jones a221 mmas brief

7/28/2019 Jones A221 MMAS Brief

1/18

A221 MMAS Brief

Words Matter:

The Past and Future of

Unconventional Warfare and

Foreign Internal Defense

MAJ Derek Jones


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Agenda

Chapter 1Introduction (Changes tothe Prospectus/Research Questions)

Chapter 2Literature Review

Chapter 3Research Methodology Chapter 4Analysis

Chapter 5Conclusions and

Recommendations Questions/Suggestions


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Chapter 1 - Introduction Define the Problem

Current debate on whether UW and FID are really the same thing, based on the

idea that working by, with and through surrogate forces is at the heart of both.

Same question that SF faced in June 2001 UW had not been conducted with DOD as the supported force since Korea

Published articles by SWC articulated that UW was an overarching operation withcore SF mission falling under UW umbrella in effort to ensure SF had a niche.

Doctrine writers failed to capture this decision in the following two UW manuals,updating older doctrine.

Events of 9/11 overshadowed this topic until the last year

Conventional Army and MEUSOC are now staking claims on FIDGood orBad?

Based on 9/11 recommendations, OGA paramilitary capability will go toUSASOC. Only units capable of supporting these ops is the SMU. Thismeans:

SMU responsible for all black mission, to include UW and FID

Give them the ability to pick and choose missions

SF loses this as its legacy mission because we were not able to articulate why we doit better (No one at USASOC wants to admit this, seem to think it is obvious)


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Revised Primary Research QuestionShould there be a defined difference betweenunconventional warfare and foreign internal defense?

Subordinate question 1. What is UW? Tertiary question 1a. What is the history of UW?

Tertiary question 1b. What is SFs role in UW?

Tertiary question 1c. What is OGAs role in UW? Tertiary question 1d. What are the current UW doctrine, and tactics, techniques and procedures?

Tertiary questions 1e. What is UWs applicability in todays contemporary operating environment?

Tertiary question 1f. What are the Logical Lines of Operations for UW?

Tertiary question 1g. Is there a better contemporary definition of UW?

Subordinate question 2. What is FID?

Tertiary question 2a. What is the history of FID? Tertiary question 2b. What is SFs role in FID?

Tertiary question 2c. What is OGAs role in FID?

Tertiary question 2d. What are the current FID doctrine, and tactics, techniques and procedures?

Tertiary question 2e. What is FIDs applicability in todays contemporary operating environment?

Tertiary question 2f. What are the Logical Lines of Operations for FID?

Tertiary question 2e. Is there a better contemporary definition of FID?

Subordinate question 3. Is there an identifiable relationship between UW and FID? Tertiary question 3a. Is there an identifiable transition point between UW and FID?

Tertiary question 3b. If yes, can this relationship be modeled?

Tertiary question 3c. Could such a model be used to provide a doctrinal framework for case studiesor future SF operations in MTWs?


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Chapter 1 - Introduction Assumptions

Word have meaning, therefore it is important to define a precisely as possible UW and FID

Senior leaders will be open to conclusions of this thesis

Definitions of terms

UW (JP 1-02) A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of longduration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized,trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It

includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestineoperations as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities,and evasion and escape.

UWmy definitionOperations by a country or entity to support an insurgency aimed atthe overthrow of a constituted government or occupying power in another country. (Muchlike FID3 types of supportIndirect, Direct, and Combat.)

FID (JP 1-02)Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of theaction programs taken by another government to free and protect its society fromsubversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

Special OperationsOperations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equippedmilitary and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychologicalobjectives by unconventional means in a hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas.


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Chapter 1 - Introduction

Limitations Overall Unclassified

Open source information only

Classified research may be conducted for context

Case studies will be through secondary sources only, no TDY researchtrips.

Scope and Delimitations(constraints) WWI to present.

WWI and interwar yearsT.E. Lawrence, Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck WWIISOE and OSS

Cold WarUSSF, CIA-US UW and FID operations Post Cold War to 9/11

9/11 to the future

U.S. Experience only after WWIISF and OGA

No detailed discussion of SF history (Activation and Deactivation of SF

Groups) No detailed discussion of the other SF core missions


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Chapter 2Literary Review UW and Paramilitary Operations

Historylarge amounts of research on history of UW, with respect to SF andOGA.

