Jnternationlal Lawon the 6 ve of the

Twenty-fist CentuyVews fro'" le

Jnfe,~fioniaI Low Commission

Le droit internationIal'aub4e

cu XXt e si CleR~fledions de coicoteurs

6)LAU.adNationisNations IAnias

,New Y.A., -1997

UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONSales No. ElF 97.V.4ISBN 92-1-133512-4

PUBLICATION DES NATIONS UNIESNumdro de vente: E/F 97.V.4

ISBN 92-1-133512-4

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TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE DES MATIERES

Page

P reface .................................................................................................... v ii

Preface .................................................................................................... ix

Avant-propos ........................................................................................ xi

Forew ord ............................................................................................... xv

Biographical Notes on the Contributors ........................................... xix

Notices biographiques des contributeurs ......................................... xxv

A brdviations .......................................................................................... xxxi

A bbreviations ........................................................................................ xxxi

Introduction: The Achievement of the International Law Com- Im issio n ...........................................................................................

Introduction: Lceuvre de la Commission du droit international.. 19

TOM USCHAT. ChristianInternational Law as the Constitution of Mankind ................ 37

LUKASHUK, Igor IvanovichThe Law of the International Community .............................. 51

JACOVIDES, AndreasThe Role of International Law in the World Today andTom orrow ..................................................................................... 69

BENNOUNA, MohamedDroit international et diversitd culturelle ................................ 79

CRAWFORD, JamesUniversalism and Regionalism from the Perspective of the

Work of the International Law Commission ......................... 99

KUSUMA-ATMADJA, MochtarThe Contribution of New States to the Development ofInternational Law with a Special Emphasis on the Law ofthe S ea .......................................................................................... 123

VILLAGRAN KRAMER, FranciscoLes actes unilatdraux dans le cadre de la jurisprudenceintern atio nale .............................................................................. 137

BOWETI, Derek WilliamThe Role of International Organizations in the Implemen-tation of International Law .......................... 163

SZtKELY, AlbertoNon-Binding Commitments: A Commentary on the Soft-ening of International Law Evidenced in the Environ-m ental F ield ................................................................................. 173

RAO, Pemmaraju SreenivasaEnvironment as a Common Heritage of Mankind: A PolicyPerspective .................................................................................. 20 1

MAHIOU, AhmedLe droit au d~veloppem ent ....................................................... 217

FOMBA, SalifouLe droit au drveloppement en tant que droit de l'homme ... 237

YAMADA, ChuseiPeace Through Disarmament? Legal Aspect ......................... 253

ROSENSTOCK, RobertAn International Criminal Responsibility of States? ......... .. 265

PELLET. AlainVive le crime! Remarques sur les degr6s de lillicite en droitinternational ................................................................................. 287

BARBOZA. JulioSine Delicto (Causal) Liability and Responsibility forWrongful Acts in International Law ......................................... 317

THIAM, DoudouResponsabilitd internationale de i'individu en matinre crimi-nele ................................................................................................. 329

VARGAS CARRENO, EdmundoH um anitarian Intervention ......................................................... 339

HE, QizhiReflections on the Teaching, Study. Dissemination andWider Appreciation of International Law ................................ 365

AL-BAHARNA, HusainFuture Topics for the Codification of International LawViewed in Historical Perspective ............................................... 373

PREFACE

Fifty years ago, on 21 November 1947, the General Assemblyestablished the International Law Commission as its principal instru-ment for discharging the responsibilities placed on it by Article 13,paragraph I (a), of the Charter of the United Nations, namely, toinitiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of"encouraging the progressive development of international law and itscodification". The first members of the Commission were elected on3 November 1948 and the Commission opened its first session thefollowing year, on 12 April 1949. Thereupon, the Commissionembarked on its work.

The Commission consists of 34 individual experts in interna-tional law-professors, government legal advisers, statesmen and dip-lomats-representing the main forms of civilization and the principallegal systems of the world. It is this concentration of expertise and thediversity of the experience and background of its members that sowell equip the Commission to develop international law truly univer-sal in conception and in scope.

The Commission has published final reports on some 24 topicsand has produced over 20 sets of draft articles containing basic ruleson a host of areas fundamental to international law. They range fromsources of international law to State jurisdiction, from the law ofinternational organizations to the position of the individual in inter-national law, from succession of States to natural resources and eco-nomic relations. In fact, the Commission has completed extensivework in many, if not most, of the principal fields of general publicinternational law.

Many of the sets of draft articles produced by the Commissionhave served as the bases for global treaties on the subjects concernedand have consequently had a significant effect on the internationallegal order. A number of these treaties have assumed a structural rolewithin the domains of international law to which they relate, the mostprominent examples being the law of diplomatic and consular rela-tions, international criminal law, the law of treaties, the law of inter-national organizations and the law of the sea. Even those draft articleswhich have not yet played such a role represent pronouncements onthe law by a highly authoritative body in the field, and they too haveexerted a substantial influence on the practice of States and of inter-

national organizations, including in their national legislation and mit-nal rule-making.

The General Assembly has declared the period 1989-1999 theUnited Nations Decade of International Law. Two of the main objec-tives of the Decade are to encourage the progressive development ofinternational law and its codification and to promote the teaching,study, dissemination and wider appreciation of international law.Having regard to the substantial achievement of the International LawCommission in both of these fields, it is most appropriate that theCommission has decided to publish this collection of essays by itsmembers as a contribution to the Decade.

It accordingly gives me great pleasure to prepare a Preface forthis publication produced by such a distinguished body-a body ofwhich I am proud once to have counted myself a member.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali17 December 1996

PREFACE

II y a cinquante ans de cela, le 21 novembre 1947, 'Assembldegtndrale crdait la Commission du droit international, principal instru-ment dont elle dispose pour s'acquitter des responsabilitds que luiassigne l'Article 13, paragraphe 1 a), de ia Charte des Nations Unies,aux termes duquel il lui incombe de provoquer des 6tudes et faire desrecommandations en vue d'<< encourager le d~veloppement progressifdu droit international et sa codification ,. Les premiers membres dela Commission ont &6 d1us le 3 novembre 1948, et ses travaux mis enchantier 'annde suivante, le 12 avril 1949, date ax laquellc ele a ouvertsa premiere session.

La Commission se compose de 34 sp&ialistes du droit interna-tional - professeurs, conseillers juridiques de gouvernements, hom-mes politiques et diplomates - reprdsentant les formes principales decivilisation et les principaux syst~mes de droit. La diversit6 des com-p~tences, de l'expdrience et des horizons, voilx ce qui I'arme si bienpour crter un droit international vdritablement universel dans sa con-ception comme dans sa porte.

La Commission a publi6 des rapports finaux sur deux douzainesde sujets et produit plus d'une vingtaine d'ensembles de projetsd'articles dnonqant des principes directeurs relatifs A quantitd dequestions d'importance cruciale, qui vont des sources du droit inter-national i la competence des Etats, du droit des organisations inter-nationales i la position de l'individu en droit international, de ]asuccession d'Etats aux ressources naturelles, en passant par les rela-tions 6conomiques. En fait, la Commission a men6 Ax bien de vastestravaux dans bon nombre, voire dans ia plupart des principaux do-maines du droit international public g~ndral.

Les ensembles de projets d'articles produits par ia Commissionont servi Ax 6tablir nombre d'instruments internationaux consacrsaux questions considdrdes et, partant, ont eu une incidence consid6-rable sur r'ordrejuridique international. Un certain nombre de ces ins-truments remplissent une fonction normative clans les domaines dudroit international auxquels ils se rapportent, les exemples les plusmarquants dtant offerts par le droit des relations diplomatiques etconsulaires, le droit international penal, le droit des traitds, le droit desorganisations internationales et le droit de la mer. M~me ceux des pro-jets d'articles qui n'ont pas encore atteint bi un statut aussi dlevdconstituent les avis d'une instance faisant autoritd, et ont eux aussi

influd de faqon non ndgligeable sur la pratique des Etats ct des organi-sations internationales, au plan notamment du droit interne ct de laIdgislation nationale.

L'Assemblde gdndrale a ddclard la p~riode 1989-1999 Dcenniedes Nations Unies pour le droit international. Deux des objectifs prin-cipaux de la Ddcennie sont d'encourager le d6veloppement progressifdu droit international et sa codification et de stimuler 'enseignement.rHtude, la diffusion et une comprehension plus large du droit interna-tional. Eu 6gard A la contribution marquante qu'elle a apportde danschacun de ces deux domaines, la Commission du droit international6tait toute ddsignde pour publier ce recueil d'essais de ses membresplac6 sous le signe de la Ddcennie.

C'est avec le plus grand plaisir que je signe donc aujourd'hui lapreface A la publication d'un groupe d'6minentes personnalitds auquelje suis tier d'avoir moi-m~me appartenu.

Boutros Boutros-GhaliLe 17 ddccmbre 1996

AVANT-PROPOS

L'approche de la cinquantaine est 'heure des bilans, un peunostalgiques parfois. C'est aussi Ala force de 'ige -. celui auquel, lamaturitd atteinte, I'cruvre accomplie peut Ptre consolide, sans pourautant qu'il soit trop tard pour se lancer dans de nouvelles entreprises.

C'est tr~s pr.cis~ment la situation dans laquelle se trouve laCommission du droit international, crd~e le 21 novembre 1947 par lardsolution 174 (11) de I'Assembl6e g~ndrale.

Si elle se tourne vers les ann6es passtes, la Commission n'a,assurdment, pas s rougir de son bilan. Quoiqu'il soit de bon ton, danscertains milieux, de railler son train de sAnateur, elle a accompli uneoeuvre considerable dans des domaines tris divers; et il n'est pasexagdrd de dire qu'elle a 6tabli les bases d'un vdritable droit constitu-tionnel de la communautd internationale dont le projet de dclarationsur les droits et devoirs des Etats et, surtout, le projet d'articles sur ledroit des trait6s qui a d6bouch sur le (< traitd des trait~s o qu'est laConvention de Vienne de 1969, constituent sans doute les 6ldments lesplus marquants.

II est au demeurant patent que 'annde 1996 constitue trbs pro-bablement un tournant dans [a vie de la Commission du droit interna-tional: lors de sa quarante-huiti~me session, elle a achev6 en secondelecture la redaction du projet de Code des crimes contre la paix et ]as~curit6 de 'humanitd-un sujet qui figurait Ai son ordre du jour(avec de longues -clipses if est vrai) depuis 1947 - et, en premierelecture, celle du projet d'articles sur la responsabilit6 des Etats, thmecentral, au crur de I'6nigme que constitue 'existence meme du droitinternational, ce droit qui lie entre eux, d'abord meme si pas exclu-sivement, des Etats souverains, tandis qu'elle a transmis 4 'Assem-bWde gdndrale un projet, dlabord par un groupe de travail, portant surla responsabilitd pour faits licites en droit international.

Mais, de ce fait, la Commission du droit international est affron-tde A un problkme: aucun nouveau projet d'envergure n'est inscrit sson ordre du jour. Les deux sujets qui le sont', pour importants qu'ilssoient, sont davantage des compldments A son oeuvre passde que desthemes nouveaux ouvrant des champs d'investigation rdellement

ICes sujets sont -Les r~scrves aux traitds - d'une part. ct -Successiond'Etats et nationalit6 des pcrsonnes physiques et morales - d'autre part.

inddits. Et it est certainement prdoccupant de constater que, malgre

les efforts considdrables d~ployds par la Commission pour proposer

de nouvelles orientations, aussi bien quant A ses m~thodes de travail

(et, corr~lativement, A celles de la Sixi ±me Commission) qu'en cc qui

concerne son programme de travail 2, ses appels soient, jusqu'A

present, demeurds sans effet, ou, du moins, ne se soient traduits paraucune consequence concrete, I'Assemblde g~ndrale n'ayant ni

approuv6 formellement de nouveaux themes de codification et ded~veloppement progressif du droit international, ni 6tudid sdrieuse-ment les voies et moyens d'amdliorer les m6thodes de travail de laCommission du droit international et de la Sixiime Commission, mal-grd quelques signes encourageants dans la rdsolution 51/160 adopt6ele 16 ddcembre 1996.

Sans qu'une o rdvolution , soit ndcessaire. une r6forme en pro-fondeur des modes de fonctionnement de la Commission s'imposepourtant. La Commission du droit international a dtd cr e en 1947dans un contexte de guerre froide commenqante; elle dtait compos&ealors de quinze experts inddpendants, essentiellement des universi-taires; et la 4K technicit6 o des questions qu'elle avait vocation A traiter6tait sans commune mesure avec celle des problmes d'aujourd'hui.A I'heure actuelle, compos~e de trente-quatre membres, en majoritdissus du service diplomatique, la Commission travaille dans un con-texte ofO les oppositions iddologiques se trouvent apais6es, mais elleest affronte A la complexit croissante des problimes d'un droit quidoit rdgir une communaut6 de quelque deux cents Etats dont I'in-terddpendance se renforce, et A la sp~cialisation A outrance qu'en-traine cette dvolution.

Quant & son programme de travail, il est virtuellement consi-ddrable comme le montre le recensement des sujets possibles de codi-fication et de d6veloppement progressif du droit international effectu6par la Commission en 19963 qui 6tablit combien la tfiche qui lui a Wconfide demeure plus actuelle que jamais. Mais elle ne peut s'enacquitter que si elle bdn~ficie de la confiance des Etats repr~sent~s ausein de la Sixi~me Commission; ce n'est peut-etre pas une vueabusivement pessimiste des choses que de considdrer qu'ils la lui me-surent chichement.

2 Voir, pour le dernier dtat de la question. ie Rapport de Ia Commission dudroit international sur les travaux de sa quarante-huiti me session, Documentsofficiels de I'Assernble gbnirale, cinquante el unibme session, Supplement n" 10(A/51/10). chapitre VII. par. 141 -A 249 (- Programme. procdures. mdthodcs detravail et documentation de la Commission-) et anncxe If (,Rapport sur le pro-gramme de travail A long terme -).

Ibid., annexe II. pp. 366-372. par. 4.

Au demeurant, le but du present ouvrage n'est pas de faire lebilan de l'ceuvre de la Commission, quoique I'Introduction, rcdigepar la Division de la codification du Secrdtariat des Nations Unies, enfournisse I'esquisse prdcieuse en ce qu'il s'efforce d'dvaluer l'inter-action entre les travaux de la Commission et le droit internationalg6n6ral. en mettant ]'accent sur l'influence de ceux-ci sur I'6volutionde celui-laI. II est, plus modestement, de proposer au public un ensem-ble d'articles, rddig.s par vingt membres de la Commission sur dessujets tris divers, dont l'unit6 tient surtout a leur caractire essentielle-ment prospectif.

La Commission du droit international a pensd qu'en publiant cerecueil de contributions, qui reflhte les vues de ses membres sur dessujets qui leur paraissent d'une importance particuliire, elle appor-terait sa pierre .i la D6cennie des Nations Unies pour le droit interna-tional, proclam~e par la r6solution 44/23 de I'Assembl6e g~n~ale endate du 17 novembre 1989. Elle esplre contribuer de cette faqonI'enseignement, l'6tude, la diffusion et une compr6hension plus largedu droit international. Je suis heureux de le presenter au public, touten regrettant que les contraintes financires nous aient oblig6s Apublier une version bilingue, ob I'anglais se taille une part pr6pond&rante, alors qu'une publication dans chacune des six langues de travailde la Commission aurait, sans aucun doute, accru son impact et assur6plus efficacement que ces buts soient atteints.

En tant que President du Groupe de travail de la Commission dudroit international sur la contribution de la Commission .i la D6cenniedes Nations Unies pour le droit international, je souhaite remerciertr.s vivement mes colfgues qui ont contribu46 b cet ouvrage et lesmembres du Secretariat qui ont rendu sa publication possible, toutparticuliirement Mile Jacqueline Dauchy et M. Roy S. Lee, qui ont6t6 successivement les deux Secrdtaires de la Commission durant lap6riode de son 6laboration, le second ayant en outre rddigd, avecM. David Hutchinson, la prdcieuse Introduction, pour le contenuduquel j'assume cependant une pleine et entire responsabilit6,M. Georges Korontzis, et Mme Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas, quia assurd la t~che ingrate de I' editing * et s'est d6pens6e sans comp-ter pour assurer I'ach~vement de l'ouvrage dans des conditions par-fois difficiles.

Alain Pellet

FOREWORD

The approach of the fiftieth anniversary is a time for takingstock, sometimes with a certain nostalgia. It is also the "prime of life",when, maturity having been reached, the work which has been carriedout can be consolidated, although at the same time it is not too late toundertake new endeavours.

That is precisely the situation of the International Law Commis-sion, established on 21 November 1947 by General Assembly resolu-tion 174 (II).

If it looks back over the past years, the Commission certainly hasno reason to be ashamed of its record. Although it is fashionable, insome circles, to deride its slow pace, the Commission has carried outa great deal of work in very varied fields; and it is no exaggeration tosay that the Commission has laid the foundations for a true constitu-tional law of the international community, of which the draft declara-tion on the rights and duties of States and, above all, the draft articleson the law of treaties which led to the "treaty of treaties", the 1969Vienna Convention, are undoubtedly the most significant aspects.

It is also clear that the year 1996 is likely to mark a turning pointin the Commission's existence: at its forty-eighth session, the Com-mission completed, on second reading, the draft Code of Crimesagainst the Peace and Security of Mankind-a topic which had beenon its agenda (with long gaps, admittedly) since 1947-and, on firstreading, the draft articles on State responsibility, a central subjectwhich goes to the heart of the enigma of the very existence of interna-tional law, the law which binds, primarily, albeit not exclusively, sov-ereign States; the Commission also transmitted to the General Assem-bly a draft, prepared by a working group, concerning internationalliability arising out of acts not prohibited by international law.

As a result, however, the Commission is faced with a problem:there is no new large-scale project in its programme of work. The twotopics which are on the agenda,' important as they may be, are addi-tions to its past work rather than new subjects opening out trulyunexplored fields of investigation. And it is certainly disturbing tonote that, despite the considerable efforts made by the Commission to

These topics are "Reservations to treaties", on the one hand, and "Statesuccession and its impact on the nationality of natural and legal persons", on theother.

propose new directions, both with regard to its working methods tana,as a corollary, those of the Sixth Committee) and with regard to itsprogramme of work, 2 so far its appeals have gone unheeded or, atleast, have not led to any specific result, since the General Assemblyhas neither formally approved new topics for the codification and pro-gressive development of international law, nor seriously studied waysand means of improving the working methods of the Commission andof the Sixth Committee, despite some encouraging signs in GeneralAssembly resolution 51/160, adopted on 16 December 1996.

Although there is no need for a "revolution", an in-depth reformof the Commission's methods of operation is necessary. The Commis-sion was established in 1947 in the context of the early days of thecold war; at that time it consisted of 15 independent experts, mainlyfrom universities; and the technical character of the issues it hadto take up bore no comparison with that of the problems today. Atpresent, consisting of 34 members, mostly from the diplomatic serv-ice, the Commission is working in a context in which ideologicalconflicts have subsided, but it is faced with the growing complexityof the problems of a law which has to govern a community of some200 States whose interdependence is growing, and the high level ofspecialization this entails.

As to the Commission's programme of work, it is potentially con-siderable as shown by the list of possible topics for the codificationand progressive development of international law drawn up by theCommission in 1996,3 which demonstrates that the task entrusted tothe Commission is more relevant than ever. But the Commission can-not perform that task unless it has the confidence of the States repre-sented in the Sixth Committee; it is perhaps not too pessimistic a viewof matters to say that States give that confidence sparingly.

The purpose of this book is not to take stock of the Commis-sion's work, although the Introduction, draftcd by the CodificationDivision of the United Nations Secretariat, provides a valuable out-line for such an endeavour by attempting to evaluate the interactionbetween the Commission's work and general international law,stressing the influence of the former on the evolution of the latter. Itis, more modestly, to offer to the public a collection of essays, drafted

2 See, for the latest developments on the question, the Report of the Inter-

national Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session, Official Rec-ords of the General Assembly, Fifty-first Session, Supplement No. /0 (A/5 1/10).Chap. VII, paras. 141-249 ("Programme, procedures and working methods of theCommission and its documentation") and Annex II ("Report on the long-termprogramme of work").

Ibid., Annex II, pp. 328-334, para. 4.

by 20 members of the Commission, on very varied topics, linkedabove all by their essentially forward-looking nature.

The Commission felt that in publishing this collection of essays.which reflects the views of its members on topics which they considerto be of particular importance, it would be playing its part in theUnited Nations Decade of International Law, proclaimed by the Gen-eral Assembly in resolution 44/23 of 17 November 1989. It hopes thatit will be contributing in this manner to the teaching, study, dissem-ination and wider appreciation of international law. I am happy topresent it to the public, while expressing regret that financial con-straints forced us to publish a bilingual version, in which English ispredominant, although publication in each of the Commission's sixworking languages would undoubtedly have increased its impact andensured more effectively that these goals would be attained.

As Chairman of the Commission's Working Group on its contri-bution to the United Nations Decade of International Law, I wish tothank very warmly my colleagues who contributed to this book andthe members of the Secretariat who made its publication possible,especially Miss Jacqueline Dauchy and Mr. Roy S. Lee. who weresuccessively the two Secretaries of the Commission during the periodof its elaboration, the latter having also, along with Mr. David Hut-chinson, drafted the excellent Introduction, for the content of whichI, however, assume full and complete responsibility; Mr. GeorgeKorontzis; and Ms. Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas, who undertookthe thankless task of editing, and spared no effort to ensure the com-pletion of the book in sometimes difficult conditions.

Alain Pellet

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTESON THE CONTRIBUTORS*

AL-BAHARNA, Husain

Barrister-at-Law of Lincoln's Inn, London; Practising Barristerand Legal Counsel, Bahrain; Member of the Bahrain Bar Soci-ety; Member of the Council for International Commercial Arbi-tration; Former Minister of Legal Affairs of Bahrain.

BARBOZA. Julio

Ambassador, Professor of International Law at the Catholic Uni-versity and the Belgrano University in Buenos Aires; FormerLegal Adviser to the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs; For-mer Professor of International Law at the Buenos Aires StateUniversity; Chairman of the International Law Commission atits forty-fifth session; Special Rapporteur on International liabil-ity for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibitedby international law.

BENNOUNA, Mohamed

Professor, holder of the agrigation of the Faculties of Law;Director-General of the Arab World Institute in Paris; Member ofthe Institut de Droit international; Former Dean of the Facultyof Law of Rabat; Former Ambassador of Morocco; Member ofvarious Moroccan delegations to the General Assembly of theUnited Nations; Member of the Moroccan delegation to theThird United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.

BOWETT, Derek William

Emeritus Whewell Professor of International Law at the Univer-sity of Cambridge; Member of the Institut de Droit international;Queen's Counsel and Bencher of the Middle Temple; Former Le-gal Officer of the United Nations, New York; Former GeneralCounsel of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Pal-estine Refugees in the Near East, Beirut.

*No mention is made here of the authors' publications. The opinionsexpressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of theadministrations to which they belong or those of the United Nations.

CRAWFORD, James

Whewell Professor of International Law and Co-Director of the

Research Centre for International Law, University of Cam-

bridge; Former Professor of Law at Adelaide and Sydney Uni-

versities in Australia; Former Member of the Australian Law

Reform Commission; Counsel in numerous cases before the In-

ternational Court of Justice; Chairman of the Working Group of

the International Law Commission on a Draft Statute for anInternational Criminal Court.

FOMBA, Salifou

Professor of Public and Private International Law at the NationalSchool of Administration in Bamako; Former Legal Adviser inthe Ministry for Malians Abroad and in the Ministry of HumanRights; Former Member and Rapporteur of the United NationsCommission of Experts established to examine allegations ofgenocide in Rwanda.

HE, Qizhi

Legal Adviser of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People'sRepublic of China; Professor of International Law at BeijingUniversity; Member of the Legal Commission of the NationalCommittee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Con-ference; Recipient of a special award from the State Council ofChina in 1992 for his outstanding contribution to the develop-ment of social science.

JACOVIDES, Andreas

Ambassador of Cyprus to the United States; Former PermanentRepresentative of Cyprus to the United Nations; Former Ambas-sador of Cyprus to Germany; Former Permanent Secretary ofthe Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus; Former Professor ofUnited Nations Law at the New School for Social Research inNew York; Representative of Cyprus in numerous internationallegal bodies.

KUSUMA-ATMADJA, Mochtar

Professor at the Padjaran University Law School; Member of thePanel of Arbitrators and of the Panel of Conciliators of the Inter-national Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes; FormerChairman of the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commis-sion; Former Minister of Justice of Indonesia; Former Ministerfor Foreign Affairs of Indonesia.

LUKASHUK, Igor IvanovichProfessor and Chief Researcher at the Institute of State and Lawof the Academy of Sciences of Russia; Member of the Interna-tional Law Committee of the Parliament of Russia; Repre-sentative of the Russian President at the Federal Assembly inrespect of the draft Statute on Treaties of Russia; Member of theExecutive Committee of the Russian Association of InternationalLaw; Former Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

MAHIOU. AhmedProfessor of Law; Holder of the agnrgation of the Faculties ofLaw; Director of Research at the National Centre for ScientificResearch; Director of the Institute for Research and Study of theArab and Muslim World; Former Dean of the Faculty of Law ofAlgiers; Visiting Professor at various universities in Africa andEurope; Chairman of the International Law Commission at itsforty-eighth session.

PELLET, AlainHolder of the agrigation of the Faculties of Law; Professor atthe University of Paris X-Nanterre and at the Institute of Politi-cal Studies of Paris; Former Alternate Member of the Subcom-mittee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minor-ities of the United Nations; Member of French delegations to theGeneral Assembly and various organs of the United Nations;Counsel in numerous cases before the International Court of Jus-tice; Special Rapporteur on Reservations to treaties.

RAO, Pemmaraju SreenivasaJoint Secretary and Legal Adviser of the Ministry of ExternalAffairs of India; Coordinator of the Meetings of Legal Advisersof the Members of the United Nations; Member of the ExpertGroup of the United Nations Environment Programme onGeneral Principles of Environmental Law; Former Legal Adviserto the Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations; Chair-man of the International Law Commission at its forty-seventhsession.

ROSENSTOCK, RobertLegal Adviser. United States Mission to the United Nations:Visiting Professor at the University of Georgia School of Law;Member of the United States delegation to the plenipotentiarycodification conferences on the Law of Treaties, Succession ofStates in respect of Treaties, Succession of States in respect ofState Property, Archives and Debts, Treaties Concluded between

States and International Organizations or between internauutiiaOrganizations.

SZtKELY, Alberto

Ambassador; Professor of International Law at the NationalAutonomous University of Mexico, the College of Mexico, Ari-zona State University and the School of Advanced InternationalStudies; International Environmental Lawyer and Consultant;Research Director at the Transboundary Resources Center,University of New Mexico; Member of the Permanent Court ofArbitration; Former Legal Adviser of the Mexican Foreign Min-istry.

THIAM, DoudouFormer Minister of Finance, Economic Affairs and Planning ofthe Federation of Mali; Former Minister of Justice of Senegal;Former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Senegal; Former Minister,Deputy to the President of the Republic of Senegal; Lawyer atthe Dakar Court of Appeals since 1951; Chairman of the Interna-tional Law Commission at its thirty-third and thirty-eighth ses-sions; Special Rapporteur on the draft Code of Crimes againstthe Peace and Security of Mankind.

TOM USCHAT Christian

Professor of Public Law and Director of the Institute of Interna-tional and European Law, Humboldt University, Berlin; FormerProfessor of Public Law and Director of the Institute of Interna-tional Law, University of Bonn; Former Member of the HumanRights Committee; Lecturer at The Hague Academy of Interna-tional Law; Chainuan of the International Law Commission atits forty-fourth session.

VARGAS CARRENO, Edmundo

Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Chile to the Organ-ization of American States; Member of the Permanent Court ofArbitration; Former Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs and For-mer Legal Adviser of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile;Former Professor of Public International Law at the School ofLaw of the Catholic University of Chile and the University ofChile.

VILLAGRAN KRAMER, Francisco

Former Professor of International Law at the University of Gua-temala and the University of El Salvador; Former Vice-Presidentof the Republic of Guatemala; Delegate of Guatemala to the

Sixth Committee of the General Assembly; Former Member ofthe Inter-American Juridical Committee of the Organization ofAmerican States.

YAM ADA, ChuseiSpecial Assistant to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan;Professor of International Law at Waseda University, Tokyo;Former Ambassador of Japan to the Conference on Disarma-ment; Former Ambassador of Japan to Bhutan; Former Ambas-sador of Japan to Egypt; Former Ambassador of Japan to India.

xxiii

NOTICES BIOGRAPHIQUESDES CONTRIBUTEURS*

AL-BAHARNA. Husain

Inscrit au barreau. Lincoln's Inn, Londres; avocat et conseillerjuridique au Bahre'in; membre de la Bahrain Bar Society; mem-bre du Conseil pour les arbitrages commerciaux internationaux;ancien Ministre bahreinite chargd des questions juridiques.

BARBOZA, Julio

Ambassadeur; professeur de droit international public A l'Uni-versitd catholique et a l'Universitd Belgrano de Buenos Aires;ancien conseiller juridique du Ministre argentin des relationsextdricurcs; ancien professeur de droit international l'Univer-sitd d'Etat de Buenos Aires; President de la Commission du droitinternational Ai sa quarante-cinquiime session; Rapporteur spe-cial pour la Responsabilit6 internationale pour les consequencesprdjudiciables d6coulant d'activit6s qui ne sont pas interdites parle droit international.

BENNOUNA, Mohamed

Professeur agr6g6 des facult~s de droit; Directeur gdn~ral del'Institut du monde arabe A Paris; membre de l'Institut de Droitinternational; ancien doyen de la facultd de droit de Rabat;ancien Ambassadeur du Maroc; membre de diffdrentes ddl1ga-tions marocaines A l'Assemblde g~n6rale des Nations Unies;membre de la d~lkgation marocaine A la troisi~me Confdrence desNations Unies sur le droit de la mer.

BOWET, Derek William

Professeur 6mrite de droit international bi I'Universit6 de Cam-bridge (chaire Whewell); membre de Institut de Droit interna-tional; avocat de la Couronne et membre de l'ordre des avocatsdu Middle Temple; ancien juriste de l'Organisation des NationsUnies ai New York; ancien conseiller gdndral de I'Office de se-

11 nest pas fait mention ici des publications des auteurs. Les contributionsn'engagent que lcurs auteurs ct ne reprdsentent pas nccssairement les .ues desadministrations auxqucllcs ils appartiennent, ni des Nations Unies.

xxv

cours et de travaux des Nations Unies pour les rdfugirs de Pales-

tine dans le Proche-Orient A Beyrouth.

CRAWFORD, James

Professeur de droit international (chaire Whewell) et Codirecteurdu Centre de recherche de droit international l'Universit6 deCambridge; ancien professeur de droit A l'Universite d'Adelaideet A l'Universit6 de Sydney (Australie); ancien membre de laCommission de rrforme du droit australien; conseil et avocatdans de nombreuses affaires devant la Cour internationale deJustice; President du Groupe de travail de la Commission dudroit international sur un projet de statut pour une cour crimi-nelle internationale.

FOMBA, SalifouProfesseur de droit international public et privd A 'Ecole natio-nale d'administration de Bamako; ancien conseiller juridique auMinistire des Maliens de 'extdrieur et au Minist re des droitsde 'homme; ancien membre et rapporteur de la Commissiond'experts des Nations Unies cree pour enqueter sur les allega-tions de ginocide au Rwanda.

HE, Qizhi

Conseillerjuridique du Ministire chinois des affaires 6trang~res;professeur de droit international 4 l'Universit6 de Beijing; mem-bre de la Commission juridique du Comitd national de ]a Con-fdrence politique consultative du peuple chinois; a requ un prixspecial du Conseil d'Etat chinois, en 1992, pour sa contributionexceptionnelle au ddveloppement des sciences sociales.

JACOVIDES, AndreasAmbassadeur de Chypre aux Etats-Unis d'Amerique; ancienRepresentant permanent de Chypre aupr~s de l'Organisation desNations Unies; ancien Ambassadeur de Chypre en Allemagne;ancien Secrdtaire permanent du Minist re chypriote des affaires6trangres; ancien professeur de droit des organismes des Na-tions Unies A la Nouvelle Ecole pour ia recherche sociale de NewYork; reprdsentant de Chypre aupr~s de nombreux organes juri-diques internationaux.

KUSUMA-ATMADJA, Mochtar

Professeur A ]a facultd de droit de l'Universitd de Padjaran;inscrit sur ]a liste des conciliateurs et arbitres dtablie par le Cen-tre pour le reglement des differends relatifs aux investissements;ancien President de la Commission de demarcation des frontieres

entre rIraq et le Koweit; ancien Ministre indonesien de a justice;ancien Ministre indondsien des affaires itrang~res.

LUKASHUK, Igor IvanovichProfesseur et Directeur de recherche & Ilnstitut d'administrationpublique et de droit de l'Academie des sciences de Russie; mem-bre de la Commission du droit international du Parlement russe;repr(sentant du Pr.sident russe A I'Assemblde f&lrale pour larndaction de la loi sur les traitis de la Russie; membre du Comitdexkutif de I'Association russe de droit international; ancienmembre de la Cour permanente d'arbitrage.

MAHIOU, AhmedProfesseur de droit; AgrAg6 des facult~s de droit; Directeur derecherche au Centre national de recherche scientifique; Directeurde Institut de recherches et d'itudes sur le monde arabe et mu-sulman; ancien doyen de la facultd de droit d'Alger; professeurinvitd aupr~s de plusieurs universit s en Afrique et en Europe;Prdsident de la Commission du droit international b, sa quarante-huiti~me session.

PELLET, AlainAgrfgt des facult~s de droit; professeur A l'Universit6 de ParisX-Nanterre et A Ilnstitut d'6tudes politiques de Paris; ancienmembre suppliant de la Sous-Commission de la lutte contre lesmesures discriminatoires et de la protection des minoritds desNations Unies; membre des d~ldgations de La France b I'Assem-bWde g6ndrale et divers organes des Nations Unies; conseil et avo-cat dans de nombreuses affaires devant la Cour intemationale deJustice; Rapporteur sp6cial pour les Reserves aux traits.

RAO, Pemmaraju SreenivasaCosecr-taire et conseiller juridique du Ministbre f&ldral indiendes affaires ext~rieures; coordonnateur des rdunions des con-seillers juridiques des Etats Membres de l'Organisation desNations Unies; membre du groupe d'experts du Programme desNations Unies pour I'environnement sur les principes g~ndrauxdu droit de 'environnement; ancien conseiller juridique de laMission permanente de rInde aupr s de l'Organisation desNations Unies; Prdsident de la Commission du droit interna-tional i sa quarante-septiime session.

ROSENSTOCK, RobertConseiller juridique de la Mission permanente des Etats-Unisaupr.s de I'Organisation des Nations Unies; professeur invit6e

xxvii

la facultd de droit de l'Universitd de Georgie; membre de Ia dele-

gation des Etats-Unis aux conferences plnipotentiaires de codi-

fication sur le droit des traitds, sur la succession d'Etats en ma-

tinre de biens, archives et dettes d'Etat, sur le droit des trait~s

entre Etats et organisations internationales ou entre organisa-

tions internationales.

SZtKELY, AlbertoAmbassadeur; professeur de droit international A l'Universitdnationale autonome du Mexique, au Collage du Mexique, A l'Uni-versit6 de I'Etat d'Arizona et la Haute Ecole d'6tudes interna-tionales; juriste et consultant, sp~cialiste de questions de droitinternational de I'environnement; Directeur de recherche auCentre de ressources transfronti res i l'Universit6 du NouveauMexique; membre de la Cour permanente d'arbitrage; ancienconseiller juridique du Minist re mexicain des relations ext6-rieures.

THIAM, Doudou

Ancien Ministre des finances, des affaires dconomiques et duplan de la F~dration du Mali; ancien Ministre de la justice duSdndgal; ancien Ministre charg6 de la suppl6ance du President dela R~publique du Sdndgal; avocat A la Cour d'appel de Dakardepuis 1951; President de la Commission du droit internationalses trente-troisi me et trente-huitiime sessions; Rapporteur spd-cial pour le projet de Code des crimes contre la paix et la s6curit6de i'humanitd.

TOM USCHAT, Christian

Professeur de droit public et Directeur de I'Institut de droit inter-national et de droit europen de l'Universitd Humboldt A Berlin;ancien professeur de droit public et Directeur de l'Institut dedroit international A l'Universitd de Bonn; ancien membre duComitd des droits de I'homme; confdrencier a 'Acad~mie dedroit international de La Haye; President de ]a Commission dudroit international A sa quarante-quatri~me session.

VARGAS CARRENO, Edmundo

Ambassadeur, Reprdsentant permanent du Chili aupr~s de I'Or-

ganisation des Etats amdricains; membre de la Cour permanented'arbitrage; ancien Sous-Secrdtaire aux relations extdrieures etconseiller juridique du Ministre chilien des relations ext6-rieures; ancien professeur de droit international public i lafacultd de droit de l'Universit6 Catholique du Chili et I'Univer-sit6 du Chili.

xxviii

VILLAURAN KRAMER, Francisco

Ancien professeur de droit international A I'Universitd du Guate-mala et al 'Universitd d'EI Salvador; ancien Vice-Prdsident dela Ripublique du Guatemala; reprdsentant du Guatemala a laSixiime Commission de IAssemblde gdndrale; ancien membredu Comit6 juridique interamdricain de IOrganisation des Etatsamricains.

YAM ADA, Chusei

Assistant special du Ministre japonais des affaires 6trang~res;professeur de droit international A 'Universitd Waseda deTokyo; ancien Ambassadeur du Japon a la Conference du d6-sarmement; ancien Ambassadeur du Japon au Bhoutan; ancienAmbassadeur du Japon en Egypte; ancien Ambassadeur duJapon en Inde.

ABREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATIONS

AFDI

AJIL

Annuaire...

B YIL

C.LJ. Recueil

Ch YIL

C.PJ.1. sirie A

C.PJ.L sirie A/B

I.C.J. Reports

ICLQILMILR

PC.I.J., Series A

PC.LJ., Series B

Recueil des cours...

REDI

RGDIP

RSA

RYIL

UNRIAA

Yearbook...

Annuairefran~ais de droit internationalAmerican Journal of International LawAnnuaire de la Commission du droit interna-tionalBritish Year Book of International Law

CI, Recueil des arro.ts, avis consultatifs etordonnancesChinese Yearbook of International Law

CPJI, Recueil des arritsCPJ, Arrits, ordonnances et avis consultatifsICJ, Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinionsand OrdersInternational and Comparative Law QuarterlyInternational Legal MaterialsInternational Law Reports

PCIJ, Collection of JudgmentsPCIJ, Collection of Advisory OpinionsRecuei des cours de i'Acadimie de droit inter-national de La Haye

Revue igyptienne de droit internationalRevue ginirale de droit international publicNations Unies, Recueil des sentences arbitralesRussian Year Book of International LawUnited Nations, Reports of International Arbi-tral Awards

Yearbook of the International Law Commission

INTRODUCTION

THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONALLAW COMMISSION

Article 13, paragraph I (a), of the Charter of the United Nationsplaces upon the General Assembly the obligation to "initiate studiesand make recommendations for the purpose of... encouraging the pro-gressive development of international law and its codification". On21 November 1947, the General Assembly, in pursuance of its respon-sibilities under this Article, adopted resolution 174 (II), by which itresolved to establish the International Law Commission.' The publi-cation of this collection of essays therefore coincides with the fiftiethanniversary of the Commission's creation.2 It is accordingly an appro-priate time to look back at the work of that body and record itsachievement.

3

The progressive development of international law and its codifi-cation have been one of the major aspects in the evolution of interna-tional law since the Second World War, one in which the Commissionhas played a central role. Of the Commission's many accomplish-ments in this sphere, there are three in particular which are especiallyworthy of attention and which will be discussed here. First, the Com-mission has produced over 20 sets of draft articles setting forth basicrules in most of the key areas of international law. Many of thesesets of draft articles have, in turn, been transformed into major global

' This resolution was adopted on the basis of a report (document A/331 andCorr.) submitted by the Committee on the Progressive Development of Interna-tional Law and its Codification, which had been established by the General Assem-bly in the previous year in order to consider the methods by which the GeneralAssembly might most effectively discharge the responsibilities placed on it byArticle 13. paragraph I (a), of the Charter.

2 The first elections to the Commission were conducted in the year followingits creation, on 3 November 1948. The Commission opened its first session the yearafter, on 12 April 1949.

' It may be noted that the General Assembly, by its resolution 51/160 of16 December 1996, has requested the Secretary-General to make appropriatearrangements to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of theInternational Law Commission through a colloquium on progressive developmentand codification of international law to be held during the consideration in theSixth Committee of the report of the Commission on the work of its forty-ninthsession (see paragraph 18 of the resolution).

treaties within the fields to which they relate. Second, a numoer otthese sets, through the medium of the conventions which have beenelaborated on their basis, have assumed a structural or foundationalposition within the domains to which they relate. Indeed, certain suchsets have become fundamental to the very conduct of relations be-tween States. Third, the Commission has succeeded in integratingitself into the process of custom-formation, including, most strikinglyof all, the process for the creation of new rules of customary interna-tional law. Each of these three major attainments will be reviewed inturn.

i.

Article 1, paragraph 1, of its Statute provides that "[t]he Interna-tional Law Commission shall have for its object the promotion of theprogressive development of international law and its codification". 4 Inpursuance of this objective,5 the Commission has, to date, producedover 20 sets of draft articles, which set forth rules of international lawin many of its key areas. In fact, there are, today, few domains ofinternational law to the development of which it has not contributedin this way.6 Viewed in these terms, the achievement of the Commis-sion cannot but be recognized as substantial.

The achievement of the Commission is all the greater still in sofar as many of the sets of draft articles which it has produced havegone on to serve as the bases of major global conventions which con-stitute juridical landmarks in the fields to which they relate. That theCommission should play a part in the process of treaty-making wasexplicitly envisaged by its Statute.7 The role which was there foreseenfor the Commission consisted essentially in preparing draft textswhich might serve as the basis of the work of a meeting of States'

' The Commission's Statute is annexed to General Assembly resolution174 (ii) of 21 November 1947.

Notwithstanding the general scope of article I, paragraph 1, articles 16, 17,paragraphs I and 2 and 18, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Statute make it clear that theCommission's task is one which is essentially selective in nature: progressively todevelop and to codify international law on those topics in which such an under-taking is deemed to be "necessary", "desirable" or "appropriate". It is, therefore.not the Commission's function to undertake the progressive development andcodification of each and every area of international law. Much less does its missionconsist in the eventual rendering of that law into some exhaustive written "code".See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighthsession, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-first session. SupplementNo. 10 (A/51/10) (hereinafter Report... forty-eighth session), p. 206, para. 168.

6 See the conclusion reached by the Commission in the review which it con-ducted of the work of its first 25 sessions: Yearbook... 1973. vol. 11, p. 228, docu-ment A/9010/Rev.1, para. 156.

See articles 15 and 23, paragraphs I (c) and (d).

representatives gathered to elaborate and adopt a convention. Whilesuch a role was not without precedent,' the structure and organizationof the Commission and the procedures and modalities in accordancewith which it was to discharge that role were quite novel and withoutany precise parallel in international practice. It is a singular tribute tothe Commission that, without the guidance offered by any directlyapplicable precedents, it quickly accommodated itself to a role whichwas basically untried and untested and developed practices which en-abled it fully to realize its potential. The following review of the Com-mission's accomplishments, in terms of the draft articles which it hasproduced, is eloquent testimony to this fact.

A. In the field of the sources of international law, the Commis-sion has produced three sets of draft articles, two of which haveserved as the bases of the work of international conferences and haveled to the adoption of multilateral conventions on the subjects con-cerned. In 1966, the Commission adopted a set of 75 draft articles onthe law of treaties,10 which went on to form the basis of the Conven-tion on the Law of Treaties, done at Vienna on 23 May 1969.11 Sub-sequently, in 1982, the Commission adopted a set of 81 draft articleson the law of treaties between States and international organiza-tions or between international organizations, together with an annex.' 2

These served as the basis of the Convention on the Law of Treatiesbetween States and International Organizations or between Interna-tional Organizations, done at Vienna on 21 March 1986.'3 The third setof draft articles which the Commission has adopted in this domain-the draft articles on most-favoured-nation clauses 4 - were broughtto the attention of Member States and interested intergovernmentalorganizations by the General Assembly in its decision 46/416 of 9 De-cember 1991.

In addition to producing draft articles, the Commission has alsoprovided advice to the General Assembly on three specific matterswithin the field of the sources of international law: namely, ways and

I For the organization and operation of the Committee of Experts for theProgressive Development of International Law and of the Preparatory Committeefor the Codification Conference which were created by the League of Nations, seedocument MAC.AW5, pp. 52-70.

'For a detailed summary of the operation and activities of the Commission.as well as the texts of the draft articles which it has produced and of the conven-tions which have been elaborated on the basis of those drafts, see United Nations,The Work of the International Law Commission, 5th ed., Sales No. E.95.V.6.

0 Yearbook. 1966. vol. 1. pp. 177-187. document A/6309/Rev.1.

" United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331.12 Yearbook.. 1982, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 17-77.

"3 Document AICONF.129/15.", Yearbook-. 1978. vol. 11 (Part Two), pp. 16-73.

means for making the evidence of customary international law morereadily available;' 5 extended participation in general multilateral trea-ties concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations; 6 and res-ervations to multilateral conventions.' 7 As far as this last matter isconcerned, the Commission is in the course of addressing it oncemore, as part of its current programme of work, with the aim of pro.ducing a guide to practice.'8

B. In the domain of international relations, the Commission hasproduced a total of five sets of draft articles. Of these, four have goneon to serve as the bases of multilateral conventions: 9 namely, the:Convention on Diplomatic Relations, done at Vienna on 18 April1961;20 the Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna on24 April 1963;11 the Convention on Special Missions, adopted by theGeneral Assembly on 8 December 1969;22 and the Convention on theRepresentation of States in their Relations with International Organ-izations of a Universal Character, done at Vienna on 14 March 1975.23The fifth set of draft articles produced by the Commission in thisfield-the draft articles and draft optional protocols one and two onthe status of the diplomatic courier and the diplomatic bag not accom-panied by diplomatic courier 24-- was brought to the attention of StatesMembers of the United Nations by the General Assembly by meansof its decision 50/416 of 11 December 1995.

1 Yearbook... 1950, vol. I, pp. 367-374, document A/1316. That the Commis-sion should conduct a study and make a report on this subject is stipulated inArticle 24 of the Commission's Statute.

"Yearbook .. 1963, vol. II, pp. 217-223, document A/5509." Yearbook... 1951, vol. 11, pp. 125-131, document A/1858."For the Commission's proposed plan of work on this topic, see Report

of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-seventh session.Official Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, Supplement No. 10(A/S0/10) (hereinafter Report... forty-seventh Session), p. 260, para. 491. The tworeports which have so far been submitted by the Special Rapporteur for the topicare to be found in document A/CN.4/470 and Corr.I and document AJCN.4/477 andAdd. 1.

'9 Draft articles on diplomatic intercourse and immunities with commentaries,Yearbook... 1958, vol. I, pp. 89-105, document A/3859; draft articles on consularrelations with commentaries, Yearbook... 1961, vol. II, pp. 93-128, documentA/4843; draft articles on special missions with commentaries, Yearbook... 1967,vol. 11, pp. 347-368, document A/6709/Rev.I and Rev. I/Cor. I; and draft articles onthe representation of States in their relations with international organizations withcommentaries and annex, Yearbook... 1971, vol. 11 (Part One), pp. 284-338, docu-ment A/8410/Rev. I.

' United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 500, p. 95.21 Ibid., vol. 596, p. 261.22 Ibid., vol. 1400, p. 231.

Document A/CONF.67/16.24 Yearbook... 1989, vol. 11 (Part Two), pp. 14-49.

C. The sets of draft articles which went on to form the basis ofthe 1975 Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in theirRelations with International Organizations of a Universal Characteron the one hand, and the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties between States and International Organizations or betweenInternational Organizations on the other,25 may also be considered acontribution to the field of the law of international organizations.

D. In the field of jurisdiction and immunities, the Commissionhas adopted a number of sets of draft articles. In so far as privilegesand immunities are concerned, in addition to the five sets of draftarticles referred to in section B above,26 the Commission has alsoadopted one further set--the draft articles on jurisdictional immuni-ties of States and their property 2 -- which the General Assembly, byits resolution 49/61 of 9 December 1994, has decided should be placedbefore a conference of plenipotentiaries for its consideration. TheCommission has also produced one set of draft articles pertaining tothe subject of the exercise of jurisdiction.28 This set went on to serveas the basis of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment ofCrimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplo-matic Agents, which was adopted by the General Assembly on 14 De-cember 1973.29

E. In the related field of international criminal law, the Com-mission has produced three important sets of draft articles: the Prin-ciples of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Niirn-berg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal; 30 a draft Statute foran International Criminal Court;3' and the draft Code of Crimesagainst the Peace and Security of Mankind.32 As far as the second ofthese three sets is concerned, the General Assembly has decided, inits resolution 51/207 of 17 December 1996, that a conference of pleni-potentiaries should be convened in 1998 to conclude a convention on

" See the text at footnote 12.3 See text at footnotes 19 to 24 above.2 Yearbook... 1991, voL 11 (Part Two), pp. 13-62.29 Draft articles on the prevention and punishment of crimes against diplo-

matic agents and other internationally protected persons with commentaries, Year-book.. 1972, vol. II, pp. 312-323. document A/7W10/Rev.1.

United Nations. Treaty Series, vol. 1035, p. 167.Yearbook... 1950, vol. 11. pp. 374-37S& document A/1316.

3, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixthsession, Official Records of the General Assembly. Forty-ninth Session. Supple-ment No. 10 (A/49/10) (hereinafter Report-. forty-sixth session), pp. 43-146.

32 Report-. forty-eighth session. pp. 14-120.

the subject. The third set-the draft Code of Crimes-is currently thesubject of consideration by the General Assembly.33

F. In so far as concerns the position of the individual in inter-national law, the Commission, in addition to its achievements in thefield of international criminal law, has adopted two texts: a draft Con-vention on the Reduction of Future Statelessness and a draft Conven-tion on the Elimination of Future Statelessness.34 The former servedas the basis of the Convention of the same title which was done atNew York on 30 August 1961. 35 It should also be mentioned that theCommission has in its current programme of work the topic of Statesuccession and its impact on the nationality of natural and legal'persons.

36

G. Two sets of draft articles have been adopted by the Commis-sion in the domain of the law of international spaces. One of thesewent on to serve as the basis of four major multilateral conventions:37

the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,38 theConvention on the High Seas, 39 the Convention on Fishing and Con-servation of the Living Resources of the High Seas4° and the Conven-tion on the Continental Shelf,4 ' each done at Geneva on 29 April 1958.By its resolution 49/52 of 9 December 1994, the General Assemblydetermined that another of these sets-the draft articles on the law ofthe non-navigational uses of international watercourses42- shouldconstitute the basis of a framework convention, which is currentlybeing elaborated by its Sixth Committee convening as a WorkingGroup of the Whole.43

"The General Assembly, in paragraph 2 of resolution 511160 of 16 December1996, has drawn the attention of States participating in the Preparatory Committeeon the Establishment of an International Criminal Court to the relevance of thedraft Code to their work.

3' Yearbook... 1954, vol. 11, pp. 143-147, document A/2693.'s United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 989, p. 175.

For the Commission's proposed plan of work on this topic, see Report...forty-eighth session, p. 177, para. 88. For the two reports which the Special Rap-porteur for this topic has submitted to date, see document A/CN.4/467 and docu-ment A/CN.4/474 and Corr.I and 2.

" Draft articles concerning the law of the sea, Yearbook... 1956, vol. I1,pp. 256-264, document A13519.

United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 516, p. 205.Ibid., vol. 450, p. II.Ibid., vol. 559, p. 285.

"Ibid., vol. 499, p. 311.42 Report... forty-sixth session, pp. 197-326."The Working Group did not complete its work in 1996 and a second session

of the Working Group is planned for 1997 (see General Assembly resolution 51/206of 17 December 1996).

H. As far as concerns the law and practice of the peaceful set-tlement of disputes, in addition to a set of Model Rules on ArbitralProcedure," which the General Assembly brought to the attention ofMember States by means of its resolution 1262 (XIII) of 14 November1958, the Commission has adopted specific draft provisions layingdown procedures for the resolution of disputes which might arise inthe interpretation or application of certain or any of the articles of thedrafts which it has produced on a number of the topics which arementioned in this part.45

I. The domain of State succession has been the focus of twosets of draft articles adopted by the Commission. 46 both of which havegone on to serve as the bases of multilateral conventions: 7 the Con-vention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, done at Viennaon 23 August 1978,' 8 and the Convention on Succession of States inrespect of State Property, Archives and Debts, done at Vienna on8 April 1983."9

J. The Commission has also adopted one set of draft articles inthe field of States' fundamental rights and duties: the draft Declara-tion on the Rights and Duties of States.5' By its resolution 375 (IV) of6 December 1949, the General Assembly commended the draft Decla-ration to the attention of Member States and of jurists of all nations.

Yearbook.. 1958, vol. I1. pp. 83-86, document A/3859.s See draft article 73 of the draft articles concerning the law of the sea (see

footnote 37 above); draft article 45 of the draft articles on diplomatic intercourseand immunities (see footnote 19 above); draft article 62 of the draft articles on thelaw of treaties (see footnote 10 above); draft article 82 of the draft articles on therepresentation of States in their relations with international organizations (seefootnote 19 above); draft article 12 of the draft articles on the prevention andpunishment of crimes against diplomatic agents and other internationally protectedpersons (see footnote 28 above); draft articles 65 and 66 and the draft annex of thedraft articles on the law of treaties between States and international organizationsor between international organizations (see footnote 12 above); and draft article 33of the draft articles on the non-navigational uses of international watercourses (seefootnote 42 above). Note also draft articles 54 to 60 and draft annexes I and II ofthe draft articles on State responsibility, as provisionally adopted by the Commis-sion on first reading (see footnote 51 below).

' Draft articles on succession of States in respect of treaties and commen-taries. Yearbook.. 1974, vol. 11 (Part One). pp. 174-269, document A/9610/RevI.and draft articles on succession of States in respect of State property, archi es anddebts and commentaries. Yearbook... 1981, vol. Ii (Part Two). pp. 20-113.

'4 The Commission is also currently working on the topic of State successionand its impact on the nationality of natural and legal persons (see the text atfootnote 36 above).

"Document A/CONF.80/31.' Document A/CONF. 17/14.

30 Yearbook.. 1949, pp. 287-288, document AICN.4/13 and Corr.I.

K. The Commission is currently engaged in preparing craltarticles on two further subjects, both of which are of fundamentalimportance to the operation of the international legal system. The firstis State responsibility, on which topic the Commission has recentlyadopted on first reading a set of 60 draft articles and two annexes.5

The other is liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts notprohibited by international law.52

This brief survey makes for an impressive record, attesting to thesubstantial contribution which the Commission has made to almost allof the major fields of international law.

!1.

A further measure of the Commission's achievement is the signifi-cant effect which its work has had upon the very structure of interna-tional law in a number of its constituent fields.

First and foremost, several of the major multilateral conventionswhich have been concluded on the basis of the Commission's draft arti-cles have become fundamental to the whole conduct of modern interna-tional relations.

No instruments have greater claim to that status than the 1961Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the 1963 Vienna Con-vention on Consular Relations. These two conventions have attractedamong the highest levels of participation of any treaty in existence, therecurrently being 178 and 157 States party to them, respectively. In thewords of the International Court of Justice, these two instruments are'of cardinal importance for the maintenance of good relations betweenStates in the interdependent world of today'. 53 Diplomacy, as the Inter-national Court has remarked, 54 is "an instrument essential for effectiveco-operation in the international community, and for enabling States...to achieve mutual understanding and to resolve their differences bypeaceful means";5 5 while "the unimpeded conduct of consular rela-tions... is no less important in the context of present-day internationallaw, in promoting the development of friendly relations among na-

1' Draft articles on State responsibility, Report... forty-eighth session, pp. 125-151.

512 For an outline of the current state of the Commission's work on this topic,see Report... forty-eighth session, pp. 178-182. For the set of draft articles whichhas been prepared by a working group of the Commission, see ibid., pp. 235-327.

" United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, LC.J.Reports 1980, p. 3. para. 91. See also ibid., paras. 45 and 92.

" United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran. Order of 15 De-cember 1979, ICJ. Reports 1979, p. 7.

1 Ibid., para. 39.

tions".56 The "imperative obligations" which govern those two institu-tions the Court has found to be "now codified in the Vienna Conven-tions of 1961 and 1963".57

The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enjoys aposition which is similarly structural to the whole international legalorder.5 As the contents of the almost 1500 volumes of the TreatySeries which the United Nations has published to date make clear,treaties play a "fundamental role in... international relations" and areof "ever-increasing importance... as a source of international lawand as a means of developing peaceful cooperation among nations"., 9

The 1969 Convention sets forth rules to regulate the use of this basicinstrument of international relations. On a large number of occasionsnow, the rules which many of its provisions lay down have been de-clared to possess the status of customary (general) international lawby the International Court of Justice.,6 by regional courts and com-

Ibid.. para. 40.Ibid.. para- 41. See also Case concerning United States Diplomatic and

Consular Staff in Tehran. Judgment (see footnote 53 above), para. 45: "It]heVienna Conventions [of 1961 and 19631. which codify the law of diplomatic andconsular relations. state principles and rules essential for the maintenance of peace-ful relations between States and accepted throughout the world by nations of allcreeds, cultures and political complexions".

' There are currently 81 States Parties to this convention and a further21 States which are signatories to it.

" See the first and second preambular paragraphs of the 1969 Convention. Thescventh paragraph of that Convention's preamble further affirms that "the codifi-cation and progressive development of the law of treaties achieved in the presentConvention will promote the purposes of the United Nations set forth in its Char-ter. namely, the maintenance of international peace and security, the developmentof fricndly relations and the achievement of co-operation among nations".

