joel hayward, "the luftwaffe and agility," in air power: the agile air force (royal air force,...

8/7/2019 Joel Hayward, "The Luftwaffe and Agility," in Air Power: The Agile Air Force (Royal Air Force, 2008), pp. 40-49.

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Air PowerThe Agile Air ForceEdited by Neville Parton


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Contents

Foreword Air Chief Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy 5

Introduction Group Captain Neville Parton 7

DevelopingAgileAirmenAir Vice-Marshal Peter Dye 11

TheTheoryOfAgility Group Captain John Jupp 17

AgilityAHistoricalPerspective Mr Seb Cox 37

TheLuftwaffesAgility:AnassessmentofRelevantConceptsandPracticesDr Joel Hayward 45

PerspectiveoftheChiefofStaffoftheUnitedStatesAirForce

General T. Michael Moseley 55

AgilityinaSmallAirForceBrigader Morten H Lunde 67

AgilityintheLogisticsArenaAir Commodore Simon Bollom 75

ParadoxesandProblemsofAirpowerDr Phillip S. Meilinger 81


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The Agile Air Force

Fwd by cAS

Agilityhasbecomesomethingofabuzz-wordinthedefencecommunity,andlikemanysuch

termsneedstobetreatedwithadegreeofcautioninorderforthephrasenottobecomeall

thingstoallmen.Thatwaspartoftherationalebehindmydecisiontofocusthe2006CASAir

PowerConferenceonthesubjectofagilitytotaketheopportunitytoexplorewhattheterm

reallymeansintermsofdevelopingatrulyagileAirForceforthe21stCentury.Ofcourse,being

agileisnothingnewforAirForces.FromtheverystarttheRoyalAirForcedemonstratedAir

Powersabilitytodelivereffectsrapidlytopartsofthebattlespacethatwerebeyondthereachof

eithertheRoyalNavyortheArmy.AirForceshavealsobeenveryquicktoharnesstechnology,

andadapttheirwaysofoperatingtosuitchangesinthesecurityenvironment;thishasbeen

particularly apparent in recent years, where capabilities designed for high intensity warghting

operationshavebeenadaptedtosuitthedemandsofthecounter-insurgencycampaignsbeingfought in Iraq andAfghanistan.This did not come aboutwithout considerable effort, and a

willingnesstolearnandexperiment,bothofwhicharekeyelementsintheagilityequation.

Theexploitationoftechnologyhasbeenat theheartofAirPowerdevelopmentoverthe

past 100 years but the greatest difculty, paradoxically, has not been in the development of

newtechnologies,butconceptualisinghowtheyshouldbeusedtomaximumeffect.Therefore,

whilsttechnologyoffersrealopportunitiesforwideningtheutilityofsystemsacrossarangeof

scenariosand,increasingly,providesscopeforgreaterincrementalcapabilityenhancement,itis

theagilityofourpeopleinthewaytheythinkandbehavethatsetstheframeworkforhow

weoperateourequipmentandexploitnewtechnology.Iseethisasthemainpurposeofour

AirPowerConferences.Toprovide-inconjunctionwithotheraspectsofourAirPowerandAir

WarfareeducationandtrainingtheenvironmentinwhichwecanthinkanddiscussAirPower

issues,inordertodevelopnewideasandconceptsforthefuture.

The papers contained in this publication, which cover the main areas discussed at the

Conference, do not dene absolutely what is meant by either agility or an agile air force. They

do,however,containsomethought-provokingideasthatIwouldcommendtoanyonewithan

interestindevelopingtheagilityoftheRoyalAirForce,whichis,ofcourse,oneofthekeytenets

oftheRoyalAirForceStrategy.


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cAS Air PoWer coNFereNce 2006 iNTroDUcTioN

gup captan Nv Patn

The2006CASAirPowerConference,asoutlinedintheForewordbyCAS,providedan

opportunityforsharedthinkinganddebateonwhatthetermagileairforceactuallymeansfor

theRoyalAirForceatthebeginningofthe21stCentury.Indeed,inthisregarditfollowedina

longlineofCASAirPowerConferences,which,fromtheverystart,haveenjoyedacommon

purposenamelytoassistindeveloping aspiritofintellectual rigour anddebatewithin the

RAF.Byprovidingaplatformwherepractitioners,theoreticiansandhistorianscouldpresentand

discussabroadrangeofairpowerrelatedtopicswithadegreeofrelevanthistoricalcontext,that

intenthasbeenachieved.Howeverasattendanceatsucheventsisalwayslimited,thispublication

is intended to allow those who were unable to benet rst hand from the presentations given

bythespeakers,andthereby,hopefully,toencouragethethinkinganddebatetocontinue.For

suchadocument,themainpurposeoftheintroductionistooutlinethecontentsofthepapers,thusallowingreaderstorapidlyidentifythoseareasofgreatestinteresttothem.Howeverit

alsoallowstheopportunitytoexplainwhyparticulartopicswerechosen,inordertoaddtothe

coherenceofthepieceasawhole.

Oneofthemain reasonsforchoosingthesubjectareaof agility forthe conferencewas

that,ifthereisasingleproblemthatisatpresentasgenerictomilitaryorganisationsasitisto

business, it isthebuzzwordbandwagon.Themoveto soundbitepoliticshasresulted inmuch

moreemphasisbeingplaceduponterminology,andinanumberofquartersunlessyouusethe

righttermsyouarelikelynottobetakenseriously.Termssuchasthecomprehensiveapproach,

ortheentirelexiconofeffects-basedelementsEBO,EBA,EBParefrequentlyusedwithout

anycommonconceptualframeworkandofcourse,inanumberofcases,whatworkswellasa

strategic level concept becomes much more difcult when it has to be turned into operational

oreventacticallevelrealities.Agilitycouldwithoutdoubtbeseenasoneofthoseterms,and

hence the aim of the conferencewas toprovide a numberofdifferent perspectiveson the

subjectofagility,lookingbothwithintheRAFandwithout,inordertoensureagreatercommon

understandingofwhatbeingapartofanagileairforcemeansforthosewhoservewithinthem.

That was the aim, and you will nd that the papers which follow explore a variety of the different

dimensions inherent in the term agility with considerable insight, thereby fullling the original

remitandallowingyoutoexplorethepresentersideasindetail.Itisworthnotingthatwiththeexceptionofthekeynoteaddress,almostallofthepaperswerepresentedinpairs,andhenceare

consideredinthesamemannerinthisreview.

Anappositeplacetostartis,ofcourse,withanappreciationofthefactthatinordertohave

an agile organisation you need to have agile people, and the rst two papers, on Developing Agile

Airmen, andThe Theory of Agility,byAir-ViceMarshalPeterDyeandGroupCaptainJohnJupp

respectively,providesomeusefulperspectivesonthisparticulararea.Theformerbroughtout

theimportanceofteachingpeoplehowtothinkratherthanwhatto think, and the difculty in

achievingtherightbalancebetweeneducationandtraining.Thelatterexploredvariousaspects

ofagility,rangingfromtheneedforemotionalintelligencetothecapacitytodealwithambiguity,

andthenprovidedanumberofcasestudiestodemonstratehowtheabilitytoimproviseand

innovatebothhallmarksofagilityareactuallybeingworkedoutwithintheService.


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However agility is very denitely not a new phenomenon within the RAF, as the paper by

SebCox,theHeadoftheAirHistoricalBranch,cogentlyillustrates.Hishistoricalanalysisof

theperiodfromtheformationoftheRFCandRNASthroughtotheendoftheSecondWorld

Warisrepletewithexamples,bothgoodandbad,andstronglymakesthecasethatitisnotjust

enoughtohaveagileindividualstheorganisationhastobeequallyresponsiveorproblemswill

arise.DrJoelHaywardexaminesanalternateperspective,lookingattheagilitythattheLuftwaffe

displayed in terms of supporting the German Army throughout the rst 4 years of World War

2.ItisclearthatmuchoftheoperationaladvantagethattheGermanArmyenjoyedthroughout

this period resulted fromtheway that the Luftwaffe could rapidlyadapt tomeet its needs,

andcertainlytherearelessonsherethatshouldnotbeforgotten.TogetherbothSebandJoels

organisationsarehelpingtheRAFtoreshapeitselfintermsofthrough-lifeeducationofallour

people,particularlywithregardtounderstandingourpast,aswellasourpresent,andhowto

derive from both of these lessons for the future essential if we are to produce warghters who

arewellmotivated,highlytrainedandaboveallagileakeystrategicpriority.

Aninterestingaspectofagilityisthatthereisnosuchthingasanaturallyagileairforce,and

certainly size is not a key indicator as is amply demonstrated by the next pair of papers. In the rst

theChiefofStaffoftheUSAF,GeneralMoseley,exploreswhatagilitymeansfromtheperspective

oftheworldslargestairforce.Mostoftheareasthatheconsidershavetremendousresonance

intermsofaspectsthattheRAFisalsoengagedinexamining,althoughthenagain,giventhelong

historyofmutualco-operationandclosesupport,perhapsthisisnotreallysosurprising.But

theemphasisondevelopingpeopleandleaningsystemsarequiteclearlyseenasfundamentalto

developingtheUSAFfortomorrow.Attheotherendofthespectrum,BrigaderLundefromthe

RoyalNorwegianAirForce(RNoAF)providesauniqueunderstandingofjusthowtheRNoAF

completelyreinventeditselfinthespaceof6years,anddespiteastrengthofonly1600personnel

inlightblueuniform,isabletoprovidedeployableairtransport,supporthelicopter,airdefence,

strike/attack,ground-basedairdefence,andcommandandcontrolelementsworld-wide.Healso

pointstoapossiblemodelforEuropeinthefuture,intheshapeoftheEPAFExpeditionaryAir

Wing (EEAW), which provides signicant agility by leveraging across national boundaries.

Howeveragility, as alreadypointedout, requiresmore than justa goodfront of house,

andAirCommodoreBollomspaperconsidersthepartthattheleanapproachhastoplayin

termsofincreasingagilitywithin thelogisticsarea.Thispresentsa strongdefenceforleaning,

andappositelypointsoutthatsimplyhavingfatina logisticssystemdoesnotequalresiliencewhatisimportantishavingthecapacitytodealwiththeunexpected.Theapplicationofthe

same approach to the procurement of modications also makes for interesting reading, and in

particularthepartthatthisapproachcanplayinmakingtheintroductionofnewcapabilitiesboth

quickerandmoreaffordable.ItishearteningtoknowthatDLOandDPAIPTsaremanaging

toproduceinnovativesupportarrangementsthatproducegreaterlevelsofavailabilityatthe

frontlineatlowercostandyetstillmanagetoprovideagilityintermsofmeetingoperational

demand.

