joint submission on national mitigation plan fv · submission to the department of communications,...

SubmissiontotheDepartmentofCommunications,ClimateAction&Environment’sontheDraftNationalMitigationPlan.April2017.

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SubmissiontotheDepartmentofCommunications,Climate

ActionandEnvironmentonthedraft

NationalMitigationPlan(NMP)

StopClimateChaosCoalitionandtheEnvironmentalPillariApril2017


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1. Overview

ThedraftNationalMitigationPlan(NMP)containssomewelcomediscreteproposalssuchas

thepreparationofoptionsforphasingoutfossilfuels,andanationalparkingreview.Italso

containsanumberofpositivenewelementsinrelationtoeffectiveclimatepolicyplanning

includingtheuseofacarbonbudgetframing;commitmenttoidentifyingpossibletransition

pathwaysto2050;reviewofguidanceonpublicexpenditurereviewandappraisaland

identificationofexchequerandnon-exchequeroptionsforfinancingthetransition;and

enhancingstandingtechnicalandeconomicadvisorycapacityforclimatepolicydevelopment.

However,thedraftPlandoesnotrepresenttheincreaseinambitionrequiredtomeeteither

Ireland’sexistingEUtargetsortoensureIrelanddoesitsfairshareoftheglobaleffortto

deliveronthetemperaturelimitsadoptedintheParisAgreement.1Furthermore,ouroverall

viewisthatthePlanascurrentlydrafteddoesnotfulfilthetaskascribedtoitunderthe

ClimateActionandLowCarbonDevelopmentAct(2015)(hereinreferredtoastheClimate

Act)andthusshouldnotbethetemplatefornationalmitigationplanning.TheClimateAct

(2015)stipulatesinSection4(2)thattheNMPmust:

● ‘specifythemannerinwhichitisproposedtoachievethenationaltransitionobjective’,

● ‘specifythepolicymeasuresthat...wouldberequired...forfurtheringtheachievement

ofthenationaltransitionobjective’,

● ‘takeintoaccountanyexistingobligationoftheStateunderthelawoftheEuropean

Unionoranyinternationalagreement’,and;

● ‘specifythemitigationpolicymeasurestobeadoptedbytheMinistersofthe

Government...’.2

1TheParisAgreement,adoptedinDecember2015,commitsthe196countriesthatagreeditto“holdingtheincreaseintheglobalaveragetemperaturetowellbelow2°Cabovepre-industriallevelsandpursuingeffortstolimitthetemperatureincreaseto1.5°Cabovepre-industriallevels”.2TheStrategicEnvironmentalAssessmentScopingReport(2015)forthedraftNMPoutlinedthatinaccordancewithIreland’sclimatelaw,thePlancouldinclude,amongotheraspects,highlevelobjectivesforeachsectorto2050,mitigationplansfor2020,2030andbeyond,anoutlineofthecumulativeeffectsofsectoralactionandtheimplicationsforIreland’soverallclimateobjectivesandtargets,anddetailontheproposedmechanismstomeasure,reportandevaluateprogress.


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ThisisthefirstNMPundertheClimateAct,andIreland’sfirstClimatePlansincetheadoption

andratificationoftheParisAgreementandtheaforementionedpromisingaspectsofthe

draftPlanshouldbebuiltuponandstrengthenedfurther.However,thePlanshouldbe

substantiallyredevelopedinordertosettheagendaintermsofambition,approachand

methodologyforclimatepolicyplanninggoingforward.

Recommendation:Thelevelofambition,theproposedapproachtopolicy

planning,andtheoverallframingforclimateactionreflectedinthedraftPlan

requirefundamentalchanges.ItisourviewthatthePlanasawholeshouldnot

beconsideredanappropriateoradequatetemplateforambitious,fairclimate

actionandnationalmitigationpolicyplanning,andanewPlanshouldbe

broughtforward.

2. DoestheNMPputforwardaPlanfordeliveringIreland’sclimateaction

commitments?

ThedraftPlanacknowledgesthechallengesIrelandfaces,butfailstoidentifythespecific

policymeasuresandapproachesrequiredforfurtherachievementofthemitigationelement

ofthenationaltransitionobjective(i.e.,an80%reductionincombinedemissionsfrom

energy,transportandbuildingsandanapproachtocarbonneutralityinagricultureby2050

thatdoesnotcompromisesustainablefoodproduction).Thisdoesnotreflectthelegislative

requirementsestablishedbytheClimateAct(2015),assetoutabove(Section1).

Furthermore,theabsenceofaspecificpolicyapproachwithinthedraftcontrastssharplywith

recommendationsfromIreland’sClimateChangeAdvisoryCouncil(CCAC)regardingwhat

shouldbecontainedwithintheNMP.Theserecommendationswereoutlinedinarecent

communicationtotheMinisterforCommunications,ClimateActionandEnvironment,3andin

theirfirstadvisoryreportpublishedinNovember2016.4Inthisreport,theCCACadvisedthat

long-termplanningandastablepolicyframeworkcomprisingconcretepoliciesandmeasures

3See:March2017-LettertoMinisterNaughtenregardingthepreparationoftheNationalMitigationPlan.Availableat:http://www.climatecouncil.ie/councilpublications/otherpublications/4ClimateChangeAdvisoryCouncil(2016)FirstReport.Availableat:http://www.climatecouncil.ie/media/CCAC_FIRSTREPORT.pdf


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isrequiredtohelpachieveimmediate2020and2030climateandenergytargetsalready

agreedatEUlevel.TheyalsostatedthattheNMPshouldnotonlyprovideaplanoutlining

howIrelandwillachievethesetargets,butalsoincludeanoutlineoftheroadmaprequiredto

reachIreland’sself-declared,2050nationalobjective.5

Recommendation:WhileitisacceptablethatthisPlancannotdetermineindetailthe

thirty-threeyearpolicypathwayto2050,tobecredibleandeffective,however,thePlan

should:

1. Assignanappropriatecarbonbudgetandsetoutdetailedobjectivesand

intendedpolicymeasurestobeadoptedtodeliverontheseobjectivesforat

leastafiveyearperiod;

2. AccountfortheimplicationsoftheambitionofthePlanforachievementof

Ireland’s2020,2030and2050climatecommitmentsand;

3. AcknowledgetheimplicationsofanyprojectedfailurebyIrelandtomeetitsfair

shareoftheglobaleffortundertheParisAgreementandhowitintendsto

addressthisshortfall.Asarich,developednation,Irelandcanneithermorally

norpoliticallyjustify‘free-riding’ontheeffortsofothers.

ThedraftPlanreferstointentionsregardingaccessingnon-exchequer,privatefinancing

mechanismstoimplementcertainclimatepolicies.Itcanonlybeassumedthatinvestor

confidencewouldbeincreasedwithgreaterclarityonshort,mediumandlong-term

objectivesandthepolicydirectionintendedtodeliveronthem.

5In2012,thegovernmentwereadvisedtoachieveamoreunifiedandconsistentsetofambitiouspolicyinstrumentsindevelopingitsclimatechangestrategy,andtoachievea‘moreunifiedandstableviewofhowpolicyoptionsandactionswillbedeveloped,assessed,monitored,evaluatedandadapted’(NESC,2012:71).TheStrategicEnvironmentalAssessmentScopingReport(2015)fortheNMPoutlinedthatthePlanmustaddresscompliancewith2020targets,andcontainapolicyplanfor2030.


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Anarrowandincomplete‘costeffectiveness’analysiscannotdeliverfairandadequate

action

Applyingtraditionalcost-benefitanalysistoclimatepolicycanresultindelayedactionuntil

moreinformationandinnovationisavailabletolowerthecostsoftakingaction,6andcan

reducethepotentialfornewsolutionsandalternativestoemerge.7Webelievethecurrent

focuswithinthePlanon‘costeffectiveness’isbothinadequateandincompleteandwillnot

serveIrishsocietyoranorderlytransitionoftheeconomy.Inordertobefairandadequate,

thefollowingcostsmustbeconsidered:

Thelocalandglobalhumancostsofinactionmustbeacknowledged

• UndertheClimateAct(2015),climatejusticeisoneoftheprinciplesthatclimatepolicy

measuresmusthaveregardto.However,referencetoclimatejusticeandtheglobaland

domesticimplicationsofthisprinciplefordomesticclimatepolicyiscompletelyabsentin

thedraftPlan.ThedraftNMPsystematicallyrefersto‘cost-effectiveness’astheanalytical

lensforidentifyingandproceedingwithclimatemeasures,withoutanyconsiderationof

thewidersocialanddistributionalequityimplications.Atdomesticandgloballevels,the

poorestandmostvulnerablepeopleinsocietyaretheworstaffectedbyclimateimpacts.8

• Already,climaticchangesareestimatedtocausegloballybetween150-400,000

additionaldeathsannually9.Climate-relatedextremeeventsaccountedforapproximately

6Baker,T.(2016)TheEconomicsofAvoidingDangerousClimateChange.StudiesinEcologicalEconomics,Vol.6,pp.237-263.7Richardson,H.(2000)TheStupidityoftheCostBenefitStandard.JournalofLegalStudies,Vol.29(1),pp.971-1003.8IPCC,2014:Summaryforpolicymakers.In:ClimateChange2014:Impacts,Adaptation,andVulnerability.PartA:GlobalandSectoralAspects.ContributionofWorkingGroupIItotheFifthAssessmentReportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange[Field,C.B.,V.R.Barros,D.J.Dokken,K.J.Mach,M.D.Mastrandrea,T.E.Bilir,M.Chatterjee,K.L.Ebi,Y.O.Estrada,R.C.Genova,B.Girma,E.S.Kissel,A.N.Levy,S.MacCracken,P.R.Mastrandrea,andL.L.White(eds.)].CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,UnitedKingdomandNewYork,NY,USA,pp.1-32.9DARAandtheClimateVulnerableForum.(2012)ClimateVulnerabilityMonitor;AGuidetotheColdCalculusofaHotPlanet.Availableat:http://daraint.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/CVM2ndEd-FrontMatter.pdf


