jointtestimony&of:& william&ashworth&–&yahoo& daniel ......h:\joint...

7
H:\Joint testimony - PA SB 518 and PEAC.docx Joint Testimony of: William Ashworth – Yahoo Daniel Sachs – Facebook Steve DelBianco – NetChoice June 16, 2015 Senate Judiciary Committee Regarding SB 518, An Act to Amend Title 20 Fiduciary Access To Digital Assets Good morning, Chairman Greenleaf, Chairman Leach and members of the committee: We want to thank you for allowing us the opportunity to appear before you today to outline our concerns with SB 518, dealing with fiduciary access to digital assets. Similar bills, such as this, have failed to pass in any of the 30 states where it was introduced this year. We respectfully ask that if you decide to move forward with SB 518, please replace the bill with alternative language that will work better for Pennsylvania residents and the businesses serving them. Let us explain why. While well intentioned, SB 518 could cause more harm than good by seeking to make a decedent’s private communications public, by default. In general our concerns about SB 518 are the following – and further outlined below: Conflicts with the existing federal privacy law. Fails to account for the unique nature of digital stored content. Creates acute privacy concerns for decedents and for third parties with whom the decedent communicated. By use of the term “access,” it suggests that a personal representative can log in to an account belonging to a deceased person. Creates potential for serious confusion by using the term “digital asset.” Raises legal and privacy concerns by forcing providers to treat a personal representative the same way as the deceased account holder. Seeks to fundamentally reshape relationships between businesses and consumers by striking terms of service and choice of law provisions that govern those relationships. Increases the risks of cyber security malfeasance by forcing exposure of more information than necessary. Gives personal representatives “control” of “digital assets” that were never under the “control” of the deceased user in the same way. Does not require a court to find that the request for information is narrowly tailored and actually needed for the settlement of the estate. Does not require a court to verify that the deceased person was actually the holder of an account requested by a personal representative. Failing to provide custodians with a means to challenge or quash orders on the grounds that compliance is unduly burdensome. Disregards user choices about treatment of their accounts when they die.

Upload: others

Post on 04-Sep-2020

1 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: JointTestimony&of:& William&Ashworth&–&Yahoo& Daniel ......H:\Joint testimony - PA SB 518 and PEAC.docx JointTestimony&of:& William&Ashworth&–&Yahoo& Daniel&Sachs&–&Facebook&

H:\Joint testimony - PA SB 518 and PEAC.docx

Joint  Testimony  of:  

William  Ashworth  –  Yahoo  

Daniel  Sachs  –  Facebook  

Steve  DelBianco  –  NetChoice  

June  16,  2015  

Senate  Judiciary  Committee  

Regarding  SB  518,  An  Act  to  Amend  Title  20  -­‐  Fiduciary  Access  To  Digital  Assets  

 

Good  morning,  Chairman  Greenleaf,  Chairman  Leach  and  members  of  the  committee:  

We  want  to  thank  you  for  allowing  us  the  opportunity  to  appear  before  you  today  to  outline  our  concerns  with  SB  518,  dealing  with  fiduciary  access  to  digital  assets.    Similar  bills,  such  as  this,  have  failed  to  pass  in  any  of  the  30  states  where  it  was  introduced  this  year.    We  respectfully  ask  that  if  you  decide  to  move  forward  with  SB  518,  please  replace  the  bill  with  alternative  language  that  will  work  better  for  Pennsylvania  residents  and  the  businesses  serving  them.    Let  us  explain  why.  

While  well  intentioned,  SB  518  could  cause  more  harm  than  good  by  seeking  to  make  a  decedent’s  private  communications  public,  by  default.    

In  general  our  concerns  about  SB  518  are  the  following  –  and  further  outlined  below:  

• Conflicts  with  the  existing  federal  privacy  law.  • Fails  to  account  for  the  unique  nature  of  digital  stored  content.  