' The International Court of Justice has cited provisions of the Vienna Con-vention as laying down rules of general international law in the following cases:Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa inNamibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276(1970). Advisory Opinion. I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16, para. 94; Appeal Relating tothe Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council. Judgment. LC.J. Reports 1972. p. 46.para- 38: Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland). Jurisdiction of theCourt. Judgment. I. CJ. Reports 1973. p. 3. paras. 24 and 36; Interpretation of theAgreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt. Advisory Opinion,LCJ. Reports 1980. p. 73, para. 47. Military and Paramilitary Activities in andagainst Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits. L CJ. Re-ports 1986. p. 14. para- 178 (note also para. 190): Frontier Dispute. Judgment. I.C.J.Reports 1986. p. 554. para. 17; Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaraguav. Honduras). Jurisdiction and Admissibility. Judgment. I.CJ. Reports 1988, p. 69,para. 35: Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 Judgment, LC-J. Reports 1991. p. 53,para. 48; Land. Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras:Nicaragua intervening). Judgment of 11 September 1992. LCJ. Reports 1992,p. 351. paras. 373. 375 and 380; Application of the Convention on the Preventionand Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Provisional Measures. Order of 8 April1993. l.CJ. Reports 1993, p. 3. para. 13; Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jama-hiriya/Chad). Judgment. iC.J Reports 1994, p. 6. para. 41: Maritime Delimitationand Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain. Jurisdiction and Admissi-

missions61 and by various arbitral tribunals,62 as well as by UnitedNations treaty-bodies.

63

Through the medium of the conventions which they have in-spired, certain of the sets of draft articles which the Commission hasproduced have, therefore, played a direct and fundamental role in theregulation of the basic instruments by which international relationsare conducted. Equally remarkable is that the conventions in questionwere concluded and, in the case of the law of treaties, the Commis-sion's draft articles elaborated during a period in which the interna-tional community was undergoing a profound societal change as theresult of the accession to independence of a great number of newStates. By establishing and consolidating rules which are fundamentalto the operation of the international system, the instruments in ques-tion helped at a crucial time to maintain confidence in internationallaw and to ensure the stability of international society itself.

bility, Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 1994, p. 112, para. 23; and Maritime Delimitationand Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Jurisdiction and Admissi-bility, Judgment. 1.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 6, para. 33.

6 See, for example, Golder Case, European Court of Human Rights, Series A,No. 18, Judgment of 21 February 1975, ILR, vol. 57, p. 200, para. 29; Temeltasch v.Switzerland, European Commission of Human Rights, Application No. 9116/80 of5 May 1982, Report, ILR, vol. 88, p. 619, paras. 68 and 69; The Effect of Reserva-tions on the Entry into Force of the American Convention, Inter-American Courtof Human Rights, Advisory Opinion No. OC-2/82. 24 September 1982, ILR. vol. 67,p. 559, para. 19; Restrictions to the Death Penalty, Inter-American Court of HumanRights, Advisory Opinion No. OC-3/83, 8 September 1983, ILR, vol. 70, p. 449,para. 48; and Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Dutiesof Man within the Framework ofArticle 64 of the American Convention on HumanRights, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion No. OC-10/89,14 July 1989, ILR, vol. 96, p. 416, paras. 31-33.

62 See, for example, Arbitration between the United Kingdom of Great Britain

and Northern Ireland and the French Republic on the Delimitation of the Conti-nental Shelf. Decision of 30 June 1977, UNRIAA, vol. XVIII, p. 3, paras. 38, 55and 61; The Kingdom of Belgium. The French Republic, The Swiss Confederation,The United Kingdom and The United States of America v. The Federal Republicof Germany, Decision of 16 May 1980 of the Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreementon German External Debts, ILR, vol. 59, p. 495, para. 16; and Case concerning theDifference between New Zealand and France concerning the Interpretation orApplication of Two Agreements Concluded on 9 July 1986 between the two Statesand Which Related to the Problems arising from the "Rainbow Warrior" Affair,Decision of 30 April 1990, UNRIAA, vol. XX, p. 215, paras. 75, 100 and 106.

6 See especially General comment on issues relating to reservations madeupon ratification or accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto,or in relation to declarations under Article 41 of the Covenant, General CommentAdopted by the Human Rights Committee under Article 40, paragraph 4, of theInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Addendum, General Com-ment No. 24 (52), document CCPRJC21/Rev.I/Add.6, footnote 2 and paras. 6, 16and 17. The Secretary-General of the United Nations has also remarked that theConvention "is in large measure a codification of international custom". See para-graph 10 of the note verbale to the Permanent Representative of a Member State.reproduced in the United Nations Juridical Yearbook 1975, p. 195.

At the same time as certain of the Commission's draft articleshave become fundamental to the very conduct of international rela-tions, certain other sets have played a role which is structural to anentire field or domain of international law, setting forth principles andrules which define the basic lineaments of the law within the area con-cerned and constituting the framework within which problems areanalyzed and legal discourse is carried on.6 This is certainly so in thecase of the draft articles concerning the law of the sea, adopted by theCommission in 1956. The four 1958 Geneva Conventions which wereelaborated on the basis of those draft articles laid down a body ofrules which, in large part and for a number of years at least, consti-tuted the prevailing law of the sea, as is evidenced by a number ofdecisions of international courts and tribunals.M Although subsequentdevelopments brought about substantial modifications in the struc-ture of that law, the 1958 Conventions continued to embody many ofits basic lineaments. They went on, moreover, to serve as models forsignificant parts of the United Nations Convention on the Law of theSea, done at Montego Bay on 10 December 1982," in particular theparts of that convention which relate to the regimes of the temtorialsea, the contiguous zone, the continental shelf and the high seas.67 Theeffects of the 1958 Conventions in defining and setting the structureof the law of the sea are, therefore, still to be felt today.

Some of the sets of draft articles which the Commission has pro-duced might, at first blush, be thought not yet to have fulfilled theirpotential of assuming a structural role within the domains of interna-tional law to which they relate. On closer examination, though, anumber in fact turn out also to represent significant achievements.

" Report.. forty-eighth session, p. 206, para- 168. As the Commission hasremarked, "[tlhis marks a clear advance in inter-State relations", ibid

I The International Court of Justice has treated a number of the provisions ofthe 1958 Geneva Conventions as enjoying customary status. See North SeaContinental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark: Federal Republic ofGermany/Netherlands), L CJ. Reports 1969. p. 4. paras. 19 and 63; Fisheries Juris-diction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment,. CJ. Reports 1974, p. 3.paras. 50 and 67; Continental Shelf (TunisialLibya). LCJ. Reports 1982, p. 18,paras. 41-42; and Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Hon-duras: Nicaragua intervening) (see footnote 60 above), para. 383. See also theaward of the arbitral tribunal in the Arbitration between the United Kingdom ofGreat Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic-. (see footnote 62above), paras. 13, 65. 68-70, 75. 84 and 97.

6 Document A/CONF.62/122 and Corr.I to II. There are currently 113 Stateswhich have established their consent to be bound by the 1982 Convention and afurther 56 States which am signatories to it. Between States which arc party to it.the 1982 Convention supersedes the 1958 Geneva Conventions as the basis of theirmutual relations (see article 311. paragraph I).

'7 Report.. forty-eighth session, p. 206. footnote 311.

Cases in point are the two sets of draft articles on the matter ofState succession. But few States are currently party to the conven-tions which were elaborated upon the basis of those drafts: the 1983Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of State Prop-erty, Archives and Debts and the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succes-sion of States in respect of Treaties.68 Nevertheless, there is evidencethat the latter convention at least has assumed a significant placewithin that aspect of the domain of State succession to which it re-lates. In particular, the 1978 Convention and the Commission's draftarticles on which it was based have been regarded as embodyingprevailing principles of customary international law in respect of anumber of situations involving a succession of States.' There are alsoindications that certain aspects of the 1983 Convention are regardedas possessing the status of customary international law.T0

Similarly, the significance of the draft articles which the Commis-sion has produced in the field of the law of international organizationsis not to be underestimated. It is true that the 1975 Vienna Conventionon the Representation of States in their Relations with InternationalOrganizations of a Universal Character is yet to enter into force, more

" The former has so far attracted but 4 of the 15 instrumcnts of ratification oraccession which are needed for it to enter into force, while the latter only achievedthat same target-number in 1996.

" See, for example, the letter of the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs tothe Director of the Legal Division, World Health Organization, reproduced inUnited Nations Juridical Yearbook 1972. p. 195; the letter of the United NationsOffice of Legal Affairs to the Secretary of the United Nations Council for Namibia,reproduced in United Nations Juridical Yearbook 1984, p. 171 at para. 3 (ii);Continental Shelf(Tunisia/Libya), (see footnote 65 above), para. 84; and Intema-tional Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. Arbitration Commission, OpinionNo. I. ILR, vol. 92, p. 162, para. I (e), and Opinion No. 9, ibid., p. 203, paras. 2and 4. Note also International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, ArbitrationCommission, Opinion No. 3. ibid., p. 170. para. 2.

It is worthy of note that a Chamber of the International Court of Justice hasreferred to the Convention, in the same breath as the Vienna Convention on theLaw of Treaties 1969, as a "codifying" convention (une convention "de codifica-tion"), Frontier Dispute (see footnote 60 above), para. 17.

A number of statements are to be found by State officials to the effect thatcertain provisions of the Convention are reflective of customary international law.See, for example, the memorandum of the Legal Adviser of the United StatesDepartment of State, reproduced in Digest of United States Practice in Interna-tional Law. 1980. pp. 1026 and 1035 and endnote 43; and the letter of the Republicof Kiribati to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, reproduced in BYIL,vol. 52 (1981). p. 385.

' See the letter of the United Nations Legal Counsel to the Executive Directorof the International Cocoa Organization, reproduced in United Nations JuridicalYearbook 1991. p. 315. See also International Conference on the Former Yugo-slavia, Arbitration Commission. Opinion No. I (see the preceding footnote),para. I (e), and Opinion No. 9 (see the preceding footnote), paras. 2 and 4.

than 20 years after its conclusion.7 Nevertheless, the fact is that the1975 Convention is often cited by States and by international organ-izations in the course of their activitiesn and there has been recogni-tion that a number of its provisions possess the status of customarylaw or are otherwise reflective of prevailing practice."

A further example is the 1986 Vienna Convention, elaborated onthe basis of the set of draft articles that the Commission produced onthe law of treaties between States and international organizations orbetween international organizations, which has attracted but 23 of the35 ratifications or accessions needed for it to enter into force.74 Yetthere can be little doubt that, like the 1969 Vienna Convention on theLaw of Treaties on which it was based, it enjoys a place which is fun-damental to the aspect of treaty-law to which it relates. Internationalcourts, in particular, have already referred to certain of its provisionsas being reflective of prevailing law;7 5 and organizations of the UnitedNations system routinely use the Convention as a guide in the making.interpretation and application of their treaties.

7' There are currently only 30 contracting States to this convention, againstthe 35 which are needed for that purpose. A further seven States are signatories tothe Convention.

7 See the statement of the United Nations Legal Counsel at the 71st meetingof the Committee on Relations with the Host Country, reproduced in UnitedNations Juridical Yearbook 1978, pp. 189-190.

' See, for example: para. 10 of the note verbale from the United NationsSecretary-General to the Permanent Representative of a Member State (see foot-note 63 above); para. 4 of the memorandum from the United Nations Legal Coun-sel to the Assistant Chief of Protocol, reproduced in United Nations JuridicalYearbook 1977, p. 192; the statement by the United Nations Legal Counsel at the71st meeting of the Committee on Relations with the Host Country (see the pre-ceding footnote); paras. 4 and 5 of the statement by the United Nations LegalCounsel at the 115th meeting of the Committee on Relations with the Host Coun-try, reproduced in United Nations Juridical Yearbook 1986, p. 319; and para. 4 ofthe memorandum from the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs to the SeniorLegal Officer, Office of the Director-General, United Nations Office at Geneva,reproduced in United Nations Juridical Yearbook 1991, p. 320.

" A further 16 States and 10 international organizations are signatories to theConvention.

' Both the Court of Justice of the European Communities and its Advocates-General have referred to certain provisions of the Convention as reflective ofcustomary international law. See French Republic v. Commission of the EuropeanCommunities, Case C-327)91. ILR, vol. 101, p. 31, Opinion of the Advocate-Gen-eral. para. 12. and Judgment of the Court, pars. 25. See also the text at footnote 79below.

A further measure of the International Law Commission's achieve-ment is the important role which it has created for itself in the processof custom-formation.

That the Commission's work and its output would play a role inthe custom-forming process itself was not clearly foreseen in its Statute.Yet, as is amply demonstrated by the preceding review of the Commis-sion's accomplishments, the Commission has thoroughly integrateditself into the process of identifying, consolidating, sustaining, adaptingand even forming rules of customary, or general, international law. Inparticular, conventions which have been adopted on the basis of theCommission's draft articles have on many occasions been treated as pro-viding authoritative evidence of the state of customary law, in somecases even before they have entered into force.16 More dramatically stilland reflecting yet more directly the achievement of the Commissionin this regard, draft articles produced by the Commission have them-selves been regarded as evidence of the position at customary law,71

even, indeed, before their final adoption. 7 So, for example, evenbefore the Commission had concluded its work on its draft articles onthe law of treaties between States and international organizations orbetween international organizations, the International Court of Jus-tice made reference to one of them as representative of customarylaw.79 The Commission's work in the field of State responsibility isespecially worthy of note in this regard. Even before their first readingwas complete, the draft articles which the Commission had adoptedto date on that topic were widely invoked as evidence of customaryinternational law. International tribunals in particular have for a num-ber of years now made reference to the Commission's work in

"See especially the materials relating to the 1969 Vienna Convention on theLaw of Treaties which are cited in footnotes 60 to 63 above, many of which predatethe entry into force of that convention.

' See, for example, the decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal in M v. FederalDepartment of Justice and Police, ILR, vol. 75, p. 110, which, though it post-datesthe adoption of the 1978 Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties,refers solely to the Commission's draft articles on which that convention wasbased.

" See, for example, the letter of the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs tothe Director of the Legal Division, World Health Organization, op. cit. (footnote 69above).

The Commission's deliberations on a topic have also subsequently beenregarded as evidencing the contemporaneous state of the law on the issue underdiscussion: North Sea Continental Shelf(see footnote 65 above), paras. 49-55, 62and 85; and Arbitration between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-ern Ireland and the French Republic... (see footnote 62 above), para. 37.

7interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO andEgypt (see footnote 60 above), para. 47.

addressing issues which have arisen in this field.' Indeed, one arbi-tral award a decade ago characterized Part One of the Commission'sdraft articles as "the most recent and authoritative statement of cur-rent international law in this area".'

It may be that, at the point when consideration of a topic withinthe Commission begins, the relevant customary law may be either un-settled or else at a formative stage of development- Through the workof the Commission, though, new rules of positive customary interna-tional law may begin to emerge and gradually take shape. In particular,the analysis which the Commission undertakes of existing State prac-tice and its recommendations as to the form which the law should takemight attract a favourable response from States, prompting the furtherdevelopment of practice and of opiniojuris along the lines of the Com-mission's suggestions and leading, in turn, to the reception, at a con-ference of plenipotentiaries, of the Commission's final draft articles asreflective of the resulting body of practice and opinion as a whole. Inthis way, the Commission may even play a principal role in the veryformation of rules of customary international law.

So, for example, when the Commission commenced its work onthe law of the sea at the beginning of the 1950s, the continental shelfhad no positive status in custom, the body of State practice pertainingto that institution having but recently come into existence and being

' See, for example, the following awards of the Iran-United States ClaimsTribunal: International Technical Products Corporation and ITP Export Corpora-tion v. the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran et aL. Award No. 196-302-3(24 October 1985), Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports, vol. 9 (1985).p. 206, footnote 35; Alfred L W. Short v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, AwardNo. 312-11135-2 (14 July 1987). ibid.. vol. 16 (198) p. 76. paras. 28 and 33; KennethP. Yeager v. The Islamic Republic of Iran. Award No. 324-10199-1 (2 November1987). ibid.. vol. 17 (1987). p. 92, paras. 33. 42 and 65; Jack Rankin v. The IslamicRepublic of Iran, Award No. 326-10913-2 (3 November 1987), ibid. p. 135,paras. 18. 25 and 30 (c) and (e); and Phillips Petroleum Company Iran v. TheIslamic Republic of Iran, The National Iranian Oil Company, Award No. 425-39-2(29 June 1989), ibid., vol. 21 (1989). p. 79, footnote 26. See also the following arbitralawards: Case Concerning the Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946 betweenthe United States of America and France, Decision of 9 December 1978. UNRLAA,vol. XV Ill, p. 417, para 31; Case concerning the Difference between New Zealandand France... (see footnote 62 above), paras. 72, 77, 78. 101 and 105 (and noteparas. 113 and 122); AMCO-Asia Corporation and others v. The Republic of Indo-nesia. Award on the Merits, 31 May 1990, ILR, vol. 89. p. 405, para- 172; and LibyanArab Foreign Investment Company v. The Republic of Burundi, Award of 4 March1991, ILR, vol. 96, p. 282, para. 61 (and note paras. 55, 56 and 66).

' Jack Rankin v. The Islamic Republic of lran (see the preceding footnote),para. 18. Another arbitral award has described the domain as being "in the processof codification by the International Law Commission": Case concerning the Dif-ference between New Zealand and France... (see footnote 62 above), para. 72.

yet incomplete and discordant. 2 Yet, as the International court olJustice has twice remarked,8 3 by the time that the first United NationsConference on the Law of the Sea came in 1958 to elaborate a con-vention on the basis of the draft articles which the Commission hadprepared concerning the continental shelf, the basic rules governingthat institution had come, or at least were coming, to be regarded byStates as established and, moreover, as being reflected in the pertinentprovisions of the Commission's draft.8 A broadly similar process oflegal development has also been held to have taken place in the law oftreaties, in respect of the rules governing reservations. 5

As the International Court has also affirmed, 6 such a process oflegal development may not yet be complete with the elaboration andadoption of a convention based on the Commission's draft articles.Only if and when States subsequently come to accept,87 or to adapttheir practice to,88 such a convention may new rules of customary lawfinally come into existence, modelled on those set forth in that instru-ment. 9 In such a case, once more, it is the work of the Commissionwhich serves, directly or indirectly, as the driving-force behind thecrystallization of the new law, acting as a stimulus to, and as a focusfor, the development of the opinio juris of States and clarifying andco-ordinating their content.

" In the matter of an Arbitration between Petroleum Development (TrucialCoast) Ltd. and the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, Award of Septembcr 1951, ILR, vol. 18,p. 144, para. 5 (e).

" North Sea Continental Shelf (see footnote 65 above), para. 63; and Conti-nental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) (see footnote 65 above), paras. 41-42.

e In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases (see footnote 65 above), the Inter-national Court also considered the Commission's consideration of the issue whichis the subject of Article 6 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf to havecontributed to the development of customary law on that point: loc. cit., foot-note 78 above.

" Thus, at the time that the Commission began its work on the law of treaties,the rules which govern reservations, once widely regarded as well established, hadbecome highly unsettled and uncertain, as a result of a number of recent develop-ments. The work of the Commission acted as a focus for the development of theopiniojuris of States in this sphere, culminating in the crystallization of a new legalregime with the adoption of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,the relevant provisions of which were based on the draft articles which had beenadopted by the Commission in 1966. See Arbitration between the United Kingdomof Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic... (see footnote 62above), para. 38.

'6 North Sea Continental Shelf (see footnote 65 above), para. 71.' Ibid., para. 73.

Ibid., paras. 74 and 75.

In the North Sea Continental Shef cases (see footnote 65 above), the Courtconducted a detailed investigation of whether such a process had taken place inrespect of the rules set forth in Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on theContinental Shelf and reached the conclusion that it had not (ibid., para. 81).

Instrumental in the integration of the Commission into the cus-tom-formation process in all of its aspects has been the Commission'ssuccess in creating and sustaining a meaningful dialogue with States.This dialogue, which the Commission carries on through the mediumof the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly and via the question-naires which it sends to States individually, together with the requestswhich it makes of them for comments on its drafts, 90 itself meritsinclusion among the Commission's achievements. 9

IV.

The contribution which the Commission has thus made to the pro-gressive development and codification of international law has beenvariously characterized as "unique and unrivalled", "almost monumen-tal", "distinguished and lasting", "remarkable!', of "exceptional impor-tance", "essential", "significant", "appreciable" and "positive". Theconduct of international relations has been said to be "unthinkable"without several of the global conventions which have been elaboratedupon the basis of the Commission's draft articles. The Commission'scontribution to a better understanding of international law has alsobeen acknowledged as remarkable and lasting, and it has been said thatits reports and documents constituted an invaluable source of inspira-tion for all publicists.

Notwithstanding such accolades, the Commission has continued tostrive for improvement of its procedures and methods of work in alltheir aspects. To this end, it has taken a number of actions, culminating,most recently, in the adoption of a substantial report incorporating alarge number of specific recommendations for improving its "usefulnessand efficiency". 92 It has developed a more rigorous procedure for thebetter identification of new topics for inclusion in its programme ofwork.93 It has displayed, too, an increased sensitivity to the variety offorms which its contribution to the international legal process, in

"0 See Report... forty-eighth session, p. 208, para. 171, and p. 2 1 1, para. 181. Foran outline of this dialogue, see The Work of the International Law Commission,op. cit. (footnote 9 above), pp. 21-24.

"' In recent years, the Commission has striven to enhance this dialogue stillfurther. See, in particular, the recent report of the Commission on its proceduresand working methods, which contains a number of specific recommendations tothis end, Report... forty-eighth session, pp. 197-198, para. 149 (c)-(e), and p. 211,para. 182. Note also p. 210, para. 180. and p. 212, para. 185. The General Assemblyhas also paid attention to strengthening the dialogue: see text at footnote 95 belowand accompanying note.

" Report... forty-eighth session, pp. 196-230. The General Assembly took notewith appreciation of this report in its resolution 51/160 of 16 December 1996,paragraph 9.

"' For a brief outline of this procedure, see Report... forty-eighth session,pp. 205-206, paras. 165-166.

terms of the nature of its final output, might appropriately rac, in-cluding model rules, declarations, guides to practice, commentaries,advice and so on.94 The General Assembly, for its part, has also givencareful attention to the ways in which it considers the reports of theCommission and has taken steps to improve them, with a view to pro-viding the Commission with more effective guidance.95

A concerted effort is thus being made to improve the functioningof the Commission so as to enable it to make a still greater contribu-tion to the progressive development and codification of internationallaw.' At the foundation of this effort is the conviction, shared both byStates and by the Commission, that "there is important continuingvalue in an orderly process of codification and progressive develop-ment" 97 and that the Commission can continue to make an importantcontribution to that process. There is accordingly every reason to sup-pose that the International Law Commission will remain, as it hasbeen for the last 50 years, the main organ established by the GeneralAssembly for the codification and progressive development of inter-national law.

" Thus, on the topic of Reservations to treaties, see, for example: Report...forty-fifth session, p. 245, para. 430; Report... forty-seventh session, pp. 246-247,paras. 435-437 and 439, pp. 256-257, paras. 471474, and pp. 259-260, paras. 486-488and 491 (b) and (c); Report... forty-eighth session, pp. 185-186, para. 113. Similarly,on the topic of State succession and its impact on the nationality of natural andlegal persons, see, for instance: Report... forty-fifth session, p. 247, paras. 437 and439; Report... forty-seventh session, pp. 75-76, paras. 169-170, and p. 81, para. 193;and Report... forty-eighth session, p. 174, para. 81, and p. 177, para. 88 (b). Moregenerally, see ibid, p. 210, para. 178 infine. Compare the earlier approach of theCommission to this issue in Yearbook... 1988, vol. 11 (Part Two), p. 110, para. 561.

"' See, in particular, resolution 41/81 of 3 December 1986, third preambularparagraph and operative paragraph 5 (b); resolution 42/156 of 7 December 1987,fifth preambular paragraph and operative paragraphs 5 (b) and 6: resolution 43/169of 9 December 1988, operative paragraphs 7 and 8; resolution 44/35 of 4 December1989, operative paragraph 5; and resolution 50/45 of II December 1995, seventhpreambular paragraph and operative paragraph 10.

See, to this effect, General Assembly resolution 50/45 of I I December 1995,paragraph 9 (a), and Report... forty-eighth session, p. 201, para. 154.

" Report... forty-eighth session, p. 197, para. 148, general conclusion (b). Seealso p. 206, para. 168, and p. 207, para. 171.

INTRODUCTION

L'(EUVRE DE LA COMMISSIONDU DROIT INTERNATIONAL

L'Article 13, paragraphe 1. alinda a, de la Charte des NationsUnies donne mandat A I'Assemble ginErale de * provoque[r] des dtudes et fai[re] des recommandations en vue de ... encourager ie deve-loppement progressif du droit international et sa codification,*. Le21 novembre 1947, conform~ment A ce mandat, 'Assembld.e gnd&alea adopt6 la rdolution 174 (II) par laquelle elle d&cidait la cr.ation dela Commission du droit international]. La publication du prdsentrecueil d'articles coincide donc avec le cinquantiime anniversaire de]'institution de la Commission2. Le moment parait venu de se penchersur le travail qu'elle a accompli et de faire le bilan de son ceuvre3.

Le developpement progressif du droit international et sa codifi-cation ont 6t6 'un des aspects les plus marquants de I'dvolution dudroit international depuis la seconde guerre mondiale et la Commis-sion y ajoud un r6le central. Des nombreuses rdalisations de ]a Com-mission dans ce domaine, il en est trois en particulier qui mritent deretenir sp&-ialement l'attention et qui seront examines ci-aprbs. Enpremier lieu, la Commission a prdpard plus de vingt projets d'articlesqui ont posd des rigles fondamentales dans la plupart des secteurs dudroit international. Nombreux sont ces projets qui, A leur tour, ontdonnd naissance A d'importants trait.s A vocation mondiale dans les

'Cette rdsolution a 4t adopt6e sur la base d'un rapport (document A/331 etCorr. 1) prscnt6 par )a Commission du ddveloppement progressif du droit interna-tional et sa codification, cr66e par I'Assembl& g6ndraie l'annde pr&hdente pourexaminer les mdshodes scion lesquelles i'Assemblde gdn&ale pourrait s'acquitterle plus efficacement possible du mandat que lui confiait la Charte dans son Arti-cle 13. paragraphe 1. alinia a.

2 Les premiires Iections A la Commission se sont droul~es dans I'ann& quia suivi sa creation, le 3 novembre 1948. La Commission a ouvert sa premieresession I'ann&e suivante, le 12 avril 1949.

'Dans sa rsolution 51/160 du 16 d6cembre 1996. I'Assembl&e g6n&rale aprid Ic Secr6taire gdn&ai de prendre les dispositions voulues pour marquer lecinquanti~me anniversaire de la crdation de la Commission du droit internationalpar la tenue d'un colloque sur Ic d&veloppement progrtssif ct Ia codification dudroit international durant I'examen A la SixiRme Commission du rapport de laCommission du droit international sur les travaux de sa quarante-neuvi.mc session(voir le paragraphe 18 du dispositif de la risolution).

matibres auxquelles ils se rapportaient. En second lieu, certains Cieces projets d'articles ont pris, par l'intermddiaire des conventionsauxquelles ils avaient servi de base, une valeur structurante ou fonda-trice dans les domaines qu'ils concernaient. Certains d'entre eux sontm~me devenus fondamentaux, s'agissant de la conduite m~me desrelations entre les Etats. En troisibme lieu, ia Commission estparvenue A s'intdgrer au processus de formation de la coutume etnotamment, ce qui est le plus frappant, au processus aboutissant A [acreation de r~gles nouvelles de droit international coutumier. Onexaminera tour A tour les grandes rdalisations de la Commission A cestrois points de vue.

Larticle premier du statut dispose: ((La Commission du droitinternational a pour but de promouvoir le d~veloppement progressif dudroit international et sa codification ,. Conform6ment A cet objectifs,ia Commission a jusqu'ici pr6par6 plus de vingt projets d'articles quiont pos6 des r~gles de droit international dans nombre de matiiresessentielles. En fait il n'y a plus aujourd'hui que peu de domaines dudroit international au d6veloppement desquels elle n'ait pas contri-bu6 6. Sous cet angle, i'euvre accomplie par la Commission mdrite cer-tainement le qualificatif de consid6rable.

L'ceuvre de la Commission est d'autant plus importante quenombre des projets d'articles prdpards par elle ont servi de base auxgrandes conventions de portde mondiale qui marquent des dtapes juri-diques ddcisives dans les domaines qu'elles concernent. Que la Com-mission doive jouer un r6le dans le processus normatif est explicite-ment envisag6 dans son statut7. Celui-ci lui donnait essentiellementpour r6le de preparer des projets pouvant 8tre utilisds comme base de

' Le statut de la Commission est annexd A la rsolution 174 (II) de I'Assembliegndrale en date du 21 novembre 1947.

'Malgrd ]a porti:e g~ndrale de I'article premier, paragraphe I, les articles 16,17. paragraphes I et 2, et 18, paragraphes 2 et 3, montrent bien que la tiche de [aCommission est essentiellement de nature selective: il s'agit de ddvelopper et decodifier progressivement le droit international dans les mati.res oii une telle entre-prise est considdrde comme a ndcessaire ., , souhaitable ou , approprie -. IIn'incombe donc pas A la Commission de s'attaquer au ddveloppement progressifCt A la codification de tous les domaines du droit international. 11 lui incombemoins encore de transformer le droit international en une sorte de wcode,- 6critexhaustif. Voir le Rapport de la Commission du droit international sur les travauxde sa quarante-huititme session. Documents officiels de I'Assenble ginirale,cinquante el uni~me session, Supplement n" 10 (A/51/10) (ci-apr.s cit6 sous laforme: Rapport... quarante-huitibme session), p. 232, par. 168.

6 Voir la conclusion A laquellc la Commission a abouti lorsqu'elle a examinEles travaux de ses 25 premieres sessions : Annuaire... 1973, vol. II, p. 232, documentA/9010/Rev.I, par. 156.

Voir les articles 15 Ct 23, paragraphe I. alindas c et d.

travail par les reprdsentants d'Etats r~unis pour 6laborer et adopterdes conventions. Ce r6le n'6tait pas sans pr&6dent s, mais aussi bienla structure et l'organisation de la Commission que les procedures etles modalit6s selon lesquelles elle devait s'acquitter de cette tiche6taient des nouveauts sans 6quivalent exact dans ia pratique interna-tionale. II est tout A I'honneur de la Commission que, sans pouvoir seguider sur des pr cdents directement applicables, elle se soit rapide-ment adapt& A un r6le fondamentalement original et in&Iit et qu'elleait mis au point des pratiques lui permettant de rdaliser ses poten-tialitYs. Lexamen de I'action de la Commission, sous I'angle des pro-jets d'articles qu'elle a 6labor.s, en est H' loquent tdmoignage9.

A. Darts le domaine des sources du droit international, la Com-mission a prdpard trois projets d'articles dont deux ont servi de baseaux travaux de conferences internationales et ont permis i'adoptionde conventions multilatdrales sur les sujets auxquels ils se rappor-taienL En 1966, la Commission a adopt6 un projet de 75 articles sur ledroit des traitds' ° qui a constitud plus tard la base de la Conventionsur Ic droit des trait~s, signe h Vienne le 23 mai 19691". Ultdrieure-ment. en 1982, la Commission a adoptd un projet de 81 articles sur ledroit des trait~s entre Etats et organisations internationales ou entreorganisations internationales, accompagnd d'une annexe' 2. Ce projetest hL l'origine de ia Convention sur le droit des trait s entre Etats etorganisations internationales ou entre organisations internationales,signe A Vienne le 21 mars 198613. Le troisi~me projet d'articles que laCommission a adopt6 dans ce domaine concerne la clause de la nationla plus favoris&' 4; il a 6td portd A I'attention des Etats Membres etdes organisations intergouvernementales int~ress&s par I'Assemblegdndrale dans sa decision 46/416 du 9 decembre 1991.

Independamment de l'6laboration de projets d'articles, la Com-mission a donn6 des avis A I'Assembl6e g6ndrale sur trois questionsdans le domaine des sources du droit international: les moyens de

ISur I'organisation et le fonctionnement du Comitd de juristes pour le dve-loppement progressif du droit international ct de ia Commission prdparatoirc A laConffrece de codification, deux organismes crEfs par la SocidtE des Nations, voirle document AIAC.1(Y5. pp. 54-76.

'Pour un rsumE d tailld du fonctionnement et des activitds de ta Commis-sion, pour le texte des projets d'articles e des conventions Elabortes sur la basede ces projets, voir Nations Unies. La Commission du droit international ef sonczuvre, 41 ed, n' de vente F.8V.I.

' 0Annuaire.. 1966. voL IL pp. 193-203. document A/6309/Rev.I.

" Nations Unies. Recuedil des Traite's. vol. 1155, p. 331.* Annuaire... 1982. vol. II (deuxibme panic), pp. 17-80.)3 Document A/CONF.129/15.-Annuaire... 1978, vol. II (deuxibne patie). pp. 19-83.

rendre plus facilement accessible ya u..u,, --.. .international'"; l'6largissement de la participation aux trait~s multila-traux g~n~raux conclus sous les auspices de la Socidt6 des Nations16;et les reserves aux conventions multilat~rales". La Commissionrevient sur cette derni~re question, dans le cadre de son programmede travail actuel, afin de r~aliser un guide de la pratique s

B. Dans le domaine des relations internationales, la Commis-sion a adoptd cinq projets d'articles. Quatre d'entre eux ont servi debase A des conventions multilat~rales' 9, A savoir ia Convention sur lesrelations diplomatiques, conclue A Vienne le 18 avril 196120; la Con-vention sur les relations consulaires, conclue A Vienne le 24 avril196321; la Convention sur les missions sp6ciales, adopte par 'Assem-bWde g~n~rale le 8 d6cembre 196922; et la Convention sur la reprdsen-tation des Etats dans leurs relations avec les organisations intema-tionales de caract~re universel, conclue A Vienne le 14 mars 197523. Lecinqui~me projet prdpar6 par la Commission dans ce domaine - leprojet d'articles et les projets de protocoles facultatifs I et II relatifsau statut du courier diplomatique et de la valise diplomatique nonaccompagnde par un courtier diplomatique2 4

- a 6t6 portd A 'atten-tion des Etats Membres des Nations Unies par 'Asscmbl& gdneraledans sa d(cision 50/416 du I I d&cembre 1995.

IS Yearbook.. 1950, vol. H1, pp. 367-374, document A/1316. L'articlc 24 dustatut de la Commission dispose que la Commission doit faire une dtude et unrapport en la mati re.

IS Annuaire... 1963, vol. 11, pp. 227-234, document A/5509.

" Yearbook.. 195), vol. 11, pp. 125-131, document A/1858.'s Pour le plan de travail proposd A cet dgard, voir Rapport de la Commis-

siondu droit international sur les travaux de sa quarante-septibme session, Docu-ments officiels de I'Assemblde gendrale, cinquantibme session, Suppl'ment n' 10(A/50/10) (ci-aprIs cit6 sous [a forme: Rapport... quarantc-septibme session),p. 277, par. 491. Les deux rapports prdsentds jusqu'ici par le Rapporteur sp6cialcharg6 de la question figurent dans le document A/CN.4/470 ct Corr.1 et le docu-ment A/CN.4/477 et Add.I.

'.Projet d'articles relatifs aux relations et immunitds diplomatiques et com-mentaire Annuaire... 1958, vol. 11, pp. 89-101, document A/3859; projet d'articlesrelatifs aux relations consulaires et commentaire, Annuaire... 1961, vol. 1H, pp. 95-133, document A/4843; projet d'articles sur les missions sp&ciales et commentaire,Annuaire... 1967, vol. 11, pp. 384-405, document A/6709/Rev.I et Rev.l/Corr.1; pro-jet d'articles relatifs & la reprdsentation des Etats dans leurs relations avec lesorganisations internatio- nales de caractte universel avec commentaire et annexe,Annuaire... 1971, vol. 11 (premiere patie), pp. 301-358, document A/8410/Rev.I.

0 Nations Unies, Recueil des traites, vol. 500, p. 95.SI Ibid., vol. 596, p. 261.2 Ibid., vol. 1400, p. 231.

23 Document A/CONF.67/16.2' Annuaire... 1989, vol. 11 (deuxi.me partie), pp. 16-54.

C. On peut aussi considfrer que les projets d'articles qui sont Ala base de ia Convention de Vienne de 1975 sur la representation desEtats dans leurs relations avec les organisations internationales decaractre universel d'une part, et de la Convention de Vienne de 1986sur le droit des traitds entre Etats et organisations internationales ouentre organisations internationales d'autre part25, constituent unapport au droit des organisations internationales.

D. En ce qui concerne la juridiction et les immunit&s, la Com-mission a adoptd un certain nombre de projets d'articles. Pour ce quiest des privilges et immunit&s, en plus des cinq projets mentionnsplus haut k, la section B26, elle a adopt6 le projet d'articles sur lesimmunit s juridictionnelles des Etats et de leurs biens 2" que I'Assem-bl& gdn&ae a d(cidd, par sa resolution 49/61 du 9 d&embre 1994. desoumettre pour examen I une conference de pl~nipotentiaires. LaCommission a dgalement diabord un projet d'articles sur la questionde l'exercice de la juridiction28. Ce projet a servi de base A la Con-vention sur la prevention et la repression des infractions contre lespersonnes jouissant d'une protection internationale, y compris lesagents diplomatiques, adopt& par I'Assemble generale le 14 d6cen-bre 197329.

E. Dans le domaine connexe du droit penal international, laCommission a 61abord trois importants projets d'articles: les prin-cipes de droit international reconnus par le statut du Tribunal deNuremberg et dans le jugement de ce tribunal30; un projet de statutd'une cour criminelle internationae 3l; et un projet de code des crimescontre ]a paix et la s&urit de I'humanit632. S'agissant du projet destatut, l'Assemblde gdndrale a d&cidd, par sa rdsolution 51/207 du17 dcembre 1996, qu'une conference de plnipotentiaires se rduniraiten 1998 pour conclure une convention en la mati~re. Quant au projet

Voir supra Ic texte A [a note 12.Voir supra Ic texte aux notes 19 A 24.Annuaire... 1991. vol. II (deuxi~me partie). pp. 13-64.

" Projet d'articles sur la prdvention et la r6prssion des infractions commisescontre des agents diplornatiques et d'autres personnes ayant droit A une protectioninternationale, Annuaire... 1972, vol. 11. pp. 339-351, document A/870IRev.I.

' Nations Unies. Recued des Traitis, vol. 1035. p. 167." Yearbook.. 1950. vol. II, pp. 374-378, document A/1316.3, Rapport de ta Commission du droit international sur les travaux de sa

quarante-sixime session. Documents officiels de IAssemblie gfn 'rale. quarante-neuvi. me session. Supplment n' 10 (A/49/10) (ci-apris citd sous Ia forme: Rap-port... quarante-sixi~me session). pp. 47-160.

- Rapport... quarante-huitibme session, pp. 25-143.

de code des crimes, ii fait actuellement l'objet d'un examen de ia partde I'Assemblhe g dnrale 33.

F. En ce qui concerne la place de l'individu en droit interna-tional, la Commission a, inddpendamment de ses r~alisations dans ledomaine du droit penal international, adopt6 deux textes, A savoir unprojet de convention sur la reduction des cas d'apatridie et un projetde convention sur I'6limination de I'apatridie . Le premier a servi debase A la Convention portant le mime titre qui a At conclue A NewYork le 30 aoflt 1961 . En outre, la question des cons~juences de lasuccession d'Etats sur la nationalitd des personnes physiques et mo-rales figure au programme de travail actuel de la Commission 36.

G. Deux projets d'articles ont 6t6 adoptds par la Commissiondans le domaine du droit des espaces internationaux. Le premier aservi de base A quatre grandes conventions multilatdrales 37: la Con-vention sur la mer territoriale et la zone contigue3 8, ia Convention surla haute mer 39, la Convention sur la peche et la conservation des res-sources biologiques de la haute mer 4° et la Convention sur le plateaucontinental4 l, toutes conventions faites A Gen~ve le 28 avril 1958. Parsa resolution 49/52 du 9 dcembre 1994, I'Assemble g6n~rale a dtcid6que le projet d'articles sur le droit relatif aux utilisations des coursd'eau internationaux A des fins autres que la navigation42 constitueraitla base d'une convention-cadre actuellement dlabore par la SixirmeCommission r~unie en groupe de travail plnier43.

H. En ce qui concerne le droit et la pratique du r~glement paci-fique des diffdrends, la Commission a adoptd, outre le Mod~le de

3' Au paragraphe 2 de sa r.solution 511160 en date du 16 ddcembre 1996,I'Assemblde g6ndrale a appel6 I'attention des Etats qui participaient au Comit6priparatoire pour la crdation d'une cour criminelle internationale sur l'intdrEt queprisentait le projet de code pour leurs travaux.

34 Yearbook.. 1954. vol. 11, pp. 143-147, document A/2693." Nations Unies, Recuei des Traitms, vol. 989, p. 175.36 Pour le plan de travail proposd par la Commission sur cette question, voir

Rapport... quarante-huitidme session, p. 201, par. 88. Pour les deux rapports prd-sentds jusqu'ici par Ic Rapporteur spdcial, voir le document A/CNA/467 et le docu-ment A/3519.

37 Projet d'articles relatifs au droit de ]a mer, Annuaire... 1956, vol. 1I, pp. 256-264, document A/3519.

"Nations Unies, Recueil des Traitis, vol. 516. p. 205."Ibid., vol. 450, p. II.o Ibid., vol. 559, p. 285." Ibid., vol. 499, p. 311.4' Rapport... quarante-sixidme session, pp. 217-353.13 Le groupe de travail n'a pas achevd son examen en 1996 et une deuxibme

session est prdvue en 1997 (voir la rdsolution 51/206 de l'Assemble gindrale endate du 17 d&cembre 1996).

ragles sur la proc&iure arbitrale" -que I'Assemblce gdnerale a portk I'attenion des Etats Membres dans sa rdsolution 1262 (XIII) du14 novembre 1958-, des projets de dispositions d4finissant lesproc&Iures applicables A la solution des litiges que pourrait souleverl'interprdtation ou l'application de certains des projets d'articles6laborts par elle sur quelques-unes des questions mentionn es dansla pr sente partie4l.

I. Dans le domaine de la succession d'Etats, la Commission aadopte deux projets" qui ont servi de base A des conventions mul-tilaterales47: la Convention sur la succession d'Etats en matiire detraitds, conclue A Vienne Ic 23 ao~t 1978 4 et la Convention sur la suc-cession d'Etats en mati~re de biens, archives et dettes d'Etat. conclueA Vienne le 8 avril 198349.

1. La Commission a 4galement adoptd un projet d'articles dansIc domaine des droits et devoirs fondamentaux des Etacs: le projet dedclaration sur les droits et les devoirs des Etats'. Par sa rdsolu-tion 375 (V) du 6 d&cembre 1949, I'Asscmble g~ndrale a recommand6ce texte A I'attention des Etats Membres et des juristes de toutes lesnations.

- Annuaire... 1958. vol. 11, pp. 86-89. document A/3859.s Voir: projet d'article 73 du projet d'articles relatifs au droit de [a mer (voir

plus haut note 37); projet d'article 45 du projet d'articles relatifs aux relations etimmunits diplomatiques (volt note 19); projet d'article 62 du projet d'articles surle droit des traitrs (voir note 10); projet d'article 82 du projet d'articles relatifs A [arepraentation des Etats dans leurs relations avec les organisations internationalesde caractbre universel (voir note 19); projet d'article 12 du projet d'articles sur [aprfvention et la r6pression des infractions commises contre des agents diplo-matiques et d'autres personnes ayant droit A une protection internationale (voirnote 28); projets d'anicles 65 et 66 et projet d'annexe du projet d'articles sur ledroit des traites entre Etats et organisations internationales ou entre organisationsinternationales (voir note 12); et projet d'article 33 du projet d'articles sur le droitrelatif aux utilisations des cours d'eau internationaux A des fins autres que lanavigation (voir note 42). A noter aussi les projets d'articles 54 A 60 et les projetsd'annexes I et 11 du projet d'articles sur la responsabilite des Etats, tels qu'ils ontat adoptss provisoirement par la Commission en premiere lecture (voir infranote 51).

' Projet d'articles sur la succession d'Etats en matinre de traitds et commen-taire, Annuaire... 1974. vol. ii (premi Re partie). pp. 178-280, document A/96101Rev. I; projet d'articles sur la succession d'Etats en matine de biens, archives etdettes d'Etat, Annuaire... 1981, vol. 11 (deuxieme partie), pp. 19-114.

"LLa Commission travaille en cc moment A la question de la successiond'Etats et nationalite des personnes physiques et morales (voir supra le texte A lanote 36).

- Document AJCONF.80/31.- Document A/CONF. 117/14.5 Yearbook.. 1949, pp. 287-288, document A/CN.4/13 et Corr.1-3.

K. La Commission est actuellement en train d'dlaborer des pro-jets d'articles dans deux autres domaines du droit international, tousdeux d'une extreme importance pour le fonctionnement de l'ordrejuridique international. Le premier projet concerne la responsabilit6des Etats, sujet sur lequel la Commission a r~cemment adoptd en pre-miire lecture un ensemble de 60 projets d'articles et deux annexes51.L'autre projet porte sur la responsabilitd internationale pour les con-sequences prjudiciables d6coulant d'activitAs qui ne sont pas inter-dites par le droit international".

Ce bref aperqu fait ressortir le remarquable bilan de la Commis-sion et t~moigne de l'importance de sa contribution dans presque tousles domaines majeurs du droit international.

!!.

Un autre aspect de ruvre de la Commission m~rite d'8tre relev6,A savoir l'incidence considerable que ses travaux ont eue sur la structurem~me du droit international dans un certain nombre de ses domainesconstitutifs.

Tout d'abord plusieurs des grandes conventions multilat~rales quiont W conclues avec, pour base, les projets d'articles de la Commissionsont devenues des 6lments fondamentaux dans la conduite des relationsinternationales contemporaines.

Aucun instrument ne m6rite davantage cette qualification que laConvention de Vienne de 1961 sur les relations diplomatiques et la Con-vention de Vienne de 1963 sur les relations consulaires. Ces deux con-ventions figurent parmi les trait(s en vigueur qui ont recueilli la pluslarge participation - 178 Etats parties pour la premi&e et 157 pour laseconde. Comme I'a dit la Cour internationale de Justice, ces deux ins-truments 4 sont d'une importance capitale pour le maintien de bonnesrelations entre Etats dans le monde interddpendant d'aujourd'hui, 53.La diplomatie, a fait observer la Cour 54 , est t un instrument essentielde coopration efficace dans la communaut6 internationale, qui per-met aux Etats... de parvenir A la comprehension mutuelle et de rdsou-

" Projet d'articles sur la responsabilitd des Etats. Rapport... quarante-huititmesession, pp. 144-174.

52 Pour un aperqu de I'Etat d'avancement des travaux de la Commission surcette question, voir Rapport... quarante-huiti:me session, pp. 202-206. Pour leprojet d'articles prdpard par un groupe de travail de la Commission, voir ibid.,pp. 264-364.

" Personnel diplomatique el consulaire des Etats-Unis j) Tehdran, arrht, C.I.J.Recueil 1980, par. 91. Voir igalement ibid., par. 45 et 92.

54Personnel diplomatique et consulaire des Etats-Unis 6 Tihran, mesuresconservatoires, ordonnance du 15 d.cembre 1979, C.IJ. Recueil 1979, p. 7.

dre leurs divergences par des moyens pacifiques ,*3 et ,le droule-ment sans entrave des relations consulaires... n'est pas moins impor-tant dans le contexte du droit international contemporain, en ce qu'ilfavorise le d~veloppement des relations amicales entre les nations ,..La Cour a estim que x, les obligations imip&atives ), que ces deux ins-titutions comportent , sont maintcnant codifi&s dans les conventionsde Vienne de 1961 et 1963 ,57.

La Convention de Vienne de 1969 sur le droit des trait6s toucheelle aussi de fa4on cruciale A l'ordre juridique internationalV. CommeFatteste le contenu des quelque 1500 volumes du Recuei des Traitispubli~s jusqu'A ce jour par 'Organisation des Nations Unies, lestraitds jouent un ( r6le fondamental dans... [les] relations interna-tionales,, et ont une w importance de plus en plus grande... en tantque source du droit international et en tant que moyen de d~velopperla coopdration pacifique entre les nations *5. La Convention de 19696nonce les rfgles qui doivent rigir ces instruments fondamentaux desrelations internationales. A maintes reprises, des r~gles pos6es dartsnombre de dispositions de la Convention ont Ate considdrdes commedes normes de droit international (gindral) coutumier par la Courinternationale de Justicew. par des tribunaux rigionaux et des corn-

" Ibid., par. 39.' Ibid., par. 40.

r Ibid. par. 41. Voir aussi Personnel diplomatique et consulaire des Etats-Unis d Tdhdran. arrt (voir supra note 53) par. 45: * Les conventions de Vienne.qui codifient le droit des relations diplomatiques et consulaires, Ad.noncent les prin-cipes et rtgles indispensables au maintien de relations pacifiques entre Etats etacceptis dans le monde entier par des nations de boutes croyances, cultures etappartenances politiques -.

- A I'heure actuclie 81 Etats sont parties A cette convention et 21 autres EtatsIont signe.

" Voir les premier et deuxibne alirnas du pr~ambule de [a Convention de1969. Le septirne alinda du pr~ambule affirme en outre que -Ia codification et leddveloppement progressif du droit des trait& ralisis dans la prdsente Conventionserviront les buts des Nations Unies &noncs dans [a Charte, qui sont de maintenirla paix et Ia s -urit6 intetnationales. de dtvclopper entre les nations des relationsarnicales et de rdaiser la coopdration internationale *.

I La Cour internationale de Justice a estimE que certaines dispositions de laConvention de Vienne dnonqaient des regles de droit international gdnial dans lesaffaires suivantes: Consiequences juridiques pour les Etats de la presence continuede lAfrique du Sud en Namibie (Sud-Ouest africain) nonobstant la risolution 276(1970) du Conseil de se'curitd, avis consultatif CIJ. Recueil 1971. p. 46, par. 94;Appel concernant la compitence du Conseil de rOA Cl. arrt. CIJ. Recueji 1972.p. 67. par. 38; Competence en rnatiare de pcheries (Royaume-Uni c. Islande)competence de la Cour. arrit. CIJ. Recuel 1973, pp. 14 et 18, par. 24 et 36.Jnterpritation de raccord du 25 mars 1951 entre I'OMS et I'Egypte, avis consul-tatif C.IJ. Recueil 1980. p. 94. par. 47; Activitis militaires et paramilitaires auNicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c. Etats-Unis d'Amtrrique). fond. arrit,Cl. Recuei 1986. p. 95, par. 178 (voir aussi p. 100. par. 190); Diffrrendfrontalier.arrit. C.LJ. Recuel 1986. p. 563. par. 17: Actions armies frontahires et transfron-taires (Nicaragua c. Honduras). compitence et recevabilit, arrit. C.[J Recueil

missions rdgionales 6t , par divers tribunaux arbitraux °" ainst que pardes organes crids par traitd dans le cadre des Nations Unies 63.

Par le truchement des conventions qu'ils ont inspires, certainsdes projets d'articles elabords par la Commission ont donc joud unr6le direct et fondamental dans la mise en place des instruments debase qui r~gissent les relations internationales. II est dgalement remar-quable que les conventions en question aient 6td conclues et, dans lecas du droit des traites, que le projet d'articles ait 06 prdpard A un

1988, p. 84, par. 35; Sentence arbitrale du 31 juillet 1989, arrit, C.LJ. Recuei 1991,p. 69, par. 48; Diffirend frontalier, terrestre, insulaire et maritine (El SalvadoriHonduras; Nicaragua (intervenant)), arrt, C.LJ. Recueil 1992, pp. 582. 583 et 586,par. 373, 375 et 380; Application de la Convention pour la prdvention et la ripres.sion du crime de gdnocide, mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 8 avril 1993,C.lJ. Recueil 1993, p. 3, par. 13; Diffdrend territorial (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Tchad), arrt, C.LJ. Recuei 1994, p. 21, par. 41; Dlimitation maritime et questionsterritoriales entre Qatar et Bahrein, compdtence et recevabilit, arrit, C.LJ. Re.cueil 1994, p. 120, par. 23; Dlimitation maritime et questions territoriales entreQatar et Bahrein, compttence et recevabilit,4 arrit. C.LJ. Recueil 1995, p. 18,par. 33.

61 Voir par exemple: affaire Golder, Cour europdenne des droits de I'hommc,sirie A, n' 18, arrat du 21 fdvrier 1975. par. 29; Temeltasch c. Suisse, Commissioneurop~Enne des droits de I'homme, requete n' 9116/80 du 5 mai 1982, Annuaire dela Commission europdenne des droits de l'homme, vol. 31. p. 120, par. 68 et 69;L'effet des r'serves sur l'entrde en vigueur de la Convention amc'ricaine, Courinteramdicaine des droits de I'homme, avis consultatif n* OC-2/82. 24 septembre1982, sc'rie A, n* 2. par. 19; Restrictions i) la peine de mort, Cour interamdricainc

des droits de I'homme, avis consultatif n' OC-3/83, 8 septembre 1983, sdrie A, n, 3,par. 48; Interpritation de la ddclaration ambricaine des droits et devoirs deI'homme dans le cadre de I'article 64 de la Convention amifricaine des droitsde I'homme, Cour interamdricaine des droits de I'homme, avis consultatifn* OC-10/89, 14 juillet 1989, sdrie A, n* 9, par. 31-33.

62 Voir par exemple: Arbitrage entre le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne etd'irlande du Nord et la Rdpubliquefranfaise sur la ddlimitation du plateau conti-nental, d&cision du 30 join 1977, RSA, vol. XVIII, par. 38, 55 et 61; Royaume deBelgique, Rt4publiquefranfaise, Confidration suisse, Royaume-Uni et Etats-Unisd'Amdrique c. Rdpublique fidirale d'Allemagne, d6cision du Tribunal arbitralpour un accord sur les dettes extdrieurcs allemandes en date du 16 mai 1980,RGDIP, 1980, t. 84, p. 1158, par. 16; Affaire concernant les problimes nis entre laNouvelle-Zlande et la France relatifs ii l'interpritation ou d I'application de deuxaccords conclus le 9juillet 1986, lesquels concernaient les probl.mes dicoulant del'affaire du -Rainbow Warrioro, sentence du 30 avril 1990, RSA, vol. XX, p. 215,par. 75, 100 et 106.

6 Voir en particulier: Observation ginirale sur les questions relatives auxreserves 4mises lors de la ratification du Pacte ou des protocoles additionnels yrelatifs. ou lons de ladhision i ces instruments, ou au sujet des diclarationsfailesen vertu de Particle 41 du Pacte, Observation ginirale adoptie par le Coniti desdroits de I'homme au titre de I'article 40, paragraphe 4. du Pacte internationalrelatifaux droits civils et politiques, additif, Observation ge'nirale n* 24 (52). docu-ment CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.6, note 2 et par 6, 16 ct 17. Le Secrdtaire gindral del'Organisation des Nations Unics a fait aussi observer que la convention arcpr6-sente dans une large mesure une codification de la coutumc intcrnationaleo. VoirIc paragraphe 10 de la note verbale adress.e au reprdscntant permanent d'un EtatMembre, reproduite dans Annuaire juridique des Nations Unies 1975, p. 203.

moment oil la communaute internationale connaissait une transfor-mation socidtale profonde A la suite de I'accession d'un grand nombrede nouveaux Etats A l'inddpendance. En instituant et en consolidantdes r~gles indispensables au fonctionnement du systtme interna-tional, les instruments en question ont contribu , A un moment crucial,A maintenir la confiance dans le droit international et A assurer la sta-bilit6 de la socit6 internationale elle-m~me.

Si certains des projets d'articles de la Commission sont devenusdes 6lments fondamentaux dans la conduite meme des relationsinternationales, certains autres ont jou6 un r6le crucial par rapport Atout un pan du droit international, car ils ont Ononc des principes etdes ri.gles qui ont ddfini la trame du droit dans le domaine en cause etconstitud un cadre propice A i'analyse des probitmes et A rexercicede la pens6e juridique". Tel est certainement le cas du projet d'articlesrelatifs au droit de la mer, adopt6 par la Commission en 1956. Lesquatre conventions de Gen~ve de 1958, 6labortes A partir de ce projetd'articles, ont 6nonc un corps de rngles qui a constitud en grandepartie et pendant un certain nombre d'anntes au moins le droit de lamer en vigueur, comme le montrent maintes ddcisions manant decours et de tribunaux internationaux 6 . Bien que I'dvolution ultdrieureait entraind des modifications consid6rables dans la structure de cedroit, les conventions de 1958 ont continu6 A concrdtiser bon nombrede ses 6lments. Elles ont en outre servi plus tard de mod Ies pourcertaines parties importantes de la Convention des Nations Unies surle droit de la mer, sign6e A Montego Bay le 10 ddcembre 1982". enparticulier les passages relatifs aux rdgimes de la mer territoriale, dela zone contigue. du plateau continental et de la haute met 6 . Les con-ventions de 1958, en d~finissant et en prdcisant la structure du droitde la mer, font donc encore aujourd'hui sentir leurs effets.

" Rapport... quarante-huiti~me session, p. 232. par. 168. La Commission noteque .,C'est IA un progris indiscutable dans les relations entre Etats,. ibid.

