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The Spaces of Capital 13

way (for example in Gerstenberger 2007a). Our own approach relies

on the argumentation about social forms developed by Marx in his

critique of political economy. Marx’s form of analytical argumentation

meant substantial progress compared with classical economical theory

which, according to him, provided the central key to an understanding of capitalist society (Marx 2005:89–90, 94–96). Hence our thesis is that the

recent transformation processes of the state and the shifting of political

scales can only be understood if we bring the problematique of ‘form’

into the centre of analysis. Our approach rests on the results of the—

unfortunately—long-forgotten West German “State Derivation Debate”

of the 1970s (see Bieler and Morton 2003; Clarke 1991; Holloway and

Picciotto 1978), which we try to combine and develop further with the

state theoretical arguments of Antonio Gramsci and Nicos Poulantzas.

In our attempt to combine these apparently contradictory theoretical

approaches (for this critique, see Holloway and Picciotto 1991), we see

a promising and important opportunity for the further development of

historical materialist state theory (Hirsch and Kannankulam 2006, 2009;

Kannankulam 2008:36–63).

One important aspect of this issue is the question of how the

relationship between “political form” and “institutions” is understood.

More often than not, even approaches that use Marx’s theory have tended

to address this question in an unsatisfactory manner. The concept of political form is often equated with the concrete institutional structure of

the state and its apparatuses (for examples of this, see Jessop 1982:190;

1990:206). This is, at the very least, imprecise. The political form

of capitalism and the institutional shape of the political apparatus

are not identical, and they cannot be derived from one another; their

relationship to each other is complex, and involves both correspondence

and contradiction. The concrete institutional shape taken by the state

apparatus is form determined, that is to say, it is subject to structural

constraints which result from existing relations of production andexploitation. These, in turn, impose limits on the range of possible modes

of institutionalization. However, the political form can manifest itself in

a range of different institutional configurations. This depends on specific

historical paths, concrete economic relations and class constellations,

relations of social power, and the way social conflicts develop.

Our article is structured as follows: first we explicate how the

political form of capitalism is to be understood and how the pivotal

question of the relation between political form and concrete processesof institutionalization is to be dealt with. Our argument here is that

processes of institutionalization are generally form determined but that

form determination should not be misunderstood as if there is only

one unilinear way in which this occurs. As a second step we give

reasons for why the plurality of states is not simply a historically

contingent appearance of capitalist relations of production but, in fact, aC 2010 The Authors

Antipode C 2010 Editorial Board of Antipode.



14 Antipode

structural element of it. Although there is no causality between the

genesis of a geopolitical pluriverse and capitalism, the plurality of

states is nevertheless an essential precondition for the reproduction and

existence of modern capitalism. “Genesis” and “validity” (Geltung) are

analytically to be distinguished, a fact which is too often overlookedin the recent debates. On this basis we explore what exactly is to be

understood by internationalization of the state and what consequences

this has for recent scalar re-configurations. Finally, we discuss what

implications the internationalization of the state has for the political

form and the existence of the global system of capitalism in general.

In this article, we do not explicitly deal with contemporary

geographical debates, but we refer to them as a theoretical background.

Our assumption is that the spaces in which economic processes unfold,

and to which political institutions relate, are not predetermined. They

come into existence as a result of conflictual processes of societalization

and dispute, in a range of historical constellations. Spaces that are

demarcated by political power are never congruent with other spaces,

such as economic and cultural ones. In fact, one has to proceed on the

basis that there is a heterogeneous diversity of spaces which overlap,

intersect and in part have a hierarchical relationship to one another. In

these spaces, different relations of dominance and power and different

terrains for dealing with problems and interests manifest themselves.One example of this is the transfer of economic processes and political

decision-making to the international level in the course of neoliberal

globalization, which has led to a fundamental shift of power in favour

of capital and to the disadvantage of the working classes (Brand et al

2008; see also Brand and Gorg 2003; Brenner 2004; Delaney and Leitner

1997; Harvey 1982; Marston 2000; Swyngedouw 1997).

Basic Theoretical ConsiderationsWe start with a brief exposition of our basic theoretical assumptions.

These relate to the political form of capitalism and the relationship

between social form and institutions. We do not deal with the legal form,

which together with the political form and the value form is among the

basic structural features of capitalist society (see Buckel 2007).

As Marx and Engels observed, the shape taken by any given

organization of rule depends essentially on the prevailing property

relations and relations of exploitation (1953:20–22; on this point,see also Brenner 1985; Teschke 2003:8–9). The formation of the

modern state is closely connected with the successful establishing of

capitalist relations of production, but this is not a straightforward causal

relationship. The particular political form of capitalist society manifests

itself in the modern state. This society is fundamentally characterized

by private ownership of the means of production, formally free labor,C 2010 The Authors





private production, the exchange of commodities, and competition.

The commodities produced take the value form, and the law of

value regulates societal production. The appropriation of surplus by

the economic ruling class does not arise, as it does in the case of

feudalism, through direct compulsion, but rather through the (formallyequal) exchange of goods; and labor power is one of these goods.

However, private production, the exchange of goods, and competition

presuppose that members of the economic ruling class do not use

direct physical violence either in their dealings with wage earners

or within their own class. This means that fully developed capitalist

relations come into existence only when violent physical compulsion

is separated from every class in society, including the economic ruling

class. The separation of “economy” from “politics” and of “state” from

“society” is thus a crucial condition for the possibility of the existence

and reproduction of the capitalist mode of production. The result of

this is the “relative autonomy” of the political and of the state—

or, because this expression can lead to confusion, what we call their

separatedness or particularization ( Besonderung). Because capitalist

society breaks down into competing individuals and antagonistic classes,

it is impossible for the members of that society to reach direct and

conscious agreement on issues that affect them all. Just as the social

character (Gesellschaftlichkeit) of their work imposes itself as anenforced external relationship mediated by the circulation of capital, so

their political communality (Gemeinschaftlichkeit ) is forced to take an

objectified, reified shape that is separated from individuals. Individuals

encounter this communality in the form of the state, as an external

context of compulsion. The economic value form, the legal form and the

political form must be seen as the basic structural features of capitalist

society, features which are related to one another. The political form

does not just constitute a “superstructure” resting on the economy, it

is itself—as institutionalized in the state—an integral part of capitalistrelations of production (Hirsch 2005:20–39).