• Creates  acute  privacy  concerns  for  decedents  and  for  third  parties  with  whom  the  decedent  communicated.  

• By  use  of  the  term  “access,”  it  suggests  that  a  personal  representative  can  log  in  to  an  account  belonging  to  a  deceased  person.  

• Creates  potential  for  serious  confusion  by  using  the  term  “digital  asset.”    • Raises  legal  and  privacy  concerns  by  forcing  providers  to  treat  a  personal  representative  

the  same  way  as  the  deceased  account  holder.    • Seeks  to  fundamentally  reshape  relationships  between  businesses  and  consumers  by  

striking  terms  of  service  and  choice  of  law  provisions  that  govern  those  relationships.  • Increases  the  risks  of  cyber  security  malfeasance  by  forcing  exposure  of  more  

information  than  necessary.    • Gives  personal  representatives  “control”  of  “digital  assets”  that  were  never  under  the  

“control”  of  the  deceased  user  in  the  same  way.  

• Does  not  require  a  court  to  find  that  the  request  for  information  is  narrowly  tailored  and  actually  needed  for  the  settlement  of  the  estate.  

• Does  not  require  a  court  to  verify  that  the  deceased  person  was  actually  the  holder  of  an  account  requested  by  a  personal  representative.  

• Failing  to  provide  custodians  with  a  means  to  challenge  or  quash  orders  on  the  grounds  that  compliance  is  unduly  burdensome.  

• Disregards  user  choices  about  treatment  of  their  accounts  when  they  die.  

Page 2: JointTestimony&of:& William&Ashworth&–&Yahoo& Daniel ......H:\Joint testimony - PA SB 518 and PEAC.docx JointTestimony&of:& William&Ashworth&–&Yahoo& Daniel&Sachs&–&Facebook&

H:\Joint testimony - PA SB 518 and PEAC.docx 2

For  all  these  reasons,  the  approach  in  SB  518  is  opposed  by  our  companies  and  by  privacy  advocates  such  as  the  ACLU,  Center  for  Democracy  and  Technology,  and  Electronic  Frontier  Foundation.  

SB  518  creates  confusion  and  potential  liability  for  violating  privacy  protections  granted  by  federal  law  The  federal  Electronic  Communications  Privacy  Act  (ECPA)  (18  U.S.C.  2702)  creates  a  strict  bar  against  disclosure  of  the  contents  of  communications  without  the  express  consent  of  one  of  the  parties  to  the  communication.    In  addition  to  its  criminal  provisions,  ECPA  contains  a  private  right  of  action  through  which  any  person  aggrieved  by  an  unlawful  disclosure  can  bring  suit  against  a  provider.    

While  the  federal  law  creates  a  default  rule  of  “private  unless  permission  is  granted  for  disclosure,”  SB  518  creates  an  almost  entirely  opposite  rule.  Under  SB  518,  electronic  communications  content  must  be  disclosed  regardless  of  whether  a  court  has  determined  a  party’s  consent  was  obtained.    As  such,  providers  will  be  forced  to  reject  requests  from  estates  under  this  law  –  unless  a  party  has  consented  to  the  disclosure.    This  is  well  established  from  many  perspectives:  

• The  California  Court  of  Appeals  recently  reviewed  three  decades  of  caselaw  and  explained  that  “the  lawful  consent  exception  to  the  prohibitions  of  the  Act  .  .  .  is  not  satisfied  by  consent  that  is  merely  constructive,  implied  in  law,  or  otherwise  imputed  to  the  user  by  a  court.”  See  Negro  v.  Superior  Court  of  Santa  Clara  County,  230  Cal.  App.  4th  879  (2014).      

• The  United  States  Department  of  Justice  Prosecuting  Cyber  Crimes  manual  explains  to  DOJ  attorneys  that  consent  to  disclosure  of  communications  under  ECPA  must  be  actual  and  not  constructive.  