La Cour intemationale de Justice a considdrd qu'un certain nombre dedispositions des conventions de Gen~ve de 1958 relevaient du droit coutumier.Voir: Plateau continental de ia mer du Nord (Rdpubliquefidirale d'AllenagnelDanemark: Rdpubliquefddgfrale dAllenagne/Pays-Bas), arrit C.UJ. Recueil 1969,pp. 22 et 38, par. 19 et 63; Compe'tence en matilre de pikheries (Royawne-Uni c.Islande)fond, arrit. C.LJ. Recueil 1974, pp. 22 et 29. par. 50 et 67; Plateau conti-nental (TunisielJanahiriya arabe libyenne). arrit. C.1. Recueil 1982, p. 45. par. 41et 42; Diff'rend frontalier. terrestre, insulaire et maritime (El SalvadorHonduras;Nicaragua (intervenant)) (voir supra note 60). p. 586. par. 383. Voir fgalement lad&ision du tribunal arbitral dans I'Arbitrage entre le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'irlande du Nord et la Rdpubliquefranfaise sur la ddlimitation duplateau continental (voir supra note 62). par. 13, 65, 68-70, 75, 84 et 97.

Document A/CONF.62122 et Corr.I A II. A lheure actuelle, 113 Etats ontdonnd leur consentement A &re lids par la Convention de 1982 et 56 autres en sontsignataires. Entre les Etats parties, la Convention de 1982 I'emporte sur les con-ventions de Gentve de 1958 (voir I'article 311, paragraphe I).

'6 Rapport... quarante-huitibme session, p. 232, note 311.

On pourrait penser au premier abord que certains des projetsd'articles mis au point par la Commission ne sont pas encore parve-nus, comme ils en avaient la vocation, Ajouer un r61e structurant dansles domaines du droit international auxquels ils se rapportaient. A yregarder de plus pros, cependant, on constate qu'en fait un certainnombre d'entre eux constituent oeuvre considdrable.

Tel est le cas pour les deux projets d'articles relatifs A la questionde la succession d'Etats. Quelques Etats seulement sont parties auxconventions qui ont W dlabor~es sur la base de ces projets: la Con-vention de Vienne de 1983 sur la succession d'Etats en mati~re debiens, archives et dettes d'Etat et la Convention de Vienne de 1978 surla succession d'Etats en mati~re de traits 6s. NManmoins il y a lieu depenser que cette derni~re convention au moins occupe une placeimportante dans le domaine de la succession d'Etats auquel elle serattache. En particufier, dans un certain nombre de situations mettanten jeu une succession d'Etats, on a considdrd que la Convention de1978 et le projet d'articles de la Commission sur lequel elle se fondeconsacraient les principes du droit international coutumier envigueur6. Selon diverses indications, certains aspects de la Conven-tion de 1983 sont dgalement considdr~s comme ayant le statut de droitinternational coutumier"'.

" La premitre n'a recueilli que quatre des 15 instruments de ratification oud'adhdsion nkessaires A son entr.e en vigueur et la seconde n'est parvenue h ccchiffre qu'en 1996.

"Voir par exemple: lenre du Bureau des affaires juridiques de 'Organisationdes Nations Unies adressde au chef du Service juridique de 'Organisation mon-diale de la sant6, reproduite dans Annuaire juridique des Nations Unies 1972,p. 204; lettre du Bureau des affaires juridiques de 'Organisation des Nations Unicsadress6e au Secrdtaire du Conseil des Nations Unies pour la Namibie, reproduitedans Annuaire juridique des Nations Unies 1984, p. 194, par. 3 ii); Plateau conti-nental (Tunisie/Jamahiriya arabe libyenne) (voir supra note 65), par. 84; et Con-f~rence internationale sur 'ex-Yougoslavie, Commission d'arbitrage, avis no I,RGDIP, 1992, t. 96, p. 265, par. I e et avis n0 9. ibid., 1993, t. 97, p. 592, par. 2 et 4.Voir Egalement ConfErence internationale sur I'ex-Yougoslavic, Commission d'ar-bitrage, avis n' 3, ibid., 1992. t. 96, p. 268, par. 2.

II est intdressant de noter qu'unc chambre de la Cour intemationale deJustice a dit que cette convention, tout comme la Convention de Vienne de 1969sur le droit des trait~s, 6tait une convention t, de codification *, Diffirendfrontalier(voir supra note 60), par. 17.

Aux termes d'un certain nombre de dclarations dmanant de fonctionnairesd'Etat, diverses dispositions de la convention traduiraient le droit internationalcoutumier. Voir, par exemple, le m~morandum du conseillerjuridique du Ddparte-ment d'Etat des Etats-Unis, reproduit dans Digest of United States Practice inInternational Law, 1980, pp. 1026 et 1035 et note 43; Ia lettre de la Ripublique deKiribati au Secrdtaire g6nral de l'Organisation des Nations Unics, reproduite dansBYIL, 1981, vol. 52, p. 385.

0 Voir la lettre adresse par le conseiller juridique de l'Organisation desNations Unies au directeur ex~cutif de r*Organisation internationale du cacao,reproduite dans Annuairejuridique des Nations Unies 1991, p. 315. Voir igalementConfErence internationale sur rex-Yougoslavie, Commission d'arbitrage, avis no I(voir note pr(cddente), par. I e) et avis n* 9 (voir note pr&c&dente), par. 2 et 4.

De m~me il convient de ne pas sous-estimer limportance desprojets d'articles que la Commission a rdig~s dans le domaine dudroit des organisations internationales. Certes la Convention deVienne de 1975 sur la reprdsentation des Etats dans leurs relationsavec les organisations intemationales de caractire universel n'est pasencore entrde en vigueur, plus de 20 ans apr s sa conclusion7". NA-an-moins le fait est que cette convention est souvent cite par les Etatset les organisations internationales dans le cours de leur activitd72 et ilest admis qu'un certain nombre de ses dispositions ou bien font partiedu droit coutumier ou bien refl~tent la pratique dominante73 .

Un autre exemple est fourni par la Convention de Vienne de1986. dlabor~e sur la base du projet d'articles de la Commission sur ledroit des trait~s entre Etats et organisations internationales ou entreorganisations internationales, qui n'a recueilli que 23 des 35 ratifica-tions ou adh6sions qu'exige son entrde en vigueur"4. II ne fait cepen-dant gu~re de doute que, comme la Convention de Vienne de 1969 surle droit des trait~s sur laquelle elle se fonde, elle occupe une placefondamentale clans le domaine du droit des trait s qu'elle concerne.Les tribunaux internationaux, en particulier, ont d~jA mentionn quecertaines de ses dispositions traduisaient le droit en vigueur 5 et lesorganisations du syst~me des Nations Unies utilisent courammcnt la

" A I'heure actuelle 30 Etats seulement acceptent d'&re lids par la conventionalors que 35 acceptations sont ndcessaires pour son entrde en vigueur. Sept autresEtats l'ont signde.

7 Voir la declaration faite par le conseiller juridique de rOrganisation desNations Unies A la 71 s&ance du Comit6 des relations avec le pays h6te, reproduitedans Annuairejuridique des Nations Unies 1978, pp. 237-240.

' Voir, par exemple, le paragraphe 10 de la note verbale adressde par leSecrdtaire gdndral de I'Organisation des Nations Unies au reprdsentant permanentd'un Etat Membre (voir supra note 63); le paragraphe 4 du mdmorandum adress6par le conseiller juridique de rOrganisation des Nations Unies au chef adjoint duprotocole, reproduit dans Annuaire juridique des Nations Unies 1977, p. 208; laddclaration faite par le conseillerjuridique de I'Organisation des Nations Uniesla 71V sdance du ComitE des relations avec le pays h6te (voir la note prdcdente)les paragraphes 4 et 5 de la ddclaration faite par le conseiller juridique A laI IS' s.ance du Comitd des relations avec le pays h6te, reproduits dans Annuairejuridique des Nations Unies 1986, p. 368; et le paragraphe 4 du mdmorandumadressd par le Bureau des affaires juridiques de I'Organisation des Nations Uniesau juriste principal, bureau du Directeur gcn~ral, Office des Nations Unies AGenZwe. reproduit dans Annuaire juridique des Nations Unies 1991. p. 320.

" Seize autres Etats et dix organisations internationales ont sign ]a Con-'.cntion.

" Tant la Cour de Justice des Communautds europ-ennes que ses avocatsgdn6raux ont indiqud que certaines dispositions de la convention refldtaient le droitinternational coutumicr. Voir Ripubliquefranfaise c. Commission des Commu-nautds europdennes. affaire C-327/91. Recued de la Jurisprudence de la Cour dejustice, 1994-8. partie I, conclusions de ravocat g6ndral, p. 3649, par. 12 et arrt dela Cour, p. 3674, par. 25. Voir aussi infra Ic texte A la note 79.

convention comme un guide pour l'dlaboration, [interpretation et'application de leurs trait6s.

!!!.

1action de la Commission du droit international est remarquableA un autre point de vue: elle s'est taillke une place importante dans leprocessus de formation de la coutume.

Que les travaux de ]a Commission et ses rdalisations puissentjouerun r6le dans le processus meme de formation de ]a coutume n'dtait pasclairement prdvu par le statut. Pourtant, comme '6tude sommaire de'ceuvre de la Commission suffit As le montrer, celle-ci s'est totalement

implique dans le processus qui consiste A identifier, consolider, main-tenir, adapter et meme former des rigles de droit international coutu-mier ou g~ndral. En particulier on a considrd A maintes reprises queles conventions adopt6es sur la base de projets d'articles prepars parla Commission fournissaient une preuve autoris6e de l'dtat du droit cou-tumier, parfois avant mame qu'elles ne soient entr(es en vigueur 76. Defaqon plus spectaculaire encore et qui illustre bien 'action de la Com-mission A cet 6gard, des projets d'articles de la Commission ont 6t6eux-memes consid6r6s comme apportant la preuve de la situation pr6-valant en droit coutumier 77, parfois m.me avant qu'ils ne soient ddfini-tivement adopt6s 78 . Ainsi, par exemple, avant m~me que la Commis-sion ait achevd son travail sur le droit des trait~s entre Etats etorganisations internationales ou entre organisations internationales, ]aCour internationale de Justice a citd l'une des dispositions de ce projetcomme representative du droit coutumier 9. L'euvre de la Commis-sion dans le domaine de la responsabilit6 des Etats mdrite spciale-ment de retenir 'attention A cet 6gard. Avant m~me que la Commis-

76 Voir sp6cialcment les positions relatives A la Convention de Vienne de 1969sur le droit des traitds, cites supra notes 60 A 63, et dont beaucoup sont antdrieuresA 1'entr.c en vigueur de la convention.

"7 Voir par exemple la ddcision du Tribunal f~ddml suisse dans I'affaire X c.Ministi're public de la Confideration, Annuaire suisse de droit international, 1980,vol. 36, p. 205, qui, bien que posterieure i 'adoption de la Convention de 1978 surla succession d'Etats en matinre de traitds, mentionne uniquement le projet d'arti-cles de la Commission qui a servi de base A [a convention.

" Voir par exemple la lettre adressde par le Bureau des affaires juridiques deI'Organisation des Nations Unies au chef du Service juridique de ]'Organisationmondiale de la santd, op. cit. (supra note 69).

Les ddlibdrations de la Commission sur un sujet donne- ont souvent 6t6considtr~es plus tard comme traduisant rHtat du droit, "i I'poquc, sur la questionconsidr6e: voir Plateau continental de la mer du Nord (voir note 65), par. 49-55,62 et 85; Arbitrage entre le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et dirlande duNord et la Rtspublique franfaise sur la delimitation du plateau continental (voirsupra note 62), par. 37.

" interpretation de I'accord du 25 mars 1951 entre I'OMS et l'Egypte (voirsupra note 60), par. 47.

sion ait achevd la premiere lecture du projet d'articles relatifs A cettequestion, les rapports des rapporteurs spdciaux et les projets d'arti-cles jusque 1A adoptds par la Commission 6taient djA fr.quemmentinvoqu6s A titre de preuves du droit international gindral. Les tri-bunaux internationaux en particulier se rdfarent depuis un certaintemps aux travaux de la Commission quand ils traitent de problmessoulevs en la matire. Qui plus est, un tribunal arbitral a jug6, ii y adix ans, que la premiXre partie du projet d'articles dtait , I'exposd leplus rcent et le plus autoris6 du droit international actuel dans cedomaine u91.

11 se peut qu'au moment oii la Commission aborde I'6tude d'unsujet, le droit coutumier en la matii-re ou bien ne soit pas fixd ou biensoit A un stade de formation. Grice au travail de la Commission desrfgles nouvelles peuvent commencer A dmerger et A prendre progres-sivement forme dans le droit international coutumier. En particulierl'analyse de la pratique existante des Etats A laquelle la Commissionproc~de et ses recommandations quant A l'orientation future du droitpeuvent ddclencher des rdactions favorables de la part des Etats,influencer l'orientation de la pratique et de l'opiniojuris dans le senssugg~rd par ]a Commission et aboutir finalement A ce que son projetd'articles soit reconnu, lors d'une confeence de plnipotentiaires,comme refldtant la pratique qui s'est d6gag6e et l'opinion dans sonensemble. De cette mani~re la Commission peut jouer un r6le dminentdans la formation m~me des rigles du droit international coutumier.

' Voir par exemple les sentences suivantes du Tribunal des diffdrends irano-amiricains: International Technical Products Corporation and ITP Export Cor-poration v. the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran et al., sentence n* 196-302-3 (24 octobre 1985), Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports, vol. 9, 1985,p- 206, note 35; Alfred L W. Short v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, sentencen°312-11135-2 (14 juillet 1987). ibid. vol. 16, 1987, p. 76, par. 28 et 33; Kennethp. Yeager v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, sentence n* 324-10199-1 (2 novembre1987). ibid., vol. 17. 1987, p. 92, par. 33. 42 et 65; Jack Rankin v. The IslamicRepublic of Iran, sentence n' 326-10913-2 (3 novembre 1987). ibid.. p. 135, par. 18,25 et 30 c et e; et Phillips Petroleum Company Iran v. The Islamic Republic of Iran,The National Iranian Oil Company, sentence n* 425-39-2 (29 juin 1989), ibid..vol. 21, 1989, p. 79, note 26. Voir aussi les sentences arbitrales suivantes: Affaireconcernant raccord adrien du 27 mars 1946 entre les Etats-Unis dAmrique et laFrance. sentence du 9 d6cembre 1978, RSA. vol. XVIII. p. 417, par. 31; Affaireconcernant les problemes nds entre 1,a Nouvelle-Zlande et 1la France... (voir supranote 62, par. 72, 77, 78, 101 et 105 (et [a note relative aux par. 113 et 122); AMCO-Asia Corporation and others v. The Republic of Indonesia. sentence sur le fond.31 mai 1990. ILR, vol. 89. p. 405, par. 172; Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Com-pany v. The Republic of Burundi. sentence du 4 mars 1991, ILR, vol. 96, p. 282,par. 61 (et note relative aux par. 55. 56 et 66).

" Jack Rankin v. The Islamic Republic of Iran (voir la note pr6c6dente).par. 18. Une autre sentence arbitrale a dit que cc domaine 6tait en vole de codifi-cation par la Commission du digit international: Affaire concernant les problemesnis entre la Nouvelle-ZMande el la France... (voir supra note 62). par. 72.

Ainsi, lorsque la Commissifl a. ..... a.......

la mer au dbut des anndes 1950, le plateau continental n'dtait pasencore dot6 d'un statut positif au regard de la coutume, la pratique desEtats en la mati~re dtant toute r6cente, encore incomplete et discor-dante82. Pourtant, comme la Cour internationale de Justice I'a notW ideux reprises83, au moment oti la premiere Conference des NationsUnies sur le droit de la mer s'est attach~e en 1958 A 6laborer une con-vention sur la base du projet d'articles pr~par6 par la Commission surle plateau continental, les Etats en 6taient venus A considdrer que lesr gles fondamentales de cette institution 6taient dtablies ou sur lepoint de 'etre et qu'elles 6taient en outre traduites dans les disposi-tions pertinentes du projet de la Commission&. On a estim6 aussiqu'un processus largement similaire de d~veloppement juridique avaiteu lieu dans le cas du droit des trait~s, pour ce qui est des r~glesapplicables aux rdserves5.

Comme la Cour I'a 6galement affirm&6 un tel processus juri-dique peut ne pas prendre fin avec I'dlaboration et I'adoption d'uneconvention fond e sur le projet d'articles de la Commission. Ce n'estque si les Etats en viennent ultrieurement 4 accepter87 une telle con-vention ou A y adapter leur pratique88 que de nouvelles r~gles de droitcoutumier peuvent finalement voir le jour, modeles sur cellesqu'dnonce l'instrument en questionsg. Dans un tel cas, c'est le travail

s2 In the matter of an Arbitration between Petroleum Development (TrucialCost) Ltd and the Sheikh ofAbu Dhabi, sentence de septembre 1951, ILR, vol. 18,p. 144, par. 5 e.

" Plateau continental de la mer du Nord (voir supra note 65), par. 63; Plateaucontinental (Tunisie/Jamahiriya arabe libyenne) (voir supra note 65), par. 41-42.

" Dans les affaires du Plateau continental de la mer du Nord (voir supranote 65), la Cour internationale de Justice a estimd que 'examen par ]a Commis-sion de ]a question sur laquelle porte I'article 6 de la Convention sur le plateaucontinental avait contribud au d6veloppement du droit coutumier sur ce point: loc.cit. (supra note 78).

" C'est ainsi qu'au moment ob la Commission commengait son travail sur ledroit des traitds, les rgles applicables aux riserves, Iongtemps considdres commebien dtablies, taient devenues, A la suite d'une Evolution r(cente, tr~s instables ettr~s incertaines. Les travaux de la Commission ont dt6 au cceur du ddveloppementde l'opinio juris des Etats en ]a matiire et ont abouti A la cristallisation d'unnouveau rigime juridique avec ]'adoption A Vienne en 1969 de la Convention surle droit des traitts dont les dispositions relatives aux rdserves se fondaient surle projet d'articles adoptd par ia Commission en 1966. Voir Arbitrage entre leRoyaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord et la Rdpubliquefran-Vaise (voir supra note 62), par. 38.

'6 Plateau continental de la met du Nord (voir supra note 65), par. 71.M'Ibid., par. 73.ibid., par. 74 et 75.Dans les affaires du Plateau continental de la mer du Nord (voir supra

note 65), la Cour a procddE A une tude ddtaill~e du point de savoir si un telprocessus s'Etait produit en ce qui concernait les rgles enoncdes A 'article 6 de [aConvention de Gen~ve de 1958 sur le plateau continental eta conclu que tel n'&taitpas le cas (ibid., par. 81).

de la Commission qui constitue I'agent, direct ou indirect, de la cris-tallisation du nouveau droit, en ce qu'il aiguillonne et stimule la for-mation de l'opiniojuris des Etats et en ce qu'il precise et coordonneses 04ments.

Le fait que la Commission ait rnussi A susciter et A maintenir undialogue utile avec les Etats explique qu'elle soit partie prenante auprocessus de formation de la coutume sous tous ses aspects. Ce dia-logue, que la Commission poursuit par l'intermiaire de la SiximeCommission de I'Assemble gendrale, grice aux questionnairesqu'elle adresse individuellement A chaque Etat et grice aux demandesd'observations sur ses projets9O qu'elle leur envoic, mnzite d'etre port6A I'actif de la Commission9 .

IV.

La contribution que ia Commission a ainsi apport& au ddveloppe-ment progressif et A la codification du droit international a dt6 qualifi~ede diverses mani&es: wunique et incomparable>, 4gu~re moins queprodigieuse *, x distingu6e et durable *, 4c remarquable., ,d'une impor-tance exceptionnelle *, (,essentielle . 4 considoable *, 4 apprciable,,,positive o. On a affirmd que, si certaines des conventions de portemondiale d1abor~es sur la base de projets d'artices de la Commissionn'existaient pas, la conduite des relations internationales serait , inima-ginable *. On a reconnu aussi la contribution remarquable et durable dela Commission A une meilleure connaissance du droit international etl'on a dit que ses rapports et documents oonstituaient une source d'ins-piration d'une valeur inappr6ciable pour l'ensemble de la doctrine.

Compliments mis a part, la Commission a continud A s'efforcer deperfectionner ses proc6dures et m4thodes de travail sous tous leursaspects. A cette fin, elle a pris un certain nombre de mesures, finissantpar adopter r6cemment un rapport important qui contient beaucoup dereommandations sp6cifiques visant A am6iorer son utilitd et son effi-cacitdg. Elle a mis au point une proci-ure plus rigoureuse pour mieux

o Voir Rapport... quarante-huitibm session. p. 234, par. 171 et p. 237, par. 181.Pour avoir un aper~u de cc dialogue. se reporter A La Commission du droit inter-national et son izuvre, op. cit. (voir supra note 9), pp. 21-24.

" Ces dernieres ann6cs, la Commission s'est efforc&e d'intensifier encore cedialogue. Voir en particulier Ic r6cent rapport de la Commission sur ses proc~dureset mthodes de travail qui contient un certain nombre dc recommandations sp-cifiqucs A cet effet, Rapport... quarante-huitimc session, p. 223. par. 149 c A e etp. 238, par. 182. Noter aussi p. 237, par. 180 et p. 239, par. 185. L'Assembldeg d alc s'est intdressc 6galement au rcnforecment du dialogue: voir infra le texteS la note 95.

'2 Rapport... quarante-huiti-mc session. pp. 221-260. L'Assemb6e g&6r-ale apis note avec satisfaction de cc rapport dans sa rdolution 51/160 du 16 d~cembre1996 (par. 9).

choisir les nouveaux sujets A inscrire A son programme de travail".Elle s'est montre aussi plus ouverte A la diversit6 des formes quepourrait prendre son travail final, dans le cadre de son apport au pro-cessus juridique international, qu'il s'agisse de modNles de rgles, ded6clarations, de guides de la pratique, de commentaires, d'avis, etc9 .L'Assemblde g~n~rale pour sa part a pr~td une grande attention auxmodalits selon lesquelles elle examine ie rapport de la Commissionet a pris des mesures pour les amdliorer en vue de fournir A cettederni.re des directives plus efficaces 95.

Un effort concertnd est donc fait actuellement en vue d'amdliorerle fonctionnement de la Commission pour lui permettre de contribuerdavantage encore au ddveloppement progressif et A la codification dudroit international9. Cet effort procide de la conviction, partagde tantpar les Etats que par la Commission, qu'<< un processus ordonn6 decodification et de dAveloppement progressif continue de presenter unint~ret important ),97 et que la Commission pourra continuer A jouerun r6le considerable dans ce processus. I1 y a donc tout lieu de sup-poser que la Commission du droit international restera ce qu'elle a Wces 50 derniires annes: Ic principal organe 6tabli par 'Assembldegdn~rale dans le domaine du ddveloppement progressif et de la codi-fication du droit international.

9 Pour un bref aperqu de cette procddure, voir Rapport... quarante-huitiPmesession, pp. 231-232, par. 165 et 166.

"Ainsi, sur la question des rdserves aux traitds. voir par exemple: Rapport...quarante-cinquime session, p. 245, par. 430; Rapport... quarante-septibme session,pp. 262-264, par. 435 & 437 et 439; p. 273, par. 471 A 474 et pp. 276-277, par. 486A 488 et par. 491 bet c; Rapport... quarante-huitibrme session, pp. 209-210, par. 113.De meme sur la question des consequences de la succession d'Etats sur la natio-nalitd des personnes physiques et morales, voir par exemple: Rapport... quamnte-cinqui me session, p. 261, par. 437 et 439; Rapport...quarante-septime session,p. 82, par. 169-170 et pp. 87-88, par. 193: et Rapport... quarante-huiti.me session,p. 198, par. 81 et p. 201, par. 88 b. Plus gdnralement, voir ibid., p. 236, par. 178 infine. Comparer avec la manibre dont la Commission abordait la question par lepassd, Annuaire... 1988, vol. 11 (deuxiime partie), p. 116, par. 561.

" Voir en particulier les rdsolutions suivantes de 'Assembl~e gdndrale: rdso-lution 41/81 du 3 d6cembre 1986, troisiame alinda du prdambuic et paragraphe 5 bdu dispositif; rdsolution 42/156 du 7 d6cembre 1987. cinqui me alinda du priambuleet paragraphes 5 b et 6 du dispositif; rdsolution 43/169 du 9 d6cembre 1988, para-graphes 7 et 8 du dispositif; rdsolution 44/35 du 4 d6cembre 1989, paragraphe 5 dudispositif; et rdsolution 50/45 du I I ddcembre 1995, septiCme alinda du pr&mbuleet paragraphe 10 du dispositif.

' Voir en ce sens la rdsolution 50/45 de I'Assemblde gdn6rale en date duII d&cembre 1995, paragraphe 9 a du dispositif et Rapport... quarante-huitibmesession, p. 226, par. 154.

"Rapport... quarante-huiti.me session, p. 222, par. 148 b. Voir aussi p. 232,par. 168 et p. 234, par. 171.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AS THE CONSTITUTIONOF MANKIND

Christian Tomuschat

I. The Concept of "Constitution"

The concept of "constitution" has no precise meaning fixed onceand for all. Generally, constitution is a term employed with regard tonational legal systems only.' while international mechanisms withinwhich States cooperate have rarely been identified by that word. Inits recent jurisprudence, the Court of Justice of the European Com-munities has furthermore used the label of constitution in charac-terizing the basic treaties on which those Communities and the Euro-pean Union overarching them are founded.2 Notwithstanding itsproximity to the State or to entities developing para-statal charac-teristics, however, the concept of constitution has or can be given amuch broader meaning, in accordance with current linguistic usages.It may be taken to designate the basic legal framework of a given hu-man community, its essential structures and the ties which hold it to-gether. To be sure, as long as the relevant rules have not been formallydefined as such, one may have different views as to what belongs tothat hard core. Yet reflection permits to specify at least grosso modothe different components which, in their combination, make up a con-stitution.

It is a truism to state that the main task of any constitution is toenable human beings to live peacefully together in such a way thatboth the existence of the community concerned as well as the lives ofits members are protected. Constitutions serve to establish a viable

' In the words of Dicey. constitutional law includes "all rules which directlyor indirectly affect the distribution or the exercise of the sovereign power in theState", A. V. Dicey. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution,10th ed. (London, Mamillan, 1959). p. 23. For a more modern definition, seeK. Loewenstein, Political Power and the Governmental Process, 2nd ed. (Chicago,University of Chicago Press. 1965). p. 127.

"Opinion 1/91. European Economic Area, Reports 1991, 1-6099 (6102): "theconstitutional charter of a community based on the rule of law. For the first time,this statement can be found in a judgment of 23 April 1986, Les Verts, Reports1986, 1357(1365).

order under which the threat of bellum omnium contra omne.- L~aii Dcovercome. This presupposes that there exist ground rules determiningand allocating the main functions which must be discharged in orderto keep a political system on good course. These functions are, withslight variations, the same for every human community. In the first

place, human beings need common rules which reconcile the freedomof everyone with everyone else's freedom. In balancing these mutualclaims, the art consists in keeping necessary sacrifices to a minimum.Freedom for all under conditions of equality must not degenerate intofreedom for nobody. Be that as it may, it is not the detailed outcomeof such regulatory processes which forms part of a constitution butrather the rule that confers on a specific body the power to enact pro-visions binding on everyone.4 Second, it stands to reason that anyrules enacted require to be enforced by some executive agency.Lastly, if peace is to be kept within a given group, there must bemechanisms that permit the members of the group to settle their dis-putes in an orderly and peaceful manner. Again, the rules identifyingthe institutions entrusted with law enforcement or settlement of legaldisputes have a logical priority over others that may arise from car-rying out the different activities. They can certainly be counted amongthe central components of a constitution. The question of who isentitled to exercise the relevant powers is the key issue in any systemof governance.

Naturally, a constitution deserves its name only if its rules arebeing effectively observed and enforced. If it is reduced to a purelyrhetorical claim without any correspondence in life, it may at most becalled a nominal constitution. 5 Under such circumstances, however,the term loses its value as an analytical tool suitable to better under-stand political realities. A constitution, in order truly to deserve itsname, must be an effective constitution. 6 Its words must be a truereflection of the prevailing way and manner in which public powersare exercised within a given society.

II. The Need for an International Constitution

1. The question may be asked whether mankind does indeed needa constitution in the sense just described. Robinson, having become the

' T. Hobbes, Elementa Philosophica de Cive (Amsterdam, 1647), Praefatio adlectores.

In the words of H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1994),p. 94 et seq., these are rules of recognition.

' According to H. Kelsen, General Theor. of State and Law (New York,1961), p. 118 et seq., a general requirement for any legal order to be juridically inforce is its effectiveness.

6 Loewenstein, op. cit. (footnote I above), p. 148.

sole inhabitant of a remote island, could lead an autonomous, self-suf-ficient existence. Still today, there may be some indigenous groupsliving in the middle of the jungle without any contact with the outsideworld. Generally, however, the situation has changed dramaticallysince international law in the modern sense came into being in themiddle of the seventeenth century. At that time-and even before-Europe was a continent torn by rivalries and wars not only betweenclose neighbours, but pitting the most diverse coalitions against eachother. In other continents, similar developments took place. But thedifferent theatres of events were in most instances well separatedfrom one another. Occurrences in Asia or Africa did not have imme-diate repercussions on other continents, the main connecting elementbeing the fight for supremacy between the colonial powers of Europe.Even as late as the second half of the nineteenth century, the worldhad not really become a universal whole. Large stretches in Africa andAsia had not yet joined the mainstream of intercourse among nations,but continued their disconnected existence outside the rapidly devel-oping world of modern technology and communication.

Since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, for the first timein the history of mankind a worldwide network of interaction hasgradually come into being. While in earlier centuries the differentcommunities had relatively few mutual contacts, except %kith their im-mediate neighbours, today a vast array of factors can be indicated thatde facto tie all the nations of the globe together. Any major develop-ment in one country will therefore cause repercussions somewhereelse, and not only just across the next border. A classical link is con-stituted by international trade, and yet the mutual interrelated natureof the world economy has advanced at such a fast pace and reachedsuch dimensions that today any crisis in one of the leading economiesof the world affects all other economies within days or weeks only.But the most dramatic changes have occurred with regard to the fac-tors determining not only the natural habitat of man, but nature as awhole. Air and water cannot be imprisoned behind national boundarypillars; they move freely from land to sea or around the globe and takewith them on their course any contamination they may have sufferedby human activity. As a result of all the deleterious effects producedby modern industrialized societies, even the climate of this globe hascome under serious threat of profound-and unwelcome-changes;similarly, the progressive destruction of the ozone layer is the resultof activities undertaken in all parts of the world. Lastly, the phenome-non of human migration should be referred to. Invariably, policies ofrepression by dictatorial power wielders, ethnic wars or patterns ofpoverty and famine trigger flows of human beings, only some of thembeing refugees in a formal sense, who seek safe havens in other coun-tries, frequently far away from their countries of origin. Thus, even in

a region like Western Europe that has enjoyed peace for more thanfive decades and may continue to do so under a commonly estab-lished system of close cooperation, there is no reason for boundlessoptimism since many of the factors mentioned may affect the futurein an unforeseen manner. Goethe's comment that every bourgeoisleans comfortably back when being apprised of battles between peo-ples "far away in Turkey"7 has definitely been overtaken by events.Today, any news about social tension and armed conflict somewherein the world, irrespective of their location, must ring an alarm bellprecisely in nations living under conditions of peace because, morethan any other nations, they are vitally dependent on the continuanceof that favourable state of affairs.

2. It may seem a Herculean task to see all this-and many moreproblems-tackled by the international community. And yet to faceup to the tasks transcending national boundaries is inevitable. Man-kind does need a stable framework for action that at least seeks todeal with the existing and any newly emerging problems in a fair andequitable manner. For that purpose, clear-cut premises are needed.Mankind should be prepared to face up to the challenges confrontingit in a spirit of rationality by peaceful means, respecting the rights ofall of its members. Of course, one could also embrace a more cynicalapproach, referring to the famous dictum that "war is the father of allthings" (Heraclit). But if war is left to shape the destiny of mankind,this amounts to opening the gates of anarchy and death. What isneeded is a reliable foundation for the life of future generations. Apr~snous le diluge has never been the motto of a political constitutionsupported by a people as a whole. It may be the leitmotif of a groupin a society that realizes that its time has run out. If ever an attemptis made to pave the way into the future in a responsible way, the prin-ciples of peace and justice must indicate the general direction.

3. It is clear that a universal framework for action, a constitu-tion of mankind, cannot be directly related to the individual humanbeing. No system seeking to regulate the interaction among more than5 billion persons would be viable. Rather, the existing power centreshave to be relied upon by necessity. States do exist as entities whichpeoples generally view as the legitimate expression of their politicalaspirations and within which they are able to develop a true sense ofsolidarity-something which at the universal level is also proclaimed,but remains a somewhat artificial construction. They are able to bun-dle and focus all the energies and forces of their citizens, and thereforethey constitute indispensable building blocks when it comes to estab-

' J. W. von Goethe, Faust, Part 1 (1808), line 862: "Wenn hinten, weit in derTuirkei, die V61ker aufeinander schlagen," quoted from Werke, 15th cd., vol. 3(Minchen, Hamburger Ausgabe, 1993).

lishing any kind of legal framework at a higher level. This does notdetract from the fact that the human being remains the final benefici-ary of the entire system of international law. But the individual cannotbe given a decisive role within the mechanisms of a world constitu-tion. The sheer weight of numbers makes it necessary to rely on rep-resentative institutions. In this sense, every State and every Govern-ment play the role of a representative of its people.

Ill. The Features of the Constitution of Mankind under Positive Inter-national Law--General Obseriations

1. It is easy to make the preceding observations and the existingrules of positive international law meet. The Charter of the UnitedNations has laid down the guiding principles of the present-day worldorder which has emerged from the ruins of the Second World War.These principles, as elaborated upon in General Assembly resolution2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, the so-called Friendly Relations Decla-ration. are sovereign equality, self-determination and non-use of force,additionally strengthened by the-somewiat fluid-prohibition of in-tervention. All these principles reinforce and support one another. Self-determination, although it came into being as a generally acknowledgedrule of international law only in the 1960s, may be called the primaryrule of origin. It permits any people to decide on its own fate. Once, inexercise of the right of self-determination, a State has been established,that State is recognized as the legitimate governmental structure withregard to the people concerned and the territory inhabited h\ it. Theprinciples of non-use of force and non-interference haxe an auxiliaryfunction to play in that they protect the substantive results of the pro-cess of self-determination against threats from outside. Lastly, the prin-ciple of cooperation marks a transition to a different world order, basedmore on solidarity than sovereign independence.

This configuration, apart from the emphasis placed on self-deter-mination, has many traditional features. Sovereign equality is nothingnew under the sun. And yet, if it is viewed as anchored in the principleof self-determination, it acquires a new value and an incrca'zd dignitywhich is more than a simple reflection of a situation existing as a fact oflife shaped by power and might. As long as sovereign equality amountedto no more than such a defacto position, there %;as no particular jus-tification for providing it with a cloak of protection. If, however, it isrecognized as the expression of self-determination by a people, thisreason alone militates decisively for affording it with additional guar-antees such as, in particular, a ban on the use of force and interventionas now enshrined in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations.

The triad of self-determination, sovereign equality and prohibi-tion of the use of force in its rigid combination boils down to a fairly

static legal framework of international relations. It means essentiallythat the territorial configuration of the world, i.e., its division intoStates with fixed boundary lines, should remain as it is. The Charterof the United Nations does not know of any legal mechanisms de-signed to bring about adjustments in an orderly way. Likewise, theright of self-determination is not recognized as comprehending a rightof secession in favour of ethnic groups wishing to sever the ties withthe majority population of the country in which they live. Only in asomewhat hidden fashion has the Friendly Relations Declarationstated that a right of secession might be susceptible of being claimedby a people if it is not permitted to participate on a footing of parityin the conduct of public affairs of its country.8 Peaceful change, a con-cept carefully, albeit very cautiously, developed by the Covenant ofthe League of Nations, 9 has not been granted right of abode in theCharter of the United Nations. It therefore denotes a purely politicalprocess which requires consent by all parties concerned.

Notwithstanding the rigidity of this scheme, its recognition as thelegal foundation of the international community is fully warrantedinasmuch as it guarantees the existence of its members. No humangroup would be prepared to abandon itself or to cede parts of its ter-ritory without resisting, if necessary by force, any outside threat tothat effect. Peace and cooperation can only be obtained if peoples arereferred to what is in their possession. Every nation is called upon tomake the best use of its own resources, to develop its territory and itshuman capital. Thus, self-determination means at the same time self-responsibility and self-reliance.

To live in States they have shaped according to their own wishesis not only an entitlement of peoples, but also an element of the cur-rent world order concept. Overall responsibility for all events occur-ring within the territory of a State lies with its governmental institu-tions. The international community has up to now refrained fromclaiming for itself supreme authority. It trusts that the main functionsof governance will be effectively discharged by States. In particular,to keep law and order constitutes the core task without whose fulfil-ment no human community can peacefully exist.

' See D. Murswiek, "The Issue of a Right of Secession-Reconsidered", inCh. Tomuschat, ed., Modern Law of Self-Determination (Dordrecht, Kluwer,1993), pp. 21 et seq. For an enlightening background discussion, see M. Kosken-niemi, "National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Prac-tice", ICLQ, vol. 43 (1994). p. 241 et seq.

See Article 19: "The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsid-eration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable andthe consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endangerthe peace of the world".

The phenomenon of the "failed State" wreaks havoc in that artfuledifice of international governance. If a State falls into anarchy, withdifferent factions fighting for supremacy, it loses its quality as a reli-able actor on the international stage. Treaties concluded with it will bedeprived of any practical significance because there is no one to re-spect and implement them. Nobody can speak in international forumson behalf of the country concerned with any degree of authority. Eventhe notion of international responsibility presupposes a well-organ-ized machinery. If instead of just one government several rival groupscontend for power, the factual conditions for making the country con-cerned accountable are simply lacking.'0 International law cannot beeffective under such circumstances. In order to be complied with, itpresupposes stable institutions responsive to the claims and expecta-tions of the international community.

2. It is an insight gained through the bitter experiences of theSecond World War that a system exclusively based on the juxtaposi-tion of sovereign entities will not prove workable in the long run. Theaddition of individual egotisms does not make up an internationalcommunity. Some overarching or supporting structure is necessary tobind the different elements together. Indeed, there are today two typesof factors that provide the kind of cohesive glue without which thefragmentation of the world could not be overcome.

On the one hand, the international community has sought toidentify a number of basic values that are shared by mankind as awhole. Already in the Charter of the United Nations, human rights areproclaimed as one of the primary goals to be pursued by the worldOrganization. Set forth in detail for the first time in the Universal Dec-laration of Human Rights of 1948, human rights were translated intobinding legal form mainly through the two International Covenants of1966. Notwithstanding some divergencies particularly on the politicalaspects of human rights, the essential consensus has been maintained.Indeed, the Vienna Declaration of 1993 states unambiguously that'Ithe universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond ques-tion"." Thus, the dignity of the human person constitutes a valueshared-at least on paper-by all Governments of this globe. As manywars show, however, this credo is easily forgotten where historicaltraumas entangle people's minds.

Apart from a substantive support structure of common values,the international community requires an organizational structure pro-vided with institutions that are able to discharge those functions

so Suffice it to refer to the deplorable conditions prevailing in Somalia.

"1Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. United Nations documentA/CONF.157124. part 1. para. I.

which transcend the capacities of an individual nation acting alone.The principle of international cooperation becomes operative onlythrough such institutions, which nowadays exist in a rich variety, notleast embodied in the specialized agencies.

It is much more doubtful whether one can, additionally, speak ofa principle of international solidarity, operative in inter-State relation-ships as a collective reflection of the welfare State principle nowadayscurrent in domestic legal systems. It is significant, in this regard, thatthe right to development, notwithstanding its universal approval bythe Vienna World Conference on Human Rights in June 1993,12 hasnot yet been defined in clear and precise terms.'3 Although develop-ment assistance has become a routine component of the foreign policyof all the wealthier nations, its legal position remains far from beingconsolidated. Recently, severe cuts in the budgets of some Westernnations have marked a principled turnaround in the general evaluationof strategies directed at providing monies for development purposes.Notwithstanding the general realization that a world characterized bya deep divide between rich and poor countries runs extreme risks offalling prey to unrest and violence, to date there exists no clear textof hard and fast law that unequivocally sets forth the principle of soli-darity as a basic principle of international law on the same footing assovereign equality.

IV. The Main Functions of Governance

At the regional level, the European Union constitutes today the bestdeveloped model of an association of States having joined to pursuecertain common goals. The European Union has developed far-reachingand sophisticated procedures of law-making, law enforcement andadjudication. Although primarily geared to ensure economic goals, ithas at the same time been able to ensure peace among its members.

However important the European experiment may be, what mat-ters in the last analysis is world peace among all of the nations of thisglobe. Yet at the universal level, institutions are still much less developed.The Charter of the United Nations was a great step forward in 1945. Butit could not bring about a full-scale revolution of the legal ground rulesdetermining the relationships between the members of the internationalcommunity.

1. Law-making is certainly the most important function in anysystem of governance. In that respect, 1945 ushered in little change. Thedrafters of the Charter of the United Nations may not even have been

'2 Ibid., part I, para. 10."3 The Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted by General Assem-

bly resolution 41/128 of 4 December 1986, hardly provides any firm ground.

aware of the fact that, by almost literally reproducing Article 38 of theStatute of the Permanent Court of International Justice in Article 38of the Statute of the new International Court of Justice, they opted forimmobilism. Indeed, by putting international treaties in the first placeof the list of sources to be applied by the International Court of Jus-tice, they re-affirmed the principle of sovereign decision power \,ithregard to international law-making. Since treaties are instruments ofself-commitment, and since treaty-making is the only process of con-scious law-making afforded by general international law, the practicalresult is that new law can only be created by consent, in particular theconsent of those most affected by newly envisaged obligations.

It is not that a system characterized by a predominance of trea-ties does not have its positive sides. When a State formally accepts atreaty, it normally knows what it does. Ratification expresses a delib-erate will to live up to the rules established by the instrument- Rarelyare treaties concluded with the hidden mental reservation not to com-ply ,ith them, the question whether the good intentions of the begin-ning wili last forever being another matter.

On the other hand, to make collective law-making dependent onthe will of every single member of the international community is astrategy that has its natural limitations. The international communitycannot tolerate major disturbances caused through the exercise ofsovereign power that refuses to submit to a treaty regime designed formajor new challenges confronting mankind.'4 To some extent, gapsmay be closed by deriving specific legal obligations from the generalprinciples underlying the international legal order. Thus, in particularsovereign equality can be resorted to as a source for many more spe-cific obligations, in particular in the field of environmental protection.If every State is sovereign and equal to every other State, this meansin particular that territorial integrity must be respected. 15 On the otherhand, purely substantive obligations fall short of the essential proce-dural mechanisms which nowadays complement all major treaties.More and more. such procedural devices have become an integral ele-ment of treaty regimes. With regard to customary obligations, a so-phisticated system of State responsibility might fulfil a similar pur-

" The denunciation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weap-ons by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 1993 became a major issueof concern for the international community, prompting action by the SecurityCouncil; for a brief account of developments, see Yearbook of the United Nations1993. pp. 356-359.

" Reference may be made in this connection to the Declaration of the UnitedNations Conference on the Human Environment of 16 June 1972, United Nationsdocument AICONF.48/14/Rev.I, Principle 21. and the Rio Declaration on Environ-ment and Development of 14 June 1992. United Nations document AJCONF.151/5/Rev.I. Principle 2.

pose. Hitherto, however, the work done by the International LawCommission is essentially confined to codifying the traditional law.

2. Likewise, the executive function is only poorly developed ininternational law. Generally, every State is for itself the guardian of itsinterests. If a treaty obligation owed to it is not complied with, it hasno institution to turn to in order to trigger an enforcement mechanism.Rather, it is left to its own imagination to devise appropriate strategiesto vindicate its rights. The legal order puts at its disposal for that pur-pose the two remedies of retorsion and countermeasures, which bothoperate within a bilateral context. In some multilateral forums, how-ever, procedures have been set up to monitor and ensure compliancethrough collective institutions. Again, the European Community (EC)should be referred to in the first place in this connection. Under Arti-cle 169 of the EC Treaty, the European Commission has been for-mally entrusted with seeing to it that community law in its entirety befaithfully observed. States are thus relieved of the burden to fight fortheir legal entitlements, all the more so since the individual has beengranted legal standing as well to invoke to his or her benefit all thetreaty stipulations that are sufficiently precise to permit direct appli-cation by judicial bodies.

It is the great stride forward achieved by the Charter of theUnited Nations that the traditional model of self-reliance has beendeparted from in instances where to follow it would be tantamount topronouncing a death sentence upon a State that has become the targetof armed force. In order to maintain international peace and security,the Security Council was created. Its primary mandate is to ensurefull respect for the principle of non-use of force against attempts toinfringe on the territorial integrity or political independence of States.In every human community, the task of ensuring law and order con-stitutes indeed the basic function of governance. By entrusting a col-lective institution with safeguarding peace among nations, the StatesMembers of the United Nations have indeed taken a decisive step to-wards the establishment of a true constitution of the internationalcommunity. Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations is thekey element of that constitution.

It need not be stressed here that the permanent members of theSecurity Council occupy a pivotal position in the carefully con-structed arrangement for the exercise of the powers provided forby Chapter VII. Although by acting alone they are unable to tilt thebalance for the positive adoption of a resolution, their veto powerenables them to block any decision. Thus, if at all the non-permanentmembers wish to see the power of the Security Council actually acti-vated, they are compelled to accommodate the wishes of the perma-nent members. In fact, the "Big Five" are well aware of their key role.

Convening in inner circles behind closed doors, they generally attemptto agree on a desired course of action long before the Security Councilis officially seized of a draft project.

From a constitutional viewpoint, it is abundantly clear that thepermanent seats held by the "Big Five" have not been granted to themas individual entitlements in recognition of their factual position ofpower, but as a competence to be exercised in the interest of the in-ternational community. Juridically speaking, permanent seats do nothave the quality of private assets; rather, they are a public trust, to behandled responsibly in accordance with the general philosophy per-meating the Charter of the United Nations. The whole system of col-lective security may therefore suffer serious harm if any of the Gov-ernments holding permanent seats publicly declares that it will use itsSecurity Council position for the furtherance of its national policiesonly.16 There is no denying the fact that the permanent members can-not simply disregard their own interests. More often than not, as asecond step. they will additionally be requested to substantially backup actions decided by the Security Council. But if national interest istheir only parameter of orientation, other nations will find it hard torecognize resolutions of the Security Council as the legitimate exer-cise of a world order institution established by the international com-munity.

3. Regarding the judicial function, the constitution of the inter-national community, as embodied in the Charter of the United Na-tions and also crystallized as customary law, has not been able as yetto go beyond the important-but at the same time little effective-proposition in Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Na-tions that all States are under an obligation to settle their internationaldisputes by peaceful means. As such, the rule does not add much tothe principle of non-use of force inasmuch as the qualifyer of "freechoice of means" remains applicable and no State is required toaccept third-party settlement of any controversies regarding its juridi-cal status under international law.' 7 Again, the European Communitymight serve as a countermodel. Here, every member submits to thecompulsory jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Com-munities simply by adhering to the relevant treaties. At the world-

" The statement that the United States will participate in United Nationspeace-keeping operations only if such participation "advances US interests" (seestatement by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and RequirementsEdward L. Warner before a United States Senate Subcommittee, 13 April 1994.ILM, vol. XXXIII (1994). p. 816) would have to be severely criticized if it wereunderstood in a narrow sense-

" Ch. Tomuschat. Commentary on Article 2 (3) of the Charter of the UnitedNatioms marginal notes 12 and 13. in B. Simma. ed., The Charter of the UnitedNations-A Commentary (Oxford. Oxford University Press, 1994).

wide level, by contrast, the jurisdiction of the International Court ofJustice requires specific acceptance by the parties concerned. It is anopen question to what extent suggestions made by the InternationalLaw Commission to introduce a general system of dispute settlementin the field of State responsibility-which means that internationallaw in all its widest possible scope will be encompassed s-may winsupport by the international community. Currently, under the circum-stances of 1996, chances for such a breakthrough would appear to berather dim.

In one specific sector, however, international adjudication hasmade considerable headway precisely during the United NationsDecade of International Law. In order to permit the trial of personsresponsible for grave crimes against basic tenets of the internationalcommunity, the Security Council established, first, the Yugoslavia Tri-bunal in 199319 and, second, the Rwanda Tribunal in 1994.'0 Bothjurisdictions are not inernational tribunals in the traditional sense, i.e.,judicial bodies entrusted with adjudicating disputes between States.Rather, they follow the example of NUrnberg and Tokyo where themain war criminals among the German and the Japanese leadershipwere tried. It is no exaggeration to state that a system for the prose-cution of individuals committing grave violations of the fundamentalrules of the international legal order belongs also to the core elementsof a constitution of the international community. Obviously, muchremains to be done. Instead of continuing the piece-meal approachstarted with the creation of the Yugoslavia and the Rwanda Tribunals,the international community should seriously consider adopting thestatute of a permanent international criminal court, submitted to theGeneral Assembly of the United Nations by the International LawCommission in 1994.21

V. Need for Action

As the preceding observations have shown, there is ample room forimprovement in all the areas that come within the scope of the interna-tional community. To be sure, it would not be wise to make proposalsdirected at building utopian constructions. The sovereign State is still

11 Draft articles on State responsibility adopted by Ihe International LawCommission on first reading, Part Three: Settlement of disputes, Report of theinternational Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session. OfficialRecords of the General Assembly, Fifty-first Session, Supplement No. 10(A/51/10), p. 147.

'9 Resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993.' Resolution 855 (1994) of 8 November 1994.21 For the text, see the Report of the International Law Commission on the

work of its forty-sixth session, Official Records of the General Assembly. Forty-ninth session, Supplement No. 10 (A/49/10), para. 91.

the main building block of the present-day international order. Buteven powerful States are today dependent on international networksof cooperation. It should not be forgotten that, after the horrors of theSecond World War, it was in particular the United States that took theinitiative to establish a world organization to succeed the abortiveLeague of Nations. At that time, the United States Government wasfully aware of the necessity to ensure international peace through col-lective institutions. 22 Instead of viewing the future organization as anevil, it considered it as a desirable and indispensable institution.

Simply speaking, the primary goal must be to restore faith in theUnited Nations. Through their ill-considered policies in Bosnia-Herzegovina, national Governments and United Nations institutionsalike have steered the world Organization close to the brink ofcollapse. A world organization that remains passive when genocide iscommitted, women are raped, children shot by snipers and prisonersof war murdered in cold blood deprives itself of its raison d'etre. Theloss of credibility can be made good only by deeds which make clearthat everyone is to benefit from the existence of a legal frameworkwhose substantive as well as procedural elements embody the currentconstitution of the international community. If, however, the "BigFive", in particular, continue to shrug off their responsibilities lightly,treating them as a matter exclusively of their own national interest, theUnited Nations as a whole may lose the foundation of legitimacy onwhich it rests. Those whose interests are not taken care of will thenalmost necessarily be led to challenge its authority. Obviously, thiswould not change the prevailing configuration of power in the world.But the Security Council might be reduced to a pure club of themighty few, divested of the recognition of all the other nations. Itwould then experience great difficulties in reasserting its authority ininstances where it needs the assistance of all States, big or small.

As one of more concrete steps, one may recommend thestrengthening of international law-making. Nobody will believe thatone day a general treaty to that effect may come into being. Yet thereare two other ways that should be explored and pursued. First of all,in elaborating new international treaties in specialized fields regardshould be had to the possibility of authorizing processes of secondarylaw-making, following the model of the European Community. On theother hand, there is no real obstacle to interpreting Chapter VII of theCharter of the United Nations in a broad sense as permitting the Se-curity Council to make general determinations on activities deemedby it directly to threaten international peace and security. Thus. the

" An informative description has been given by R. B. Russeli and J. E.Muther, A History of the United Nations Charter (Washington, D.C., BrookingsInstitution, 1958). passim.

Security Council would be perfectly entitled to ban all atmosphenctesting of nuclear devices-and perhaps one day also undergroundtesting.23 Unfortunately, a caveat cannot be eschewed in this connec-tion. Determinations by the Security Council that eventually are notenforced are likely to produce more harm than any positive resultsthat can be expected of such an exercise of regulatory power. Thus,extreme caution is required in enacting general rules for the mainte-nance of international peace and security. The catastrophic results ofdeclaring "protected zones" in Bosnia-Herzegovina 24 without takingeffective steps to make that promise a reality are still fresh in every-one's mind.

An international constitution needs the general approval of allthose to whom it is addressed. If the Charter of the United Nationswere ever appraised by a large majority of States as an instrumentsolely used to keep smaller nations under the authority of the bigpowers holding permanent seats on the Security Council, while thosepowers did not live up to their reciprocal commitments, the UnitedNations would be doomed. The first attempt to provide the interna-tional community with a somewhat tighter legal framework deservingto be charactized as a constitution would then have visibly failed. In-ternational law as such, without any effective institutions for the pro-tection of international peace and security, is too weak to be placedon the conceptual pedestal of a constitution. It is by no meansexcluded that at the universal level mankind may lose again the fairlyhigh degree of integration it has reached. But a growing realizationthat a strategy of pursuing national interest in a going-it-alone fashionmay also prompt a return to the enlightened days when the UnitedNations was founded by men and women clearly aware of the factthat their nations could only prosper within a universal framework ofpeace and justice.

2 For a more ample demonstrtion, see Ch. Tonmuschat, "Obligations Arisingfor States Without or Against Their Will", Recueil des cours... 1993-IV, vol. 241,pp. 344-346.

2' Security Council resolutions 819 (1993) of 16 April 1993; 824 (1993) of6 May1993; and 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993.

THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONALCOMMUNITY

Igor Ivanovich Lukashuk

Mankind is approaching a historic turning-point: the beginning ofthe third millennium of the common era. Today there is an especiallykeen desire to look into the future and try to see what it holds. It istherefore quite natural that more and more new works on the subjectof the future, including the future of international law, are being pub-lished. '

On the eve of the twenty-first century, highly significant eventsare taking place in the field of international law. The United Nationshas celebrated its first half-century. The International Law Commis-sion is now approaching its fiftieth anniversary. These dates fallduring the United Nations Decade of International Law, which closesthe twentieth century. These events are not as fortuitous as they mayseem. They point to the fact that the coming century will be one of aninternational community truly based on law, a century of universalrule of law. International law will become the law of the internationalcommunity.

In recent years, the expression "international community" hasbecome firmly established not only in political instruments but also inlegal instruments. It is also finding its way into the domestic law ofindividual States. Thus, there is a provision in the Preamble of theConstitution of the Russian Federation in accordance with which thePeople adopted the Constitution "recognizing [itself] as a part of theworld community". 2 This is a reflection of a new, contemporary rela-tion to the surrounding world based on the notion of an organic linkto the world community. Russia, as any other country, cannot pursue

'There are quite a few publications of this kind, such as R. J. Dupuy, ed., TheFuture of international Law in a Multicultural World (The Hague. MartinusNijhoff, 1984); T. 0. Elias. New Horizons in International Law. 2nd ed. (Dordrecht.Martinus Nijhoff. 1992); J. Delbruck, ed. The Future of International LawEnforcement: New Scenarios-New Lai (Berlin, Durcker and Humblot, 1993);1. Lukashuk, Onoshenija mirnogo sosushzestvovanija i mezhdunarodnoje prav'o[Relations of Peaceful Coexistence and international Law] (Kiev. 1976). ch. IN'.pp. 147-190 (in Russian).

2 The expression "world community" is usually used to denote two concepts.In one instance it means the same thing as "international community-; in another.it may be defined as the "community of peoples" or "mankind".

its national interests in isolation but only in cooperation with othercountries as a member of the international community.

Contemporary international law, often called post-confronta.tional, constitutes a revival of the law of the Charter of the UnitedNations. This historic document reflected the hopes and dreams ofmankind, which had endured untold suffering during the SecondWorld War. At the time, even conservative statesmen could not ignoresuch aspirations. To a large extent, the Cold War halted the process ofrestructuring international law and international relations on the basisof the purposes and principles of the Charter.

However, one cannot fail to observe that, notwithstanding the icyarmour of the Cold War, international law continued to develop. Thisbears witness to the vitality of the process of the progressive develop-ment of international law. We must emphasize the role that the Inter-national Law Commission played in this process.

While the purposes and principles of the Charter were to a con-siderable extent only formally recognized during the Cold War, theyare now becoming part of the daily practice of international relationsand serve as the basis for restructuring international law. Post-confrontational international law is creating the preconditions for thetransition to the law of the international community.

Since the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations, theworld has changed significantly, attaining a new degree of unity as aresult of strengthened ties between States and their greater inter-dependence. Today, new ways must be found to solve the fundamen-tal foreign policy problem faced by States, namely, the problem ofstriking a balance between national and international interests.Achieving such optimal balance depends to a great extent on interna-tional law. Indeed, that is one of its most important functions espe-cially in the present-day world.

Today, international law should be based on the concept of aninternational community. This approach should be followed by allnations so as to further the goals of promoting peace, security andglobal economic, scientific and technological development and ofestablishing a modern method of regulation of the world system, aswell as to make effective use of international law. It is only if mankindmanages to develop a united community that it will be able to fightsuccessfully for its own survival.3

3 See the following statement by V. Petrovsky: "The recognition of the unityof the world and its interdependence is the main focal point in the process oftransition of the international community to the new world system of peace, coop-eration and security based on the United Nations Charter". V. Petrovsky. "Disar-mament and National Security in an Interdependent World". Disarmament TopicalPapers 16 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.94.IX.3), p. 19.

One of the reasons for the difficulties currently experienced bythe international community is that great and small Powers alike donot recognize their collective and individual responsibilities to but-tress the world order.' Russia's position on this issue was stated byPresident Yeltsin in the following manner:

"Any country, whether large or small, should be aware of itsresponsibilities for maintenance of order based on law and mo-rality... only a profound understanding on the part of each par-ticipant in international cooperation, of his or her individualresponsibility can engender a common sense of responsibility forthe world situation." 5

The new world order and corresponding law should have a firm moralbasis and should promote social justice. It will be the order and lawof the international community.