Economic (value) form and political form designate the historically

specific manner under which class relations of capitalist societies are

shaped and how classes relate to each other. The modality of the

constitution of classes and class struggle are crucially shaped through

these forms.

The particularization of the state creates the conditions for an

objectified and depersonalized mode of organization of social andclass relations. The state is capitalist because it is an integral part of

capitalist relations of production and is tied to these relations by virtue

of its structure and functions, but it does not function as the immediate

instrument of the economic ruling class or classes. The state is not a

person, and it is not a consciously created organization set up for a

particular rational purpose; rather, it must be understood as the materialC 2010 The Authors




16 Antipode

condensation of antagonistic class relations (Poulantzas 2000:123–139)

and of relations of rule connected with these (race, gender) (Demirovic

and Puhl 1997; Jessop 2008:157–177; Karakayali and Tsianos 2003;

Nowak 2006, 2009). By means of a process of socialization that takes

the form of a state, members of the exploited classes are disorganized as individual citizens. Simultaneously, the state constitutes the terrain

on which the development of a shared policy to be pursued by the ruling

classes, who are actually competing economically with one another

(the power bloc), becomes possible at all. Because the state is an

institutionalization of competing and antagonistic class relations, it is

not a closed apparatus but takes the shape of a heterogeneous network

of agencies which are partly in conflict with one another.

We can say that capitalist social forms, and so then the

particularization or relative autonomy of the state, are not functionally

predetermined and guaranteed, but rather produced and reproduced by

societal action that is shaped by existing class relations and relations of

exploitation. The existence and reproduction of these social forms are

therefore fundamentally precarious. It is possible that societal struggles

and disputes call into question the capitalist forms and thus ultimately

the reproduction of societal formation as a whole.

Social forms are thus objectifications of societal contexts that

result from general principles of capitalist societalization whichconfront human beings in a reified way. They structurally determine

the general orientations of perception and behavior that prevail in

society. These orientations become concretized in societal institutions.

This means that institutions can be seen as materializations of

societal determinations of form (Holloway 1991:254–257). However,

institutions and forms are not identical. Social forms, as the expression

of a contradictory societalization context, establish, support and set

limits to institutionalization processes, but this does not mean that such

forms are fixed once and for all or that they will always appear ina specific configuration. For example, the value form that determines

capitalism can be manifested in very different systems of money and

credit.

The concept of social form thus designates the context of conciliation

(Vermittlungszusammenhang) between societal structure, institutions

and social action. Because action that establishes and reproduces

institutions is shaped by the antagonisms and conflicts that are specific

to the capitalist mode of production, contradictions can arise betweensocial forms and institutions. This means that it is in principle possible

for existing structures to become incompatible with the process by

which capital is valorized. It follows from this that the nation state is

only one possible mode of institutionalization of the capitalist political

form, albeit one that in historical terms has succeeded in establishing

itself for a long period of time. Nevertheless, the transformation of C 2010 The Authors





societal relations associated with this, characterized by what Max Weber

(1946:77) called the “monopoly on the legitimate use of physical

violence” within a bounded territory, the principle of the formal rule

of law, and a bureaucratic rationality that is predictable to a certain

extent, has proved to be extremely advantageous for the reproduction of capitalist relations of production. Weber is certainly to be criticized for

his theoretical foundations. This is especially true for his perspective of

a historically continuing process of rationalization and the assumption

that the modern bureaucratic state is an expression of this process.

What is seriously masked here are the antagonistic class relations and

structures of exploitation.

But what is nevertheless to Weber’s merit is the fact that he clearly

argued that the modern state is not to be defined by any historically

changing means (function), but through its ends (form) alone; Weber is

very precise in arguing that the modern state is a specific institutionalized

form of physical force and violence (1946:77). And any serious attempt

to analyze the changing institutional shape and functions of the state

does need to take this as its starting point. To paraphrase Bob Jessop

(1982:135), that is to say that form constitutes function, not only

problematizes it, and function problematizes form.

Having said this, we would argue that in recent criticisms of Weber,

and the demand that his conception of the state should be abandoned,there is a danger of throwing the baby out with the bathwater (Robinson

2001; see also Teschke 2003:49–53; 2006:543–546). Authors who argue

along these lines fail to see that it is precisely the way the apparatus

of force has become centralized and autonomous that makes it a central

element of the capitalist political form. Even Robinson, who proclaims

the arrival of the “transnational state”, is forced in the end to admit that

this form of the state lacks the power to establish itself successfully, the

capacity to use force, so that while “fiscal intervention, credit creation,

tax redistribution and control over capital and labor allocations” maybe formulated to a growing degree in the supranational policy arena,

they can only be established in practice by the nation state (Robinson

2001:181; for criticism of Robinson’s position, see Block 2001).

The Nation-State System

It is certainly correct in principle to call for a move away from“methodological nationalism” in the analysis of the state (Smith 1995).

However, this does not answer the question of why there was such a

close connection between the coming into being of the modern nation-

state system and the emergence of the capitalist mode of production,

and its success in establishing itself, in the period between the 17th and

the 20th centuries.C 2010 The Authors




18 Antipode

The historical course of events reveals no causal connection between

the successful establishment of capitalism and the emergence of the

modern system of states (Gerstenberger 1990, 2007b; Hirsch 2005:50–

58; Reinhard 2000; Teschke 2003; Tilly 1975). These two processes

cannot be reduced to one another, but they were historically connectedand served to strengthen each other. The decisive preliminary conditions

are to be found in the upheavals in feudal relations of power and property

that occurred in Western Europe from the 11th century onwards.