DoctrineNo change to current UW doctrine. Last publication was APR 2003.

Professional Journals(Special Warfare magazine) Numerous articles since thereview of UW started in the summer of 2000.

No succinct agreement on UW definitions

most misuse current doctrinal terms confusing UW, FID, and COIN.

Most recent article described using UW to fight insurgency or GWOT.

AcademicNumerous articles on UW and use of surrogates. A couple onupdating UW doctrine, but suggestions are not well grounded.

FID HistoryAlso a large amount of research with respect to SF and OGA.

DoctrineJoint publications on FID is an excellent manual.

Professional Journals(Special Warfare magazine) - Numerous articles since the1960s on FID. OEF and OIF have caused a flood of related articles in numerousjournals as the conventional army tries to understand SOSO, COIN, and FID.

AcademicNumerous articles on FID

UW to FID Transition - None


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Chapter 3Research Design Historical and Doctrinal Background for UW and FID (SF and

CIA)

CPT T.E. Lawrence and Gen Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck WWIexperiences

British Development of concepts for supporting resistancegroups during the late interwar years leading to theestablishment of the SOE

SOE operations

OSS operations

Establishment of the CIA (Paramilitary Capability) and theemergence of Special Forces as DODs capability

Agreement that CIA would conduct peacetime UW and DODwould conduct UW in war.

Initial covert actions in Eastern Europe following WWII

White Tigers in KoreaUW (DOD no doctrinal baseasMalcolm describesLT with no formal training)

Bank and Volckmann develop doctrine and TO&E for SFGroup


9/18

Chapter 3Research Design Historical and Doctrinal Background for UW and FID (SF and CIA)

10th Group Activated and assigned UW Europe

Kennedys call for change of mission for UW experts (SF andCIA) to fight against Communist-backed or supported Warsof Liberation (FID).

White Star in LaosBlack FID (Support to Hmong tribesOps against Communist Pathet Lao)

VietnamFIDStarted by CIA turned over to SF

AfghanistanBlack UWCIA w/SF support

NicaraguaBlack UWCIA w/SF support

El SalvadorFID

Post 9-11 operations AfghanistanUW (Decisive Op) transition to FID

PhilippinesFID

IraqUW (Shaping Op) transition to FID


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Chapter 4Analysis Basic framework will be State vs. Counter-state

UW and FID doctrines are based on a Nation State conflict, not for use

against non-nation state actors Biggest problem is SF is trying to stay relevant, yet cant come to grips with

the idea that UW and FID dont seem to fit when we are operating against anon-nation state actors.

Senior leaderships remedy if it isnt conventional, it is unconventional

The logical lines of operations for UW and FID are exactly opposite eachother.

UW aimed at overthrowing and FID aimed at maintaining.

Senior leadership has continually used the argument that FID is nothingmore than UW in a peacetime environmenttoo simplistic

AQ is a Global InsurgencyTakes global counterinsurgency campaign.

Broken down by country the key missions will be FID and CT/DAunilaterally or with surrogates (this is not UW), and SR through surrogates(ASOT).

UW reserved for Rogue nations (Iran, Syria and N. Korea). Once thesenations are defeated, then operations will transition to FID.

One argument for UW umbrella - OGA has never separatedUW/FID/HUMINTall part of the paramilitary capability(#s)


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Chapter 4Analysis UW doctrine has worked exactly as advertised in Afghanistan and Iraq.

FM 3-0 does not address UW specifically/Support to insurgency in the

Stability Operations Chapter. Seven phased framework works (attempts in 2001 to drop 7-phases as

outdated in favor of conventional army phases, no change with new framework.)

Only real problems are with Phase 7Demobilization

Based on COL Banks experience with the OSS Quick demobilizationUS wanted out quickly after WWII, didnt

have to worry about nation building.

US didnt conduct UW in countries we ended up rebuilding Germany and Franceso never saw the transition

Now we see that demobilization doesnt happen until well intoFID as these forces are initially converted to local militias until thenational security forces are able to gain control, then they aredemobilized.

So Phase 7 is more of a Transition from unconventional forcesto forces now defending the state.