• Even  the  American  College  of  Trust  and  Estate  Counsel  has  written  to  Congress  saying  “the  privacy  protections  of  the  ECPA  are  an  obstacle  for  fiduciaries  needing  access  to  the  contents  of  a  person’s  electronic  communications  stored  in  online  accounts.  The  potential  civil  damages  have  created  a  significant  chilling  effect  on  providers  when  dealing  with  fiduciaries  requesting  the  contents  of  a  person’s  electronic  communications.”  

By  neglecting  the  consent  requirements  of  federal  law,  SB  518  will  create  needless  confusion  and  expense  for  estates,  providers,  and  the  Pennsylvania  courts.  

In  addition,  the  bill  fails  to  take  into  consideration  the  privacy  of  third  parties  whose  personal  information  may  have  been  included  in  communications  with  the  decedent.  For  example,  consider  the  situation  of  a  public  official  who  routinely  communicates  through  email  with  his  or  her  sponsor  in  Alcoholics  Anonymous  or  any  other  support  group.  Under  SB  518,  when  the  sponsor  passes  away,  the  highly  personal  contents  of  those  emails  would  be  disclosed  to  the  fiduciary,  compromising  the  personal  details  of  the  public  official.    

Obtaining  a  court  order  could  help  address  federal  privacy  law  requirements.    However,  SB  518  fails  to  create  a  pathway  for  providers  to  obtain  a  court  order  based  on  a  finding  that  a  party  has  indeed  consented  and  disclosure  is  permitted  under  ECPA.  The  federal  law  grants  providers  immunity  for  disclosures  in  good  faith  compliance  with  court  orders,  so  ensuring  providers  can  rely  on  such  orders  to  the  extent  they  disclose  contents  is  necessary  to  comply  with  federal  law.    

SB  518  also  invalidates  default  privacy  agreements  between  consumers  and  service  providers.  However,  some  consumers  sign  up  for  particular  social  media  accounts  or  email  services  because  of  policies  that  delete  all  content  upon  death  or  a  specified  period  of  inactivity.  Given  the  wide  variety  of  choices  available  to  consumers,  including  new  tools  to  provide  users  with  granular  “afterlife”  choices  for  their  social  media  accounts,  legislation  should  not  disregard  these  choices  and  preferences.  

Page 3: JointTestimony&of:& William&Ashworth&–&Yahoo& Daniel ......H:\Joint testimony - PA SB 518 and PEAC.docx JointTestimony&of:& William&Ashworth&–&Yahoo& Daniel&Sachs&–&Facebook&

H:\Joint testimony - PA SB 518 and PEAC.docx 3

Because  of  these  legal  and  privacy  issues,  not  one  of  the  30  states  that  considered  the  approach  of  SB  518  has  passed  the  legislation  this  year.      

SB  518  should  be  amended  to  match  the  PEAC  Act  -­‐  an  alternative  that  has  the  support  of  Privacy  Groups  and  Industry.  Instead  of  heading  down  this  path,  we  advocate  replacing  SB  518  with  the  Privacy  Expectation  Afterlife  and  Choices  Act  (PEAC)  Act  (attached  and  available  at  NetChoice.org/PEAC).  

The  PEAC  Act  would  achieve  the  goals  of  SB  518  without  overriding  the  deceased’s  privacy  choices  and  expectations.  

Privacy  advocates  like  the  ACLU,  EFF,  and  CDT  and  industry  created  the  PEAC  Act.    Moreover,  the  PEAC  Act  is  now  law  in  Virginia  and  is  moving  through  the  California  legislature.      

Under  the  PEAC  Act:  

• Privacy  expectations,  statements  in  a  will,  and  settings  chosen  by  users  would  remain  after  the  user  dies.  Unauthorized  fiduciaries  may  not  read  private  communications,  since  privacy  choices  in  life  continue  after  death.  

• Fiduciaries  can  see  the  banks,  investment  managers,  and  accountants  with  whom  the  deceased  corresponded.  This  lets  fiduciaries  identify  important  interactions  and  contact  those  institutions  as  part  of  settling  the  estate.  

