Stefan Strauß

Privacy vs. security – a given trade-off?

Joint conference on SurPRISE, PRISMS and PACT: Citizens’ Perspectives on Surveillance, Security and Privacy: Controversies,

Alternatives and Solutions. Vienna, 13-14 November 2014

”Surveillance, Privacy and Security: A large scale participatory assessment of criteria and factors

determining acceptability and acceptance of security technologies in Europe”

This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 285492.

Privacy and security – a trade-off?

Privacy=state free from interference, a form of liberty

Intrusion is the exception not the norm

Trade-Off reflects a constructed “neither-nor” situation without considering complementarity

(cf. Solvove 2006, 2011)

Trade-off not inherent, results from surveillance as security practice

reinforced by technologySecurity gain?

In the fundamental rights liberty is the defining value: „democracy, the rule of law andfundamental rights are designed to protect the liberty of the individual within the society.”

Thus, security is neither analogous nor opposed to liberty. (cf. Guild et al 2008)

EU Fundamental Rights Charter:Art. 6 – Right to liberty and securityArt. 7 – Respect for private and family lifeArt. 8 – Protection of personal data

How the tradeoff occurs

• Technological – „disclosure by default“ (Strauß/Nentwich 2013)

• diminishing boundaries between personal andnon-personal information

• Economic – security as business model (security economy)

• Political – securitization and increasing pre-emption/vention

• Societal – decreasing privacy awareness andincreasing self-exposure via social media etc.

Securitization – Security as continuing process

Security becomes a quasi-central virtueand vehicle for political priorities and actions

Securitization: “the very political act of defining what counts as a threat… through the label ‘security’ problems are turned into existential threats that require exceptional, emergency measures, which may include breaking otherwise binding rules or governing by decrees rather than by democratic decisions.” (Trombetta 2009)“… sustained strategic practice aimed at convincing a target audience to accept … the claim that a specific development is threatening enough to deserve an immediate policy to alleviate it” (Balzacq 2005)“… conceputalizes security not as an objective condition but rather as a process marked by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with sufficient saliency to have political effects” (Watson 2011)

Transformation from traditional to human-centered security

Owen (2004)

EU-Security policy – Overview

• Broad range of threats• Terrorism, cybercrime, poverty, hunger, disease, international

conflicts, climate change, lack of resources, state failure, etc.• But measures mainly focus on fighting crime and terrorism,

border control, cyber-security• Security as economic factor “Security is a precondition of development.

Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, (including social infrastructure); it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible.” (ESS 2003)

Paradigm shifts in security policy

• Extended security framing and calls for holistic approach • Security as economic driver – “Security economy” (OECD 2004)• Changing relation between security and liberty in the EU

• The Hague Programme, continued with Stockholm Programme (2010-14)• Overlap between internal and external security

(civilian, police and military activities)• Blurring boundaries between “normal”/rule-based and exceptional states• Inherent logic of prevention and pre-emptive security measures

• Gaps between security threats and measures• Individual partially becomes suspicious and

turns from protected object into the threat• Increasing surveillance tendencies in law enforcement

• + information exchange and connectivity (DR, PNR, Eurodac, Eurosur, Schengen IS, etc.), predictive policing,..

Citizens’ perceptions – General attitudes and concerns

If you have done nothing wrong you do not have to worry about SOSTs

The use of SOSTs improves public security

SOSTs are only used to show something is being done to fight crime

Once SOSTs are in the place, they are likely to be abused

I am concerned that too much information is collected about me

I am concerned that my personal information may be shared without my permission

I am concerned that my personal information may be used against me

21

8

14

35

40

36

66

43

18

20

35

30

33

25

18

21

14

16

14

17

5

10

30

23

11

11

10

3

7

20

27

2

4

3

1

1

2

1

1

1

1

1

100%0%

N=1772

18,5%

29%

52%

85%

6%8,5%

agreers(N=549)

opposers(N=804)