These changes were characterized in particular by the usurpation

of imperial power by the feudal lords (Teschke 2003:76–96). The

antagonism between the power of the church and secular rule, which

was characteristic of the Holy Roman Empire, played an important

part here (Spruyt 1994:34–58). The feudal mode of exploitation and

accumulation contained an inherent tendency to territorial expansion

(Brenner 1985b:238–239; Benz 2001:13; Teschke 2003:61–69, 83–

104). This led to military rivalry between the feudal lords, and between

the lords and their vassals, and provided the decisive dynamic that

contributed to the coming into existence of the modern state system.

Military expansion required an increase in the internal power of the state

and led to a greater demand for resources, and as this happened the feudal

estates, in conflict with their rulers over the latter’s attempts to impose

higher taxes on them, were able to force the rulers to give them more of asay in a range of important matters. Under medieval law and its principle

of quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus debet comprobari, exceptional taxes

could only be imposed if those required to pay them gave their consent

(Anderson 1974:45). In combination with the adoption (reception) of

Roman law, which took place between the 13th and the 16th centuries,

this led to the setting up of a centralized administrative apparatus. At the

same time, the money economy developed further. The pressure both to

mobilize and to extract more resources (the coercion–extraction cycle)

was one of the most important foundations of the modern state (Tilly1975; Reinhard 2000). The wars and conflicts associated with religious

schism were another factor that made it possible for absolutism to

establish itself successfully in Europe. The parceled-out medieval form

of rule was gradually overcome, though the precapitalist-feudal mode

of accumulation remained in existence for the time being (Teschke

2003:264–268). Spatially separate territories came into being, as did

centralized and professional administrative apparatuses. Step by step,

the princely court was separated from the administration of the state(Hirsch 2005:54). This means that the development of the market and the

money economy was not the result of a specifically economic dynamism,

but was driven first and foremost by “disputes about the extent and forms

of personal rule” (Gerstenberger 1990:512).

The decisive factor in further developments was the fact that in

England, as the result of a specific class constellation described by MarxC 2010 The Authors





in chapter 24 of Capital, and to a significant degree as a consequence of

the way the class of large landowners who had emerged from the feudal

system organized themselves politically in parliament, absolutism was

not strengthened. What happened instead was that capitalism and the

modern state became more closely interlinked with one another, so thatthey both developed more rapidly (Teschke 2003:249–268). By contrast

with developments in continental Europe, the English feudal nobility

gradually transformed itself from a military caste into a demilitarized

and successful class of large landowners against which the peasants in

their recurring revolts failed to establish freehold control over the land

(Brenner 1985a:30–37, 46–62). After the Civil War fought against Stuart

absolutism (1642–1649), the alliance between the capitalist landed

nobility and those engaged in trade with the colonies succeeded in

securing a situation in which private property rights were combined

with commercial rents and political freedoms. Or, to put it another way,

they managed to reestablish a traditional order within which parliament

had long held a strong position (Magna Carta in 1215, the Provisions

of Oxford in 1258 and Westminster in 1259; on these points, see Benz

2001:39; Grimm 1987:62; Teschke 2003:252–255). This provided the

basis for the country’s economic and military dominance, which exerted

increasing pressure on the continental European states to adapt to it.

In contrast to developments in Britain, the feudal nobility incontinental Europe did not manage to transform itself into a capitalist

class. The French king was able to ally himself with the (trading)

cities and to attain absolute power (Spruyt 1994:77–108). Against this

background, it was the task of the bourgeois revolutions to impose

by force a far-reaching “expropriation of the personal ownership of

power” (Gerstenberger 1990:52). But these revolutions were, strictly

speaking, only “bourgeois” in a limited sense. It would be more

accurate to say that they were triggered by complex struggles over

property and privileges in which the role of the bourgeois class was notinitially prominent (Teschke 2003:254–255). This did, however, lead to

a separation between the state and society, politics and the economy,

which was a decisive precondition for the establishment of capitalist

relations and so for the ultimate formation of the modern state. We can

therefore summarize these developments by saying that it was not capital

or the capitalist bourgeoisie that laid the foundations of the modern

state, but a dynamic of power and conflict that was already present in

the structure of medieval society as it underwent transformation, butwhich at the same time pointed beyond the existing historical shackles.

Teschke is surely making a point against the a-historic school of

neo-realism within the discipline of international elations in insisting

that the Westphalian Order of 1648 was not an order of sovereign

states in the modern sense, since the internal organization of states

such as France still rested on dynastic and therefore feudal foundationsC 2010 The Authors




20 Antipode

(Teschke 2003:225–246). But it is one thing to argue that it was only in

England that a sovereign state emerged and that this laid the foundations

for capitalist development, and it is another thing to conclude that in

feudal political structures such as in France the possibility for capitalist

development could not be traced further back in history and/or that itcould not be found in geographic regions other than England (Spruyt

2006:516). In Teschke’s argument it is either capitalism or feudalism,

and one has to decide (Teschke 2003:96–97, chapter 4 passim). But

this argumentative prison is too narrow. Even his theoretical mentor

Robert Brenner allowed himself the freedom of admitting that he did

in fact generally accept the explanatory models he was criticizing and

that his aim was to add further explanation, not to reject them (Brenner

1985b:217). Therefore, we have to admit that the classic argument of

Perry Anderson (1974) is more convincing to us than the narrow passage

that Teschke offers, that:

the actual movement of history is never a simple change-over from

one pure mode of production to another: it is always composed of

a complex series of social formations in which a number of modes

of productions are enmeshed together under the dominance of one of

them (1974:423).

