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Page 1
Jobs, Expansion and Transportation (JET) Task Force Meeting September 26, 2014
Agenda
Topic:
I. Welcome and Introductory Remarks Dan Rosthenthal
II.
Current State of the Aviation Industry and Future Trends for the Industry Bill Swelbar
III. Break (Non-JET Task Force Members Welcome to Depart) 5 Minutes
IV. Working Group Updates - Air Services - Transportation - Economic Development
Geoff Chatas William Murdock Jean Carter Ryan
V. Economic Development Working Group Featured Presentation Jean Carter Ryan
VI. Announcements and Final Remarks
Agenda
Topic:
I. Welcome and Introductory Remarks Dan Rosenthal
II.
Current State of the Aviation Industry and Future Trends for the Industry Bill Swelbar
III. Break (Non-JET Task Force Members Welcome to Depart) 5 Minutes
IV. Working Group Updates - Air Services - Transportation - Economic Development
Geoff Chatas William Murdock Jean Carter Ryan
V. Economic Development Working Group Featured Presentation Jean Carter Ryan
VI. Announcements and Final Remarks
THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY: It’s Evolution Is Causing Airports to Adapt William S. Swelbar Executive Vice President
I really don't know one plane from the other. To me they are just marginal costs with wings.
— Alfred Kahn, 1977
No one expects Braniff to go broke. No major U.S. carrier ever has. — The Wall Street Journal, 30 July 1980
If we went into the funeral business, people would stop dying. — Martin R. Shugrue, Vice-chairman Pan Am
I can't imagine a set of circumstances that would produce Chapter 11 for Eastern. — Frank Lorenzo
I think historically, the airline business has not been run as a real business. That is, a business designed to achieve a return on capital that is then passed on to shareholders. It has historically been run as an extremely elaborate version of a model railroad, that is, one in which you try to make enough money to buy more equipment. — Michael Levine, Executive VP Northwest Airlines, 1996
The worst sort of business is one that grows rapidly, requires significant capital to engender the growth, and then earns little or no money. Think airlines. Here a durable competitive advantage has proven elusive ever since the days of the Wright Brothers. Indeed, if a farsighted capitalist had been present at Kitty Hawk, he would have done his successors a huge favor by shooting Orville down. — Warren Buffett, annual letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders, February 2008
Should we see demand decrease, however, we will respond nimbly and appropriately by decreasing capacity and taking costs out to help ensure we remain profitable throughout the business cycle. — Jeffrey Smisek, United Airlines CEO
“This [the airline industry] Is No Longer a Hobby” — Richard Anderson, Delta Air Lines CEO speaking to analysts on 1Q 2012 earnings call
Capacity Growth Across the Business Cycles: Load Factor Increases 14 Points Over the Last Two As Growth Slows
Data Source: A4A Airline Cost Index Tables
82.4%
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
90.0%
0.00
200,000.00
400,000.00
600,000.00
800,000.00
1,000,000.00
1,200,000.00
1978:4 - 1982:4 1983:1 - 1991:1 1991:2 - 2001:4 2002:1 - 2009:3 2009:4 - Present
Average Load Factor Average Annual Available Seat Miles (000)
Average Load Factor (%)
10
Capacity Grows Faster Than Real GDP: An Industry That Grew Too Big
Note: SAAR, 2009 Chained Dollars Note: Business cycle 1 = 100
-
50.0
100.0
150.0
200.0
250.0
1978:4 - 1982:4 1983:1 - 1991:1 1991:2 - 2001:4 2002:1 - 2009:3 2009:4 - Present
Available Seat Mile Index Real GDP Index
11
Unit Revenue Does Not Keep Pace With Inflation: The Consumer Benefits In A Significant Way
Note: Consumer Price Index SAAR Note: Business cycle 1 = 100
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1978:4 -1982:4
1983:1 -1991:1
1991:2 -2001:4
2002:1 -2009:3
2009:4 -Present
Consumer Price Index Passenger Yield (with Ancillaries) Passenger Unit Revenue (with Ancillaries)
12