1. Concept of an International Community

We have already mentioned that the expression "internationalcommunity" has achieved general recognition in both internationalpractice and doctrine. Efforts are currently being made to define thecontent of this notion and to determine its legal aspects. 6

The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which es-tablished the term "international community" in international law, de-fined it as a community of States (article 53). What is meant here isnot merely the sum total of States, but a specific system that has cer-tain attributes, including legal attributes, that are not to be found inthe individual States that constitute it. It is not by chance that inter-national legal instruments refer to the international community ofStates as a whole, that is, a unified entity. Acting as such, the interna-tional community has the right to adopt and amend the peremptoryrules of international law (jus cogens). As an independent social andpolitical system, a community has-and cannot fail to have-its owninterests, which are not confined to the coinciding individual interests

'See R. P. Anand, Confrontation or Cooperation? International Law and theDeveloping Countries (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff. 1987).

5Address by President Boris Yeltsin, Official Records of the General Assem-bly. Forty-ninth Session, 5th meeting. 26 September 1994. document A/49/PV.5.p.4.

6 Works on this subject include: Ch. Tomuschat. "Obligations Arising forStates Without or Against Their Will", Recueil des cours... 1993-1V, vol. 241,pp. 195-374; "Die internationale Gcmeinschaft", Archiv des Volkerrechs, vol. 33(1995), pp. 1-20; and H. Mosler, The International Society as a Legal Community(Alphen nan den Rijn. Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1980).

of States.7 Thus, one of the international community's principal tasksis to protect its own interests.

The foregoing is also reflected in the practice of the InternationalCourt of Justice. In its decision in the case concerning United StatesDiplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, the Court referred to inter-ests "vital for the security and well-being of the complex internationalcommunity of the present day".'

The concept of an international community with its own interestsand needs has influenced the process of codification and progressivedevelopment of international law. Reference can be made, in this con-nection, to the work of the International Law Commission. In its con-sideration of the topic of international liability for injurious conse-quences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law, theCommission stressed that it would examine and adopt the articlesproposed for this topic, "in accordance with its usual practice, on thebasis of... [their] utility for the contemporary and future needs of theinternational community".

9

This position taken by the International Law Commission de-serves attention. The law of the international community differs fromclassical international law largely in that the interests and needs of theinternational community as a whole will occupy a central position inthe hierarchy of interests protected. We believe that, if the Commis-sion consistently follows its "usual practice" and continues to beguided by the interests of the international community, this will con-tribute significantly to the success of its work.

One indication that the International Law Commission is pur-suing this approach was its adoption of the concept of "internationalcrimes", based on the idea of the "protection of fundamental interestsof the international community".'0

' From a sociological point of view, as well as on the basis of the generaltheory of systems, it is difficult to agree with the author of a very solid work,Claudia Annacker, who believes that "loin the international level, communityinterest is tantamount to the sum of coinciding individual interests. State practiceshows that the assumption of a pre-existing community interest differing in itsnature from the sum of individual interests.., remains fictitious". C. Annacker, "TheLegal Regime of Erga Onnes Obligations in International Law". OsterreichischeZeitschriftfiir Offentliches Recht und Vulkerrecht, vol. 46 (1994), pp. 136-137.

LC.J. Reports 1980, p. 43.Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth

session, Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth session,. Supple-ment No. /0 (A/49/10), p. 369 (emphasis added).

"o Article 19, paragraph 2. of the draft articles on State responsibility reads asfollows:

"An internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a Stateof an international obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental

The members of the international community are States, that aresubjects of international law. They are entities possessing supremepolitical power without which the international community could notbe organized. Although they are also subjects of international law,international organizations are not considered to be members of theinternational community. Indeed, the 1986 Vienna Convention on theLaw of Treaties between States and International Organizations orbetween International Organizations has retained the wording of the1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, according to whichthe international community is a community of States.

At the same time, the role of international organizations in pro-tecting the interests of the international community and regulating re-lations within such community is self-evident- This can be explainedas follows. Like other social systems, the international communityconsists of two subsystems: one that is governed and another thatgoverns. The first is the sum total of peoples, i.e., the populations ofStates. The second is composed of States that, as repositories of su-preme power, interact with one another. The latter subsystem has theresponsibility of serving the interests of the former.

Professor Tomuschat considers the international community tobe such a governing subsystem: "The international community is con-ceived of as a kind of authority that closely follows world events andbears responsibility for maintaining an orderly and peaceful interna-tional environment and for ensuring decent conditions of existence toevery human being"."

But let us return to international organizations. There is no doubtthat they are part of the governing subsystem of the internationalcommunity as instruments of States. Without them, such governancewould, perhaps, be impossible today. However, unlike States, organ-izations are in no way part of the subsystem that is governed, sincethey lack the corresponding social substratum.

International legal instruments often refer to such notions asmankind". Many provisions even deal with the rights of mankind.

Let us recall the concept of -common heritage of mankind", whichapplies to the seabed and the subsoil thereof, to the resources of theArea, to the moon, as well as to many other areas.

interests of the international community that its breach is recognized as acrime by that community as a whole constitutes an international crime.-

Yearbook. 1980, vol. 1I (Part Two). p. 32." Tomuschat. -Obligations Arising for States Without or Against Their Will-.

op. ciL (footnote 6 above), p. 222- With very few exceptions. our views regardingthe international community are similar to those of our distinguished colleague. Hiswotk in this area has enabled us to elucidate further aspects of the interrelationshipbetween the international community and international law.

In its preamble, the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing theActivities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, refers to the "com-mon interest of all mankind". Article I, paragraph 1, of the Treatystates that "[t]he exploration and use of outer space... shall be carriedout for the benefit and in the interests of all countries... and shall bethe province of all mankind".

Although many provisions pertaining to mankind have been for-mulated in legal terms, some believe that such provisions are of a po-litical and moral nature only.

At this juncture, we should once again quote ProfessorTomuschat, according to whom "mankind as a term is reserved forthose instances where the ultimate beneficiary or victim of someaction is to be identified, while the international community desig-nates the actors who are able and empowered to voice and articulatethe concerns of mankind-which, without an organizational structure,is just an amorphous mass".' 2

We believe this is not quite the case. As we have seen, "mankind"is not only a social but also a legal notion. An analogy can be drawnto some extent with the relationship between a State and its people.However, the matter is more complex: "mankind" is the most generalconcept which describes the subsystem that is governed. A concernfor mankind will gradually become the determining factor for the gov-erning subsystem of the international community, which comprisesStates and international organizations.

In the light of the foregoing, it becomes clear that internationallaw bestows increasingly important functions on the internationalcommunity. In order to exercise these functions, the communityshould be provided with the appropriate resources, including legal re-sources. During the discussion of the reports of the International LawCommission in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, repre-sentatives from a number of countries have advocated the recognitionof a specific legal status to the international community. A similaropinion has been voiced by legal scholars. 13

2 Ibid., pp. 225-226.

'3 The opinion of Annacker on this question is as follows:"Since legal capacity is indispensable for every kind of legal relationship,

a community of States can become a party of a legal relationship only if it isa subject of international law. Legal personality on the international level doesnot depend upon the assignment of legal status. On the contrary, one candeduce the legal personality from the attribution of rights and/or duties to anentity by States."

Annacker, op. cit. (footnote 7 above), pp. 138-139.

In the course of debate in the International Law Commission onthe draft articles on State responsibility, it was observed that, in thecase of an international crime, the injured party was "the communityof States as a distinct legal entity and that the concept of internationalcrime helped to promote the international community to the status of,as it were, a quasi-public legal authority". 4

Be that as it may, the fact remains that the concept of an interna-tional community occupies an increasingly important place in theinternational legal system and exerts an influence on many areas ofinternational law.

The community is the holder of certain rights, according to inter-national law. Consequently, it also has the capacity to exercise suchrights. And it is precisely this capacity that is in question. IndividualStates or a highly representative organization such as the UnitedNations speak on behalf of the community. In certain areas of inter-national relations, the community may be represented by specializedagencies; an analogous position exists with regard to the rights ofmankind. Let us recall article 137, paragraph 2, of the 1982 UnitedNations Convention on the Law of the Sea: "All rights in the re-sources of the Area are vested in mankind as a whole on whose behalfthe Authority shall act".

Many members of the International Law Commission tend tosupport this conclusion. In their view, the power to react to interna-tional crimes should lie essentially with the international communityas embodied, needless to say, in the United Nations.5

2. Organization of the International Community

In any society, one of the central organizational problems is thenature of the relationship between its members and the society as a%bhole. The attainment of independence from the Pope and the Emperorby European States and their acquisition of sovereignty were importantsteps towards the development of an international system. Admittedly,in this instance, the issue had less to do with the correlation of interestsbetween the whole and its parts than with the liberation of States fromforeign rule.

The acquisition of sovereignty by States played a major role intheir national and international development. There ensued the idea ofinternational law as law regulating the mutual relations between sover-eign States. Gradually. the "excessive" independence of States began to

" Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixthsession. Official Records of the General Assembly. Forty-ninth session. Supple-ment No. 10 (A/49/10), para. 246.

," Ibid., para. 282.

conflict ever more sharply with their common interests, as it affectedboth their national and their international interests. Suffice it to recallthe endless wars, including two World Wars, that have been fought.

Mankind has paid a high price for its realization of the need torespect common interests and the responsibility that membership inthe international community places on every State. The idea that theimportance of common interests, especially the interests of peace andsecurity, should be recognized formed the basis of the Charter of theUnited Nations and modern international law as a whole, which is thelaw of the Charter of the United Nations.

Now as never before, we face the task of finding the best possibleway of reconciling the individual interests of States with the interestsof the international community as a whole. Unless this problem issolved, it will be impossible for the community and its members tofunction properly. The purpose of the law of the international commu-nity is precisely to solve this problem.

There is a widely held view that State sovereignty is to blame forall the woes of the international community. However, this is not quitethe case. Sovereignty is an attribute of the State that enables it tocarry out its internal and external functions. It should be recalled thatinternational law is in fact created and implemented through the sov-ereign authority of States. It is precisely this authority that imparts thenecessary power to the mechanism of international legal regulation.We may consider challenges to State sovereignty to be about as well-grounded as demands to limit individual liberties. Both the former andthe latter should be implemented within the scope of the law, whilerespecting the rights and legitimate interests of other subjects and ofsociety as a whole.

We must recognize the existence of the following interdepen-dency: a failure to safeguard the interests of society means that theinterests of its members, who are increasingly dependent on it, suffer.On the other hand, the interests of society require the fullest possiblesatisfaction of the interests of its members since this determines thehealth of a society, and therein lies its raison d'etre.

At the same time, both at the international level and in individualStates, the growing role of the interests of society as a whole and theimportance of ensuring the effective enjoyment of human rights willbring the task of safeguarding common interests to the fore. We willalso witness changes as regards the best way of combining the inter-ests of the society with those of the individual. In time, the interestsof the international community will come to occupy the highest levelin the common system of social values.

Needless to say, an entity as complex as the international com-munity cannot exist without a corresponding organizational and legal

foundation or some sort of constitution. Such a constitution does infact exist in the form of the Charter of the United Nations and theperemptory norms associated %% ith it. The Charter "as the first instru-ment to define the basic purposes and principles of the internationalcommunity, with which all branches and norms of international lawmust be consistent. The Charter provided the basis for the estab-lishment and operation of the highest representatise, executive andjudicial bodies. Moreover, the system of specialized agencies wasestablished under the Charter and functions in accordance %kith it.

In the system of international law, a central position is held bytwo sets of norms. The first embraces the fundamental principles ofinternational law, whose purpose is to define the fundamental rightsand obligations of States, that is, the legal status of the principal sub-jects of international law. As a result, these principles determine thedistinctive features of the modern system of international relationsand international law. In view of their role, they' have been gi% en thehighest, peremptory, force.

The second set embraces universally recognized principles andnorms in the field of human rights. These define the fundamentalrights and freedoms of the individual and also possess the highest,peremptory, force. Both sets of norms form the basis of the interna-tional public order.

These are completely new concepts that were unknown to theinternational law of the past. They demonstrate the progress that hasbeen made in this field over the past 50 years.

The law of the international community will necessitate substan-tial changes in the relationship between international norms and na-tional law. The primacy of international law will gradually become anestablished fact. The effectiveness of both domestic and internationallaw depends on their mutual interaction. Together with the interna-tionalization of national law. we witness the process of internalizationor domestication of international law. More and more, internationalnorms are destined for final execution wxithin the sphere of nationaljurisdiction. International law increasingly depends on national lawfor implementation of its norms.

It is of particular importance that the constitutional law of Statesreflects both above-mcntioned fundamental sets of norms. We shallattempt to illustrate this through the example of the new Constitutionof the Russian Federation. In accordance with article 15.4. "[g]ener-ally recognized principles and norms of international law and intera-tional treaties of the Russian Federation arc a constituent part of itslegal system. If an international treaty of the Russian Federationestablishes rules other than those stipulated by the law. the rules ofthe international treaty apply".

The above provision does not establish the primacy of the normsof international law; it merely incorporates them into the country'slegal system and makes them directly applicable. As far as treaties areconcerned, their provisions are accorded the status of lex specialis inrelation to the norms of national law. The latter are not abrogated bythe treaty; they simply do not apply in the specific instance coveredby the treaty. This may be termed the primacy of application.

Unlike the previous Constitution of the Russian Federation, thenew Constitution contains no article recognizing the fundamentalprinciples of international law as the principles of Russian foreign pol-icy. None the less, we may assume that since these universally recog-nized principles have become a constituent part of the law of the land,they would also be used to guide foreign policy.

However, the primacy of the second set of norms in Russian lawis defined in quite unambiguous language: in the Russian Federation,rights and freedoms of persons and citizens "shall be recognized andguaranteed in accordance with universally accepted principles andnorms of international law and in accordance with this Constitution"(article 17.1). Such formulation implies that generally recognized prin-ciples and norms of international law concerning human rights pos-sess a status not lower than the status of constitutional norms. This isfurther supported by article 55.1 which states that "[the enumerationin the Constitution of the Russian Federation of fundamental rightsand freedoms shall not be interpreted as a denial or limitation of othergenerally recognized human rights and freedoms" (emphasis added).

The latter provision provides a basis for the argument that theConstitution may not limit generally recognized rights and freedoms,a main source of which is general international law. It follows, then,that an expansion of the generally accepted rights and freedoms ofinternational law would effect corresponding expansions in Russianlaw without requiring any further normative acts. This phenomenonillustrates a new level of interaction between international and consti-tutional law. International law determines the content of the most im-portant part of the Constitution, that which deals with human rights.Indeed, as is well-known, human rights in their totality determine thenature of the social and political structure of a society. The above de-velopment is among the most notable characteristics of the emerginglaw of the international community.

One of the fundamental principles of this law is the principle ofdemocracy.16 All civilized societies are based on democratic princi-

6 See G. Dmitrijeva and 1. Lukashuk, "Mezhdunarodnyi princip demokratii"["The International Principle of Democracy"l, Mezhdunarodnaja zhizn, No. 11-12(1992), pp. 14-22 (in Russian).

pies. However, in world politics and, accordingly, in international law,the issue of democracy has remained on the periphery. The reason forthis state of affairs is clear enough: world politics were not demo-cratic. Nevertheless, elements of international democracy can befound in some norms and procedures, as in the principle of sovereignequality and the rule of "one State-one vote".

Problems associated with democracy in the international com-munity still need to be addressed. A situation in which a State with apopulation of I billion and a State with a population of 100,000 eachhave a single vote can hardly be called democratic. Moreover, the in-ternational community should increasingly take account of the "willof mankind", however theoretical this concept may seem. But, at pres-ent, the main issue may lie elsewhere. The strengthening of interna-tional peace and security and the development of the internationalcommunity depends to a considerable extent on establishing democ-racy within States. International law has an important role to play inthis respect. Let us remember how international law contributed toentrenching human rights in the political and legal systems of States.

The democratic principle will be developed further in the law ofthe international community. The principal trend will be the recogni-tion of a democratic system based on respect for human rights andfree elections as the sole legitimate political system. The first signs ofsuch a development may be found in international political instru-ments. The 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe requires States"to build, consolidate, and strengthen democracy as the only systemof government". 17 It would appear that, in the nearest future, only ademocratic State may be a full-fledged member of the internationalcommunity. Such promotion of democracy will be one of the mainfunctions of the law of the international community. The Charter ofParis further urges States "to cooperate and support each other withthe aim of making democratic gains irreversible".'8 The internationalcommunity of the twenty-first century will be a democratic commu-nity of democratic States.

3. Mechanism for the Operation of the Law of the International Com-munity

One of the main reasons for a substantial improvement in theentire mechanism for the governance of the international system is thegreatly increased need for regulation. Insufficient regulation couldbring mankind to the brink of catastrophe. As Tomuschat has stated.

" Charter of Paris for a New Europe, adopted by the Conference on Securityand Cooperation in Europe on 21 November 1990. ILM. vol. 30 (1991). p. 193.

" Ibid.. p. 195.

"[nlever before in history have the regulatory needs of the interna-tional community been as acute as today".'9

States are only slowly becoming aware of the urgent need to im-prove the mechanism for the operation of international law. This isdemonstrated, for instance, in the programme of activities for theUnited Nations Decade of International Law, which does not includeany substantial measures for improving such mechanism.

Only the provisions of the programme relating to the dissemina-tion of information on international law are significant in this respect.The knowledge of international law among the various strata of so-ciety, parliamentarians and members of Governments leaves much tobe desired. Yet, without sufficient awareness of international law, noorganizational mechanism will make such law as effective as it needsto be.

It is therefore extremely important to provide the populationwith information about the world, about relations between States andpeoples and about the rules of conduct in the international commu-nity. Unfortunately, the mass media do not pay attention to these mat-ters. Many of the most important international legal instruments arenot publicized. The same can be said of major General Assembly andSecurity Council resolutions, not to mention decisions of the Interna-tional Court of Justice. The latter, along with the documents of theInternational Law Commission, are of enormous significance forjurists, who more and more frequently have to resolve questionsrelating to the application of the norms of international law at thedomestic level.

Despite the reservations of States, changes in the mechanism forthe operation of international law are nevertheless taking place underpressure from the needs of the present-day world. Such changes con-cern both law-making and the application of the law.20

In the area of law-making, a mechanism for the relatively rapidadoption of norms by a majority of States became necessary and hasthus come into existence. Today, even the most important norms ofgeneral international law, the norms of jus cogens, are being adoptedby "the international community of States as a whole". Both the In-ternational Law Commission and the Vienna Conference on the Lawof Treaties determined that this formula does not mean universalagreement but agreement of a sufficiently representative majority ofStates.

" Tomuschat, "Obligations Arising for States Without or Against Their Will",op. cit. (footnote 6 above), p. 212.

2 See D. P. Verna, "Rethinking About New International Law-MakingProcess", Indian Journal of International Law, vol. 29 (1989), p. 38 et seq.

Strictly speaking, a new phenomenon has arisen, namely the col-lective opinio juris of the international community, which derivesfrom a representative majority of its members and has legal force forall States. Another new means of law-making is the development ofgeneral international law on the basis of universal conventions. As iswell-known, even the International Court of Justice regards the con-ventions adopted by United Nations conferences as manifestations ofinternational law, sometimes even before their entry into force.2'

General Assembly resolutions have become another importantsource of law-making. After their adoption as recommendations, therules embodied in such resolutions are recognized by States as normsof general international law (opiniojuris). The most significant in thisrespect is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the provisionsof which laid the foundation for a new branch of internationallaw--the international law of human rights. Moreover, these provi-sions have been embodied in the Constitutions of many States, in-cluding that of the Russian Federation.

Lastly, the practice of so-called "instant law", when a generalnorm arises as a result of the recognition of a single precedent or asingle act, is well-known. One example of this is the tacit recognitionof the legality of the flight of an artificial earth satellite.

We would also like to note the significance for the mechanism forthe operation of international law, and indeed for the governance ofthe international community as a whole, of "soft law", which com-prises norms with binding moral and political force. The most strikingexample is the extensive code that was formulated in the course of thedevelopment of the Helsinki process.

Although "soft law" has a "soft mechanism of action" and entails"soft responsibility", it is serving as an increasingly important instru-ment for the regulation of international relations, and is often just aseffective as law. Such "soft law" can supplement international law in

!i See the case concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jama-

hiriya/Malta), LC.J. Reports 1985, p. 30.m Analyzing the difference between legal and political obligations, the State

Department of the United States of America came to the following conclusionregarding the mechanism for the operation of the latter:

"A 'political' undertaking is not governed by international law and thereare no applicable rules pertaining to compliance, modification, or withdrawal.Until and unless a Party extricates itself from its 'political' undertaking, whichit may do without legal penalty, it has given a promise to honour that com-mitment, and the other Party has every reason to be concerned about compli-ance with such undertakings. If a Party contravenes a political commitment, itwill be subject to an appropriate political response.-

M. Nash (Leich), -Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to Inter-national Law: International Acts Not Constituting Agreements". AJIL, vol. 88(1994), p. 5 18.

areas covered by the latter and may also regulate relations in fieldsoutside the purview of international law. The corresponding instru-ments serve as an authoritative interpretation of the norms of interna-tional law and promote its development.

There are also quite a few changes in the mechanism for theapplication of international law. Faced with the existence of the inter-national community, the International Court of Justice is takingaccount of the legal consequences arising therefrom. In particular, ithas made a distinction between the ordinary international obligationsof States and their obligations towards the international communityas a whole, such as the obligations deriving from the norms on theprohibition of aggression and genocide, as well as from human rightsnorms. The obligations towards the international community are theconcern of all States, they are erga omnes obligations.23

In codifying the law on State responsibility, the InternationalLaw Commission categorized particularly serious offences as "inter-national crimes". These crimes are characterized by the special typeof responsibility they engender, that is an erga omnes responsibility,a responsibility towards the international community as a whole.Such responsibility is bound to introduce new elements as to its con-sequences. 24 An international institution similar to an actio popularisis in the making.

Another new development is the recognition of the criminal re-sponsibility of the individual under international law, regardless of theposition he or she holds in the State, for the perpetration of crimesagainst the peace and security of mankind. International CriminalTribunals have been established for the former Yugoslavia and forRwanda, and the International Law Commission has submitted to theGeneral Assembly a draft statute for a permanent international crimi-nal court as well as a draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Se-curity of Mankind. Up to now, it was the people of an entire nationwho paid the price for the criminal acts of its rulers. The criminal re-sponsibility of individuals for international crimes is a distinctive fea-ture of the law of international community.

In order to appreciate the revolutionary nature of such changes,one need only recall that, to this day, the norms on State responsibilityare extremely primitive. In practice, the law on international respon-sibility does not exist as a branch of international law.

2' Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company. Ltd.,LC.J. Reports 1970, p. 32.

24 Having studied this question, Annacker has stated: "The community inter-est protected by an erga omnes obligation determines the way it is performed".Annacker, op. cit. (footnote 7 above), p. 149.

The substantial growth in the role of international organs andorganizations in ensuring the application of the norms of internationallaw must be emphasized. Most significant in this respect is the workof such organs as the General Assembly and the Security Council,which are interpreting their powers under the Charter more and morebroadly.

Meeting at the level of heads of State and Government, the Secu-rity Council declared that "'non-military sources of instability in theeconomic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields" constitute athreat to peace and security.2 5 This broad interpretation is based onthe notion that the Security Council is the guarantor of peace andsecurity for the entire international community.

The Security Council has adopted certain resolutions relating toSomalia and Rwanda on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter.26

However, in these cases, there was neither an international conflictnor were there any acts of aggression. The conflicts were internal,although they undoubtedly were contrary to the interests of the inter-national community. The Security Council took action under Chap-ter VII on the basis of a very broad interpretation of its powers underArticle 39 of the Charter to "determine the existence of any threat tothe peace" or "breach of the peace". "

There are reasons to believe that the existing norms on the useof force by the international community, above all the norms on thepowers of the Security Council, no longer correspond fully to theinternational community's level of development. One must assumethat the law of the international community will eliminate this discrep-ancy.

The solution of this problem is of vital importance for interna-tional legality. It must be borne in mind that, in the current circum-stances, the Security Council exercises not only executive but alsolegislative and judicial power. -2 8 This is demonstrated by the Council'sadoption of the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals forthe former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.-9 Few would argue that the

I Document SP3500. p. 3.1 See, eg.. Security Council resolutions 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992 and

929 (1994) of 22 June 1994.' Some jurists are doubtful that these cases involved a breach of the peace or

a threat of such a breach. See M. J. Glennon, "Sovereignty and Community afterHaiti: Rethinking the Collective Use of Force" , AJIL, vol. 89 (1995). p. 7 2 .

2' See K. Harper, "Does the United Nations Security Council Have the Com-petence to Act as Court and LegislatureT'. New York University Journal of Inter-national Law and Politics. vol. 27 (1994), pp. 103-157.

-4 See resolutions 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993 and 955 (1994) of 8 November1994.

adoption of such constituent instruments of international judicialbodies does not constitute international law-making. Moreover, itwould hardly be possible to regard international criminal tribunals assubsidiary organs of the Security Council established under Article 29of the Charter.

The most convincing argument from the entire arsenal of reasonsput forward by the Secretary-General with regard to the estab-lishment by the Security Council of the International Criminal Tribu-nal for the former Yugoslavia is that such a course was chosen out ofnecessity and in the absence of an alternative.30 This, once again, con-firms the need for a more precise definition of the functions that theSecurity Council performs in the interests of the international com-munity as a whole.

Thus, we are faced with the reality of a substantial expansion ofthe functions performed by the Security Council. Naturally, the ques-tion arises as to the legal grounds for this process. The attempt by theSecretariat of the United Na:ions to find sufficiently convincing justi-fication for this has not been successful. This may be seen as yet an-other demonstration that it is difficult to explain many new phenom-ena in international law from a traditional standpoint. On the otherhand, the concept of the law of the international community providessufficiently convincing answers to questions that are being raised. Thepowers of the Security Council are being expanded with the consentof the international community as a whole.

At first glance, this may seem a unique development. However,analogous cases exist in national law. Professor Henkin commentedon the powers of the President of the United States in foreign affairsas follows: "Presidents act, sometimes to applause, sometimes togrudging acquiescence, sometimes to bitter condemnation and chal-lenge, and action and reaction are also the stuff of constitutionallaw".

31

In order to be in a position to perform the functions entrusted toit under the law of the international community, the United Nationswill have to undergo changes that go beyond the Security Council. Animportant innovation in this respect is the forthcoming establishmentof a permanent international criminal court which, although not for-mally part of the United Nations, will be linked with it. The estab-

o "This approach would have the advantage of being expeditious and of beingimmediately effective as all States would be under a binding obligation to takewhatever action is required to carry out a decision taken as an enforcement meas-ure under Chapter VII". Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2

of Security Council resolution 808 (1993), document S/25704, para. 23." L. Henkin, "Foreign Affairs and the Constitution", Foreign Affairs, vol. 66

(1987-1988), p. 284.

lishment of this court will herald the emergence of a new function ofthe international community: the application of criminal law in con-nection with the maintenance of international peace and security.

It may be assumed that in the not-too-distant future a humanrights tribunal will also be established on the basis of the experienceof the Court operating within the Council of Europe.

We believe that the General Assembly, as the most representativeorgan of the international community, will also be strengthened. Ho% -ever, the most important change will very likely be the establishmentof a parliamentary assembly of the international community.

The existing international organizations, including the UnitedNations, are organs of the executive power of States. Their potentialis therefore limited by the constitutional powers of Governments.Meanwhile, the dimensions of the international problems that must besolved require the involvement of legislative power. It is true that theestablishment of a parliamentary assembly and the expansion of itspowers beyond the limits of purely advisory powers will call for con-siderable efforts in training its members for such work.

Finally. we come to the International Law Commission. Thefacts testify to the Commission's gro% ing contribution to the progres-sive development of international law. However, it is not difficult tosee that more is needed, that the pace of the Commission's work mustbe accelerated- Thus, once again, the question will arise of increasingthe length of its sessions in order to allow more time for the work ofthe Drafting Committee.

We believe that there are grounds for making innovations in theworking methods of the International Law Commission. In particular,in view of the Commission's prestige and the high quality of its drafts,consideration could be given to the creation of a "soft law" of theCommission. Its reports and drafts, once generally known, could playa significant role in the solution of specific legal issues, serve as ameans of interpreting international norms and promote the progres-sive development of international law.

We are under no illusion of having succeeded in presenting a suf-ficiently comprehensive picture of the distinctive features of interna-tional law in the twenty-first century and of how the transition to suchlaw can be brought about. Our objective was more modest: we soughtto define the most likely general trend in the development of interna-tional law. To this end, we analyzed the practice and made referenceto valuable doctrinal contributions, paying particular attention to thework of the International Law Commission.

Our research has led us to conclude that major changes areoccurring in the nature of inter-State relations. The predominantly

bilateral character of such relations is being replaced by a universalinterrelationship of States and peoples. The "socialization" of interna-tional life and international law is under way. The international com-munity is being consolidated.

Reflecting these processes, international law is also changing. Ittoo is gradually losing its predominantly bilateral character;32 the sig-nificance of universal legal relations, of erga omnes legal relations, isgrowing; the function of protecting the interests of the internationalcommunity as a whole is coming to the fore. Accordingly, changes aretaking place in the mechanism for both law-making and the applica-tion of the law.33 The development of the law of the international com-munity is proceeding apace.

For another opinion, see M. Koskenniemi, "Vrkhovenstvoto na pravoto vmezhdunarodnite otnosheniya" ["Supremacy of law in international relations"],Pravna misi, No. 3 (1994), p. 97 (in Bulgarian).

" See 1. Lukashuk, Funkzionirovanije mezhdunarodnoho prava [Functioningof International Law] (Moscow, 1992) (in Russian).

THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEWORLD TODAY AND TOMORROW

Andreas Jaco-ides

The title of this essay-"The Role of International Law in theWorld Today and Tomorrow"-- is perhaps a little too ambitious. Moreaccurately put. it would be some reflections on the role of interna-tional law in the world by someone who, for more than three decades,practised both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy in the service ofhis country (Cyprus) and who, because of training, experience andinclination, is strongly convinced that international law has a very im-portant role to play in diplomacy and international affairs.

This is the half-way point of the United Nations Decade of Inter-national Law, proclaimed by the General Assembly in 1989.' the pur-pose of which is to enhance and solidify respect for international law,as well as to popularize it. It also happens that the year of writing ofthis essay coincides with the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of theUnited Nations when much thinking and soul-searching is going on invarious forums, national and international, as to where the United Na-tions stands and where it is going after 50 years of its existence. Thisis particularly relevant since the United Nations and its Charter have.respectively, provided the forum and the basis of much of the activityin codifying and progressively developing international law during thepast half century.

There have been times, particularly in the aftermath of the Sec-ond World War and, more recently, in the wake of crises such as thatof the Falklandsltalvinas and the Gulf War, when high-sounding dec-larations have been made by world leaders proclaiming the value andrelevance of international law in world affairs. It was hoped at thetime. and it still should be hoped, that these declarations A ould be oflasting value, intended to govern relations among States in a "newworld order" and to be applied universally and objectively. Yet. timeand again, these hopes were dashed and these declarations in manyinstances proved to be no more than convenient slogans applied se-lectively and according to temporary expediencies in a "new worlddisorder". In too many cases, double standards have been applied andaggressors have been able to defy with impunity the application of the

IResolution 44/r3 of 17 November 1989.

relevant rules of international law and the collective will of the inter.national community, as expressed in unanimous resolutions of theGeneral Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations.Bad precedents, when tolerated and condoned, tend to be repeated.

There are several themes upon which this essay is premised.These are that international law does indeed play an important role indiplomacy and international affairs; that the rules of international lawmust keep pace with the evolving conditions of international life; thatthese rules must be based on international morality and must beapplied universally, not selectively; that the present world situation isconducive to enhancing the role of international law and its effective-ness; that attention should focus on the areas of law affecting presentneeds and that these should be defined and progressively developed;that the role of newly indepelndent States is instrumental and has beenconstructive in developing such rules; that the role of the LegalAdvisers to Foreign Ministries is essential and their opinion in anygiven situation should be sought and be given decisive weight bypolicy-makers before taking any policy decision on matters involvinginternational law; and that the role of the International Law Commis-sion and that of other expert bodies, on the universal and regionallevel, as well as that of major law-making conferences, are also veryimportant.

Increased activity in the international legal field certainly pro-vides a focal point for the Non-Aligned Movement in the changed cir-cumstances of the world situation within the broad framework of theprinciples which dictated its creation. Likewise, the Commonwealth,which constitutes a principal legal system based on the common law,can play more of a role than heretofore in the international legal field.

It can be fairly stated that, by and large, States abide by theirtreaty obligations, despite the lack of an international legislature withbinding powers or a standing international peace force or even a com-pulsory third-party adjudication system. Ultimately, the viability ofany system of law depends upon the will of the community it seeks toregulate. The vast majority of States ordinarily observe their obliga-tions under international law, even if motivated only by enlightenedself-interest. Even when they do not observe such obligations, theytend to attempt to justify their actions or omissions by invoking legalarguments, however contrived, rather than admit that such actions oromissions violate the relevant rules of international law.

In any given situation, there may indeed be room for bonafideargument, different interpretations and lack of clarity, and certainlyso-perhaps even more so-in international law as indeed in the otherfields of law. But, if the rule of law is to have real meaning in interna-tional relations, as indeed in domestic situations, such rules as are

clearly discernible and objectively valid need to be observed in prac-tice in all situations. Before a decision is taken on policy regarding anygiven situation which is covered by rules of international law. the con-sidered view of the legal aspect needs to be sought, formulated, com-municated and be given due-indeed determining-weight by thepolicy-makers before deciding on the policy in that situation. This istrue everywhere and particularly true in countries which proudly pro-claim that they are nations of laws and not of people. The rule of lawin international affairs means that narrow national interests are sub-ordinated to international law. particularly where the relevant rules ofinternational law are clear and unambiguous. National interestsshould be pursued in a way consistent with international law.

Looking back to my own experience of three and a half decadesof diplomatic life, the principles and rules of international law-whether in major issues of national survival or in mundane topicsof everyday diplomatic life such as consular and diplomatic law, e.g..immunities and tax exemptions--were frequently relied on and pro-vided the framework in which diplomatic negotiations. arguments andpositions were formulated and used.

While the role of international law in international diplomacy isoften limited, it is not insignificant. In certain cases where law coin-cides with power, law- is determining-as we have witnessed in therecent case of the Gulf War. In other cases, where law does not coin-cide with power, international law at least serves as a restraint onpower by placing some constraints on its abuse by the strong andmighty and by providing the weak with arguments to buttress theirposition as well as international standards for third parties, not di-rectly involved, to support these positions. Contemporary interna-tional law, as developed in the era of the United Nations with the par-ticipation of all members of the international community, andparticularly of the newly independent States which brought some newperspectives to bear on the law-making process, has increasinglytended to sustain those who have justice on their side, particularly insuch areas as decolonization, the protection of human rights, the lawof treaties and the law of the sea.

The role of international law in practice varies, of course,according to the field which it is supposed to regulate. While limitedin the field of international peace and security, it is considerable inregulating international relations, exchanges and behaviour in fieldssuch as commerce, trade, finance, science, energy, art. etc.

z As acting Dean in Washington or as Chairman of the Committee on Rela-tions with the Host Country in New York or as Permanent Secretary at the Min-istry of Foreign Affairs in Nicosia.

How much a role international law is allowed to play varies fromState to State and often depends on the attitudes of the individualsmaking the decisions. No general rule necessarily applies but, on thewhole, it is small and weaker States which have more reason to relyon the law rather than on power in defending their sovereignty, inde-pendence, territorial integrity and other fundamental interests, and,more generally, in projecting their policies. Even though all States aresupposed to be equal, some States are more "international law-minded" than others.3

Within the United Nations system, much work is being carriedout in codifying and progressively developing international law. Thehighest judicial organ of the United Nations, the International Courtof Justice, has of course made a great contribution to this end, boththrough its contentious and its advisory jurisdiction, in all areas of thelaw it has had the occasion to address. Its recently increased jurisdic-tion is undoubtedly a reflection of the confidence that the Court hasbeen enjoying in recent years and is certainly to be encouraged to con-tinue along the same lines. The Sixth (Legal) Committee of the Gen-eral Assembly, a universal body of Government representatives fromall Member States of the United Nations, also plays a major rolethrough its three-month annual session, in itself and through severalCommittees and Working Groups, whether of the whole or withrestricted membership, which examine and develop individual topicsand report to the Sixth Committee, which in its turn considers thesereports and recommends relevant resolutions for adoption by theGeneral Assembly. Besides these bodies, much work in internationallaw is carried out daily through the Security Council and other UnitedNations bodies and through the Office of Legal Affairs of the Secre-tariat-whether at Headquarters or in the specialized agencies. Majortopics, such as the law of treaties or the law of the sea, to mention twoof many examples, after appropriate preparatory work by expert orother preparatory bodies and relevant comments by Governments,are referred to major law-making conferences under United Nationsauspices and result in landmark treaties which enter into force afterthe requisite number of ratifications by States are obtained.

Evidently, in an essay such as the present one, there is no possi-bility to examine even cursorily the substance of this enormousamount of international law-making within the United Nations sys-tem, let alone that carried out bilaterally and through other bodies or

It is my conviction that if the rules of international law had been applied, theCyprus problem would not have arisen. And, if these rules were to be appliedtoday, I believe the problem can be solved in conformity with the relevant UnitedNations resolutions, and in a manner that is fair for all parties concerned and in theinterest of international peace in the volatile Eastern Mediterranean region.

groupings of States-other essays in this volume deal with several ofthese issues. What I intend to do is to illustrate my thinking on thetopic of this essay by touching on some of the aspects of the work ofthe International Law Commission in the light of the main themesI indicated earlier.

Since its creation by the General Assembly in 1947, the Interna-tional Law Commission has made an enormous contribution to thecodification and progressive development of international law.4 On thebasis of the Commission's present agenda, one can point to solid workhaving been accomplished on such subjects of "lawyers' law" as "'Ju-risdictional immunities of States and their property" and "Interna-tional watercourses", which have reached fruition, and, hopefullysoon, the relevant respective conventions will be adopted. Much pro-gress has been made on the challenging item on "International liabilityfor injurious consequences arising from acts not prohibited by inter-national law". To my mind, particularly relevant and significant for therole of international law in the world today are the topics of "Stateresponsibility" and of the "Draft Code of Crimes against the Peaceand Security of Mankind". which includes the establishment of aninternational criminal court.

"State responsibility" is a very broad subject which has been onthe agenda of the International Law Commission for too long (andthis because of reasons largely beyond the Commission's control) andshould be finalized at the earliest possible time. It is important toobserve that it has gone through considerable progressive develop-ment. Gone are the days when "State responsibility" primarily meantremedying injury to aliens and, in effect, catered to the needs andrequirements of a small number of powerful developed States, oftenat the expense of weaker and less developed States.

With the coming into effect of the Charter of the United Nations,encompassing rules prevailing over the provisions of other treatiesconflicting with such rules and with the acceptance in the 1969 ViennaConvention on the Law of Treaties of the principle of peremptorynorms of international law which cannot be departed from by Statesby agreement between themselves (jus cogens), the topic of "Stateresponsibility" has been placed on a much broader foundation. It isnow recognized, also by the International Court of Justice, that thereexist obligations erga omnes and that the interest of the internationalcommunity as a whole needs to be duly taken into account. "Stateresponsibility" has thus been transformed as a proper expression ofthe application of progressive development.

' This is reflected in many books, including the handy United Nations publi-cation The Work of the Internationol Law Commission in its successive editions,the latest being the fifth, published in 1996 (Sales No. E.95.V.6).

On this topic, and in general, the Commission must ensure thatthe expectations of the international community and in particular ofthe newly independent States, which came into existence after theclassical rules of international law were formulated, are not ignored.The Commission must keep pace with contemporary notions of inter-national law such as international crimes. It must keep pace with thecurrent developments in the international scene and not be slow inrecognizing and capitalizing on the opportunities provided in recentshifts of attitude by major powers, particularly as these might facili-tate acceptance of the principle of third-party settlement of disputes.The effective and expeditious third-party dispute settlement proce-dure, which unavoidably eluded the international community in pastmajor projects such as the Convention on the Law of Treaties and lessso in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, shouldbe included as a matter of principle in all future multilateral law-making treaties. Every effort should be made to include such a systemin the future convention on State responsibility, especially consideringthe need for authoritative judicial adjudication on the new notions onwhich it is based (jus cogens, international crimes, obligations ergaoinnes, among others).

The "Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security ofMankind", a topic which acquired additional importance and topical-ity in the light of recent and current developments on the world scene,deserves its rightful place in the corpus of present-day internationallaw and can serve the important purpose of deterrence and punish-ment against present and future violators of its provisions. The Inter-national Law Commission's adoption of the Draft Code on firstreading in 1991 was an important step forward and its adoption onsecond reading in 1996, appropriately slimmed down and concen-trated on legally definable grave crimes, thus conforming to politicalrealities, will hopefully lead to the final fruition of this major topic.

Closely connected with the Code, though not necessarily de-pendent on it, are recent developments regarding an internationalcriminal judiciary. The creation of a permanent international criminalcourt is an institution long overdue. While a case could be made for aless minimalist approach and for broader jurisdiction of such a court,it is indisputable that the International Law Commission did an out-standing job in producing, in record time in response to the GeneralAssembly's request, a draft statute for such a court. It now remainsfor the international community to exhibit the necessary politicalwill-the momentum already exists-in order to overcome the re-maining obstacles and to adopt at the earliest possible time the draftstatute and establish such a permanent international court whichwould, in several respects, be preferable to ad hoc tribunals tailoredfor particular situations. Such an institution would be a major contri-

bution by the international community to the United Nations Decadeof International Law.

Once the topics on the present agenda of the International LawCommission are brought to a satisfactory conclusion, it is importantfor the Commission and the Sixth Committee of the General Assem-bly to choose wisely which topics should be dealt with by the formerin the years ahead. No doubt many factors apply in making suchchoice. To my mind the primary criterion is what is in the mainstreamof the concerns of the international community and my preferred-albeit subjective-choice would include topics such as the imple-mentation of United Nations resolutions, the binding nature of Secu-rity Council resolutions, the legal aspects of United Nations peace-keeping, a more comprehensive and binding system of peacefulsettlement of disputes;5 issues of environment and economic relationsand defining the legal content of jus cogens.

With regard to the latter topic, I would like to note briefly a fewbasic points. Since the notion of jus cogens (peremptory norms ofinternational law from which no State may derogate by agreement orotherwise) was incorporated into international law in the 1969 ViennaConvention on the Law of Treaties, it has been referred to in debatesat the United Nations, including the Security Council, has been thesubject of in-depth studies by scholars, has been raised in the pro-ceedings of learned societies, has been alluded to by the InternationalCourt of Justice and is often referred to in debates and documents ofthe International Law Commission (particularly regarding the DraftCode of Crimes and State responsibility items). Yet, there exists noauthoritative statement on what the peremptory norms are or wherethey may be found. It is frequently said-in my view correctly-thatthe principle of the prohibition of the use of force in internationalrelations, contained in Article 2, paragraph 4. of the Charter of theUnited Nations, isjus cogens. Undoubtedly other principles and rulesof international law exist for which the same status may be claimed.Evidently there is need to define the exact parameters of what comesunder the rubric of jus cogens since the situation as it now stands isnot conducive to the objectivity, transparency and predictabilitywhich hould characterize a legal principle, especially one which has

IPerhaps on the lines proposed by Professor L. Sohn on the adaptation ofthe relevant Hague Conventions to the needs of the twenty-first century. SeeL. B. Sohn, -Preparation of a New Treaty for the Settlement of International Dis-putes-, in M. Brus. S. Muller and S. Wiemers. eds., The United Nations Decade ofInternational Law: Reflections on International Dispute Settlement (Dordrecht,Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), pp. 51-57. See also "Draft General Treaty on the PeacefulSettlement of International Disputes: A Proposal and Report". The InternationalLawtyer, vol. 20 (1986). pp. 261-291 (prepared by Professor Sohn for the AmericanBar Association Standing Committee on World Order Under Law).

been solemnly incorporated in such a landmark treaty as the 1969Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and also in the 1986 ViennaConvention on the Law of Treaties between States and InternationalOrganizations. At it stands, jus cogens can mean a great deal to someand very little to others. Without going into greater depth now, in myopinion it is important that this concept be considered by the Interna-tional Law Commission, as a highly qualified authoritative body ofexperts which codified it in the first place in the 1960s, with a view toestablishing which rules of international law are indeed peremptory.6

I hope that a way will be found to do this during the United NationsDecade of International Law as an important contribution to the Dec-ade, whether by the International Law Commission or otherwise.

We are living in interesting and challenging times, times full ofopportunities but also of pitfalls in terms of politics, economics, andthe development and the role of international law. We are witnessingdevelopments of historic importance all over the world, with the endof the Cold War and the newly found unanimity among the permanentmembers of the Security Council. Several regional problems havebeen solved, especially those which had their origin in the competitionbetween the two super-Powers, but others have been created in thewake of the disappearance of communism as a world ideology and theunleashing of ethnic and religious tensions and conflicts, notably inparts of the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia. Germanyhas been peacefully reunified, apartheid has been peacefully disman-tled in South Africa, the Middle East is hopefully on the way to amore peaceful and prosperous future and so is Northern Ireland, tocite some of the most obvious cases, but other international and re-gional problems continue to fester.7 Global interdependence and theneed to protect the environment, promote sustainable development,provide equality for women are some of the themes of the day. In thewake of the disappearance of the nuclear confrontation, economicgroupings have gained prominence in various parts of the world; sinceMaastricht the European Union has embarked on a different, moreadvanced, form of integration and the Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe has taken on additional functions. The UnitedNations, despite its financial and administrative problems, has beenrevitalized and has taken on additional responsibilities under its Char-ter, which has stood well the test of time. Hopefully, the Organizationcan look to the future with confidence.

With the recently found (though by no means assured to con-tinue) unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council,

6 See United Nations document AICN.4/454, pp. 16-26 and annex containing afurther elaboration.

' Cyprus being one such tragic anachronism.

making possible enforcement action under the original Charter design,care should be taken so that this will not lead to abusive interpreta-tions prejudicial to the rights and legitimate interests of the UnitedNations membership at large. While the concept of absolute sover-eignty is superseded, especially as far as it prevents the protection ofhuman rights, sovereign equality is still a cardinal principle of theCharter of the United Nations. In the distant past there was PatRomana, in more recent times there was Pax Britannica and currentlythere has been talk of Pax Americana. I submit that what is called forin the era of the United Nations is neither imperium nor gunboatdiplomacy but a peace based on the democratic exercise of the rightsand duties of all members of the international community, large orsmall, within the rules of international law and the principles of theCharter of the United Nations, which might be labelled "Pax Uni-tarum Nationum".

Will the new world order acquire proper legal meaning and leadto international legal order? Will this happen, if it does, not throughthe arbitrary directorate of the powerful but through equal justice forall? Will the United Nations be supported politically and financiallyso as to satisfactorily meet the challenge for effective peace-keeping.peacemaking and peace-building, promoting sustainable develop-ment, helping to save the environment and achieving its other objec-tives? Will unity and cooperation, as we have witnessed in Europewith German reunification and the process of integration through theEuropean Union, prevail over disintegration and conflict as we arewitnessing in several other parts of the world and indeed in parts ofEurope? Will international disputes, which will inevitably continue toarise, be solved peacefully in accordance with the law or shall we wit-ness more instances of the application of the law of the jungle? Willmajor law-making conventions be widely accepted and will resort toimpartial tribunals, such as the International Court of Justice, becomethe rule rather than the exception?

These and no doubt other relevant-indeed agonizing-ques-tions ought to be very much on the mind of all those who believe thatinternational relations should be based on international legal orderand that the dream of a more just and peaceful world is not a utopiandream. They should be very much on the mind of my generation andI hope also on the mind of the younger generation of up and cominginternational lawyers, the future members of the International LawCommission, of the International Court of Justice, of the InternationalTribunal for the Law of the Sea as well as of the International Cri-minal Court. when it hopefully comes into being, and on the mind ofthose who will be the next generation of decision-makers at the toplevels of national Governments and in the international bureaucracy.

The clear objective is international legal order based on thesupremacy of international law. If this objective is to be achieved, tomy mind, the best formula is idealism tempered with realism. Politics,it has been said, is the art of the possible and the same is nearly astrue of international law. We should strive to achieve what is ideal butwe must also be prepared to compromise on the basis of what isachievable at any given time since the penalty for insisting on what isideal may be to achieve no result at all. The prayer of the medievaltheologian has relevance to many situations, including the develop-ment and application of international law: "Good Lord, give me thecourage to change the things that can be changed, the serenity toaccept the things that cannot be changed and the wisdom to know thedifference between the two".

DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DIVERSITECULTURELLE

Mohamed Bennouna

Elle itait entourie de sa toilettecomme de L'apparedi dilicat el spi-ritualisd d'une civilisation.

Marcel Proust, A la recherchedu temps perdu,Paris, Gallimard, 1988, t. II.

D'origine europenne, le droit international a dfO faire face A desinterpellations et A des remises en cause successives qui ont 61argiprogressivement son champ d'activit6 sur les plans spatial et materiel;encore que cette dvolution s'est faite au travers d'une ,, dialectiqueouverte A o6a, facteurs de progr~s et de r6cession coexistent cruel-lement-T.

1) Avec la fin de la guerre froide, le droit international a W con-frontd k deux mouvements apparemment contradictoires :

- D'un c6td, <, la mondialisation , soutenue par la transnationalisa-tion de I'information, de la technologie et des moyens de produc-tion et par ia proclamation de la part des puissances dominantesd'un o nouvel ordre international , sur le diapason de ]a dmocratielibdrale et de l'dconomie de marchd2.

- De l'autre c6t6, une multiplication sans precddent des revendica-ions identitaires et des particularismes culturels qui dtaient commecongel~s pendant la pdriode de la guerre froide et de l'affrontementid ologique.

Ainsi, face A i'appel A l'ouverture du monde (exceptd d'ailleurspour les personnes humaines) sous la bannie du module dominant,on a assist6 A des mouvements de repli. de rejet et de fermeture. Qu'onne voie pas IA un simple renouveau du conflit bien connu entre uni-versalisme et culturalisme, tel qu'alimentd par les 6tudes d'anthro-

' R. J. Dupuy, - Communaute internationale et disparitds de ddveloppement ,Recuei des cours... 1979-IV. vol. 165, p. 42.

2 Charte de Paris pour une nouvelle Europe, adopide le 21 novembre 1990dans le cadre de la Conference pour la s&uit6 et la cooperation en Europe,Politique itrangere, 1991, p. 292 et suiv.

pologie, qui s'est enlisd d'ailleurs dans une vdritable impasse. La dis-cussion porte d6sormais sur la signification et le contenu de l'uni-versalisme, entre ceux qui le confondent avec un monde uniforme,expression d'une Humanitd r6concilide avec elle-m~me, et ceux qui leconqoivent comme le produit de la grande diversit6 des cultures,coexistant dans une , Humanit6 plurielle ,. Pour les uns, l'universa-lisme est une donn6e absolue s laquelle on ne peut qu'adlhdrer et pourles autres, il doit 8tre recherchd constamment et enrichi au travers dudialogue interculturel.

II en a rdsultd un second paradoxe entre une situation qui, objec-tivement, devrait 8tre marquee par une plus grande s6curitd sous 'ef-fet de l'att6nuation de la stratdgie de dissuasion nuclaire ainsi quedes progr~s en matiire de d6sarmement, et un sentiment g6ndrald'ins6curit6 occasionnd par des menaces r6elles ou inventdes, tels quemodules de croissance satur6s, terrorisme ou besoin d'imaginer denouveaux ennemis pour consolider des structures 6tatiques en mal decoh6sion.

2) Les incertitudes qui planent sur le nouvel 6tat du monden'ont d'6gal que le trouble qui s'est empard des thdoriciens des rela-tions internationales, habituds A raisonner au travers du schdma con-fortable de la bipolaritd. La premi~re r6action, concomitante Ai l'effon-drement de l'Union sovi6tique, a 6t6 le cri de victoire de FrancisFukuyama annongant, avec la fin de lHistoire, le triomphe et lag6ndralisation du modile occidental de ddmocratie libdrale et d'dco-nomie de march63.

Cette prophdtie, ayant 6t6 assez rapidement ddmentie par lesfaits, le cri de victoire s'est transformd en un cri d'alarme sous Iaplume de Samuel Huntington, qui met en garde contre un ,,affronte-ment des civilisations > et en appelle A [a solidaritd de l'Occident faceAs ce qu'il d6nomme ,< la connexion confucdenne et islamique o,.

II est vrai que depuis la conclusion hative de Fukuyama, la guerredu Golfe a boulevers6 le paysage de I'ensemble du monde arabe; desrevendications nationalistes, culturelles et/ou ethniques se sont faitjour dans plusieurs r6gions du monde, embrasant les Balkans, cer-taines parties de l'ex-Europe sovi~tique, sans compter le drame quevivent de nombreuses contr6es du continent africain, o6 des Etats sesont compl~tement d6lit6s.

'F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York, The FreePress, 1992.

aS. P. Huntington, ,Thc Clash of Civilizations,,, in A. Clesse. R. Copper,Y. Sakamoto, edit., The International System After the Collapse of the East-WestOrder, Martinus Nijhoff. 1994, pp. 7-27.

On se demande cependant pour quelles raisons l'article deSamuel Huntington, qui tente de rtdpondre aux preoccupations del'unique super-puissance avec des projections gdn~rales et arbitraires,a eu autant d',chos et a suscit6 autant d'interrogations et d'inqui-tudes de par le monde. C'est probablement, comme le suggere R. Falk,parce qu'il met l'accent sur I'importance grandissante, en cette pd-riode historique, de ol 'identite civilisationnelle ,, par opposition lar~fdrence 6tatique qui a prdvalu jusque-la dans le systeme mondial5 .

II est rvdvlateur, d'autre part. que le Secrdtaire gdn~ral des Na-tions Unies ait publid. le 3 janvier 1995, un Supplement a son Agendapour la paL de juin 1992, attirant i'attention sur I'accroissement tr~ssensible des conflits intra-dtatiques et l'dcroulement des institutionspubliques dans les pays concernis, ainsi que sur la ntcessit6, en con-s&juence, d'laborer de nouveaux concepts pour guider l'activitd desNations Unies. Selon le premier responsable de I'Organisation uni-verslle : a L'epoque actuelle appelle une rflexion nouvelle, un effortcommun et la mise au point de moyens in~dits de rdgler les crises. Eneffet, un monde diffdrent est apparu lorsque la guerre froide a pris finet nous ne le comprenons encore qu'imparfaitement,,6.

3) Pour tenter de comprendre, il convient d'dviter la confusiondes desirs et des rfalit~s et le formalisme de facade. Ainsi, on ne peutse refugier derriere le constat Inifiant que << cette 6volution procodemoins de la coercition et de I'abus de leur puissance par ceux qui lad~tiennent que d'un processus d'occidentalisation de la soci~t6 inter-nationale lid au succ~s de la d~mocratie et de l'6conomie libdrale, quisont objectivement des produits de la civilisation europdenne etnord-amricaine,,. Ainsi ddcrite, cette dvolution correspond pourH. Thierry au o sens de I'histoire ,, et il en appelle aux Nations Uniespour se substituer I'infirmitd de nombreux Etats7, comme si cetteOrganisation operait dans une neutralitd totale et sereine par rapport

la r~alitd du rapport de force et des intr&s en cause. Or, on sait quela scene intemationale est domin6e par ]a politique des (,deux poidsdeux mesures , et la fameuse v raison d'Etatv.

On ne peut nier aujourd'hui que les entites, qui s'estiment ddfa-vorisdes ou ndglig6es dans la nouvelle configuration du monde, sereplient sur le particularisme culturel pour s'affirmer et I6gitimer leurs

R, Falk, . False Universalism and the Geopolitics of Exclusion: the Case ofIslam ., Princeton. a), il 1996 (non publi').

6 Suppliment i IAgenda pour la pair: Rapport de situation prisente par le

Secrtaire gninral t I'occasion du cinquantlirne anniversaire de ('Organisationdes Nations Unies. document A/5(60. par. 103.

- H. Thierry. L'Etat et I'organisation de la socict6 internationale,,. in L'Etatsouverain a laube du XXI' siecle (Colloque de la Societe frangaise pour le droitinternational, Nancy. 1993). Paris. Pedone. 1994, p. 210.

actions. La culture serait, dans ce contexte, la poursuite de la politiquepar d'autres moyens.

La protection des spcificites culturelles nationales et de groupesminoritaires est inscrite dans les agendas de mouvements politiques,au Nord et au Sud de la plante, en position ddfensive ou offensive etse r6clamant de diverses sensibilitds iddologiques.

II est donc n6cessaire de cerner de plus pr~s cette nouvelleexpression de 'action politique afin d'en d6terminer les ressorts et laport6e, ainsi que l'impact sur le droit international.

4) La controverse semble se cristalliser autour de la notion deo Ilgitimitd d6mocratique *, avanc~e comme l'un des critres d'apprd-ciation de I'Etat dans la pdriode de I'apr~s-guerre froide. Elle toucheaussi bien l'individu, dont les droits seraient drig6s en une valeurabsolue et exigible en tout lieu et en tout temps, que 'Etat appel Ales mettre en reuvre et A les promouvoir. A I'dpreuve de la diversit6culturelle, nous nous pencherons donc successivement sur la probi-matique des droits de 'homme et sur celle de I'Etat.

1. Les droits de I'homme i r'preuve de la diversite culturelle

Les droits de 'homme sont n~s dans le contexte de l'Europe duXVIII e si&le et sous I'influence de la philosophie dite des Lurires.La problmatique de I'Etat souverain westphalien dtait au centre decette rdflexion, puisqu'il s'agissait de limiter ses prdrogatives, en tantque d~tenteur exclusif de la violence Idgale (Max Weber), en 6largis-sant le champ des libert~s individuelles.

Parall~lement, les droits de rhomme 6taient lids A la question dela I6gitimit6, soit ia justification du pouvoir politique, au travers de iathdorie du contrat social et des prdrogatives inhdrentes A la personnehumaine (droits naturels).