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85,000additionaldeathsinEuropeovertheperiod1980-2013.10In2015alone,more

than19.2millionpeopleacross113countriesfledclimate-relateddisasters.11

• Thelocalcostsofclimatechange-relatedextremeeventsarenotadequately

incorporatedintothedraftPlan.VariousEPAresearchprojectshaveexaminedIreland’s

vulnerabilityandplacedestimatesof,forexample,thecostofcoastalfloodingwith1m-

5minundationevents.12,13Thehumanimpactsofincreasinglyunpredictableandintense

weathereventsonhomesandbusinessesinIrelandarealreadysignificant.Theseimpacts

areperfectlycapturedinaDáilstatementonflooding,madeinearly2016,byTaoiseach

EndaKennyT.D.:

‘Today,myfirstthoughtsandwordsmustbewiththosewhohave

sufferedsomuchbecauseofthestormsofthelastmonth:themen

andwomenwhosefarmsandhomeshavebeenflooded,isolatedor

evacuated,whoselivelihoodshavebeenthreatened,andwhohave

spentlong,anxiousdaysandnightsafraidofandmesmerisedbythe

weatherforecastofrain,rain,rain,andtheheartbreakitbrought’.14

• Anequitylensfactoringintheimplicationsofclimateactionandinactionforthemost

vulnerableinIrishsocietyisneeded.Thesocialandregionalimplications(positiveand

negative)arisingfromlowcarbondevelopmentacrossthevarioussectors,i.e.,thecosts

toworkers,businessesandcommunitiesthatareaffecteddirectlybythephasingoutof

fossil-fuelindustriesforexample,andthepotentialforeconomicandotherbenefitsto

accruedbycommunitiesunderdecarbonisationmeasures.Itisclearthatfailureto

10EuropeanEnvironmentAgency(2016).Climatechange,impactsandvulnerabilityinEurope2016.pp.19and27.Availableat:http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/climate-change-impacts-and-vulnerability-2016/key-findings11NorwegianRefugeeCouncil(2016)DisasterandClimateChange.Availableat:https://www.nrc.no/what-we-do/speaking-up-for-rights/climate-change/12Sweeney,J.&Coll,J.(2013)CurrentandfuturevulnerabilitiestoClimateChangeinIreland.ClimateChangeResearchProgramme(CCRP)2007-2013,ReportSeriesNo.29.EnvironmentalProtectionAgency,Johnstown

Castle,Wexford.13Flood,S.andSweeney,J.(2012)Quantifyingimpactsofpotentialsea-levelrisescenariosonIrishcoastalcities.In:Otto-Zimmermann,K(ed.)ResilientCities2011.Springer,London,27-52.14See:http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/irish/Nuacht/Aithisc_an_Taoisigh_/Dail_Statement_by_the_Taoiseach_Enda_Kenny_T_D_on_Flooding_13_January_2016.html


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addressormanage,inparticular,unevendevelopmentandtheneedsofaffected

communitieswillunderminethelevelofpublicsupportforclimateactionmeasures.

Delaydrivesupthecostsofdecarbonising

• In2006,thelandmarkSternReportontheEconomicsofClimateChangeestimatedthat

thecostofinactioncouldbeasmuchas20%ofglobalGDP,incomparisontojust1%of

GDPfortakingclimateaction.15Sternhassinceemphasisedthatcurrenteconomic

modelstendtoseriouslyunderestimateclimatechangeimpacts.16

• In2011,theInternationalEnergyAgency(IEA)projectedthatforevery$1ofinvestment

incleanertechnologythatneedstobeinvestedinthepowersectorbefore2020,an

additional$4.30wouldneedtobespentafter2020tocompensatefortheincreased

emissionsifsuchinvestmentswerenotmade.17

• ThecostofadaptingtoclimatechangeimpactsinIrelandhasbeenestimatedatbetween

€80mand€800mannually.18Adaptationtotheseimpactsisabsolutelyessentialto

protectIrishcommunitiesandbusinesses.Themosteffectiveadaptationstrategyisto

pursueandpromotegloballyanincreaseinmitigationaction.

• NoattempthasbeenmadeinthedraftPlantodeterminethecostsassociatedwith

climateimpactsondifferenteconomicsectors.Thiscontrastswiththeacknowledgement

inearlierclimateactionplans–suchastheNationalClimateChangeStrategy(2007-2012)

–ontheeconomicimperativeforearlyaction,andrecognitionthatthecostsofinaction

greatlyoutweighthecostsofanearlyandeffectiveresponse.

Thecostofnon-compliancewithEUtargetsmustbefactoredin

• In2014,thethenDepartmentofEnvironment,CommunityandLocalGovernment

predictedthatnon-compliancecostswithagreedEU2020targetscouldbebetween€140

15Stern(2006)SternReview:TheEconomicsofClimateChange,London:HMTreasury.16Stern,N.(2016)Currentclimatemodelsaregrosslymisleading.Nature,Vol.530(7591):407-409.17Theworldislockingitselfintoanunsustainableenergyfuturewhichwouldhavefar-reachingconsequences,IEAwarnsinitslatestWorldEnergyOutlook.InternationalEnergyAgencyPressRelease9/11/2011.18EnvironmentalProtectionAgency(2013)Co-ordination,CommunicationandAdaptationforClimateChangeinIreland:anintegratedApproach(COCOADPT).Availableat:https://www.epa.ie/pubs/reports/research/climate/CCRP_30%20COCO%20Adapt.pdf


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millionand€600million.19Thisamountstoalmost22%oftheprojectednetfiscalspace

in202020,whichcouldotherwisefundimprovementsinhealthoreducation.Estimates

fromtheInstituteofInternationalandEuropeanAffairs(IIEA,2016)21suggestthatinthe

scenarioofnonewclimateactionmeasuresbeingurgentlybroughtforward,combined

2020and2030non-compliancecoststotheIrishtaxpayersmayexceed€6billion.22

• Thesecosts,orattemptstopreventorminimisethem,arecurrentlynotacknowledgedin

thedraftPlan.Theyshouldbefactoredin,andthelikelyimpactofproposedpolicy

measuresinreducingthesecostsincludedintheanalysisofimplicationssectionofeach

five-yearplan.

Thecostoffailingtocapitaliseonopportunitiesofanambitiousdecarbonisationpathwaymustbetakenintoaccount

• ALondonSchoolofEconomicsstudyin2015concludedthattheneteconomicbenefits

forcountriesfromtacklingclimatechangecontinuetooutweighthecosts.23

• Currently,IrelandisthethirdhighestproducerofemissionsperpersonintheEU,and

eighthintheOECD.Ireland’semergingreputationasa‘climatelaggard’24shouldbeof

considerableconcernfromaneconomicperspective.In2016,theGlobalGreenEconomy

Index,aleadinginternationalmeasureofthegreeneconomicperformanceofeighty

countries,showedIrelandslidesignificantlyinglobalrankingsdueinparticular,toa

perceivedlackofpoliticalleadershiponclimatechangeandpoorperformanceon

19DepartmentofEnvironment,CommunityandLocalGovernment(2014)FutureExpenditureRisksassociatedwithClimateChange/ClimateFinance.Availableat:http://igees.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Future-Expenditure-Risks-associated-with-Climate-Change-Climate-Finance1.pdf20DepartmentofFinance(2016)InformationNoteonFiscalSpace2017–2021.Availableathttp://www.finance.gov.ie/sites/default/files/Information%2Note%20on%20Fiscal%20Space%202017%20fin.pdf21Curtin(2016)‘HowmuchofIreland’s“fiscalspace”willclimateinactionconsume?’Availableat:http://www.iiea.com/blogosphere/how-much-of-irelands-fiscal-space-will-climate-inaction-consume22Bywayofcomparison,thecutsincurrentexpenditureduringthethreeyearsoftheTroikabailout(2011,2012,and2013)totalled€4.6billion(SeeTable1.herehttp://bit.ly/NERI2015).23LondonSchoolofEconomics(2015)NationallySelf-InterestedClimateChangeMitigation:AUnifiedConceptualFramework.GranthamResearchInstituteonClimateChangeandtheEnvironment.Workingpaper.24IrishTimes.November22nd2016.‘Governmentcriticisedforfailingtoactonclimatechange;PatCoxsaysIrelandisindangerofbecomingtheclimatechangelaggardofEurope’.Availableat:http://www.irishtimes.com/business/energy-and-resources/government-criticised-for-failing-to-act-on-climate-change-1.2878291


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environmentalcommitments.Thisissignificantlyunderminingthepotentialtoportray

Irelandasahubforinvestmentpotentialintheemerginggreenglobaleconomy.