The nal paper comes from the one of the best-known contemporary writers on air power,

intheshapeofUSAFColonel(retired)PhilMeilinger,whohasmemorablybeendescribedas

theClausewitzof theAir.Thisprovides,amongstotherelements,atimelyreminderofwhat

airpowerbringstothejointbattle,andespeciallythefactthatthisisnotafreegoodgaining

airsuperioritycostsandinourcase,asfortheUSAF,thatincludesconvincingdoubtersin


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peacetimeoftheneedtospendtoensurecapabilitywhenitcomestowar.Italsoclearlypoints

totheneedformentalagilityonallourpartsifwearetocopewiththechangesinwarfarethat

areoccurring,andtobeabletounderstand,andmoreimportantlyexplain,someoftheparadoxes

thatairpowerpresents.Thisofcourseaccordswithanotherofourstrategicpriorities,thatof

improvingourabilitytoclearlyarticulatethecontributionthatairpoweringeneral,andtheRAF

inparticular,makestoUKdefence.

Takenasawhole,thesepapersprovideauniqueopportunitytoexploretheconceptof

agilityintermsofitsapplicationacrossthespectrumofairpower,andallofthemprovidefood

forthought.AsCAShasnotedinhisforeword,whilsttheydonotrepresenteitheracomplete

oruniqueviewofagilityinthisregard,theydorepresentausefulresourceforanyonewithan

interestinairpower.Andthisisoneoftheareasthatwedoneedtoconcentrateon,asevidenced

inanumberofthepapersenhancingourabilitytoexplainwhatairpoweris,anddoes,toa

broadrangeofaudiencesandperhapsmostcrucially,inlanguagethattheyunderstand.Being

abletodothiseffectivelywillcertainlyrequireaconsiderabledegreeofmentalagility,andthecontentsofthispublicationareintendedtoaidindevelopingthatparticularaspectenjoy!

GroupCaptainNevilleParton

DirectorofDefenceStudies(RoyalAirForce)

DefenceAcademy,Shrivenham,2007


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DeVeloPiNg Agile AirMeN

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IntroductionThere is a temptation at conferences, focussed as they must be on a specic, topical theme,

todramatizeonesargumentsifnottocreateasenseofurgency.So,beforeIgoanyfurther,

IshouldmakeitclearthatIdonotbelieveweareatacross-roads,somehowcaughtbetween

thenon-agilepastandtheagilefuture.Infact,theRoyalAirForcehasalwaysbeenagileinthe

waythatitemployspeopleandinthewaythatindividualsrespondtochangeandtheunique

demandsofoperations.However,weliveinanincreasinglydynamicenvironmentwheretheonly

certainthingaboutthefutureisthattherewillbelesscertainty.Increasedagilitythereforewill

bethefoundationforcontinuedoperationalsuccess.But,howdoweachievethis-atboththe

corporateandindividuallevel?Myintentiontodayistosetthescene,toindicatewhereweareandhowwemightmeetthechallengeinthefuture.

Definitions (and some Questions)So, what denes the agile airman? Implicitly, you might expect me to include the characteristics

ofagilityinpeoplealertness,liveliness,suppleness,etc.Youwillnotbesurprised,therefore,to

nd I dene agility as the sum of the personal qualities that deliver: adaptability, robustness,

exibility and responsiveness. We can all visualise these characteristics, but, are these natural

(innate)orcantheybecreatedanddeveloped?Iftheycanbecreatedanddeveloped(whichafter

allismytopic),isthisbestachievedthroughhardcompetenciesoris itmoreaboutmindset,

aboutapproachandaboutattitude?Inshort,arewetalkingabouteducationratherthantraining?

But is it sufcient just to have agile individuals, in other words what needs to be in place to allow

anagileairmantoactinanagilefashiondowehavetheenablingstructuresandculture?In

factcanpeoplebeimplicitlyagilebutpreventedbystructuresfromexercisingthisagilityor

perhapsweshouldseektomakestructuresagile,inordertoallowthemtocarrythelessagile

amongstus?

Tohelpconceptualisetheseissues,Iofferthe

followingmodel(Fig 1)thatsuggeststhereare

3elementsinDevelopingtheAgileAirman:

I will return to this model in due course, but for the present it is sufcient to say that these

arenotdiscreteelementsandthatagilityarisesfromtheircomplexinteraction.

So where have we come from?Thisisnotintendedtobeadetailedhistoricalanalysis-afterall,youwillgetaprofessional

viewlaterthisafternoon.However,itcanbearguedthattheRAFwasatitsmostagileinthe

late1920swhenwewereofaroughlysimilarsize(35,000uniformedpersonnel).Trenchard

recognisedthathehad to invest for the future and provide solid foundations onwhich the

Servicecouldlaterbuild.Budgetarypressures,thejealousiesoftheotherServicesandthelackof


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anovertmilitarythreattoUK,forcedTrenchardtobefrugalbutdidnotstophimbeingversatile

and opportunistic - placing key people inkey posts - and putting substantial resources into

trainingandeducation.Developingandsustainingastrongethos/espritwascentraltohisthinking.

ThelessonsIdrawfromthisarethatyouneedtoinvestforthefuture(inorganisation,culture

andtheindividual),avoidshort-termism,anddecideonyourvitalground.

TheRAFinWW2wasverylarge(over1millionstrong)whichwasinitselfatestament

tothesuccessofTrenchardsstrategy.TheRAF,andairpoweringeneral,wascrucialtoAllied

successonland,atseaandintheair-ineverytheatreofoperations.However,withexpansion

cameaverylargestaffandarguablyaprice-tagthatwasunaffordable.Infact,theRAFwassolarge

in1944thattheArmystartedtorunoutofmanpower.ThefurtherlessonsthatIdrawarethat

sizeprovidesanagilityallofitsown,resiliencecanbeassuredthroughredundancy,anddiversity

providesanaturalagility;butitcomesataprice.

But, less anyonethinkthat the late 1920sorWW2werewithout problems, I have twoquotations for you to ponder. The rst is from the Director of Academic Studies at Cranwell in

1920:

The officer of the R.A.F., I used to say, has got to be a quite different product from anArmy or a Naval officer. The time has passed when an officer could afford to narrow hisinterests down to his sport and his immediate job. Youve got to cultivate a liberality ofmind, a breadth of outlook, a tolerance and an all-pervading enthusiasm for every side oflife at least as big as that of the head of a great business firm. The sole use of this subject,

which we call English for want of a better name, is to develop your individuality if you haveone, or to bring one to birth if you havent.1

AttheendoftheyearhereceivedthefollowingcommunicationfromtheAirCouncil.

Sir,

1. I am commanded by the Air Council to inform you that certain aspects of theinstruction lately given to the Cadets of the R.A.F. College, Cranwell, were broughtto their notice by the Air Officer Commanding.

2. The Council viewed with considerable apprehension the type and method ofinstruction disclosed and in consequence instructed the A.O.C. to call for yourexplanation, which they have now received.

3. This explanation has been carefully considered by the Air Council, who are forcedto the conclusion that you have adopted methods of instruction which cannotbe justified even by the widest interpretation of the duties entrusted to you, and

which are not compatible with the ordinary obligations binding on a member ofthe teaching profession. Some of these methods were moreover, in their opinion,peculiarly unsuitable to an Officers Training Establishment such as Cranwell.

4. I am to say therefore that the Council regret that they have no option but to call uponyou to resign your appointment, such resignation to take effect as terminating yourconnection with the College before the commencement of the next term.


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1

I am sir,Your obedient servant,

W. F. Nicholson.

Ineffecthewassackedforteachingthecadetshowtothinkratherthanwhattothink.The

second quotation is from a retired senior ofcer writing in 1941:

I have often wondered why some senior officers in the services show all the symptoms ofmental paralysis after the age forty-five or so. It is not because the level of intelligence ofcandidates for commissions is markedly below the average of educated members of thecommunity. On the contrary, the severe competition for entrance to some branches of theservice secures some of the best brains in the country; but as the years roll on the criticalfaculty seems to become atrophied, and it is interesting now to be able to be able to discussthe phenomenon without being called for ones reasons in writing by ones immediate

superior.

If a junior officer puts forward a suggestion the implication is that a senior officer mighthave thought of it, and didnt think of it.

The attitude therefore tends to be that the proposal has been thoroughly considered bywiser and more experienced heads and rejected for good and sufficient reasons.After being squashed a sufficient number of times according to his tenacity, the juniorofficer ceases to put forward unwelcome suggestions, and by the time he in turn achievesseniority he has usually absorbed the attitude of his erstwhile superiors.2

The ofcer who wrote these words was Lord Dowding.

Where are we now?BeforeItrytoanswerthisquestion,itmightbeworthwonderingwhetherwecanidentify

aperiodwhenwewereatourleastagile?WasitperhapsduringtheColdWar?Orduring

thesubsequenttransition?Anobjectiveassessmentisprobablybeyondus,sinceitislargely

event-drivenandowesmoretohindsightthananinnate,measurablequality.WhatIthinkwecan

say(returningtomymodel)isthat-toachieveagility-organisation,cultureandtheindividual

must be aligned. Since the 1990s, there have been some very signicant shifts in RAF posture,

equipment, basing,manpower, structuresandtraining, andweare only partway throughthe

changeprocess:

Organisation.In1990theRAFwasstillorganisedfortheColdWar,and,although,theService

has contracted signicantly since then, the shape (that is: basing; Branch and Trade structures;

personnelprocesses;trainingregimes;Headquarters;etc)haveremainedessentiallythesame.For

example,onlyinthelastyearhastheExpeditionaryAirWingconcepthasgainedmomentum.

Culture.TheColdWarcreateditsownculture.Fixedbases,largenumbersofnon-deployable

personnel,monolithicHeadquarters,rigidpatternsoftrainingandemploymentallproducedatransactionalmentalityepitomisedbythehostilitytowardseducationandtheprevalentview

thatifitcouldnotbemeasuredithadnovalue.

1.Mais,AllTheDaysofMyLife,pages83-117,Hutchinson,London,19372.Dowding,TwelveLegionsofAngels,pages55-60,Eyre&Spottiswoode,London,1941


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1

Individual.RAFpersonnelofthe1990sweretheproductoftheColdWar.Theassociatedmindsets

andattitudeswereheavilyingrainedandhavestillnotentirelydisappearedinfacttheymay

neveruntilmygenerationretires.WhileoneofourgreatestconcernsposttheColdWarwas

the perceived erosion of values (frequently identied with contractorisation and civilianisation),

wesingularlyfailedtodevelopacommonunderstandingofwhatconstitutedRAFethos(thevital

lightbluethread).

Ofcourse,weshouldnotforgetthat,overthesameperiod,theRAFparticipatedinaseries

ofsuccessfulcampaigns.But,wedidsorelyingonexistingpatternsofbehaviourandwiththe

equipmenttomatch.Agileindividualswereabletoprovideoperationalagilitybutthiswasinspite

oftheorganisationandtheprevalentculture,notbecauseof.

