un plan moné-taire controversé dont le point de mire était une "trêve de l'or". En échange de la promesse formelle de limiterleurs achats d'or auprès du Trésor américain, les Européens recevraient des Etats-Unis l'engagement queceux-ci s'attacheraient sérieusement à couper court au déficit de leur balance des payements. Au terme de cetarrangement, un nouvel accord monétaire international serait négocié avec les Européens afin de remplacercelui de Bretton Woods. Etonnamment beaucoup de monde à l'intérieur de l'administration Kennedy étaitprêt à sacrifier dans ce nouveau système le rôle central du dollar et ses privilèges de "seigneuriage". En voilàune position qui aurait eu beaucoup d'attrait pour les Européens. Le présent article analyse les débats serrésdéclenchés par le plan au sein du staff américain et explique pourquoi finalement il n'est rien sorti de concretde cette apparente bonne volonté giscardienne de contribuer à enrayer l'exode du dollar et de l'or.

Hegemonie oder Schwäche?Giscard d'Estaing, Ball und der Gold Standstill Vorschlag von 1962

Wie gestaltete sich in den frühen sechziger Jahren Amerikas internationale Währungspolitik gegen-über Europa; und wie war diese in das allgemeine Tagesgeschäft der transatlantischen Beziehungeneingebunden? Neue, erst seit geraumer Zeit zugängliche Quellen aus Beständen beiderseits desAtlantik ermöglichen es die herkömmliche Meinung, dass die Vereinigten Staaten ihre hegemoniale


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Macht durch ein Festhalten am Bretton Wooods System absichern wollten, infrage zu stellen.Genauso bezweifelt der vorliegende Aufsatz auch die Standardvorstellung, Frankreichs internationaleWährungspolitik sei damals ganz besonders anti-amerikanisch ausgerichtet gewesen.

Neue Erkenntnisse zeigen wie 1962 - zur gro_en Überraschung der Kennedy-Administration -der französische Finanzminister Valéry Giscard d'Estaing den Vereinigten Staaten sein Hilfe anbot,um die Probleme der defizitären Zahlungsbilanz und der Goldausfuhr zu bereinigen. Beflügelt durchGiscards angkündigte Unterstützung, arbeiteten der beigeordnete Staatssekretär George Ball und füh-rende Mitglieder des Council of Economic Advisors einen Plan aus, in dessen Mittelpunkt ein kon-troversiertes Goldstillhalteabkommen stand. Als Gegenleistung für ein ausdrückliches europäischesVersprechen zukünftig Goldeinkäufe in den USA einzuschränken, würden die Amerikaner ihr Defizitder Zahlungsbilanz nun verschärft bekämpfen. Danach sollte ein neues internationales Währungsab-kommen mit den Europäern verhandelt werden. Es würde jenes von Bretton Woods ersetzen.Erstaunlich ist, wie viele Leute der Kennedy-Administration bereit waren die zentrale Rolle des Dol-lars und seine "herrschaftlichen" Privilegien in einem neuen System aufzugeben das den Europäerndoch sehr entgegengekommen wäre. Der vorliegende Aufsatz untersucht die heftigen Debatten dieder Plan innerhalb der amerikanschen Verwaltung ausgelöst hatte, und erklärt auch warum aus Gis-cards gutem Willen das Problem der Dollar- und Goldausfuhr zu entschärfen nichts wurde.


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Hubert ZimmermannWestern Europe and the American Challenge: Conflict and Cooperation in Technology and

Monetary Policy, 1965-1973

This survey of transatlantic relations during the 1960s and early 1970s analyses, by concentrating onthe fields of monetary and technology policies, the causes and consequences of the erosion of Euro-pean-American relations in this period. The lacking interest of the United States for an expansion ofcollaboration in high technology sectors left numerous existing possibilities unexplored. At the sametime, an already existing structure of mutual cooperation in monetary policy, the Bretton Woods sys-tem, broke down, mainly due to an increasing unilateralism on part of the United States. The mostimportant consequence of these “American challenges” was an intensification of European coopera-tion. The EC summit of The Hague in December 1969 was the most visible expression of thisreaction. The decisions to create a monetary union, increase technological cooperation and realise acommon foreign and security policy bore witness to this trend.