This Cycle As Compared to the Last The Effect of Load Factor Increases and Ancillary Revenue On Sustained Profitability Cannot Be Underestimated
90.0
95.0
100.0
105.0
110.0
115.0
120.0
Passenger Yield (cents perRPM)
Passenger Yield withAncillaries (cents per RPM)
Passenger Unit Revenue (centsper ASM)
Passenger Unit Revenue withAncillaries (cents per ASM)
Consumer Price Index
13
The Industry had Little Choice but to Vigorously Cut and Manage Controllable Costs: Particularly Labor Costs
Note: Consumer Price Index SAAR Note: Business cycle 1 = 100
50.0
100.0
150.0
200.0
250.0
300.0
1978:4 -1982:4
1983:1 -1991:1
1991:2 -2001:4
2002:1 -2009:3
2009:4 -Present
Unit Non-Labor Cost (cents per ASM) Consumer Price Index
Unit Labor Cost (cents per ASM) Unit Fuel Cost (cents per ASM)
14
An Uncontrollable Cost: Fuel Was the Catalyst the Industry Needed to Change Its Game
Data Source: A4A Airline Cost Index Tables
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
1978:4 - 1982:4 1983:1 - 1991:1 1991:2 - 2001:4 2002:1 - 2009:3 2009:4 - Present
Labor Expense as a Percent of Total Op Expense Fuel Expense as a Percent of Total Op Expense
15
For The Industry: Deregulated Period Resulted in $36 Billion of Pre-Tax Losses
Note: Business cycle 1 = 100 Data Source: A4A Airline Cost Index Tables
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
-$70,000
-$60,000
-$50,000
-$40,000
-$30,000
-$20,000
-$10,000
$0
$10,000
$20,000
$30,000
1978:4 - 1982:4 1983:1 - 1991:1 1991:2 - 2001:4 2002:1 - 2009:3 2009:4 - Present
Pre-Tax Income ($Millions) Unit Revenue with Ancillaries (cents per ASM) Unit Cost excluding TR (cents per ASM)
CUMULATIVE PRE-TAX LOSS
$(35,883.1)
16
Commercial Air Service: Challenges and Opportunities
How Did We Get to 2014?
1. DL/NW entered bankruptcy on the same day and in effect exited as one carrier.
2. The emergence of the “New Delta”, with lower costs and the strength of fortress hubs, accelerated consolidation of carriers and airports - CVG, MEM.
3. US Airways forced UA/CO to combine by pursuing United.
4. Southwest acted as a legacy carrier and bought AirTran.
5. US Airways forced American to merge.
6. Three carriers plus Southwest now control 87% of the US domestic industry.
The internet becoming the ticket distribution vehicle, combined with growth by the LCCs, and perpetually rising fuel prices in the mid 2000’s, resulted in nearly all the legacy carriers entering bankruptcy. So what happened next?
18
Consolidation in the U.S. Makes Air Service Expansion Much More Difficult
19
The historic relationship of airline industry growth and GDP is broken. Is the break in the pattern the future?
What will cause the legacy carriers to grow?
Where will that growth be?
What is the future of LCCs? What happens as their costs increase—does WN return to growth?
What is the future of ULCCs?
WILL THERE BE A REGIONAL INDUSTRY?
What does all this mean for airports? Or for passengers?
20
Overview: A Challenging Era for Air Service
Airlines have restricted capacity growth over the last six years in a strategy known as “capacity discipline.”
Medium-sized and smaller airports have felt the brunt of capacity cuts through airline consolidation and the closure of duplicate hubs.
Like the rest of the country, Columbus has suffered some air service setbacks – but not to the extent most airports have.
Creativity and intelligent planning will be necessary to maintain and grow air service in Columbus.
21
Challenges Facing Air Service in the United States
In the wing oil in excess of
$100 per barrel
40,000 cycle decision
Prevalence of low cost
carriers in primary
catchment areas
Pilot shortage surely to impact regional sector of the business
Flight Time/Duty Time regulations
may cause staffing
challenges
Capacity discipline at
major carriers has reduced frequencies and seats
Smallest new production
aircraft likely to be at least
100 seats
No 50 seat and less replacement aircraft in the pipeline
Government-Induced
Economic Operational
Strategic
22
Smisek said he expects United Continental, a merger in 2010 of United Airlines and Continental Airlines, to shrink in the U.S.