• ResearchcarriedoutfortheIrishCorporateLeadersGroupin2014highlightedthe

potentialfor90,000jobsinIrelandunderanambitiousdecarbonisationagenda.25

• Climatepolicycanbeeithersociallyprogressiveorregressive.Onthepathto

decarbonisation,changesinthelabourmarketwillincludenewjobcreation,the

eliminationofcertainjobroles,substitutionandjobtransformation,yetthedraft

mitigationPlanprovidesnoindicationofhowtheemploymentneedsinaffected

communitieswillbemetintheshorttomediumterm.ThefinalNMPshouldinclude

safeguardstoensureclimatepoliciesdonotcreateunintendedimpactsoramplifythe

vulnerabilityofcommunities.

Considerationofthesystemicrisksofinactionmustbecomecentral

• Climatechangeanddirectlyconnectedissuesofextremeweatherandresourcecrises

haveconsistentlyfeaturedamongthetop-rankedrisksintheWorldEconomicForum’s

GlobalRisksReportsince2011.

• Whileclimatechangeisimpactingonallworldregions,poorcountriesareandwill

remaindisproportionallyaffected.However,Europe,includingIreland,isalsovulnerable

tospill-overeffectsfromclimatechangeimpactsoccurringoutsidetheEU,especiallyin

relationtotrade,infrastructureandtransport,geopoliticsandsecurityrisks,human

migrationandfinance.26

• AreportbyanAdvisoryCommitteetotheEuropeanSystemicRiskBoard,broughtbefore

EUFinanceMinistersinApril2016,highlightedthat‘alatetransitiontoalow-carbon

economywouldexacerbatethephysicalcostsofclimatechange’(2016:4).Itprojectsthat

thiswouldresultina‘hardlanding’,constrainingenergysupply,increasingwhole

economyproductioncosts,witheffectsequivalenttolargeandpersistentnegative

25IrishCorporateLeadersonClimateChange(2014)UnlockingOpportunity.TheBusinessCaseforTakingClimateActioninIreland.Availableat:http://www.foe.ie/download/pdf/unlocking_opportunity_the_business_case_for_climate_action_in_ireland.pdf26EuropeanEnvironmentAgency(2016)Climatechange,impactsandvulnerabilityinEurope2016:Anindicator-basedreport.Brussels:EuropeanEnvironmentAgency.Availableat:http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/climate-change-impacts-and-vulnerability-2016


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macroeconomicshock.27Thisisonlyoneofaswatheofrecentinitiativeshighlightingthe

systemicriskstothefinancialsystemandglobaleconomyoffailingtoactadequately,

effectivelyandinatimelywaytodecarboniseglobalandnationaleconomies.28

Recommendation:ToberobustthefinalNMPmustfullyexplicitlyevaluatethe

directcostsofinaction,therisingcostsactionifactionisdelayed.The

opportunitycostsofinactionandthesystemicrisksassociatedwithinaction.

Moreover,werecommendthatthebuildingoftechnicalandeconomic

advisorycapacityshouldincludetheexpansionofthecurrentnarrow‘cost-

effectiveness’analysis,asamatterofpriority,tointegrateanalysisofthe

implicationsofallofthecostsandrisksoutlinedaboveonanongoingbasis.

(Section2).

3. DoestheNMPprovideavisionforIrelandin2050thatthepublicand

privatesectorcangetbehind?

TheoveralltoneofthePlaniscautious,borderingondefeatist.Theoverwhelmingmessageis

thatclimateactionisundesirable,costlyandthattheemphasismustbeonminimising

disruptiontocurrentnationaldevelopmentplans.Thisisinstarkcontrasttothetoneand

framingforotherpolicyareas,suchasforexample,inFoodWise2025(2015)the

government’sroadmapforexpansionofIreland’sagri-foodsector,theNationalRecovery

Planin2010,ortheActionPlanforJobs(2012).Weacceptandendorsetheanalysisthat

climateactionwillrequiresignificantchangesthatrequirepublicandprivatesectorsupport.

Webelievestronglyhowever,thatelicitingsuchsupportrequiresavastlydifferentvisionand

tonetothatcurrentlysetoutinthedraftPlan.Signsofsuchanambitiousvisionandpositive

27EuropeanSystemicRiskBoard(2016)Toolate,toosudden:Transitiontoalow-carboneconomyandsystemicrisk.ReportsoftheAdvisoryScientificCommitteeNo6/February2016.Germany:EuropeanSystemicRiskBoard.28Since2015,aninvestigationbytheBankofEnglandintosystemicriskledtotheestablishmentoftheG20FinancialStabilityBoardTaskForceonClimate-relatedDisclosure.InrecentmonthstheDutchCentralBankandSwedishFinancialSupervisoryAuthority,theAustralianPrudentialRegulationAuthority,DeputyGovernoroftheBankofCanada,andajointreportbytheFrenchTreasury,CentralBankandPrudentialRegulatorshaveallinitiatednationallevelconsiderationoftheseissues.


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tonewereevidentonthepublicationoftheEnergyWhitePaper29producedbythesame

DepartmentinDecember2015buttheyareabsentnow.

Scotland’sDraftClimateChangePlan(2017-2032)providesausefulillustrationofa

frameworkthatisnotonlyambitious,policyimplementation/outcomeandtarget-focused,

butalsoframesclimateactionasprovidinganopportunityforinnovation.TheScottishPlan

alsoacknowledgestheprinciplesofclimatejusticeandScotland’sinternationalcommitments.

DenmarkandSwedenprovideothervisionaryexamplesofwheregovernmentshaveaccepted

andembracedthenecessityandinevitabilityofthechangerequired,andarechoosingto

makedecarbonisationcentraltotheirgrowthandjobcreationstrategies.30

Effectiveclimateactioncouldsignificantlystrengthenthestabilityandresilienceofthe

domesticeconomy.Inmanycases,thisactiondoesnotnecessarilyrequirenewexchequer

resources,butrathertheeliminationofincoherentpolicies,re-allocatingexistingresources,

andrecalibratingincentivestowardslowcarbondevelopment.31

Recommendation:InordertoprovideavisionforIrelandin2050thatthepublic

andprivatesectorcangetbehind,theNMPmustpresentacompellingvisionfora

decarbonisedIreland,acceptingandembracingthechallengeandmakingthe

decarbonisationagendaanagendaforsocialprogressandequity,prosperityand

environmentalsustainability.Thiswillrequirefosteringapragmaticbutpositive

narrativearoundclimateactionifthepublicandprivatesectorareexpectedto

supportthemeasuresneeded.

29DepartmentofCommunications,EnergyandNaturalResources(2015),“EnergyWhitePapersetsambitiouscourseforcarbon-freeenergysector”.Availableathttp://www.dccae.gov.ie/en-ie/news-and-media/press-releases/Pages/Energy-White-Paper-sets-ambitious-course-for-a-carbon-free-energy-sector.aspx30NordicCouncilofMinisters(2014)NordicActiononClimateChange.Copenhagen:NordicCouncilofMinisters.Availableat:http://norden.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:768493/FULLTEXT01.pdf31IrishCorporateLeadersonClimateChange(2014)UnlockingOpportunity.TheBusinessCaseforTakingClimateActioninIreland.Availableat:http://www.foe.ie/download/pdf/unlocking_opportunity_the_business_case_for_climate_action_in_ireland.pdf


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TheNationalMitigationPlan,liketheforthcomingNationalDialogueonClimateChange,32can

onlybecredibleandmeaningfulifitisbasedonthescienceandtherequiredlevelofactionto

alignIreland’sdecarbonisationagendawithitsfairshareoftheglobalefforttodeliveronthe

ParisAgreementcommitments.IntheNationalDialogue,thepubliccanandshouldbeasked

forviewsonthe‘howto’ratherthanon‘howmuch’.

Recommendation:Equippedwiththescientificevidenceandknowledgeofthe

implicationsofafailuretoact,theGovernmentmustframetheDialogueinterms

ofaclearandunswervingcommitmenttoactambitiouslyandfairlyonclimate

change.Thisisessentialtoprotectsocietyfromthethreatofclimatechangeand

ensurethatIrelandisinapositiontoreapthesocial,healthandeconomic

opportunitiesofferedbymeaningfulclimateaction.

4. DoestheNMPadduptoIrelanddoingitsfairshare?

MeasuringIreland’sfairshareofclimateaction

AfundamentaltestfortheadequacyofthedraftmitigationPlaniswhetherornotitcontains

anddetailscomprehensiveactiontoenableIrelandtodoitsfairsharetowardsmitigation.

TherearefourbenchmarksforwhatIreland’sfairshareofactionis:its2020targetsasagreed

withEUpartners,proposed2030targets(currentlyundernegotiation),theNational

TransitionObjectivefor2050(establishedbytheGovernmentinlinewiththeEU’s2050

objective),andfinally,Ireland’sobligationsundertheParisAgreement.