Nevertheless, historical developments thus show that one cannot assumethat the coming into being of the modern state was a simple matter of

a causal economic connection or a structural relationship, as the base-

superstructure theorem has it.

However, this does not settle the question of whether the development

of capitalism in the context of a plurality of competing apparatuses

of rule was no more than a historical accident, or whether the

compartmentalization of the political form into a large number

of territorially demarcated spaces (individual states) is one of the

fundamental structural features of capitalism. Nobody denies that it wasthis plurality that drove forward the emergence of capitalism and the

modern state. Teschke and Lacher (2007) conclude, on the basis that the

emergence of capitalism and of the modern state are two processes that

cannot be reduced to one another, that the connection between capitalism

and the existence of a large number of states is both genetically and

structurally contingent, and that capitalism could equally well have come

into existence within the political structure of an empire (2007:574).

Both of these conclusions are questionable. Teschke’s confusion stems

from his argument that, on the one hand, the successful establishmentof capitalism as a relation of production rests on a differentiation

between politics and the economy, which means that exploitation takes

place without immediate physical compulsion and so “‘the state’ no

longer needs to interfere directly in the processes of production and

extraction” (2003:143). This means, Teschke argues further, that the

C 2010 The Authors





state can confine itself to the essential functions of institutionalizing

the capitalist property regime and “legally enforcing civil contracts

among politically (though not economically) equal citizens” (2003:143).

However, Teschke then goes on to claim that capitalism does not need

a geopolitical pluriverse or a system of states in order to reproduceitself (2003:144–145, 266–267). If there is no need for a states system,

a world state will be the only alternative. However, one needs to

show that a world state is possible under capitalist conditions. Teschke

confuses historical description with theoretical argument. Capitalism

did not cause the territorially fragmented system of states to come into

being, but it does not follow that this system is not necessary for the

reproduction of capitalism. Against the background of the analysis as

we have summarized it here, one could pose the question of how it can

be that “a specific state form is internally related to capitalism as a social

property relation: modern sovereignty”, as Teschke himself says, only

to conclude in the next breath that this cannot explain the territorially

bounded nature of the modern state (2003:144). It is undoubtedly the

case that the geopolitical world of diverse states changes historically,

and that this cannot be explained in a mono-causal way in terms of

mechanisms of “economic” competition, but one cannot in any way

conclude that we should therefore abandon the idea of systematic

connections between capitalism, territoriality, sovereignty and thestate.

The parcelling-up of the apparatuses of rule does not arise from

capitalist relations, but the historical course of events itself shows that

it was one of the decisive preconditions needed for the development

of those relations and for their success in establishing themselves. A

central role is played here by the specific way in which the political

form of capitalism is institutionalized, and the theoretical debate has

so far paid little or no attention to this problematic (this is also true

of Callinicos 2007). What happens is that the political form, that is tosay the particularization or relative autonomy of the state, reproduces

itself essentially via the mode of competition between states. The

establishment and preservation of this form rests on the competition

between individual states, each with its own institutionalized class

relations and compromises.

As we have shown, the capitalist state with its relative autonomy

is a precondition which makes it possible for the contradictory and

antagonistic relations between classes and groups to be regulated insuch a way that societal reproduction can take place. This is because

a joint policy for the economic ruling classes can only be formulated

by means of the state, so that those subject to this rule can be bound

both repressively and consensually into existing relations of power and

exploitation. The capitalist mode of regulation is constituted territorially,

rests on a politics of separation, and is coupled with a specific regime of C 2010 The Authors




22 Antipode

citizenship and with the potential to mobilize nationalism that goes with

this. This rests essentially on the fact that the classes facing each other

in the context of global accumulation and valorization are themselves

politically divided by the existence of individual states competing with

one another. As a result, the possibility arises at the individual statelevel that cross-class coalitions will come into being with the goal of

securing shared competitive advantages in the world market. The system

of competing states organizes social contradictions and conflicts in such

a way that the particularization of the individual state apparatuses in

their relations with the different classes is strengthened. The plurality of

states is therefore a constitutive expression and component of capitalist

relations of exploitation and competition. States can thus be understood

as the institutional materializations of an international network of

contradictory class relations (Poulantzas 1974).

The political fragmentation of the world market in the form of

its political organization into individual states continues to be the

basis of and precondition for differently structured conditions of

production and class relations. One consequence of this is that capital,

which is able to move across borders, can maximize its profits by

connecting these spaces with each other or playing them off against one

another. The development of capitalism is fundamentally characterized

by considerable space–time differentiations, a set of circumstancesdescribed by Lenin (1974) as “the law of uneven and combined

development”. This refers to the fact that competing capitals have to

pursue the goal of extra profit because they may be ruined if they

do not do so, and the result is the creation of systematic economic-

technological differences. These differences are strengthened further by

the advantages provided by the creation of regional clusters (Callinicos

2007:544–545; Morton 2007:612–615; see also Brenner 2004:12–32;

Harvey 1982, 2001; Rosenberg 2005; Smith 1984; Wissen and Naumann

2008).Since the relationship of forces among classes condenses in ways

that vary from one state to another, capitalism develops differently in

different locations. These differences take the form of a pressure to

adapt which is felt by those who have not been at the forefront of

economic-technical and societal developments that are profitable for

capital, and so are economically weaker. In this way, the class relations

that are organized differently at state level exert a reciprocal influence

on one another. This means that class relations at the level of individualstates are always also determined by global structures mediated via

the competition between states. The particularization of the state is

thus the condition of possibility for the formation of specific class

constellations on which the different conditions of competition rest, and

this particularization is constantly being reproduced via the mechanism

of valorization of capital and competition.C 2010 The Authors





The political form of capitalism is in the final analysis also the basis

for the contradictory relationship between economic and geopolitical

competition that is typical of capitalism (Harvey 1982, 2003; see also

Callinicos 2007). The consequence of the separation of politics from

the economy, and of the particularization of the state, is that economiccompetition and the competition between states are processes which

relate to one another but function according to different dynamics.