Ces droits impliquent l'existence d'un < Etat de droit,, et d'unr6gime de d6mocratie libdrale. En effet, le citoyen 6tant appeld 5 laformation de la volont6 g6ndrale par 1'Hlection de ses repr~sentants,ces derniers doivent veiller sur le pacte fondamental (source de I6gi-timit6) tout en 'adaptant progressivement i 1'6volution de la socitet i ses besoins. Le contr6le de rddiction des normes et de leur miseen ceuvre est assur6 par des institutions judiciaires inddpendantes.

Ds le d6part, les droits de l'homme, du fait meme de la philoso-phie qui les sous-tend, avaient une pr6tention A I'universalit6. Si onpoussait la logique des droits naturels .i son terme, elle serait incom-patible avec l'existence des fronti&es et de toutes les discriminationsqu'elles entrainent; l'homme devrait avoir le monde pour patrie.

Les droits de I'homme vont donc se heurter au monde des sou-verainet~s (a). Mais dans la mesure ou ces droits ont 6volu deslibertds formelles vers les droits dconomiques et sociaux et ceux de latroisi~me gdn&ation, prenant en compte I'Humanitd dans son ensem-ble (developpement, environnement, etc....), ils vont soulever la ques-tion des moyens disponibles aussi bien au niveau de I'Etat que de ]acommunautd internationale. Or ies soci&6ts ayant suivi des rythmesde changement diffdrents, les droits de l'homme doivent-ils s'adapter

la relativit6 du temps historique ? (b) Enfin, nds dans un contexteculturel donnd, les droits de l'homme doivent &re admis et 16gitim~sailleurs pour Etre erig.s en valeurs universelles. (c)

a) Les droits de l'homme dans un monde de souverainetis

Le ph6nomine dit de ]a mondialisation n'a pas emp6ch6 les fron-tires de se fermer de plus en plus A la libre circulation des hommes,surtout entre le Sud et le Nord de ]a plan&e. Le discours sur I'uni-versalit des droits de r homme va de pair avec la volontd des pays pros-p res de prendre les mesures les plus fermes contre ]'immigrationclandestine, et de r~server les avantages acquis A leurs propres ressor-tissants. I1 West pas question, comme I'a declard un homme politiquefranqais, *d'assumer toute la misre du monde,, (M. Rocard). II end~ooule que, pour la population d6favoris6e du globe, a 'universel ,, esttout au plus fantasmd au moment oi les determinants au quotidienramnnent aux contraintes du groupe restreint on de l'Etat. Ehommetraine avec lui ses papiers d'identite, et il sait qu'il sera plus ou moinssoutenu. que son destin individuel aura plus ou moins de valeur selonI'Etat d'appartenance, les moyens et la cr6dibilitd dont il dispose. On nepeut donc dviter que cet homme ne s'adresse d'abord i son Etat, et qu'ilne soit sensible aux valeurs de solidarit6 qui le renforcent et lui laissentesp6rer ainsi ultrieurement une amdlioration de son sort AutrementdiL tant que la raison d'Etat prime au niweau international, il aura duma a croire s I'universalit6 du message sur ]a libertd de la personnehumaine.

Cette universalit6 a dejA 46td battue en brche par le colonialismeet la discrimination raciale institutionnalis&, pratiqu~s par ceux-IAm~mes qui faisaient des droits de l'homme un aspect essentiel de leursyst~ne de valeurs. Le droit des peuples A disposer d'eux-memes. re-connu en tant que norme imp&ative du droit international au cours dela dcennie soixante8 permettra de bannir tout deni des droits de

' Principe codifid par fa d6claration 2625 (XXV) de I'Assembl&e gdndrale desNations Unies. du 24 octobre 1970, riaffirmd par les avis de la Cour internationalede Justice du 21 juin 1971 et du 16 octobre 1975, sur les affaires de ]a Namibie etdu Sahara occidental et citd comme exemple dc rtgle impftative par la Commis-sion du droit international.Annuaire-. 1966, vol. ii, p. 270. document A/6309/Rev.I.

I'homme fonde sur une pretendue A mission sacree de civilisation s, eten consequence toute hidrarchie entre les cultures.

En vertu de I'autodetermination, les peuples domin~s, qui oataccbs A leur propre structure 6tatique en tant qu'acteurs interna.tionaux, odeterminent librement leur statut politique et assurent libre-ment leur developpement 6conomique, social et culturel 0 S'il en estainsi, c'est que le debat politique doit se derouler A l'int~ieur desfronti~res sans ingerence exterieure de la part des autres Etats nimime des Nations Unies (Article 2, paragraphe 7, de la Charte). Mais,on sait aussi que le fameux domaine reserve s'est r~trtci parall~le-ment A l'universalisation progressive des droits fondamentaux de lapersonne humaine'0 . L'Etat ne peut donc les meconnaltre en arguantde l'exercice de sa propre souverainete et du principe de non-ingerence puisqu'il s'agit 1A d'une obligation erga omnes, dont tous lesEtats peuvent demander le respect. II reste A se demander par quelsmoyens ?

En d'autres termes, si la violation des droits fondamentaux de [apersonne humaine est un acte illicite qui engage la responsabilit6 deson auteur, il faut en determiner la gravite (ddlit ou crime), et mettreen cuvre les procedures et normes secondaires approprides en la ma-tiere. Quant aux contre-mesures qui seraient adopt6es contre 'auteurde 'acte illicite, elles doivent s'inscrire egalement dans le cadre dudroit de ia responsabilitd internationale, y compris les limitations etles procedures du r~glement des diffdrends, pour eviter que la reactionA un acte prdtendument illicite ne soit un pretexte utilis6 par les pluspuissants (comme dans les pratiques coloniales) pour faire pr6valoirleurs intrets nationaux ". If ne suffit pas de qualifier un pays de ter-roriste pour prendre des actes unilatdraux, des sanctions 6conomi-ques contre tous les investisseurs potentiels dans ce pays (lois Helms-Burton et d'Amato-Kennedy promulguees par le president Clintonrespectivement en mars et aoflt 1996, et protestation d'un certainnombre de pays europdens notamment)12 .

' Article premier (identique) des deux Pactes relatifs aux droits civils et poli-tiques et aux droits 6conomiques sociaux et culturels de 1966.

0 G. Arangio-Ruiz, -Le domaine rdservd: L'organisation internationale et Ierapport entre droit international ct droit interne,', Recueji des cours... 1990-VI,vol. 225, pp. 9-484.

"Voir le chapitre It sur les contre-mesures de la deuxi me partic du projetd'articles sur la responsabilit6 des Etats adopt6 par la Commission du droit inter-national en premibre lecture, Rapport de la Commission du droit international surles travaux de sa quarante-huiti/me session, Documents officiels de IAssemblieginerale, cinquante et uniame session, Supplement n" 10 (A/51/10). p. 167 ct suiv.

2 La premiere loi vise Cuba, et la seconde I'Iran et la Libye. Ces lois ont Wcontest~es parce qu'elles ont une application extra-territoriale et qu'elles font peude cas des rfgles de l'Organisation mondiale du commerce.

D'autre part. le droit d'ingdrence humanitaire, avancd par cer-tains auteurs, la suite notamment de Mario Bettati. est porteurd'abus en drpit des motivations g~ndreuses qui le sous-tendent.SL'humanitaire, ne peut justifier la violation des principes de non-

recours a la force et de respect de I'intdgrit4 territoriale qui fondent. l'6galit6 souveraine,, des Etats. Le prdtendu droit d'ing(rence esLpar essence, discriminatoire puisqu'il ne peut 8tre actionn6 que par lesEtats les plus puissants.

En r~alit. dans un monde oi la distinction nationaux-6trangersdemeure la rfgle. et oii ces derniers peuvent ftre discrimin~s o lgale-ment >, expuls~s et s~pards parfois de leur famille, la protection desdroits de tous les humains, quels qu'ils soient, ne peut tre assurrequ'au travers de proc&Iures collectives au sein des organisations uni-verselles.

Encore faut-il que toutes les parties prenantes L la socidtd inter-nationale, et pour le moins les principales sensibilitds culturelles ou. les grandes formes de civilisation,) 3, puissent faire entendre leursvoix et participer au processus de dcision. Or, Ai I'heure actuelle, ledes&tuilibre s'est creus6 au sein des Nations Unies en faveur d'unorgane restreint, le Conseil de s curitd, dont la composition, 6tablie ily a plus de cinquante ans. est loin d'etre representative de la diversitdculturelle du monde.

I en r~sulte que les rnmes faits, les mmes violations du droiLdonnent lieu L des rdactions diffdrentes selon les parties concernees,comme cela a 6t6 flagrant dans les contentieux isradlo-arabe et dansle conflit qui a ravag6 I'ex-Yougoslavie, ou encore dans l'appr6ciationdu comportement des grandes puissances dftentrices du droit de veto.Analysant les reprdsailles amdricaines du 26 juin 1993 contre lrak(approuvies implicitement par la majorit6 des membres du Conseil).qu'il qualifie de comportement illicite par excellence, L. Condorelli enconclut: << Dans une situation de crise profonde, de flottements et detfitonnements, comme celle que nous vivons actuellement, la doctrinea plus qu'un devoir de critique: je parlerais d'un v-ritable devoir deresistance face au pouvoir des Etats,,"4 .

" Article 9 du Statut de ]a Cour internationaic dc Justice sur I'election desjuges-

'. L. Condorelli. -,A propos dc Iattaque am~ncaine contre Flirak du 26 juin1993: lettre d'un professeur desempare aux lecteurs du JEDI- Journal europiende droit international, 1994. vol. 5. p. 143. Les 3 et 4 septembre 1996. les Etats-U nisont de nouveau lance des missiles sur Bagdad en reaction 5 une incursion irakiennedans le Nord du Kurdistan dcrte , zone d'exclusion adrienne , par les allies.Cette action unilatdrale. sans aucun fondement juidiquc, a fait I'objet de reservesexpresses parmi les pays europ-ns et arabes; ce qui n'a pas emp&:hd les Etats-Unis d'6tendre d'autorit, la zone d'exclusion adrienne jusqu'aux faubourgs deBagdad-

Quoi qu'il en soit, il n'en demeure pas moins que le discours, surla d~mocratisation des syst~mes politiques, dans le cadre d'un Etat dedroit, est affaibli par la brutalitd du rapport des forces dans les rela-tions internationales. On ne s'6tonnera pas que certains pays prennentpritexte de cette situation et de la menace potentielle qu'elle corn-porte, pour donner la priorit6 au renforcement de I'autoritd de 'Etatsur les libertt~s individuelles. Or ce sont les Etats forts qui ont puamorcer leur modernisation et leur d6veloppement et ont r~ussis'imposer sur la scene internationale (pays de 'Asie du Sud-Est, parexemple, qualifi6s de nouveaux pays industrialiss) 15. I1 en est ainsiparce qu'ils se sont donn6s les moyens d'une strat6gie de contr6le etd'allocation des ressources. Leurs dlites puisent ds lors leurs 16gi-timit6 dans ]a satisfaction des revendications socio-6conomiques de lapopulation et dans I'am61ioration de ses conditions d'existence. L'ac-cent est mis en premier, contrairement au schi.ma occidental, sur lesdroits 6conomiques et sociaux; la satisfaction des libert6s indivi-duelles est repouss6e i un avenir meilleur. La tradition de subordina-tion As un groupe homog~ne est souvent invoqude comme justificationdu pouvoir des Mites et comme le moyen le plus sfr de satisfaire lesbesoins individuels.

I1 est question ds lors de socidt~s en transition engagdes dans unprocessus de construction nationale, de d6veloppement et de moder-nisation, suivant une voie adaptde leurs propres caract~ristiques his-toriques.

b) Les droits de l'homme et le temps historique

II est certain que les soci6ts n'ont pas 6volud au meme rythne etqu'elles vivent des temps historiques diff~rents. Notre propos n'est pasde rouvrir ici la controverse sur la notion de retard historique qui impli-que n6cessairement une dialectique du progr~s, avec Ia clt une hi~rar-chie des socidt6s selon leurs performances. Nous entendons simplementrappeler que les soci t&s humaines ont connu des d~veloppementsdistincts en fonction de leur propre structure sociologique, de leur envi-ronnement propre et ext6rieur, ainsi que des int6ractions qu'elles ontentretenues avc ce dernier.

II en d6coule des disparitds consid6rables, avec Ia persistance ici etIa de mentalitds et d'organisations tribales ou patrimoniales, de I'anal-phab6tisme dans des proportions couvrant parfois plus de la moiti6 de[a population, d'une certaine relation ii la croyance et A la religion,n'autorisant qu'une faible marge de tol6rance; sans compter la faiblessedes infrastructures de base, servant Ai faire communiquer entre elles les

"s A. Pollis, -Cultural Relativism Revisited Through A State Prism .,HumanRights Quarterly, 1996, vol. 18. pp. 316-344.

regions d'un meme pays, ou le nombre dc dispensaires donnant lespremiers soins aux malades, etc....

Comment, clans ces conditions de d~phasage historique. penserque les droits de I'homme, tels que proclamis par les grands textes ivocation universelle, puissent etre mis en oeuvre et respectds quel que

soit le contexte? A moins de fermer les yeux sur la rcalitd de nom-breuses socictds oiz l'adhsion des 6lites 5 ces droits, dans les forumsdiplomatiques ou par la ratification des conventions internationales,s'accompagne de leur ignorance totale ou partielle dans la vie au quo-tidien et dans I'exercice du pouvoir.

On peut se demander, des lors si ces droits ne doivent pas Etreconsideres comme des objectifs .A atteindre, et s'ii n'appartient pas Achaque socidt6 d'elaborer des programmes de rdalisation sous con-tr6le international. Ainsi qu'on l'a soutenu pour le droit au develop-pement, il s'agirait de droits finalists, assortis d'une sorte d'obligationde r6sultat programmee dans le temps en fonction de la situation dechacun et de ses moyens. Pour etre acceptable, un tel raisonnementne peut concerner ni les atteintes .t la dignit6 et A I'integritd physiquedes 6tres humains quels qu'ils soient, ni afortiori les crimes contre lapaix et la s6curite de I'humanit6, tels qu'ils viennent d'etre codifiespar ia Commission du droit international A sa quarante-huitiemesession.

Ce serait en effet porter atteinte ai des droits fondamentaux outranscendentaux, lies A I'existence de la personne humaine et de lasociet6 internationale et protdgds par des normes de droit imperatifauxquelles on ne peut deroger sous aucun pr~texte.

Force est de constater que mEme pour ce *, noyau dur, il nexistepas encore aujourd'hui un droit d'acces direct par le dep6t d'uneplainte devant une juridiction universelle compdtente pour supplder lacarence des systemes juridiques nationaux. Le projet de juridictioncriminelle internationale elaborg par la Commission du droit interna-tional n'a pu contourner la souverainetd, et a soumis la saisine d'unetelle cour au consentement des Etats concernds ou A une d 5ision duConseil de securite pour ce qui est du crime d'agression, avec tous les

aas propres au fonctionnement de cet organe16.

Or on sait que darts de nombreuses soci6tes, I'6galitd devant ]a

justice est loin d'etre garantie, non pas taut au niveau des principes,

ft Rapport de la Commission du droit intcmational sur les travaux de saquarante-sixi me session. Documents officiels de IAssemblue ginirale. quarante-

neuvime session, Suppliment ne 10 (A/49110). p. 47 et suiv. L'article 23 du projetdc statut d'une Cour criminelle internationale, relatif I I'- Action du Conseil desecurit,- a Wid fortement critiqu6 par les ddlgu6s des Etats A la reunion du Comil6

ad hoc pour la creation d'une cour cuimindle internationale. Documents officielsde I'Assemblie ginerale, cinquanleme session. Suppliement no 22 (A/5022).

auxquels tous rendent hommage. que dans la pratique judiciaire, man-quant le plus souvent d'autonomie, de fiabilit6 et de credibilit6. Bienplus, certains Etats s'estiment trop faibles pour affronter le crimeorganisd A large 6chelle (trafic de drogue, par exemple), brassant par-fois des ressources suprieures A celles du budget national et ayant,de ce fait, les moyens de pervertir et de corrompre les institutionsrepresentativesl 7.

Le jeu des droits de I'homme et de la d6mocratie rencontre Iiaussi des limites, et seule une solidaritt internationale concretefond~e sur un programme d'action .x moyen terme est susceptible defavoriser des activitds de substitution pour contrecarrer le crime orga-nist6 (l'Union europ6enne a engag6 une action de ce type avec certainspays de [a rive sud de la M6diterran6e).

Tout en veillant A consolider progressivement certaines valeursqui fondent la civilisation de l'universel, le droit international ne peutdonc n6gliger rHistoire, ses p~ip6ties et les handicaps qui en rdsul-tent pour certains pays. D'autre part, certaines libert6s qui favoi-sent ['affirmation des individualitfs dans l'expression de leurs opi-nions et de leurs croyances, ainsi que dans leurs relations familiales,doivent faire l'objet d'un processus de l6gitimation culturelle pour8tre admises dans d'autres contextes que ceux qui leur ont donn6naissance.

c) Les droits de I'homme et la Wgitimation culturelle

Le processus de transposition de concepts juridiques et 6thiquesd'une culture Ai une autre est une t~che extr~mement ardue. Pour cefaire, on doit se dfmarquer d'une part du relativisme culturel strict desanthropologues, consistant A adopter une attitude de neutralit6itl'gard des traditions culturelles quelles qu'elles soient et, d'autre part,de ia supdriorit6 culturelle de la tradition occidentale des droits del'homme et en cons&iuence de la n6cessit6 d'&Iuquer les autres pour lesprtparer A 'adopter. Leur 1dgitimation, leur acceptation, leur intdrio-risation dans les mceurs et dans les comportements, ne peuvent se r~ali-ser qu'au travers d'un dialogue interculturel permanent de mani~re Aconfronter les systimes de valeurs et les traditions, et parvenir ainsi Ades consensus sur tel ou tel de leurs aspects. Le droit internationaldevrait normalement fournir les procdures adapt&.s pour canaliser le

"v Voir la r6solution 44/39 de I'Asscmble gfndrale des Nations Unics, du4 d6cembre 1989, intitulde , Responsabilit6 pcSnale internationale des particuliers ctdes entit6s qui se livrent au tr-afic illicite transfrontire de stupdfiants et -i d'autrcsactivit6s criminellcs internationaics: crdation d'une cour de justice pdnale intema-tionale ayant competence pour connaitre de ces ddlits,,. Et notrc article sur ,,lacrdation d'une juridiction p6nalc internationale et la souverainetd des Etats,,,AFDI, 1990, vol. 36. pp. 299-306.

dMbat et en concrtiser les r~sultats dans des accords internationauxassortis de mt anismes de contr6le. avec toutes les imperfectionsinhrentes au monde des souverainetts puisque la pratique des rtser-yes permettra toujours aux uns et aux autres de se singulariser s.

Quoi qu'il en soil, un tel dialogue devrait mettre A jour ce quidans les spicificit6s culturelles, avancees pour se soustraire A tel outel principe, relive du simple pretexte ou d'arguties politiciennesd'ites ou de castes d~cid6es i conserver le pouvoir et A 'exercer Aleur unique profit. Car qu'on le veuille ou non, ii existe aujourd'huiune vritable ,,culture des droits de i'homme . anim&e par des asso-ciations ou des organisations non gouvernementales nationales ettransnationaleks culture de contestation des privileges dtablis et desabus des ddtenteurs du pouvoir. Le fameux adroit de resistance al'oppression , est enracin6 dans toutes les traditions culturelles huma-nistes.

Le principe de reciprocite est le meilleur gage de la diversit6 descultures et d'un dialogue rel et 6galitaire entre etes. II est inadmis-sible, par exemple. que certains pays A religion d'Etat restreignent'exercice des autres cultes et les droits des personnes concernees,tout en revendiquant pour les adeptes de leur propre religion unelibertd sans entraves ailleurs. Comment accepter d'autre part que lessystbnes juridiques de ces pays jugent des 6trangers en fonction deleur lieu de rattachement religieux. r&el ou supposd, et non de leurnationalit6 et de leur appartenance A un Etat laque ?

Les situations d'leg-monie, les menaces ext~rieures et les tenta-tives d'isolement et de quarantaine dirig&es contre un certain nombrede pays (notamment des pays arabes et musulmans) renforcent la tra-ditionalisation des societds vis~es et le repli sur elles-m.mes parrEflexe d'auto-d6fense. C'est tout le sens du debat aujourd'hui entreles Etats-Unis et les Europ~ens au sujet des sanctions 6conomiques6lict es par les premiers, et du a dialogue constructif,* priconisd parles seconds car, comme le relive tris justement A. Laroui, , le seulantidote A la tradition, c'est 'espoir, c'est-&-dire la perspective d'unavenir ouvert ,1. Cette perspective est seule a m~me de favoriser uneinteraction positive entre les forces endogenes de changement et 1'en-vironnement international. Les domaines les plus sensibles con-cement la famille. y compris la relation entre les sexes, la religion, les

" A. Pellet (Rapporteur special de la Commission du droit international).deuxicme rapport sur les reserves aux traites. document A/CN.4/477/Add.I. Auparagraphe 257. lauteur conclut: -Aucunc considdration dcisive ne paraitimposer Iradoption d'un regime particulier de r6serves pour les traitd' normatifs.i m&me pour les traitEs de droits de lhomme -.

" A. Laroui. /a crise des jinellecitels arabes: Tradilionalisme ou histori-c/sme ? Paris. Maspero. 1974. p. 57.

libert6s d'expression et d'association, et plus g6nfralement les mo-dalitfs du choix des gouvernants.

Du point de vue de la paix et de la sdcurit6 internationales, objec-tif consensuel s'il en est, c'est le pluralisme et l'ouverture qu'il faut1dgitimer et faire progresser, aussi bien au niveau des instances dupouvoir que des sociftds civiles. En revanche, les soci6t6s mono-lithiques et fermdes sont porteuses de germes de conflits et d'affron-tements .l'int6rieur et en dehors des fronti~res.

Encore faut-il que la perception de l'autre ne soit pas faussfe parles grands mfdias qui ont tendance h mettre en exergue les aspects lesplus spectaculaires d'une socidt6, et notamment les positions de grou-pes extr~mistes, cr6ant ainsi des amalgames et des g~ndralisationsabusives. L'ignorance ou l'image ddform6e de l'autre peut entraInerdes rdactions de rejet et d'hostilit6. Or les <(mass media>, et done lasource et l'habillage de l'information, sont dominds aujourd'hui parI'Occident et par une approche culturelle unique. Et toute tentative der 6quilibrage au niveau international, notamment au tr,"vers du d~bath ]'Organisation des Nations Unies pour l'education, la science et laculture (UNESCO) sur le nouvel ordre de I'information, s'est heurtdeh une opposition virulente de tous ceux qui insistent sur la libert6 dela presse et le libre jeu des forces du march6 en ce domaine (cetteattitude a conduit les Etats-Unis et ]a Grande-Bretagne A quitterI'UNESCO, ce qui a affaibli considfrablement cette organisation). Or]a libert6 ainsi conque est une libert6 ,i sens unique sans aucune con-siddration pour ia diversit6 des cultures, des sensibilit6s, des sourcesde l'information et de son interpretation, sans compter que les Etatsne parviennent plus A la r~glementer et en limiter les abus.

!1. L'Etat i I'ipreuve de la diversiti culturelle

Dans oun monde priv6 de sens >, selon l'expression de Zaki La'fdi2°,on assiste A une certaine ,< dfcomposition de I'Etat-, pris en tenaillesentre les forces pr6ponddrantes du marchd et les poussdes nationali-taires". Cette ,dialectique du clocher et du satellite >22 a fragilis6I'Etat (a), qui est tenu de se recomposer sur de nouvelles bases parune redjfinition de sa structure et de ses fonctions (b).

:, Z. La'idi, Un monde privi de sens, Paris, Fayard, 1994.

-1 B. Stern, 6dit., Marchi et nation - regards croisis: Internalisation de

'conomie ou retour des nations ?, Paris, Montchrestien. 1995.22 R. J. Dupuy, , Le Conseil de s6curit6 en recherche de paix ,, in Y. Daudet.

6dit., Les Nations Unies et la restauration de lEtat, Paris, Pedone, 1995, p. 13.

a) L'Etatfragilise

On peut se demander si ceux qui dtplorent la ddliquescence deI'Etat en Afrique. allant jusqu'bk considrer certains pays comme des,,territoires sans maitres,, n'ont pas la m6moire courte ou tout aumoins selective. A Nest-on pas en effet, se demande J. Charpentier par-fois rewnu a la situation antftieure At la colonisation. celle qui l'avaitjuridiquement justifi6e en lui refusant les fgards dus it des Etats? ,2.Comine s'il s'agissait de la vdritable justification, comme si les Etatsbien constitu~s ont toujours eu Adroit i des 6gards, lorsqu'il ont 6t6occupds et annexes, comme en tdmoigne l'histoire europenne rd-cente. S'il est incontestable que l'Etat est nd et s'est consolidd dans lecontexte culturel europ(en (westphalien) avant d'8tre export6 sousd'autres cieux, il est vrai aussi que cet enfantement s'est fait dans ladoulcur sur un fond de violence et de deplacement de populations.C'est toute la probldmatique de i'Etat-nation, nouvelle divinitd dumonde moderne, tent6 de s'6tendre en revendiquant le jus ad bellumcomme son expression ultime et I6gitime, avec toutes les aberrationstotalitaires et fascistes ayant conduit au plus grand genocide de 'His-toire.

Comment s'dtonner des lors que d'autres civilisations ayant requl'Etat en partage ne connaissent aussi des affrontements et des catas-trophes humanitaires ? Maiheureusement, la constitution d'une com-munaute politique unique sur un territoire, i la population ethnique-ment et culturellement diversifi6e, s'est rarement ralis& autrement.Qu'on reprenne it cc propos l'histoire de la plupart des pays industria-lists oti les guerres civiles ou de s6cession ont marqu6 '6mergence etraffirmation de I'EtaL

Si on en revient A des differences d'ordre chronologique ou detemps historique, ce n'est pas pour accepter les exc~s d'ob qu'ils vien-nent. mais simplement pour mettre en garde contre les ddrivcs visantA accabler telle ou telle civilisation des m~faits des nou% eaux venussur la scene dtatique, qui proliferent effectivement dans une certaineanarchie. La crise de l'Etat est bien stir diffdrente au Nord et au Sudde la plan~te, mais elle se nourrit ici et 1l, et at des degr6s divers. desrnmes ingr&ients, entre mondialisation et particularismes culturels.Encore que I'in~galitd de puissance fait peser le poids des ingdrencesextirieures sur les plus faibles. Quant aux rtseaux transnationaux de'6conomie et de la monnaie, ils convergent essentiellement ',ers ies

pays industrialiss o6 se trouvent leurs centres de d6cision.

J. Charpentier. ,,Le phnorr~ne &atique travers les grande mutationspolitiques contemporaincs - in L'Etat souterain a l'aube dA XXI' siecie, op. cir.(supra note 7). p. 27.

II n'en demeure pas moins que la plupart des Etats, en dehors deceux qui ont une rt~elle dimension continentale, ne peuvent survivreet planifier raisonnablement leur avenir que dans des regroupementsplus larges, soit comme partenaires soit comme clients. Leur marge demanceuvre se rrduit inexorablement au fur et A mesure de la concen-tration du pouvoir . l'chelle mondiale. Quant aux groupes sociaux enleur sein, ils ont de plus en plus affaire A, des dcideurs 6loignds etpolitiquement irresponsables, bureaucraties appr~ciant sur dossiers,sur le module des instances de ]a Commission europ~enne deBruxelles, ou bien les institutions financi res internationales, pour lespays du Sud.

On en vient A se demander si 'Etat n'est pas ramend A un r6lepurement srcuritaire puisque les leviers de commande pour faire faceaux probl~mes sociaux sont en train de lui dchapper. I! va se trouverdu m~me coup en porte-a-faux, dtant appei a rrpondre de situationssans avoir les clks de la decision. De ce fait, les populations sont ten-tees de se replier sur des solidaritrs plus rapprochres, plus percep-tibles sur les plans culturel et/ou g6ographique, soit le cadre regionalou sous-rdgional.

Les entitds plus restreintes, en phase avec les rralitds humainesou ce qu'on ddnomme la socirtd civile, ambitionnent de nouer desrelations par-delA les frontires et de contrebalancer les rrseaux finan-ciers transnationaux, que l'Etat est incapable de contenir.

Dans ce drbat autour du r6le de 'Etat, on trouve d'un c6t6 ceuxqui ont choisi d'accompagner la mondialisation, en tant que phdno-mane ineluctable, et, de 'autre, ceux qui s'opposent a la dissolutiondes valeurs culturelles et sociales essentielles dans l'universalismeaseptisd des marchands.

A l'intrrieur de ce schdma, on peut entrevoir bien des nuances etdes variations, mais en definitive l'Etat souverain est remis en causeA des degr~s divers, n'6tant plus i m~me d'assurer stabilit6 et scuritd,ni en tant que tel ni en tant qu'unitd de base des organisations inter-nationales. La rrfonne de celles-ci ne peut aboutir sans qu'interviennesimultandment une recomposition de l'intrrieur du paysage 6tatique.

b) L'Etat recornposi

En rrponse h la crise de ]a frodalit6, le concept d'Etat a 6t6 invent6en Europe par ]a < pleine dissociation du systime politique face au sys-t~me culturel et religieux ,>, avec des diffrences de degr6 scion ]a pr&lo-minance de I'Eglise romaine ou des Eglises rtformes"4. L'autonomieet la souverainetd du politique, dans le champ du temporel, a prdpar6

2, B. Badie et P. Birnbaum, Sociologie de I'Eat, Paris, Grasset, 1982, p. 145.

donc le lit de l'EtaL Celui-ci est tenu dordnavant de se recomposersous l'effet du retour du religieux et des minorit~s culturelles dont ils'tait affranchi A ia naissance.

1. Etat et religion

Iessouflement des grandes ideologies du XIXc si~cle, qui nourris-saient Ic discours politique, A partir de la philosophie du progr~s cons-tant et de la maitrise de l'innovation scientifique et technique, a remisSI'avant-scine le recours i la religion, au sacrd et au transcendental,

qui s6curise et donne sens A l'action collective.

La religion sera de plus en plus instrumentalise par 'action poli-tique, en rt action Ai I'exclusion de categories de la population ou decollectivit~s enctires. Elle servira en m~me temps de vecteur de con-testation d'Etats despotiques ou totalitaires et/ou de reconstructiond'identitds qui ont perdu, du fait des aldas historiques, leur substance.

Ainsi, l'Eglise a dtd 6troitement associe A la rdsistance au com-munisme dans les pays de I'Est, notamment en Pologne; alors quedans la partie asiatique de i'Empire sovidtique, c'est autour de I'Hten-dard de lIlslam que des regions enti~res vont affirmer leur autonomieet revendiquer leur propre Etat. Les rfdrences religieuses se radica-lisent au sein des populations au fur et A mesure de l'exacerbation desconflits, comme en Tchdtchdnie ou encore dans 'ex-Yougoslavie. Desrdseaux de solidaritd transnationaux viennent soutenir les forcesendog nes.

Dans la plupart des pays arabo-musulmans, l'6chec des dlitespost-coloniales et de leurs strategies de d~veloppement a entraind unecrise de l6gitimitd de I'Etat perqu comme un ,,corps 6tranger a la so-cidt o ,5 et ressor d'id~ologies islamistes de conquete du pouvoir. CetEtat s'est maintenu lui-m~me en cultivant i'ambigu't6, jouant simul-tan~ment sur le terrain des institutions importes et de la traditionislamique marquee par I'unitd du temporel et du spirituel, et incarnepar le chef de l'Etat, au sein d'une communautd (l'Oumma) par essen-ce consensuelle. II est donc suspendu entre tradition et modernit6sans adhdrer compl~tement ni A l'une ni A l'autre. Le politique n'a pasW dissoci6 du religieux et n'a pas acc&l A une rdelle autonomie, cequi aurait pu alors d~placer le d6bat du terrain populiste, aliment6 parl'id~ologie islamiste, A celui des faits de socidtd et de r6ponses, entermes de moyens et d'objectifs, a y rapporter. II faudrait, pour cefaire, que I'Etat puisse s'engager risolument dans la voie de la sdcu-larisation, soit la distinction entre le champ du politique et du religieux

I Aziz El Azmeh. Populisrne contre dmocratie: Discours democrati-santsdans le monde arabe -. in Gh. Salam. 6ddit., Dimocranes sans dimocrates. Paris.Fayard. 1994. pp. 223 et 5.

par une distribution progressive des fonctions. Cette dvolution n'estpas incompatible avec I'existence d'une religion d'Etat (comme c'estle cas dans la plupart des pays arabo-musulmans) A condition que cer6le officiel soit bien d6limitd aux niveaux financier et juridique, sui-vant le module de l'Europe du Nord. On peut 6viter ainsi le d6bat sansissue sur ]a compatibilitd de I'Islam et de la laicit6, laquelle est issued'un affrontement de l'Eglise et de I'Etat (en France essentiellement),entrainant leur s6paration stricte.

Sur le plan international, ]a s~cularisation demeure l'un desenjeux dans le processus de paix au Moyen-Orient. On ne doit pasperdre de vue qu'Israel, Etat th6ologique, r6serve ]a pleine citoyen-netd A tous les Juifs de par le monde, tout en reldguant les ArabesIsra6liens dans un statut de citoyens de seconde zone. Dans ces con-ditions, les partis religicux se livrent p~iodiquement bi des surench6-res avec, en 6cho, une radicalisation du Hamas islamiste palestinien.On assiste, au bout du compte, .A une d~stabilisation du difficile com-promis signd A Washington en 1993 entre Rabin et Arafat.

Bien plus que I'Htablissement d'un march6 6conomique moyen-oriental (confdrences de Casablanca et d'Amman, automnes 1994 et1995), la reddfinition des rapports entre I'Etat et la religion peut 6treconsiddrde comme l'un des facteurs essentiels de la paix au Moyen-Orient.

II faut reconnaitre cependant, dans un autre ordre d'id6es, quememe dans les pays occidentaux, s~cularisds ou la'cis~s, certainescategories de la population, qui se sentent exclues (Black Muslims auxEtats-Unis ou dmigrds musulmans en Europe), peuvent 8tre enr6l6esau sein de solidarit~s construites sur des mots d'ordre religieux.

Entre le communautarisme, susceptible d'enfermer ces popula-tions dans une culture de ghetto, et l'intdgration, qui fait souvent peude cas de leur specificitd, le d~bat est ouvert pour imaginer un espacede coexistence entre i'Etat laIc et r6publicain et I'Islam minoritaire,qui s'exprime non seulement sur le plan individuel mais aussi collectif.

2. Etat et minorites culturelles

Les minorit~s sont tr~s diversifies, onationales ou ethniques, re-ligieuses et linguistiques >)26. Regroup~es ici sous le g6ndrique de cul-turelles >, elles peuvent 8tre qualifi~es aussi selon leur caract6ristiqueprincipale ou les revendications qui les sous-tendent. Le d~nomi-nateur commun serait la d6signation odes groupes humains qui setrouvent marginalis~s ou en position d'inf~riorit6 numdrique (saufexception), et en m me temps politique, sociale ou dconomique, voire

D6laration des droits des personnes appartenant h des minorit6s nationalesou ethniques, religieuses et linguistiques, adopte par I'Assemblde g6nirale desNations Unies dans sa r6solution 47/135 du 18 ddcembre 1992.

culturelle , 2, 7. Si les Etats ont parfois r~agi en adoptant des structuresf&drales ou en accordant des autonomies r~gionales, ils sont g~n6-ralement opposes au phdnomine minoritaire, qui les remet en causedans leur essence unitaire, pr~fdrant une politique assimilationnistepure et simple ou, au mieux, la prise en compte de ce phdnom~ne dansle cadre de [a philosophic globale des droits de l'homme.

Le Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques de1966 en traite dans cette optique A l'article 27 :

<< Dans les Etats o6 il existe des minorit~s ethniques, reli-gieuses ou linguistiques, les personnes appartenant A ces mino-rites ne peuvent 8tre priv cs du droit d'avoir, en commun avecles autres membres de leur groupe, leur propre vie culturelle, deprofesser et de pratiquer leur propre religion, ou d'employer leurpropre langue D.

II s'agit en quelque sorte de la consecration d'un droit A la dif-ference qui dtcoule de la ddclaration universelle des droits deI'homme et du principe de non-discrimination, tel que rappeli parI'article 26 du Pacte pr&ite.

Cela n'a pas empch la Commission des droits de 'homme desNations Unies de pousser plus loin 'analyse de la notion de minorit6,sans d'ailleurs la d~finir, en elaborant une D&laration A ce sujet28 . Cetexte a-t-il franchi le pas en garantissant aux minoritaires non seule-ment des droits individuels, mais aussi des droits collectifs ? Certes,le principe d'une protection de leur existence et de leur identitd estretenu (article premier), mais il revient A chaque Etat, dont tous lesattributs doivent Etre prdserv~s, de prendre les mesures pour y parve-nir, .s condition toutefois que cette protection soit pleinement compa-tible avec l'exercice des droits de 'homme universellement reconnus.Ce qui n'exclut pas le recours A une discrimination positive oqui per-met ainsi aux minoritds d'acqurir l'galitd r6elle avec les majoritfs,mais ne doit dvidemment pas avoir pour consdquence de ddfavoriserles majoritds ,29. II s'agit d'un traitement prtfdrentiel accordd tempo-rairement A une cat~gorie de la population dans des domaines sp&ci-fiques en vue de corriger la discrimination dont elle est l'objet de fait.

2 P. George, Gdopolitique des minoritds. Paris. Presses universitaires de

France. 1984. p. 5.' Texte 6labord au sin de la Sous-Commission de ]a lutte contre les mesures

discriminatoires et de la protection des minorits. Voir 1. 0. Bokatola, La decla-ration des Nations Unies sur Ics droits des personnes appartenant 5 des mino-rites nationales ou ethniques, religicuses et linguistiques -, RGDIP, 1993. t. 97.pp. 745-65.

- Ibid.. pp. 755-756.0 Voir I'Observation gndrale n' 18 du Comit6 des droits de Ihomme. Rapport

du Comitd des droits de I'homme. Documents officiels de IAssemblie gdndrale.

II est certain que la protection des minorit~s en tant que tellesdans une socidtd interdtatique soulive de nombreuses difficult6sd'ordre conceptuel 31, meme si, par ailleurs, ,le droit des pcuples tdisposer d'eux-m~mes et des minoritds, a 6t6 qualifi6 de ,,normeimp6rative du droit international ,,32.

Ainsi la France, arguant de I'article 2 de sa Constitution, a estim6que I'article 27 du Pacte n'dtait pas applicable aussi longtemps que laR6publique dtait concernde 33. Le Conseil constitutionnel a, pour sapart, rendu une d6cision le 9 mai 1991 :

((Consid~rant que ]a France est, ainsi que le proclame l'ar-ticle 2 de la Constitution de 1958, une R6publique de tous lescitoyens, quelle que soit leur origine, d~s lors la mention faite parle 16gislateur du peuple corse, composante du peuplc franqais, estcontraire A la Constitution, laquelle ne connait que le peuplefranqais composd de tous les citoyens franqais, sans distinctiond'origine, de race et de religion 34.

En quelque sorte, IA oti l'Etat-nation revendique l'exclusivitd de]a relation avec ses citoyens et la pleine application, pour tous, desdroits de I'homme, il n'y a pas place pour des minoritds35. Mais, ensupposant acquis le principe de protection de la minorit6, un certainnombre d'obstacles demeurent, notamment ia d6termination desmembres et des crit~res de rattachement, ainsi que l'existence desous-groupes au sein d'un groupe minoritaire ou encore ce qu'onqualifie de (doubles minorit~s >36.

On en vient finalement .i se demander s'il n'est pas vain de vou-loir tracer un r6gime g6ndral des minorit6s, IA o6 il n'y a que des situa-tions particulires At intensitd variable, et au sujet desquelles chaqueEtat ou groupe d'Etats doit pr6voir un cadre juridique appropri6.Cette m6thode d'approche a 6t6 finalement adoptde, au niveau

quarante-cinqueine session, Supplement n' 40 (A/45/40), vol. 1, annexe V, sect. A,par. 10.

" N. S. Rodley, -Conceptual Problems in the Protection of Minorities: Inter-national Legal Developments-, Human Rights Quarterly, 1995, vol. 17, pp. 48-71.

32 A. Pellet - Note sur la Commission d'arbitragc de la Confdrence europ~ennepour la paix en Yougoslavie,, AFDI, 1991, vol. 37, pp. 329-348. Voir les avis n" Iet 2 de Ia Commission.

" Rodley, op. cit. (supra note 31), p. 51. Voir aussi Dominique Guesdon c.France, Rapport du Comit6 des droits de I'homme, Documents officiels de lAs-semblie gdndrale, quarante-cinquiime session. Suppldment n" 40 (A/45/40), vol. 11,annexe IX, sect. G, par. 5.6.

' Citd par S. Pierr6-Caps, , Peut-on parler actuellement d'un droit europeendes minoritds ? ,,, AFDI, 1994, vol. 40, p. 92.

Ibid., pp. 92-93.-<Rodley, op. cit. (supra note 31), p. 70.

europen, pour ripondre A la rdsurgence de la question des minoritesdepuis la fin de la guerre froide.

Le Conseil de I'Europe a ouvert A la signature des Etats membresune Convention-cadre, le I- f~vrier 1995, laquelle., partant du constatque 4 les bouleversements de i'histoire europ~enne ont montr6 que laprotection des minoritds est essentielle A la stabilitd, A ]a s~curitd dd-mocratique et A la paix du continent *, vise a asseoir cette protectionsimultandment sur a une cooperation entre Etats w et Kune coopera-tion transfrontaliere entre collectivites locales et regionales *, . Letout st subordonn6, bien entendu, a la fameuse reserve du respect dela Constitution et de I'inttgrit territoriale des Etats.

Si cette Convention s'inspire en grande partie de la DEclarationdes Nations Unies de 1992 quant aux droits garantis, elle s'en distin-gue cependant en cc qu'elIc consent un r6gime plus favorable K dansles aires g~ographiques d'implantation substantielle ou traditionnelledes personnes appartenant h des minorits *. D'autre part, et h partirde cc cadre general peu contraignant. a les parties s'efforc[ent] deconclure, si necessaire, des accords bilateraux et multilatdraux avecd'autres Etats, notamment les Etats voisins, pour assurer la protec-tion des personnes appartenant aux minorites nationales concernes *

(article 18).

A l'issue de ]a Conference de I'Organisation pour la s6curit6 et lacoop.ration en Europe (Paris, 20-21 mars 1995), une s~rie d'accordsbilat~aux liaient certains Etats membres, parallIement A I'adoptiondu Pacte sur la stabilitd en Europe38 . En fonction des caractdristiquespropres aux Etats concernes, l'organisation de relations de bon voi-sinage sera fondee sur une reconnaissance des minorites existantesde chaque c6td de la frontiire et de leur propension A dialoguer par-dela celle-ci. Ainsi se trouve consolidee la configuration territorialeactuelle des Etats, tout en erigeant leur diversit culturelle en vecteur

de cooperation accrue. La minofit6, en effet, peut servir de facteurd'approfondissement du dialogue avec un Etat 6tranger dont eilepartage la sensibilit6 culturelle. Les personnes appartenant At la mi-norit4, comme c'est le cas pour unc certaine cat~gorie d'6migrcs enEurope, ont vocation de la sorte h jouer le r6le de passeurs culturels.Mais cc ne peut Etre qu'un processus plus ou moins long. selon le

- Pirambule de la Convention-cadre pour la protection des minoritIs natio-nales, texte in RGDIP. 1995. t 100. pp. 229-236. Voir P. Tavernier. -A propos deIa Convention-cadre du Conseil de I'Europc pour [a protection des ninoritds natio-hales *. ibid., pp. 385-402.

8 Pierre-Caps, op. cit. (supra note 34), p. 72. Le Pacte &ant un documentpolitique., on laisse aux Etats le soin de tracer Icurs obligations rd-iproques a lacarte. Rappelons. pour memoire, que les traitds sur les minorites conclus au len-demain dc La premiee guerre mondiale ont iid imposes par Ics vainqueurs auxvaincus.

poids de la mtmoire et du capital de confiance ou de defiance accu-mul6s. Le sch6ma europden devrait Etre m6dit6 par les pays africainso6 le partage colonial et l'ind6pendance des Etats dans les frontiiresh6rit6es ont fait peu de cas des diversit6s ethniques et culturelles. Lemaintien du principe de l'intangibilit6 des frontiires est au prix d'unerecomposition des Etats, dans leur structure interne et dans leurs re-lations avec leurs voisins.

En conclusion, le droit international se doit de prendre en compte]a diversit6 des cultures et des civilisations qui sont, A 'heure de lamondialisation par le march6, 'expression d'un nouvel humanisme.Les libert6s fondamentales sont certes indispensables A la protectionde la dignit6 et de I'int6grit6 de tout 6tre humain, mais elles se heur-tent, dans leur g6n6ralitd et leur abstraction, au cloisonnement d'Etatset de soci~t~s, faqonn6s par une histoire et des codes culturels tr sdiffdrenci6s. La d6mocratie pourrait en fait conduire A un renforce-ment des particularismes, , l'occasion des 6lections.

Le d~fi principal, comme cela a dtd d6montr6 notamment dans'affaire du Kurdistan, est de concilier la consolidation n6cessaire desEtats et leur regroupement, avec une libre ddtermination culturelledes entit6s existantes en leur sein, de mani~re Ai contenir les vellit6ssecessionnistes et l'6miettement anarchique de souverainet6s incapa-bles, en elles-m~mes, de faire face A des responsabilitds internatio-nales.

UNIVERSALISM AND REGIONALISMFROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE WORK

OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION

James Crawford

1. Temsions between Universalism and Regionalism'

The diversity of the world is evident to any observer. That diversityis not just physical-a function of geography, climate and ecosystems

' Useful items in the vast literature on universalism and regionalism in moderninternational law are few, but they include: M. Bos, "L'universalitd du droit desgens: postulat ct progrimmc". Netherlands International Law Review. vol. 6(1959). p. 62; J. H. F. van Panhuys, "Regional or General International Law? AMisleading Dilemma", ibid.. vol. 8 (1961). p. 146; A. D'Amato. "Consent, Estoppeland Reasonableness: Three Challenges to Universal International Law". VirginiaJournal of International Law, vol. 10 (1969). p. I; A. Bozeman. The Future ofLaw in a Multicultural World (Princeton, NJ., Princeton University Press, 1971);R. P. Anand, ed.. Asian States and the Development of Universal Internatio-nal Law (Delhi. Vikas Publications, 1972): W. Wengler, "La crise de l'unit6 del'ordre juridique internationalr, in Molanges Rousseau (Paris. Pedone, 1974),p. 329; Soci&te frangaise pour Ic droit international. Rigionalisme et universalismedarts le droit international contemporain, Colloque de Bordeaux (Paris. Pedone.1977)- K. Wilk. "International Law and Ideological Realignment: UniversalityReexamined". New York University Journal of International Law and Politics.voL 10 (1978). p. 463; R. Dolzer. "Universalism and Regionalism" in A. Grahl-Madsen and J. Toman, eds.. The Spirit of Uppsala (Berlin, de Gruyter, 1984).p. 513: D. Schindler, "Regional International Law". Encyclopedia of Public Inter-national Law (Amsterdam. North-Holland, 1984). vol. 7. p. 404; L. C. Green. "Isthere a Universal International Law Today?. Canadian Yearbook of InternationalLaw. vol. 23 (1985). p. 3; V. S. Vereshchetin and G. M. Danilenko. "Cultural andIdeological Pluralism and International Law". Jahrbuch fr Internationales Recht,vol. 29 (1986), p. 56; "The Challenge of Universality". The American Societyof International Law, Proceedings of the 83rd Annual Meeting (1989), p. 547;D. A. Westbrook, "Islamic International Law and Public International Law: Sep-arate Expressions of World Order". Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 33(1993), p. 819; and G. Abi-Saab, "International Law and the International Commu-nity: The Long Road to Universality", in Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya (Dor-drecht, Martinus Nijhoff. 1994), p. 3 1. There is of course a historical question aboutthe development of international law, and the extent of its continuity with earlierforms of inter-State relations: see, e.g., C. H. Alexandrowicz, "Doctrinal Aspectsof the Universality of the Law of Nations". BYIL, vol. 37 (1962). p. 506; R. Ago."Pluralism and the Origins of the International Community", Italian Yearbook ofInternational Law, vol. 3 (1977). p. 3; G. M. Badr. "A Historical View of IslamicInternational Law". REDI, voL 38 (1982). p. I; and Y. Onuma, "Eurocentrism inthe History of International Law". in Y. Onuma, cd.. A Normative Approach toWar (Oxford. Clarendon Press. 1993). p. 371. The issues discussed in the present

-or cultural-arising from a plurality of peoples with their own his-tories, traditions and beliefs. It is evident also in the domain of law,despite the unifying influences of the major legal traditions. 2

At the level of international relations, diversity is perhaps lesspronounced. The reasons for this include the limited number of actors(States, public international organizations, even international non-governmental organizations with a significant profile), the tendencyfor a smaller number of actors still to set the major agendas for debateand the use of a more or less common set of ideas.3 One might add,too, the socializing tendency of intergovernmental diplomacy, and,more fundamentally, the complex, diffuse but undeniable effects of"globalization" which has accentuated the trend towards relative uni-formity in recent years.4

Nonetheless even at the international level there have alwaysbeen significant divergences of policy, interest and approach amongstStates and groups of States. The historic divisions between nations inthe modern period (colonizers and colonized, socialist and non-social-ist, first and third world, aligned and non-aligned, developed and de-veloping) have had their effects. Those divisions have been accompa-nied at various times by such ideological outriders as the distinctionbetween "civilized" and "'uncivilized" nations,5 the idea of "socialist"

chapter are on the whole independent of the answer one gives to the historicalquestion.

2 The effect of those traditions in entrenching distinctive underlying attitudesand modes of legal reasoning has also been emphasized. See P. Legrand, "Euro-pean Legal Systems Are Not Converging". ICLQ. vol. 45 (1996). p. 52.

1 On the common "stock of concepts", see I. Brownlic, "The Expansion ofInternational Society: The Consequences for the Law of Nations", in H. Bull andAdam Watson. eds., The Expansion of International Society (Oxford, ClarendonPress, 1984), pp. 357-358.

' On the phenomenon of globalization generally, see M. Waters, Globalization(London, Routledge. 1995); P. Hirst and G. Thompson, Globalization in Question(Cambridge. Polity Press. 1996). For its implications in terms of international struc-tures, see D. Held, Democracy and Global Order (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995).

The distinction had some currency in the later nineteenth century: see. e.g.,J. Hornung, "Civilisds et Barbares", Revue de droit international et de ligislationcomparde, vol. 17 (1885), pp. 5-18,447-470 and 539-560; ibid, vol. 18 (1886), pp. 188-206 and 281-298. It has been argued that in some form it is even necessary today.See G. W. Gong, The Standard of Civilization in International Society (Oxford,Clarendon Press, 1984). It is echoed, of course, in the reference to "civilized na-tions" in article 38, paragraph I (c), of the Statute of the International Court (itselfrepeated by the International Law Commission in the 1958 Model Rules on Arbi-tral Procedure, article 10). In the Western Sahara case the Court itself plainlyrejected "civilization". in preference to "social organization", as a criterion for thecapacity of a society to hold rights over territory. LC.J. Reports 1975, p. 12.

international law,6 and the claim to a special status for the interna-tional law of decolonization and of development.7

Alongside struggles at a more or less "global" level by referenceto these and other polarities, there has been a continuous develop-ment of special, and especially regional, approaches and institutions.This reflects the fact that although the situation of every State or na-tion may be attributed to its "'place in the world", that "place" tendsfirst of all to be seen in terms of its immediate neighbours and its ownregion. Moreover in many cases the things which Governments andofficials spend most time on, and which they can do most to affect,tend to be issues relating to neighbours or to the region. Even whenthe focus is on matters of apparently universal concern, the approachof many Governments is likely to be profoundly affected by regionalpostures and implications-and not only in such contexts as minorityrights or the non-navigational uses of international watercourses.Thus, in addition to earlier claims to "regional international law" in theAmericas,' the period since 1945 has seen the active and often vigor-ous development of regional approaches to peace and security,9 hu-man rights,'" the marine environment,'I exploitation of marine natural

6 See J. N. Hazard, "Socialism and International Public Law", Columbia Jour-

nal of Transnational Law, vol. 23 (1985). p. 251. and works there cited. See alsoA. Cassese. International Law in a Divided World (Oxford, Clarendon Press. 1986).pp. 109-115.

'Cassese, op. cit.. (footnote 6 above), pp. 115-123; NI Bedjaoui, "Non-aligne-ment et droit international", Recueil des cours... 1976-11. vol. 151, p. 337; "Towardsa New International Economic Order" (Paris, United Nations Educational. Scien-tific and Cultural Organization, 1979); R. Rich, "The Right to Development: ARight of Peoples?", in J. Crawford, ed., The Rights of Peoples (Oxford, ClarendonPress, 1988), p. 39; and S. K. Chatterjee, "International Law of Development".Encyclopedia of Public International Law. op. cit. (footnote I above). vol. 2,p. 1247.

8 See. e.g., J. A. Barberis, "International Law. American". Encyclopedia ofPublic International Law, op. cit. (footnote I above). vol. 2, p. 1178. See furtherbelow, text at notes 70-83.

1 See Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VIII, the various regional ar-rangements and alliances, and the attempts to develop regional security doctrinesduring the Cold War. See W. Rogers and W. M. Reisman. "The Brezhnev Doctrineand the Reagan Doctrine: Apples and Oranges?", The American Society of Inter-national Law, Proceedings of the 81st Meeting (1987), p. 561. There has been asignificant regional involvement in some "peace-keeping" issues (e.g., Liberia,Haiti), and the European Community asserted priority of concern at various stagesof the Yugoslav crisis.

10 Through the parallel development of regional human rights protection sys-tems in Europe (1950), the Americas (1969) and Africa (1981).

11 As in the "regional seas" conventions. See, e.g., B. Boer, "EnvironmentalLaw and the South Pacific: Law of the Sea Issues", in J. Crawford and D. Roth-well, eds&, The Law of the Sea in the Asian Pacific Region (Dordrecht, MartinusNijhoff, 1995). p. 67.

resources, 2 the settlement of disputes,3 disarmament (especially inthe nuclear field),'4 and of course economic development and freetrade.'5

One cannot but stress also the underlying economic differencesbetween countries and regions, the problems of continued under-development, especially in Africa and parts of Asia, 6 of internalarmed conflict and associated displacement of persons, 7 and of theinfluence of different religious beliefs.

The underlying diversity of nations and the tendency to regiona-lism even in respect of areas, such as human rights, where universalvalues would appear to be at stake, raises significant tensions forinternational law and may even call in question its claim to "univer-sality". 8

12 E.g., the role of regional fisheries agencies under the Agreement for theImplementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Lawof the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management ofStraddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks of 4 August 1995, docu-ment AICONF.164/38, articles 9-13, 17.

" E.g., Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the Conference onSecurity and Cooperation in Europe, 15 December 1992. IL.M, vol. XXXII (1993),p. 551.

" E.g., the regional nuclear weapon free zones treaties: Treaty for the Prohi-bition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Tlatelolco, 14 February 1967, UnitedNations, Treaty Series, vol. 634, p. 281; South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty,Raratonga, 6 August 1985, ILM, vol. XXIV (1985), p. 1440; Treaty on the SoutheastAsia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, 15 December 1995, ibid., vol. XXXV (1996),p. 635; and African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, Cairo, II April 1996, ibid.,p. 698. Note the qualified use made of these treaties by the International Courtin the 1996 advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of NuclearWeapons, ibid., pp. 825-826, paras. 62-63 (the existence of these treaties gives riseto an a contrario argument with respect to deployment and testing of weaponselsewhere).

" There is a proliferation of regional economic development and free tradeareas: the European Communities, the European Free Trade Association, theNorth American Free Trade Agreement, the Southern Cone Common Market(MERCOSUR), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, etc. In theperiod 1990-1994, 33 new regional economic agreements were notified to the Gen-eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): see GATT Activities 1994-1995(Geneva, World Trade Organization, 1996), p. 99. The number in the whole period1948-1994 was 106: see GATT, Guide to GATT Law and Practice, 6th ed. (Geneva,1995), vol. 2, pp. 858-870.

"6 See United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report1996 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1996).

" G. Loescher, "International Security and Population Movements", inR. Cohen, The Cambridge Survey of World Migration (Cambridge, CambridgeUniversity Press, 1995), p. 557.

"s In this essay I use the term "regionalism" in a broad and no doubt inexactsense, to include claims to special treatment by reference to (or regulatory systemsbased on) historical, economic or geographical sub-classifications of States. "Par-ticularism" might be a better term, but for its pejorative implications.

L Universalist Assumptions and the Work of the International LawCommission

By contrast, the tension between general international law and re-gional systems and values has found litle echo in the work of the Inter-national Law Commission, and this notwithstanding the substantialrange of areas of international law the Commission has canvassed since1949. The very first instrument produced by the Commission was theDraft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States. It proclaimed that"the States of the wold form a community governed by internationallaw". I t set a tone of resolute universalism, which has been followedby the Commission ever since. So much so that the issue of region-alism is mostly not raised in the Commission's texts; it has no pur-chase as an idea.

This can be seen, for example, from a comparison of the four1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, which were draftedon the basis of the Commission's work, and the 1982 United NationsConvention on the Law of the Sea, which was not.

The 1958 Conventions are framed almost entirely by reference togeneral categories: they refer to "all States", to "all nations", to "gen-erally accepted international standards", and so on. They make fewconcessions to regional particularities. The only important exceptionoccurs in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the ContiguousZone, under which, in drawing straight baselines, account may betaken "of economic interests peculiar to the region concerned, the re-ality and the importance of which are clearly evidenced by a longusage"Y.2 Other concessions to regionalism are very minor. There isrecognition of the need for "mutual regional arrangements... withneighbouring States" for search and rescue services in the field ofmaritime safety.2 There is limited recognition that a State may have aspecial interest in conservation of living resources in an area of thehigh seas even though its nationals do not fish there;2 otherwise, non-

" Draft Declaration, preambular paragraph I; Yearbook... 1949, p. 287. TheDraft Declaration was "commended" to States and jurists without further result:see General Assembly resolution 375 (IV) of 6 December 1949: and GeneralAssembly resolution 596 (VI) of 7 December 1951.