We'll have the domestic [operations] sized solely to feed the international traffic
CERA Conference, Houston, TX. March 11, 2011
The National Picture:
How Has Capacity Discipline Affected Air Service?
The last nine years of domestic aviation can be divided into three time periods
25
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Year
-ove
r-Ye
ar %
cha
nge
in a
vaila
ble
dom
estic
seat
s
AA
DL + NW
UA + CO
US + HP
WN + FLPost-recession
Pre-recession
Economic Recession
Source: InterVISTAS analysis of Innovata schedule data via Diio Mi
What are Schedule Rationalization and Capacity Discipline?
• Rationalization (2007-2009): an active reduction of available seat capacity as a result of macroeconomic shocks to the airline industry and a “new normal” of higher fuel prices.
• Capacity discipline (2010 – present): a restriction of seat capacity growth by network carriers (and Southwest) even as passenger enplanements have continued to increase.
• “[Yield growth between 2007-2012] would have been impossible without capacity discipline.” –John Gebo, SVP Financial Planning, United Airlines, August 2013
26
An upward shock to the price of fuel in 2008 caused airlines to quickly pull back capacity
27
$-
$0.50
$1.00
$1.50
$2.00
$2.50
$3.00
$3.50
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Mill
ions
of D
omes
tic F
light
s
Scheduled Domestic Flights and Fuel Price per Gallon
Domestic Flights Fuel Price per Gallon
Sources: BTS Form 41 cost data (via MIT Airline Data Project) and Diio Mi schedule data
Fuel Prices and Capacity Rationalization
28
According to the MIT Airline Data Project, airline fuel prices have stabilized, yet scheduled domestic flights have not rebounded.
Source: Diio Mi and MIT Airline Data Project
$-
$0.50
$1.00
$1.50
$2.00
$2.50
$3.00
$3.50
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Mill
ions
of D
omes
tic F
light
s
Domestic Flights Fuel Price per Gallon
Most Medium- and Large-Hub Airports Saw Negative or Minimal Growth in Departures 38 large and mid-sized airports saw decreases in departures from
2012-2013, whereas 24 airports saw departure growth.
29
0
5
10
15
20
25
< -10% -7.5% to -10% -5% to -7.5% -5% to -2.5% -2.5% to 0% 0% to 2.5% 2.5% to 5% 5% to 7.5% 10% +
# of
Lar
ge- a
nd M
ediu
m-H
ub A
irpor
ts
% Change in Departures from 2012 to 2013
From 2007-2012, U.S. Airlines Cut 1.4 million Domestic Flights from the National Airspace System
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mill
ions
of D
omes
tic D
epar
ture
s
Scheduled Domestic Departures from U.S. Airports
Large Hub Non-Large Hub
55.8%
44.2%
59.4%
40.6%
Source: InterVISTAS analysis of Innovata schedule data via Diio Mi 30
Growth in Domestic ASMs and RPMs has been Historically Tied Closely to GDP
Source: BTS T-100 via Diio Mi, BEA -8.0%
-6.0%
-4.0%
-2.0%
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
% C
hang
e fr
om P
revi
ous
Year
YoY % Change GDP YoY % RPMs YoY % ASMs
GDP growth correlation with
RPM growth: 0108 ASM growth: 0.8259
31
Domestic Seat Capacity has Remained Stagnant Despite Economic Growth
-8.0%
-6.0%
-4.0%
-2.0%
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Year-over-year % Changes in U.S. GDP and Domestic Seat Departures YoY % Change GDP YoY % Change Domestic Seats
Source: BTS T-100 via Diio Mi, BEA
Represents a recent shift in airline strategy; typically, airlines grow capacity in times of domestic economic growth.
32
Capacity Discipline and Schedule Rationalization Wiped Out Nearly 100 million Domestic Seats Available domestic seats are at their lowest level since 1995
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1,000
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Mill
ions
of D
omes
tic S
eats
U.S. Average Load Factor and Available Domestic Seat Departures
Load Factor Domestic Seats
Source: BTS T-100 via Diio Mi, BEA 33
Rising Real Unit Costs Have Made It Harder for all Carriers to Justify Uneconomic Flying The unit cost gap between “low-cost” carriers and network carriers has
also shrunk, adjusting for inflation.