How do we develop agility?WeneedlooknofurtherthantheChiefoftheAirStaffsStrategicPriorities.Thekeyelements

(detailedinRAFStrategy2006)forthenext5-10yearsrequirethatwe:

- Maintainandfurtherdevelopanagile,adaptableandcapableexpeditionaryService

- Ensureourstructures,organisationandprocessesdeliverrapidandaccuratedecision

makingattherightlevel

- Developasustainablemanningandpersonnelstrategythatsupportsourexpeditionary

capabilityandtakesaccountoftheprevailingsocialenvironment

Agilityiseitherstatedorimpliedinalloftheabove.Sodowejustrecruitnaturallyagile

people?Itmaybeunreasonabletoexpectpeopletobeagileinourtermswhenwerecruit

thembutshouldwenotseekoutthecharacteristicsinindividualsthatwillenableagility?But,

doweknowwhatthesecharacteristicsare?Innovationandimaginationwouldfeaturehighlyon

mylistbutaretheysoimportantthatwewouldcompromiseon,say,pilotskillsoranengineering

degreebecauseanindividualisregardedaspotentiallyagile?

Intermsofpersonalitytypes(MyersBriggs)doweencourageselfassured,outgoingtypes,

ordoweseekabalancewiththemoreintrospectivelyinclined?Ofcourse,thispresumesthat

thereissuchathingasanagilepersonality.Frankly,weneedtodosomemorethinkingaboutthequalitiesandcharacteristicsweseek.Canwemakepeoplemoreagile?Ihavetosaythatyou

will need to look very hard to nd the words innovation and imagination in any of our training

syllabuses.TheDefenceSystemsApproachtoTrainingdoesnotseemtoencouragethem,yet

thesequalitiesmustunderpinatrulyagileorganisation.Istherenotadangerthatmuchofour

training actually stulties innovation and imagination, so reducing natural agility?

Anyway,cantrainingmakeindividualsmoreagile?Or,isitmorelikelytobeeducationthat

makes people more agile? Training is the acquisition of competence to achieve specic tasks.

Education lies higher up the taxonomy and ismore todowith the developmentofmental

processesandattitudes.Wemightchoosetoassociatementalagilitywithanagilementalityor

perhaps,moreaccurately,apotentiallyagilementality.


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1

ProgressTherearesignsthatwearemovingintherightdirection;forinstancechangestoRecruit

TrainingandIOTarenowlargelyinplace,withtheconceptualbuildingblocksforagility(how

tothinknotwhattothink),principlesofmissioncommandandanenhancededucationelement

being integral to these courses. At the same time the Review of Ofcer and Airmen Development

(ROAD)recognisesthatweneedtobuildcoherentlyontheseinitialfoundationsinaprogressive,

inclusive manner. The early ndings conrm that there needs to be a greater emphasis on

increasingthethough-lifetrainingandeducationof individuals.Furthermoretheneedforlean

thinkinghasaneffectacrosstheentirespectrumofagility.Notonlydoesitinvolvechangesto

organisationandprocessbutitdemandsstrongleadershipandanenablingculturethatisnot

afraidofchallenge.Itsimpactonindividuals,ontheirsenseofempowerment,onwhereownership

lies and on enhanced self-condence is signicant. Lean is as much about cultural change as it is

aboutprocessaccelerationandeliminatingwaste.

Althoughsubstantialprogresshasbeenmade,therearesomeoutstandingissues.ChangesintrainingdeliveryarrangementsnotablytheMilitaryFlyingTrainingSystemandDefenceTraining

RationalisationprogrammesmaypotentiallyweakenServiceethos.Ontheotherhand,the

creationoftheCOS(Trg)appointment,withendtoendresponsibilitiesforallRAFindividual

training,isawelcomedevelopmentthatwillgoalongwaytobringcoherencetoanincreasingly

diversetrainingenvironment.

However, are we really condent that we have done all we can to permit/oblige people to

bemore agile?TheapplicationofLean, incoverage, coherenceandsustained impact, is not

yet where we want it to be. Our Cold War operational posture, with a larger but less exible

force,hasgone,butmuchofthepersonnelstructureremains.Quitesimply,wehavetoomany

trades and branches. We have relatively inexible personnel policies. We also do not have a truly

responsivemanpowerplanningprocesses.TherecentMCSGstudyhaslookedatalltheseissues

andproposedawayahead.Therewillbeatrainingandeducationbillassociatedwithagilityit

isunlikelybeafreegoodbutequally,wecannotaffordnottoreleasetheinnatepotential(and

agility)inallourpeople.Wemustalsocreateacultureinwhichpeoplefeelencouraged,andare

supported,inbeingagile.

ThisisverymuchattheheartofMissionCommand,butdowehavetherightstructures?Are

westillstuckintheColdWarinorganisationalterms?Infact,canorganisationsbeagileoraretheymerelyadaptable?Arethereorganisationalcharacteristicsthatencourageagility?Dowe

need atter structures but, if we do, are they compatible with our military hierarchy? Can agility

trulyexistwithinatraditionalcommandchain?Whilecentralised,highleveldecision-makingmay

suppressanindividualsinnateagility,isthereversetrue?Forexample,bydecentralisingmanpower

controlwecertainlymadestationsmoreagilebutultimatelywemayhavecompromisedagility

attheorganisationallevel.

Keeping People AgileAgility requires energy. It has tness implications for the brain as well as the body. But like

physical tness, it is susceptible to disuse and subsequent atrophy. Loss of agility in individuals is

recoverablebutitrequiresitsownexerciseprogramme,timeandopportunity.Lookingtothe

future,itseemsinevitablethattherewillbefurthercontractionwithevergreaterbudgetary


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pressuresandcontinuingoperationaldemands.Agilityisboththekeytomeetingthesechallenges

andthebasisforourcontinuedrelevance,justasagilitywasessentialtooursurvivalinthelate

1920s.

Coherence and AssuranceHowcanwe tell ifwearesucceeding?Howdowemeasuretheagilityofindividuals (or

organisations)?ThePeopleCampaignPlanhasanimportantroleinthisrespect.Thereisclearlya

greatdealofeffortunderwaytoimproveagilitybutitisvitalthatwemaintaincoherenceacross

and through the personnel agendas; balancing competing priorities and assessing the people

implicationsinallthatwedo.But,bearinginmindwhatIhavealreadysaid,perhapsthereshould

beanEducationStrategywovenintothePeopleCampaignPlan?

ConclusionsHoweveragilewehavebeeninthepast,weneedtodevelopgreateragilityifwearetocope

withthefuture.Muchhasbeendonetosetinplacethehardinfrastructureforanagileairforcebutlessfortheenablingcultureandpeoplepolicies.CASsStrategicPrioritiesprovidethehooks

fordeliveringagileairmentogetherwiththenecessarypermissivestructuresandprocesses.Ifwe

areagreedastothenatureofindividualagility,andwewishtodevelopagileairmen,weneedto

acknowledgethatimplicitagilityexistsatanindividuallevelinallourpeople,andseekevidence

ofagilityduringtherecruitmentandtrainingprocesses.Wemustnurtureouragiletalent;being

carefulnottotrainoutagilityinfavourofconformity,andrewardagilitythroughtheassessment

processandincorporateitaspartofcareerdevelopment.Wealsoneedtoenhanceindividual

agility througheducation (mental agility produces anagilementality!) and ofcourse provide

theopportunitiestoexercisetheseagiletalentsalthoughinourcurrentoperationalclimate

such occasions are not difcult to nd. It is also up to us to create adaptable organisations that

permit,encourageandobligepeopletobeagileratherthanprecludethemfrombeingso,and

nally, we need to nd some way to assess our overall agility, if we want to know whether we

aresucceeding

IamconsciousthatmuchofwhatIdonehasbeentoposequestions.Thatishowitshould

be at these events. However, I offer this nal model (Fig 2)ofwhatIbelievewearetryingtoachieve.Ontherightisthenon-agileAirForce(ontheleftiswherewealsodontwanttobe).

Thechallengeishowtomoveourorganisation,cultureandindividualstotheleftbutnotsofar

totheleftthatweloseagilityinaconfusedmassofinitiativesandchangeprogrammes.


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The Agile AirMANThe TheorY oF AgiliTY

gup captan Jn Jupp

TheChiefoftheAirStaffhassaidthatAgilityisattheheartofourcapability;thatweneed

tokeeppacewithchangeintellectuallyandthatwemustmakesurethatwearejustasagileand

adaptableasourequipment1.HewentontosaythatIraqandAfghanistanhavebothemphasised

thecomplex,ambiguousnatureofthemodernbattlespace.TheFASOC2seekstoshowthatAir

Powersdistinctiveattributes,oneofwhichisagility,arethemesforitsfuturedevelopment.So

whatisitthatismeantbyagilitywhenitisappliedtopeople?Weseemtounderstanditwhen

itisappliedtomachinesandintuitivelywethinkthatagilepeopleinthissensearenotthose

gymnastsamongstus.Itissomeintellectualormentalability.TheFASOCdescribesitasthe

abilitytouseandadaptstructures,processesandequipmentininnovativewaystoachievethe

desiredeffects3.ButwhatdoesitmeanwhenitisattachedtotheepithetAirman.

The Airmans Perspective

TheAirmansPerspectivehasbeentoutedsincetheinceptionoftheRAFandhasitsgenesis

in the fact that the airman literally had a view of the whole battleeld as he ew above it.

Hitherto only gallant men with rope and axe had struggled to attain summits to whose

height we rose daily, unmindful of the privilege. From this exalted eminence we surveyed

the earth The war below us was a spectacle. We aided it and abetted it, admiring

the tenacity of men who fought to take the next trench thirty yards away. But such

objectives could not thrill us, who, when we raised our eyes, could see objective after

objective receding fty, sixty, seventy miles beyond4.

Because the air is ubiquitous, extends over everything, and the sphere of inuence of the

airmanismuchgreaterthanthatofthesoldierorsailor,theairmansviewofthebattlespacehas

always tended to the operational rather than the tactical. Todays airman has a tactical inuence

withinabout150milesradiusofhisorheraircraftbutiswellawarethathemaybetasked

intoanotherareawithtotallydifferentdynamicsandpossiblyintoadifferentrolewithinthe

samesortie.He isoperating in4 dimensions5.Theairmanneedstheoperationalviewofthebattlespace to cope with this change. Those that support the ying effort need the same broad

view.InOperationTELICforexample,theRAFwasdeployedto9differentairbasesin7different

countriesandoperatedoverthesouthern2/3rdsofIraqwhileithadtobeintimatelyaware

ofwhatwas happening in theNorthofthe country. Supportingorganisations needed tobe

awareof all of this activity spread overa hugegeographical areaaswell as the other Joint

Forcecomponentsandtheirrequirements.Afterall,theaircomponentwasoften(thoughnot

exclusively) a supporting component and soneeded tounderstand the entirety of the Joint

Forcesbusiness.

1AnInterviewwithChiefoftheAirStaffRoyalAirForceinTheJournaloftheJPACC,Edition32006.2FutureAirandSpaceOperationalConcept.3FASOC,TheBeacon.4SagittariusRising,CaptainCecilLewis,PeterDavisLondon1936.5FASOC,SupportingEssay1,TheAirmansPerspective.