1 Convention on the Teritorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 29 April 1958,United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 516, p. 205, article 4. paragraph 4. This is anearly verbatim quotation from the International Court's endorsement of regionalfishing interests in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, 1. CJ. Reports 1951, p. 133.It is repeated in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,article 7. paragraph 5. For discussion, see infra, text to notes 84-87.

a Convention on the High Seas of 29 April 1958, article 12- paragraph 2United Nations, Treaty Series. vol. 450, p. I I.

22 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of theHigh Seas of 29 April 1958. article 8. paragraph I. ibid., vol. 559, p. 185.

discriminatory conservation measures focus on areas adjacent to theterritorial seas of coastal States and to the position of the coastal Statewith respect to such areas.2

The reserved approach taken to particularistic claims can also beseen in the language of article 7, paragraph 6, of the Convention on theTerritorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, referring to "so-called 'his-toric' bays", without further specification.24 By the same token thereare in the 1958 Conventions few simply arbitrary limitations based ondistance or other considerations and introduced to deal with specificclaims or positions.

The diplomatic provenance of the 1982 Convention and the overtcompromises it sought to make between conflicting economic inter-ests, many of them conceived in local, regional or bloc terms, pro-duced a text of a very different character. There are many special pro-visions for developing countries.25 There is recognition in specificcontexts of a wide range of special interests including, for example:coastal States with deltas or other unstable coastlines;26 straits Stateswhere the strait in question is formed by the mainland and one of itsislands (as distinct from an island of another State, or two parts of themainland, or two islands);27 certain archipelagic States (but not non-State archipelagos such as Hawaii); 21 land-locked 9 and "geographi-

2' There is a very limited exception to the principle of non-discrimination inarticle 13, paragraph I, which relates to long-standing "fisheries conducted bymeans of equipment embedded in the floor of the sea". Even then, access must benon-discriminatory unless "such fisheries have by long usage been exclusivelyenjoyed" by the nationals of the coastal State.

" The term "so-called" was preserved in the 1982 Convention on the Lawof the Sea, article 10. paragraph 6. One reason for suspicion of "historic" claimsis the feeling that only certain States are in a position to make such claims. SeeD. P. O'Connell, The International Law of the Sea (Oxford, Clarendon Press,1982), vol. 1, pp. 424-426.

25 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, articles 61, para-graph 3; 62, paragraphs 2. 3 and 4 (a); 82, paragraphs 3 and 4; 119, paragraph I (a);140; 143, paragraph 3 (b); 144, paragraphs I (b), 2 (a) and 2 (b), and 148. There isalso special provision for developing land-locked and geographically disadvantagesStates in certain circumstances: articles 69, paragraphs 3 and 4 and 70, paragraphs 4to 6 (but subject to articles 71, 82, paragraph 4. and 148. The least developed Statesreceive certain additional consideration (article 82, paragraph 4).

6 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, article 7, para-graph 2.

2'7 Ibid., article 38, paragraph I.1 Ibid, Part IV. On the arbitrary character of the definition of "archipelago"

and of permitted "archipelagic baselines" see, e.g., J. Crawford, "Islands as Sover-eign States", ICLQ, vol. 38 (1989). pp. 296-297.

2 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part X. In onesense the right of access to the sea of landlocked States is a "universal" rather thana particular or regional issue in the sense in which these terms are used in thisessay. The class of land-locked States possesses no other common feature than nothaving a coastline, and their access to maritime trade might be thought a problem

cally disadvantaged" States; 3o and States with broad continental mar-gins." Other articles reflect the defeat of particular interests-e.g., ofclaimants to maritime zones based on sovereignty over "rocks" (asdistinct, apparently, from sand cays).3 By contrast the provisions ofthe 1982 Convention which are based on the 1958 texts are freer ofsuch forms of special interest recognition or non-recognition.

This is not to imply a categorical criticism of the legislative tech-nique adopted by the Third United Nations Conference on the Lawof the Sea and embodied in the 1982 Convention, although some of itsspecific provisions can only be described as arbitrary.33 The require-ments of the "package deal" and the avowedly economic and strategiccharacter of the main interests at stake were such that no other pro-cedure could have produced general agreement. But it does suggestthat there may be an important difference between the role of diplo-matic forums and that of the International Law Commission even inthe initial formulation of texts.

A briefer review of the other work of the Commission reveals thesame pattern as that shown in its preparation of the 1958 Conventions.

In only one of its texts-the draft articles on Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses (1978)-did the Commission use the term "developingState" as a category, although without any definition.3 The decision

of general significance. In practice, however, the claim to access may be contro-verted and governed by -local custom" (see the case concerning Right of Pas-sage over Indian Territory. discussed at note 83 below). The impetus for article 3of the Convention on the High Seas of 29 April 1958--the precursor of the 1982United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part X-came not from theCommission but from a special conference of land-locked States (documentAACONF.13/C.5/L.1). See L. C. Caflisch. "Land-locked States and their Access toand from the Sea". BYIL, vol. 49 (1978). pp. 71, 81. Similarly the Convention onTransit Trade of Land-locked Countries of 8 July 1965, United Nations. TreatySeries. vol. 597. p. 3, was sponsored by the United Nations Conference on Tradeand Development and did not involve the Commission.

1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, article 70."Ibid.. article 76. paragraphs 4 to 7; but subject to a complex contribution

formula in article 82. There is a -Statement of Understanding" which relates to thesouthern part of the Bay of Bengal.

' Ibid.. article 121. paragraph 3 (the "Rockall" clause).33 P. Allott, "Mare Nostrum: A New International Law of the Sea", AJIL,

vol. 86 (1992). p. 776 suggests that with the 1982 Convention the international lawof the sea in some respects ceased to be merely "the international aggregate ofaggregated national interests". That is true only to a very limited degree; the Con-vention might equally be regarded as a high point in the cumulative trading ofspecial claims and interests. But see ibid., pp. 784-785. for a more generous view.

' "Developing States" are referred to as a category in articles 23, 24 and 30.For the text of the draft articles, see United Nations. The Work ofthe InternationalLaw Cormnission, 5th ed., Sales No. E.95.V.6, p. 184. As with the 1982 UnitedNations Convention on the Law of the Sea, there is no definition of the term in thedefinition clause (article 3).

to do so was contested and was reported to the General Assembly inthe following terms:

"In discussing the question of the operation of the most-favoured-nation clause in trade relations between States at differ-ent levels of economic development, the Commission was awarethat it could not enter into fields outside its functions and was notin a position to deal with economic matters and suggest rules forthe organization of international trade. Nevertheless, it recog-nized that the operation of the clause in the sphere of economicrelations with particular reference to the developing countriesposed serious problems, some of which related to the Commis-sion's work on the topic...

As a result of its consideration, the Commission found thatthe operation of the clause in the sphere of economic relationswith particular reference to the developing countries is not a mat-ter that lends itself easily to codification of international law inthe sense in which this term is used in the Statute of the Com-mission because the requirements for that process, as describedin article 15 of the Statute, namely, extensive State practice,precedents and doctrine, are not easily discernible. The Commis-sion has therefore attempted to enter into the field of progressivedevelopment and has adopted articles 23 and 24. It also adoptedarticle 30 in the hope that further development may take place inthis field in the future... 35

Actually, articles 23 and 24 are rather anodyne, dependingentirely on the consent of the affected States, while article 30 lacksspecific content. 36 In the event, for various reasons, the draft articleswere never submitted to a diplomatic conference but were effectively"shelved" in 1991.37

In its two related texts on State succession, which became thebases for the two Vienna Conventions of 197838 and 1983, 39 the Com-mission adopted provisions markedly favourable to States emerging

" Yearbook... 1978, vol. 1I (Part Two), pp. 12-13, paras. 53-54. For the debate,see Yearbook... 1978, vol. 1, pp. 99-102, 115-117, 170-171 and 241-248.

' Articles 23 and 24 are concerned with special preferences to developingcountries in accordance with generally accepted preferences adopted by competentinternational organizations (such as GATT or the European Community), or by theStates in question. Article 30 leaves open the possibility of "the establishment ofnew rules of international law in favour of developing countries".

" See General Assembly decision 46/416 of 9 December 1991; The Work of theInternational Law Commission, op. cit. (footnote 34 above), p. 87.

" Vienna Convention on State Succession in respect of Treaties, 23 August1978, United Nations publication, Sales No. F.79.V.10.

" Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of State Property,Archives and Debts, 8 April 1983, document AICONF.I117/14.

from decolonization-a category referred to as "newly independentState"40 The two Conventions. and especially that of 1983, gave sub-stantial scope to newly independent States to decide on the extent andmodalities of succession, as compared with other apparently similarsituations including the separation of part of a State.' Partly for thosereasons the texts were heavily criticized and by 1995 had not yet en-tered into force.42

In no other text yet adopted by the Commission is there any rec-ognition of special sub-categories of States such as "developing" or.newly independent". On the other hand, the Commission's texts takeas given the existence of the "international community of States as awhole". Indeed they sometimes refer to that community in so manywords-for example, in the definition of peremptory rules of generalinternational law (jus cogens) in article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Conven-tion on the Law of Treaties, as well as in its equivalent provision fortreaties of international organizations, article 53 of the 1986 Conven-tion.43 The preamble of the 1994 draft Statute for an InternationalCriminal Court refers to the purpose of the Court as dealing with the.most serious crimes of concern to the international community asa whole"." Article 19 of the draft articles on State responsibility"defines" the controversial category of international crimes in termsof violations of norms so fundamental that their breach "is recognizedas a crime by [the international] community as a whole". 45 A similar

' A term "newly independent Stale" is defined in article 2. paragraph I (), ofthe 1978 Convention as a State which was previously a "dependent territory for theinternational relations of which the predecessor State was responsible". See also1983 Convention, article 2. paragraph I (e). In neither Convention is the term"dependent territory" defined. For the evolution of these texts in the Commission.see J. Crawford. "The Contribution of Professor D. P. O'Connell to the Disciplineof International Law", BYIL_ vol. 51 (1980). pp. 31-44.

' See e.g. 1978 Convention, articles 16-17 (newly independent States), 34(separation of part of a State): 1983 Convention. articles 15 28, 38 (newly inde-pendent States) as compared with articles 17, 30 and 40 (separation of part of aState).

'2 As at 31 December 1995, the 1978 Convention had 14 Parties; the 1983Convention had 4 Parties.

3 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and Interna-tional Organizations or between International Organizations of 20 March 1986.document A/CONF29/13. There is evidently not thought to be an "internationalcommunity of States and international organizations".

- See The Work of the International Law Commnission, op. cit (footnote 34above). p. 214 (second preambular paragraph). By inference the community is notexclusively composed of States.

11 Under article 40. paragraph 3. all States are ipsofacto injured by a breachof such a norm Contrast, however, the qualification added by the InternationalLaw Commission in 1996 (Report of the International Law Commibsion on thework of its forty-eighth session, Official Records of the General Assembly. Fifty-firstsession. Supplement No. i0 (A/51/10), p. 141. note *) to the effect that alterna-tive phrases such as -exceptionally serious wrongful act" could be used instead of

assumption of universal interest underlies the draft Code of Crimesagainst the Peace and Security of Mankind, finally adopted in 1996,6although the draft articles and commentary offer very little idea of"the exact contours" of that concept. 47

These examples of reference to "the international community asa whole" draw disproportionately on the category of "superiornorms". 48 But the basic point would remain valid even if one confinedthe inquiry to "ordinary" rules of international law embodied in Com-mission texts. It is true that in a number of instances the diversity ofnational legal and social systems is expressly referred to.49 But thesedifferences are invoked as reasons for the adoption of general rules insuch fields as diplomatic and consular relations and the law of trea-ties. And it may be significant that the express references to politicaland social differentiation are made in those instruments where theprinciple of reciprocity and the claims of universalism are strongest.In short, the Commission has characteristically dealt in "universals",50

in the sense of norms affecting all States, or at least all relevant Stateshaving regard to the terms and object of the norm in question (allcoastal States, all host States, etc). With only a few exceptions (andthose for texts that have not come into force) it has avoided partialand particularistic categories.

"international crime". But on what basis can it be said that all States are necessarilyinjured by "exceptionally serious wrongful acts"? Apart from anything else thistends to confuse the issue of the status of a norm and the character of its breach.

• Ibid., chap. II."Ibid., p. 15, para. 4."See P. Weil, "Toward Relative Normativity in International LawT, AJIL,

vol. 77 (1984), p. 443.4' The preambles of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations

(para. 3) and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (para. 4) claimthat the Conventions will "contribute to the development of friendly relationsamong nations, irrespective of their differing constitutional and social systems".The preamble to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (para. 2)refers to treaties as "a means of developing peaceful cooperation among nations,whatever their constitutional and social systems". The point was echoed by theInternational Court in the case concerning United States Diplomatic and ConsularStaff in Tehran, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 24 ("essential for the maintenance of peace-ful relations between States and accepted throughout the world by nations of allcreeds, cultures and political complexions"). To similar effect Judge Lachs, ibid..p. 48; Judge Morozov (dissenting), ibid, p. 51; and Judge Tarazi (dissenting), ibid.,pp. 58-59.

'o In some cases at the expense of any content of the universal norm inquestion. See F. Morgenstern, "International Legislation at the Crossroads", BYIL,vol. 49 (1978), p. 114 (referring to "superficially uniform provisions devoid of realcontent"). An extreme example of a "universal" norm effectively void of contentis article 2 of the 1996 draft articles on State responsibility: "Every State is subjectto the possibility of being held to have committed an internationally wrongful actentailing its international responsibility".

A number of reasons for this may be suggested, more or lessobvious. The Commission is a subordinate organ of the UnitedNations, the prototype of the universal international organization.Under its Statute, the Commission's object is "the promotion of theprogressive development of international law and its codification".5

"International law" is seen here as a global system, and the Commis-sion is to be appropriately constituted to deal with it: "in the Commis-sion as a whole representation of the main forms of civilization andof the principal legal systems of the world should be assured".52 It istrue that with the Commission's enlargement to 34 members in 1981,the Statute was amended formally to recognize the existence of re-gional groups." But according to a strong internal tradition these haveno substantive significance. In the recent practice of the Commissionthis tradition largely holds true. Overt appeals to particularist or re-gional constituencies are frowned on, and the idea that the Commis-sion for the purposes of deliberation has no regional groups is empha-sized, in particular, by senior Latin American members whose ownregion is perhaps most associated with the idea of regional interna-tional law.

Beyond the terms of the Statute itself and the generality of theCommission's mandate lie other considerations. The Commission'sgreatest successes have been in areas where the general reciprocity ofStates is strongest, and the "situational" distinctions between differentgroups or categories of States are weakest or most variable. Suchareas include, in particular, the law of treaties, diplomatic and consu-lar relations, and aspects of the law of the sea (the territorial sea andhigh seas; to a lesser extent, the continental shelf). Contrast such top-ics as the most-favoured-nation clause, or fisheries beyond territorialwaters, where the divergences of interest are sharper and the Commis-sion's success has been much less.-4 It may also be significant that theCommission made no attempt to develop another such area in whichit had been specifically asked by the General Assembly to do furtherwork-the question of historic waters (including historic bays)."

5, Article 1, paragraph I.s Article 8 of the Statute. The Commission's mandate potentially extends to

"the whole field of international law" (article 18). In practice there have been anumber of "no go" areas (e.g., legal personality and recognition, the relations be-tween international and national law), and these may even be increasing.

" Article 9 of the Statute, as amended by General Assembly resolution 3639of 18 November 1981.

s' It is a mark of the different "climate" of international law-making inthe 1950s that the third Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of theLiving Resources of the High Seas was nonetheless concluded and came into force,although it attracted fewer parties than the other three conventions.

"s The Commission was asked to work on "the juridical regime of historicwaters, including historic bays" by General Assembly resolution 1453 (XIV) of

Of course "regionalism", however broadly defined, is not the onlyrelevant factor. If the crucial determinant of success in relation to anytopic is whether there is a general balance of rights and responsibili-ties as between States parties or potential parties to the convention inquestion, it remains the case that such a balance may not exist evenin respect of subjects of "universal" concern. The point may be illus-trated by the history of the Commission's work on relations betweenStates and international organizations. The first part of its work onthat topic led to the adoption of the 1975 Vienna Convention on theRepresentation of States in their Relations with International Organ-izations of a Universal Character.-6 As its title indicates, that Conven-tion is limited to international organizations "of a universal character",as distinct from regional or other limited multilateral organizations.57

Yet even in the context of such "universal" organizations there is alack of reciprocity as between different groups of interested States.While all States have an interest in establishing due freedom for inter-national organizations and due protection for their representatives tothose organizations, only host States have to strike the balance be-tween these freedoms and considerations of their own public policy-the extent of immunities from jurisdiction, control over immigrationand such matters. As one of the critics of the 1975 Convention (and ofthe Commission's preliminary work) pointed out,

"the basic division of interests had become clear well before theConference started. On the one side was the small number of sig-nificant host States, most of them by coincidence affluent West-ern countries, and on the other side the overwhelming major-ity of States which were primarily sending States. Unlike theprevious codification conferences on questions of privileges andimmunities, at the 1975 Conference these was no substantialreciprocity of interests between sending States and receivingStates. Although, as was stated several times during the Confer-ence, every State is potentially a host State, most delegations atVienna chose to see themselves primarily as sending States andwere therefore more disposed towards an expansion of privilegesand immunities than a contraction. Well-founded objections fromhost States that a convention which did not adequately take

7 December 1959; a preliminary study was done (Yearbook... 1962, vol. I, pp. I-26), but the Commission eventually decided not to proceed. on the ground inter aliaof "political problems" as well as lack of urgency (Yearbook... 1967, vol. II, p. 369,para. 45; see also Yearbook... 1967, vol. 1, p. 249, para. 85).

Document AICONF.67/16." For the definition of "international organizations of a universal character"

see article I, paragraphs I and 2, which, in addition to the United Nations and itsspecialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency extends to "anysimilar organization whose membership and responsibilities are on a worldwidescale".

account of their interests was hardly likely to attract the neces-sary support went largely unheeded".m

Such predictions of the failure of the Convention have proved justi-fied by events.59

There were other factors at play in the Commission's failure todeal with relations between States and non-universal, especially re-gional, organizations. The principal reason for not dealing with suchorganizations in the first stage of the work was said to be the problemof "recognition by and relationship with non-member States, whichwould require the formulation of particular rules peculiar to theseorganizations".' This was seen as a particular problem in light of thepolicy of the Soviet Union and its allies not to recognize the EuropeanCommunities. 6' To judge from the debates, however, the "diversity" ofregional organizations seems to have come down to this particular

-' J. G. Fennessy, "The 1975 Vienna Convention on the Representation ofStates in their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Charac-ter", AJIL vol. 70 (1976). p. 65.

" Or rather, non-events. As at 31 December 1995, the Convention was not yetin force, although 30 of the required 35 ratifications had been deposited. No inter-national organization has yet decided to implement the Convention under arti-cle 90. nor has any major host State ratified the Convention. Both steps arerequired by article 2 for the application of the Convention in any case.

' A. EI-Erian, "Scope and order of future work on the subject of relationsbetween States and inter-governmental organizations". Yearbook.. 1963, vol. ItI.p. 186, document A/CN.41L.103, para. 2; see also his comments in Yearbook.. 1963,vol. 1. p. 298, para. 109. EI-Erian was clearly opposed to dealing with regionalorganizations, on the ground inter alia "that regional organizations were so diversethat uniform rules applicable to all of them could hardly be formulated". Year-book... 1967, vol. 11. p. 139, para. 37; see also ibid., pp. 148-149. Ago had tentativelydisagreed, on the basis that "from the practical point of view, relations betweenStates and organizations of a universal character might not differ appreciably fromrelations between States and smaller, regional organizations". Yearbook... 1963.vol. I, p. 303, para. 31.

6 "Official relations" were established between the European Community andthe Council of Mutual Economic Assistance by a Joint Declaration of 25 June 1988,Official Journal of the European Communities, 1988, L157/34, accompanied byestablishment of permanent missions to the European Community by the SovietUnion and some of its Council of Mutual Economic Assistance partners. SeeT. Schweisfurth, "The Treaty-Making Capacity of the CMEA in Light of a Frame-work Agreement between the EEC and the CMEA", Common Market Law Re-tview. vol. 22 (1985), p. 6 15 . A. Toth, The Oxford Encyclopedia of European Com-munity Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990), vol. 1, pp. 354-355, interprets thesetransactions as involving "non-recognition" and later "recognition" of the Euro-pean Community on the analogy of the law of inter-State recognition. He infersthat the concept of objective legal personality of international organizations, intro-duced by the Court in the case concerning Reparations for Injuries Suffered in theService of the United Nations, LCJ. Repors 1949, p. 174, is only applicable touniversal" organizations. Ther is no support for this view in the advisory opinion

on the Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between WHO andEgypt, I.C.J. Reports 1980. p. 73. especially pp. 89-90, although that opinion did notinvolve relations with third parties.

problem. No other very plausible illustration was given of the diver-sity of practice.62 Moreover to focus only on universal organizationstended to ignore the difficulty that it was precisely for such organiza-tions that issues of representation had been resolved in an earlier gen-eration of agreements-in particular the Conventions of 1946 and1947 concerning the United Nations and its specialized agencies.63 Asagainst the Commission's draft articles which became the 1975 Con-vention, these earlier agreements would prevail as lex specialis.(A

Thus, the a priori exclusion of regional organizations in the firstphase risked depriving the Commission's work of much of its utility,and may have contributed to the lack of balance later shown in theconsideration of the draft. Many more States are host States of re-gional than of universal organizations. Paradoxically, to confine thetext to "international organizations of a universal character" made thelegislative process more divisive than it might have been had the fullrange of organizations, including regional and limited multilateralorganizations, been covered.65

Perhaps for such reasons, the Commission in considering thesecond part of the topic of relations between States and internationalorganizations appeared initially more receptive to the idea of in-cluding regional and other organizations of limited membership,although the Special Rapporteur continued to voice his by now stan-dard objections.66 In the event, however, no substantial considerationwas given to the question of regional organizations in the rather epi-

6- The Special Rapporteur frequently referred to the observation that "someregional organizations had their own codification organs and it was undesirablethat the Commission should invade the field assigned to them". See e.g., Year-book... 1967, vol. I1, p. 139, para. 37. In fact only a small minority of such organ-izations have legal committees with equivalent functions to the InternationalLaw Commission, and none of those committees was working on issues of repre-sentation.

63 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of13 February 1946, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. I. p. 15, and Convention onthe Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of 21 November 1947,ibid., vol. 33, p. 261.

' See 1975 Convention, articles 3,4 (a). In effect the Commission was draftinga lex generalis for a specified group of organizations each of which had its lexspecialis. References to the comparative uniformity of organizations within theUnited Nations system failed to confront this fact.

65 Article 2, paragraph 4, of the 1975 Convention envisages that its rules maybe made applicable to non-universal organizations by agreement, but this wouldhave been possible in any event.

' See A. EI-Erian, second report on the second part of the topic of relationsbetween States and international organizations, Yearbook... 1978, vol. 11 (PartOne), pp. 281-282, document A/CN.4/31 I and Add. I ("so diverse that uniform rulesapplicable to all of them could hardly be formulated.., better to leave those regionalorganizations great latitude to settle their own relations with Governments... someregional organizations had their own codification organs and it was undesirablethat the Commission should invade the field assigned to them").

sodic work done by the Commission in the period before 1992,67 whenthe second part of the topic was shelved. 68

This suggests that to achieve balance in the process of codifica-tion and progressive development it is desirable to canvass the fullrange of cases, and that artificially limiting the scope of %ork to "uni-versal" issues or institutions may distort the range of relevant consid-erations. After all, there are few true universals in internationallaw-there is, for example, still no "universal treaty".69

To summarize, the Commission's record reveals not merely anabsence of reference to the issues of regionalism but even a deliberateattempt to eschew any such ideas-what I have described as a reso-lute universalism. Yet, as we have seen, regionalism has long been animportant phenomenon in international relations. If the end of theCold War marked the end of a phase of competing blocs, regionalismin other areas may have become more significant. But if one couldwrite a history of normative developments at the international level interms of the tension or dialectic between universalism and region-alism, the point is that a history of the contribution of the Commissionto those developments would be one-sided, or even wholly lacking. Inconformity with its Statute and mandate, the Commission has workedentirely on the assumption of universalism.

3. The Accommodation of Regional Differences in International Law

It is useful to compare the record of the Commission in this regardwith that of the International Court, despite the many differences be-tween the two. In particular, the Court is a judicial body, whose func-tion, especially in contentious cases, is to pronounce on specific issues ofinternational law arising in the context of specific disputes between theStates Parties, rather than to develop new rules of international law ina "pre-legislative" mode. Thus, the Court might be expected to be svm-pathetic to considerations based on the particular interests or affili-ations of the Parties, including, where relevant, the regional aspects oftheir dispute. But-while very sensitive to the attitudes of the indixidualStates concerned, and thus to questions of consent, acquiescence andrecognition on their part-the Court has been reluctant to attribute any

I See the differing views expressed in Yearbook.. 1985, vol. II (Part One).pp. 106-107; Yearbook... 1987. vol. 1, pp. 193, 195-198, 200-202 and 205. It wasconcluded that "only international organizations of a universal character should beincluded. Regional organizations could be dealt with at a later stage." Yearbook..1989. vol. 11 (Part One), pp. 154-155.

The decision to discontinue the topic sine die is reported in Yearbook.. 1992.vol. II (Part Two). p. 53.

' In the sense of a treaty to which all States in the world without exceptionare parties. The closest is the Statute of the International Court (187 States Parties).

legal significance to regional considerations as such. On the contrary,it has seen particular cases with regional overtones very muchthrough the prism of general international law. General internationallaw has provided the overall (and even overriding) framework withinwhich particular issues of a region have been viewed.

This is certainly true of the one case in the history of the modemCourt in which regional international law was expressly relied on assuch, the Asylum case.70 The decision is too well known to requiredetailed analysis, but the following points may be made.

First, the Court approached the issue against the background thatany extension of the right to grant diplomatic asylum was a derogationfrom the territorial sovereignty of the receiving State, and had to bestrictly proved. 7 1 Other principles of general international law-theprinciples that a State may not conclusively determine the scope of itsinternational rights or obligations, 72 that it should respect the laws andinstitutions of the receiving State,7 3 and that it should not interfere inthe latter's internal affairs74 -had also to be taken into account beforeany "exceptional" right of the granting State could be recognized.

These considerations militated against the recognition of the spe-cial rights claimed by Colombia, as well as against a broad interpreta-tion of the applicable treaties.75 They seem also to have been decisivein the majority's finding that on the facts Haya de la Torre's claim forasylum was not "urgent" anyway.76 The Court's approach is usefullycompared with that of the six judges who dissented on the latter point,and who stressed the strong regional support for an extended practiceof granting asylum among Latin American States.77

Io. CJ. Reports 1950, p. 266. On the Asylum case, see K. Hailbronner, "Hayade la Torre Cases", Encyclopedia of Public International Law, op. cit. (footnote Iabove), vol. 2, p. 683.

7' LCJ. Reports 1950, pp. 274-275; see also p. 284.72 Ibid., p. 274.71 Ibid., p. 284.71 Ibid., p. 285. True, the Court referred to non-intervention as "one of the

most firmly established traditions of Latin America". But it is also a principle ofgeneral international law (see p. 286), whereas the other "Latin American" prac-tices mentioned by the Court seem to have been elaborately characterized asnon-legal and were in fact discounted in its decision (e.g., p. 285: "considerationsof courtesy, good-neighbourliness and political expediency"; p. 286, "an institutionwhich, to a very great extent, owes its development to extra-legal factors... iirspiredby mutual feelings of toleration and goodwill"). See also Haya de la Torre case,IC.J. Reports 1951, pp. 81 and 83.

I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 279.76 Ibid., p. 284.17 See ibid., pp. 291-296 (Judge Alvarez), pp. 309-310 (Judge Badawi Pasha),

pp. 321-322 (Judge Read, with whom Judge Zoriid agreed), pp. 333-338 (JudgeAzevedo). and pp. 359-360 (Judge ad hoc Caicedo Castilla).

Secondly, the Court treated the existence of "an alleged regionalor local custom peculiar to Latin American States"-8 as in effect abilateral issue:

"The Party which relies on a custom of this kind must provethat this custom is established in such a manner that it hasbecome binding on the other Party. The Colombian Governmentmust prove that the rule invoked by it is in accordance with aconstant and uniform usage practiced by the States in question,and that this usage is the expression of a right appertaining to theState granting asylum and a duty incumbent on the territorialState... [Elven if it could be supposed that such a custom existedbetween certain Latin American States only, it could not beinvoked against Peru which, far from having by its attitudeadhered to it, has on the contrary repudiated it by refraining fromratifying the Montevideo Conventions of 1933 and 1939, whichwere the first to include a rule concerning the qualification of theoffence in matters of diplomatic asylum". 79

It seems clear from this passage that, despite its invocation ofArticle 38, paragraph I (b), of its Statute,s0 the Court was imposing astricter requirement of proof than would have been applied to an al-leged rule of general international law.8' In the latter case it is not nec-essary that every State should have specifically accepted or adheredto the rule. It may be that persistent opposition can render a generalrule not opposable to a given State.82 But the objection must be con-sistent and clear, a State could hardly opt out of a rule by mere ab-stention (e.g. as manifested by simple failure to ratify a conventioncontaining the rule). In the Asylum case what the Court saw as sys-tematic elements of general international law (sovereignty, non-inter-vention, the regular enforcement of national law even against political

"See ibid., p. 276.ibid pp. 276-278 (emphasis added)

o Ibid., pp. 276-277."True, the Court is not consistent in its requirements for demonstrating gen-

eral international law, either, it is as capable of "deconstructing" an alleged rule asit is of constructing one. See. on the one hand, the North Sea Continental Shelfcases, LC-J. Reports 1969, p. 3; the case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Lightand Power Company. Lid. (Second Phase), I.CJ. Reports 1970. p. 3; and, on theother, the advisory opinion on Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service ofthe United Nations. I.CJ. Reports 1949, p. 174; and the case concerning the Mi-litary and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. UnitedStates of America) (Merits). LCJ. Reports 1986, p. 6. But even in such cases it isneither necessary nor sufficient to establish that the State Party contesting the rulehas or has not accepted it

12 As in the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, I.CJ. Reports 1974. p. 175- SeeJ. I. Charney. "The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of CustomaryInternational Law", BYIL, vol. 56 (1985). p. I.

offenders) overwhelmed considerations of regional custom or prac-tice. And since the body of Latin American practice is by far the mostsophisticated and generalized of the systems of regional custom in themodem era, one is inclined to say of the rest of the world--afortiori.83

These lessons were not lost on Norway when it sought to estab-lish a particularistic claim to baselines in the Anglo-Norwegian Fish-eries case in the following year.8Y In that case there was no regionalpractice on which Norway could rely, although the history of the Nor-wegian claim was long enough and Norwegian practice consistentenough that a case of historic title could well have been established.But the gist of Norway's position was that under general internationallaw its method of maritime delimitation was justified, having regard tothe responses of States and the requirements of reasonableness. Andthis was the basis on which the Court upheld Norway's position.8

The Court's well-known invocation of "certain economic interests pe-culiar to a region, the reality and importance of which are clearly evi-denced by a long usage" followed closely upon its rejection of Britisharguments based on historic title.86 These considerations were rele-vant not to establishing historic title in derogation from internationallaw but to the application of general international law "to the diversefacts in question ... to the special conditions obtaining in different re-gions", and in particular to the coast of Norway. 7

" This is not to imply that regional or local custom can never be relied on; itis simply that it must be proved as between the particular States parties to thedispute. Conceptually it makes no difference whether the "region" consists of2 States or 22. Compare the case on the Right of Passage (Merits), LC.J. Reports1960, p. 39, where the Court denied that a local custom could only be establishedbetween three or more States. Having held a limited local custom establishedthrough long bilateral practice (pp. 40-43), it declined to consider whether a similarresult would follow from any rules of general international law (pp. 43-44). Thereason was that the particular practice was intended to be "governing" and wouldthus prevail over any general rule (p. 44).

LC.J. Reports 1951. p. 116.'5 See ibid., p. 131 ("all that the Court can see [in Norway's position] is the

application of general international law to a specific case"), p. 133 ("an adaptationrendered necessary by local conditions").

' Ibid., pp. 130-132.17 See ibid., p. 133. The Court went on to refer, in cumulative fashion, to

"general toleration" of the Norwegian system of delimitation under the rubric of"historical consolidation" (p. 138). But it had already held that the Norwegianposition was "in conformity with international law" (pp. 134-135). The question oftoleration related rather to the enforcement of the Norwegian claims against par-ticular States (e.g. p. 139). Thus it was Norway which occupied the high "general"ground and the United Kingdom and other distant States which were required toshow particular grounds of opposition. Further, Norway having established thegeneral validity of its position, the onus was on the United Kingdom to show thatits application in particular localities was unjustified (pp. 142-143).

By contrast, the Court when faced with regional practice in othercases has not hesitated to assert the rule in question to be one of gen-eral international law. It did so, for example, in the advisory opinionon Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishmentof the Crime of Genocide, basing itself on a Latin American practiceof permitting reservations to multilateral treaties, and in despite of acontrary practice adopted by the League of Nations.8s As the dissen-tients predicted, and the majority may have expected, this new ap-proach was then taken up in State practice. and was systematized bythe Commission itself in articles 19-23 of the Vienna Convention onthe Law of Treaties."9

Another example of the incorporation into general internationallaw of a standard first adopted at a regional level is the principle of utipossidetis. endorsed by the Organization of African Unity in 1964 inrelation to "the borders of African States" but applied by the Court asa universal rule. Thus in the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) aChamber of the Court stressed that:

"the principle of uti possidetis seems to have been first invokedand applied in the Spanish America, inasmuch as this was thecontinent which first witnessed the phenomenon of decoloniza-tion involving the formation of a number of sovereign States onterritory formerly belonging to a single metropolitan State. Nev-ertheless the principle is not a special rule v%,hich pertains solelyto one specific system of international law. It is a general princi-ple, which is logically connected with the phenomenon of theobtaining of independence, wherever it occurs...

The fact that the new African States have respected the admin-istrative boundaries and frontiers established by the colonialpowers must be seen not as a mere practice contributing to thegradual emergence of a principle of customary international law,

" .CJ. Reports 1951. p. 25 (League of Nations and Organization of AmericanStates practice contrasted). See the preference for the League practice in the jointdissenting opinion: pp. 34-36 (Judges Guen-ero, McNair. Read. Hsu Mo); at p. 37they explain the Latin American practice as based on "the prior agreement of thecontracting parties- of the Pan-American Union. Judge Alvarez. in other contextsa proponent of Latin American international law. thought the matter covered bythe "new international law- which prevailed over -old-fashioned ideas on multilat-eral conventions" (p. 54).

" More recently the claims of 'universalism'" in the context of human rightstreaties have taken the form of insisting on the severability of certain impermissiblereservations, more along the line of Judge Alvarez in the Reservations case. SeeHuman Rights Committee, General Comment No 24 on Reservations to the Inter-national Pact on Civil and Political Rights (document CCPR/Ct21/Rev.I/Add.6).inInternational Hunan Rights Reports, vol. 2 (1995). p. 10. For criticism, seeA. Pellet, second report on reservations to treaties, document A/CN.4/477 andAdd.]. pp. 71-87.

limited in its impact to the African continent as it had previouslybeen to Spanish America, but as the application in Africa of a ruleof general scope...

There is no doubt that the obligation to respect pre-existinginternational frontiers in the event of a State succession derivesfrom a general rule of international law, whether or not the ruleis expressed in the formula uti possidetis. Hence the numeroussolemn affirmations of the intangibility of the frontiers existing atthe time of the independence of African States, whether madeby senior African statesmen or by organs of the Organization ofAfrican Unity itself, are evidently declaratory rather than consti-tutive: they recognize and confirm an existing principle, and donot seek to consecrate a new principle or the extension to Africaof a rule previously applied only in another continent".90

It may be objected that this passage ignores important differ-ences between the South American uti possidetis doctrine and theprinciple of intangibility of colonial frontiers post-independence asadopted by the Organization of African Unity in 1964. But the influ-ence of the Chamber's dictum has been undeniable, and the principleof uti possidelis as so understood has been applied, and evenextended to pre-independence situations is some subsequent prac-tice.

91

To summarize, there may be more in common in the approachesof the Court and the Commission to legal issues of a regional or par-ticularist kind than might have been supposed from the very differentstructures and functions of the two bodies. So far as the Court is con-cerned, regional claims can be accepted if they can be accommodatedwithin the ordinary framework of consent, acquiescence and recogni-tion; otherwise their importance tends to be contextual only. So far asthe Commission is concerned, texts are likely to be acceptable as abasis for subsequent consideration only if they can be formulated interms of general classes of States and institutions. In any case, theinternational system of the modern period seems to be intolerant ofthe idea that there is any third category as between general interna-tional law and the legal relations of consenting States, relations con-ceived as not different in principle from bilateral relations. This is notto deny the fact of regional hegemony at different times and places.But to the extent that such hegemony is not embodied in treaties or

' I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 565-566. See further J. Crawford, "The GeneralAssembly, the international Court and ScIf-deternination" in Essays in Honour ofR. Y. Jennings (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 585, 601.

" Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 3, ILR,vol. 92 (1992), p. 170.

otherwise clearly agreed to by the affected States.92 it will be extra-legal in character.

4. Conclusion: International Legal Agencies in a Highly DifferentiatedWorld

As the instances cited in this essay suggest, there is a curious dia-lectical relationship between universalism and regionalism or particu-larism so far as the formal structure of international relations is con-cerned. Thus the International Court in an early and influential opinionwas able to infer from "the clearly universal character of the UnitedNations under whose auspices the [Genocide] Convention was con-cluded", and the quasi-univiwrsal participation in that Convention whichits framers expected, the proposition that certain variations were per-missible as between some of the Parties to it.93 The ideal of universalitycould only be achieved on the basis of some allowance for disagree-ment on particulars.

This relationship between universality and the possibility of vari-ation may seem paradoxical, a spurious sort of "unity in diversity".But it can also be seen as the necessary product of an attempt to con-ceive of and to organize a global society of States in the persistentabsence of any central authority. Mutatis mutandis, the Commissionand the Court have adopted rather similar responses to this situation.For the Court, dealing frequently with claims as between neigh-bouring States or States in the same region, the situation is nonethe-less approached against the matrix of such general principles as sov-ereignty, territoriality, consent, etc., which provide a fr.ame ofreference for the assessment of particular claims. For the Commis-sion. its texts are likely to be acceptable only if they can be presentedin as general terms as possible-hence the preference for residualstandards and the subtle variations on the residual principle whichfeature in the various texts.

'- Even where regional hegemony is embodied in treaties, universal standardsrelating to the use of force will prevail, whether on the basis ofjus cogens or underChapter VIII of the Charter (under which treaty-based enforcement action none-thcless requires Security Council approval). See B, Simma, ed., The Charter ofthe United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994).pp. 679-757.

" LCJ. Reports 1951, p. 21. Similarly, p. 23 (the Convention wa , intended tobe -definitely universal in scope" therefore certain reservations must be permitted).Conversely the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, article 20, paragraph 2.recognizes that treaties negotiated between a small number of States may be con-cluded on the basis that they w ill apply integrally between all the States Parties, soas to preclude reservations by any one Party not accepted by all others- The linkbetween universal participation and the capacity for variation is here made inreverse.

But the longer term implications of this analysis for the twoinstitutions are rather different. The fields of operation of both areconfined by other specialist institutions which have proliferated in themodem period and which are tending to appropriate particular areasof "the whole field of international law".9" That has positive features:in particular, it allows the development of specialist expertise and itmay foster links with the relevant sectors of national Governments.But it also carries risks for the coherence of the international legalsystem.

On the other hand, in its contentious jurisdiction the Court hasthe great advantage of being required to work from the particular tothe general (and it may be noted that its advisory jurisdiction is anincreasingly limited aspect of its caseload95). Moreover, at least incases commenced by special agreement, the Court has the advantagethat the decision to refer the matter to it usually entails that its out-come is to govern, to be determinative. The Commission shares nei-ther of these advantages in its "pre-legislative" activity

The analogy should not be pressed too far. But the scope for newinternational standards of a general and reciprocal character-such asthose contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties orproposed in the draft articles on State responsibility-is limited. Oneof the criticisms that can be levelled at the topic of "International lia-bility for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited byinternational law" is precisely that it calls for rules at the wrong levelof generality. By contrast one of the best known and most successful"moves" in the Commission's history was that, masterminded byRoberto Ago, from "primary" to "secondary" rules in the field of Stateresponsibility.96 Whatever view is taken about that distinction, itcannot be replicated, or even approached, in most other areas. Thesubsequent contrast between the progress made on State responsi-bility and the lack of progress made on the subject of "International

" See article 18 of the International Law Commission's Statute. In the case ofthe International Court, such bodies include ad hoc arbitral tribunals, the Inter-national Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, International Centre for the Settlementof Investment Disputes Tribunals, etc. See, e.g., S. Oda, "Dispute Settlement Pros-pects in the Law of the Sea". ICLQ, vol. 44 (1995). p. 863; and G. Guillaume, "LaCour internationale de Justice: Quelques propositions concretes A 'occasion ducinquantenaire", RGDIP, vol. 102 (W 1996), p. 323. For the International Law Com-mission, they include a range of bodies concerned with codification and progres-sive development in specialist areas. See Report of the International Law Commis-sion on the work of its forty-eighth session, Official Records of the GeneralAssembly, Fifty-first session, Supplement No. 10 (A/51/10), paras. 169 and 241.

" See R. Higgins, "A Comment on the Current Health of Advisory Opinions",in V. Lowe and M. Fitzmaurice, eds., Fifty Years of the International Court ofJustice (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 567.

"See Yearbook... 1973, vol. II, pp. 169-170, para. 40; Yearbook.. 1974, vol. 1.p. 5, para. 2.

liability" carries important and perhaps gloomy implications for thedesign of the Commission's future agenda. It seems that "internationallaw in 'her infinite variety"--to borrow Richard Baxter's descrip-tion-cannot bear very much universality.

"' For the current state of the -liability" topic. see Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session, Official Records of theGeneral Assembly. Fifty-first Session. Supplement No. 10 (A/51/10). chap. V andAnnex L

" R_ R. Baxter. -International Law in "Her Infinite Variety-. ICLQ. vol. 29(1980). p. 549.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF NEW STATESTO THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW WITH A SPECIAL EMPHASISON THE LAW OF THE SEA*

Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja

!.

If ui view the term international law in a broad sense, includingthe law of nations, then the history of international law is a vry old one.as there was already a law of nations (ius gentium) in Roman times. Ifon the contrary, we view the term in a narrower sense, meaning thelaw that governs relations between nation-States, then internationallaw is relatively new as it is only a few hundred years old-

Modern international law, as a system of law that governs therelations between States, was born when the modem society of na-tions came into existence. The 1647 Treaty of Westphalia is usuallytaken as the moment of the birth of the modem society of nations.

The Treaty of Westphalia is important in the history of moderninternational law as it is considered the event that laid the basis, orfoundation, for a society of nations consisting of nation-States. Inaddition to ending the Thirty Year War, the Treaty of Westphalia:(1) confiumed the change in the political map which had occurred be-cause of that war, (2) conclusively ended the efforts to restore theHoly Roman Empire, (3) separated relations between States and theChumh and (4) enabled relations to be based on national interests.The Treaty of Westphalia also recognized the independence of theNetherlands, Switzerland, and the small States in Germany. It is forthese reasons that the Treaty of Westphalia can be said to have laidthe foundation for a new society of nations both in form, as it wasbased on nation-States, as well as in substance, as the State and Gov-ernment were separated from the influence of the Church.

The characteristics which distinguished the new society of na-tions created by the Treaty of Westphalia from the feudal society ofChristian nations in Europe which had existed since the Middle Ages,were: (I) the State constituting a territorial unit, as a sovereign terri-

Based on an artce pubtished in the Santa Clara Law Review, voL 12 (1992L pp. t9-910,

torial entity, each nation-State having sovereignty within the bounda-ries of its territory, (2) relations between one nation-State and anotherbased on independence and equality, (3) the refusal of the society ofindependent nation-States to recognize a higher authority-such as anemperor in temporal matters, and the Pope as head of the Church,(4) relations between independent States based on law which in manycases borrowed concepts from Roman Civil Law, (5) nation-Statesrecognizing the existence of international law as a law governing theirrelations with one another, while at the same time emphasizing theimportant role States play in the observance of this law, (6) theabsence of an international court and international police force toenforce international law, and (7) a change in the perception of lawfrom a doctrine which thought of war in terms of a "just war" wagedin defense of Religion, to a doctrine that viewed war as a means ofresolving conflict and achieving national ends through force, i.e., waras an instrument of national policy.

The principles laid down in the Treaty of Westphalia, enumeratedabove, were confirmed in the Treaty of Utrecht. The Treaty of Utrechtwas considered a very important document since it adopted the con-cept of a balance of power as a principle of international relations.

The secularization of the authority of the State Government andthe decline of the influence of the Church as a spiritual force pro-viding guidance to States in their relations created the need for a neworder to regulate the balance of power and the national interests of therespective nation-State members of the new international society. It isfor this reason that Hugo Grotius' concept and system of a law ofnations, based on a theory of secularized natural law, came to fill aneed that was very much felt at that time.

The success of Hugo Grotius, the author of De liure Belli Pacis(The Low of War and Peace) which was published during the ThirtyYear War, was not only due to the intrinsic value of the work but alsobecause his teachings were very much in tune with the demands of thetime. As is well known, Grotius based his system of international lawon the doctrine of natural law. His doctrine was secularized and freedof the influence of religion and the Church. His doctrine was also at-tractive since it gave an important place to nation-States.

The international community, based on the foundation laid downby the Treaty of Westphalia, gained strength over the years. It provedable to overcome various important political events at the end of theeighteenth century and during the nineteenth century. The interna-tional community overcame events such as the French and Americanrevolutions, attempts to reestablish the hegemony of the big kingdomsin Europe and attempts to restore the influence of the Church.

These attempts, ending with the Congress of Vienna in 1815 andfollowed by the Holy Alliance between the Kings of Austria, Prussiaand Russia, seemed to succeed after the failure of Napoleon's adven-tures. They proved, however, unable to stop the progress of the mod-ern nation-States during the nineteenth century.

On the American continent, the attempt by the European king-doms, which made up the Holy Alliance, to re-establish their hege-mony was answered by the Monroe Doctrine. The nineteenth centurywas characterized by many wars in Europe, and was considered tobe the time when the modem nation-State came to its maturity andreached the pinnacle of its power.

The Hague Peace Conferences were important events in the de-velopment of international law. The first Hague Peace Conference of1899, followed by the second Hague Peace Conference in 1907. pro-duced many international conventions that were of great importanceto the development of international law. especially the laws of war.These international Hague Peace Conferences also set up a Perma-nent Court of Arbitration. The Court re-established an institution forconflict resolution between nations that was an important factor forstability during the Middle Ages. Arbitration as a means of settlinginternational disputes had lost much of its importance during theseventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a period of growthfor new nation-States following the Treaty of Westphalia. The declineof arbitration as a means of settling conflict was a direct consequenceof the use of armed force or war as an instrument of national policy.It should be no surprise that during this period many wars occurredin Europe and that arbitration as a means of resolving conflict wasalmost forgotten.

It is for this reason that the establishment of the PermanentCourt of Arbitration in 1907 and the later establishment of the Perma-nent Court of International Justice in 1921 are important events in thehistory of international law. This was a sign that the process of devel-oping an international society based on nation-States had maturedand that the nation-States had come of age.

An inventory of the characteristics of international society afterthe Hague Conference of 1907 conclusively demonstrates that a greatdeal of progress has been made since the inception of the system withthe Treaty of Westphalia in 1647. Further developments took placeafter the 1907 Hague Peace Conference that were important for thedevelopment of the international community as a legal community.These included the conclusion of the Briand-Kellogg Pact in Paris in1928, prohibiting the use of war as an instrument of national policy.and the establishment of the League of Nations in 1919 and the UnitedNations in 1945.

There is no incompatibility between the Briand-Kellog Pact of1928 and the Covenant of the League of Nations and later the Charterof the United Nations of 1945, which all sought to achieve interna-tional cooperation and world peace. All had the same objective of pro-moting international peace and the happiness and well-being of man-kind by outlawing war as a source of human conflict and misery. Theapproaches used, however, were different. The Briand-Kellog Pact of1928, which outlawed war as an instrument of national policy, usedthe classical method of inter-State relations that proved to be ineffec-tive. The Covenant of the League of Nations and the Charter of theUnited Nations used structurally different approaches. The use offorce and the threat of force were handled in a more sophisticatedmanner. While prohibiting the use of force as an instrument of na-tional policy, its use for the common good of the international com-munity was allowed in certain cases.

The Charter of the United Nations, and before that the Covenantof the League of Nations, introduced international organizations andagencies as subjects of international law. The United Nations Organ-ization and its specialized agencies concerned themselves not onlywith political matters, but also with economic and social affairs, edu-cation and culture, health, labour as well as other topics. The UnitedNations system covers all aspects of human life, including monetaryand banking matters that were established by the Bretton Woodsagreements.

Besides the institutional developments which occurred in the late1940s as a consequence of the establishment of the United Nationsand its specialized agencies, another development has taken placesince the mid-1800s which is no less significant. The history of inter-national law demonstrated that modem international law as a legalsystem was a cultural legacy of Western Europe, based mainly onChristian ethics.

This situation came to an end when Turkey was accepted as amember of the Concert of Europe in 1856. The process was acceler-ated by the recognition of Japan as a world power after her victoryover Russia in 1905, which was soon followed by the entrance ofChina, Afghanistan and Iran into international society on a basis ofequality. The acceptance of the Western legal systems and principlesin peoples' everyday lives came with their roughly simultaneous adop-tion by the codification of civil and commercial law in countries out-side Europe which were not colonized by the West, such as Turkey,Japan and China.

In other parts of the world, Western legal principles and systemswere introduced by other means. The common law system and prin-ciples of English law were introduced into the 13 colonies in Northern

America which later developed into a separate American legal system.The Portuguese and Spanish legal systems and principles introducedinto Central and South America became the basis for the national legalsystems of countries in Latin America. In other parts of the globesuch as Asia and Africa countries such as Portugal, Spain. Britain,France and Holland introduced Western legal systems and principlesto their colonies. Although the means of introducing these various le-gal systems and principles were not the same, the net effect was thatthe indigenous populations were made familiar with Western legalprinciples and systems. Through these various means and processes,the legal systems and principles which originated in Western Europebecame universal.

!1.

The Second World War in Europe and Asia between the Allied andAxis powers in the 1940s brought in its wake great changes that were toalter international society beyond recognition. The single most impor-tant change caused by the Second World War was the great number offormer colonies that became independent nations, radically changingthe political map of the world.

These changes ware a direct consequence of the political statementsand promises made by leaders and statesmen during the war like, forinstance, those contained in the Atlantic Charter. In some cases thepro of attaining full nationhood was accompanied by violence or astruggle for independence-

The second factor having a major impact was the great advance intechnology made during the war, especially in aviation and telecommu-nication.

A third factor was the increase in population. The effect of popu-lation growth accentuated by the rising expectations caused by inde-pendence was most urgently felt in matters relating to the resources ofthe sea. The greater dependence on the sea as a source of wealth, encom-passing both living and non-living resources, gave rise to measures bynation-States to secure those resources for the weil-being of their people-

The impact of post-war developments, either of political or techno-logical nature, on international law relating to natural resources was,therefore. most evident in the law of the sea. Therefore, me will now turnour attention to the post-war developments in the international law ofthe sea. On 28 September 1945, United States President Harry S. Tru-man issed a prodamation,' which initiated a new development in the

' Presidential Proclamation No. 2667. reprnted in United Nations LegislativeSexnes Laws and Reguations on the Regime of the High Seas (SalesNo. 1951.V.2). vol. L p. 38.

international law of the sea-the continental shelf concept, originallya geological concept. This measure by the President was intended toreserve the natural resources, especially mineral resources such as oiland gas, contained in the continental shelf and its subsoil off thecoasts of the United States, for the benefit of the people of the UnitedStates. It would now be possible for the United States to explore andexploit, in an orderly manner, vast stretches of submarine areas adja-cent to the United States, especially off the East coast, covered by awater column of up to a hundred fathoms.

The Truman Proclamation on the Continental Shelf was soon fol-lowed by similar proclamations by Mexico, which issued a declarationon 29 October 1945, followed by Panama on 1 March 1946, and Ar-gentina on II October 1946 which declared its sovereignty over the"epicontinental sea and the adjacent continental shelf".2 The declara-tions of Chile on 29 June 1947, Peru on 1 August 1947, and Costa Ricaon 27 July 1948 followed. These subsequent declarations were morefar-reaching since they claimed sovereignty over the continental shelfand the sea adjacent to the coast up to a distance of 200 miles fromthe coast.- The United Kingdom issued an Order in Council, dated26 November 1948, for the alteration of the boundaries of its depen-dencies in the Caribbean, at the time, the Bahamas and Jamaica.4

The continental shelf proclamations also spread to other conti-nents. Saudi Arabia issued a proclamation on policy with respect tothe subsoil and seabed of areas in the Persian Gulf contiguous to thecoast of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. These measures were later fol-lowed by similar measures by the Arab Emirates which at that timewere English protectorates.5

From the Middle East the continental shelf fever spread to Paki-stan, which on 9 March 1950, issued a declaration that "the seabed upto a depth of 200 metres pertains to the territory of Pakistan".6 Pre-viously, on 18 June 1949, the Philippines had also extended its juris-diction over natural resources to include the seabed and subsoil by

2 Ibid., pp. 4-5.

'Ibid., pp. 6-7 and 16-17.Order in Council No. 2574, Statutory Instruments (1948) (Alteration of the

Boundaries of the Bahamas); Order in Council No. 3574, Statutory Instruments(1948) (Alteration of the Boundaries of Jamaica).

'These protectorates, and the dates of the measures were: Bahrain (5 June1949), Qatar (8 June 1949), Abu Dhabhi (10 June 1949), Kuwait (12 June 1949),Dubai (14 June 1949), Sharjah (16 June 1949), Ras al Khaimah (17 June 1949),Ajman (20 June 1949) and Umum Al Qaiwain (20 June 1949). See Laws and Reg-ulations on the Regime of the High Seas, op. cit. (footnote I above), pp. 23-29. Seealso M. M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law (Washington, D.C., UnitedStates Government Printing Office, 1965), vol. 4, pp. 806 and 808.

6 Declaration of the Governor General (9 March 1950).

stating in the Petroleum Act of 1949, that all oil and gas reserves foundin the continental shelf or its analogue in an archipelago belong to theState, inalienably and imprescriptiblV. 7

From the above description, it is clear that the continental shelfdoctrine first proclaimed in the Truman Proclamation of 1945 quicklyspread to the whole world and established a new concept in interna-tional law. Some of these later proclamations went far beyond theoriginal Truman Proclamation since they claimed not only jurisdic-tion, but went further to claim full sovereignty, not just over the con-tinental shelf, but over the supejacent water column as well.

By comparing the various proclamations on the continental shelfsubsequent to the Truman Proclamation of 1945. one notices a widedivergence in State practice on the matter. Although all these meas-ures constituted attempts to extend the jurisdiction of the coastalState over adjacent seas to claim the sole right of exploring andexploiting the mineral resources in the seabed and subsoil for thebenefit of the coastal State, the proclamations differed widely in scopeand extent.

Some proclamations following the Truman Proclamation limitedthe claim to the right to explore and exploit mineral resources con-tained in the seabed and subsoil. Other proclamations claimed juris-diction, and even sovereignty, over the continental shelf itself, in-cluding its subsoil, but not including the superjacent waters. A thirdcategory extended sovereignty over the continental shelf and thewaters above it, and the fourth categor' extended sovereignty overadjacent seas up to a distance of 200 miles % ithout even making ref-erence to a continental shelf. As the last category cannot be properlyincluded in claims based on the continental shelf concept it will betreated separately later.

Because of subsequent developments, it cannot be denied thatthe Truman Proclamation on the Continental Shelf of 1945 had atremendous impact on the development of the law of the sea, evenbeyond its original intent: it started a process of encroachment on thelong-held principle of the freedom of the sea-

The Truman Proclamation on Fisheries is clear and self-explana-tory. Its objectives were much more modest than the Proclamation onthe Continental Shelf, as it was limited to the conservation of livingresources in the seas adjacent to the coast of the United States. Unlikethe Proclamation on the Continental Shelf, the Proclamation on Fish-eries was not a radical departure from existing international law. Infact it was a fairly accurate record of living marine resource conser-

" See Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the High Seas, op. cit. (foot-note I above). p. 19.

vation practice in North America, specifically off the coasts of Canadaand the United States.

Measured against the strict application of the absolute freedomof the seas in the classical sense, however, the Truman Proclamationon Fisheries can also be considered a form of encroachment on theclassical freedom of the seas concept, which allowed no restrictionwhatsoever in the freedom of fishing. One of the original freedoms ofthe seas was the right of people to take fish from the sea as aninexhaustible source of wealth. The right of coastal States to takemeasures for the conservation of living resources in the seas adjacentto their coast is proof that in modem times, the strict application ofthe freedom of fishing is no longer possible.

Another interesting development in the international law of thesea after the Second World War were the claims made by some LatinAmerican countries over adjacent seas up to 200 miles from theircoast. A declaration by the President of Chile, dated 23 June 1947, anda declaration of the President of Peru, dated I August 1947 were thefirst instances of claims by coastal States over adjacent seas extendingto a distance of 200 miles from their shores. Although these claimswere made subsequent to the 1945 Truman Proclamation on the Con-tinental Shelf, the declarations of the Presidents of Chile and Perucannot be properly considered as claims based on the continentalshelf theory, as these claims did not use the depth criterion of 200 me-tres, but instead used the distance criterion of 200 miles.