8.00
9.00
10.00
11.00
12.00
13.00
14.00
15.00
16.00
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
CAS
M E
x-Tr
ansp
ort R
elat
ed C
osts
in
Con
stan
t 201
3 C
ents
NetworkLCC3.07 cents
1.51 cents
Source: MIT Airline Data Project, adjusted for inflation using BLS CPI 34
LCCs Now Lead Network Carriers in Cutting Capacity Ultra-Low Cost Carriers departures continue to grow (+10.4% from
2012-2013), but they only represent 1.4% of the total domestic capacity in the United States.
Network carriers (-0.8%) and Low Cost Carriers (-4.1%) continued to cut scheduled flights from 2012-2013.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Mill
ions
of S
ched
uled
Dom
estic
Flig
hts
NetworkLCCULCC
-0.8%
-4.1%
+10.4%
Source: InterVISTAS analysis of Innovata schedule data via Diio Mi 35
520
540
560
580
600
620
640
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Thou
sand
s of
Dep
artu
res
Southwest Airlines Departures from Smaller U.S. Airports
Is It Finally Time to Call Southwest a Legacy Carrier? Southwest cut flights from smaller airports by 10% since 2007 while increasing
its presence at large-hub airports (6% increase in flights).
Source: Diio Mi
-9.8%
36
Capacity Discipline is the “New Normal” for Airports of All Sizes
Rationalization (2007-2009): an active reduction of available seat capacity as a result of macroeconomic shocks to the airline industry and a “new normal” of higher fuel prices.
Capacity Discipline (2010 – present): a restriction of seat capacity growth by network carriers (and Southwest) even as passenger enplanements have continued to increase.
Capacity discipline started as early as 2010 as carriers held seat capacity at lower, “rationalized” levels despite an economic recovery.
Capacity discipline has “locked-in” lower levels of available seats and departures at smaller airports.
37
Capacity Discipline Has Not Been Applied Evenly Smaller airports saw a disproportionate share of the cuts in flights
and available seats as a result of capacity discipline.
Airport Type % change in domestic flights (07- 12)
Large Hub -8.8%
Medium Hub -26.2%
Small Hub -18.2%
Non-Hub -15.4%
EAS -5.0%
All Smaller Airports All Airports
-21.3% -14.3%
Source: Diio Mi
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mill
ions
of D
epar
ture
s
Scheduled Domestic Departures at Smaller U.S. Airports
Medium Hub Small Hub Non Hub EAS
38
Smaller Airports Are Still Seeing the Largest Cuts In Service
Although all airport types saw net decreases in domestic flights from 2012-2013, once again, smaller airports saw larger decreases in flights than large-hub airports. Large-hub and medium-hubs saw seat growth of 1.0% and 0.3%, respectively.
0123456789
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Mill
ions
of S
ched
uled
Dom
estic
Flig
hts
Large Hub Medium Hub Small Hub Non-Hub
Airport Type % change in
domestic flights (‘12-’13)
% change in domestic
seats (‘12-’13)
Large Hub -0.2% 1.0%
Medium Hub -2.2% 0.3%
Small Hub -3.0% -1.4%
Non-Hub and EAS -4.2% -2.5%
All Smaller Airports
All Airports
-2.9% -1.1%
0.6% 0.4%
Source: InterVISTAS analysis of Innovata schedule data via Diio Mi 39
For How Long Will Capacity Discipline Remain the Status Quo? The short-term future will depend on how long airlines
continue to practice capacity discipline.
Is capacity discipline a stable equilibrium?
Prisoner’s dilemma: there appears to be an incentive for airlines to break with capacity discipline and gain more market share, but if all airlines do so, there will be too much capacity in the market.
Which airline will be the first to break with capacity discipline, and when will that break occur?
Expansion opportunities are limited so long as capacity discipline is in effect.