ThesetargetsmustbereviewedonfootofthetemperaturegoalsadoptedinParis,andas

withallothercommittedcountries,Irelandwillberequiredtoratchetupitsambitionand

rampupwide-reachingpolicyimplementationtoachievethesegoals.Theadoptionofa

carbonbudgetframeworkinthedraftPlanisawelcomedevelopment;however,this

frameworkisnotrigorouslyapplied.33Furthermore,thedraftPlanisrequiredtosetthe

32MoreinformationabouttheNationalDialogueonClimateChangecanbeviewedat:http://www.dccae.gov.ie/en-ie/energy/topics/Energy-Initiatives/Pages/NDCC.aspx33Anemissionstargetcanbeexpressedintwoways:


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parametersforotherMinisterstoframetheirsectoralmitigationplans.Thisisasintendedin

theClimateAct(2015).Howeverthereisnoindicationofthemannerinwhichthisistobe

achievedorwhatsupportwillbeprovidedtoindividualDepartmentstoenablethemto

complywiththeoverallnationalcarbonbudget.

Recommendation:Toprovideausefulguideforpolicydevelopmentand

implementation,werecommendthatthefinalPlanshouldcontainanoverall

carbonbudgetfortheachievementoftheNationalTransitionObjectiveby2050

(thiscalculationismadebelow).Withinthatoverallbudget,thePlanshouldalso

determineacarbonbudgetforthefiveyeartimeframeitcoversandproceedto

allocateavailableemissionsandreductioneffortsbetweensectorstoachieve

thecontinuous,substantialandsustaineddecarbonisationthatisrequired

economywide.

Ireland’s2020targets

TheEPAhasconsistentlystatedthatcurrentplansandpoliciesareinsufficienttobringIreland

inlinewithits2020targets,strongincentivesareneededtomoveawayfromfossilfuel

dependency,andIreland’scurrentemissionstrajectorydemonstratestheneedfornewand

innovativemeasurestomeetthechallengesIrelandfaces.34

1. An"end-point"reductionlevel:apercentagereductioninannualemissionsbyacertainyear,relativeto

somereferenceyear.Initselfsuchatargetsaysnothingabouttheplannedpathwayofemissionsoverthisperiod(theymightdeclinesteadily,ormightgoupfirstandthensubsequentlydeclinemorequicklyetc.):butthisdetailedpathwaymaymakeabigdifferencetotheactualclimateimpacts(eveniftheend-pointtargetismet).Hence,anend-pointtargetinitselfisapoortoolforpolicyplanning.

2. Thetotalamountofaccumulatedemissionsallowedoveracertaintime(or,indeed,foralltimeintothefuture).Thisisknownasacarbonbudget.Thesciencetellsusthat,foranygiventemperatureincreaselimit,thereisacorresponding,finite,remainingamountofglobalatmosphericcapacitytoabsorbemissions,largelyregardlessofhowlongorhowshortaperiodthosetotalemissionsarespreadover.Carbonbudgetsarebetterplanningtools,astheyreflectthe"zerosum"natureofthetrade-offsofremainingemissionsacrosssectorsandacrosstime.Ifwecontinuetoemitmorenow,wemustemitevenlessinthefuture(i.e.,thedetailedshapeofthereductionpathwaydoesn'treallymatteraslongasthecumulativetotalisthesame).Ifonesectorisallowedagreatershareoftheavailablebudget,someothersector(s)mustbeallocatedless.Onagloballevel,whenonecountryannexestoitselfagreatershareoftheremainingglobalbudget,itisessentiallyexpectingotherstosettleforless.

Irelandhasusedbothwaysofexpressingtargetsinthepast.Forexample,theKyototargetforthe2008-2012periodwasexpressedbothasalimitonemissionsof13%above1990levels,andastotalemissionsof314MtCO2.34See:‘Greenhousegasemissionsprojectedtoincreasestronglyaseconomicgrowthtakeshold’.EPAPressrelease,April13th,2017.Availableat:http://www.epa.ie/newsandevents/news/name,62088,en.html


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Ireland’s2020climatetargetistoreducecombinedemissionsfromtransport,buildingsand

agricultureby20%below2005levels.35ThedraftPlanexpressesthis2020targetasacarbon

budgetof338MtCO2efor2013-2020.Asacknowledgedearlierinthissubmission,thedraft

PlanconcedesthatIreland(alongsideonlyasmallnumberofotherEUcountries)issettomiss

its2020targets:emissionswillbe,atbest,6%below2005levels.TheEPAprojectstotalnon-

ETSemissionsfortheperiodwillexceed350MtCO2e,anemissionsgaptotargetof12MtCO2.

InthedraftPlan,theGovernmentcontendsthatIreland’s2020emissionstargetis

‘misinformed’and‘notconsistent’.Thereissomeacademicdebateabouttheprecisebasisfor

calculatingthistargetinsidetheoverallEUtargetframework,butisnotcredibleasthe

dominantreasonforIrelandbeingsoofftrackonour2020targets.Historically,Irishclimate

policyhassufferedfromanimplementationgapoverthelasttwodecades.Thestated

objectiveof2000and2007NationalClimateChangeStrategieswastoensurethatclimate

commitmentswouldbemetinacoherentandcost-efficientmanner.Whilecertainmeasures

adoptedwereimplementedasplanned,manyweresubjecttosignificantdelayorwerenot

implementedatall.AccordingtoIIEAanalysts,hadthemeasurescontainedinthose

documentsbeenimplementedinatimelymanner,Ireland’sclimatecommitmentscouldhave

beenachieved.36

WithinthisdraftPlan,theGovernmentalsoattributesIreland’sfailuretomeetits2020

targetsto‘reducedinvestmentcapacityovertheperiodoftheeconomicdownturn’.We

acknowledgetherewereinvestmentrestrictionscreatedbytheeconomicrecession(which

forexample,constrainedretrofittingofbuildings).However,therecessionalsocontributed

directlytosignificantlyreducingemissionsovertheaffectedyears.Moreover,therehasbeen

afailurebytheGovernment,inrecentyears,todelivereffectivemeasurestodecouple

resumedeconomicgrowthfromincreasingemissions.

35EmissionsfromtheenergysectorarecoveredbyaEuropean-wideEmissionsTradingScheme(ETS),howeverIrelanddoeshavenationaltargetstoincreaserenewableenergyinelectricity,transportandheat.36Curtin,J.,andHanrahan,G.(2012)Whylegislate?DesigningaClimateLawforIreland.Dublin:TheInstituteofInternationalandEuropeanAffairs.Availableat:http://www.iiea.com/publications/why-legislate-designing-a-climate-law-for-ireland


15

Thishistoricalimplementationgaphasbeencompoundedbyanabsenceofpolicyplanning;it

isdifficulttopointtoanysubstantialnewmeasuresadoptedsincethe2020targetperiod

commencedin2013.Furthermore,theveryfactthatthedraftmitigationPlanonachieving

targetsfor2013-2020isbeingpublishedin2017(amidpointthroughtherequiredtime

frame,andfiveyearssincethelastactionplanexpired)reflectsadeeplyconcerninglackof

intent.Thisdelaywillonlyintensifytheshortandlong-termcostsdetailedintheopening

sectionofthissubmission(Section2).

Ireland’sproposed2030targets

Ireland’sprovisionaltargetfor2030isa30%cutintheannualaggregateemissionsofthe

transport,buildingsandagriculturesectors.Thecarbonbudgetforthesesectorsis

approximately383MtCO2efor2021to2030.Basedoncurrenttrends,theEPAprojectthat

Irelandwillproducealmost456MtCO2eoverthesameperiod;thisleavesanemissionsgapof

73milliontonnes,representinga19%overshootonthecarbonbudget.37Despitethe

considerablefinancialpenaltiesIrelandmayfaceoverthecomingdecadeto2030andthe

significantlocalandglobalhumancosts(asdetailedearlierinSection2),thedraftPlanfailsto

specifyhowtheGovernmentintendstoclosethisemissionsgaptotarget.38

ItisasignificantconcernthatthedraftPlanindicatesthattheGovernment’scurrentclimate

planistoputoffactionandinvestmentnowandinsteadknowinglyexposeIrishsocietyto

financialpenaltiesthatcouldbeequivalenttothelevelsofspendingcutsduringtheyearsof

thefinancialBailout(seefootnote23).ItisalsonotablethattheEU’scollectiveandMember

StatetargetswillhavetoincreaseundertheratchetmechanismundertheParisAgreement.

37EnvironmentalProtectionAgency(2013)Ireland’sGreenhouseGasEmissionsProjections2012-2030.Wexford,Ireland;EPA.Availableat:https://www.epa.ie/pubs/reports/air/airemissions/EPA_GHG_Emission_Proj_pub_2013_FINAL.pdf38Theseemissionsgapfiguresarebasedonaproposed2030target.AsnegotiationsonthistargetmovetotheCouncilofMinisters,therearesignsthatothergovernments,mostnotableGermany,mayrejectanyconcessionsgrantedtoIreland.Seeforexample:‘Germanycoolshopesonclimatetargets’.TheTimes.April2nd,2017.Availableat:https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/germans-cool-hopes-on-climate-targets-6w52zml06


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Ireland’s2050NationalTransitionObjective

Thenationalpolicyposition,adoptedbytheGovernmentin2014(pre-Paris),definesthe2050

mitigationtargetasatleastan80%reductionincombinedannualemissionsfromenergy,

transport,andbuildings,andanapproachtocarbonneutralityinagricultureandland-use

thatdoesn’tcompromisesustainablefoodproduction.Thepolicyring-fencesallavailable

nationalgreenhousegassinksfromlandusetobecountedasoffsetsagainstagriculture-

relatedemissions;requiringallothersectorstoundertakecollectiveemissionscutsofatleast

80%comparedto1990levels,withnooffsetting“flexibility”.