L’Europe occidentale et le défi américain:conflits et coopération dans les domaines de la technologie et de la politique monétaire

(1965-1973)

L’analyse des relations transatlantiques dans les domaines de la politique monétaire et technologiqueau cours des années soixante, début soixante-dix, révèle les causes et conséquences d’une érosion desrapports entre Européens et Américains. Tandis qu’en matière des technologies de pointe les possibil-ités réelles d’une extension de la coopération ne sont pas épuisées, à défaut d’un intérêt de la part desAméricains, la coopération déjà existante dans le domaine monétaire, c’est-à-dire le système deBretton Woods, s’effondre. L’unilatéralisme monétaire croissant des Etats-Unis en est la principalecause. En réaction à ce «défi américain», les Européens intensifient leur coopération intra-commun-autaire. La chose devient particulièrement manifeste à l’occasion du sommet de La Haye (décembre1969) où sont adoptées les décisions de créer une union monétaire, de pousser la collaboration tech-nologique et de mettre en œuvre une politique étrangère et de sécurité européenne.

Westeuropa und die amerikanische Herausforderung:Rivalität und Zusammenarbeit in den Bereichen Technologie- und Währungspolitik, 1965-1973

Anhand eines Überblicks über die transatlantischen Beziehungen in den Bereichen der Währungs-und Technologiepolitik in den 1960er und frühen 1970er Jahren werden die Ursachen und Folgen derErosion der europäisch-amerikanischen Beziehungen in diesem Zeitraum analysiert. Während aufdem Gebiet der Hochtechnologien bestehende Möglichkeiten zu einer Ausweitung der Kooperationaufgrund des Desinteresses der USA unterblieben, brach im Währungsbereich eine schon exist-ierende transatlantische Kooperationsstruktur, das Bretton Woods System, zusammen. Die Haupt-ursache dafür war der zunehmende Unilateralismus der USA in der Währungspolitik. Die wichtigsteKonsequenz dieser „amerikanischen Herausforderungen“ war die Intensivierung der europäischenZusammenarbeit. Die EG-Gipfelkonferenz von Den Haag im Dezember 1969, auf der Beschlüsse zurSchaffung einer gemeinsamen Währung, zur verstärkten Zusammenarbeit im Technologiebereichund zur Verwirklichung einer gemeinsamen Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik gefaßt wurden, war dersichtbarste Ausdruck dieser Reaktion.


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Georges-Henri SoutouPresident Pompidou and the relations between the US and Europe

Georges Pompidou aimed at improving Franco-American relations profoundly within the frameworkof a triangular structure constituted by America, France and Europe, with France occupying a privi-leged position. An important Franco-American agreement along these lines with far-reaching conse-quences on the political, economic and military level didn’t seem out of reach in 1970-71. Howeverthis agreement failed (the Azores Conference in December 1971 being a decisive turning-point) forstructural reasons: besides the intrinsic complexity of certain problems like monetary or nuclearquestions that didn’t further compromises, Pompidou who after all was more Gaullist than peopleused to think at that time was not in the least willing to make the slightest concession in matter ofnational independence no more than to draw closer to Nato beyond very restricted limits or to acceptan international monetary agreement confirming American superiority without compensation. As toNixon and Kissinger they certainly were more positive towards France than Kennedy and Johnsonhad been, but despite their proclaiming the vision of a multipolar world in which Europe could playits part, they didn’t nevertheless renounce American leadership within the Atlantic framework.