40
3 Guiding Principles in the “New Normal” of Air Service Development
Retain It:
Airline mergers and capacity discipline have been relatively kind to CMH
CMH service has been stable since 2009, not true of all airports
Expand It:
Capacity Discipline continues
It’s a Zero Sum Game
Consolidations and growth of airline hubs serving CMH increases connectivity to the world
Enhance It:
Upguaging of aircraft brings better passenger comfort 41
The Columbus Market:
Better connected than most
Columbus’ Population Has Grown Faster than the U.S. Average over the Last 12 Years
43
-5.0% 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 25.0%
Pittsburgh
Milwaukee
U.S. average
Louisville
Kansas City
Columbus
Indianapolis
Nashville
% Change in Metropolitan Population, 2000-2012
Source: Columbus 2020
15.6%
11.3%
The Recovery from Capacity Discipline Has Begun at CMH
CMH’s growth in available domestic seats from 2012-2013 ranked above 19 other Medium Hub airports and the Medium Hub average.
44
-35%
-30%
-25%
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
MSY
HOU
BNA
SJC
AUS
ANC
PDX
PIT
RSW
BDL
MCI STL
SNA
CMH
DAL
RDU
SAT
BUF
OGG OAK IN
D
CLE
OM
A
SMF
SJU
JAX
PBI
BUR
CVG
ABQ
ON
T
MKE
MEM
% Change in Available Domestic Seats at Medium Hub Airports, 2012 - 2013
1.0%
Medium Hub Average:
0.2%
Source: Innovata SRS via Diio Mi
CMH is Very Well Connected for its Size
CMH was ranked 10th out of 33 Medium Hub airports by an MIT study for the quality of its connections to the global air transportation network.
45 Source: Wittman, M. and Swelbar, W. Measuring Connectivity at US Airports. MIT Int’l Center for Air Transportation Report No. ICAT-2013-05.
100
105
110
115
120
125
130
135
140
145
150
Columbus Austin San Antonio Medium Hub Average
ACQ
I Sco
re (2
012)
MIT Airport Connectivity Quality Index (ACQI) Score for Selected Medium-Hub Airports
Air Service Accessibility in Columbus Is Among the Best in the Country In a recent MIT study, the Columbus region ranked 31st among all
U.S. metro areas for access to well-connected air service—above Indianapolis, Austin, Memphis, New Orleans, and San Antonio.
46
75
85
95
105
115
125
135
Columbus Indianapolis Austin Memphis New Orleans San Antonio Louisville
Air S
ervi
ce A
cces
sibi
lity
Scor
e (2
012)
Air Service Accessibility Score for Selected Medium-Sized U.S. Regions
Source: Wittman, M. Air Service Accessibility in U.S. Metropolitan Regions. MIT Int’l Center for Air Transportation Report No. ICAT-2014-02.
Foreign Firms in 27 Countries Have Operations within 50 Miles of Columbus
47
Locations of Foreign Firms with Operations in the Columbus Area
Country # of Firms Japan 44
Canada 36 England UK 31
Germany 26 Switzerland 12
France 10 Netherlands 7
Source: Uniworld
CMH
The Incentive Conundrum
To Play or Not to Play?
The Incentive Conundrum Columbus embarks on a strategic approach to air service development
“Carpet Bombing” is not the way to target markets
CMH is not desperate and desperate markets carpet bomb
Consider incentives only on markets being realistically evaluated
The strategic approach employed has prioritized domestic and international markets But CMH is not the only community targeting these markets
Incentives can differentiate CMH from other competitors in this “zero sum game” air service environment
Just like it is Net Present Value decision for the airline to fly or not, it is a Net Present Value proposition for the community to invest or not CMH is a “have market”
Any investment should incrementally improve CMH’s place on the air service grid
49
QUESTIONS AND DISCUSSION William “Bill” Swelbar Executive Vice President InterVISTAS Consulting LLC +1 202.688.2243 [email protected]
Agenda
Topic:
I. Welcome and Introductory Remarks Dan Rosenthal
II.
Current State of the Aviation Industry and Future Trends for the Industry Bill Swelbar
III. Break (Non-JET Task Force Members Welcome to Depart) 5 Minutes
IV. Working Group Updates - Air Services - Transportation - Economic Development
Geoff Chatas William Murdock Jean Carter Ryan
V. Economic Development Working Group Featured Presentation Jean Carter Ryan
VI. Announcements and Final Remarks
Agenda
Topic:
I. Welcome and Introductory Remarks Dan Rosenthal
II.