The relationships between states are determined not only by economic

developments and interests, but also by strategies pursued by political

actors which can be traced back to particular bases of reproduction and

legitimation. The preconditions for the valorization of capital (which

vary spatially and temporally) and thus, in turn, the relations between

economic spaces, are also fundamentally dependent on the strategic

options of these actors. This complex mechanism of competition

also contributes to the preservation of the political form and the

particularization of the state. For an analysis of imperialistic structures

and dynamics these interrelations will certainly be of importance (ten

Brink 2008). Neo-Realist approaches within the field of international

relations argue that geopolitical competition and conflict do not merely

stem from economic dynamics but follow dynamics of their own (Waltz

1979, 2008; Mearsheimer 2001; for a critique see Czempiel 2002). In

arguing so they certainly point out an important aspect of internationalpolitical processes but at the same time tend to neglect basic class,

competitive and exploitative relations. This means that the process of

global accumulation both presupposes and has as its consequence the

existence of different political-societal spaces. These spaces are tied to

the constitution in territorial form of states as apparatuses of force with

their specific national processes of identification and legitimation. The

real unity of the world market establishes itself with and against the

form of the individual state, and this itself is one of the forms taken by

the mechanism of capitalist competition.However, it is important to distinguish between the nation state and

the national state. Territorial states are not necessarily, or even usually,

“national” states in the strict sense of the word. The concrete form of

the state system has not been fixed permanently. States can disappear,

break up, and merge. As a result of the contradictions and conflicts

that are inherent in the capitalist mode of societalization, the concrete

configuration of the state system changes constantly.

This, however, does not explain why individual states tend to be nationstates. Nations do not occur naturally; they are the products of relations

of power and rule (Anderson 1983; Balibar and Wallerstein 1992:197–

224; Jackson and Penrose 1993:202–205; Reinhard 2000:440–458).

Exaggerating only slightly, one can say that states, as apparatuses

of rule, use existing historical and cultural conditions to create the

nation. The construction of national identities makes it possible toC 2010 The Authors




24 Antipode

cover up social tensions and to neutralize class struggles. One can

also say that nationalism cannot be “deduced” from capitalism; it

follows as a consequence of historical processes and struggles that

are initially independent of capitalism. At the same time, however,

this connection indicates that capitalist production relations requirespecific patterns of legitimation that they cannot create themselves.

The construct of “the nation” thus corresponds to the capitalist political

form in a fundamental way. Under conditions of capitalist societalization

humans are not only broken down into antagonistic classes, but are also

simultaneously and systematically isolated and flexibilized as market-

dependent individuals and robbed of their traditional social ties by

incessant economic upheavals. There is therefore a tendency constantly

to undermine and change radically social relations, cultural common

ground, and collective orientations and life contexts, those things that

make a society possible at all as a particular entity that is conscious of

itself and capable of continued existence (Reinhard 2000:440–458).

The modern nation and nationalism are the field on which social

coherence is symbolically based. To put this in simple terms, it means

that the “nation” is the ideological cement that holds together a society

divided into classes and shaped by competition between individuals.

One could follow Alain Lipietz here (1992:46) and speak of an “ex post

functionalism”: historical developments do not follow a masterplan, butin retrospect one can nevertheless say that capitalism and nationalism,

or to be more precise capitalism, the territorial state, citizenship and the

associated nationalism are systematically connected with one another.

One can therefore assume that regardless of the transformations that

states and the state system undergo in future, the nation-state form of

the individual state will not lose its significance.

Internationalization of the State?Concerning the internationalization of the state there exists a huge

literature, which cannot be dealt with here in detail (see, for example,

Bieler et al 2006; Cox 1989; Hardt and Negri 2000; Held and Koenig-

Archibugi 2005; Mandel 1975; Murray 1971; Robinson 2004; Shaw

2000). Whilst it is frequently said that the state is being internationalized,

the term remains rather vague. It refers both to an increase in individual

states’ dependency on international economic-political processes and

to the development of state-like structures at the supranational level. Inthis section we argue that the nation state or individual state has been, at

least in historical terms, an important level at which the political form of

capitalism has been able to concretize itself, but it is not necessarily the

only level where this can happen. There have been state-like structures

at the international level ever since the modern state system came into

existence, since the competitive relation between states does not solelyC 2010 The Authors





exist in open and sometimes armed conflicts but also in regularized

modes of coordination, which, if need be, are institutionalized in

corresponding international organizations and regimes (Teschke and

Lacher 2007:570).

The internationalization of the state has received a decisive impetusfrom the neoliberal restructuring of capitalism that has been described

as “globalization”. This rests on the far-reaching deregulation of

markets for commodities, capital and finance, and is at the same

time characterized by comprehensive privatization. As a consequence,

economic interdependence increases and there is also a greater risk of

comprehensive economic crises. The global process of valorization and

accumulation is increasingly escaping from the hands of individual

states, which means there is now more need for regulation at the

international level—as the global financial crisis that began at the end

of 2007 showed (for a more detailed elaboration, see Hirsch 1998,

2005). The processes and struggles associated with these developments

show clearly that in the context sketched above, in which principles

of capitalist form are connected with historically specific patterns of

institutionalization and conflicts mediated through crises, upheavals

and processes leading to disassociations take place which challenge

and transform the existing configurations of form and institutions.

It is thus clear that the connections and dynamic of principles of form and patterns of institutionalization are expressions of existing

contradictions rather than a harmonious, stable, and long-lasting

relationship.