Unlike the other continental shelf claims, the declarations of thePresidents of Chile and Peru, although referred to as claims on thecontinental shelf, were based not on the existence of the continentalshelf in the geological sense, but on a theory of compensation.According to this theory, the lack of a geological continental shelfadjacent to the coast of the two countries required a compensation.'

As can be seen from the opinion of George Scelle during the dis-cussions of the draft articles on the law of the sea adopted by theInternational Law Commission in 1956, the theory of compensationwas not taken lightly by experts of international law. However, theclaims of Chile and Peru were later strengthened by arguments basedon marine biology-the "bioma" theory.9

The principles upon which Chile and Peru based their claimsconsisted of a combination of both geological and biological argu-ments. These principles were put forward in the Santiago Declaration

See footnote 3 above.Yearbook... 1956, vol. I, p. 170. On the Chile, Ecuador and Peru claim,

including the compensation and bioma theories, see M. Kusuma-Atmadja,Masalah Lebar Laut Jenewa Tahun 1958 Dan 1960. pp. 142-144 and 151-152.

of 18 August 1952, signed by Chile. Ecuador and Peru. This Declara-tion stated, inter alia:

(I) Owing to the geological and biological factors affecting theexistence, conservation and development of the marine faunaand flora of the waters adjacent to the coasts of the declarantcountries, the former extent of the territorial sea and contiguouszone is insufficient to permit the conservation, development anduse of those resources to which the coastal countries are entitled.

(II) The Governments of Chile. Ecuador and Peru thereforeproclaim as a principle of their international maritime policy thateach of them possesses sole sovereignty and jurisdiction over thearea of sea adjacent to the coast of its own country and extendingnot less than 200 miles from the said coasts.10

These principles and theories proved to have a big influence onlater developments on the law of the sea, especially on the concept ofthe 200-mile wide exclusive economic zone.

Another development in the law of the sea, which can be consid-ered a contribution by new States to the development of internationallaw, was the Declaration by the Republic of Indonesia on 13 De-cember 1957, regarding Indonesian national waters, which stated:

All waters around, between and connecting the islands or part ofthe islands constituting the Republic of Indonesia without regardof their size or width are integral parts of the territory of the Re-public of Indonesia and therefore part of the national wkaterswhich are under the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia.Passage of foreign vessels through these national waters is guar-anteed as long as and insofar as it is not contrary to the sover-eignty and security of the Indonesian nation. The determinationof the territorial sea measured from straight baselines connectingthe outermost point of the islands of the Republic of Indonesia,will be enacted by a law. I I

The considerations which led the Indonesian Government to is-sue this declaration on Indonesian national waters were as follows:

* For an analysis of these theories. see Kusuma-Atmadja, op. cit. (footnote 9above), pp. 142-144.

" Indonesian Government Declaration of 13 December 1959 on Indonesiannational waters (author's translation); see S. Oda, International Control of SeaResources. 2nd cd. (Dordrecht Martinus Nijhoff. 1989), p. 33. For the backgroundhistory of this Declaration, weC M Leifer, International Straits of the World:Malacca. Singapore and Indonesia (Alphen aan den Rijn, Sijthoff and Noordhoff.1978), pp. 17-23

(I) The geography of the Republic of Indonesia as an islandState consisting of thousands of islands is unique and requires aspecial regime;

(2) For the sake of the unity of the Indonesian nation all islandsand the seas between them must be considered as one integralentity;

(3) The breadth of the territorial sea as stated by the colonialGovernment in article 1, paragraph 1, of the Territorial Sea andMaritime Circles Ordinance of 1939 is no longer in keeping withthe security and safety interests of the Republic of Indonesia;and

(4) Each sovereign nation has the right and the duty to takemeasures it considers necessary to protect its safety and security.

The archipelago concept underlying the Indonesian GovernmentDeclaration of 13 December 1957 was not an entirely new concept inthe public international law of the sea. It had been proposed in severalacademic meetings and was even included in the draft articles of the1930 Hague Conference on Territorial Waters. A more recent state-ment regarding archipelagic waters was made by Mr. Tolentino in theSixth Committee of the United Nations in 1956. What was new in the1957 Declaration by the Indonesian Government was a statement ofGovernment policy containing a commitment to enact legislation onthe matter at a later date. The law of Indonesian national waters em-bodying the Indonesian archipelago principle was enacted on 18 Feb-ruary 1960. In the Elucidation to Act No. 4 of 1960 on Indonesiannational waters, the reasons for enacting the Act embodying the re-gime of archipelagic waters was stated to be as follows:

(i) The drawing of straight baselines connecting the outermostislands of the Indonesian archipelago was done to preserve theunity of the nation, its territorial integrity, and safeguard its eco-nomic wealth;

(2) The nation is sovereign over all waters lying within thebaselines drawn according to paragraph 1, including the seabedand subsoil and including all natural resources contained therein,as well as the air space above it;

(3) The territorial sea with a width of 12 miles is measured fromstraight baselines; and

(4) The right of innocent passage of foreign ships through thearchipelagic waters is guaranteed as long as such passage is nei-ther contrary to the interests of the coastal State nor endangersits security and public order.

Act No. 4 of 1960 is very interesting despite its brevity and sim-plicity. It is the first national application by law of the principle ofstraight baselines which was recognized in the Anglo-NorwegianFisheries case.'2 This case was decided by the International Court ofJustice in 1951. and the principle was formally made part of moderninternational law of the sea in the 1958 Geneva Convention on theTerritorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. The chart accompanying ActNo. 4 of 1960 contained 200 basepoints connected by 196 straightbaselines with a total length of 8,069.8 nautical miles.

The drawing of straight baselines from point to point, connectingthe outermost islands in the Indonesian archipelago, had two conse-quences: (I) a belt of 12 nautical miles of territorial sea encircled thewhole Indonesian archipelago: and (2) the status of the waters lyingon the landward or inward side of the straight baselines were trans-formed from high seas into internal waters. In order that the changein legal status of these waters did not disrupt the passage of foreignvessels enjoyed prior to this Act, article 3 explicitly stated that theinternal waters would remain open to the passage of foreign ships.

The enactment of Act No. 4 of 1960 on Indonesian nationalwaters caused immediate reaction, especially by big maritime States.Protests were made by the United Kingdom, France. the Netherlands,Australia, the United States and Japan. To reassure those partiesinterested in the assured passage through Indonesian waters, theIndonesian Government enacted Government Regulation No. 8 in1962, dealing with the passage of foreign vessels through Indonesianwaters. Article I of Government Regulation No. 8 states that the rightof innocent passage of foreign ships through Indonesian internalwaters, which before the enactment of Act No. 4 of 1960 were partof the high seas, is guaranteed. Under Article 2 of the Act, the term"'innocent passage" meant the passage for peaceful purposes from thehigh seas to an Indonesian port and from an Indonesian port to thehigh seas, or from one point on the high seas to another point on thehigh seas, traversing waters forming part of the Indonesian archi-pelago.

Article 3 states that passage of foreign ships is considered inno-cent as long as it is not contrary to the security, public order and na-tional interests of Indonesia. and as long as it does not disturb thepeace and good order of the Republic of Indonesia. It is suggested thatthe innocent passage of foreign ships be made through internationalpassage routes recommended in navigational charts.

An interesting feature of Government Regulation No. 8 of 1962is the provision on specially designated sea lanes. The Chief of Staff

SI. CJ. Reports 1951.

of the Navy has the authority to designate sea lanes through whichforeign warships, Government ships and fishing vessels may pass.Foreign warships using these designated sea lanes are not required togive the prior notification generally required in exercising the right ofinnocent passage through Indonesian waters.

In 1969, Indonesia, together with the Philippines, Fiji and otherarchipelagic countries, worked very hard to have the concept of archi-pelagos and the legal regime of archipelagos accepted by the SeabedCommittee of the United Nations during the preparatory stage ofthe Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Theseefforts led to the inclusion of several articles on the regime of archi-pelagos in the draft text and the eventual adoption of one whole sec-tion (Part IV) on archipelagos in the 1982 United Nations Conventionon the Law of the Sea.

The attempts of coastal States to extend control and jurisdictionover adjacent seas were more successful at the Third United NationsConference on the Law of the Sea than they were at the First andSecond United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea in 1958and 1960. In those earlier Conferences, proposals for the 200 milezone and the archipelago concept were put forward, but were eitherdefeated or withdrawn for lack of support. However, the movementof coastal States to increase their claims over adjacent seas had grownconsiderably stronger in the early 1960s after the failure of the SecondUnited Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea to reach an agree-ment on the breadth of territorial seas as well as an increase in thenumber of newly independent States. In the mid- 1960s, the situationhad developed to such an extent that there seemed to be a real dangerof the oceans being carved up by all the claims made by coastal Stateswith long coastlines. It was at this critical juncture that ProfessorArvid Pardo, Malta's Permanent Representative to the United Na-tions, made a proposal for a General Assembly resolution to designatean international seabed area, including the mineral resources con-tained therein, as a common heritage of mankind, to be free fromcoastal States' competing claims.

The activities of the Seabed Committee, subsequently estab-lished by the General Assembly, soon became a rallying point forthose parties dissatisfied with the state of the international law of thesea. It was, therefore, natural for the Seabed Committee to evolve intoa preparatory committee for the Third United Nations Conference onthe Law of the Sea. This Conference was interesting not only becauseit gave birth to new concepts, but because agreements were reachedon issues not resolved during the First and Second United NationsConferences on the Law of the Sea in Geneva in 1958 and 1960, suchas the breadth of territorial seas and the definition of the continental

shelf. New concepts, such as the 200-milc exclusive economic zone,the legal regime of archipelagos, and the right of access to the sea ofland-locked countries, were adopted and included in the 1982 Conven-ion. A definition of "geographically disadvantaged States" and a wvell-designed new regime for marine scientific research and the protectionof the marine environment were also included. The most controversial.yet least satisfactory, inclusion was the regime on the international sea-bed area and the exploitation of its resources.

The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea wasan interesting law-creating process Unlike the First and Second Con-ferences, which were based on the preparatory work of the Interna-tional Commission, the Third Conference was a more political pro-cess. The Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly on voting andthe taking of decisions were at least subordinated to, if not replaced by,special Rules of Procedure adopted for the Conference at the Caracassession in 1974. The essential difference was that the process of decision-marking by a simple or two-thirds majority was replaced by the lawof consensus. Another striking feature marking the deliberations at theSeabed Committee, and later at the Conference, was the strong refusalto abide by precedents-espccially any reference to the 1958 Conventionon the Law of the Sea. There was a strong feeling, especially among thenewly independent States of Africa, that they had no part in this law-creating process and hence did not feel bound by it. There was a deter-mined effort to create a new law of the oceans from scratch. Given thesedifficulties, and the complexity of the problems involved, one will agreethat the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is agreat achievement and testimony to what can be achieved through hardwork, persistence and the spirit of give and take.

Ill.

The examples of contributions made by new States to the develop-ment of international law cited so far have all been in the realm of thepublic law of the sea. It would be a mistake, however, to think that nocontributions were made in other areas as well. In particular, significantcontributions were made to the acceptance of the principle of sover-eignty over natural resources which was confirmed in General Assemblyresolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, entitled "Permanent sov-ereignty over natural resources".

It is the author's contention that the contributions made by newStates to the development of international law as described above areimportant in making international law more truly universal and, there-fore, more acceptable to the present international community as awhole-

LES ACTES UNILATERAUX DANS LE CADREDE LA JURISPRUDENCE INTERNATIONALE

Francisco Villagrin Kramer

II est bien connu que Ic comportement actif et passif de l'Etatproduit des effets ct des consequences juridiques. L'action de I'Etatdans le domaine des relations internationales peut donc engager oulier 'Etat envcrs un autre Etat ou avcc la communaut6 intcrnationaledans son ensemble, sans que pour cola il soit nkcessaire que l'Etat soitpartie Zi des accords ou conventions internationales. II suffit qu'ild~clare, manifeste, promctte ou admctte son intention d'etre lid et quele droit international reconnaisse des effects bi ces actes.

Dc la mfme faqon. l'inaction de F'Etat peut produire des offets etdes consequences juridiqucs. notammcnt la perte de ses droits du faitde l'absencc de protestation' ou de notification quand, scion Ic droitinternational, une tellc notification est n~cessairc 2.

L'6coulcment du temps sans aucune manifestation peut aussiproduire un effct contraire aux droits dc l'Etat 3. De la mime manire.

I Voir, entrc autres. l'affairc Liibeck c. Mecklenburg-Schwerin. Annual Digestof Public International Lawt Cases. 192526. p. 114; I'affairc des Froniiirescolombo-renezueliennes RSA. vol. 1. p. 280; I'affairc de lie de Pahnas. ibid..vol. It. p. 868: l'affaire concernant ]'Accord relaifaut services atiriens dul 27 mars1946 entre les Etats-Unis d'Amnrique et Ia France. ibid., vol. XVIII; I'affaire desPcleries. C.L.J. Recceil 1951, p. 139; I'affairc des Minquiers et des Ecrihous.CLJ. Recueil 1953, p. 47; l'affaire du Droit de passage stir territoire indien. CI.J.Recueil 1960, p. 6; I'affaire du Temple de Priah Vihiar. CI.J. Recid 1962; l'af-faire des Actiiitis militaires et paramniitaires au Nicaragua et contre cehii-ci(Nicaragua c. Etats-Unis dAnmurique). C.LJ. Recueil 1984. pp. 408-410-

2 Par exemple, dans I'affaire relative Zk la SouverainettF stir certaines parcellesfrontalires. la Cour internationale de Justice pr&isa que la question qui sc pos.itait . de -avoir si la Belgique a perdu cctte souvcrainctd, faute d'avoir affirm6 ses

droits et pour avoir acquiesce -a dos actes de souverainetd pritlcndument excrc4:--par les Pays-Bas -k diffcrentes reprises depuis 1843 ,. C.LJ. Recied 1959. p. 227.Voiraussi I'affaire des Grisbadarna, RSA, vol. XI. pp. 155-160; I'affaire de I'lle dePalmas (voir supra note I), pp. 843-868; 'affaire du Droit de passage (voir supranote I). pp. 6 ct 41-42. Voir 46galement Ph. Cahier. . Le cornportement des Etatscomme source dc droits ct dobligations -. Milanges Guggenheim. Geneve. Impri-mere de la Tribune de Gencve, 1968. p. 237 et suiv.

Voir a ce sujct l'affaie des Grisbadarna (voir supra note 2). p. 181; I'affaireChamizal RSA. vol. Xi. p. 316 et suiv.; I'affaire de VIndemnite russe. ibid., pp. 445-446; I'affairc relative A la Sour'raineti sur certaines parcelles frontali'res (voirsupra note 2), pp. 227-230; I'affaire de la Barcelona Traction. Light and PowerCompany. Lid., C.I.L Recueil 1964. pp. 20-26.

l'inaction ou Ic silence de I'Etat peut montrer son acquiescement et,comme nous le savons, I'acquiescement conduit a 'estoppel 4.

Nous nous bornerons s examiner dans cette dtude les actesunilatraux dans le cadre du comportement actif de I'Etat. Nous lais-serons de c6t6 les effets juridiques que produisent l'inaction ou le si-lence des Etats5. Quoique les deux aspects aient dt6 6tudi6s en pro-fondeur par la doctrine6, il convient de se pencher 'i nouveau sur les

' Voir hi cc sujct I'affaire Schufcldt, RSA, vol. 1I, p. 1079 ct suiv.; l'affaire dela Sentence arbitrale rendue par le Roi d'Espagne le 23 decembre 1906, C.LJRecueil 1960, pp. 210-215; l'affaire du Temple de Priah Vihtar (voir suqpra note I),p. 23; I'affaire de la Barcelona Traction (voirsupra note 3). pp. 24 ct 55; lcs affaircsdu Plateau continental de la Mcr du Nord, C.Li. Recueil 1969, p. 26; I'affaire de IlDilitnitation ,naritine dans la rtdgion du Golfe du Maine, CI.J. Recucil 1984, p. 26;l'affaire du Nicaragua (voir supra note 1), p. 413 et suiv. Voir aussi I'arr2t duTribunal f~dral suissc dans laffaire Canton du Valais c. Canton du Tessin, An-nuaire suisse de droit international, 1981, vol. 37, p. 229 et I'affaire relative i desActions armndes frontalii'res et transfrontalires (Nicaragua c. Honduras), CLJ.Recueil 1988, p. 105.

En cc qui concerne les offets du silence, voir, entre autres, l'affairc dc Illde Palnas (voir supra note I), p. 843; I'affaire de I'Accord relatifaux servicesairiens (voir supra note I), pp. 454458; l'affairc Liibeck c. Mecklenburg-Schwerin(voir supra note I), p. 489 Ct suiv.; I'affaire des Pcberies (voir supra note I).p. 139; I'affaire des Minquiers et des Ecrdlious (voir supra note I), p. 71; I'affairede la Sentence arbitrale rendue par le Roi d'Espagne (voir supra note 4), p. 192;I'affaire du Temple de Preah Vilar (voir supra note I). Voir 6galcment J. Bcntz,,Le silence comme manifestation de volontd en droit international public-.

RGDIP, 1963, t. 67, p. 45 Ct suiv.; 1. Bar-ale , L'acquiescement dans la jurispru-dence internationale, AFDI, 1965, vol. II, p. 389 et suiv.; G. Venturini,.,Valeurjuridique des attitudes ct des actes unilatdraux des Etats -. Recueil des cours..1964-11. vol. 112, p. 374 et suiv.; F. Villagrn Kramer,,- Actos convencionales y noconvencionales: ratificaci6n, aquiescencia y estoppelo. in Milanges Jiminez deArechaga, Montevideo, Fundaci6n de cultura universitaria, 1994, pp. 978-979.

6 Sur les acrcs unilatiraux, voir G. Fitzmaurice, <The Law and Procedure ofthe International Court of Justice, 1951-54: General Principles and Sources ofLaw,,, BYIL, 1953, vol. 30, pp. 1-70; E. Suy, L'acte juridique unilateral, Paris,1%2; P. Guggenheim, Traits de droit international public. Gen&ve, Librairie del'Univcrsitd de Gen ve, 1967, t. I, pp. 273-282; R. Quadri, Diritto internazionalepubblico, 5' 6d., Naples, Liguori, 1968, pp. 568-570; J. P. Jacque, Eltdnentspour unetliorie de lacte juridique en droit international, Paris, Librairie g6nidrale de droitct de jurisprudence, 1972; -A propos de la promesse unilat&ale., in MtlangesReuter, Paris, Pedone, 1981, pp. 327-345; J. H. W. Verzijl, International Law inHistorical Perspective, Leyden, Sijthoff. 1973, vol. VI. pp. 105-111; T. M. Frank,,,World Made Law: the Decision of the International Court of Justice in theNuclear Test Cases , AJIL, 1975, vol. 69, pp. 612-620; S. Caroone, .Promise inInternational Law: A Confirmation of its Binding Force, Italian Yearbook ofInternational Law, 1975, vol. I, pp. 166-172; A. P. Rubin, ,The International LegalEffects of Unilateral Declarations,, AJIL, 1977, vol. 71, pp. 1-30; J. D. Sicault,, Du caract&c obligatoire des engagements unilatdraux en droit international pu-blic,,, RGDIP, 1979, t. 83, pp. 634-688; W. Fiedler, '<Unilateral Acts in Interna-tional Law,>, in Encyclopedia of International Law. Amsterdam, North-lHolland.1984, vol. 7, pp. 517-522; K. Skubiszewski, , Les actes unilatiraux des Etats,, inM. Bedjaoui, edit., Droit international: Bilan et perspectives, Paris, Pedone, 1991,t. I, pp. 231-276; H. Thirlway, . The Law and Procedure of the International Courtof Justice, 1960-1989 ,. BYIL, 1989, vol. 60. pp. 349; et Oppenheim's International

actes unilatvraux, surtout apr~s que la Cour internationale de Justiceles eut cxamines dans ses arrets sur les affaires du Nicaragua. du Dif-firendfrontalier (Burkina Faso/Republique du Mali) et de la Dilimi-ration maritime dans la rigion du Golfe du Maine.

Notre schema de rfefrence est celui de la jurisprudence intema-tionale. Nous l'utilisons parce que les actes unilatdraux ne figurentpas dans I'Article 38 du Statut de ]a Cour et, n.anmoins, les tribunauxintemationaux en ont pr6cise les 6lements et surtout le fondement deleur force obligatoire. Dans ce sens, on peut penser, comme certainsjuristes amdricainse, que la Cour intemationale de Justice a cre denouvelles tfgles applicables aux actes unilat~raux ou bien qu'ellc aappliqud les regles et les principes existants. Nous croyons que cettederni~r est 1'explication qui correspond le mieux h ia ralite juri-diquc. En tout cas, les tribunaux intemationaux ne se sont pas pro-noncds sur la question de savoir si les actes unilatdraux sont ou nonune source du droit international. lls se sont limitds .i prciser qu'ilssour une source d'obligations internationales s.

1. Actes unilatiraux lato et stricto sensu

Si les actes unilateraux cmanent de I'autorit6 des pouvoirs le-gislatifs, judiciairs et exeaitifs des Etats et m&nc des organisationsintcrnationales, leurs effets. dans le dornaine international ne sont pasdMtrmin&s par Ic droit interne mais par le droit international. Par con-s6quent pour produire des effets internationaux, ils devront se con-former aux limites dtablies par celui-ci. La Cour internationale deJustice l'a pr6cisd tres nettcment en se r&frant tant aux acres de ddlimi-tation des espaces maritims qu'- l'octroi de la nationalit6 dans lesaffaires des Picheries et Nottebohmn.

Ili faut aussi tenir compte du fait que certains acres unilatdrauxont une relation directc avec ic droit conventionnel. Tel est le cas deI'approbation. de la ratification et du d4p6t de ]a ratification destrait~s, des reserves et de I'adhdsion et P'accession aux traitds interna-tionaux. Au contraire, d'autrs actes unilatiraux ont une relationdirecte avec le droit international gtndral. Tel est Ic cas de la notifica-

Law. 9 61.. revue par R. Jennings ct A. Watts. Harlow, Essex, Longman. 1992.vol. 1: Peace, pp. 1187-1196.

' Frank. op. cit. (supra note 6). pp. 612-614; Rubin. op. cit. (supra note 6). p. 1.=Pour les acres unilatcraux en tint que source du droit. voir Jacque. op. cit.

(supra note 6). p. 330; Skubiszewski. op. cit. (supra note 6). p. 232; Cahicr. op. cit.(supra note 2). p. 244; en rant que source d'obligations voir I'affaire des EssaisNuciaires, CLI Recuejl 1974. p. 267. et infra. section V.

9Affaire des Pecheries (voir supra note I). p. 132; affaire dc la Compilence enmaiere de pIcheries (Royaume-Uni c. Islande). CIJ. Recueil 1974; affaire None-bohm, Cjj Recueil 1955.

tion, de la reconnaissance des situations de fait ou de droit et aussides Etats et des Gouvernements, ou encore de l'octroi de la natio-nalit6. Les protestations et les renonciations entrent, par consdquent,dans le cadre du droit coutumier.

La jurisprudence admet dgalement comme actes unilat6raux lesd6clarations unilatdrales de volontd quand lesdites d6clarations, mani-festations ou admissions sont imputables aux Etats d~clarants, memes'ils n'ont pas de liens avec le droit conventionnel ou avec la coutume.On parle, dans ce cas, d'actes autonomes, surtout apris que la Courinternationale de Justice a considdrd, dans I'affaire des Essais nucliai-res, que des engagements de cette nature exprim6s publiquement etavec I'intention de se lier ont un effet obligatoire, ajoutant ensuite:

,, ... aucune contrepartie n'est ndcessaire pour que la d6clarationprenne effet, non plus qu'une acceptation ult~rieure ni meme uner6plique ou une rdaction d'autres Etats, car cela serait incompa-tible avec la nature strictement unilat6rale de I'acte juridique parlequel I'Etat s'est prononcd ,,0.

La Cour a mis en relief qu'il existe une cat6gorie d'actes stricte-ment unilatiraux qui, a la diffdrence des actes li6s aux traitds ou auxr~gles coutumires, ne demande pas d'acceptation ou de r6plique dela part d'autres Etats pour quc I'Etat ddclarant s'engage ou pour queI'acte produise des effets obligatoires pour I'Etat d6clarant. La naturestrictement unilatdrale est, par cons6quent, caractdristique des actesr6put6s autonomes.

If. Actes unilat6raux paralilles et collectifs

Eacte unilat6ral est caractdrisd par le fait qu'il 6mane d'un seulsujet de droit. Le terme sujet de droit conduit 5 r6puter Ics Etats et lesorganisations internationales indixiduellemcnt comme les seuls auteursd'un tel acte. Mais, si I'on se souvient - comme le fait SicaultI de I'dty-mologie ,, uni)) - seul - << lats > - c6t6 - on se rend compte quele caractre unilat6ral d'un acte mane Zi d'autres possibilit6s. Ainsi,I'acceptation de la juridiction de la Cour internationale de Justice peut8tre faite unilat6ralement par les Etats; cela donne lieu toutefois ? uneesp~cc d'accord entre deux Etats qui s'engagent dans une affairedevant la Cour, ou bien A des d6clarations unilat6rales parallies.Quoique le Statut de la Cour soit un instrument conventionnel quidtablit le m6canisme de la d6claration unilatdrale pour accepter la ju-ridiction de la Cour, le fait est que la Cour cllc-mme a qualifid cesd6clarations d'actes unilatdraux. Ainsi, dans l'affaire des Phosphatesdu Maroc, la Cour permanente de Justice internationale a dit que:

CLJ. Recueil 1974, p. 267.Op. cit. (supra note 6), p. 640.

La d6claration dont l'instrument de ratification a etc dposepar le Gouvemement franirais le 25 avril 1931, est un actc unila-tdral par lequel ce Gouvernement a accepti la juridiction obliga-toire de la Cour 2.

Par aillcurs, dans l'affaire des Emprunts normigiens, la Courintematonale de Justice a examine les coincidences et les differencesentre deux declarations unilateralcs - celle de la France et celle de iaNorvige - et a remarqud:

... comme il s'agit de deux declarations unilaterales, cette com-petence lui est conferde seulement dans la mesure ofu elles coin-cident pour ia lui confrer. Or. la comparaison des deux d&lara-tions montre que la declaration fran~aise accepte lajuridiction dela Cour dans des limites plus dtroites que Ia declaration norvd-gienne; par cons&luent. la volontd commune des Parties, base dela compihence de la Cour, existe dans ces limites plus dtroitesndiqu&s par ]a reserve franqaise W,3.

La coincidence des dclarations n'6tablit pas un accord entredeux Etats ayant fait des declarations unilatdrales. Le paralllisme semaintient et c'cst seulement dans une aire commune que la Courtrouve F'espace n&-essaire pour exercer sa juridiction.

D'aillcurs, il faut se rappeler que dans le domaine du droit destraites, il existe la possibilite - prdvue par I'article 36, paragraphe 1,de la Convention de Vienne de 1969- que divers Etats se mettentd'accord pour offrir -A un troisiibme Etat - qui n'est pas partie i l'ac-cord - certains bWnefices - la clause de [a nation la plus favo-ris& -ou des droits - comme c'est Ic cas de la stipulation pourautrui. Cette institution conventionnelile permet qu'un certain nombred'Etats formulent unilateralement et en tant qu', ensemble ,,. une d6-claration ou une promesse, qui. non seulement les lient mais Ics enga-gent envers des Etats tiers, sans que ces derniers y soient pattic oumanifestent leur acceptation. Dans ce sens. I'acte unilateral est col-lectif'4 .

12 C.PJ.I. sirie A/B. 74, p. 23. Voir aussi I'affaire de I'Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.-C.I. Recueil 1952. p. 104. et Iaffaire du Nicaragua (voir supra note 1). p. 418 el

3 C.IJ. Recueil 1957. p. 23. Voir Egaiement I'affaire de IAnglo-Iranian Oil Co.(voir supra note 12). p. 103. et I'opinion individuclle du Juge Shahabuddeen dansIaf aire des Actions anniesfronalieres e1 transfronfalires (voir supra note 4).pp. 140142. Les dtlarations unibtrales des Etats-Unis et de Ilran de 1981.depos6cs auprb; du Gouverncent de I'AIgrie, sont connues sous Ic nornd'. Accords d'Algcr w, voir ILR. vol. 68. p. 52, C1 vol. 96. pp. 6-7. Au sujet desdiclarations des Eas-Unis et de Cuba sur le sequestre d'avions, voir Verzijl,op. cit. (supra note 6). p. 110.

" Voir Fiedle. op. cit. (supra note 6). p- 67; Jaequf. op. cit. (supra note 6).p. 3 et P. Reuter, Introduclion to the Law of Trealies, London, 1989. p. 80. lequel

ill. Effets uti singuli et erga omnes

I1 faut tenir compte du fait que les actesjuridiques peuvent pro-duire des effets envers un autre sujet de droit mais aussi erga omnes.Avant que la Cour internationale de Justice ait rendu son arrt dansI'affaire des Essais nucleaires, les tribunaux internationaux s'taientbornmds ai se prononcer seulement sur le caractre des actes unilatd-raux et ses effets vis-A-vis d'un autre Etat, d'une organisation interna-tionale, ou de la Cour internationale de Justice elle-m~me.

La Cour permanente de Justice internationale, par exemple, con-siddra la v dclaration IhIen ) comme obligatoire pour la Norv~gevis-h-vis du Danemark' 5 . II en a t, de mrme pour la ddclaration queI'agent du Gouvernement suisse fit au bdndfice de la France au coursde la procddure dans I'affaire des Zonesfranches de la Haute-Savoieet du Pays de Gex16. Quant aux dclarations que le Prdsident et leMinistre des affaires ,trangres du Nicaragua firent au sujet de la sen-tence prononcde en 1906 par le Roi d'Espagne, elles ont lie Ie Nica-ragua 17.

Toutes ces ddclarations ont un ,I6ment commun: 'effet uti sin-guli. Seul I'Etat bdndficiaire ou affectd par I'acte unilatdral peutrdclamer son exdcution ou soutenir que I'acte ne produit aucun effetparce que I'auteur n'a pas 'intention de s'obliger ou bien parce que'acte ne rdunit pas les d6dments ndcessaires 8 . La Cour internationale

de Justice prit note des ddclarations du Prsident de la Rdpubliquefrangaise et des ministres des affaires 6trangres et de la ddfense dansle sens que les essais nucldaires seraient suspendus et les considdracomme engageant la France. Le probi~me qui se posait dtait d'dtablirsi ces ddclarations obligeaient la France vis-h-vis des Etats engagdsdans la procddure devant la Cour (I'Australie et la Nouvelle-Zlande)ou si elles avaient des effets erga omnes. La Cour se prononqa enfaveur de ce dernier effet, du fait que les dclarations n'6taientadressdes ni A la Cour, ni b I'Australie, ni A la Nouvelle-ZWlande, maisavaient un caract re gdnral. La Cour s'est exprime dans les termessuivants:

. Les d6clarations unilatdrales des autorit~s franqaises ontdt6 faites publiquement en dehors de ]a Cour et erga omnesmeme si la premiere a td communiqude au Gouvernement aus-

utilise 1'expression -collective unilateral actsp, de meme que Shahabuddeen,op. cit., (supra note 13).

"s Affaire du Statut juridique du Grbenland oriental. C.P.J.L sirie A/B, n" 53,p. 7 1.

" C.P.JL serie A/B. n" 46, p. 170.17 Affaire de la Sentence arbitrale rendue par le Roi d'Espagne (voir supra

note 4)." Voir infra. section VI.1 (Ddclarations faites par les Chefs d'Etat).

tralien. Ainsi qu'on l'a vu plus haut, pour que ces d&larationseussent un effet juridique. il n'6tait pas n~cessaire qu'ellesfussent adressdes .t un Etat particulier. ni qu'un Etat quelconquesignifift son acceptation -19.

I. Forme et substance

Sauf pour les actes solennels, cc qui compte or n'est pas la formemais la substance. Cette affirmation. faite couramment dans les milieuxjuridiques, semble gagner du terrain dans les diff~rents domaines dudroit international.

D'abord il con'ient de se rappeler qu'en mati&e de traites le droitinternational laisse les parties choisir la forme. Le juriste argentin Jos6Maria Ruda. ancien Prdsident de ]a Cour internationale de Justice,rdsumait la jurisprudence en la mati&e comme oeci :

,,Nul n'ignore quce le droit international n'impose aucuneforme particuli-e pour la conclusion d'un accord, h condition quel'intention des parties de faire naitre des droits et des obligations,c'est-A-dire de produire des effets juridiques soit suffisamment6vidente Juridiquement. on ne fait pas de distinction selon qu'unaccord est formel ou non, puisque la validiti d'un traitd ne dependpas de I'adoption d'une forme particuli&e. C'est donc aux partiesqu'il incombe de choisir ]a forme qu'elles jugent appropri& pourassumer des obligations internationales ,.0.

Si cela est la r~gle dans le domaine des traits. il ne peut pas enaller diff&emment dans le cas des actes unilatdraux, surtout quand its6manent de I'autoritd des organes de I'Etat et suivent les formaht~sprivues par le droit interne. Le probItme de la forme ne se pose paspour les actes dcrits dont le document meme sert A interpreter etdeterminer I'intention exacte de I'Etat, mais il surgit avec les dclara-tions orales.

La Cour permanente de Justice internationale accepta commeobligatoires les declarations 6crites faites par les Gouvernements etsuivies de ddclarations orales faites devant elle par les agents et lesrepresentants des Etats dans les deux premi res affaires danslesquelles elle a connu des actes unilat&aux, celle des Jntdrits alle-mands en Haute Silhsie polonaise2 ' et des Concessions Mavrommatisa JrusalemZ2.

' Affaire des Essais nucliaires (voir supra note 8). p. 269.m Opinion individuelle sous I'avis consultatif sur IUnterprtation de I'accord

da 25 nars 1951 entre I'OMS ei I'Egypte, CIJ. Recaeil 1980. p. 123.2' CP.J.I. sirie A? o 7. p. 25.SCPJ.. sirie A. te 5. p. 37.

Donc, on peut dire que le probl~me de la forme surgit dansI'affaire du Grieenland oriental avec la d6claration du Ministre desaffaires 6tranglres de la Norvige, M. lhlen, faite en rdponse At unedemande du Gouvernement danois, et disant simplement que ,leGouvernement norv6gien ne fait pas de difficultds au rZ glement decette affaire ,. Compte tenu des n6gociations entre les deux pays etdes circonstances dans lesquelles elles s'dtaient d6roul6es, la Cours'est limitde 't consid~rer

(<... comme incontestable qu'une telle rdponse it une d6marchedu repr6sentant diplomatique d'une Puissance dtrangire faite parle Ministre des affaires 6trangres au nom de son Gouvcrnement,dans une affaire qui est de son ressort, lie le pays dont il est leMinistre >,23.

Bien que la substance ait joud un r6le important, l'oralit6 Cutacceptde sans doute At la lumi~re des preuves fournies que les motsdtaient exacts et que I'auteur en dtait le Ministre des affaires dtran-g6res.

Dans I'affaire de la Sentence arbitrale rendue par le Roid'Espagne, la Cour internationale de Justice examina, en 1960, diver-ses d6clarations faites au Nicaragua par le Prdsident de la Rdpubliqueet par le Ministre des affaires 6trangires. Compte tenu de I'ensembledes declarations et sans se rdrer A l'616nicnt de I'oralitd, la Cour aestim6 que Ic Nicaragua

<,... par ses d6clarations expresses et par son comportemcnt. areconnu le caract~re valable de la sentence et il n'est plus en droitde revenir sur cette reconnaissance pour contester la validit6 dela sentence ,24.

Finalement, dans I'affaire des Essais nucldaires, Ia Cour dlucidale problIme entre la forme et la substance en disant:

4,Pour cc qui est de la forme, il convient de noter que cen'est pas lIa tin domaine dans lequel le droit international imposedes r gles strictes ou spdciales. Qu'unc d6claration soit verbaleou dcrite, cela n'entraine aucune diffdrence essentielle, car de telsdnoncds faits dans des circonstances particuli~res peuvent cons-tituer des engagements en droit international sans avoir n6ces-sairement ii 8tre consignds par 6crit. La forme n'est donc pasdecisive ,25.

2' C.P.J.l setrie A/B, n" 53, p. 71. Voir, cc suict. J. W. Gardner, oThe Inter-national Binding Force of Unilateral Oral Declarations,,, AJIL, 1933, vol. 27,pp. 493-497; Carbone, op. cit. (supra note 6), et A. McNair, The itw of Treaties,Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1%1, pp. 9 et 15.

2' CLJ. Recueil 1960, p. 213." C.L.J. Recueil 1974, pp. 267-268.

Ensuitc, la Cour cite son arrt dans I'affaire du Temple de PrjahVihiar:

, [Comme] c'est g6ndralement le cas en droit international quiinsiste particulidrement sur les intentions des parties. lorsque laloi ne prescrit pas de forme particulere, les parties sont libres dechoisir celle qui leur plait, pourvu que leur intention en ressorteclairement >>26.

La Cour avait ajoutd dans la m~me affaire:... la seule question pertinente est de savoir si la r6daction

employ6e darts une ddclaration donnie rdv~le clairement Fin-tention... ,17.

V Force obligatoire des actes unilatiraux

Dans certains syst&mes de droit interne, la loi dtermine les effetsdes actes qui naissent sans convention. Tel est le cas des declarationsunilatdrales de volont6 qui engagent ses auteurs et de la gestion d'af-faires (agency)28. D'autres systdmes considdrent que i'offre requiert,pour devenir obligatoire, qu'elle soit acceptde et que, de ce fait, elleentre dans le domaine conventionnel, tandis que d'autres systdmesencore dtablissent ]'interdiction de venire contra factumn proprium-Les systimes anglo-saxons de ]a common law, eux, situent les pro-messes unilatdrales dans le cadre de la (<reliance ,, terminologie quidvoque un 6l6ment de confiance et de sdcurit -'9.

La translation des concepts de droit interne en droit internationalexplique les difficultds qu'eprouve la doctrine pour arriver at une con-ception commune en ce qui concerne la force obligatoire des actesunilateraux et, en particulier, des declarations unilatdrales. Mais latiche d'dtablir la force obligatoire de ces actes semble devoir se sim-plifier quand on fait une distinction entre les actes unilatdraux lis audroit des traitds et ceux lids au droit coutumier. Dans le premier cas,la force obligatoire repose sur la rdgle pacta sunt servanda tandis quedans le cas des actes unilateraux rdgis par ]a coutume intertiationale,la ri~gle sera celle de l'inveterata consuetudo opiniojuris sire neccssi-tatis. De cette manii-re on peut dire que le probkme de ]a force obli-gatoire des actes unilatdraux se rdduit aux actes stricto senst, c'est--dire. aux actes autonomes.

CIJ. Recuel 1961, pp. 32-32._w Ibid., p- 32. Cependant. le R&gJement de la Cour stipule, a ]'Article 88. que

le ddsistemcnt doit se faire par 6crit. Pour sa part, IArticle 102 dc la Charte desNations Unies pr-escrit la publication des engagcments intcrnationaux.

2l Voir .a cc sujet. par exemple, A. P. Screni. - Agency in International Law-.AJIL, 1940, vol. 34. pp. 638-646; et I. Brownlie. Principles of Public InternatrionalLaw. 4' &., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990, pp. 642-643.

: Voir Frank, op. cit. (supra note 6). p. 67; et Rubin, op. cit. (supra note 6),pp. 20-21.

1. Declarations des agents des Gouvernements

Si 'on jette un coup d'0eil sur les premiers arrts et avis consul-tatifs de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale relatifs aux actesunilatdraux et, en particulier, aux promesses unilatrales, on constate labr6vitd des ddveloppements de la Cour h ce sujet. En effet, dans 'affairedes Intdrits allemands en Haute-Sildsie polonaise, en se r6f~rant auxdeclarations faites en dehors et m~me au cours de la proc6dure devantelle, ]a Cour se limita .A dire -qu'elle ne saurait mettre en doute lecaractifre obligatoire de toutes ces ddclarations ,. De mime, dans'affaire des Zones franches de Haute-Savoie et du Pays de Gex, en

examinant la d6claration faite par I'agent du Gouvernement suisseconsid&r6e inacceptable par i'agent franqais, la Cour se borna .td6clarer:

4 ... eu 6gard aux circonstances dans lesquelles cette declarationa td faite, la Cour doit cependant la considdrer comme obliga-toire pour la Suisse 31.

Rappelons que, quand la Cour se prononqa sur la odeclarationhlen o, elle se limita A dire qu'elle la considdrait << incontestable . 32.

I! est bien certain que la Cour a mis I'accent sur le fait que leMinistre d6clarant non seulement avait fait la d6claration au nom deson Gouvernement, mais aussi que l'affaire dtait de son ressort. L'im-putabilit6 est conforme au droit international, raison pour laquelle elleproduit I'effet de lier le pays.

2. Declarations prisidentielles et minist&ielles

Dans I'affaire des Essais nucliaires, la Cour a considdr6 qu'il6tait temps de se prononcer sur la forme des actes unilatdraux et leurforce obligatoire. Et, en effet, elle le fit, non pas avec le laconisme despremiers arrets, mais avec I'extension et la profondeur exig6es parl'importance de I'affaire.

'0 C.P.J.L serie A, n" 7.C.P.JL sirie A/B. n' 46, p. 170.

32 Voir supra note 23. J. V. Louis, dans son article , Le procs des diplomatcsfranqais au Caire ,, AFDI, 1963. vol. 9. p. 237. attire I'attention sur les diffrentespositions doctrinaires au sujct de la -ddclaration Ihlen,,. Par excmple, scionCh. Rousseau, il s'agit d'un acte unilat6ral (Principes gendraux du droit interna-tional public, Paris, Pedone, 1944, vol. 1, p. 132); scion P. Guggenheim, c'est uneconvention (op. cit. (supra note 6), p. 62); pour J. Dchaussy, c'est un accord enforme simplifide (Jurisclasseur de droit international, fascicule 14. n" 36); pourE. Suy, c'est I'acceptation d'une offre (op. cit. (supra note 6), p. 121): scion I'opi-nion dissidente du Juge Anzilotti dans I'affaire du Grijenhznd oriental. la -d6clara-tion Ilhen o entre dans le cadre conventionnel (C.P.J I. sirie A/IB n" 53, p. 91).

Abordant les aspects fondamentaux, les circonstances danslesquelles se produisent les declarations unilatdrales, l'intention desEtats d&larants et le principe de la bonne foi. la Cour mit en reliefleur importance de la mani~re suivante.

a) L'intention de se her

11 est reconnu que des declarations revetant la forme d'actesunilateraux et concernant des situations de droit on de fait peuventavoir pour effet de cr6er des obligations juridiques. Des d6clarations decette nature peuvent avir et ont souvent un objet tres pr&is. QuandrEtat auteur de ]a d&claration entend etre lid conform~ment A sestermes, cette intention confere i sa prise de position le caractere d'unengagement juridique. I'Etat int&esse 6tant desormais tenu en droit desuivre une ligne de conduite conforme .i sa d&:laration. Un engagementde cette nature, exprimne publiquement et dans I'intenion de se lier,meme hors du cadre de negociations internationales, a un effet obliga-toire. Dans ces conditions, aucune contrepartie n'est necessaire pourque la declaration prenne effet, non plus qu'une acceptation ult&icureni mine une r(plique o une reaction d'autres Etats, car cela seraitincompatible amx la nature strictement unilatdrale de l'acte par lequelI'Etat s'est prononc.

Bien entendu, tout acte unilateral n'entraine pas des obligationsmais un Etat peut choisir d'adopter une certaine position sur un sujetdonn6 dans rintention de se lier ce qui devra &re determind en inter-pretant I'acte3 .

b) L'ilnzeni de la bonne foi

Concernant ia bonne foi, qui aupara-int aait etc identifie commeetant ai la base des actes unilateraux, la Cour signala que:

,, un des principes de base qui president At la crdation et a'execution d'obligations juridiques quelle qu'en soit la source estcelui de la bonne foi. La confiance reciproque est une conditioninherente de la coop&ation internationale. surtout i une epoqueo6, dans bien des domaines, cette cooperation est de plus en plusindispensable. Tout comme la regle du droit des traitespacta suntservanda clle-meme, le caractere obligatoire d'un engagementinternational assumrn par declaration unilaterale repose sur labonne foi. Les Etats interesses peuvent donc tenir compte des

' CIJ. Recueil 1974. p. 267.

d6clarations unilat6rales et tabler sur elles: ils sont fondis ai exi-ger que l'obligation ainsi crude soit respectdc ,34.

Les commentaires de la position de ia Cour dans 'affaire desEssais nucldaires ont dtd vari6s. Selon le juriste amdricain Frank, cetarrt est un pr6cddent de grande signification qui rappelle l'arrEt de laCour Supreme des Etats-Unis dans la c61ibre affaire constitutionnelleMarbury v. Madison. II considire, en outre, que la Cour a crd unenouvelle regle, appreciation partag6e par d'autres juristes am6ricains,parmi lesquels Rubin 35.

L'accent mis par la Cour sur la bonne foi donne lieu A d'autrescommentaires. Rubin, par exemple, considere que la bonne foi neconstitue pas le fondement de la force obligatoire des engagementsunilat6raux, mais seulement de l'interdiction de venire contrafactumproprium 36.

Dc son c6t6, E. Zoller considere que

<, ... la jurisprudence r6ccnte de la Cour doit se comprendrecomme une dtape circonstancielle dans '6volution de celle-I, oubien comme le point de d6part d'une moralisation progressive dudroit international. I1 serait cependant 6tonnant qu'apr s avoirtant cherchd A se ddgager de la gangue du droit naturel, le droitinternational, par le biais d'on ne sait quel artifice, s'efforce d'yretourner au m6pris des rdalit6s internationales )37.

Mais c'cst surtout Paul de Visscher qui situe I'arret dans un con-texte plus vaste:

< II est clair que les arr~ts du 20 d6cembre 1974 prennentplace dans ce courant fondamental de moralisation du droit que'6largissement de la communaut6 internationale a contribu6 As

pr6cipiter, de manire quelque peu anarchique d'ailleurs. Sousl'influence de ce courant, le principe de la bonne foi, jadis tenupour un principe de moralit6 internationale consid(rt6 comme in-hdrent A l'id6e de souverainetd, a aujourd'hui tendance As se mani-fester de mani&e plus exigeante, plus pr6cise et plus positive.

' Ibid., p. 268. Voir aussi G. Schwar-enbergcr, ., The Fundamental Principlesof International Law ,, Recueil des cours... 1955-1, vol. 87, pp. 312-314; Venturini,op. cit. (supra note 5), p. 402; P. Reuter, Droit international public, Paris, Pressesuniversitaires de France, 1983, pp. 94-100.

" Voir Frank, op. cit. (supra note 6); et Rubin, op. cit. (supra note 6), p. I.Rubin, ibid., pp. 2-3 et 5.

" E. Zoller. La bonne foi en droit international public, Paris, Pedone, 1977,p. 354; voir aussi Thirlway, op. cit. (supra note 6), pp. 7-21.

Les textes des rdsolutions des Nations Unics en font rdgulire-ment mention ))38.

VI. Imputabiliti

De la mme faqon que le faits illicites engagent la responsabilitdinternationalc de l'Etat quand ils sont imputablcs ou attribuables aicelui-ci, les actes unilatdraux engagent I'Etat et leurs effcts deviennentobligatoires pour lui quand ils lui sont imputables.

L:imputabilit6 est ainsi un ldment Ai considdrer en cc qui concerneles circonstances dans lesquelles les actes unilatdraux sont adoptds,quant l'intention dc ses auteurs d'tre lids ou d'acccpter ou d'assumerunilatdralement des obligations internationales. Cela est important sur-tout quand l'intention des sujets nest pas claire. dvidente ou manifesteou encore quand il s'agit de d&:larations erga omnnes.

L'imputabilitd se produit dans lc cadre de relations de droit, re-lations qui, dvidemmcnt, peuvcnt 6tre dtablies par le droit interne maispeuvent n'avoir aucun effet dans le domaine international, puisquec'est le droit international qui d6termine si I'acte, la promesse ou ladcclaration unilat6ralc est ou non imputable ,i I'Etat et, par cela, si elleengage ou non lEtat.

II n'est pas douteux que la reprdsentation de I'Etat, dans le do-maine international, est le fair de ses organes. II n'est pas non plusdiscutable que I'Etat soit lid ou puisse etre engagd envers un autreEtat ou la communaut6 intcrnationale dans son ensemble par unaccord bilatdral ou multilat6ral ou par des r~gles coutumires, dem~me que par un acre qui peut consister en une dclaration, une mani-festation ou une promesse unilatdrale qui ne requiert pas l'acceptationdes autres Etats pour devenir obligatoire. Dc la m~me maniire, I'Etatpeut se lier par I'admission de certains faits ou par la reconnaissancedes droits d'autres Etats.

Au niveau international, on ne peut mettre en doute que le Mi-nistre des affaires 6trang res reprdsente et engage l'Etat. Quand ils'agit de dclarations orales, cela devient d'une grande importancedans les relations internationales. Une autre manifestation dgalementtr~s importante de la volont de l'Etat est le fait des dclarations faites

"P. dc Visscher. - Remarques sur l'volution de la jurisprudence de la Courinternationale de Justice relative au fondcment obligatoire de certains actesunilatcraux .. in Melanges Lachs. La Haye. Martinus Nijhoff, 1984. pp. 463-464.Pour ce qui est d'autres commentaires de I'arret de la Cour, voir H. Thierry, , Lesarr~ts du 20 d&cembre 1974 ct ICs relations de la France avec la Cour interationalede Justice, AFDI. 1974. vol. 20. pp. 286-298: S. Sur. - Les affaires des Essaisnucleaires-,. RGDIP. 1975. t- 79. pp- 972-1027; Carbone, op. cit. (supra note 6).pp. 168-172; et Macdonald and Hough. -The Nuclear Case Revisited,, GermanYearbook of International Law. 1977, vol. 20.

par les Chefs d'Etat, surtout dans des occasions solennelies, commeune confdrence de presse, et qui, selon les circonstances Ct I'intention,engagent I'Etat. Mis part les Ministres des affaires 6trangres ou lesChefs d'Etat, reste -i savoir si un acte des Ministres de la d6fense oudc la marine ou de fonctionnaires de rang mineur, peuvent dgalementengager ou lier I'Etat. Cette question a dtd r6solue par la Cour inter-nationale de Justice.

1. Diclarations faites par les Chefs d'Etat

M is bi part les d&clarations des M inistres des affaires 6trang~res dela Norv~ge et du Nicaragua et du Pr&sident de cc dernier Etat, la Coura aussi examin6 l'imputabilit6 dans des affaires postdricures. En effet,dans I'affaire du Nicaragua, la Cour a examind non sculement ladfclaration faite par le Prdsident des Etats-Unis, M. Reagan, au coursd'une conf6rence de prcsse sur les actes secrets au Nicaragua, maisaussi les dfclarations faites par le Gouvernement du Nicaragua en1979 sur des questions d'ordre interne et de politique interne.

En cc qui conceme les ddclarations du Prdsident Reagan, la Coura dit :

o D'aprs le Nicaragua, ces d6clarations s'insciraient dans ",unes6rie de propos reconnaissant que les Etats-Unis apportaicnt, defaqon habituelle et syst6matique, une aide aux mercenaires mc-nant des op6rations militaires contre le Gouvernement du Nica-ragua)). De l'avis de la Cour, le refus du Pr6sident de se pronon-cer sur le lien entre Ics activitds secr6tes et ((cc qui c'est passe,[et] certaines des op6rations qui ont lieu I.A-bas ' peut, dans lecontexte oii il se situait, 6tre consid6rd comme rcvenant .i admet-tre quc les Etats-Unis ont jou6 un r6le dans l'attaque contreCorinto, mais pas n6cessairemcnt que le personnel des Etats-Unis y ait t6 directement Inm6 )>39.

A propos des d6clarations faites par le Gouvernement du Nica-ragua contenant, selon les Etats-Unis, des promesses de tenir des61ections libres, la Cour a dit, en revanche:

II s'6tait agi d'une promessc essentiellement politique,faite non seulement ai l'organisation mais aussi au peuple duNicaragua qui devait en &.tre le premier bdntficiaire. Mais la Courne d6couvre aucun instrument ayant une valcur juridique,unilat6ral ou synallagmatiquc, par lequel le Nicaragua se scraitengag6 quant au principe et aux modalit6s de la tenue d'diec-tions )>40.

SC.LJ. Recueid 1986, p. 49.4) Ibid., p. 132.

La Cour a igalement examind une autre promesse du Gouverne-ment du Nicaragua dans le domaine de la politique intdricure, .a savoirI'incorporation et la participation progressive des secteurs marginauxde Ia population -A la vie de la nation et elle ajouta:

-,Qui plus est. -A supposer meme que cette promesse poli-tique ait eu valeur d'cngagement juridique, elle n'aurait nulle-ment pu perncttre aux Etats-Unis de reclamer la misc en ruvred'un tel engagement, pris non pas envers eux directement mais .alegard de l'organisation, scule habilite . en verifier I'cxecution.La Cour ne d&couvre aucune base juridique a la , responsabiliteparticulicre en cc qui concemc le respect des engagements prispar le Gouvernement du Nicaragua que les Etats-Unis estimentavoir assumee en raison du "r6le qu'ils ont jou6 dans I'installa-tion du Gouvernement actuel du Nicaragua ,41.

2. Dlarations sans effets

Mais c'est surtout dans I'affaire du Diffrendfrontalier (BurkinaFaso/Rpublique du Mali) que la Cour examina de nouveau les 616-ments des actes unilatdraux, en mettant I'accent sur l'intention desEtats de se lier. A propos d'une d.claration faite par le Pr.sident duMali, laquelle, selon le Mali, est une * rdflexion du Chef de I'Etatmalien qui n'dtait qu'une boutade du type de celle que l'on lance dansune conference de presse . la Cour, pour sa part, s'est etendue sur laquestion de la maniicre suivante:

a La declaration faite par le Chef de I'Etat malien le II avril1975 ne s'inscrivait pas dans le cadre de n6gociations ou de pour-parlers entre les deux Parties; tout au plus rev.tait-elle la formed'un acte unilateral 6manant du Mali. De telles d clarationswconcernant des situations de droit ou de fait, peuvent certes

avoir pour effet de creer des obligations juridiques *. .t la chargede i'Etat au nor duquel ells ont 6tW faites, comme la Cour I'anote das les affaires des Essais nuclaires... Mais la Cour, dansces affaires, a aussi pr6cise que ce nest que a quand I'Etat auteurde la declaration entend 8tre lid conformement -i ses termes *, que4'cette intention confere A sa prise de position le caract~re d'unengagement juridique *... Tout d~pend donc de l'intention deI'Etat considere, et la Cour a -k cet 6gard souligne que c'est A ellequ'il appartient Ade se faire sa propre opinion sur le sens et la

" Mid, pp. 132-133.

portde que 'auteur a entendu donner A une d6claration unila-tdrale d'oii peut naitre une obligation juridique >42.

Finalement, la Cour a expliqu6 qu'il n'y a aucune raison d'inter-pr6ter la d6claration faite par Ic Pr6sident du Mali comme un acte uni-lat6ral comportant des effets juridiques .i 1'dgard du diffdrend.

Darts le m me sens, la Chambre de [a Cour dans I'affaire duGolfe du Maine, consid6ra qu'unc ddclaration contenue dans une let-tre d'un fonctionnaire de rang mineur n'engageait pas internationale-ment les Etats-Unis. L'int6rcss6 lui-m~me confirma qu'il n'dtait pasle fonctionnaire compdetnt cn la matiire pour formuler une ddclara-tion officielle 3.

3. D&Iarations des agents des Etats

Indpendamment des d&larations faites par les Gouvernementsen dehors des proc&tures judiciaires, la Cour permanentc de Justiceinternationale, comme nous l'avons vu plus haut, a tenu pour obliga-toircs les d6clarations faites par les agents des Etats dans les affairesMavronniatis, des Intdrits alleinands en Haute-Sildsie polonaise etdes Zones franches de la Haute Savoie et du Pays de Gex.

La m~me position a 6t6 prise par un tribunal arbitral dans uneaffaire plus r6cente, celle du Filetage t l'int&ieur d Goife du Saint-Laurent entre le Canada et la France. A cc sujet, le tribunal s'exprimacomme suit:

,Au cours de la procddure orale devant le pr6sent Tribunal,I'Agent du Gouvernement frantais a constamment tir6 argumentde l'existence des quotas de captures pour affirmer qu'un navirefileteur operant dans le Golfe dtait ainsi limit6 dans son effort depche, allant mime jusqu'a d6clarer au cours de I'audience dumardi 4 juin 1986, "i propos des chalutiers-fileteurs, que, filetantou non Ai bord, ,, ils ne captureront pas un kilogramme de moruede plus que le quota autoris6 >... Eu dgard aux circonstances danslesquelles elle a dtd faite, le Tribunal doit considdrer pareille d6-claration comme engageant la France a user de tous les moyensdont elle dispose pour veiller, conjointement avec les autorit6scanadiennes, au respect dc cette d6claration >44.

'2 Ibid., p. 573. Voir aussi I'affaire Kuin. Emeric c. Etat rounmain, AnnualDigest of International Public Law Cuses, 1927-28, p. 489, pour des ddclara-tions isoldes, ct, pour les contradictions, I'affaire dcs 1'cheries (voir supra note I),p. 238. Voir 6igalement Fitzmauricc, oly. cit. (supra note 6). pp. 44-47 (Protest andAdmission).

CLJ. Recueul 1984.RSA. vol. XIX, p. 265.