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SomuchfortheAirman(usedheretomeanallthosewhodealwithAirPowerfromanair

marshal to an SAC), but what of agility? An MOD paper, The Agile Commander denes agility as

adaptability7,responsiveness8, exibility9androbustness10.

Flexible Responsive

The words responsive and exible are dened by reference to change, whether that be

changingcircumstancesorwholesalechange.Thissortofchangeisendemiconoperations,no

plan survives rst contact with the enemy let alone the change that any military action brings

aboutphysicallyandmentallyonthoseinvolved.Allleadersneedtobeabletochange,toadapt

todifferentcircumstanceswithoutnecessarilyhavingtheadviceordirectionoftheirsuperiors

exceptforcommandintent.(IntheRAF,leadershipisnecessaryatanyandeveryrankascanbe

seenfromthestoriesfromSACsandNCOsbelow).Butleaderscannotbeagilewithoutknowing

thecommonpurpose;knowingtheintentallowsspeedofaction.Militaryactionisdesignedto

bringaboutmassivechangeontheenemywithinashortperiodoftime,yettheenemywillneedtobedealtwithassoonasmilitaryactionisover.Leadingformeradversariesthroughthechange

intheaftermathofoperationspeaceenforcement,peacekeepingornationbuilding,willneed

some considerable skill in this area calling on all the robustness, exibility, responsiveness and

adaptabilitythatourleadersofallranksarecapableof.

Mentally Agile

InnovationinadaptingprocessestomeetthedemandsofamodernexpeditionaryAirForce

willbevital.Butthoseourprocesseshaveevolvedtoensurethatpifallsencounteredbyour

predecessorsdonotcatchusout;ourchangesmustensurethatthosepifallsarestillavoided,if,

ofcourse,theyarestillrelevant.Therefore,knowledgeoftheprocessanditspurposearealso

vital.Putanotherway,westopbecomingacandoairforceatourperil,thoughweneedto

acknowledge that we cannot do it all, all the time. The need for exibility and responsiveness on

operationsisaxiomatic,buttheseattributesarelinkedtotheleadershipofchangenomatter

whatthecircumstances.Change,largeandsmall,isnowapermanentpartofourlivesastheRAF

determinedlymeetsthechallengeofremainingrelevantinaworldthatitselfisrapidlychanging

politically, economically, socially and technically. RAF leaders need a exible and responsive

approach,bothseeingtheneedsoftheirownorganisationandrecognising,andevenanticipating,

theneedsofthehigherorganisationforwhichtheywork11

.Whetheronoperationsornot,within the uncertaintyofchange there areopportunities thatcan be graspedby thoseagile

enoughtoseethem.Theempowermentofpersonnelwithintheleaningprocessisapowerful

exampleofthis.

6 D CBM/J9 Capping Paper: Agile Command Capability: Future Command in the Joint Battlespace and its Implications for CapabilityDevelopment.

7AdaptableAbletoadjustorbealteredfornewconditions.Acclimatize,adjust,attune,becomehardened,getusedto,reconcile,alter,amend,

change,transform.8Responsiverespondingreadilyandwithenthusiasm.Alert,alive,aware,interested,open,perceptive,receptive,sensitive.9Flexibleabletochangeorbechanged,toadapttodifferentcircumstances.Accommodating,adaptable,cooperative,open-minded,responsive,willing.

10Robust Able to withstand difcult conditions, strong and healthy, determined and forceful. Athletic, brawny, t, hale and hearty, powerful,strong,tough,vigorous.

11TheAttributesforRAFLeadersFlexibleandResponsiveexpandsonthisandcanbeaccessedfromtheRAFLeadershipCentrewebsitehttp://www.cranwell.raf.r.mil.uk/live/RAF_Leadership_Centre/Index.htm


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Innovationisoftenalliedwiththinking-out-of-the-box,butwhatdoesitmeantothinkout

of the box, and what is the box in the rst place? The box is those beliefs and values that are

builtupthroughlifeandexperience.Theboxisthosethingsthathaveofteninthepastensured

successandthatwethereforetaketoournextappointmentasgivensthatwedonothaveto

re-examine.Unfortunatelyforus,thisisnotalwaysthecaseandwhathasworkedconsistently

wellinthepastwillnotalwaysdoso inthefuture.However,tobeabletoquestionthesorts

of beliefs involved here requires serious reection or the confrontation of those beliefs by an

externalsource.Becauseofthis,itisnecessarytoconsiderseriouslyalltheideasthatarebrought

to the table no matter how extraordinary they may seem at rst. It demands that we areWn

t Tak rsksandtoknowourselvesandotherstobeemtnay intnt.Thereis

tension inbetweenthepromptsof intellectandourexperience. Experienceenablespattern

recognition,whichspeedsupresponsebutcanbetheenemyofinnovation.Adevelopedintellect

allowsfortheadaptationofexperiencetochangecontext.Harnessingintellectandexperience

offers a route to intuitive decision making that combines and balances risk, benet and speed.

Mentally and Physically Robust

Adaptability can be taken as another word for exibility but some of its connotations take the

concepts further. While its denition is being able to adjust or be altered for new conditions12the

synonymsforadaptableincludebecomehardened,reconcileandtransform.Thereareideasof

robustnessandempathyherethatmustbeexamined.Anadaptableleadermustbeabletochange

thenatureofthebusinessinhand.Hemust,atthesametime,beabletoreconciledifferent

demandsandopportunities.Perhapsthismaybereconcilingtheintentofthecommanderwith

thesituationonthegroundorthecomplexitiesofapeacekeepingmission.Thiswillrequire

emtna intn. Clearly, whenever judgement is being used, the leader must act

ethically.

Robustnessisanecessityforallmilitaryleadersastheymustbeabletowithstandthephysical

rigoursofoperationswithoutlosingtheirmentalcapacity.Thephysicalrigoursofoperations

are not the only physical demands on a leader. Any leader in any sphere can nd the demands

ontheirtimewearing,theymayhavetobeconstantlyavailabletogivedirection,toreassure

theirteamormembersoftheirwiderorganisationandfeelingsofconstantresponsibilitycan

bedraining.Thepressuresof leadership can be very stressful and are often faced alone. Inoperations these problems can be increased tenfold. A leader who is not t, or physically robust,

willnotlongsurvivehisorhertenureingoodhealth.Thementalsideofrobustnessdemands

the determination tocarry things through, the forcefulness toget results.A leadermustbe

vigorous and powerful in pursuing the aims and yet exible and adaptable enough to know when

tochangedirection.EmotionalIntelligencetounderstandthepeoplewithwhomhe isdealing

willbeessentialwhetherthosepeoplearewithinhisorherteamorexternalagencies.Political

12OxfordDictionaryandThesaurus200113SeetheAttributesforRAFLeadersEmotionalIntelligenceandPoliticalAstuteness


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astutenesswillalsobeessential13.

Able to Handle Ambiguity

Onoperations,theremaynotbemuchtimefordecisionstobemade;awayfromoperations

considerabletimemaybeavailable.Eitherwaytheagileairmanwillneedsounddecisionmaking

skillsandtheabilitytoactswiftlywhentheoccasiondemands.Certainlytoknowwhenadecision

needstobemade.Also,inpeaceorwar,militaryaffairsarecomplexandoftenshroudedin

ambiguity. The ability to handle ambiguity is clearly linked to exibility and responsiveness, mental

agilityandthewillingnesstotakerisks.Itisalsovitalinbeingpoliticallyastute.Theoperational

frictionthatcausesthefogofwarisreasonablywellunderstood;itcreatesambiguity.Thepace

andcomplexityofmodernwarfarecanalsocreateambiguityofitsown.Considerthebattlespace

of the Gulf War in 2003; warghting, peacekeeping and peace support operations were being

carriedoutinonebattlespace.TheUSMChasdescribedthisasthe3-blockwar.Thiscancreate

immenseambiguityforaleaderwhohastoworkwithinthemoralframeworkexpectedofhis

forcesineachofthosetypesofoperation,andtheycanbeverydifferentwithverydifferentimperatives.Certainlydecisionswillrarelybeclear-cutinsuchasituation.Equally,politics,whether

international or national, within a large organisation or in the ofce, are seldom straightforward.

Aleadermuststeerapaththroughtheshadesofgreythatismorallyacceptableandwillgain

the support of his or her team. A leader can process out ambiguity, nd his or her way through

itorexploitit14.Exploitingambiguityrequiresstrongleadershipandworksbestinsituations

where there is leadership without authority. Joint, and particularly, multinational operations t

this model perfectly. In peacetime, the model ts in many situations where differing start points,

opinionsandhistoriesmeanthatgroupsworkingtogethermaynothaveidenticalendsinmind.

Yettherecanbecommonalitiesthatshouldbeexploitedbyourleaders.Therehasbeensome

researchinthisarea15 that shows that dening and agreeing the means of advance rather than

thegoalsorendstobeachievedhasmoreeffectonproductivity;itisessentialthatthisistaken

in the inter-organisational eld rather than the intra-organisational one. While this may seem

contrary to the tenets of mission command where a commander is to dene what he wants to

beachievedbutnothow,itmustberememberedthathemustalsoexplainwysomethingisto

beachievedandthiswhyismoreimportantthanthewhat.Itistheintentthatiskeyandthe

actionsofsubordinatesmustalwaysbein-linewiththat.

Inthepoliticalworld,theNorthernIrelandPeaceProcessprovidesaninsightintoexploiting

ambiguity. Dening clearly what decommissioning meant would have held apart the parties totheagreementinintractablepositionsthatwouldnothaveallowedanyadvance.Byleavingthe

endstatesomewhatvague,bothsideswereabletomovetowardsagoalbymeansthatwere

agreedtobeagoodthingbybothsides.Eventually,theyarrivedatapositionwheretheywere

bothcontentandpeacecouldbeareality.

Mission Command

Clearly,ifagilityistobeleveragedtheremustberoomformanoeuvrebyallRAFleaders.

ThephilosophyofMissionCommandallowsthisfreedom.MissionCommandwasdevisedas

anArmytactictoovercometheimpossibilityofacommanderbeingabletocommunicatewith

13SeetheAttributesforRAFLeadersEmotionalIntelligenceandPoliticalAstuteness14SeetheAttributesforRAFLeadersAbletoHandleAmbiguity.15Inter-organisationalPerformance,LJBourgeois


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processesthatwehaveinplace.Butweneedtobemastersoftheprocessesandtobeableto

adaptthemtochangingcircumstances.Somestoriesofourpeoplesexperiencesonoperations

andelsewherefollow;theyamplydemonstratetheneedtoimprovisewithintheframeworks

and encourage as much innovation as we can in ourselves and others; to be exible, adaptable,

responsiveandrobust.

Thereismuchinlanguageandhowvariouspeopleinterpretit.However,theAttributesfor

RAFLeaders21coverallthisgroundandtheyhavebeenhighlightedwheretheyapplyinthetheory

above.CombinedwiththeneedtoembodytheRAFCoreValuesandactethically,thephilosophy

ofMissionCommandandFollowership,knowledgeofandefforttobehaveinaccordancewith

theAttributesforRAFLeadersshouldenhanceagilityintheService.