Increasing demands for international regulation also arise as a result

of growing threats to the environment, which cannot be dealt with by

individual states acting on their own. At the same time, the globalization

of capital is in a way accompanied by a globalization of subalterns

expressed in growing levels of cross-border migration. Reactions to

this involve tighter state control, which is an increasingly significantinstrument used to regulate labor power on a global scale and has

led in part to an institutionalization of surveillance and control at the

supranational level (Buckel, Kannankulam and Wissel 2008). Against

this background, the internationalization of state administration has

received a boost. However, this mainly rests on the fact that the end

of the East–West conflict opened up an opportunity for the powerful

capitalist states, led by the USA, jointly to dominate the world and

to impose economic and societal structures that would work to theirbenefit. One of the most important aspects of this was the interest of

multinational corporations in securing the conditions of valorization at

a level above that of the spaces of individual states. Another significant

factor is the concern to create a system of states prepared to follow the

neoliberal agenda of economic deregulation, privatization, and securing

property.C 2010 The Authors




26 Antipode

The advanced internationalization of capital, which was by then

taking on new forms, was one precondition for this development, which

replaced the Fordist variant of capitalism that entered a period of crisis in

the 1970s. Companies which operate and are integrated internationally

have become much more flexible in both economic and technicalrespects, and it is now easier for them to evade structures of regulation set

up by individual states (as well as the class relations institutionalized in

these forms of regulation). The neoliberal strategy designed to overcome

the crisis of Fordism had two goals: to shift the relationship of social

forces towards the interests of capital and to open up new opportunities

for profitable investment. The result of this was a major shift of the

global structuring of space towards the supranational and subnational

levels, which was to the disadvantage of the institutionalized structures

of regulation set up in the nation-state context. The transformation of

states into “competition states” exposes them to intensified competition

between economic locations in relation to opportunities for the profitable

utilization of capital (on this point, see in particular Brenner 2004).

This is combined with a clear dominance of decision-making processes

located at the international economic and political level. In this way

capital has succeeded in negating to a considerable extent the effects of

structures enabling social compromises set up at the level of individual

states. As a result its profits have increased significantly. The kernel of the processes labeled as globalization ultimately lies in a reorganization

of class structures on a global scale which has led to a change in the

relations between the classes and the states’ apparatuses in which the

relationship between forces has clearly been changed in favor of capital.

There are a number of dimensions to these processes that one can

summarize with the help of the concept of the internationalization of the

state. Firstly, it involves the internationalization of the state apparatuses

themselves: a greater degree of dependence between individual states

on international economic and political processes—though this dependson their economic strength and the extent to which they are integrated

into the world market. This exposes them at the same time to greater

reciprocal competitive pressure and is expressed in extensive restrictions

on the room for maneuver they have regarding intervention in economic

and social policy (“the national competition state”, Hirsch 1995). As

a result of the constraints caused by competition between economic

locations, institutionalized democratic processes in the framework of

individual states become increasingly irrelevant (Hirsch 2005:202–240).It is important to note, however, that this development has not simply

been forced on the states from outside, but was instigated and actively

carried out by the states themselves in the period since the global liberal–

conservative political turn at the end of the 1970s. Seen in this light,

this is by no means a straightforward weakening of the states by an

external process but a strategic self-transformation carried out by theC 2010 The Authors





states themselves. In a way that seems paradoxical until one looks at it

more closely, the states are actors in a reconfiguration of spaces in which

the individual state level declines in importance (Brenner 2004:30, 64).

Another aspect of this development is the privatization of politics,

which is advancing at both the individual state and the internationallevels. This is the result of a strategy designed to extend private

property rights and open up new investment opportunities for capital.

The states are confronted by internationally operating companies, actors

whose weight has increased considerably. This means that politics is

increasingly taking place in state–private negotiation and decision-

making structures that are almost impossible to control. It is true

that the “cooperative state” is not something completely new (Ritter

drew attention to the phenomenon as early as 1979), since under

capitalist conditions governments have always been forced to come

to arrangements with powerful societal groups. But this has become

much more significant and has led to a major shift in the relationship

between politics and the economy, and between the state and society,

and so too to new conditions for the reproduction of the political form

of capitalism.

One result of the internationalization of capital and the deepening

competition that followed this is the development of regional economic

blocs under the leadership of strong metropolitan states, especially theNorth American Free Trade Area and the European Union (EU). The

EU is a special case of internationalization of the state, because what we

can observe here is a more marked formation of state-like apparatuses

at the supranational level (Bieler 2005). A further development that

can be attributed to the dominance of the capitalist metropolises is the

growth in the significance of international organizations, especially the

IMF, the World Bank, the OECD, and the WTO, and the attempts

to use these organizations to organize and impose the interests of

the metropolises. In addition, there are less firmly institutionalizedcontexts of cooperation and networks such as the environmental and

climate conferences, in which non-governmental organizations as well

as international companies play an important role, G7 or G8 meetings,

and others (on this point, see Schoppengerd 2007). The combination of

these factors has led to a stronger spatial diversification of state levels

and functions. It is true that no level has come into existence that is

genuinely independent of the individual states, because the international

organizations and regimes rest on the interest in cooperation of at leastthe strong states, and these states determine and place restrictions on

how effective they can be (Wissel 2007b). However, these organizations

are not purely intergovernmental. They develop dynamics of their own

which have an effect on the policies of individual states. At any rate,

attempts to evade these dynamics are costly and involve risks that cannot

be precisely calculated.C 2010 The Authors




28 Antipode

The internationalization of the state, in particular the diversification

of spatial scales and functions and also privatization, is accompanied

by a significant degree of internationalization of law (Cutler 2003;

Gunther and Randeria 2001; Meyer 2005; Randeria 2006). There is

a trend towards the replacement of laws enacted by the state anduniversally valid within a particular territorial unit by “legal pluralism”.

This is characterized by the existence of a number of different systems

of judicial norms which are often in competition with one another,

stemming in part from private sources (the so-called lex mercatoria), and

in some cases regulating the same issues by applying different norms.

