joining the dots - the report of the tiger task force

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The Tiger Task Force was constituted pursuant to the decision taken during thesecond meeting of the National Board for Wildlife on March 17, 2003

The Ministry of Environment and Forests (Project Tiger) set up the task force videnotification no.6 (4)/2005-PT dated April 19, 2005 to review the management of tigerreserves.

The terms of reference of the Task Force are as follows:

1. Suggest measures to strengthen tiger conservation in the country.2. Suggest measures to incentivise the local community in conservation of tigers.3. Suggest measures to incentivise local forest staff posted in sanctuaries/national

parks and ensure an effective HR plan for tiger conservation/wildlife managers.4. Suggest measures to improve the methodology of tiger counting and forecasting.5. Suggest methods of transparent professional audit of wildlife parks and placing

data on tiger conservation in the public domain.6. Suggest a new wildlife management paradigm that shares concerns of

conservation with the public at large. 2. The Project Tiger Division of the Ministry of Environment & Forests would be

facilitating the working of the Task Force and render all necessary help.3. The Task Force should submit its report within three months from the date of

this notification.4. The sitting fees and travel cost would be reimbursed to the Members of the Task

Force as per norms.

The Members of the Task Force are as follows:

(1) Ms Sunita Narain, Director, Centre for Science and Environment. - Chairperson(2) Shri H S Panwar, Ex-Head, Project Tiger and Ex-Head, - Member

Wild Life Institute of India. (3) Prof Madhav Gadgil, Environmental Historian and member, - Member

National Board for Wildlife. (4) Shri Valmik Thapar, Member, National Board for Wildlife. - Member(5) Shri Samar Singh, Ex-Secretary, Govt. of India and Member, - Member

National Board for Wildlife.

© 2005 Union Ministry of Environment and Forests (Project Tiger)

Published byProject Tiger, Union Ministry of Environment and ForestsAnnexe No 5, Bikaner House Shahjahan Road, New Delhi – 11www.projecttiger.nic.in

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Introduction v

Executive summary vi

01 The assessment 1-141.1 Conserving the tiger 2

1.2 The Sariska shock 14

02 A paradigm change 21-26Making conservation work 22

03 The way ahead 27-1433.1 The institutional agenda 28

3.2 The protection agenda 36

3.3 The illegal trade agenda 51

3.3a Domestic enforcement agenda 56

3.4 Innovative protection agenda 63

3.5 The science agenda 70

3.6 The research agenda 80

3.7 The relocation agenda 88

3.8 The coexistence agenda 99

3.9 The fringe agenda 117

3.10 The tourism agenda 132

3.11 Ecological services agenda 141

04 Action plan for change 145-151

05 References 153-159

Contents

06 Annexures 161-206I. The composition and terms of reference of the Tiger Task Force 162

II. Note of dissent by Valmik Thapar, member, Tiger Task Force 163

III. Response of the Chairperson, Tiger Task Force, to note of dissent 181

IV. Expert consultations based on terms of reference of the Tiger Task Force 184

V. Visits of the Tiger Task Force 187

VI. Experts requested to comment on methodology of tiger estimation 188

VII. Suggestions received on the terms of reference of Tiger Task Force 189

VIII. Methodology for estimating and monitoring tiger status and habitat 193

IX. Investing in institutions for change: strengthening the Project Tiger directorate 198

X. A critique of cadre-building in the forestry sector and suggestions for human resource improvement 200

XI. Amending the criminal provisions of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 203

XII. Guidelines on establishment of widlife wings issued 1973-1981 206

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■ JOINING THE DOTS TIGER TASK FORCE REPORT

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The Tiger Task Force was set up because of a crisis —the knowledge that the nation had lost its tigers fromthe protected reserve of Sariska in Rajasthan. But theTiger Task Force was also set up to look beyond thisimmediate provocation: there were lessons to belearnt from this tragedy, lessons the nation needed tolearn so that the survival of the tiger could beguaranteed. Sariska, then, was not only a crisis butalso became an opportunity. Clearly, the time hadcome to review the past and also to secure the future.

It is evident that all is not well with the Indiantiger. It is this concern that led the Prime Minister, DrManmohan Singh, to review conservation efforts atthe National Board for Wildlife meeting held inMarch 2005, to later visit the tiger reserve ofRanthambhore in Rajasthan to assess the situation onthe ground and to meet with the chief wildlifewardens of different states. The Prime Minister alsoasked for the Tiger Task Force to be set up, with amandate to review tiger conservation and to suggest anew paradigm that shares the concerns ofconservation with the public at large. It is clear to usthat his concern is a shared one: how we must savethe tiger and how we must do that in the particularcircumstances of India, where forests are notwilderness areas but also where people live.

This was our objective as we began work. Weknew we had to find what has to be done, urgentlyand effectively, to safeguard the tiger’s future. Weknew also we were not the first to engage in such atask. India has had a long history of conserving thetiger, in which many have been involved. And muchhas already been done.

The Tiger Task Force started its work by seekinganswers. It organised four consultations: two inDelhi, concerning issues related to conservation andpoaching and on the methodology of tiger estimation;one in Nagpur, where tribal activists and non-governmental organisations working oncollaborative conservation put forth their opinion;and one in Bangalore, to meet researchers andscientists working on different aspects of habitat andspecies research.

The Tiger task Force also visited tiger reserves —Periyar in Kerala, Pench in Maharashtra, Pench andKanha in Madhya Pradesh and Sariska and

Ranthambhore in Rajasthan. In each visit, fieldmanagers, foresters and guards told us about theirefforts to protect and what they believed had to bedone in the future. We also visited villages locatedwithin the reserves and outside.

In all, it was an enormous learning experience,most of which we have tried to encapsulate in thereport. But even beyond what we have learnt andsought to explain, we can say with confidence thetiger is not alone. When we began our work, we hadan initial list of tiger experts, knowledgeable abouttiger conservation and involved in its protection. Butas we went about our work, we found theconstituency of the tiger to be truly widespread.People across the country sent us their views andcomments. In these three months, we receivedinformation from over 120 people. We met over 200people on our visits and more than 100 attendedconsultations.

We would like to thank them all. We cannot,obviously, include all the suggestions, but all havebeen heard carefully; this has helped us devise ourstrategy for the future. It is clear that one problem ofthe tiger has been its ‘exclusive’ constituency; ourhope is that this report will provide ways in whichthis group of supporters is enlarged and getsincluded in the future efforts for tiger conservation.The tiger needs all these friends, and more.

We thank the Union ministry of environmentand forests for their cooperation; in particular, DrRajesh Gopal, director, Project Tiger, for giving timeto the Tiger Task Force. We learnt a lot from him andwe hope our report will help him and his colleagues,working on tiger conservation, in their efforts as well.

No report per se brings change. It is people, whobelieve in the report and its ideas, who are thechange-makers. We hope our report will findbelievers as well. We hope that the agenda for tigerconservation will be secured, so that the future of thetiger can be secured. It will need seriousness. It willneed commitment. But it can be done.

Sunita NarainSamar Singh H S PanwarMadhav Gadgil

Introduction

The Tiger Task Force report begins by placing itselfin context (see: The assessment, p 1-20). There is animmediate context to this report: the widely reportedand discussed event of the disappearance of tigers inSariska. There is also a larger context: the discourseand practice of tiger conservation in India.

In terms of the immediate context, the Sariskadebacle, the Task Force investigated the affair. Thereport presents the conclusions (see: The Sariskashock, p 14-20). The protection system there hascompletely collapsed. While officials were busymisreporting the record of tiger numbers, poachersroamed about and cleaned the reserve out. Apowerful mining lobby, keen to carry out miningoperations in the reserve fringe, is thrilled. Localpoliticians now want the protected area denotified:“What is there to protect?” they ask. Villagers hereregard the tiger, and the park administration, as theircommon enemy no 1: they live sandwiched betweenthe two, and are bitter about their desperatelywretched existence and continued harassment. Thepark management talks about relocation, but hasdone little. In the meantime, even the one village thathad been moved out has come back into the reserve.There is unease all around. In this situation,protection cannot and does not work.

In terms of the larger context (see: Conserving thetiger, p 2-13), the report finds important, butforgotten, moments in the recent history of officialconservation planning. The report of the 1972 taskforce headed by Karan Singh, Project Tiger: aplanning proposal for preservation of tiger (Pantheratigris tigris) in India, inaugurated the tigerconservation programme in India (and officialconservation as well). It is a remarkable blueprint. Itgave the programme a promising start.

If “people versus parks” — and its inevitablecorollary, “people versus tigers” — is onecontentious point of the debate around conservationin India today, the report finds extremely sensitivedeliberations upon this issue in the past. It is obviousthat some, among those that have given direction toofficial conservation policy, were horribly aware thatin India, forests are not unpopulated tracts ofwilderness. The 1983 Eliciting public support forwildlife conservation — report of the task force, by acommittee headed by Madhavrao Scindia, focuses onthe dependence of rural people on forests: “In theirprecarious existence, enforcement of restriction in

wildlife reserves triggers antagonism”. This reportwanted development programmes and funds forvillages located in the periphery of conservationzones. It calls these zones “islands of conservation”.“If the land surrounding such effort continues todeteriorate in productivity affecting the availabilityof resources for communities, these islands arebound to succumb one day to the community’sdemands”.

In the 1990s, a furious storm breaks, reminiscentof today. The tiger is in deep trouble. Project Tiger,India’s flagship conservation programme, is in deeptrouble. Conservation itself is in deep trouble. Thiswas an opportunity to change directions. But whatemerges is: One, the conservation regime re-dedicates itself to a command-and-control mode ofwildlife preservation. Two, it becomes no longernecessary to refer to or think of “people” whilespeaking of or planning for conservation.

The Sariska debacle is irrevocably because of thisdirection we chose.

3 unavoidable variables

It is incumbent upon the Tiger Task Force to look tothe future. The Task Force realises that, so far asconservation policy and practice are concerned, anysuch blueprint must be predicated upon threeunavoidable variables (see: A paradigm change, p21-26). As the report puts it, “The protection of thetiger is inseparable from the protection of the forestsit roams in. But the protection of these forests is itselfinseparable from the fortunes of people who, inIndia, inhabit forest areas”. There is the tiger. Thereis the forest. There are the people, living inside theseforests and on the fringes of these forests.

All readers of this executive summary areencouraged to look at the map on page 23. It showsthree layers: the 150 poorest districts of India; thefact that these are also constitutionally designatedSchedule V areas (areas primarily inhabited bytribals); and the fact that these are prime “tigerdistricts”. Consider also the tables on page 26 Forestcover and tribal districts, and Net change in forestcover in the country since 2001… . The fact is thatcommunities — not necessarily tribals, but equallyimpoverished — live in and around those areas theofficial conservation apparatus protects for the sakeof the tiger. Equally, forests in these areas are under

vi Executive summary

Executive summary

greater strain: fiat forbids use of the forest, but peoplepersist in doing so, often out of sheer need. Enter thetiger, single males no fiat can tie down, trying towander from forest to forest, but unable to do sobecause the forests are shrinking and forest corridorsbrim with disaffected villages arbitrarily resettled outof the forest.

The Tiger Task Force has tried then to unravelthe knot conservation policy and practice has todaytied itself in.

The way ahead

With this aim in mind, the report moves into theheart of the matter. The Tiger Task Force resolves theproblem into 11 distinct, but connected, aspects (see:The way ahead, p 27-143).

Just reform

Sariska was an eye-opener to the Task Force. Itwitnessed there absolute institutional collapse. So itis that this segment of the report begins by lookinginto institutional reform (see: The institutionalagenda, p 28-35). Following the 42nd amendment tothe Constitution in 1976, the subject of ‘forests’ and‘wildlife’ shifted from the State list to the Concurrentlist. As the report puts it, “the Centre acquiredoverriding powers to ensure protection andpreservation of forests and wildlife”. By the 1990s,this arrangement began to function more in thebreach. Project Tiger suffered. Without direct stake inprotecting wildlife and forests, states treated these asmatters to be administered. State politicians foundprotecting huge swathes of land expensive, eveninimical to growth. The Centre had a direct stake, butwas too distant from ground realities to be effective.

How should this state of affairs improve? Thereport weighs two options. One, centralise further(see: p 29-30). Two, rely on a participatoryphilosophy of institution-building. The reportendorses the latter option. Improve Centre-statecollaboration, says the report, strengtheninginstitutions at the Centre that oversee tigerprotection, and improving state capacities. Thereport says local communities must be involved inprotecting the tiger; relevant institutions, therefore,must be put in place.

Among a series of recommendations (see: p 30-35) the report makes with respect to overhauling ortransforming institutions of wildlife protection, itsays that the Union ministry of environment andforests must be re-organised into two separatedepartments: that of environment and that of forests.The Project Tiger directorate must be given the legalstatus of an authority, to facilitate its work andprovide it autonomy.

Must protect

But even as institutional reform is undertaken, it isclear that more needs to be done to improve theprotection for the tiger immediately (see: Theprotection agenda, p: 36-50). After visits to reservesand detailed research, it is the assessment of the TaskForce that Sariska is certainly not representative ofwhat is happening in every reserve in the country.But it is also clear that a Sariska-type situationhaunts every reserve, where protection is happening,today, against all odds.

The question then is: what can be done toimprove protection? The usual answer is: more guns,more guards and more money. This approach, thereport finds, solves nothing. Sariska, in fact, hasspent more money per tiger and per sq km thanalmost all reserves in India. It has more personnel persq km and more protection camps per sq km, thanmost reserves. Still it failed (see the graphs:Allocation of funds to tiger reserves from inception to2004-2005, and Average yearly allocation of funds totiger reserves from inception to 2004-2005, p 37; seeespecially What we can learn from Sariska, p 46).

The report delves into all aspects of protection(see: Funds and protection, p 37-39; Personnel andprotection, p 39-42; the vacant staff position, p 42-43; the age of the staff, p 43-44; and infrastructure: p45) to suggest each reserve must devise strategies tobetter protect the tiger. This is especially true of a)reserves in northeast India, vast and inaccessibleexcept to local communities, and b) naxalite-dominated reserves.

And less crime

It isn’t enough to merely spruce up the reservemanagement. Conservation in India today possessesan extremely watered-down mechanism to crackdown on wildlife crime. A market exists today fortiger skin and tiger parts; as tigers decline elsewherein south and southeast Asia, the danger for the tigerin India becomes more palpable. Inter-governmentalcooperation on protecting endangered species hasdriven the market underground, making it difficult todetect and so break; also, the world is failing in itsattempts to control the illicit trade: as late as 2004,shops in New York exhibited herbal medicinesclaiming to be made of tiger parts (see: The illegaltrade agenda, p 51-55).

A weak enforcement mechanism thus spellsdisaster. The report takes up this question in depth(see: Domestic enforcement agenda, p 56-62). Aftershowing in great detail exactly how weak theWildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 is in terms ofenforcement (see: p 58-59), the report demands theAct’s criminal provisions be amended, and wants a

Executive summary vii

TIGER TASK FORCE REPORT JOINING THE DOTS ■

Wildlife Crime Bureau to be set up immediately.Perhaps, then, India can look after her tigers.

Perhaps India can look after her tigers better bybeing imaginative in this sphere (see: Innovativeprotection agenda, p 63-69). Poachers rely uponextremely skilled local communities of hunters, whoknow the forest better than the backs of their hands.Poachers can; money can buy anything, especiallyextremely poor people. But what if the hunter turnsprotector? The report records such an initiative inCambodia. In India, too, such a turnaround ispossible: research shows that the Lisu of Changlangdistrict in Arunachal Pradesh could become the bestprotectors of the Namdapha tiger reserve there (see: p65-67). Periyar tiger reserve in Kerala proves it can bedone (see: p 67-68). Couldn’t innovations like this bereplicated, where possible, elsewhere in the country?

For this to happen, at least one bridge has to bebuilt: between the conservation bureaucracy andwildlife researchers. The Task Force finds thecurrent disconnect between the two extremelydisturbing (see: The research agenda, p 80-87).Indeed, it finds weak correlation between thepractice of conservation and the knowledgeproduced on and about it. The report points to thepug-mark method of counting tigers as the bestexample of this practice becoming unscientific overtime, and agrees this method needs to be replaced(see: The science agenda, pp 70-79). It reviews themethodology that is being suggested as an alternativeand finds it will work better in estimating tigers andtheir habitat. It wants this method to be tried outurgently.

An outlook that believes conservation meansfencing forests off by fiat is too narrow. Many tigerslive outside tiger reserves. Thus conservation needsto focus on the larger landscape. It must also be aninclusive effort: the wildlife biologist or communityecologist is equally crucial to it. The Sariska debaclewent unnoticed also because information on tigernumbers there was fudged. The Task Force urges foropenness and for independent audits that can buildand break the ‘reputations’ of state leaders inmanaging their tiger populations.

Out in the open

The simplest way to protect the tiger is to renderinviolate the space it roams in, catching prey. InIndia, this means keeping all people out of forestsdeclared as protected areas (as reserves, orsanctuaries, or national parks). As people live inreserves, they need to be ‘relocated’ so that the space is made ‘inviolate’ and undisturbed.Conservationists demand it. But what is the situationon the ground?

For the first time, data has been collected on the

number of villages — families and people — that liveinside India’s tiger reserves. The Task Force places itin the public domain (see: The relocation agenda, p88-98; specifically, see: p 89-91).

The data is not complete — there is no properassessment of the total number of settlements in tigerreserves. But what does exist proves a) relocation is alogistical nightmare and b) it has a cost that isunaccounted for.

The first is borne out by the fact that in the last 30years, only 80 villages and 2,904 families have beenrelocated from different tiger reserves in the country.Readers of this summary could consult the table on p91 Costs of relocation. The Task force has estimatedthat, roughly, there are 1,500 villages — or 65,000families, or 325,000 people (@ five per family) —inside the core and buffer zones of tiger reserves. Atthe current rate of compensation the governmentgives to families it seeks to relocate (Rs 1 lakh), itwould cost Rs 665 crore to relocate all families fromtiger reserves. If the rate of compensation isenhanced — say, to Rs 2.5 lakh — it would require Rs1,663 crore to re-settle all.

There’s more. Usually, forest land is used to re-settle families (no agency has the gumption, orpolitical will, to provide revenue land). Today, if astate government were to use forest land and re-settlepeople, it would have to pay the Centre what iscalled the NPV, or net present value of the forest itwould divert for the purpose of re-settlement. TheNPV amount has been fixed at Rs 5.8 to Rs 9 lakh perhectare (depending on the category of forestdiverted). Therefore, to re-settle all families fromtiger reserves, the government will require Rs 9,645crore.

This stalemate has to be broken. The Task Forcesuggests a way ahead. It asks for a scientificassessment of the villages that need to be relocatedand it asks for a time-bound programme for this tohappen. It asks caution but it also demands speed.The situation today is untenable for the people wholive inside. The unwritten policy is that they will berelocated. As a result, no development reaches them,for then they wouldn’t want to leave. But relocationdoes not happen. People become, and remain,trespassers in their own land.

They came back

In Sariska, villagers of Kraska village were offeredland by the forest department in a village outside thereserve’s core area. They relinquished their land-ownership certificates and shifted to that village,only to face the wrath of its residents. Selling off thenew land they had got at low prices, the villagerswent back into the core. Now they live in anatmosphere that is war-like: harassed, forcibly

viii Executive summary


evicted again, they live impoverished and lives.The Task Force visited Hindala village in

Ranthambhore and witnessed the terrible poverty ofthese people living inside this prestigious nationalpark. They have no water, no schools, no medicalfacilities. They are harassed if they graze theiranimals in the land outside their village. “The forestdepartment says it is planning to relocate this village.The villagers told the Task Force that they wereprepared to move, but also expressed concern thatthe villagers who had been relocated fromRanthambhore in the past were facing problems evenmore severe than theirs” (p 96). A damningindictment of conservation: people preferring to liveillegal and wretched lives because official relocationis a promise that does not work.

Other examples

The report looks at other examples of relocation, andfinds a pattern exists to the process (see: p 92-94; alsosee the example of village Pandharpauni/ Navegaon,p 100). Families are usually shifted to the fringe ofprotected areas. The land they are given is usually ofpoor quality. Although the land they get is firstcleared of all vegetation, it is still categorised as‘forest land’. The restrictions of the Forest ProtectionAct, 1980, apply here. So people live a constrictedexistence. Moreover, they are not allowed to use theresources of the protected forest they live next to.

Relocation was successfully done in the Bhadratiger reserve in Karnataka. But it cost the state Rs 4.02lakh per family. Is this then the cost we have to pay?

All this creates a situation where, as peoplebecome poorer, they also become desperate (see theexample of Bandhavgarh, p 100; see also Melghat’sconservation conundrum, p 110, or Pench: Illegaland threatening, p 113) and hostile. Since the forestno longer sustains them, they no longer sustain theforest. As for the tiger, it finds itself roaming in ahabitat that begins to disappear.

This is not to say

But even with all this learnt, this is not to say theremust not exist inviolate spaces for the tiger. Thereport recommends that “there should be an urgentand realistic review of the number of villages thatactually need to be relocated from the reserves. Thedecision must be based on the fact that the villagesthat need to be relocated are so made to do sobecause they are located in the critical habitats —tiger natal areas and conservation priority areas”.Urging “for speed and careful decision-making”, theTask Force “recommends a tight schedule of exactlyone year to study settlements and list the ones to berelocated” (p 97).

Being exclusive

A 1989 report estimates three million people liveinside the 600-odd protected areas that exist in Indiatoday. So, says the report: “If the way ahead is tocome to a practical resolution on how to balance, andmanage, the livelihood needs of people with theimperatives of conservation, it is important tounderstand the impact of human resource use ontiger reserve forests: is such use detrimental? What isthe threshold beyond which such use begins to soseverely degrade tiger habitat that the animal’sexistence becomes truly endangered? What if suchuse is not detrimental?” (see: The coexistenceagenda, p 99-116; specifically, An experiment insustainability, p 102, with graph The Soliga knowsustainable harvesting, p 103. These questions alsoaffect the argument of The fringe agenda, p 116-131)

Accepting that “this terrain of competing needsis a complicated one”, the report examines why whatit calls the “war of conservation” is so widespread inIndia. Seeking answers, it realises that “in manyparts of the country, the rights of local people inforests remain unrecorded” (see, in this respect, theexample of Buxa tiger reserve in West Bengal, p 101).Currently, many states are on a spree to prohibit tree-and bamboo felling, cutting grass, collecting minorforest produce within protected areas. Theunintended result of this has been heightenedtension between people and staff in variousprotected areas. “In this situation,” the report says,“it is important to examine what the rights are ofpeople living within sanctuaries and national parks.Do they even have rights? What is prohibited? Whatdoes the law say on this issue?”

So follows a close examination of the Wildlife(Protection) Act, 1972 (see: p 103-106). Till the 1991amendment to the Act, a sanctuary could be notifiedwithout people’s rights being determined. This was astatutory defect, but the Act was implemented. Innotified sanctuaries created 1973-1991, therefore,rights would not have been settled. The 1991amendment, and then the 2003 amendment,attempted to mitigate this defect. The latter actuallyprovides safeguards: till rights are settled, the statehas to make alternative arrangements for fuel, fodderand minor forest produce for people living in areasdeclared as protected. But these amendments failedto solve problems: settlements did not take place; theenforcement regime was strengthened withoutsafeguards. Says the report:

“There seems to now exist two proceduralregimes, and institutions seem to pick one or theother, not tackling the inherited ambiguitiescaused by the original defect in the law:● Rights are settled, the sanctuary is notified

Executive summary ix


and all prohibitions come into force;● Rights are not settled, but the sanctuary or

national park exists; so, all prohibitionscome into force but none of the safeguards”(p106).

The law, as interpreted, provides that people livingin and around a protected area can collect andremove forest produce for “bona fide needs” butthere is no definition of what the phrase means.Moreover, the Act bars rights to property (in thisrespect see: p 107; see especially Submission of theMadhya Pradesh government on section 20 of theWildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, barring accrual ofrights p 108).

In this way, the report clarifies what it means bya “war of conservation”. Now it can ask: iscoexistence then possible? How? It recommends“inclusive protection be incorporated intoconservation management urgently”, and urges parkmanagers to be innovative. The fact is if people co-habit the tiger’s space then it is imperative that waysare found so that coexistence is harmonious.Anything else is not good for the tiger. Not good forconservation.

Become inclusive

A strategy of inclusive protection should be evenmore of the essence of future conservation in Indiabecause of the internecine conflicts — betweenpeople and park managers, or regarding resource use— breaking out on the park fringes (see: The fringeagenda, p 117-131). The report details the nature ofthe interaction between fringe villages and protectedareas. Often, they place tremendous pressure onparks (see the example of Bandipur tiger reserve, p118). Animals, in turn, damage crops (see: p 118), orkill livestock (see the case of Bhadra tiger reserve, p:119). The table Compensation paid by tiger reservesfrom inception till 2002, in p 120, clearly shows thisconflict drains the financial resources of tigerreserves. It also strains the people’s relationship tothe forest.

The report then analyses attempts to solve thisconflict. It examines the India EcodevelopmentProject — a Rs 288 crore attempt (incidentally this ismore than what has been spent on official tigerconservation over 30 years), tested in 7 tiger reserves,to tackle the problem of the negative impact ofpeople upon parks, and vice versa (see: p 120-127).“Where the decision-making was unilateral, at the

behest of the forest department”, says the report, “theattempt quickly failed. Where they wereimplemented in the right spirit, the schemes (of theproject) did pick up the economic baselines of thevillages” (see the examples of Nagarhole nationalpark and Buxa tiger reserve, p: 124-125). The keyweakness wasn’t in what the project did. It lay inhow it did what it did. “The project created parallelinstitutions in the villages. It did not work withexisting delivery mechanisms — the panchayats andline departments of programme delivery. Also, atraditionally antagonistic forest department had torebuild its relationships with villagers. Where seniorforest officers took the lead and spent time in thefield, things were different.”

It isn’t as if solutions don’t exist. Increase theproductivity of forests and pasturelands in thevicinity of a reserve, the report suggests. “If peoplelive in a forest-dependent economy, then it isimperative to evolve policies for forest-developmentin these areas”. The Task Force also asks thegovernment “to look at how joint forest managementand community forestry in fringe forests can beintegrated to work both for people as well aswildlife”. It also considers the strategy of monetisingthe ecosystem services of a forest, and involvinglocal communities to protect forests in lieu of whichservice they get paid (see: Ecological servicesagenda, p: 141-143).

In the same vein, the report looks at how tourism,that has great potential in providing locals a way toprosperity, is doing exactly the opposite: hotels andresorts operate without any building code ofenvironmental standards. They guzzle groundwaterand require waste disposal by the ton. Moreover,they do not contribute to the local economy at all(see: The tourism agenda, p 132-140). The reportprovides successful examples of eco-tourisminvolving local communities (see: Innovating intourism by involving local communities, p: 138), andrecommends government encourage homesteadtourism around reserves. Also, it asks that “hotelswithin a radius of five kilometres from the boundaryof a reserve must contribute 30 per cent of theirturnover to the reserve”.

The moot point in looking at so many solutions isa simple one. Ease the pressure on people; peoplerespond sustainably. Ease the pressure on the forest;the forest will regenerate. The pressure on the tiger isbound to ease. This paradigm of ‘inclusiveconservation’ will safeguard the tiger. Nothing elsewill. The agenda is within our reach.

x Executive summary


01The assessment1.1 Conserving the tiger

1.2 The Sariska shock

1

Phase one: 1972-1980 In the early 1970s, international concern about thestate of the Indian tiger (Panthera tigris tigris)reached a fever pitch. In 1969, the IUCN or WorldConservation Union held its general assembly inDelhi. Based on an assessment by forester K SSankhala, the assembly called for a moratorium ontiger killings and asked for urgent action to protectthe species. As a sequel to this appeal, the IndianBoard for Wildlife initiated action for protection andasked states to ban tiger hunting for five years.

But the international community was notconvinced. In 1972 Guy Mountfort, an influentialtrustee of the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), met(then) prime minister Indira Gandhi, urging her tosave the species from extinction. Well known for anabiding concern on environmental and conservationmatters, the prime minister set up a group ofspecialists to study the situation and create a plan forthe future. Chaired by Karan Singh, a keenconservationist and currently a Rajya Sabha member,this task force submitted its report in August 1972. Soemerged the blueprint for India’s tiger conservationprogramme: Project Tiger, as it came to be known.1

Initially, Project Tiger was conceived for sixyears — April 1973 to March 1979. Its objective was“to ensure the maintenance of a viable population ofthe tiger in India and to preserve, for all times, suchareas as part of our national heritage for the benefit,education and enjoyment of future generations”.After due deliberation, the task force decided tobegin with eight viable reserves representingdifferent ecosystems where the tiger could beprotected in perpetuity. These were:

1. Manas, Assam: eastern Himalayan foothills, withsemi-evergreen to evergreen forests and heavyrainfall;

2. Palamau, Bihar (now in Jharkhand): easternpeninsular region, with sal and bamboo forests;

3. Simlipal, Orissa: Mahanadi basin, with moistmiscellaneous forests;

4. Corbett, Uttar Pradesh (now in Uttaranchal):central foothills of the Himalaya, with sal as thepredominant species;

5. Ranthambhore, Rajasthan: Junction of Aravalliand Vindhya, with dry deciduous open forests;

6. Kanha, Madhya Pradesh: central peninsularIndia, with sal and miscellaneous forests;

7. Melghat, Maharashtra: southern offshoot ofSatpura, with deciduous forests dominated byteak and bamboo; and

8. Bandipur, Karnataka: miscellaneous forests ofthe Western Ghats.

The mangove forest of Sundarban was added whenthe project was formally launched and these becamethe first nine tiger reserves in the country. Theforeign advisors from the World Conservation Unionsuggested to the task force that “the best method ofprotection of the tiger is to have large areas of at least2,000 square kilometres (sq km), with similarcontiguous areas so that a viable population of about300 tigers in each such area can be maintained”.Interestingly, the advisors also said that the “idea ofcontinuous blocks of 2,000 sq km is to rotate suchunits by opening one of the units for periodiccontrolled shooting”.

The task force, however, demonstrated politicalrealism in creating reserves with an average size of1,500 sq km, and embedding them within alreadyprotected reserve forests; the premise was theseforests would provide enough space for tigers toroam. The management plan the task force suggestedwas that each reserve would have a ‘core’ for tigers tobreed and live undisturbed in, and a ‘buffer zone’where limited human activity would be allowed.

In the ‘core’ — a sanctum sanctorum of at least300 sq km — no felling, grazing or movement ofhumans, except for matters related to reservemanagement, would be permitted. Said the task forcein this respect: “…forms of human disturbance, suchas commercial felling, collection of minor forestproduce, mining, excessive traffic, heavy grazing bydomestic livestock are clearly detrimental and mustbe phased out for complete elimination.”

Also, the task force was conscious thatmaintaining a genetically viable population of tigerswould require larger areas than the reserves and theircontiguous forests provided. The members stronglyruled against any operation to hold tiger populationsat artificially high levels by using methods likehabitat modification or artificial breeding. Theybelieved, instead, that the reserves would provide abreeding nucleus from which surplus animals coulddisperse into surrounding habitats.

The 1972 report was remarkable. It presented anexhaustive blueprint: management systems, theadministrative framework and legal provisions. It setout measures to counter poaching and to makeenforcement more effective. It listed equipmentrequired to manage reserves effectively. In so doing,it inaugurated a clear-sighted beginning for India’stiger conservation programme.

1.1 Conserving the tiger

2 The assessment


Phase two: 1980-1990By early 1980s, there were 15 tiger reserves in thecountry, in an area of 24,712 sq km. Periyar in Keralaand Sariska in Rajasthan were added in 1978, and in1982, four more — Buxa in West Bengal, Indravati inthe then Madhya Pradesh, Namdapha in ArunachalPradesh and Nagarjunasagar-Srisailam in AndhraPradesh — became part of the Project Tiger fold.

In the early 1980s, the then prime minister wrote

to all state chief ministers emphasising on the needto follow the detailed guidelines issued by thecabinet secretariat (department of personnel) and theministry of agriculture.

In 1983, a task force chaired by MadhavraoScindia, a prominent politician, submitted its report,which if it had been implemented would havesecured India’s conservation future. Called the TaskForce on Public Support for Wildlife Conservation, it

The assessment 3


Source: http://projecttiger.nic.in as viewed on June 5, 2005

TIGER RESERVES OF INDIA

Tiger reserve

Number of tiger reserves: 28Total area of tiger reserves: 37,761 sq km(5 per cent of forest area)

CORBETT(1973)

DUDHWA(1987)SARISKA

(1978)

RANTHAMBHORE(1973)

VALMIKI(1989)

BUXA(1982)

MANAS(1973)

PAKKE-NAMERI(1999)

NAMDAPHA(1982)

DAMPA(1994)

PANNA(1994)

BANDHAVGARH(1993)

PALAMAU(1973)

SIMLIPAL(1973)

SUNDARBAN(1973)BORI-SATPURA

(1999)PENCH(1992)

PENCH (1992)

TADOBA-ANDHARI(1993)

INDRAVATI(1982)

NAGARJUNASAGAR-SRISAILAM(1982)

BHADRA(1998)

BANDIPUR(1973)

PERIYAR(1978)

KALAKAD-MUNDANTHURAI(1988)

MELGHAT(1973)

KANHA (1973)

was set up by the Indian Board for Wildlife (now theNational Board for Wildlife) to recommend ways andmeans of eliciting public support for conservation.The concern was clear: conservation efforts wereincreasing, but policy makers realised there was a“growing degree of apathy and indeed, antipathy,towards wildlife among different classes andsections of the public”, as the report put it in itsintroduction.2

This task force focussed on the issue of thedependence of rural people on forests, and whatconservation-led policing did to this relationship. Itsaid: “Most communities in the neighbourhood ofreserves sustain themselves by eroding marginal landand depleting forest pastures. In their precariousexistence, enforcement of restrictions in wildlifereserves triggers antagonism. That discipline isessential to revive essential life support systems thatthese areas provide is not appreciated for the samereason.” At the same time, the task force also believedcooperation could be possible if the demands ofprotection were backed by reasonable alternatives.

The report of this task force, conceived as it wasby a farsighted politician (the member secretary ofthis task force, incidentally, was H S Panwar, also amember of the Tiger Task Force), went on to dosomething unusual in the area of conservation.Instead of blaming people and demanding moreprotection for reserves — a standard demand — thetask force negotiated for better developmentprogrammes and funds for villages located in theperiphery (fringe) of conservation zones. For thispurpose, it recommended the Special Areas forEcodevelopment programme, with higher per capitainputs on development based upon a conservationbias. It also recommended other measures, includingemployment benefits from reserves for local people.

Failure to undertake such measures, said thereport, would mean the success of management intiger reserves — the report called them “islands ofconservation” — would be short-lived, irrespectiveof how scientifically it was conceived: “If the landsurrounding such effort — sustained islands —continues to deteriorate in productivity affecting theavailability of resources for the communities, theseislands are bound to succumb one day to thecommunity’s demands.” It also warned these‘islands’ would be inadequate to meet ecologicalimperatives, not being able to function as vibrantgenetic pools.

The words of this task force were prophetic.Unfortunately, its recommendations were tardilyimplemented. An ecodevelopment programme,funded later by the World Bank, was initiated in themid-1990s. But it was not conceptualised as adevelopment initiative, but simply as a programmeaimed at putting aside money to wean away villagers

from using the resources of the protected areas. It didnot invest enough to meet the challenges whichconservation in India faced at that time.

It is important to note here that Madhav Gadgil,another member of the Tiger Task Force, madesimilar recommendations in a project report on theNilgiri biosphere reserve (which includes theBandipur tiger reserve) submitted to the Governmentof India in 1981. Gadgil’s report suggested thesespecial areas could serve as laboratories ofconservation-friendly development, with zones ofcooperation around conservation areas andmechanisms for coordination among developmentprogrammes and protected area programmes.

Phase three: 1990-2000The turning point in India’s tiger conservationprogramme came in the 1990s. Problems erupted andwere ‘managed’, not solved. This was also a period,like the early 1970s, when international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were active inpushing policy in the country.

By now India had 19 tiger reserves,encompassing 29,716 sq km, with a population of1,327 tigers (1989 tiger census). But as a criticalreview of Project Tiger, carried out in 1993 by theUnion ministry of environment and forests (MoEF),acknowledged: “All in all, Project Tiger faces a newset of problems. Project Tiger saved the tiger fromextinction in the nick of time but over 20 years it isclear that expanding human populations, a new wayof life based on alien models and the resultant effecton natural resources has created fresh problems thatindicate danger for the tiger. Militancy and poachingonly add fuel to the fire. This is a serious and criticalmoment in the history of tiger conservation.”3

In 1994, a Parliamentary Committee on Science,Technology, Environment and Forests recommendedan evaluation of the programme to make it moremeaningful and result-oriented. The committee feltthis was necessary because the “objectives of ProjectTiger have not been achieved in as much the tigerpopulation in the country has registered a decline,poaching still continues in menacing proportions andthe habitat of the tigers seems to have shrunk in area”.4

Following this committee’s recommendations,another high-powered committee headed by J JDutta, former principal chief conservator of forests inMadhya Pradesh, was constituted. The Duttacommittee submitted its report in early 1996. Itexamined issues of management as well as theinterface with local people in reserves. Here was areport that, for the first time, discussed what neededto be done in terms of the legal status of what it called“enclaved villages” — human habitations withinnational parks. Interestingly, it argued that while theremoval of villages from tiger reserves was an ideal

4 The assessment


circumstance, it was not a management imperative.In fact, conservation demanded that efforts must gobeyond this issue to identify link corridors andmanagement of forests outside the reserves. It alsoscrutinised issues of personnel as well asadministrative and other facilities.5

This was also the time when WWF-India released its action plan to save the tiger, enumeratedin The Tiger Call and Tiger Conservation Strategy and Action Plan. The plan focussed on theneed to involve local communities as well asmeasures to improve the anti-poaching enforcementnetwork.6,7

But in the meantime, all hell broke loose: two UK-based organisations, the Tiger Trust and theEnvironmental Investigation Agency (EIA) releasedThe Big Cat Cover Up8 and The State of the Tiger9,reports suggesting everything was wrong with theIndian programme for tiger conservation. Theyaccused Indian conservation institutions of playinginto the hands of poachers, and lambasted them forrefusing to accept the need for more armedintervention to save the tiger.

The release of these reports was followed by aninternational media campaign on the imminent

extinction of the tiger; one newspaper opined that“corruption, complacency and the complicity ofsome communities whose livestock is threatened bythe big cat, has produced a second crisis made morecomplex by money it generates”.10 The two UK-basedinstitutions demanded radical changes in wildlifeprotection and management in India — stricterenforcement, increased patrolling and sustainedanti-poaching drives. While the Tiger Trustrecommended the creation of rapid response teamsand combat and hunter patrols, EIA wanted morepolitical will. Significantly, neither had anythinggoing for local communities. Some Indianenvironmentalists argued “if concerned people arenot involved at this crisis point, the same flawed —Western conservation — paradigm would continueto be practised in the county”. This approach, theysaid, was eco-fascist.11 Such efforts have continuedto this day (see box: Agendas to push).

In the mid-1990s, those who believed in adifferent paradigm were in a minority. The largereffort turned to damage control. Many critic-conservationists were taken on board as the tigerconservation programme confidently strode towardsits silver anniversary celebrations. The confidence

The assessment 5


Agendas to push

On July 12, 2005, on the eve of the prime minister’s US

visit, the Union ministry of environment and forests(MoEF) received a draft press statement issued by the US

department of state. The press release contained a jointagreement to be signed between president George Bushand prime minister Manmohan Singh. The ministry ofexternal affairs needed the comments of the MoEF beforethe statement could be released. The statement wassimple. It said that the “countries would take aggressivenew steps to address the sharp decline in the IndianBengal tiger population.” The US department of statesaid it would “give in 2005 approximately US $4,68,000(Rs 2 crore) through the private ‘Save the Tiger Fund’and the ‘Rhinoceros and Tiger Conservation Fund’. Jointcooperation would also be established for a long-termmonitoring programme.

The MoEF replied there was no need for a bilateralagreement at this stage. It stressed that India needed toevaluate its tiger conservation programme in terms of thechallenge of coexistence with local communities. It alsohad already put into place a tiger estimation programme,which was being evaluated by the Tiger Task Force. Itbelieved it could set its own agenda. It would determineits science for tiger counting.

But a joint advertisement by the US government’sfish and wildlife service and the Save the Tiger Fund, funded by oil giant Exxon Mobil, was publishedwhen the prime minister was in Washington.

was a veneer: there exists little evidence in reports,deliberations or minutes of the Project Tiger steeringcommittee that much was done to stem the tideagainst the danger the tiger was in. Core issues, suchas those concerning people living inside and on thefringes of the reserves, were given short shift. Therewas also little institutional reform.

In November 1998, the government andconservationists celebrated the 25th anniversary ofProject Tiger. In 1999, the Millennium TigerConference was organised, which only repeated theagenda of the last conference.12 A review of thereports shows that criticism against Project Tiger had— strangely enough — ebbed. Conservationistspraised the programme, saying it had stabilised tigernumbers in the last 30 years.13 In 2001, the Unionministry of environment and forests published itsStatus Report on Project Tiger, but this providedlittle analysis of the real situation.14 A decade hadbeen lost.

Project Tiger today

By 2005, India has 90 national parks and 501 wildlifesanctuaries covering an area of 1,56,934 sq km(roughly 22 per cent of the forest area and 5 per centof the land area of the country).

Of these, 28 have been declared tiger reserves,spread over 37,761 sq km in 17 states. These reservesconstitute roughly 5.6 per cent of the recorded forestarea and over 1 per cent of the country’s geographicalarea. The total tiger population recorded in the 2001-2002 ‘census’ is 3,642, but over half of thesetigers live outside tiger reserves (see table: Tigerpopulation over the years).

Project Tiger fundsSince its inception in 1973 till 2002-2003 (a period of30 years), the Central government has providedRs 172.65 crore as financial assistance to the parks. Ifthe contribution of states till March 2004 is added,the country has spent Rs 373 crore on protecting1,500-odd tigers in 28 reserves.

In the 10th Five Year Plan (2002-07), the outlayfor the programme has been doubled — from Rs 75crore (Rs 15 crore annually) in the previous Plan toRs 150 crore (Rs 30 crore annually). This includesprovisions for ecodevelopment and beneficiary-oriented tribal development schemes, meant torelocate tribals from within tiger reserves.

Over time, the funding mechanism for theprogramme has changed. Till 1979-1980, ProjectTiger was completely funded by the Centre. Then inthe 6th Five Year Plan (1980-85), Central funding forrecurring items was reduced to 50 per cent; now,states had to contribute a matching grant for thesame. This arrangement persists till today: statesspend 50 per cent on recurring salaries andestablishment costs, while Central assistance is usedfor non-recurring costs related to the maintenanceand protection of tiger reserves. The Centralgovernment also pays the entire cost of relocation ofvillagers from tiger reserves, research projects andecodevelopment projects.

In 1991-1992, the ecodevelopment scheme wasintroduced to carry out development activities invillages adjoining tiger reserves. In the 9th Five YearPlan (1997-2002), the scheme had an outlay of Rs 54crore. In the 10th Plan, it was merged with the ongoingumbrella schemes of Project Tiger and thedevelopment of national parks and sanctuaries. Inother words, within the Rs 30 crore sanctioned for 28tiger reserves, there exists a meagre Rs 4-5 crore everyyear for development activities in the thousands ofvillages surrounding the reserves. In contrast, between1996 and 2004, under the India EcodevelopmentProject of the World Bank, Rs 200 crore was spent inseven reserves (roughly, Rs 30 crore per reserve).

A particular problemA particular problem that has dogged Project Tiger,and today bedevils it, is the manner in which the

6 The assessment


1972 1979 1984 1989 1993 1995 1997 2001-02

In tiger reserves 268 711 1,121 1,327 1,366 1,333 1,498 1,576

Outside reserves 1,559 2,304 2,884 3,007 2,384 2,010 2,066

Total 1,827 3,015 4,005 4,334 3,750 3,508 3,642

TIGER POPULATION OVER THE YEARS

Source: Project Tiger directorate

Number of national parks: 90Total area of national parks: 36,882 sq km

(5 per cent of forest area)

Number of sanctuaries: 501Total area of sanctuaries: 120,052 sq km

(17 per cent of forest area)

Total protected area: 156,934 sq km (22 per cent of forest area)


relocation of persons living in and around tigerreserves — in core and buffer areas — has beentackled. The relocation strategy, as it exists today,works as follows: the Central government providesfinancial assistance for relocation, and the stategovernment is expected to identify land forrelocation. If the latter fails to do so, it looks fordegraded forest lands where it can resettle families. Itthen applies to the Centre for prior approval underthe Forest Conservation Act, 1980, for diversion ofthis land for relocation, an activity classified as anon-forestry purpose.

But even after permission is given and thefamilies are resettled, the categorisation of the land is unchanged: it remains forest land. However, most standing trees are cut down before the land is handed over, thus reinforcing thetragic notion that livelihoods of people areincompatible with standing trees. The reason behindthis strange status quo lies in the Union ministry ofenvironment and forests guidelines according towhich, under the minimum conditions that applywhen forest land is diverted for non-forestrypurposes (such as relocation) under the ForestConservation Act, 1980, the legal status of the forest

land will remain unchanged. In other words, the amount of forest land ‘officially’ on record will remain the same, even though the actual landmay now be drowned under the water of a damreservoir, or has been used to build a power station.In such cases, social problems are inevitable:because this land remains categorised as forest land,rules apply to it that are highly restrictive andexploitative, and families that move to such landsinevitably suffer.

How relocation actually worksRelocation of villages from reserves is routed throughthe beneficiary-oriented tribal development scheme(see table: Funds disbursed and families relocatedunder the beneficiary-oriented tribal developmentscheme in the 9th five year plan). During the 9th Plan,the scheme’s approved outlay was Rs 19 crore, ofwhich, between 1997-1998 to 2001-2002, a total of Rs14.39 crore was spent to relocate 2,157 families fromdifferent protected areas — approximately Rs 67,000per family. It is important to note that this scheme isnot restricted to tiger reserves, and continues in the10th Plan as a merged component of the ongoingCentrally-sponsored schemes of Project Tiger as well

The assessment 7


State National park/ Funds disbursed Families Remarkssanctuary since 9th Plan relocated

(Rs/lakh)

Madhya Pradesh Kanha 3.80 25 25 tribal families have been voluntarily rehabilitatedoutside the national park to make it inviolate

Kuno Palpur 1,042.28 1,400 19 villages were voluntarily rehabilitated outside the sanctuary to make the area inviolate for future programme of relocation of Asiatic lions

Madhav 50.00 102 One village has been voluntarily relocated outside the national park to make the area inviolate

Karnataka Bandipur 14.65 100 One village was relocated from Bandipur tiger reserve during 1992-93 but land was not allotted to it. Land has been allotted now and land development works have been undertaken

Nagarhole 243.50 250 250 tribal families voluntarily rehabilitated outside the national park to make the area inviolate

Maharashtra Melghat 46.00 92 3 villages voluntarily rehabilitated outside the tigerreserve to make the area disturbance free

Orissa Chandaka 40.00 188 188 tribal families voluntarily relocated outside Dampara the sanctuary to make the area free of any

disturbance

Total 1,440.23 2,157

FUNDS DISBURSED AND FAMILIES RELOCATED UNDER THE BENEFICIARY-ORIENTED TRIBAL DEVELOPMENT SCHEMEIN THE 9TH FIVE YEAR PLAN (NOT ONLY TIGER RESERVES)


development of national parks and sanctuaries.Thus, we find that the main relocation activity overthis period involved villages in the proposed lionsanctuary at Kuno Palpur in Madhya Pradesh. Thecost of this relocation did not take into account thecost of land — invariably forest land — used forresettlement.

In the 10th Plan, within the umbrella schemethere is a provision of Rs 10-15 crore towardsrelocation — roughly Rs 2 crore a year. Thegovernment has a budget to provide up to Rs1,00,000 to every family for its relocation needs (seetable: Relocation costs — what is spent by thegovernment on each household). With an annualprovision of Rs 2 crore, no more than 200 familiescan be relocated in a year.

Project Tiger: a review

The question is: is Sariska representative of whatmight be happening in other tiger reserves?

The Task Force has carefully scrutinised theworking of the programme, assessing as well thethreats it faces and the effectiveness of protectionefforts. For its review, it visited a few key reserves; itmet all field directors and chief wildlife wardens oftiger habitat states; it consulted a wide range ofwildlife specialists and reviewed documentsavailable with the directorate and other agencies. Itsassessment based on the above is clear: Sariska isnot representative of what is happening in everytiger reserve. But at the same time, a lot more needsto be done to strengthen internal systems ofmanagement to ensure that a Sariska-type situationdoes not recur.

Internal management and supervisionThe success of any project and its implementationlies in the internal systems that provide for effectiveand efficient operations. It is clear that the originalarchitects of Project Tiger had conceived a detailedframework for its management and functioning. As early as 1973, guidelines were issued to states providing operational directions for acomprehensive system of reporting, monitoring andreview. The key elements of this system were:15

i. All tiger reserves were required to preparemanagement plans covering a period of six years,to be implemented through annual plans. Aformat for annual plans was prepared and sent toall states and it was agreed states wouldimplement plans after these were finalised inconsultation with the Central government.

ii. Annual funds would be released only after theCentre received an annual report on work done bystate governments. This report was to be receivedby the third quarter of every financial year.

iii. State governments had to “carefully select thepersonnel”. The field director and other gazettedofficers (deputy director) were to be appointedonly with the Centre’s approval, with aminimum tenure of three years. The pre-termtransfer of key officials could only be done afterthe Centre’s approval. The Central governmentwas also required to facilitate capacity buildingand training of staff the states recruited.

iv. The states were given prescribed formats formonthly and half-yearly reports to monitorprogress. The second half-yearly report wasrequired to be “comprehensive and analytical sothat the Government of India can judge whetherthe project is proceeding in the right direction”.It was emphasised that reports should besubmitted regularly and the release of funds wasmade conditional to the submission of theannual report.

v. All reports received from states, from members ofthe steering committee and from officials were tobe carefully scrutinised by the Centralgovernment to assess the performance ofindividual state governments. It was made clearthat “on the basis of such assessment theGovernment of India may, if necessary, divertfunds and equipment from one state to another”.

The project’s conceptualisers were deeply consciousof the fact that success would “ultimately dependupon the help and cooperation of state governmentsand upon the interest they take in it”. This was thecore of the management challenge.

At its nascent stage, there was a high degree ofpolitical commitment to the project. In early 1981,after the 14th meeting of the Indian Board for Wildlife

8 The assessment


Cost (in Rs)

Land development (2 hectares) 36,000

Building materials per family 36,000

Transport of household goods per family 1,000

Community facilities computed per family 9,000

Wood lot and fuel reserves per family 8,000

Pasture and fodder plantation per family 8,000

Cash incentives for shifting 1,000

Miscellaneous activities 1,000

Total 1,00,000

RELOCATION COSTS — WHAT IS SPENT BY THEGOVERNMENT ON EACH HOUSEHOLD

Note: 20 per cent variation in each item subject to the total ceiling cost maybe approved when demanded, site specific requirementsSource: Project Tiger directorate

(now the National Board for Wildlife), it was foundthat despite specific instructions and guidelinesissued by the Central government, a number of stateshad not acted; only 13 had set up wildlife wings. Allstates were, therefore, directed to ensure that separatewildlife wings be set up immediately and that“suitable personnel with aptitude for wildlife workare actually manning those wings”. Detailedguidelines were issued for the formation of thewildlife wings; these remain extremely relevant tilldate (see box: The guidelines of 1974: relevant today).

Then unfortunately, beginning late 1980s, theinternal management of the project began to declinesteadily. Guidelines issued by the Centralgovernment under the specific instructions of the then prime minister Indira Gandhi wereconveniently forgotten and, as a result, went intodisuse. In fact, the Tiger Task Force would like to puton record the extreme frustration it encountered tolocate these crucial guidelines.

By the late 1990s, the only project guidelines thatremained in operation, and that states had to follow,involved the submission of the following:

1. Monthly summary of important events/happenings in the tiger reserve — a narrativereport;

2. Monthly report on deaths of all wildlife in thetiger reserve;

3. Reports on poaching incidences and unnaturaldeaths of tigers and leopards (as and whenrequired);

4. An annual report from the tiger reserve (the 1973format now discontinued); and

5. Annual utilisation certificate and expenditurestatement.

The guidelines for the all India tiger census wereissued periodically; these continued to stress on theuse of the pugmark method. In the late 1990s, a briefnote was sent to states outlining the limitations ofpugmarks. But nothing much was done at this stageto review and revamp the science of tiger estimation.

What also deteriorated in the 1990s wascoordination and internal supervision, critical forany effective programme. It must be noted that suchdecline began to occur in a period when the role andautonomy of state governments grew. The effectiveoutcome was that, as reserve managements becameless accountable to the Centre, monitoring in tigerreserves went from bad to worse. The Project Tigerdirectorate, weak as it was in this period, became byall accounts an institution that merely disbursedfunds and had little control over implementation.Many states stopped submitting monitoring reports;some did not find it necessary to get Centralgovernment approval in appointing key officials. Theminutes of Project Tiger steering committee meetings

The assessment 9


The guidelines of 1974: relevant today

“In her DO letter No 694-PM/73 dated December 27,1973 addressed to the chief ministers of all statesand Union territories on the foregoing subject, theprime minister had, among other things,emphasised the need for specialised managementof our national park and sanctuaries, optimumutilisation of wildlife staff with experience andexpertise and recruitment of additional staff toeffectively enforce the provisions of the Wildlife(Protection) Act, 1972. The following importantorganisational arrangements were accordinglyapproved by the prime minister and circulated tothe chief secretaries of all states and Unionterritories for implementation, under thisministry’s letter No _J 11013/5/74-FRY/WLF datedDecember 23, 1974:

a) At the state level, a beginning was required tobe made without delay to established a separatewildlife wing under the overall charge of thechief conservator of forests. This wing wasrequired to be headed by an officer of the rankof conservator of forests in other states. Officers

who were already trained in wildlifemanagement work were required to beidentified and posted immediately to this wing.

b) Such identified officers posted in the wildlifewing at various levels were not expected to betransferred to the forestry wing unless equallytrained officers were available to replace them.When an officer became ripe for promotion inthe forestry wing and a suitable officer was notavailable to replace him, the post held by himin the wildlife wing was required, as far aspossible, to be upgraded so that his services,expertise and experience continued to beavailable to the wildlife wing.

c) In order to maintain performance standards, allpersons directly or indirectly concerned withwildlife management were required to beregularly assessed in their annual reports fortheir performance in wildlife conservationwork.”

This is an extract of a letter by N D Jayal, jointsecretary (F&WL), ministry of agriculture andirrigation, dated September 16, 1976 to all stateforest secretaries.

for this period reveal this breakdown. Lately, there has been an attempt to revamp the

internal management systems. As the Project Tigerdirectorate explained to the Tiger Task Force, thefollowing measures have been taken over the pastthree years:

1. The formats for monthly, half-yearly and annualreports have been reissued and revived;

2. Directives have been issued to states for regularreports on: a. mortality survey;b. protection initiatives/patrolling and anti-

poaching;c. physical assault on staff; andd. disease surveillance and livestock

immunisation.3. States have been directed to conduct

independent monitoring and evaluation of tigerreserves;

4. Guidelines have been issued for the managementof buffer areas, which have emphasised thatcommunities living in these areas should beinvolved in the management of the reserves withreciprocal commitments;

5. Guidelines have been sent to states for theregulation of tourist visitation in tiger reserves aswell as to calculate the carrying capacity ofreserves;

6. Preparation of habitat occupancy maps of tigers,in and outside reserves, has been initiated;

7. In 2002, the directorate also reviewed the censusmethodology being followed in the country andbegan a project to revamp the estimationprocedure;

8. A project was undertaken to assess the status ofthe tiger and its habitat, involving the ForestSurvey of India and the Wildlife Institute ofIndia;

9. In 2003-2004, the directorate identified expertsand commissioned an independent audit ofreserves, based on identified criteria andindicators. This report is being finalised;

10. The Forest Survey of India was commissioned toundertake a comparative assessment of the forestcover in and around tiger reserves. Its report hasassessed the change in status between 1997 and2002. The last time such a study wascommissioned was in the early 1990s and,therefore, this assessment is important to trackchanges as may have happened;

11. As a pilot initiative, five tiger reserves have beennetworked electronically to develop a prototypefor a dynamic management information system.The directorate now plans to work on this modelto build a country-wide system for reporting.

12. Investments made in tiger reserves since project

inception have been compiled on a customisedsoftware and the data is being used for analysis.This data was collected from each tiger reserveand presents, for the first time, an assessment ofwhat has been spent in which activity by reservemanagements;

13. The tiger poaching data for the entire country hasbeen compiled and collated;

14. The Botanical Survey of India and the ZoologicalSurvey of India have been commissioned toundertake flora and fauna surveys;

15. In 2005, states were directed to send to theProject Tiger directorate monthly evidences — ofsightings, pugmarks and scats.

But in spite of these improvements made tostreamline project functioning, the catastrophe inSariska happened. The fact is that the core problemof Centre-state relations, which impinges on theproject, remains unresolved. It is, therefore,imperative to work out models of management thatcan work in this age.

Threats: the war withinIn the late 1980s, the Indian Institute of PublicAdministration conducted a questionnaire-basedsurvey in the protected area network of India. Itdiscovered that 60-70 per cent of the managers whoresponded to its survey had filed cases againstpeople for illegal grazing or hunting, setting reserveson fire and other similar offences. The managers alsoreported physical confrontation with localcommunities.16

By then it was clear that conflict — betweenprotectors of the parks and people who lived in andaround them — was growing, fast becoming the keythreat to conservation. It was because of thisperceived threat that the government initiated theecodevelopment programme in the early 1990s, toprovide alternative livelihood options and sources offirewood to people in the vicinity of wildlifereserves. This programme peaked in the late 1990swhen World Bank assistance was made available aswell. But on the whole, its success has been limited— partly because the investment in the programmewas too little, too late as compared to the extent ofthe problem. In the meantime, the followingcontinued to happen:● Authorities continued to operate on the premise

that local people are the ‘enemy number one’ ofconservation efforts: a war, therefore, had to befought against them. At best, they were to beplacated by insignificant hand-outs, butinducting them as partners in the conservationeffort was completely out of the question.

● People — an estimated four million — continuedto live within protected areas and many more, on

10 The assessment


their fringes. The rights of these people in the‘enclaved’ villages were never settled, relocationoccurred sporadically and they lived an illegalexistence — trespassers in their own lands.Conservation imperatives ensured their rights tograze animals and to collect firewood and minorforest produce stood exterminated.

● Park authorities, in turn, invested in protectionand enforcement. All this meant increasedclashes between people and park protectors.

● Simultaneously, the poverty of the areas outsidethe parks exacerbated. The parks, in manycases, became isolated islands of protection andresources. The forests outside the reserves weredecimated. These areas, under the territorialwing of the forest department, had littleresources and received no planning impetus.The grazing pressure became acute, withlimited fodder in overgrazed village and forestlands. Also, a lack of investment in irrigationfacilities, ranging from small tanks towatersheds, meant agricultural productivitysuffered. All this has contributed to the generalpoverty and destitution of villagers livingaround parks.

● At the same time, many tiger reserves wereinfiltrated by insurgents and naxalites; manysuch reserves are now completely beyond thereach of forest and protected area managements.The rise in insurgency in these areas is widelyattributed to the growing alienation andmarginalisation of communities living in abjectpoverty in the country’s richest lands. During theNational Development Council meeting in 2005,the chief minister of Karnataka — who called fora change in the forest laws — said that theemerging naxalite problem in the Kudremukhnational park was directly related to thecompulsion to shift age-old tribal enclaves out ofthe forest.

As a result of these factors, conflict has grown andcan be assessed as the biggest threat facing India’stigers and other wild species, indeed the future ofIndia’s conservation programme today. Acompilation of media reports on tiger reservesexposes this vulnerability clearly (see box: Human-animal conflict makes news).

An assessment of threats faced by different tiger reserves, made for the World Bank’s ecodevelopment programme, says that in most reserves, the main pressure is from conflicts with local communities as well as armedinsurgency. In Palamau tiger reserve, for instance,“one of the biggest threats is the presence ofextremists and varied armed gangs who virtually rulethe roost and make it extremely difficult for the forest

department to operate”.17 People’s alienation fuelsthe growing threat of extremism and naxalism inthese areas.

It is clear that this internal threat must becombated. It is also clear that unless we find ways ofmanaging the competing needs of conservation andpeople, India’s conservation programme willnot work.

Project Tiger: an assessment

It is now over 30 years since Project Tiger waslaunched. It is, therefore, an opportune time toevaluate its strengths and weaknesses so that policycan be designed to protect the magnificent tiger. Theassessment of the Tiger Task Force in this regard is asfollows:

1. The programme, when initiated, had the highestpolitical commitment. It was carefully crafted sothat reserves for the tiger could be created andprotected. Its architects also put into place amanagement system to organise the work thatstates had to do, including setting up specialisedwildlife wings, and ensuring protection. But theproblem was that the commitment to the projectwas never made inclusive.

2. Over time, interest waned at the Centre and theinstitutions for management lost direction. Theircontrol over activities in states declined with theloss in their own capacities. Managementsystems and scientific tools did not keep pacewith the challenges to protect a species inincreasingly complex situations.

3. While state forest departments with limitedresources did as much as they could, politicalleaderships in states were not as committed orinvolved in the programme. In political circles,over time, interest gave way to anger against thedifferential treatment meted to tigers vis-a-viswhat were perceived to be more importantdevelopmental objectives such as mining andhydroelectric projects. The contribution of stategovernments was rarely acknowledged.

4. At the same time, local people, who lived in theterritory of the tiger, were left out of the benefitsof the programme. They were made illegalsettlers in their own land and denied even theirbasic needs. These ignored people increasinglyturned against the tiger. Their contribution insharing the ecological space of the tiger wasnever recognised. They continued to lose theirlivestock, crops and lives to wild animals, butwere rarely properly compensated.

5. There was no real interest group supporting thetiger. On the contrary, interests that were againstthe tiger — from illegal mining and building

The assessment 11


dams in tiger habitats to poaching and crime —gained ground.

6. Over this period, tiger conservation has becomemore and more ‘exclusive’. As threats to the tigermultiplied, the response of tiger lovers has beento band together into a select group that wouldcontrol policy and programme formulation.Their attempt has been to centralise decisions, sothat they can get the power and its instruments toprotect the tiger. Everybody else, theyincreasingly believe, is against tigers.

7. Over time, the interests of this small group ofconservationists has also got embroiled in thetiger. The benefits they make from tourism,filming and conservation is not shared with thepeople or the parks. The problem is that this

leads to even greater alienation of all against thetiger, which they believe is being protected forthe sake of a few, against the interests of all.

8. Simultaneously, all that should have been donefor the development of forests and rural areas —increased productivity of grazing land, irrigationfacilities, employment — has remained undone.The line-departments in charge of development,from rural development to tribal affairs, havealso proved inadequate. People remaindependent on forest resources and desperatelypoor. They have no option but to ‘use’ theprotected reserves. These are the remainingbastions of livelihood resources.

9. The end result: the belief that the tiger can only beprotected by building stronger and higher fences

12 The assessment


Human-animal conflict makes news

● In the Nagarjunasagar-Srisailam reserve inAndhra Pradesh, 20 cases of tiger poisoningwere reported, as naxalites incited people tokill tigers.

● In the Namdapha tiger reserve in ArunachalPradesh, Lisu tribals in 1998 attacked forestcamps and injured foresters.

● In Pakke sanctuary, Assam, 18 wild elephantswere reportedly poisoned to death in 2001; in2002, four more were killed. Theadministration had to ban the sale of pesticidesin the district in a bid to stop the killings.

● In Manas, Assam, forest staff till recently wereregularly attacked by militants.

● In the Indravati reserve in Chhattisgarh, noforest guard has reportedly entered the reservesince 2002 because of naxalite control.

● In Palamau tiger reserve, Jharkhand, on onehand there is tension with villagers who areknown to kill elephants and on the other, withnaxalites who rule the area.

● In Bandipur and its neighbourhood inKarnataka, the dreaded sandalwood smugglerand poacher Veerappan operated withimpunity for over a decade, killing largenumbers of tuskers, felling fully grownsandalwood trees and murdering governmentofficials. It was widely recognised that he coulddo this because of the strained relationsbetween officials and the villagers.

● In Bandipur, again, severe drought in 2003forced farmers to drive their cattle into theforests of the reserve. In 2004, there werereports of electric fences and poison being usedby farmers living near the forests to killelephants.

● In the well protected Kanha tiger reserve inMadhya Pradesh, in January 2005, there werereports of 10 wild dogs and one tiger beingfound poisoned by neighbouring villagers.

● In Pench, Maharashtra, three tigers were killedin 2004 by villagers in retaliation for cattledeaths.

● In Melghat, Maharashtra, extensive firesallegedly lit by tribals were reported earlier thisyear.

● In Simlipal, Orissa, it was reported in 2004 thattribals had encroached on forest lands and wereclearing them.

● In Ranthambhore, Rajasthan, tensions overgrazing continue to run high regularly. In July2000, police fired 17 rounds to disperseagitating villagers. In August 2002, villagersassaulted police personnel, who retaliated byopening fire and injuring one person. Thevillagers then invaded the park and laid siege toit with their animals. The siege was lifted aftermonth-long negotiations.

● In the Dudhwa tiger reserve in Uttar Pradesh,tiger poisoning cases have been reportedfrequently till recently.

● In Buxa, West Bengal, a public hearingorganised by the National Forum of ForestPeople and Forest Workers, alleged that avillager had been murdered by a forest rangerand the matter hushed up. The body wasexhumed in April 2005 on the orders of a court.The case has led to unrest in the area.

● In Valmiki reserve in Bihar, five companies ofthe Home Guards camped inside the forest inApril 2005 to hunt down extremists fromacross the border, even as tensions with localcommunities living within the parkcontinued.

against ‘depredators’. In many cases, theprotectors (forest guards and officers) have puttheir lives at stake to save the tiger. In many cases,their efforts have paid off. But as more, powerful,interests converge against the tiger, the purpose ofconservation is getting lost, bit by bit. It is,therefore, essential to seek out new directions inthe future so that the tiger can be protected.

In summary, it is the assessment of this Task Forcethat every tiger reserve in the country is not facing aSariska-type crisis. But the Task Force also believesthat the protection of tigers is happening in Indiaagainst all odds. What we need to understand is that

a Sariska-type crisis haunts every protected area inIndia — where islands of conservation are underattack from poachers, miners and every otherexploitative activity. They are also under siege fromtheir own inhabitants, the people, who live in thesereserves and outside the islands of conservation, andwho have not benefited from these protected areasbut continue to lose livelihood options and face dailyharassment. In these circumstances, if the defencesare down, protection will fail. Like it did in Sariska.The challenge is to ensure that the siege can be liftedso that the tigers can survive.

With this report, the Tiger Task Force hopes it canprovide some answers to this immense challenge.

The assessment 13


In December 2004, the nation was shocked to knowthat tigers may have disappeared from the Sariskatiger reserve in Rajasthan. What had happened there?

By March 2005, the Wildlife Institute of India(WII) confirmed in its interim report (which itfollowed up with detailed habitat monitoring) thatthere were indeed no tigers left in Sariska. The primeminister asked the Central Bureau of Investigation(CBI) to inquire into the disappearance: it reportedthat since July 2002, poachers had been killing tigersin the reserve and that the last six tigers were killedin the summer-monsoon of 2004. The CBI reportpointed to the involvement of local villagers. It alsosuggested the existence of a well-established networkof middlemen trading in tiger parts, with thenotorious Sansar Chand at its centre.1

But questions still remained: why did the systemfail to recognise the signs of the rot in Sariska till itwas too late? What could the country’s remainingtiger reserves learn from this episode?

Sariska: a review

The Sariska tiger reserve is spread over about 881 sqkm, and has three core areas and a buffer zone. Theapproximately 400-sq km ‘Core-I’ is the key tigerhabitat and a proposed national park. But it is alsohome to 11 villages, earmarked for relocation sincelong. Core-I also includes pilgrimage sites and is thetourist zone.

During 1995-2003, all census conducted in thepark estimated its tiger population at 24-25; this wasofficially reduced to 16-18 by the 2004 census. Infact, the number of tigers in the park has always beena matter of dispute. In the late 1980s, the then parkdirector had officially recorded that the tigerpopulation was not as previously estimated — 40-odd — but only 18-22. This had led to a furore; sincethen for over a decade, the park management hadchosen to stick steadfastly to an estimated 24-25tigers.

The Task Force was told informally during itsvisit to Sariska that even the 2004 census hadreportedly counted only 12-14 tigers, but the numberwas modified to 16-18 to avoid controversy. What isnow known is that in May 2004, the then fielddirector had written to Rajasthan’s chief wildlifewarden that his census team had concluded therewere between 16 to 18 tigers; keeping in mind theearlier estimate, this could have led to a controversy.He, therefore, requested permission to conductanother census. This letter was not endorsed to

Project Tiger directorate in Delhi. However, no suchcensus was ever conducted. But in August 2004, thechief wildlife warden wrote to Project Tiger sayingthat recurring bad weather had damaged most of theimpression pads of the pugmarks. He made nomention of the problems of falling numbers or thealarm it had created.

But it is now evident that even this 2004 figuremay be a gross over-estimation. The WildlifeInstitute of India, investigating the tiger’sdisappearance in Sariska, verified the census bychecking the plaster casts of pugmarks: it founderrors in the estimate. According to an analysis theInstitute did in March 2005, the data park authoritiescollected about the number of tiger sightingsreported by tourists and forest staff from 1997 to mid-2004 shows a decline 1999 onwards, but parkauthorities continued to report there were 24-27tigers (see graph: Tiger population and sightings inSariska from January 1997 to July 2004).2

The analysis also says the core of the park, whichthe Wildlife Institute of India has taken to be 274 sqkm, can support only 15 tigers based on the tiger-prey density. The population also has a highlyskewed sex ratio, bad news for breeding: theInstitute’s data shows no cubs were born in the parksince 2002, and interrogation of arrested poachershas confirmed only two out of the 10 poached tigerswere females.

In other words, there has been a steady decline intiger numbers in Sariska over the years, which thecensus was unable to detect; remedial action,therefore, could not be taken. Sariska illustrates thecritical need for an efficient methodology to estimatetiger populations.

The reserve has a staff strength of 305 (with fourvacancies). There has been no new recruitment since1987. The average age of the staff is between 45-50years, which makes on-foot deployment difficult. Butthe reserve has a good network of roads forpatrolling; it has 14 vehicles, wireless facilities andanti-poaching camps located in its remotest corners.3

The reserve has a state highway — the Alwar-Thanaghazi-Jaipur highway — passing through itscore. An alternative road constructed to bypass thereserve remains unused. The traffic into the reserve,especially pilgrims visiting a temple inside the park,has risen sharply over time. In 2003, 140,000pilgrims and 15,000 vehicles visited the temple,increasing to 2,00,000 pilgrims and 23,000 vehiclesin 2004-2005. During the annual festival in 2004-2005, as many as 30,000 pilgrims and 5,000 vehicles

1.2 The Sariska shock

14 The assessment


entered the reserve on a single day. The number oftourists visiting the park has remained between45,000-60,000 per year (with a decline in 2003-2004to 40,000). The earnings from entry fees collected bythe park authorities and deposited with the stategovernment have been between Rs 28-53 lakhper year.4

Human habitationConservationists believe human habitations withinthe core area of the park are leading to degradationand disturbance of tiger habitat. GhazalaShahabuddin of the New Delhi-based Council forSocial Development, who has conducted anextensive field study in Sariska, says that about 40per cent of ‘Core-I’ is severely degraded, to the pointof being incapable of supporting any prey.5

According to park authorities, besides the 11villages in the core, there are 12 villages inside thesanctuary and five more within the reserve — 28 inall within Sariska’s 881 sq km area. In addition, thereare nearly 200 villages in the vicinity of the park,whose residents use the forest for firewood and forgrazing their animals. Sariska officials do not haveany reliable estimate of the number of livestock inthe villages, or the number of livestock that enter thepark from outside.

It is important to note here that Sariska’sofficials, and the state forest department, are largelyresponsible for the problems they encounter indealing with people in and around the reserve:

Firstly, till date, they have not completed what

is a pre-requisite for declaring an area a sanctuary ornational park — the recording and settlement of therights of people who live there. In Sariska thisprocess, begun in 1983, remains incomplete.

Secondly, the 11 villages in the core area aredenied any form of development — roads, schoolsand even wells. Some years ago, park authoritieseven prohibited residents from practisingagriculture. The move, paradoxically, forced peopleto keep more goats, thus damaging the ecosystemfurther.

Thirdly, the rehabilitation of one villageundertaken by the department in the 1970s washandled so ineffectively that many residentsreturned to their original village in the sanctuary.This has led to a crisis of confidence: villagersremember this episode with bitterness. Moreover,villagers of hamlets such as Sirawas and Bandipulhave been relocated to spaces that lack basicfacilities.

Fourthly, the department has been ‘working’ onrelocation plans without involving local people atall, thus adding to mistrust. Shahabuddin, who hascompleted a detailed household survey of the 11villages in Core-I, finds authorities have dealt withrelocation in an extremely slipshod and negligentmanner, without taking the local people intoconfidence. In the late 1980s, under a relocationplan, people were shown land situated near a waterbody. But then it was noted that this land was, infact, sanctuary land. So the plan was shelved andrelations between people and the Sariska

The assessment 15


Tiger sighting by staff

Source: WII 2005, Assessment of status of tiger in Sariska tiger reserve, Rajasthan, Wildlife Institute of India, Dehradun

1997 1998 1999 2000

Years

7

24 24

17

65

3

01 0

26 26 2627

26

17

2001 2002 2003 2004

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

Tige

r nu

mbe

rs o

r si

ghtin

g

Tiger population as per official census

TIGER POPULATION AND SIGHTINGS IN SARISKA FROM JANUARY 1997 TO JULY 2004

management soured irreversibly. Researchers working in the park say that as a

result of all this, there is a deep hatred for the tigeramong local people, and mainly among thepastoralist gujjars. The gujjars blame the sanctuaryfor everything — their lack of livelihood, inadequatedevelopment infrastructure in their villages and,most of all, the persistent harassment. This isextremely unfortunate, as these people are forest-based buffalo-rearers who have traditionallycoexisted with animals.

In her recommendations to the Tiger Task Force,Shahabuddin presents the following action points:a. Complete the recording and settlement of rights

of villages inside the sanctuary, particularly in‘Core-I’;

b. Relocate the few villages necessary forconservation, but with the involvement of and inconsultation with villagers and NGOs working inthe area;

c. Provide identity cards to all villagers livingwithin the core zone to prevent unauthorisedentry;

d. Invest in ecodevelopment programmes to reducethe pressure on habitats and firewoodplantations and ensure payment ofcompensation for injury and livestock losses topeople urgently;

e. Share the benefits of tourism with villagers in thepark periphery, in exchange for agreements togive up goat breeding and limiting buffalonumbers; and

f. Use the entry fees to the reserve to compensatevillagers for loss of cattle to carnivores and toprovide subsidised fodder for their cattle.

Mining interestsMining began in the area in the 1960s; by 1991, therewere over 400 units located mainly within andaround the southern boundary of the reserve. In May1991, Tarun Bharat Sangh (TBS), a well-known NGO,filed a public interest litigation (PIL) in the SupremeCourt against this mining, which was steadilydestroying tiger habitat. The Court ruled against themines and directed the state government to stopissuing licenses. The Justice M L Jain committee wasset up to prepare a list of the mines within theprotected area, and in November 1991 the Courtreiterated its earlier order of closure.

But tensions continued. Rajendra Singh of TBS

was attacked by miners during his visit to the sitewith experts. This led to another PIL, as a result ofwhich a miner was fined and briefly imprisoned. In1992, the Union ministry of environment and forests,responding to the Court directive, issued anotification restricting certain environmentallydamaging activities in specified areas of the Aravalli

range. The area of the tiger reserve was included inthe restricted zone. Matters came to a head in 1993when a senior Supreme Court advocate was attackedby miners. The Court responded with a definitiveruling on April 8, 1993, against mining in andaround the reserve.

In all this, a few things still remain unknown: didthe closure of the mines fuel the anger of localpeople, now further denied employmentopportunities? What role did the powerful miningcommunity play in poaching of tigers?

Sariska: an assessment

The assessment of the Tiger Task Force — based onits field trip to the reserve in July 2005, a detailedreview of reports and discussions with concernedofficials, researchers and villagers — is as follows:

1. It is clear that there was a managementbreakdown in the tiger reserve. During the 1990s, thefield director in charge of the reserve had been inoffice from July 1996. But in September 2003, thestate government upgraded the post of the fielddirector from deputy conservator to conservator andappointed an official as field director. The fielddirector in position found that he was suddenlydowngraded and termed “officer-in-waiting” — aposition he held till February 2004. The new fielddirector continued in this position till September2004. All this was done without any clarity of theroles of the different officials and contributed furtherto management collapse. The deputy director, whotook charge in March 2004, left in June 2004 and hissuccessor was appointed only in September 2004.During the 2004 monsoon period, the assistant fielddirector was in charge of the reserve. Even the fielddirector was on home leave.

This confusion and lack of managerial controlwas combined with a collapse of internal systems,including that of recording of animal sightings andpatrolling. There was no supervision of forest guardsto do protection work. Internal roads necessary forsurveillance were not repaired; even the worn-outtyres on the anti-poaching jeep had not beenreplaced. The Project Tiger directorate is on record tothe state government regarding these lapses. TheTiger Task Force, too, noted with distress that eventoday, in spite of the tragedy in the park, Sariska’sofficials were not maintaining records as requiredunder Project Tiger guidelines.

2. It is also clear that the tragedy per se is not onlyabout the lack of resources or staff. In fact, anassessment of financial resources and personnelreveals that Sariska ranks above the national averageso far as availability of funds, staff and equipment is

16 The assessment


concerned. Therefore, it cannot be argued that morefunds are required to solve the problems of thisreserve. Rs 22 crore has been spent on the reservesince its creation in 1978. Assuming there were 22tigers in the reserve (now known to be a grossoverestimation), the reserve has spent Rs 1 crore pertiger over this period. On an average, the countryspent Rs 23.70 lakh per tiger in this 30-year period(2001-02 census estimates). Compared to that,Sariska has spent four times more — but even thishas turned out to be completely inadequate inprotecting the tigers! Also, the funds available toSariska compared to its area are more than doublethe average for all reserves in the country (see table:Comparison of money spent area-wise in Sariska tothe country’s average).

3. The evidence also points to the role of‘commercial’ poaching in the area. Investigations bypark authorities reveal that the first case, involvingbig players like Sansar Chand, occurred in 2001when two leopards were killed. Unfortunately,because of the collapse of the park’s management thecase was not investigated fully. The entry of Chandchanged the economics of poaching in Sariska:poachers used to insignificant returns now hadaccess to large amounts of money, paid up front.Interrogation of poachers has revealed that since2002, when three tigers were killed, poaching hasincreased. In 2003, another three were poached andthe last four fell in 2004.

4. Increase in poaching has combined withextremely faulty and negligent conduct of tigercensus in the reserve. To add to the chaos, the dailycamp register (which records the sightings of animalsby staff and which helps verify the census) has notbeen maintained properly. As a result, the earlywarning system in the reserve failed. Till 2004, thepark’s managers believed there were above 20 tigers,which they reduced to 16-18 in 2004. But what isnow emerging is that there may have been even fewertigers — six-10 — left in the reserve. Theseeventually fell prey to poachers.5. The breakdown in the park’s defences has beenaided by the extreme hostility existing among local

people against the park and its tigers. In thesecircumstances, it is not difficult to understand whythe tigers went missing: they were there for thepoachers to take. In its investigations, the CentralBureau of Investigation found that many villagersassisted poachers in killing the tigers and skinningand removing the carcasses.

Reports by local NGOs say villagers saw metaltraps, used by poachers, on the main tiger trails.There were instances when guards confrontedpoachers in the park, but were helpless as they werethreatened at gunpoint. Even with working wirelesssets, they could do little. Moreover, their relationswith local people were so strained that they couldnot get any help from the villages.6

Many researchers have recorded the specialrelationship traditionally existing in Sariska betweenthe gujjars, the tiger and nature. But officialinterference and constant intimidation has led tosuch a breakdown that, today, it is widely suspectedvillagers hired the services of traditional huntingcommunities to ‘protect’ themselves and theirlivestock from the tiger. It is important to note herethat the government has no provision for awardingcompensation for livestock killed by animals inside aprotected area.

Over the years, the park management has donelittle to resolve these issues. The futile relocationexercise has generated more distrust. The villagerslive in extreme poverty and deal daily with theharassment. They do not have an option. They areforest-dependent householders, who have to use theresources of the reserve — the fodder and the grazinglands — for their survival.

When the Tiger Task Force visited Kankwarivillage, located inside the core area and consideredan important tiger breeding ground, it found villagersexisting on the edge of survival. They lack basicresources such as education and medical facilities.They earn their living through livestock breeding,but face immense hardships in their dailyinteractions with the forest department. They are notallowed to carry fodder and other basic material intotheir village. They live as illegal settlers in their ownland. The village is not a revenue village. It is asettlement within the forest, and its rights have neverbeen determined. Therefore, the forest departmenthas never bothered to recognise even the grazinglands the village is entitled to. It is important to notehere that according to the information given to thetask force during its visit to Sariska by park officials,much of the land under the Sariska tiger reserve hasnot been recorded as forest in revenue records.7

The villagers assured the Task Force they wereprepared to relocate, provided they receivedadequate facilities in the new area. But they distrustrelocation immensely, because of their past

The assessment 17


Sariska Average of all reserves

Annual average area-wise fund 2.58 1.01allocation in tiger reserves from inception (Rs lakh per sq km)

COMPARISON OF MONEY SPENT AREA-WISE IN SARISKATO THE COUNTRY’S AVERAGE

Source: Compiled from Project Tiger directorate data

experience. They also complained that authoritieshad backed off after once showing them land forrelocation. This heightened the distrust.

5a. It is clear to the Task Force that there is a completebreakdown in relations between the park authoritiesand the settlements within Sariska. It is also clear thatover the years, much more could have been done torelocate people or repair this relationship.

5b. The Task Force also finds it strange that the parkadministration has no real idea or estimate of theextent of damage done by settlements within thepark. In fact, there is considerable confusion aboutthe number of livestock and even the number ofhouseholds in villages. It is clear that again, muchmore will have to be done to sort out these issues toadvance future plans for relocation.