• Fiduciaries  can  see  the  contents  of  communications  only  when  the  deceased  expressly  allowed  it  in  their  will,  or  when  there  is  some  other  evidence  of  user  consent.  If  the  deceased  allowed  disclosure  of  these  communications,  then  service  providers  must  comply,  subject  to  verification.  

It’s  not  just  our  view  that  the  PEAC  Act  is  the  correct  approach,  but  it’s  also  what  Pennsylvanians  believe.    The  national  polling  firm  Zogby  Analytics  surveyed  adults  across  age,  demographics,  and  political  spectrums  on  this  issue.    Zogby’s  poll  found:  (available  at  NetChoice.org/Afterlife)  

By  nearly  5-­‐to-­‐1,  Americans  oppose  disclosure  by  default.    Over  70%  of  Americans  say  their  private  online  communications  and  photos  should  remain  private  after  they  die,  unless  they  gave  prior  consent  for  others  to  access.        

Just  15%  said  an  estate  attorney  should  make  the  decision  about  sharing  their  private  communications  and  photos.      

For  these  reasons,  we  oppose  SB  518  as  drafted.    We  remain  hopeful  that  we  can  work  with  all  stakeholders  on  an  approach  that  helps  citizens  choose  their  afterlife  privacy  while  allowing  the  fiduciary  to  wrap-­‐up  the  estate  and  comply  with  federal  law.      

 

     

     

 

Page 4: JointTestimony&of:& William&Ashworth&–&Yahoo& Daniel ......H:\Joint testimony - PA SB 518 and PEAC.docx JointTestimony&of:& William&Ashworth&–&Yahoo& Daniel&Sachs&–&Facebook&

H:\Joint testimony - PA SB 518 and PEAC.docx

Additional  Concerns  with  SB  518  • We  have  concerns  about  language  regarding  “access”  as  it  creates  confusion  as  to  whether  a  

personal  representative  can  log  in  to  an  account  belonging  to  a  deceased  person.    Moreover,  for  privacy  and  safety  purposes,  such  access  should  never  be  required  by  law.    Instead,  we  propose  a  model  based  on  disclosure  of,  rather  than  access  to,  account  information.    However,  we  do  not  intend  to  preclude  providers  from  offering  such  access  should  they  so  choose.  

• We  have  concerns  about  the  potential  for  serious  confusion  caused  by  the  term  “digital  asset.”    Many  pieces  of  information  that  are  stored  by  providers  are  not  the  “assets”  of  an  account  holder.    However,  recognizing  that  even  if  electronic  communications  contents  and  records  are  not  “assets,”  they  may  still  be  helpful  in  settling  estates,  we  offer  a  pathway  for  disclosure  of  such  information  whether  or  not  it  is  an  “asset”  of  the  decedent.  

• We  have  concerns  that  the  bill  would  require  providers  to  treat  a  personal  representative  the  same  way  as  the  deceased  account  holder.    This  may  be  contrary  to  service  agreements  and  providers  may  not  be  able  to  do  so  without  unlawfully  disclosing  the  contents  of  electronic  communications.    The  law  should  also  preserve  the  right  of  providers  to  decide  who  can  access  their  systems  and  services.  

• The  bill  seeks  to  fundamentally  reshape  relationships  between  businesses  and  consumers  by  striking  terms  of  service  and  choice  of  law  provisions  that  govern  those  relationships.    Altering  terms  of  service  is  not  necessary  to  compel  disclosure  of  information  to  fiduciaries.    Instead  of  drastically  reshaping  these  relationships,  we  propose  a  different  approach  that  would  respect  existing  business  relationships  but  would  not  permit  service  agreements,  by  themselves,  to  bar  the  disclosure  of  information  needed  to  settle  estates.  