The development and application of laws are thus decoupled to some

degree from the individual states. However, it is important to distinguish

between the generation and the enforcement of laws. When a conflict

arises, the law is applied by individual states, which enjoy a monopoly

on the use of force, and its application depends on the effectiveness

of that monopoly (Randeria 2006). It is easier for “strong” states than

for weak ones to evade international legislation and the international

administration of justice, to the extent that strong ones do not recognize

international legal authority at all.

A final important background element in the internationalization

of the state is the development of an international managerial class,

which is also driven by the internationalization of capital. This classis made up of functionaries of states and international organizations,

representatives of companies and the media, employees of academic

think tanks, and so on. The interests represented here continue to be

shaped by the competition between companies and states, but more

firmly institutionalized contexts of debate have been created in which

joint strategies can be discussed and formulated (Apeldoorn 2003; Cox

1993, 1998; Pijl 1997).

This means that the “internationalization of the state” thesis needs

to be qualified in a number of respects. This process is by no meansone that takes the same form everywhere and envelops all states in

the same manner, but rather a reconfiguration of political spaces on a

global scale: a process that is largely determined by the dominance of

the capitalist metropolises of the North/West; a process that serves to

reinforce this very dominance. This rests mainly on the politics of a

group of states which operate according to their interest to secure the

conditions for the valorization of internationalized capital. The capitalist

state is not a closed container or a unified subject, but rather an ensembleof heterogeneous apparatuses where different class relations which in

principle go beyond the state are materialized. It is also imprecise to

speak of the development of “statehood” at the international level.

“Statehood” is a very vague concept—compared with, for example,

Gramsci’s concept of the integral state (Gramsci 1971:244, 267). In

the modern, capitalist sense the concept of the state is closely connectedC 2010 The Authors





with the centralization and particularization of the apparatus of violence,

and there are no serious signs of this happening at the international

level. It is therefore false to say that the levels at which state-like

institutions develop are in principle of equal status (Jessop 2002), or

that the dominance of one level is a historical and empirical questionrather than a theoretical one (Brenner 2004:73). As we have tried to

show, it is possible to answer this question more precisely if one takes

into account the political form of capitalism.

Nor does the internationalization process do away with the conflicts

between the metropolitan states, which can be traced back to different

factions of capital, different constellations of social forces, and different

forms of social integration. A result of this is that at the international

level, state-like institutions are on the whole not very stable.

The diversification of the state apparatus at different spatial levels

has led not only to the erosion of liberal-democratic institutions that

exist only at the level of the individual state, but also to a systematic

irresponsibility, lawlessness and unruliness in politics. It makes it

possible for “scale shifting” to take place: decisions that cannot be

pushed through at one level are shifted to another level so they can

be put into effect through external compulsion. Or this can work the

other way round: decisions taken at the supranational level may not be

implemented at the level of the individual state or the local level, or theymay only be partially implemented (Randeria 2006 deals with this and

provides some graphic examples).

Internationalization and the Political FormWe conclude this discussion by addressing the question of what the

developments described above mean for the political form of capitalist

society. Or, to be more precise, whether and to what extent they lead to

institutional configurations which have a contradictory relationship tothe maintenance and reproduction of that form and what consequences

follow from this. Brand and Gorg state that internationalization leads

to intensified state-like “second-order condensations”, that is, at the

subnational and supranational levels rather than that of the individual

states (Brand and Gorg 2003; see also Brand, Gorg and Wissen

2007). This is a reference to Poulantzas’ definition of the state as

the material condensation and institutionalization of a relationship of

forces (Poulantzas 2000:128–129). There are some problems with thisway of conceptualizing the question, since it suggests a hierarchy

when in reality this is a matter of different qualities (see also Wissel

2007a:129). Indeed, strictly speaking, one would have to call this a

second-order material condensation or second-order materiality. The

specific element here is not that condensation in the sense of dealing with

contradictions takes place at the international or transnational level, butC 2010 The Authors




30 Antipode

rather that the materiality of the condensations takes on another quality

because there is no international state or monopoly on the use of force.

Within the individual state, the specific manner of the condensation

of power relations is essentially determined by the centralization of

the apparatus of physical violence and its formal particularization inrelation to social classes, or as Weber puts it, the “monopoly on the

legitimate use of physical violence” (1946:77). Within the framework

of the individual state, the condensation of class relations applies to this

apparatus of violence and so acquires a particular quality of durability

and coherence. This means that social compromises can be embodied

institutionally and it is easier to establish hegemonic relations. There is

no doubt that internationalization affects the individual state’s monopoly

on the use of force in a number of ways. It changes the relationship

between the state and society and between politics and the economy,

and it affects the particularization of the political. At the same time,

however, there is no centralized and autonomous apparatus of violence

at the global level (no “world state”), and under capitalist conditions

no such apparatus can develop. Attempts to bring such an apparatus

into existence have failed. The Charter of the United Nations (Art. 47)

provides for the setting-up of a UN Military Staff Committee and for

the placing of armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council,

but this has never been implemented. In practice, the UN SecurityCouncil functions as a kind of body responsible for passing on the

instructions of the dominant military powers—to the extent that the

five countries with power of veto ever come to an agreement. This

means that the “second-order materializations” coming into existence

at the international level are bound to remain dependent on the degree

to which the states that set them up and determine how they work are

actually interested in cooperation. As a result, their scope is limited.