Overall,theobjectiveisatthelowerendofambitionoftheagreedEUobjectiveof80-95%

reductionintotalannualemissionsby2050,andhasnotbeenupdatedtoreflectthegoalsof

theParisAgreement(seebelow).39

Forelectricity,buildingandtransportsectors:

• In2015,emissionsamountedto41milliontonnesperannum,17%above1990levels;

• The2050targetissevenmilliontonnes(incomparison,1990levelswere35Mt);

• The2050targetrequiresIrelandtoreduceemissionsby5%year-on-year,everyyear,

betweennowand2050;

• Expressedasacarbonbudgetfortheperiod2016-2050,thisamountstoalimiton

combinedemissionsfromallsectorsexceptagricultureof,atmost,653milliontonnes

ofcarbondioxide.

Yet,basedoncurrentEPAanalysis,emissionsareprojectedtoincreasetonearlytwoanda

halftimesthatlimit,atotalof1585milliontonnesofCO2–anovershootof932million

tonnes.Asis,thecurrentdraftPlanwouldthereforeresultinanovershootofthe2050

objectivebyalmostonebilliontonnesofcarbondioxide.Thetotalavailablecarbonbudgetfor

2016-2050wouldalreadybeexhaustedby2030onthecurrentbusiness-as-usualemissions

trajectory(seegraphbelow).

39Notably,theEuropeanUnion2030targetiscurrentlynotconsistentwithlimitingtemperaturerisetobelow2°C,letalonetolimitingtheincreaseto1.5°C.


17

During1990-2015,annualemissionsfromtheagriculturesectordecreasedby14%(from21

milliontonnesto18milliontonnesofcarbondioxideequivalent(MtCO2e).Basedonareview

ofanalysisbyTeagasc,Weestimatethatby2050Ireland’srecognisedcarbonsinkswillhavea

capacityofbetweencurrentlevelsof3.5milliontonnesperyear(i.e.,currentsinkpotential)

andamaximumofninemilliontonnesperyear(i.e.,maximumsinkpotential).

● Underthemaximumsinkscenario,evenwithallthisenhancedsinkactivityallocatedto

theagriculturalsector,agriculturalemissionsmuststillbehalvedfrom18milliontonnes

toninemilliontonnesperyearby2050.Thisrepresentsyear-on-yearreductionsof2%a

year,everyyearbetweennowand2050.

● Underthecurrentsinkscenario,anemissionsreductionintheagriculturalsectorfrom

18milliontonnesto3.5milliontonnesperyearisrequiredby2050.Thiswould

0.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

35.00

40.00

45.00

50.00

2015 2025 2035 2045

The National Transition Objective carbon budget to 2050: Current projections until budget exhausted versus sustained effort curve.

Projected Emissions until NTO 2050 carbon budget exhausted

Sustained effort 5%/year within NTO 2050 carbon budget


18

representa5%perannumreduction,everyyearbetweennowand2050,thesamelevel

ofeffortastherestoftheeconomyandsociety.

ThedraftmitigationPlanoffersnosuggestionofagriculturepoliciescommensuratewitheven

thelowerendoftheseabsoluteemissionreductionrequirements.

Recommendation:Themitigationplanmustberevisedtooutlinehowthe

GovernmentintendstoclosethegapbetweencurrentprojectionsandIreland’s

2020and2030EUtargets,whilebeingconsistentwiththenational2050

objectiveofan80%cutinnetannualGHGemissions.

HowdoesthedraftPlanmeasureupcomparedtoIreland’sPariscommitments?

Combinedinternationalactionplansare,asyet,inadequatetoachievingthegoalsoftheParis

Agreement(i.e.,holdingtheincreaseintheglobalaveragetemperaturerisetowellbelow2°C

abovepre-industriallevelsandpursuingeffortstolimittemperatureincreaseto1.5°Cabove

pre-industriallevels).IndependentanalysisconductedbyClimateActionTrackerindicatesthat

existingNationallyDeterminedContributions(NDCs),ornationalpledges,madeunderthe

ParisAgreementarenotinlinewiththetemperaturegoalsagreedinParis.Currentpledges

stilladduptoapproximately2.8°Cincreaseinglobalwarming.

AccordingtocalculationsbytheClimateEquityCalculator,atooldevelopedbytheStockholm

EnvironmentInstitutetoestimatethefairshareeffortforindividualcountries,Irelandmust

reduceallgreenhousegasemissionstozerowithinadecadetodoitsfairshareofkeeping

globalwarmingwithinthebare2°Climit.Inaddition,Irelandwouldhavetofinanceadditional

overseasmitigationmeasures.TheClimateFairSharesmodel(whichappliesamoreflexible

balancebetweenachievingdomesticreductionsandfundingoverseasmitigation)estimates

thatIreland’sequitable(“fairshare”)contributionwouldbetoreduceemissionsby53%-63%

below1990levelsby2025,andfundoverseasactionbyUS$4.29billionperannum.This

wouldlimitannualemissionsin2025tobetween20-26milliontonnesofCO2e,comparedto

EPAprojectionsofaround63MtCO2e.Thisrepresentsanemissionsgapofaround40million

tonnesperannumalreadyin2025,thesameasIreland’stotalemissionsfromallsectors

exceptagriculturein2015.Currently,therefore,thedraftPlanimpliesaplantoemitthree

timestheannualemissionsofIreland’sfairshareofglobaleffortundertheParisAgreement


19

by2025.WithinthelimitsindicatedbytheAgreement,Ireland’sentireannualcarbonbudget

wouldbeexhaustedbyemissionsfromtheagriculturalsectoraloneby2025.

AllexistingEUandIrishtargetswillhavetoberadicallyrevisedstrengthenedinthelightof

theParisgoals,andbecauseofthecumulativenatureofcarbondioxidepollution,Ireland’s

continuingdelayinincreasingactionandambitiondrasticallyincreasestheeffortthatwillbe

requiredineveryfutureyear.ThedraftmitigationPlanmustindicateindetailhowIrelandis

preparingtostrengthenambitionandsettheagendaintermsofapproachforclimatepolicy

planninginlinewiththegoalsoftheParisAgreement.

Recommendation:ThemitigationplanmustdemonstrateIreland’sintention

andcapacitytoenhanceclimateactioninlinewithitscommitmentsunderthe

ParisAgreement.

Inthefollowingsections,weaddressdetailedaspectsofthePlanandmakerecommendations

forconcretechangesthatshouldbemade.

5. DoestheNMPcommencethephaseoutoffossilfuels?

ThecurrentoverarchingvisionofIreland’senergypolicy,asarticulatedinthe2015White

Paper,istobecomezerocarbonwithaconcretetargetofan80-95%reductioninannual

greenhousegasemissionsfromtheenergysectorby2050(relativeto1990levels).Ireland

hasanabundanceofrenewableenergyandcanbecomeamajorbeneficiaryoftheglobalshift

towardscarbon-freeeconomies.40Whiledomesticrenewableenergysourceshaveincreased

inIreland,itiscleartheoverallcontributionfromrenewableenergyremainslow.41Currently

Irelandreliesonimportedfossilfuelsforabout85%ofitsenergyneeds,andwithinthe

electricitysectorabout75%ofIreland’selectricityisgeneratedusingcoal,gasandpeat.

40EnvironmentalProtectionAgency.Ireland’sSustainableEnergy.Availableat:https://www.epa.ie/media/epa_factsheet_energy_v2.pdf41SustainableEnergyAuthorityofIreland(2016)EnergyinIreland1990-2015.Availableat:http://www.seai.ie/Publications/Statistics_Publications/Energy_in_Ireland/Energy-in-Ireland-1990-2015.pdf


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AnalysisbyfinancialanalystsintheCityofLondonshowedthattocomplywiththeParis

Agreementupto80%offossilfuelreservesownedbyfossilfuelcompaniesmustnotbe

burned.42Furthermore,2016researchindicatedthatfullexploitationofcurrentlyoperating

fieldswillnotbepossibleiftemperaturelimitsadoptedintheParisAgreementaretobe

adheredto.43

WhilethedraftNMPacknowledgestheneedtodiversifyIreland’srenewablesectorandto

phaseoutenergyfrompeatandcoal,thereisnoclearoutlineprovidedonhowandwhen

theseobjectiveswillbeachieved:nonewactionsareadoptedfordecarbonisingelectricity

generation,nofixeddecisionismaderegardingthefutureofMoneypoint,44andnomeasures

areincludedregardingtheterminationofpeatharvestingforelectricitygenerationbefore

2030.