• We  have  concerns  that  the  bill  is  overbroad  in  its  efforts  to  compel  access  to  tangible  personal  property  of  companies  or  persons  other  than  the  deceased  user.    This  could  create  very  serious  privacy  and  cybersecurity  risks.  

• We  have  concerns  about  provisions  giving  personal  representatives  “control”  of  “digital  assets”  that  were  never  under  the  “control”  of  the  deceased  user  in  the  same  way.  

• We  have  concerns  that  the  bill  does  not  require  a  court  to  find  that  the  request  for  information  is  narrowly  tailored  and  actually  needed  for  the  settlement  of  the  estate.    This  is  a  tremendously  important  part  of  our  proposal  that  will  serve  to  limit  unreasonable  and  burdensome  requests  on  providers  and  limit  privacy-­‐intrusive  requests  for  information  about  online  dating  sites,  domestic  violence  forums,  and  other  sensitive  personal  communications  unrelated  to  estate  settlement.  

• We  have  concerns  that  the  bill  does  not  require  a  court  to  verify  that  the  deceased  person  was  actually  the  account  holder.  This  is  a  needed  privacy  protection  as  many  accounts  are  opened  anonymously  or  under  pseudonyms  and  the  provider  may  have  to  way  to  verify  the  account  holder’s  identity.  

• We  have  concerns  that  the  bill  would  impose  unwarranted  burdens  on  providers  by  failing  to  provide  providers  with  a  means  to  challenge  or  quash  orders  on  the  grounds  that  compliance  is  unduly  burdensome.    Our  proposal  mitigates  these  serious  due  process  concerns.  

• Many  companies  have  offered  users  choices  about  treatment  of  their  accounts  when  they  die.    This  bill  would  disregard  those  choices.    Our  approach  would  honor  them.

Page 5: JointTestimony&of:& William&Ashworth&–&Yahoo& Daniel ......H:\Joint testimony - PA SB 518 and PEAC.docx JointTestimony&of:& William&Ashworth&–&Yahoo& Daniel&Sachs&–&Facebook&

H:\Joint testimony - PA SB 518 and PEAC.docx

Privacy  Expectation  Afterlife  and  Choices  Act  (PEAC)  Act  Section  1:    

As  used  in  this  Act,  the  following  definitions  shall  apply:    

(a)  “Asset”  means  anything  of  financial  value  that  is  part  of  the  estate  of  the  decedent.  

(b)  “Authorized  user”  or  “user”  means  a  person  or  entity  who  has  lawfully  obtained  credentials  to  access  an  account  with  an  electronic  communication  service  in  a  manner  consistent  with  the  terms  of  service  that  apply  to  that  account.    

(c)  “Contents”  means  information  concerning  the  substance,  purport,  or  meaning  of  communications  and  includes  the  subject  line  of  the  communication.    

(d)  “Electronic  communication”  means  a  transfer  of  signs,  signals,  writing,  images,  sounds,  data,  or  intelligence  of  any  nature  that  is  transmitted,  in  whole  or  in  part,  by  a  wire,  radio,  electromagnetic,  or  photooptical  system  that  affects  interstate  or  foreign  commerce.  “Electronic  communication”  does  not  include  any  of  the  following:    

(1)  Wire  or  oral  communication.  

(2)  Communication  made  through  a  tone-­‐only  paging  device.    

(3)  Communication  from  a  tracking  device.  

(4)  Electronic  funds  transfer  information  stored  by  a  financial  institution  in  a  communication  system  used  for  the  electronic  storage  and  transfer  of  funds.    

(e)  “Electronic  communication  service”  means  a  service  that  provides  to  users  the  ability  to  send  or  receive  wire  or  electronic  communication.    

(f)  “Electronic  communications  system”  means  a  wire,  radio,  electromagnetic,  photooptical,  or  photoelectronic  facility  for  the  transmission  of  wire  or  electronic  communications  and  any  computer  facilities  or  related  electronic  equipment  for  the  electronic  storage  of  those  communications.    