They remain functionally restricted and fragmented. For example, they

can be used to guarantee private property rights but are of very little use inany attempt to bring about binding material redistribution. The ongoing

process of internationalization is being decisively shaped by the fact

that individual states are determined to hang on to their own monopoly

on the use of force. This even applies within the EU, though in this case

there seems to be an initial move towards the creation of a supranational

apparatus of violence in the shape of FRONTEX, which is a border-

police coordinating agency responsible for the control and surveillance

of migration. This is a consequence of the creation of a political territorythat goes beyond the individual states (Buckel and Wissel 2008). But

even if the EU were one day to develop into a genuine state, this would

do nothing to change the existence of a state system that has always

been characterized by changes in its concrete configuration. NATO, on

the other hand, functions as a kind of joint apparatus of violence of the

metropolitan states, but its effectiveness depends on whether or not theseC 2010 The Authors





states are prepared to cooperate. And, as we have seen recently, this is

by no means always the case. Finally, global relations of violence are

currently being shaped by the fact that the USA, because of its military

predominance, functions in practice as a kind of generalized apparatus

of violence acting globally in the interests of international capital and of states allied with the USA. This, however, is a consequence of existing

relations of military dominance and dependency, and it is certainly

not leading to a generally institutionalized state-like apparatus, as the

repeated instances of unilateralism in US foreign and military policy

demonstrate. The system that consists of the dominant capitalist states,

what Shaw (2000:199–208) calls the “global western conglomerate of

states”, is neither a world state nor a supranational one.

The internationalization process associated with neoliberal

“globalization” has several consequences for the reproduction of the

political form of capitalism. Firstly, the range of forms taken by the

privatization of politics is leading to a change in the relationship

between the state and society. The growing importance of private

actors in different spheres, including policing and security, together

with the spread of state–private negotiation systems, means that the

“particularization” of the state or its “relative autonomy” is becoming

more precarious and the dividing line between “politics” and “the

economy” more difficult to identify. In the literature, this has beendescribed as a movement towards the “refeudalization” of politics

(Held 1991:223–227; Maus 1992; Scharpf 1991). Functions which

regulate society are increasingly being taken over by businesses

or nongovernmental organizations, and at the same time important

foundations of representative liberal democracy are increasingly being

called into question. The partial “denationalization” and pluralization

of law is significant in this regard (Randeria 2006).

Secondly, the differentiation of the state apparatus into separate

levels changes the way in which class relations are institutionalized.Internationally operating capital, in particular, relates to a large number

of fragmented state-like apparatuses. This can make it easier for capital

to pursue its interests successfully via “forum shifting”, but it makes

it more difficult for it to formulate and follow a relatively consistent

policy. “Forum shifting” takes place when governments try to enforce

their interests in changing between different regulatory institutions.

This can be seen, for example, in conflicts around intellectual property

rights that take place between WTO/TRIPS and WIPO (see Brand et al2008; Braithwaite and Drahos 2000, chapter 24). The particularization

of the state is the precondition for the very possibility of such a policy,

establishing a relationship with the exploited and dominated classes that

goes beyond competition between capitals. Further, it is questionable

whether it is possible to compensate for the absence of a centralized

state apparatus at the global level by anything like coordinated actionC 2010 The Authors




32 Antipode

on the part of the “international manager class”. In practice, capital

carries out its policy in a network of different state apparatuses and

systems of negotiation that is as heterogeneous as it is complex, and the

democratic procedures involved here are largely limited with respect

to the associated procedures for mediation and reaching compromises.This also has a negative effect on the prospects for the establishment of

hegemonic relations. As a result, the capitalist power bloc is becoming

more fragmented and heterogeneous (Wissel 2007a:108–130).

Thirdly, the fact that international companies are becoming less and

less dependent on contexts of reproduction organized on the basis of

individual states means they are losing interest in societal integration

as a whole. This is deepening divisions within societies. The erosion of

liberal democracy is weakening a mode on which the particularization

of the state rests to a considerable extent. Poulantzas (1973:58–65;

1977:81–114; see also Jessop 2006:53–56) points out that bourgeois

exceptional regimes can give the authoritarian state more freedom of

action in the short term, but in the medium and long term they are

unable to recalibrate an “unstable equilibrium of compromise” between

classes because the channels and regulatory mechanisms available in

the “normal” liberal-democratic state (free elections, a free press, the

multi-party system, and so on) have been weakened or even eliminated.

It is true that the transformed post-Fordist state is not an “exceptionalstate”, but it has comparable features up to a point in that it takes the

form of authoritarian statism (Jessop 2006, 2009; Kannankulam 2008;

Poulantzas 1973). This means that in the course of internationalization,

the political form of capitalism is called into question in this respect too.

We can therefore conclude that the processes described as the

internationalization of the state are leading to a situation in which the

concrete shape of the system of political institutions is increasingly

coming into conflict with the political form of capitalism. The political

form remains fundamentally determining, but overall it is becomingmore precarious. This not only leads to increased violence in society and

in international relations, but also makes it more difficult to formulate

and carry out successfully a policy designed to preserve stability in

the long run. Since the stability of capitalist society and its capacity to

reproduce itself depend essentially on the extent to which its political

form can be guaranteed, we can expect that it will become generally

more unstable and crisis prone. However, one cannot say with certainty

what follows from this. Capitalism is not fundamentally “stable”; itdevelops with and through crises, and the result of this is constant

radical change in its economic and political structures. The possibility

of a gradual transition to a society that is no longer capitalist in the strict

sense of the term but is characterized by other, more immediate forms

of rule and exploitation cannot be ruled out altogether, although it is not

very likely. However, future developments are not determined by anyC 2010 The Authors





logic or “set of historical laws”, but depend on social struggles and the

strategies of actors engaged in these struggles. It is not only conceivable

but probable that neoliberal, globalized, post-Fordist capitalism will

prove to be a historical episode just as Fordism was. However, it is

fairly certain that it would be premature to proclaim the end of thenation state and the arrival of an era of democratic world governance

(see, for example, Beck 1998; Beck and Grande 2005; Grande 2005;

Held 1995; Zurn 1998). There are good reasons to believe that we can

expect capitalism to remain organized politically into individual states,

and that the structures of rule, division and exclusion associated with

this will not disappear—even if there are fundamental changes in the

internal shape of states and their global configuration.

Endnote1 Translated by Dr Gerald Holden.

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