IntheiranalysisoftheNMP,theIIEA(2017)pointtotheUnitedKingdom’sDepartmentfor

Business,EnergyandIndustrialStrategy’sproposalsfortheUK’senergysystemin2035asa

relevantexamplethatcouldbedrawnuponbyIrelandinaddressingsimilarchallenges.45We

acknowledgetheamendmentintheaccompanyingSEAEnvironmentalReporttotheNMP

thatastudybeundertakeninthenexttwoyearstoprovidearoadmapandinformthenext

NMPconcerningthefutureofMoneypoint,howeverclarityisurgentlyrequired.46

Recommendation:Fromaclimateactionperspective,itisnecessarythatclarity

beprovidedthattheobjectiveofthisroadmapmustbetomoveMoneypoint

42CarbonTrackerInitiative(2014)UnburnableCarbon–Aretheworld’sfinancialmarketscarryingacarbonbubble?Availableat:http://www.carbontracker.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Unburnable-Carbon-Full-rev2-1.pdf43OilChangeInternational(2016)TheSky’sLimit:WhytheParisClimateGoalsrequireamanageddeclineoffossilfuelproduction.Availableat:http://priceofoil.org/content/uploads/2016/09/OCI_the_skys_limit_2016_FINAL_2.pdf44TheEnergyWhitePaper(2015)containsacommitmenttomakekeydecisionsonthefutureoftheMoneypointstationbefore2020.Nodecisionhasbeenmade.45Curtin,J.(2017)AnAssessmentofIreland’sFirstDraftMitigationPlan:DoesitlaysolidfoundationsforLow-CarbonDevelopment?Availableat:http://www.iiea.com/ftp/Publications/2017/IIEA_National%20Mitigaton%20Plan%20Assessment%20Report_2017.pdf46See:http://www.dccae.gov.ie/documents/SEA%20Environmental%20Report.pdf


21

awayfromcoalburning.Wealsosupporta2016recommendationfromthe

CCACfortheterminationofpeatfiringofpowerstationsasanobviousstepin

shiftingpolicytowardsdecarbonisationandawayfromfossilfuel

dependence.47Furthermore,theNMPshouldrecommendabanonfuture

explorationforfossilfuelsinIreland(includingterritorialwaters).

Commitmenttothepreparationofoptionsfortheremovaloffossilfuelsubsidiesinthedraft

Planiswelcome.Theprogressiveeliminationofsubsidiestofossilfuelenergycanfacilitatea

shifttosignificantemissionsreductionsatalowsocialcost.48Financialsubsidiesshouldbe

redirectedtoinvestmentsinrenewableenergyandlowcarbondevelopmentandsustainable,

progressiveenergypovertyalleviation.Thereisconsiderableneedforaplanhowever,onhow

torespondtothesocialandeconomicneedsofindividualsandcommunitiesaffectedbythe

phasingoutoffossilfuels.Across-agencytaskforce(asisoftencreatedwhenlarge

multinationalemployersclosedown)supportedbypoliticalinitiativeandengagementand

chargedwiththeresponsibilityofidentifyingalternative,goodquality,sustainablejob

opportunitiesforaffectedcommunitieswouldhelpminimiseandaverttheimpendingimpact

onemployment.Shiftingsubsidiesintootherpoliciesandsectorsisessentialtoprogressa

sustainableapproachtoenergypoverty,provideretrainingandalternativejobstoreplace

thosethatmustbephasedout,andrenewable-basedenergysecurity.

Recommendation:WesupporttherecommendationfromtheIIEA(2017)that

individualclimatepoliciesbesociallyandrurallyproofedandthatGovernment

committoproactivelymanageimpactsandsmooththetransitionforaffected

workers,enterprisesandcommunities.49

47Thesestationsarehighlyinefficient,providingjust9%ofIreland’selectricitybutproducing27%ofemissionsfromelectricitygeneration.Moreover,peatfiringissubsidisedtothetuneof€120millionayear.48SomanathanE,SternerT,SugiyamaT,ChimanikireD,DubashNK,Essandoh-YedduJK,FifitaS,GoulderL,etal.(2014).Chapter15-Nationalandsub-nationalpoliciesandinstitutions.In:ClimateChange2014:MitigationofClimateChange.IPCCWorkingGroupIIIContributiontoAR5.Eds.In,,CambridgeUniversityPress49Curtin,J.(2017)AnAssessmentofIreland’sFirstDraftMitigationPlan:DoesitlaysolidfoundationsforLow-CarbonDevelopment?Availableat:http://www.iiea.com/ftp/Publications/2017/IIEA_National%20Mitigaton%20Plan%20Assessment%20Report_2017.pdf


22

WewelcomedthepassageoftheFossilFuelDivestmentBilltoThirdStageinJanuarythis

year.ThiswasanimportantsignalofrecognitionbyamajorityintheOireachtasofthe

evidencethatthebulkofremainingfossilfuelreserveswillneedtoremainunburned,and

thereisanimperativetophaseoutfossilfuelsassoonaspossible.

Recommendation:DivestingtheIrelandStrategicInvestmentFundoffossilfuel

assetsandthephase-outoffossilfuelsubsidiesshouldbeadvancedswiftlyas

criticalstepstorespondtothecommitmentinArticle2oftheParisClimate

Agreementtoalignfinanceflowswiththedecarbonisationagenda,andas

importantstatementsofintentonIreland’scommitmenttobuildingafossil

freefuture.

6. DoesthePlanrampuprenewableenergyandkick-startcommunity

ownership?

The2015WhitePaperonenergyrecognisesthescaleofthechallengeoftransitioningour

energysystemtozerocarbon,andinparticular,acknowledgestheimportanceofcitizenand

communityparticipationinthetransitionprocess.Whilelocaloppositioncanpresenta

significantbarriertotheexpansionoftherenewablesectorinIreland,50communitiescanalso

playaconsiderableandpositiveroleinthetransitiontoalowcarbonsociety.51Asthedraft

Planrightlyacknowledges,ifemissionreductiontargetsaretobemet,increasedsocietal

enablementandengagementinmitigationisessential.

However,wehaveconcernsthatthedraftPlan’scurrentapproachof‘engagement,

participationandacceptance’suggestsatop-downprocessthatifusedasthesolemethodof

engagementwillminimisesocialacceptanceofpolicymeasures,andfailtorealisethe

50Loring,J.(2007)‘WindEnergyplanninginEngland,WalesandDenmark:Factorsinfluencingprojectsuccesses’.EnergyPolicy35(4):2648–2660.51Middlemiss,L.K.andParrish,B.(2010)‘Buildingcapacityforlow-carboncommunities:Theroleofgrassrootsinitiatives’.EnergyPolicy,38(12):7559-7566.


23

principleofhavingcitizens‘atthecentreofthetransitionandtheenergyindustry.52

Communityownershipiscentraltoachievingpublicacceptanceofrenewableenergyprojects

andtowardsclimatepolicymoregenerally,andachangeindevelopmentmodelto

encompasscommunityownershiphelpsfosterapositiveeffectonpublicattitudes.53,54While

thedraftplanacknowledgesitisconsideringpricesupportformicro-generation,thereisno

clearindicationofanyplantoestablishaframeworkforcommunityownership,asisthecase

inotherEuropeancountries.Therehasbeenasignificantincreaseinrecentyearsin

renewablegeneration;nevertheless,localcommunitiesinIrelandownlessthan0.3%ofthis.

ThiscontrastssharplywithotherEuropeancountries–suchasGermany–where1.5million

citizensgeneratesolarelectricityontheirroofsandintheircommunitiesandwhere

householdsownover50%ofallrenewableenergy.

CurrentlyinIreland,thereisnonationalstrategyforcommunityenergy.Energypolicy

provideslittleregardtothepotentialroleofcommunityenergy,andprovidesnoclear

incentivetosupportthedevelopmentofcommunityenergyinIreland.Thereisnoguaranteed

Feed-in-Tariffofferedforexportingsmallscaleelectricitygenerationtothegrid.

ThedraftPlanaskshowcommunityengagementandacceptancecanbeenhancedandwhat

otherrenewabletechnologiesmightbeconsideredtoprogressthetransitiontoalowcarbon

society.Inresponsetothisquestion,wecontendthatthereisscopeforsignificantinvestment

insolarpowergenerationinIreland.55Solarpoweroffersauniqueopportunitytoprovide

diversityinelectricitygenerationandforcitizensandcommunitiestoparticipateinandtake 52In2014,aNESCreportrecommendedthataspartofIreland’snationaltransition,‘nationalpolicyneedstocreateaframeworkthat,inthefirstinstance,openspossibilitiesatlocallevel,assistsinclusiveexplorationofthosepossibilitiesandbringstheresultingsettlementontoanationalprocessofbenchmarkingandlearning’.Engagementneedstogobeyondhelpingcommunities‘engageintheplanningprocess.’(NationalEconomicandSocialCouncil(2014)Report139:WindEnergyinIreland:BuildingCommunityEngagementandSocialSupport.Availableat:http://www.nesc.ie/en/news-events/news/press-releases/latest/nesc-publishes-report-139-wind-energy-in-ireland-building-community-engagement-and-social-support/)53Warren,C.andMcFadyen,M.(2010)Doescommunityownershipaffectpublicattitudestowindenergy?AcasestudyfromsouthwestScotland.LandUsePolicy,27(2):204-213.54Enevoldsen,P.andSovacool,B.(2016)Examiningthesocialacceptanceofwindenergy:PracticalguidelinesforonshorewindprojectdevelopmentinFrance.RenewableandSustainableEnergyReviews,53:178-184.55IntheUnitedKingdom,10GWofsolarpowerhasbeendeployedsince2010.InIreland,whereasolarpanelwillperformaswellasintheUKorGermany,thereisonly2MWofsolarelectricityinstalled.