In this context, it is important to assess the impact of human populations so that policy can bedesigned. For instance, according to an assessment oftiger reserves in the report prepared by the ForestSurvey of India for Project Tiger, the forest covercomprises 674 sq km — 77 per cent — of the 881 sqkm area that comprises Sariska. Dense and

moderately dense forests cover 44 per cent of theforested area, the rest being open and scrubland.Significantly, the Forest Survey assessment notes thatthere has been little or no change in the forest coverbetween 1997 and 2002. In other words, humanimpact has not resulted in visible deterioration overthis period. Also, according to this assessment, forestcover destruction cannot be the cause ofdisappearance of tigers from Sariska.8

6. Over the years, destructive pressures both within the park and outside have led to shrinkage of tiger habitat: it has been brutally mined, grazed onby countless livestock, even as little has beeninvested in protecting and afforesting the landsaround the park. The Wildlife Institute of Indiareport finds that Sariska is an island, with virtuallyno forested habitat in its surroundings (see map:Broad vegetation types of Sariska tiger reserve and itsconnectivity with neighbouring forests).9 On onehand, the tiger cannot move beyond the park — itshabitat has shrunk drastically. On the other, people’sresources have also shrunk, forcing them to exertmore pressure on the reserve. This is a doublejeopardy for the tiger.

18 The assessment


Source: WII 2005, Assessment of status of tiger in Sariska tiger reserve, Rajasthan, Wildlife Institute of India, Dehradun

BANSUR

SHAHPURA

N

VIRATNAGAR

THANAGAZI

SARISKA

JAMWA RAMGARH

DAUSA SAKRAI

Protected area

Cities/towns

Close forest

Open forestScrub

Agriculture/habitationWater bodies

LACHHMANGARH

RAJGARH

BASWA

RAMGARHALWAR

KISHANGARH BAS

ALWAR FORT

JAMWA RAMGARH

KOTPUTLI

BROAD VEGETATION TYPES OF SARISKA TIGER RESERVE AND ITS CONNECTIVITY WITHNEIGHBOURING FORESTS

The assessment 19


The Tiger Task Force is clear that in the present circumstances, this habitat will be easilylost without protection. The pressure from the mining lobby is enormous, and thiscombines with the alienation of the people to create a destructive situation for the park.After the news of the disappearance of tigers, local politicians have convened meetings inthe area demanding the reserve be opened up to grazing and agriculture. Bitterly resentfulof park authorities, the leaders and villagers have threatened to take over the park, whichthey say has no reason to exist since the tigers are now gone.

The Task Force believes Sariska is an important reserve supporting the largest intacthabitat of the tiger in the Aravalli ecosystem. The condition of the habitat is good and,therefore, needs to be protected. The reserve is also the catchment for innumerablestreams in this otherwise dry region. The Task Force, therefore, recommends that urgentsteps need to be taken to restore the park and to rehabilitate tigers in the reserve, as under:

1. The state government must fix accountability for events in Sariska. This is essential, forit will act as a deterrent to other officers in Rajasthan as well as in other parts of thecountry, given what happened in Sariska is unacceptable.

The actions of the state government in this regard have been inadequate so far:● Firstly, it has set up a state task force to investigate the matter and to recommend

remedial actions, but has now extended its term by another three months, which hasdelayed the urgent action needed.

● Secondly, it has suspended seven staff members — one range officer, two forestersand four work-charge employees (unqualified guards) — following a report filed by itssenior official. These staff members were suspended on the basis of informationprovided by an arrested poacher, who pointed out to the forest department the beats(areas) that he had killed tigers on. But what is strange is that other apprehendedpoachers have, since then, indicated other locations where animals were trapped, butno action has been taken against the staff responsible there. The state governmentsuspended the chief wildlife warden in the wake of the controversy. But the charge-sheet against the official was never filed and as per the rules, he has been reinstated.

2. The internal management of the reserve must be improved, so that once tigers are re-introduced the management can ensure it will protect the habitat and the species in thereserve without any disruption.

The Task Force recommends the state government take firm steps to improve theinternal working of the park. It must also make a firm, time-bound, commitment to theProject Tiger directorate in this regard and draw up benchmarks for its performancereview and assessment.

3. The re-introduction of tigers into the habitat must be done with caution and care. TheWildlife Institute of India suggests three-five tigers can be re-introduced in the initialphase and then supplemented. However, the Institute has cautioned that worldwideexperience on species reintroduction demands the work should be done carefully andwith a high degree of commitment and involvement of all concerned.10

4. The relocation of villages within the key tiger habitat must be done with utmost care.The recovery plan being developed by Wildlife Institute of India requires the relocation ofcertain key villages to minimise disturbance in the habitat. It recommends that Haripura,Kankwari, Umri and Kiraska, with approximately 1,800 people and 7,000 livestock in all,should be relocated on a priority basis.

The Task Force recommends relocation be done with full consultation with affectedvillagers. Park authorities must also realise that villagers living within the park are forest-dependent and, therefore, the land required for their relocation must be able to either

Recommendations

20 The assessment


meet their grazing needs or there must be sufficient investment for them to switch over toland-based livelihoods. The current relocation plan, as envisaged by the park authorities,does not resolve this issue adequately as it only provides limited agricultural land, withminimal irrigation facilities and grazing lands. The Task Force would like to caution themanagement that if relocation is not done carefully and with extreme sensitivity, it wouldfurther strain the relationship between the park and its people.

The Task Force also recommends that park authorities, working in tandem with theProject Tiger directorate, should evolve a plan for the remaining villages that willcontinue to exist in the park because their relocation is not possible or feasible. In thiscontext, the Task Force suggests there should be a better assessment of the impact of thevillages on the forest, ways found to mitigate this impact and to reduce the use of forestresources. The park management urgently needs to work on a plan, in consultation withvillagers, to manage resources better. The current situation, which makes all use illegal, isclearly not leading to effective reserve management.

5. A plan must be evolved to manage pilgrimage traffic and to share the benefits oftourism with affected villagers and the park. The impact of pilgrims’ presence in thereserve, concentrated along the core area, can be heavy. Therefore, there is a need toregulate numbers and manage this pressure carefully.

The Task Force recommends that the authorities work out a plan for the above, whichshould consider how the benefits of pilgrimage traffic — entry fees and charges collectedfrom shops — can be shared with local villagers. The Task Force is certain pilgrims willappreciate they are paying homage at a forest shrine, which demands adherence to certainrules and regulations. These shrines are sacred groves, which need community disciplinefor protection.

The Task Force recommends that there should be a plan to share revenues fromtourism, including revenues earned by hotels and other like facilities in the park vicinity,with local communities.

6. The productivity of forests in the areas outside the tiger reserve needs to be improved.It is evident the pressure on Sariska from adjoining villages is unsustainable. But it isequally evident that this cannot be controlled through mere fiat and increased force.

The Task Force recommends that urgent steps be taken by the park authorities,working with the territorial forest department, to consult villagers in co-managing theforests in the vicinity of the park. This plan will require greater investments in soil, waterand forest conservation. But it can only be done if villagers realise the benefits of thisprotection.

The Task Force also recommends that park authorities work on an agreement with thefringe villagers to increase investment in their lands, in return for their cooperation inprotecting the reserve.

7. An institutional mechanism to monitor progress in habitat improvement and people’sinvolvement must be put in place. The Task Force recommends the plan for rehabilitationshould be carefully monitored by scientists, researchers and local NGOs, who should bepart of a park level management committee. All information, including the plans forrelocation of tigers and people, should be made freely available to the public.

The Task Force strongly recommends rehabilitation and protection of Sariska as atiger reserve, but urges once again that this will only be possible if there is a clear plan ofaction, and determination and commitment to implement its different facets.

02A paradigm change

Making conservation work

21

The current crisis of disappearing tigers in Sariskamay be looked upon as a tragedy. But the Tiger TaskForce prefers to view it as an opportunity. Here is thechance to take a close and exhaustive look at themanner in which the tiger has been hithertoconserved; to understand where, after 30 years, aprogramme exclusively devoted to protecting thismagnificent animal has gone wrong; and find howtoday’s lacunae may be transformed to the tiger’sadvantage, so that the future of its protection may bea positive one.

The protection of the tiger is inseparable from theprotection of the forests it roams in. But theprotection of these forests is itself inseparable fromthe fortunes of people who, in India, inhabit forestedareas. Thus, any regulatory or enforcement regimethat wishes to throw a protective ring around the tigermust take into cognisance that, apart from the tiger,the protection equation contains two other variables:the forests and the people that live in and around it.This is the unique situation conservation in India hasalways faced and tried to grapple with.

But over the last 30 years the style of conservationthat developed in India and is now unilaterallypredominant is one that has not taken all threevariables into account. It has tried to cater to the tiger,exclusively. People inhabiting protected areas havebeen discounted and displaced. Their livelihoodshave been destroyed. So they have become notprotectors of the forest, but poachers and smugglers ofwood and other forest produce.

The peculiar situation that has emerged is that aspeople’s marginalisation has led to poverty, the tiger’sfortunes, too, has got impoverished. The history ofconserving the tiger in this country is the manner inwhich this process has isomorphically unfolded. Thecarnivore-human conflict has exacerbated: the truthof its exponential growth is visible in and aroundmost tiger reserves. So is the visible degradation ofthe forest, at once source of people’s livelihoods andthe home of the tiger.

The question then is: how do we protect thetiger? How do we regenerate these lands? How mustwe manage the competing, but equally vital, needs ofhuman livelihood? We don’t have the option tochoose one over the other: the poverty of one willdestroy the other. It is quite literally aboutcoexistence.

Resolution, therefore — untested across theworld — will lie in our abilities to create anenvironment so that the tiger, forests and people cancoexist.

It is, therefore, important to design policies andactions which are multi-pronged and which● focus on enhancing the protection of tigers in the

short-run and earmark inviolate spaces fo itsexistence;

● safeguard the future of the tiger by involvinglocal communities with reciprocal andcollaborative models, to share the benefits ofconservation; and

● involve local communities in rebuilding theforest economies of the tiger’s habitat so that allcan grow.

This is the paradigm of ‘inclusive growth’ that willsafeguard the Indian tiger: the Indian model ofconservation. Nothing else.

The tiger’s habitat

India’s primary tiger habitat is spread over vast areas of central India, and the Western and Eastern Ghats. These are also the areas where the majority ofour scheduled tribes live. These lands areenormously rich in natural resources — forests,minerals — but the irony is that the people living inthem are among the poorest in the country. The otherkey tiger habitats are in the Himalayan region and itsfoothills.

These lands — the habitat of tigers as well aspeople — also provide most of central andpeninsular India with its water. They are the sourceof the water that irrigates farmlands, that villagersdrink and that cities guzzle freely, exchanging itcheaply with their excreta.

These forests are essential for our survival. Weneed them for ecological security — to replenishwater systems, provide habitats for wild species andas our biodiversity treasure troves. We also needthem for economic security — for firewood, fodder,building material for people and raw material forindustry. While managing forests for such distinctobjectives is complicated enough, what makes theissue more difficult is that there are poor peopleliving on these lands. They need this land for their survival, but their land rights have never been settled. The question is, what is to be done withthese people.

Evicting them and fencing the forests in cannot be the answer. If that is done, the people will break the fence down to work the forests.Handing the forests over to the people and lettingthem cut these down cannot be the answer either.

Making conservation work

22 A paradigm change



TIGERS AND PEOPLE: THE COEXISTENCE CONUNDRUM

23

Forest area

Tiger reserve

Schedule V area

150 poorest districts

A paradigm change


Without the forests, people will have no wherewithalto survive.

The tiger crisis is, first and foremost, a forest crisis. The core of the problem is our inability to manage our forest wealth in a way both sustainable and productive. As a result, we have been left with small areas — largely our protected area network — which remain asforests.

These forest ‘islands’ are under heavy stress. Thereason is that the land outside them, also forest land,is today highly degraded and unproductive. It cannotmeet the basic needs of the people who live on these lands. It cannot provide them with livelihoodopportunities. In fact, because the land is forest land,development of irrigation and other facilities is also curtailed. The cycle of poverty grows, and withthis, the pressure on the last remaining bastionsintensifies.

The people share the tiger’s habitat

It is important to realise India’s conservationprogramme is located not in the homes of its rich, butin the settlements of its very poorest. It is their landthat is set aside for protection. It is they who sharetheir resources with the tiger, without getting anybenefits in return.

The tiger districts are, in most cases, classified asthe poorest 150 districts in the country. These arealso the districts classified as Schedule V areas —primarily inhabited by tribals — and have little or noirrigation facilities (see map: Tigers and people: thecoexistence conundrum).

To succeed, tiger conservation must take thesefacts into account. It has to bring benefits to this regionand to its poor people. The question is how. It is herewe must understand the economy. People, who co-inhabit the tiger’s home, are forest-dependent. Theylive within a biomass subsistence economy, which isbased on subsistence agriculture. This economy canonly survive if there is livestock to minimise the riskof crop failure and to provide manure for the lands.The livestock insurance policy needs grazing lands, asagriculture is poor and unirrigated; fodder, therefore,is only available in the open lands. The lack of assuredfodder also means that people cannot keep qualitylivestock as they need to minimise their risks.

The land is not fit for agriculture in most cases,and crop yields are meagre. People can only surviveif they have access to forest resources from wherethey can collect firewood for sale or live off thecollection of various forest produce — from honey tomahua. For them, life is just not possible without theforests. People, therefore, live within the reserves notbecause this gives them huge benefits, but becausethey have no alternative. Their economy — like the

tiger — depends on the forests. But while relocating villages, agencies only think

in terms of ‘land’ and not of ‘access to forests’.Planners do not take into consideration the ‘grossnatural product’ of forests, which sustains the livesof millions in this country. However, unless the landgiven for relocation is irrigated and fertile, peoplewill have no option but to continue to live within aforest-dependent economy — which means, they putstress on the forest resources once again.

The challenge, therefore, is to rebuild foresteconomies so that the habitats of tigers as well as thelivelihoods of the poor can be protected. The issue isnot about tigers per se, but about recreating economicand livelihood basis for forests to be regenerated.

The tiger shares people’s habitat

In Kanha tiger reserve in Madhya Pradesh, fieldmanagers keep a count of the number of tiger cubs.They know that they should have an increase of 10tigers in the reserve every year to maintain a viablepopulation. They account for mortality of the youngand old when they estimate the population increaseof the big cats.

But the population does not increase. Thenumbers of tigers in the reserve remain the same.This is because the young tiger, in search of territory,moves beyond the protected enclave to the worldoutside. Once there were forests outside the reserve,and the tiger had survived. But now the landscape isdegraded. Poor people live there. They live on theforests. But no investments have been made toimprove their habitat. The tiger, as a result, is ingrave danger (see map: Central India: forests andtiger reserves).

Coexistence is threatened. It is important torealise that not only do the people use the tiger’s



Panna

BandhavgarhPalamau

SimlipalKanhaSatpuraPench

PenchMelghatTadoba

Indravati


CENTRAL INDIA: FORESTS AND TIGER RESERVES

habitat, but the tiger too needs the people’s habitat.This is the coexistence challenge.

Wildlife managers say that the tiger cannot beprotected within the ‘enclaved islands’ that ourreserves have become. In the last tiger ‘census’, morethan half the big cats were found not inside butoutside the tiger reserves. These are lands which thetiger shares with people. But as the forests degrade inthe landscape, the habitat shrinks. The source —areas where the tiger breeds or its natal areas — arethe reserves. The sinks, where the tiger goes to live,lie in the lands outside.

This is because the tiger needs territory. Tounderstand conservation of tigers, it is important tounderstand how the tiger lives and mates. The tigersociety revolves around the breeding female, whostarts breeding at three-four years of age in arelatively fixed home range. She has a tenure offive-seven years before she loses her range to avigorous competitor. The adult male tiger has alarger range, overlapping several breeding females— three on an average. In favourable conditions,females give birth to litters of three-four cubs onceevery two-three years. When roughly two years old,the young are abandoned by their mother and theseare known as dispersing transients (floaters) bybiologists. Tigers move 10-15 km per day. Transienttigers can move over hundreds of kilometres insearch of new homes.

This gives rise to a double jeopardy: on one hand,the habitat of the tiger shrinks drastically as it cannotmove beyond the park to establish its territory. Onthe other, the resources of people also shrink andthey then exert even more pressure on the tigerreserve.

There is, therefore, no choice but to find ways ofcoexistence. If people are not allowed into the tiger’shabitat, they will be even more resentful of thecreatures’ entry into their habitat. This is why tigerpoisoning cases are on the rise. This is why tigers inthe wild will not survive. We must get out of the‘island’ mentality. The tiger’s home is its landscape,wherever it ranges. It is this we have to learn toprotect.

How will that be done?

There are two essential strategies:1. The habitat must be made inviolate for the tiger

where it must. It must be shared between thepeople and the tigers in a way that peaceprevails. The poverty of one, otherwise, will bethe destruction of the other.

2. The outside forest habitat must be regenerated sothat people can be less dependent on theenclaves of the tiger, and the tiger has more spacein the surrounding landscape to live.

All share the forest habitat

We will have to understand why our forests are introuble: this is the real challenge of the tiger crisis. Ifwe work hard, we can protect a few hundred tigers inthe protective islands of our reserves. If we improveour enforcement, we can protect a few more. But ifwe really want to safeguard the future of tigers, wewill have to regenerate our forests.

The problem is that we do not know how. In thepast, the State had appropriated forest resources fromlocal communities. Over the years, logging andmining led to rampant degradation. If the Britishstripped the forests of Ratnagiri in coastalMaharashtra to make ships and railway lines,independent India sold its forests for a pittance to thepulp and paper industry. This was the extractivephase of forest use.

But in the early 1980s, the State turned trackfrom exploiting natural resources to protecting them.Under the Forest Conservation Act, 1980, only theCentral government had the right to allow forest land to be converted to non-forest purposes (roads,power stations, dams and the like). This was theconservation phase.

The rampant diversion of land for developmentstopped, but deforestation continued. So, since the1990s, the Supreme Court has stepped in, imposingchecks on how forests are to be worked. Manydifferent orders aimed at stopping deforestation havebeen issued over these years. In December 1996, theCourt ordered a ban on timber felling, unless theforest department made a working plan for forestedregions demarcating areas that could be logged. In1998, it said that all working plans for all forestdivisions had to be prepared by the stategovernments but approved by the Centre. It hasbanned the transport of logs from the northeasternstates and ordered the closure of all unlicensedsawmills and wood processing plants; states havebeen asked not to allow new ones either.

But the tragedy is that while deforestation hasreduced, forest degradation continues.

The State of Forest Report 2003 shows that thecountry has lost 26,245 sq km of dense forestsbetween 2001 and 2003. On the other hand, the openforests — forests with a crown density of only 10 to40 per cent — have increased by 29,000 sq km. Thecountry now has 11.88 per cent of its geographicalarea under dense forests, of which only 1.56 per centcould be classified as very dense, with a canopycover of over 70 per cent (see table: Net change inforest cover in the country since 2001 assessment).

The problem is that dense forests aredisappearing in the very habitats that we areconcerned with in this report — the habitats of tigersand poor people. According to the State of Forest

A paradigm change 25


Report, as much as 63 per cent of the dense forest inthe country is in its tribal districts. This, as we havesaid earlier, is also the tiger district (see table: Forestcover and tribal districts).

The maximum loss of dense forest cover has alsooccurred in these very tiger-tribal districts. Thetiger’s habitat is under threat. The people’slivelihoods are impoverished. There are millionswho live in these forest lands. The answer cannot beto throw them out; neither can it be to exclude themfrom the management of these forests. The forestswill continue to degrade as people will continue touse these lands. This is the real challenge we face.

The problem with forest management

The fact is that we have always legislated to protectthe forests; we have never managed or regeneratedthem. What we have learnt is to protect our forestsusing draconian measures, but we do not know howto increase the productivity of these lands whichhave competing needs and users. Today, vast areas offorest land in the country lie under-utilised andunder-productive. The reason is we cannot increaseproductivity without involving the people who usethese increasingly degraded lands.

Indeed, because we do not know how to involvepeople in their management, we cannot build futuresfrom these lands. Economic progress, to us, is not

about keeping forests. The value lies in destroyingthem for mining, industries. Similarly for the poor,managing forests as forests does not bring themwealth. They can only survive if they clear forests, tocultivate marginal and degraded lands from whichthe returns are always meagre. The land degradesfurther, the people become more destitute: so turnsthe vicious cycle of poverty.

We have to learn to differentiate between forestswhich need to be protected at all costs — pristineforests, biological hotspots, tiger habitats — andforests, which need to be managed and used and thenregenerated. It is clear that we still have to learn touse our resources sustainably for developmentalpurposes.

It is no wonder, then, that poor people come tolive in rich lands, or that environmental protectioncomes into conflict with development. Theeconomic security of poor people has to be enjoinedto the forests, which in turn are the habitats of wildspecies and essential for ecological security.



Assessment Dense Open Total Scrubyear forest forest forest

cover

2001 41,809 258,729 675,538 47,318

2003 390,564 287,769 678,333 40,269

Change -26,245 29,040 2,795 -7,049

NET CHANGE IN FOREST COVER IN THE COUNTRY SINCE2001 ASSESSMENT (IN SQ KM)

Source: Anon 2003, State of Forest Report 2003, Indian Council for ForestryResearch and Education, Dehradun

Total dense forest in India (2003 estimation) 390,564 sq km

Total dense forest in tribal districts 246,858 sq km

Percentage of dense forest of the country found in tribal districts 63 per cent

Geographical area in tribal district 1,103,463 sq km

Very dense forest in tribal district 36,932 sq km

Moderately dense forest in tribal district 209,926 sq km

Open forests 160,440 sq km

Total forests 407,298 sq km

Percentage of forest cover of the geographical area of the tribal district 37 per cent

Source: Anon 2003, State of Forest Report 2003, Indian Council for ForestryResearch and Education, Dehradun

FOREST COVER AND TRIBAL DISTRICTS

03The way ahead

3.1 The institutional agenda

3.2 The protection agenda

3.3 The illegal trade agenda

3.3a Domestic enforcement agenda

3.4 Innovative protection agenda

3.5 The science agenda

3.6 The research agenda

3.7 The relocation agenda

3.8 The coexistence agenda

3.9 The fringe agenda

3.10 The tourism agenda

3.11 Ecological services agenda

27

Project Tiger is a centrally sponsored scheme inwhich the states provide matching grants to pay forrecurring items of expenditure, such as maintenanceof habitat, creation of temporary water facilities, etc.The Union ministry of environment and forests hasthe mandate to provide technical guidance andfunding support; it is also responsible for overallcoordination, monitoring and evaluation of theproject, apart from helping states in estimatingnumbers of tigers and other wildlife.

Following the 42nd amendment to the IndianConstitution in 1976, the subject of forests andwildlife was transferred from the State List to theConcurrent List. With this, the Central governmentacquired overriding powers to ensure protection andpreservation of forests and wildlife.

By the 1990s, the problems between Project Tigerand the states had begun. It was pointed out time andagain that states were lagging behind in disbursingproject funds they received, staff vacancies were notbeing filled, the monitoring of protection work wasweak and that wildlife crime enforcement lacked teeth.

In 2000, the Supreme Court, acting on a publicinterest litigation (Public Interest Litigation writnumber 1474/1998), directed the secretary, Unionministry of environment and forests, to convene ameeting of chief secretaries of tiger habitat states toevolve a joint strategy for protection of the tiger. Thefollowing results of deliberations that ensued with thestates were listed in an affidavit the secretary filed:1

a. There is a shortage of resources in states, whichleads to delayed disbursal of funds, non-paymentof staff salaries for up to six months, and even alack of funds to pay for fuel for vehicles.

b. Because of the delay in disbursing Centralassistance to tiger reserves by state governments,earmarked activities are not completed and fundsremain unutilised. The Centre, therefore, withholdsthe next instalment. This leads to a situation whereon one hand, Central outlays for wildlifeconservation increase progressively, but on theother, funds lapse because of non-utilisation.

c. There are vacancies of staff at the field level — insome states, more than 30 per cent of the posts offorest guards and foresters remain unfilled. Mostof the existing field staff is ill-equipped, overageand inadequately trained.

d. More than 30 per cent of the tiger population anda substantial number of other wildlife are foundoutside the protected area network, but forestersdo not consider conservation of this wildlife

among their top priorities. e. There is a need to ensure timely compensation

for livestock killed by wildlife, for without thisthe conflict between humans and animals willintensify.

The affidavit also listed some solutions, which wereaccepted by the Supreme Court. These were:

1. New mechanisms would be introduced to solve the problem of delay in disbursement. Thechief secretaries of the key problem states —Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh,Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Orissa — agreed thatCentral funds for wildlife conservation should bedirectly released to entities created for this purpose.

2. Central funds would reach implementingagencies within six weeks of the time of receiptand the state government would prioritiseallocations for wildlife under their state plans.

3. The state governments agreed to fill up existingvacancies on a priority basis. Madhya Pradesh,which had decided to abolish vacant posts, agreedto exempt the posts of forest guards and forestersfrom downsizing. Maharashtra and Orissa agreedto fill all vacancies within six months, whileKarnataka said every effort would be made to fillup to 200 vacancies of forest guards within oneyear. Assam and Arunachal said that in view offinancial constraints, they would transfer stafffrom sectors with a lower priority.

4. The amount of compensation to be paid has beenrevised by the Centre, and the state governmentswill now pay the amount expeditiously.

5. State governments will strengthen the existingprotection mechanism. The states also suggested that they would look at the feasibility ofrecruitment and training of forest guards throughpolice agencies. The Union ministry ofenvironment and forests reported that it hadalready requested the Central Industrial SecurityForce to train foresters in insurgency-pronereserves. It was also agreed that the staff would begiven the authority to confiscate vehicles, armsand other articles used for wildlife offences.

6. It was agreed to provide incentives to forestpersonnel living in remote areas. The Unionministry of environment and forests wouldevolve transparent guidelines dealing with thetransfers and posting of officials in wildlife areas, as well as a suitable human resourcedevelopment policy.

3.1 The institutional agenda

28 The way ahead


Much of the reform agenda was agreed upon. But inthe absence of careful follow-up with the states,many of these suggestions were not implemented.

Then, in 2005, the Supreme Court intervenedagain, this time on an affidavit filed byconservationist Navin Raheja (writ number 47/1998),who pointed out that there existed difficulties in thetimely allocation of funds by the state governmentsto the tiger reserves. The Project Tiger directorate, inits affidavit in the above writ petition, stated thatwhile there was no standard definition for the term ‘priority sector’. It had been used to giveimportance to wildlife and forests as against thefinancial allocations for other infrastructure andadministrative facilities as done in states in the caseof ‘law and order’. It was also stated that the prioritygiven by the Central government in this regard isreflected in its enhanced allocation to the wildlifesector — from Rs 170 crore in the 8th Plan to Rs 800crore in the 10th Plan.

While reiterating the actions sought from thestate, a time frame was also suggested for fundrelease and utilisation certificate:

“First instalment: By four weeks after receipt ofannual plan of operations from respective stategovernments, which should not be delayed beyondthe month of May of the financial year (since despiterepeated requests, the annual plan of operationsdoes not reach the ministry of environment andforests before mid-April by and large).

“Second instalment: By two weeks after receipt ofutilisation certificate pertaining to previous yearfrom the states along with 60 per cent utilisationreport of funding support released as firstinstalment, which should not be delayed beyond themonth of December of the financial year.”

As far as monitoring and evaluation was concerned,it stated that the regional monitoring of tiger reserveshas been undertaken by a panel of experts.2

The apex court accepted the process suggested inthe affidavit filed by the Project Tiger directorate anddirected that the states should make available thefunds the Government of India released for wildlifeconservation to field formations within 15 days. Theamount should be available for the purpose forwhich the Centre provided assistance. It is nowcrucial to ensure close monitoring to ensure thisdirection is implemented.3

Options for institutional reform

The Task Force is clear that in spite of these efforts,problems remain in the institutional framework formanagement. The events in Sariska and other key

conservation sites show there is a need, in states, formuch greater commitment and vigilance. It is alsoclear the institutions to manage conservation areweak and unprepared; professionals do not have therequisite training or capacities. Therefore, there is aneed to re-engineer and remodel the institutions ofgovernance. Without this, the agenda for reform willremain ad hoc and inadequate.

The Task Force has considered two differentapproaches for institutional reform.

Option 1: CentraliseThe aim here is to further centralise decision-makingby creating an authority that can be given the powersto coordinate the work of tiger reserves and overseeimplementation. This would emulate the example ofcountries that declare protected reserves as ‘federal’reserves, bringing their development under unifiedcontrol.

In April 2005, the amicus curiae in the T NGodavarman forest case, ongoing in the SupremeCourt, filed an application asking for an authority tobe created for wildlife management. In thisapplication, it is said, “state governments and theirofficers, for whatever reason, have been unequal tothe task of protecting and preserving our nationalparks and sanctuaries. It is, therefore, necessary thatit is submitted as a matter of law, that the Centralgovernment take effective steps including by way ofconstituting an authority.” This authority wouldcomprise of civil servants and outsiders who wouldoversee the working and management of at least 25 ofthe significant protected areas, almost all of whichare tiger reserves. The funds collected fromcompensatory afforestation would be made availablein whole or in part to this authority for conservationof protected areas. This authority would be givencharge then of overseeing management. Stategovernments would have to ensure that the authorityis consulted in the appointment, posting or removalof senior officers in these reserves.4

This approach also includes creation of a nationalpark service-type force, which will be under Centralcontrol and can be posted to different parts of thecountry. It has been suggested that there should be anempanelment of officers, which can be considered forposting in any of the premier protected areas withinthe home state and in other states.

In the current difficult times for conservation,these approaches seem simple and attractive enough.They require the disbanding or marginalisation ofcurrent institutions and their replacement withstructures which are centrally managed in the handsof a dedicated team.

The Tiger Task Force has carefully consideredthese proposals. It believes it will create moreproblems for the tiger, even in the short run. The

The way ahead 29


reasons are as follows:

a. The tiger lives in a habitat which is contiguous toother spaces. It, therefore, needs protection notjust within its ‘island’, but also in the landscapebeyond. Therefore, it needs the cooperation ofthe people that protect these outside lands andthose that live in these lands. Any furthercentralisation will only increase the rift betweenthe Centre and states on tiger conservation andhinder local alliances crucial for its survival.

b. The habitat of the tiger needs developmentefforts, not just protection. In other words, itneeds the engagement of many agencies at thestate level for its survival. It must be noted thatwhile centralised control may be good forprotection, it is a tremendous limitation fordevelopmental work. Any effort which furtherbypasses states is sure to be detrimental to thelong-term success of the project. For instance,there is a need for relocation of villages fromreserves. This cannot be done without the activecollaboration of other state agencies anddepartments, which will be resisted if there isgreater central control.

c. The survival of the tiger will depend on ourabilities to rebuild the institutions for itsgovernance. The deliberate disabling of thecurrent institutions is not the answer.

d. The empanelment of officers amounts to creatinga central service, which is unfeasible. The keyreason why state services are needed is becauseof their integration with line agencies in thestate. The ecological and social conditions are sovaried that sending officials to different reserveswill, therefore, not work.

Also, this approach does not lead to any cadre-staffbuilding in the team. The most important challengethat park managements face is to build a team ofleaders. Leadership will also demand fostering acertain commitment in their reporting staff, so thatcontinuity can be created. If the officers are transient,this will clearly not be possible.

It is for all these reasons that the Task Force hasdecided to, instead, recommend a sub-cadre forwildlife and review the training and human resourcedevelopment needs of the service.

It is the strong belief of this Tiger Task Force thatafter 30 years of conservation history, the time hascome to make serious and long-term changes whichwill secure the future of the tiger. The project thusneeds to broadbase its support so that its agenda canbe implemented: this is vital. The agenda includeswork that is serious, detailed and requires long-termcommitment of groups and institutions in bringingabout change. Any effort to centralise the work will

only create further alienation of agencies crucial towork the agenda, and so will not lead to meaningfulchange. The Task Force urges all to note that effective‘policing’ is not the only task that confronts tigerconservation in the country today. For these reasons,the Task Force has decided not to adopt this approach.

Option 2: Strengthen Centre-state collaborationand institutionsThe Task Force has decided it will develop analternative approach that will undertake thefollowing: ● Strengthen institutions at the Centre that oversee

and guide the project, reinforce the primeminister’s efforts in this direction and also involvethe Parliament to ensure political commitment.

● Strengthen institutional capacity at the statelevel by securing the interests and involvementof its leaders.

● Improve the capacity of professionals engaged inthe management of wildlife.

● Strengthen the supervision of the project throughinnovative mechanisms, that will createinformation in the public domain and buildcollaboration links with researchers and NGOs,particularly at the state level.

● Build a participatory base by including theinterests of local communities in tiger protection.This will engender sustainability of the project.

The Task Force is aware that this work is onerousand difficult. The reform of institutions ofgovernance and structures will need long-termcommitment and political support. The Task Force isalso deeply aware of the urgency of the situation andthe exigencies involved. But it believes that much ofthis agenda is within reach. It also believes that after30 years of management, the tiger deservesseriousness. This opportunity cannot be lost byadvocating quick-fix solutions that might ultimatelyprove regressive for the programme.

Recommendations

A. On strengthening institutions at the Centre

1. Reorganise the Union ministry of environmentand forests to create two separate departments: thatof environment and that of forests and wildlife.

The key reason why the Task Force isrecommending this reorganisation is because it findsthat the forestry and wildlife sector requires focussedand detailed work, which is not possible in thecurrent organisational set-up of the ministry.

The Task Force is aware of the concern that asimple departmental reorganisation will notnecessarily lead to more efficiency. In fact, it could

30 The way ahead


well create confusion and lead to turf wars betweenthe two professional service heads — of generaladministration and of the specialist forestry service.

The problem, however, is that the forestry and wildlife sector needs greatly enhanced capacitiesto effectively implement its protection anddevelopmental agenda. In the 2005-06 budget outlayof the ministry, forestry and wildlife got 33 per centand the rest went to the environment sector (about Rs460 crore and Rs 820 crore respectively). It isimportant to note here that there has been a steadyshift in this regard: till 2002-2003, financialallocations were evenly split between the two.

It is also important to note that the funds spentfor forestry and wildlife at the state level are larger. Inthe 10th Five Year Plan, Rs 11,444 crore has beenallocated for this sector by the Centre to states andUnion territories.5 There is a need to work with statesto effectively direct the sector and to improve itsperformance. This requires a strong central agency asmuch as enhanced capacities at the state level. Thereare also a large number of institutions under theforestry-wildlife sector that are autonomous andprofessional. These institutions need professionalmanagement to support their independence andgrowth. This, too, requires a strong and effectivecentral institution with the capacity to oversee andmanage with a high order of professionalism andexpertise.

Furthermore, the present functioning of theministry has become mostly regulatory, involvingclearances for projects, pollution control andinternational treaties. The functions of ‘forestry’, onthe other hand, are partly developmental, requiring agreater thrust on re-greening lands for livelihood andeconomic purposes, and partly conservationist. Butall these functions require a different nature ofspecialisation and functioning. Therefore, the TaskForce is suggesting the reorganisation of these distinctfunctions, which it hopes will bring about greaterattention to both and improve their effectiveness. Wemust remember that the department of environmentand the department of forests are both critical insafeguarding the future of India and needstrengthening (see table: Budget of the Union ministryof environment and forests, 2005-2006).

2. Revitalise the National Board for Wildlife and/orrequest the prime minister to chair the steeringcommittee of the Project Tiger for the coming fewyears. This is in order to build the politicalconstituency needed for the conservation of the tiger,to shape the agenda at the state level and to initiatethe long-term reform needed for tiger conservation.

It is clear that tiger conservation is at animportant crossroads. On one hand, there is agrowing and urgent threat against the species. On the

other, there is an opportunity to correct the mistakesof the past and to invest in urgent reform.

The key element of the reform is a renewedengagement of all in the protection of the tiger. Thecommitment of the Indian prime minister is evidentin this issue and his engagement in securing theinterest of all will be critical. Also, there is a need toput into place mechanisms that can take the reformagenda forward. This will require careful monitoringand supervision.

It is for this reason the Task Force isrecommending the option of revitalising the NationalBoard for Wildlife, which is chaired by the primeminister or better still, for the prime minister to takeon the chairpersonship of the steering committee ofProject Tiger. There is a precedent on this. In theearly 1980s, the then prime minister, Indira Gandhi,had chaired the steering committee of Project Tiger.

The Indian prime minister’s direct involvementwill give the project its necessary direction andimpetus. Given the exigencies of the othercommitments of the prime minister, we arerecommending that he hold this position for a periodof two-four years, during which the agenda forreform can be activated and put on a firm footing.

In addition, we would recommend that themembership of the National Board for Wildlife andthe steering committee be reviewed to make it moreeffective. The constitution of these governanceinstitutions must include researchers, activists, triballeaders and others who can introduce differentperspectives to the discourse. Since many years now,the membership of the Board and the steeringcommittee has been restricted to a few experts who

The way ahead 31


Budget % of (2005-06) annual Rs crore budget

FORESTRY AND WILDLIFE• Education and training 21.04 • Forest conservation, development 41.00

and regeneration• Wildlife preservation 139.70• National Afforestation and 260.85

Ecodevelopment programme

Total allocation for forestry 462.59 33 and wildlife

Total allocation for environment 829.79 60and ecology (including river action programmes)

TOTAL 1,388.90

BUDGET OF THE UNION MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENTAND FORESTS, 2005-2006

Source: GOI 2005, Expenditure budget 2005-06, Vol 2, February, Delhi

hold very similar positions and experiences. It is forthis reason the wildlife sector has become extremelyinsular and exclusive, losing its ability to envisionthe bigger challenges that confront it.

Secondly, the deliberations and decisions of theBoard and the steering committee should be madeavailable to all. This will help engage a much largerconstituency and will also provide supervision. TheBoard and the committee must also strengthen theirsupervision and monitoring functions so that theycan perform as key institutions of management inthis sector.

3. Strengthen the role of the Project Tigerdirectorate in monitoring and coordination. Convertit into the Project Tiger Authority by giving itadministrative autonomy. Project Tiger shouldreport annually to the Indian Parliament so thatpolitical commitment to the project deepens.Independent monitoring reports commissioned bythe body should be available publicly and used fordecision-making with states.

The directorate of Project Tiger must have theinternal capacity to both coordinate and guide theeffective implementation of the programme.Currently, the office is understaffed and under-equipped to handle the range of work that isnecessary (see Annexure IX: Investing in institutionsfor change: strengthening the Project Tigerdirectorate). The Task Force has reviewed thepresent work load and is suggesting that the ProjectTiger directorate should be converted into a statutoryauthority — the Project Tiger Authority.

The following must be done to strengthen therole of the directorate:

1. To ensure that states follow the guidelines andprescriptions laid down for the project, a systemof having a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’(MoU) with the project states should be instituted.Any deviation or default from the MoU should bereported to the steering committee.

2. Considering the multifarious nature of workhandled by the director, Project Tiger, it is essentialto strengthen the directorate with autonomy. Thedirectorate at present comprises of one director (ofthe rank of inspector general of forests), a jointdirector, one section officer, one personalsecretary, one accountant, a lower division clerkand a peon. The directorate should have at leasttwo deputy inspector general-level officers (one forgeneral and the other for technical work) to assistthe director, apart from other professionals. Thereshould also be scope for contractual arrangementswith scientific institutions like the NationalRemote Sensing Agency, the Forest Survey ofIndia, the Wildlife Institute of India and

universities to foster field research.3. The director, Project Tiger, should be delegated

powers to deal with states under Section (3) ofthe Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, especially forthe enforcement of Project Tiger guidelines.

4. The role of director, Project Tiger, should notremain confined to tiger reserves, but needs to beextended to other crucial forest areas as wellwhich have viable tiger populations.

5. The Project Tiger directorate should berestructured and made into an administrativeauthority at the outset. In the meantime, workshould be initiated to use the statutory precedentof the Central Zoo Authority to establish a‘Project Tiger Authority’. This statutory role willgreatly improve in planning, supervision andmonitoring functions.

The directorate must ensure that the followingis done:

a. Appointment of key personnel in tiger reservesafter approval from the Centre: This was acondition from the very inception of the project,but has gone into disuse. By creating a strongerprofile and management role for the directorate,states can be persuaded and directed to ensurethat this is done. This is critical because personnelin these reserves must be chosen carefully so thatthey have the credentials and an interest inwildlife conservation, as well as the managementexperience to deal with the larger issues at hand.

b. Careful annual analysis of the independentassessment done for each reserve by thedirectorate: This will enable the directorate to notethe performance of each reserve, its personnel andthe state government in protecting tigers. While thehigh performers must be rewarded annually, thelow performers must also be given a reputationalincentive to improve. This can be done by:

● Making the report of the independent audit, withits ratings and scores of high and low performers,available as an annual report from the directorateto the Parliament. This will lead to much greaterinvolvement of parliamentarians from differentstates in this work and build a stronger supportbase for the project.

● Using the score to reduce financial allocation tothe different reserves. As it clearly will not beadvisable to use financial conditionality in amanner that allows reserves to furtherdeteriorate, it can be used to create conditionsthat improve the working of reserves. However,the Task Force also suggests that any reserve andstate government which receives low scores for aconsecutive period of three years should bepenalised financially as well.

32 The way ahead


c. Make the rating and assessment of theindependent monitoring available in the publicdomain: This can be done through the Web and inreports to the Parliament. This will force scrutinyfrom the civil society and lead to an informedpublic debate. It is also a safeguard to ensure theindependence of the monitors, as scrutiny frompeers and the public is the best auditor.

d. Involvement of the directorate in the habitat andtiger estimation made across the country: It mustwork with professional institutions, buildingtheir capacity to undertake this work to supportstate governments in the estimation. This‘census’ is critical for deciding policy andstrategies in this field.

B. On strengthening institutions at the state level

1. Create a state steering committee for ProjectTiger with the chief minister of the tiger range stateas its chair.

There is no regular mechanism for chiefministers of tiger range states to take stock, assessand direct work on tiger conservation. Without theinvolvement of the chief ministers, this agendacannot go forward.

The chief minister is the chairperson of the statewildlife board. But unfortunately, these boards havebecome defunct in many states, where their meetingshave not been convened for many years. The problemis that state governments — especially the politicalleadership — do not see any advantage in wildlifeconservation. The boards have also lost their purposeand do not play effective roles in guiding wildlifepolicy. There is no simple or easy answer to this issue.

We have to understand why states and theirleaders are disinterested in wildlife. The problem isthat wildlife conservation has been reduced to narrowconstituencies; the public has lost interest in it. Butpublic support for wildlife is crucial. The Task Force,therefore, suggests that much more must be done toexpand the concern, to involve different segments ofthe society in wildlife conservation and to provide anincentive for states to take this issue seriously.

The cases of Kaziranga national park in Assam orKanha in Madhya Pradesh are relevant here. Publicreputation and pride has led the state governments torecognise and facilitate these protected areas.Similarly, the reputation of each state government andits people must be enjoined to the protection of tigers.

2. The state chief wildlife warden must have abackground and interest in wildlife conservation.

The position of the chief wildlife warden iscritical in states, for this official is a statutory authorityunder the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, and isresponsible for all wildlife-related work and oversees

the functioning of protected areas. Currently, anyofficer can become the chief wildlife warden on thebasis of seniority — irrespective of experience,aptitude or interest in wildlife issues. In the guidelinesfor the project issued in the early 1970s, it was clearlyindicated that officers who are given this charge musthave a background or interest in wildlife conservation.However, this guideline is rarely used. It is importantthat governments develop a criterion for theappointment of the head of wildlife in the state.

But it is also important to note that this processwill only work if the state government has areputational advantage in maintaining its wildlifeand has a vigilant public opinion. These will drive itto ensure that only professionals with a demonstratedhigh order of skills are appointed to this critical post.

3. Create management committees for eachprotected area, which will include local communityrepresentatives, NGOs and researchers.

The 2003 amendment of the Wildlife (Protection)Act, 1972, included a provision for an advisorycommittee in each state, chaired by the chief wildlifewarden and including members of state legislature,Panchayati Raj institutions, NGOs and individuals.The committee was to advise on measures to be takenfor better conservation and management, includingthe participation of people living within and aroundthe protected area. The Tiger Task Force has beenunable to find any state that has constituted such acommittee; it urges that this be done for every tigerreserve, to begin with. At the same time, the TaskForce suggests some modifications, as follows:

a. The mandate of the committee must not only beadvisory, but must have management functionsas well. The management plan of each reserve aswell as the annual plans and the work completedmust be discussed with the committee. This willrequire an eventual amendment of the Wildlife(Protection) Act, 1972, but states can take theleadership in this. The effective functioning ofsuch committees must become models for othersto emulate.

b. As there are large numbers of people livingwithin and adjacent to reserves, these committeesmust include their representatives so thatdiscussions can be initiated with them.

C. On strengthening professional expertise inconservation

1. Create a sub-cadre of wildlife specialists andprofessionals.

The need for this sub-cadre has been discussedfor many years, but little of substance has happenedin this regard. The issue that remains unresolved is

The way ahead 33


whether the service should be created as a separatewildlife (parks) service, or whether it should be asub-cadre within the forestry services.

As early as in 1973, the then prime minister IndiraGandhi wrote to all chief ministers, asking them tointroduce a specialised management for parks andsanctuaries. She suggested an approach in whichstates with important wildlife populations wouldcreate wildlife departments under the forestdepartment; there would be a separate wildlife serviceand forest officers would be given a choice to opt forthis service. Specialised training would be provided tothis cadre, which would be responsible for managingnational parks and sanctuaries exclusively.

In 1976, the Central government issued detailedguidelines for the creation of wildlife wings in thestates. The guidelines included a provision that inother forests, the existing territorial officers of theforest department would continue to be responsiblefor wildlife conservation. But to improve their workin wildlife conservation, the Centre asked the chiefwildlife wardens of the states to make end-of-the-yearentries in their confidential reviews with regard to thework done and interest evinced in conservation.

The 1980 report of the Committee forRecommending Legislative Measures andAdministrative Machinery for EnsuringEnvironmental Protection — also known as the N DTiwari committee, which recommended the settingup of a department of environment in the country —also deliberated on this issue. In its view, “Foreffective and scientific management of such reservesa special sub-cadre of scientific personnel should becreated within the forest department of states andUnion territories.” In addition, “Personnel shouldnot be interchangeable with those in regular forestservices, but should be assured their careeradvancement within their sub-cadre by extendingthe concept of flexible complementation.” However,one member of this committee suggested thereshould be a separate central wildlife service,dedicated to the protection of species and parks.

Currently, the training for the Indian ForestService officers is conducted primarily at the IndiraGandhi National Forest Academy (IGNFA) inDehradun. The IGNFA curriculum includes courses inwildlife that provide orientation to officers, but nospecialisation. The Wildlife Institute of India alsooffers ongoing training courses in wildlifemanagement for mid-career professionals. But theseprofessionals do not necessarily qualify for work inwildlife areas after this specialisation.

The Task Force has reviewed the options for adedicated service versus a sub-cadre service, andalso discussed this issue with a wide-ranging groupof experts and officers.

It believes that it is important, in this age of

modern management, to be both a specialist andintegrationist in professions. This is even moreimportant in the area of forestry and wildlifemanagement. On one hand, wildlife managementdemands a high order of expertise, specialisation andinterest. On the other, a large number of wildlife isfound outside protected areas, which requiresmainstreaming the knowledge to foresters of alltypes. In addition, there are people living within thehabitats of wild animals — inside and outsideprotected areas. The forestry and wildlife professionhas to be capable of incorporating their concerns andworking as developmental agencies in the reserves.

It is for this reason the Task Force suggests thefollowing needs to be done:

a. Creation of a sub-cadre of wildlife specialistswithin the Indian Forest Service. The training forthis sub-cadre must be carefully reviewed by theIndira Gandhi National Forest Academy, WildlifeInstitute of India and other expert institutions sothat the course is rigorous and comprehensive.

b. The wildlife training provided to all others mustalso be reviewed so that it can mainstream thelearning.

c. The wildlife service should have a provision forlateral entry by wildlife scientists, so thatprofessionals can also be part of theadministration. In addition, there should be anopportunity for continuous training andspecialisation in this service during their career.

d. To mainstream concern for wildlife, theconfidential reviews of the territorial officersshould include an assessment from the statewildlife warden (this was recommended in the1976 guidelines as well).

e. To mainstream concern for people’s livelihoods,the confidential reviews of both the wildlife andforest services must include an assessment oftheir work done in this area. This is particularlyimportant for wildlife service officers, who haveto build relationships with local communitiesand engage them in conservation.

D. On strengthening supervision in the project

1. Conduct independent audits of each reserveannually and put this information in the publicdomain.

As discussed above, an independent assessmentof tiger reserves must be done every year by a wide-ranging team of experts and activists. The purpose ofthis management audit is to establish thebenchmarks for each reserve and to track itsdevelopment carefully. If this audit is done well, itwill obviate Sariska-type events for it will provideforewarning information, which can then be used for

34 The way ahead


The way ahead 35


Imperatives for strengthening Project Tiger:● Political commitment and coordination at the national and state levels● Coordination with the tiger range states● Enhancing the capacity of the Project Tiger directorate and coordination within the

Union ministry of environment and forests

The recommendations:1. Reorganise Union ministry of environment and forests to create two separate

departments: that of environment and that of forests and wildlife.2. Revitalise the National Board for Wildlife and/or request the prime minister to chair

the steering committee of the Project Tiger for the coming few years.3. Convert the Project Tiger directorate into the Project Tiger Authority by giving it

administrative autonomy. Project Tiger should report annually to the IndianParliament so that political commitment to the project deepens.

4. Create a state steering committee for Project Tiger with the chief minister of the tigerrange state as its chair.

5. Create management committees for each protected area, which will include localcommunity representatives, NGOs and researchers.

6. Create a sub-cadre of wildlife specialists and professionals.7. Conduct independent audits of each reserve annually and put this information in the

public domain.8. Build collaborative networks with researchers to monitor change.

For Centre-state working:9. To ensure that states follow the guidelines and prescriptions laid down for the

project, a system of a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ (MoU) with the ‘project states’should be instituted. Any deviation or default from the MoU should be reported to thesteering committee.

10. The director, Project Tiger, should be delegated powers to deal with the states underSection (3) of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, especially for the enforcement ofProject Tiger guidelines.

11. The role of the director, Project Tiger, should not remain confined to tiger reserves,but needs to be extended to other crucial forest areas as well that have viable tigerpopulations.

12. The Project Tiger directorate should be restructured and made into an administrativeauthority at the outset. In the meantime, work should be initiated to use the statutoryprecedent of the Central Zoo Authority to establish a ‘Project Tiger Authority’. Thisstatutory role will greatly improve planning, supervision and monitoring functions.

Recommendations at a glance

management and policy decisions. What will be critical here is to (i) ensure

transparency in the audits and (ii) make certain thatall reports are made available in the public domain.

2. Build collaborative networks with researchersto monitor change.

There are a number of individuals andinstitutions engaged in monitoring change in habitatsand species in and around protected areas. There arealso researchers engaged in understanding thehuman-park relationships. There is currently nocoordinated project to bring all this research

together. The Task Force suggests creating aconsortium that can network and facilitate researchand use its outcomes for policy directions.

The fact is that tigers cannot be saved unless theinstitutions set up to protect and manage tiger habitatsare saved. It is clear that what is needed is not to createnew institutions per se, but to make the existingmechanisms functional and effective. This Task Forcebelieves that this can only happen with greater publicdisclosure, support and interest so that institutions aremade accountable and are under pressure to perform.There are no quick fixes to institutional reform. Butreform is essential and must be undertaken.

Funds and protection

An analysis of funds allocated for each tiger reservereveals some important trends:

1. The oldest reserves such as Kanha in MadhyaPradesh, Corbett in Uttaranchal or Ranthambhore inRajasthan may have received the highest amount oftotal funds since the inception of the programme. Butwhen this is analysed against the number of yearssince the reserve has been set up, the picturechanges.

2. Instead of Kanha or Corbett, the reserves thathave received the highest average yearly allocation

are Bhadra in Karnataka, Panna in Madhya Pradeshand Tadoba-Andhari in Maharashtra. These reservesreceived over Rs 1 crore annually. Older reserves likeKanha or Corbett slip to 5th and 7th positionsrespectively in this respect.

3. The annual average allocation across the countryis Rs 72.12 lakh per reserve per year since theinception of the programme.

4. But if what is allocated to a reserve is seen asproportional to the area the reserve covers, interestingfindings appear. This is assuming that the larger thearea, the higher the money needed for its managementand protection. This estimation does not take into

The purpose behind creating a protected area and atiger reserve is to provide special and additionalprotection to the biodiversity, beyond what isprovided in other categories of forests.

Under the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972,sanctuaries and national parks are provided with ahigher level of protection. The Act is designed toconstrain human activity and presupposes that therewill be no human presence in national parks andminimal human presence in sanctuaries. It hasintroduced a permit system under which the chiefwildlife warden can grant permits for use of forest-based biomass or products, but these are restrictiveand limited.

The Act specifies that:“No person shall destroy, exploit or remove any

wild life including forest produce from a sanctuaryor destroy or damage or divert the habitat of any wildanimal by any act whatsoever or divert, stop orenhance the flow of water into or outside thesanctuary, except under and in accordance with apermit granted by the chief wildlife warden, and nosuch permit shall be granted unless the stategovernment being satisfied in consultation with theBoard that such removal of wildlife from thesanctuary or the change in the flow of water into oroutside the sanctuary is necessary for theimprovement and better management of wildlifetherein, authorises the issue of such permit:

“Provided that where the forest produce isremoved from a sanctuary the same may be used formeeting the personal bona fide needs of the peopleliving in and around the sanctuary and shall not beused for any commercial purpose.”

While this is the legal formulation for creating

protected areas, the creation of a tiger reserve is anadministrative process. In most cases, tiger reservesare created as administrative entities over-arching anational park, adjoining sanctuaries or reserve forests.The idea works to advantage as it fits in very wellwith the logic behind a tiger reserve. The requirementof a tiger reserve is the demarcation of the area intothe core (invariably protected as a national park) andthe buffer (both/either a sanctuary or forest area).

The core is accorded the highest level ofprotection; no human habitation is recommendedhere. The buffer allows for people to live in. But thebasic laws regulating the national park and thesanctuary continue to be in place. The creation of atiger reserve does demand that the entire area of thebuffer (which may have been a sanctuary or a reserveforest earlier) comes under a unified control — inother words, the same senior officer controls theoperations of the department related to the buffer aswell as the core area. This is meant to generate acohesive and comprehensive management plan forthe entire tiger reserve.

The focus in the tiger reserves is to increaseinfrastructure for protection. Till date, increasingprotection has been considered the equivalent ofincreasing the infrastructure for protection. TheTiger Task Force, in collaboration with the ProjectTiger directorate, has assembled data on some vitalelements of current infrastructure to understandwhere the lacunae lie. The Project Tiger directoratealso provided the Task Force with detailed allocationand expenditure statements for each tiger reserve.Analysis of these is vital to understand the source ofweakness in the field and to see if these have beenmisinterpreted, resulting in non-workable strategies.

3.2 The protection agenda

36 The way ahead


account the ecological significance of the reserve.But in this case, the highest recipients are, still,

Panna and Pench in Maharashtra. Sariska in Rajasthancomes a close third. These are the smallest reserves inthe country, with Pench covering just 257 sq km.

Pench has invested over Rs 3 lakh per sq kmsince its inception in 1992. Sariska has invested Rs

2.58 lakh per sq km since it was created in 1978.

5. But if an estimate is made on the basis of persquare kilometre per year since the reserve has beenin operation, Bhadra still scores the highest with Rs30,000 per sq km per year, while Sariska stands atnumber seven with Rs 10,000 per sq km per year, still

The way ahead 37


(Rs

in la

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Name of tiger reserve

0

500

1,000

1,500

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2,500

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ALLOCATION OF FUNDS TO TIGER RESERVES FROM INCEPTION TO 2004-2005

National average

National average

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

(Rs

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Bhad

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AVERAGE YEARLY ALLOCATION OF FUNDS TO TIGER RESERVES FROM INCEPTION TO 2004-2005

higher than Corbett (Rs 6,000 per sq km per year) andKanha (Rs 5,000 per sq km per year).

6. The Task Force has used the number of tigers inthe reserve (2001 census) as a rough indicator of theallocation of funds vis-a-vis the importance of thehabitat. The estimate changes again. This time, thereserves of Dampa in Mizoram, Sariska and

Ranthambhore climb to the top. Reserves like Kanhaand Corbett, with higher numbers of tigers, drop to14th and 18th positions respectively — closer to thenational average of Rs 23 lakh per tiger from theinception of the programme. But it is reserves likeSundarbans in West Bengal that deserve attention,because they get less than Rs 8.76 lakh per tiger, ascompared to the over Rs 1 crore per tiger that was

38 The way ahead


0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

Dam

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(Rs

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ALLOCATION OF FUNDS TO TIGER RESERVES PER TIGER FROM INCEPTION TO 2004-2005

National average


(Rs

in la

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0

0.50

1.00

1.50

2.00

2.50

3.00

3.50

Penc

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National average


ALLOCATION OF FUNDS TO TIGER RESERVES PER SQUARE KILOMETRE FROM INCEPTION TO 2004-2005

Personnel and protection

It is clear that protection or management is notpossible without trained and capable staff.

At one level, the forestry sector suffers from poorcadre management and training. The revival of directrecruitments to the state forest services havesignificantly upset the promotion prospects lowerdown, leading to frustration in the subordinateforestry cadres — the rangers and the frontline staff.At another, the decay in the forestry services have ledto deteriorated capacity-building (see Annexure X: Acritique of cadre-building in the forestry sector andsuggestions for human resource improvement).

This is an issue that came up in most discussionsthe Tiger Task Force was involved in. So the TaskForce worked with the Project Tiger directorate to

collect information from each reserve about thenumber, age and training of personnel to better assessthe problems in the country.

The issues reviewed in this survey were:● The personnel in place and their ability to

become an effective force for protection● The infrastructure provided to the force to

effectively monitor and protect tiger reserves● The issues of human resource management and

strategies to make the best use of the availableinfrastructure

Consultations with experts suggested that the staffstrength, as well as the staff’s capacity and ability toprotect and guard, had deteriorated over the decades.The problem was two-fold: one, the field staffsanctioned for particular tiger reserves had not been

The way ahead 39


spent in Sariska since its inception.

7. Sundarbans has the highest number of tigers —245 according to the 2001 census — and the leastinvestment in terms of both area and tigers. Corbetthas a total investment of Rs 27 crore spread over 32years, for an area of 1,316 sq km, and an estimatedpopulation of 137 tigers.

On the other hand, there is Ranthambhore,which shows an investment of Rs 23.5 crore spreadover the same years and area as Corbett, with anestimated population of 35 tigers. Till date, therefore,Ranthambhore has invested Rs 67 lakh per tiger,

compared to the Rs 19.66 lakh spent by Corbett andRs 8.76 lakh by Sundarbans.

This indicator is not to count the money pertiger. But it is useful as a management tool tounderstand that it is not necessary that money alonewill make the difference for tiger preservation (seegraphs: Allocation of funds to tiger reserves frominception to 2004-2005; Average yearly allocation offunds to tiger reserves from inception to 2004-2005;Allocation of funds to tiger reserves per squarekilometre from inception to 2004-2005; Allocation offunds to tiger reserves per tiger from inception to2004-2005).


Are

a co

vere

d (in

sq

km)

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

Valm

iki

Tado

ba-A

ndha

ri

Sund

arba

ns

Sim

lipal

Satp

ura

Saris

ka

Rant

ham

bhor

e

Periy

ar

Penc

h (M

P)

Penc

h (M

aha)

Pann

a

Pala

mau

Pakk

e-N

amer

i

Nam

dhap

a

Nag

arju

nasa

gar-

Sris

aila

m

Mel

ghat

Man

as

Kal

akad

-Mun

dant

hura

i

Kan

ha

Indr

avat

i

Dud

hwa

and

Kat

arni

agha

t

Dam

pa

Cor

bett

Buxa

Bhad

ra

Band

ipur

Band

havg

arh

Source: Compiled from data received from Project Tiger directorate

AVERAGE AREA COVERED BY GUARDS IN TIGER RESERVES

National average

deployed. Two, the existing field staff was old andunfit for physically strenuous activity like patrollingin the forests.

Much of the physical labour of securing theprotected area is the responsibility of either the forest

guard or the forester. Their duties include patrollingtheir beats and walking the beats assigned to themduring night, camping at chowkis built to facilitatepatrolling deeper into the forests, carrying out anti-poaching raids and maintaining fire lines and patrol

40 The way ahead


Tiger reserve Total area covered by a staff (in sq km)

Ranger Forester Guard

Bandhavgarh 89.38 72.63 23.24

Bandipur 150.80 62.83 14.93

Bhadra 123.00 28.94 10.70

Buxa 27.11 10.26 3.06

Corbett 101.23 73.11 11.34

Dampa 166.67 250.00 166.67

Dudhwa and Katarniaghat 80.12 25.70 10.48

Indravati 2,799.00 215.31 39.99

Kanha 162.08 27.39 12.23

Kalakad-Mundanthurai 66.67 61.54 20.00

Manas 258.18 48.14 10.18

Melghat 98.65 23.29 7.55

Nagarjunasagar-Srisailam 67.32 51.71 10.59

Namdapha 248.13 116.76 66.17

Pakke-Nameri 301.50 86.14 25.66

Palamau 114.00 36.64 5.86

Panna 31.88 28.53 7.32

Pench (Maharashtra) 85.67 32.13 5.14

Pench (Madhya Pradesh) 54.14 22.97 13.30

Periyar 70.64 21.00 5.36

Ranthambhore 74.11 23.00 9.88

Sariska 108.25 34.64 13.53

Satpura 61.92 30.96 12.28

Simlipal 196.43 74.32 25.00

Sundarbans 215.42 112.39 25.34

Tadoba-Andhari 124.00 56.36 11.07

Valmiki 120.00 42.00 10.91

National average 228.85 81.20 15.35

AREA COVERED BY STAFF OF TIGER RESERVES

Source: Compiled from data received from the Project Tiger directorate

roads. For the skilled poacher, the forest-dependentvillager as well as for the tourist, the guard is the faceof the forest department. Therefore, these two ranksalmost hold the fort together for the forestdepartment.

Coverage and efficiencyThere is no quantitative standard for measuring theefficiency of field staff in terms of the area they cover,particularly as ecosystems and habitats differ acrossthe country. But a comparative analysis across the 28reserves shows up trends on one very significantparameter: the basic area that a forest guard issupposed to cover. The Task Force analysed data forthree field-level staff positions — rangers, forestersand guards and watchers (see table: Area covered bystaff of tiger reserves).

1. There is a large variation in the area that a guardor any field officer needs to cover in different parksthat fall under a tiger reserve. In the case of guards,the most well-covered is Buxa tiger reserve in WestBengal, with a guard for almost every three sq km.The worst in terms of area covered is Dampa tigerreserve in Mizoram, with a dismal 166.67 sq km to becovered, on an average, by each guard posted there.

2. On an average, a guard in the country’s tigerreserves covers 15.35 sq km. But if the reserves in theextremes are removed from the data spectrum, thenthe average for most in the country is 13.54 sq km perguard. It is also difficult to estimate if the number ofguards available in the area makes an overwhelmingdifference in the protection strategy.

Given the diversity of ecosystems, thereobviously cannot be one country-average of the areathat a forest guard or any other forest field officershould cover. The task depends on regional,topological and ecological variations. Under idealsituations there should be adequate guards for eachbeat of a tiger reserve, given the beat is of arationalised size (see graph: Average area covered byguards in tiger reserves).

The Task Force does not have complete data toanalyse the position of guards as compared to thebeats. But for the few cases it has information on, thesanctioned number of guards at present does notcorrespond to the number of beats in the tigerreserves. Take the case of Bandhavgarh, whereagainst 62 beats there are 50 sanctioned posts offorest guards; even though the reserve has hired moreguards than it had been sanctioned, six beats remainvacant.

3. However, analysis shows that if only the coreareas of a reserve are taken as its key patrolling area,then in reserves like Sariska, Periyar (Kerala) or

Ranthambhore there is one staff to manage every sqkm of the area.

4. The tiger reserves in northeast India showdefinitive low coverage by the forest departmentstaff. In the case of Nameri in Assam, a forest guardcovers an area of 25.66 sq km on an average. InNamdapha in Arunachal Pradesh, it deteriorates to66.17 sq km and in Dampa, a dismal 166.67 sq km.This must be understood in the context of the landuse patterns in the region coupled with the type ofterrain these reserves cover. Traditionally, theseareas have not had high intensity coverage by anygovernment or administrative staff. Much of theseareas also remain inaccessible to people orcommunities which have not inhabited the regionstraditionally, and who, therefore, are inept atnavigating in and using the region, especially duringthe so-called ‘tough periods’, such as the monsoons.A stereotypical approach is to ask for an increase inprotection staff in these regions, despite the fact thatduring monsoons, the period when the threat ofpoaching peaks, the staff will find it almostimpossible to move around in the reserves.

A more logical way to progress in these regionswith a view to increase protection would, therefore, beto look for ways to involve people who havetraditionally inhabited and used these areas forvarious livelihood needs. A case in point is theNamdhapa tiger reserve. The area of the reserve isused by, besides other communities, the Lisu, who arelegendary for their hunting abilities and are known toutilise and move around the forests with ease duringall seasons. It would be innovative to examine thepossibility of converting the expertise of this tribe, atpresent perceived as a threat, to the advantage of thereserve. A proposal to utilise the resources, humanpower and expertise of the Lisu community in theprotection of Namdhapa has been discussed inanother section of this report (see chapter 3.4:Innovative protection agenda). The opportunity ofemploying similar strategies in other parks innortheast India should be explored as against theapproach to increase armed personnel which could, atthe least, turn out to be dangerously explosive.

5. A peculiar situation arises in the case of reservesfalling in naxalism-affected areas, such asNagarjunasagar-Srisailam in Andhra Pradesh,Valmiki in Bihar, Palamau in Jharkhand andIndravati in Chhattisgarh. Each one of these reserveshas a high number of guards but, as experts point out,real patrolling in these regions is made impossible bythe prevailing security situation.

Even here, the clamour has been for an increasein patrolling and staff in these vulnerable andtroubled reserves. But the fact is that the patrolling

The way ahead 41


staff available with the forest department is alreadyvery high here. In Valmiki, the forest guard on anaverage has to cover an area of 10.91 sq km; inNagarjunasagar-Srisailam, 10.59 sq km. Palamau isas low as one forest guard for 5.86 sq km.

It is also a fact that the vacancies in the positionof the guard in these insurgency-ridden reserves are48.57 per cent, again symptomatic of a state underpressure.

Therefore, what is clearly needed is to devise

strategies to:a. fill those vacancies of guards, the recruitment for

which has already been sanctioned; andb. find alternative ways of patrolling those reserves

which are under the control of insurgents.

Again, the government must look at other optionsand explore alternative strategies to manage theseparks. The old belief that more guards mean betterprotection has been tested and has failed.

The vacant staff position

The issue is not what the total staff strength is, buthow many staff positions have been filled. The TaskForce has found that:

1. Almost one-fifth or 18.2 per cent of the posts forfield staff (forest guards, foresters and rangers)remain vacant across 28 tiger reserves.

The sanctioned total staff strength for all reservesis 4,353 personnel. Of these, 792 posts are lyingvacant. Vacancies were marginally higher, at 19.24per cent, in the case of the forest guard who forms thefrontline of protection as compared to the forester(14.24 per cent) (see graph: Forest guard vacancy(percentage)).

2. But it is important to review the vacancies in terms of the level of the staff. It is clear that

the bottom-rung (the crucial foot soldiers) have higher vacancies. In fact, there are 108

42 The way ahead



–20

–10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Sund

arba

ns

Pakk

e-N

amer

i

Band

ipur

Sim

lipal

Pala

mau

Indr

avat

i

Nam

dhap

a

Valm

iki

Bhad

ra

Buxa

Man

as

Dud

hwa

and

Kat

arni

agha

t

Periy

ar

Pann

a

Cor

bett

Nag

arju

nasa

gar-

Sris

aila

m

Penc

h (M

aha)

Mel

ghat

Rant

ham

bhor

e

Kal

akad

-Mun

dant

hura

i

Satp

ura

Saris

ka

Kan

ha

Dam

pa

Tado

ba-A

ndha

ri

Penc

h (M

P)

Band

havg

arh

National average

Naxalism affected

Northeast tiger reserves

Vaca

ncy

(in p

erce

ntag

e)


FOREST GUARD VACANCY (PERCENTAGE)

Seniorofficers

Range forestofficers

Foresters Guards Others

Total sanctioned

Vacant

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

Num

ber

of s

taff

Designation of staff


NUMBER OF VACANCIES ACROSS POSTS IN TIGER RESERVES

sanctioned positions for senior officers (chiefconservator-assistant chief conservator). Of these, 96are filled — which means 11 per cent vacancy in thiscategory.

3. The forest guard vacancy in Sundarbans,Bandipur in Karnataka and Simlipal in Orissa are ofparticular concern (these are non-insurgency andnon-northeast reserves discussed earlier).

4. It is important to review vacancies in tiger

reserves with respect to overall vacancies in theforest department. Today, across the country, thereare 76,174 guards in position for a sanctionedstrength of 87,592. Vacancies are as low as 13.04 percent. This indicates vacancies are lower in non-wildlife areas than in protected areas. Thus theremust be redeployment from the other forest sectorsand divisions to the wildlife divisions and protectedareas. There is no reason why the state of frontlinestaff should be any worse in the protected areas thanin non-protected areas.

Age of the staff

A related issue is the need to tackle the problem of the ageing force that exists at the field level. The average age of guards posted in the reserves is 42 years, whereas that of the forester and ranger is 46.The standard procedure of recruiting existing non-permanent staff to merely fill vacancies, as has

been done in Sariska recently, is certainly not theanswer. The forest guard is the equivalent of theinfantry for the forest department and must be tested — before recruitment — for physical fitnessand other abilities that would hold him in good steadin the field. There is a strong case for re-evaluatingthe criteria by which recruitments of forest guardsare made.

Capacity of the staff

It is vital that staff is fully trained to ensure effectiveprotection and management.

1. It is important to understand that the state ofaffairs in wildlife reserves is symptomatic of thesituation in the forestry sector in general. Lesser

people are being trained in the profession of forestryin the country. For instance, most colleges that trainrangers — the first rung of field officials — havevirtually closed down. This is extremely worrying: itimplies forest services will have lesser numbers oftrained personnel to manage an extremelyspecialised field (see graph: Number of trainedrangers passing out of state forest service courses).

The way ahead 43


0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Ave

rage

age

in y

ears National average

Pala

mau

Sim

lipal

Rant

ham

bhor

e

Dam

pa

Saris

ka

Band

havg

arh

Dud

hwa

and

Kat

arni

agha

t

Cor

bett

Kan

ha

Nag

arju

nasa

gar-

Sris

aila

m

Penc

h (M

P)

Pann

a

Indr

avat

i

Band

ipur

Kal

akad

-Mun

dant

hura

i

Satp

ura

Sund

arba

ns

Bhad

ra

Penc

h (M

aha)

Pakk

e-N

amer

i

Periy

ar

Tado

ba-A

ndha

ri

Nam

dhap

a



AVERAGE AGE OF GUARDS IN TIGER RESERVES

44 The way ahead


2. According to data provided by field directors, amere 10 per cent of the guards (field staff) in tigerreserves have been imparted any kind of training inwildlife. Out of 28 tiger reserves, 16 have no trainedforest guards at all. While the primary role of theforest guards is that of patrolling, there is no doubtthat in-job training on wildlife issues enhances theirself-esteem as well as that of the work they do, thusincreasing efficiency (see graph: Trained guards(percentage) in tiger reserves).

Deployment strategy: forest camps There is no doubt that at the centre of this issue is theidea of using strategic force instead of a large force.This demands two things from the tiger reservemanagement: one, an effective deployment ofpersonnel and two, a more efficient use of existingmachinery and infrastructure. That this has nothappened in a concerted manner is evident from theway permanent camps are utilised as bases tomonitor the habitat.

1. On an average, a patrolling camp for the totaltiger reserve — buffer and core — covers 36.34 sqkm. The fact is that patrolling is concentrated in thecore area. Therefore, a better estimation would be tocalculate the number of camps vis-a-vis the core areaof a reserve.● In Kanha, there is a camp for every 11.31 sq km

for the total area. Assuming concentration ofcamps is highest in the core, this reserve has acamp for every 3.12 sq km.

● Interestingly, in Ranthambhore, there is a campfor every 3.23 sq km of the core. Melghat is equally

well protected, with a camp for every 3.78 sq km. ● In Panna the camps, on an average, cover 10.04

sq km. But as the entire area comprises the core,the coverage per camp is much higher.

● The Kalakad-Mundanthurai tiger reserve inTamil Nadu has the lowest number of patrollingcamps — only one patrolling camp for the entire800 sq km reserve area.

2. The problem is that the camps present in mostreserves are poorly equipped and guards have towork in deplorable conditions, with no water, foodor other facilities. This makes it even more difficultto use the camps effectively for protection.

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

Num

ber

of t

rain

ed r

ange

rs

Years

National average

1978

-80

1979

-81

1980

-82

1981

-83

1982

-84

1983

-85

1984

-86

1985

-87

1986

-88

1987

-89

1988

-90

1989

-91

1990

-92

1991

-93

1992

-94

1993

-95

1994

-96

1995

-97

1996

-98

1997

-99

1998

-00

1999

-01

2000

-02

2001

-03

2002

-04

2003

-05


NUMBER OF TRAINED RANGERS PASSING OUT OF STATE FOREST SERVICE COURSES

0

20

40

60

80

100

120


Perc

enta

ge o

f tr

aine

d gu

ards

in e

ach

tiger

res

erve

Band

havg

arh

Cor

bett

Dam

pa

Indr

avat

i

Kan

ha

Kal

akad

-M

unda

nthu

rai

Pann

a

Penc

h (M

P)

Periy

ar

Satp

ura

Sund

arba

ns

Note: Tiger reserves from where no information was received have not beenincluded above.Source: Project Tiger directorate

TRAINED GUARDS IN TIGER RESERVES (PERCENTAGE)

Infrastructure

But a camp is not an automatic requisite forprotection. It also needs to be worked by managers,who must ensure that personnel are available for thecamp and are prepared and vigilant. This demands astrong internal management system, so that parkauthorities can ensure this is done.

Even if one were to remove the outliers orexceptional cases of reserves in northeast India, wherethe staff strength is low to begin with, the relationbetween the number of forest guards in place and thenumber of patrolling camps varies immensely.

The number of forest guards in the tiger reservesvis-a-vis the number of camps shows a very smallpositive correlation of 0.152 (on a range of +1 to –1where +1 represents a perfect correlation betweenthem). This indicates the number of camps created ina tiger reserve has almost no relation with thenumber of guards available for patrolling. The guardsare worth the money spent on them only if they havebeen deployed in the field at strategic locations andare not sitting idle.

Some tiger reserves have followed a morestrategic policy of deploying larger numbers of fieldstaff in the core of the reserve than in the buffer, forthe logic of an existing biodiversity-rich coredemands the area be better patrolled. This is the casein Kanha. There are some advantages to this strategy.The main purpose of the staff working in the core hasto be of protection whereas in the buffer, interactionwith the villages inside and at the periphery is of

greater moment; therefore, the skills of working withcommunities need to be honed. A greater degree ofefficiency can be achieved if the staff is accordinglytrained (see graph: Area covered by each camp (totalarea)).

1. There is a constant demand on the part of thereserves to increase the number of vehicles availableto forest officials. Depending upon the habitat,effective patrolling requires boats, bicycles as well asmotorcycles. But as of now, no audit exists of howefficiently these vehicles in the parks are used.Anecdotal information gathered during interactionswith officials has revealed that diversion of vehiclesmeant for patrolling to other purposes — includingtourism — has been a practice in some parks. Thismust be curtailed. At the same time, the old fleet ofvehicles should be phased out after inventorisation.

2. The Task Force has been unable to collectcomplete information on the number of guns andother weapons available in each reserve. But it mustbe noted here that:a. Most of the illegal hunting in the country is still

done by poachers using traditional arms andordinary 12-bore guns. In comparison, most ofthe armed forest staff now carry double-barrelguns, rifles and revolvers.

b. The Central government has been generous interms of funds to state forest departments for theprocurement of arms and ammunition. Thereforefunds, again, are not the problem.

The way ahead 45


Are

a (in

sq

km)


National average

Kal

akad

-Mun

dant

hura

i

Nag

arju

nasa

gar-

Sris

aila

m

Indr

avat

i

Dam

pa

Sund

arba

ns

Pakk

e-N

amer

i

Sim

lipal

Tado

ba-A

ndha

ri

Valm

iki

Band

ipur

Satp

ura

Saris

ka

Dud

hwa

and

Kat

arni

agha

t

Band

havg

arh

Periy

ar

Bhad

ra

Mel

ghat

Penc

h (M

P)

Pala

mau

Rant

ham

bhor

e

Kan

ha

Cor

bett

Pann

a

Penc

h (M

aha)

Nam

daph

a

Man

as

0

150

300

450

600

750

900


AREA COVERED BY EACH CAMP (TOTAL AREA)

46 The way ahead


c. However, forest staff are reluctant to usefirearms, as existing rules do not provide themenough immunity when someone is killed orinjured during firing.

d. The Central government also provides assistancefor deployment of armed guards in reserves. The

experience of these guards has, however, not beenvery encouraging. For instance, Ranthambhore isone reserve which has battalions of the RajasthanArmed Constabulary (RAC). But still, grazingcontinues. The numbers of tigers are also down, asper the census done by the state task force.

What we can learn from Sariska

Sariska is a perfect case in point to highlight all thatthe Task Force is discussing here. Unlike what hasbeen reported widely, Sariska seems to be wellstaffed and well protected. There are almost novacancies in the park; only two posts of forestersand two of guards are vacant. Whereas, on anaverage across all the 28 tiger reserves, more than20 posts at forester and guard levels remain vacantin each reserve.

If one compares the area that the field staff isrequired to cover as part of protection work, thenon an average, a forester in Sariska looks after theprotection of 34.64 sq km and a guard 13.53 sq km.This makes Sariska an above average case; the national average for the area a forester covers is 51.37 sq km and what a guard covers is 15.34 sq km.

Kanha Corbett Sunderbans Kalakad-Mundanthurai

Sariska

Ave

rage

yea

rly a

lloca

tion

(Rs

in la

kh)


National average

0

20

40

60

80

100

Periyar

AVERAGE YEARLY FUND ALLOCATION: THE BEST ANDTHE WORST

800


National average


SariskaAre

a co

vere

d by

eac

h ca

mp

(in s

q km

)

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

Periyar

AREA COVERED BY EACH CAMP


Periyar

Perc

enta

ge o

f tr

aine

d pe

rson

nel

0

10

20

30

40

50


Sariska

NA

PERCENTAGE OF TRAINED PERSONNEL

Particulars At Sariska

Senior officers Sanctioned 4

Filled 4

Rangers Sanctioned 8

Filled 8

Foresters Sanctioned 25

Filled 23

Forest guards Sanctioned 64

Filled 63

Rest Sanctioned 204

Filled 203

Area covered per guard (sq km) Forester 34.64

Guard 13.53

India on average (sq km) Forester 63.13

Guard 21.75

Source: Compiled on the basis of data from Project Tiger directorate

SARISKA TIGER RESERVE: PERSONNEL IN PLACE,SECURITY MISSING


The way ahead 47


It is clear that much more needs to be done to invest in the capacity and facilitiesprovided for protection and management of tiger reserves. But it is equally clear that thereare no single answers to the problems of the reserves. The Task Force believes that a singleor simple contention that the answer to tiger protection is to invest more resources,infrastructure or personnel for protection and management, is clearly not borne out by thefacts.

1. The reserves that have received the most financial investment have not necessarilyfared as the best managed or protected reserves in the country. Funds or infrastructure isnot the only determinant for success.

In fact, these resources can be counter-productive if the strategy for management isnot well considered and operationalised. For instance, Sariska and Ranthambhore, bothin Rajasthan, where the tiger has been reported to be under severe threat of extinction,have received the heaviest investments for developing protection infrastructure. It isimportant to address this issue. India, being a poor country with many competingpriorities, funds will always be scarce here for any given activity. The fact that the heavyinvestments made in these reserves have not yielded fruits needs to be highlighted, so thatstrategies that are indeed effective can be adopted.

Recommendation: Each reserve must have a specific and detailed strategy for protection.The independent monitoring of the reserve must include an assessment of theenforcement mechanisms in place and the patrolling efforts of field staff, so that policyinterventions can be designed.

The Task Force does not recommend the need for armed forces as the mostappropriate for protection. In fact, it finds that intervention of armed personnel inprotection of reserves is not necessarily the most appropriate response. Project Tiger hasprovisions for providing central funding support to deploy armed personnel from centralreserve police and state police. But this experience, in many cases, has not been usefulbecause of the unfamiliar terrain and circumstances.

2. However, there are areas that have unique problems that need urgent and carefulreview. These are:i. The reserves in the northeastern part of the country, which are inaccessible and

occupy vast areas: Manas, 2,840 sq km; Nameri, 1,206 sq km; and Namdapha, 1,985 sqkm. Except for Manas, which is flat and largely accessible, the terrain in the otherreserves is extremely inhospitable for outsiders. The question is: what kind ofprotection strategy should be applied in these areas? The convention — more guardsper sq km — will simply not work here.

ii. The reserves in the naxalite-hit areas, which are simply out of bounds for the forestprotection forces. These are also large — Nagarjunasagar-Srisailam is the largestreserve in the country with an area of 3,568 sq km. Indravati sprawls over 2,799 sq km,and Palamau and Valmiki over 800 sq km each. Again, sanctioning more staff will notwork here, because they simply cannot be deployed. At present, these are reserveswith the highest vacancies in the field staff. In these reserves, what is needed is astrategy that involves the armed protection forces and makes allies of the local people.The alienation of the people because of the forest policy breeds support for naxalism;wildlife is part of this problem.

Recommendation: There should be a clear strategy for protection in the northeasternreserves, where local people will be the only ones capable of traversing and protecting the

Recommendations

48 The way ahead


area. There should also be a strategy for the reserves controlled by naxalites, where armedintervention by the police might be the only option. In other cases, armed protection is notnecessarily the solution. The answer will be in the deployment and internal managementto make the most effective use of existing resources and infrastructure for protection.

3. There is no indicator by which it can be determined that the number of staff in anyreserve is adequate for its protection and management. In a country as vast as India, thearea that is patrolled by each staff, even in the best of circumstances — as in Buxa tigerreserve — is 3 sq km, or 300 hectares. The average in the country is as high as 15.35 sq km,particularly because of the vastness of the northeast region and its inaccessibility. Evenafter removing these ‘extremes’, each guard is required to patrol 13.54 sq km (1,300hectares).