But there were also economic causes considering the crises of autumn 1973 and also due to the factthat from that year, with the end of the Vietnam war and in the aftermath of the international upheaval dueto the Nixon shock of 1971 and to SALT, the US depended less on France to make prevail their concep-tions in Europe and in the world and were thus in a position to display a more demanding attitude. GeorgesPompidou, on the other hand, in view of international uncertainties and anxieties aroused by Moscow andBonn, switched back to a more strictly Gaullist conception of his foreign policy.

Georges Pompidou however never sought the rupture with Washington. Even in the worstmoments (autumn 1973 and winter 1973-1974) he continued to advocate compromise solutions. As aresult, Pompidou’s efforts to achieve a rapprochement with Washington bore posthumous fruit:nuclear cooperation taken up again by his successors, the Ottawa declaration of June 1974, the Valen-tin-Ferber agreements of the 3d July of the same year regarding cooperation between the 1

st

Armyand Nato. These texts defined the relations between France and Nato up to the 80ies.


Georges Pompidou a recherché une amélioration profonde des relations franco-américaines, dans le cadred’un ensemble triangulaire Amérique-France-Europe où la France aurait joué un rôle privilégié. En1970-1971 un grand accord franco-américain dans cette direction, avec des conséquences importantes surles trois plans, politique, économique, militaire ne paraissait pas hors de portée. Cependant cet accord aéchoué (la conférence des Açores de décembre 1971 fut là un tournant essentiel) pour des raisons struc-turelles: outre la complexité intrinsèque de certains problèmes comme les questions monétaires ounucléaires, qui ne facilitaient pas les compromis, Pompidou était quand même plus «gaulliste» qu’on nel’a cru souvent à l’époque, et nullement disposé à faire la moindre concession en matière d’indépendancenationale ou à se rapprocher de l’OTAN au-delà de très étroites limites, ou encore à accepter un accordmonétaire international entérinant la supériorité américaine sans contreparties. Quant à Nixon et Kissingerils étaient certes plus constructifs à l’égard de la France que Kennedy et Johnson, mais, malgré leur visionproclamée d’un monde multipolaire où l’Europe jouerait son rôle, ils ne renonçaient tout de même pas au

leadership

américain dans le cadre atlantique.Mais il y eut aussi des causes conjoncturelles: les crises de l’automne 1973, et aussi le fait qu’à partir

de cette année-là, avec la fin de la guerre du Vietnam et à la suite du bouleversement international dû auchoc Nixon de 1971 et aux SALT, les Etats-Unis avaient moins besoin de la France pour faire triompherleurs conceptions en Europe et dans le monde et pouvaient donc se montrer plus exigeants envers elle.Tandis que Georges Pompidou, devant les incertitudes internationales et les inquiétudes que lui inspiraientMoscou et Bonn, revenait à une conception plus strictement gaulliste de sa politique extérieure.

Cependant Georges Pompidou ne rechercha jamais la rupture avec Washington. Même aux piresmoments (automne 1973 et hiver 1973/74) il resta partisan de formules de compromis. Du coup le rap-prochement avec Washington voulu par Pompidou eut des fruits posthumes: la coopération nucléairereprise par ses successeurs, la déclaration d’Ottawa de juin 1974, les accords Valentin-Ferber du 3 juillet


173

de la même année concernant la coopération entre la 1

ère

Armée et l’OTAN. Les rapports entre la France etl’OTAN restèrent définis par ces textes jusqu’aux années 80.