24

ownershipoftherenewabletransition.Householdsandcommunitiescouldreducetheir

demandforfossilfuelelectricity,lowertheirenergybills,andgenerateanincomefromthe

excesscleanenergytheyproduce.Withoutaguaranteedpaymentformicro-generation,

includingsolar,however,this“rooftoprevolution”willnothappeninIreland.Todate,over60

TDsandSenatorshavewrittentoMinisterNaughtensupportingcallsforafairpriceformicro-

generationandsolarelectricity.56

Recommendation:Werecommendthatafairpricebeprovidedforsolar

electricitysuppliedtothegrid,theintroductionofmeasurestoenable

community-ledprojectssuchassimplifyinggridaccess,andtheimplementationof

aDanish-stylesharedownershipschememandatingthatdeveloper-ledprojects

offer20%oftheequitytolocalcommunities.

7. DoestheNMPrealigntransportinvestmenttoreduceemissions?

ThereisanincreasingurgencytofocusondecarbonisingIreland’stransportsector.Total

annualtransportemissionsincreasedby4%in2015alone,havedoubledoverallsince1990,

andstronggrowthinemissionsfromtransportisprojectedovercomingyears.Incentivesin

recentyearstochangefrompetroltodieselintheprivatecarfleethavecreatedsignificantair

qualityproblems,especiallyinurbanareas,andincentivesarenowrequirednotonlyto

encourageuserstoswitchtoelectricvehicles,butalsotousealternativemodesof

transport.57

In2009,theGovernmentadoptedSmarterTravelasnationalpolicy.58Thepolicyincludedthe

followingtargetstobeachievedby2020:

56Acopyofthisletterisavailableat:http://www.stopclimatechaos.ie/download/pdf/letter_to_minister_naughten_on_payment_for_solar_elctricity.pdf57See:https://www.epa.ie/media/Chapter10_Environment_Transport.pdf58DepartmentofTransport.(2009)SmarterTravel:ASustainableTransportFuture.ANewTransportPolicyforIreland2009-2020.StationeryOffice:Dublin.Availableat:http://www.smartertravel.ie/sites/default/files/uploads/2012_12_27_Smarter_Travel_english_PN_WEB%5B1%5D.pdf


25

• ThetransportsectormakingameaningfulcontributiontoIreland'sEUclimatechange

commitmentsbyreducinggreenhousegasemissions;

• 500,000morepeopletakingalternativemeanstocommutetoworksothatthetotal

shareofcommutingbycardropsfrom65%to45%;

• Walking,cyclingandpublictransportrisingto55%oftotalcommuterjourneystowork;

• Thetotalkilometrestravelledbycarnotincreasingsignificantlyfrom2009levels.

Noneofthesetargetsarebeingmet,andtheNMPfailstoaddresshowtheobjectivesofthe

SmarterTravelpolicywillbeachieved.Forexample,theNMPincludesnooutlineofhowit

intendstobridgethegapbetweenthecurrentrateof3%ofalljourneysbeingmadebybike,

andthe2020targetof10%.

Recommendation:ToachievetheobjectivesofSmarterTravel,we

recommendsthattheNMPrebalanceexistingfundingawayfromroad

infrastructureandprioritiseinvestmentinwalking,utilitycyclingandclean,

sustainablepublictransport.Aswellasreducingemissions,redirectingexisting

fundingwillcreatebenefitsforpublichealth,cleanerair,andimprovedpublic

spaces.59

WewelcomeanumberofinitiativesidentifiedintheNMP,forexample,expansionoftheBike

toWorkScheme,thedevelopmentofatask-forceforelectricvehicles,andareviewof

nationalparking.Weareconcernedhowever,thatthecurrentplanisweakonreducingthe

levelofdependencyonprivatecarownershipastheprimarymeansoftravel,andinstead,

over-reliesontechnologicalprogressionandbiofuelstodecarbonisetransport.Thiswait-and-

seeapproachamplifiespolicyuncertaintyandinstability.Furthermore,therelianceonprivate

transportfailstoaddresspersistentproblemsrelatedtocongestion.Intheirpolicybriefon

themitigationPlan,theIIEAsupportstherecommendationthatthecasebemadeforfurther

investmentinpublictransportintheCapitalReviewprocess.Theyarguethepointthatthe

59TheSmarterTravelInitiativehasbeenallocated€100mfundingundertheCapitalPlanBuildingonRecovery:

InfrastructureandCapitalInvestment2016-2021.Theoveralltotaltransportbudgetisapproximately€10Billion.


26

currentemphasisonincreasedinvestmentinroadinfrastructureis‘incompatiblewith

decarbonisation’.60

Inanumberofinstances,thedraftPlanreferstoincreaseduseofbiofuelsandexpansionof

theBiofuelsObligationSchemeasameansofdecarbonisingtransport.IntheSEAReport

accompanyingthedraftNMPitisacknowledgedthatwhilebiofuelsmayhaveanimportant

roletoplay,biofuelcultivationcanresultinnegativelandusechange,erodefoodsecurity,

contributetobiodiversitylossandstillinvolveverysignificant(andpoorlymonitoredor

verified)lifecycleemissions.Howtheseconcernscanbeaddressedinawaythatissocially

andenvironmentallyjustneedstobeconsideredinthefinalNMP.

Recommendation:TheNMPshouldcommitinthenewnationalplanning

frameworktofacilitatinglow-carbonmobility,particularlybyrequiring(asa

licensingcondition)fullyintegratedtransportnetworksacrosspublicand

privatesectors,offeringseamlessconnectivitytopassengers.61

Theintroductionofcleaner,lowemissionpublictransportisavitalcomponentofalow

carbontransportfuture,boththroughthereductionofemissions,andbyreplacingcar

journeysthroughmodalshift.Forpublictransport,conversiontoelectricpowermakessense,

withinbuiltairqualityimprovements.Othersustainableoptionsmayincludetheuseofbio-

methane,alowercarbonformofnaturalgasproducedbythedecompositionoforganic

wastematerialviaanaerobicdigestion(suchasmunicipalwaste,orfarmslurry)-analready

prevalentsourceoffuelinanumberofEuropeancities.TheUK’sLowCarbonVehicle

PartnershipGreenBusInitiativeprovidessomeusefulexamplesofwhatcanbeimplemented

inIreland.

60Curtin,J.(2017)AnAssessmentofIreland’sFirstDraftMitigationPlan:DoesitlaysolidfoundationsforLow-CarbonDevelopment?Availableat:http://www.iiea.com/ftp/Publications/2017/IIEA_National%20Mitigaton%20Plan%20Assessment%20Report_2017.pdf61Thiscommitmentwouldspecificallyrequirezone,distance,ortime-basedfaresspanningarbitrarytransfersbetweenmodesandtransportoperators.Thecurrent“integratedticketing”approacheasestheadministrativeburdenforoperators,publicandprivate,butisnotpassenger-centredandinpracticeresultsinmultiple,separatefaresfordiscreteelementsofwhatis,infact,asinglepassengerjourney.


27

Recommendation:WerecommendthattheNMPsupporttheconversionofpublic

transportvehiclestosustainableenergysources.

8. DoestheNMPputagricultureonapathtocarbonneutrality?

Thenationalobjectiveisthattotalannualemissionsfromagriculturein2050willbenomore

thanwhatisabsorbedannuallybyIreland’scarbonsinks(i.e.,forests,peatlands,and

grasslands).IntheirbriefontheNMP,theIIEA(2017)detailshowundercurrentprojections

to2030,theagriculturesectorcouldtakeupover51%ofIreland’stotalcarbonbudget,

leavinglittlescopeformanoeuvreorflexibilityinothersectors.62

TherehasbeennosubstantivediscussionwithinIrishsocietyonthecurrentpolicypush

towardsintensification.Thisisdespitethewiderimplicationsandchallengescreatedfor

addressingIreland’sclimatechallenge.Furthermore,theoptionofreducingemissionsby

decreasingherdsizesanddirectinganddiversifyingfarmingawayfromnon-sustainable

modelshasnotbeenpromotedasaviablepolicyoption.TheCCAC(2016)haveadvisedthat

theagriculturesector(incombinationwithforestryandotherland-usecategories)willneed

todetermineapathwaytoachievingits2050objective,andtheNMPshouldincludea

timelinefortheexpectedimplementationofsolutions.Thispathwayneedstoencompass

significantactionstoreduceemissionsandincreasecarbonuptakeinasustainableway.

Recommendation:Tosufficientlyoff-setagriculturalemissions,theNMPneeds

tooutlinewhatanenvironmentallyandsociallysustainablelevelofcarbonsink

is,whilegivingconsiderationstobiodiversity,recreationandagriculture.