Again, answers to this cannot lie in simply increasing numbers of the protection andpatrolling force. What is really needed is a careful assessment of the demand and theadequacy of the staff as compared to the area, the ecological region and the nature of thethreat. For instance, in Kanha, one of the best managed tiger reserves, guards patrol 12.16sq km on an average. In Ranthambhore, which is now known to have lost a large numberof its tigers, guards patrol 9.88 sq km on an average.

The issue that needs to be considered carefully is why does patrolling work in Kanha,which has as per the last count protected its tigers, and not in Ranthambhore? Clearly, thethreat of poaching remains in both the reserves. In both, the number of people who liveinside and outside the boundaries are proportionally equal. But there could be othercontributing factors, such as the hostility of local people to the reserves, the pressure ofgrazing because of lack of investment in neighbouring areas and mismanagement.

Recommendation: Further recruitment of staff — foresters as well as guards — must bereserved, as far as possible, for local villagers. The villagers located within the reserve(who are not being relocated) or the villagers who have been relocated outside the reservemust get preferential jobs in the reserves. This will provide local people with a positivestake in the protection of reserves. There should be direct recruitment and trainingprovided for the recruits.

The criterion for recruitment should be amended so that it relaxes the formaleducational qualifications needed for this position and instead values skills in junglecraft. In addition, there should be provision for in-service training for locally recruitedstaff.

4. The ability and capacity of the staff is an important consideration. As far as this isconcerned, most reserves are in the same boat. The average age in the country for guardsis 42 years, for foresters, 46 years and for rangers, 47 years. But there are cases of concern— in Palamau the average age of guards is 53 and in Simlipal it is 49 years. The problemhere is that states are cash-strapped and are downsizing staff. In the most recent cases ofrecruitment, the effort has been to re-deploy persons from other services, which leads toeven more problems, or to hire temporary staff. It is not possible to look at this issue inisolation and must be considered carefully in the light of the situation prevailing acrossthe country and solutions found accordingly.

As far as training for foresters and guards is concerned, the situation is far fromsatisfactory in most reserves. The situation is unusual only in Corbett, and merits amention: all the guards and foresters have undergone formal training there. Kanha is next,where 53 of the 71 posted foresters are trained. But the capacity of guards has not beenbuilt in Kanha, with only six trained guards out of a total 159.

These are two of the top reserves in the country. In other words, the training of staff isclearly critical for management.

The way ahead 49


Recommendation: Training must be institutionalised so that each reserve has skilled andcommitted personnel.

5. The other key determinant seems to be the presence and deployment of camps withinthe reserves. It is clear that the reserves that seem to have made the best use of their camps— by increasing their numbers and locating them in vulnerable areas — are the mostsuccessful. But having a camp is not enough; it is also important that the camp is used andthis requires the internal management systems of the reserve to be tight and effective.

The other problem is that camps in many reserves lack basic facilities — of water orbuildings. Without this, it is difficult for the guards to be posted for longer durations,weakening protection. Therefore, this is clearly an area that needs investment. In Kanha,for instance, the Task Force found that an attempt had been made to provide solar energyfor charging the batteries of the wireless sets.

Another issue that has been raised in meetings with the guards is the need for freerations, so that they can avoid a trip to the market, which is often too far. This smallexpense would save them time and boost their morale. The situation of the field staff,particularly guards, in tiger reserves and other protected areas needs to be considered interms of facilities for their families. Currently, this category of staff lives within thereserves in protection camps whereas their families live in the staff quarters of the reserveand lack basic facilities such as schools for their children.

In other words, for effective management of the reserves, we need an able, capable andwell-equipped protection force. But getting this will require serious and substantivechanges in the way we invest in our natural and human capital.

Recommendation: There is a need to invest in basic facilities for the frontline staff. Thetwo key facilities this Task Force strongly recommends are: a. Housing camps in neighbouring district towns, usually where the project headquarter

is based, for families so that the education of their children can be secured;b. Free rations for guards living in the camps. This practice is followed by many

protection forces and helps in their work.c. Each reserve must create a staff welfare fund out of the income from tourism, which

can be used to supplement medical and other benefits for the staff.

6. These incentives must come with responsibility. Currently, the special allowancewhich is paid to staff within tiger reserves is taken for granted, as it becomes part of thepay package. It does not lead necessarily to better performances.

Recommendation: Even as there is investment in basic facilities and incentives, theremust be disincentives and rewards built into the system, based on independentmonitoring. For instance, the provision for free ration and special allowance must bewithdrawn in reserves that score low on the rating chart. This should be done withcomplete transparency so that it is not seen as political or discriminatory. In fact, this move will be a test for the independence and rigour of the independent assessment as well.

7. The issue of personnel in reserves needs a broader assessment as it concerns the stateof forest-related services across the country. The assessment of this Task Force is that thisservice is facing key challenges that need urgent redressal. Our concern is:a. The number of rangers being trained in the country is virtually down to zero. In other

words, over the coming years, there will be fewer trained personnel available in thissector. There are 16,000 positions for rangers in the entire country. In 2003-2005, only30 rangers passed out of the only functional training school in Kurseong, West Bengal.

50 The way ahead


b. The salary payments for state-level staff are in complete disarray in many areas —people do not get paid often for months on end. This situation cannot lead to highmorale and effective working in the field.

c. Then, even more seriously, reviews for staff have been waiting for years in manycases. The situation is so bad that a person entering a service at a particular level islikely to retire at the same rank. This is a clear failure of the administrators and has tobe dealt with immediately.

Recommendation: All the above recommendations will provide temporary relief unlessthere is a review of the crisis in forestry services and steps are taken to address issues oftraining, personnel development, staff reviews and salaries. This is necessary and urgent.

Nearly every part of the tiger has a commercial value.Live tigers are sold as exotic pets. Traditional Asianmedicine uses tiger bone as an ingredient in a numberof different concoctions. The skin is used to make‘magical’ amulets and novelties, and worn as part oftraditional attire. The teeth and claws too becomeamulets, while the tiger penis is an ingredient inreportedly powerful aphrodisiacs and tonics.

The tiger trade is primarily an export-orientedtrade for India. Tiger parts are not in demand inIndia, but have a large market abroad. The nature ofinternational trade in tiger parts is essential tounderstand the business of tiger trade in India.

There have been a few country-based or product-based studies conducted on tiger trade over the past two decades. But as these studies have been conducted by individual non-governmental(domestic and international) organisations, theresearch has been incremental in nature and presentsonly the parts of a complete picture.

The Chinese connectionIn the 1970s, tiger poaching was driven by demandfor the skin (used as fur in the US and Europeanmarkets) as well as for the bones (used in traditionalChinese medicine). But anti-fur campaigns wereeffective in reducing the demand for skins to someextent1.

Yet the 1980s and early 1990s saw a new rush —this time, increased demand for Chinese medicinesand, therefore, tiger bones and claws. The trade wasdriven by economic growth in southeast and eastAsia, including Japan, which at one time was thebiggest importer of Chinese ‘tiger’ medicines2.Between 1990 and 1992, over 71 tonnes of tigerderivatives/products were imported into Japan3.

The other large post for trade has been HongKong, which works as a hub for movement of tigergoods to other parts of the world, including Chinesemigrant communities in the US, Canada, the UK andEurope. Between 1990-92, Hong Kong was known toimport almost 48 per cent of the business in tigerproducts (excluding grains, capsules and pills) fromChina. Chinese authorities disclosed that in 1991,they exported 5,250 kg of liquid medicine, 15,079cartons of tablets and 31,500 bottles of tiger wine.4

This was at a time when the Chinese tigerpopulation was known to be almost decimated. Itwas well known that during the 1950s, the tiger wasseen as a threat to agricultural development in Chinaand had officially been declared a pest; it was hunteddown by state-appointed teams. China accumulated

a substantial amount of bones, which it was using forits medicines. By the mid-1980s, not only was thestock of bones gone, but there were hardly any tigersleft in its wilderness. But tiger parts were still comingfrom other countries, including India. The customsdata from South Korea showed that the country hadimported six tonnes of tiger bones between 1975 and1992, which experts calculated would mean between500 to 1,000 dead tigers. The imports were fromIndonesia and China which, it was assumed, meantthat the country was being used for re-exports, as itsown tigers were gone.

In 1996, the UK-based NGO, the EnvironmentalInvestigation Agency (EIA) reported that there werewell established routes for the movement of tigerparts out of India. The parts were being exported toTibet either directly or through Nepal and Myanmar.The business of tiger parts from India was seen to beincreasing in this period as tiger populations insoutheast Asia decreased.5

The early 1990s: flexed musclesBy the early 1990s, international concern had peakedon this issue. China, Taiwan and Japan were indictedfor their role in trade in tiger parts. In November1993, US groups pressurised their government toinvoke the Pelly Amendment — which allows thegovernment to impose bilateral trade sanctions on any country endangering wildlife. The US

government cracked down to impose trade sanctionson Taiwan but left out China, saying the White Housefelt that “it had shown considerable progress ineliminating tiger trade”. But critics believed that thiswas more because of its own trade interests withChina, growing at that time. In March 1994, when thenewly created Global Tiger Forum met with 11 tigerrange countries and international NGOs as members,China, though invited, stayed away.6

But international pressure prevailed and by 1994China, Taiwan and South Korea announced bans ontrade in tiger bones and their use in traditionalmedicines. The sanctions on Taiwan were lifted in1995, saying that “substantial steps” had been takento halt tiger product trade. In 1999, the US passedlegislation banning any product even “claiming” tocontain tiger parts, purportedly done to check the useof medicines which did not contain tiger bones, butwere labelled to do so.

But the international pro-tiger community waslooking for a victory. It asserted that China was notthe problem. In the late 1990s, WWF-TRAFFIC — thesame group that had blown the whistle on China —

The way ahead 51


3.3 The illegal trade agenda

52 The way ahead


now published its report, Far from a cure; the tigertrade revisited, in which it said that even thoughillegal trade continued, investment by China inenforcement was paying off.7 According to thisreport, its surveys in the late 1990s found that inChina and other non-range countries, the availabilityof tiger bone medicine had declined. Also, wholesaleprices reported for raw tiger bone in the black marketin China and South Korea were lower in the late1990s, suggesting a drop in demand.

Yet it was unclear whether such restrictions onlyforced the market to go underground, makingdetection of the trade more difficult. It was alsounclear whether they may have raised the stakes and,therefore, prices of tiger parts and the costs ofpoaching. The earlier reports that had shown amarked rise in tiger trade had been done with the helpof official statistics, ‘open’ surveys and telephonicinterviews, but the reports in 2000 largely dependedupon market reviews and attempts to penetrate theillegal markets. Therefore, how comparative thesefigures were remains questionable. The shovelling ofthe trade underground may have had other impactson the nature of the trade, making it undetectable orskewing statistics. It was also found that somemanufacturers labelled their products as tigerproducts, though they contained other animal partslike those of the leopard’s.

Just as conservationists cannot be certain howmuch of the old processed medicines reallycontained tiger parts, so too is it uncertain whetherthe new processed medicines really do not. Thequestion — do manufacturers continue to use tigerbone and just change the label — was apparently themost sensitive one asked during interview surveyscarried out for this report: most informants inCanada, Singapore and Taiwan claimed to be unsure.

Therefore, though there is a consensus that thetraffic in bones and other parts has gone downrelative to the mid-1980s, there is no conclusiveproof or evidence to suggest that the demand is lowenough, or substituted well enough by otheringredients, to not affect tiger populations in Indiaand other Asian range states.

Part of this vagueness in understanding trade intiger parts also arises from the availability of faketiger products or derivatives in the market. While apart of the trade in fakes has always existed, how itwas altered, with the tiger trade being banned in many parts of the world, remains unclear.Consequently, how it impacts the demand for tigerparts is also not clear.

The underground trade By early 2000, trade in tiger products and theirderivatives was clearly and most definitely illegal.But it continued.

In fact, there is evidence that illegal trade in tigerskins has surged since 2000. Four separate reportsfrom international NGOs seem to suggest that theinternational action, geared to ban trade and tightenenforcement, is not bringing in the benefits that wereforeseen.

By 1999, the EIA’s report State of the Tiger hadalready warned that enforcement was not working inChina. Chinese researchers found tiger medicineswere freely available in pharmacies. In Japan as well,medicines were available over the counter as well as online, advertising tiger products as theiringredients: this, when researchers found thatdetection was more and more difficult in thisunderground market.8

In October 2003, customs officers at a temporarycheckpoint in the Tibet Autonomous Region found,to their horror, a truck carrying a consignment of 31tiger skins, 581 leopard skins and 778 otter skins.These were being transported into the region. Thehaul, on the route to the Tibetan capital Lhasa,believed to be a major hub for this trade, was clearlycoming from India. Investigators found the Delhiedition of the daily newspaper, The Times of India,stuck to the backs of the skins. All three of thearrested traders had spent some time in a town justacross the border from Ladakh.

When the EIA sent its researchers to track down thelink, it found shops selling garments made of tigerskins. “Traders in Lhasa have told the EIA that wholetiger skins are sold to wealthy Chinese visitors fromBeijing and Hong Kong for decorative use in theirhomes. Whole leopard skins are also sold out ofbackrooms in Lhasa to wealthy Chinese and Europeanclients.”9 The report concluded that though the skintrade is poorly understood and the end markets arediffuse, it is clear that China is the primary destinationfor tiger and leopard skins from India.

Then in 2004, another report from WWF-TRAFFIC

on the Sumatran Tiger — a critically endangeredspecies — found that tiger part smuggling persisted,even though there was an apparent curtailing in themarkets for tiger bones used in traditional Asianmedicines. This report found that tiger parts weresold to Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Japan, Malaysiaand China. The report acknowledged that this washappening “despite Sumatran Tigers being fullyprotected by law, with tough provisions for jail time,steep fines, as well as increased effort in tigerconservation and building law enforcement and anti-poaching capacity”. However, its authors could onlysuggest that there should be increased enforcementin Indonesia to check this illegal trade.10

Also, it is clear that the advanced and highlypoliced industrial countries have not been able tocontrol this illegal trade. The 2004 TRAFFIC-NorthAmerica report on medicine markets in San

Francisco found that shops continued to sellproducts made from wild animals. However, insteadof tiger bones the products contained leopard parts.The leopard is also an endangered animal and hasbeen covered under the same restrictions. In the NewYork area, 41 per cent of the shops surveyed soldtiger bones and seven per cent sold rhino hornproducts (also banned). The report concluded thatthe Rhino and Tiger Product Labeling Act, passed in1998 in the US to ban the trade in these products (andeven their labelling), was having a nominal effect.The report then asked for more education and publicawareness.11

Therefore, what is clear is that illegal tradecontinues. It is the key reason for tiger poaching inrange countries like India and Indonesia. It is alsoapparent that the strategy to label the trade illegal hasonly made it more difficult to detect and contain. Inother words, as yet, international action on thiscritical issue has failed.

But strangely, instead of focusing on the need forincreased global action to stop illegal trade, the focusof the international NGOs, governments and agencieshas been on putting the blame on range countries likeIndia. They want India to invest more in guns, guards and enforcement, which will deal with theproblem.12 While it is clear that India needs to domuch more to improve its enforcement at home, it isequally clear that whatever it does will be inadequateif the international community cannot find answersto the tiger part riddle.

CITES on tiger trade

The Convention on International Trade inEndangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)is the international agreement that regulates thistrade. Since the early 1990s, CITES has been seeking tocontrol persistent illegal trade in tiger parts andderivates. In 1994, at its 9th Conference of Parties(CoP), a resolution was adopted to control this trade.When almost all countries complied and tiger tradewas made illegal, in 1997, at CoP 10, the partiesstrengthened this resolution to include specific stepsto address the decline in tiger populations andmandated its standing committee to undertakepolitical and technical missions to tiger range andconsumer countries to improve enforcement.

In early 2000, the CITES political and technicalmission visited India, China and Japan. In the case ofIndia, the mission was scathing in its denouncementof the government’s programme for tigerconservation. The team recommended that not onlymust all parties to the convention “refrain fromproviding financial support for tiger conservation inIndia”, it also directed the secretariat to report to the45th meeting of the standing committee on the

progress India had made on its recommendations.In the case of Japan, the team was more

circumspect. It asked the secretariat to assess theeffectiveness of the measures introduced by Japan tocontrol tiger trade.

But in the case of China, the team wasingratiatingly polite. It praised China for itscommitment to tiger conservation and said “it wassatisfied that there is genuine commitment byChinese officials to tiger conservation”. It alsorecognised the economic and cultural sacrifice thatChina had made in not using its stockpiled or captive-bred tiger products in traditional medicine. Whilethis is undoubtedly the case, what is interesting is that the same mission did not find India’sconservation programme, done at enormous personalsacrifice by the poorest, worthy of mention.

As far as the issue of illegal trade was concerned,the team noted that Chinese officials were clearlybemused that their country should still be viewed asa consuming nation, and felt that it was “perfectlyunderstandable that China should feel somefrustration at the lack of appreciation of its efforts”.However, while it went out of its way to appeasethese sentiments, “it noted the continuingintelligence and evidence that China remains aprimary destination for tiger parts and derivates”.What should then be done was not clear.13

In 2001, the first meeting of the CITES TigerEnforcement Task Force was held in Delhi. Later in2002, the task force organised a training programmeon illicit wildlife trade issues at the National PoliceAcademy.

At the CoP 12, held in Santiago, Chile in 2002, itwas agreed that the standing committee wouldcontinue to review progress on these issues. Thereview prepared by the CITES secretariat reported thatthe National Board for Wildlife, chaired by the primeminister, was taking measures to improve tigerconservation. It also continued to applaud China’scommitment to combating illegal trade.14

In 2004, at CoP 13 in Bangkok, the secretariat’sreport identified India and Nepal as particularlygood examples of countries where local communitieswere being encouraged to play a part in, and benefitfrom, the conservation of Asian big cats and theirhabitats. At the same time, it noted that conflictsbetween cats, and humans and livestock, were acommon problem range states reported. But illegaltrade, it noted, was still rampant in the region.15

The decision taken at CoP 13 was to direct thesecretariat to convene a special meeting of theenforcement task force “to examine the issue of illicittrade in Asian big cat skins with a view to facilitatingand improving the exchange of enforcementinformation and coordination of investigation”.

But things turned nasty around this time. At the

The way ahead 53


54 The way ahead


51st meeting of the standing committee, held inBangkok in October 2004, the secretariat reportedthat it had not received any written evidence of theprogress to enact adequate legislation to protect wildspecies from Gambia or India. The committeeinstructed the secretariat to issue a notificationrecommending a suspension of commercial trade inspecimens of CITES-listed species with these twoparties; the notification was issued in December2004.16 In March 2005, this notification waswithdrawn, based on the revised CITES legislationplan received from India, which consisted of India’sproposal to set up its own wildlife crime bureau,among other things. The CITES secretariat said it has“determined that India has shown good progress inthe adoption of legislation for implementing theconvention”.17

However, things did not end here. On April 12,2005 the secretary general of CITES wrote to the Indianprime minister seeking an urgent appointment todiscuss issues of concern and “how CITES and theinternational community can come to India’s aid”. Hesaid he was concerned that a specialised wildlifecrime unit had not yet been established and that Jammu and Kashmir continued to engage inprocessing shahtoosh wool. He went on to say thatthe fall in tiger population would be a strikingindictment upon all conservation efforts: “CITES is notwilling for such a charge to be laid against it”.18

Armed with this letter, the US government

submitted a proposal to the 53rd meeting of thestanding committee, held in June 2005, which askedfor strengthened efforts to halt the illegal trade. TheUS government wanted the secretary general to give areport on his request to the Indian prime ministerand if the meeting had not occurred, “a request toconvene the meeting at the earliest convenience”.19

In the meeting, the Indian delegation managed tostall the move.

But what is clear is that the global community,working through CITES, has being ineffective inchecking international trade in tiger parts. Theagreement, which has been established as a legalframework for the regulation and restriction of trade inspecies of wild animals and plants, has unfortunatelybecome extremely malleable to petty country politics.

CITES has often been criticised because of itsdependence on trade measures. In this case, it is clearthat the ban on tiger parts, however essential, haspushed the trade underground and made it evenmore difficult to detect. It is clear that trade ishappening. It is also clear that the markets existoutside India — in China, Tibet and even in the US.

It is important at this stage, when the Indian tigeris being hunted mercilessly, that we review theeffectiveness and role of global institutions like CITES.Global governance, which needs the cooperation of all, desperately needs institutional reform to make it more effective and meaningful in thisinterdependent world.

Captive tigers

China has an active tiger breeding programme. In2000, the CITES technical mission reported thatthere were 50 South China, 100 Bengal and Indo-China and 400 Siberian tigers in captivity. It wasnot clear what the country intended to do with thispopulation, given the ban on tiger products trade.

Thailand has a similar programme. The Sriachatiger zoo has over 400 tigers, which the governmentsays has microchips implanted on them to improvedetection. But little is known about the exactnumbers of tigers being bred in captivity in thecountry and this is providing opportunities forillicit trade. An Environmental InvestigationAgency (EIA) report in early 2000 said that therewere probably 1,000 tigers in captivity in Thailand;its investigations found that these tigers were

making their way into the market for illicitproducts.

However, international NGOs are stronglyagainst any move to promote the captive breedingof tigers for commercial purposes; they say thatlegalisation of the trade will only serve toperpetuate a market demand. They also say that theworldwide demand for tiger parts in traditionalChinese medicine and a booming demand for skinsis simply too vast to be catered to by farming; it willbe more economical to kill tigers in the wild. Theaverage cost of raising one tiger to maturity innon-professional husbandry conditions is overUS $2,000, they point out.20

But the fact remains that these tigers remain incages. They are worthless because legal trade is notallowed. What, then, is their future? And what istheir contribution to the illegal trade?

The way ahead 55


It is clear that unless international trade in tiger parts is checked, there will be growingpressure on the tigers of India. The tigers of India are one of the last remainingpopulations of the big cats in south and southeast Asia. Therefore, there is bound to bedemand which leads to illegal poaching. Over the last several years, the efforts of theinternational community to ban trade in tiger products, however important, has onlymeant that the trade has gone more underground and has become more difficult to detect.

It is the assessment of this Task Force that the international community has failed toinvestigate and break this trade. It is, therefore, very important for India to take proactiveand strong measures on the matter of international trade in wildlife. It must do thefollowing:

a. It must take up this issue with the international community through CITES. In this, theTask Force strongly believes that the ministry must be very proactive to shape theagenda at CITES to ensure that the international market for tiger products areinvestigated. It is not enough for the international community to ask India tostrengthen its own domestic wildlife enforcement. This is very important and it mustbe done. But this strengthened domestic policing will not be enough to check thetrade in tiger parts. The international community must be under pressure to combatand destroy this trade.

b. India must work to build its bilateral relationships with China in this regard. TheGlobal Tiger Forum, which was set up to network and dialogue with tiger rangecountries, has clearly proved to be inadequate. In fact, it has become irrelevant,especially as China has still not joined the forum. India must disengage itself frominstitutions that are not working and find strategies of engaging with China.

c. This Task Force believes it must be done bilaterally. It knows that both governmentsare extremely concerned about issues related to tiger part trade. The Task Force,therefore, suggests the Union environment minister take the lead in this regard bydiscussing and developing a bilateral relationship with his counterpart in China, andthat this dialogue must be kept alive and ongoing.

It is critical that India takes the leadership on this issue and does not leave it to global institutions which are proving inadequate in this regard.

Recommendations

The trade of the tiger in India is banned under theWildlife (Protection) Act, 1972. The tiger is aSchedule I species, which means that it isendangered and strictly protected. But trade in tigerparts continues and experts believe that the trade ishighly organised and run by a well-known selectgroup of people.1

In January 2000, police seized four tiger skins, 70leopard skins, 221 blackbuck skins, 18,000 leopardclaws, 150 kg leopard and tiger bones, 132 tigerclaws, two leopard teeth and one dried leopard penisfrom private properties in Khaga in Uttar Pradesh.This seizure was one the largest hauls of illegalwildlife products ever recorded in India, indicating aconsistent and large-scale level of organisation.

Earlier, on December 18, 1999, three tiger skinsand 50 leopard skins had been seized by sales taxofficials from a truck in Ghaziabad, on the outskirtsof Delhi. The skins were concealed in large jute bags,and wrapped in polythene and layers of denim cloth.The skins were fresh and each had a signature on theback. The truck was bound for Siliguri in northBengal, near India's borders with Nepal and Bhutan.Both the names of the sender and receiver on thepackages turned out to be fake.2 But all the seizurespointed to Tibetan connections.

While the notorious Sansar Chand, the master-mind smuggler, is now behind bars, there are otherbig names that feature in the annals of wildlife crime.The Central Bureau of Investigation believes that allthese gangs, even though they operate in differentareas or domains, are well connected (even related attimes) to each other and there is no rivalry betweenthem; they have been operating over long periods oftime. The main suspect in the Khaga case wasShabbir Hasan Qureshi, whose house when raided inJuly 2004 produced 456 tiger and leopard claws andapproximately US $13,000 in cash.3

There is no doubt that India has to strengthen itsdomestic efforts to check tiger poaching and otherwildlife crimes, and that these actions need to betaken urgently and effectively. It is also evident thatthe Union ministry of environment and forests hasbeen slow in putting together the frameworkrequired to effectively deal with wildlife crime.

It was in 1994 that a committee underS Subramanium, a former senior police official,submitted its report on preventing illegal trade inwildlife and wildlife products. The committee, in anextremely comprehensive report, suggested anumber of actions needed to tighten enforcement ofwildlife crime. Its recommendations included the

setting up of a central task force that would overseeand coordinate the work of the central wildlife crimedata bank (also proposed) and the intelligence unit. Itnamed this as the directorate of prevention of crimeagainst wildlife. This directorate proposed a legalcell to pursue important cases in courts across thecountry; an investigation wing for cases withnational and inter-state reach and an operations cellto carry out undercover raids on organised crime.The report also set out other urgently requiredactions needed to strengthen enforcement.4

Since then, the Union ministry of environmentand forests has played around with the idea of settingup this directorate. Every few years, the idea isrevived, but it dies a natural death. More recently,perhaps because of the internal pressure generatedby the Sariska episode as well as the action initiatedby the Convention on International Trade inEndangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES),the idea has once again gained momentum. At theMarch 2005 meeting of the National Board forWildlife, the ministry submitted a proposal for anational wildlife crime bureau.5

But it is clear that the proposal is too ambitiousand personnel-heavy. The proposal provides for 260new posts at various levels. The bureau will beheaded by the additional director general of forests(wildlife) and have positions created both at theCentre and regions for monitoring and enforcement.It is important at this stage to review this proposal inthe light of the current situation so that theenforcement mechanism, once created, can beeffective as well.

The current enforcement machine

In March 2002, the ministry set up the wildlife crimecell in the office of the director, Project Tiger. InApril 2004, the cell was moved to the office of thedirector, Project Elephant. When it was set up, it wasproposed the cell would have two joint directors toundertake its work. But till date, these positions havenot been filled. As a result, work on the cell is greatlycompromised, making it virtually ineffective.

In addition, the ministry has a separatedirectorate of wildlife preservation, headed by theadditional director general of forests (wildlife). Itconsists of four regional offices headed by officersholding the positions of deputy directors and threesub-regional offices (headed by assistant directors)located in Amritsar (Punjab), Cochin (Kerala) andGuwahati (Assam). The mandate of these offices is to

3.3a Domestic enforcement agenda

56 The way ahead


regulate import and export of wildlife items; tocoordinate wildlife crime prevention with stateagencies; and to monitor crime trends and providereports to the central office.

The directorate, in fact, plays precisely the rolethe proposed wildlife crime bureau is supposed to.But while the ministry has proposed the creation ofmany new posts, many positions are still lyingvacant in the current directorate. For instance, thepost of the regional director in Kolkata (a key portcity) has been vacant for many months, while thedeputy director in charge of Chennai (again, animportant port) has been holding additional charge.

In 2003, the ministry transferred the post of theassistant director, based in Guwahati, to Delhi. Thejustification was that the illegal trade has shiftedfrom the northeast to other parts of India — this isclearly untenable, given all the evidence thatsuggests the routes to China and Myanmar via thissensitive region. Since then, the sub-regional officein the northeast has been lying defunct. Thisdeliberate disabling of institutions must be checked,for it does not leave the Task Force with confidencethat any new mechanism, however important, will betaken seriously.

In the states, the chief wildlife wardens areexpected to coordinate the cases related to poachingof wild animals and other wildlife crimes andmaintain databases. However, in practice, few statesmaintain central databases of all these crimes. Therate of successful prosecution in wildlife cases isextremely low. Most blame this state of affairs on acombination of reasons — poor investigations,defective prosecution reports (charge sheets),mishandling of cases by public prosecutors and lackof supervision by senior forest officers.

In other words, unless something is done tochange the functioning of the current departments,setting up a new bureau will only be cosmetic. It may help the country improve its track record with CITES, but will do little to stem the scourge ofwildlife trade. It is essential that the agenda fordomestic enforcement includes the critical andstructural reforms needed in the institutions forinvestigation, forensic facilities and criminalprovisions to ensure that the big and powerfultraders do not go untried.

A crime databaseThere is no central database on wildlife crime. Thereis no compulsion on the part of regulations or laws tomaintain one. But regulations do demand that thefield directors of protected areas maintain, at locallevels, registers of animals that die and are found bythe field staff. These are recorded along with possiblecauses of death. In the case of the tiger, too, similarwork is done. The forest department too maintains a

record of any seizures of wildlife animals or theirparts.

Project Tiger has, for the first time, asked anexternal consultant to collate this data to analyse theconsolidated figures (see table: Tiger seizure cases).6

● There are 411 records for five years (1999-2003).● Out of these, 173 records relate to mortality and

238 are of seizures. ● Within the mortality records, 114 cases relate to

poaching. ● In the seizures, 238 items of tigers were

confiscated (it is difficult to correlate the seizureswith mortality).

● A total of 333 people were arrested in connectionwith seizure cases and 72 persons arrested inconnection with poaching.

The Wildlife Protection Society of India, an NGO,maintains an independent database of tiger seizures.During this same period (1999-2003), its databaseshows that India lost 284 tigers due to poaching. Inthe case of tiger bone seizures, in the absence ofskulls, the NGO computed the number of dead tigers

The way ahead 57


State 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total

Andhra Pradesh 1 6 2 - 2 11

Assam - 1 - 1 - 2

Chhattisgarh - - - 2 - 2

Delhi 1 3 1 1 1 7

Gujarat - - - - 1 1

Jammu and Kashmir - - - - 1 1

Karnataka - - 2 - - 2

Kerala - - - - 1 1

Maharashtra 2 5 6 1 5 19

Manipur 1 - - - - 1

Mizoram - - 1 0 0 1

Madhya Pradesh 30 7 6 6 8 57

Orissa - - - 1 - 1

Punjab - - 1 - - 1

Rajasthan - - 1 1 - 2

Tamil Nadu 1 1 1 - 1 2

Uttaranchal - - 4 9 2 15

Uttar Pradesh 9 13 20 2 - 44

West Bengal 9 17 1 4 8 39

Total 54 53 46 28 30 211

Source: Project Tiger 2005, Tiger poaching: analysis of country-level data,1999-2003, Delhi, mimeo

TIGER SEIZURE CASES

by using an average of 12 kg of bones per tiger.7

Interestingly, both the databases show thatpoaching and seizures have fallen during the period.But it is also clear that there needs to be a muchbetter coordinated effort to maintain the databaseand, more importantly, to follow through on theactions taken in each case.

The database on wildlife crime must be afunctional bank of information that is used for takingaction — to track offenders, to track conviction rateand, most importantly, to use this intelligence toprevent crime.

The field directors and chief wildlife wardensshould be required to file their data on a real-timebasis to this database, which can then be used by thecoordinating agency to follow through on importantcases and to compile and analyse trends as well as toinform other law enforcement agencies about theoffenders.

The issue to discuss is: why has this databasenot been operationalised so far and how should it bedone in the future?

Improving conviction rates

The fact also is that we have abysmally lowconviction rates in wildlife crime. With nocentralised collection of data on wildlife crime,statistics are not available. But experts interviewedduring this Task Force’s consultations suggest theconviction rate in wildlife crime around the countrycould be a dismal 1 to 2 per cent at present. InKaziranga national park, it is said that more poacherswere killed in encounters with the field staff thanrestrained through successful prosecution in thecourt of law.

Prosecution for wildlife crimes is done as per theprovisions of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972. TheAct was amended as recently as in 2003 to bring intighter penalties for offences — including aminimum sentence of three years, extendable toseven years; bail provisions have been made morestringent. According to B K Sharma of CentralBureau of Investigation (CBI), who has been workingon wildlife crime, the provisions of forfeiture ofproperty derived from illegal hunting puts the Act atpar with the Narcotics and Psychotropics Act, 1985and the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2003.According to him, with the 2003 amendments inplace, the Act is comparable to internationalstandards and contains stringent penal provisions.8

The problem, experts explain, lies in the detailsthat govern the implementation of the law. They,therefore, suggest that urgent steps be taken to furtheramend the Wildlife (Protection) Act to make itexpeditious and increase deterrence against crime.The Central Bureau of Investigation, while making its

presentation to the Task Force, also suggested thatkey weaknesses need to be removed to expediteprosecution.

The main problems, as pointed out by experts,are as follows:i. The length of the pre-charge evidence makes the

process repetitive. In these cases, the witnesseshave to come before the judge in the “pre-chargeevidence” stage, and then once it gets to trial,they all have to depose once again. The famous1993 Delhi seizure case is still in the pre-chargeevidence stage after 12 years. This is unlike thepowers of the police laid down under the CrPC

(Sections 154-173), where the court takes onrecord the charge sheet filed by the investigatorsto decide if there is prima facie evidence toproceed in the case; thus, it has been suggestedthat the powers of wildlife investigators shouldbe the same as those of the police.

ii. The trial takes place at the level of the chiefjudicial magistrate/metropolitan magistrate, andis lengthy and unfruitful. The Tiger Trust, an NGO working on the reform of the Wildlife(Protection) Act, 1972, suggests that thejurisdiction of the trial has to be raised from thelevel of chief judicial magistrate (CJM) toadditional district judge, because it takes four-five years to conduct pre-charge evidence. On theother hand, due to the lower number of appealsin the court of the additional district judge, thereis less rush; moreover s/he has highersummoning powers and better assistance fromthe police in pursuing procedural matters. Forthis, an amendment has to be made in theWildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 (Section 51),which raises the quantum of punishment fromthree to seven-10 years. When this is done, thetrial will come under the jurisdiction of thesessions court. In addition to this, the fine hasalso to be increased to Rs 50,000. This is fordeterrence, and to expedite the trial, since atpresent it takes eight-10 years for conviction oracquittal at the level of the chief judicialmagistrate.

iii. The Tiger Trust also recommends re-categorisation of animals in the schedules of theWildlife (Protection) Act, 1972. At present,Schedule I has a long list of animals that needs tobe re-categorised as critically endangered — thiswould include the cat group and some otheranimals near extinction. The punishment ofseven-10 years should be increased for thiscategory.

iv. Under the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 theseverity of offenses is related to thecategorisation of the animals in the differentschedules provided. The forensic laboratory has

58 The way ahead


to check and certify for a case to proceed. Thereis a lack of these facilities, and investigatorscomplain of delays in getting reports. It is alsosaid the investigative techniques the forestdepartment uses are outdated and the forensicsupport is inadequate. At present, there is aheavy dependence on the Wildlife Institute ofIndia’s forensic laboratory, whereas the regionalforensic labs used to detect and investigate othercrimes have not been put to use.

v. The Act does not allow for the level of the crime.The CBI suggests that there should be a differencebetween large volume traffickers and small timepoachers, which at present the Act does notprovide for.

vi. The CBI also suggests that no sentence passed bythe courts should be suspended, remitted orcommuted to avoid recurrence or disappearanceof criminals, as has happened in the case ofSansar Chand’s appeal against conviction.

vii. At another level, there has been little review onhow relevant departments and agencies aretrained on wildlife crimes. In addition, there is aneed for regular training of prosecuting lawyers,and the judiciary, on aspects of wildlife crime.Although some NGOs in India do carry outtraining for departmental officials as well as thejudiciary, there is no extensive or consistentprogramme for in-job training for the judiciary orthe forest officials posted at locations where suchcrimes are high.

viii. The wildlife officials also complain of lack oflegal support during the prosecution process,with government prosecutors being overworkedand unavailable for their cases. There is clearly aneed for special attention to ensure that the casesget good legal representation.

Amending criminal provisions

Based on the above submissions, the Task Force hasconsulted legal experts to detail out what is neededto ensure that law is both a deterrent to poachers andis effective is bringing the guilty to book. Withoutthis legal reform, combating trade will be difficult.

The Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 containsdetailed provisions for the prevention and detection ofoffences (see Annexure XI: Amending the criminalprovisions of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972). Someof these provisions have been amended in 1991 (by Act6 of 1991) and 2003 (Act 16 of 2003). The purpose ofthese sections is both preventive and deterrent. It isgenerally agreed that these provisions, contained inChapter VI of the Act, have not been used and generallyprove to be ineffective. The lack of prosecution and theinability to secure convictions are writ large over the

skeletal data available — and perforce, unavailable.Occasionally, these provisions achieve publicnotoriety when famous people are prosecuted. But thelaws must apply to all and the protective regime mustbe enforced without fear or favour.

The Act must be understood in terms of a. The offences it discouragesb. The special procedure in investigationc. The method and forum of triald. Special provisions in relation to the

cognisance of offences, the compounding ofoffences, presumptions as a matter ofevidence and offences by companies

In these terms, the Act seeks to be comprehensive.But there exist lacunae in implementation thatundercuts the legal reach of the Act. Thus, in order tostrengthen the Act’s criminal provisions, cases needto be treated as serious criminal cases. The first stepmust be to differentiate between serious and non-serious cases and ensure that serious cases are triedas police cases by the Sessions Courts.

This has an impact on the manner in which thecases are prosecuted. Currently, since they arecomplaint cases, the police do not prosecute them. Itis left to the overworked forest officials to come tocourt and build the case before it can be takenfurther. The cases linger on because they areprescribed as ‘lesser’ cases and are not treated aspriority. The prosecutors, mainly forest officials, areinept and lose interest. The second step, therefore,must be to have special prosecutors.

Since these cases randomly languish in courtsthroughout the country, they are not monitored by awildlife crime bureau either at the state or the Unionlevel. So, the third step must be to create a wildlifecrime bureau for all cases — especially the seriousones.

Ineffective protectionThe numerous reasons for the ineffective provisionsof the Act are as follows:1. The Act makes no distinction between serious

and special offences, thereby depriving theprevention, detection and deterrent strategy ofany strategic capability. The offences relating toendangered species should be placed at a higherlevel than those that relate to other animals. Thusoffences relating to tigers, blackbucks, elephants,rhinoceros, etc need to be treated as special bynot only giving them priority for the purposes ofinvestigation, but also by increasing the penaltyfor attempting an offence against these animals.Similarly, there is an absence of a specialinvestigation team whose brief would be totackle offences relating to serious or specialcases. A similar classification as is made for the

The way ahead 59


offences in the Code needs to be imported intothe Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 to clarify theprocedure to be followed for different offences.

2. The investigation is left to a number of officers,trained and untrained — those trained in forestryare not trained in investigation and vice versa.This leads to an unfortunate situation whereeven though the investigation is carried outproperly, no evidence is available; or, when theevidence available through the process ofinvestigation is found to be flawed, and henceprosecution becomes pointless.

3. The trial in all cases proceeds as a complaint caseto be tried as a warrant case, except whencomplaints are on the basis of a police report.This results in prosecutions primarily being inthe hands of forest and environment officialsthrough a long drawn process. Similarly, there isa lack of trained special prosecutors for offencesdealing with wildlife. Clearly, in serious andspecial cases, the offences should be tried as if onthe basis of a police report by the Sessions Court,and where available, the case should beprosecuted by special prosecutors.

4. Special provisions are needed so that forensicand expert evidence is readily available to the court. Provisions are required for more experts and laboratories. More often than not,prosecution is delayed because the prosecutionis unable to determine whether the part of theanimal recovered is one of an endangeredspecies. Identification becomes difficult withrespect to hides and skins and thus experts arenecessary to testify to whether the animal inquestion is a tiger or a leopard.

Proposals to strengthen criminal provisionsOne of the key ingredients of the enforcement policyis a speedy trial process with effective investigationwhich will lead to appropriate punishment of theconvicted. Presently, the ingredients are lacking. Thefollowing are the proposals that can ensure astrengthening of the criminal process:1. A schedule needs to be created to distinguish

between special and serious offences.2. Serious offences should be tried directly by the

Sessions Court and should be punishable for amandatory term of at least seven years. Thereport filed by the investigating officer, whetherhe be a forest official or a police officer, shouldbe treated as the police report. A table in thenature of the Schedule in the Code of CriminalProcedure should be added, to which additionsand modifications may be made.

3. The serious offences are● Non-bailable● Cognisable

● Not compoundable● Should be tried by special prosecutors4. It would be necessary to continue the range of

officers who can investigate offences under theAct with powers of entry, seizure, arrest anddetention. But to ensure a streamlining of theinvestigation capabilities of both the forest andthe police wings, proper training ought to begiven.

5. Similarly, provisions should be made for specialinvestigation teams to look into serious or specialoffences.

6. Special courts should be designated by the stategovernments in consultation with the Uniongovernment among the existing hierarchy ofcourts to ensure that the offences under theWildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 are prosecuted,and penalties imposed as expeditiously aspossible.

7. With respect to the prevailing provisions, thebail provisions [Section 51A] should becontinued and an offence of conspiracyspecifically added. Similarly, the cognisanceprovisions need to be re-examined and reposedin the state or the Union government.

8. The wildlife crime bureau must be made into astatutory body to monitor, oversee and prepareperiodic reports. It must have the power to makerecommendations and proposals for the purposeof strengthening the wildlife protection system.The bureau shall be in addition to the CentralZoo Authority. A similar amendment, wherebyprovisions are added as Chapter VI-B, is necessaryto create such a body.

Setting up a wildlife crime bureau

The bureau is urgently needed. But the issue is to structure it so that it is effective in combatingcrime. In its deliberations to review the proposal for the national crime bureau submitted by the Union ministry of environment and forests, the Task Force has consulted a number of experts —from people experienced in dealing with parallelcrime busting institutions like the narcotics bureau, to those experienced in wildlife crime at thestate level.

The bureau proposed by the ministry will be:● Headed by additional director general of forests

(wildlife), who will be assisted by the inspectorgeneral of forests

● Headquartered in Delhi and have regional officesat Jabalpur, Mumbai, Chennai, Cochin, Kolkata,Delhi, Guwahati, Imphal and Amritsar.

● Have officers posted in the bureau on deputationfrom different agencies like forests, customs andothers.

60 The way ahead


The proposed national wildlife crime control bureau,with its headquarters at New Delhi and nine regionaloffices, will require creating 260 new posts at variouslevels to ensure its operational efficacy and to meetthe objectives set. Funds for the bureau will be madeavailable from the allocation for the 10th Five YearPlan. The proposal is being sent to the concernedministries for inter-ministerial consultations.

Proposed modifications

At the central level1. Create a small and effective crime bureau at the

central level. The bureau at the Centre should beheaded by a senior officer (in the super-timescale). The appointment of this person should bedone using a selection criterion, which seeks torecruit a suitable person. The person will reportto the additional director general of forests.

2. At the central level, the bureau should have threeofficials, besides the needed support staff:

● For police investigation and coordination withcrime control agencies (preferably a policeofficer or intelligence bureau officer ondeputation)

● For coordination with states and maintaining thecrime database (preferably a person with expertisein data analysis and tools for networking)

● For coordination with agencies working on theinternational border and follow-up with cases

3. The bureau should be able to get on deputationfield operatives for intelligence gathering onwildlife crimes from the police force, Indo-Tibetan Border Police, territorial army and others.

4. There should be a coordination committee underthe chairpersonship of the secretary, Unionministry of environment and forests, withmembers from the Union ministry of homeaffairs, the Central Board of Excise and Customs,the Central Bureau of Investigation, BorderSecurity Force, Indo-Tibetan Border Police andrevenue intelligence. This committee, with thedirector (wildlife preservation) as membersecretary, should review every six months thefollowing:

● Inter-departmental coordination ● Monitoring progress of important cases ● New initiatives ● Monitoring implementation of court directives

relating to wildlife crime5. The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) must be

given specified tasks in investigating wildlifecrime. Its role will be to work closely with thewildlife crime bureau so that it can findsynergies in combating crime. However, the keyresponsibility of the CBI would be to investigatethe organised crime networks as a special

investigation team. It should take over charge ofcertain key special and serious cases, for instancethe Sansar Chand case.

At the state level6. There should be a wildlife crime cell in each

tiger range state of the country. Each node should be staffed with personnel for legalsupport, intelligence gathering and criminalinvestigation, and database monitoring.

Central assistance should be provided towards thesalary of officers on deputation to the state-levelwildlife crime control cells.

One officer of the level of deputy conservator offorests should be on deputation to the policeheadquarters to facilitate close coordination.

A state-level coordination committee under thechairpersonship of the chief secretary, with thedirector general of police, home secretary, armycommander of the region as members, and the chiefwildlife warden as member secretary, should meetevery three months to monitor the following:

1. Inter-departmental coordination 2. Progress of important cases 3. Extremist engineered disturbances 4. Low intensity conflicts affecting wildlife 5. Need for deployment of forces in and around

protected areas6. Implementation of court directives/government

of India directives

The Task Force envisages the wildlife crime bureau, inthis modified structure, will require 80-100 positions,many of which would already be in the field.

It urges that this structure must beoperationalised urgently.

Forensic laboratory facilities

The Wildlife Institute of India has a functionalforensic laboratory, which at present is the onlyspecialised laboratory to analyse seized wildlifematerial for prosecution support in wildlife crimes. Ithas developed reference materials and protocols fortesting to identify the species to which the seizedmaterial pertains. Recently, it has acquired much-needed high-end equipment to carry out such tests atthe molecular biology level to rapidly identify thespecies and, eventually, the regional origin andindividual animals of a particular species. However,work on protocol development for this is presentlybeing done.

This laboratory is meant more to developreference material and protocols on individualspecies in a research framework. The actual work of

The way ahead 61


62 The way ahead


1. The wildlife crime bureau must be set up immediately. The Task Force has reviewedthe current proposal for a wildlife crime bureau and has worked to modify it to ensurethat it is lean, mean and effective. We strongly believe that unless the crime bureau canwork effectively on different levels — one, to strengthen the enforcement at the state level;two, to investigate international trade links; and three, to break the crime of largepoachers — it will not be possible to effectively deal with the crime.

For this reason, the Task Force suggests a two-tiered approach: set up a wildlife crimebureau at the central level, with nodes in each tiger range state in which there will be acapacity to both investigate and follow up on the crime. In the course of its visits throughthe different states, the Tiger Task Force was constantly told by officials that the keyweakness was their inability to investigate the crime at the state and inter-state levels, andto be able to pursue the conviction in courts because of lack of legal support.

The detailed structure of the wildlife crime bureau as proposed by the Task Force isgiven above. In summary, the Task Force proposes the following:a. At the central level, a stronger bureau with the capacity to develop a country-wide

database of wildlife crime to enable coordination, to be able to pursue important casesat the state level and follow up with investigative agencies like the Central Bureau ofInvestigation (CBI), on the investigation as well as the conviction of large organisedcrime networks.

b. The CBI must be given certain tasks in investigating wildlife crime. The role of the CBI

will be to work closely with the wildlife crime bureau so that it can find synergies incombating crime. However, the key responsibility of CBI would be to investigate theorganised crime networks and to take over charge of certain key cases, such as theSansar Chand case.

c. There is a need to involve and to train other police agencies, such as the Indo-TibetanBorder Police, as well as the other security forces, to ensure greater vigilance on ourborders as well. The Task Force suggests that this should be an explicit task of thewildlife crime bureau: it should take the lead in organising these training programmeswith the Wildlife Institute of India and other specialised institutions.

d. Forensic cells should be set up in central, regional and state forensic laboratories toinvestigate wildlife specimens and produce evidence in wildlife crime.

e. The wildlife crime bureau must be made into a statutory body under the Wildlife(Protection) Act, 1972 to make it effective and give it autonomy.

2. It will not be enough to only investigate the crimes: criminals must be convicted. In thisregard, the Task Force has deliberated very carefully with legal experts to understand theweaknesses in the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 so far as its criminal provisions areconcerned. It is very clear that there is a need to strengthen the Act, particularly for what aredesignated critically endangered species, so that there is a greater deterrence for criminalactions against these species resulting in speedier trials. The current Act is weak in thisregard and, therefore, in the majority of cases it leads to delayed hearings and a dismal stateof the rate of convictions. The Task Force has detailed out the changes that are required inthe Indian Wildlife Act to strengthen these provisions (see Annexure XI: Amending theprovisions of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972). This amendment must be done urgently.

Recommendations

bulk of the tests of wildlife crime material will haveto be sent out to regional, central and state forensiclabs like the ones at Kolkata and Jaipur. Only themore sophisticated work and difficult cases shouldcome to this laboratory.

This laboratory is experiencing difficulty as itsscientists, who test the material, are summoned to

courts, upsetting their main task of much neededresearch in wildlife forensics. Accordingly, theWildlife Institute of India has proposed to the Unionministry of environment and forests to supportsetting up of forensic cells in central, regional andstate forensic labs. The Tiger Task Force, too, feelsthe existence of such cells is necessary.

There are several nomadic and other communities,skilled in hunting, whose services are being used by poachers across the country to kill animals for a price. The traditional livelihoods of thesecommunities used to revolve around hunting andgathering; they always subsisted in close relationswith forests. But over the years, they have beenvictimised and marginalised and, today, are forced tolive in absolute poverty at the fringes of forests. Thequestion, therefore is how, if at all, the services ofthese traditional hunters and trackers can be used —not against, but for the tigers.

Unfortunately, we have done little to understandthe peculiar needs of these communities. Besideshunting, they are skilled in extracting minor forestproduce. Their practices are sustainable. As theinterest in protection has grown, it is theselivelihoods that have faced a clampdown. Theirpoverty today pushes them towards unlawfulactivities, which are unsustainable and destructive.Field officers across the country have told the TigerTask Force that without the rehabilitation of thesecommunities, protecting wildlife will be difficult.

The Task Force has studied some of the caseswhere the government, researchers or other agencieshave experimented with programmes to create forest-based livelihoods for these groups. These are merelyrepresentative of the possibilities or potential thatexist in this sphere. These efforts do show thatwherever people have put in an effort and thoughtthrough the process — in India or elsewhere — it hasbeen possible to devise a working plan for thesedestitute tribes.

The Bawaria

The Bawaria are a traditional nomadic hunting tribethat have been accused of being party to the poachingin Sariska tiger reserve in Rajasthan. Five members ofthe tribe were arrested during investigations after therecent crisis.

According to the 1981 census, this community isspread across four states in 32 districts. Rajasthan,according to the same census, had 31,903 Bawaria.

This community is famed for its ability to huntand track animals. The Bawaria were earlier used byroyal hunting parties to track animals during shikars(hunts). A socio-economic study by researcher BaharDutt for Muktidhara, a Rajasthan-based NGO, lists 22species the Bawaria are known to hunt.1 Theseinclude large predators like the tiger, leopard, hyenaand the jackal. They are also regular hunters of

ungulate species like the spotted deer and thesambar as well as smaller animals like the mongoose,Indian hare, jungle cats and numerous bird species.Hunts for smaller animals are more regular.

The most common species the Bawaria hunt isthe sambar, followed by the peacock and theparakeet. Dutt suggests hunting of ungulates can beeither for personal consumption, or for sale as meat,antlers or hide to local markets.

The community uses various tools like snaresand traps for the animals and has devised trapsingeniously for the purpose. Its recent use of smallexplosive devices and guns has also been recorded.

Changing occupational profileBut the occupational profile of the people haschanged with time. According to the 2003 surveydone by Dutt earlier, more than 70 per cent of thetribe members had hunting as their main profession.In the current generation, 80 per cent of the Bawariain Alwar district have taken to protecting agriculturalfields against crop depredation by animals like thenilgai (blue bull). Their skills at hunting animals are being brought to use informally by othercommunities living in the vicinity of forests. But asthis utilisation continues at an informal level andthere is no official recognition of their role as aprotector, the Bawaria merely get — in return fortheir efforts — some foodgrains and a piece of land tobuild a temporary shelter on the farmers’ fields.

Unlike in earlier times when hunting may havebeen their major occupation, today they resort tohunting in times of distress. The study shows that onan average, more than 70 per cent of the Bawariafamilies interviewed faced food shortage crises and21 per cent of the families had taken to hunting totide over this crisis.

Their insecurity also arises from the fact thatthough they are entitled to land, very few haveactually been able to get it from the government.Coupled with the fact that the traditional campingland — the commons — has slowly disappeared fromRajasthan, the Bawaria are left with little option but todepend upon landholders to provide them space fortemporary shelters, which are made out of plasticsheets and hay. In a public hearing held in Delhi in2003, some Bawaria families recorded their pendingapplications for land rights with the government.With no tenure over land and their main skill beingtermed ‘illegal’ under the wildlife laws of the country,the Bawaria have tried to evolve a livelihood strategyto provide a degree of sustenance for themselves.

The way ahead 63


3.4 Innovative protection agenda

64 The way ahead


Nomadism, which in earlier times could havebeen an economic strategy to sustain themselves in asemi-arid zone, has now become a social necessityforced upon them. At the same time, Duttemphasises, their skills are used by the forestdepartment in its usual course of work to gatherinformation within the forest areas, especially duringthe animal census conducted by the department.

The level of harassment the Bawaria face from the administration, besides the landholdingcommunities, is very high. The police as well asforest officials often target them for interrogation forany local crime (whether related or unrelated towildlife). The study shows that 65 per cent of the Bawaria have reported harassment by theadministration and 46 per cent have at one time orthe other been in jail.

After the episode in Sariska, several membersfrom this community were reportedly picked up byforest officials and the police for interrogation. Oneextended family was finally indicted and hasconfessed to killing the majority of the tigers inSariska. Evidently, this community, with its skillsand knowledge of the tiger, is today finding new andlucrative occupations in commercial poaching.

The options todayIt is acknowledged by the forest department as wellas experts that the Bawaria still maintain a high levelof skills when it comes to understanding the foresthabitats, which comes from their skills and practicesof hunting. There has been a constant outcry thatunder the present circumstances it is important towean them away from hunting. Yet no plan to ensurethis has been put to the test or implemented. Withoutan alternative strategy for livelihood being availableto the Bawaria, it is easy to see how their situationhas deteriorated. Under circumstances of destitutionand lack of economic incentives, the Bawaria areundoubtedly used as frontline hunters by organisedpoachers, and are ready to work at any price.

A workable solution to help some Bawariafamilies could be based on a simple strategy thatkeeps them engaged with forests, unless theyvoluntarily wish to look at alternative options oflivelihood. Bahar Dutt, who has worked with thistribe, suggests that Project Tiger needs to find ways ofusing the skills of these local Bawaria to turn theminto the frontline defenders of the forests andprotected areas, rather than see them as antagonists.

This should be possible. The average age ofguards and work-charge employees in Sariska tigerreserve is high and there is a need for newrecruitment. Currently, the State overcomes this byrecruiting some temporary workers, which includenursery labour. It is ironic that though skilledBawaria have been available all along, the forest

department has not innovated to include them inprotection and instead, used unskilled labour to do ajob they have evidently failed in.

Cambodia: hunters become protectors

Cambodia is a range state of the tiger. But since theearly 1990s, the conservation community has fearedthat poaching for tiger parts and products representsthe most serious threat to the tiger’s continuedsurvival in the wild. Cambodia continues to have alarge and visible market for tiger parts though thesupply, as in India, has gone underground. WhileCambodian forests continue to harbour a rich preybase, targeted market hunting has seriously depletedtiger populations in many parts of Cambodia.

In an attempt to regulate tiger hunting, the TigerConservation Programme Office in the ministry ofagriculture, forests and fisheries of the RoyalGovernment of Cambodia took bold action to startworking with hunters.2 Phnom Penh-based wildlifeofficials realised that their knowledge of and abilityto work in the wilder parts of Cambodia had beencompromised by years of war. They needed theassistance and skills of local people. So in 2000, afunded programme was begun in Cambodia whereselected hunters were hired as community wildliferangers. The goal was to gain an immediate reductionin the level of tiger poaching in the country, and touse the ex-poachers’ considerable tiger-finding skillsto develop community-based conservation capacityin the main tiger habitats.

Three field offices have been established inCambodia’s three largest tiger habitats. Each office ismanaged by a combination of provincial andnational-level forest staff, and each office currentlyoversees a network of nine to 12 community wildliferangers. The University of Minnesota, USA, which hascollaborated in the effort along with the Cambodiangovernment and Cat Action Treasury (CAT), aninternational funding group for cats-relatedconservation programmes, conducted extensivetechnical training exercises. The staff at all levelswas trained in Global Positioning System datacollection and Geographical Information Systemsdata analysis techniques, the latest in mappinginformation that even India is trying to build into itsconservation programmes.3 In other words,sophisticated and modern technology tools werecombined with local skills for optimal results.

What was doneAmong the first tasks of the field offices was therecruitment of teams of community wildlife rangers.The best of the hunters who participated in previousinterview surveys were contacted, and informalmeetings were held with a variety of local people to

identify other candidates. The first rangers beganpatrolling and submitting monthly survey andintelligence reports in July 2000.

Recruitment focused on men known to hunttigers, some more actively than others. In severalcases, men who had recently been caught huntingtigers were recruited into the programme, instead ofbeing prosecuted under the relatively weak forestryregulations.

The programme staff carries out regularmonitoring patrols in key unprotected tiger habitats,and collects valuable data on tiger (and otherwildlife) poaching and trade. The staff meetsfrequently with provincial, district and village levelofficials, as well as military personnel.

The rangers, it is reported, normally operate inteams and carry a Global Positioning System device.Regional coordinators download the device’smonthly readings to verify ranger patrols. Data isreported to Phnom Penh in monthly narrativesummaries and Global Positioning System datapoints are entered into a Geographical InformationSystems-based system. The survey results aresummarised according to the three regions, andillustrated with maps prepared from the GlobalPositioning System data the ranger teams gatheredand that the field office staff compiled.

The project has identified several groups ofprofessional hunters and wildlife traders, broughttheir activities to the attention of the relevantauthorities and negotiated contracts with them tostop hunting and trading.

Has it worked?The promoters of this approach say that it has turneda number of professional tiger poachers into assets.4

The hunter-rangers have provided valuableintelligence about tiger poaching and other wildlifehunting and trade. In December 2001, a major tigerand elephant poaching gang was uncovered with thehelp of these rangers.

The approach, if illegal hunting is discovered, isto have the rangers and staff negotiate no-huntingcontracts with the poachers. These negotiations areconducted in the presence of district and policeofficials and carry a good deal of weight. Thisprocedure is equivalent to a stern warning, and, sofar, none of the people who have signed suchcontracts with the project have been caught poachingagain, says the report.

The project proponents and their reports recordthat poaching has reduced in Cambodia since the1990s5, but whether this merely correlates with theprogramme or is actually a consequence of theprogramme is something the Task Force has beenunable to gauge from a distance. But the fact is thatthe programme has used innovative methods and

brought new skills to people who used to bepoachers. It has worked at a low-cost option of localhiring, and intelligently deployed them for surveysand patrolling.

Namdapha: can hunter-tribes be protectors?

The reserves in the northeastern states of India arevast and inaccessible, low on staff and high on localcontrol. One conservation option here, as elsewhere,is to spread a security blanket around a reserve andprotect it with hard action. This model has beensuccessfully tried in Kaziranga national park, Assam,where a low intensity war has been fought betweeninsurgents and poachers versus the government for aperiod. But even here, the park authorities and thegovernment have worked on reconciling localinterests in protection. But there are other reserveswhere this protection model is not feasible. What,then, are the options?

The 2,000 sq km Namdapha tiger reserve islocated in Changlang district, the eastern-most partof Arunachal Pradesh. It was declared a reserve forestin 1970 under the Assam Forest Regulation Act, 1891(first proposed in 1947), and subsequently a wildlifesanctuary in 1972. It was finally declared a nationalpark in May 1983; two months before, it wasdeclared a tiger reserve. In 1986, a 177 sq km area ofreserve forest was added to the tiger reserve and isdesignated as the buffer zone, while the rest (1,808 sqkm) is considered the core zone.

The area has a wide altitudinal range, from 200 mto over 4,500 m. The terrain is steep and inaccessible.The old 157 km Miao-Vijaynagar road runs throughthe park, though it is motorable only for 26 km up toa settlement called Deban. The park headquarter is atMiao township, with a single functioning range inDeban. Civil supplies to villages located outside the

The way ahead 65


WWF: NGO monitoring network

In the mid-1990s, the WWF-India had developed aprogramme for mobilising grassroot support inthe tiger range areas. This was done through thecreation of a NGO monitoring network with thefollowing objectives;a. To develop an advance warning, threat alert

mechanism for safeguarding the protectedareas;

b. To mobilise grassroot NGOs and othercommitted field based groups who are focalpoints of this network, for elicitingparticipation of the local people in activitiessuch as ecodevelopment as well as forprotected areas management.6

eastern boundary of the park are carried on foot or onelephant back through the park, mostly along theriver and parts of the road. Access for tourists, andeven park authorities and biologists, is mostlyrestricted to areas up to 900 m. The interior andhigher areas of the park remain unexplored, exceptby hunters from local communities.7

Local communities: the ones who knowThe only ones who really know the forest, therefore,are the local communities that walk the forest forhunting and survival. Aparajita Dutta, a wildlifebiologist with Nature Conservation Foundation (NCF),a Mysore-based NGO, has been studying the region fora while, and believes that hunting pressures on theregion are extreme and it is only these huntingcommunities in the region that really know theforest.

The region is home to several indigenous tribes.Beyond the southeastern boundary of the park (at 80mile) are 13 villages with 673 households and apopulation of 5,147. There are four Lisu villages inVijaynagar circle — these adjoin the park and have403 households (population 2,600) — and nine othervillages of Nepali ex-servicemen with a population ofabout 2,018; these ex-servicemen had been settledhere by the government after 1962. Apart from this,there are other tribal and non-tribal governmentdepartment staff and personnel of the Assam Riflesand the Indian Air Force.8

The Lisu, also referred to as Yobin by somecommunities, are agriculturalists and also have areputation of being skilled hunter-gatherers. There isstrong resentment, anger, and mistrust against theforest department among most Lisu. Their biggestgrievance is that the creation of the park anddemarcation of the boundary in 1983 was carried outwithout any consultation with them, and there wasno settlement of rights. Many insist that the areabetween Deban and Gandhigram is their area andthat they had no idea when the national park wascreated. For instance, most Lisu believe that thebiggest hurdle to building the arterial road (whichthey see as crucial to their development) has been theforest department — it was responsible for stoppingroad repair and maintenance in 2000. There is alsoresentment as they believe the forest department hasportrayed the Lisu as “illegal settlers who haveencroached the area of the reserve from across theinternational border of the country”.

The field staff strength in Namdapha is very lowand they are not trained or motivated; given the pooraccessibility, patrolling by the department isrestricted to the fringe areas. There are merely 22sanctioned posts of forest guards to manage andprotect 1,985 sq km. Of these 22 posts, only 11 arefilled. This effectively means one person per 180 sq

km. In contrast, Kaziranga national park in Assam, amodel of successful protection through enforcement,has 500 forest guards for 800 sq km (one guard per1.6 sq km) on flat lowland terrain with numerousranges, beats and forest camps. In Namdapha, thereis a complete lack of basic facilities and of supportfrom local police and administration. Most staff areoutsiders; not a single Lisu is currently employed inthe department.9 The headquarters in Miao is 10 kmfrom the park boundary with a single range at Deban.Currently, no staff is posted at some of the accessibletemporary camps. Even to patrol this relativelyaccessible area, the staff depends on boats to crossthe river and rations have to be carried there. Oftenduring the monsoon when the river is in spate, it isdangerous to use the boats and staff has beenstranded on the other side for days with no food. Inthe absence of regular staff presence and patrolling,hunters often use these forest camps.

The crisis…Consequently, the park is in a state of crisis.Researchers believe tigers have all but disappearedfrom the reserve, though information remainsunverified. Hunting continues unabated and aresilient and enterprising community turneddestitute and desperate by the creation of the parklooks upon the ‘park’ (not the forest) with animosity.At present, there is a stalemate. The state is unable toincrease the strength of the staff.

Even if the forest department does get additionalresources, it will be handicapped without knowledgeof the park. The immediate need to ensure wildlifeconservation in Namdapha is protection fromhunting, fishing and other kinds of disturbance.

…and its solutionMost Lisu today view the park as the biggest barrierto their aspirations and the root of all their problems.They are bearing all the costs of conservation. Theyhave poor relations with the department, whichsometimes result in retaliatory hunting, and thisneeds to be remedied through dialogue and bettercommunication. However, if they can get tangiblebenefits, there could be a positive attitudinal change.

A solution to the agricultural land problem of theLisu is also urgently required to stop the influx ofLisu families settling inside the park. A realisticrelocation/resettlement plan has to be made inconsultation with and the agreement of the Lisu.There is a need to find alternate employment optionsand opportunities for the Lisu, some of which (suchas eco-tourism) could be tied to the national park.The Lisu community’s support for the park would goa long way in ensuring wildlife conservation as theycan themselves work either directly as guards andinformers (about hunting activity) in the forest

66 The way ahead


The way ahead 67


department, or through support from otherorganisations. Once they have a stake in the area,there will be a much better understanding of the needfor conservation there.

The Nature Conservation Foundation, which hasbeen working in the area for several years, hasalready launched a plan on these lines. The plan, inprinciple, is simple and based on the logic theexisting social and ecological set-up demands. Itproposes a creation of a protection force for thereserve that is based upon the talent and knowledgeof the community. This requires creation of a trainedforce of Lisu hired by the forest department andworking in collaboration with the department tomonitor the biodiversity as well as accord protectionto the area. The Nature Conservation Foundationsuggests a way to reduce the burden of hiring andmaintaining such a force: investments can be madeto bolster the tourism infrastructure, and the revenuefrom tourism can be shared with the community.

Eco-tourism is the most tangible benefit the Lisucan get out of the park; through eco-tourism, they cancreate a direct and positive affiliation with the parkas well as a case for protection of wildlife. Touristinflow into the park is right now relatively low. Butthe area is known to bird watchers around the worldand needs to be marketed and projected as a uniquedestination. Most Indian tourists are from Assam andonly visit Deban, which is seen more as a picnic spot.Infrastructure and other tourist facilities are, as yet,limited to Deban. Building the tourism system is achallenge, but not an insurmountable one; it is easilymore viable than positioning more guards andinfrastructure in that region. Moreover, theinvestments made in tourism will be of the nature ofcapital investments, leading to revenue generationfor the cash-strapped department as well assustainable livelihoods for the people. Suchinvestments, in a climate of political volatility andrising unemployment, are the need of the hour: toinvest in creating livelihoods rather than than inbringing in more administration, guards, arms,ammunition which encourage attendant alienation ofthe people.

The Task Force has received representationsfrom the Nature Conservation Foundation. Itsresearchers have been engaging with Project Tigerofficials as well, to see how the initiative, at presenta private one, can be up-scaled into an official mascotfor Project Tiger to experiment as an alternative.

This will require the following at the minimum:● A formal pact of reciprocity between the Lisu

and the forest department with consensus beingthe binding element;

● A clear delineation of rights, privileges andbenefits for the people even before such a pact isprepared;

● A clear benchmarking of indicators to monitorthe health of the habitat as well as theeffectiveness of the Lisu protection force;

● A collaborative effort between the state, thecommunities and interested research groups tospearhead the effort; clear demarcation of roles,and responsibilities between the stakeholders;

● A definitive time frame to set forth this processand, thereafter, to review the effectiveness andlook for mid-course corrections if necessary.

While all this is easily done on paper, at the fieldlevel it demands the best of staff and the mostmotivated of personnel. Therefore, both the peopleas well as the forest department need to be givenadequate training in setting up an experiment thatdemands skills to manage the protection force as wellas run it as a profit-making exercise.

But it clearly needs to be encouraged, becauseunless we experiment and innovate, how will wesucceed?

Periyar: where poachers turned protectorsIn Periyar tiger reserve in Kerala, there has been aninteresting effort to provide people — erstwhileelephant poachers and smugglers of cinnamon bark— with an alternative source of livelihood fromtourism in the park. These ex-vayana bark smugglers,as they were once called, now engage with the forestdifferently.10

Today, former poachers are companions to theforest guards who patrol the Periyar tiger reserve.Information about tree-felling and smuggling isquickly relayed to the ranger by these formerpoachers over a walkie-talkie, the patrol team isreinforced and the forest thief is overpowered.

Every day at dusk, one of the former poacherssurveys the crowds at the local bus stop in the townof Kumily for suspicious elements from his old days.The old network now works for the forestdepartment, not against it: powerful allies in this waragainst wildlife crime.

In the past, these villagers depended upon theforest for firewood and thatching grass for their ownuse and for sale. Illicit smuggling of cinnamon wascommon as was poaching of bison, buffalo and smallgame. In 1997, when a few illicit collectors of thevayana bark were caught by the forest department,they were offered a deal: the cases against themwould be dropped in return for their services inprotecting the park. Twenty-two poachers agreed.

They said they needed a regular income; the parkmanagers, therefore, worked with them to startoperations in offering a tourist service to ‘trail tigers’.The aim was to explore the wilderness of Periyar,and to become guides inside the park. As therevenues from this ‘business’ grew, forest offences

68 The way ahead


also came down. The real advantage lies in the intelligence

network this group now brings to the assistance ofthe park authorities. On the visit to Periyar, the TaskForce was told by M M Naushad, a former vayanabark collector, how their intelligence network hadfoiled poaching attempts. At least 500 sandalwoodsmugglers have been caught and smuggling ofcinnamon tree bark has also been checked. No case ofelephant poaching has been reported since this groupstarted its work. What they valued most of all, as theyexplained to the Task Force, was that they were nowtreated with respect in their villages.

The park authorities have collected data tomonitor the impact of this programme. They havefound that:● The intelligence provided by this group of ex-

bark collectors has resulted in detecting 28 cases

and the arrest of 49 offenders in five years.● There is clear evidence that there has been a

reduction in illegal activities after theinvolvement of this group (see graph:Comparison of reduction in illegal activitiesbefore and after project implementation by ex-vayana bark collectors).

● Cinnamon trees are regenerating, showing thatthere is less pressure on them through smuggling(see graph: Comparison of increase inregeneration of cinnamon trees, 1998-2000).

The challenge now for the park authorities is tosustain this effort and to expand it so that morepoachers and smugglers can become protectors. Butwhat their initiative shows is that it is possible tofind ways of working and making a difference witheven the most difficult communities.

30,000 9,792

360 0 0

Tota

l No/

Kg

Vayana barkcollection

Cutting sapling

Illegal activites

Poaching0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

10,000

Before project implementation After project implementation

Source: Anon 2005, data on Periyar tiger reserve, Periyar Foundation, mimeo

COMPARISON OF REDUCTION IN ILLEGAL ACTIVITIESBEFORE AND AFTER PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION BY

EX-VAYANA BARK COLLECTORS

Den

sity

of

rege

nera

tion

1998

2000

195

610

475

207

693

516

Low Medium High

Density category

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

Source: Anon 2005, data on Periyar tiger reserve, Periyar Foundation, mimeo

COMPARISON OF INCREASE IN REGENERATION OF CINNAMON TREES,

1998-2000

The way ahead 69


1. Solutions for protection often require innovation. The poaching networks are wellorganised and they can and will reach out to the poorest in the country to use their cheaplabour and skills for doing their ‘dirty’ work. Each park authority must identify the majorhunting tribes and communities in proximity to, or operating in, a reserve. Thisinformation should be used to develop plans to figure out how the expertise of the hunterscan be used for protection as well as for gathering basic ecological information. India’stiger reserves, too, need trained foot soldiers and wherever possible, communities of theforest-dependent or the hunters should become the first option to look to for recruitmentand creation of intelligent protection forces.

2. The independent monitoring of each park must evaluate the work done by the parkmanagement on working with its forest-dependent traditional hunting communities. Thepark management and Project Tiger must work on locale-specific approaches with thesecommunities. These efforts must be supported and carefully monitored so that thelearning can be disseminated and become practice.

Recommendations

As wildlife populations of India started decliningsteeply in the 1950s, people began to speculate ontheir numbers. The famous hunter-naturalist, JimCorbett, was responsible for one of the earliest ofsuch estimates of tigers, and he placed their numbersin the country at 2,000. E P Gee, one of the firstnaturalists to document India’s wildlife followed,suggesting that India had 40,000 tigers at the turn ofthe century, which he said were down to 4,000 in1965.

In the late 1960s, K S Sankhala, who went on tobecome the first director of Project Tiger, estimatedthat there were 2,500 tigers in India.1 J C Daniel of theBombay Natural History Society conducted aquestionnaire-based survey of forest officials toarrive at the same estimation. These were alleducated guesses, albeit coming from experts withcredibility 2.

It was Saroj Raj Choudhary, a respected wildlifeexpert from the Indian Forest Service, whoattempted to put these estimates on a sounderempirical footing by devising the pugmark countmethod. This method is grounded in the assumptionthat every individual tiger’s pugmarks have somedistinctive features that permit discrimination,despite variation introduced by a number ofenvironmental variables. By attempting to locatepugmarks of all individual tigers in a locality, thismethod proposed to census the entire tigerpopulation.

The first such ‘tiger census’ was conductedacross India between April and May 1972, which putthe number at 1,800. This was likely to be anunderestimate, as it did not include the large tigerhabitats of the Sundarbans and Assam because of theearly onset of monsoons.3

India has, over the years, elaborated on the‘pugmark census’ — counting the pugmarks of tigers in the wild — to estimate tiger numbers. In this technique, forest department personnel fan out across tiger reserves and all other tiger habitats looking for pugmarks and other signs ofsighting the tiger. The pugmarks are cast in plaster totrace the imprints of the left hind paw. These castsare then collected and compared to identifyindividual tigers.

The method has evolved over the years.Choudhary devised the tiger tracer, transferring thepug impression from the ground to a piece of tracingpaper. O P Jayaraman introduced a glass tracer, onwhich were etched the axes of x and y in order tocorrectly determine the quadrates, pattern and layout

of the four toes and the pad. H S Panwar, a memberof the Tiger Task Force and the then field director ofKanha tiger reserve, identified parameters relating to every pugmark and suggested that they bestatistically analysed.

Using this methodology, the Indian wildlifeestablishment has been conducting an All India TigerCensus, initially once in five years and now once infour years. The ‘cooperation consensus’, as wasoriginally devised by Choudhary, is not restricted tothe tiger reserves but is done across the habitat of thetiger: forest department personnel fan out across tigerreserves and all other tiger habitats looking forpugmarks and other signs of the tiger’s presence —faecal matter, scratch signs, kill evidence, actualsightings and other reliable information from localcommunities.4

Conducted over one week, the census iselaborately structured. It is organised by the differentstates in cooperation with the Centre. The country isdivided into zones, which then enables training aswell as collation of the data. The territory mapping isdone at a national level. The information is collectedby each beat guard, who oversees the smallest unit inthe forest administration — roughly 30-40 sq km.The state government appoints a chief coordinator,who oversees the process and analyses the data.

Errors in pugmark countingOver time, it has been understood that severalpossible sources of errors exist in the pugmarkcensus methodology:● Pugmarks of some tigers may never be

encountered● Different pugmarks of the same tiger may vary so

much that they may be assigned to differentindividuals.

● Pugmarks of two distinct tigers may be soindistinguishable as to be assigned to the sameindividual.

● Levels of these errors may differ from locality tolocality and from season to season, depending onthe terrain, tiger densities and other factors.

These errors imply that it would inevitably bedifficult to arrive at exact numbers of tigers based ontotal pugmark counts. It is, therefore, imperative thatone estimates the extent of all these sources of errors.Based on these estimates, one should then come upwith not just one specific number, but a range withsome statement of the likelihood that the actualnumbers will fall within that range.

3.5 The science agenda

70 The way ahead


Dangers of pretending to be exactWildlife managers and biologists were, of course,aware of these possibilities. Several questions havebeen raised and studies undertaken to estimate sucherrors, reduce them to the extent possible, andpropose alternatives5. In practice, however, the totalpugmark count with the objective of coming up withone specific exact number continues to be themethod followed in all the official tiger numberestimates to this day.

Given the complexity of the real world, anaccurate total count of tigers is simply not feasible. Ifthis is not accepted, and only a single number isprovided as if that is a precise estimate, there is adanger that any lower number arrived at in asubsequent year would be taken to imply that therehas been a definite decline in the number of tigers.For example, there may be an error margin of ±7tigers with 99 per cent probability in some tigerreserve. The estimate arrived at through totalpugmark count in the first year may be 32, whichdeclined to 29 in the second year. In reality, theactual total number may in fact have increased.

Moreover, if there were a tendency to judge theperformance of park managers on the basis of thesupposedly exact number of tigers in the area undertheir charge, then the managers would naturally beinclined to manipulate the data and project a pictureof continually increasing numbers. Such a tendencycould be checked if there was in place a system ofpublic scrutiny of the veracity of the numbers beingdeclared. However, no such system has been inoperation — the tendency to manipulate data,therefore, has gone on unchecked.

This might have happened in several places. Wenow have concrete evidence that it did happen inSariska, where the publicly declared numbers havebeen decidedly inflated at least over 2001, 2002 and2004. A most unfortunate consequence of thedissemination of such manipulated data has been afailure to recognise the signs of decline in tigernumbers, resulting in their total elimination during2004.

It is important to note here that around mid-2002, the Project Tiger directorate had already begunworking on a revised methodology for the assessmentof tiger habitats and numbers. The directorate, in itsnote, assessed the situation: “Over 20 years of seriousefforts and millions of rupees of investment towardspromoting conservation of tigers and theirecosystems, it is rather ironical that we still do nothave a system of evaluating the effectiveness of theseconservation efforts.”6

The directorate then laid out its objectives asfollows:● To assess the habitat and status of tigers in the

sub-continent

● To develop appropriate (site-specific) census andmonitoring protocols

● To develop spatial and aspatial models anddatabase for risk assessment and persistence ofexisting tiger populations

● To collate, analyse, store, update anddisseminate this information to decision makersand field managers

● To disseminate the census, habitat evaluationand monitoring techniques to field personnel byconducting regional training workshops andproducing manuals

● The directorate noted that its ‘Tiger Habitat andPopulation Evaluation System’ would not onlyserve as a monitoring tool for the tiger and itshabitat, but would also serve to monitor theforests, their extent, the threats — in effect, theentire wilderness biodiversity resource for whichthe tiger serves as a flagship.

Science: an enterprise of scepticismWe evidently need to put in place a new system ofestimation of the numbers of tigers and the health ofthe ecosystems that harbour them. This new systemshould acknowledge that given the many sources ofvariability in complex natural systems, exactnumbers, such as total pugmark counts, are notfeasible, and that instead we must substitute these by estimates accompanied by appropriate confidence limits. But there are more fundamentalissues at stake. We need to acknowledge that science is not a matter just of systematic procedures.Rather, it is a system of continual open scrutiny of the procedures being employed towards any given objectives, such as estimation of tiger numbers,and of the level of reliability of the results these procedures produce. This system hastraditionally worked through peer review ofpublication of scientific results specifying details ofthe methodology and of primary data as well asanalysis and interpretation. Therefore, many wildlife biologists have rightly pointed out that the total pugmark count method has never beenexposed to this test and is consequentlyunacceptable to them. At the same time, they point toa number of alternatives that have been so tested,including the use of camera traps, and hence arepreferable.

Peer review in refereed journals is a time-testedsystem that will continue to function. However, it isjust one of the ways of ensuring that scienceprogresses through transparency, by sharing allresults, the methodology employed to arrive at themand the logic followed in the deductions. Sciencealso attempts to eliminate biases that may arisethrough conflicts of interest by devising proceduressuch as double blind trials. It is these democratic,

The way ahead 71


inclusive traditions of science that we need to buildupon in devising a system to foster a healthy growthof wildlife biology in the country.

In this context, it is important to note that peerreview in refereed journals is a system that wasevolved in pre-ICT revolution times. It is a system thatconfers considerable power on a small number ofindividuals involved in making editorial decisionsand serving as referees. There are examples, too, ofmisuse of this power. There is, therefore, much meritin going beyond peer reviews. Today, public scrutinycan be made much more extensive and effective byposting on the Web all the data, the methodologyfollowed and the logic employed. Ideally, we shouldmake all this information available in all the Indianlanguages also. Indeed, such a Web-based scrutiny,exposing scientific activities to a wider public,would serve the vital function of demystifyingscience, and of checking vested interests thatscientists too may try to encourage. Such a Web-based system could also help bring on boardinformation on ecological parameters available withlaypeople.

Certainly, there is an abundance of evidencepointing to the fact that given the nature of complexecological systems, scientists too have a limitedunderstanding of their functioning, at the same time that laypeople may have observations of value.The experience of a group of Bangalore-basedecologists investigating the fate of wild amlapopulations on the nearby BRT Hills provides aninteresting example. Their hypothesis was that theregeneration of the amla is governed by the amount offruit collected for commercial use, and that the lowlevels of regeneration in recent years were related toexcessive harvests of the fruit. So they laid outstatistically well-designed experiments to test theinfluence of different levels of harvests of fruit. Thelocal Solliga tribals told them that these experimentswould yield no results of interest, because, accordingto their understanding of the ecosystem based onmany years of first-hand observations, the levels ofregeneration were primarily influenced by forestfires. Amla seeds require fire to germinate well, andthe Solligas felt that the low levels of regenerationwere related to the suppression of forest fires inrecent years. The scientists did not initially givecredence to this view and continued with theirexperiments. Only later did they come to theconclusion that the Solligas had indeed been right. So it is highly appropriate for us to put in place a more inclusive system of obtaining inputs from all people, especially in the context of wildlifebiology. In fact, even India’s famous ornithologistSalim Ali drew upon the knowledge of Mirshikars, atribe traditionally engaged in bird trapping, in hisown work.

Hierarchy of scales

The estimation of number of tigers over a total rangespanning many thousands of kilometres of parks,reserve forests and even non-forest areas calls for amassive effort. Such an effort cannot, obviously, beequally intensive throughout the tiger range. It is,therefore, best to go in for different levels and kindsof efforts at a hierarchy of spatial scales, focusing themore intensive effort in relatively limited selectedareas. The effort should not be confined to estimationof tiger numbers, but has to be broader covering at allscales: ● State of tiger habitat● Abundance of tiger prey species● Abundance of tigers● Human impacts on tiger habitat● People-wildlife conflicts

Low intensity, extensive effortThe most wide-ranging effort will have to span theentire tiger range. It will not be feasible to rigorouslyarrive at quantitative estimates at this scale. Instead,the most extensive effort will have to aim at aqualitative understanding of the points listed above.