Präsident Pompidou und die amerikanisch-europäischen Beziehungen

Georges Pompidou strebte nach einer Verbesserung der französisch-amerikanischen Beziehungeninnerhalb einer Dreieckstruktur Amerika-Frankreich-Europa in dessen Rahmen Paris eine vorrangigeRolle übernommen hätte. Um 1970/71 schien ein derart gestaltetes großes französisch-amerika-nisches Abkommen mit wichtigen politischen, wirtschaftlichen und militärischen Auswirkungenauch tatsächlich möglich. Trotdem scheiterte die Verständigung (die Konferenz auf den Azoren imDezember 1971 bildet diesbezüglich einen entscheidenden Wendepunkt). Neben der besonderenKomplexität mancher Fragen, insbesondere im währungs– oder nuklearpolitischen Bereich – sie warnicht dazu angetan einen Kompromiss zu fördern – gestaltete sich die letztlich starre Haltung beiderSeiten als ausschlaggebend für den Misserfolg. Pompidou war doch weit mehr „gaullistisch“ als mandamals glaubte. Er war weder bereit auch nur die geringsten Zugeständnisse in Sachen nationaleUnabhängigkeit zu machen, noch eine Annäherung Frankreichs an die Nato über gewisse, sehr enggezogene Grenzen hinaus zu dulden. Genauso wenig akzeptierte er ein internationales Währungsab-kommen das allzu einseitig die amerikanische Überlegenheit anerkannte. Nixon und Kissinger ihr-erseits waren zwar Frankreich gegenüber konstruktiver gesinnt als Kennedy und Johnson, und trotz-dem waren auch sie nicht bereit die amerikanische Vorherrschaft im atlantischen Bündnisaufzugeben. Daran änderte auch ihre Vison einer multipolaren Weltordnung nichts, in der Europaeine grössere Rolle hätte spielen sollen.

Es gab aber auch konjukturbedingte Gründe für den Misserfolg: die Krisen im Herbst 1973 und dieallgemein veränderte internationale Lage in Folge des Nixonschocks von 1971, der SALT-Gesprächeund der Beendigung des Vietmankrieges. All dies bewirkte dass die USA weniger auf FrankreichsMitwirkung angewiesen waren, um ihre Vorstellungen in Europa und der Welt durchzusetzen.Französischerseits veranlassten die internationale Unsicherheit und die Beunruhigung über dieMoskauer und Bonner Politik Pompidou zu einer streng gaullistisch ausgerichteten Konzeption seinerAußenpolitik zurückzukehren.

Georges Pompidou suchte aber nie den offenen Bruch mit Washington. Sogar im Augenblick derschlimmsten Krisen (Herbst 1971; Winter 1973/74) blieb er stets ein Verfechter von Kompromiss-lösungen. Die von ihm gewollte französisch-amerikanische Annäherung trug denn auch ihre Früchtenach seinem Tod: die von seinen Nachfolgern wieder aufgenommene Zusammenarbeit im Nuklear-bereich; die Ottawa-Erklärung vom Juni 1974, die Valentin-Ferber Abkommen vom 3. Juli desselbenJahres über die Zusammenarbeit der 1. Armee mit der NATO. Bis in die achtziger Jahre hinein wur-den die Beziehungen zwischen Frankreich und der Nato durch diese Texte festgelegt.

Walter Hallstein-Institut für Europäisches Verfassungsrecht (Hrsg.)

Forum Constitutionis Europae – Band 1

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Das nationale Verfassungsrecht ist heute nur noch in der Zusammenschau mit denGrundnormen der Europäischen Verträge zu verstehen. In diesem Sammelbandanalysieren renommierte Verfassungs- und Europarechtler zentrale Fragen dereuropäischen Verfassungsentwicklung.Ingolf Pernice untersucht die »Constitutional Law Implications for a State Partici-pating in a Process of Regional Integration« und »Die politische Vision vonEuropa und die notwendigen institutionellen Reformen«. Zu sehr unterschiedli-chen Folgerungen gelangen Paul Kirchhof und Manfred Zuleeg bei ihrer Analysedes Verhältnisses zwischen nationalem Recht und Europarecht. Gerd Wartenbergberichtet über »Praktische Erfahrungen bei der Bund-Länder-Koordinierung inAngelegenheiten der EU«. Die zentrale Frage der Folgen des EU-Beitritts auf dienationale Souveränität analysiert Miroslaw Wyrzykowski in seinem Beitrag »DieEuropaklausel der polnischen Verfassung – Souveränität in Gefahr?«.Den Band beschließt Dimitris Tsatsos mit der Entwicklung eines »Prinzip(s) dereuropäischen Verfassungsverantwortung«.