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Chapter 4Analysis FID doctrine has also been proven. Training and advising are the

key to success for US militarily and politically, yet SF has done

everything possible to get out of the FID business. FID not sexy in Afghanistan, we realized that training is not as fun a

killing bad guys

Pulled GWOT trump card to get out of it

Same in OIF SF pulled out ASAP after OIF but forced to return

SF did not want any part of training and advising missions, except for specialmission units

Forced the army to conduct FID, let them take the initiative for this mission

Conducted ASOT and DA operations and called them UW (ASOT inherent toevery mission UW/FID (Kosovo-FID), DA in FID are called strike missions,that have proven that uncoordinated nodal attacks on cellular structures only

make the structure stronger) SF advised Iraqi units are performing well

Reg Army advisors initially sucking up 60 personnel to advise one battalion,now down to 10-12 per battalion (ODA), but majority of regular armyadvisors are not sufficiently trained for advising.

SF could have helped relief the political pressure by taking on more of theadvising responsibility, allowing regular army to reduce numbers as Iraqibattalions became more proficient


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Chapter 5Recommendations Clarify UW definitionsupport to an insurgency

FID doctrine is sound. SF needs to take leading role in FIDmissions or SF will lose this mission. (Arguments on whether ornot training or advising is the bread and butter mission of SF)

Change Phase 7 to Transition

Needs to be clear that these seven phases dont match up withconventional phased model, but are sub-phases (shape, deter,gain initiative, dominate, etc)

If SF wants to insure a niche, UW needs to be incorporatedinto FM 3-0, as an economy of force decisive operation(Afghanistan- both times), and as a shaping operation (Iraq,WWII, Korea).

SidebarASOT is not UW, nor its own mission. It is inherent inevery mission.

Environmental Prep is also not UW or FID. Defining this as anew core mission may be the stop gap to the definition problems.


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Chapter 5Recommendations UW and FID RelationshipUW efforts will inherently role over

to FID missions if we stay to conduct nation building.

Model of this relationship From the model SF doctrine can be written

Transition point IdentifiedCounter-state to State


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Peacetime Engagement - The Full Spectrum of Combat Ops

Preparation

Infiltration

Organization

Build-up

Combat Operations

Transition

Revitalization

Normalization

Sovereignty

7

8

5

Introduction of

Conventional Forces

9

Time

1

6

2

34

5

7

Initial Contact

2

Neutralization

1

3

Humanitarian Response

Training and Employment

Reconstruction

4

Secure the Environment

Transition PointInterim Gov

6

Indigenous Forces GrowthCurve (militias demobilized as HNsecurity forces become operational)S

ize

ofUS/CoalitionForces(InTheater/UnderSolidC

urve)

NCA makes decision

to begin preparations for

future operations

within a country.

Seven Phases of US Sponsored UW in Support of Conventional Forces FID Operations in Support of Internal Defense and Development Strategy

Transition to Stability Operations - Security Cooperation

US Public Support

For continued

Operations Ends

Size

ofIndigenousForce(Fu

llyTrained/UnderDashe

dCurve)

Fig. 1. Unconventional Warfare to Foreign Internal Defense Transitional Curve Model

Counter-State State


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Preparation

Infiltration

5

Organization

Build-up

Combat Operations

Transition

Revitalization

Normalization

Sovereignty

7

8

9

Initial Contact

2

Neutralization

1

3



Provide Secure Environment

Major Cities Only

Transition Point - Karzai

6

SEP 017 OCT 01

Air Campaign

Begins

1

64

23

DEC 01

Today

19 DEC 01

Elections

427

Reconstruction

Fig. 2. Transitional Curve Model - Afghanistan

Secure the Env

5

Counter-State State


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Preparation

Infiltration

5Organization

Build-up

Combat Operations

Transition

Revitalization

Normalization

Sovereignty

7

8

9

Initial Contact

2

Neutralization

1



Reconstruction

Transition PointInterim Gov

6

DEC 2001 JUL 2002

1

6

4

7

2

19 MAR 03

3

4

10 APR 03

30 JUN 04

Election Rhetoric Begins

Effects US population

Support for the War

Today

Fig. 3. Transition Curve Model - IRAQ

Secure the Environment

5

3

Counter-State State


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Questions - Recommendations

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