We simply do not have the adequate scientifichuman resources to undertake even qualitativeinvestigations on this scale. At the same time, it ishighly worthwhile to draw upon the practicalecological knowledge of local communities as well asgovernment employees working in the field. Thiswide-ranging effort must, therefore, engage theextensive network of forest guards and watchers, aswell as knowledgeable local residents. It would ofcourse be necessary for the scientists to participate inthe process, building the capacity of forest staff andlocal people, and at the same time, learning fromtheir field experiences.

This grassroots-level involvement could comefrom two streams. Firstly, the wildlife managersorganising the surveys could engage forest guardsand watchers, as well as knowledgeable localresidents and amateur naturalists. Secondly, itwould be appropriate to take advantage ofpanchayat-level documentation of biodiversity in theform of ‘people’s biodiversity registers’ that is nowbeing initiated as a follow-up of the BiologicalDiversity Act. These registers will be periodicallyupdated as well. All the panchayats falling withinand on the periphery of the tiger range, whether inprotected areas, reserve forests, or non-forest areascould be asked to so focus their documentation as toprovide a continual monitoring of tiger populationsas well as of the health of the tiger habitat.

Landscape level understandingSpatial information derived from satellite imagery

72 The way ahead


and organised with the help of GeographicalInformation Systems (GIS) is a most valuable sourceof information pertaining to the status of the tigerhabitat spanning the entire distribution range of thetiger. Given the fact that a substantial proportion ofthe tiger population occurs outside tiger reserves, weare increasingly beginning to appreciate thesignificance of conservation efforts focusing on thewhole landscape. GIS using satellite-derived andother spatial information would be a key tool in thiscontext.

The various kinds of information thus generatedthrough such an extensive effort would provide abroad picture of the status of the tiger habitat. Thiswould help partition the overall tiger habitat into aseries of strata representing different states ofparameters of interest, such as habitat fragmentationand prey densities.

Intensive studiesThis broad understanding of the entire tiger rangewould be the starting point of designing morethorough investigations. A set of sample localitiesmay then be chosen from the overall tiger range formore intensive, rigorous investigations.

These focused, intensive investigations may alsocover all the aspects considered at the earlier stage(state of tiger habitat, abundance of tiger preyspecies, etc).

These intensive investigations may draw on thewhole arsenal of scientific hardware such as cameratraps and DNA sequencing, as well as software such asstatistical techniques and computer simulations (seebox: Checking DNA). Their focus should not beconfined to trees, ungulates and larger carnivores,but also include many other significant elements ofbiodiversity. They should not view humans only as anuisance, but also as the only species to have evolvedpractices of deliberate conservation of biodiversity.

An inclusive, cooperative effort

Recognising that a main difficulty so far has been theopaqueness and exclusivity of the efforts at assessingtiger populations, both the extensive as well as theintensive investigations should be conducted in thespirit of science. The main ingredients of thescientific enterprise are: ● Open access to all facts and inferences● Rejection of all authority other than that of

empirical facts, and● Welcoming all interested parties to question all

assertions as to facts as well as logic

This would not only involve following theestablished scientific scheme of peer review inprofessional journals, but would entail welcoming

involvement of all interested parties in the endeavorof assessing tiger populations and their habitats.Such involvement, at the level of the extensive effort,should bring on board, alongside wildlife managers,scientists as well as local community members andamateur naturalists. The more intensive effort wouldcall for involvement of scientists and wildlifemanagers to a much greater extent, though there willstill be scope for involving local communitymembers and amateur naturalists.

In fact, a point of view debated during the TigerTask Force hearings is that such ecologicalassessment is like an audit of a business concern. Anaudit is best conducted by an independent externalagency. If this is accepted, the wildlife managersshould not participate in the ecological assessment atall, leaving it in the hands of an independent groupof scientists. However, so long as the wholeassessment process is inclusive and transparent,ensuring that there is no undue manipulation of dataas happened in the case of Sariska, it may beappropriate to involve the wildlife managers in theprocess. Such involvement would contribute tofurther building up of their capacities at all levelsfrom forest guards and watchers upwards.

Multidisciplinary effortTiger conservation is not simply a matter of ensuringa healthy prey population base for the carnivores. Itis a far more complex process that will have toinclude attempts at positively involving thousands ofhuman beings that share the tiger habitat. The effortat assessment of tiger populations and their habitatswould, therefore, have to look at whole landscapes,as also at a range of ecological, social, economic,political as well as ethical issues. Such an effortwould have to engage natural and social scientists aswell as resource managers, and be open toparticipation of all interested public as well. As afirst step in this direction, an expert group of peoplewith expertise in relevant technical disciplines suchas wildlife management, population and communityecology, statistics, remote sensing, resourceeconomics, common property resource managementand anthropology may be constituted to devise aproper methodology and protocol for analysis of thedata and basing management decisions on theresultant understanding.

We do have substantial Indian capabilities in thiscontext, but it is important to bring it together towork as a team and to focus their efforts. There is agreat deal of expertise abroad as well and we mustalways keep ourselves open to their inputs. However,modern communication technologies make it veryeasy to obtain these inputs even in the absence offace-to-face contacts. We, therefore, suggest that weconcentrate on building up an indigenous team

The way ahead 73


effort, rather than bring in foreign consultants. In anycase, we advocate a very open system, in which notonly Indians, but also all interested foreign scientistswould have access to most of the relevantinformation. There should be an open invitation toall foreign scientists too to study, reflect, criticise andmake suggestions.

Proposed habitat monitoring The Project Tiger directorate has been working forthe past three years with the Dehradun-basedWildlife Institute of India to devise a system to

implement a better monitoring system (see AnnexureVIII: Methodology for estimating and monitoring tigerstatus and habitat). The Tiger Task Force hasreviewed the proposed methodology with the ProjectTiger director and scientists at the Institute. It hasalso invited comments from experts on the proposalso that the views of all concerned can be considered(see box: Consultations to review methodology).

The Tiger Task Force believes the proposednational tiger estimation methodology to be a movein the right direction and endorses it. It hopes thatthe national tiger estimation, which is to be

74 The way ahead


Checking DNA

Because the tiger is an elusive animal, biologistssearch for different ways to find and identify it.One emerging approach is to use non-invasive DNA-based techniques, which identifies individualspecies and animals with the molecular analysis ofcollected hair and scat samples. The problem isthat while molecular scatology — analysis of scatsamples — has been increasingly used in the world,there is little work on the tiger outside India. Theuse of genetic tags or DNA-based mark-recapturepopulation estimations have been widelydemonstrated in the census of the black bear,brown bear and the Altantic humpback whale, butnot in that of the tiger. Indian scientists have todevelop and standardise protocols which would becapable of using the body parts and faecal matter todetermine the species, the sex and then theindividual animal.

Two institutes are currently working on this:the Wildlife Institute of India and the Centre forCellular and Molecular Biology in Hyderabad. TheWildlife Institute of India has a current projecttitled ‘Comparison of tiger (Panthera tigris tigris)population estimated using non-invasivetechniques of pugmark, camera trap and DNA

analysis of hair and scat in Ranthambhore tigerreserve’. It is also working on characterisation ofspecies from bone, tusk, rhino horn and antler todeal with wildlife offences.

The Ranthambhore project is a pilot studybeing done to standardise protocols foridentification of free ranging individual tigers, saysS P Goyal, the principal investigator in the project.The project uses all three techniques — pugmarks,camera traps and molecular genetics — to compareand validate the three options. In the study area,scientists have collected fresh scat (faeces) sampleswhile walking on different trails. Each vial of theprepared scat for analysis has been marked with its

location using a Global Positioning System finder.In addition, the scientists have collected hairfollicles by using mechanical devices and glue hairsnares. Before processing the sample for DNA

analysis, the scientists will examine the hairsamples microscopically to check their cuticularpatterns, which determine the species.7

In his presentation to the Task Force, held inMay 2005, Goyal explained the progress in thisproject. He said that they had collected 25 scatsamples, which were being analysed. The analysiswas complete for checking the species and sexidentification of the tiger. However, what they were working on was genotyping or individualidentification. According to him, researchers haveincorporated individual identification along withsex markers to understand variation in theseaspects due to sexes. These markers are called‘short tandem repeats’ or ‘micro-satellites’. Theimportant aspect is to screen the marker for thatparticular species to find the markers that arehighly polymorphic. Then, five to 10 of such highlypolymorphic markers can address all sorts ofquestions related to individuals without any falseidentification. This stage is progressing fast at theInstitute’s laboratory.

Recently, a group of Chinese scientists havedeveloped micro-satellites for tigers, which can beused for identifying individuals. This work cannow proceed using this tool.8

The problems, according to Goyal, involvegenotyping the individuals from micro-satellites,particularly as the scat sample is often degradedand DNA that can be extracted is small and often,poor.

In addition, the Task Force has received aproposal from the Centre for Cellular andMolecular Biology on estimating the number ofwild tigers in tiger reserves in India by DNA

profiling of faecal samples. The Centre has a highorder of capacity to undertake this work.

conducted from November 2005, will be done usingthis evolved methodology (see chart: The variousstages of the monitoring protocol).

However, as many details will have to be refined,for instance, in terms of analysis of the datacollected, the Tiger Task Force recommends thateven as the work on estimation proceeds using thisnew methodology, the Project Tiger directorateshould set up a scientific expert group immediatelywith expertise in relevant technical disciplines suchas wildlife management, population and communityecology, statistics and remote sensing for overseeingthe process. This group should work from the veryinception of the process and assist in suggestingappropriate ways of analysing and interpreting thedata. This expert group should in fact be funded toenable its members to engage in data analysis as well

as do other research relevant to further developmentof the methodology.

Overseeing tiger and tiger habitat assessmentWhile the Project Tiger directorate and WildlifeInstitute of India programme would be a majorcomponent of the needed effort at assessing tigerpopulations and tiger habitat, a great deal more needsto be done. For instance, we need to know muchmore about the various parasites and diseasesafflicting tigers and in part, shared with othercarnivores. We should understand the implicationsof provision of water sources in the dry season thatmodify the natural patterns of dispersal of tiger prey.We also need to quantify the extent of impact ofvillages inside, in contrast to those on the peripheryof tiger reserves. We need to figure out how much

The way ahead 75


THE VARIOUS STAGES OF THE MONITORING PROTOCOL

PHASE I

PHASE II

PHASE III

PHASE IV

Convert indices to density and numbers

Intensive monitoring of source populations —a) Photo IDsb) Radio telemetryc) Sign surveys — three-monthly

Occupancy and relative abundanceSpatio-temporal monitoring

Landscape complex characterisation(remotely sensed and attribute data in GIS)

Modelling patterns underlying tiger occupancy, source population and connectivity

Stratified sampling based on Phase I and II for:1. Tiger density (capture-recapture framework)

2. Ungulate density (distance sampling)

Tiger/carnivore sign survey Habitat qualityUngulate encounter rate

Beat level sampling(10-20 sq km)

revenue flows from wildlife tourism and howfeasible it is to direct some of it towardsecodevelopment efforts. Evidently, a great deal ofresearch needs to be undertaken on a diversity ofthemes by a variety of individuals and agencies.

This extensive effort cannot be undertaken solelyby the in-house agencies of forest departments. Infact, the positions of research officers have lainvacant in a majority of tiger reserves and littlerelevant scientific work has been accomplished. Nor

76 The way ahead


Consultations to review methodology

The fourth term of reference of the Tiger Task Force is tosuggest measures to improve the methodology of tigercounting and forecasting.

The Task Force assessed and evaluated the nationaltiger estimation methodology developed by the ProjectTiger directorate and the Wildlife Institute of India (WII)in this regard.

In order to ensure that all views, comments andcriticisms were taken note of, the Task Force did thefollowing:

1. It held a consultation in Delhi, in May 2005,inviting all the prominent experts and scientistsworking on population estimations in the country. Thedeliberations included a presentation from Y V Jhala ofthe WII on the proposed methodology that the Institutewas developing with the Project Tiger directorate, aswell as a presentation by Ullas Karanth on themethodology used by him. Rajesh Gopal, director,Project Tiger, explained the rationale and sciencebehind the proposed methodology and the progressmade so far. 2. The Task Force then sent the technical noteprepared on the methodology to all concernedscientists, inviting written comments and suggestions(see Annexure VI: Experts requested to comment onmethodology for tiger estimation).3. A second consultation was held in Bangalore inJune 2005 to discuss the methodology with a furthergroup of scientists and field managers. 4. The written comments received were thendiscussed with scientists at the WII and with thedirector, Project Tiger.5. A member of the Task Force, Madhav Gadgil, wasentrusted with the responsibility to assess themethodology and to resolve all the comments receivedfrom experts. It must be noted that Gadgil is a renownedfield statistician, with a PhD in mathematical ecologyfrom Harvard University, USA. He has worked for manyyears on population estimation of animals, beginningwith the first elephant census in 1978. Since then, his

interests have continued in this area and his papershave been published in almost all peer-reviewedscientific journals, including five in the very prestigiousProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences(PNAS). H S Panwar, former director, Project Tiger andWII, with years of experience in practising conservationand with a background in population estimation, alsovetted the methodology.6. Madhav Gadgil spent time further discussing themethods of statistical analysis with the scientistsconcerned. After these rounds of deliberation and beingsatisfied with the proposed methodology, the TaskForce has decided to endorse the approach and torecommend the director Project Tiger to proceed withthe use of the methodology in the coming census.7. The Tiger Task Force is also recommending thateven as the work on estimation proceeds using this new approach, the Project Tiger directorate should set up a scientific expert group immediately withexpertise in relevant technical disciplines such aswildlife management, population and communityecology, statistics, and remote sensing to oversee the process from its inception. This will help theprocess to be dynamic and science-based and thelearning can be incorporated into the analysis on anongoing basis.

In the discussions with Project Tiger directorateand WII the different comments received were broadlycategorised and carefully reviewed. The comments andthe responses of Project Tiger and WII are as follows:

1. Relating to misunderstanding arising out of text:Critique: Tenacity to follow only pugmark-basedpopulation estimation.Response: Tiger signs (including pugmark) is used fordetermining spatial occupancy and relative signdensity. We are not promoting the pugmark method butusing a range of methods for absolute density estimationin stratified representative units. Instead, we are usingmark-recapture framework through a. Camera trap-based identificationb. Refined, digitised pugmark-based identificationc. DNA-based identification

can the Wildlife Institute of India be made the soleagency responsible for the entire spectrum ofscientific work, for that would mean failing to takeadvantage of the enormous potential in a multitudeof other Indian agencies. Indeed, in case of tigerpopulation assessment itself a great deal of work has

been done by groups outside not only governmentagencies, but also other research institutes anduniversities. So every effort should now be made toencourage all interested parties to participate infurthering our understanding of the tiger and itshabitat.

The way ahead 77


2. Relating to scientific and technical issues:Critique: Related to design of surveys — relationshipbetween sign index and population density may not belinear or there may be no relationship between signindex and absolute density. Response: Sign index is primarily used for determiningspatial occupancy by tigers and other carnivores.Currently, research is ongoing to establish the form ofthis relationship between sign index and populationabundance of tigers in the Satpura-Maikal landscape.Similar relationships will be estimated for alllandscape complexes.

Critique: Precision in detecting population change.Response: The method proposed is conservative, thatis, reporting lower population estimates than reality.The method suffers from non-detection of tiger signswhen there is tiger presence and not vice versa.Therefore, it is unlikely to over-estimate populationsize. Thus errors, if any, will not be detrimental to theconservation decision process. There may be noise inthe sign index due to territoriality and breedingseasonality of tigers; however, such variability will beaccounted for by analysing data at a range or protectedarea level. The precision for detecting change at thesampling unit (beat) may be poor, but at a higher scale(range, division, protected area) the precision todetect change in an abundance class is likely to begood.

Critique: The Satpura-Maikal pilot has notimplemented the occupancy estimation approachResponse: The information made available in thetechnical note was largely indicative of the field data collected in the pilot project. The intendedanalysis was also outlined. The data would be analysed in a probabilistic framework. The sign-detection analysis will be done following detectionprobability analysis as proposed by J A Royale, D IMacKenzie, J D Nichols and and U K Karanth. Theanalytic methods are peer reviewed and categorised:sign-detection within probabilistic framework: animal density estimation following distance sampling

theory, and tiger population estimation followingmark-capture framework.

Critique: Ungulate estimation — related to convertingencounter rates to abundance.Response: Habitat specific effective strip widthsestimated by actual sampling by research team in eachlandscape complex.

Critique: Tiger numbers are considered to beunimportant in the proposed methodology.Response: The proposed monitoring protocoladdresses the reality that it would not be possible toestimate tiger numbers throughout the landscape in theentire country. The hierarchical approach of theprotocol proposes to intensively monitor (numbers) inall source populations (tiger reserves and protectedareas, Phase IV). The research-level monitoring (PhaseIII) for establishing relationship between sign index andpopulation size would ensure population estimation inrepresentative samples of varying tiger density in eachlandscape complex.

3 Practical problems in operation:Critique: Non-existence of beat boundaries in severaltiger-occupied landscapes.Response: The beat system exists in majority of tigeroccupied landscapes. Where the beat boundary is notdelineated, an appropriate sampling unit of 15-20 sqkm would be marked on a 1:50,000 scale map based onnatural recognisable boundaries and used as thesampling unit.

Critique: Questionable reliability of data obtained byuntrained and unmotivated data collectorsResponse: Experience from Satpura-Maikal, Kuno,Sariska, Ranthambhore and Dachigam stronglysuggests that with appropriate training, the forest staffcan collect the required data with high levels ofmotivation. This system will serve to revitalise,provide a sense of belonging and ownership to theagency (forest department) responsible for theconservation of our biodiversity resources.

78 The way ahead


1. The time has now come to go beyond the pugmark count method (aiming at a totalcensus), to a sample-based approach. The massive effort required to estimate the numbersof tigers over its entire range cannot be equally intensive throughout the range. It is,therefore, necessary to go in for different levels and kinds of efforts at a hierarchy ofspatial scales, focusing the more intensive effort in relatively limited selected areas.

2. The effort at assessment of tiger populations and their habitats would have to look atwhole landscapes, as also at a range of ecological, social, economic, political as well asethical issues. Such an effort would have to engage natural and social scientists as well asresource managers, and be open to participation of all interested public as well.

3. The most wide-ranging effort spanning the entire tiger range will have to aim at aqualitative understanding of (a) the state of tiger habitat, (b) the abundance of tiger preyspecies, (c) the abundance of tigers, (d) human impacts on tiger habitat and (e) people-wildlife conflicts. This wide-ranging effort must engage the extensive network of forestguards and watchers, as well as knowledgeable members of local communities. In thiscontext, it would be appropriate to take advantage of panchayat-level documentation ofbiodiversity in the form of ‘people’s biodiversity registers’ that is now being initiated as afollow-up of the Biological Diversity Act.

4. Given that a substantial proportion of the tiger population occurs outside tigerreserves, we are increasingly beginning to appreciate the significance of conservationefforts focusing on the whole landscape. GIS-using satellite derived and other spatialinformation should serve as a key tool in this context. A qualitative understanding of theentire tiger range would be the starting point of designing more thorough investigations.A set of sample localities may then be chosen from the overall tiger range for moreintensive, rigorous investigations.

5. The Tiger Task Force has reviewed the revised methodology for estimating/monitoring tiger status and its habitat proposed by the Project Tiger directorate and theWildlife Institute of India. It believes that this is a move in the right direction andendorses the methodology. It hopes that the national tiger estimation, which is to beconducted from November 2005, will be done using this evolved methodology.

6. However, as many details will have to be refined, for instance, in terms of analysis ofthe data collected, the Tiger Task Force recommends that even as the work on estimationproceeds using this new methodology, the Project Tiger directorate must set up ascientific expert group immediately with expertise in relevant technical disciplines suchas wildlife management, population and community ecology, statistics, and remotesensing for overseeing the process. This group should work from the very inception of theprocess and assist in suggesting appropriate ways of analysing and interpreting the data.This expert group should in fact be funded to enable its members to engage in dataanalysis as well as do other research relevant to further development of the methodology.

7. It is essential to facilitate involvement of a broad range of researchers in wildlifebiology, especially in the context of intensive studies at the field level. All effort must bemade to encourage and facilitate the intensive research and monitoring studies of sourcepopulation of tigers using a variety of tools — photo-identification and monitoring,camera traps, radio-telemetry and DNA-based genetic studies in different landscape units.The Tiger Task Force feels that it is important to put in place institutional mechanismsthat would streamline existing procedures for clearance and co-ordination of research andensure better utilisation of the research output.

Recommendations

The way ahead 79


8. This could take the form of panels that may be chaired by the inspector general offorests (wildlife)/chief wildlife warden, and include the secretary of the NationalBiodiversity Authority/State Biodiversity Board, and experts in ecology, social sciencesand bio-statistics. It would be best if these panels serve as ‘single window’ clearing housesfor all matters relating to wildlife research so that they streamline current proceduresrather than create another layer.

9. The emerging techniques of DNA is an important new area of estimation. The TaskForce would recommend that the work in this field needs to be supported. The WildlifeInstitute of India and the Centre for Cellular and Molecular Biology (CCMB) must beencouraged to take on pilot programmes at a landscape level using this technique. Inparticular, the Task Force would like to invite the CCMB to provide inputs in thedevelopment of molecular techniques for identification of individual tigers.

10. The Tiger Task Force feels very strongly that the most serious lacuna in our approachto managing information on tigers has been a lack of openness and willingness to takeeverybody along. The inclusive, open approach that we advocate depends crucially onfree access to all information, except where very evident security concerns are involved,to all people. In modern times, this would be best ensured by posting all pertinentinformation on the Web, in English as well as in all Indian languages.

Wildlife research has been facing some seriousproblems. Almost every wildlife researcher has agrouse against the wildlife bureaucracy: either for itsfailure to aid in their research or for ignoring thefindings of their research. The wildlife bureaucracy,in turn, has complaints about individual researchersand questions about their motivations for research.The situation, as a result, has become quite chaotic.Earlier this year, the Union ministry of environmentand forests reportedly issued a circular asking allstate forest departments to stop giving permission forany kind of research that entails ‘handling’ ofanimals (touching, holding or even wire-trippingthem for a camera shot). The ban was across forests,protected or otherwise, as well as across species.1

The fact is that wildlife research, unlike mostother research areas, is extremely dependent on thecooperation of the protected area administration, asall protected areas are controlled and access is onlythrough the bureaucracy in charge. Therefore,without any pre-agreed rules, the relationship ishighly dependent on the individuals concerned.Some researchers complain of the time it takes to getclearances for conducting research; some allegeharassment when their findings go against the forestdepartment, and still others speak of arbitrarydecisions to revoke permission for their work. Ofcourse, there are also those who contend that this isnot the case across the country.

In his submission to the Tiger Task Force,Raghunandan Chundawat, a wildlife researcherworking on snow leopards and on tigers in Pannatiger reserve in Madhya Pradesh, presented a list ofthe problems faced by wildlife researchers workingin India in recent years. In his note to the Task Force,Chundawat said: “Unfortunately, in the last threedecades, no system has been created that encouragesor institutionalises access to available professionalresearch in protected areas, nor one that takesadvantage of the growing body of professionals withexpertise in relevant areas who work outside thegovernment. We need to change the attitude of ourmanagement from a guard protecting jewels to alibrarian who is managing a library of unexploredknowledge and inviting people for learning. Theseproblems occur now and again because we havefailed to create a system which supports andprovides protection to independent research in thecountry.”2 (see box: Relationship blues — problemsfaced by wildlife researchers)

The problems are so engaged and often, personal,that it is virtually impossible to take an unbiased or

independent view of the situation. It is, therefore,important to discuss a management framework thatwill facilitate research and also ensure that thisresearch is used for policy formulation.

Procedures for clearance of research

Currently, the provisions of the Wildlife (Protection)Act, 1972, govern wildlife research in the country.Section 28 (grant of permit) of the Act gives authorityto the chief wildlife warden to grant permission “onapplication, grant to any person a permit to enter orreside in a sanctuary for all or any of the followingpurposes, namely:● investigation or study of wildlife and purposes

ancillary or incidental thereto;● photography;● scientific research;● tourism;● transaction of lawful business with any person

residing in the sanctuary”.In addition, Section 12 (grant of permit for

special purposes) allows the chief wildlife warden togrant a permit in writing to hunt any wild animalspecified in such permit for the purpose of:● education● scientific research● scientific management

There is also Section 17B (grants of permit forspecial purposes) which allows the chief wildlifewarden, with previous permission of the stategovernment, to grant any person a permit to pick,uproot, acquire or collect from the forest landspecified plants, including for the purpose ofeducation and scientific research.

There are other provisions about working withanimals and species listed in Schedules I and II of theAct. In cases that involve any research that isinvasive (which includes handling of animals),permission has to be sought directly from the Unionministry of environment and forests.

Need for research guidelinesThe problem is not the legislation per se, but itsimplementation, say researchers. For this reason,they argue for a policy that will guide wildliferesearch in the country. In mid-1998, the standingcommittee of the erstwhile Indian Board for Wildlife(now the National Board for Wildlife) had ratified aset of guidelines to issue permits by state forestdepartments. But these guidelines, prepared byscientists R Sukumar and K Ullas Karanth, were not

3.6 The research agenda

80 The way ahead


finalised and implemented. The draft guidelines for a national wildlife

research policy included the following principles:

a. The need to differentiate between wildliferesearch, as research conducted by qualifiedscientists or by assistants and students workingunder their supervision, and photographing,filming, video-graphing of wildlife and suchother activities which are of a potentiallycommercial nature, proposed to be carried out byindividuals who are not qualified scientists ortheir assistants and students. The latter must notbe treated as wildlife research.

b. The guidelines pertain to research by Indiannationals only. In case of foreign nationalswanting to do research in India, all existing lawsgoverning their presence and work under othergovernment rules (home ministry, externalaffairs ministry and others as applicable) wouldapply additionally.

c. The guidelines set out the time period that wouldbe taken by the agencies for granting research as

well as the levels that need to be involved, giventhe complexity and duration of the researchapplication.

d. The guidelines asked that there should be clearobjective reasons for rejecting any proposal forwildlife research. In case a research proposal isrejected, either by the chief wildlife warden orthe director (wildlife), government of India, thereasons for such rejection must be clearlycommunicated to the researcher at the time ofcommunicating the rejection.

e. The guidelines also set up provisions forarbitration: in cases of such rejection by the chiefwildlife warden, the state government shall bethe executive appellate authority, and in the caseof director (wildlife), the Central governmentshall be the executive appellate authority.

f. The research questions and methodologies usedwill be decided by the researchers according totheir own institutional agenda of priorities in thecase of independently funded wildlife researchprojects.

g. The guidelines also set out terms for ownership

The way ahead 81


1. Tiger project in Nagarhole by Ullas Karanth:Has had to face tremendous problems inconducting research; more recently, several casesin courts have been slapped on him.

2. Tiger research project in Panna, MadhyaPradesh: After the death of radio-collared tigersdue to poaching, death of prey species in snaresand complaints made to chief wildlife wardenregarding the lax protection measures anddestructive management practices, the forestdepartment started harassing the researcher andcurtailing research activities in this case. After apetition was filed regarding the flawedmanagement practices based on the informationgathered by the researcher and following hiswhistle-blowing on the deteriorating status of tigersin Panna, the management began a harassmentcampaign against the researcher. It included actslike cancelling research permission, refusing torenew the permission to monitor the radio-collaredtigers, retrospective charges for using elephants astransport and legal notices to recover the revenuethrough forfeiting the researcher’s property andasking him to vacate his field camp, seizing theresearch vehicle and equipment etc.

3. Study on the forest owlet in Shahda,Maharashtra, by the Bombay Natural History

Society (BNHS): The forest owlet had been consideredextinct till recently, until surveys rediscovered a fewsmall populations of the species. The BNHS launcheda detailed study. After completing his field-work,the researcher left the field to write his thesis. On avisit to his field site later, he was shocked to see mostof the forest in which he had conducted the studyhad been clear felled. When he made an attempt tofind out the reasons and the circumstancessurrounding this, he was slapped a charge of Rs90,000 retrospectively for his use of accommodationprovided by the department during his field-work.

4. Research project on the white-bellied shortwingin Annamalai: The researcher has 50-60 ringedbirds but is not able to study and monitor them aspermission has not been renewed. A sum of Rs16,000 is being charged for entry retrospectively,including that of his two assistants who are localsand reside inside the sanctuary.

5. Research project on crickets: This project wasproposed and permission for it granted by the chiefwildlife warden, but the director of the Kudremukhsanctuary did not allow the researchers to enter thesanctuary and work during the night.

Extracts from Raghunandan Chundawat’ssubmission to the Tiger Task Force, May 2005

Relationship blues — problems faced by wildlife researchers

of the research, saying it must be recognised thatthe product of any wildlife research in terms ofits scientific results and publications is theintellectual property of the researchers. Theagency or personnel managing the area in whichsuch research is permitted to be carried out willnot have the right to claim these research resultsor impose their names on the publications,without the express and voluntary permission ofthe researchers. Research permission should notimpose any conditions relating to the publicationof research results, as this would constitute aninfringement of the fundamental right ofacademic freedom of the researchers.

h. The chief wildlife wardens and director(wildlife), government of India, must constitutetechnical panels comprising individualspecialists on various aspects of wildliferesearch, to assist them in reviewing scientificwildlife research proposals. All studiesinvolving destructive or manipulative research,and, those studies whose quality ormethodologies the chief wildlife warden isunsure about prima facie, must be referred tothese technical review panels. Proposalssubmitted by qualified scientists can be rejectedonly after reference to the technical panel.

i. Wildlife researchers engaged in bona fideresearch shall inform the managing authorities ofthe area of any fact or observation relevant towildlife conservation, including violation oflaws, occurring in the area. However, theyshould not interfere in the normal day to dayadministration of the area nor can they escort oraccompany unauthorised personnel into thearea.3

Research to guide management

A broad-based framework, inclusive of managementand human aspects of conservation, is theprerequisite for wildlife research. A major objectionthat field managers raise is that a lot of today’swildlife research addresses only animals and nothabitats or plant ecology. There are very few studiesthat look at interface conflicts and the way out. Thereis no experimental research with respect to habitats,except by managers. This is one of the reasons formanagers to be somewhat indifferent to animalbiology research — and that too, about the morecharismatic species.

The issue of prioritising research has beenconsidered in depth at the Wildlife Institute of India.In 2001, the Training Research and AcademicCouncil of the Institute nominated a sub-group toconsider a research agenda. The report of the sub-group emphasised a “landscape approach”. The

consensus was that the complexity and seriousnessof the problems at hand could not be addressed inthe limited scale of a single protected area. The ideawas to upscale field conservation to the landscapelevel, in a manner inclusive of the concerns of localpeople and with their participation.

The conservation of the tiger and most otherspecies of flora and fauna faces the typical ‘sourceand sink’ situation with respect to the protected areaand its surrounding. It is, therefore, necessary to firstidentify some landscapes in the country whichrequired priority because of their relativebiodiversity significance and the magnitude ofproblems. The next stage is to do baselines onbiological, management and socio-economicattributes and issues in an interdisciplinary manner.Once this stage is through, depending upon theseverity of the problems, research topics could beidentified in the respective ecological-biological,management and human aspects of conservation andof the welfare of local people. Such a framework is auseful tool to prioritise basic, applied andexperimental research, and can assist in generatinginformation useful to management.

If anything, tiger conservation needs such aframework urgently. The tiger’s long-term survivaldepends on it. Even if we prioritise initialmanagement to target protected areas and theirimmediate ‘mutual impact zones’, it is imperative tolook beyond to the physical and social landscape.The 1983 task force under Madhavrao Scindia hadalso seen the management imperatives along theselines, but neither the management nor the researchwhich came after, followed the roadmap proposed by the task force. The result is here for us to see. All research definitely contributes to a betterunderstanding, but only a few can be of effective helpin solving problems. It is this link that must bestrengthened.

This also points to the importance of prioritisingresearch and the need for interdisciplinary research.Wildlife research is needed in three disciplinary andresearch activity domains — basic, applied andexperimental.

Facilitating networking It is clear that while all research is important and canassist in building knowledge-based actions, what isneeded is a coordinating mechanism to allownetworking between researchers and park managers.This forum would facilitate identification ofpriorities, strengthen the exchange of informationand build a strong community of researchers. Oneinstitution which can play this role is the WildlifeInstitute of India, which was set up to undertakeresearch and training in wildlife science andmanagement. Since its inception in the 1980s, the

82 The way ahead


Institute has spawned a large number of researchersworking in different parts of the country. Thecommunity of wildlife researchers has grownenormously over these years. In addition, there is anew breed of wildlife managers, who havespecialised in research and who can play effectiveroles in this discourse (see box: Wildlife Institute ofIndia — a critical role ahead).

It is important, then, to realise that internalexpertise and confidence in research abilities hasgrown enormously since Project Tiger was launchedin the early 1970s. At that stage, Indian expertise wasconsiderably weaker and cat specialists and wildlifebiologists who were consulted for the design of theprogramme came from abroad. But today, with thegrowth of this area of expertise in the country, thesituation has changed.

Indian researchers are competent to undertakethis research. In fact, unlike their counterparts in therest of the world, they bring uniquely Indianperspectives to wildlife matters. It is this researchknowledge that now needs to be integrated withpolicy.

It is clear that research should not be singly

designed for policy. At the same time, nobody canargue that policy should, or can be, designed withoutresearch. It is here that networking is needed the most.

Let us be clear: researchers do policy researchwhen there is a demand for it. Unfortunately, manytimes, policy is research-proof. On the other hand,policy makers argue that research is policy-proof.Clearly, there is no easy resolution to this issue. Whatis needed is to create forums — not just one but many— which can bring together these differentcommunities to a common discussion ground. Thisfacilitation of research and policy is essential.

The Tiger Task Force would not want to suggestthat any one institution be put in charge of this work.But it is clear that the Wildlife Institute of India mustplay a greater and involved role in bringing togetherthese different groups and interests.

Mechanisms to facilitate research

The Tiger Task Force finds the Sukumar and Karanthguidelines to be quite reasonable, but would like tosuggest institutional mechanisms that would further

The way ahead 83


Wildlife Institute of India – a critical role ahead

Set up in 1982, the Wildlife Institute of India (WII)marched ahead only when its was accordedautonomy in 1986. Support from its society,governing body (GB) and the Union ministry ofenvironment and forests (MoEF) facilitated its work intraining, academics and research domains so as toaccord with field realities of conservation —interspersion of dependent communities inwilderness areas of all kinds across the length andbreadth of India. Its faculty structures andprogrammes were tailored along these essential fieldrequirements and the progress was hailed by stateforest-wildlife organisations and scientific circles.

Unfortunately, a decade’s setback after the early1990s undermined its functional autonomy andeven programmes. Delayed increase in facultystrength and in filling vacancies stalled progress.Low ingress of proven field wildlife managers to itsdeputation reserve in the faculty exacerbated theadversity. It is ironical that upgrading of thedirector’s post in proportion with the enhancedresponsibility and status, though approved by itsgoverning body, chaired by the secretary, MoEF andendorsed by its society presided over by theminister, MoEF, has remained pending now for 15years.

There is no question that WII has to play a nodalrole in resurrecting wildlife and protected area

management along the imperative of a rationalparadigm shift so as to balance conservation and thesocio-economic well-being of forest dwelling people.Its founder faculty has the strength to carry forwardthis agenda meaningfully and speedily if thedeficiencies pointed above are remedied and itsfunctional autonomy with total transparency restoredwithout further delay. There is no reason for this notto happen, as all the concerned decision makers arepart of the institution’s governance as well.

The WII has a nodal facilitating andcoordinating role in prioritising wildlife researchso as to meet the concerns of protected areamanages in terms of not just animal species but alsofor habitats within and for wildlife outsideprotected areas. It has to infuse professionalcapacity among foresters in order to have adynamic and effective protected area sub-cadre. WII

also has to help national, regional and state levelforest training institution to ensure that they havecogent curricula and competent trainers. Last butnot the least, it has major work to do in order toadvance and consolidate its impressive progress inthe development of wildlife forensics. Its help, insetting up wildlife forensic cells within regional-Central and important state forensic laboratories, isneeded by way of training scientists and providingscientific protocols and reference materials for suchlabs to identify species of seized animal skins, otherbody parts and derivatives.

streamline the procedures and ensure betterutilisation of research output. As noted above,researchers feel that their work is not properly usedto make management decisions, while managerscontend that much of the research fails to addresssignificant management issues. This is undoubtedlyrelated to the fact that there is no existing mechanismof fruitful communication between researchers andmanagers.

The Tiger Task Force feels that such aninstitutional mechanism should be established both

at the state and the national levels. This could takethe form of panels that may be chaired by theinspector general of forests (wildlife) or chief wildlifewardens, and include the secretary of the NationalBiodiversity Authority or the State BiodiversityBoard, and other experts in ecology, social sciencesand bio-statistics. It would be best if these panelsserve as ‘single window’ clearing houses for allmatters relating to wildlife research, so that they canstreamline current procedures rather than createanother layer. The Tiger Task Force further suggests

84 The way ahead


Knowledge-based management plans

The Project Tiger guidelines make it mandatory forevery tiger reserve to be managed in accordancewith a site-specific management plan. This is theroadmap for managing a tiger reserve. It lays downthe concept of core-buffer zoning, prescribedinterventions for protection, habitat improvement,field data collection relating to change in thecomposition of flora and fauna on account ofprotection, animal estimation and other aspects.

But the management plan needs to be made more dynamic and incorporate both theconcepts and plans of science, cohabitation, habitat management and monitoring morecomprehensively.

It is notable that at the moment, there is a disconnect between the scientific researchconducted in tiger reserves and the monitoring andrevaluation of the management plans. As soon asthe proposed prioritisation of research is done foreach tiger reserve, the same must be made part of atiger reserve’s management plan. Upon completionof the research, the findings of research carried outon the priority areas should be used to constantlyupdate the management plans after an opendiscussion on it with the stakeholders, includingappropriate representatives of the people insideand outside the park (on the fringe), as they are immediately affected by changes in themanagement of the reserve. This can ensure twothings: one, the management plan remains a moredynamic and alive document; two, there is avalidation of the conservation-oriented research asto its practicality.

Similarly, on the social issues that affect thereserve, the management plan should also work asa dossier of information on the social profile of thereserve. The reserve authorities should compileand collect all social parameters, as delineated bythe Project Tiger directorate. On the basis of thedata and the plans made with Project Tiger forpeople-related issues, the plans should be made

part of the agenda for the tiger reserve authoritiesby incorporating them into the management plan. The surrounding fringe areas as well as the buffer zone need village level, participatorymicroplanning, with a legally enforceablememorandum of understanding between the tigerreserve management and the ecodevelopmentcommittees (already formed or about to be formed)spelling out the reciprocal contractual agreement.

But for these management plans to becomedocuments that are open to advise and informationfrom all possible sources, either governmental ornon-governmental the plans must be put out inpublic domain by placing them on the project tigerwebsite. There must be a method to incorporate thesuggestions and submission made by researchersand other interested people and the method ofincorporating such submissions must be clear toeveryone as well and in public domain.

The Task Force has recommended the creationof management committees for each reserve. Theplan must be discussed in the managementcommittees.

The implementation of the plan and theoutcome of the interventions contained in the sameshould be annually monitored by a panel ofindependent experts.

The Project Tiger directorate has prescribed aset of criteria (45) for standardising the monitoringwork which the Task Force has asked for acomprehensive review. The management plansshould include these criteria as well as evolve a setof their specific criteria, typically useful forevaluating the site.

The evaluation criteria should assess planning,process, inputs and output. The criteria shouldcover: legal status, land use, biotic pressure, use ofthe area by other departments, management planupdating, status of buffer, staff development,antipoaching strategy adopted, infrastructure, fundflow, tourism regulation, trust with the localcommunities, vision beyond the tiger reserve andthe like.

that the panels must be required to meet every twomonths and clear all pending decisions.

The Tiger Task Force recommends that thesepanels perform the following functions:● Develop broad guidelines governing all wildlife

research by wildlife managers as well as otherresearchers; such guidelines would pertain, forinstance, to the collection of plant specimens,creation of grazing enclosures and such likepertinent areas of research.

● Create online databases (Web-based) of allrelevant research findings, so that both managersand researchers are aware of the state-of-the-artresearch and can direct their energies in the mostfruitful channels.

● Suggest areas of research relevant to managementdecisions — for instance, what the bona fidefuelwood needs of villages still inside tigerreserves are. There should, however, be no banon undertaking projects that may seem to haveno immediate relevance to the park management.After all, understanding of what is relevant islimited. Despite his many years of work, for

instance, Salim Ali had not understood the vitalrole of buffaloes in maintaining bird habitats atBharatpur.

● Arrange dialogues between researchers andmanagers so that research findings relevant tomanagement are taken on board.

● Examine and decide on according permissionsfor research, along with any conditions that theresearchers must observe. Since the state panelswould be chaired by the chief wildlife wardens,no further clearance from the forest departmentshould be necessary. In case either a researcheror local forest officials have any grievances, thesame panels should serve as a dispute resolutionforum. In case the disputes persist, the centralpanel should serve as an arbitrator.

● Ensure that the researchers make their dataavailable to the public within some specifiedtime frame. While it is legitimate for theresearchers to claim intellectual property rightsover their research, it is important that they agreeto release their original data within somespecified period (such as three years from the

The way ahead 85


Independent audits of the tiger reserves

An independent audit of any enterprise is thesubstratum of a good review and method forseeking mid-route corrections, if needed. A tigerreserve, too, with its several facets, must be lookedupon as an enterprise that requires constant reviewagainst a specific dynamic plan. The Project Tigerdirectorate has began a system of independentaudit of the working of the tiger reserve. Thisprocess needs to be taken forward.

Amongst the criteria, the experts havegenerated a ranking-based system of measuringeach tiger reserve for its performance and thepossible problems that weaken the protected area.Legal status, compatible land use, pressure frompeople, status of management plans, staff situationand equipment are some of the criteria that havebeen used to rank the reserves.4 This is a good start.But it needs to be taken beyond the first step.

A good audit is as good as the parameters andthe protocols behind filling up the information tomeasure a reserve against those parameters. TheProject Tiger directorate must, in a time-boundfashion, build up a complete dossier of informationon the process of audit and the method by which theranking on each parameter is used. It is essentialthat both the officials in each reserve and otherinterested people know well in advance whatinformation is used to measure the reserve againstwhat parameter. This benchmarking will be critical.

The parameters with appropriate weightagesmust be then used to create a ranking of thereserves.

Confidence in the auditThe audit in itself cannot be the end of the process.The audit must be carried forward and merged intothe management of the plan by linking theresources that Project Tiger provides to thereserves. The rankings must be used to also giveweight while devolving Central funds to the tigerreserves. This shall ensure that there is an incentivefor the tiger reserves to improve upon the rankings.At the same time there must be a reputationaladvantage to gain for the parks by ranking higher.The Task Force, in its deliberations, has beenadvised by many field officers that parks likeKaziranga national park and Gir wildlife sanctuaryand national park have gained a lot by the statesand their people holding the areas in high regard asstate treasures.5 The ranking system developed onbasis of this audit too should feed into suchreputational credit.

To ensure that the system retains a reputationfor fairness as well as academic caliber, it must be completely put out in public domain, includingthe protocols, methodology and periodic results.And to ensure the system also undergoes acomplete governmental review, it must form part ofthe report that the directorate makes to theParliament.

date of collection). This would give sufficienttime for researchers to publish their work andgain scientific credit, while ensuring that allwork done becomes available to the public andfor management purposes within a reasonableperiod.

Putting information in the public domain

The Tiger Task Force feels very strongly that the mostserious lacuna in the approach to managinginformation on tigers has been a lack of openness andwillingness to take everybody along. The inclusive,open approach that we advocate depends crucially onfree access to all information for all people, exceptwhere very evident security concerns are involved. Inmodern times, this would be best ensured by postingall pertinent information on the Web, in English, aswell as in all Indian languages. Recent moves towardsensuring freedom of information have fortunately

removed all bureaucratic hurdles to such anendeavour. The information to be thus made availableshould include all research and survey results,pertinent satellite imagery (such as LISS 4 images),resource maps, working plans and managementplans, as well as on-going schemes of habitatmanipulation interventions, information collectedthrough the People’s Biodiversity Registers, and soon. An attempt should be made to also incorporateinformation on past and current activities of othergovernment agencies such as agriculture and tribaldevelopment in the concerned localities.

A competent technical group involvingecologists, statisticians and computer scientistsshould help in organising all the relevant informationin a suitably designed information system. This effortmay be conducted in collaboration with the recentinitiative of the National Biodiversity Authority todevelop a countrywide, networked BiodiversityInformation System.

86 The way ahead


1. It is essential to facilitate involvement of a wide range of researchers in wildlifebiology, especially in the context of intensive studies at the field level. It is also essentialto undertake interdisciplinary research moving beyond a single protected area and into abroader landscape framework. This should cover, besides biological aspects, themanagement and socio-economic aspects of wildlife conservation and protected areamanagement.

2. The Tiger Task Force is of the opinion that it is important to put in place institutionalmechanisms that would streamline existing procedures for clearance and coordination ofresearch and ensure better utilisation of the research output.

To do this, panels should be set up at the state and national levels, chaired by theinspector general of forests (wildlife) or the chief wildlife wardens, and including thesecretary of the National Biodiversity Authority or the State Biodiversity Board and otherexperts in ecology, social sciences and bio-statistics. These panels must serve as ‘singlewindow’ clearing houses for all matters relating to wildlife research, so that theystreamline current procedures, rather than create another layer of decision-making.

3. Internal expertise and confidence in research abilities have grown enormously in thecountry since the time of the launch of Project Tiger. Indian researchers are competent toundertake specialised research and unlike their counterparts in the rest of the world, theybring uniquely Indian perspectives to wildlife matters. It is this research and itsintegration with policy that needs to be fostered. The Wildlife Institute of India must beencouraged to play the role of a facilitator to improve the interface of research,management and policy. The agenda for research is massive and it will need theinvolvement and active engagement of many institutions and researchers. What is neededis to create forums that can bring together this knowledge and improve its use in policy.

4. The process of designing and implementing the management plans for each tigerreserve needs to be reworked. a. The plans must be updated regularly, taking into consideration the scientific and

Recommendations

The way ahead 87


socio-economic research that has been conducted; b. Their process of updation must include open discussions with the local communities,

local NGOs and researchers; c. The proposed reserve-level management committees must be asked to scrutinise the

details of these plans; d. The plans must be put in the public domain and be used for the independent

evaluation of the reserve.

The Project Tiger directorate must work with chief wildlife wardens and all field directorsto set up and implement this process.

5. The independent audit of each tiger reserve is potentially a vital tool for decisionmaking. This audit can to be used to create a reputational advantage for the reserve. Inorder to do this, the Task Force would recommend:a. Project Tiger directorate should work to further improve its criterion and indicators

for the rating. The criterion must be done to benchmark the progress and problems inall critical areas and set targets for its improvement.

b. The rating should then be used for management decisions and for creating aninformed and involved public opinion on the working of individual reserves.

c. It must be used to inform Parliament of the progress being made in tiger conservationand the challenges ahead.

But this will only be possible if the process has credibility and independence. To do this,the findings of the independent audit must be put in the public domain. The peers andcritics are the best auditors and insurers of quality.

6. The Tiger Task Force strongly feels that the most serious lacuna in the existingapproach to managing information on tigers has been a lack of openness and willingnessto take everybody along. The inclusive, open approach that the Task Force advocatesdepends crucially on free access to all information for all people, except where veryevident security concerns are involved. In modern times, this would be best ensured byposting all such information on the Web, in English, as well as in all Indian languages.

Wildlife conservationists say it is necessary to createinviolate spaces for the tiger. They state that Indiamust be prepared to set aside this land — 37,761 sqkm of tiger reserves, which, they say, is barely 1 percent of the country’s land area — for this flagshipspecies to breed and roam in.

This is clearly not unreasonable. After all, tigerreserves have been designated with this distinctpurpose in mind. When they were created in the1970s, the international agency assisting thegovernment had said that it was necessary for thetiger “to have large areas of at least 2,000 sq km withsimilar contiguous areas so that a viable populationof about 300 tigers in each area could bemaintained”. The task force chaired by Karan Singhthen went on to investigate the feasibility of thisproposal, but found that it could not locate manyareas as large as 2,000 sq km, which could be‘reserved’ for tiger conservation. It, therefore,decided to adopt an approach in which smallerreserves would be created as model parks to preservethe tiger, while much more would be done to buildpublic opinion in favour of wildlife preservation andso secure larger areas for protection.1

Even when the first eight tiger reserves wereselected in different ecological systems, the taskforce noted that each reserve had existing humanpressure — of grazing, resource use and commercialfelling. It then suggested a management plan thatwould involve restricting and minimising humanactivities within the reserves. The core of the reservewould be designated a national park, with no humanactivity, while the buffer area could sustain people.

The plan was that people would be relocatedfrom the core areas of the tiger reserves, while theywould continue to co-exist in the buffer areas. Butthe problem has been that while Project Tiger isbased on a management plan, using concepts of coreand buffer, the law does not have this provision.While the concept of core-buffer is deployed foradministrative purposes of the reserve, the lawprovides for something else: two main categories ofprotected reserves — national parks and sanctuaries— and two categories of protected forests — reserveforests and protected forests.

The tiger reserves in the country are a patchworkof these existing legal land uses. In many cases,where there were a large number of settlements,adjustments were made to exclude these areas fromthe core and to keep the area under the category ofeither a ‘sanctuary’ or a ‘reserve forest’. In fact, incertain cases, the core area of the tiger reserve does

not have the legal protection a forested space getswhen it receives ‘national park’ status. It remains asanctuary, but its administrators have to manage it asa completely protected zone.

The problem is that while there is an emphasison removing the biotic pressure that people bring tothe tiger’s habitat in most cases, there is littleempirical evidence of the nature of this impact andwhat can be done to manage or mitigate it, before theoption of relocation is considered. What isinteresting is that the architects of Project Tiger hadnoted, even then, that the “information on the effectsof villages and their occupants on surrounding areasis generally lacking”. In addition, it had pointed outthat the forest department considers that “poachingby villagers in the reserves is spasmodic and its effectis negligible. Villagers are undoubtedly a fire hazard,but they are also available to assist in extinguishingserious fires”.

But as villagers would impact the habitat overtime, that task force said it was desirable that smallpockets of forest villages should be shifted. In casethis was not possible, then, at the very least, cattlethat are a menace to forests should be diverted toalternative sites. In case people were angry becausetheir cattle were killed by tigers and were resorting to retaliatory poisoning, the task force said thatcompensation should be paid urgently.

Since then, more reserves have been created. Theprinciple followed is the same: absolute protectionfor the core and human activity geared towardsconservation in the buffer.

But unfortunately, 30 years hence, this picture isfar from perfect. In fact, matters have become muchworse. People continue to live in the core as well asthe buffer areas of the reserves. There has beeninadequate work done to relocate settlements and, inthe meantime, poverty and destitution has drivenmore people into the reserves. Authorities maintainthat according to the plan, these people are notallowed to use forest resources, first in the core andnow even in the buffer areas. People live there, sothey do use the resources; but this use is illegal. Theauthorities say that people should not be living in thereserves, as per the management plan for the reserve,which has demarcated areas as core and buffer, sothere is no question of providing developmentassistance or even compensation for cattle kills.There is escalating and deadly tension between thepeople and the park because of all this. At the end ofit, the tiger and the people are both losing.

The issue, then, is to review what has been done

3.7 The relocation agenda

88 The way ahead


till date to make these spaces ‘inviolate’, and whatneeds to be done in the future. The Tiger Task Force found to its surprise that whereas someconservationists and wildlife managers discuss theneed for the relocation of human habitations as theirtop priority — they also say that human pressurewithin the reserves is creating problems for thetiger’s survival — there is virtually no compilation ofdata on firstly, the number of habitations withinthese reserves or on the fringes of the reserves; andsecondly, the impact of these habitations on the tigerpopulation.

Clearly, without this data, little can be done tounderstand the nature of the challenge.

Therefore, the Task Force has worked with thedirector, Project Tiger, to collect informationregarding the number of villages inside the reserves— the core areas of Project Tiger (mainly nationalparks). This is the first time a review has been madeof the number of people living in these areas and ofwhat needs to be done.

The number of relocated villages Since the inception of Project Tiger in the early1970s, a total of 80 villages and 2,904 families havebeen relocated from different tiger reserves (see table:

Villages, families and livestock relocated fromdifferent tiger reserves).

The largest and oldest relocation concerns Kanhain Madhya Pradesh in the 1970s and 1980s, while themost recent relocation has been undertaken inBhadra tiger reserve in Karnataka, where the Centralgovernment has spent Rs 11.68 crore and the stategovernment Rs 4.65 crore on costs of rehabilitation.2

In addition, it is estimated that the bulk of the landon which the 439 families have been settled isextremely productive and irrigated land, along theShimoga-Bangalore highway, which has been valuedat another Rs 15-25 crore at market value.3 Thisrelocation cost the government, at a conservativeestimate, Rs 8.3 lakh per family, as against thestipulated Rs 1 lakh per family under the norms.

Money spent on relocationIt is difficult to estimate the money spent onrelocation, for much of the work was done a longtime ago, when the schemes were still unclear. We doknow that recently, in the Bhadra tiger reserve, theCentral and state governments have spent Rs 4.02lakh per family, without accounting for land costs.But excluding this expense in Bhadra, the countryhas spent Rs 3 crore to relocate 467 families, or, on anaverage, Rs 64,000 per family since the 9th Five YearPlan in tiger reserves (see table: Cost of relocationsince 9th Five Year Plan and the average spent perfamily).

For purposes of estimation, if we assume that Rs 50,000 has been spent, on an average, on the 2,904 families relocated from reserves all over thecountry since the inception of Project Tiger, the totalamount spent on relocation would amount to Rs 14.52 crore. Given that the Centre’s spending onProject Tiger till 2002-2003 is Rs 173 crore, the

The way ahead 89


Name of Funds spent/ Families Averagereserve allocated relocated spent per

(Rs lakh) family (Rs)

Kanha 3.80 25 15,200

Bandipur 14.65 100 14,650

Nagarhole 243.50 250 97,400

Bhadra* 1,765.00** 439 402,050

Melghat 46.00 92 50,000

Total 2,072.95 906

COST OF RELOCATION SINCE 9TH FIVE YEAR PLAN ANDTHE AVERAGE SPENT PER FAMILY (WITHOUT

ACCOUNTING FOR LAND COSTS)

Note: *Not included in 9th Plan**includes Rs 13 crore of Central government and Rs 4.65 crore of stategovernment funds. Not all funds may have been disbursed. Source: Project Tiger directorate

Name of reserve Villages Families Livestock relocated relocated relocated

Simlipal 3 72 51

Melghat 3 94 1,556

Ranthambhore 11 195 3,879

Sariska 1 71 165

Panna 3 210 2,131

Kanha 27 656 10,509

Bhadra 12 439 4,930

Corbett 3 300 3,000

Buxa 1 33 20,000

Nagarjunasagar-Srisailam 1 167 Nil

Bandipur 3 417 120

Nagarhole 12 250 NA

Total 80 2,904 46,341

Non-tiger reserves

Kuno Palpur 19 1,400

Madhav national park 1 102

Chandaka Dampara 3 188

VILLAGES, FAMILIES AND LIVESTOCK RELOCATED FROMDIFFERENT TIGER RESERVES

Source: Information submitted to Project Tiger by states, June 2005

amount spent on relocating people who lived inthese reserves is clearly a small fraction of the costs.Also, if we compare these costs to Bhadra, wheremore has been spent to resettle 439 families than allthe 2,904 families relocated till date, it is clear thatthe funds spent on relocation have been very smalland inadequate.

It is also important to note that the quantum offunds and the current budgetary allocation under the

tribal relocation scheme, which has now beenmerged with the Project Tiger funds, require urgentreworking. The costs to be incurred in relocation —at Rs 1 lakh per family — were estimated many yearsago and are clearly inadequate. If the costs arecomputed on the basis of what was spent in Bhadra— Rs 4.02 lakh per family (without land) and Rs 8.3lakh (with land costs) — it would make the processmuch more acceptable to local people.

90 The way ahead


Tiger reserve Core Overall tiger reserve

Villages Families* Population* Villages Families* Population*

Bandhavgarh 6 210 1,050 75 2,625 13,125

Bandipur 54 2,592 12,960 54 2,592 12,960

Bhadra 0 0 0 5 67 335

Buxa 0 0 0 89 3,122 15,608

Corbett 0 0 0 25 875 4,375

Dampa 0 0 0 61 2,135 10,675

Dudhwa and Katarniaghat 1 35 175 37 1,295 6,475

Indravati 56 1,300 7,956 56 1,300 7,956

Kanha 19 665 3,325 169 5,915 29,575

Kalakad-Mundanthurai 15 1,703 9,580 16 1,728 9,700

Manas 0 0 0 167 5,845 29,225

Melghat 19 1,585 7,925 58 2,950 24,607

Nagarjunasagar-Srisailam 24 840 4,200 149 8,432 43,978

Namdapha 2 52 260 2 52 260

Nameri 0 0 0 8 630 3,150

Pakke 0 0 0 0 0 0

Palamau 3 105 525 164 5,740 28,700

Panna 45 1,565 7,825 45 1,565 7825

Pench (Maharashtra) 1 52 239 1 52 239

Pench (Madhya Pradesh) 0 0 0 99 3,465 17,325

Periyar 0 0 0 4 599 2,995

Ranthambhore 4 140 700 25 875 8,643

Sariska 11 6,337 34,185 27 7,793 43,506

Satpura 6 224 1,122 60 2,114 35,548

Simlipal 7 245 1,225 65 2,275 11,375

Sundarbans 0 0 0 0 0 0

Tadoba-Andhari 0 0 0 6 210 1,050

Valmiki 0 0 0 20 700 3,500

TOTAL 273 19,215 101,077 1,487 66,516 380,535

NUMBER OF VILLAGES AND PEOPLE IN THE CORE AREA AND IN THE TIGER RESERVE

Note: *The information on the number of villages has been extrapolated in many cases to estimate the families (x35) and population (x5).Source: Information sent by state governments to Project Tiger directorate, July 2005.

The numbers still to be relocatedThere is no assessment of the total number ofsettlements in the tiger reserves. There is also noassessment of the number of settlements in the coreareas of the reserves, which are in particularimpinging on the health of the tiger.

The Task Force has worked with the ProjectTiger directorate to put together an estimate of the number of villages that are in the core and buffer areas of the tiger reserves. This data is,however, still not validated as there is tremendousuncertainty about the number of settlers. Theproblem is compounded by the fact that in largetracts of forests in the country, the rights of peoplehave never been settled — there are no real records ofthe number of families who live in these villages.When the reserves were declared, people lived inthese lands. But the lands were reserved forest lands,notified as such by the state. Unfortunately, in manyparts of the country, when the reserved forests werenotified, the rights of the local people were notrecognised. In other words, people have seen their homes changed from being ‘reserved forests’ to ‘reserved for tigers’ while they have become‘illegal settlers’.

According to this compilation, it is estimatedthat there are roughly 1,500 villages within the 28tiger reserves and roughly 65,000 families (3,25,000people at five people per family) that need to berelocated from both the core and buffer areas of tigerreserves (see table: Number of villages and people inthe core area and in the tiger reserve).

Cost of relocationIf we compute costs at the current rate, we need Rs665 crore for 66,516 families; if we take an enhancedscheme of say Rs 2.5 lakh per family, it wouldrequire Rs 1,663 crore to resettle them (see table: Costof relocation). Compare this to the funds available forrelocation in the 10th Five Year Plan period: Rs 2-3crore annually, or Rs 10-15 crore in all.4

In addition, as revenue land is rarely availableand forest land is usually used for resettlement, thestate has to pay between Rs 5.8 to Rs 9 lakh per ha fordiversion of this land. The fact is that this is forestland which is being lost to the nation: so, the costshould be paid, even if there are gains inside theconservation area. If this is added to the total,assuming that there are 65,000 families that require2.5 ha of land each, the additional financial cost forthis land will be Rs 9,645 crore. If we compute thesecosts only for the 273 villages in the core areas of thereserves, it will cost Rs 192 crore at current rates andRs 480 crore at an enhanced rate, without assumingthe cost of land. This, it has to be noted, is equivalentto the annual budget for the entire forestry sector atthe Centre.

Relocation from coreThe originators of the programme hadconceptualised that the core area would be free ofhuman habitation. The core areas of the 28 tigerreserves constitute roughly 17,612 sq km, less thanhalf the total area under protection (see table:The area of reserves and percentage of core to thetotal area).

The Task Force has also estimated the number offamilies in the core area of the reserves. According tothe data collected, there are 273 villages in the core ofthe 28 reserves.

Therefore, one option would be to focus the relocation programme on the core areas of thetiger reserves. In which case, the number of villages to be relocated will be far less. This isbecause six reserves — Panna and Kanha in MadhyaPradesh, Melghat in Maharashtra, Nagarjunasagar-Srisailam in Andhra Pradesh, Indravati inChhattisgarh and Bandipur in Karnataka — containas much as 217 of the 273 villages in the core. Inother words, 79 per cent of the human habitations inthe core areas of tiger reserves are found in thesereserves. It is also important to note that two of thesereserves — Indravati and Nagarjunasagar-Srisailam— are in naxalite-infested areas, where relocationwill be difficult.

The way ahead 91


Number of villages 273 1,214 1,487

Number of families1 19,215 47,301 66,516

Cost of Cost of Cost of relocation relocating relocation from core from buffer all(Rs/crore) (Rs/crore)

At current rate of 192.00 473.00 665.16 Rs 1 lakh per family

At enhanced rate of 480.00 1,183.00 1,663.00Rs 2.5 lakh per family2

For payment for land3 2,786.00 6,859.00 9,645.00

Total cost, assuming 3,266.00 10,042.00 11,508.00enhanced rate

COST OF RELOCATION

Note: 1. If figures are not available, then extrapolated at 35 families per village

(underestimate)2. The current allocation needs to be revised, this amount been taken for

purposes of estimation only. 3. The current guidelines provide for 2.5 ha per family. This estimation is

taking the current net present value of Rs 5.8 lakh per ha, as the cost offorest that needs to be diverted and is lost or the cost of revenue landthat needs to be bought.

Source: New Delhi; Project Tiger directorate

Issues in relocation: land

It is important here to consider the question of theland needed to resettle families and its implicationsfor conservation. It is clear that across the countrythere is no revenue land available for resettlement.State governments, therefore, increasingly ask for thediversion of forest land for resettling families. Asforest land cannot be diverted for non-forestrypurposes without the sanction of the Centralgovernment, an application is made under the ForestConservation Act, 1980 for this land. Recent

directions of the Supreme Court require stategovernments to pay the net present value of thediverted forest land. This cost has been computed bythe apex court at Rs 5.8 to 9 lakh per ha (dependingon the category of forest that is diverted). The forestland is then cleared of all vegetation before it ishanded over to families for resettlement. But what isalso important to note is that even after the forestland is handed over to the relocated families, itsclassification in government records remains as“forests”. This means that the regulations of theForest Conservation Act, 1980 applies to the land.

92 The way ahead


Name of tiger reserve Total area Core area Buffer area % of core to total

Dampa 500 340.00 160.00 68.00

Sariska 866 497.00 369.00 57.39

Ranthambhore 1,334 274.50 1,060.14 20.58

Pench (Maharashtra) 257 257.00 – 100.00

Kalakad-Mundanthurai 800 537.00 358.00 67.13

Palamau 1,026 213.00 813.00 20.76

Panna 542 542.00 – 100.00

Tadoba-Andhari 620 218.76 357.02 35.28

Periyar 777 350.00 427.00 45.05

Buxa 759 385.02 375.90 50.73

Bandipur 1,508 523.00 357.00 34.68

Indravati 2,799 1,258.37 1,540.71 44.96

Bhadra 492 276.66 175.03 56.23

Kanha 1,945 940.00 1,005.00 48.33

Valmiki 840 335.64 358.00 39.96

Pench (Madhya Pradesh) 758 292.85 465.00 38.63

Simlipal 2,750 845.70 1,904.30 30.75

Corbett 1,316 520.82 797.70 39.58

Satpura 1,486 1,486.00 – 100.00

Manas 2,840 520.00 2,317.00 18.31

Dudhwa 1,362 490.20 190.03 35.99

Bandhavgarh 1,162 624.75 536.71 53.77

Namdapha 1,985 1,807.82 177.42 91.07

Nagarjunasagar-Srisailam 3,568 1,200.00 2,368.00 33.63

Melghat 1,677 340.00 160.00 20.27

Pakke-Nameri 1,206 1,206.00 – 100.00

Sundarbans 2,585 1,330.00 1,255.00 51.45

Total 37,760 17,612.09 17,526.96 46.64

AREA OF RESERVES AND PERCENTAGE OF CORE TO THE TOTAL AREA (sq km)

Source: http://projecttiger.nic.in, as viewed on June 5, 2005

Thus, families remain highly restricted in thefacilities they can get on this land and are stilldependent on the forest agencies for all assistance.

The issues, therefore, are three-fold: ● What will be the total quantum of forest land

required to resettle families relocated from tigerreserves?

● What will this diversion of forest land do to thetiger habitats and critical corridors where tigerslive?

● Does this forest land provide the resettled peoplewith opportunities to build livelihood securities,which will help to relieve the pressure on thetiger reserves?

There is little evidence to suggest that wildlifemanagers have taken these issues into considerationduring the planning of their relocation strategies. Inall the reported cases of relocation it is clear that thequality of land — degraded forest land — which isgiven in the relocation package does not lead toadequate livelihood security, unless there isinvestment in reliable irrigation facilities. As a result,people who get these lands in compensation find noalternative but to join the ‘fringe’ villages in puttingpressure on the protected area for their dailysurvival: for firewood, fodder and minor forestproduce.

On the other hand, the relocation itself leads toclearance of forests and destruction of habitats. It isalso important to note that the impoverishment offorests leads to impoverishment of people, which inturn contributes to the pressure on the protectedareas. In Karnataka’s Nagarhole tiger reserve, forinstance, of the roughly 1,500 families living insideand over 3,500 other claimant families displacedearlier, some 250 families have moved outside. Theforest department has worked hard on providing thevillagers with model houses, yards and even solarpanels. Each family has been given 2.5 hectares ofdegraded forest land for cultivation. But as thefamilies have little economic ability to invest in thedevelopment of the land, they find that they stillhave to earn their living from labour and foraging inthe forest.5

In this way, relocation can easily become a self-defeating proposition. Firstly, the land needed tosettle each family will be enormous. The forest landwill have to be turned into marginal agricultural land— degraded land for poor people is not the bestsolution. Secondly, displacement leads to furthermarginalisation and exacerbation of poverty. Itdefeats the purpose of conservation; people have noalternative but to continue to use the forest for basicsurvival needs.

There are no estimates of how much forest landwill be required to relocate the families within

protected areas. But if one makes such an estimatebased on the families living within just the tigerreserves — 1,500 villages or 65,000 families — wewould require 162,500 hectares (1,625 sq km) offorest land for just these families.

The problem is not the quantum, but the locationand ecological importance of the forest, often part ofthe corridor used by wild animals and the landscapein which they live. For instance, it is said that thevillages of Sariska were slated to be relocated toprime tiger habitats like Ajabgarh and Serawasforests. These forests were known to have tigers andwere in fact ‘tiger shooting blocks’ of the state in thedays of the Maharajas and their hunting sorties.6

The problem also is that a protected area facespressure from villages within the park and fromoutside. In other words, by simply relocatingsettlements to outside the demarcated zone ofprotection does not necessarily lead to betterprotection, for the relocated villages merely add tothe pressure from outside. Also, as wildlifeprotection improves, animals find the boundaries ofthe park inadequate and move outside. Their spill-over is not tolerated by the already hostile peopleand this leads to increased retaliatory killings andloss of species. The effort of park managers has beento ‘think’ relocation and so, as the pressureexacerbates, they start looking for solutions inrelocating the villages at the periphery as well. In thisway, the cycle continues.

This is not to say that relocation is not necessary,in certain cases. Relocation is indeed important incases where human activity is impacting on the keyhabitat of animals and, if done well, can bringsubstantial conservation benefits.

But if poorly done, relocation contributes to thehostility of the local people towards the sanctuaryand can be counter-productive. Therefore, it needscareful planning and execution. For instance, inApril 2005, villagers living in Dobjhirna village inHoshangabad district of Madhya Pradesh wereengaged in a hostile battle with the forestdepartment. The problem was that the departmentwas planning to shift a village — Dhai — from withinthe core area of Satpura tiger reserve and hadidentified the land of Dobjhirna for re-settlement.The problem was that Dobjhirna itself was an ‘illegal’settlement; the villagers were living on andcultivating what was officially forest departmentland. With the department moving in to clear land forthe settlers, the proposed relocation led to tensionsand reports of violence by the police and forestdepartment. The people who were to move toDobjhirna were already apprehensive about thismove to transfer them from within the protected area— where they had fodder for their cattle and theclandestine sale of mahua to meet their needs — to

The way ahead 93


this area which was devoid of vegetation andlivelihood options. All in all, a situation is not goingto help conservation as new settlers find that survivalis not possible without forests and old settlers arefurther displaced to look for more land to cultivate.7

The quality of relocationIt is also clear that relocation requires money,facilities, administrative skills and commitment fromthe implementing agencies. It is important to notethat if this relocation is not ‘satisfactory’, it leads togreater anger and alienation of the local peopletowards the sanctuary; it makes the next effort forrelocation even more difficult, for people, aware ofthe past experience, stoutly resist. Most of all, theconservation imperative becomes even more difficultwhen people have no option but to turn to aprotected area for their survival once again. Theexercise virtually ends up defeating its own purpose.

An example of relocation: SariskaThe quality of relocation in the country has mostlyverged on being disastrous. For instance, the onevillage that was relocated from Sariska tiger reservein Rajasthan found itself in such poor conditions thatall the villagers returned to the original village insidethe forest. Now, when agencies are keen to move theremaining villages from the core, there is resistanceand deep suspicion. Researcher Radhika Johari, adoctoral student at the department of anthropology,York University, USA, reports of her conversationwith villagers within the reserve, who recalled theviolent efforts of the administration to evict non-revenue villages from the core area. The villagers atKraska spoke of how they were offered land by theforest department in a village located outside thecore area, how they relinquished their land-ownership certificates, only to face opposition fromthe existing residents of the village and to find thatthe land allotted was hilly and unsuitable. They soldoff this land at low prices and returned to the forest,where they were declared illegal by the forestdepartment. When they refused to move, thedepartment used force to evict them. All thisirreversibly destroyed the relations between theauthorities and the people and also left enoughresentment and bad memories to fuel resistance tofurther relocation.8

Retired foresters V D Sharma and R G Soni, andRajendra Singh of Tarun Bharat Sangh, in theirsubmissions to the Tiger Task Force, explained thatthe process followed was extremely faulty. The landwas allotted only on paper but when the settlers wentto the village, the revenue officials in charge of theentire relocation programme did not hand over theland. In fact, the land was then taken over by a fewinfluential people.9

But it is also important to note that relocation ofkey villages from within the core zone — a highpriority tiger habitat — would be important forconservation. A J T Johnsingh of the WildlifeInstitute of India, who has worked for long in thishabitat, argues that the area of ‘Core-I’ is capable ofsustaining both prey and tiger species. Therefore, hesuggests that relocation, particularly of Umri village(which has 26 families and a high livestockpopulation) would be an important step ahead.10 Theproblem is to rebuild the confidence of villagers andto repair the broken relationship between villagersand protectors, which has in no small measurecontributed to the disaster in the reserve.

It is only more recently that there have beeninstances where implementing agencies have gonebeyond what is technically required to give people apackage, which is both satisfactory to them and helpsrebuild their livelihoods. But even here, success ishard to come by. Firstly, this work demands thatother agencies — from irrigation to education —coordinate their activities with the forestdepartment. Secondly, it demands long-term work toensure that all the facilities needed are provided.Thirdly, and most critically, it needs careful andsensitive working with affected people so that theyare fully engaged in the process.

An example of relocation: KunoRelocation in Kuno wildlife sanctuary in MadhyaPradesh, being developed as a site to introduce theAsiatic lion from Gir in Gujarat, was plannedcarefully. A total of 19 villages — 1,400 families —were resettled to the outskirts of the sanctuary. Theinhabitants were mostly poor, forest-dependentSahariya tribals. The package was based on a Centralscheme — the beneficiary oriented scheme for tribaldevelopment — which considers every male above18 years, and provides a compensation of Rs 1 lakhper family, for all the services and facilities needed.

In 1997, the Union ministry of environment andforests cleared the use of 3,721 ha of forest land forrehabilitation. This was inadequate, so an additional1,283 ha of land was given for relocation in 2000.Researchers from the Samrakshan Trust found that inmany villages, there were complaints regarding thequality of the land and its clearance, but these weresorted out over time. They found the rehabilitationprocess had both negative and positive fallouts — theland in the sanctuary which the people hadcultivated was of a much better quality and had gooddrainage facilities, so they were not satisfied with theallotted land. On the other hand, it was also a factthat there was greater degree of equality in theallotted area, with every family receiving 2 ha ofland. Health, education and communicationfacilities were better in the new area, although

94 The way ahead


unreliable and costly. The real problem concerned people’s

livelihoods. On the one hand, researchers found cropyields were substantially lower in the new areas,primarily because the land quality, being degradedforest land with little irrigation, was poor. On theother hand, without access to forests, people had lostother sources of revenue and food: from hunting tothe collection of minor forest products like honey,tendu or berries. People also had to leave theirlivestock inside the sanctuary because of the lack offodder sources in the newly settled sites. The peoplehave now shifted from cattle to goats, which againputs a stress on the degraded ecosystem. This ledresearchers to conclude that “in the short run, therehas been a significant decline in livelihood security,which can be directly attributed to displacementfrom resource-rich forests”. This meant that agencieswould need to sustain their investment in therelocation efforts and would require institutionalcapacities to do this development work.11

But the challenge to sustain investment isdifficult. It is, therefore, little surprise that ajournalist writing for the magazine Frontline, whovisited the relocated village of Pehra in 2005, found ahigh order of economic distress and destitution:agricultural productivity had declined and villagerswere forced to migrate for work. Without theresources of the forests, malnutrition had increased,and drinking water was scarce. In resettledPipalbawdi village, people decided to return to theforest for the monsoon crop in 2004. In other words,with all the time and money spent, the work onrelocation could well be lost.12

An example of relocation: Bhadra The Bhadra experience is widely considered a modelfor future relocation in the country and needs to becarefully considered. This 500 sq km area wasdeclared a wildlife sanctuary and tiger reserve in1998 — with an initial notification issued as early asin 1974. The 1992 census found there were 736families in 16 villages located within the sanctuaryarea.13

In 2003, a study conducted by wildliferesearchers found 4,000 people were living insideBhadra — a few had recognised legal status but mostwere ‘encroachers’. Researchers also studied theimpact of human activity and found the villagersdepended on firewood and minor forest productcollection for their livelihoods. When they modelledthe use pattern, they estimated the total area affectedby intensive human activity around the 13 villagesthey studied was about 12 sq km, in addition to thearea of the villages. The total area affected by humanactivity was computed at 53.70 sq km — roughly 11

per cent of the total area of the sanctuary.14

The people’s initial reaction to relocation washostile. On the one hand, park authorities increasedpressure on people to leave the sanctuary by seizingall firewood, putting a stop to livestock grazing andclosing the sanctuary gates so that people could notuse the roads. As their harassment increased, peoplebecome more and more angry. Large areas were burnteach year as people deliberately set fire to forests.

But park authorities then worked hard to get thepeople involved in relocation and agreed on anattractive and rewarding package. In its officialdocument chronicling the relocation programme, thegovernment of Karnataka says: “…to wax eloquenton conservation to people who are cut off fromcivilisation during monsoons is a ridiculousproposition. After all, these people have been livinghere for over a century. To deny them the right to usethe game roads, to cut fodder for livestock or togather firewood seemed inhuman.”15

The reason why Bhadra is more successful is:● The quality of land given to the settlers is

extremely productive and fertile. It is also over50 km away from the sanctuary, so it helps buildnew livelihood opportunities.16

● The quantum of money spent on individualfamilies and services was substantially higherthan what has been sanctioned through theCentral scheme for relocation.

● The fact that all settlers — legal or ‘illegal’,landed and landless — were given land in therelocation venue provided a much greaterinterest in relocation.

● The government agencies worked carefully tocoordinate the activities between the differentdepartments and, more importantly, ensuredthere was little misappropriation of funds. Thisis also a case where local NGOs played animportant facilitating role.

But even here, recent evidence suggests a fewfamilies that received unirrigated land are unhappy.Also, villagers in the fringe of the core area, who areagreeable to relocation, want the same quality ofirrigated land. The question in Bhadra is how will itensure the expectations of these people will be met.If it is not, Bhadra might well witness unrest andtension between park authorities and people.

The question remains if the money spent onBhadra — Rs 4.02 lakh per family — would not havebeen utilised to ‘manage’ the impacts within thereserve. After all, research shows that the areaimpacted by human beings was only 11 per cent ofthe reserve. Are these conservation benefits worth it?More importantly, was the decision for relocationtaken after these considerations?

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96 The way ahead


Task Force rationale for the futureIt is important for India to assess, in the light of the above data, the feasibility ofundertaking relocation in all reserves and of relocating all villages in the reserves. Let usbe clear till date only 80-odd villages have been relocated from tiger reserves. The trackrecord of that relocation exercise has also not been uniform or praise-worthy. In fact, inmany cases, people who have been relocated have either come back or are todaycontributing to the pressure on the park from the fringes.

Currently, all action on this front is suffering from what can only be called an ostrichsyndrome. On the one hand, conservationists argue relocation is an absolute necessity toensure effective reserve management; on the other, everyone accepts — discreetly — thatthe scale of relocating all villages from all reserves is so huge that it becomes a strategyvirtually impossible to contemplate. The solution then is status quo. The stategovernments have informed the Supreme Court, in not so clear terms, that they neitherhave the finances or the land to settle the rights of all people living within reserves. Theyhad informed the secretary, ministry of environment in the early 1990s that this workwould cost over Rs 600 crore, which they do not have.

The law, the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, maintains that there should be no peoplein the national parks (mostly, the core of tiger reserves). If there are any, then their rightsshould have been settled and they should be allowed to remain only after it has beenaccepted that their use of the reserves will not lead to conservation problems.

The forest department maintains that it must relocate people, but does very little onthe ground. Also, there is no clarity on why a particular village in a particular reserve getstargeted for relocation. Moreover, relocation that is undertaken is poorly done in mostcases, leading to increased stress on the protected areas.

In the meantime, people continue to live in the parks. They are denied access to basicneeds. They do not have legal livelihood options and so everything they do to survive isdone stealthily. This leads to conflict between them and the park managers. Nodevelopment can be done for villagers for they are ‘unwanted’ and ‘temporary’; theyshould have been shifted out. In this way, the stalemate continues.

This Task Force had visited Hindala village in Ranthambhore and witnessed theterrible poverty and destitution of people, who have been living within this prestigiousnational park. They have no water, no school, no medical facilities. They are harassed ifthey graze their animals in the land outside their village. The forest department says thatit is planning to ‘relocate’ this village. The villagers told the Task Force that they wereprepared to move, but also expressed concern that the villagers who had been relocatedfrom Ranthambhore in the past, were facing problems, even more severe than theirs. Theyfeared for their future. Given their sheer destitution today, this is a real indictment of theprocess of relocation.

Currently, policy denies that there is a need to do anything different. The NationalWildlife Action Plan (which works as the country’s policy on wildlife) says that “whileall facilities should be provided to the people who volunteer to move outside nationalparks and sanctuaries, adequate safeguards will have to be taken to prevent land-baseddevelopmental activities within national parks and sanctuaries, because such effort willbe in violation of Section 29 of the Wildlife (Protection) Act. However, there should be noban on imparting skills to local communities, which will reduce their dependence onnatural resources of the protected areas”.17

In other words, no development activity can be allowed, as it will contravene theWildlife (Protection) Act, 1972. But in some abstract way, the people who formulated thepolicy get out of the problem by asking for ‘skills’ to be ‘imparted’ to the lakhs of peoplethat live within the network of protected reserves. However, there is no clarity about howmany people need to be relocated, by when, and how this is to be done. There is,therefore, no policy that seeks to end this logjam: people or parks, or people and parks.

Recommendations

The way ahead 97


The Task Force therefore recommendsIt is vital that policy must be devised to break this logjam. The Tiger Task Force acceptsthe reality of the situation and has devised the best possible options for the future. Thefollowing are the recommendations:

1. There should be an urgent and realistic review of the number of villages that actuallyneed to be relocated from the reserves. The decision must be based on the fact that thevillages that need to be relocated are so made to do so because they are located in thecritical habitats — tiger natal areas and key conservation priority areas.

2. One option is to consider that all villages in the core area of reserves — roughly 273— need relocation. The other option is to undertake a review of all the villages in thereserves and only then decide which of these actually need to be moved for ecologicalimperatives. There must be a criterion for the identification of these villages, so that it isclear which village is to be relocated and why. This is essential.

In this context, the Tiger Task Force is not suggesting any fixed numbers of villages orareas for relocation. But it is urging for speed and careful decision-making. It is importantthat the decision to relocate takes into account all financial and logistical implications.Till date, in 30 years, if only 80-odd villages have been relocated, the agencies that workout the relocation estimates must take into account the feasibility and capacity ofimplementing agencies to undertake this work.

3. In order to ensure that the process of selection of villages to be relocated is completedspeedily, the Tiger Task Force recommends a tight schedule of one year to studysettlements and list the ones to be relocated. This schedule must be strictly compliedwith.

4. Based on this list, the Project Tiger directorate must draw up a time-bound action planto complete the process of relocation. The action plan for relocation must be completed interms of its financial and land provisions before it is finalised and accepted. This isessential, as only once this is completed can the park management be clear about theplans it has to develop for the families it has to co-exist with. It is clear that not all the1,500 villages can be relocated. Or even need to be relocated. But what is important is towork on the plan for relocation speedily, so that the villages that co-inhabit the land of thetiger can do so with dignity.

5. During the formulation of this action plan, the responsible agency must keep in mindthe experience of past relocation efforts to ensure that the process of relocation does notlead to further resource degradation or loss of livelihood of people.

6. The financial allocation for the relocation scheme must be revised and enhanced sothat it can take into account the needs, particularly, of providing irrigated land and otherfacilities to ensure livelihood security. The provision of irrigation facilities is crucial, asthe land for resettlement, if it is forest land, is degraded and provides people little optionsfor economic survival or improvement.