Current State of the Aviation Industry and Future Trends for the Industry Bill Swelbar
III. Break (Non-JET Task Force Members Welcome to Depart) 5 Minutes
IV. Working Group Updates - Air Services - Transportation - Economic Development
Geoff Chatas William Murdock Jean Carter Ryan
V. Economic Development Working Group Featured Presentation Jean Carter Ryan
VI. Announcements and Final Remarks
Agenda
Topic:
I. Welcome and Introductory Remarks Dan Rosenthal
II.
Current State of the Aviation Industry and Future Trends for the Industry Bill Swelbar
III. Break (Non-JET Task Force Members Welcome to Depart) 5 Minutes
IV. Working Group Updates - Air Services - Transportation - Economic Development
Geoff Chatas William Murdock Jean Carter Ryan
V. Economic Development Working Group Featured Presentation Jean Carter Ryan
VI. Announcements and Final Remarks
Columbus-Franklin County Finance Authority
Jobs, Economy & Transportation Taskforce for
Port Columbus Economic Development
Committee Update
Columbus-Franklin County Finance Authority
GOAL Leverage and partner with community stakeholders to grow the economic wealth of our region by creating joint economic development strategies to coordinate future land use planning, infrastructure investment, service delivery, development incentives and marketing efforts for the entire area around Port Columbus.
Columbus-Franklin County Finance Authority
Economic Development Committee Members Jean Carter Ryan, Finance Authority Michael Johnson, East Columbus Civic Michael Dalby, Columbus Chamber Mark Barbash, Finance Fund Drew Vennemeyer, Quandel Bob White, Daimler Irene Alvarez, Columbus 2020 Elaine Roberts, CRAA
Steve Campbell, Columbus Jonathan Pittman, Columbus Mark Lundine, Columbus Anthony Jones, Gahanna Zach Woodruff, Whitehall Tory Richardson, CRAA Alex Beres, Franklin County Randy Bowman, Columbus
Columbus-Franklin County Finance Authority
“There are no shortcuts to any place worth going.” -Beverly Sills
Columbus-Franklin County Finance Authority
Strategy to Develop Recommendations Review 2008 Report Gather Information
Columbus-Franklin County Finance Authority
“What I am looking for is a blessing that is not in disguise.”
- Kitty O’Neil Collins
Columbus-Franklin County Finance Authority
2008 Recommendations Establish business sector priorities for
recruitment Joint business retention and expansion Protect/Invest in economic (land) and
infrastructure assets Support airport operations through compatible
development
Columbus-Franklin County Finance Authority
2008 Recommendations Joint marketing Establish higher development standards
and environmental enhancements Improve connectivity with larger region
Columbus-Franklin County Finance Authority
Information Gathered Business Input – NetJets, Daimler, Fortner Data on business type/sector in Port Columbus
foot print Data on business needing to be proximate to
airport Columbus Region Defense effort
Columbus-Franklin County Finance Authority
Information Gathered (Cont.) Available sites Infrastructure needs & plans Rail line information Incentives available CRAA airport functions & relationships
Columbus-Franklin County Finance Authority
Issues Facing Study Area Land and site availability Look and feel of area Infrastructure needs BRAC Coordination of limited governmental resources
Columbus-Franklin County Finance Authority
Potential Recommendations Topics Joint marketing of sites and area Targeted marketing for growth sectors Transit/transportation Code enforcement Infrastructure improvements Aviation industry – related thoughts
Columbus-Franklin County Finance Authority
“Stopping on 3rd base adds no more to the score than striking out.”
- E. Joseph Cossman
Agenda
Topic:
I. Welcome and Introductory Remarks Dan Rosenthal
II.
Current State of the Aviation Industry and Future Trends for the Industry Bill Swelbar
III. Break (Non-JET Task Force Members Welcome to Depart) 5 Minutes
IV. Working Group Updates - Air Services - Transportation - Economic Development
Geoff Chatas William Murdock Jean Carter Ryan
V. Economic Development Working Group Featured Presentation Jean Carter Ryan
VI. Announcements and Final Remarks