CAOC COMMAND22 IN OP IRAQI FREEDOM

AmodernUSCAOCisclearlynotyetfullyNEC,butsomepartsofitarequitecloseandperhapsgiveusanindicationofthechallengesaheadasNECmatures.Inparticular,thevolumes

of information available (literally at theclickof amouse) are immense, especiallywhenair

operationsonthescaleofOpIRAQIFREEDOMaretakingplace.Thedelegationofdecision

makingwasthusthekeytomaintaininganysenseoftempoessentiallyMssn cmmand

workingwithinthevariouslevelsoftheCAOC(aswellofcourseasinthecockpitsofaircraft).

Oneofthekeyfunctionsofcommandinthisenvironmentiseffectiveriskmanagementwillthe

resultsbeworththerisk,eithertoourownforcesorintermsofundesiredeffects(collateral

damage,casualtiesetc)?Whiletherewereclearguidelinesforcertaindecisionsforinstance

theCFACChimselfretainedtheapprovalforCSARpackagesintoallbutlowriskareaswealso

delegatedwhereverpossible.

Ambiguityaboundsinsuchanenvironment,andthetimeavailabletotrytogainthebest

possibleinformationtoreachadecisionwillbedifferentinalmosteverycase.Theinformation

management challenges, both across the CAOC and in ones own working area, can be

considerable!However,eveninthemosttimecriticalmoments,itisprobablyworthtakingafew

secondstopersonallycheckoneor2facts!IrealisedfairlyearlyonthatIhadsentsomemissions

into high threat areas to attack high value targets and they had failed to nd anything. On further

investigationIfoundthattheintelligenceonmanyofthetimesensitivetargets(SSMs,SAMsetc)

wasbasedonimagery,andthatitsometimestookupto1214hourstointerprettheimagery,giventhevolumebeingproduced.Clearly,withmostIraqimobilesystemsbeingmovedevery

fewhours,therewaslittlepointintaskinganaircraftintoahighthreatenvironment(suchasthe

Baghdadarea)toattackoneifitwasalmostcertainthatithadmovedinthemeanwhile!Butof

coursethedecisionwasnotalwaysasstraightforward;whatifthetargetwaspotentialWMD,

andtheISRwasonlyafewhoursold,howmuchrisktotaketotrytoattackit..?especiallyif

ELINThasjustreportedpossibleactiveSAMradarcloseby?andyourSEADaircrafthave

justdepartedtheareafortheirAAR?.and..etc!Interestinglyenough,othershadnotmade

thisconnectionandwerecontinuingtosearchfortargetslongaftertheyhadalmostcertainly

moved.ItisprobablyjustaswellthattheBaghdadSuperMEZturnedoutnottobequitethe

20AirTaskingOrder.21Warghter, courageous, Emotionally Intelligent, Flexible and Responsive, Willing to take Risks, Mentally Agile/Physically Robust, Able to HandleAmbiguity,PoliticallyandGloballyAstute,TechnologicallyCompetent.Abletoleadtomorrowsrecruit.Anexplanationoftheseattributescanbefoundathttp://www.raf.mod.uk/leadershipcentre/

22FromaninterviewwithAVMNickolsonhistimeasoneoftheCAOCDirectorsduringOpIraqiFreedom.


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threatthatwethoughtitwasatthetime!

Althoughsleepwasinquiteshortsupply,physicalrobustnesswasprobablynotthemost

essentialrequirementofthejob;theenvironmentwasprettycomfortable,withairconditioning,

goodfoodanddrink and adecentbed.But thementalrobustness requiredwasperhapsfar

greaterthanIhadeverimagined.Thepressureofconstantlyhavingtomakedecisionsonwhich

other(sometimesmany)peoplesliveswereatstakewasmentallydrainingtoadegreethatIhad

neverbeforeexperienced.Unlikemanybeforeme,Iwasfortunatethatthislevelofstressreally

onlylastedforacoupleofweeks.

And considerable robustness was also required in dealings with others at times. In the rst

fewdaystheB52aircraftwereoperatingaloneinNIraq(becauseoftheTurkishdecisionnotto

allowusbasing)withouteitherairdefenceor,moreimportantly,SEADsupport.B52commanders

telephonedtheCAOCtoexpresstheirconsiderableconcernsthatthelevelofrisktotheir

crewsduring theseoperationswasnotbeingproperlyconsidered.Apart fromtheir surprise

at dealing with a British ofcer over the issue, it was difcult explaining to them that we wereverywellawareoftherisksandhadconsideredthemextremelycarefully,butthatthepotential

strategic signicance of not sending them (they were the only support we could provide to the

Kurdsatthatstage)meantthattheriskwasworthwhileincampaignterms,evenifhigherthan

theindividualsintheircockpitsfeltwasnecessary!

Theagilityofourstructuresandprocessesisofcoursehighlydependentontheagilityof

ourpeople.Despitesomeveryablepersonnel,maturedoctrine,andstrongjointandAirC2

processes,theCAOCwasprobablynotasagileasitcouldhavebeeninmanyways.Thiswas

mainlyintheachievementofasmoothtransitionofworkbetweenthevariousdivisions(Strat/

Plans,Ops,ISR,Mobility);asaresult,ourfeedbackloopswerenotalwayscomplete(particularly

inareassuchasBDA)andoverallagilitysuffered.Thecauses?Probablyamixtureofsomepeople

whodidnotunderstandtheprocesseswellenough(training)andsomewho,althoughtheywere

well trained, did not have the agility of mind needed in a fast-moving high intensity ght. That we

succeededwasmainlybecausewehadplentyofassetsandtheCombatOpsdivisionprovedto

be the most exible and agile I have ever seen (in large part due to some outstanding embedded

RAFpersonnel);thisundoubtedlymaskedalackofagilityelsewhereandtheseamsbetweenthe

CAOCsdivisions.Thelesson?IthinkthatyourpeoplemustbebothproperlytrainedinAirC2

andhavetheagilityofmindtocopewithambiguityandtheunexpected;eitheroneontheirown

is just not sufcient!

A DOB COMMANDER23

Basedonmyexperiencesasa StnCdrpreparingforcesforexpeditionaryoperations,and

thensubsequentlyas aDOBCommander, thekeyenablerstoanagileairman are:mindset;

preparation; exibility and adaptability; and empowerment.

Therightmindsetistorecognisethatexpeditionaryoperationsarenotanaberrationin

day-to-dayroutine:theyarewhatwedoandtheagile,expeditionaryairmankeenlywantstobe

involved.Hedoesnotrecognisethetermout-ofarea,becausehisorherprimaryoperatingarea

isawayfromhomebase.Similarly,hedoesnotacceptthetermMainOperatingBase,because

thenaturalstateofoperationsisnotathomebasebutondeployment.AttheDOB,theright

23FromAirCdreHillier,DOBCommanderatAlUdiedonOpTELIC.


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Allies,someactivitieshavevaluesimplybecausetheyhelpbuildandsustaintheCoalition:for

manyofthe6000USAFpersonnelatmyDOB,Isuspectoneoftheirstrongestmemoriesofthe

UK presence at Al Udeid was the capabilities of 12 rst-rate RAF chefs!

TheagileairmanoperatingwithanexpeditionaryspiritisrequirednotonlyattheDOB,

butatallpointsinthereachbackprocess:everyoneisdoingdeployedoperations,regardlessof

theirphysicallocationandneedstoadapttheprocessestoachievetherequiredresults.Aircrew

pistolammunitionwasremovedfromanATaircraften-routetotheDOBbecauseithadnot

beenproperlydemanded:InitialOperatingCapabilitywasdelayedasaresult.Doubtlessthereare

arguments from both sides on this specic issue, but the point is that decisions need to be taken

withafullunderstandingoftheoperationalimperative,notjustwithanarrowfocusonprocess.

Finally,agilitygetsfrustratedwithoutproperempowerment.Riskownershipliesbestwith

the person best placed tomanage it. Judgingaircraft explosive safety distancerequirements

from3000milesawayintheUK,withoutanyrecognitionoftheimpactoncoalitionpartnerarrangements, frustrates properownership ofdecisions. Somepersonnel are just not up to

thejob:theprocessofremovingthemneedstobeswiftandwithaproperbalancebetween

sensitivitytotheindividualandtheneedtogetthejobdone.WhenaDOBcommandersays

hedoesnotneedmorepersonnelorequipment,trusthisorherjudgement;holdhimorher

responsibleifitsubsequentlygoeswrong.

A DOB COMMANDER24

Thedoctrine,SOPsandmanualsaregreatwhenthingsaregoingasexpected.Youneedagility

whenyoumoveoffthebeatenpath.TheoperationalsecurityissuesthatsurroundedmyDOB

preventedmefromdoingaproperrecce;henceIwasoff-pistefromsquareone.Ididmanagea

visittoanexerciseatthebase,whichamountedtoaclandestinerecceofsorts,butmanypeople

vitaltoareccecouldnotgo.Severelylimitedonnumbers,ItookthepersonIthoughtmost

vitalmyRAFRegimentForceProtectionspecialist.ItmeantthatIhadtolookatotherways

ofgaininginformation,likespendingconsiderablymoretimethanusualtalkingtokeyEmbassy

staff.Atthisstage,thereweremanyissuesthatrequiredtactandperseverance;forexample,

STCA5repeatedlyputamediahandlingteamonmyparty,despitemytakingitoffseveraltimes,

explainingthatmyhostswouldnotallowthemediawithin30milesofthebase.Themessageis,

inthespiritofMssn cmmand, trust the DOB Cdr's judgement. He can always be red ifhegotitwrong.

Onorder,Ideployedwiththeset-upteamandcommencedworktomeetthetimelines.Iwas

taskedtobereadyforopsatmaximumrate,within14days.Thiswastoinclude2aircrafttypes

andthenecessaryforceprotection.Thiswasachieved.Unfortunately,ourhostsdidnotwantthe

Harrierstoarriveuntilitwasabsolutelycertainthathostilitieswereinevitable.Hence,wecould

notgetdiplomaticclearanceforthemtoarriveandIhad22daysfromdeclarationofopenfor

businesswithnoaircraft.Thisrequiredinnovativeleadershiptopreventpeoplefromgoingoffthe

boil.WithnoHarriersuntilfurthernotice,IproposedanearlyentryfortheCanberraPR9during

avisitbytheCombinedForcesAirComponentCommander.Itwasaclassiceveryone'sawinner

solution: the Coalition could use imagery from the aircraft for genuine operational benet; our

24FromaninterviewwithAirCdreKirkpatrick,DOBCommanderonOpTELIC.


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hostscoulduseitfortheirpurposesandmypeoplewouldhavesomethingtodotomaintain

their interest.Ourhostswereconcernedabouttheobviousdifferencein silhouettebetween

Harriersandtheiraircraft,mindfulthatthepresenceofthenewaircraftwouldnotbelostonthe

locals. I asked if the Harriers could arrive at night. Our hosts were surprised that we ew at night

andwentawaytothinkaboutit.Theycamebackwiththeoffertogettheminthefollowingnight

therebyprovidinganagilitychallengeforus,whichwemet.