The allocation for the scheme within the umbrella Project Tiger scheme is Rs 10-15crore for the 5 years of the 10th Plan – roughly Rs 2-3 crore a year. If all the families in thetiger reserve need to be relocated it will cost Rs 1,660 crore (taking an enhanced allocationof Rs 2.5 lakh per family). If the plan is to relocate 19,215 families from the core areas, itwill require Rs 480 crore. Given that relocation usually occurs on diverted forest land, thecost of relocation to the state would include the net present value of the forest land.Accounting for this would bring the total bill to relocate famlilies out of the core areas ofthe reserves to Rs 3,200 crore.7. The scheme must take into account the options for livelihood in the resettled village.It is important for planners to take into account the fact that people who live within the

98 The way ahead


reserves are forest-dependent communities, and survive within agro-silvo-pastoraleconomies. The relocation package must be designed to provide viable alternatives.Currently, there is no grazing land or irrigated agricultural facilities offered in therelocation package. This means that people have no alternative but to revert to the forestfringe for survival.

8. The scheme must ensure that all families — and not just those families with recordedrights or who have revenue land — are relocated.

9. Families are usually relocated on forest land from which the standing forest is cut totransform a forest into a relocation site. But even then, the land is categorised as forestland. This means that the rules of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 continue to apply tothis land, in which families now live. This places restrictions on their livelihood anddevelopment opportunities.

This, clearly, must change. Such land as becomes a relocation site, if it is categorisedas ‘forest’, must duly be re-categorised as ‘revenue’ land, otherwise it will continue tocreate problems for the resettled villages.

10. To monitor the quality of relocation and to ensure that there is careful coordinationand follow-up in the relocation work, a task force for relocation must be set up at theProject Tiger directorate, which will coordinate the work with the state offices.

The Task Force has deliberated upon whether the work of relocation should behanded over to revenue agencies, or to other district-level agencies. It has come to believethat while there is a need for close coordination with district and irrigation agencies, thetask must remain with the wildlife agencies, as they are most interested in its successfulcompletion. However, as these agencies often lack the necessary experience in ruraldevelopment, the state working with the Project Tiger directorate must find innovativemethods of involving other agencies in this work.

The Task Force would suggest that a mechanism be set up at the Central level in theProject Tiger directorate to oversee the implementation of the relocation work and mostimportantly, follow it up over the years. This is crucial. At the end, it is clear that even ifthe massive task of relocation is undertaken, it will still leave a large number of peoplewithin the protected areas and also tiger reserves. The issue of coexistence with thesepeople, who share the tiger’s habitat is discussed in the following section of the TaskForce report.

The way ahead 99


Conservation in India has been consistent about atleast one imperative: a protected area such as a tigerreserve is exclusively for the megavertebrate to roamin, with the corollary that people living inside thereserves must be relocated elsewhere. But over the last 30 years, this imperative has becomeabstract, and abstracted from the real conditions thatexist in the tiger reserves, indeed most protectedareas, today.

For, in reality, in the last 30 years only 80villages — some 16,000 families — have beenrelocated. Data with the Tiger Task Force shows 273villages continue to exist in the core areas of tigerreserves; the non-core areas are where about 1,000villages exist — in both cases, living precariously. Arough calculation shows that there could be 250,000to 350,000 people living in the total area the reservescomprise.

Add to this livestock. This population is difficultto estimate but assuming that the roughly 65,000families residing inside own two-three head of cattle,the number would be 130,000 to 200,000.

Indeed, it is logistically and financiallyimpossible to relocate even these people from just the28 tiger reserves; the imperative thus becomes evenmore difficult if all protected areas are taken into

account. Just to put the issue in perspective, tigerreserves occupy a little more than 1 per cent of thegeographical area of the country, while the protectedarea network — about 600 sanctuaries and nationalparks — account for 5.1 per cent of the country’s landarea. In other words, the number of people residing inprotected areas will be five times higher. There is nodefinite data on all villages that exist inside theseareas, but so far as people are concerned the countcould be three to four million people (see box: Howmany people live in protected areas?).

So it is that the Tiger Task Force has asked for aclear relocation plan in those reserves whereconservation managers find human settlements arenegatively impacting tiger habitat — not notionally,but empirically. This plan must be based on criterionto identify the key conservation zones and natalareas of tigers. It must be speedily executed, and withsensitivity, so that the livelihoods of poor people canbe secured in their new homes (see 3.7: Therelocation agenda).

Given the reality of the situation in the tigerreserves, the Task Force would like to examine anoption that is beginning to gain increasingimportance in the wider conservation network:coexistence.

3.8 The coexistence agenda

How many people live in protected areas?

Nobody really knows. But the Indian Institute ofPublic Administration, in a 1989 project to surveythe management of national parks and sanctuariesin the country, had collected data on humanpopulations within protected areas. From thissurvey, it was found that 56 per cent of the nationalparks and 72 per cent of the sanctuaries reportedpopulations inside their areas. Based on theresponses received and extrapolation to otherunreported reserves, the status report computedthat there were three million people (600,000families) living within the protected area networkof India. It also found that 36 per cent of thenational parks and 56 per cent of sanctuariesreported removal of minor forest produce.

In the late 1990s, this survey was repeated andan effort was also made to verify the informationon human habitation received from the managersof protected areas, with census data. Theresearchers estimated that there are 3.7 millionpeople (740,000 families) who live in the 600-odd

protected areas of the country. The questions then are: how long will it take to

relocate people from such areas? Is this is a feasibleoption? Forester H S Pabla explains that in 1997there were 955 villages and 77,339 families livingin the 45 protected areas of Madhya Pradesh — onan average, 21 villages and 1,718 families in eachreserve. If these figures are extrapolated at thenational level, it would mean that there are over859,000 families (roughly 4.3 million people). Atthe current rate of compensation — Rs 1 lakh and2.5 ha of land per family — the resources neededwould be prohibitive. Madhya Pradesh, forinstance, has relocated only 33 villages (3 per centof the villages) till date — 26 of these in just onetiger reserve, Kanha.1

In the past 30 odd years, roughly 80 villageshave been relocated till date and roughly 14,000families shifted. If any of these estimates is accuratethen the country has relocated only 1.8 per cent ofthe families in the protected areas till date. Itbecomes vital, therefore, to work out policies forrelocation or coexistence. There is no other option.

100 The way ahead


Coexistence: why consider this option?

If the way ahead is to come to a practical resolutionon how to balance, and manage, the livelihood needsof people with the imperatives of conservation, it isimportant to understand the impact of humanresource use on tiger reserve forests: is such usedetrimental per se? What is the threshold beyondwhich such use begins to so severely degrade tigerhabitat that the animal’s existence is trulyendangered? What if such use is not detrimental?Clearly, this terrain of competing needs is acomplicated one.

Currently, the approach is rather simplistic:deny that competing needs exist. People who liveinside these reserves are treated as ‘biotic pressure’and policy seeks to remove them as fast as possible.But on the ground, relocation is not speedily done. Itbecomes a protracted process, leading to uncertaintyand the alienation of people from the park. PujaSawhney is a researcher who has studiedBandhavgarh tiger reserve in Madhya Pradesh. Afterthe reserve was declared, she found, economichardships of forest-dependent people increased. Thelegal stipulation of eviction compounded theproblem — thinking that they would be relocated,people simply lost the incentive to use the forestsustainably. The fear of relocation, and resultantharassment, turned people here more hostile. In theabsence of viable alternatives, people here have nooption but to use the forest and this results inrecurrent friction between them and park managers.2

When the policy is one of denial, little gets doneto work out arrangements that will meet the needs ofboth conservation and people. The anger andhostility of people living within reserves, instead,continues to increase. The costs are huge: in puremoney terms as well as in pure conservation terms.

Relocation related to the Tadoba-Andhari tigerreserve in Maharashtra is a good instance of this. In1955, an area of 116.55 sq km around the Tadoba lakewas declared a national park. Two villages wereresettled outside. Then in 1986, the area underprotection was expanded to include the Andhariwildlife sanctuary. Six villages now fell under thepark’s boundary; one of them — Pandharpauni,renamed Navegoan, or new village after the firstresettlement — faced possible relocation for a secondtime. The area was declared a tiger reserve in 1993,but a year before, all rights regarding collection ofminor forest produce were suspended, leading to thevillagers being impoverished. All developmentactivities have been stopped, pending relocation.Employment the forest department provides isreduced: the forest cannot be ‘worked’ any more. Sopeople survive by taking recourse to ‘illegal’practices — cutting bamboo into small pieces and

smuggling these out on bicycles. A bundle of 50pieces requires 15 bamboos and fetches a meagre Rs15 per bundle: equally, the forest cover is alsoturning meagre.3

As a result, protection is compromised. A majoreffort — if not the entire focus — of park managers isto ‘fight’ against ‘illegal’ activities. In Bandhavgarhtiger reserve in Madhya Pradesh, for instance, in fiveyears from 1995 to 2000, park authorities registered488 cases of illicit felling, 255 cases of illegal grazingand 62 cases of illegal bamboo extraction, amongothers. Increased hostility here translated into peoplesetting fires within the park and poisoning animals.In this period, authorities registered over 19 cases offire; researchers noted there were actually 73incidences of fire. The reserve here came underpressure both from within and outside. Of the totalcases of illegal activities, 25 per cent involvedvillagers from within the reserve and 37 per centinvolved villages at the fringe of the protected area.In such a situation, would relocation provideanswers?4

In this situation of uncertainty the ‘war ofconservation’ has only intensified. In the years tocome, it will be impossible to protect species againstwidespread hostility. The matter requires urgentresolution.

So it is that the following issues must be betterunderstood:

a. What are the legal provisions that govern therights of local people in protected areas?

b. What is the empirical evidence that the use ofhabitats by people is endangering conservationefforts?

c. What can be done to better manage competingneeds? What resolution does coexistenceprovide?

Till date, government has no authentic estimate ofthe numbers of people who live within the variouscategories of protected areas in the country. As aresult, there is no empirical assessment of the impactthese people have on protected areas. Moreimportantly, there is no understanding of the impacta protected area has on the lives of people. In otherwords, what is the dependence of people on theselands to meet their subsistence and livelihood needs?In these circumstances, conservationist pressuresdrive governments into believing it is the bioticpressure of humans that is destroying our naturalheritage.

The problem is compounded by the fact that inmany parts of the country, the rights of local peoplein forests remain unrecorded. In some areas, forestswere declared as ‘reserved’, without the rights oflocal people living in these lands being enumerated,

and accepted, by the erstwhile colonial government.When these lands were later notified as sanctuariesor national parks, the customary and traditionalrights remained unrecorded.

What happens in such a situation? At a publichearing organised by the National Forum for ForestPeople and Forest Workers in April 2005, ittranspired that inside the Buxa tiger reserve of WestBengal, there were an estimated 37 forest villagesand five hamlets, habitations set up by the colonialgovernment in the late 19th century for labour inforest operations. In return for settlement rights andrights over forest produce, the communities had to provide their labour, also known as begar. Whenthe Buxa reserve was declared, employmentopportunities dried up. But villagers still do not havelegal ownership over homesteads or agricultural landand are denied their customary rights to collect forestproduce.5 How can the objectives of conservation beserved by turning people into trespassers in theirown lands, as has happened here?

The Supreme Court matters

The Supreme Court today plays a critical role inensuring environmental protection and conservationin the country. It has directed to stop mining, habitatdestruction and improve protection in the interest ofreserves over the years.

In February 2000, the amicus curiae (in theomnibus forest case ongoing in the Supreme Court),filed an application seeking clarification if an earlierorder of the Supreme Court — the apex Court hadpassed it in 1996; it pertained to a ban againstremoval of fallen or dry standing trees — applied toprotected areas as well. The application pertained tocommercial felling of trees in protected areas by theKarnataka state forest department. The apex Court, inits order dated February 14, 2000, then ordered that“in the meantime, we restrain the respondents fromordering the removal of dead, diseased, dying orwind-fallen trees, driftwood and grasses etc from thenational park or game sanctuary or forest”.

This order led to a number of directions from theSupreme Court:● On February 28, 2000 it clarified this ban was not

for forests, but only for protected areas. ● On April 3, 2000 in response to a representation

received from the state of Rajasthan, the Courtfurther clarified that the order “will have noapplication in so far as plucking and collection oftendu leaves is concerned”,

● On May 10, 2001 it noted that “the removal offorest produce such as leaves, harra, sal seeds,mahua flowers and mahua seeds from forestother than national parks and sanctuaries is notprohibited”.

● In February 2002 it clarified that “the order ofthis Court prohibiting cutting of trees does notapply to bamboo including cane, which reallybelong to the grass family, other than those innational parks and sanctuaries. In other words,no bamboo including cane in national parks and sanctuaries can be cut but the same can becut elsewhere.”6

On October 20, 2003, the Union ministry ofenvironment and forests wrote a letter to all chiefsecretaries. The letter detailed guidelines fordiversion of forest land for non-forest purposesunder the Forest Conservation Act, 1980. It said theministry had approved certain modifications for thediversion of land under the act; one of these was: “Para 1.2 (iii) now clarifies that rights andconcessions cannot be enjoyed in the protected areasin view of the orders of the Supreme Court dated14.2.2000 restraining removal of dead, diseased,dying or wind-fallen trees, drift wood and grasses etcfrom any national park or sanctuary”.7

It is important to note that para 1.2 (iii) of therules of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980, referredto in the ministry letter, pertains to the harvesting offodder grasses and legumes which grow naturally inforest areas. The para says the removal of thesegrasses will not require approval of the centralgovernment. This Act, in fact, has nothing to do withthe rights and privileges of people living withinprotected areas, which are governed by the IndianWildlife (Protection) Act, 1972.

On July 2, 2004, the Central EmpoweredCommittee — set up the Supreme Court to assist it inall forestry matters — wrote to all state governmentsdrawing attention to the fact that a number ofinstances had come to its notice, of prohibitedactivities occurring within protected areas. Theseactivities, the Central Empowered Committee said inits letter, were happening without the prior approvalof the Supreme Court and should be stopped.

The list of prohibited activities mentioned in theletter included felling of trees and bamboo, cutting ofgrass and collection of minor forest produce. TheCentral Empowered Committee warned the states to“ensure strict compliance of the Hon’ble SupremeCourt’s order so that none of the prohibited activitiesare allowed to be undertaken either by the projectauthorities or the forest department; prior permissionof the Hon’ble Supreme Court shall be obtainedbefore undertaking them”.

Impact on conservationThe result has been that state governments haverushed to stop all use of minor forest produce andcollection of grass from protected areas. The TaskForce during its visits to different states was

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102 The way ahead


repeatedly told, in its interactions with chief wildlifewardens, that they were implementing the order. Theproblem was that while the directions sought toincrease conservation of valuable forests andbiodiversity sites, the unintended result has beenincreased tension between people and park staff.

All studies carried out on people-park interactionsshow that people who live within the park and on itsfringes are highly dependent on the collection andsale of minor forest produce for their livelihood needs.A detailed household level survey in Bandhavgarhtiger reserve in Madhya Pradesh, for instance, foundthat sale of minor forest produce — amla, tendu andmahua — contributed 25 per cent of the householdincome. On an average, households earned Rs 2,023

per year from these products. These forest productsare also important for household consumption and forbarter. Therefore, the attempt to stop such resourceuse leads directly to further impoverishment andheighten people’s anger against authorities.8

The experience from the Bilirangan templewildlife sanctuary in Karnataka shows thatextraction of minor forest produce can, in fact, bedone sustainably by local communities and can work for conservation. But now, the Karnatakagovernment has issued orders to ban all collection ofminor forest produce. Now, people still collect theseforest products, but illegally, leading to greater stressand exploitation (see box: An experiment insustainability).

An experiment in sustainability

The Bilirangan temple wildlife sanctuary is probablythe most studied experiment in sustainable use ofminor forest product or non-timber forest produce. It isone of the few sanctuaries where such extraction hasnot only been systematically run, but also closelymonitored for a decade by the forest department,ecologists, and conservation organisations as well asgroups engaged in rural development in the region. Allthe observing groups unanimously agree that thecollection of non-timber forest produce is a sustainablesource of livelihood for tribal people.

However, in February 23, the principal chiefconservator of forests (wildlife) of the Karnatakagovernment instructed the sanctuary to ban non-timberforest produce collection by the tribal cooperativesociety, Large Area Multipurpose Cooperative Society.This, the wildlife department said, was in pursuance ofthe amended section of the Wildlife (Protection) Act,1972 which does not permit removal of forest producefrom the sanctuary (Section 29), other than for bona fideneeds of people living in and around the sanctuary.This notice has brought 25,000 Soliga tribals to thebrink of destitution.

Spread over 540 sq km, the sanctuary lies betweenthe Eastern and the Western Ghats. The Soliga tribe

migrated from the Nilgiris centuries ago and settledhere. Once the area was declared a sanctuary under theAct, they were ‘allowed’ to practice shifting cultivationand were engaged as labour in various forestryoperations and plantations. Primarily a hunting-gathering tribe at that time, the Soliga gave up huntingbut continued to gather forest produce, including honeyand lichen. Today, more than 7,500 Soliga familiesmake a living by collecting honey, lichen, and otherproduce from the sanctuary.

The tribal cooperatives were formed to regulate thecollection of forest produce, purchase the produce atfixed rates and then auction it off. The governmentcreated it under the state forest department to collectand sell non-timber forest produce, besides managingother activities for the state’s tribals. Before thesocieties were created, the tribals used to sell theproduce at a pittance to a city contractor who hadbagged the rights for collection from the forestdepartment. Over the last eight years, the arrangementdeveloped into a systematic process with theinvolvement of two other non-governmentalorganisations: the Vivekananda Girijana Kalyan Kendraand the Ashoka Trust for Research in Ecology andEnvironment (see table: Forest produce collection hasbeen careful).

The former has been organising the people into self-

Name of produce Quantity collected in two divisions out of three Average Quantity per per year ha per year

2000-01 2001-02 2002-03

Gooseberry 134,034 666,891 137,447 31,790 9.74

Lichen 21,515 7,815 45,658 24,996 0.77

Honey 6,983 16,193 19,406 14,194 0.442

Note: all figures in kilogramme; ha = hectare; Total Forest Area of Collection of these two societies = 32100.834 hectaresSource: Nitin Sethi, 2004, Stop Trade, Down To Earth, Vol 13, No 9

FOREST PRODUCE COLLECTION HAS BEEN CAREFUL

The way ahead 103


Do people have rights?

In this situation, it is important to examine what therights are of people living within sanctuaries andnational parks. Do they even have rights? What isprohibited? What does the law say on this issue?

The law which governs the setting up,management and protection of sanctuaries andnational parks, is the Wildlife (Protection) Act , 1972.The Act has been amended five times, with the latestchanges passed in 2003.

Sanctuaries and national parks: the rights to bedetermined and settledThe law provides that governments must ‘settle’ the

rights of people who live within a protected areabefore a sanctuary or national park can be formallynotified.

The provisions of the Wildlife (Protection) Act,1972, say:

1. The government can by notification declare its intentions to constitute any area as asanctuary (Section 18) or a national park (Section 35).

Subsequently, the government has to take stepsto settle the rights of people and once this isdone, it can notify the sanctuary or nationalpark.

help groups, and ensuring value addition, such aspackaging honey into bottles. The latter has beenmonitoring the impact of extraction on forest health aswell as working with the tribals to develop aparticipatory self-monitoring mechanism.

It has taken the Vivekanand Girijana KalyanKendra almost two decades to set up the entireinfrastructure. Now they have a secondary high schoolfor the Soliga, a primary health centre and a honey-processing factory; they also provide alternativeemployment through other vocational activities. In thelast two years, profits have been ploughed back to thecommunity from all their activities.

Ecologist Siddapa Shetty of the Ashoka Trust forResearch in Ecology and Environment has beencarrying out research in the sanctuary for the past eightyears. He has studied the extraction of honey as well as

amla by the Soliga. Shetty reiterates that they didn’thave to teach the Soliga what sustainable harvestingwas (see graph: The Soliga know sustainableharvesting). The Soliga are themselves very selectiveand systematic about collecting lichen, amla as well ashoney. It is not random and certainly not rampantexploitation. His studies show that they harvest only29 per cent of the fruits of P emblica (one of the twovarieties of amla) each year and only 60 per cent of thefruits of P indofischeri (the other variety). Thepercentage of overall collection of fruits is low anddoes not seem to have a negative impact onregeneration of the fruiting trees (one measure ofsustainability of extraction). In fact, studies show thatthe Soliga in the sanctuary are far more advanced intheir collection practices than the tribals in some of theother forested regions of the Western Ghats.

Source: Siddapa Shetty 2003, Ashoka Trust for Research in Ecology and Environment, Bangalore, mimeo

THE SOLIGA KNOW SUSTAINABLE HARVESTING

250

200

150

100

50

01998-1999 1999-2000 2000-2001

Year

Transect estimation by ecologists Visual estimation by Soligas

23.2

25

148

Estim

ate

of a

mla

har

vest

ed

(in t

onne

s) 145 16

9.6

135

208.

4

218.

3

87.2

75.1

2001-2002 2002-2003

104 The way ahead


The process of determination of rights is:2. The government will appoint an officer (or

collector) who within 30 days of the issue ofnotification (intention to declare the area assanctuary) shall inquire into and determine theexistence, nature and extent of rights of anyperson in or over the land comprised within thelimits of the sanctuary (Sections 18-19);

3. After the government has declared its intentionsno further rights shall be acquired in, on or overthe land, except by succession, testamentary orintestate (Section 20).

The process of settlement of rights is:4. Once the collector has determined these rights,

these will be publicly announced and all affectedparties will be given a chance to assert theirclaims and demand compensation. These claimswill be verified by the collector “from the recordsof the state government and the evidence of any person acquainted with the same”. (Section 21-22);

5. Once the collector has determined these rightsand ascertained their veracity the following canbe done (Section 24):

● Exclude these lands from the limit of theproposed sanctuary;

● Proceed to acquire these lands or rights, exceptwhere the holder has agreed to surrender his rights to the government. The rights will be acquired by making payment of suchcompensation as is provided in the landacquisition act;

● Allow, in consultation with the chief wildlifewarden, the continuation of any right of anyperson in or over any land within the limits ofthe sanctuary (only in sanctuaries).

The process of acquisition is: 6. Once the rights are determined, the process of

acquisition begins. The compensation awardcould be given in land or in money or part ofeach.

The time period for settlement is:7. All this must be completed within a period of

two years from the date of notification ofdeclaration of sanctuary under Section 18.However, the notification will not lapse if theabove is not done (Section 25A).

What happens after this? After the rights are settled, the sanctuary or nationalpark can be formally notified (Section 26A).

After this, the imposition of the regulatoryregime of prohibitions and restrictions follow(Sections 27-34A). The prohibitions include:

a. Restriction on entry into sanctuary withoutpermission

b. Scientific research without permitc. Destruction or removal of wildlife including

forest produce without permit.

After the sanctuary is notified — Section 29 in thecase of sanctuary and 35 (6 and 7) in the case ofnational parks — a regime of prohibition and permitscomes into operation. This section says that “noperson shall destroy, exploit or remove any wildlifeincluding forest produce from a national park…except in accordance with a permit granted by thechief wildlife warden, and no such permit shall begranted unless the state government being satisfiedin consultation with the Board (of wildlife) that suchremoval of wildlife from the sanctuary (or nationalpark) or the change in the flow of water from outsidethe sanctuary (or national park) is necessary for theimprovement and better management of wildlifetherein, authorises the issue of such permits.” Inother words, it is an extremely prohibitive clause that allows resource use only in exceptionalcircumstances. Wildlife is defined as “any animal,aquatic or land vegetation, which forms part of anyhabitat”. In other words nothing, from honey to fish,can be removed.

However, the law distinguishes between theneeds of local people and extraction purely forcommercial purposes: “provided that where theforest produce is removed from a sanctuary (andnational park) the same may be used for meeting thepersonal bona fide needs of people living in andaround the sanctuary and shall not be used for anycommercial purposes”. But whereas in a sanctuary,grazing and movement of livestock is not deemed toa prohibited act, in the case of national parks it is notpermitted. In addition, the chief wildlife warden may“regulate, control or prohibit, in keeping with theinterests of wildlife, the grazing or movement oflivestock”.

The difference between a sanctuary and anational parkAfter the settlement of rights has been made, in asanctuary the law allows that rights can continue toexist after consultation with the chief wildlifewarden. In other words, people can live within thearea, and use resources based on the rights that weredetermined and agreed upon. In a national park, thisis not allowed. Therefore, once a national park isdeclared, all the rights of use have to be settled,compensated and extinguished.

In a sanctuary, grazing or movement of livestockis not a prohibited activity. It is in a national park.

Therefore, the law is clear. It says that it isincumbent on government to record and to settle

these rights speedily before the reserve is declared.The law is based on the premise that whenever anarea will be declared as protected for wildlife speciesor conservation, it will be done only once thegovernment compensates inhabitants of the land andagrees on a ‘settlement’ with people. This assumesthe process will be speedily done so that, in themeantime, no new rights will be created — no newpeople will be allowed to settle on the land or use itsresources — other than those that lived there whenthe process of notification began.

In other words, like in any other land acquisitionmatter, the law provides that the rights of people wholive on these lands, which the state needs to acquirefor public purposes, have to be verified andcompensated. They cannot be extinguished ornegated. The law does provide for the fact that theserights, once determined, can be allowed inconsultation with wildlife authorities in certain areas— sanctuaries, not national parks.

Perfect in law, imperfect in life

The law is straightforward. But the implementationof the law has been negligent, to say the least.

In fact, there has hardly been any settlement ofrights in India’s protected areas. In its 1989 survey ofprotected areas on the country, a report compiled bythe Indian Institute of Public Administration foundthat only 40 per cent of the national parks thatresponded to its survey, and only 8 per cent of the209 sanctuaries that responded, had completed theirlegal procedures.9 In tiger reserves, two reserves havebeen formally notified as national parks.

The problem is compounded by the fact that tillthe 1991 amendment to the Wildlife (Protection)Act,1972, a sanctuary could be notified without therights being determined. Therefore, in notifiedsanctuaries created in the period 1973-1991, therights would not have been determined or settled.Even as the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 wasimplemented, what got overlooked was the originalstatutory defect in the law: the fact that a sanctuarycould be declared immediately even if the rightsweren’t settled.

The 2003 amendment to the Wildlife (Protection)Act, 1972 is the latest attempt to rectify this defect. Ithas tried to do so in the following way:

1. The regulatory regime was to apply even thoughthe final notification, under section 18A(1), had notbeen completed.2. Till rights were settled, the state had to makealternative arrangements for fuel, fodder and minorforest produce for people living in areas declared as aprotected area (section 18a (2)).3. The settlement process was supported by a

process in which settlement personnel were to beappointed within 30 days for both past and futurenotifications to declare a sanctuary (section 18 B).4. The settlement was to be completed within 2years (section 25A(1)).5. The settlement process would not lapse if notcompleted in 2 years (section 25A (2)).

But these amendments failed to solve problems:Unfortunately, the situation on the ground worsened.Settlements did not take place, and the governmentdid not make provisions for fuel, fodder and forest produce. But the enforcement regime wasstrengthened without these safeguards.

What is shocking is that, till date, very fewprotected areas have completed the process ofrecording the rights of people, let alone completingthe process of acquisition of those rights andcompensating people who live there. The practicehas been to turn all people living within protectedareas into outsiders and illegal users of their own lands. In the name of conservation, what has been carried out is a completely illegal andunconstitutional land acquisition programme.

In fact, by not even recording the rights of peoplein these areas the authorities are in violation of theWildlife (Protection) Act, 1972.

In 1997, hearing a case filed by the WorldwideFund for Nature, the Supreme Court (writ petition no337/95) ordered all state governments to issue aproclamation asking for claims to be filed and tocomplete the process of determination of rights andacquisition of those rights within one year. For a fewmonths after this order, state governments furiouslyissued orders, leading to even more tension andconfusion.

Then, many states such as Madhya Pradeshresponded to the Supreme Court saying that they hadneither the finances nor the land for relocation.States also told the Union ministry of environmentand forests that more than Rs 600 crore would beneeded to settle the rights of people and they did nothave these resources. The case is ongoing.

What happens if rights are not determined?Currently, the situation is that people live in theselands. Their rights have not been settled, but arebeing extinguished by different agencies interestedin conservation. Can this be allowed? What are the rights of people over the use of resources, in the absence of their rights being finally decided? The law is clear that the rights continue till they are expunged through a formal process ofcompensation.

It is worth repeating here section 18a (2) of the2003 amendment to the Wildlife (Protection) Act,1972. Explicitly, it says that after the government has

The way ahead 105


declared its intention to declare an area a nationalpark or sanctuary and before the rights of affectedpeople are finally settled, “the state government shallmake alternative arrangements required for makingavailable fuel, fodder and other forest produce to thepersons affected, in terms of their rights as per thegovernment records”.

In other words, the ground reality is that thegovernment has to provide for the “needs” of peopleif it declares any area as a sanctuary or national parkor any other protected reserve — till the rights havebeen compensated. At the same time, the groundreality is that it does not. So, a situation gets createdin which a double negligence occurs: on the onehand, rights that ought to be settled by law are notsettled; instead they keep getting expunged.Institutions whose intention is to protect thereserves — the Union ministry of environment andforests, or the Central Empowered Committee —seem to have done nothing to ensure that, whenrights are taken away by their fiat, alternatives areprovided.

There seems to now exist two proceduralregimes, and institutions seem to pick one or theother, not tackling the inherited ambiguities causedby the original defect in the law: ● Rights are settled, the sanctuary is notified and

all prohibitions come into force;● Rights are not settled, but the sanctuary or

national park exists; so, all prohibitions comeinto force but none of the safeguards.

Either way, people are the losers. Either way,conservation is jeopardised.

What is being done?In November 4, 2004, the Central EmpoweredCommittee filed an interim report for theclarification of the Supreme Court order of February14, 2000 (in which it had banned the removal of deadtrees etc from national parks and sanctuaries). In thisreport, the committee recommended the apex Courtclarify the following:● What is allowed for the better management of

parks — like firelines, maintenance of fairweather roads, habitat improvement?

● What is prohibited in a protected area?● Can exemption be given for small public utility

projects of non-commercial nature?

The key recommendation that concerns the rights of people is that the committee includesremoval of bamboo or grasses in the list ofprohibitions. Without provision of alternatives, thisimpinges on people’s fodder requirements. Equally,it is silent on the extraction of minor forest produceby people.

A particularly vexed question

The law, as interpreted by conservationists, providesthat people living in and around the protected areacan collect and remove forest produce, but only tomeet bona fide needs. The problem is that no one hasever defined what “bona fide needs” mean. In otherwords, if poor tribals in the Nagarhole national parkin Karnataka collect honey and sell it for theirsubsistence needs, would this constitute a “bonafide” need?

This issue was taken up by the deputyconservator of forests of the Chamarajanagar range inKarnataka — where the Bilirangan temple sanctuaryis located — with his superior officer, in response tothe order banning collection of minor forest produceby Soliga tribal cooperative societies existing there.The matter, he said, would have been very simple tointerpret if the definition of “commercial collection”and “personal bona fide use” was defined in theWildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 or the rules. Theissues, as he elaborated, are:● Soliga are a forest tribe, who migrated from

Nilgiri centuries ago and settled with the forests. They were allowed to practice shiftingcultivation in lieu of which they were engaged aslabour in various forestry operations. As a result,they do not own land. Collection of minor forestproduce for their cooperative society is their onlysource of income. In other words, says thedeputy conservator, for the Soliga this collectionserves subsistence needs only.

● Commercial exploitation then could beunderstood, he says, in terms of the quantity ofproduce collected per ha of forests. In this case,can collection of 10 kg of gooseberry or 442 gmsof honey per ha be termed as commercial?

Moreover, banning the collection of minor forestproduce will destroy the relationship that hasdeveloped between the Soliga and forests andsustainable extraction of these resources.

In addition, he admits, the ban is unlikely to beeffective. The first difficulty will be in finding whichSoliga is collecting, or has collected, minor forestproduce for the purpose of trade. If a Soliga is foundwith 10 kg of gooseberry or five kg of honey, can it besaid what use it is for, personal or commercial? Infact where there has been a ban, the experience has been that extraction continues, without anysafeguards.10 But the ban in the sanctuary continues.Extraction continues, but illegally, in a moreunsustainable fashion. Moreover, it inevitably leadsto more harassment of tribals and corruption.

The problem is that these provisions — used,interpreted and misinterpreted, with good intentions— are leading to tremendous harassment of people.

106 The way ahead


The way ahead 107


Let us be clear. The entire effort of the SupremeCourt, investing its valuable time and commitment,is to safeguard the protected areas of the countryfrom commercial and illegal uses. But it iscompletely inexplicable how the Union ministry ofenvironment and forests issued the guideline which,in effect, expunged all rights and concessions ofpeople in protected areas, using moreover aprovision of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980. TheCentral Empowered Committee, in its letter to states,has included in the list of prohibited activitiescutting of grass and collection of minor forestproduce. At no stage has it been clarified if this hasbeen done after rights have been settled oralternatives made available to poor people.

The fact is that this interpretation of the law byfirst the ministry and then the committee has, in fact,cost the country’s conservation efforts dearly. Theanger of people against conservation has onlyworsened and will make protection even moredifficult.

The reality is that since people live in thesereserves and use resources, conservation policy hasdriven the process underground. This has worked tothe detriment of the forest as well as the people. Forinstance, in Sariska in Rajasthan, villagers used totraditionally graze their cattle inside the park and theforest department used to issue receipts to people forusing the park. In this way, the authorities could‘manage’ and ‘regulate’ use. But in 1982, when it wasdecided Sariska would be declared a national park,the forest department stopped collecting grazing fees.The idea was that if the fee was not charged, peoplecould not claim grazing rights and it would be easierto notify the area as a national park. The fact is thatthe final notification for the national park is still inabeyance and grazing continues, but in an illegal,uncontrolled and destructive way.11

Barring rights to property

Under section 20 of the Wildlife (Protection) Act,1972 there is a provision; rather innocuouslyworded, it is turning out to be devastating for peopleliving in protected areas whose rights have not beensettled.

The provision says that after notification underSection 18 (intention to declare), “no rights shall beacquired in, on or over the land comprised withinthe limits of the area specified in such notification,except by succession, testamentary or interstate.”This provision could have been inserted to ensurethat during the short period in which governmentwould settle the rights of people in the protectedareas, no new settlers would emerge in order to reapthe benefits of settlement.

But because the settlement of rights has never

taken place, and is quite likely never to take place,the situation for people living within reserves is suchthat even owning private revenue land has becomeunbearable. The principle chief conservator offorests, Madhya Pradesh, has drawn the attention ofthe Union ministry of environment and forests of theneed for an urgent review and revision in thisprovision (see box: Submission of the MadhyaPradesh government on section 20 of the Wildlife(Protection) Act, 1972, barring accrual of rights). Inhis submission, it is pointed out conditions havebecome terrible for local people, in turn generatingintense hatred for the wild animals.

In the Karera Great Indian Bustard Sanctuary inMadhya Pradesh, for instance, there have been caseswhere people are unable to get their sons married,because no one wants to give his daughter into avillage where no progress is possible. As a result ofthe ban on land transactions here, restrictions placedand the resulting hostility, the entire bustardpopulation has been wiped out. Now there is a strongdemand to denotify the sanctuary, says thesubmission.

It is important to note here that a large number ofpeople who live within the protected reserves live onrevenue land, which is privately owned. But whilethe law provides that the rights should be acquired,this has not been done. This selective use ofprovisions of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, ismaking people enemies of conservation.

Is de-notification an option?

If people cannot be relocated from the protectedareas, is it possible to denotify areas of humansettlement so that these can be excluded fromreserves? This would improve protection within thereserve and meet the conservation objectives ofwildlife managers, who see no alternative but toexclude people to save the wild animals.

There is a fear that this approach can be used todivert protected areas, so the 2003 amendment to theWildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 has made the processextremely cumbersome and centralised. It haslegislated that “no alterations of the boundary of thesanctuary or national park shall be made by the stategovernment except on the recommendation of thenational board (National Board of Wildlife)”. In 2000and again in 2004, the Supreme Court furthertightened this provision, directing “no de-reservationof forests/sanctuaries/national parks shall beeffected”.

This makes it even more difficult for stategovernments to recognise the fact that if they cannotsettle the rights of people and cannot relocate them,they could de-notify areas of human settlementwithin a protected area. In Bandhavgarh tiger reserve

in Madhya Pradesh, for instance, state authoritieshad put forward a proposal to delineate the parkboundary so as to exclude certain villages. Thisensured 319 sq km would be free from humanhabitation and completely protected. But it was notdone, as it would further fragment the reserve.

In Melghat tiger reserve in Maharashtra, forinstance, this option was exercised. The governmentwas aware the buffer zone of the reserve had manyvillages. It was not possible to acquire the rights ofthese villages because of the sheer size of theoperation. People lived an illegal existence.Therefore, park authorities decided to opt for de-

notification of an area of the sanctuary which couldbe then developed for villagers, while the core couldbe protected, without human interference, for tigers.

But conservationists were unhappy about themove and took the matter to the state high court.Since then a desperate status quo persists. The stategovernment has informed the court, under pressurefrom the conservation lobby, that it will not use thearea for commercial purposes (interpreted as notallowing cutting of trees, other than for the basicsubsistence needs of people). The tribals continue tolive in destitution, their poverty driving them to usethe resources of the tiger reserve and their anger

108 The way ahead


“As you know, section 20 of the Wildlife(Protection) Act, 1972 bars the accrual of any freshrights in, on or over the land comprised within thelimits of the area specified in the notificationissued under section 18, except by succession.This section has been erroneously interpreted asbanning any sale/purchase of landed property, aswell as the development of these properties, in thevillages situated within the notified tentativeboundaries of the proposed protected areas. Thesale/purchase of land and any change in the landuse are seen as the creation of new rights inviolation of this section. This interpretation,though erroneous, would not have caused anyproblems if we had been able to acquire all therights over these lands, as required by the Act,expeditiously. However, our inability to acquirethe private lands situated inside the proposedprotected areas for more than two decades, andforbidding people from selling their lands to otherbuyers as well, has resulted in tremendouseconomic and social difficulties for the people,and extreme discontent among people againstconservation itself. An extreme example of thesituation is seen in the Karera Great Indian BustardSanctuary in this state, where there have beencases in which people are unable to marry theirsons off as no one wants to give his daughter into avillage where no progress is possible. As a result ofthe ban on land transactions, and restrictionsplaced on the people, and the resulting hostility,the entire bustard population has been wiped outand there is a strong demand to denotify thesanctuary. A more or less similar situation prevailsin nearly all the other sanctuaries and proposednational parks of the state. The state is facing aspate of litigations on the issue as conservationextremists want the government to implement

this interpretation of the section rigidly, withoutbothering about the implications for the affectedpeople.

As the government does not have thewherewithal to expeditiously acquire all the rightsin proposed protected areas, and we can ill affordto let popular discontent against conservationcontinue indefinitely, urgent steps are required tomend the situation. The problem can be easilysolved if people are allowed to exercise fullownership rights, including the right to sell andpurchase, over their properties, and the bar onaccrual of new rights such as grazing, is limited togovernment forests only. However, the current textdoes lend itself to the extreme interpretation thatwe are forced to follow now. The bar on accrual ofrights even on private lands may have appearedbenign at that time, as the framers of the law maynot have envisaged a situation in which hundredsof villages and thousands of acres of private landswould be affected by this ban. It may also have beeninserted to force people to opt for relocation.However, in the current context, it appearsextremely highhanded, in violation of thefundamental rights of a large and poor population,and is certainly counterproductive forconservation.

Three alternative drafts for the amendment areenclosed herewith for your consideration. I hopeyou would be able to include it in the proposal foramendment already under consideration in theMinistry.”

Letter by P B Gangopadhyay, principle chiefconservator of forests (wildlife), Madhya Pradesh toadditional director general of forests (wildlife),ministry of environment and forests, with copy toTiger Task Force, June 19, 2005

Submission of the Madhya Pradesh government on section 20 of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972,barring accrual of rights

leading to unsustainable use and destruction. Thetigers are under threat and the park authorities haveto focus their energies on protecting against all odds.It is clear that the status quo is unsustainable andunproductive. The situation has once again createdanti-conservation anger and jeopardised protection(see box: Melghat’s conservation conundrum).

People verses tigers

In this situation, matters are fast deteriorating. Thelaw provides that the rights of people should besettled before a sanctuary or national park can beformally notified. But this has not been done. Peoplelive in protected areas and are driven to destitution.If tigers kill their livestock, there is no compensationbecause their existence is not legal; if they want tosell their private land, they cannot because it is notallowed. They cannot collect minor forest producebecause it is interpreted to be illegal in the permitsystem that operates and they cannot graze animalsor even practice agriculture in many cases. Butbecause they live there, they engage in all theseactivities. It is done illegally. It is done undertremendous harassment and it leads to corruption. Itis also completely unsustainable as illicit use onlymakes the use more destructive.

In all this, conservationists keen to protect thetiger and other species are asking for even strictercompliance and adherence to what they perceive isthe legal framework. They make no mention of thefact that in the absence of rights remainingunsettled, the process of declaring an area as aprotected area is incomplete and illegal. Selectiveinterpretation of the law is leading to huge conflicts— inside and outside protected areas. It is truly awar within, imploding inside reserves and takingeverything in its wake.

Is coexistence then possible? How?

Conservation policy in India, which aims to exclude(remove) people from protected area, is based on thepremise that all human use is detrimental toconservation. It is also built on the assumption thatpeople’s knowledge is irrelevant in the managementof protected areas. But again, given the reality of theIndian situation where people live within theprotected reserves, it is important to revisit theseassumptions to look for answers beyond.

Even when villages are proposed for relocation,wildlife authorities have little empirical evidence ofthe impact that needs to be contained. For instance,there is one village — with less than 35 families — inthe tiger reserve of Pench in Maharashtra. Reserveauthorities are determined to relocate the village, atconsiderable cost, to degraded forest land in the

vicinity of the reserve. They estimate that, with thepayment of the net present value, as mandated by the Supreme Court for diversion of forest land tonon-forestry purposes, the relocation will cost overRs 3-4 crore.

When the Tiger Task Force visited Pench, itasked officials about the impact of this tinysettlement on the reserve, which would then explainwhy it had to be relocated. The officials could not explain why. Nor had they any idea of whatcould be done to mitigate its impact or manage itsresource use.

It is, therefore, essential we understand thepossible human impacts, so that policy can be betterinformed and effective. There is no comprehensiveassessment of this issue but an analysis of theresearch papers for different protected areas can helpto build a better understanding of the situation.

The fact is that people, who live in the protectedreserves and on its fringes, depend on its resourcesfor their survival. Rucha Ghate from NagpurUniversity has worked on quantifying the value ofthe minor forest produce used by people livingwithin Tadoba-Andhari tiger reserve inMaharashtra. She gathered information on thenumber of cattle and the collection of fodder,firewood, medicinal plants, fruits and householdtimber. She found the imputed value of theseresources was a staggering Rs 77.5 lakh per year forall six villages in the sanctuary. Importantly, as littleas 25 per cent of the annual income came from “legalsources” — agriculture and employment; the bulk(67 per cent) came from consumption of forestproduce like fodder, fuel and fruits and the rest fromillicit bamboo sale.12

Still, Ghate found that even with this level ofresource use of resources in the period 1989-2001,forest cover had actually increased, and not reduced,in the tiger reserve. In fact, she found the habitat wasmore degraded where there was pressure from thevillages outside village and not in the areassurrounding the villages inside the reserve. Herconclusion and submission to the Tiger Task Force,therefore, is that until the villages are relocated, theyshould be involved in protection work within thesanctuary, earning between Rs 1,000-1,200 permonth per household. Furthermore, if people areinvolved in tourism, they will have a greater stake inthe reserve and can be encouraged to become humanbuffers. To meet the needs of people, plantation offodder and firewood belts around the buffer villageswill take pressure off the reserve. In other words, themanagement strategy should move from being‘exclusive’ to ‘inclusive’ says Ghate.13

Another researcher, Harini Nagendra, who hasbeen working on satellite image-mapping of differentreserves, confirms that within Tadoba-Andhari, for

The way ahead 109


110 The way ahead


Melghat’s conservation conundrum

Melghat tiger reserve (MTR) is today in a piquantposition. It has a plan to ensure people co-existwith the the tiger reserve but the plan is now inlimbo. Forest officials at the reserve are in apredicament: the management plan of the reservein Maharashtra’s Amravati district cannot beexecuted, even though the state’s chief wildlifewarden gave it his assent way back in November2003. While the plan has laid out in an elaborateform how to involve the tribal community inmanaging the reserve. But the state government hasdone a volte-face in an affidavit it has filed,undertaking that it will not allow any commercial

exploitation of forests within the multiple-use areaof the reserve. The affidavit comes in a court casefiled against demarcation of a part of the tigerreserve as a multi user area — where people wouldbe able to utilise the forest usufructs.

The multi user area planIn 1994 Melghat tiger reserve comprised a core (theGugamal national park) and a buffer zone (theMelghat sanctuary). The core area was uninhabited,while there were 61 villages within the sanctuary.As per the reserve’s pre-1994 management plan,these villages with a population of 28,000 were to

be relocated outside the sanctuary. In 1994, theforest department realised that relocating so manypeople was unfeasible. There was no land torelocate 61 villages. The challenge was to marry theinterest of both the tiger and the tribal. So, anenquiry was conducted and via a notification datedFebruary 15, 1994, 526.90 sq km of the sanctuarywas re-classified as an multiple use area. The areacomprised 39 villages and the people here were tobe given certain rights to collect non-timber forestproduce (NTFP).

Conservation groups, however, opposed theorder. In 1995, the Mumbai-based BombayEvironmental Action Group filed a public interestlitigation in the Nagpur high court pleading themove would destroy the reserve. In response, the Maharashtra government gave the HC anundertaking that it won’t allow “commercialextraction of forest produce” in the multiple usearea. As the case still sits in court, the forestdepartment, scared of irking the court, has taken adefensive note. It has now decided to look uponbamboo harvest — which would have providedlivelihoods to many — as “commercial extraction”and therefore put a hold on it. In 2003, thedepartment had come out with a working schemefor bamboo-bearing areas in the multiple use area.Officials of the department estimate Rs 2,000 crorecan be raised annually — and the money ploughedback into the reserve and for development of the 39villages within the multiple use area — if bamboois harvested scientifically in a three-year cycle. Butnow the scheme cannot be implemented before theimbroglio over “commercial extraction” getsresolved.

But, as is the case in all such conflicts, the adhoc ban order has only pushed the people in the 39villages to extract forest produce illegally or bybribing forest guards — there is no other option .Both the people and forests suffer. This, even as thedenotification order clearly states that the multipleuse area does not fall within the Melghat sanctuaryand so people here do have rights over forestproduce. But the forest department’s forcedvacillation means that, now, the people in the 39villages cannot avail of these rights till the legalmess is set right.

In the consultations held with the Tiger TaskForce at Nagpur the principal chief conservator of forests (wildlife) informed that the stategovernment will soon file a fresh affidavit beforethe high court, restating its case for allowing use ofresources in the multiple use area. Has the staterealised it has hurt its own interests as well ascaused many people to become destitute?

Total area of the tiger reserve 1,676.93 sq km

Gugamal national park 361.28 sq km

Villages within the park Nil

Melghat sanctuary 788.75 sq km

Villages within sanctuary 19 (1,585 families)

Multiple-use-area (MUA) 526.90 sq km

Villages within MUA 39 (4,928 families)

Estimated domestic cattle population 125,000

Estimated herbivore population 8,000

Estimated tiger population 70

DharniKolkas

Highway

GhatangGavilgad

fort

Multiple-use areaMelghat sanctuaryGugamal national park

THE DIFFERENT ZONES OF THE TIGER RESERVE

The way ahead 111


instance, forest villages located within the park havemuch less impact on its degradation as compared tothe excessive pressure placed by villagers outside thepark.14 These findings need to be considered by thegovernment of Maharashtra when it works on itsproposal to relocate the villages.

But this is not to say that human activities, giventhe high dependence, will not impinge on the qualityof the habitat. The question is to understand thenature of the intervention and what can be done tomitigate or substitute its impact.

For instance, it is clear that the use of non-timberforest produce is critical to the livelihood security ofmillions in the country. Economist Kanchan Choprahas estimated that in certain areas such producecontributes up to 40 per cent of the household income.

The issue then is to determine howunsustainable this use is and what can be done toimprove resource utilisation and management.Researchers Ghazala Shahabuddin and SoumyaPrasad have put together key studies that assess the ecological sustainability of such extraction inIndia to analyse trends. They find the studies presenta mixed picture — in some studies researchers findheavy extraction of non-timber forest produce leadsto reduced regeneration and resource degradation.But there are also cases where there is no visibleimpact of low- and high-intensity harvesting.

Many studies indicate that the method ofextraction — setting fire, removal of reproductivespecies, destructive harvesting — is often much more damaging than the quantum of extraction. In certain studies, researchers did find thecompetition between humans and wild animals overminor forest produce adversely impacted the latter.For example, a study found that harvesting the fruitof Artocarpus sp did deprive the lion tailed macaqueof its diet.

But it was also noted in many cases that if themethod of extraction took into account the foodhabits of other species, this conflict could be avoided— harvesting fallen fruit and leaving the rest foranimals.

The problem is, as the researchers of this reviewconclude, there is “scant, mostly anecdotalinformation on the ecological sustainability ofextraction of non timber forest produce in India”.The available literature suggests species andpopulations differ in their response to harvesting.But unsustainable extraction will depend on theharvesting technique adopted, the extent ofextraction and the plant part used. They concludethat much more research is required before it can beclearly understood to what extent and in what ways livelihoods based on these products can becompatible with conservation.15

Legal vs illegal: what is more sustainable?

If the challenge is conservation, then policy must be designed to practice sustainable resourcemanagement. In this context, it becomes important tounderstand if illegal use, in vogue because of currentpolicy, is more sustainable than legal use, whichcould be practiced if policy was modified forconservation’s sake.

Unfortunately, there is little analysis availablewith park managers or conservationists aboutresource use and its impacts. Therefore, policy isdesigned in the absence of data.

Take the issue of two reservoirs — one in MadhyaPradesh on the Tawa river, within the Satpura riverreserve and the other on the Pench river, inMaharashtra. The reservoirs are in the core of reservesand therefore, by policy, all use is banned.Conservation demands this. But compare whathappens when use is legal and when it is illegal.

Tawa: legal but under threat

In Tawa, 44 displaced villages took up an alternatesource of livelihood and have managed resources in asustainable manner for over 9 years now. In 1974, the21,000-hectare reservoir was handed over to the stategovernment in 1975 for fish production and then to the Madhya Pradesh Fisheries DevelopmentCorporation till 1994. It was auctioned to a privatecontractor for a year after that. The reservoir was opento all from 1995 to 1996 and then handed over to a co-operative after a prolonged struggle. Because of a lackof any source of livelihood after the area came withinnational park limits, the displaced people demandedexclusive fishing rights to the reservoir. So came intobeing the Tawa Matsya Sangh.

Initially, the Tawa Matsya Sangh got fishingrights for five years in 1996, which was laterextended. The co-operative is constituted solely oflocal communities and is two-tiered. At the locallevel, it started off with 33 primary co-operativesocieties, which undertook the actual fishing andthen handed the catch over to the second level of afederation that took care of marketing, transport andsale of fish, stocking of fish seed, and supply of netsand boats to fishermen.

Tawa serves as a good example because over theyears it was under state, private and then cooperativecontrol and the trends clearly show that the co-operative regime has been able to manageproduction, maintenance of stock, employment andincome generation most efficiently.

Sustainable production A report by the Ahmedabad-based Centre for

112 The way ahead


Environmental Planning and Technology shows that production was highly fluctuating when thereservoir was under the control of the MadhyaPradesh Fisheries Development Corporation. Underthe Tawa Matsya Sangh, production steadilyincreased from just under 100 tonne in 1996 toalmost 400 tons in 2000, though it has figured a slightdecrease in the past three years. Per hectareproduction in 2000 was 32.37 kg, three times thenational average for big reservoirs (see graph: Totalproduction of fish in Tawa reservoir).

Moreover, the increase in fish production did notadversely affect the fish stock in the reservoir. In fact,the average size of the catch increased over the years.The proportion of the three major crops of Catla,Rohu and Mrigula has been maintained at 80 percent. Also, the use of mono-filament yarn nets isbanned by the sangh to avoid over-fishing. Thoughthese nets increase the catch marginally, they areharmful because they catch fish of smaller size. Thisis a good place to compare the private regime to theco-operative regime. The private contractor hadforced the fisherfolk to use these nets to merelyincrease the catch, thus affecting the stock adversely.

Stocking of fingerlings is another importantfactor in maintaining production. If adequatefingerlings are not available, future productioncannot be ascertained. The stocking increaseddramatically in the first four years and then declinedmarginally. Another achievement of the co-operativeis the ability to develop capacity among the localcommunities to harvest fingerlings and reducedependence on external sources. From almost nil theco-operative increased the production of fingerlingsto 37 per cent in 2003-2004, displaying an internal

institutional capability to manage and sustain thereservoir’s fish production.

The livelihood of almost 4,000 families from 45villages began to depend on fishing from thereservoir and the number of fisherfolk rose from amere 200 to almost 500 in 2004.

The Tawa Matsya Sangh has successfullymarketed its fish catch to local as well as distantmarkets, with some of the fish even going to Howrahin West Bengal. The total income of fisherfolkincreased from 1997 to 2000, dipped slightly till2003 and went up again. In the last year, averageincome of the fisherfolk increased although theproduction dipped slightly, which means they weregetting a better price for the catch.

Conservation fisheryThe Tawa Matsya Sangh is very cognisant of the needto protect and maintain the natural resource that isthe backbone of the local livelihood and thecommunity. It ensures that mono-filament yarn netsand nets below a certain mesh size are not used forfishing, to protect the juvenile fish. It has alsoensured that every fish gets at least one opportunityto breed. Every year, a closed season of two months isobserved, during which fishermen patrol the area inboats and jeeps to prevent any violation. Everyvillage around the reservoir has a primary co-operative, which gives every villager and potentialpoacher an opportunity to participate and get a senseof ownership. This is probably one of the best waysto fence the areas from poachers.

The sangh has also established a system ofwages, wherein they pay the highest wages in theseasons when the tendency to poach is the highest.

Tota

l pro

duct

ion

in T

awa

(in t

onne

s)

93.23

245.81

344.38

393.16

327.18

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-2000 2000-2001

Year

Source: Amalendu Jyotishi and R Parthasarthy 2005, The Tawa Reservoir Fisheries Management: Experiences and Options, School of Planning, CEPT,Ahmedabad, February, pg18

TOTAL PRODUCTION OF FISH IN TAWA RESERVOIR

The way ahead 113


All of the above only go on to point that the inclusionand participation of the local communities areinstrumental not only to protecting and conservingnatural resources but also to sustain livelihoods andraise local levels of income.

But fish is defined as wildlife under the Wildlife(Protection) Act, 1972. The Central EmpoweredCommittee of the Supreme Court has written to statewildlife agencies not to allow any “prohibited”activities without prior permission of the SupremeCourt. By law, fishing in the sanctuary or nationalpark cannot be allowed without the permission of thechief wildlife warden in consultation with theNational Board for Wildlife, and now the SupremeCourt. The permission can only be sought andgranted if the removal of wildlife from the nationalpark is necessary for the improvement and bettermanagement of wildlife.

Clearly, there is no provision on what issustainable use in these conditions. The restrictionsplaced by conservationists has also meant parkauthorities are under pressure to stop what is notdestructive. Notices have been put up in the tigerreserve, telling fisherfolk that the permission will bewithdrawn and that it is illegal. Once again, peoplewill be driven to unemployment and anger againstthe reserve.

Pench: illegal and threatening

What is happening in neighbouring Pench should bea lesson for Tawa. In Totladoh settlement of Penchtiger reserve all fishing rights have been taken awayfrom the local people. It is important to compare thedifferences between both the situations — one wherethe people are involved in protecting the area andsecond in which the people are totally excluded fromany participation.

Totladoh is a settlement of migrants from Seoniand Chhindwada districts of Madhya Pradesh andNagpur district of Maharashtra in the 1970s. After theconstruction of the Pench hydro-electric project, thevillages in the submergence area also migrated toTotladoh. Over the years, most of the villagers startedearning their livelihood by fishing in the reservoir.

Under an agreement between the Maharashtraand the Madhya Pradesh governments over theTotladoh reservoir (2,000 ha), the Madhya Pradeshfisheries department started fishing operations in theTotladoh reservoir. All the local and displaced wereslowly rehabilitated into the fishing business andwere given the right to fish in the reservoir. TheNehru Yuva Matsya Society was formed by thefisherfolk and also landed a contract for fishing fromthe state government. The government was paidroyalty from the fish trade.

Then, in 1995, the Maharashtra government

banned fishing in the reservoir, claiming theTotladoh area came under a reserve forest area theBritish had declared in 1879 and which was declareda national park in 1975, making it illegal to fish in thereservoir. The local people, of course, did not havean alternate source of income and they continued tofish in spite of the ban. They got into skirmishes withthe forest officials and the police and the tensionbetween them mounted.

On the Madhya Pradesh side, an agreement wasreached between fisherfolk and the park authoritiesin which compensation was paid in lieu of fishingrights. The people on the Maharashtra side continueto suffer under the ban imposed by the forestdepartment, interpreting fishing as a violation theWildlife (Protection) Act, 1972.

The villagers of Totladoh were thrown out in2002 and fishing was stopped; however, the tensionstill continues. It is estimated that about Rs 25 lakhworth of fish is extracted in a year. The illegal chainof fishing is industriously managed. Fisherfolk enterthe national park at night for four hours and maketheir way to the reservoir. They are paid Rs 100 bythe middlemen for this fishing. A different personcollects the fish at the reservoir and transports it by abicycle through the park for Rs 100. This is depositedat the fringe village, from where another couriercollects the fish and takes it to the nearest town,where the middleman waits. All this is illegal. Allthis continues to happen each night at the reservoir.

The forest department has raided and captured100 boats that were submerged in the reservoir. Itmust be noted that these fishing boats had beentransported through the core of the secured park tothe reservoir. Now tension has intensified further.The seizure by the forest department has elicited aviolent response from the local people, who havestarted forest fires each time their boats have beencaptured by the authorities. The situation is thatpeople are kept out of the reservoir, the illegal fishingwill continue, the forest officials and police willcontinue to capture fishing boats and the villagerswill continue to retaliate.

By not letting the local communities toparticipate and sustainably utilise the whole purposeof protecting the park and the natural resources isdefeated. It is important to ask if this is the rightpolicy: for conservation (see box: Changing attitudesthrough participation).

The coexistence imperative

The choice is therefore ours to make. People live inprotected areas and will continue to live therebecause there are no real alternatives. The issue is ifwe can work with people to create situations inwhich they can live with the rules of the protected

114 The way ahead


area and in fact work to strengthen the protection ofthese areas. Or we can work against people so thatthey increasingly turn against the protected areas andanimals. In this situation, we can invest more andmore into its protection — more fences, guns and guards. Maybe we will win. But it is more likelywe will lose.

In the current situation of unrest, it is clear thereare no winners. The people who live in the mostdestitute situations within the reserves are certainlynot gaining. But simultaneously, conservation is notgaining.

Most wildlife managers the Tiger Task Force metin the past few months have wanted more and morefire power. Some even suggested the forestdepartment should be given the same status as theforces fighting the insurgents and naxalites. Thereserves were equivalent, they said, to “disturbedareas”.

It is clear that protected areas need the sanctity ofrestrictive use and protection. It is also clear thatprotection is much simpler if there are no competinguses and if the rules are simple. If there are no peoplein the reserves, then it is easy to identify the outsider

or the poacher, was repeated to the Tiger Task Forceon its visits to tiger reserves. Perhaps rightly.

But what does one do when there is no choice? Itis clear that even after certain areas are madeinviolate, many areas will remain which are alsocritical tiger habitats, but have human habitation.

The alternatives are also not easy. But they willhave to be tried seriously to make them work. But foralternatives to work, there should be clarity that useof resources per se is not unsustainable. Poorlymanaged use of resources is unsustainable. If this isunderstood, then what is needed is to put into placeregimes that will promote the sustainable use ofresources. It is well understood, across the world,that sustainable use arises out of security of tenureand rights.

Therefore, if we want to move towards moresustainable use of resources in our protected area, wehave no choice but to work towards agreements ofreciprocity — where local communities who live inthe reserves have rights over the use of resources, inreturn for protection and conservation benefits.

This can be done in many different ways: ● Reservation of jobs in protection and

Changing attitudes through participation

In 1991, the Bwindi National Forest Reserve andGame Sanctuary in Uganda was gazetted as aNational Park, barring communities access to thepark, and making collection of forest produceillegal.17 The park covers 33,000 hectares and isknown for its exceptional biodiversity: more than200 species of trees, 350 species of birds and half ofwild population of the endangered mountaingorilla.18

Though the process of reducing access has beenoccurring since the declaration of the forest reservein 1932, the complete denial of access to the forestseriously aggravated the situation. The park haswitnessed constant illegal encroachments anddeliberate arson19. Fires in the park, a third ofwhich were caused by arson, caused thedestruction of 5 per cent of the park.20 The attitudetowards conservation was apparent in interviewswhere community members said that “Gorillasshould be put in cages and taken to zoos”. Further,park rangers faced constant harassment and weresubject to attacks, denied sale of food and evenambulance services, despite the rangers beinglocals themselves.21

It immediately became clear that ban on accessmight have been a mistake, and that denial ofaccess to resources was untenable.

In 1992, Uganda National Parks, which

administered the park, began pilot schemes toinclude the community in the management of thepark, a potentially risky move, given the precarioussituation of the gorilla population and local attitudestowards the animal. However, a Raid VulnerabilityAssessment gave empirical data on the impact thatwould result from the community collecting variousplants species. With this analysis, the park andelected member of local parishes negotiated limitson collection on different forest produce, andlimited access to the park was resumed. Beekeepingwas recognised as low impact, and authorities beganby allowing this activity. By 1996, 500 people fromfour parishes have setup 3000 hives in the park.These limited measures began to ease therelationship on the ground between the communityand the park authorities by creating a betterrelationship between the communities and the parkauthorities. No more deliberate fires have beenreported started. Through a collaborativemanagement approach which covered 20 per cent ofthe area of the park, fifteen of the twenty-twoparishes bordering the park went from being a parkthreat to being a park resource, assisting with theconservation of the park by helping guard againstencroachment and even assisting with putting outforest fires6. A serious scientific look at the impact ofcommunity access to forest resources can help parkmanagement, even when the community isapparently hostile to conservation efforts.

The way ahead 115


management of the reserve; ● Reservation and preferential opportunities in the

benefits that arise out of protected areas — shareof tickets, tourism opportunities;

● Rights to harvest and sell minor forest produceand fish in a sustainable manner;

● Clarity of the rights over grazing so that areas areclearly demarcated. Investment in improving theproductivity of grazing lands so that the pressureon the rest of the park is reduced;

● Investment in development activities — schools,medical facilities and communication — so thatbasic minimum needs are met;

● Investment through development programmes

and forest development programmes so thatthere is investment in building the productiveasset base of the villages.

● Rights to collaborative management of certain areas of reserves — so that people cantake the responsibility to manage the protectedareas.

In other words, we are designing a regime of explicitbenefit sharing and ‘compensatory rights’16 forcommunities who pay the greatest price forconservation.

It is clear that if this is not done, then the cost toconservation will be devastating.

1. Policy must accept that people will continue to live in protected areas. It is notpossible to settle the rights and relocate all the families living in the reserves. The facts areclear: in the last 30 years, less than 10 per cent of the families in tiger reserves have beenrelocated.

2. If people live in protected areas, ways must be found to secure their use of resourcesand livelihoods. In the current legal framework, the use of resources by communities isnot included, because people are not expected to be in the national park at all, and in alimited way in sanctuaries. But it is important to note that even in sanctuaries, use ofresources is legal after rights have been settled and use agreed upon. The law alsoprovides that during the time the rights are settled and people live in protected areas, thestate government has to provide alternative sources of fuel, fodder and other forestproduce. In short, the rights of people cannot be expunged without providing alternatives.

3. In this situation, the selective interpretation of the Indian Wildlife (Protection) Act,which curtails the use of resources by people without taking into account the safeguardshas only led to greater unrest around our protected areas and has been detrimental toconservation.

4. Strategies for joint-collaborative-inclusive management of our protected areas arethen essential, so that this “illegal” use is made legal and regulated.

Even if it is accepted that the management of competing uses in our protected areas willbe difficult, the fact is that in the current circumstances there are no options. It is not theintention of this Task Force to suggest that the protection awarded to protected areasshould be diminished or that destructive use should be allowed. It is also aware that it isperceived by managers in the field that protection is easier without the management ofcompeting uses. If all use is disallowed then it should be easier to guard against theillegal.

But this is not the case. ‘Illegal’ use continues, because it has to, given the reality ofthe more than three million people who live on these resources. The current use,precisely because it is ‘illegal’, is destructive — both for resources and for therelationships between animals and parks. It is not good for conservation.

5. The conservation strategy should be as follows:a. The areas, which are essential for total protection, should be made inviolate. People

Recommendations

116 The way ahead


living in these areas should be relocated and the rights settled. These areas, to beginwith would be the core areas (national parks) of tiger reserves. If the agencies are ableto relocate more people, because of the availability of finances and resources likeland, more area can be made exclusive for conservation.

b. In the remaining areas within the tiger reserve and protected areas, the strategy formanagement has to be inclusive and use of resources must be accepted and allowed.

6. It is not necessary that all use will be destructive. The question is how the use will beregulated or managed. In order for the resource use not to be destructive, the participationof local communities in decision-making and in management becomes essential.Regulation is best possible, if all are parties to the decision.

7. This use of resources within protected areas will require very innovative thinking by the park managers. It is not possible to find one prescription that will fit all reserves.But once it is accepted that use if not necessarily destructive or that the management of resources by communities is not necessarily destructive, practices can be evolved foreach area.

8. The work within protected areas can include activities that promote conservation,protection and sustainable management. The forest development committees can beinitiated so that there is investment in habitat improvement and grassland development.Cooperatives can be formed to sustainably harvest minor forest produce.

9. It is essential that this approach of inclusive protection is incorporated intoconservation management urgently. For this, the following must be done:a. Each tiger reserve (to begin with) must take into account the current needs of people

who live within the reserve and evolve a plan for resource management and use. Thisstrategy must be evolved in consultation with local communities, researchers andlocal NGOs.

b. The strategy must include plans for careful monitoring and evaluation. c. The Project Tiger directorate must have internal capacity and staff to be able to

monitor and guide this process carefully. Every effort must be made to encourageinnovation and experimentation.

d. This process must begin immediately. The plans for each reserve must be completedwithin one year and be available publicly.

10. The independent monitoring of tiger reserves must provide a high weightage for thework done by park managers in collaborative management. The improvement inrelationship between people and parks must be a key criterion in the review. Each tigerreserve must be rated for this work and the best and worst identified for rewards andpenalties.

While the problems of people inside our protectedareas exacerbate, the country remains ignorant of thesituation of many more who live on the fringes ofthese national parks and sanctuaries. Conservationfaces the challenge of working with people inside aswell as with communities on the fringe.

Harini Nagendra, a researcher with theBangalore-based Ashoka Trust for Research inEcology and Environment (ATREE), has studied andcompared the war within and outside the Tadoba-Andhari tiger reserve in Maharashtra. Herassessment is clear: the villages outside the park,connected to markets by road networks, have a largerimpact on deforestation and forest fragmentationcompared to the more isolated interior villages. Herprescription for the park is equally clear: instead offocussing on resettling the forest villages, thedemands of forest protection will be better served byworking with these surrounding communities todevelop alternate mechanisms of incomegeneration.1 She goes on to explain the phenomenonin depth.

She and her colleagues have studied changes infour categories of forest cover in the reserve:● Zone 1: In areas within the tiger reserve, far from

habitations● Zone 2: In the 2-km buffer stretching inwards

from the reserve’s periphery● Zone 3: In a 2-km area radiating from the villages

inside● Zone 4: In a 5-km area extending outwards from

the park periphery

She clearly finds that the impact on the forest of thevillages outside the reserve is much greater. The 53villages outside, denied rights they enjoyed earlier,now resort to illegal sale of forest produce to nearbymarkets. Comparatively, the six villages insideprimarily use the forest for subsistence alone.

There are two issues worth understanding here: 1. The sheer number of people on the fringe is

greater than the few who live inside the park.2. The villages on the fringe are connected to

markets far beyond the vicinity of the park andhave the resources to transfer forest produce tothese markets. Therefore, what they extract fromthe forest is far more than what they need forimmediate personal consumption; in the case ofvillages inside, this is often not possible.

Unfortunately such studies, useful in taking careful

conservation decisions, are extremely few. Thus,reliable data related to fringe community practicesand aspects of existence is absent. Such absence isdirectly related to the belief — consistent amongsome conservationists and foresters — that it is thevillages in the interior of tiger reserves that need to beshifted out to enable successful conservation. Thepoint is that while this policy prescription may stillhold true, pressures on the reserve will continue tomount if no rational answers are available for villageson the periphery. Indeed, at times, if the relocation ofvillages is badly done — say, villages areautomatically resettled at the fringe — the problem ismerely transferred from the inside to the outside. Theissue then is to find solutions to the problem ofproviding the people with alternate ways ofsubsistence and livelihood.

There is little reliable information on the numberof villages at the periphery of reserves; in particular,information that details their resource use patternsand the consequent impact on the park. But what isavailable shows that in many parks, the number ofvillages within is fewer than those at its periphery. Inother words, here is a problem that demandsdifferent strategies of coexistence.

For instance, in Ranthambhore there are 25villages within, with less than 8,500 people. Butoutside, there are 96 villages, with over 100,000people. However, reserve authorities relocatedvillages to the fringe without clearly considering theimplications of this action. Now, these villages havejoined the crowd which is pushing its way into thereserve. Clearly, here the strategy is to engage withthe fringe villages. Relocation from within thisreserve may be vital to isolate tiger habitat, butwithout tackling fringe pressures, the habitat willremain under increasing threat.

In Madhya Pradesh, while there are 726 villagesand 60,137 families inside the parks, there are 2,200villages and 1,32,000 families in the periphery.2

Thus it is clear that, given the high dependenceof people on these last remaining forests, humanactivities will impinge on the quality of the habitat.The question is to understand the nature of theintervention and what can be done to mitigate orsubstitute its impact.

An interesting study arises out of work done byother researchers in the fringe villages of Bandipurnational park, which forms part of the Bandipur tigerreserve in Karnataka. As M D Madhusudan of theNature Conservation Foundation, Mysore shows, alack of resources and livelihood drove the people to

The way ahead 117


3.9 The fringe agenda

118 The way ahead


the closest available resource: the forest. In the early 1990s, village Hangala along with 74

other villages stumbled upon a windfall whilegrappling with severe water and debt crises. Thedemand for Indian coffee was spiralling, and thevillagers took to rearing cattle for the dung, whichthen catered to coffee plantations (as manure for thecoffee fields) elsewhere. Over time, villagers boughtmore cattle; the bovine population increased in allthe villages participating in the trade — in some, byas much as 30 to 40 per cent over just five years. In afew villages, the growth rate of livestock shot up 13-17 times higher than the average national livestockgrowth rate for the same time period.

But consecutive droughts and bad watermanagement, coupled with faulty agriculturalprescriptions by the government, had wiped outgrazing lands and common pasture lands in villageareas: the forest, therefore, began to serve as a freeand open source for fodder (see map: Cattle densityin villages around Bandipur national park). Theresult: the forest close to the northern boundaries ofthe park adjoining the villages, is today moredegraded than elsewhere in the reserve. Preliminarystudies of the area show a heavy livestock density atthe northwestern edge of the reserve and adisappearance of vegetation cover from the areaaround Hangala village.3

Repeatable situationThis situation, with local variations, is repeatedacross the country. The landscape immediatelyoutside is under intense use, with people living in anagro-silvo-pastoral economy. They need access tograsslands for their livestock. They need income

sources that come from the forest: firewood and saleof minor forest produce. They need constructionmaterial and medicinal plants from the forests. Theirdrinking water and their sources of irrigation watercome from the forest.

The problem is two-fold:● The productivity of the forest, and land

surrounding fringe settlements, has declinedover the years. It has been overused and has seenlittle management or investment.

● Investment made in development — irrigation,rural development, drinking water or tribalaffairs — has not worked as it should have.Money and programmes have been spent on thewelfare of fringe villagers, but their poverty hasonly been exacerbated.

This has then led to increased conflict as theimperatives of conservation have clashed with theneeds of livelihood.

Compensation

The poor share their homes and fields with wildanimals. Just as animals suffer when people entertheir habitat, people suffer when animals enter theirhomes and fields. Most state governments paymonetary compensation for the loss of human lifeand livestock; and only a few pay for crop losses. Buteven where a compensation scheme exists,applications for compensation for livestock death areusually not accepted, or the amount sanctioned ismuch lower than what was asked for. It is clear thatwith this interface of humans and large mammals,

conflicts are inevitable. The issue is to seehow the friction can be managed better.

Wild animals and predators often take aserious toll of livestock and human lives,causing huge losses to the rural economy. InMadhya Pradesh alone, conservationimpacts nearly 5,500 villages within two kmof forest boundaries, with 451,000 familiesand 879,450 ha of cultivable land.According to H S Pabla, additionalprincipal chief conservator of forests,Madhya Pradesh, 166 human deaths and3,131 human injuries from wildlife werereported from the state between April 1998and March 2003. In addition, 14,090 headsof cattle were lost to large predators.4

There is no record of the extent ofdamage to crops, found Pabla in hisinvestigation. This is because while moststates have provisions for compensation forhuman life and livestock loss, very few haveany provision for compensating crop loss. A

<100101-200201-400401-800>800

Bandipur National Park

Hangala

Livestock density (per square kilometre)

Source: M D Madhusudan 2003, Uneasy Neighbours, Human Resource-use and LargeMammal Conservation in the Tropical Forests of Karnataka, India, National Institute ofAdvanced Studies, Bangalore, mimeo

CATTLE DENSITY IN VILLAGES AROUND BANDIPUR NATIONAL PARK

The way ahead 119


rapid survey conducted in Noradehi, Raisen andVidisha forest divisions in Madhya Pradesh inSeptember 2002 to assess crop damage, found thesituation serious.5 Data from Noradehi showedfarmers lost as much as 30 per cent of their paddycrop, 10 per cent of the wheat crop and 40 per cent ofthe pulse (gram) crop in villages located inside thesanctuary. But villages on the outskirts also sufferedequally. A village two km from the forest boundarylost 10 per cent of its paddy crop and 25 per cent ofits gram crop.

The study assessed the average crop damage atRs 1,067 per ha per year in the sample villages,which comes to between 10-20 per cent of the totalyield. On the basis of the human population andcultivated area of 214 villages situated within fivekm of protected area boundaries, and the crop lossassessed in the sample villages, the total loss to thestate has been estimated at Rs 628 crore — Rs 94crore as direct loss and Rs 534 crore as the cost ofprotection in the form of labour and material. “Thefigures are rather crude, but the estimation helps tounderstand the enormity of the problem. It is obviousthat the actual damage to crops, coupled with theopportunity cost of protecting the crops is so highthat it deserves serious attention. Equally serious isthe quality of life of people of the vulnerable villages,who spend close to 100-200 nights, year after year,guarding their crops from wild depredators,” saysPabla6 (see table: Summary of compensation systemsin various states).

The case of the Bhadra tiger reserve, Karnataka,has been well documented by M D Madhusudan.Covering an area of 495 sq km, Bhadra is located inthe foothills of the Western Ghats and has 26 villageson the fringe, with 6,774 families. Livestock killingby large predators has had a significant impact oncattle population in Bhadra. The livestock kill in thefive sample villages covered by the study was 219.Compensation was sought in over half the instances.Of 71 applications filed for compensation, only 15were accepted and compensated for Rs 17,250.Compensations awarded by the forest departmentwere three per cent of the overall loss villagerssustained from livestock depredation, and five percent of the loss for which villagers filed claims.7

In terms of crop damage, villagers near Bhadralost 11 per cent of the monetary value of their annualproduction. The annual loss per family amounted toRs 5,100, or 30 per cent of the average annualhousehold income in the region. Fourteeen per centof those who suffered losses said they did not file forclaim because of the lengthy bureaucratic process —it takes 77 days to fully process an application forcrop loss compensation. Even so, 69 per cent ofrespondents in village surveys wanted thecompensation programme to continue despite thefact that it undervalued losses, as long as the processwas made quicker and less bureaucratic (see table:Bhadra crop compensation processing time).

The difficulty of access to forest offices and non-availability of concerned staff make the seemingly

Source: H S Pabla, 2005, The Mantra for Man-animal Coexistence, mimeo

State Crop damage (Rs) Livestock (Rs) Human deaths, Loss of house, permanent disability, other propertyinjuries (Rs) (Rs)

Andhra Pradesh At par with natural Market value Upto 20,000 At par with natural calamities or riots calamities or riots

Assam — — 20,000 —

Bihar 500 per acre — 6,000-20,000 200-1,000

Gujarat 250-5,000 — 25,000-100,000 —

Jharkhand 2,500 per hectare 500-3,000 33,333-100,000 1,000-10,000

Karnataka 2,000 per acre — 25,000-100,000 5,000

Madhya Pradesh — 5,000 10,000-50,000 —

Maharashtra — 3,000-9,000 (or 75% of 50,000-200,000 —(market value, whichever is less)

Meghalaya 3,750-7,500 per hectare 100-1,500 30,000-100,000 5,000-10,000

Orissa 1,000 per acre — 2,000-100,000 2,000-3,500

Tamil Nadu Upto 15,000 per acre — 20,000-100,000 5,000

Uttar Pradesh 150-2,500 per acre — 5,000-50,000 400-3,000

West Bengal 2,500 per acre 70-450 5,000-20,000 500-1,000

SUMMARY OF COMPENSATION SYSTEMS IN VARIOUS STATES

120 The way ahead


simple act of filing a compensation claim atroublesome task. The requirement to producedocuments for land rights to support claims oflivestock has ensured that none of the livestock killsin Karvaani, inside Bhadra, have been compensatedto date. Similarly, landless families have had littlesuccess in obtaining compensation in livestock kills.The filing and follow-up of compensation claims alsorequire significant financial investment (travel toforest offices) on the part of claimants.

Finally, compensations, even if awarded, offsetonly a miniscule part of the loss sustained by thevictim.8

As a policy, compensation does recognise andaddress the monetary aspect but the process frompolicy to action needs review. The procedure forawarding compensations needs to be more realisticand responsive if it is to help in assuaging conflicts.

The Project Tiger directorate has collected dataon compensation park managers in different reserveshave paid up (see graph: Compensation tiger reserveshave paid till 2000). This data is still being compiled,but what is already evident is that morecompensation, relatively, is paid to villages innaxalite-infested park areas than in others. If this isindeed correct, it reveals the necessity, wheretensions are higher, of disbursing claims forcompensation as fast as possible. It clearly alsoshows the need to ensure that disbursal ofcompensation claims is done by park managersthemselves, so that hostility is reduced.

It is Corbett, considered a better managedreserve, which has disbursed the largestcompensation amounts.

Ecodevelopment

There have been two planned experiments whichattempted to resolve tensions along the fringes ofparks in India. Both have used the concept ofecodevelopment. The first was called the ForestryResearch Education and Extension Project (FREEP).Ecodevelopment was a project component in it and itwas implemented in two national parks — theKalakad-Mundanthurai tiger reserve, Tamil Naduand the Great Himalayan National Park, HimachalPradesh. Since 1991, the Union government hadtried to run a centrally-funded ecodevelopmentproject in several protected areas, on a less ambitiousscale. The Forestry Research Education andExtension Project began in 1994. It was planned to bethe precursor to the much larger, more elaborate andmore ambitious India Ecodevelopment Project (IEDP)

Source: M D Madhusudan 2003, Liviing amidst large wildlife: livestock andcrop depredation by large mammals in the interior villges of Bhadra tigerreserve, south India, Springer

Village Total compensation per cent Time taken to total loss claimed (days)

Hipla 4 196

Karvaani 0

Kesave 5 172

Maadla 5 181

Muthodi 5

Overall 5 183

BHADRA CROP COMPENSATION PROCESSING TIME


0.00

10.00

20.00

30.00

40.00

50.00

60.00

70.00

Valm

iki

Cor

bett

Pala

mau

Sund

arba

ns

Rant

ham

bhor

e

Kan

ha

Nag

arju

na S

agar

Dud

hwa

Buxa

band

ipur

Mel

ghat

Sim

lipal

Man

as

Bhad

ra

Saris

ka

KM

TR

Penc

h (M

hara

shtr

a)

Indr

avat

i

Dam

pha

Satp

ura

Band

havg

arh

Tado

ba

Nam

daph

a

Pann

a

Periy

ar

Com

pens

atio

n (in

Rs

lakh

)


COMPENSATION PAID BY TIGER RESERVES FROM INCEPTION TILL 2002

that began in 1996. Both projects ran with part-funding and part-grants from the World Bank and theGlobal Environment Facility.

The India Ecodevelopment Project had thefollowing basic objectives:9

1. Improve protected areas management: This wasto be done to strengthen forest departmentcapacities and increase people’s participation inpark management.

2. Village ecodevelopment: This was aimed atreducing negative impacts of ‘local people’ onparks and vice versa. This asked for participatorymicroplanning of activities at the village level, tohelp villages and the forest department decide ona set of reciprocal promises. The forestdepartment would provide alternativelivelihoods and the people would commit tohelp the department in better managing andprotecting the forest. Ecodevelopment alsomeant so-called special programmes, includingthe ‘option’ of voluntary relocation and other‘investments’ to benefit people and biodiversity.

3. Generate support for park management andecodevelopment: The project also focussed onenvironmental education and visitormanagement at the parks. More importantly, itpromised funds for impact monitoring and goal-oriented ecological and social science research.

When this project was in preparation in 1991-1992,the Forestry Research Education and ExtensionProject’s ecodevelopment work was taken as amodel. The India Ecodevelopment Project took one-and-a half years, and numerous consultations, tocome into being. The Union government hired theIndian Institute of Planning and Administration,New Delhi, to chalk out the ‘indicative plan’, aproposal submitted by the government to the WorldBank to launch formal negotiations, which thedepartment of economic affairs took up with theBank in 1994.

The project initially began with eight sites inmind. The one to be finally rejected was Simlipal inOrissa, for the state government had relocatedvillages even as the project was being planned andthe Bank did not want to be associated with a sitethat had relocated people. The government finallyselected and proposed seven sites: all but two weretiger reserves — Gir national park and sanctuary inGujarat and the Nagarhole national park in Karnataka(see map: The India Ecodevelopment Project). Thelatter was later on added to the Bandipur tigerreserve.