(g)  “Provider”  means  an  electronic  communication  service  or  remote  computing  service.    

(h)  “Record”  means  a  record  regarding  a  communication  sent  or  received  by  a  subscriber  or  user  of  an  electronic  communication  service  or  remote  computing  service,  including,  but  not  limited  to,  account  logs  that  record  account  usage,  cell-­‐site  data  for  mobile  telecommunications  calls,  and  online  addresses  of  other  individuals  with  whom  the  account  holder  has  communicated.    

(i)  “Remote  computing  service”  means  providing  computer  storage  or  processing  services  to  the  public  by  means  of  an  electronic  communications  system.    

Section  2:    

(a)  A  probate  court  that  has  jurisdiction  of  the  estate  of  the  deceased  user  may  order  a  provider  to  disclose  to  the  executor  or  administrator  of  the  estate  a  record  or  other  information  pertaining  to  the  account  of  the  deceased  user  that  is  in  electronic  storage  with  the  provider,  but  not  the  contents  of  communications  or  stored  contents,  if  the  court  makes  all  of  the  following  findings  of  facts  based  upon  a  sworn  declaration  of  the  personal  representative  or  other  admissible  evidence:    

(1)  The  user  is  deceased.    

(2)  The  deceased  user  was  the  subscriber  to  or  customer  of  the  provider.    

(3)  The  account  belonging  to  the  deceased  user  has  been  identified  with  specificity,  including  a  unique  identifier  assigned  by  the  provider.    

Page 6: JointTestimony&of:& William&Ashworth&–&Yahoo& Daniel ......H:\Joint testimony - PA SB 518 and PEAC.docx JointTestimony&of:& William&Ashworth&–&Yahoo& Daniel&Sachs&–&Facebook&

H:\Joint testimony - PA SB 518 and PEAC.docx 6

(4)  There  are  no  other  owners  of,  or  persons  or  entities  who  have  registered  with  the  provider  with  respect  to,  the  deceased  user’s  account.    

(5)  Disclosure  is  not  in  violation  of  another  applicable  federal  or  state  law.    

(6)  The  request  for  disclosure  is  narrowly  tailored  to  the  purpose  of  administering  the  estate.    

(7)  The  executor  or  administrator  demonstrates  a  good  faith  belief  that  the  information  requested  is  relevant  to  resolve  issues  regarding  assets  or  liabilities  of  the  estate.    

(8)  The  request  seeks  information  spanning  no  more  than  18  months  prior  to  the  date  of  death,  or  the  requester  has  made  a  request  for  information  that  specifically  requests  data  older  than  18  months  prior  to  the  date  of  death.    

(9)  The  request  is  not  in  conflict  with  the  deceased  user’s  will  or  other  written,  electronic,  or  oral  expression  of  the  deceased  user’s  intent  regarding  access  to  or  disposition  of  information  contained  in  or  regarding  the  user’s  account.    

(b)  A  probate  court  that  has  jurisdiction  of  the  estate  of  the  deceased  user  may  order  a  provider  to  disclose  to  the  executor  or  administrator  of  the  estate  the  contents  of  communications  or  stored  contents,  if  the  court  makes  all  of  the  following  findings  of  facts  based  upon  a  sworn  declaration  of  the  personal  representative  or  other  admissible  evidence:    

(1)  The  will  of  the  decedent,  or  a  choice  made  by  the  deceased  user  within  the  product  or  service  or  otherwise  regarding  how  the  user’s  contents  can  be  treated  after  a  set  period  of  inactivity  after  the  user’s  death,  or  other  event  evidences  the  decedent’s  express  consent  to  the  disclosure  of  the  requested  contents.    

(2)  The  findings  required  by  paragraphs  (1)  to  (8),  inclusive,  of  subdivision  (a).    