Forme,mycentreofgravitywastoensurethatnosmalltacticalincidentonbaseresulted

inunintendedstrategicconsequences,withthepossibilityofmissionfailure.Iwasdetermined

tomaintainthegoodwillofourhosts.Thisinvolvedspendingmanymorehoursthanfelthealthy

in smoke lled rooms, drinking endless cups of sweet tea. It was important to me that the Host

BaseCommanderheldusinhigherregardthantheUSAFdetachment.

I did not foresee that I would nd myself standing in the middle of an aireld on a mobile

phone, speaking to a commercial Belgian Boeing 737 captain. Mentioning no identiable locations,loads,ortypes,IassistedhiminunderstandingtheTerminalApproachChart(TAP)whichhad

beenfaxedtohim; thiswasalmost illegiblebeforeitwassent itasit hadbeenphotocopied

somanytimes,butitwastheonlyoneavailable.Hewantedreassurancethatitwasgenuine,

"because it didn't look right". He wanted me to read the gures out to him so that he could ink

themin.IntheendIreassuredhimthatIwasalsoapilotandIwasstandinginthemiddleofthe

aireld, with atness for a goodly number of miles around, and that he would have to hunt for

an obstacle with vertical extent to be able to hit it. He led a copy of the TAP for his company's

recordsandturnedupabout8hourslaterwithourDOBGuardForce.

Oneparticularlyagilemomentforoneofmyteaminvolvedthelocalcontractcateringstaff.

AhighproportionofthelocalsatourlocationwerePalestinian.Thiswasboundtoleadtothe

oddtensiongiventheAmerican/Britishpresence,especiallyifhostilitieshadcommenced.Iwas

concernedattheriskofourfoodbeingsabotaged.Relationshipswiththelocalsgottensewhen

the rst action got underway. The US response was to send down some HUMVEEs containing

verylargeguardsinsunglassesheavilyarmed,completewithknives.IaskedmySqnLdrRAFRegt

ofcer to go down there and sort things out. He checked in his personal weapon and went to his

tenttochangeintosportskit.HeinvitedtheAmericanstoclearoff,thenwenttothekitchensto

drinkteawiththecaterers,whilstwatchingSkyNewsshowingBaghdadbeingbombed.Amazingly,

hegotthecatererstocalmdownandgobacktowork.

One pieceofBranch bashfulness affected meconsiderably and demanded agility. Having

deployed 2 hand-picked Air Trafc Controllers, each current on Harrier operations, one a

qualied Tactical Air Trafc Controller, it came as a surprise that they were ordered by their

BranchsponsoratHQSTCthattheywere,undernocircumstances,tocontrolaircraft.Ihadnot

realisedthattheOpsSpt(ATC)BranchwastheonlyoneinourServicetohaveitsutilitylinked

topostcode.Ipointedoutthatthepilotswerenotfamiliarwiththelocality(orWesternIraq),

thatweallhadtodriveonthewrongsideoftheroadandthatadegreeofadaptabilitycould

reasonablybeexpected.ItookthesituationasfarasIcouldwithStrikeCommand(viatheUK

Air Component HQ) but Strike ATC would not budge. Unless the controllers were qualied at

my particular aireld by RAF ATC examiners (who also did not know the aireld) they could not

controlandwehadnowayofqualifyingthem.IapproachedtheUSAFDetachmentcommander

andaskediftheyhadacoursetoqualifytheircontrollersontheirdeployedset-up.Theydid.He


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agreedthatmycontrollerscouldenrolonthecoursetobefamiliarisedwiththeequipmentand

procedures,butthatIshouldbeinnodoubtthattheyriskedfailureifnotuptothemark.Iwas

unsurprised when both passed with ying colours and became lynch pins in the combined ATC

successes.

I insisted thatwehadourRAFRegtSO1 in theUSAF ground defence cell.Agilitywas

certainlyneeded inthisarea.Wehadlocaltroopspatrollingoutsidethewireonourbehalf. I

wasconcernedaboutthepotentialforablue-on-blue.ItnearlyhappenedwhenUSguardssaw

movementatnightwhichtheywereunsureofandwhichmadethemwanttoengage.MyRAF

RegtSO1heardthebeginningsofthe'goat'fromhispositionintheopsroom.ExcitedAmerican

voicesfromaUSArmyPatriotBatterywereradioingtheUSAF-controlledgrounddefencecell,

reportingsuspiciousactivityjustoutsidethewire.Theywantedpermissiontoengage.TheRAF

Regt SO1 took charge of the network, got an assurance that no one was being red upon and

broadcastthattherewasnoreasontoengage.Hehadcorrectlydeducedthattheobserved

movementswerelocaltroopsactingonourbehalf.Hisinterventionpreventedacatastrophicblueonblue.

ToallprospectiveDOBCommanderswho,likeme,harbouredthenotionthattheywere

going to lead the ying ops from the front in the cockpit - a message: that is not your job.

Yourprimaryjobistoestablishandmaintainanetworkofharmoniousrelationshipsbetween

yourDetachmentandyourhost,coalitionpartners,theEmbassy,yourAirComponentHQ,and

betweenallsub-elementsofyourDOB.Bysodoing,youwillcreatethenecessaryconditions

toletthesquadronsgetonanddothebusinessofcreatingprecisecampaigneffectsusingair

power.

THE COMMANDER COMBAT OPS WITHIN THE CAOC25

AstheSO1inchargeofCombatOps,itisvitaltohavetherightteamaroundyou.They

needtobecompetentbutalsotoworkasateamandtheiragilityisvitaltotheagilityofthe

organisation.Alsoitisvitalforagilitythatwehadthefullsupportofoursuperiors,atleast2up.

ForTELICwehadawork-upculminatinginafullBLUEFLAGatShawAFB,SouthCarolinato

createacohesiveteambutevensoafewpeoplehadtobereplacedbecausetheywerenotupto

thecandospiritthatwasnecessarytomakeitwork.IlikenedtheCAOCtoanorchestrawith

the various sections fullling various roles and the Chief of Combat Ops being the conductor;eachindividualmaybeasuperbplayerbuttheconductorhastomakethemworkasateam

togetthemtomakea goodsound.Onefalsenoteruinseverything;notnecessarilyfromthe

orchestraofcourse,itcouldevenbeamobilephoneintheaudience.Whenthebombdropped

inthemarketplaceonTELICitmadeabadnote.

InTELIC,oneexampleofagility,andthelackofit,wasknownasthebridgetoofar.There

wasabridgeinthewesterndesertthatneededtakingdownandwetaskedsomeF16sagainst

it.WhentheygotthereitwasobscuredbycloudsotheyusedJDAMinGPSmode.Whenwe

gottheBDAthebridgewasstillintactsoweairbornere-taskedsomemoreassetswhoalso

usedJDAMinGPSmode.AfterthatBDAwehadtodoitagain.InallwesentF16s,F15sand

F14sagainstthatbridgeandnonehitit.ThefourthtimewesentGR4s.Theygottherewith

25FromaninterviewwithWgCdrHyslop.


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bridgenotobscuredandsawthatthecoordinatestheyhadbeengivenwereslightlywrongso

usedEnhancedPavewayinthelasermodeandtookthebridgeout.Agreatpieceofagilitythat

enhancedtheBritishreputationintheCAOCforweeks!Buttherewasalackofagilityinthe

CAOCastheBDAshowedalltheUSAFJDAMimpactstobeinthesameplaceawayfromthe

bridge,thisshouldhavebeenpickedup,thecoordinatescorrectedandthebridgetakenout

soonerwithoutwastingsomucheffort.

InIncirlikduringNorthernWatchIwastheDCFACCandwehadTornadosin therecce

role with us. All the coalition aircraft were red on most days mostly by AAA. The Iraqis seemed

to have a cycle where new gun crews came along and genuinely tried to re at our aircraft.

However,theysoonlearnedwhatourresponsewaslikeandtoaimprogressivelyfurtherbehind

theaircraftandactwithalotlessfervour.Oneguncrew,however,discoveredthatiftheirgun

wasnexttoavillagewewouldnotretaliatebecauseoftheROEconcerningcollateraldamage.So

theyalwaysplacedtheirgunnexttoresidentialbuildingsandgenuinelytriedtoshootdownour

aircraftallthetime;andtheyweregettinguncomfortablyclose.Werealisedthattheonlyattackwe could make with sufcient accuracy to meet the ROE but also with the likelihood of damage

tothetargetwashighanglestrafe.Wediscoveredthattherewere3USpilotswhohadbeen

trained in strafe all ghter school graduates and got them together to plan the attack. That

day our rogue gun crew did re on our aircraft and got an unexpected response from us high

anglestrafe.Weonlydiditoncebecauseofthegreaterriskassociatedwiththeattack,butwe

onlyneededtodoitoncetocreatethedeterrenteffectwerequired.

THE REGT SQN COMMANDER26

When51SqnRAFRegtarrivedbackatitshome,RAFLossiemouth,inDecember2002after

4monthsonOPRESINATE(SOUTH)weexpectedtohaveayearawayfromoperations.No51

SqnRAFRegtwasnewlyre-formedandmanpowerwas76all-rankspriortoincrementalfunding

allowingthemanpowerceilingtoreach164all-ranks.LikeoursisterFieldsqnsoftheRAFRegt,

51SqnwasequippedasLandRover-bornespecialistinfantryforISTAR-basedtasksandwiththe

ability to react and hit any aggressors against our air assets in ight-strength. This all sounds very

effective,buttherealitywasthatthe76-manSqnhaslimitedutilityasitwasusedtooperating

onlyatsection(8-man)strength.

OnChristmasEve2002IfoundmyselfbeingbriefedatRAFHoningtonontheSqnsemergencydeploymenttoKuwaitandthenIraqinsupportoftheJointHelicopterForce.Inordertogive

me a full-Sqns-worth of manpower my two ights were augmented with two ights from 63 Sqn

RAFRegt,otherwiseknownastheQueensColourSquadron(QCS),basedatRAFUxbridge.In

additionIwouldreceive15Auxiliaries(10%ofthetotal)totopuptheSqnstrength.TheSqnwas

tobereadytodeployinshortorder,infactthemainbodydeployedinearlyMarch2003.The

challengewastounitethetwohalvesoftheSqnundermySqnHQ,(whilstbased600milesapart

intheUK),andtraintoastandardtobeabletooperateinIraqinsupportoftheJHF.TheJHFwas

notanorganisationwithwhich51SqnRAFRegthadtrainedbeforeandsoIwasunfamiliarwith

theirSOPs.Equipmentissuessuchasvehicles,weapons,nightvisionaidsandcommunications

had to be matched to the skills level of individuals. QCS had no vehicle eet so our 40-odd Land

Rovers and trailers had to be put on trains south for them. Range qualication shoots had to

beundertakeninavarietyofweaponssystemsassumingthatwecouldbooktherangesatno-

26FromWgCdrBeckley,OC51RAFRegtSqn,OpTELIC.