2000, 147 S., brosch., 58,– DM, 423,– öS, 52,50 sFr, ISBN 3-7890-6591-9(Schriftenreihe Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, Bd. 4)

Grundfragen der europäischenVerfassungsentwicklung

175

Contributors - Auteurs - Autoren

Marc TRACHTENBERG

, is a professor of history at the University of Pennsylvania,Philadelphia PA, 19104-6228, USA.Website: http://www.history.upenn.edu/trachtenbergTel: (+ 215) 898-8477E-mail:

[email protected]

Christopher GEHRZ

, is a graduate student in the history department at YaleUniversity, New Haven, CT 06520, USA.personal addr.: 15 Beacon Street, Hamden, CT 06514Tel: (+ 203) 287-9692E-mail:

[email protected]

Paul PITMAN

, is a Research Fellow at the Miller Center of Public Affairs at theUniversity of Virginia. personal addr.: P.O. Box 302, Canyon, California 94516, USA.Tel: (+ 925) 376-5176E-mail:

[email protected]

Francis J. GAVIN

, is an Assistant Professor of Public Policy at the Lyndon B.Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, P.O. Box Y,Austin, Texas, 78713-8925, USA.Website: http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/Tel: (+) 512-471-5249Fax: (+) 512-471-1835E-mail:

[email protected]

Erin R. MAHAN

, received her Ph.D. in History from the University of Virginia inMay 2000. She is an Historian at the U.S. Department of State.E-mail:

[email protected]

Georges-Henri SOUTOU

, est Professeur à l'Université de Paris IV – Sorbonne, EcoleDoctorale du Monde contemporain, 1, rue Victor Cousin, F-75230 Paris Cedex 05.E-mail:

[email protected]

Dr. Hubert ZIMMERMANN

, ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Lehrstuhl fürInternationale Politik, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Postfach 1021, 44780 Bochum.Tel: (0049) 234 3222956Fax: (0049) 234 3214532E-mail:

[email protected]

Dieses Verzeichnis von Hochschullehrern und Forschern mitArbeitsschwerpunkt Europäische Integration erscheint seit1989. In die vorliegende dritte, aktualisierte Ausgabe wurdenauf vielfachen Wunsch auch Wissenschaftler aus Nicht-EU-Staaten, die bisher in einem Ergänzungsband zusammengefaßtworden waren, einbezogen.

Die Ausgabe 2000 enthält 1138 Eintragungen von Wissen-schaftlern aus insgesamt 33 nationalen Mitgliedsvereinigungender European Community Studies Associations (ECSA). Die nach Staaten geordneten Eintragungen enthalten

- Namen und Anschrift,

- Schwerpunkte in Lehre und Forschung,

- institutionelle Zugehörigkeit,

- wesentliche neuere Publikationen.

Ein zweiteiliger Index erleichtert die Nutzung: Im ersten Teilsind die verzeichneten Wissenschaftler ihren Forschungs-schwerpunkten zugeordnet, im zweiten Teil nach Disziplinenund Ländern aufgelistet.

Dieses einzigartige Verzeichnis soll die Kommunikationzwischen Wissenschaftlern, auch unterschiedlicher Diszipli-nen, auf dem Gebiet der Europäischen Integration fördern underleichtern; es ist zudem eine überaus nützliches Handbuch fürjeden, der wissenschaftliche Experten zu den verschiedenstenFragen der Europäischen Integration sucht.

Who's Who in EuropeanIntegration Studies 20002000, 372 S., brosch.,48,– DM, 350,– öS, 44,50 sFr,ISBN 3-7890-6938-8(ECSA-Series • European CommunityStudies Association – Europe /Association pour l'Étude desCommunautés Européennes)

Who's Who in EuropeanIntegration Studies 2000

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