What is interesting is the way the projectdelineated the idea of fringe. Usually, the impact of afringe radiates out from a park periphery till it

becomes negligible. But even as the projectproponents and the government discussed the limitof the ‘fringe’, what ultimately came to be understoodas a fringe was via a random idea of what waspractical rather than what was necessary. So, in thecase of the Buxa tiger reserve in West Bengal, forinstance, even though the project was aware of125,601 scheduled tribe people working in thesurrounding tea gardens, it finally excluded them.10

Similarly, in Nagarhole national park in Karnataka,the population in the project area was 72,652 (as perthe 1981 census), but the project identified only66,507 people to work with.11 In other parks, too,people were left out for reasons of ‘practicality’.

The project’s funds came from five primarysources (see table: Source of funds for IndiaEcodevelopment Project). At the same time, ‘ projectbeneficiaries’, as people were referred to in theproject framework, had to contribute as well to theproject cost. The idea was to bring in people’s stakein the project, and therefore into conservation, byasking them to pitch in roughly seven per cent ofwhat it would it would cost to launch activitiesunder the project. While this may look minimal ascompared to the overall costs, it meant substantialcontribution on the part of the people. The moneywas to be spent under various heads.

In all, the India Ecodevelopment Project decidedto consider 3,715 villages spread around the sevenparks (see box: Fringe villages): it would involve164,786 families and a population of 823,928. Again,one must emphasise this was not the total populationon the fringe of the parks selected as project sites;this was the segment the project decided it couldafford to work with.

The idea of ecodevelopment The key objective of the project was to reduce thenegative impacts of ‘local people’ on protected areasby providing alternative sources of firewood andincome.

The way ahead 121


Source: Anon 1996, Staff Appraisal Report, World Bank, Washington

SOURCE OF FUNDS FORINDIA ECODEVELOPMENT PROJECT

Funding agency US $ (million) Per cent

International Development Agency 28.00 42

GEF Trust 20.00 30

Project beneficiaries 4.59 7

State government 9.06 13

Union government 5.36 8

Total (for 28 reserves) 67.00 100

122 The way ahead


Administratively, the project went on to create aparallel set of village-level bodies called the villageecodevelopment committees. These consist ofvillagers along with a forester or guard as theofficiating secretary. The president of the committeeis elected from among the committee members. The

committee was meant to sit with the department anda non-governmental organisation and make amicroplan of all activities it would undertake overthe project period. In return for the forest departmentproviding alternative livelihoods using projectresources, people reciprocally promised to help the

Buxa tiger reserve761 sq km36,000 Rs 29.56 crore37 forest villages in the reserve, no

settlement in national park

Gir national park andsanctuary1,412 sq km72,000 Rs 33.23 crore54 hamlets in

national park,

3 temple complexes, 14

forest villages

Nagarhole national park643 sq km70,000 Rs 32.37 crore54 tribal settlements

Palamau tiger reserve1,026 sq km75,000 Rs 11.25 crore3 forest villages,

102 villages in enclaves

JHARKHANDMADHYA PRADESH

MAHARASHTRA

RAJASTHAN

GUJARAT

KA

RN

ATA

KA

KERALA

Pench tiger reserve758 sq km48,000 Rs 23.78 croreNo settlement

Periyar tiger reserve777 sq km62,000 Rs 22.33 sq km3 tribal settlements,

1 agricultural settlement

Ranthambhore tiger reserve1,035 sq km 64,000 Rs 20.63 crore4 villages in national

park, 25 in sanctuary

Area (sq km) Number of beneficiaries Release of fund to parks (Rs crore) (up to 2002-03)

Source: World Bank 2002, aide memoire, Annexure 3 budget and expenditure, November, mimeo

THE INDIA ECODEVELOPMENT PROJECT SITES

The way ahead 123


department protect the forest: among other ways, byhelping department frontline staff in patrolling;gathering intelligence on poaching; preventing cattlefrom grazing in parks, and whatever else the forestdepartment suggested. In practice, all these couldhappen only after mutual agreement among allstakeholders.

Each ecodevelopment committee member wasallocated Rs 10,000 against which he or she wouldthen contribute 25 per cent of the costs, or Rs 2,500.The money could then be used to invest in differentschemes and productive assets, either at individuallevels or at community basis.12 The money could

then generate, as the World Bank and thegovernment put it, livelihoods reducing the impactof people on the forest.13 On its part, the forestdepartment would improve its functioning, andensure better protection of parks: project fundsallowed purchase and construction of infrastructureand better equipment for park officers and staff(computers, boats, Geographical InformationSystems software, and vehicles).

Ecodevelopment as envisaged earlierThe idea of ecodevelopment entered conservationdiscourse in India in 1983, when the Indian Board

Fringe villages

A profile of the people on the fringe of the forestand inside each park:

Buxa According to the 1991 census, 15,608 peopleinhabit forest villages and fixed demand holdingswithin the protected area. In 1996, according to aWorld Bank project report, there were 37 forestvillages inside the reserve’s boundaries, and eightwithin the park. The report also mentions 44revenue villages, with a population of 84,648 (1991census). The project decided to target 36,000 ofthese for ecodevelopment.

Ranthambhore In 1996, the national consultants to IndiaEcodevelopment Project identified 211,695 peoplewithin 10 km of the reserve to be included in theproject. But the project authorities then reduced thenumbers they wanted to work with to 64,000.Before this, Worldwide Fund for Nature-India(1994) had identified 85,000 people, in 85 villages,for possible inclusion in ecodevelopmentactivities. The project realised that it would alsohave to deal with major urban settlements nearreserve boundaries, as in the cases of SawaiMadhopur, Khandar and Karauli (combinedpopulation of 82,000).

GirOver 70,000 people were surveyed to be living inthe intended project area during the 1981 census.The protected area authorities identified apopulation of 72,000 within a two-km radius ofpark boundaries, in 97 revenue villages, forparticipation in ecodevelopment. Within the parkitself, 54 pastoral settlements or 'nesses' inhabitedby 2,540 Maldharis; 14 forest villages with apopulation of 4,500 residents including 239 Siddis,

a scheduled tribe of African origin; and threetemple complexes occupied by 65 people, wereidentified.

NagarholeThe total population in the project area was 72,652as per the 1981 census. Within a five-km radius ofthe boundary, the protected area authoritiesidentified a population of 66,507 in 96 revenuevillages, for participation in project activities.

PalamauThree villages were recorded in the core zone.According to the 1991 census data, 30,795 people,in 102 villages, were located within legallyexcluded enclaves in the sanctuary’s buffer area.Another 89 villages within a five-km radius of thesanctuary were selected to participate inecodevelopment activities, to give a totalpopulation of 75,000 targeted for this project.

PenchThe 1981 census counted 50,000 people in theintended project area (99 revenue villages).Findings from the participatory research carriedout in over 10 villages around the national parksuggest that 80 per cent of families suffered fromvarying degrees of poverty, and that most of thesefamilies belong to scheduled tribes.

PeriyarWhile the protected area authorities and thenational consultants (Indian Institute of PublicAdministration) identified a population of225,000 according to the 1981 census within twokm of the reserve for inclusion in the project. TheBank suggested that the project planners need toreduce the target population to a more manageablesize. A revised target population of 58,144 in theselected villages within the two-km radius waschosen.

124 The way ahead


for Wildlife (now the National Board for Wildlife) setup the Task Force on Public Support for WildlifeConservation. Headed by politician MadhavraoScindia, the task force broke new ground byrecommending the creation of ‘Special Areas forEcodevelopment’. These were to be focus areas onthe fringes of parks, where multiple use of forests andland would be allowed. The task force recommendedthat, in these areas, there would be greater inputs ona per capita basis for development based upon a firmconservation bias.14 The task force recognised thatfor the people living in the forested regions (fringesof protected areas) no other employment alternativeexisted. As people were completely dependent uponagriculture and cattle-raising on marginal lands, thetask force recommended that ecodevelopmentshould involve working on soil conservation,afforestation, forestry practices such as silviculture,improving dry farming techniques, micro-minorirrigation, pasture and fodder development andimproved animal husbandry and energy alternatives.

The task force at the time had recognised that anumber of line departments would need to beinvolved in work that was primarily a specialisedform of sustainable rural development. But, itrecommended that a nodal agency in the thendepartment of environment be created to monitorwork. The work at the district level, the task forcerecommended, should be implemented andcoordinated by a body of officers drawn fromdifferent departments at that level.

Also, it asked that employment in both wildlifereserves and the Special Areas for Ecodevelopmentbe preferentially offered to local communities to usetheir expertise as well as create new vistas oflivelihoods for them, based on forests and forestedareas.

The 1983 task force also acknowledged this was

also the only way to conserve India’s forests andwildlife, and to keep people involved at all possiblelevels.

The experience of ecodevelopmentThe total cost of the India Ecodevelopment Projectover seven years was Rs 288 crore, including theseven per cent (roughly, Rs 20 crore) contribution bypeople. The project, in turn, was expected to investRs 118.72 crore on people-oriented activities (seetable: India ecodevelopment project).

But what is interesting to note is the fact that thefunds were not spent till very late in the project. Thisobviously affected the efficacy of the project.

It must be recognised that ecodevelopmentbrought in as much money in six years for seven tigerreserves as Project Tiger had spent on all the 28 tigerreserves in three decades. The officials and thedepartment obviously were incapable of spendingsuch resources without resorting to quick-fixexpenditures towards the end of the project.15

ImplementationWherever the decision-making remained unilateralat the behest of the forest department, the attemptsquickly failed. Wherever they were implemented inthe right spirit, the schemes did pick up theeconomic baselines of the villages. So, in the case ofNagarhole national park in Karnataka, where large-scale discrepancies in disbursement were alsoinvestigated, people landed up with undesired assetsthey promptly disposed off for easy money. Stovesand inferior quality pots were distributed. Peoplewere trained to become nurses and drivers in placeswhich had no hospitals or cars.16

In Buxa tiger reserve, West Bengal, eachecodevelopment committee member was allocatedRs 10,000. But on the forest department’s advice, all

Source: World Bank 2002, aide memoire, Annexure 3, budget and expenditures, November, mimeo

Civil Vehicle/ Village Consultants' Proj Prep of PPF Unallocated Totalworks material ecodev services mgt travel future proj

Buxa 849.01 139.60 1,610.99 271.84 76.81 - 7.41 - 2,955.66

Gir 415.23 131.20 2,317.56 383.02 34.45 41.64 - - 3,323.10

Nagarahole 924.02 229.12 1,697.84 297.68 87.68 - - - 3,236.34

Palamau 113.67 90.12 835.94 61.81 13.10 10.00 - - 1,124.64

Pench 430.05 108.89 1,607.82 162.02 29.02 39.73 - - 2,377.53

Periyar 702.95 286.18 871.58 313.70 28.47 30.00 - - 2,232.88

Ranthambhore 297.83 107.35 1,474.58 172.55 10.29 - - - 2,062.60

PTO - 58.00 - 538.00 4.00 229.00 4.13 251.18 1,084.31

Total 3,732.76 1,150.46 10,416.31 2,200.62 283.82 350.37 11.54 251.18 18,397.06

INDIA ECODEVELOPMENT PROJECTINVESTMENT COST (IDA + GEF + GOI), ACTUAL EXPENDITURE AND BUDGET (RS LAKH)

The way ahead 125


the villages here decided to purchase community-level assets. The villages invested in tractors, pig andchicken farms, grain sheds and shredders. But inmany villages, the assets came to naught, for theyeither created rifts or led to corrupt practices.

These villages suffered from critical defects inproject planning and implementation, which createda new delivery mechanism built around the existingstructures of the forest department. In general,ecodevelopement committees were to be set up aftermaking villages aware about the ecodevelopmentproject. Non-governmental organisations were tocreate awareness and then frame micro-plans inwhich villages were on equal footing with the forestdepartment. In Buxa, for instance, the first attempt atsetting up ecodevelopment committees failedbecause the non-governmental oganisations thedepartment hired were new to this kind of

association. The department lost time: this shows upin the number of ecodevelopment committeescreated in each of the five years of the project. Theproject picked up only in the third and the fourthyear, by which time it was about to close (see graph:Forced to spend, ecodevelopment project splurgestowards project closure).

Lack of capacity to spendOther sites suffered in a similar manner. A WorldBank Issue Paper of April 10, 2000 — internallyprepared just before the official mid-term review —recorded that a mere 20 per cent of the funds hadbeen disbursed, while 58 per cent of the entireproject time had lapsed. As far as unutilised fundslying with state authorities was concerned, a mere 15per cent of the funds had been used up. As a result,there was enormous pressure to utilise funds, whichin turn led to a scramble to complete projects.17

For instance, in Ranthambhore, the totalsanctioned amount at the beginning of the projectwas Rs 38.38 crore, more than the total money spenton the park in its 30-year history. But the park’sauthorities were unable to start the project, so thetotal allocation was reduced to Rs 20.08 crore, ofwhich the park finally spent Rs 18.75 crore. Themoney was spent in a rush in the last five years of theproject period of eight years, when biogas plantswere made, checkdams contructed and families weredistributed LPG cylinders to wean them away fromfirewood use.

Livelihoods versus small assetsThe biggest debate that arose out of the IndiaEcodevelopment Project was what to invest in. Onpaper, everyone was consulted and micro-plans wereprepared, but the people in many places were noteven aware of the possibilities. The project had

50.55

81.46

1995

-199

6

1996

-199

7

1997

-199

8

1998

-199

9

1999

-200

0

2000

-200

1

2001

-200

2

2002

-200

3

2003

-200

4

Utilisation as per cent of

funds released

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

10.650

0

5,000

10,000

Fund

s (r

upee

s in

lakh

) Release UtilisedUtilisation in per cent

62.74

113.09113.09

86.0187.34

FORCED TO SPEND, ECODEVELOPMENT PROJECTSPLURGES TOWARDS PROJECT CLOSURE

Source: Anon 2004, Project Tiger office, Union ministry of environment andforests, New delhi, mimeo

Source: Anon 1996, Staff Appraisal Report, World Bank, Washington

Total Percentage(US $’000) total base

costs

Improved PA management 13,911.7 22

Village ecodevelopment 33,825.5 55

Develop effective and extensive 4,713.5 8support for ecodevelopment

Project management 5,276.8 9

Prepare future biodiversity projects 2,332.6 4

Reimbursement of PPF 2,000.0 3

Tota baseline costs 62,060.2 100

Physical contingencies 1,781.5 3

Price contigencies 3,158.3 —

Total project costs 67,000.0 108

PROJECT COST SUMMARY

Civil works (20%)

Vehicle/Material (6%)

Village ecodevelopment (57%)

Prepare of futureproject (2%)

PPF (0%)

Unallocated (1%)

Consultants'services (12%)

Project managementtravel (2%)

PERCENTAGE BREAK-UP OF FUNDS SPENT ANDBUDGETED TILL 2003-04

Source: World Bank 2002, aid memoire, November 2003, Annexure 3,Budget and Expenditure, mimeo

126 The way ahead


suggested certain indicative activities (see table:Indicative activities under IEDP). Evaluations of theproject have reported that the project focused onpurchasing assets that would supposedly weanpeople away from the forests. The project did notrealise that simply purchasing tools or machines notdependent directly on the forest for inputs did notmean people would take to them, especially if theycould not afford to use them. There were cases ofpeople receiving LPG gas connections they promptlysold off to the market.

Where the project did invest in basics, resultsshowed up. Thus, biogas plants set up in Kalakad-Mundanthurai tiger reserve in Tamil Nadu helpedreduce locals’ dependence on firewood. But wherebiogas plants were built in water-scarce areas, thestrategy failed. Though the forest department wasunable to create markets for products they hadhelped people grow in Periyar tiger reserve in Kerala,they were able to reduce the burden of debt onpeople by paying off their loans. In Buxa tiger reservein West Bengal, villagers who once fought with forestofficials over crop depredation, began cooperatingwith the department once they saw cropcompensations coming in relatively more timely.

The work boomeranged wherever the projectworked in exclusion. In Ranthambhore, for instance,a wall was built to seclude villagers and preventthem from grazing livestock in the park. Animosityrose and friction led to violence. The wall wasbroken down at several places and on July 21, 2000,the forest guards even resorted to firing 17 roundsduring a clash with 10 villagers of Uliana, who werefound grazing a herd of some 150 buffaloes in thecore area of the park. The conflicts only got deeper.18

Line departments vs forest departmentThe key weakness of the project was not what it did,but how it did it. The project created parallelinstitutions — the ecodevelopment committees — inthe villages. It did not work with existing deliverymechanisms in the village, the panchayats and otherline departments of programme delivery. This meantthe forest department had to invest personnel tocreate a parallel structure for village development.Also, a traditionally antagonistic forest departmenthad to rebuild its relationships with villagers. Wheresenior forest officers took the lead and spent time inthe field, things were different. Kerala’s Periyar tigerreserve and Pench tiger reserve in Madhya Pradeshunder the India Ecodevelopment Project, and TamilNadu’s Kalakad-Munduntharai tiger reserve underFREEP, are considered the better instances ofecodevelopment programmes.

Because of this, some experts believe thatturning the forest department away from its mainduty — protection — and involving it in what are

standard rural development line departmentfunctions is not a good idea. Understaffed already,and untrained to manage people, the forestdepartment should be left to do its core function.Otherwise, firstly, the forest suffers as the role of theprotector changes character. Secondly, forestofficials not trained in general to handle suchsituations find it difficult to implement projects.Conservation scientist Ullas Karanth, in hissuggestions to the Tiger Task Force, says, “There isample evidence that the original mission-focus of theforest department to protect tigers and their habitatssingle-mindedly (which was evident between 1970-1990) has been almost lost. And this is the singlebiggest cause of collapse of protection around mostof India’s wildlife areas and tiger reserves. One of themost critical needs now is to delink all the ongoingand proposed ‘ecodevelopment projects’ (which areessentially rural development activities) from theambit of forest department and entrust it to otherexisting rural development agencies or create aspecialised agency for this purpose. The forestdepartments should refocus their attention on theircore task: protecting nature reserves.”19

But there is also the counter-view that involvingthe forest department is essential as it builds therelationship of the people with the park. Suchinvolvement helps train the department to rework itsentire forestry strategy. Also, association betweenpeople and the department helps reduce antagonism.Very often, it has been seen that the goodwillgenerated by the department by creating communityassets has been used to garner support from thepeople. This can only be done if the developmentalactivities flow through the department. It can helppeople realise that the benefits and developmentalgains they are making, are due to the existence of

INDICATIVE ACTIVITIES UNDER IEDP

Crop protection measures Construction of stone walls, energised fences etc

Fuelwood, fodder and joint Small-scale village-based plots forestry management of plantations and fodder

Construction of water harvesting Micro-irrigation schemes, structures and irrigation systems checkdams, tube wells,

Small-scale crop and agriculture Improved planting stock, activities agronomic practices, credit

and marketing to improve productivity

Small-scale farm-based and Bee keeping, sericulture, lac non-farm based alternative production, tailoring, income generation improving livestock

Biomass substitution Improved stoves, biogas plants, solar cookers

Source: Anon 1996, India Ecodevelopment Project, Project Report 1996,World Bank

The way ahead 127


forests. A disconnect between the two could lead todevelopment without any rewards being ploughedback to the forests.

The options for the futureVishwas Sawarkar, member of the Expert Committeefor Monitoring and Evaluation of Tiger Reserves, setup by the Union government, states it well: “It is…time now to think and reorder and as necessarycombine our traditional and sectoral ruraldevelopment programmes in at least the forestedrural sector on the lines of the ecodevelopmentprogramme. Ecodevelopment conforms to allobjectives of the traditional rural development andmuch more in the sense that it does not believe in thepopular adage ‘one size fits all’; it does not importurban perceptions of development; it has theessential flexibility to mould itself to suit the crucialsite specific needs; it is developed with fullparticipation of people concerned.”20

The forests in the landscape

The problem is that the forests in the vicinity ofsettlements are degraded: this pushes the peopletowards the protected area. It is also clear that peopleare highly dependent on forests for meeting theirsubsistence needs. The lack of irrigation facilitiesresults in low fodder productivity, which in turnputs pressure on existing common resources. Theproductivity of forests for foraging declines; peoplehave to keep more and more livestock to survive. Thepressure on the land increases, it degrades further.

In such a situation, what clearly needs to be doneis to improve the productivity of forests and pasturelands in the vicinity of the reserves. If people livewithin a forest-dependent economy, then it isimperative to evolve policies for forest-developmentin these areas.

It has been estimated that the rural demand forfuelwood in 1996 was 152 million tonne and it willrise to 187 million tonne by 2006. As against this, thelegal supply of fuelwood was a mere 46 milliontonne, according to a 1995 study21. The case fortimber is similar. The rural sector uptakes almost 70per cent of the domestic consumption of timber but,as against a demand for 54.4 million cubic meters in1996, the forests could only supply 12 million cubicmetres.22 The current supply of fodder from allpossible sources, including forests, pasture lands andagricultural fields, is estimated to be 434 milliontonne as compared to an estimated demand of 992million tonne in 1990.23 The gap for all the three —fodder, timber and firewood — is ever widening andis leading to degradation of growing stock.

It is critical that the productivity of our forestsmust be increased. Currently, India’s growing stock

of forest has a productivity at a dismally low level of0.7 cubic metre per ha per year as against a globalaverage of 2.1 cubic metre per ha per year.24 It is clearthat unless we can do this and generate more biomassto meet the needs of people, the pressure on existingforests outside and inside protected areas will grow.

According to the report, 287,769 sq km of land isclassified as open forests. The total area of tigerreserves in the country is 37,760 sq km. In otherwords, an area which is over eight times bigger ispotentially available for meeting fuel and fodderneeds.25

It is also clear that all tiger reserves are located inregions which are forested. But as explained earlier,these lands are also populated by the poorest in thiscountry. The challenge then is to find ways ofimproving productivity of these lands, in situationsof intense use by extremely poor people.

The practice of joint forest managementJoint forest management was initiated in the early1990s to create reciprocal rights over forests betweenthe forest department and people. Under theprogramme, people were given rights over usufruct— grass and minor forest produce — in return forprotection on degraded forest land. In 2000, theguidelines for the programme were extended to coverforest land which was classified as dense forest(canopy cover of over 40 per cent). The programmewas also institutionalised: forest developmentagencies were created in states as federations of thejoint forest management committees.

According to the Forests and Wildlife Statistics,India 2004 report of the Union ministry ofenvironment and forests the programme covers morethan 150,000 forest fringe villages and more than2,500 forest villages.26 But unfortunately, the gains ofthis programme are not being realised.

The problems are partly financial and partlyinstitutional.

In part, the investment in afforestation is low; theinitiative also remains poorly coordinated. Theoutlay for the National Afforestation Programme isover Rs 1,100 crore over the five years of the 10th FiveYear Plan. In addition, there is an allocation forwatershed programmes. Twenty per cent of ruraldevelopment funds are expected to be spent onafforestation as well. The problem is thecoordination required to ensure that all these fundsare spent through the village joint forest managementcommittees in forest land.27

The financial problem is related in part to theinstitutional hassles that continue to trouble thisscheme. The key problem with institutions created tomanage joint forest management remains theirinability to involve villagers in managing forests. Thescheme is still locked into the paradigm of defining

128 The way ahead


people’s participation as ‘you participate in myprogramme’. It has been unable to deepen thecommitment of people to forest protection, because itis designed to still keep control over decision-makingin the hands of the department, whereas theexperience of forestry teaches that people need to becentrally involved in the management of forest land,in order to increase productivity.

There is yet another problem. The fact is thateven after 15 years of joint forest management,

people sharing the benefits of the produce have beenlimited to a few states and few areas. It is a fact thatstate governments require funds for establishmentcosts. Over the past some years, forest revenues havegone down because of conservation initiatives, butestablishment costs have continued to increase. Thestanding forests of the joint forest management areasare needed to pay for establishment costs. It isbecause of this, in most states, involved calculationsto estimate the ‘net’ value of the standing timber that

Community reserves

A step was taken in this direction by creating twospecial categories of protected areas — communityreserves and conservation reserves during theamendment to the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972in 2003. But it has been pointed out by experts likeAshish Kothari of Kalpvriksh that the reservesmeant to enshrine community-protected areas withlegal teeth, do not practically work out at presentbecause of lack of clarity on several counts.

The two protected areas were brought into forcebesides the categories of national parks andsanctuaries which have existed since the inceptionof the Act. The Act says:

36C. (1) The State Government may, where thecommunity or an individual has volunteered toconserve wild life and its habitat, declare anyprivate or community land not comprisedwithin a National Park, sanctuary or aconservation reserve, as a community reserve,for protecting fauna, flora and traditional orcultural conservation values and practices.

The key idea behind this categorisation is thatpeople should traditionally protect the area and theland should be either private land or communityowned. The other new category is the conservationreserve. The amendment to the law lays down:

"36A. (1) The State Government may, afterhaving consultations with the localcommunities, declare any area owned by theGovernment, particularly the areas adjacent toNational Parks and sanctuaries and those areaswhich link one protected area with another, asa conservation reserve for protectinglandscapes, seascapes, flora and fauna andtheir habitat.

The management of the community reserve getscomplicated once any land is declared as one.After the issue of notification declaring the land, no

change in the land use pattern can be made withinthe community reserve, except with a permissionof its community reserve management committeeand thereafter, the approval of the same by the stategovernment.

Critics like Kothari have pointed out that thefact that the existing parks and sanctuaries cannotbe converted into these categories limits thepotential of the category of protected area.28 Thiscould have helped reduce tensions in many parkswhere people’s rights and control have beencurtailed. Another critical failure of the newcategory, they point out, is that the law does notconsider the fact that the people also conserveforests on government lands and those too shouldbe turned into community reserves.

The management of these reserves under theamendments rests with a committee, which shallconsist of five representatives nominated by thevillage panchayat (village council) or where suchpanchayat does not exist, of the members of thegram sabha (village assembly) and onerepresentative of the state forest or wildlifedepartment under whose jurisdiction thecommunity reserve is located. This structuring istoo rigid and limits the flexibility with which mostcommunity-preserved areas work, like the sacredgroves across the world or the van and lathpanchayats of Uttaranchal. Most of these survivebecause they have found innovative institutions tocounter the day-to-day politics of development.These could get stifled if the straight-jacketregulations of the Act are superimposed.

The imposition of restrictions by the SupremeCourt on removal of any products from forests hasmeant that no community which has practised acertain resource use regime, will now want to comeunder the ban by letting its forest be declared as acommunity or conservation reserve. De facto, thetwo categories now stand defunct. Drafted in theproper fashion they hold the potential to changehow people collaborate with the government inconservation, while giving the government the leadon sustainable use regimes.

The way ahead 129


1. The tiger’s habitat cannot be secured unless we secure the future of the millions wholive on the fringe. Currently, there is little information about the numbers or their impacton the reserves, so that it can be used for the reserve’s management. These studies shouldpreferably be carried out on a GIS-based platform and put out in the public domain alongwith all empirical data so that other institutions and researchers can then build on thisinformation. It should be part of the work of the Project Tiger directorate to encourage andundertake research on people-wildlife interactions within and on the fringe of thereserves.

2. An important area of conflict between people and protected areas is the problem ofcompensation for damage caused to livestock, crop or life by animals. The scattered datathat exists shows that the compensation paid today is negligible in many cases. And thishappens when the forest department does not even pay for the opportunity cost ofprotection to the people. Naturally this issue very often leads to antagonism amongpeople towards the tiger reserves and their administrations. It is imperative that statesreview the provisions and procedures for compensation for human life, livestock andcrop damage. It has been seen that half the battle for the forest department in winning thehearts of the people lies in not only adequate compensation but in timeliness too. Ascompensation falls in the hands under the purview of the field directors the timelypayment of compensation to people must be one of the criteria that the park managementis measured for during the evaluation of the reserves and their ranking.

3. Compensation must be paid for crop damage as well. In addition, compensation mustbe paid to families who continue to live within the reserves.

4. There is no doubt that much more will need to be done in the land outside the tigerreserve. The question is how should this be done? It is here that planners must learn fromthe experience of the recently concluded ecodevelopment project in the seven reserves.The key learning from this project are;a. The administrative machinery does not have the capacity to handle such largeinfusions of funds over a short period. In this case, these reserves received roughly Rs 20-

Recommendations

will be shared with the villages are still being done.The problem here is that confidence in theprogramme erodes when people realise that afterprotected the lands in promise of benefits, they getnothing; people feel cheated.

Mohit Gera, senior forest officer, writes of suchproblems in Jammu and Kashmir: “One of the majorimpediments have been the cumbersome sharingmechanism and the lower percentage of shareearmarked for the village forest committees (thenodal village agencies for joint forest management)Some of the other provisions such as constitution ofcommittees at the range level, procedures providedfor taking up community land and its development,and the lack of rules regarding utilisation of villagefunds have always been major obstacles to thesuccess of the programme.”29

The government now needs to look at how jointforest management and community forestry in fringe

forests can be integrated to work both for people aswell as for wildlife. Joint forest managementconceptually provides a perfect framework but hasbeen maimed by several limitations. While in somestates provisions have been made for legalagreements between forest agencies andcommunities, in most, collaboration remains ad-hoc,with no statutory guidelines. It works then on theprinciple of committed forest officials, who can usetheir influence for the advantage of people. But oncethey go, the scheme falters again.

Clearly, if the basic idea of joint forestmanagement has been reciprocity, the only way itcan work is to create a contract that is legally bindingwhere people can then argue to get what the forestdepartment has promised against them promising todo certain activities beneficial to the forests. Withoutthe forests outside, the fate of the tigers cannot besecured.

130 The way ahead


Rs 30 crore each, which is equivalent to the entire money that has been given to them asCentral assistance since their inception.

b. The quantum of funds that are allocated on such project cannot be sustained after theproject is completed. This leads to huge problems of expectations within the localcommunities, unless the project has been successful in creating self reliance and cyclic-type development.

c. The concept of the programme remains flawed, unless it can find ways to enjoin peopleto the protection of reserves or find alternatives sources for the forest and grazingresources they require.

The ecodevelopment project instead worked on the premise that it had to ‘substitute’ (notprovide) forest produce. So, it distributed LPG cylinders to substitute firewood, it builtbiogas plants to substitute firewood and provided alternative employment opportunitiesoutside the forest-dependent lifestyles of people. So it looked for options in tailoring andpoultry.

This is because this project, like most governmental schemes, did not incorporate theforest-livestock economy of people and find ways of improving its productivity. It is forthis reason, the LPG cylinders distributed under the project were sold; biogas plants couldnot work because people did not have livestock or water, critical to run the plants. Theresult is that even after huge funds have been invested, in most cases, the impact on thehabitat is minimal.

In other words, if the project has to succeed, it must be built on the premise that it hasto secure people’s livelihoods in the forest-grazing-agriculture economy of theirsubsistence. This can only be done if the productivity of the forest and grazing lands isimproved and there is investment in water facilities, to increase productivity.

The project can also succeed if it works to enjoin people’s livelihoods with theprotected park. In other words, it works to increase the sustainability of the use ofresources within the park and also enjoins people in sharing the benefits that the parkprovides.

d. The project must also improve its delivery systems. The problem withecodevelopment is that it does not work with the existing mechanisms of development inthe village. It creates its own – committees and user groups – for programme management.This works well only where there is an existing capacity to negotiate with projectauthorities, not otherwise.

The Tiger Task Force understands that the government is currently working on the nextphase of an externally aided ecodevelopment project. It is important the all the issueslisted above are carefully considered and incorporated into the plan. The country cannotafford such expensive experiments, unless they are carefully crafted and skillfullyexecuted.

5. What is clear also is that ecodevelopment, as an approach, remains too fragmented andexpensive for long term change. The first phase of the project, which invested fundsequivalent to the 30-year spending of Project Tiger in seven years over seven sites, wasconsidered too little for all the villages in the fringe. The fact is that benefits will have toreach all the villages and therefore, strategies will have to be revised accordingly to ensurethat this can be done.

6. The most important opportunity lies in targeting a revised joint forest managementprogramme in the vicinity of the reserves. It is evident that forests in these areas, habitatsof people and tigers, need to be regenerated. But it is also clear that the current joint forestmanagement programme, with its forest development agencies, remains too narrow and

The way ahead 131


lacks the participation from people. If this programme can be revamped so that peopleliving in the fringes can be given management decisions and rights over forest lands, itwill improve the productivity of the resources as well. The answer within the reserve willlie in our abilities to rebuild the resources outside.

7. The only way to ensure that the forest department can garner the resources to investin fringe villages is for the government to increase the per capita expenditure that it makeson the fringe of the tiger reserves. In fact, the government must look at investments in thetiger reserves in tandem with the money it should be spending on the fringe communitiesand the allocations should be made in accordance. Again, it must be emphasised theseinvestments can turn productive if and only if they are made in tune with the naturalresource regimes of the areas and not by investing in short-term assets based alternatelivelihoods. It can also only work if people are involved in the management of the naturalresources. The additional funds must be spent as a reciprocal arrangement with the localvillagers — increased investment in their resources to build collaborative and protectivefences around the reserves.

The Indian tiger is a tourism attraction. But tourismis both an opportunity and threat for the tiger.Tourism is an important economic activity. It is alsoan important educational activity. It can link tigers toa wider constituency and build conservation supportfor it. It can also bring monetary and employmentbenefits to local people and secure their interest inthe tiger’s future.

But done badly, it can lead to further stress onthe tiger’s habitat. It can destroy the surrounding areaby overusing resources such as water and putmunicipal services like garbage disposal and sewageunder stress. It can also lead to the alienation of localpeople, who see the benefits of this economic activityexported out of their region. The issue, then, is howtourism can be shaped so that it brings benefits to thetiger, its habitat and to the people who share thisspace.

Today, tiger reserves are important touristdestinations and the more prominent ones attractsubstantial numbers of visitors. Visitations toreserves are also as varied as tourism in generalacross the country — from backpackers to high-endtourists, serious bird-enthusiasts to neighborhoodweekend visitors.

The Tiger Task Force, through the office of theProject Tiger, has compiled statistics from most tigerreserves to attain an overview of the existing tourismvolume and the potential.

Information from 22 of the 28 tiger reserves

shows that a total of 1.29 million people visited thereserves in 2004-05. This is not including pilgrimvisitors: many tiger reserves, such as Periyar inKerala and Ranthambhore and Sariska in Rajasthan,have important shrines located within theirboundaries (see table: Top 10 tourist sites).

From this information, it can be computed thaton an average each tiger reserve receives 58,456tourists in a year. But clearly, there are some that,because of better professional promotion orinfrastructure, get many more tourists than others. In2003-2004, Periyar received the highest number oftourists at 415,373; Satpura (Madhya Pradesh)received 162,785; and Ranthambhore, 111,375.

But even a naxalism-affected reserve likePalamau had more than 10,000 tourists. This goes toshow the potential the reserves have if promotedwell as eco-tourism destinations.1

The revenues

It is difficult to compile the revenue earned by eachpark from its gate receipts.

The gate charges in most cases range between ameagre Rs 25 to Rs 50 at the most. The issue also is tosee what the potential would be if the price to catcha glimpse of the tiger was increased. Clearly, the ideawould not be to take the tiger out of the reach ofcommon Indians, but it is also important to realisethat people value the experience and will beprepared to pay more, if it benefits the tiger andpeople.

Therefore, if a simple extrapolation is made ofthe average for all the reserves, by calculating thegate entries fees at the current level of Rs 25 or anincreased level of Rs 100, the potential revenue atiger reserve earns increases from Rs 4 crore to Rs 16crore.

What is known is that Periyar, with 415,373tourists in 2004-2005 earned Rs 1.80 crore from itsgate receipts and other tourist activities. Incomparison, the total grant it receives from theCentral government is roughly the same — Rs 2 croreannually. Ranthambhore received 96,000 visitors in2003-2004, which increased to 111,375 by the nextseason of 2004-2005. In 2003-2004, its earnings wereRs 1.67 crore, which would have increased in thefollowing year. Sariska, with roughly 50,000 visitorslast year (2004-2005), earned Rs 28 lakh. Kanha,another important tourist destination, had 70,464visitors that year (2004-2005), earning roughly Rs 52lakh.2

3.10 The tourism agenda

132 The way ahead


Reserve Numbers of Revenuetourists (2004-05) (Rs lakh)

Panna 36,404

Sariska 49,451 28

Bandipur 51,986

Sundarbans 60,000

Kanha 70,464 52

Kalakad-Mundanthurai 70,807

Corbett 95,220

Ranthambhore 111,375 167*

Satpura 162,785

Periyar 415,373 180

TOP 10 TOURIST SITES

Source: Project Tiger directorate; *2003-2004

In other words, the revenue and the potentialcertainly exist. But the question is: does this moneybenefit the park? Or the local people?

Reinvesting tourism receipts

The problem is that, in most cases, all the gatereceipts go to the state exchequer and not to thereserve. There is, in fact, little talk of investing backthe funds generated from gate receipts to the reserve.The only state where this is done across allsanctuaries and national parks is Madhya Pradesh,where all gate receipts are necessarily reinvested inreserve development funds, staff welfare and localcommunity needs.

Taking a lesson from this, Ranthambhore was thefirst to introduce a cess which was levied on eachticket so that at least part of the gate receipts could bereinvested into the park. Over the last few years, itwas reported to the Task Force that a total of Rs 6crore has been collected. But unfortunately, the stateexchequer has taken the decision to consider this‘ecological cess’ as part of the normal gate receipts,and so the money has gone to the state and not thepark.2

The Periyar tiger reserve has learnt fromRanthambhore. Since November 2004, it has startedcharging an ecodevelopment surcharge on each entryticket — at the rate of Rs 10 for Indians and Rs 100 forforeigners. The collected money is invested into thePeriyar Foundation, an organisation registered underthe Societies Registration Act. The park managersaim to use this money to continue work onecodevelopment in the neighbouring villages, staffwelfare and research activities.

In this way, in just one year (2002-2005) Periyarearned back Rs 42.47 lakh from the surcharge onentry tickets3.

Guidelines ask for low-key ventures

The flip side to all this is that tourism in tigerreserves needs to be extremely well managed toensure that the direct impact on the habitats due totourism is mitigated. The chain of command as wellas management of tourism in tiger reserves hassuffered from multiple governing institutions as wellas confusion in policy and regulations so far. ProjectTiger has brought out a set of guidelines to regulatewildlife tourism in tiger reserves. The document,with a list of dos and don’ts, has laid down the basicprinciples well.

Besides other things, it requires that:● Each protected area must have its own tourism

plan that should indicate the area open totourism in the reserves.

● Tourism activities should not be allowed in thecore of the national parks and the tiger reserves.

● There should be a ceiling on the number ofvisitors allowed to enter at any time in a givenpart of the reserve. The ceiling has to be decidedby the field director of the park keeping in mindthe carrying capacity of the habitat and theavailability of facilities, transport and guides.

● Rates for use of cameras for photography insidethe protected areas should be drawn up in arational manner so that it does not discouragewildlife enthusiasts, but the use of camera forcommercial photography should be rated muchhigher.

● All tourism structures that come up in the fringeof the protected areas or the periphery shouldblend in with the surroundings.

● Wildlife tourism should not get relegated topurely high-end exclusive tourism.

The limitation in this sphere is that these guidelinesremain guidelines and are difficult to implement onthe surrounding land, which remains outside thepurview of the forest/park administration. The fact isalso that much of the ‘business’ of wildlife tourism isorganised, managed and run from outside the parksand sanctuaries over which the forest department haslittle or almost no control.

The National Wildlife Action Plan (2002-2016)says that “ecotourism must primarily involve andbenefit local communities and the first benefits oftourism activities should flow to the local people”.The plan goes on to say that these benefits should be“in the form of employment opportunities andsupport for panchayat programmes such aswatershed restoration, afforestation, health schemesand others”. There should be strict energy, waterconservation and waste disposal guidelines forexisting and new facilities, says the plan.4

Despite these guidelines and overall policy, thebusiness of tourism in and around each protectedarea has been practised differently in differentreserves.

The policy documents and guidelines have beenin place for a while but they have, till date, worked inthe absence of sound information on the size of thewildlife tourism business and the present fashion inwhich it operates.

Managing tourist activity

While tourism itself remains unchecked, so does theimpact of tourism on the reserves. The most basic datathat should be calculated for each park is the carryingcapacity of the parks and the delineation zones wheretourism is permitted and where it is banned. ProjectTiger, in 2003, issued guidelines for calculating the

The way ahead 133


carrying capacity of a reserve. Carrying capacity is aquantitative parameter that takes into account the roadlength available to move on, the periods for which thepark is open to tourists, the disturbance caused bytraffic on the roads and the managerial capacity of thepark and then calculates how much tourist traffic thepark can bear without damage being caused.

Similar versions of the carrying capacity modelcan easily be computed for each park as the basicframework for managing numbers, vehicles andpressure of tourism. The Project Tiger directorateclearly states the following as a guide to regulatingtraffic:● In place of open Gypsy cars and smaller vehicles,

medium-sized buses, with a closed body andsliding windows, may be used for parkexcursions. This will minimise the risk of closeencounters with wild animals, apart fromreducing the number of vehicles inside the parkat any point in time.

● A minimum mandatory distance of at least 500metres should be maintained between twovehicles plying on the same road.

● Tourist vehicles, while spotting a tiger or anyother wild animal, should maintain a minimummandatory distance of 30 metres.

● The route guides should be more professionallytrained and penalty should be imposed onvisitors in case they violate park rules.

● Since a certain amount of risk is always involvedin jungle excursions despite all precautions, astandardised ‘Indemnity Bond’ may also beprescribed, indemnifying the park authoritiesfrom litigation/arbitration which may arise onaccount of accidents suffered by tourists duringpark rounds.

● Under no circumstances should touristexcursions be allowed during the night.

● No tourist facilities should be created in the ‘corezone’ of a tiger reserve.5

Once this baseline is set, tourism requires regularimpact monitoring to ensure that it does not impingeon the park and its habitat. This too, at present, is notundertaken in most reserves. The only thing mostparks do is to demarcate tourist zones and regulatethe number of entries (in some cases).

Outside the park

While the forest department is empowered to managetourism inside the park boundaries, it ishandicapped in managing the disturbance orproblems caused by hotels or tourist businessesoutside the park. As the department is not geared torun tourist facilities also, numerous big and smallhotels have mushroomed at the periphery or vicinity

of the big parks, and many more are coming up. Theland outside the park is owned by villagers or isrevenue land, which is acquired by hotels and resortsto build at the park’s edge.

There is no regulation currently to control thegrowth of these tourist facilities. The problem is asfollows:

a. The hotels and resorts operate without anybuilding code of environmental standards. Thesecombine to put pressure on the already stressedecology — using water, disposing waste andgarbage. In many cases the hotels have been builton grazing lands of villagers, which further putsstress on their livestock and, in turn, pressure onthe resources of the reserves.

b. The hotels and resorts do not contribute to thelocal economy, effectively doing little to take thepressure off the people’s need to use theresources of the reserves. Even if someemployment is provided, in most cases thelargest benefit of revenues is exported out of thelocal environment. It does little for conservation,even though the business is based onconservation.

c. The problem is that this furthers the sense ofinjustice and alienation of local people as theysee rich tourists entering areas they are notallowed into. And they see rich hoteliers makemoney that they can’t.

d. There is no control on the number of hotels andresorts that are coming up around the reservesand, therefore, if the growth exceeds the carryingcapacity of the reserve, there is pressure to openout the larger areas of the reserve for tourism orthere is more pressure on the existing areas,which, in turn, is detrimental to wild animals.This is what is happening in Ranthambhore, forinstance.

The analysis of the character and volume of tourismin Ranthambhore and Periyar tiger reserves presentstwo completely contrary models of wildlife and eco-tourism. A study of both helps to review the genericand specific problems and solutions that touristsbring to protected areas.

Ranthambhore Tiger Reserve

There is a lot to learn from Ranthambhore about howtourism can be a potentially viable economicactivity; and how tourism, if managed badly, can be apotentially devastating activity for ecology andpeople. This is a reserve visitors throng to, fromeverywhere. The thrill is to see the tiger, often from aclose distance. The data provided by the parkauthorities show that its visitors are increasing each

134 The way ahead


year, reaching 111,000 last season. The reserve has atotal area of 1,300 sq km, with 20 per cent under thecore area.

Ranthambhore, as any other park in India,charges entry fee and camera charges. The parkmanagement restricts the number of entries into thedesignated tourism zone. In September 2004, theregulation of activities relating to entry of touristsand vehicles was handed over to the statedepartment of tourism and the Rajasthan TourismDevelopment Corporation. This was allegedly donebecause of the reported instances of corruption andmishandling by the forest department of this high-profile and lucrative tourist trade.

However, as the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972restricts entry into a protected area without thepermission of the chief wildlife warden or anauthorised officer, the order issued by the stategovernment (no F11(8) Forests/2001) says the entrywill be subject to the permits granted by the forestdepartment. The number of vehicles allowed entry isrestricted to 35, which make two trips each day,carrying a maximum of 462 people in each journey.The booking of tourists and vehicles is managed bythe tourist department. The routes that the touristvehicle will take is handed out by the touristdepartment based on the information provided inadvance by the park authorities. The touristdepartment has to ensure that the routes are allottedto vehicles in such a manner that there is noovercrowding or convergence on any one route, saysthis order. In other words, the regulation is designedfor good management.6

Tourism inside the parkSeveral submissions were made to the Tiger TaskForce during its visit to the Ranthambhore tigerreserve about the total mismanagement of touristactivity in the area, leading to corruption, nepotismand destructive impacts on the park itself. The parkauthorities and the staff of the tiger reserve, who metthe Task Force, informed it of their problems inmanaging this trade, which was now not under theirdirect control. They explained that even though,technically, they still controlled the entry numbers ofvehicles into the park, all other activities were out ofbounds for them.

It is also evident that the rules of booking for avisit to the park have been made so convoluted inRanthambhore that they are amenable to corruptionand underhand dealings. The Task Force was toldthat numerous problems exist in the way bookingsare handled, as a result of which even hotelierssuffer. For instance, under the rules, bookings forpark visits need to be made in advance — at times theperiod of advance can stretch to as much as 60 days.All the vehicles going in are then designated fixed

routes to travel on. But it has now come to light thatvehicles jump the queue or choose specific routesthat have greater probability of sightings. A recentstudy by a local non-governmental organisation saysthat the routes are congested and overused. The factis that tourist operators only want to traverse routesthat have a higher probability of a tiger sighting.7 Asa result, as it was reported to the Task Force, in thelast season (2004-2005) vehicles literally convergedfor hours in areas where tigers were sighted, oftencreating artificial barricades and so restricting theirmovement for hours. A maximum number ofvehicles used the few “tiger sighting routes”, theirdrivers throwing all rules out of the window.

Such poorly managed tourism is beginning toimpact the reserve, say park authorities. Theyexplain they are finding that the reserve’s tigers aremoving out. This, they explain, is because of theintensive human pressure on the animal’s habitat.The Project Tiger directorate has also brought thisissue to the attention of the government of Rajasthan.

It is difficult for the Task Force to verify thisassertion but, clearly, the latest tiger estimation inRanthambhore needs to be carefully evaluated in thelight of this growing impact of human disturbance onthe tiger’s habitat. Ranthambhore highlights whetherthe tourism department, instead of the forestdepartment, should run the tourism business in thepark. And what the management regimes andpractices should be that will make tourismsustainable and not destructive.

Tourism outside the parkIn Ranthambhore tourism is privately operated.There are only two state government-run tourist resthouses. The rest of the industry — hotels, vehicles,guides — are in the hands of private entities. The listof hotels collated by the park authorities shows thatthere are 33 hotels in Ranthambhore, of which 26hotels are prominent. The clientele of these hotels issolely based on the reserve, as there is no otheralternative tourism attraction point. All these arehigh-end premium hotels providing exclusivewildlife experience. Therefore their business isdirectly linked with the infrastructure managementand character of tourism in the park.

The costliest hotel around the reserve is Aman-e-Khas, owned by a multinational hotel chain, with aroom tariff of Rs 30,000 a night. The Oberoi chain’sVanya Vilas, with 25 rooms and an average room rateof Rs 16,500, follows.8 Assuming a season of eightmonths, and using data park authorities provided —data related to the average room rate, occupancylevels — the annual turnover from the top elite 21hotels is an estimated Rs 21.81 crore.9 This is clearlysubstantial and could be invested back into the parkand people.

The way ahead 135


This is precisely what does not happen. The parkdoes not even get the gate receipts. The local peoplealso do not benefit. The result of such exclusive high-end tourism has been that a large number of othersmaller entrepreneurs, as well as people in theneighbourhood and fringe of the park, feel alienatedand believe that these hotels corner the only sourceof revenue the park generates. Revenue that, in thefirst place, should have been redistributed to thepeople who were affected by the creation of the park.

Building in eco-sensitive areasIn addition, many of the hotels and resorts havecome up on land that is considered eco-sensitive —on land adjacent to the park boundary or bufferedbetween the sanctuary and the national park. Manydisputed land and hotel sites are owned byconservationists. This locational advantage (of some)has only fuelled the anger of local people, who againsee this as unfair. This issue gets particularlyaggravated and sensitive as conservation imperativesstop the movement of local people in the park, whilethe prime land outside the park is taken up byconservationists, rich hoteliers and foreign owners.This dichotomy leads to enhanced anger against thepark and is detrimental to its interests.

The problem is that there are no clear restrictionson building hotels on what are considered eco-sensitive zones. In Ranthambhore it was tried andthen abandoned. In December 2002, the secretary tothe government of Rajasthan issued directives settingout criteria for the location of hotels around the park.It said that “construction activity near the park willbe allowed beyond a distance of half a kilometrefrom the boundary of the park. All construction inthe zone near the park will be banned and there willbe a total freeze in extension of existing structures”.But within six months, this directive was withdrawn.The same official of the government issued orderssaying that “all ongoing hotel projects which havebeen affected by the earlier order may be grantedspecial relaxation for taking up construction within500 metres of the Ranthambhore national park”.This, said the letter, was being given as a very veryspecial case only10.

The fact is that it was widely reported in the localpress that this permission was given for very specialhotels, including the very exclusive Aman-e-Khas.Local people, who met the Tiger Task Force duringits trip, were clearly convinced that this was done tobenefit a few. Again, the problem is that theprotection regime in the park affects many and so ifthe benefits do not accrue equally, it createsproblems.

Does location matter?It is also important to evolve criterion for the location

of the hotels and other construction activities, as thisclearly creates a precedence for ecologicallydamaging activities. In Ranthambhore, a few hotelsare located on land buffered between the SawaiMadhopur sanctuary and the main park. This isanomalous in view of the fact that, all over thecountry, ecologists today promote the idea that suchbuffer areas — which work as corridors for wildanimals to move around in an already limited forestspace — must not be altered, encroached upon ortheir land use changed. In fact, in a similar case inKarnataka’s Bandipur tiger reserve, the opposition ofseveral experts has ensured the government does notallow a resort to come up in the famous Moyar gorgebelt, which is a corridor for elephants.11 Theseexperts have submitted to the Task Force a need toregulate tourist and resort activities in theseecosensitive zones.12

There are no provisions which govern theconstruction of tourist complexes in and aroundprotected areas. So, hoteliers are taking advantage ofthis lacuna.

In many cases the land a hotel has come up on isformer grazing land. This change in land use onlyaggravates the grazing situation of the park. A poorgrazier woman the Task Force met in Ranthambhorecomplained that not only had she lost her grazingland, but that the hotels were also draininggroundwater. “We are better dead than alive,” shesaid. “The park has given us nothing but trouble.”This is a sad commentary on conservation.

Alternative models

As against the usual business model of regulartourism practiced in and around tiger reserves, someparks in India and abroad have experimented withminor modifications to look at community-basedtourism, working either completely on its own or intandem with large-sized tourism businesses toensure equity and provide opportunities toentrepreneurs as well as local communities. There isa great advantage to these models for they can beused as important tools in engaging the people on thefringe of forests in activities related to forestry andtherefore reduce their alienation attendant to thecreation of parks and sanctuaries. There are severalcase studies of such models, now emerging in Indiaand abroad.

Periyar Tiger Reserve

In Periyar tiger reserve in Kerala, park authoritieshave reduced poaching threats by converting ex-poachers and other regular trespassers into eco-tourism guides. Periyar’s success has been tocreate economies from the forest based on

136 The way ahead


developing the skills of people in tourism, park management and impact monitoring. The groupecodevelopment committees that have been createdhere work professionally and have been able togenerate a regular monthly income from the park itself. There are four professionalcommittees — the former-cinnamon bark collectorscommittee, Tribal Trekkers, the Tribal Heritageecodevelopment committee and the Periyar TigerSamrakshan Samiti. All four ecodevelopmentcommittees are involved in ecotourism activitiessuch as border hiking, jungle rafting and bamboorafting.

The Tribal Trekkers ecodevelopment committeewas constituted by recruiting young men from amongst the Mannas and the Paliyan tribes living in settlements of the fringes ofthe tiger reserve. The men, earlier involved infishing, collecting honey, thatching grass andcollecting firewood, were trained to guide tourists through a nature walk. From their traditionalknowledge of terrain, flora, fauna sprang one of the most successful ecotourismenterprises at the tiger reserve. This committee wasset up with a fund of Rs 3.5 lakh; it today has Rs4,26,490 in its community development fund. It hasgiven other ecodevelopment committees loans of Rs2 lakh. It has given loans to its own members, to thetune of Rs 3,63,202, for medical and educationalpurposes.

The trekkers take back a monthly salary of Rs3,800. From their funds, 10 per cent is contributed topark welfare, 5 per cent to park maintenance and 10per cent to their own ecodevelopment committees.The rest goes to their community development fund,from which salaries are paid.

The impact of involving groups of people whoearlier engaged in destructive activities with the parkis obvious.

However, much like Ranthambhore, tourism inand around the park is high revenue as well. But inrecent years, there has been a conscious effort topromote homestead tourism — so that people can‘experience’ life in cardamom and tiger country. IfPeriyar can continue to innovate on these measures,it will sustain its success and local interests will beenjoined with the park.13

Tourism with equity

Tourism must therefore have a purpose, whichpromotes conservation and livelihood security. RSukumar of the Centre for Ecological Sciences atBangalore has been studying elephant ecology foryears; and in his submission to the Task Force hasnoted with concern that “a new wave of luxurytourism now threatens to unleash across our

protected areas”. The problems are manifold. Inmany protected areas there has been relocation oftribals and cultivators from within to outside theparks. The virtual take-over of protected areas byluxury tourism would open fresh wounds in the yet-to-heal conflict between parks and people. The issueof profits from tourism being ploughed back into thelocal economy as well as park management also hasto be seriously addressed, says Sukumar. In addition,there is a need to ensure that critical corridors andecologically important areas are not used for touristactivities.14

At the same time the impacts of tourism in thetiger reserve must be studied carefully so that baseline data on carrying capacity is used to monitorchange. Thereafter periodic review studies of thedifferent impacts of tourism must be carried out.Again, as these periodic monitoring either by expertsor under their guidance shall require resources, it isessential that the park dedicate some of the revenuegenerated by tourism into the tourism impactmonitoring mechanism.

Tourism has a large potential for involvingpeople in the forests and it is also a way of payingback people the value of the ecological services theforests provide to the society. While other forms ofpayments to the community for protection of forests— joint forest management and other mechanisms —are also explored today across the world, the bestform of payment for ecological security can onlycome from a rights-based approach. In this, peopleget preferential chances to earn money from anactivity that not only generates enough revenue tokeep them from being alienated, but also helps fostera relationship between the forests, the forestdepartment and the people inside and along fringes.

The Pilgrim flood

Another facet to tourism in India’s tiger reservestoday is the pilgrim tourist, visiting shrines insideprotected areas. While this is a tradition in manyreserves, under present circumstances pilgrimagehas become a challenge for the park authorities inmanaging the deluge of devotees in reserves such asSariska or Periyar.

Perched on a hill in the western division of thePeriyar tiger reserve, surrounded by evergreen forestsreligiously called poongavanam, is Sabrimala, theshrine of the Hindu deity Lord Ayappa. The shrinedraws five million pilgrims annually. Pilgrims fastfor days; attired in black they take a holy dip at theriver Pampa before trekking up to Sabrimala. Themost propitious time to visit the shrine is during theMakkaravalaku season; its 60 days, from midNovember to January, attract the bulk of the pilgrims.The passage of thousands of people through the

The way ahead 137


forest poses a huge challenge for the forestdepartment of the tiger reserve. Pilgrims travel up tothe Pampa river in vehicles. Hundreds of shopsmushroom along the routes, tonnes of firewood arecut from the forest and the hills turn into a nightmareof plastic. During the season, villagers complain, thePampa gets highly polluted.

Over the years, efforts have been made by the

Kerala government and the forest department tominimise impact. A sewage treatment plant has beenset up, toilets have been made and buildingsregulated. But the fact is that the impact remainsbecause of the large numbers of pilgrims.

It is clear that while uncontrolled visitors tothese pilgrim sites are bound to impact the forests,one must remember that these sites can also be used

138 The way ahead


Annapurna Conservation Area Project, NepalManaged by the King Mahendra Trust for NatureConservation, Annapurna Conservation Area inneighbouring Nepal has created a system whereby allelements of tourism are today taken care of by peopleliving in the area. Ghazala Shahabuddin from the NewDelhi-based Council for Social Development hasstudied this approach and says that the government hasensured that benefits accrue to local people —managing homesteads, trekking routes and eateriesalong trekking routes, people earn at each stage of thebusiness.

The Annapurna Conservation Area comprises ofspectacular landscape, that of the 8,000-metre plusHimalayan ranges of Annapurna and Dhaulagiri. Thearea is extremely biodiversity rich as it straddles a verylarge gradient. The programme, initiated in 1986,covers an area of 7,600 sq km spread over five districts.Fifty-five village development committees form theanchor of the programme. A total of 1,00,000 peoplelive in the area and about 1,16,000 tourists visit the areaannually. The area now has one of the most famoustrekking routes in Nepal. The project has createdConservation and Management committees in eachvillage to manage tourism.15

The area’s management has ensured local peopleare able to create small tourist lodges to earn fromtourists. Most lodges, equipped with solar hot showersand other facilities, are extensions of people’s homes.When mineral water bottles, adding to litter, became aproblem, villagers started ‘safe drinking water stations’in every village along the route, using advancedtechnology for water cleaning. The revenue of thiswater sale goes back to the village.

In other words, the benefits of tourism go back tolocal communities and build a stake in the protection ofthe reserve. As a result, there is much less garbage andwaste in the area. The cause of conservation isadvanced. It is a lesson to learn from.

Costa RicaIn Costa Rica, nature is a tourism factory. Tourism wasthis small Central American country’s top foreignexchange earner, till the computer giant Intel set up itsmicroprocessing plant there. In 1995 in Costa Rica, the industry generated over US $650 million per annum— 7.5 per cent of the country’s GDP. Tourism has beenbuilt on the development of national parks — in 1996,of the 781,000 visitors from abroad, nearly 270,000visited national parks. With this economic interestassured, as much as 31 per cent of the country is under the protected area system and now privateindividuals are finding that it pays to conservebiodiversity for tourists.

The tourism value chain is still in favour of theairlines and large and international operators. Butnevertheless, a substantial proportion stays within thecountry and is shared. This has led to increaseddependence and so a vested interest in the trade and,therefore, also an interest in protecting theenvironment. Interestingly, over 70 per cent of thehotels in the country have less than 20 rooms. Thismeans that the small lodges near national parks domore than their bit to conserve the environmentalresources around.

Ecotourism — built on remote and small-scalenature reserves — is an opportunity to provide localemployment and local economic growth. In this

Innovating in Tourism by involving local communities: some successful examples

to tie people into a relationship with forests — as inthe sacred groves tradition practiced in India.

To regulate pilgrim movement in the park,pilgrim sites must be maintained as sacred groveswith an extremely strict code of conduct enforced bythe park authorities in tandem with the shrine’smanagement. To ensure the imposition of this code,again it is essential that pilgrims be charged a

nominal sum of money that is ploughed back intomaintenance and monitoring of the pilgrimvisitations.

In Periyar, a part of the route has been reservedfor the ecodevelopment committees of local villagesto operate. This has made people stakeholders in theconservation of the park and needs to be furtherpromoted.

The way ahead 139


country, everything — from butterfly farms whichexport live butterflies, to organic coffee farms, to richand deep rainforests, to live volcano to river swamps —are all marketed and sold. Nature is truly a cottageindustry here. And a profitable one too.16

Zimbabwe: Campfire projectThe story of Zimbabwe’s struggles with wildlifemanagement mirrors India’s challenges. Almost fivemillion people live in arid and semi-arid communallands surrounding the country’s protected areas.Despite the dryness and difficult conditions, a widerange of wildlife is also found here. Today, 15 per centof Zimbabwe is protected as conservation areas.17 Someanimal species have prospered so much in theprotected areas that they are causing serious damage topeople’s livestock and agriculture. Some species arealso suffering genetic problems because ofinbreeding.18

At the same time many people, just as in India,were evicted when the protected areas were created.They now live in the surrounding communal lands.They are no longer permitted to hunt the animals andharvest the plants now found inside protected areas,again just as in India

As a reaction to the problems arising out of thecreation of these parks, CAMPFIRE (Communal AreasManagement Programme for Indigenous Resources)was started in the 1989 as a programme designed toassist rural development and conservation.19 It workswith the people who live in these communal lands,supporting the use of wildlife as an important naturalresource.

Five main activities help provide extra income tolocal communities20: ● Trophy hunting: About 90 per cent of CAMPFIRE's

income comes from selling hunting concessions toprofessional hunters and safari operators workingto set government quotas. Individual hunters payhigh fees to shoot elephant (US $12,000) and buffaloand are strictly monitored, accompanied by local,licensed professionals.21

● Selling live animals: This is a fairly recentdevelopment. Some areas with high wildlifepopulations sell live animals to national parks orgame reserves.

● Harvesting natural resources: A number of naturalresources such as crocodile eggs, caterpillars, river-sand and timber are harvested and sold by localcommunities. Skins and ivory can be sold from'problem animals' (individual animals whopersistently cause damage or threat and can legallybe killed).

● Tourism: Most revenue from tourists has not goneto local communities. Five districts of Zimbabwenow benefit from tourism. Development ofspecialist areas such as culture tourism and birdwatching are promoted with local people employeddirectly as guides or hired to run local facilities fortourists.

● Selling wildlife meat: Where there are manyspecies that are used for meat, the country’sNational Parks Department supervises killing andselling of skins and meat.

Put together, these various activities have given thelocal population in Zimbabwe a source of livelihoodwhich has today helped ensured that the country’sdwindling elephant population has reached levelswhere it has ironically become a menace ofoverpopulation.

140 The way ahead


1. The regulation and management of tourism in tiger reserves must remain in the chargeof the forest department. The Ranthambhore experience clearly shows that touristinterests, if allowed to take precedence over conservation, can be extremely detrimentalto the park. If the park management does not have the capacities to manage tourism,efforts must be made to involve local communities and staff welfare associations in therunning of affairs. These interested communities will bring benefits to the conservationefforts in the park for their interests are enjoined with its protection. Under nocircumstances should there be any move to ‘privatise’ the park management for tourismactivities. 2. The zone adjacent to the park — its fringe and high impact zone — must be reservedfor homestead-based tourism run at a small scale by local communities. This zone shouldideally extend up to three km from the outer periphery of a reserve’s boundary. In case itis not possible to extend this zone up to three km, the reserve management must decidehow far the zone should extend, after due consultation with the Project Tiger directorate. 3. All other resorts and hotels can only be allowed beyond this zone reserved forhomestead tourism. This ‘reservation’ will promote alternative tourism and provide foropportunities for local communities to directly benefit from this economic activity.4. The Union ministry of environment and forests must finalise an eco-tourism policyfor tiger reserves that incorporates this land-use reservation into the EnvironmentProtection Act, 1984.5. Reserve managements must increase gate ticket prices by imposing an ecological cess,which must be ploughed back to each reserve. Ideally all gate money should go back to thereserve. But given the requirements of state governments, this may not be possible. In thiscase, the extra revenue collected as ecological cess should be given to the reserve,explicitly to be shared with local communities who continue to live within its boundariesand for staff benefits.6. Hotels within a radius of 5 kilometres from the boundary of a reserve must contribute30 per cent of their turnover to the reserve. This has to be a compulsory cess on the hotelindustry, for this industry is drawing advantages out of investment made from publicfunds for the protection of reserves. The hotels can be allowed to claim 100 per centincome tax benefit for the same, as an incentive. 7. The tourism plan for each reserve must be developed and approved by the ProjectTiger directorate. The plan must designate the tourism zones, clearly demarcate thezoning plan and be based on carrying capacity studies. The plans must be available in thepublic domain along with all tourism-regulating rules.8. The reserve must ensure that all possible avenues of engaging local communities areexhausted before it resorts to using other resources as guides and for other employmentand work opportunities.9. The pilgrim sites inside the park must be designated as sacred groves with strictcontrols and regulations. All transit camps and places of stay for such pilgrimages insidethe park must be minimised and severely restricted. The benefits of the pilgrimageactivity must accrue to local communities. The temple boards must be persuaded to allowthis to happen.

Recommendations

The way ahead 141


Almost all tiger reserves are watersheds for majorand minor streams and rivers. Without the reserves,water security will certainly be furthercompromised. But currently, this ecological servicebeing rendered by the reserves is not rewarded. Forinstance:● The dam in Pench tiger reserve provides water to

the city of Nagpur in Maharashtra.● The dam in Periyar tiger reserve in Kerala is used

for towns and agriculture in the neighbouringstate of Tamil Nadu.

● The town of Sawai Madhopur in Rajasthan getsits water through deep tube-wells at the edge ofthe Ranthambhore tiger reserve.

● The city of Tirunelveli in Tamil Nadu gets itswater from the dam in the Kalakad-Mundanthurai tiger reserve.

But none of these cities, states or towns pays for theconservation of these watersheds. There is a cost tobear for their conservation though — the cost ofconserving the forests that keep the watersheds alive.The State of Forests Report 2003 has, for the firsttime, assessed the water bodies — rivers, streams,lakes, ponds and wetlands — located inside forestareas. It estimates that 17,396 sq km of water bodiesexist within the forested areas of the country.1 Therole of forests in maintaining the hydrological cycleof the country is critical. In addition, there is thebiodiversity value of forests.

Currently, there is no mechanism to account for

these services which standing forests and protectedareas provide to the country. It is today an imperativeto ensure that these costs are internalised.

Therefore, we need to incorporate the principlesof valuing forests for the tangible as well asintangible benefits these lands provide. This costmust be paid to the communities who live in andaround these forest lands. They bear the cost ofmaintaining these watersheds. To maintain theseforests demands the people who live in and aroundthese forests forego the developmental fruits that therest of the country enjoys at their cost. Therefore,they must be compensated for protecting thesenatural resources at the cost of their own economicand social development. This concept of anecological tax — paid for water, recreation or otherservices that these reservoirs of biodiversity provide— is gaining ground across the world.

At present, there exists a provision to calculatethe net present value (NPV) of forests, and pay anamount when they are diverted for non-forestpurposes. But this is nothing but payment fordestruction. In that sense, it is a negative approach ofproviding value to forests. This is not a payment toprotect forests as forests and for keeping theminviolate. Also, the money goes to a central authority,not to the state that has diverted its forests. Themoney also does not go to the community that bearsthe cost of ‘diversion’. There is no incentive toprotect forests, as there is no value of standingforests.

3.11 Ecological services agenda

CHANGING STATE EXPENDITURE ON FORESTRY AND REVENUE EARNED FROM THE SECTOR

Expenditure

Revenue

Rs c

rore

1987

-198

8

1989

-199

0

1991

-199

2

1993

-199

4

1995

-199

6

1997

-199

8

2000

-200

1

2002

-200

3

2004

-200

5

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

Rs c

rore

Revenue

Expenditure

1987

-198

8

1989

-199

0

1991

-199

2

1993

-199

4

1995

-199

6

1997

-199

8

1999

-200

0

2001

-200

2

2003

-200

420

04-2

005

0

15

30

45

60Himachal Pradesh Arunachal Pradesh

Source: Ruksan Bose 2005, ‘Too cut and dried’, Down To Earth, Vol 14, No 5, July 31, 2005, p24

142 The way ahead


Cost of conservation

In fact, the ‘burden’ of conservation has grown overthe last few years. An analysis of the revenue andexpenditure of the state forest sector shows thatconservation is costing forest-dependent statesenormously.

While the revenue generated by the states fromforests have dwindled, expenditures have mounted.In the mid-1990s, for instance, Madhya Pradeshmade money from its forest resources. Its revenuewas higher than its expenditure in this sector. But by2005, the situation completely reversed. Now thestate spends more than it can earn. Today, ArunachalPradesh’s spending on forestry is as high as itsrevenue used to be in the mid-1990s; 80 per cent ofthe state is forested, but today it makes practicallynothing from its vast forest wealth (See graph:Changing state expenditure on forestry and revenue

earned from the sector)The situation is such that India, today, has

become a major importer of wood — that is to say,from forests cut elsewhere. By 2001, India’s export offorest-based products stood at Rs 4,459 crore; themajor items were rubber and paper products. Butimports were over a whopping Rs 12,000 crore —three times higher. That year, the country spent overRs 2,000 crore simply on importing wood7.

The repercussions are at three levels. One, thecountry loses precious foreign exchange. Two, thecountry keeps its own millions of people deprived ofeconomic development. And three, the costs ofmaintaining these forested areas are borne by stategovernments whose budgets are reduced and whohave less and less money for developmentprogrammes.

Economic valuation of forests offers amethodology to quantitatively calculate the benefitsthat forests provide, and also helps elucidate who are

Ecological services valuations

Himachal PradeshA valuation of Himachal Pradesh’s forests used acombination of methods: market prices orestimates for timber, fodder, fuelwood and non-timber forest produce which have markets; and thetravel cost method to gauge the value ofecotourism. They revealed that the state’s forestsprovide annual benefits exceeding Rs 1,00,000crore.2

Bhopal (Madhya Pradesh)The Kolar dam provides nearly 60 per cent ofBhopal’s water. The dam receives water from theKolar river, which originates from a thicklyforested area 70 km upstream3. The 60-70 villagesin this catchment area put significant bioticpressure on these forests: they are largely poortribal communities dependent on the forests fortheir fuelwood, fodder and non-timber forestproduce. To maintain watershed services in thelong run, an incentive-based system was proposedto motivate communities in the catchment areas toprotect the forests, which would be cheaper thanother alternatives.

A study by Madhu Verma on the Bhoj wetlandsused a combination of methods like directvaluation, contingent valuation, preventative orreplacement cost and hedonic pricing to put avalue on various benefits. Livelihood benefits werecalculated using incomes or the market price ofproducts. Bhopal currently makes no payments atall for watershed protection services it receives

from these forests. Yet it pays Rs 9.5 crore to supplyhighly subsidised drinking water, which could besaved if a fraction of the cost was spent onconservation activities in the catchment area4.

Costa RicaIn 1996, Costa Rica implemented a system of‘payments for environmental services’ (PES).Through financial and legal mechanisms, local,national and global beneficiaries of forest servicescompensate those who protect them. Funds areallocated through the National Forestry FinancialFund, which works directly with people, andthrough NGOs; these funds compensate those whoprovide these services. Costa Rica’s 1996 forestrylaw explicitly recognises four ecosystem servicesprovided by forests: carbon fixation andsequestration, hydrological services, biodiversityprotection and scenic beauty5.

Community management of Mayan BiosphereAlmost 3,88,000 hectare (ha) of the MayanBiosphere, a 2-million ha reserve in Guatemala, hascome under community managed concessions. Thefirst community concession was awarded in thearea in 1996. The concessions were created as aresponse to increased illegal logging and thedevelopment of new agricultural areas. Thecommunity forest management is verified forsustainability by independent parties, and reportsindicate that the pressure on the reserve hasdecreased, biodiversity values have beenmaintained and extra income has been generatedfrom the communities.6

The way ahead 143


benefiting from the forest, and who are bearing thecosts of conservation.

Not a ‘one-size fits all’ approachOver 300 PES (payments for environmental services)systems have been inventoried in the world. Eachmodel is distinct and appropriate for specificcircumstances in order to calculate the costs and topass them to the right owner. PES is applicable, but itis not a monolith. India’s approach too needs to beappropriate and tailored to each forest and situationon the ground. The main peculiarity in India is thatthe poorest people in forests have no land rights.Since many PES systems link land use to theprovision of services — payments are based on clearland rights — its application without a land rights

regime for those who protect forests could createmore alienation.

Incentives do not have to be land-based,however, nor do they have to be cash payments: thishas been demonstrated in the village of Sukhomajriin Haryana, where water rights were de-linked fromland. The pani panchayats in Maharashtra also workthis way. Such innovative approaches to expandrights, including rights to environmental benefits, areneeded.

It is clear that conservation support in India willneed innovative approaches. The fact is that we haveto make conservation ‘pay’ so that the burden on thepoor is reduced. It is they who live within theconservation areas; it is they who are deprived ofdevelopment and livelihood opportunities.

The Tiger Task Force recommends that the Project Tiger directorate must take urgentinitiative to begin a definite and time-bound programme for payment of ecologicalservices to stakeholders.

To do so, it must work with the tiger reserves to carry out an evaluation of the ecosystemservices that accrue to the nation from the reserves, and must formulate the mechanismfor charging the city/area/districts that get water from the watersheds secured by thisreserve, and sharing the revenue so earned between the reserve authorities and the peoplein and around the reserve in an equitable fashion.

Recommendations

04Action plan for change

Key recommendations

145

1. Sariska is an important reserve supporting thelargest intact habitat of the tiger in the Aravalliecosystem. The reserve is also the catchment forinnumerable streams in this otherwise dry region.Urgent steps must be taken to restore the park andrehabilitate tigers in the reserve.

2. The state government must fix accountability forthe events in Sariska. This is essential, for it willact as a deterrent to other officers in Rajasthan aswell as in other parts of the country; whathappened in Sariska is unacceptable.

3. The state government must take steps to improvethe internal working of the park. It must also make afirm, time-bound, commitment to the Project Tigerdirectorate in this regard and draw up benchmarksfor its performance review and assessment.

4. The relocation of villages within the key tigerhabitat must be done with utmost care and withfull consultation with affected villagers. Parkauthorities should realise that villagers livingwithin the park are forest-dependent and,

therefore, the land available for their relocationmust be able to either meet their grazing needs, orthere must be sufficient investment for them toswitch over to land-based livelihoods.

5. Park authorities, working in cooperation with theProject Tiger directorate, must evolve a plan forthe remaining villages that will continue to existin the park because relocation is not possible orfeasible for all.

6. A plan should be developed to further managepilgrimage traffic; it must be ensured that thebenefits of tourism are shared with affectedvillagers and the park.

7. Park authorities should work on an agreementwith villagers living on the periphery (fringe) toincrease investment in their lands, in return fortheir cooperation in protecting the reserve.

8. An institutional mechanism — a park-levelmanagement committee — should be constitutedto monitor progress in habitat improvement andpeople’s involvement.

1. Reorganise the Union ministry of environmentand forests to create two separate departments:that of environment and that of forests andwildlife.

2. Revitalise the National Board for Wildlife. Theprime minister could be requested to chair thesteering committee of the Project Tiger for thecoming few years.

3. The Project Tiger directorate should be convertedinto a Project Tiger Authority by giving it

administrative autonomy. Project Tiger shouldreport annually to the Indian Parliament so thatpolitical commitment to the project deepens.

4. To ensure that project states follow the guidelinesand prescriptions laid down for the project, asystem of having a ‘Memorandum ofUnderstanding’ (MoU) with these states can beinstituted. Any deviation or default from the MoU

should be reported to the steering committee.5. Considering the multifarious nature of work

Since the inception of Project Tiger in the early 1970s, the country has consistently invested in the protectionand conservation of the tiger. The Tiger Task Force report has reviewed the work done over these years; thecrisis; and the challenges ahead, to recommend reform in the framework of action.

The report advocates that the following needs to be done urgently:

a. Reinvigorate the institutions of governance.b. Strengthen efforts geared towards protection of the tiger, checking poaching, convicting wildlife

criminals and breaking the international trade network. c. Expand the inviolate spaces for the tiger by minimising human pressure in these areas.d. Repair the relationships with the people who share the tiger’s habitat by building strategies for

coexistence.e. Regenerate the forest habitats in the fringes of the tiger’s protective enclaves by investing in forest, water

and grassland economies of the people.

Key recommendations

146 Action plan for change


Sariska

Institutional mechanisms

Action plan for change 147


handled by the director, Project Tiger, it isessential to strengthen the directorate withautonomy and personnel.

6. The director, Project Tiger, should be delegatedpowers to deal with states under Section (3) of theWildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, especially for theenforcement of Project Tiger guidelines.

7. The role of director, Project Tiger, should not beconfined to tiger reserves. Instead, it shouldextend to other crucial forest areas as well whichhave viable tiger populations.

8. A state steering committee for Project Tiger

should be created, with the chief minister of thetiger range state as its chair.

9. Management committees should be set up for eachprotected area. These committees will include localcommunity representatives, NGOs and researchers.

10. Create a sub-cadre of wildlife specialists andprofessionals.

11. Independent audits of each reserve must beconducted annually; the information generatedmust be placed in the public domain.

12. Build collaborative networks with researchers tomonitor change.

1. Each reserve must have a specific and detailedstrategy for protection. The independentmonitoring of the reserve must include anassessment of the enforcement mechanisms inplace and the patrolling efforts of field staff, sothat policy interventions can be designed.

3. A clear strategy for protection is needed in the northeastern reserves, where local people willbe the only ones capable of traversing andprotecting the area. There should also be a clearstrategy for the reserves controlled by naxalitesand other insurgent groups, where armedintervention by security forces might be the onlyoption.

4. Further recruitment of staff — foresters as well asguards — should be reserved for local villagers.The criterion for recruitment should be amendedso that it relaxes the formal educationalqualifications needed for these positions andinstead, values skills in jungle craft. In addition,there should be provision for in-service trainingfor locally recruited staff.

5. Institutionalise training so that each reserve hasskilled and committed personnel.

6. Disincentives and rewards based on independent

monitoring should be built into the system. Theincentives must be withdrawn in reserves thatscore low on the rating chart. This should be donewith complete transparency so that it is not seenas political or discriminatory. In fact, this movewill be a test for the independence and rigour ofthe independent assessment as well.

7. Investments in basic facilities should be made forthe frontline staff:a. Housing camps in neighbouring district

towns, usually where the project headquarteris based, for families so that the education oftheir children can be secured;

b. Free rations for guards living in the camps.This practice is followed by many protectionforces and helps in their work.

8. A staff welfare fund can be created for eachreserve, out of the income from tourism. This canbe used to supplement medical and other benefitsfor the staff.

9. There must be an urgent review of the crisis inforestry services and steps that have been taken toaddress issues of training, personnel develop-ment, staff reviews and salaries.

1. Very proactive and strong measures are needed onthe matter of international trade in wildlife andwildlife products. The Union ministry must workto shape the agenda at the Convention onInternational Trade in Endangered Species ofWild Fauna and Flora (CITES), to ensure that theglobal market for tiger products is investigated.The international community must be put underpressure to combat and destroy this trade.

2. A bilateral relationship must be built up withChina to combat the trade in tiger parts. Theenvironment minister should take the lead bydiscussing and developing this relationship withhis Chinese counterpart, and this dialogue mustbe kept alive and ongoing. It is critical that Indiatakes the leadership on this issue and does notleave it to global institutions which are provinginadequate in this regard.

Protection

International trade in wildlife products



1. The wildlife crime bureau must be set upimmediately, based on the modificationssuggested in the report:a. At the central level, a strong bureau is needed

with a capacity to develop a country-widedatabase of wildlife crime to enablecoordination, investigation and legal follow-up.

b. At the state level, there must be a node of thewildlife crime bureau with the capacity toboth investigate and to follow up on thecrime.

c. The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) mustbe given the responsibility to investigateorganised wildlife crime and to take overcharge of certain special cases, for instance,

the Sansar Chand case. d Regional forensic facilities must be set up to

investigate wildlife specimens and theevidence in wildlife crime.

e. The wildlife crime bureau must be made astatutory body under the Wildlife (Protection)Act, 1972 to make it effective and give itautonomy.

2. The Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 should beammended as suggested in the report, so that theprovisions related to crime are tightened andmade more stringent, particularly for designatedcritically endangered species. This will providefor deterrence for criminal actions against thesespecies and result in speedier trials.

Domestic wildlife crime

1. Identify the major hunting tribes and communitiesin proximity to, or operating in, a reserve. Eachpark authority must work to develop plans to usethe expertise of these hunters for protection as wellas for gathering basic ecological information.

2. The independent monitoring of each park mustevaluate the work done by the park management

on working with its forest-dependent traditionalhunting communities. The park management andProject Tiger must work on locale-specificapproaches with these communities. These effortsshould be supported and carefully monitored, sothat the learning can be disseminated and canbecome practice.

Innovative protection

1. The Tiger Task Force has reviewed the revisedmethodology proposed by the Project Tigerdirectorate and the Wildlife Institute of India forestimating/monitoring tiger status and its habitat,and endorses the approach. It hopes that thenational tiger estimation, which is to beconducted from November 2005, will be doneusing this evolved methodology.

2. The Project Tiger directorate must set up ascientific expert group immediately withexpertise in relevant technical disciplines foroverseeing the process. This group should workfrom the very inception of the process and assistin suggesting appropriate ways of analysing andinterpreting the data.

3. All efforts should be made to encourage andfacilitate intensive research and monitoringstudies of source population of tigers using a

variety of tools — photo-identification andmonitoring, camera traps, radio-telemetry and DNA-based genetic studies in different landscape units.

4. The work in the field of molecular techniques forestimation needs to be supported. Encourage theWildlife Institute of India and the Centre forCellular and Molecular Biology (CCMB) to take onpilot programmes at a landscape level using thistechnique. The CCMB should be asked to provideinputs in the development of moleculartechniques for identification of individual tigers.

5. The inclusive, open approach that we advocatedepends crucially on free access to allinformation, except where very evident securityconcerns are involved. In modern times, thiswould be best ensured by posting all pertinentinformation on the Web, in English as well as inall Indian languages.

The science



1. Put in place institutional mechanisms that wouldstreamline existing procedures for clearance andcoordination of research and ensure betterutilisation of the research output. To do this,panels should be set up at the state and nationallevels, chaired by the inspector general of forests(wildlife) or chief wildlife wardens, and includingthe secretary of the National BiodiversityAuthority or the State Biodiversity Board andother experts in ecology, social sciences and bio-statistics. These panels must serve as ‘singlewindow’ clearing houses for all matters relating towildlife research, so that they streamline currentprocedures, rather than create another layer ofdecision-making.

2. The process of designing and implementing themanagement plans for each tiger reserve needs tobe reworked. The plans must be updatedregularly, taking into consideration the scientific

and socio-economic research that has beenconducted; these plans should be put in thepublic domain and be used for the independentevaluation of the reserve.