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notice.Nottheidealpreparationforwar!

SittingontheborderthenightbeforethegroundwarstartedIcouldseethewholeSqn

convoylaidoutinthedesertlikepiecesspreadoverthesquaresofachessboard.Theammunition

hadbeenborrowed,inthemaincourtesyofourRAFRegtcontactsatAliAlSalem.Desert

clothinghadbeenre-allocatedbetweentheSqntoensurethateveryonehadatleastoneset

ofdesertdpmclothing.OurNBCdetectorshadbeensharedoutamongstotherunitsbutwe

hadatleastthecorrectNBCclothing.GroundIntelligencehadbeengenericandlackeddetail

onourobjective,thetownofSafwan.Weweretooccupyadesertedlandingground(wherethe

IraqissurrenderedtoSchwarzkopfin1991)justnorthof theIraq/Kuwaitborder.Ihadmade

fulluseofTACIMINTWGstaffatAliAlSalemwhohadbeenabletoprovidemewithimagery

oftheexactroutethatweweretouseacrosstheborder.MyleadsectionsallhadA4bindersof

thisimagerytohelpnavigatetheway.Indeed,throughoutthenexttwomonthswehadfrequent

assistancefromTACIMINTWG,egforouroccupationofBasraairport,theimagesallowedus

to see with our eyes what awaited us and allowed us to make up aireld crash maps ready for

defenceoperations.COMBRITFORtoldmeontwooccasionsthathewasappalledthattheArmycouldnotgetimageryfromairassets.Moreagilitysomewhereinthechainwasnecessary

butitpaidtobeair-aware.

OuroperationsatSafwanwerebreadandbuttertotheRAFRegt.Workingalongsidethe

USMarinesofthe272MarineWingSupportSquadronandourownTacticalSupplyWing,Iwas

abletocoordinatethedefenceofthelandinggroundandensuredtheprotectionoftheUSand

RAFhelicoptersthatpassedthroughforFuelandAmmunition.Therewasnodoctrine,noTTPs

andnocoalitionexercisestoprepareusforthisoperation;Ijustappliedcommonsense.The

challengewas toovercomethe effortsofthe SaddamFedayeen andBaathPartyactiviststo

whom the helicopters and fuel presented a high-prole target. The obstacles were presented

bythelackofintelligencethatImentioned,(intheendwegatheredourownlocalintel),the

rapidroulementofBritishunitsassignedtooverseetheDivisionalRearArea,inwhichwewere

located,thelackofacoordinatedCIMICeffortinourareawhichannoyedtheIraqis,andthe

randomhumanitarianaideffortslargelysponsoredbytheKuwaitis.OurdefenceofSafwanwas

proved by the 100% ying sortie success rate. Our co-ordination with Div Rear HQ, PWRR and

theRMPgaveusthelinkagesweneededwithourneighbouringunits.Wewontheheartsand

mindsofthelocalfarmersandtownspeoplebyusingourmedicalandEODassetstocometo

their aid. We co-ordinated detailed food and water re-supply around the aireld and ensured the

safedeliveryofwaterfromBritishForcestankersintoSafwantown.ThepresswewelcomedandescortedaroundSafwanandthefarmingcommunities.

Within short weeks of deployment the Sqns ights had knitted together to form a capable

sqn. Not fully capable by the book by any means, but good enough for purpose. Ofcers and

NCOsusedtheirinitiativeateveryphase:procuringrationsfromtheUSForces;sectioncdrs

trainingtheirpersonnelintheeveningsandateveryvehiclehalt;designingourownVehicleCheck

Points tomeetthethreat; engineeringpersonnelmodifyingvehiclestoovercome thethreat

ofcheese-wiresdesignedtobeheadoursentries;aSqnshopinIraqsellingsuppliesboughtin

Kuwait;asatellitedishtobringtheTVnewstothetents;generatorswhichappearedfromout-

withtheServicessupplychain;thelayoutoftheSqnleaguerallowingthesectionstoliveoffof

theirLandRoversandtrailersintheopenair;hygienedrillsthatwereadheredtoandminimised

thecasualtiesfromdiarrhoeaandvomiting;asectioncdrsavingthelivesofthetwogunmenwho

red on his patrol and who were then cut down by the re from his section.


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0

Intheenditallworked.Wekeptthehelicoptersprotectedfromthegroundthreat.Itwas

messy;therewerenegligentdischarges,overturnedvehiclescausinginjury,andavehiclegothit

byamineandthecrewhadtoberescued,(justlikethetrainingvideo).Itwasnotthewaywe

hadplannedtogotowar.YetnooneonmySqndiedorsufferedseriousinjury.Theleadership

qualities imbued in the ofcer and NCO cadre enabled the Sqn to take advantage of every

opportunity in whatever situation. I like to think I was a exible leader; I probably was not as

exible as I thought I was! The important message is for commanders at all levels to listen to

andusethepersonwithexperiencetoundertakeatask;inthatwayyoumakethemostofyour

assetsandencouragepeopletocontributetothemission.

A HARRIER MISSION COMMANDER27

In2003IwenttoIraqasanexecwith3Sqn.TheAirTaskingOrdersimplyprimedusforNon

TraditionalISRwithaback-upofon-callCAS.Therewerenogiventargetsorweaponswewere

simplyaskedtocarrythebestavailable.Thetripswouldlastanythingbetween4and6hrs.

Ononemission,my third intheatre,we got airbornewith instructions togotoan ISR

missioninourareaofresponsibility.Wetankedsoastobefulloffuelforanycontingencyand

almostimmediatelytheAWACS28taskedustogotoAnNajaf,whichwasoutsideourareaof

operations![AcrossintheeasternpartofIraq]Wehadnomapsforitandhadnotconsidered

thatpartoftheoperation.OnarrivalatAnNajafwecontactedaforwardaircontrollerwho

wassomewhatupset.HewaspartofasmallteamofconventionalAmericanforcesandtheyhad

justfoundabigweaponscacheinthetown.TheyhadbeentryingtoloadsomeoftheRPGs29

ontothebackoftheirHumveeswhenthelocalmilitiahadarrivedtostopthem.Themangaveus

the standard forward air controller talk-on and nished with the non-standard comment If you

seeanythinginthetownthatisntus,youcanbombit.Wemanaged,afteracoupleofminutes

negotiation,topersuadehimtochangehismindandproposedthatwedoalittleairpresence

toseeifwecouldsplitupthebadguysandmakethemrunaway.Thenwedroppeddowntolow

levelandtacticallyairpresencedthetown.ThisgavetheAmericansalittlebitofbreathingspace

togetontheirHumveesandlegit.

Bythisstagewewereoutoffuelandsowentbacktothetankerhopingthatweweregoing

tobere-taskedbackto scud-hunting. Just beforewehadcompleted therefuelling,wewere

taskedtosupportsometroops[backintheoriginalareaofresponsibility].ItwasagainCASfortroopsincontact.Wegotourbombsawaytohelpoutthoseboysandreturnedtothetankerfor

athirdtime.Offthetankerweweretaskedrighttotheedgeofourareaofresponsibilitywhere

weareoutofcontactwithourC2soworkingprettymuchonourown.Wewerealsoverytight

forfuel.Wegotincontactwiththegroundforces,droppedanotherbombandsortedthingsout

beforereturningbacktobase.BythattimemycockpithadbeenaprettywickedplaceandIwas

inneedofabreak!

Therewasnopre-planningandonlyafewdecisionswerepre-emptedontheground.We

simplyhadtogetairbornewithamapofIraqandhopeforthebest.Everysortieinvolvedself-

assessment from the cockpit of positive identication of the target; in-cockpit application of the

27FromSqnLdrHarveySmythspresentationtotheRAFLeadershipConference2005.28AirborneWarningandControlSystem.29RocketPropelledGrenades.


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Risk/Benefit

TimeSituation

Awareness

1

Law Of Armed Conict (is this proportional, is this effect necessary?); in-cockpit evaluation of

collateraldamageandcontinuousselfassessmentoftheRulesOfEngagement.Allthishappening

in the cockpit whilst integrating with ground manoeuvring Forces, deconicting from organic res

suchasMLRS30andcontinuouslyavoidingthethreat.

Cockpitleadersarenowoperatinginaworldwherereducingthekillchain,orsensorto

shootertime,canhavestrategiceffect.Todothistheyaremakingmoreandmoredecisionsin-

cockpit,sometimeswithadegreeofcalculatedriskbecauseoftheambiguityofthefogofwar;

decisionsthatinpreviousyears,mayhavebeenmadeinaCAOCorsomeC2buildinglocated

awayfromthecontrolledchaosofthebattlespace.

THE COMMANDER WHOSE AGILITY WAS SEVERELY TESTED31

ThatwewerelikelytogotowarinIraqwasonalimiteddistributionforseveralmonths

beforeoperationTELIC.ThismeantthatIhadtore-focusourpre-deploymentactivities,withoutmaking it obvious thatOps were imminent. InmyMBA studies, case histories proved that

communicationwas a common theme in taking people toplaces theymightnot otherwise

choosetogoleadingthem.IhadtoleadthemtoaplacethatIcouldenvisagebutwithout

tellingthemanything,indeedcoveringthetruthwithmistruthsaboutprudentpreparationetc.

This period of several months was certainly a time where my ability to be self-sufcient and

robustasaleaderwereputtothetest.

ForOpTELICalltheMarhamsqncdrshadtodeploytoAliAlSalemwhichrenderedC2ad

hocatbest.Ihadtoadaptandmakedowithcommandarrangementswhichdidnotmeetwith

mycreativesubconsciousandthisdidcausemetobeunsettled.Itwasrighttosuppressmy

innerthoughtsonC2asIconsideredthearrangementsthebestcourseofactionandnothreat

tooperationalcapability.HereIbelievetherearethreedimensionstoconsiderwithinatriangle

ofvariablepressuresontheagileairmanthatshapeandpressurisehisorheractions:

With pressure to act rapidly, there can be a propensity to act before sufcient Situational

Awareness is available or without due consideration of the risk or benet of ones actions. But as

SituationalAwarenessbuildsovertimethemomenttomaketheoptimumimpactcanbelostor

thepositiveimpactreduced.Everydayinhisorhercareer,theagileairmanbalancesthetriangle

ofpressurestoactdecisively.

31FromOC9SqnonOpTELIC.


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DuringthecombatphaseofOpTELIC,myrolebecamemorefocusedonleadingbyexample

with time allocated to supporting my ground personnel who were working in difcult conditions.

UnderthreatofSSM32attacksandwithoutadequateNBCprotection.