(c)  Except  as  provided  in  subdivision  (d),  a  provider  shall  disclose  to  the  executor  or  administrator  of  the  estate  the  contents  of  the  deceased  user’s  account,  to  the  extent  reasonably  available,  only  if  the  executor  or  administrator  gives  the  provider  all  of  the  following:    

(1)  A  written  request  for  the  contents  of  the  deceased  user’s  account.    

(2)  A  copy  of  the  death  certificate  of  the  deceased  user.    

(3)  An  order  of  the  probate  court  with  jurisdiction  over  the  estate  of  the  deceased  that  includes  all  of  the  findings  required  in  subdivision  (b).    

(4)  An  order  that  the  estate  shall  first  indemnify  the  provider  from  any  and  all  liability  in  complying  with  the  order.    

(d)  A  provider  served  with  an  order  compelling  disclosure  of  subscriber  deceased  user  records  or  contents  pursuant  to  this  section  may  make  a  motion  to  quash  or  modify  the  order  within  a  reasonable  time  after  receiving  the  order.  The  court  shall  do  any  of  the  following:    

(1)  Modify  the  order  to  the  extent  that  the  court  finds  that  compliance  with  the  order  would  cause  an  undue  burden  on  the  provider,  or  quash  the  order  if  the  court  finds  that  the  order  cannot  be  modified  so  as  to  avoid  the  undue  burden.  However,  a  cost  that  the  requester  offers  to  pay  pursuant  to  subdivision  (e)  shall  not  be  considered  when  a  court  is  making  a  determination  whether  the  request  constitutes  an  undue  burden.    

(2)  Quash  the  order  if  any  of  the  applicable  requirements  of  subdivision  (a)  or  (b)  are  not  met.    

(3)  Quash  the  order  if  the  court  finds,  based  upon  the  preponderance  of  the  evidence  submitted  by  the  provider  or  any  other  person,  that  any  of  the  circumstances  set  forth  in  Section  3  apply.    

Page 7: JointTestimony&of:& William&Ashworth&–&Yahoo& Daniel ......H:\Joint testimony - PA SB 518 and PEAC.docx JointTestimony&of:& William&Ashworth&–&Yahoo& Daniel&Sachs&–&Facebook&

H:\Joint testimony - PA SB 518 and PEAC.docx 7

(e)  A  provider  may  require  the  requester  to  pay  the  direct  costs  of  producing  a  copy  of  the  record  or  other  information  pertaining  to  the  account  of  the  deceased,  when  those  records  are  not  already  available  for  production  during  the  ordinary  course  of  business.    

Section  3:  

A  provider  shall  not  be  compelled  to  disclose  a  record  or  the  contents  of  communications  if  any  of  the  following  apply:    

(a)  The  deceased  user  expressed  an  intent  to  disallow  disclosure  through  either  deletion  of  the  records  or  contents  during  the  user’s  lifetime,  or  an  affirmative  indication,  through  a  setting  within  the  product  or  service,  of  how  the  user’s  records  or  the  content  of  communications  can  be  treated  after  a  set  period  of  inactivity  or  other  event.    

(b)  The  provider  is  aware  of  any  indication  of  lawful  access  to  the  account  after  the  date  of  the  deceased  user’s  death  or  that  the  account  is  not  that  of  the  deceased  user.    

(c)  Disclosure  would  violate  other  applicable  law,  including,  but  not  limited  to,  electronic  communications  privacy  provisions  or  copyright  law.    

Section  4:  

(a)  Disclosure  of  the  contents  of  the  deceased  user’s  account  to  the  executor  or  administrator  of  the  estate  shall  be  subject  to  the  same  license,  restrictions,  terms  of  service,  and  legal  obligations,  including  copyright  law,  that  applied  to  the  deceased  user.    

(b)  Nothing  in  this  Act  shall  be  construed  to  require  a  requesting  party  to  assume  control  of  a  deceased  user’s  account.    

Section  5:  

A  provider  shall  not  be  held  liable  for  compliance  in  good  faith  with  a  court  order  issued  pursuant  to  this  Act.