Citizens’ perceptions – tradeoff

Contradictions in opinions of nothing to hide agreers:Nothing to hide but …

Concerned

Not concerned

Neither nor

NA

54%

23%

23%

7%12%

agreers(N=541)

opposers(N=807)

„concerned that mypersonal information

might be used against me“

„concerned that toomuch information iscollected about me“

80%

83%

agreers(N=549)

opposers(N=803)

96%

8%9%

„concerned that my personal information may be shared

without my permission“

Effectiveness vs. intrusiveness

231219

018

3418

015

25

038

6440

4131

360

2132

270

2810

22

2223

28

1824

250

2016

240

2525

29

167

14

1018

120

2411

220

1627

25

143

11

714

8

1669

016

3418

92

5

11

11

0

21

0112

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

smart CCTVDPISLT

smart CCTVDPISLT

smart CCTVDPISLT

smart CCTVDPISLT

In my opinion, … is an effective national security tool

The idea of … makes me feel uncomfortable

I feel that … Is forced upon me without my permission

I feel more secure when … is in operation

Major concerns about SOST usage

4155

370

2850

280

4246

320

3344

380

3451

380

3350

37

2629

280

2430

320

2531

340

2429

300

2228

310

2532

34

139

180

1510

200

1312

160

1614

160

1610

150

179

15

125

110

217

130

137

120

168

120

175

110

145

8

72

60

1136

063

50

1044

0945

010

34

111

0111

01

10

111

011

0111

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

smart CCTVDPISLT

smart CCTVDPISLT

smart CCTVDPISLT

smart CCTVDPISLT

smart CCTVDPISLT

smart CCTVDPISLT

how usage may develop in future

it can reveal sensitive information about me

it can reveal strangers where I am (or was)

it can lead to misinterpretations of my behaviour

it can violate my fundamental human rights

it can violate everyone's fundamental human rights

Intrusiveness and acceptability

24

59

51

48

19

48

71

35

24

59

51

48

Laws and regulations ensure thatSOST

is not misused

SOST improves public security

SOST is privacy intrusive

the level of intrusiveness isacceptable given the public security

benefits it offers

SLT DPI smart CCTV

Trust in security authorities

8

7

12

0

7

4

9

0

10

6

8

0

5

3

5

28

29

34

0

26

23

30

0

29

28

36

0

17

11

24

32

26

32

0

35

35

35

0

30

29

33

0

29

28

33

16

19

10

0

17

19

11

0

17

19

13

0

23

25

20

13

15

9

0

11

11

8

0

12

15

7

0

23

27

14

3

3

3

0

5

7

6

0

2

4

4

0

4

6

4

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

smart CCTV

DPI

SLT

smart CCTV

DPI

SLT

smart CCTV

DPI

SLT

smart CCTV

DPI

SLT

security authorities which use … are trustworthy

… are competent in what they do

… do not abuse their power

… are concerned about the welfare of citizens as well as national security

Summary and conclusions

• Securitization vs. „Privatization“ of privacy and loss of its public value• Extended security concept partially plausible due to complex global challenges • Vague effectiveness with gaps between measures and threats• Pre-emption and mass surveillance create new insecurities and

reinforce the (alleged) security/privacy tradeoff and vice versa How far can/should pre-emption and prevention go?

• Increasing dynamic of security while privacy remained relatively static• Overcoming the tradeoff fallacy by asking the right questions:

not whether but how privacy should be protected (cf. Solove 2011)

• Reconsidering privacy as a form of autonomy and liberty with multiple dimensions towards more systematic privacy impact assessments and effective privacy by design

• Enhancing transparency, accountability and oversight ofSOSTs+practices to revitalize the public value of privacy

Thank you for your interest!Stefan StraußInstitute of Technology Assessment (ITA)Austrian Academy of SciencesA-1030 Vienna, Strohgasse 45/5Tel: +43 (1) 51581 6599Fax: +43 (1) 7109883Email: sstrauss@oeaw.ac.atWeb: http://www.oeaw.ac.at/ita/en/