WhentheNo2inmyformation,oneofmycrews,werekilled,IremainedondutysothatI

couldspeakwiththeoncominggroundcrewshift(whohadseenthecrewoff)inordertoallow

themtoexploretheirfeelingsandexorcisetheirgrief.Ipartlysuppressedmyownemotional

feelingswhichIbelievedtobeinthebestinterestsofleadingthroughtheepisode.Iwasopen-

mined enough to realise that each individual affected by the event needed to react as they saw t,

butintermsofgettingonwiththejob,Iwantedtoplaceatimepressureonthemtodothatand

getbacktodoingthesuperblyprofessionaljobIrequiredofthem.Ididnotappreciatehavingto

askforthereportintotheincident2yearsaftertheeventIfeltthatitshouldhavebeenmade

availabletomeimmediatelyitwascomplete.IfeltIwaspreventedbyprocessfromfullyvoicing

myconcernsoverthefragilityofourgreatestassetourpeople.

Mypersonalexperienceandsummationisthatthefeaturesoftheagileairmanaretangible

buttheycanbeaffectedbyintangiblemeans.Inordertoretainthemalleabilityandbalance

betweenanautomatonandaspiritedleaderwhofullyunderstandsmissioncommand,thereisa

needtonurtureandprotect,bywayofappropriaterecognitionandreward(betheyintrinsicor

extrinsic).Withoutappropriatelubricationtheagileairmancanbecomebrittle.

A FG OFF SUPPLIER33

InJanuary2001theRAF,undertheauspicesof ISAFhadrestoredtheoperatingcapability

ofKabulinternationalairportsuchthatitwascapable,notonlyofprovidingtheonlylineof

communication to support ISAF but, more crucially, providing a means by which aid could ow

into Kabul. Equally, it was the means by which the ever-growing army of diplomats and ofcials

could travel with reasonable speed and security. Not surprisingly the airport attracted the

attentionofthoseopposedtotheinterimnationalgovernmentand,throughoutFebruaryand

Marchof2001,attemptsweremadetoshelltheairportusingimprovisedmortarsandrocket

launchers. On the night of 30 April, the dissidents achieved their rst success, dropping 107mm

rocketroundsontotheoperatingapronandrunway.

Whilst the post attack recovery process was underway, notication was received that twoC130 aircraft were inbound, one requiring fuel as a matter of urgency, and one to ofoad RM

Commandos.Thearrivalofthesetroopshadbeensubjecttoamyriadofdelaysandpressurewas

mounting to complete their inload. Despite an expectation that the aireld may imminently come

underfurtherattack,thedecisionwastakentolandbothaircraftundertotalblackoutforarapid,

engines running, refuel and unload an unusual procedure fraught with its own difculties. Once

the aircraft were on the ground, speed was to be of the essence and Flying Ofcer Watson, the

APOD Movements Ofcer, was responsible for co-ordinating the rapid refuelling and unloading

of both aircraft. She quickly assembled her movements team in full ghting order and led them

out onto the apron. Under her leadership the rst aircraft was refuelled and dispatched in under

thirtyminuteswithoutincident;shethenpreparedforthesecondaircraftwhichwasfollowing

on quickly behind. The Royal Marines on the second aircraft were aware that the aireld had

32Surfacetosurfacemissile.33FromLeadership:AnAnthology,RAFLeadershipCentre2005,VisionandDecisiveness,AirCdreAbbott.


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just been under attack. Disorientated by an unfamiliar, pitch black aireld and the deafening roar

ofC130engines,theMarineswereinavulnerableposition.Astheaircrafttaxiedinandthe

ramp dropped, Flying Ofcer Watson wasted no time in organising the Commandos and ensured

theirrapiddisembarkationtoanearbyshelter.Despitetherisksinvolved,andurgencyrequired,

to dispatch the aircraft for its onward journey, Flying Ofcer Watson had the forethought and

judgementtoquicklyorganisethere-loadingoftwopalletsontotheC130soasnottowaste

theoutboundsortie.

A WO FIREMAN34

My section was responsible for providing re cover at Kabul [Op FINGAL 2002], but a lot

of our time was spent on non re duties force protection and guarding issues and so on. The

setup at Kabul had a military area and a non-military side but the re section was located next

tothenon-militaryactivity.Onthedayinquestionasituationhadbeenbrewingthroughoutthat

dayasnoaircrafthadtakenoffforthepastfewdaysandacrowdofpeoplehadgatheredonthedispersalandwerebecomingveryagitated.LateoninthedaytheMinisterforTransportandhis

aidehadbeenshowntoanaircraftthatwasreadytodepartandthecrowdbecameveryrowdyin

response to this, ring into the air and shouting. They crowded round the aircraft, which already

haditsenginesrunning,andthena fewofthemmanagedtobreakintoit,attackingandkilling

theMinisterforTransportandthrowinghisbodyinthebackofataxi.Onseeingthis,hisaide

andanothermanbeganrunningawayacrossthedispersalpursuedbytherioters.Allthisactivity

wastakingplaceoutsideourareaofresponsibilityandIhadreceivedordersinthebuildupof

thesituationthatwewerenottogetinvolvedbut,astheeventsescalatedandthecrowdmoved

closertowardsus,Isawthatactionwasnecessary.

Iformedmymanpowerintoa lineandalthoughwewereonlytwelvepeople,wewereof

coursearmed,andsoimmediatelylookedquitethreatening.Atthatstageinmymindwewere

purelyactingasadeterrentandguardforourareaofresponsibility,butfairlyquicklythetwo

men who were eeing from the crowd saw us and started running towards us. I had to make a

decisionthenandthereastowhattodoand,inmyminditstoppedbeingadecisionbasedon

areasofresponsibility,andbecameamoraldecisionwherepeoplesliveswereatstake.Ishouted

orders to move forward, by this stage there was only about fty feet between the crowd and

usbutwemanagedtosurroundthetwomenandgetthemtosafety.Ithinkthesightof,albeita

smallnumber,butagroupnevertheless,ofmilitarywelldisciplinedpersonneladvancinginawellorderedmannerwasenoughtoensurethesafetyofthetwomenindanger.Thesituationhadthe

potentialtoescalatefurtherandbecomequitenastybutoncewemovedforwardinadecisive

way,shoutingordersandmakingastancewewereluckyandtheybackeddown.

A SGT ARMOURER35

Intermsofmanpower,[5131(BD)Sqn]isaroundthesizeofthegroundcrewelementof

aTornadoSqn;thatis,about105men.Ourtraditionalrolehasbeentiedcloselytothemain

operating bases, as we are responsible for keeping airelds clear and operable. For that purpose

weareequippedwitharmouredSpartanvehicles.SincetheRAFRegimentlosttheirarmoured

capabilityafewyearsagowearenowtheonlyarmouredunitwithintheRoyalAirForce.Although

34Ibid,VisionandDecisiveness,WOAndyPittock.35FromAirForceLeadership:BeyondCommand?ExposedLeadership!RAFLeadershipCentre2005.


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ourown,soitwasexcellentresponsibilitytodothatandImjustanSAC.

The most difcult incident I had to deal with was when we had civilians with us and we were

goingintoBasra,ledbyanArmyCaptainwhosemapreadingskillswereabitsketchy;weended

upgoingintowardsahostilevillageandofcoursealltheciviliansstartedtopanicbecausethey

didn'thaveanyweapons.Weendedupdowninaravinegoingthewrongwayuptheroad.

Thatwasquiteunnervingbutitwasourresponsibilityaspacketcommanderstomakesurethe

civilianswerealrightintheircabsbecausetheywereallshoutingandpanicking.Ineverthought

I'dbeabletodothat,buthavingbeengiventhechanceandprovingtomyselfthatIcandoit,gave

me a lot more condence and I think it's given a lot of other lower ranks more condence in

themselves.Itsmademethinkthatanyonecanbeagoodleaderputintherightposition,inthe

rightsituationandgivenachance.


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AgiliTY A hiSToricAl PerSPecTiVe

Mr Seb Cox

I thinkthatonemajorproblemthatwe faceintryingtoconsideragilityin ahistorical

contextisthat,intermsofterminologyandjargonitisaveryrecentadditiontoourlexicon.

In times past, and not so recent past either, you would be hard pressed to nd any RAF ofcer

exceptaPEdOreferringtoagilityasapositiverequirement.

Thishistoricalconsiderationwillthereforeattempttopickuponthemessuchasadaptability,

robustness, exibility, and responsiveness at the individual and organisational levels, together with

organisationalculture.SohowdoestheRAFratehistorically?

Thestory,asonemightexpect,isfarfromconstantovertime.Attheverystartofourstory

Ithinktherearelegitimatecriticismstobemade.TheveryearlydevelopmentofairpowerintheUKwasratheruneven.Therewere,Ithinkseveralreasonsforthis.Thisstemmedinpartfrom

two factors, rst the military conservatism of the British Army and Royal Navy at the time both

weresomewhathideboundinstitutionswhichwerenotparticularlywelladaptedinstitutionally

or organisationally to adopting new, indeed potentially revolutionary, technologies. Secondly,

aeronauticsatthetimewasveryclearlyanextremelydangerouspursuit,andwasthusayoung

mansgame.Acombinationwherebyknowledgeandenthusiasmareconcentratedatajuniorrank

levelwithinapowerfullyhierarchicalandsomewhatconservativeorganisationisnotconducive

tothoughtfulandrapidprogress.IthinktheearlyhistoryoftheRFCandRNAS,particularlypre-

war, shows a number of relatively junior ofcers trying simultaneously to demonstrate the utility

ofanewtechnologywithintheframeworkofexistingmilitaryroles,notablyreconnaissance,to

some rather sceptical seniors. At the same time these self-same junior ofcers were attempting

toexploreandextendtheenvelopeofpotentialairpowerrolestodirectattacketc.andtodo

so when neither the weapons, nor frankly the aircraft, were sufciently capable. It is a difcult task

simultaneouslytobothproselytiseandmaintainarapidpaceofdevelopmentwithoutexposing

ones ank to the sceptics all too ready to pour scorn on ones efforts should they fall short in

somerespectorother.

The aviation pioneers also ran across inuences other than scepticism which were far from

benign. Thus, we nd the early structure of the Royal Flying Corps, as originally proposed by

the Standing Sub-Committee of theCommitteeof ImperialDefencewas to be amodel ofjointery, intended to have a Naval Wing, a Military Wing and a unied Central Flying School 1,but

israpidlyunderminedbyinter-servicerivalrywhichdestroysthisstructureandeventuallysees

theformationofaseparateRoyalNavalAirServicewhichgoesitsownway.Originally,theWar

Ofce had agreed that it held responsibility for the air defence of the UK, including London itself

andimportantmilitarysitessuchasRNdockyards,WoolwichArsenal,munitionsfactoriesetc.As

late as June 1914, just weeks before the outbreak of war, the War Ofce had no scheme for home

defencebutinsisted thatit remained their responsibility andthatany availableNaval aircraft

should operate under Army control. At the same time War Ofce plans called for the despatch of

allavailablesquadronstoFranceontheoutbreakofwar,andwhenwarcameinAugusttheyduly

decampedenmasseoverthehorizonleavingjustafewsecondlineaircraft,noneofwhichwere

armedwithanythingmorelethalthanthecrewspersonalweapons.Whilstthiswasanimpressive

examp

joel hayward, "the luftwaffe and agility," in air power: the agile air force (royal air force,...

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