3. The independent audit must be used to create areputational advantage for the reserve.a. The Project Tiger directorate should work to

further improve its criterion and indicators for the rating. The criterion must bedeveloped to benchmark the progress andproblems in all critical areas and set targets forits improvement.

b. The rating should then be used formanagement decisions and for creating aninformed and involved public opinion on theworking of individual reserves.

c. It must be used to inform Parliament of theprogress being made in tiger conservation andthe challenges ahead.

Research

1 There should be an urgent and realistic review ofthe number of villages that actually need to berelocated from the reserves. The decision must bebased on the fact that the villages that need to berelocated are made to do so because they aresituated in the critical habitats — tiger natal areasand key conservation priority areas. There mustbe a criterion for the identification of thesevillages, so that it is clear which village is to berelocated and why.

2. There must be a tight schedule of one year tostudy settlements and list the ones to be relocated.This schedule must be strictly complied with.

3. Based on this list, the Project Tiger directorateshould draw up a time-bound action plan tocomplete the process of relocation. The actionplan for relocation must be completed in terms ofits financial and land provisions before it isfinalised and accepted.

4. During the formulation of this action plan, theresponsible agency must keep in mind theexperience of past relocation efforts to ensure that

the process of relocation does not lead to furtherresource degradation or loss of livelihood of people.

5. The financial allocation for the relocation schememust be revised and enhanced so that it can takeinto account the needs, particularly, of providingirrigated land and other facilities to ensurelivelihood security.

6. The scheme must take into account the options forlivelihood in the resettled village. It is importantfor planners to keep in view the fact that peoplewho live within the reserves are forest-dependentcommunities, and survive within agro-silvo-pastoral economies. The relocation package mustbe designed to provide viable alternatives.

7. The classfication of land after the families arerelocated must be changed from forest to revenueland, which will allow the settlers advantages ofdevelopment and other facilities.

8. Set up a task force at the Central level to monitorthe quality of relocation and to ensure that there iscareful coordination and follow-up in therelocation work.

Relocation

1. The tiger’s habitat cannot be secured unless wesecure the future of the millions who live on thefringe. Currently, there is little information aboutthe numbers or their impact on the reserves.Studies, preferably on a GIS-based platform,should be carried out to collect this information,which can be used for the reserve’s management.Place these studies and their results in the publicdomain along with all empirical data, so that otherinstitutions and researchers can then build on thisinformation. It should be a part of the work of theProject Tiger directorate to encourage andundertake research on people-wildlifeinteractions within and on the fringes of thereserves.

2. Timely payment of compensation for livestockdeath and human injury and death, which falls inthe purview of the field directors, should be madeone of the criteria that the park management is

measured for during the evaluation of the reservesand their ranking.

3. Pay compensation for crop damage as well. Inaddition, compensation must be paid to familieswho continue to live within the reserves.

4. The Tiger Task Force understands that thegovernment is currently working on the nextphase of an externally aided ecodevelopmentplan. It is important that all the issues listed in thereport regarding the opportunities and failures ofthe first phase of the ecodevelopment project arecarefully considered and incorporated into theplan. The country cannot afford such expensiveexperiments, unless they are carefully crafted andskillfully executed.

5. The joint forest management programme in thevicinity of the reserves must be revamped so thatpeople living in the fringes can be givenmanagement decisions and rights over the



1. People will continue to live in protected areas:policy must accept this. It is not possible to settlethe rights and relocate all the families living in thereserves. The facts are clear: in the last 30 years,less than 10 per cent of the families in tigerreserves have been relocated.

2. If people live in protected areas, ways must befound to secure their use of resources andlivelihoods. The current legal framework does notaccount for the use of resources by communities,because people are not expected to be in thenational park at all, and in a limited way in thesanctuaries. The law provides that during the time the rights are settled and people live inprotected areas, the state government has toprovide alternative sources of fuel, fodder andother forest produce. In short, the rights of people cannot be expunged without providingalternatives.

3. In this situation, the selective interpretation of theIndian Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 whichcurtails the use of resources by people withouttaking into account the safeguards, has only led togreater unrest around our protected areas and hasbeen detrimental to conservation.

4. Strategies for joint-collaborative-inclusivemanagement of our protected areas are thenessential, so that this “illegal” use is made legaland regulated.

5. All use need not be destructive. The question ishow the use will be regulated or managed. Inorder for the resource use not to be destructive,

the participation of local communities indecision-making and in management becomesessential. Regulation is best possible if all areparties to the decision.

6. It is important that this approach of inclusiveprotection is incorporated into conservationmanagement urgently. For this, the followingmust be done:a. Each tiger reserve (to begin with) must take

into account the current needs of people wholive within the reserve and evolve a plan forresource management and use. This strategymust be developed in consultation with localcommunities, researchers and local NGOs.

b. The strategy must include plans for carefulmonitoring and evaluation.

c. The Project Tiger directorate must haveinternal capacity and staff to be able tomonitor and guide this process carefully.Every effort must be made to encourageinnovation and experimentation.

d. Begin this process immediately. The plans foreach reserve must be completed within oneyear and be available publicly.

7. The independent monitoring of tiger reserves mustprovide a high weightage for the work done by parkmanagers in collaborative management. Theimprovement in relationship between people andparks must be a key criterion in the review. Eachtiger reserve must be rated for this work and thebest and worst identified for rewards and penalties.

Coexistence

The fringe

produce of forests; this will improve theproductivity of the resources as well. The answerto the crisis within the reserve lies in our abilitiesto rebuild the resources outside.

6. The government must increase the per capitaexpenditure in the development of forests,grasslands and water on the fringes of the tigerreserves. For these investments to be productive,they must be made in tune with the natural

resource regimes of the areas and not by investingin short-term, assets-based alternate livelihoods.The investment will work if people are involvedin the management of the natural resources.

7. The additional funds for development must bespent as a reciprocal arrangement with localvillagers — increased investment in theirresources to build collaborative and protectivefences around the reserves.



1. The regulation and management of tourism intiger reserves must remain in the charge of theforest department. The Ranthambhore experienceclearly shows that tourist interests, if allowed totake precedence over those of conservation, can beextremely detrimental to a reserve. If the parkmanagement does not have the capacities tomanage tourism, efforts must be made to involvelocal communities and staff welfare associationsin the running of affairs. These interestedcommunities will bring benefits to theconservation efforts in the park, for their owninterests are enjoined with its protection.

2. The areas adjacent to the park — its fringe andhigh impact zone — must be reserved forhomestead-based tourism run on a small scale bylocal communities. This zone should ideallyextend up to three km from the outer periphery ofa reserve’s boundary. In case it is not possible toextend this zone up to three km, the reservemanagement must decide how far the zone shouldextend, after due consultation with the ProjectTiger directorate.

3. All other resorts and hotels can only be allowedbeyond this zone reserved for homestead tourism.This ‘reservation’ will promote alternativetourism and provide for opportunities for localcommunities to directly benefit from thiseconomic activity.

4. The Union ministry of environment and forestsmust finalise an eco-tourism policy for tigerreserves that incorporates this land-use reservationinto the Environment Protection Act, 1984.

5. Reserve managements must increase gate ticket

prices by imposing an ecological cess, whichshould be ploughed back into each reserve —explicitly to be shared with local communitieswho continue to live within its boundaries and forstaff benefits.

6. Hotels within a radius of five km from theboundary of a reserve must contribute 30 per centof their turnover to the reserve. Make this acompulsory cess on the hotel industry, for thisindustry is drawing advantages out of investmentsmade from public funds for the protection ofreserves. The hotels can be allowed to claim 100per cent income tax benefit for the same, as anincentive.

7. The tourism plan for each reserve must bedeveloped and approved by the Project Tigerdirectorate. The plan must designate the tourismzones, clearly demarcate the zoning plan and bebased on carrying capacity studies. The plansmust be available in the public domain along withall tourism-regulating rules.

8. The reserve must ensure that all possible avenuesof engaging local communities are exhaustedbefore it resorts to using other resources as guidesand for other employment and workopportunities.

9. Designate the pilgrimage sites inside the park assacred groves with strict controls and regulations.All transit camps and places of stay for suchpilgrimages inside the park must be minimisedand severely restricted. The benefits of thepilgrimage activity must accrue to localcommunities. The temple boards should bepersuaded to allow this to happen.

Tourism

Ecological services

1. The Project Tiger directorate must take urgentinitiative to begin a definite and time-boundprogramme of payment for ecological services tostakeholders. It must work with the tiger reservesto carry out an evaluation of the ecosystemservices that accrue to the nation from the

reserves, and must formulate the mechanism forcharging the city/area/districts that get water fromthe watersheds secured by this reserve. Therevenue so earned can be shared between thereserve authorities and the people in and aroundthe reserve in an equitable fashion.

153

05References

154 References


01. An assessment

1.1 Conserving the tiger1. Indian Board for Wildlife, 1972, Project Tiger: a

planning proposal for preservation of tiger(Panthera tigris tigris) in India, task force, Unionministry of agriculture, government of India,Delhi

2. Indian Board for Wildlife, 1983, Eliciting publicsupport for wildlife conservation — report of the task force, Department of Environment,government of India, Delhi

3. Union ministry of environment and forests,1993, A review of Project Tiger, government ofIndia, Delhi

4. Union ministry of environment and forests,1996, Report of the high-powered committee toundertake a review of the Project Tiger; carry outevaluation and suggest ways and means to makeProject Tiger more meaningful and resultoriented, government of India, Delhi

5. Union ministry of environment and forests,1996, Report of the high-powered committee toundertake a review of the Project Tiger; carry outevaluation and suggest ways and means to makeProject Tiger more meaningful and resultoriented, government of India, Delhi

6. Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), 1996, TheTiger Call, New Delhi

7. Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), 1996, TigerConservation Strategy and Action Plan, NewDelhi

8. Michael Day (undated), The Big Cat Cover Up,The Tiger Trust, UK

9. Debbie Banks and Dave Currey (undated), TheState of the Tiger: India’s Tiger Crisis,Environmental Investigation Agency, UK

10. Anon, 1996, ‘The Indian tiger in mortal danger’,leader comment in The Guardian, September 12,UK

11. Anon, 1996, ‘Wrong roars’, leader in Down ToEarth, Vol 5 No 17, Society for EnvironmentalCommunication, New Delhi

12. Anon, 1999, ‘Blues for the big cats’, Down ToEarth, Vol 7 No 24, Society for EnvironmentalCommunication, New Delhi

13. Valmik Thapar, 2002, ‘The state of the Indiantiger’, Sanctuary Asia, October, Mumbai

14. Union ministry of environment and forests, 2001,Project Tiger Status Report, government of India,Delhi

15. Project Tiger, 1973, guidelines for execution ofthe project by the states, Union ministry ofagriculture, government of India, Delhi, mimeo

16. Ashish Kothari et al 1989, Management of

national parks and sanctuaries in India: a statusreport, Indian Institute of Public Administration,New Delhi

17. PEACE-ELDF-SAMRAKSHAN, ‘Lessons learned from the ecodevelopment experience in India’,mimeo

1.2 The Sariska shock1. CBI, 2005, ‘Disappearance of tigers from Sariska’,

Special Investigation Team report, New Delhi2. WII, 2005, ‘Assessment of status of tiger (Panthera

tigris) in Sariska tiger reserve’, Rajasthan,Wildlife Institute of India, Dehradun

3. Project Tiger, 2005, compiled from datasubmitted by state government, Delhi, mimeo

4. Anon, 2005, Sariska tiger reserve, informationcompiled for Tiger Task Force by field director,mimeo

5. Ghazala Shahabuddin, 2005, Recommendationson Sariska tiger reserve to the Tiger Task Force,May 31, Delhi, mimeo

6. V D Sharma, R G Soni and Rajendra Singh, 2005,suggestions to the Tiger Task Force, mimeo

7. Anon, 2005, Sariska tiger reserve, note given tothe Tiger Task Force by field director, mimeo

8. Forest Survey of India, 2005, ‘Status and changeof assessment of forest cover in tiger reserves ofIndia’, report done for Project Tiger, draft,Dehradun

9. WII, 2005, Assessment of status of tiger (Pantheratigris) in Sariska tiger reserve, Rajasthan, WildlifeInstitute of India, Dehradun

10. WII, 2005, Assessment of status of tiger (Pantheratigris) in Sariska tiger reserve, Rajasthan, WildlifeInstitute of India, Dehradun

03. The way ahead

3.1 The institutional agenda1. MoEF, 2000, an affidavit of Vishwanath Anand,

secretary, ministry of environment and forests inresponse to writ petition number 1474/1998,Pinki Mishra vs Union of India, mimeo

2. MoEF, 2005, affidavit by Rajesh Gopal in responseto order of Supreme Court of India, dated12.12.2003, mimeo

3. Supreme Court 2005 order, Supreme Court ofIndia, writ petition 47/1998, February 21, mimeo

4. Anon, 2005, Application by the amicus curiaefor directions in the Supreme Court, in writpetition no 202 of 1995, in the matter of T NGodavarman versus Union of India and others,April, mimeo

5. Ruksan Bose, 2005, ‘Too cut and dried’, Down ToEarth, Vol 14, No 5, 2005

3.3 The illegal trade agenda1. EIA, 1996, The Political Wilderness — India’s

Tiger Crisis, Environmental InvestigationAgency, London

2. EIA, 1996, The Political Wilderness — India’sTiger Crisis, Environmental InvestigationAgency, London


4. WWF, 1996, Tigers in the Wild, Species StatusReport, Gland


6. Anju Sharma, 1994, ‘Last chance for the big cat’,Down To Earth, Vol 12 No 24, Society forEnvironmental Communication, New Delhi

7. Kristin Nowell (undated), ‘Far from a cure: thetiger trade revisited’, WWF-TRAFFIC

8. EIA, 1999, The State of the Tiger: India’s TigerCrisis, UK

9. EIA, 2004, The Tiger Skin Trail, UK

10. Chris R Shepherd and Nolan Magnus, 2004,Nowhere to hide; the trade in Sumatran tiger, ATRAFFIC-Southeast Asia Report

11. Leigh A Henry, 2004, ‘A tale of two cities: acomparative study of traditional Chinesemedicine markets in San Francisco and NewYork city’, TRAFFIC-North America, WWF,Washington DC

12. EIA, 2004, ‘Urgent need for a specialised enforcement unit in India to deal with thegrowing illegal trade in tiger skins’, press release,November 9

13. CITES, 2000, ‘The CITES tiger high level politicalmissions’, doc 11.30 (rev 1) annex 2, mimeo

14. CITES, 2002, ‘Interpretation and implementationof the convention; conservation of and trade intigers’, CoP 12, doc 33, mimeo

15. CITES, 2004, ‘Interpretation and implementationof the convention; conservation of and trade intigers’, CoP 13, doc 28, mimeo

16. CITES, 2004, ‘Notification to parties’, December,mimeo

17. CITES, 2005, ‘Notification to parties’, March,mimeo

18. Willem Wijnstekers, 2004, letter to the Indianprime minister, CITES JMS/WWW, April 12, mimeo

19. CITES, 2005, Interpretation and implementation ofthe convention; illegal trade in tigers’, documentsubmitted by the US on behalf of the NorthAmerica region, for the 53rd meeting of thestanding committee, June 27 to July 1, Geneva SC

53 doc 17, mimeo

20. Anon, 2001, ‘Thailand’s tiger economy’, EIA,London

3.3a Domestic enforcement agenda1. B K Sharma, 2005, minutes of the Tiger Task

Force consultations, CBI, Delhi, May 18, 2005,mimeo

2. Anon, 2005, ‘Breakthrough in Ghaziabadand Khaga skin seizures’,http://www.21stcenturytiger.org/news/news.html, as seen on May 31, 2005

3. EIA, 2004, The Tiger Skin Trail, EIA, London4. MoEF, 1994, Report of the Committee on

Prevention of Illegal Trade in Wildlife andWildlife Products, ministry of environment andforests, New Delhi

5. MoEF, 2005, ‘Expedite the setting up of theNational Wildlife Crime Bureau in view of theactions by CITES’, Agenda item No 14 for theNational Board for Wildlife Meeting, March,New Delhi, mimeo

6. Project Tiger, 2005, Tiger poaching analysis ofcountry level data, 1999-2003, Delhi, mimeo

7. WPSI tiger seizures as viewed on websitewww.wpsi-india.org

8. B K Sharma, 2004, ‘Wildlife crime in India:myths and realities’, in Sanctuary Asia, April,Mumbai

3.4 Innovative protection agenda1. Bahar Dutt, 2003, ‘The forgotten people:

Bawarias of Rajasthan’, proceedings of the publichearing, New Delhi, Muktidhara, Rajasthan

2. Ouk Kimsan, 2001, ‘Community-basedmonitoring and conservation of tigers inCambodia's most important tiger conservationunits’, Royal Government of Cambodia,Cambodia, December




6. WWF-India, 1996, Tiger conservation strategy andaction plan, New Delhi

References 155


7. Aparajita Datta, 2005, Protecting with people: wildlife conservation in ArunachalPradesh, Nature Conservation Foundation,mimeo

8. Aparajita Datta, 2005, Protecting with people: wildlife conservation in ArunachalPradesh, Nature Conservation Foundation,mimeo

9. Aparajita Datta, 2005, Protecting with people:wildlife conservation in Arunachal Pradesh,Nature Conservation Foundation, mimeo

10. Deepa Kozhisseri, 2005, ‘Once poachers, now guards’, Down To Earth, Vol 14 No 7,Society for Environmental Communications,New Delhi

3.5 The science agenda1. Rajesh Gopal, 1992, Fundamentals of Wildlife

Management, Justice Home, Allahabad2. John Seidensticker, 2002, foreword in Ullas

Karanth and James Nichols edited, MonitoringTigers and their Prey, Centre for Wildlife Society,Bangalore

3. GOI, 1972, ‘Project Tiger: a planning proposal forpreservation of tiger in India’, task force report,ministry of agriculture, New Delhi

4. Rajesh Gopal, 1992, Fundamentals of WildlifeManagement, Justice Home, Allahabad

5. K Ullas Karanth, James D Nichols et al 2004,‘Tigers and their prey: predicting carnivoredensities from prey abundance’ in PNAS, April 6,Vol 101, No 14, 4854-4858

6. Project Tiger directorate, 2002, ‘Tiger habitat andpopulation evaluation system for the Indian sub-continent’, mimeo

7. Anon, 2004, Research proposal submitted by S PGoyal, mimeo

8. Yan Chun Xu et al 2005, ‘Individualisation of tigers by using microsatellites, ForensicScience International, 151 (2005) 45-51, Elsevier,Ireland

3.6 The research agenda1. Nitin Sethi, 2005, ‘Hunted’, Down To Earth,

Vol 13 No 22, Society for EnvironmentalCommunications, New Delhi

2. Raghunandan Chundawat, 2005, submission tothe Tiger Task Force

3. R Sukumar and Ullas Karanth, 1998, draft guide-lines for a national wildlife research policy,mimeo

4. V B Sawarkar, 2005, Independent Monitoring ofTiger Reserves, Wildlife Institute of India, mimeo

5. B S Bonal, 2005, deliberations with the TigerTask Force, New Delhi

3.7 The relocation agenda1. Indian Board for Wildlife, 1972, Project Tiger: a

planning proposal for preservation of tiger(Panthera tigris) in India, task force, ministry ofagriculture, government of India, Delhi

2. Principal chief conservator of forests, Bhadrawildlife sanctuary, 1993, A note on the actiontaken to rehabilitate the people and livestockfrom Bhadra wildlife sanctuary, mimeo.

3. Anon, 2005, data from Karnataka forestdepartment to the Tiger Task Force (personalcommunication)

4. Project Tiger, 2005, Compendium of guidelinesand circulars issued by director, Project Tiger,mimeo

5. Sunita Narain, 2003, ‘A foriegn vocabulary’,Down To Earth, Vol 12 No 3, Society forEnvironmental Communications, New Delhi


7. Padmaparna Ghosh, 2005, ‘Laid out and bare: the price of mindless relocation’, Down To Earth,Vol 14 No 1, Society for EnvironmentalCommunications, New Delhi

8. Radhika Johari, 2003, Maps of gods andmemories of trees: blurring the boundaries ofSariska tiger reserve, paper presented at theCanadian Anthropology Society, CASCA, May 7-11, Halifax, mimeo


10. A J T Johnsingh, K Sankar and ShomitaMukherjee, 1997, ‘Saving prime tiger habitat inSariska tiger reserve’, Cat News 27, Autumn

11. Arpan Sharma, 2003, ‘Displacement fromwildlife protected areas: implications forconservation and livelihoods’, Social Change,June-September, Vol 33, 2&3

12. Dionne Bunsha, 2005, ‘Left high and dry’,Frontline, Vol 22, Issue 11, May 21-June 03,Chennai

13. Principal chief conservator of forests, Bhadrawildlife sanctuary, 1993, A note on the actiontaken to rehabilitate the people and livestockfrom Bhadra wildlife sanctuary, mimeo.

14. Krithi K Karanth et al (undated), Village size andforest disturbance in Bhadra wildlife sanctuary,Western Ghats, India, mimeo

15. Government of Karnataka, 2002, ‘Forgottenvillages: the story of resettlement of villages fromthe Bhadra tiger reserve, deputy commissioner,Chikmagalur

16. Krithi K Karanth et al (undated) Village size andforest disturbance in Bhadra Wildlife Sanctuary,Western Ghats, India, mimeo

156 References


17. Ministry of environment and forests, 2002,National Wildlife Action Plan, government ofIndia, Delhi

3.8 The coexistence agenda1. H S Pabla, 1997, ‘Man-wildlife conflict around

protected areas’, Vacham wildlife preservation,Vol VIII, No 2, April 1997, Centre for HumanSettlements and Environment, Bhopal

2. Puja Sawhney, 2003, People-park interaction: acase of Bandhavgarh national park, Centre forDevelopment Research, University of Bonn,Germany

3. Rucha Ghate, 2003, ‘Global gains at local costs:imposing protected areas’, department ofeconomics, Nagpur university, mimeo


5. Manshi Asher, 2005, report of the public hearingat the Buxa tiger reserve, National Forum forForest People and Forest Workers, April, mimeo

6. Shomona Khanna and Naveen T K, 2005,Contested terrain: forest cases in the SupremeCourt of India, Society for Rural Urban andTribal Initiative, April, New Delhi

7. V K Bahuguna, 2003, guidelines for diversion offorest land for non-forest purposes under FCA,letter to the chief secretary/administrator (allstates), 20.10.2003, F No 2-1/2003-FC, FC division,MoEF, in Handbook of FC Act 1980, MoEF, NewDelhi


9. Ashish Kothari et al 1989, Management ofnational parks and sanctuaries in India: a statusreport, Indian Institute of Public Administration,New Delhi

10. DCF, wildlife division, Chamarajanagar, 2004,official memorandum, no B/WL/CR-36/2002-03,Karnataka


12. Rucha Ghate, 2003, Global gains at local costs:imposing protected areas, department ofeconomics, Nagpur university, mimeo

13. Rucha Ghate, 2005, submission to the Tiger TaskForce, Nagpur, June, mimeo

14. Harini Nagendra, personal communication,[email protected]

15. Ghazala Shahabuddin and Soumya Prasad, 2004,‘Assessing ecological sustainability of non-

timber forest produce extraction: the Indianscenario’, Conservation and Society 2, 2, Sagepublications, Delhi, Thousand Oaks, London

16. Sharad Lele, 2005, letter and suggestions to TigerTask Force, by email July 4, Bangalore

17. J Mutebi, ‘Co-managed protected areas: fromconflict to collaboration, experience in BwindiImpenetrable National Park, Uganda, CARE

Uganda18. UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre,

Bwindi Impenetrable National Park, UgandaSeptember 2003/July 22 2005, http://www.unep-wcmc.org/sites/wh/bwindi.html

19. R G Wild, J Mutebi, ‘Conservation throughcommunity use of plant resources’ CARE

December 199620. R G Wild, J Mutebi, ‘Conservation through

community use of plant resources’, CARE,December 1996

21. R G Wild, J Mutebi, ‘Conservation throughcommunity use of plant resources’, CARE

December 199622. J Mutebi, ‘Co-managed protected areas: from

conflict to collaboration’, experience in BwindiImpenetrable National Park, Uganda, CARE,Uganda

3.9 The fringe agenda1. Harini Nagendra et al 2005, ‘People within parks

— forest villages, land cover change andlandscape fragmentation in the Tadoba-Andharitiger reserve, India’, mimeo

2. H S Pabla, 2005, ‘Use it or lose it: the mantra forman-animal co-existence’, mimeo

3. Nitin Sethi, 2004, ‘The Bandipur-Brazilcorridor’, Down To Earth, Vol 13 No 11, Societyfor Environmental Communications, New Delhi




7. M D Madhusudan, 2003, ‘Living amidst largewildlife: livestock and crop depredation by largemammals in the interior villges of Bhadra tigerreserve’, south India, Springer

8. M D Madhusudan, 2003, ‘Living amidst largewildlife: livestock and crop depredation by largemammals in the interior villges of Bhadra tigerreserve’, south India, Springer

9. Anon, 1996, India Ecodevelopment Project,Project Report 1996, World Bank


References 157



12. Nitin Sethi, 2004, ‘Officially bankrupt’, Down ToEarth, Vol 13, No 5, Society for EnvironmentalCommunications, New Delhi


14. Anon, 1983, ‘Eliciting public support for wildlifeconservation’, Indian Board of Wildlife, Uniongovernment of India, Delhi




18. Anon, 2000, ‘Bone of contention’, Down ToEarth, Vol 9, No 7, Society for EnvironmentalCommunications, New Delhi

19. K Ullas Karanth, 2005, Comments andsuggestions on some general issues of tigerconservation in india, Centre for WildlifeStudies, Wildlife Conservation SocietyBangalore

20. Vishwas Sawarkar, 2005, ‘What will it take to secure in the long term the future of tigers in the forests of India — an appraisal’, submitted to the Tiger Task Force, government ofIndia

21. V K Bahuguna et al 2004, Root to Canopy,Winrock International India


23. Mark Poffenberger and Betsy McGean, 1996,Village Voices, Forest Choices, OxfordUniversity Press


25. Anon, 2004, Forest and Wildlife Statistics India2004, Union ministry of environment andforests, New Delhi

26. Anon, 2004, Forest and Wildlife Statistics India2004, Union ministry of environment andforests, New Delhi

27. Ruksan Bose, 2005, ‘Too cut and dried’, Down ToEarth, Vol 14, No 5, Society for EnvironmentalCommunications, New Delhi

28. Ashish Kothari, 2005, comments on the Wildlife(Protection) Amendment Bill, 2002, Kalpvriksh,Pune

29. Mohit Gera, 2004, ‘Jammu and Kashmir’, Root to

Canopy, V K Bahuguna et al editors, WinrockInternational India

3.10 The tourism agenda1. Project Tiger, 2005, ‘Analysis of data received

from states’, mimeo2. Anon, 2005, data from Rajasthan state forest

department to Tiger Task Force, personalcommunication

3. Anon, 2005, data from Periyar Foundation to theTiger Task Force, personal communication

4. MoEF, 2002, the National Wildlife Action Plan2002-2016, government of India

5. Anon, 2004, compendium of guidelines issuedby Project Tiger director, New Delhi

6. Government of Rajasthan, 2004, guidelinesregarding regulation of tourists and vehicles inRanthambhore national park, September 20,Jaipur

7. Dharmendra Khandal, 2004, ‘Tourismmanagement in the Ranthambhore national park:problems and solutions’, September, TigerWatch, Sawai Madhopur, mimeo

8. Anon, 2005, data received from Rajasthan stateforest department to the Tiger Task Force, 2005

9. Anon, 2005, data received from Rajasthan stateforest department to the Tiger Task Force, 2005

10. A K Garg, 2003, Order No F 11 (14) forest/01,government of Rajasthan, forest department, May 26, Jaipur

11. R Sukumar, 2005, brief note placed before the Tiger Task Force, at the meeting held atthe CES, IISc, Bangalore, June 21, Centre forEcological Sciences, Indian Institute of Science,mimeo

12. R Sukumar, 2005, brief note placed before theTiger Task Force, at the meeting held at the CES,IISc, Bangalore, June 21, Centre for EcologicalSciences, Indian Institute of Science, mimeo

13. Deepa Kozhisseri, 2005, ‘Once poacher, now guard’, Down To Earth, Vol 14, No 6,Society for Environmental Communications,New Delhi

14. R Sukumar, 2005, brief note placed before the Tiger Task Force, at the meeting held at the CES, IISc, Bangalore, June 21, Centre forEcological Sciences, Indian Institute of Science,mimeo

15. Ghazala Shahabuddin, 2005, ‘When people takecharge, sustainable tourism equals sustainableliving’, mimeo

16. Rustam Vania, 2002, ‘The enterprise’, Down ToEarth, Vol 11, No 5, Society for EnvironmentalCommunications, New Delhi

17. http://earthtrends.wri.org/text/biodiversity-

158 References


protected/country-profile-205.html as seen onJuly 24, 2005

18. http://www.globaleye.org.uk/archive/summer2k/focuson/mars_pt1.html, as seen on July 22,2005

19. Richard Hassler 1999, Overview of the social,ecological and economic achievements andchallenges of Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE programme,IIED

20. http://www.unsystem.org/ngls/documents/publications.en/voices.africa/number6/vfa6.08.htm, as seen on July 22, 2005

21. http://www.globaleye.org.uk/archive/summer2k/focuson/mars_pt1.html, as seen on July 22, 2005

3.11 Ecological services agenda1. Anon, 2004, State of Forest Report, Forest Survey

of India 2003, Dehradun



4. Madhu Verma, 2001, ‘Economic valuation ofBhoj wetlands for sustainable use’, mimeo


6. Augusta Molnar et al 2004, Who conserves theworld’s forests? A new assessment ofconservation and investment trends, ForestTrends, Washington, USA


References 159


06Annexures

I. The composition and terms of reference of the Tiger Task Force

II. Note of dissent by Valmik Thapar, member, Tiger Task Force

III. Response of the chairperson, Tiger Task Force, to note of dissent

IV. Expert consultations based on terms of reference of the Tiger Task Force

V. Visits of the Tiger Task Force

VI. Experts requested to comment on methodology of tiger estimation

VII. Suggestions received on the terms of reference of Tiger Task Force

VIII. Methodology for estimating and monitoring tiger status and habitat

IX. Investing in institutions for change: strengthening the Project Tiger directorate

X. A critique of cadre-building in the forestry sector and suggestions for human resource improvement

XI. Amending the criminal provisions of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972

XII. Guideline on establishment of widlife wings issued 1973-1981

Annexures 161

161

162 Annexures


No 6 (4)/2005-PTGOVERNMENT OF INDIA

MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT AND FORESTS(PROJECT TIGER)

Annexe No. 5, Bikaner HouseShahjahan Road, New Delhi-11

Dated the 19th April, 2005.

NOTIFICATION

In pursuant to the decision taken during the second meeting of the National Board for Wildlife held on17-3-2005, a Task Force for reviewing the management of Tiger Reserves has been constituted. The Membersof the Task Force are as follows:

(1) Ms Sunita Narain, Director, Centre for Science and Environment. - Chairperson(2) Shri H S Panwar, Ex-Head, Project Tiger and Ex-Head, - Member

Wild Life Institute of India. (3) Prof Madhav Gadgil, Environmental Historian and Member, - Member

National Board for Wildlife. (4) Shri Valmik Thapar, Member, National Board for Wildlife. - Member(5) Shri Samar Singh, Ex-Secretary, Govt. of India and Member, - Member

National Board for Wildlife.

The terms of reference of the Task Force are as follows:

1. Suggest measures to strengthen tiger conservation in the country.2. Suggest measures to incentivise the local community in conservation of tigers.3. Suggest measures to incentivise local forest staff posted in sanctuaries/national parks and ensure an

effective HR plan for tiger conservation/wildlife managers.4. Suggest measures to improve the methodology of tiger counting and forecasting.5. Suggest methods of transparent professional audit of wildlife parks and placing data on tiger conservation

in the public domain.6. Suggest a new wildlife management paradigm that shares concerns of conservation with the public at

large. 2. The Project Tiger Division of the Ministry of Environment & Forests would be facilitating the working of

the Task Force and render all necessary help.3. The Task Force should submit its report within three months from the date of this notification.4. The sitting fees and travel cost would be reimbursed to the Members of the Task Force as per norms.

(DR. RAJESH GOPAL)IGF & DIRECTOR, PROJECT TIGER

To(1) All Members of the Task Force.(2) P.M.O.(3) PS to MEF(4) PS to MOS (E&F)(5) PPS to Secretary (E&F)(6) PPS to DGF & SS(7) PPS to Addl. DGF (WL)

A N N E X U R E - I The composition and terms ofreference of the Tiger Task Force

19, Kautilya Marg,Chanakyapuri,

New Delhi-110021Dated: 27.07.2005

To

Ms Sunita Narain,Chairperson,Task Force for Reviewing the Management of Tiger Reserves,New Delhi

Subject : Dissent Note on the Report of the Task Force for Reviewing the Management of TigerReserves

I am enclosing my Note of Dissent on the report alongwith Annexure A to D. It may please be ensuredthat this Note of Dissent alongwith enclosures is recorded and incorporated in the final report. A soft copy onfloppy is also enclosed.

Please acknowledge receipt.

VALMIK THAPARMember

Task Force for Reviewing theManagement of Tiger Reserves

Annexures 163


A N N E X U R E - I I Note of dissent

NOTE OF DISSENT BY VALMIK THAPAR, MEMBER ON THE DRAFT REPORT OF THE TASK FORCEFOR REVIEWING THE MANAGEMENT OF TIGER RESERVES

I. The long term survival of tigers will depend on the single most important factor namely inviolateprotected areas A certain minimum area has to be managed exclusively in its natural form for the tiger.The area may be ?%, 1% or 2% or more of the geographical area of this country depending on the politicalmandate to do so. Let the principle of this be applied in the interest of the tiger. After all it is these areaswhich provide the water, food and ecological security of the country. On the other hand the entire reportis based on a totally different strategy namely that:

“There are two essential strategies here:1. The habitat must be shared between the people and the tigers, so that both can coexist, as they must. The poverty of one, otherwise, will be the destruction of the other.”

(Page 4, Chapter 02 – A Paradigm Change – Making Conservation Work)

II. The concept paper on “A Paradigm Change – “Making Conservation work” and the chapter on Co-existence of people raise serious issues that impact on the entire report. Let us not forget that the taskforce was mandated to suggest measures to save the tiger from vanishing off the face of India. It was aresponse to an ongoing tiger crisis. Unfortunately, in its eagerness to find ‘eternal solutions’ for allproblems afflicting the country at one go, the Task Force appears to have lost this mission-focus and hasgone adrift trying to find solutions to all the problems of inequity and social injustice that afflict India. Inthe process the interests of the tiger’s survival has been relegated and lost sight of.

III. It is imperative to note that all the ‘potential tiger habitats in the protected areas of India, add up only to100,000 sq. km. and populations where reproduction is taking place now occupy less than 20,000 sq. km.This is a relatively small fraction of India’s huge rural poor population is exposed to tigers. The premisethat there are vast areas of India where tigers and people must be forced to co-exist through someinnovative scheme of increased use of underutilized forest resources by involving the local people doesnot make any sense to tiger conservation especially when the human and cattle populations areconstantly rising. The fact is each tiger must eat 50 cow-sized animals a year to survive, and if you put itamidst cows and people, the conflict will be eternal and perennial. Tigers continue to lose out as they didin Sariska (and over 95% of their former range in India). The premise of continued co-existence over vastlandscapes where tigers thrive ecologically, as well people thrive economically, is an impractical dream,with which I totally disagree. Such dreaming cannot save the tiger in the real world. On the other handsuch a scenario will be a “no win” situation for everyone and result in further declines and the eventualextinction of tiger populations Alternatives where tigers have priority in identified protected reservesand people have priority outside them have to be explored fast and implemented expeditiously. Thereis no other way. The present concept of a ‘new’ coexistence is an utopian idea and impractical and willnot work. This I am absolutely clear about.

Blaming strict nature reserves and conservation laws where tigers have priority, for all the povertyand inequity driven ills that plague our vast country is pointless polemics: These ills are consequences ofthe failure of development, economics and politics of the country and society as a whole and cannot besimple-mindedly blamed on conservationists.

IV. In the chapter 5.8 “The Co-Existence Agenda”, it is stated that:

“Exacerbating tensions with protection

If this was not bad enough, recent events have made things even more unbearable for the people wholive in these reserves.

In February 2000, the Amicus Curiae (in the omnibus forest case ongoing in the Supreme Court), had filed an application seeking ….. The court in its order dated 14.2.2000 ordered that “in the meantime, we restrain the respondents from ordering the removal of dead, diseased, dying or wing-fallen trees, drift wood and grasses etc. from the national park or game sanctuary or forest.”

164 Annexures


This order has lead to a number of directions: ….

But matters (and confusion) did not end there.

On October 20, 2003, the Ministry of Environment and Forests wrote to all chief secretaries a letterdetailing the guidelines for diversion of forest land for non forest purposes under the ForestConservation Act 1980. …

But even this was not enough.

On July 2, 2004, the Central Empowered Committee (CEC) set up the Supreme Court to assist it in theforest matters, wrote to all state governments ….

Impact on conservation

The combined result of these directions, orders and clarifications has been that all hell has brokenloose in the protected areas. …”

The report gives an impression that the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s orders dated 14.2.2000, 3.4.2000,10.5.2001, and February, 2002, application moved by the Amicus Curiae pursuant to which some of theabove orders have been passed, guidelines issued by the MoEF and clarification dated 2.7.2004 issued bythe CEC for implementation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s order are unwarranted, misplaced and thatthese have been issued without application of mind. This view is totally unacceptable. I firmly believethat the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s orders have been most invaluable in furthering the cause ofconservation and the protection of wildlife habitat. The large scale destruction of the tiger habitat due tomassive mining, tree felling, supply of bamboo to paper mills, diversion of protected area habitat for illconceived projects, etc. have been controlled significantly something which would not have beenpossible but for the intervention by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

V. The concept paper simply ignores what sound science tells us about tiger conservation. It fails to note thedeteriorating protection of the tiger reserve, and the need to put in place alternative, effective mechanismsto protect the core breeding populations of tigers in these protected areas. “A Paradigm for Change”should have included a complete revision in the process of protection and enforcement coupled withreform. Though this is suggested in other chapters its absence in the concept is perplexing. In the chapteron Co-existence with people the recommendation of relocating people will come into direct conflict withthe recommendations on co-existence of people. In the end the recommendations would be a bundle ofcontradictions and the outcome will come to naught. The suggested measures because of the inherentcontradictions will only cause further degradation of the tiger habitat and the tiger will be the endsufferer. After all why on earth would anyone want to leave a protected area when the co-existencepackage is so attractive? We are only too aware that there are criminal elements out there ready to kill thetigers and plunder their home under the cover of livelihood related uses given a chance. The report of theCBI about Sariska has confirmed this. Let us not overlook the fact that our mandate is about securing thefuture of the tiger and this can only be done in the framework of our laws. Let there be no doubt aboutour mandate.

VI. Even after many rounds of discussions, the final chapters have changes that were never discussed. Forinstance few examples are:

(i) the decision taken by the Task Force was that the Hon’ble Prime Minister should Chair the SteeringCommittee of Project Tiger. This was not “either or” with the National Board of Wildlife (Chapter –The Way Ahead);

(ii) it was agreed that the Wildlife Crime Bureau should be headed by a senior officer in the super timescale. Now added to this is “the person should report to the Additional Director General of Forests”.Can this make any sense? All it will do is to prevent his independent functioning in such sensitiveinvestigative job. This is a typical bureaucratic approach to make the system ineffective (Chapter –Domestic Enforcement – 3.3(a));

Annexures 165


(iii) regarding the State Empowered Committee of Rajasthan, I had clearly mentioned that the extensionof the term of the Committee was to do with the census the Committee was carrying out. TheCommittee had taken a series of actions from its inception. Now the said paragraph states “….but hasnow extended its term by another three months which has delayed the urgent action needed” (page 7of Chapter 2 – The Sariska Shock). This is factually incorrect and misleading;

(iv) there was a boxed section in the Chapter 3.5 “The Science Agenda” on how senior researchers andscientists have been hounded and harassed by officials in the Parks. This has now been totallydeleted though it was earlier agreed to be retained.

VII. I am also quite shocked how the report has glossed over the role of the MoEF including the Project TigerDirectorate in recent years. In the report given by me in the first meeting itself on 29th April, 2005, I hadclearly brought out the role of the Project Tiger in the debacle that took place in Sariska and the extinctionof tigers in Keladevi Sanctuary. It was then pointed out by me that there was need to inquire into and fixthe responsibility for the debacle. The vital issues raised in the above report find no mention in the finalreport without any apparent reasons. Since then more than 21 tigers have been found to be missing inRanthambhore Tiger Reserve. This is a very serious issue. Again very little of this finds place in the report(ANNEXURE-D).

I had earlier sent to you (i) a draft report (now final) identifying specific problems of tiger conservationand giving specific solutions (ANNEXURE-A); (ii) an action plan for co-existence of people (ANNEXURE-B); and(iii) objection to Research and Study Chapter (ANNEXURE-C). I have also objected to the sub-cadre in wildlifeand have instead proposed the alternative of creating a panel of suitable officers (Para 1(I to v) of Part II of myreport (ANNEXURE-A). I have also urged a Central Forest and Wildlife Protection Force may be set up (Para 2(vi)of Part II) of my report (ANNEXURE-A).

Copies of the above are enclosed as ANNEXURE-A to ANNEXURE-C to this Note of Dissent. These together withANNEXURE-D form part of my Dissent Note.

Before parting, I am constrained to observe that sadly much of the report has become focused on how toimprove the life of people inside protected areas rather than protecting tigers inside them. This people focusshould have been the job of another task force. The focus on the tiger has therefore blurred since the prioritieshave shifted. In a way this is tragic and if some of the recommendations are endorsed in policy they couldhave dangerous repercussions for the tiger.

(Valmik Thapar)Member

Task Force for Reviewing theManagement of Tiger Reserves

Dated :27.07.2005

166 Annexures


INTRODUCTION

1. The Sariska tiger crisis happened because (a) theTiger Reserve was completely mismanaged therebyleaving the field open for poachers; (b) the actualnumber of tigers was much less than that reflected inthe earlier census figures because the census was notparticipatory, transparent and scientific, the totalcount pugmark census methodology used since the1970s has been proven inaccurate; and (c) excessivehuman and livestock disturbance right across thearea.

2. The Sariska tiger crisis is symptomatic of most ofIndia. In 2004-2005 local extinctions have takenplace not only in Sariska Sanctuary but also in KelaDevi Sanctuary in Rajasthan. These two sanctuariesbetween them lost 24 tigers. There was also a sharpdecline of 21 tigers in Ranthambhore Tiger Reserve.All the seven tigers in the Palpurkuno Sanctuary andall the six tigers in Rani Durgawati Sanctuary inMadhya Pradesh have been wiped out and are nowlocally extinct. The decline across the North Eastincluding Namdapha and Dampha Tiger Reservescoupled with the declines in places like PalamauTiger Reserve, Valmiki Tiger Reserve, Dudhwa TigerReserve, Indrawati Tiger Reserve, Panna TigerReserve and Nagarjuna Sagar Tiger Reserve reflectthe grim national scenario. The States have obviouslynot given the required priority to the issue ofconservation and protection of tigersnotwithstanding the existence of many reports,recommendations and the Wildlife Action Plan thatare drawn up from time to time after involvingexperts at the national level. The non-implementation of the National Wildlife Action Plan(2002-2016) particularly stands out starkly in thisregard.

3. The tremendous pressure on forests and theunsustainable levels of biomass removals by localpeople as well as by the forest department andrampant grazing have adversely affected the NationalParks/sanctuaries/reserve forests. The State of theForest Report, 2003, clearly brings out that the forestshaving more than 70 per cent density is only 51,285sq. kms. (1.56 per cent of this country’s geographicarea). Further, an area of 26,245 sq. kms (0.75 percent of country’s geographic area) of dense forests

having more than 40 per cent density has been lost injust two years. Out of this area of 26,245 sq. kms ofdense forests, a total of 23,140 sq. kms is inpotentially rich tiger habitats and includes, amongothers, States like Assam, Jharkhand, Karnataka,Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh andUttranchal. The trends revealed in this latest reportare exceedingly grave and disturbing and, if notreversed, could have serious consequences for thetiger’s forests. There would be 300,000 sq. kms ofpotential tiger habitat. Less than 10% containbreeding population.

4. The unregulated biotic pressure has resulted in aconflict of interests between the local population andthe forest management with the real threat of largescale destruction of wildlife habitat looming on thehorizon. Encroachments, delayed settlement of rightsof the people and the diversion of forests for illconceived projects have compounded the problems.In this background the populist approach of liberallyregularizing encroachments and grant of pattas inforest areas and management interventions in theform of dry bamboo extraction, underplanting, etc.will both mean further fragmentation invitingirreversible ecological disaster. Ultimately the tigeritself will be on the brink of extinction.

5. Tiger populations breed well and grow rapidlyin population in habitats without incompatiblehuman uses. They cannot co-exist with peopleparticularly in a situation where both human impactsand livestock grazing are continuously on theincrease. In the Ranthambhore Tiger Reserve thetiger has gone locally extinct in Kela Devi Sanctuaryand Sawai Mansingh Sanctuary in the year 2005.The reason for this is the presence of 52,510 goats,10178 buffaloes, 4928 cows and even 37 camels. Notto talk of 40 villages and their ever increasing humanpopulation. One wonders whether this sanctuaryhas been declared to protect forest and wildlife orcattle? The long term survival of tigers will thereforedepend on how secure and inviolate are theprotected areas in which they live.

6. In the above background an attempt has beenmade to highlight the problems (Part I) under sixheads as below :

i) Forest Personnel;

Annexures 167


DISSENT NOTE

ANNEXURE-A

A PLAN OF ACTION TO ENSURE THE LONG TERM SURVIVAL OF TIGERS

ii) Infrastructure;iii) Biotic Pressure on the Wildlife Habitat;iv) Policy and Enforcement Issues;v) Research, Science and Monitoring ; and vi) Funds Related Issues

7. Similarly, an attempt has also been made toprovide possible solutions to the problems listed inthe preceding para within the existing legal andadministrative framework that exists in India. Thesolutions suggested (Part II) have been indicatedunder the following heads :

i) Manage the Protected Area with CompetentOfficials so that Problems are Resolved ;

ii) Sensitize the Centre and StateAdministration to the Needs of the Tiger;

iii) Prevent Destruction of the Tiger’s Habitat;iv) Strengthen Research and Training Across

Tiger Habitats;v) Provide Timely Funds to all Specially

Designated Tiger Areas;vi) Legal Support; andvii) International Cooperation.

8. The Plan of Action drawn up identifies theproblems and provide solutions without becomingencyclopedic. The problems have to be tackled on awar footing to ensure that the solutions are faithfullyimplemented in the field in a time bound manner.The need of the hour is implementation.

9. Issues related to personnel matters need to begiven a very high priority because the officials whomanage the tiger’s landscape, and the local people,have to be committed and dedicated and trained to

be effective. This also raises issues like how do youcreate a system to ensure that the best person is onthe job and how do we make him fully effective inthat job? Particularly given that the StateGovernments really make the final decisions in allpersonnel posting in reserves. How do we attemptthis?

10. Similarly, to minimize human disturbance howdo you involve the forest management and the localinhabitants? Ultimately both the forest managementand the local people have to develop a sense of prideand satisfaction in what they are doing if the forestsand wildlife are to be conserved and protected.Today the area in which tigers live undisturbed isgrossly inadequate and therefore the long termsurvival of the tiger hangs in the balance.

11. There has to be close coordination anddovetailing of the activities initiated by the NationalLevel Committee headed by the Prime Minister, theState Level Committee headed by the Chief Ministerand the National Advisory Committee on Researchso that they all move and act in tandem and becomereceptive mechanisms for change.

12. It is with all these factors in mind that this planof action has been spelt out in a simple and straightforward way without too much detail whichwherever further required has been left to theappropriate expert administrative and researchcommittees. This Plan of Action has been sostructured so as to ensure that the existing delicatebalance of responsibility and power between theCentre and the State is not disturbed.

1. FOREST PERSONNEL

i) Lack of professionally trained, committed,competent and physically fit FieldDirectors and other officials.

ii) The Forest Department’s mindset is that ofan owner not a custodian.

iii) There is no system of selectiveappointments to the sensitive posts atvarious levels in the PAs/Tiger Reserves.(Instead many are treated as punishmentpostings).

iv) Vacant posts numbering nearly 5000 inPAs/Tiger Reserves.

v) The average age of forest guards is above 50

years.vi) No effective system of specialized training

(induction stage, in service etc.)vii) Transfer policy – no fixed tenure.

Irrational transfers on extraneousconsiderations.

viii) Lack of incentives including special pay,housing, etc.

ix) Insufficient promotion avenues –forestguards remain stagnant for years.

x) Poor service conditions for front line staffin terms of provisions for ration, specialpay, family accommodation, workinghours, schooling, medical facilities,compensatory leave, life and other

168 Annexures


PART I

THE PROBLEMS

insurance policies etc.xi) Physical fitness programme – No training

or drill centres on site.xii) Lack of effective disciplinary action system

against the delinquent officials.Punishment should be swift and act as adeterrent.

xiii) Lack of priority for deployment of armedpolice in time of crisis/to sensitive area.

II. INFRASTRUCTURE

i) Forest Officials are not empowered to usefire arms for protection of Governmentproperty/forest produce/wildlife except inKarnataka/Tamil Nadu.

ii) Inadequate as well as out dated fire armsexist with the officials and whereveravailable no proper training programme/facilities exist.

iii) Lack of uniform, shoes, patrolling kit forthe staff.

iv) No/inadequate wireless hand-sets forcommunication.

v) Inadequate mobility (motorcycles, jeeps,trucks, boats, etc.).

vi) Inadequate forest chowkies/posts, antipoaching camps, patrol camps and staffquarters.

vii) Poor service and maintenance of vehicles,wireless, chowkies/checkposts, buildings,equipments, etc.

III. BIOTIC PRESSURE ON THE WILDLIFE HABITAT

i) Settlement of acquisition rights underWild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 pendingfor decades in PAs.

ii) No effective steps taken to prevent andremove encroachments.

iii) Very poor progress of relocation of villages located inside the NationalPark/sanctuary.

iv) Inadequate compensation for the loss oflife and property including crops resultingin anger and deliberate damage both towildlife and habitat.

v) Habitat fragmentation due to ill conceivedprojects/schemes which have adverseimpact on PAs.

vi) Absence of adequate wildlife corridorsconnecting one PA/Tiger Reserve withanother.

vii) Conflict of PA with local community(within as well as in peripheral villages).

viii) Rampant legal/illegal mining continues.

ix) Unregulated and poor tourism management.x) Excessive/illegal grazing and removal of

fuelwood, MFP, etc. continues atunsustainable levels.

xi) Presence of roads (State and other roads)with heavy traffic passing through PAs.

xii) Poor management of tigers outsidePAs/tiger reserves.

IV. POLICY AND ENFORCEMENT ISSUES

i) Lack of will at higher echelons of politicaland administrative set up at both Centreand State levels (committees hardly meet,decisions kept pending, whatever decisiontaken remains unimplemented, posts notfilled, dual charge, powers oftransfer/posting misused, etc.).

ii) Ineffective role of the MoEF in conveningmeetings of committees, decision takingdelayed, poor follow up action ondecisions taken, appointments etc. Endlessrecommendations of expert committeesgathering dust in MoEF for years e.g.Subramanayam Committee.

iii) Lack of a grasp of human and ecologicalconcerns in wildlife conservation resultingin poor policy.

iv) National Wildlife Action Plan (2002-2016)only on paper. Completely ignored andremains unimplemented.

v) Lack of professionally trained wildlifeofficials leading to poor enforcement offorest and wildlife laws which is a criticalcomponent in the protection work.

vi) Lack of coordination between Centre andState in the implementation of policies,laws, guidelines and directives.

vii) Lack of coordination amongst the variousagencies/departments.

viii) National Wildlife Crime Bureau is yet to beset up even though decision to create it wastaken eight years ago.

ix) Ineffective intelligence collection andnetworking at local level, state level,national level and international level, andabsent or ineffective in most States.

V. RESEARCH, SCIENCE AND MONITORING

i) No wildlife management manual – theProtected Area manager has no guidelinesto refer to and no clear prescription tofollow which leads to taking ad hocdecisions.

ii) Absence/poor quality of Management Plan for Protected Area. Wherever they

Annexures 169


exist the prescriptions are poorlyimplemented due to lack of funds orexpertise.

iii) Poor scientific input in management andmonitoring of PAs.

iv) Unscientific estimation of tiger population– Grossly inflated because of defectivemethodology. Also lacks transparency.

v) Size of the breeding tiger populationdepends on good protection/adequatepreybase, less disturbance and adequatewater availability.

vi) Independent scientific researchersdiscouraged, even harassed.

vii) Poor management of the area (habitat,animals, people tourism etc.). Shouldinclude independent ecological audit andmonitoring.

VI. FUNDS RELATED ISSUES

i) Grossly inadequate allocation – (Stateplan, Central Plan).

ii) Diversion of Central assistance – inabsence of proper funding mechanism.

iii) Earmarking of funds necessary so that it isnot diverted for non-forestry/non-wildlifeactivities.

iv) Delay in disbursement and utilization offunds – Late release of funds results in iteither being misutilised or remainingunutilized because it is not possible to useit before the financial year ends on the 31stMarch of that particular year.

v) Inadequate delegation of financial powers– purchases etc.

vi) No funds for intelligence gathering.

I. MANAGE THE PROTECTED AREA WITHCOMPETENT OFFICIALS SO THATPROBLEMS ARE RESOLVED

i) Prepare a panel of officials who haveevinced keen interest in wildlife – at thelevel of Field Director (Conservator ofForests)/ Deputy Conservator of Forestlevel), A.C.F. and RFO – Make a smallbeginning – say with 10 Field Directors, 25ACFs, 50-100 RFOs and then increase thenumbers.

ii) The panel to be drawn up by the Ministryof Environment & Forests in consultationwith independent experts and StateGovernments. The detailed procedure andstandards for this purpose to be laid downby the National Committee headed by thePrime Minister (refer para II (i)).

iii) The empanelled officers may beconsidered for posting in any of thepremier PAs within his home cadre and inother States (on State to State deputationbasis).

iv) In addition to forest officers, the panel mayinclude non-government experts andwilling officers from other services ondeputation. Lateral induction may also beresorted to.

v) Extensive training on a continuous basis toempanelled officials.

vi) Security of tenure to be ensured – officials

to be shifted before completion of tenureonly in exceptional cases with reasons tobe recorded and communicated along withtransfer orders.

vii) Like some of the specialised governmentagencies the tenure may be extendable indeserving cases – no cap need be fixed.

viii) Eligibility for in situ promotion to ensurecontinuity.

ix) Special pay and facilities for officialsposted in the field.

x) Mechanism for swiftly fixingaccountability and responsibility againstlax/corrupt/defaulting officials.

II. SENSITISE THE CENTRE AND STATEADMINISTRATION TO THE NEEDS OF THETIGER

i) A National Tiger Management Committee,at the Central level, under theChairmanship of the Prime Minister withrepresentatives of the Ministries ofEnvironment and Forests, Home, Finance,Tribal Welfare, Rural Development and thePlanning Commission as well asindependent experts as members should beconstituted to provide policy input andinject innovative reforms in the system.The said Committee, wherever required,may intervene to provide the requisitepolitical and administrative inputs and

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PART II

SOLUTIONS

support at the Central/State level. TheCentral Committee will regularly interactwith the State Committee chaired by theChief Minister.

ii) A High Powered Committee under theChairmanship of the Chief Minister withthe Forest Minister, Chief Secretary,Secretaries looking after Departments ofForests, Home, Finance and Planning,Principal Chief Conservator of Forest andChief Wildlife Warden as members to beconstituted immediately for takingdecision for filling up vacant posts,imparting training to the front line staff,providing incentives to the officials,improving service conditions and facilitiesand the deploying of armed police insensitive areas in times of crisis. ThisCommittee will also deal with otheradministrative issues such as empoweringthe use of fire arms, providing uniforms,patrolling equipment, wireless networks,vehicles, and the allocation and release ofadequate funds for wildlife conservationwith adequate delegation of financialpowers, etc.

iii) To accord priority and focus on theconservation and protection issues, aseparate department for Forest andWildlife should immediately be carved outwithin the Ministry of Environment andForests. It may be mentioned that duringthe meeting of the National Board ofWildlife held on 17.3.2005 under theChairmanship of the Prime Minister, therewas a general consensus for a separateDepartment for Forest and Wildlife.

iv) Immediate implementation of the NationalWildlife Action Plan (2002-2016). Funds tobe earmarked for the implementation ofthis Plan.

v) The Wildlife Crime Bureau shouldimmediately be made effective preferablybefore 1st September, 2005, and even afterit is set up the CBI should continue to play alead role.

vi) A Central Forest and Wildlife ProtectionForce should be constituted by drawingofficials on deputation from Police, CRPF,CISF, ITBP, etc. – This fully equipped andtrained force can be deployed at shortnotice to any trouble spot.

vii) The officials posted in PAs should not beused for election or any other non-protection work. Similarly the vehiclesbelonging to the PA shall not be diverted forany work relating to election or other duties.

viii) Projects like eco-development etc. shouldnot be handled by the Forest Departmentwhose sole job must be focused onprotection.

ix) The environmental impact of allcommercial and developmental projectsproposed to be undertaken in and aroundthe tiger’s habitat needs to be thoroughlyscrutinized by experts before beingcleared.

x) The impact of externally aided projects inthe field of wildlife conservation andprotection has by and large been negativeand therefore should be discouraged.

III. PREVENT DESTRUCTION OF THE TIGER’SHABITAT

i) Settlement/acquisition of rights in the PAsunder the provisions of the Wild Life(Protection) Act, 1972 should beundertaken on priority.

ii) A time bound programme for therelocation of villages from within theprotected areas should be prepared andimplemented at the earliest. Therehabilitation plan should ensure that thecompensation package is the best possible,liberal and attractive so that it leads to abetter quality of life. As far as possible therelocation process should be outsourcedwith the Forest Department playing only acatalytical role.

iii) Since the above matter is of criticalimportance, the State Committee under theChairmanship of the Chief Minister shouldregularly review the all round progress.The funds for this purpose may be madeavailable by the MoEF, Ministry of TribalAffairs, Ministry of Rural Developmentand the State Governments. Other sourceslike the Compensatory Afforestation Fundmay also be tapped.

iv) Prevention and eviction of encroachmentsshould be given emphasis.

v) The villagers in and around the PAs shouldbe effectively involved in conservation andprotection of the area. Some of thesuggested measures are :a) creation of village patrols where

local villagers are trained, givenmonthly remuneration and likehome guards can be effectivelydeployed. A specially designedcourse may be drawn up for theirtraining;

b) use of local villagers for water and

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soil conservation, fire protection, astourist guides and interpreters andin any other P.A. based activity.Suitable training courses for theseactivities may be drawn up;

c) networking local people inintelligence gathering against timbermafia and poachers;

d) build up close rapport with foreststaff and local anti-poaching patrols(to use their traditional knowledgeof the area) to track poachers;

e) impart training for theirinvolvement in scientific research(special courses that are site specificto the ongoing research can beconducted);

f) the revenue from tourism collectedby the Park Authorities may beused for the establishment of aVillage Trust Fund for engaging thelocal population in the protectionof the PA – to be administered bythe village elders. Some of thisrevenue could also go towards staffwelfare;

g) the local population may play aneffective role in conservation andprotection of the area byestablishing ManagementBoards/Committees for the PA

consisting of representatives of thevillages, Park officials and locallybased conservation NGOs andscientists. This ManagementBoard/Committee may meet everythree months in order to encourage atransparent and participatoryapproach towards management andthereafter will regularly send itsrecommendations to the State LevelCommittee;

h) rehabilitation of hunting tribes,traditional poachers living in andaround PAs should be done on apriority basis (as was done inPeriyar). One way of rehabilitatingthem is by involving them in anti-poaching works which gives richdividend. They could also beresettled away from forest areas andthen given alternatives for theirlivelihood. This would need to beclosely monitored;

vi) Specific prescriptions for tiger protectionshould be incorporated in the WorkingPlans in respect of identified tiger rich

habitats in forests outside the protectedareas.

vii) Priority needs to be accorded foridentification and protection of wildlifecorridors for the movement oftigers/wildlife from one PA/habitat toanother.

viii) Imposing a cess on hotels and touroperators who depend on the PA for theirbusiness. The cess will be determined bythe State Committee under theChairmanship of the Chief Minister. Thecess can be used for the welfare of the localpopulation such as schooling, medicine,etc.

ix) efforts should be made to provide alternateroutes to the existing roads/National/StateHighways passing through the PAs whichare playing havoc with the tiger andwildlife.

xi) Mining (new leases as well as renewalcases), hotels and resorts and otheractivities which have a negative impact onthe habitat and wildlife should not bepermitted within the safety zone (say onekm. from the boundary).

xi) Protected Areas affected byinsurgency/naxalites and which have goodforests and tiger habitats require specialattention through special measures. – BothCentral and State Committees will dealwith this issue.

xii) Under no circumstances mining,agriculture, regularization ofencroachment and other activities whichlead to fragmentation/destruction of thehabitat should be permitted.

Many of the above activities can beprohibited/regulated under the existing provisions ofthe Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 and also byissuing of notification under the Environment(Protection) Act by the MoEF.

IV. STRENGTHEN RESEARCH AND TRAININGACROSS TIGER HABITATS

i) A Wildlife Management Manual/Codeshould be prepared in a time boundmanner by the MoEF with the assistance ofthe Wildlife Institute of India. It should beensured that every PA is managed as per theprescriptions of the Management Pan forthat particular P.A. The Manual would beakin to a handbook that provides detailedinformation for the better management ofthe P.A.

172 Annexures


ii) An important component of theManagement will be a detailedprescription for tourism, managing it andensuring both respect for the tiger and thevisitor.

iii) A National Level Research AdvisoryCommittee with independent experts andinstitutional members may be constitutedto give inputs/frame guidelines from timeto time regarding: (this should be anautonomous body free from governmentshackles so that they render independentand objective advise fearlessly) a) tiger census methodology (to be

decided after a complete review byall scientists associated with thisespecially because of the seriouslimitations of the total counts in thepug mark methodology);

b) research, monitoring and ecologicalaudit; and

c) issue of transparent guidelines forResearch Projects includingredressal of grievancesexpeditiously.

iv) Revamp the course and curriculum at theIGNFA which imparts training to IFS

probationers and also organize specialrefresher courses for the serving IFS

officers. v) A full fledged Centre for Wildlife Studies

consisting of (a) forest officials and otherexperts on deputation to the Indira GandhiNational Forest Academy; (b) visitingfaculty consisting of reputed national levelexperts; and (c) experts from the WildlifeInstitute of India, etc. should beestablished in the Indira Gandhi NationalAcademy of Administration.

vi) The Centre for Wildlife Studies incoordination with the MoEF should bemade responsible for the preparation of thecurriculum and imparting training for theIFS probationers, conducting refreshercourses and specialized studies/research.,etc.

vii) This Centre may also be used for providingspecialized refresher courses/trainingprogramme for other officials (from ForestDepartment as well as other Departments).

viii) A detailed annual presentation can bemade to NBWL/Prime Minister’s Committeeby the National Advisory Board of Researchin order to apprise him each year regardingthe prevailing state of affairs.

V. PROVIDE TIMELY FUNDS TO ALLSPECIALLY DESIGNATED TIGER AREAS

The Central assistance, instead of being routedthrough the normal State Governmentmachinery, should be released directly to the field staff on the existing pattern of release of funds by the MoEF through the ForestDevelopment Agency (FDA). This will not only ensure timely release and utilization offunds but responsibility and accountability canalso be easily fixed for non-utilization andmisuse of funds. A system of concurrentfinancial audit as well as ecological audit shouldbe put in place

VI. LEGAL SUPPORT

i) Legal cells headed by experienced legalofficers should be set up in each State forimparting training to officers/staff ininvestigative skills, collection ofevidenced, preparation of chargesheets/complaints etc.

ii) The Legal Cell will vigorously and closelypursue and monitor serious cases ofpoaching etc. They shall in such casesappoint special counsels/senior lawyers sothat cases are taken to their logical endwithout delay.

iii) Regional Forensic Laboratories to beestablished and recognized under theprovisions of Code of Criminal Procedure.The opinion/reports of these laboratoriesare accepted as evidence in the Courts.

iv) Provide prompt and effective legal supportto officers/staff facing harassment onaccount of false retaliatory cases filedagainst them.

v) Should also expedite cases (departmentalor criminal) against officials by pursuingthem vigorously.

VII. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

In some areas, India’s tiger habitats arecontiguous across national boundaries withNepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Mynamar.These transboundary issues need to be taken upat bilateral level as also at SAARC meetings so thata joint/special task force could be set up forbetter protection and management of these areas.This will greatly help the present population oftigers that move to and fro across internationalborders.

Annexures 173


BASIC CONSERVATION STRATEGY

i) The areas falling within the National Parksshould be made inviolate. People living inthese areas should be relocated and theirrights acquired under the WLPA. If anyvillage is not found of strategic importancewithin the National Park the boundary ofthe park should be altered to exclude suchvillage. The excluded village may beincluded in the adjoining sanctuary, if any. Needless to say that rehabilitationpackage should be the best available andattractive.

ii) Relocation from the sanctuary should berestricted to the minimum possible takinginto account the conservation value of thearea i.e. the relocation should be restrictedto the area which are absolutely vital forthe protection of tigers and are to be treatedas “core area” for tiger conservation.

iii) A detailed time bound plan for relocationof villages identified should be preparedand funds required should be madeavailable at the earliest.

iv) It should be made clear that the existingprovisions of the W.L. (P) Act. allows theright holders to carry out their legitimateactivities such as agriculture, grazing, etc.

v) Pursuant to Hon’ble Supreme Court’s orderdated 14.2.2000 in IA No. 548, noharvesting/removal of forest produceincluding minor forest produce ispermissible from nationalparks/sanctuaries.

vi) It may be clarified that the WLPA allowsmaking of alternate arrangements formaking available fuel, fodder, and otherforest produce to the existing right holders(Section 18-A(2)). Section 29 of WLPA

provide that any forest produce requiredfrom the sanctuaries should be distributedfor meeting the personal bona fide needs ofthe people living in and around thesanctuaries (and not for any commercialpurpose).

vii) In view of above legal provisions, the MoEF

may move the Hon’ble Supreme Court for

modification of its order dated 14.2.2000 toenable the legal right holders to enjoy thebenefits in the sanctuary and in the areaswhere final notifications have not beenissued. The CEC has filed its report dated4th November, 2004, which is underconsideration of the Hon’ble SupremeCourt. The MoEF may intervene in the saidI.A. and modification of the said order.

viii) A number of sanctuaries have beennotified which include non-strategic areasof very low conservation value with manyvillages. A time bound exercise ofrationalizing the boundaries of suchsanctuaries should be undertaken by theMoEF in consultation with the States. Thisprocess will result in the exclusion ofmany areas. This will be of great help inmitigating the sufferings of a large numberof people.

ix) Even in non-strategic areas of thesanctuaries, if the villagers volunteer toshift out, such shifting should befacilitated.

x) The villages from the sanctuaries may beallowed to be shifted into reserveforest/protected forest/unclassed forestwithout payment of compensatoryAfforestation, NPV, etc. For this purpose asimplified procedure for granting approvalunder the F.C. Act should be formulated.

xi) For the villagers which remain inside thesanctuary, innovative interventions withinthe framework of the law and the SupremeCourt’s order should be introduced toensure that the bona fide livelihood needsof the local people are taken care of. Thesemay include :a) preference in employment in

various government departments;b) engagement in water and soil

conservation and other forestmanagement measures;

c) involvement in village protectionforce;

d) passing on part of cess collectedfrom nearby hotels;

e) employment in private sector hotels

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DISSENT NOTE

ANNEXURE-B

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE REGARDING COEXISTENCE OF PEOPLE IN THEPROTECTED AREAS – DRAFT PREPARED BY VALMIK THAPAR

and in other developmental projectsaround the park;

f) tourist guides, trackers, intelligencegatherers, etc.

The above list is indicative and notexhaustive. The management plan shouldinclude a detailed prescription forinvolving the local population in the parkmanagement, mitigating man-animalconflict with a view to improve theirquality of life.

The existing provisions of the Wild Life

(Protection) Act, 1972 provides for meeting all the concerns and requirements of the local people.The only issue is its effective implementation,therefore, there is no need for any review/revision ofthe Act.

The MoEF’s directions are in consonance and incompliance of Hon’ble Supreme Court’s orders andtherefore cannot/should not be withdrawn. It may bementioned that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in PradipKrishen v/s UOI (AIR 1996 SC 2040)+ has specificallydirected to complete settlement proceedingsexpeditiously.

Mr. Valmik Thapar Member of the Task Force has submitted the following note of decent inrelation to the recommendations on approaches to beadopted for monitoring tiger populations in thefuture.

The past history of Project Tiger is strewn withfailures to reform the monitoring system due to a lackof attention to detail and ignoring of inputs formscientists seriously engaged with tiger conservationissues.

Since then the proposed scheme has beenthoroughly examined and critiqued by leadingcarnivore ecologists who have specialized inpopulation survey methodologies for decades at thespecific request of the Task Force. These in putshave come from Dr. Ullhas Karanth, Dr. RaghuChundawath, Dr. M. D. Madhusudan, Dr. AJTJohnsingh, Dr. SP Goel, Dr. Yoganand (the last three are from the Wildlife Institute of India). Allthese analysis, have endorsed the broad idea ofProject Tiger taking up countrywide distributionsurveys of tiger under a new sampling-basedparadigm (instead of total count censuses). But they all have pointed out several flaws in the

proposed scheme. Their critique covers the issue ofthe very design of the surveys in proposed stages,practical problems in implementing many of thesurvey methods in field conditions, problems ofanalysis as well as with the demonstrated examplefrom Satpura-Maikal Pilot Project which actually hasnot implemented the occupancy estimationapproach. Given this Valmik Thapar stronglybelieves that a technical panel of experts proposed bythe Task Force should examine all these aspects ofthe proposed methodology before it is implementedin order to resolve the problems that are admitted toexist with this protocol. This should be done withina time frame of just 3 months. Such a process will ensure the removal of any flaws and errorswhich may be present and prevent costlyexpenditures from taking place before the methodhas been vetted. This safeguard will be vital to thisnew step we are taking.

Therefore Valmik Thapar disagrees with the view that the protocol regarding tiger estimationshould be implemented immediately and even beforethe technical panel has a chance to examine andimprove it.

Annexures 175


DISSENT NOTE

ANNEXURE -C

OBJECTION BY MR. VALMIK THAPAR – MEMBER TIGER TASK FORCE ON RESEARCH ANDSCIENCE TO BE INCORPORATED IN THE REPORT

From: Valmik ThaparMember – TIGER TASK FORCE (TTF)

To: The Chairman and all other Members, for the meeting of the Task Force on 29th April, 2005.

Date: 28th April, 2005

The Tiger Task Force (TTF) was born from a crisisthat resulted in the extinction of the tigers in Sariskaand Kela Devi Sanctuaries. The Prime Ministerdescribed the state of affairs as the worst crisis ofwildlife since the inception of the Project Tiger.

OBJECTIVE

The objective of this note is to spell out short termand long term measures that will help save wildtigers. I presume that is the objective of the TTF.

SHORT TERM MEASURES

(1) Deployment of additional Home Guards andArmed Police in different tiger reserves acrossIndia which are facing serious problems. This isan essential preventive measure pre-monsoon2005.(a) Manas Tiger Reserve, Assam(b) Namdapha Tiger Reserve, Arunachal

Pradesh(c) Simlipal Tiger Reserve, Orissa(d) Valmiki Tiger Reserve, Bihar(e) Palamau Tiger Reserve, Jharkhand(f) Nagarjuna Tiger Reserve, Andhra Pradesh(g) Indravati Tiger Reserve, Chattisgarh(h) Panna Tiger Reserve, Madhya Pradesh(i) Pench Tiger Reserve, Madhya Pradesh(j) Tadoba Tiger Reserve, Maharashtra(k) Dudhwa Tiger Reserve, Uttar Pradesh

(2) Ranthambhore and Sariska Tiger Reserve are noton this list as the Government of Rajasthan havealready taken essential steps of deploying morethan 300 Home Guards and armed Police on theperiphery as a precaution against armedintruders. All regular raids are being conductedagainst possible poachers and unwantedelements. A full infrastructure of vehicles has

also been provided for patrolling (details of thiscan be made available from the State as anexample of what can be done as a preventive stepfor other States to follow).

DISSEMINATE ALL INFORMATION. This isvital as a case study so that everyone realiseswhat happened and can learn a lesson from it toprevent repeats. This case study should be sentacross India as an example of what can happen.

WHAT HAPPENED?

Let’s not forget as far as Sariska is concerned theDirector of the Reserve provided an earlywarning in his census report on 25th May, 2004.It remained unheeded to by the Chief WildlifeWarden of Rajasthan and he only communicatedit or part of it on August 17th, 2004 to theDirectorate of Project Tiger who did not reacttill February 2005 after each tiger had beenwiped out. I quote below from it.

On 25-4-2004 the Field Director of Sariskareported to the Chief Wildlife Warden ofRajasthan and stated “on the basis of theavailable evidence and on ocular analysis of thepugmarks and movement of tigers the teamreached a rough estimate that the number oftigers were between 16 and 18………..Since thisestimate is quite different from that of last year’scensus and could lead tocontroversy…………Experts should be called tocarry out examination of the evidence.”

However, the Chief Wildlife Warden ignored thisletter and on the 17th August, 2004 sent a letter tothe Director, Project Tiger stating for SariskaTiger Reserve has 16-18 tigers. There is then an‘asterix’ on this that says: “Due to bad weathermost of the Pugmark Impression Pads weredamaged and it obstructed effective trekkingand collection of evidence.”

Why did Project Tiger in Delhi not reject thecensus and order a new one?

(3) It is also understood that a Tiger AssessmentReport was submitted by the Wildlife Institute of

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DISSENT NOTE

ANNEXURE- D

SPECIAL NOTE

India after a 10 day site visit with two seniorbiologists and eight Ph.D. students. They alsofound no evidence of tigers and shockinglyfound a wild boar stumbling round dragging atiger trap in its legs. This was March and youcan imagine how many steel traps were spreadacross the heart of this tiger reserve.

(4) It is understood that the CBI report on Sariskatalks of:

a) Grossly inflated census figures over 10years related to the maximum sustainablepopulation – 80% margin of error.

b) 75% of staff are untrained and unsuitablefor extensive on foot responsibilities.

c) More than 3000 hectares of the tiger reserveis encroached.

d) Complete lack of monitoring andastonishment regarding the fact that NOintelligence was gathered on poachers –glaring failure of intelligence by forest staff.

e) No effort to effectively patrol or maintaincommunication with villagers.

We must examine this example – it must bereflective of several areas in India. If thesefactors are true for other areas there is littlechance of saving tigers. Also examine why theCBI was able to find all this in 2 days and ProjectTiger ‘not at all’. This will be the only way tounderstand the root of the problem that afflictsour tiger reserves. We need to send the Sariskacase history to all our Project Tiger reserves andother protected areas so that such a debacle isnever repeated.

If the CBI can get into Predator-Prey density ratios, statistics and census analysiswhat stopped Project Tiger doing this in earlieryears?

(5) We also need to study the Kela Devi examplewhere in 600 odd sq. kms of this sanctuary (apart of Ranthambhore Tiger Reserve) inFebruary 2005 there were written recordsstating that for moths there were no signs of anytigers. In fact in February this wascommunicated to the Field Director ofRanthambhore Tiger Reserve.

Yet when the Additional D.G. (Wildlife) and theDirector, Project Tiger went to RanthambhoreTiger Reserve for a site visit immediately afterSariska (23rd February, 2005) what did they writein their site visit report?They wrote:

”The alleged disappearance of 18 tigers fromRanthambhore Tiger Reserve is misleading andnot true. There is a daily monitoring system inplace wherein details of tigers utilizing differentparts of the habitat within the reserve arerecorded.”

The idea of daily monitoring of tigers withoutradio collars in an absurdity. While on the 23rd

February, 2005 Director, Project Tiger wasmaking these comments on a site visit toRanthambhore Tiger Reserve the DeputyDirector, Project Tiger, Sawai Madhopur (buffer)had on the 3rd February, 2005 (20 days earlier)sent a letter to the Field Director saying that in alarge component of Ranthambhore Tiger Reserve– which is Kela Devi Sanctuary – there was noevidence of tigers, pugmarks or faecal matter. On16th March, 2005 he again sent a letter to FieldDirector stating that after intensive patrolling hecould not find anything and finally the FieldDirector sent a letter to chief Wildlife Warden on31st March, 2005 saying that the tigers in KelaDevi were down from 6 to 0. Local extinction.

(b) “The Project Tiger Directorate receivesupdating periodically from tiger reserves onimportant events / happenings, as well asmortality of wild animals due to poaching /natural deaths, complemented by factualinformation gathered during frequent fieldvisits of MoEF officials. Therefore, there isno collapse of any warning system.”

“The alleged decline of tiger counts across thecountry is only a speculation at this stage by NGOsand media.” Is this why the Deputy Director’sletters of 3rd February and 16th March, 2005 werenot acted on? Or is it because there was noknowledge of them? Both are terrible examples ofmonitoring or early warning mechanisms!

It is obvious that from both the examples ofSariska and Ranthambhore that one part ofProject tiger (the field) did not know what theother part of Project Tiger (Delhi) was doing orvice verca. There is obviously no dailymonitoring, let alone communication of it toProject Tiger, Delhi. Project Tiger (Delhi)appears to live in the dark about most matters.

Analyse both these examples. They must besymptomatic of reserves across India. We needto find ways to prevent such horrific events.

(6) We must also look at the role of activist NGO’s bothin Sariska and Kela Devi. In Sariska Rajendra

Annexures 177


Singh’s Tarun Bharat Sangh was deeply involvedwith wildlife matters. They had in the late 1990’sheld a Bagh Bachavo Yata and have stated thatthey had sent some warning of the crisis of 2004 tothe forest department. In Kela Devi another NGO

had played a role in preventing livestock fromouter areas to come in and it was a much quotedexample of people’s participation in wildlifeprotection. Arun Jindal from the Society forSustainable Development based in Karauli had foryears been supporting a process of participation.So had Rajendra Singh. Let’s learn from theirfailures – since the tiger has gone from both areas.

(7) Co-opting as a special invitee the head of theinvestigation in Sariska Shri B.K. Sharma fromthe CBI and asking him to make a presentationboth on Sariska and other areas in terms ofpoaching and illegal trade.

(8) Provide a mandate to the CBI to continueinvestigations into poaching, illegal trade etc. allover India and this will be an immediatedeterrent to the accelerating activities ofpoachers. This will have to be recommended bythe Prime Minster.

(9) Immediate educational awareness campaign in

the media regarding threats of poaching, illegalwoodcutting by timber mafias and encroachmenton forest land by commercial groups includingmining mafias.

(10)All relevant reports, CBI, WII, Project Tigerassessments and evaluations, earlier reports i.e.Wildlife Crime Bureau, SubramanyamCommittee, affidavits of MoEF to the SupremeCourt, Supreme Court orders to be provided forthe reference of the Committee immediately.The CBI report will be essential reading for everyPark Director across India.

(11) Activate all State Wildlife Advisory Boards toconvene meetings since these institutions need tobe alerted to the gravity of the problem andthereby take necessary steps to diffuse theproblems. These boards are also like earlywarning systems that can help to detect otherproblems.

(12) Immediate implementation of the new WildlifeCrime Prevention and Control Bureau as endorsedby the National Board of Wildlife on the 17th

March, 2005 meeting. This is immediately neededto prevent the illegal trade in tiger derivatives andminimise the activities of poachers.

“The Committee expresses its serious concern overthe sudden disappearance of the Tigers from SariskaTiger Reserve. The Committee feels that thenegligence of Forest staff coupled with the large scalepoaching has cost the country dear. Conditions inmost of the national parks are more or less same,posing a clear danger to protected animal species.Poaching is not a new phenomenon but the poachersare now more advanced with latest weapons andvery powerful communication network, making thelackadaisically managed tiger reserves easy picking.In contrast, forest guards are usually equipped with awooden stick and most of the times without anymeans of communication. Taking note of thisalarming situation, the Committee is of consideredopinion that a Special Task Force at the central orstate level with the involvement of Para-military

forces must be constituted to combat the menace ofpoaching of wildlife.

Moreover, the Ministry should also involve thevillagers living in and around National Parks / Tigerreserves to prevent the poaching as they are aware ofthe tentative movement of the poachers but becauseof poachers’ threats or any other compulsion, theyrefrain from coming out openly to help the forestDepartment to catch the poachers. The Committeestrongly recommends that all vacant positionsshould be filled immediately and at no time any tigerreserve in the country should be left with the juniorofficers.”

“The Committee notes the reply of the Ministryand is strongly of the opinion that Ministry’s efforts have in no way improved the state of “project tiger” and management of tiger parks in the

178 Annexures


Extracts from

REPORT (UNCORRECTED) OF THE DEPARTMENT –RELATED PARLIAMENTARY STANDINGCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, ENVIRONMENT & FORESTS

(139th & 146th Reports)

PRESENTED TO THE RAJYA SABHA ON THE 25TH APRIL, 2005(LAID ON THE TABLE OF THE LOK SABHA ON THE 25TH APRIL, 2005)

country as sadly reflected in the increased incidence of poaching of tigers and disappearance of a section of wild cats from strategic areas in the country. The Ministry needs to undertakecomplete review of its programmes and plug theloopholes, where necessary to implement themeffectively.”

“The Committee fees that the Ministry has nottaken much action in pursuance of itsrecommendation for protecting and developingwildlife parks. The Ministry has informed onlyabout Tigers and their habitats. Nothing has beenmentioned about other animals like elephant, lion,rhino, etc. Even achievements of the programmesunder “Project Tiger” have come under scrutiny asevident from recent news reports that tigers havedisappeared from the Sariska and RanthambhoreTiger Reserves. The Committee feels that for properdevelopment and protection of the wildlife parks,emphasis should be given on anti-poaching camps,mobile squads, capacity building of frontline staff inintelligence gathering, detection and successfulprosecution of cases and providing necessaryinfrastructure to them.”

“The Committee is of the view that quotingstatutory provisions is not the proper action expectedfrom the Ministry. What is more important is properand holistic implementation / enforcement of theseprovisions. These provisions / guidelines themselvescannot act as a deterrent. With the support of these

provisions, Ministry should evolve a mechanism toimplement its plans / steps emphatically.”