ThedraftNMPoutlineshowtheagriculturalsectorinIrelandissignificanttothesustainable

developmentofaruraleconomyandthereforemustbebalancedwiththeenvironmental

objectiveofreducingemissions.Thisappealto“balance”positsanentirelyfalsedichotomy,

assumingemissionsreductionsandaresilientruraleconomyareinherentlyinconflict.Itfails

62Curtin,J.(2017)AnAssessmentofIreland’sFirstDraftMitigationPlan:DoesitlaysolidfoundationsforLow-CarbonDevelopment?Availableat:http://www.iiea.com/ftp/Publications/2017/IIEA_National%20Mitigaton%20Plan%20Assessment%20Report_2017.pdf


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torecognisetheimportanceofdiversificationwithinaruraleconomy.Itisalsobasedonthe

premisethatthecurrent,dominantmodeloffarminginIrelandiseconomicallyand

environmentallysustainable.Yet,thismodelisheavilydependentuponpolicyandincentive

structuresandaconsiderableproportionofIrishfarmsareeconomicallyvulnerableandnon-

viablewithoutcurrentsubsidies.TheGovernmentshouldbeencouraginganeconomically

smartpathwayforagricultureandtheruraleconomybypromotingsustainablelanduse

diversification.

Recommendation:WehavearguedthatIreland’scurrentagricultureandland-

usepolicyisneither‘climate-smart’norsustainable,andIrelandshouldbe

supportingfarmerstotransitionawayfromruminantproductiontoamore

sustainablemodeloffarming.ThiscanbeachievedbyencouragingHighNature

Valuefarming,incentivisinglowcarbonfarmingandpromotingandsupporting

healthierandlessecologicallydamaginghumandiets.63

TheNMPreferstotheuseofforestryandbio-energyassuggestedoffsetsforagriculture-

relatedgreenhousegases.Inearly2017,IrelandwascriticisedbytheEuropeanclimateaction

network,CarbonMarketWatch,foradvocatingfortheuseofforestryoffsetstomeeteffort-

sharingtargets.ThenetworkrecommendsthatIrelandadvocateforreducingorremovingthe

optiontouseforestryoffsetstomeetitstargets.Wehavearguedthattheuseoflandsinksto

offsetagriculturalemissionswillachieveonlyasmallfractionoftherequiredemissions

reductionassuchlandsequestrationisimpermanentandhighlyuncertain.64Ifincorrectly

sited,widespreadafforestation,whichcreatesfundamentalchangesinecosystemfunction

andstructure,canpresentthreatstoelementsofIreland’sbiodiversityandaquaticsystems

overthelong-term.65,66Forestpolicyneedstobeequallycognisantofthefar-reaching

63See:StopClimateChaos/EnvironmentalPillar(2016)NotSoGreen:DebunkingtheMythsAroundIrishAgriculture.Availableat:http://www.stopclimatechaos.ie/download/pdf/not_so_green.pdf64Mackey,B.etal(2013)Untanglingtheconfusionaroundlandcarbonscienceandclimatechangemitigationpolicy,NatureClimateChange,3,522.65Graham,C.,Irwin,S.,Wilson,M.,Kelly,T.,Gittings,T.andO’Halloran,J.(2013)TrackingtheimpactofaffectationonbirdcommunitiesIrishForestry.Availableat:https://www.ucc.ie/en/media/research/planforbio/pdfs/09-Grahametal2013.pdf


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environmentalimplicationsofafforestationalongsidethesocialandeconomicimpacts;

structuraldiversityofforestryisimportant.

Recommendation:Thedraftmitigationplanasksiftherearepoliciesand

abatementstrategiesthatshouldbeconsideredasleverstodevelopan

approachtocarbonneutrality.Peatlandrestorationissurprisinglyomitted

fromthedraftPlan.RestoringIreland’speatlandsasameansofemissions

reductionandcarbonstorageisanobviousmeasurewhichshouldbeincluded

inthefinalmitigationplan.

Becauseofpeatextraction,disturbance,andrelatedactivities(e.g.,combustion,horticulture),

Irishpeatlands(mostofwhicharemoderatelyorseverelydamaged)havebecomeasourceof

carbonemissions.Intheirhealthystate,peatlandswillnotonlystorecarbon,butalso

continuetoabsorbCO2astheyexpand.InIreland,nearintactpeatlandsmayactively

sequester,onaverage,57,402tonnesofcarbonperyear.67Forthispotentialtoberealised

however,strongerenforcementtoprotectpeatlands,rewettingandrestoration,andusing

alternativenon-peatsourcesforenergyproductionwillberequired.Basedontherecognition

ofthevalueofpeatlandsaslong-termcarbonsinks,Scotland’sDraftClimateChangePlan

(2017-2032)includestarget-drivenplansforpeatlandrestoration.Asimilarapproachcan

easilybeadoptedinIreland.

Recommendation:Wehavepreviouslyarguedthatifadequatelymanaged,

sequesteredcarboninpeatlandscouldprovideacheapmitigationmeasure,and

produceimportantincomeintermsofagri-climateenvironmentalmeasuresunder

theRuralDevelopmentPlanRegulations.68Suchmeasurescanbecomplementary

66Ormerod,SJ,O’Halloran,Gribbin,SD&Tyler,SJ(1991)TheecologyofDippersCincluscinclusinrelationtostreamacidityinuplandWales;Breedingperformance,Calciumphysiologyandnestlinggrowth.JournalofAppliedEcology,28:419-433.67Wilson,D.Müller,C.,andRenou-Wilson,F.(2013)CarbonemissionsandremovalsfromIrishpeatlands:

presenttrendsandfuturemitigationmeasures.IrishGeography,Vol.46(1-2):1-23.68See:StopClimateChaos/EnvironmentalPillar(2016)NotSoGreen:DebunkingtheMythsAroundIrishAgriculture.Availableat:http://www.stopclimatechaos.ie/download/pdf/not_so_green.pdf


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tootherenvironmentalobligations,suchastheBirdsDirectiveandcommitments

undertheNationalPeatlandStrategyandtheEUBiodiversityStrategy.

9. Conclusion

Thenon-negotiablenatureofthephysicsofclimatechangeandtheimperativefortheState

toprotectitscitizensfrompreventableharmclearlyrequirethatambitiousandequitable

policiesandmeasurestowardsdecarbonisationneedtobeimplementedwithoutdelay,even

wherethisinvolvesdifficultpoliticaldecisionsandchallengingpolicycontexts.Inthis

submissiononthedraftNationalMitigationPlan,theCoalitionhaswelcomedanumberof

discretenewproposals–whichshouldbestrengthenedfurther–andhasexpressed

concerns,andmadeanumberofexplicitrecommendationstohelpstrengthenIreland’s

mitigationpolicyframeworkgoingforward.Aboveall,thissubmissionhassoughtto

demonstratethatthedraftPlancannotbeconsideredacceptable–intermsofambition

towardsmeetingIreland’snationalandinternationalclimateandenergycommitments–nor

inrelationtothetaskassignedtoitunderIreland’sClimateActionandLowCarbon

DevelopmentAct(2015).Theproposedapproachtopolicyplanning,thelevelofambition,

andhowclimateactionisframedrequirefundamentalchanges.

Irelandcannotaffordtoadoptawait-and-seeclimatepolicyapproach.Theframework

adoptedwithinthecurrentdraftignoresclimatescience,underestimatesthelong-term

climaterisks,andwillonlysufficetolimitthenationalconversationonclimatechangein

IrelandbydistractingattentionawayfromIreland’sclimateresponsibilitiesandthesignificant

economicandhumancostsresultingfromafailuretotakeaction.Everyyearofdelayin

reachingthe5%annualreductionrate–asoutlinedinthissubmission–increasesthe

challengeoverthelong-term,drivesupthecostoftransitionandunderminesIreland’s

opportunitytobenefitfromtheemergenceofthegreenglobaleconomy.Mostimportantly,

itsignalsanabsenceofintenttohonourcommitmentstointernationalpartnerstodeliveron

theParisAgreement,andaprofoundlackofsolidarityandrespectforthecountriesand

communitiesforwhomcurrentclimateimpactsarealreadytoomuch.


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Addressingthegapsandweaknessesidentifiedinthissubmissioncangoasignificantwayto

providingamorerobustbasisforeffectiveandequitableclimatepolicyplanning,

implementationandreview.However,thetoolsalonewillnotbeenough.Politicaland

departmentalleadershipisurgentlyneededtoshiftthepublicandpoliticaldiscourse

currentlyreflectedinthedraftPlantoonethatenablesenergetic,ambitiousandurgent

climateaction.

i Stop Climate Chaos (SCC) is a coalition of 31 civil society organisations campaigning to

ensure Ireland plays its part in preventing runaway climate change. It was launched in 2007

and is the largest network of organisations campaigning for action on climate change in

Ireland. Its membership includes development, environmental, youth and faith-based

organisations.

The Environmental Pillar is made up of 28 national environmental non-governmental

organisations (NGOs) that work together to represent the views of the Irish environmental

sector. The Environmental Pillar creates and promotes policies that advance sustainable

development and acts as an advocacy coalition promoting sustainable solutions in areas such as

climate change, biodiversity, tree-cover, resource efficiency, transport, planning and water.

joint submission on national mitigation plan fv · submission to the department of communications,...

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