“The Committee observes that despite variousschemes of the Ministry, effective patrolling ofwildlife is almost missing as is evident from rampantpoaching. In the recent past, the Committee duringits study visits to some Tiger Reserves / WildlifeSanctuaries was anguished to see the forest rangersequipped with a wooden stick and roaming on feetwhereas poachers, in contrast, are believed to beequipped with latest communication network,modern weapons and vehicles. In view thereof, anyfinancial assistance for the wildlife protection whichwas made has not been successfully utilised in thepast. The Committee reiterates that interested NGOsshould be encouraged to provide latest transport andcommunication facilities to the staff responsible forthe protection of wildlife parks. The Committee isalso of the opinion that a “Special Task Force” mustbe constituted to combat the menace of poaching ofwildlife.”

“The Committee feels that by merely includingendangered species of animals in Schedule I of theWildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, may not be enough.The Ministry should also take some stringentmeasures along with enforcing the provisions of theAct for their survival. The Committee would haveappreciated if the Ministry had come forward with acomprehensive plan of action for preserving theaforesaid species.”

LONG TERM MEASURES

(1) Discussions on creating a dedicated Ministry forForests and Wildlife by bifurcating the presentMinistry of Environment and Forests.

(2) Creating a dedicated and specially trainedNational Park Service meant to govern andadminister 100 of the best protected areas inIndia. This service must allow inter-statetransfers.

(3) Opening fresh recruitment for all forest staff on apriority basis just like the Police and Army, andfill up all vacancies.

(4) Extra allocation of finances by PlanningCommission for the forest and wildlife sectorespecially in the area of protection. A meetingwill be essential with Deputy Chairman ofPlanning Commission.

(5) A meeting between the Prime Minister and allchief Ministers regarding the crisis of the tiger

and other wildlife – Members of Parliament to bepresent – slide presentation to be made. Wemust realise that saving the tiger and forest is astate subject and therefore Chief Ministers willhave to be inspired to act.

(6) Encouraging the role of scientific research andits recommendations in the management of ourwilderness.

(7) Encouraging the protection of our wildernessareas by local communities / tribals / forestdwellers who can be fully trained in specialschools for this purpose and for otherrequirements of forests and wildlife managementi.e. eco-tourism etc. Even if 10 people each aretrained in one Park and the programme started in20 Parks within 6 months we will have 200people engaged in protection. And this figurecan be tripled over the years.

(8) Creating a Manual or Code of Conduct andProcedure for all protected area managers thatbecomes their ‘Bible’ to follow in the field and

Annexures 179


includes systems for early warning and detectionof problems etc.

(9) A review of the entire structure of Project Tigerwith a view to overhaul it and create a ProjectTiger Division in MoEF that is streamlined,efficient and effective especially in a crisissituation. There must be a way to have bettercommunication from the field to Project Tiger(Delhi) so that Kela Devi’s and Sariskas’ don’thappen.

(10)Financial allocations and disbursement ofmoney – how to create a rapid flow and preventnon-utilisation of funds etc.

(11)Corridor connectivity from one tiger area toanother is also vital for the prevention of habitatfragmentation and vital existing corridors mustbe identified for protection.

WHY DO TIGERS DIE AT THE HANDS OFPOACHERS OR OTHERS?

(a) for revenge against livestock kills;(b) by accident as poachers try for ungulates;(c) by intent and for commerce be it skin or

bones;(d) or orchestrated by mining mafias or those

who want to denotify protected areas anddestroy habitats.

The above note spells out that if the climate ofSariska or Ranthambhore prevails then there couldbe a wipe out of tigers across India. To prevent theirdeath by poachers or others we need earlyimplementation of both short term and long termmeasures – This is the only way forward.

Valmik Thapar

180 Annexures


30.07.2005Valmik ThaparMember, Tiger Task Force19 Kautilya MargChanakyapuri 110021

Dear Mr Thapar,This is with reference to your note of dissent on the report of the Tiger Task Force. It isextremely unfortunate you have decided to take this step, as I do believe we have workedhard to put together a report that will assist conservation of tigers in India.

As I have explained to you, my effort as chairperson has been to listen to andincorporate the views of many concerned people across the country. We have receivedsubmissions from and met over 200 different experts, officials and villagers in the pastthree months. The initial draft report, which you have, includes references to theseconversations and research findings, as it is essential that informed knowledge drives theprocess of conservation in the country.

As I have discussed, I find one key problem with tiger conservation is that theconstituency in favour of the tiger has become extremely exclusivist. Therefore, even asthreats to the tiger have multiplied, there is limited support for its protection. Theresponse of a few conservationists has been to keep the group small, as they believe thateveryone else is against the tiger. The problem is compounded by the fact that someconservationists have direct interests in tiger protection — through businesses in hotels,filming, land or conservation and this has only lead to even greater alienation of all againstthe tiger, which they believe is being protected for the sake of a few.

I even told you I was extremely concerned at the level of anger I saw among people inRanthambhore — from villagers to small hotel owners to guards and others. Not only wasit their complaint that they had got nothing from the park, but they were bitter that others— prominent conservationists — were misusing their position to circumvent rules fortheir own interests. This sense of injustice has created a huge constituency against thepark and I strongly believe this is bad for conservation.

My effort, then, over the past few months has been geared to making this constituencyin favour of tiger protection much more broadbased and inclusive. It is for this reason thatthe draft report has detailed these positions, for I believe that public support will becrucial to further the cause of tiger conservation.

We have, of course included your note of dissent in the report, but let me take theopportunity to explain many of the issues you have raised. I do believe that we must workto understand each other so that differences, over time, can be resolved.

1. You have quoted from the draft chapter, which looks at the approach to makeconservation work. According to you, this “coexistence” that the report talks about is justnot possible and it will devastate the tiger. The fact is that you have selectively quoted from the chapter, when you are clear that theapproach that we are advocating in the report is very different — it is much more nuanced

Annexures 181


A N N E X U R E - I I I Response of the chairperson, TigerTask Force, to note of dissent■ SUNITA NARAIN

and much more complicated. The report makes clear that there are separate and equally urgent strategies as far as the

tiger protection is concerned: a. We must make areas inviolate for tigers, as you and your colleagues have suggested.But the report only qualifies this, saying that making areas inviolate for tigers will requiremore than strong statements. For the first time, we have collected data on the numbers ofvillages that have been relocated from the reserves and how many remain to be relocated.

The facts are devastating. Only 80 villages have been relocated from tiger reserves tilldate. There are roughly 1,500 villages that still exist within the reserves. Even the ones thatbeen relocated have often come back because relocation was shoddily done, or haveturned deeply antagonist to the tiger. This was clearly evident in Ranthambhore on ourvisit. This, I know, is a tiger reserve you know well.

Therefore, this task force has, for the first time, put these facts on the table. It hasargued that there needs to be urgent, speedy and sensitive relocation of these families. Ithas also argued that the funds for relocation must be enhanced so that people can beresettled without exacerbating conservation problems.

The Task Force has calculated that Rs 665 crore will be required for this relocation,using even the existing meagre budget norms. Please do note that till date the country hasspent Rs 14 crore on most relocation efforts and Rs 173 crore on Central assistance for tigerconservation in the past 30 years. b. The report has argued that if people continue to live within the protected reserves(after the process of relocation is complete and all cannot be relocated by any chance),then ways have to be found in which we can buy peace with communities. It is here thatwe have suggested that different methods can be used — from preferential shares intourism to collaborative management involving communities who will share benefits andso safeguard the tiger. The report states unequivocally that the current tension within theparks is leading to disastrous consequences for the tiger and conservation.

2. You have quoted from the draft chapter on coexistence on the problems you haveconcerning the analysis on the directions issued by the Central Empowered Committee(CEC). I do realise that you are a member of CEC, and therefore, our analysis of the legal provisionsas against the interpretation of CEC is not easy for you to accept. I had, as promised, read allthe material on the CEC position and have incorporated it in the chapter. But I still find thatthe facts bring out a different position.

The issue is if the 2003 amendment of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 which givespowers to disallow the collection of minor forest produce, grass and other subsistenceneeds of communities can be enforced without taking recourse to the safeguards alsoprovided in the same amendment, that make it incumbent on governments to providealternative fuel, fodder and other forest produce in these cases.

The report argues: a. That the Ministry of Environment and Forests and CEC should have also ensured thatthe alternatives were provided, if the rights were expunged. b. That not doing so has meant that the anger of local communities against the protectedareas of India has intensified.

3. The decision was to ask the prime minister to chair the steering committee not toleave it as an either/or option on revitalising the National Board for Wildlife. The idea to request the Prime Minister to chair the steering committee came from Mr

182 Annexures


Samar Singh. We all agreed to it. However, it is clear that it is the prerogative of the PrimeMinister to decide and we cannot direct him to do so. It is for this reason that Mr SamarSingh and I decided to reformulate this recommendation. But the intention is clear and Icannot see any reason for your disagreement on this matter.

4. Wildlife Crime Bureau should be headed by senior officer in super time scale. Butaccording to you, the person should not report to the additional director general offorests. Again, your raising this completely baffles me. The fact is that the person has to reportwithin the given hierarchy. It was agreed that the crime bureau would be within the MoEF

and, therefore, the officer reports to the senior-most official in wildlife issues. Clearly, wecould not formulate this in a way that the officer would continue to report to someone inCBI or home ministry, unless the bureau was located there. We did not take any suchcommon decision.

5. On the extending of the term of the state empowered committee of Rajasthan.The point in the report is that the government of Rajasthan has not taken adequate actionas far as the episode in Sariska is concerned. It is in this context that the report mentionsthat the extension of the term of the state committee (I know you are a member) has onlyled to further delays as crucial decisions are pending. I cannot see how this is factuallyincorrect or misleading.

6. On dropping the box by Raghu Chundawat on the harassment of scientists. The box is very much included. It is not in the science chapter but in the research chapter.

7. On glossing over the role of MoEF and Project Tiger directorate in the Sariska andother debacles. Again, everyone who knows me even a little should know that I do not ‘gloss’ over the roleof government. What I have simply done is to look at the facts and the circumstances toconclude that the key failure came from the state government’s mismanagement (andcontinued) mismanagement of the park in Sariska.

What we did discuss is why the systemic failure took place so that the Project Tigerdirectorate was unable to intervene and did not even have the information from the state.It is this that led us to recommend the need to convert Project Tiger into an authority andto vest the officer in charge (whoever it may be) with legal powers to facilitate workingwith states.

You repeatedly allege the report has a ‘people focus’ and not a ‘tiger focus’. I do notknow how to respond to this, because then you clearly do not even begin to understand thechallenge of tiger conservation in the country today, as we see it and have detailed in thereport. Indeed, it is unfortunate you were consistently busy during the entire term of theTask Force, because of which your interaction with all of us was limited. If we had seenmore of you, I am sure a better common understanding would have emerged.

I will publish this response in the report, along with your note of dissent. I have alwaysbelieved dialogue is more powerful than dissent.

With regards

Yours cordially

Sunita Narain

Annexures 183


184 Annexures


The Tiger Task Force had invited a wide range of experts from different fields for consultation tolearn from their experiences and insights, and to develop strategies for the future based on theselearnings. They were also asked to provide any papers that they have written and, if possible, givewritten submissions on the different aspects that the Task Force has been asked to examine. Allreports of the consultations will be available on the website: www.projecttiger.nic.in

The Task Force had held these consultations at New Delhi, Nagpur and Bangalore.

New Delhi consultation, May 18, 2005: on conservation of the tiger, problems of poaching andenforcement

1. B K Sharma, deputy director (admn), Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), Block No 3, 4th Floor,CGO Complex, Lodhi Road, New Delhi 110 003

2. Belinda Wright, executive director, Wildlife Protection Society of India, M-52, Greater KailashPart I, New Delhi 110 048

3. Ashok Kumar, senior advisor and trustee, Wildlife Trust of India, C644, First Floor, NewFriends colony, New Delhi 110065

4. Amlan Dutta, assistant programme officer, Wildlife Trust of India, C-644, First Floor, NewFriends Colony, New Delhi 110065

5. Manoj Mishra, Peace Institute, 178-F, Pocket-IV, Mayur Vihar, Phase I, New Delhi 110 0916. P K Sen, director, Tiger and Wildlife Programme, WWF 172B, Lodi Estate, New Delhi 1100037. Madhu Sarin, environment journalist, 48, Sector 4, Chandigarh 160 0018. A K Mukerjee, former director general of forests, I-1625, Chittaranjan Park, New Delhi 110 0199. B S Bonal, director, National Zoological Park, Mathura Road, New Delhi 10. Harsh Vardhan, honorary general secretary, Tourism and Wildlife Society of India, C-158A,

Dayanand Marg, Tilak Nagar, Jaipur 302 004, Rajasthan

New Delhi consultation, May 19, 2005: methodology of tiger counting, forecasting, professionalaudits of wildlife, research guidelines and access to information

1. Ullas Karanth, director, Wildlife Conservation Society-India Program, 823, 13th Cross, 7th BlockWest, Jayanagar, Bangalore 560 082, Karnataka

2. Raghu S Chundawat, Wildlife Institute of India, Post Bag No 18, Chandrabani, Dehradun 248 001, Uttaranchal

3. Y V Jhala, head, Department of Animal Ecology and Conservation Biology, Wildlife Institute ofIndia, Post Bag No 18, Chandrabani, Dehradun 248 001, Uttaranchal

4. Qamar Qureshi, faculty, Wildlife Institute of India, Post Bag No 18, Chandrabani, Dehradun 248 001, Uttaranchal

5. Ravi Chellam, programme officer, United Nations Development Programme, 55, Lodi Estate, P O Box 3059, New Delhi 110 003

6. Vasant Saberwal, programme officer, Department of Environment and Development, FordFoundation, 55 Lodi Estate, New Delhi 110 003

7. Asad R Rahmani, director, Bombay Natural History Society, Hornbill HouseDr Salim Ali Chowk, Shaheed Bhagat Singh Road, Mumbai 400 023, Maharashtra

8. A J T Johnsingh, head, Wildlife Institute of India, Post Bag No 18, Chandrabani, Dehradun 248 001, Uttaranchal

A N N E X U R E - I V Expert consultations based on termsof reference of the Tiger Task Force

Annexures 185


9. Surendra Prakash Goyal, scientist, Wildlife Institute of India, Post Bag No 18, Chandrabani,Dehradun 248 001, Uttaranchal

The Task Force also met John Sellers, senior enforcement officer, CITES, and Debbie Bank, seniorcampaigner, Environmental Investigation Agency, 62/63 Upper street, London N10NY

Nagpur consultation, June 12, 2005: on issues connected to local communities and tigerconservation

1. Ashish Kothari, coordinator, Kalpavriksh - Environment Action Group, Apt. 5 Shree DattaKrupa, 908 Deccan Gymkhana, Pune 411 004, Maharashtra

2. Bittu Sehgal, editor, Sanctuary magazine, 146, Pragati Industrial Estate, N M Joshi Marg,Mumbai, Maharashtra

3. Mohan Hirabai Hiralal, Vrikshamitra, Shende Plot, Ramnagar, Chandrapur 442 401,Maharashtra

4. Shailendra J Chaudhuri, 38 Manish Nagar, Nagpur, Maharashtra5. Motiram, Hosangabad, Madhya Pradesh6. Ashish Goswami, People for Animals, Gopuri, Wardha 442 001, Maharashtra7. Manojit Saha, Deccan Herald, 303, Tulsiamich, Nariman Point, Mumbai, Maharashtra8. Bhurelal Gandhi, coordinator, Tawa Matsya Sangh, Kesla, Hosangabad, Madhya Pradesh9. Sunil, village and PO Kesala, Hosangabad, Madhya Pradesh10. Milind Pariwakam, Centre for Wildlife Studies, Bangalore, Karnataka11. Devaji Navalu Topha, Adivasi Mitra, gram sabha, village Lekha Mendha, Post Heti, Tehsil

Dhanora, Gadchiroli 442 606, Maharashtra12. Sulabha Chakravarty, coordinator, Green Hope, 46, Om Sai Building, Anant Nagar,

Nagpur 440013, Maharashtra13. Anuradha Paul, executive editor, Green Hope; executive secretary, VED Council, 50, Anand

Palace, Dhantoli, Nagpur 440012, Maharashtra14. Prafulla Bhamburkar, WWF-India, 6, Venkatesh Nagar, Khamla Road, Nagpur 25, Maharashtra15. Uday Patel, honorary wildlife warden, D-71/1, Urjanagar, Chandigarh16. Satish Gogulwar, convenor, Maharashtra State Participatory Forest Management Network,

Kurkheda, Gadchiroli 441 209, Maharashtra17. Rahul Bais, Amhi Amachya Arogyasathi, c/o Ramesh Alome’s house, Plot No 21, near Sanjuba

School, Surve Layout, Nagpur 440014, Maharashtra18. Shanker Patil, president, Adivasi Gram Vikas, Paryatak Margdarshak Aur Vanyajeev

Sanrakshan Samiti, PO Moharli, Taluka Bhadrawati, Chandrapur, Maharashtra19. Vinod Jambhule, Tiger Research and Conservation Trust, CTPS Urjanagar, E-233/6 Chandrapur,

Maharashtra20. Pandurang Shrirame, PO Moharli, Taluka Bhadrawati, Chandrapur, Maharashtra21. Shilpa P Hande, Plot No. 4, Nagbhoomi Society, Chhatrapati Nagar, Nagpur, Maharashtra22. Mohan, Rashtriya Van Shramjeevi Manch, 501, Lakshmi Apartments, Ravi Nagar Chowk,

Nagpur 440 033, Maharashtra 23. Ravishankar Bhure, Rashtriya Van Shramjeevi Manch, 9, Postal Audit Colony, Ramapratap

Nagar, Nagpur 440022, Maharashtra24. Archana Singh, Lokmath Samachar, Pandit Jawaharlal Marg, Nagpur 440010, Maharashtra25. Debi Goenka, Bombay Environmental Action Group, Kalbadevi Municipal School, # 54,

2nd Floor, Mumbai 400 002, Maharashtra26. Poonam Dhanwatey, Tiger Research and Conservation Trust, Plot No 59-60, Shivneri,

Ramdaspeth, Nagpur 440 010, Maharashtra27. Harshawardhan Dhanwatey, Tiger Research and Conservation Trust, Plot No 59-60, Shivneri,

Ramdaspeth, Nagpur 440 010, Maharashtra28. Vijay Ghugey, Nature Science Club, 138, Kalpataru, Mahalaxminagar No 2, Manewada Road,

186 Annexures


Nagpur 440 024, Maharashtra29. Rucha Ghate, SHODH: The Institute for Research and Development, 50, Puranik Layout, Bharat

Nagar, Nagpur 440033, Maharashtra30. Gokuldas Shankar, Gedam, At. Botezari, Post Moharli, Taluka Bhadrawati, Chandrapur,

Maharashtra31. Mahadev B. Kumre, At Botezari, PO Moharli, Taluk Bhadrawati, Chandrapur, Maharashtra 32. Kanhu Shinde, At Botezari, PO Moharli, Taluk Bhadrawati, Chandrapur, Maharashtra 33. Devrao V. Kannake, At Botezari, PO Moharli, Taluk Bhadrawati, Chandrapur, Maharashtra 34. Vilas Shanker Kannake, At Botezari, PO Moharli, Taluk Bhadrawati, Chandrapur, Maharashtra 35. Murali Manohar Rahi, Main Road Gondiya, Gondiya, Maharashtra 36. Kundan Hate, vice president, Satpura Foundation, 86, Shivneri Appartments, Kanfadenagar,

Ring Road, Nagpur 440015, Maharashtra37. Raj Kumar Khodecha, National Environment and Wildlife Society, Gondia, Maharashtra38. P V Joseph, National Environment and Wildlife Society, Gondia, Maharashtra39. Sunita Shukla, SRISHTI, 103, Mount Road, behind Hotel Upvan, Sadar, Nagpur 440 001,

Maharashtra40. Raju Kasambe, 64, Vidya Vihar Colony, Pratap Nagar, Nagpur 440 022, Maharashtra41. Prakash Amte, Lokbiradari Prakalp, Hemalkasa, PO Bhamragad, Gadchiroli 442 710,

Maharashtra42. Gopalrao Thosar, Vasundhara, 66, Ganesh Colony, Pratap Nagar, Nagpur 440 022, Maharashtra43. Kishore Rithe, Nisarg Sanrakshan Sanstha, Pratishtha, Bharat Nagar, Akoli Road, Near Sainagar

Jawal, Amravati 444 607, Maharashtra44. Dilip Gode, secretary, Vidarbha Nature Conservation Society, Tidke Ashram, Ganeshpeth,

Nagpur 440 018, Maharashtra45. Shripad Suklikar, president, Vidarbha Nature Conservation Society, Tidke Ashram,

Ganeshpeth, Nagpur, Maharashtra46. Kusum Karnik, environmentalist, Bhimashankar Prakalp, At and PO Manchar,

Manchar 410 503, Maharashtra47. V Chandra, Rashtriya Van Shramjeevi Manch, 5/87 Bharatnagar, Nagpur, Maharashtra48. Kaustubh Pandharipande, Samvedana, Professor’s Colony, Karanja (Lad), Washim 444 105,

Maharashtra49. Ramu Bhagwat, The Times of India50. Mahesh Upadev, Saamana, Mumbai, Maharashtra51. Rohini Kant Matey, The Hitavada, Wardha Road, PO Box No 201, Nagpur, Maharashtra

Bangalore consultation, June 21, 2005: on the measures to improve the methodology of tigercounting and forecasting; suggest methods of transparent professional audit of wildlife parks; andplacing data on tiger conservation in the public domain

1. Anil Gore, professor of statistics, department of statistics, Pune University, Ganshkhind, Pune411 007, Maharashtra

2. P S Roy, deputy director, National Remote Sensing Agency, Balanagar, Hyderabad 500 037,Andhra Pradesh

3. Pushpa M Bhargava, ANVESHNA, Furqan Cottage, 12-13-100, Lane # 1, Street # 3, TarnakaHyderabad 500 017, Andhra Pradesh

4. Kartik Shankar, fellow, Ashoka Trust for Research in Ecology and the Environment (ATREE),No 659, 5th A Main Road, Hebbal, Bangalore 560 024, Karnataka

5. Sumati V, student, WCS, Bangalore, Karnataka6. Shomita Mukherjee, Centre for Wildlife Studies, Bangalore, Karnataka7. Anindya Sinha, National Institute of Advanced Study, Indian Institute of Science campus,

Bangalore, Karnataka8. M D Madhusudan, wildlife ecologist and trustee, Nature Conservation Foundation, 3076/5 IV

Cross, Gokulam Park, Mysore, Karnataka

Annexures 187


The Task Force members have undertaken field visits to a few tiger reserves in the country tounderstand the management and the present status of these reserves. The members also visited theWildlife Institute of India to discuss with the officials the methodology of tiger estimation andhabitat monitoring. The visits were as follows:

1. Periyar Tiger Reserve, Thekkaddy and Sabarimala, Kerala2. Pench Tiger Reserve, Maharashtra3. Pench Tiger Reserve, Madhya Pradesh 4. Kanha Tiger Reserve, Madhya Pradesh 5. Sariska Tiger Reserve, Rajasthan6. Ranthambhore Tiger Reserve, Rajasthan

9. Soumya Prasad, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore 560 012, Karnataka10. Aparajita Datta, senior scientist, Nature Conservation Foundation, 3076/5, IV Cross, Gokulam

Park, Mysore 570 002, Karnataka 11. D V Girish, Nature Conservation Guild, Chickmagalur, Karnataka12. Praveen Bhargav, managing trustee, Wildlife First, No.1235, 1st Floor, 26th A Main,

32nd G Cross, 4th T Block, Jayanagar, Bangalore 560 041, Karnataka13. K M Chinappa, Centre for Ecological Research and Conservation, 076/5 IV Cross Gokulam Park,

Mysore 570 002, Karnataka14. Krishna Narain, Wildlife Watch, Bangalore, Karnataka15. G Vishwanath Reddy, conservator of forests, 27/A Vanashree, Gokulam Main Road, V Mohalla,

Mysore 570 002, Karnataka16. K N Murthy, Watershed Development Department, Vana Vikas Building, Malleswar,

Bangalore, Karnataka17. R Sukumar, chairperson, Centre for Ecological Sciences, Indian Institute of Science,

Bangalore 560 012, Karnataka 18. N Samba Kumar, Centre for Wildlife Studies, Bangalore, Karnataka19. Harshwardhan Dhanwatey, Tiger Research and Conservation Trust, Nagpur, Maharashtra20. M C Vinay Kumar, 18Y 52nd B Cross, 3rd Block, Rajajinagar, Bangalore, Karnataka21. S Dhananjaya, Karnataka Forest Department22. B Venkatesh, Karnataka Forest Department, Bandipur23. K A Subramanium, National Centre for Biological Sciences, UAS-GKVK Campus Bellary Road,

Bangalore 560 065, Karnataka 24. Mahesh Rangarajan, independent researcher, 24 Samachar Apartments, Mayur Vihar Phase-I

Extension, Delhi 110 09125. Jagadish Krishnaswamy, Ashoka Trust for Research in Ecology and the Environment, No 659,

5th A Main Road, Hebbal, Bangalore 560 024, Karnataka26. Milind Watve, Department of Microbiology, Babahasaheb Garware College, Karve Road, Pune,

Maharashtra27. M K Surappa, honorary secretary, Karnataka State Council for Science and Technology,

Bangalore 7, Karnataka28. Shivanna, secretary, Karnataka Biodiversity Board, Ground Floor, Vanavikas, 18th Cross

Malleshwaram, Bangalore 3, Karnataka29. C Srinivasan, field director, Bandipur30. P Anur Reddy, conservator forests (wildlife), Karnataka 31. A K Verma, chief wildlife warden, Karnataka32. Jagmohan Sharma, Karnataka Forest Department33. D Yatish Kumar, Karnataka Forest Department34. Col C P Muthanna (retd), Coorg Wildlife Society

A N N E X U R E - V The visits by Tiger Task Force

188 Annexures


The proposal from the Project Tiger directorate and the Wildlife Institute of India to review andchange the methodology for assessing tiger habitat and to estimate the numbers was sent to manyexperts for their comments. The names of the experts are given below:

1. Aparajita Datta, senior scientist, Nature Conservation Foundation,3076/5, IV Cross, GokulamPark, Mysore 570 002, Karnataka

2. S P Goyal, scientist, Wildlife Institute of India, Post Bag No 18, Chandrabani, Dehradun 248 001, Uttaranchal (comments received)

3. Anil P Gore, professor of statistics, department of statistics, Pune University, Ganeshkhind,Pune 411 007, Maharashtra (comments received)

4. A J T Johnsingh, dean, faculty of wildlife sciences, Wildlife Institute of India, Post Bag No 18, Chandrabani, Dehradun 248 001 (comments received)

5. Jagdish Krishnaswamy, fellow, Ashoka Trust for Research in Ecology and the Environment , No 659, 5th A Main Road, Hebbal, Bangalore 560 024, Karnataka

6. Sharad Lele, coordinator and senior fellow, Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies inEnvironment and Development, ISEC Campus, Nagarabhavi, Bangalore 560 072, Karnataka

7. Kartik Shankar, fellow, and Mohammed Irfan Ullah, fellow, Ashoka Trust for Research inEcology and the Environment, No 659, 5th A Main Road, Hebbal, Bangalore 560 024, Karnataka(comments received)

8. Ullas Karanth, director, Wildlife Conservation Society-India Program, 823, 13th Cross, 7th Block West, Jayanagar,’ Bangalore 560 082, Karnataka (comments received)

9. P S Roy, deputy director, National Remote Sensing Agency, Hyderabad.500 037, AndhraPradesh (comments received)

10. M D Madhusudan, wildlife ecologist and trustee, Nature Conservation Foundation, 3076/5 IV Cross, Gokulam Park, Mysore, Karnataka

11. T R Shankar Raman, wildlife scientist, Nature Conservation Foundation, 3076/5 IV Cross,Gokulam Park, Mysore 570 002, Karnataka

12. R Sukumar, chairperson, Centre for Ecological Sciences, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore 560 012, Karnataka

13. R S Chundawat, Wildlife Institute of India, Post Bag No 18, Chandrabani, Dehradun 248 001(comments received)

14. B L Deekshatulu, ISRO visiting professor, University of Hyderabad, 10-3-123/3/1, East Maredpally, Secunderabad-500 026

15. Ravi Chellam, programme officer, United Nations Development Programme, 55, Lodi Estate, PO Box 3059, New Delhi 11000

16. Asad R Rahmani, director, Bombay Natural History Society, Hornbill House, Dr Salim AliChowk, Shaheed Bhagat Singh Road, Mumbai 400 023, Maharashtra

A N N E X U R E - V I Experts requested to comment onmethodology of tiger estimation

Annexures 189


The Task Force had written to a number of experts and activists requesting them to send their ideasand suggestions, based on the terms of reference. Many people had also written voluntarily to theTask Force giving their suggestions and ideas. The Task Force is grateful to them for sending theirideas and recommendations, contributing to our understanding of issues.

1. Praveen Bhargav, managing trustee, Wildlife First, No 1235, 1st Floor, 26th A Main, 32nd G Cross, 4th T Block, Jayanagar, Bangalore 560 041, Karnataka

2. S S Bist, director (PE) and IGF, ministry of environment and forests, Room No 126, ParyavaranBhawan, CGO Complex, Lodhi Road, New Delhi 110 003

3. Aparajita Datta, senior scientist, Nature Conservation Foundation, 3076/5, IV Cross, GokulamPark, Mysore 570 002, Karnataka

4. Rucha Ghate, SHODH: The Institute for Research and Development, 50, Puranik Layout, BharatNagar, Nagpur 440 033, Maharashtra

5. Anil P Gore, professor of statistics, department of statistics, Pune University, Ganeshkhind,Pune 411 007, Maharashtra

6. Radhika Johri, department of anthropology, York University, 2054 Vari Hall, 4700 Keele Street,Toronto, Ontario, Canada M3J 1P3

7. Krithi K Karanth, doctoral student, Terborgh Lab Levine Science Research Center, PO Box 90328, Nicholas School of Environment, Duke University, Durham NC 27708

8. Jagdish Krishnaswamy, Ashoka Trust for Research in Ecology and the Environment, No 659, 5th A Main Road, Hebbal, Bangalore 560 024, Karnataka

9. Kusum Karnik/Anand Kapoor, environmentalists, Science of Conservation, BhimashankarPrakalp, At and PO Manchar, Manchar 410 503, Maharashtra

10. Sharad Lele, coordinator and senior fellow, Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies inEnvironment and Development, ISEC Campus, Nagarabhavi, Bangalore 560 072, Karnataka

11. Kamal Naidu, chief conservator of forests, government of Andhra Pradesh, CCF Office,Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh

12. V B Sawarkar, director, Wildlife Institute of India, Post Bag No 18, Chandrabani, Dehradun 248 001, Uttaranchal

13. V D Sharma, former PCCF & CWLW, Rajasthan14. Tykee Malhotra, managing trustee, Sanskara Development Trust, F-328, Lado Sarai, Mehrauli,

New Delhi 110 030 15. V B Mathur, professor and head, department of protected area network, Wildlife Management

and Conservation Education, Wildlife Institute of India, Post Bag No 18, Chandrabani,Dehradun 248 001, Uttaranchal

16. Ashish Kothari/Pankaj Sekhsaria, Kalpavriksh – Environment Action Group, Apt 5, ShreeDatta Krupa, 908, Decan Gymkhana, Pune 411 004, Maharashtra

17. Fateh Singh Rathore, vice chairperson, Tiger Watch, Ranthambhore, Rajasthan18. Madhu Sarin, environment journalist, 48, Sector 4, Chandigarh 160 001, Punjab19. Krishna Narain, Wildlife Watch, [email protected]. Qamar Qureshi, faculty, Wildlife Institute of India, Post Bag No 18, Chandrabani,

Dehradun 248 001, Uttaranchal 21. Sanjeeva Pandey, director, Great Himalayan National Park, Shamshi, Kullu 175 126, Himachal

Pradesh 22. Vinod Kumar Damodar, honorary animal welfare officer, Animal Welfare Board of India,

‘Breeze’, 5/2750-A, Behind Officers Club, Thiruthiyad, Calicut 673 004, Kerala

A N N E X U R E - V I I Suggestions received on the termsof reference of Tiger Task Force

190 Annexures


23. M C Vinay Kumar, 18Y, 52nd B Cross, 3rd Block, Rajajinagar, Bangalore, Karnataka 24. Charudutt Mishra, executive trustee, Nature Conservation Foundation, 3076/5 IV Cross

Gokulam Park, Mysore 570 002, Karnataka 25. S C Dey, former director of wildlife conservation and secretary general, Global Tiger Forum,

A-269, 2nd Floor, Defence colony, New Delhi 11002426. Debbie Banks, senior campaigner, Environmental Investigation Agency, 62-63 Upper Street,

London, N10NY

27. S K Ramalinge Gowde, president, IFS Association, Room No 538, Block B, Paryavaran Bhawan,CGO Complex, Lodi Road, New Delhi 110 003

28. B S Thengdi, DyCF, Land Reccords, Nagpur, Maharashtra 29. A K Mukerji, former director general of forests, I-1625, Chittaranjan Park, New Delhi 11001930. Vaishaish Uppal/Raman Mehta/Shekhar Singh, D-4, Gulmohar Park, New Delhi31. P S Roy, deputy director, National Remote Sensing Agency, Balanagar, Hyderabad 500 037,

Andhra Pradesh 32. Lalji Singh, director, Centre for Cellular and Molecular Biology, Uppal Road,

Hyderabad 500 007, Andhra Pradesh33. Harini Nagendra, Asia research coordinator, Center for the Study of Institutions, Population

and Environmental Change, Indiana University, and Fellow, Ashoka Trust for Research inEcology and the Environment, Bangalore, Karnataka

34. Arun Agnihotri, [email protected]. Shomita Mukherjee, Centre for Wildlife Studies, Bangalore36. S Chandola, addl PCCF and CWLW, Uttaranchal37. K Yoganand, PhD scholar, Wildlife Institute of India, Dehradun 248 00138. Mohammed Irfan Ullah, fellow (scientist), Ashoka Trust for Research in Ecology and the

Environment, 659, 5th A Main Road, Hebbal, Bangalore 560 024, Karnataka39. Mahesh Rangarajan, independent researcher, 24 Samachar Apartments, Mayur Vihar Phase-I

Extension, Delhi 110 009 40. Harsh Vardhan, honorary general secretary, Tourism and Wildlife Society of India, C-158A,

Dayanand Marg, Tilak Nagar, Jaipur 302 004, Rajasthan 41. Bransdon S Corrie, chief conservator of forests (WL), Thiruvananthapuram42. Anjana Gosain, honorary secretary, Tiger Trust, 206, Rakeshdeep, 11 Commercial Complex,

Gulmohar Enclave, New Delhi 110 04943. Archana Singh, Lokmath Samachar, Pandit Jawaharlal Marg, Nagpur 440010, Maharashtra44. Arpan Sharma/Asmita, Samrakshan Trust, E-314, Anandlok, Mayur Vihar Phase – I, New Delhi-91.45. Anil Garg, near PO Khadi Bhandar, Kothi Bazar, Betul 460 001, Madhya Pradesh46. Vivek R Sinha, 764, 100 Feet Road, HAL IInd Stage, Indiranagar, Bangalore 560 038.47. Anita S Areckal, deputy conservator of forests, Mangalore Forest Division, Mangalore, Karnataka48. Ashok Kumar, senior advisor and trustee, Wildlife Trust of India, C-644, First Floor,

New Friends Colony, New Delhi 110 065 49. Raghunandan Singh Chundawat, Wildlife Institute of India, Post Bag No 18, Chandrabani,

Dehradun 248001, Uttaranchal 50. Vijay Soni, angler, environmentalist, Indian Fish and Wildlife Conservancy, 43, Golf Links,

New Delhi 110 00351. Dr S Shivaji, scientist (deputy director), Centre for Cellular and Molecular Biology (CCMB),

Uppal Road, Hyderabad 500 007.52. Dr M Janikaraman, 6060 Village Bend Street, Apt # 310, Dallas TX 75206, USA

53. Avdhash Kaushal, RLEK, 68/1, Suryalok colony, Rajpur Road, Dehradun, Uttaranchal.54. Meenal Shrivastava, professor, international relations, Wits University 2050, Johannesburg,

Wits, South Africa 55. S K Tiwari, wildlife photographer, naturalist, [email protected]. Ramma Handoo, B-12, Maharani Bagh, New Delhi 110 065 57. S M Jain, consultant, forestry, 7-B, Talwandi, Pvt Sector, Commerce College Road,

Kota 324 005, Rajasthan

Annexures 191


58. Rakesh Shukla, research officer, Kanha tiger reserve, New Kanha Colony, near Mandla ForestRange, Civil Lines, Mandla 681 661, Madhya Pradesh

59. A N Prasad, field director, Palamau tiger reserve, government of Jharkhand, Daltonganj 822101, Jharkhand

60. S M Satheesan, B-16/5, AAI Colony, Sahar Road, Andheri East, Mumbai 400 099, Maharashtra 61. Bittu Sehgal, editor, Sanctuary Magazine, 602 Maker Chamber V, Nariman Point,

Mumbai 400 021, Maharashtra62. K Ullas Karanth, director, Wildlife Conservation Society-India Program, Centre for Wildlife

Studies, 823, 13th Cross Road, Jayanagar, 7th Block (West), Bangalore-560 082, Karnataka63. M K Saran, [email protected]. Brian Child, chairperson, SASUSG65. Kaushlendra Singh, [email protected]. A J T Johnsingh, head, Faculty of Wildlife Biology, Wildlife Institute of India, Post Bag No.18,

Chandrabani, Dehradun 248 001, Uttaranchal67. Y V Jhala, head, Animal Ecology and Conservation Biology Department, Wildlife Institute of

India, Post Bag No.18, Chandrabani, Dehradun 248001, Uttaranchal68. Kartik Shanker, fellow, Ashoka Trust for Research in Ecology and the Environment, 659, 5th A

Main Road, Hebbal, Bangalore 560024, Karnataka69. Nirvana Bodhisattva, chairperson, Nirvanavan Foundation, Director CHILDLINE Alwar, Mahila

Thana Campus, Moti Dungri, Alwar, Rajasthan 70. Ghazala Shahabuddin, research associate, Environmental Studies Group, Council for Social

Development, 53, Lodi Estate, New Delhi-11000371. Barun Mitra, director, Liberty Institute, Julian Simon Centre, C-2/13, Sahyadri Apartments,

Plot No.5, Sector-12, Dwarka New Delhi 11004572. Shekar Dattatri, Plot 40, Door No.11, 3rd East Street, Thiruvanmiyur, Chennai 600041,

Tamil Nadu, 73. Sanjay Thakre, Email: [email protected]. Navneet Maheshwari, Email: [email protected]. Subhadra Urmila Majumdar, E-mail: [email protected]. Vijay Verma, Patur, Turner Road, PO Clement Town, Dehradun 248002, Uttaranchal77. S S Murthy, Mission Compound, Napier Town, Jabalpur 482001, Madhya Pradesh, 78. A S Negi, Email: [email protected]. Ujjal Kumar Sarma, E-mail: [email protected]. Ajith Kumar, Wildlife Conservation-India Programme, 294, 5th main, Canara Bank layout,

Bangalore 560097, Karnataka81. M D Madhusudan, Wildlife Ecologist and Trustee, Nature Conservation Foundation, 3076/5, IV

Cross, Gokulam Park, Mysore 570002, Karnataka, 82. Shantanu Guha Ray, producer & head, Cricket Show and Special, ESPN Star Sports, 22, Pushpa

Vihar Commercial Complex, New Delhi .83. H S Jamadagni, professor and chairperson, Centre for Electronics Design and Technology,

Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore 560012, Karnataka and Dr A. Pittet, Chief Project Advisor

84. Manoj Misra, Peace Institute, 178-F, Pocket IV, Mayur Vihar, Phase – I, New Delhi – 110 091, 85. T R Shankar Raman, wildlife scientist, Nature Conservation Foundation, 3076/5, IV Cross,

Gokulam Park, Mysore 570002, Karnataka 86. Punit Lalbhai, project associate, CEE Tiger Conservation CELL

87. Ratna Kapur, Email: [email protected]. S P Goyal, scientist, Wildlife Institute of India, Post Bag No.18, Chandrabani,

Dehradun – 248 001, Uttaranchal, 89. Jarnail Singh, conservator of forests & field director, Pench National Park, Near Government

Printing Press, Civil Lines, Nagpur, Maharashtra 90. Hitesh Malhotra IFS, Addl. PCCF (WL) and CWLW, Govt. of AP, R & D Circle, Opp. RBI Building,

Aranya Bhavan, Saifabad, Hyderabad 500004, Andhra Pradesh

192 Annexures


91. J C Daniel, honorary secretary, Bombay Natural History Society, Hornbill House, Dr Salim AliChowk, Shaheed Bhagat Singh Road, Mumbai 400023, Maharashtra

92. Janaki Lenin, Draco Films, PO Box 21, Chengalpattu 603001, Tamil Nadu 93. A R Maslekar, B-15, Amar Heights, Aundh Road, Khadki- Pune - 411 02094. Karamjeet Singh, Email: [email protected]. Manojit Saha, [email protected]. V P Singh, chairperson, Empowered Committee on Forests & Wildlife Management - 2005, Van

Bhawan, Vaniki Path, Tilak Marg, C-Scheme, Jaipur 30200597. Ramanuj Choudhary, chief conservator of forests (Working Plans), Office of the Chief

Conservator of Forests (Working Plans), Nagpur-44000198. K Chanchal Singh, convener, Kota Regional Chapter, INTACH, 71, Lodhi Estate,

New Delhi-11000399. Parul Rishi, Faculty of Personnel Management & Organisational Behaviour, Indian Institute of

Forest Management, Nehru Nagar, Bhopal-462003.100. Bijan Ghosh, advocate, Supreme Court of India, 341 New Chamber Block, Supreme Court

Buildings, New Delhi 110001101. Jayan P A, [email protected]. Kartick Satyanarayan, co-founder, chairperson, Wildlife S.O.S, D-210, Defence colony,

New Delhi 110024103. Sanjay Upadhyay, Enviro Legal Defence Firm, 278, Sector 15-A, NOIDA 201301104. Prakash Gole, director, Ecological Society, B/2 Jayanti Apartments, Senapati Bapat Road,

Near Ratna Memorial Hospital, Pune 411016105. R K Singh, Wildlife Trust of India, New Delhi 106. Ravi Singh, secretary general and CEO, WWF-India Secretariat, Pirojsha Godrej National

Conservation Centre, 172 B, Lodhi Estate, New Delhi 110003107. Satya Priya Sinha, consultant and project coordinator, sos Rhino Project, Wildlife Institute of

India, Chandrabani, Dehradun 248001108. Vijay Ghugey, Nature Science Club, 138, Kalpataru, Mahalaxmi Nagar, No 2, Manewada

Road, Nagpur 440024109. Gopal Thosar, honorary president, Vasundhara, 66, Ganesh Colony, Police Chowki,

Pratapnagar, Nagpur 440022110. S N Sukliker, president and Dilip Gode, secretary, Vidarbha Nature Conservation Society,

Tidke Ashram, Ganespeth, Nagpur 440018111. Kundan Hate, vice president, Satpuda Foundation 86, Shivneri Apartment, Kanfade Nagar,

Ring Road, Nagpur 440015112. Saharsh Agarwal, Camp Umariya, Umariya district, Madhy Pradesh 484661113. Pasi Joseph, Murali Rahi, Rajkumar Khodecha, National Environment and Wildlife Society,

Gondia, Maharashtra114. R Annamalai, field director and conservator of forest, Tamilnadu Forest Department, Project

Tiger, NGO ‘A’ colony, Tirunelveli 627007115. S S Chitwadgi, chartered forester, Bharat Forestry Consultancy, 156/A, Indrapuri, Bhopal

462021116. S H Patil, conservator of forests and field director, Tadoba-Andhari tiger reserve Chandrapur

Annexures 193


The only form of tiger population monitoringundertaken in the country is a total count (census) ofthe country-wide tiger population every four yearsand within tiger reserves every one-two years. Thecensus is based on intensive monitoring of tigerswithin areas, identifying individual tigers by visualinspection of the pugmark tracings/plaster casts,mapping tiger distribution at the local scale andinferring total numbers from the above information(Choudhury 1970, Panwar 1979, Sawarkar 1987 andSingh 1999). This methodology has come undersevere criticism (Karanth et al, 2003). The majorlimitations of the above technique are that1. it relies on subjective (expert knowledge)

identification of tigers based on their pugmarks;2. the pugmarks of a tiger are likely to vary with

substrate, tracings/casts and the tiger’s gait;3. it is not possible to obtain pugmarks of tigers

from all tiger occupied landscapes, and4. the method attempts a total count of all tigers

(Karanth et al, 2003).An alternative proposed by tiger biologists is to

use individually identified tigers by camera traps ina capture-recapture statistical framework to estimatetiger densities (Karanth 1995 and 1998, Karanth andNichols 1998, 2000 and 2002, Karanth et al 2004, PerWegge et al 2004 and Pollock et al 1990). The methodhas been useful in determining tiger densities insmall areas, within tiger reserves having high tomedium density tiger populations. The method has ahigh potential for monitoring source population andsmaller sample areas within tiger occupiedlandscapes. However, due to the technical nature ofthe technique, high cost, security issues of theequipment and low performance in low density tigerpopulations this method has its limitations for a country-wide application for monitoring tigers (Carbone et al 2001, Karanth 1995 and 1998, Karanth and Nichols 1998, 2000 and 2002,Karanth et al 2004 and Kawanishi and Sunquist2004).

The other two potential methods that can be usedin smaller sample areas for monitoring source tigerpopulations are the individual identification of tigersfrom digital images of their pugmarks (Sharma et al,

in press) and tiger DNA profiles obtained from scatsand other non-invasive techniques (Broquet andPetit 2004, Prugh et al 2005 and Xu et al 2005).

Here, we propose an alternative technique basedon a four-stage approach:

Stage I: Spatial mapping and monitoring oftigers, prey and habitat

This stage consists of mapping(a) tiger presence and relative abundance (Karanth

and Nichols 2002);(b) tiger prey presence and relative abundance and(c) habitat quality and anthropogenic pressures at a

high spatial resolution of 15-20 km2. We consider a forest beat (an administrative unit,

15-20 sq km in size, delineated primarily on naturalboundaries) as the unit for sampling. Since each beatis allocated to a beat guard for patrolling andprotection, the boundaries of a beat are wellrecognised by forest staff. The sampling would besystematically distributed in all beats of tiger occupiedforests (tiger reserves, revenue and reserve forests).Thus, in effect, the entire landscape where tigers arelikely to occur is sampled (beats are not stratified orrandomly sampled, but all beats are sampled as largehumanpower is available for sampling). In forestareas, where beat boundaries are not delineated (< 20per cent of tiger occupied forests in the country) –such as the northeast — 15-20 sq km sampling unitswill be identified on the basis of natural boundaries(ridges, drainage, etc). The detailed methodologicalapproach for sampling carnivore signs, ungulateencounter rates, pellet/dung counts, habitat andanthropogenic pressures are presented in the ‘FieldGuide’ (Jhala and Qureshi 2004).

The target data are extremely easy to collect andrequire no high level of technical skills or equipment.It is crucial that the forest department staff is primarilyresponsible for the data collection due to the sheermagnitude of the task involved. Furthermore, theinvolvement of the forest department staff instillsownership and accountability of this agency which isprimarily responsible for the protection andmanagement of wildlife resources. The forest

A N N E X U R E - V I I I Methodology for estimating andmonitoring tiger status and habitat■ Y V JHALA, faculty, Wildlife Institute of India■ QAMAR QURESHI, faculty, Wildlife Institute of India■ RAJESH GOPAL, director, Project Tiger

department staff will be trained in the data collectionprotocol and tested for consistency.

The spatial data generated will be scientificallyrobust, and amenable for statistical analysis andinference. Since several replicate surveys will beundertaken in each beat, we shall be able to modeltiger occupancy, detection probability of tiger signs,and relative sign density at a high spatial resolution(stratified on the basis of ecological characteristics,range or a superimposed grid of varying scale) usingthe approach of MacKenzie et al (2002), Royale andNicholes (2003) and Royle (2004). Since the data willbe analysed in a GIS domain, several spatial andattribute data like human density, livestock density,road network, topographical features, forest type andcover, meteorological data, poaching pressures andlandscape characteristics will be used as covariatesto model tiger occupancy and relative abundance ina landscape and individual forest patches. Time-series analysis of the data at a larger spatialresolution is likely to have sufficient precision formonitoring spatial occupancy of tigers in associationwith changes in tiger prey, habitat quality andanthropogenic pressures.

We have tried to address the issue of reportinginflated numbers by laying emphasis on animal signsinstead of numbers. Furthermore, the resolution of thedata generated will be reduced to four-five categories(high, medium, low and absent). Several corroboratingvariables like prey encounter rates, pellet groupcounts and habitat condition will help in ensuringquality data; discrepancies in reporting will be easy topinpoint. There would be an audit mechanism inplace to scrutinise the data collection, compilationand analysis. National and international expertswould act as observers while officers in-charge willensure adherence to the prescribed protocol andtransparency of protocol implementation.

The system, once institutionalised and imple-mented, will not only serve to monitor tiger popula-tions but will also monitor the status of otherbiodiversity resources of all tiger occupied landscapes,truly exemplifying the role of the tiger as a flagship. Itwill serve as an effective tool for decision makers,managers and conservationists alike and will helpguide and plan land use policy at a landscape level.

We have tested the logistics of implementation ofthe above methodology in the Satpura-Maikal

194 Annexures


Map 1: DISTRIBUTION OF UNGULATE TIGER PREY IN THE SATPURA-MAIKAL LANDSCAPE

Relative density

Low

Medium

High

Forest

Annexures 195


landscape (about 48,000 sq km) in Madhya Pradeshcovering 3,150 beats in 178 forest ranges and mappedtiger and ungulate abundance. Tiger presence wasrecorded in 290 beats with 78 beats having high, 57having medium and 155 having low abundance oftiger signs. Ungulate tiger prey was recorded in 1,678beats. Spatial distribution of these is shown in Figures1, 2a and 2b. The analysis of this data is in progress.

Stage II: Spatial and attribute data

The spatial and aspatial data that are likely toinfluence tiger occupancy of a landscape will be usedfor modeling in a GIS domain. The vegetation map,terrain model, night light satellite data, drainage,transportation network, forest cover, climate data,Normalised Difference Vegetation Index, livestockabundance, human density, socio-economicparameters, etc will be used for modeling habitatcondition and tiger occupancy. Beat-wise vegetationsampling will be done to generate broad vegetationmap. IRS (KISS3 and AWiFS), LANDSAT and AVHRR

satellite data will be used. Part of this componentwill be done in collaboration with Forest Survey ofIndia. This modeling will help in determining

current spatial distribution of tigers, potentialhabitats, threats to crucial linkages betweenoccupied landscapes and conservation planning.

Stage III: Estimating the population of tigersand its prey

Stage 3 of the proposed methodology answers thequestion of how many tigers and ungulates are there.Teams of researchers will be deployed in eachlandscape complex for estimating tiger density andungulate densities within stratified sampling units.

Tiger numbers

We propose to stratify a Tiger Conservation Unit(TCU) into tiger sign abundance classes of high,medium, low and no tiger sign at the beat and largerspatial resolution (range 100 sq km). In each of thesestrata, within a landscape (TCU), we propose toestimate actual tiger density in three-five replicatesof sufficient size (50-200 sq km).

All known techniques of tiger density estimateswill be used depending on the logistic possibilitywithin each landscape: capture-recapture based on

Map 2a: TIGER SIGN PRESENCE WITHIN THE SATPURA-MAIKAL LANDSCAPE

Relative density

Protected area

Tiger sign

Forest cover

camera traps (Karanth 1995 and 1998, Karanth andNichols 1998, 2000 and 2002, Karanth et al 2004,Pollock et al 1990, Carbone et al 2001 and Per Weggeet al 2004), mark-recapture based on pugmarks(Sharma et al in press) and DNA profile obtained fromtiger scats (Broquet and Petit 2004, Prugh et al 2005and Xu et al 2005). These densities will then beextrapolated for the areas under various densityclasses within the landscape to arrive at a tigerpopulation estimate (Figure 3). We do realise thatthese population estimates are likely to have highvariances, but since these estimates will not be usedfor monitoring trends (which is proposed to be donethrough the site occupancy and relative abundancedata), they should suffice the need for converting arelevant ecological index to a more comprehensibleconcept of numbers.

Tiger prey

Stage I of the protocol would be reporting encounterrates on line transects (Buckland et al 1993); thesewould suffice for monitoring trends in ungulate

population and site-specific occupancies. To convertencounter rates to density, an estimate of theeffective strip width of these transects would beessential. The effective strip width of a transectprimarily depends on the visibility (vegetation andterrain type), ability to detect ungulates by differentobservers and animal behaviour response (Bucklandet al 1993). We modeled effective strip widths indifferent vegetation types of a landscape in theSatpura-Maikal landscape using model ungulatecutouts (Figure 4). Effective strip widths determinedfrom the model and actual sightings of ungulates fordifferent vegetation types estimated for the sameseason did not differ (Mitra 2004) within Kanha (aprotected area). However, ungulate response is likelyto play an important role in disturbed areas indetermining effective strip widths. We intend todetermine habitat and terrain-specific effective stripwidths by actually sampling selected sampling unitsand by modeling. Since the transect line in a beat ishabitat-specific (Jhala and Qureshi 2004), we wouldbe able to use these estimates of effective strip widthsfor converting encounter rates of ungulates to density

196 Annexures


Map 2b: 100 SQ KM HABITAT BLOCKS WITH DIFFERENT ABUNDANCE RANKING OF TIGER SIGNS WITHIN THESATPURA-MAIKAL LANDSCAPE

Low

Medium

Good

High

Forest cover

Annexures 197


estimates by modeling detection probabilities. Pellet group counts on transects would serve as

an index to the presence of ungulate species andpellet relative abundance (and are not used forabsolute density estimation), especially in disturbedareas where actual sightings may be difficult.

Stage IV: Intensive monitoring of sourcepopulations

We propose that source populations of tigers (tigersin tiger reserves and protected areas) in each tigerlandscape complex be monitored intensively. Wepropose the following methodology for thismonitoring:

Photo registration of tigers: Pictures of individual

tigers obtained by camera traps or by regular camerasshould be maintained in the form of a photo identityalbum. Records should be kept on the location,condition (breeding status, injury, etc) andassociated tigers whenever a tiger is sighted. Thiswill provide crude data on ranging patterns,demography and mortality.

Tiger pugmark and other signs: Regular monitoringof tiger signs (pugmark tracings, plaster casts, etc)should be undertaken in every beat at a weeklyinterval with monthly compilation of data. Withexperience and exposure to the resident tigers andtheir pugmarks, the forest staff may be able toidentify individual tigers from their track setcharacteristics (Panwar 1979, Smith et al 1999 andSharma 2001). Sign surveys and individual tigermonitoring should become a regular task for everyguard as was the practice some years ago and iscurrently practised in some tiger reserves. Themonthly data should be mapped and maintained toanalyse trends.

Monitoring by telemetry in select areas: Use modern technology of VHF, GPS and satellite telemetryto study and monitor aspects of demography,metapopulation dynamics (dispersal, rangingpatterns), mortality, predation ecology andbehaviour.

In all source populations, tiger abundance anddensity should be estimated using camera traps,digital images of pugmarks and/or DNA profile fromnon-invasive methods biannually.

The Project Tiger directorate will play the overall supervisory and coordination role for all the phases and tasks under each phase of themonitoring.

EXTRAPOLATING TIGER SIGN INDEX TO TIGER DENSITIES AND POPULATION ESTIMATES

Now sign Low Medium

Tiger sign index

Preliminary data suggests tiger population in the Satpura-Maikallandscpe ranges between 239-392 (315)

High

• Area Samped ~48,000 km2

• High Density Tiger~1,800 km2

• Medium Density Tigers~1,300 km2

• Low Density Tigers~5,900 km2

Stage III - Intensivestratified sampling forTiger Density Estimation(currently ongoing,preliminary data)

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

Tig

er D

ensi

ty 1

00 k

m-2

198 Annexures


The tiger-reform agenda will not be possible withoutrevamping institutional structures and processesacross the board. The Project Tiger directorate itselfwill have to be strengthened: planning,implementation, monitoring and correctivemechanisms must happen down the line.

Currently, the directorate has only theincumbent director as an effective professional.Whatever assistance he has is deficient in fieldexperience as well as the needed senior status tomeasure up to the desired equations, as is required todeal with the states.

The directorate staff lacks field training, anddoesn’t have the seniority to deal with stateseffectively.

Certainly, this situation must improve.Compenent professional assistants having expertise in wildlife management, GeographicalInformation Systems, statistics and socio-economics. Only carefully selected, individualsfrom the state forest service cadre and scientificcadres – with the participation of the director in theselection process – can ensure the requisiteprofessional experience and calibre in thecandidates selected.

It is on these lines that the Project Tigerdirectorate shall have to be revamped. It will benecessary to accord a fair measure of autonomy to thedirectorate in order to ensure quick decision-makingand exercising timely interventions for correctives atthe tiger reserve and state administration levels.Likewise, effective institutional structures shall haveto be put in place to approve programmes andfinances.

A competent governing body will be essential to take decisions on policy and programme-meritand its size for the different reserves. The states’response shall have to be ensured by carefullyselecting lead managers in each reserve and placingthe buffer zones under field directors’ control rightaway, where not already done. Simultaneously, ajudicious planning exercise shall have to beundertaken to launch the integrated conservationand people supportive programmes over a largerarea, say a sub-landscape much beyond the existingbuffer zones.

The Director, Project Tiger should haveconsiderable operational freedom and office supportto perform the above role. At present, the Project Tigerdirectorate is performing the following functions:

National:

A. General1. Processing of the annual plan of operations

received from states for providing fundingsupport

2. Collation and scrutiny of utilisation certificatesas received from states vis-à-vis the centralassistance provided

3. Collation and scrutiny of monthly, quarterly,half-yearly and annual reports received from thestates

4. Monitoring compliance of instructions relatingto patrolling/special patrolling/protectioninitiatives

5. Supervisory field visits and interaction withchief wildlife wardens and field staff

6. Facilitating networking for wildlife crimedetection

7. Collation of tiger poaching data8. Replying to Parliament questions, Parliamentary

Committees/VIP references.9. Filing replies relating to tiger conservation

litigation ongoing in courts of law10. Furnishing replies to audit paras, furnishing

reports and returns and participating in theroutine meetings of the ministry

11. Fostering awareness, eliciting public supporttowards tiger conservation

12. Implementing complementary externally aidedprojects

B. Technical1. Providing technical comments to the state chief

wildlife wardens on management plans of tigerreserves

2. Formulating guidelines on managerial issuesrelating to core and buffer zones, includingcarrying capacity for tourist visitation, eco-tourism and park interpretation

3. Carrying out independent monitoring of tigerreserves based on a set criteria by a panel ofexperts

4. Monitoring the country-level status of tigerpopulation/habitat based on GeographicalInformation Systems (GIS)

5. Carrying out the all India estimation of tigers, co-predators and prey animals once in every fouryears

6. Assessing the comparative forest cover status of

A N N E X U R E - I X Investing in institutions for change:strengthening the Project Tiger directorate

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tiger reserves and their surrounds through theForest Survey of India

7. Facilitating faunal survey of tiger reservesthrough the Zoological Survey of India

8. Facilitating floristic survey of tiger reservesthrough the Botanical Survey of India

9. Preparing a country-level status paper on ProjectTiger

10. Digital customisation of category-wise fundsutilised in tiger reserves since the inception ofthe project, and its updation

11. Linking tiger reserves in the GIS domain throughNational Information Centre for ManagementInformation Systems.

12. Fostering field research and radio telemetrystudies of tigers in tiger reserves in collaborationwith the Wildlife Institute of India

13. Organising national/international workshops ontiger conservation

14. Facilitating capacity building of field officers intiger reserve for management and crimedetection

15. Mainstreaming the good/wise practices fromvarious tiger reserves

16. Participating in training courses of field officersas resource person

International:

1. Participating in international meetings ofconventions like the Convention on InternationalTrade in Endangered Species (CITES)

2. Participating in trans-boundary meetings withNepal on tiger conservation

3. Participating in the meetings of the Global TigerForum

4. Evolving bilateral protocol with neighbouringtiger range countries

200 Annexures


The institutional hierarchy in the forestry sector isorganised in the following structures:

The Indian Forest Service (IFS), an All-India Service,leads forest and wildlife management both in thestates and the Centre. Recruitment in the service isdirect and by promotion from the State ForestService. Central government positions are also filledby IFS officers seconded on deputation from the statecadres.

The State Forest Service (SFS): The SFS officers renderthe function of supervisory assistance in protectionand work execution. Recruitment is both direct andby promotion from range forest officers. When IFS

was reconstituted in 1966, direct recruitment to thestate service was stopped. But, ostensibly, to sharethe increased workload direct recruitment wasrestarted in 1978. As it proved later this was anunwise move as over time this has led to widespreadstagnation in forestry cadres down the line fromrangers to forest/wildlife guards.

Forest Rangers or Range Forest Officers (RFO): Forestand wildlife protection and execution of fieldactivities as well as accounts are organized andcontrolled with a range as the base unit. The RFO isthe key field level functionary. Recruitment is bothdirect and by promotion from the post of deputyrangers.

Forester/Deputy Ranger (Range Assistant or RoundOfficer): A range is usually organized into twosubunits in charge a forester or deputy ranger. Theylead or participate in patrolling parties as well asexecute field works and other activities. Recruitmentat forester level is both direct and by protection fromforest guard level. Generally deputy ranger Positionsare all filled by promotion from foresters.

Forest and Wildlife Guards: Basic protection unit isa beat manned by a forest/wildlife guard assisted bya ‘watcher’. In PAs, guards must live in interiorchowkis and carry our patrolling as well as keeptrack of animals or animal-signs and habitat use bythem. They thus render valuable information of use

in wildlife management. Besides they also carry outthe works e.g. fire protection, road maintenance.

Foresters and forest/wildlife guards constitutethe main frontline whereas the rangers are the mainfield executants. ACFs (IFS probationers and SFS

officers), DCFs and CFs carry out different levels ofsupervisory and control functions in an ascendingorder from rangers above:

Assistant Conservator of Forests (ACF): Fieldsupervision of protection and management.

Deputy Conservator of Forests (DCF): Above plusplanning annual work programmes, budgets,rendering accounts and exercising administrativecontrol over their territories and units in their charge,say a forest division, a protected area or a part of atiger reserve.

Conservator of Forests (CF): As head of a forest-circleor the field director of a tiger reserve, carries outplanning, oversees implementation and exercisesoverall administrative control. In a territorial chargea CF usually controls 4-5 forest divisions.

Poor Cadre Planning & Management

The adverse impacts of revival of direct recruitmentsto the SFS have significantly upset the promotionprospects lower down leading to frustration in thesubordinate forestry cadres – the rangers and thefrontline staff. This has been further drasticallycompounded by the heavy direct recruitments in theIFS and SFS and even RFO cadres during 1978 up toabout 1990. In the IFS the peak years were 1988, 1989and 1993, otherwise they have remained at annualaverages during periods shown below:● Peak years: 1988 - 155; 1989 - 107 and 1993 - 82● 65 during 1968-1986● 55 during 1989-1997 (excluding 1993, a peak

year)● 25 during 1998-2003

In the SFS also these have been erratic withirrationally high levels from 1980 to 1990 averagingat 123 per year. They dropped off to about 33

A N N E X U R E - X A critique of cadre-building in theforestry sector and suggestions for humanresource improvement■ H S PANWAR, member, Tiger Task Force

between 1991 and 1998, steeply declining in 1999 tojust three. There was no recruitment in 2000 and 16were recruited in 2001. After that there have beenjust a few or no recruitments.

At RFO level the recruitment were again highduring 1978 to 1982 averaging at 470 per year. Itranged from 120 to 290 between 1983 and 1989,averaging at 209 per year. Later it dropped to atrickle. The total cadre strength of RFOs of all statesput together is 9974. If a third is to be filled bypromotion from lower rank, the net strength of directrecruits would be 6600. If an average of 20-25 yearstay in RFO cadre is taken before promotion, thiswould suggest a mean quota of about 260-330 peryear, or say an average of 300 per year. Steady directrecruitment to the RFO cadre at this rate is criticalbecause the average age of this important fieldexecutive cadre must remain around 40 years. Buterratic heavy recruitment in six years from 1978 to1982 upset this and also the avenues for promotionfor the frontline staff.

It is not difficult to see that the directrecruitments to the different levels of forestry cadreshave been erratic and irrational across the board.This has undermined the functional efficacy ofinstitutional structures in field functions. This hasalso led to marked stagnation in all cadres too, whichhas been a major reason for the low morale of theforestry services all across. As challenges and threatshave aggravated, the forestry service efficacy hasbeen steadily decimated by these horrors in cadreplanning and management. It has also done untoldharm to the training institutions, also all across.

The forestry services have to discharge a widespectrum of functions from policing to developmentincluding contribution to the socioeconomic wellbeing of the forest dwellers. Besides the well over adecade old adoption of none or next to negligibledirect recruitments by the states at all levels hasgiven a severe blow to the protection anddevelopment functions of the forestry services.

While it is not advisable to make directrecruitment to the SFS cadre in most states it isnecessary to fill up positions by promotion from theRFO cadre. It is essential to revive direct recruitmentsat ‘normal’ levels immediately at the RFO and foresterlevels. Recruitments to the FG/WLG cadres shall haveto be somewhat heavier in order to fill up large-scalevacancies and thus rationalize the average age of thefrontline. There is, however, no case for any increasein the respective sanctioned strength of all thecadres. In order to mend the fence with the localcommunity, a good measure would be to fill up all orat least 50 per cent posts at forester and 75 per centposts at forest/wildlife guard levels by preferentialappointment of local candidates. For the tribalcandidates having good jungle-craft skills

(ascertained by test) the educational qualificationsmay be brought down to just 5th standard of schooleducation. In any case all cadres need a thoroughreview and an obligatory institution of a rationalstrategy so that such upsets that affect the very coreof forestry and wildlife functions are not everrepeated.

Capacity Building

In tune with the decay in the forestry services, thecapacity building has deteriorated too, mainly fromlack of interest on part of the states. Thus, there isnot only a shortage of staff but also a steep fall in theprofessional capacity, particularly in wildlifemanagement and in respect of the needed paradigmshift in favour of participatory management of forestsand PAs through initiatives e.g. JFM andecodevelopment. The low availing of trainingfacilities in wildlife management in the WII is nowthe reason of many PAs in many states being managedby untrained officers. The training capacity of WII for9-month PG Diploma course in wildlife managementfor IFS and SFS officers is 30 per year but right throughnearly two decades the actual number of trainees hasstagnated at less than 20 on an average. Likewise the3-month certificate course for the rangers having alsoa capacity of 30 has remained underutilised at wellbelow 20 per year. In order to meet the reasonadvanced by the states of paucity of funds the MoEF

has provided for cent percent training cost to beborne by itself from 2003. This has so far had onlymarginal improvement. It is also seen that traininginterest varies from state to state.

There is low priority to capacity building and toundertaking organized staff development plan in theforestry services. The worst sufferer of this lapse isthe wildlife management. States have not takenmuch interest in upgrading their forester and forestguard training schools in terms of introducingspecial packages for wildlife management withinforestry courses and undertaking full time wildlifemanagement courses. Some years back the WII haddeveloped specific curricula in wildlife managementfor forester and wildlife guard courses and selectedtwo schools (Kalagarh in Uttaranchal andBandhavgarh in Madhya Pradesh) for assistance byway of training of trainers and also helped run onecourse. But these schools are now running underutilized. It is necessary to strengthen these schoolsso as to meet the needs of other states in therespective regions. WII should also ask other largestates to come forward to avail this capacity buildinghelp in developing their schools and staff. WII has anenormous responsibility ahead to bring up capacityin states and to prepare a fair number of IFS officers inorder to constitute the long awaited ‘wildlife sub-

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202 Annexures


cadre’, which the TTF has fully endorsed. Butunfortunately it has lost long years in stagnationdespite its efforts to the contrary.

Preparing for paradigm shift

There has been some recognition but hardly anyconviction for the paradigm shift in forest andwildlife management towards an integratedmanagement strategy to ameliorate degraded forestsin order to improve ecosystem services and enhanceproductivity for the forest dwellers, the country atlarge and for state revenues. Diversion, degradationand fragmentation of forests from pressures ofindustrial development, markets and a steep rise inhuman population post-independence have forcedforesters to adopt a protectionist enforcementapproach. This has cost them the loss of sympathyof forest dwellers and the development plannersalike.

While industrial development needs beingobligated to observe stricter discipline and to carrygreater environmental responsibility, the forestry-wildlife sector equally needs to become a keymainstream development agency, especiallycontributing to the well being of the forest and forest-fringe dwellers. The sector must also simultaneouslyimprove overall conservation in the interest ofecological security including water security,protecting our rich biodiversity and wildlife,endangered species included. This reinforces thatwhile a forester-wildlifer is a strict enforcer againstmiscreants, he is a friend and developmentfunctionary of the local people, particularly the poorand the landless forest-dependents

The needed paradigm shift entails an ability to

envision conservation at landscape level, whichwhile securing ecosystem services, biodiversity andwildlife helps rapid amelioration of degraded forestsand pastures in a transparent participatory modewith the genuine local stakeholders and deservingbeneficiaries. IGNFA, WII, IIFM and rangers colleges, allinstitutions in the domain of the MoEF, need to gearup to prepare the forester-wildlifer to be a realisticvisionary, a planner and implementer of intergradedprogrammes capable of ushering the paradigm shiftinto the field level. This will require a thoroughreview of all curricula of these institutions as well asa wherewithal for competent and adequate trainingof fresh recruits. Equally, IGNFA and WII shall have toexpeditiously take up the work of planning andrunning refresher courses for IFS and SFS officers.Short-term courses will be needed for senior IFS

officers and medium terms courses for other IFS andSFS officers. WII shall also have to design andimplement such courses for the rangers. Bothinstitutions shall have to take up special training oftrainers (ToT) programmes imparting expert help inthe initial stages in institution based and fieldtraining modules. They must continue to run suchprogrammers later as and when needed to update thecapacity of training institutions. The Director offorestry education shall similarly have to participatein the capacity building of rangers colleges and ineffectively running programmes.

Importantly, similar assistance will be neededfor forester and forest/wildlife guard training schoolson the new outlines suggested. Identified regionalschools should be dedicated to running specialwildlife management courses for foresters from allstates and for wildlife guards from the states that donot have their own wildlife training schools.

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A. Offences and penalties

● The Act prescribes various offences andpenalties. These are discussed below:

a. Any violation of the provisions of the Act, itsrules or orders made thereunder attracts apunishment of three years or a fine up to Rs25,000 or both [Section 51(1)]. A second orsubsequent offence of the same nature attracts animprisonment term of at least three yearsextending to seven years and a minimum fine ofRs 25,000 [second proviso to Section 51(1)].

b. Where offences are committed in relation toanimals mentioned in Schedule I, or Part II ofSchedule II, or where the offence relates tohunting in a sanctuary or national park orchanging their boundaries, the punishment willbe at least three years imprisonment extending toseven years and a fine of Rs 25,000 [first provisoto Section 51(1)].

c. Violation of provisions prohibiting trade orcommerce in trophies, animal articles and thelike, derived from certain animals, would attracta punishment of at least three years ofimprisonment extending to seven years and afine of Rs 10,000 [Section 51(1A)].

d. Any person who teases, molests, injures, feedsanimals in zoos or causes disturbance to animalsor litters the zoo will be punishable byimprisonment for a term of six months or a finewhich may extend to Rs 2,000 or with both[Section 51(1B)].

e. Persons convicted under the provisions of theAct also stand to lose their license or permit[Section 51(2) and 51(3)] while also having theirlicense under the Arms Act, 1959 cancelled/reinforced by an order that no re-issue of armslicense be made till up to five years from the dateof conviction [Section 51(4)]. They will also haveno claim to the vehicle used while the offencewas being committed [Section 51(2)]. It alsobecomes difficult for persons convicted toreceive bail under Section 51A.

f. Persons who, without reasonable cause, fail toproduce the things they are required to produceunder the Act, will be guilty of the offence[Section 50 (8)].

g. It is also important to point out that prosecution

under any other law is not barred for any act whichconstitutes an offence under this Act, or from beingpunished for a higher punishment or penalty thanthat provided by this Act [Section 56].

B. Special provisions relating to the investigation procedure

1. The Act prescribes distinct and specialprocedures for investigation which are (a)different from those for the investigation of anoffence under the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 and (b) ostensibly designed to empowerforest officials to initiate and participate in theinvestigation process so that any immediateviolation of the Act can be remedied. To the extentto which forest officials have been brought into theinvestigative process to deal with an immediatetransgression of the regime of the Act, theseprovisions are salutary. But after an initialinvestigation is enabled in this way, the procedurelimps forward, only to get ensnared as a relativelyminor case through the criminal process.

2. It might be useful to recount the specialinvestigative provisions of the Act of 1972 (asamended). These are as follows:

● Power to enter, search and seize ● Power to arrest and detain● Power to record evidence● Duty to render assistance● Power to destroy or dispose

Power of entry, search and seizure:Section 50 (1) (a) allows certain officials, includingthe Director or any other officer authorised by him inthis behalf, or the Chief Wildlife Warden or theauthorised officer or any forest officer or any policeofficer not below the rank of a sub-inspector, torequire the production, for purposes of inspection,any article of wildlife or license and permitdocuments to be kept by the person under theprovisions of the Act. These officers are also givenpowers of search [Section 50 (1) (b)] and seizure[Section 50 (1) (c)].

It should be noted that this immediate power ofentry, search and seizure can be exercised to (a)require any animal, trophy to be produced; (b) stop avehicle or search premises, baggage or other things;

A N N E X U R E - X I Amending the criminal provisions ofthe Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972■ Critique by PILSAC, New Delhi for the Tiger Task Force

or (c) seize any animal, trophy, plant in respect ofwhich an offence is created. An exception is made offisherfolk who inadvertently enter by boat, not usedfor commercial fishing, into a national park.

Power to arrest and detain:There is a power to arrest and detain without warrantfor something impermissible — done withoutpermission. Such a detention may not take place ifthe officers in question are satisfied of the name andaddress of a person and if the person concerned willanswer a summons or other proceedings that mightbe taken against him Section 50 (3). While such anapproach is conducive to civil liberties, suchprovisions work against the poor, who often have nofixed address nor are able to satisfy the officer of theirbona fides. It should be noted that persons detainedor things seized will be produced before a magistrate[Section 50 (4)].

The power to record evidence:Under Section 50 (8) (d), any officer not below therank of an Assistant Director of Wildlife Preservationor Wildlife Warden shall have the power to receiveand record evidence. More importantly, suchevidence can be admissible in any subsequent trialunder Section 50 (9) before a magistrate, the onlycondition being that it should have been taken in thepresence of the accused person.

Duty to render assistance:Under Section 50 (7), all persons have a duty torender assistance for the purposes of (i) prevention ordetection of an offence; (ii) apprehending personscharged with violation of the Act and (iii) for seizureof substances when exercising the power of seizureunder Section 50 (1) (c).

Power to destroy or dispose:If the article seized is government property as definedin Section 39, then the officer has the power to arrangefor the sale of the seized substance under Section 50(6) (a). If on the other hand, the article is notgovernment property, then the proceeds of the saleshall be returned to the owner under Section 50 (6) (b).

These special provisions are necessary in orderto police the various areas and regimes created by theAct of 1972. They are also hedged in by civil libertyprecautions, so that what is done is placed before amagistrate; and a person arrested may not bedetained by an officer where the bona fides of anarrestee are established. This does hurt the landless,but that is no reason for the provisions to beremoved. Consistent with the Constitution, it shouldbe made clear that where a person is arrested, heshould be brought before a magistrate within 24hours. The provisions that remand live or captive

animals to the custody of the person, in whosepossession they are, need examination.

These provisions provide the enforcementprocess a healthy start; the process then flounders.There is no provision for inviting a SpecialInvestigation Team. As soon as these ‘immediate’acts are done, the entire case is placed before amagistrate to limp along without priority or speed.

C. Method and forum of trial

Following investigation, a case proceeds on the basisprescribed under the Code, 1973 [Section 4(2), CrPC]unless the Wildlife Protection Act, 1972 lays downspecial provisions to the contrary [Section 5, CrPC].Broadly speaking, this means:1. There is no distinction between serious and trivial

cases. All cases proceed under weak trial regimes.2. All the cases proceed as complaint cases, rather

than serious criminal cases to be tried bysessions.

3. Even as complaint cases, where the offenceattracts imprisonment for two years or more, it istreated as a warrant case to be tried by aprocedure different from normal crimes.

4. Where the offence attracts imprisonment for lessthan two years, it is treated as a summary case, tobe tried by a less rigorous procedure.

5. Very minor cases can be tried by summaryprocedures.

What needs to be done?The cases need to be treated as serious criminalcases. The first step must be to differentiate betweenserious and non-serious cases and ensure that seriouscases are tried as police cases by the Sessions Courts.

This has an impact on the manner in which thecases are prosecuted. Since they are complaint cases,the police do not prosecute them. It is left to theoverworked forest officials to come to court and buildthe case before it can be taken further. The cases lingeron because they are prescribed as ‘lesser’ cases and arenot treated as priority. The prosecutors, mainly forestofficials, are inept and lose interest. The second steptherefore must be to have special prosecutors.

Since these cases randomly languish in courtsthroughout the country, they are not monitored by aCentralised Monitoring Task Force either at the stateor the Union level. So, the third step must be tocreate a Centralised Monitoring Task Force for allcases — especially the serious ones.

In order to appreciate the distinctions created bythe Code, it would be useful to summarise therelevant provisions of the Code. The Code makes adistinction between summons cases and warrantcases. Summons cases under Section 2 (w) mean acase relating to an offence and not being a warrant

204 Annexures


Annexures 205


case. Warrant cases under Section 2 (x) of the Codeare those relating to an offence punishable withdeath, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for aterm exceeding two years. As has been listed earlier,the various offences of the Wildlife Protection Act,1972 prescribe punishment of more than two yearsexcept for violation of Section 38J related to teasingof animals in a zoo. Thus, Sections 238-250 of theCode dealing with warrant cases would come intoplay for all the major offences of the Act.

When the case is instituted on the basis of apolice report, the magistrate, once satisfied that thevarious documents that were to be handed over to theaccused under Section 207 have been done so[Section 238], proceeds to frame the charge [Section240]. If the magistrate does not believe a case can bemade out on the police documents, he may dischargethe accused [Section 239]. When the accused recordsa plea of guilty he is convicted under Section 241. Ifhe pleads not guilty, the magistrate frames the chargeif a case has been made out and proceeds to hear thecase on merits after the prosecution [Section 242] andthe defence [Section 243] have arrayed the evidencerequired. If the case is not instituted on a policereport, then the magistrate hears the prosecution anddecides whether, on the basis of the evidencepresented by the Prosecution [Section 244], anoffence has been made or not. If no case has beenmade out against the accused, then the magistratedischarges the accused [Section 245]. Otherwise, acharge is framed under Section 246(1), and the mattergoes to trial, following the procedure prescribed inSection 246. With respect to the offence of teasing ina zoo, the procedure followed is the mechanismindicated for a summons case. Summons cases do notrequire the framing of a charge [Section 251] and ifthe accused pleads guilty, the magistrate starts thetrial process as prescribed in Section 254. The forumto be used for conducting trial is guided by Part II ofthe First Schedule of the Code, which deals with theclassification of offences against other laws. On thebasis of the punishment prescribed, the case goesbefore a magistrate (for punishment of imprisonmentof less than three years) or a First Class Magistrate (forimprisonment of three years and not more than sevenyears) or a Sessions Court (for imprisonment of sevenyears, life or the death sentence).

D. Special provisions

The Act prescribes certain special provisions relatingto cognisance of the offence, compoundability of theoffence and presumptions at the stage of trial whichare outlined below: 1. Section 54 allows the Government to compound

any notified offence whereby a person, who has committed such an offence, would bedischarged on paying a certain sum of money[Section 54(2)]. Such compounding is done only to the extent of a penalty of Rs 25,000. All such compounding terminates all pendingproceedings in relation to that offence, and nofurther proceeding is taken in respect of thatoffence. The penalty is determined by the forestofficer in accordance with Section 54 (1).

2. Every person’s complaint of the violation of theWildlife Protection Act, 1972 does not result in atrial. The process of cognisance — the manner inwhich judicial notice is taken of the offence — islimited to complaints according to the provisionsof Section 55, which lists authorities like theDirector, Wild Life Preservation, Member-Secretary, Central Zoo Authority as beingcompetent to make the complaint. Section 55 (c)also allows any general member of the public tomake a complaint, after giving notice of 60 daysto the government that he intends to do so. If thegovernment does not proceed on theprosecution, then such a person could complainto the Court, which would then take cognisanceof the offence.

3. Other special provisions relate to presumptionsin Section 57, which reverses the onus of proof on to the person who has been caught withan animal part and presumes unlawfulpossession of the same unless the contrary isproved.

4. A special provision relating to offences bycompanies in Section 58 pins liability on theperson from the company who has connived inthe commission of the offence.

5. Any person involved in the abetment or attemptto violate the provisions of the Act is deemed tohave violated that provision and punishmentaccordingly follows [Section 52].

206 Annexures


1. Letter No. 694-PMO/73 dated 27 December 1973 of the Prime Minister to the Chief Ministers of all States.2. Letter No. 15/ii (i)74-AIS(IV) dated 16 January 1976 of the Cabinet Secretariat (Deptt of Personnel and AR)

to the Chief Secretaries of all States and UTs.3. Letter No. J-11014/75-76 FRY(WL) dated 16 September 1976 of Joint Secretary (F&WL), Ministry of

Agriculture to the Chief Secretaires of all States and UTs.4. Letter No. J-11014/75-74 FRY(WL) dated 25 October 1976 of Joint Secretary (F&WL), Ministry of Agriculture

to the Forest Secretaries of all States and UTs.5. Letter No. 279-PMO/76 dated 16 December 1976 of the Prime Minister to the Chief Ministers of all States.6. Letter No. 5-6/80-FRY(WL) dated 8 April 1980 of the Union Minister of Agriculture to all Governors and

Chief Ministers.7. Letter No. 660-PMO/80 dated 20 April 1980 of the Prime Minister to all Governors and Chief Ministers.8. Letter No. 8-1/80-FRY(WL) dated 21 April 1981 of Joint Secretary (F&WL), Ministry of Agriculture to the

Forest Secretaries of all States and UTs.

A N N E X U R E - X I I Guidelines on establishment ofwildlife wings etc issued during the period 1973- 1981

joining the dots - the report of the tiger task force

Documents