4. Effet probant des dMlarations

Dans deux affaires celle des Minquiers et des Ecrthous et celledu Nicaragua. la Cour internationale de Justice a considdrd ndces-saire de prdciser Ic caractre et les efrets probants des dclarationsunilatdrales qui ont dtd portdes bi sa connaissance et qui ont ct,2 faitesen dchors de la procddurcjudiciaire. La Cour a mis I'acccnt sur I'effctprobant, plut6t que sur I'intention de scs autcurs ou sur I'effet propre-ment dit dc lier I'Etat.

Ainsi, le Ministre franqais de la marine reconnut que les ilots desMinquiers dtaient ,,poss~ds par 'Angleterre, dans une lettre adres-s6e au Ministre franqais des affaires 6trang res le 14 septembre 1819.Ceite ddclaration fut l'objet d'un examen par la Cour dans I'affairedes Minquiers et des EcrdAous. Dans son anfrt, la Cour considdracette lettre comme la preuve des points de vue officiels Ai I'dpoque,dans les termes suivants:

<<Par une note du 12 juin 1820 au Foreign Office. ddj.i citde plushaut, I'ambassadeur de France .i Londres a transmis une lettredu 14 septembre 1819 du Ministre franqais de [a marine au Mi-nistre franqais des affaires 6trangZres. o ' les M inquiers sont indi-quds comme ,c possddds par rAngleterre ,, et sur l'une des cartesannex6es, le groupe des Minquiers est indiqud comme ttant an-glais. Le Gouvernement franqais soutient que cette admission nesaurait lui tre oppose, car elle Cut faite au cours de ndgociationsqui nont pas abouti ai un accord. Toutefois, il ne s'agit pas d'uneproposition ou d'une concession faite au cours de nigociations,mais de l'daonc de faits transmis au Foreign Office par I'ambas-sadeur de France. qui na exprimd aucune rtseve a ce sujet. Cettedeclaration doit done tre considdrde comme la preuve des vuesofficielles franqaiscs A 1'Upoque )45.

Sans doute, rlddment important 6tait que la lettre du Ministrefranqais de la marine 6tait parenue A la connaissance du Gouverne-ment britannique et que celui-ci I'a port6e a la connaissance de laCour.

La Cour a 6galement considrd la valcur probante des ddclara-tions des reprdsentants des Etats- surtout de haut niveau politique- dans I'affaire du Nicaragua. A cc sujet, la Cour s'exprima de lamani~re suivante:

" Le dossier soumis a la Cour contient 6galement des ddcla-rations de repr~sentants d'Etats. parfols du plus haut niveaudans la hidrarchie politique. Certaines de ces dclarations ont dtdfaites devant des organes officiels de l'Etat ou d'une organisation

SC.IJ. Recuedi 1953, p. 71

r~gionale ou internationale et figurent dans les comptes rendusofficiels de ces institutions. D'autres, prononcdes lors de conf&rences de presse ou d'interviews, ont W rapport6es par la presse6crite locale ou internationale. La Cour considire que des dtcla-rations de cette nature, 6manant de personnalitds politiques offi-cielles de haut rang, parfois mme du rang le plus 6levd, poss6-dent une valeur probante particuli~re lorsqu'elles reconnaissentdes faits ou des comportements d6favorables ai I'Etat que repr6-sente celui qui les a formuldes u46.

VII. Interpretation des actes unilateraux

Comme on le sait, dans i'affaire des Essais nucliaires, la Courinternationale de Justice a remarqud, au sujet de l'interprdtation que,<< [b]ien entendu, tout acte unilat6ral n'cntraine pas des obligations,mais un Etat peut choisir d'adopter une certaine position sur un sujetdonnd dans l'intention de se licr, cc qui dcvra tre di~termind en inter-prdtant I'acte . Elle ajouta que [I]orsque des Etats fant des ddcla-rations qui limitent leur libert6 d'action future, unc interpretation res-trictive s'impose,, 7.

L'interpr6tation restrictive qui, scion la Cour, s'impose quand lalibert6 d'action future d'un Etat est en cause, rappelle I'affaire du<<Lotus >, dans laquelle la Cour permanente de Justice internationalea mis en garde contre les effets implicites des actes des Etats, surtoutquand elle a affirm6 que ([Iles limitations h l'inddpendance des Etatsne se pr~sument donc pas>'8.

Un autre 616ment qu'il convient de retenir est celui des cir-constances dans lesquelles sont adoptds les actes unilatraux parcequ'elles ne sont pas - comme ]a Cour ra remarqud - toutes 6quiva-lentes. C'est pour cela que l'intention des Etats de se lier devra treprdcis6e en interprdtant 'acte.

A l'6poque o6 elle a formuld ses observations sur l'interprdtationrestrictive, la Cour permanente de Justice internationale avait dijareconnu que les dfclarations par lesquelles les Etats acccptaient la

CLJ. Recuel 1986, p. 41.41 CLJ. Recueil 1974, p. 267.

SC.P.J.L sirie A. n' 10. Voir 6galement lavis consultatif sur Ic Rigimne

douanicr austro-allemand C.P.Jl. serie A/B. n' 4. Sur les d6clarations de renon-ciation, voir I'affaire Campbell, RSA, vol. 11. pp. 1154-1158; I'affaire KronprinsGustav Adolf,,. ibid., p. 1299 (la renonciation dolt Etre ddmontrWec par preuvcconcluante); l'affaire du Rann de Kutch, ibid., vol. XVII; I'affaire Gillow. IL-R,vol. 75, pp. 562-581; I'affaire relative aux Droits des ressortissants des Etats-Unisd'Amerique au Maroc. CL.J Recuei 1952, p. 194; laffaire de la Barcelona Trac-tion (voir supra note 3). pp. 6-21 (disistement et renonciation de droit). Voir aussiSuy, op. cit. (supra note 6), pp. 156-175; et Oppenheim's International Law-, op. cit.(supra note 6), p. 1195.

juridiction obligatoire sont des actcs unilatdraux. Cest pour ccla quedans l'allaire des Phosphates du Maroc. aprs avoir manifestd que lajuridiction de la Cour ,, n'cxistc quc dans Ics termcs ou celi a dteaccept& *. clle ajouta:

aDans I'espice. Ics terms qui forment la base dc l'exceptionratione temporis priscnt&v par Ic Gouvememcnt franqais sontparfaitement clairs: sculs rcEvcnt dc la juridiction obligatoire lessituations ou les faits posterieurs ai la date de la ratification ausujet desquels s'cst dlcev Ic diffdrend... Dans ces conditions, iln'est pas n&ecssaire de rccourir -i I'interprdtation restrictive qui,dans le doute, pourrait se rccommandcr bi l'igard d'une clausedont I'intcrprdtation nc saurait en aucun cis depasser l'expres-sion de la voiontd des Etas qui Font souscrite ,,!.

Quelques annees plus tard. la Cour intcmationale de Justice cutI'occasion d'examiner unc autre declaration unilatdrale d'acceptationde sajuridiction obligatoire, cellc de I'Iran. En effet dans l'affaire deI'Anglo Iranian Oil Co., la Course prononra sur deux points soulevespar lc Royaume-Uni. En cc qui conccrne Ic premier. le Royaume-Unisoutenait que la d&laration se rdferait A I'application des traites ac-cepts par HIran a une date quelconque w; la Cour a rapondu:

Si I'on envisage la dclaration au point de vue purementgrammatical. on peut considdrer que les deux theses sont com-patibles avec ie texte. A la ngueur, on peut soutenir que les motsaet posterieurs a la ratification de cette declaration *. se rappor-tent soit a I'expression a traites ou conventions acceptcs par laPerse -, soit i I'expression a au sujet de situations ou de faits ,,,.

a Mais la Cour ne saurait se fonder sur une interprdtationpurement gramrnaticale du texte... eu egard A l'intention du Gou-vernement de l'Iran .A I'dpoquc oij cclui-ci a acccptd la comp6-tence obligatoire de la Cour,. 0

Quant au deuxikme point soulevd par Ic Royaumc-Uni. la CourLndiqua qu'en matiie d'interprctation des actes tinilatdraux ce nesont pas Is r&les d'interprdtation des traites qui s'appliquent. Eneffet, le Royaume-Uni soutenait que la declaration de I'lran contenaitdes mots supcrflus, si on i'interprdtait - comme le vcut P'Tan o. LaCour nFpondit aqu'un textc juridique doit Wtre interprdtd de mani~requ'une raison d'C:tre et un sens puisscnt atre attribuds -a chacun de ses

CPJ.L sirie A/B. n 74. pp. 23-24.

C.IJ. Recueil 195-. p. 104.

"Ibid. p. 105.

A cc sujet, la Cour prdcisa:

<<On peut dire que cc principe doit s'appliquer en gdndralquand il s'agit d'interpr6ter le texte d'un trait6. Mais le texte dela d6claration de I'Iran n'est pas un texte contractuel rdsultant dendgociations entre deux ou plusieurs Etats. 11 risulte d'uner6daction unilatdrale par le Gouverncment de Iran, qui sembleavoir apportd uric prudence particulikre a. la r6daction du texte dela d6claration. I1 semble y avoir ins6rd ex abundanti cautela desmots qui peuvent, h strictement parler, sembler superflus. Cetteprudence s'explique par les raisons particulires qui ont conduitle Gouvernement de I'Iran h rddiger la dclaration d'une fagontr~s restrictive ,S2.

Finalement, la Cour, en examinant si une declaration unilatdraled'acceptation de la juridiction obligatoire avait ou non un effetr6troactif et, par cons6quent, dtait incompatible avec ]'Article 36 duStatut, signala, dans I'affaire du Droit de passage, que pour apprdcierI'all6gation il faut ddterminer le sens et l'effet du texte et les pincipesde droit applicables. Selon la Cour:

« Les mots << une notification qui prendra effet i. la date ofielle aura 6t6 donnde ne peuvent Etre interprdts comme signi-fiant que cette notification aura effet rdtroactif, de sorte qu'elles'appliquerait aux affaires ddjil pendantes devant la Cour. Inter-prdtds dans leur sens ordinaire, ces mots signifient simplementqu'une notification faite en vertu de la troisizme condition s'ap-plique seulement aux diffdrends soumis A la Cour apr~s la datede la notification. Cette interprtation conduit ii la conclusionqu'on ne saurait Idgitimemcnt attribuer un effet r6troactif i unenotification faite en vertu de la troisizme condition. C'est uner~gle de droit g6ndralement acceptdc et appliqu6c dans le pass6par ]a Cour qu'une fois la Cour valablement saisie d'un diffrdrend,I'action unilatdrale de I'Etat ddfendeur, ddnonqant tout ou partiede sa declaration, ne peut retirer compdtence A la Cour ,53.

La Cour conclut:

,, C'est une rZgle d'interprdtation qu'un texte 6manant d'un Gou-vernement doit, en principe, &3tre interpr6td comme produisant etdtant destind .t produire des effets conformes et non pas con-traires au droit existant ,>14.

" Ibid.CLJ. Reciedi 1957, p. 142.Ibid.

En conclusion, l'intention des Etats jouc un r6le important enmati&e d'interprdtation des actes unilatdraux sauf, bien stir. quandcle conduit ai des r~sultats absurdes ou arbitraires.

VIlIl. Revision et revocation des actes unilateraux

D'apr~s la th&rie g, n&ale du droit, les actes juridiques sontsusceptibles de rvision, modification, suspension, revocation et annula-tion. Ainsi, les actes conventionnels peuvent tre amendSs par toutes lesparties ou modifies par accord inter se entre certaines parties. De lamrme mani&e, ces actes peuvent Wre I'objet de ddnonciation unila-tdrale quand la d6nonciation est prdvue ou. autrement, d'extinction oude suspension en cas de violations substantiellcs, en suivant lesprocddurcs prtvues par le droit codifid des traits. La suspension etI'extinction peuvent &re aussi le rdsultat de la survenance d'une situa-tion rendant 'ex&ution impossible ou d'un changement fondamentalde circonstances. Finalement, les actes conventionnels peuvent trenuls ab initio ou re annulds ex nunc. On voit done que, dans le cadredu droit des traitds, il n'existe pas de , pdtrification , des situations etdes relations juridiques entre les Etats.

En cc qui concerne les actes unilat&aux, il faut dire que les Etatsne poursuivent pas non plus l'immutabilit6 des situations de fait ou dedroit et des relations juridiques et politiques entre eux et avec les orga-nisations internationales. Ainsi. le problme de fond est de pr~ciserdans quelles situations et quelles circonstances les actes unilatdrauxpeuvent re rdvisds, rdvoquds et annul6s.

A cet 6gard, on peut appliquer aux actes unilat6raux, par analo-gie, les rdgimes 6tablis par le droit codifid des trait6s, ou bien prdciser,selon le genre d'acte dont il s'agit, ses liens avec le droit coutumier 55,

et l'on peut certainement trouver des traits communs entre les actesunilatraux et ceux r6gis par le droit des trait6s. Les actes unilatdrauxpeuvent aussi &re affect6s par des vices de consentement et. toutcomme les trait6s, ils sont soumis aux effets des r6gles impdrativcs dujus cogens. La disparition de la Cour permanente de Justice interna-tionale a mis en lumire ces effets sur les d6clarations unilat6ralesd'acceptation de la juridiction obligatoire.

Cependant, d'autrcs acres unilat6raux sont soumis aux restric-tions et aux interdictions 6tablies par le droit coutumier. Par exemple.la reconnaissance de jure d'un Etat n'est pas rdvocable et la revoca-tion de la nationalitd des personnes physiques est soumise aux restric-tions 6tablies par le droit international. Bien stir, il y a des domaines

" Skubiszcvk, ki. op. cit. (supra note 6). pp. 248-249."" Voir I'affaire relative "i I'Incident airien du 27 juillet 1955 (Israel c. Bul-

garic), CI.J. Recueil 1959, p. 144.

o6 il n'y a pas de rtgles. Et c'est prcis6ment dans ces domaines quela jurisprudence internationale fournit des paramtres et des indi-cateurs. Nous pouvons donc d6duire que les actes unilatdraux ne sontpas immuables57 .

La revision et la revocation sont soumises aux rbgles 6tablies soitpar le droit conventionnel, soit par le droit coutumier. Ainsi, les r~glesapplicables dipendent, par essence, du genre d'acte unilateral dont ils'agit et des circonstances dans lesquelles il a Wt 6mis. II n'y a pas dedoute que le droit de modifier ou de rdvoquer un tel acte existe et ilest encadr6 par des rfgles et des principes, mais surtout par la bonnefoi, comme on le voit en examinant la jurisprudence internationale.

1. Actes unilatiraux stricto sensu

La c~l~bre dclaration 6gyptienne de 1957 sur Ic canal de Suez adonn6 lieu, pr6cis~ment, A une discussion 6 niveau international. Laquestion s'est posse de savoir si rlle dtait et est encore ou non modifiableou revocable. Selon Jacques Dehaussy:

,(La R~publique arabe unie parait avoir, th6oriquement, la possi-bilitd de revenir sur les engagements exprim6s dans la d6claration,soit par un retrait global, soit par une modification partielle.Nombreux sont les Gouvernements qui en ont tir6 argument pourproclamer inacceptable tout r~glement unilat6ral du problrne deSuez o 5 8.

Parmi les Etats qui ont exprim6 au Conseil de sdcurit6 des pointsde vue A ce sujet se trouvait la France qui s'est prononc~e commesuit :

,... une dclaration unilatdrale, m~me enregistre, ne peut tr~s6videmment avoir d'autre porte que celle d'un acte unilateral, etnous devons tirer de cette constatation d'6vidence la cons6-quence que, d~crdtde unilatdralement, la declaration peut 8tremodifi~e ou annul6e de la meme faqon ,9.

Quelques anndes plus tard, la Cour internationale de Justice, sansque la question lui soit posse, se prononqa en termes laconiques surla revision et la rdvocation des actes unilatdraux. En effet, dans l'af-

'7 Voir Carbone, op. cit. (supra note 6). p. 27; Sicault, op. cit. (supra note 6).pp. 650-656; N. Quoc Dinh, P. Daillier et A. Pellet, Droit international public, 5' 6d.,Paris, Librairie gndralc de droit et de jurisprudence. 1992, pp. 357-359; ct Oppen-heim's International Law, op. cit. (supra note 6), p. 1198.

" J. Dehaussy, , La dcclaration 6gyptienne de 1957 sur Ic canal de Suez,,AFDI, 1960, vol. 6, p. 180.

" 776' s6ance, 26 avril 1957, Documents officiels du Conseil de sicuriti.douzi'me annie, par. 59. Voir aussi A. C. Kiss, Repertoire de la pratiquefrancaiseen mati4,re de droit international public, Paris, Centre national de la recherchescientifique, 1962, vol. 1, pp. 617-618.

faire des Essais nucliaires, elle a affirme que les Etats intdress$s pou-vaient tenir compte des d&clarations unilatrales et tablcr sur elles, enpr~cisant qu'-i cet 4gard, * ils sont fondds ' exiger que I'obligationainsi cr6e soit respectee , o

Puis, dans un autre paragraphe de son arrEt, elle a ajoutd:

,x... l'engagement unilatdral rdsultant de ces declarations nesaurait &re interprete comme ayant comportd l'invocation d'unpouvoir arbitraire de rdvision .61.

II est 6vident que, pour la Cour, le droit de rdviser un acte unila-tdal existe, mais en meme temps elle pruvient que ce droit n'entrainepas un pouvoir arbitraire. La limite fix6e par [a Cour conduit A penser,comme Jacqu6 le signale 2. A la th&orie de I'abus de droit. h l'interdic-dion de venire contra factum proprium et A I'effet juridique de I'es-toppell.

I! est donc necessaire d'examiner le droit de rdvision et de rdvo-cation des d6clarations unilatrales d'acceptation de la juridiction dela Cour intemationale de Justice, 6tant donn6 que la Cour a ddj. eui'occasion de se prononcer sur ces droits.

2. Dclarations unilaterales d'acceptation de ]a juridiction obligatoire

Etant donn6 que I'acte unilat ral d'acceptation de la juridictionobligatoire de la Cour peut re rdvis, modifid ddnonc6 ou simplements &eindre, soit du fait de l'expiration des delais fix6s clans la d6clara-Lion, soit du fait de la disparition de la Cour elle-meme, la modification,la d6nonciation et la caducit4 sont inhrents a ces actes.

La Cour cut I'occasion d'examiner le droit de r~vision et de denon-ciation dans deux arrets posterieurs A ceux des Essais nucliaires: lepremier dans I'affaire du Nicaragua en 1984 et le second dans I'affairerelative a des Actions arm&esfrontaibres et transfrontalibres en 1988.La Cour se prononqa, dans le premier cas, sur le droit des Etats-Unisde modifier leur declaration du 14 aofit 1946 et, clans le second, sur lesmodifications introduites par le Honduras A sa d6claration de 1960 parune nouvelle d6claration du 22 mai 1986.

C.IJ. Recueil 1974. p. 26861 Ibid.. p. 270.

6 Jacqud, - A propos dc la promesse unilat&dale , op. cit. (supra note 6).p. 343.

' Voir. par exempic. Rubin, op. cit. (supra note 6), p. 2; Venturini. op. cit.(supra note 5). p 402: Cahier. op. cit. (supra note 2., pp. 237 et 265; et VillagrfnKramer, op. cit. (supra note 5). Pour la jurisprudcnce, voir supra note 4, ainsi queI'affaire du DiffeFrend frontalier terrestre. insulaire et naritine (El SalvadoriHonduras). C.LJ. Recued 1990.

II r6sulte de I'arret de 1984 que lcs d6clarations d'acceptation dcla juridiction obligatoire sont des engagements facultatifs de caract~reunilat6ral auxquels les Etats sont libres de souscrire, soit sans condi-tions ni limites de dur6e, soit cn introduisant toutes sortes de condi-tions et de rdserves. Toutefois, Ic caract&re unilatdral n'implique pasque <, I'Etat d6clarant soit libre de modifier A son gr6 I'dtendue et [atencur de ses engagements solennels >>4. A l'appui, ]a Cour rappelason arr~t dans I'affaire des Essais nucliaires dans lequel elle avaitd6clar6 que l'Etat intdressd devait ,"suivre une ligne de conduite con-forme .A sa dcclaration >65. Elie ajouta:

,, La question ]a plus importante qui se pose a propos de lanotification de 1984 est de savoir s'il dtait loisible aux Etats-Unisde ne tenir aucun compte de la clause de pr6avis de six moisqu'ils avaient librement choisi d'ins6rer dans leur d6claration de1946. Ce faisant, ils avaient assum6 une obligation contraignante'I 'dgard des autres Etats parties au syst me de la clause facul-tative. Les Etats-Unis ont certes Ic droit, inh6rent A tout acteunilatdral d'un Etat, de changer la tencur de leur declaration oud'y mettre fin; ils ont n6anmoins assumd une obligation irr6voca-bic a 1'6gard des autres Etats qui acceptent la clause facultative,en d6clarant formelilement et solennellement que tout change-ment semblable ne prendrait effet qu'apr~s l'expiration des sixmois de prdavis >>66.

Scion la Cour, le Nicaragua pouvait donc opposer aux Etats-Unisla clause de prdavis de six mois, ,, parce qu'elle constitue un engage-ment faisant par-tie intdgrante de I'instrument ofi elle figure >>6

7 .

Dans I'autre affaire, celle des Actions armnjes, la Cour examinasa conpdtence non seulement A la lumire de la nouvelle d6clarationdu Honduras mais aussi de I'article XXX du Pacte de Bogoti. Apr savoir 6tabli sa compftence conform6ment Li ce Pacte, la Cour con-siddra qu'elle n'avait pas besoin d'examiner les modifications intro-duites par le Honduras 68.

En cc qui concerne la caducit6 des d6clarations du fait de la dis-parition de I'ancienne Cour permanente de Justice internationale, ilfaut remarquer que la caducit6 fut admise dans I'affaire de I'IncidentaL'rien du 27juillet 1955 (Israel c. Bulgarie) 9 , ce qui ne fut pas le casdans I'affaire du Temple de Priah Vihiar, dtant donn6 que la

CLJ. Recuied 1984, p. 418.

' C.IJ. Recued 1974, p. 267.Ci.J Recueil 1984, p. 418.

67 Ibid." CLJ. Recueil 1988. pp. 80 ct 88.

CLJ. Recied 1959, pp. 144-146,

Thaflande avait renouvel,, par ddclaration faite devant la nouvelleCour, son acceptation de la juridiction obligatoir1 °.

En guise de conclusion. nous pouvons dire que si le droit de modi-fication et dc rdvocation des actes unilatdraux est inhdrent a ceux-ci.il n'cst pas illimit6. La nature. Iextension et les ddlais des engage-ments peuvent constituer un emp&hement et obliger I'Etat, dans uncas oil il voudrait se ddsengagcr. a suivre les procddures dtablies parle droit international.

Finalement. "k la lumizre de la jurisprudence analysde dans lespages pr6ocdentes ct mme de la doctrine dominante. on peut dire quela tdche de codification des r gles de droit international gcntral appli-cables aux actes unilatdraux cst beaucoup plus simple aujourd'huiqu'elle ne 1"ctait auparavant. Les deux Cours mondiales et les Tribu-naux internationaux d'arbitrage , ont certainement largement con-tribut. La t5che de codification revient maintenant a" la Commissiondu droit international.

SCI.J Recueil 1961, p. 17 Ct suiv.

THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONALORGANIZATIONS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Derek William Bowett

!. Introduction

The notion of "'implementation" is different from that of the enact-ment, codification or development of law. It presupposes that rules oflaw already exist and looks to the means whereby those rules are imple-mented or enforced: in short, it is concerned with the observance of the"Rule of La%&".

The role of international organizations in this regard covers a vrywide field and, given the limitations of space and the aim of celebratingthe United Nations Decade of International Law, this essay will focus onthe United Nations organizations.

I!. Implementation in Practice: The Rules and the Techniques fortheir Enforcement

It is necessary to distinguish betwen different types of rules of law,for the means for their implementation vary greatly according to type.

1. The Rules of the Organizations Themselves

Even within this category certain sub-divisions are needed.

(a) Constitutional Texts

Disputes over the implementation of the basic constitutional textsare common. and these can take the form of disputes between Members,or disputes between Members and the Organization itself, notably %hena Member feels aggrieved by a decision of one of the organs. The initialassumption is that such disputes will be settled internally, within theOrganization itself. and indeed the three financial organizations, plusthe International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) envisagein their constitutions no form of reference to any external body.'

'Sce S. Klein. Unitcd Nitions Speciali/ed Agcncies-. in Encyclpedia ofPublic International La" (Amsterdam. North-ltolland. 1983). vol. 5 p. 361.

Other organizations provide in their constitutions for referenceof such disputes to arbitration or to the International Court of Justiceby means of a request for an advisory opinion (this being a conse-quence of international organizations having no standing to appear asParties). Yet, compared to the League of Nations, the United Nationshas made little use of this facility.2

(b) Decisions and Directives

Of these there are two categories: the first concerns those that aredirected towards States, and, within the United Nations, it is the Secu-rity Council which under Article 25 has the power to take decisionsbinding directly upon States.

Within the specialized agencies, the decisions against which aMember may feel inclined to protest tend to be taken by way of theadoption or revision of the often technical legal instruments which aredistinct from the Constitution but which become operative rules of lawwithin the particular area of competence. Thus, the AdministrativeRegulations of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU); theActs of the Universal Postal Union (UPU); the Annexes, Procedures forAir Navigation Services (PANS) and Supplementary Procedures(SUPPS) of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); theTechnical Regulations of the World Meteorological Organization(WMO); the Regulations of the World Health Organization (WHO); thedecisions of the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund(IMF)-these are but some of the vehicles whereby binding rules arecreated. True, a Member State may in most cases "opt out" of new rulesadopted by a majority vote, but in practical terms this may deprive theMember of many of the real benefits of membership, so it is not anoption to be made lightly.3

A second category concerns those decisions which, althoughbinding, operate internally within the organization, such as decisionsto establish a new organ, or to allocate budgetary contributions, or toadopt a particular programme.

2 During the 19 years of the League, some 27 advisory opinions were re-quested of the Permanent Court of International Justice by the League and theInternational Labour Organization. In 50 years, the United Nations organizationshave made 19 requests. Of the agencies, there is the Inter-Govemmental MaritimeConsultative Organization request (1960) and the World Health Organizationrequests (1980 and 1995-the new request on conformity of the use of nuclearweapons with the Constitution). The United Nations itself has made 16 requests.of which 3 have related to the United Nations Administrative Tribunal.

See generally, 1. Detter, Law-Making by International Organizations (Stock-holm, Norstedt and Soners, 1965); E. Yemin, Legislative Powers in the UnitedNations and Specialized Agencies (Leyden, Sjithoff, 1969); and K. Skubiszewski,"International Legislation", in Encyclopedia of Public International Law, op. cit.(footnote I above), pp. 97-104.

(c) Intental Rules

Each organization will have a substantial body of internal rules-Rules of Procedures. Staff Rules and Regulations-which certainlybecome part of international law and are implemented by the Organiza-tion on a regular basis. Moreover disputes with staff members are han-dled under careful judicial safeguards, comprising internal appeals pro-cedures and, ultimately, reference to an Administrative Tribunal.

2. Rules Agreed between Organizations and States

A considerable body of law is to be found in the many agreementsconcluded between organizations and States. The commonest are theHeadquarters Agreements. Agreements on Privileges and Immunities,Loan Agreements Agreements on Technical Assistance, Claims Settle-ment Agreements and Agreements on the Status of United NationsForces. Whilst organizations can, and do, contract under municipal law,the type of agreement referred to above is certainly governed by inter-national law and, in addition, provision is made for the settlement ofdisputes through arbitration or claims commissions.

3. Rules Adopted under the Auspices of the Organization

Organizations frequently promote international agreements be-tyeen States. The many "codification" conventions-on the law of thesea, on treaties, on diplomatic and consular relations, on statelessness,etc.-are a case in point. The United Nations Educational, Scientific andCultural Organization (UNESCO) conventions. the many InternationalLabour Organization (ILO) conventions, the United Nations Environ-ment Programme (UNEP) conventions, the International MaritimeOrganization (IMO) conventions are yet further examples.

It is in these cases that the Organization will often assume a specialrole with regard to the supervision of the implementation of their treatyobligations by States.

The ILO pioneered a highly successful technique which consists ofrequiring States to submit annual, or other periodic, reports on thenational measures taken by them to implement their treaty obligations;the examination of those reports by an organ4 of the organization

' In the ILO. this is the Committee of Experts on the Application of Con% en-tions and Recommendations. an independent body whose members airc appointedin their individual capacity. See N Valtico'.. International Labour Liii. (Dcventer.Kluwer. 1979); and E. A. Landy. The Effectiveness of International Supervision:77Tiry Years of ILO Eerience (London. Stevens. 1966). In UNESCO. the obliga-tion to report is contained in Article VIII of the Constitution, although few Mem-hers comply regularly and comprehensively.

concerned and, in addition, a "complaints procedure" plus inquiry andfact-finding.

The system established in the United Nations in respect of Trus-teeship Agreements and the Human Rights Covenants is not dissimi-lar.5 The various conventions generally provide for the appointmentof committees of experts, although for two conventions (the Interna-tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and theInternational Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of theCrime of Apartheid) the organs are established by the Economic andSocial Council itself. It is these committees which examine complaintsand pursue inquiries in order to establish whether a violation of theCovenant has occurred.6

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, whilstproviding for conciliation of disputes as a general rule, made a signifi-cant advance in article 66 by providing that, where a Party invokedjuscogens as a justification for invalidating or terminating a treaty underarticles 53 and 64, an aggrieved Party has a right of referring a disputeto the International Court of Justice by way of unilateral application.

The new, 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seamakes some striking advances in providing for dispute settlement pro-cedures as a means of ensuring compliance with the Convention. Itwill be recalled that the 1958 Conventions could do no better than anOptional Protocol for dispute settlement. But in the 1982 Convention,article 287 requires the Parties to choose one of four procedures forsettlement of disputes arising under the Convention: reference to theInternational Court of Justice, to the new Law of the Sea Tribunal,'to arbitration, or to special arbitration.

Equally ambitious is the new World Trade Organization's Under-standing on Rules and Procedures governing the Settlement of Dis-putes, adopted as part of the Uruguay Round in 1993.' The Under-

'B. Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary(M Unchen, Beck, 1994), espec. Article 68; Ph. Alston, ed., The United Nations andHuman Rights: a Critical Appraisal (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992).

6 For a useful description of the reporting system under the various humanrights instruments, which varies from convention to convention, see L. Sohn,"Human Rights: their implementation and supervision by the United Nations", inTh. Meron, ed., Human Rights in International Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press,1984), vol. 11, pp. 369-399.

7 E. Lauterpacht, Aspects of the Administration of International Justice(Cambridge, Grotius, 1991), pp. 20-22, is critical of this apparent "duplication" ofthe work of the Intemational Court of Justice. But see D. H. Anderson, "LegalImplications of the Entry into Force of the United Nations Convention on the Lawof the Sea", ICLQ, vol. 44 (1995), pp. 324-326, who takes a more generous view.

6 ILM, vol. 33 (1994), pp. 114-171. See, for commentary, A. F. Lowenfeld,"Remedies along with Rights: Institutional Reform in the New GA'I', AJIL,vol. 88 (1994), pp. 477-488; E. Canal-Forgues, "Le syst'me de rcglemcnt des

standing covers several agreements (the "covered agreements") andestablishes a new Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to administer thesystem. The Parties are encouraged to use consultation, good offices.mediation and conciliation but, if agreement is not reached, the matteris then referred to an expert "panel" which, working on a confidentialbasis, "makes such findings as will assist the DSB in making recom-mendations or giving the rulings provided for." Thus the DSB has ul-timate responsibility, even though there is an appellate body from thepanel, and the DSB is charged to "keep under surveillance" the com-pliance with its recommendations or rulings. The DSB, faced withnon-compliance, can order compensation or authorize suspension ofconcessions -equivalent to the level of the nullification or impair-ment" suffered by the complainant.

4. Rules of General International Law

The constitutional texts of international organizations do not existin a vacuum, nor are the activities of their organs governed solely bythose texts. These texts form only a part of international law and theyoperate within that broader context. As skc shall see, there is clear esi-dence of an intention to promote and apply international law in general,whenever that is appropriate to their activities.

To take a very obvious example, the concepts of "domestic j urisdic-tion" (Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter), of "territorial integrity"(Article 2, paragraph 4) or "self-defence" (Article 51) depend for theirapplication on general international law, for the Charter itself does notdefine them. Thus the requirement of proportionality, essential to thelegality of self-defence, is proided by the general law, not the Charter.

As the Court said in the Nicaragua case:

"Principles such as those of the non-use of force, non-interven-tion, respect for the independence and territorial integrity ofStates, and the freedom of nax igation, continue to be binding aspart of customary international law, despite the operation ofprovisions of conventional law in which they have been incorpo-rated."9

A recent example of the direct reliance on rules of general inter-national law by a United Nations organ is seen in the establishment

diff&ends de l'Organisation Mondiale du Commerce." RGDIP. vol. 98 (1994),pp. 689-708- The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of course had a disputesettlement procedure as far back as 1950-see R. E. Hudec, Fnforcing Interna-tional Trade Lao: The Evolution of the Mhdern GATT Legal System (Salem.Bunerworth. 1993)-but the ne, system is more comprehcnsi~c and morc corn-mited to adjudication of disputes rather than conciliation.

'Case concerning the Militarv and Paramilitary Activities in and againstNicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States !f America). .LCJ. Reports 1984, p. 424.

by the Security Council'0 of the International Criminal Tribunal forthe Former Yugoslavia. This is without doubt a United Nations body,yet the law it applies and implements is not simply the Charter but the1949 Geneva Conventions, the laws and customs of war, and theGenocide Convention. I To take a further example, the tribunals es-tablished by the International Centre for the Settlement of InvestmentDisputes (ICSID), itself a subsidiary organ of the World Bank, applyrules of general international law in the absence of express rules cho-sen by the parties. 12

The concern of international organizations with the implementa-tion of general international law is graphically illustrated by the re-quest of the General Assembly on 15 December 199413 that the Inter-national Court of Justice should give its advisory opinion on thefollowing question:

"Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstancespermitted under international law?"

III. The Issue of Sanctions

Many international organizations have power to decide on sanc-tions against Member States. In all legal systems the taking of sanctionsrepresents the ultimate stage in the implementation of law, visiting aparty guilty of a violation of its legal obligations with such penalties orconsequences as are commensurate with the breach and/or will affordredress to any injured party. The process is usually twofold.

(a) The determination that a breach has been committed, and(b) The determination of an appropriate sanction. The first

stage is normally judicial and hinged about by the safeguards usual injudicial proceedings: observance of the rules of natural justice, impar-tiality and objectivity, and regularity (in the sense that, subject to vari-ations justified by the particular circumstances any party guilty of thesame breach will be so treated).

By these standards the practice of international organizationshas been disappointing. As we have seen in Section II, the reliance onstandard, third-party techniques for resolving disputes is impressive;but in this field of "sanctions" the practice is seen to be highly politicaland deficient in principle.

0 Resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993.Statute of the Tribunal, document S/25704, Articles 2, 3 and 4.

2 Article 42 of the Convention. See A. Broches, "The Convention on theSettlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States",Recueil des Cours... 1972-11, vol. 136. pp. 331-410; and C. F. Amerasinghe, "TheJurisdiction of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes".Indian Journal of International Law, vol. 19 (1979), pp. 166-227.

," Resolution 4975 K.

1. Deprivation of the Demerits of Membersbip

Under this heading are sanctions such as loss of vote, suspensionor deprivation of memberships, or, in the financial organizations. loss ofdrawing rights or rights to loans. and finally expulsion.

In those organizations where loss of vote--eather -automatic", asin the United Nations. or -flexible", as in ICAO-arises from non-payment of subscriptions there appears to be little room for anxiety. Thequestion whether arrears exist is a matter of record, and whether spe-cial circumstances exist to excuse non-payment is very much a matterof political rather than legal judgement

But suspension or deprivation of rights of participation on theground that a member's conduct violates the constitution is patently a-justiciable issue. In practice, hover. it has been dealt with as astraightforward political issue in many of the organizations. Thus SouthAfrica was recommended to withdraw from the ILO by the GovernmentBody in 1961; it was refused the right to participate in African regionalconferences of the Fbod and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 1963;the ITU and the WMO followd suit in 1965 and 1975. Portugal andIsrael (in relation to UNESCO) also at one time suffered certain disabili-ties imposed upon them.

The concern is not simply that these penalties wre imposed fol-lowing a purely political process. but that the criteria applied to thesefew States were not applied generally, in other cases. Denial of humanrights, on a large scale, has occurred in other States without theseorganizations applying similar sanctions. highlighting the arbitrarynature of these "sanctions'.

2. Enforcement Measures

The reliance on peace-keeping tends to avoid the issue of legal re-sponsibility which should be a precondition of sanctions: the essence ofpeace-keeping is that the States involved consent to what is undertaken,and the principle of "non-intervention" ensures that the United Nationsdoes not discriminate between the Parties. Reliance by the Council onArticle 39, rather then Article 2. paragraph 4. commonly typifies theCouncil's wish to invoke the vague concepts of "threat to the peace,breach of the peace" which do not in themiselws involve a finding thata particular State is responsible for having created that situation. 4

But once sanctions are authorized, the situation is different pre-cisely because the taking of sanctions against a State presupposes that

" It must be accepted that a finding in these terms does not necessarily in-volve a finding of defictual conduct. See G. Ga. -Rdflexions sur le r6e du Conseilde s.cunitF dans e nouvel orde mondiar. RGDIP. voL 97 (1993). pp- 291-320.

the State is in breach of its obligations. There is, however, littledence that the United Nations sees this as a necessary precondiito be established with all the safeguards of due process. 15

Non-military sanctions have been taken against Rhode,South Africa, 17 Yugoslavia, 8 Somalia,19 Libya,20 Liberia2' and HaMilitary sanctions were taken against Iraq, following the invasioKuwait,23 and against the Bosnian Serbs.24 The fact that the UnNations relied on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NAT(execute the air attacks against the Bosnian Serbs does not changeessential point that the decision was a political decision. What t]incidents of recent years do illustrate is that the division betvpeace-keeping and peace enforcement-that is to say, sanctionsincreasingly difficult to maintain once there is opposition to theof the United Nations.

" For an appeal for due process in United Nations decisions, see L. S"Due Process in the United Nations", AJIL, vol. 69 (1975), pp. 620-622.

6 Beginning with an oil embargo under Security Council resolution 221 (I

of 9 April 1966, the United Nations moved to a total economic blockade by(Security Council resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968); for full discussion oaction taken against Rhodesia, see V. Gowlland-Debbas. Collective Respons.IllegalActs in International Law: United Nations Action in the Question of Sern Rhodesia (Dordrecht, Nijhoff. 1990).

' Security Council resolution 418 (1977) of 4 November 1977.Security Council resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 place.

embargo on supplies of all weapons and military equipment.9 Security Council resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992 banned deliv

of weapons. In the following year, resolution 837 (1993) of 6 June 1993 authoithe United Nations peace-keeping force to take all necessary measures ag.those responsible for attacks on the force. The Secretary-General did instigatinvestigation which confirmed that General Aidid was responsible before atwas taken against his men (see document S/26351).

' Security Council resolution 748 (1992) of 31 March 1992: this placed ablockade on Libya, restricting air communications with the country.

2 Security Council resolution 758 (1992) of 8 June 1992 placed an amisbargo on Liberia.

22 Security Council resolution 841 (1993) of 16 June 1993 imposed a linblockade on Haiti. Resolution 940 (1994) of 31 July 1994 went further and autized "all necessary means" to remove the military leadership of Haiti.

2 Security Council resolution 678 (1990) of 28 November 1990. And aftei

cessation of hostilities, by resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, the Security C.cil ordered Iraq to dismantle its ballistic missiles, chemical and biological wealand manufacturing facilities. See generally, U. Villani, Leznni sit lONUe ladel Golfo (Bari, Cacucci, 1991).

2 The United Nations humanitarian mission and peace-keeping force in Inia did not carry out these military sanctions but left this to NATO. For a re'of all the Security Council authorizations of the use of force, from Iraq (1991Rwanda (1994). see II. Freudenschuss, "Between Unilateralism and Colle(Security: Authori7ations of the Use of Force by the UN Security Council", Epean Journal of International Law, vol. 5 (1994), pp. 492-523.

It is not the purpose of this essay to question the justification forthese various measures by the United Nations. The present concernis that. although these measures assumed a party was in breach of itsobligations, the breach was simply assumed as part of a political pro-cess: no kind of impartial, objective legal determination that a breachhad occurred was attempted.25 This characteristic of the sanctionspolicy of the United Nations is disquieting. As one another has re-cently stated:

"The Council has made quasi-judicial determinations that go wellbeyond those inherent in its express authority to determinethreats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression.It has also gone beyond its readily implied authority to interpretand apply relevant Charter provisions or to interpret its ownresolutions. It has done so despite its own non-judicial character,and without procedural safeguards." : 6

The proposition is not that a political organ, exercising politicalpowers. ought to be transformed into a quasi-judicial body. It is sim-ply that if sanctions are to be taken against a Member, as a means ofcompelling that Member to implement its legal obligations, then theinitial determination that the Member is in breach ought to be takendeliberately and with the safeguards of due process. Thereafter, thedecision on whether, in all the circumstances, sanctions should betaken; on the form of such sanctions; on who should take them, andwhen they should cease-all these remain political decisions, and itwould be foolish to content otherwise.

The objection that the urgency of the situation will rarely permitthe Security Council to engage in a leisurely judicial process has to beanticipated. The Security Council has the power to "temporize" untila decision on responsibility is reached by using its powers under Arti-cle 40. Moreover it is by no means clear that the proces of making animpartial, objective assessment of the evidence of breach is necessar-ily so time-consuming. One does not envisage a lengthy, judicial pro-cess akin to hearings before the International Court of Justice. Use ofa Commission of Jurists-a feature of the work of the Council of theLeague--could produce a rapid conclusion. Presumably the CouncilMembers review the evidence before deciding on sanctions, so thesame review conducted by impartial jurists need take no more time.

I It is of interest to examine the careful and wide-ranging study by the ClintonAdministration in the United States on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations.ILM, vol. XXXIII (1994). pp. 798-827. It contains no hint that the United State.sperceives any need to have a prior legal determination of the question of breach.

3 F. L Kirges, Jr., "The Security Council's First Fifty Years". AJIL vol. 89(1995). p. 538.

Nor does the objection that a Member State may have to relyupon confidential information, which cannot easily be made accessi-ble to a Commission of Jurists, carry much weight. No doubt there areoccasions on which a State has information derived from its intelli-gence sources available to it, and it would not wish to share suchinformation for fear of jeopardizing such sources, but in such caseshow can other Member States in the Council support action alleged tobe justified by such information without having the information? Andif the information can, and must, be divulged to other Members inorder to secure their political support, there would seem to be no rea-son for not divulging it to a Commission of Jurists.

NON-BINDING COMMITMENTS:A COMMENTARY ON THE SOFTENINGOF INTERNATIONAL LAW EVIDENCED

IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL FIELD

Alberto Szkkely

I. Purpose of this Essay

The United Nations General Assembly, through its resolution 44/23of 17 November 1989, declared the period 1990-1999 as the "United Na-tions Decade of International Law", one of the main purposes of whichshould be "to encourage the progressive development of internationallaw and its codification".

Those who participated, were close to, or observed the processthat led to. the adoption of the Declaration on the Decade, partic-ularly since the inception of the initiative by the Non-Aligned Move-ment, will remember that the effort was prompted by a concern for thefuture of international law and of its effectiveness, particularly as aresult of certain discouraging episodes such as the attitude of the UnitedStates regarding the case brought against that country to the Interna-tional Court of Justice in 1986, concerning Military and ParamilitaryActivities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States ofAmerica).'

The Decade constitutes, then, an opportunity to reflect on thefuture of international law. Such reflection could be helpful in de-tecting any possible negative or worrisome signals observable in cur-rent trends, and in warning about them.

This essay only attempts to start to analyse, and perhaps even tocautiously warn, of some possible disturbing signals which appearedto begin to take shape precisely during the first few years of the Dec-ade, particularly in the realm of international environmental law.

' See -Goals of the United Nations Decade of International Law: Law Reformand National Programs". in The American Society of International Law, Pro-ceedings of the 87th Annual Meeting (1993), pp. 357-376, R. St. J. Macdonald, -'heUnited Nations Decade of International Law", Canadian Yearbook of Interna-lional Law, vol. 28 (1990), pp. 417427; and F. Seyersted, "La d cada del derechointernacional de Naciones Unidas", Anuario Argentino de Derecho Internacionalvol. 4 (1990-1991). pp. 73-90.

which undoubtedly constitutes one of the top contemporary worldissues. If those signals were to become a symptom of internationallegal negotiations in other areas, this would seem to indicate that thelongest organized effort of the international community to codify andprogressively develop international law, which started in 1945 with thecreation of the United Nations, would have reached its zenith andcould even dwindle toward an era of decadence.

I. The Trend

Those signals have to do with the evidence of a trend, on the partof all types of States, to use international instruments which in the pastserved as the vehicle to generate binding rules of international law, asmere programmatic political documents which at best provide fornon-binding commitments that will leave the participating States basi-cally free to act at their individual unilateral discretion, that is, the di-rect opposite of the object and purpose of positive international legalinstruments.

Behind such trend, which can be detected since the end of the ColdWar era, there seems to be an absence of political will of States to com-mit themselves to new international obligations that will further restricttheir freedom of conduct or their ability to undertake activities byhaving to submit to burdensome limitations. This is inevitably the casein the environmental field, given the fact that most anthropogenicactivities necessarily impact, in various measures, the natural environ-ment. This absence of political will is evidenced not only by the textswhich States negotiate internationally, but even more so by those theyjust simply refuse to negotiate and conclude.

This seems to be consistent with a world where "liberalization" hasbecome an ideology in the intercourse of States, now heavily concen-trated in the trade of goods and services, that is supposed to lift thebarrier effect that State sovereignty and geopolitical boundaries entailfor so many transboundary and international human activities, and isintended to turn the planet into a "global village". The rule of the gameand the key to success in today's world of globalization is to be able toeffectively compete, and thus the competitors wish to be and remainas free from any restraints as possible. Already in 1984, TadeuszGruchalla-Wesierski noted that, although States are willing to addressproblems collectively, they try to limit the amount of constraints theyput upon themselves, by resorting to soft law.2

For European and other Western democracies, the idea seems tobe to go ahead through their own institutional mechanisms-without

T. Gruchalla-Wesicrski, "A Framework for Understanding 'Soft Law'",McGill Law Journal, vol. 30 (1984), pp. 39-40.

waiting for the rest of the international community. which movesthrough slow, politicized and tortuous ways-with the developmentof their own regional and specialized international legal regimes.including an environmental regime. This is the case with regard to allaspects not only of international life, but in many typically domesticareas as well, most of which have not yet been touched upon in almostall other regions of the world, or which have been up for negotiationfor a long time at universal or general international fora. Thus, anumber of instruments have been adopted in a wide variety of impor-tant areas, such as:

- the 1991 Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) Convention onEnvironmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context;

- the 1988. 1989, 1992 and 1994 Protocols to the 1979 ECE Conven-tion on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution;

- the 1989 European Communities Council resolution on the Green-house Effect and the Community;

- the 1992 ECE Convention on the Protection and Use ofTransboundary Watercourses and International Lakes;

- the 1991 Convention on the Protection of the Alps;

- the 1992 Convention on the Transboundary Effects of IndustrialAccidents;

- the 1992 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environmentof the North-East Atlantic;

- the 1995 Agreed Minute between Canada and the European Com-munity on the Conservation and Management of Fish Stocks;

- the 1993 Council of Europe Convention on Civil Liability for Dam-ages Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment;

- the 1992 Nuclear Suppliers Group Memorandum of UnderstandingImplementing Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials and Related Technology;

-the 1991 United Nations Convention on the Liability of Operatorsof Transport Terminals in International Trade; and

- the 1994 European Energy Charter Treaty.

Other, non-environmental, areas on which hard international lawhas been produced by those countries are those dealing with admin-istrative assistance in tax matters; transfrontier television; jurisdictionand enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters; in-sider trading; trade and commercial and economic cooperation; theestablishment of a European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-ment; conventional armed forces; laundering, search, seizure and con-fiscation of proceeds from crime; certain international aspects of

oanKruptcy; oroauening ot access to ne truropean -iuman KIgntsCourt by individuals; asylum; the application of competition laws; theconcept of a new Europe; the European Union; the European SocialCharter; the peaceful settlement of disputes; and the protection ofnational minorities.

3

However, the conventional instruments utilized by States toformalize liberalization in their mutual relations, which are generallybulky volumes of detailed implementing obligations, usually becomeshy and softened whenever it comes to their environmental variable.Illustrative cases in point are the texts of the 1992 North AmericanFree Trade Agreement, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on EuropeanUnion and the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WorldTrade Organization.

Many international meetings and negotiations, particularly onenvironmental and sustainable development issues, adopt instrumentscontaining supposedly agreed "rules" of so-called "soft law", whichare so deprived of any mandatory or imperative language, and of anyreciprocal rights and obligations, that they could hardly be recognizedas rules of international law at all. What used to be typical preambularlanguage in conventional instruments is now the stuff of which opera-tive articles are made, resembling more political statements or decla-rations of good-will intentions, as in the action plans and programmesof the seventies, than an international legal instrument.

'See, respectively, the 1988 Council of Europe/Organization for EconomicCooperation and Development (OECD) Convention on Mutual AdministrativeAssistance in Tax Matters; the 1989 Council of Europe Convention on Transfron-tier Television; the 1989 European Free Trade Association/European CommunitiesConvention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commer-cial Matters; the 1989 Council of Europe Convention on Insider Trading: the 1989Agreement on Trade and Commercial and Economic Cooperation between theEuropean Economic Community, the European Atomic Energy Community andthe Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; the 1990 Agreement Establishing a Euro-pean Bank for Reconstruction and Development; the 1990 Treaty on ConventionalArmed Forces in Europe; the 1990 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering,Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime; the 1990 EuropeanConvention on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy; the 1990 ProtocolNo. 9 and the 1994 Protocol No. I I to the European Convention for the Protectionof Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, on Broadening Access to the Courtby Individuals, and on Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby;the 1990 European Community Convention Determining the State Responsible forExamining Applications for Asylum Lodged in One of the Member States; the 1991European Communities/United States Agreement on the Application of their Com-petition Laws; the 1991 Charter of Paris for a New Europe; the 1992 MaastrichtTreaty on European Union; the 1991 and 1995 Council of Europe ProtocolsAmending the European Social Charter; the 1992 Decision of the Conference onSecurity and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes.Including the Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration; and the 1995 Council ofEurope Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.

An analysis of those instruments shows that some contemporarydiplomats have developed a warrisome expertise in drafting a newgeneration of soft law provisions aimed at preventing any semblanceof enforceable obligations, that one would certainly not want to seebecome widespread in other international legislative efforts.

Do those developments then provide evidence of a regressive,rather than a progressive, tendency in the development of interna-tional law? Some of that evidence %ill be analysed here.

Ill. The Htistorical Framework

This reflection could not be properly undertaken without referenceto, at least, the most recent historical record of the development ofinternational law.

Judged by its fruits, the period immediately preceding the Decade,which started in 1945 with the impulse of the Preamble and of Arti-cles 1, 2 and 13 of the Charter of the United Nations, can be consideredas the golden era of international law, and not only on a quantitative butalso on a qualitative basis. The international community was ready andwilling to put into force an impressive web of hard international legalprovisions.

Under the sponsorship of the World Organization and through avariety of fora and institutional mechanisms a swift proliferation of avast net of positive international legal instruments at the universal orgeneral level came into being, particularly through conventionalsources, which, in turn, generated or inspired the production of literallythousands of regional, subregional and bilateral international treatiesand agreements, providing for more and more detailed legal rules ofinternational behaviour in a widening array of fields of human activity.

During that period, transcendental treaties were adopted directlyunder the auspices of the General Assembly of the United Nations,which progressively developed and codified important areas of publicinternational law. Among the best examples of some more than a coupleof hundred conventional instruments are:- the major conventional instruments on human rights, including the

1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights; the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rightsand its 1989 Second Optional Protocol on the Abolition of the DeathPenalty; the 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of StatutoryLimitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity; the 1948Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-ide; the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the 1965 InternationalConvention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-tion; the 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Pun-

isnment o ine tnme oi ^parneiu; me i b: internationai t-onven-tion against Apartheid in Sports; the 1979 Convention on the Elimi-nation of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; the 1989Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the 1990 InternationalConvention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workersand Members of their Families;

- the 13 conventional instruments prepared by the International LawCommission, namely: the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties; the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States inRespect of Treaties; the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties between States and International Organizations or be-tween International Organizations; the 1958 Conventions on theTerritorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, on the High Seas, onFishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the HighSeas, and on the Continental Shelf, and the Optional Protocol ofSignature concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes; the1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and its OptionalProtocols; the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations andits Optional Protocols; the 1969 Convention on Special Missionsand its Optional Protocol; the 1973 Convention on the Preventionand Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Per-sons, including Diplomatic Agents; the 1975 Vienna Convention onthe Representation of States in their Relations with InternationalOrganizations of a Universal Character; and the 1983 ViennaConvention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property,Archives and Debts;

- the 1949 Revised General Act for the Pacific Settlement of Interna-tional Disputes;

- the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; aswell as

- 3 instruments on disarmament; 3 on the status of women; 5 onrefugees and stateless persons; 9 on the environment; 5 on the lawof the sea; 7 on navigation; 2 on outer space; 2 on health; 3 ontelecommunications; 19 on narcotic drugs and psychotropic sub-stances; 6 on miscellaneous penal matters; II on the traffic in per-sons; 6 on obscene publications; 2 on fiscal matters; 13 on interna-tional trade and development; 37 on commodities; 55 on transportand communications, including custom matters, road traffic, trans-port by rail, water transport and multimodal transport; 7 on educa-tional and cultural matters; and 3 on the declaration of death andmissing persons. 4

' Sec United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-Gen-eral: Status as at 31 December 1995, Sales No. E.96.V.5.

To all of the above, numerous other conventional instrumentsshould be added, negotiated and concluded under the auspices of spe-cialized agencies of the United Nations family, as well as those instru-ments inspired by the Charter of the United Nations and whichhelped organize international society on a regional or subregional ba-sis. either for political, military or economic purposes, or for both.That was the case, for instance, with the 1949 Washington Charter ofthe North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); the 1975 HelsinkiFinal Act of the CSCE; the 1960 Paris Convention Establishing theOECD; the 1955 Warsaw Pact on Friendship, Cooperation and MutualAssistance; the 1947 Rio Treaty on Inter-American Reciprocal Assist-ance; the 1948 Bogoti Charter of the Organization of American States(OAS); the 1960 Montevideo Treaty Establishing a Free Trade Zoneand Instituting the Free Trade Latin American Association; the 1975Panama Convention Constituting the Latin American Economic Sys-tem; the 1980 Montevideo Treaty Instituting the Latin American Inte-gration Association. the 1987 Lima Treaty Constituting the LatinAni ican Parliament; the 1969 Cartagena Agreement on SubregionalIntegration; the 1962 Panama Charter of the Organization of CentralAmerican States; the 1981 Basseterre Convention Establishing theOrganization of the Eastern Caribbean States; the 1963 Addis AbabaCharter of the Organization of African Unity; the 1991 Treaty Estab-lishing the African Economic Community; the 1981 Treaty Estab-lishing the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern AfricanStates; the 1993 Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Easternand Southern Africa; the 1992 Treaty of the Southern African Devel-opment Community; the 1945 Cairo Pact of the Arab League; the 1955Bagdad Pact on Mutual Cooperation; the 1951 San Francisco PacificSecurity Treaty between Australia. New Zealand and the UnitedStates of America; the 1954 Manila Treaty on the Collective Defenseof South East Asia; and the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation inSouth East Asia-

A common characteristic of most of the above instruments isthat. through unequivocally imperative language that left no doubtabout their binding nature, they were meant to provide the Partiesinvolved with reciprocal and enforceable rights and obligations, thussetting a framework of limits to the freedom of individual sovereignbehaviour for the sake of attaining common goals and of ensuring andprotecting common interests.

It could be argued that the record of participation by States inthose conventional instruments is rather modest, if not poor, sinceonly a few of them have, as Parties, at least the simple majority of thewhole membership of the international community. Moreover, manyinstruments have taken a long time to attain the sufficient number ofratifications and accessions as required to come into force, and still

many others have not been able to reach that stage, which means thatquantity does not necessarily mean quality.5 Yet, a great quantity ofthose instruments are a source of international customary law,6 and,in many instances, they have not come into force because most Statesfind it difficult to commit to their hard law provisions.

Concurrently, a multitude of other initially soft-law instrumentswere adopted by the General Assembly, such as "resolutions" and"declarations" of high international significance for the world commu-nity, that were not without any legal value7 and, often, some of thoseinstruments speeded up or gave way to the emergence of a new ruleof international law, whenever they were sufficiently recognized andsupported, so as to be considered as reflecting or even inducing thecreation of customary international law. Some of the best examplesare:

- resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948 on the Universal Dec-laration on Human Rights;

- resolution 377 (V) of 3 November 1950 entitled "Uniting forPeace";

- resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960: the Declaration on theGranting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;

- resolution 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961: the Declaration on theProhibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Weapons;

- resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 on the PermanentSovereignty over Natural Resources;

- resolution 1962 (XVIII) of 13 December 1963: the Declaration ofLegal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explora-tion and Use of Outer Space;

- resolution 1904 (XVIII) of 20 November 1963: the United NationsDeclaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-nation;

- resolution 2263 (XXII) of 7 November 1967: the Declaration on theElimination of Discrimination Against Women;

For a quantitative evaluation of that participation up to the end of the erapreceding the Decade, see A. Szdkely, "El derecho internacional como vchiculo dclas Naciones Unidas para la paz: Una evaluaci6n dc su efectividad", in Instituto deInvestigaciones Jurfdicas. Congreso Internacionalde la Paz (Mdxico, 1987), vol. II,pp. 873-988.

6 See L. B. Sohn, "Unratified Treaties as a Source of Customary InternationalLaw", in A. Bos and H. Siblesz, eds., Realism in Law-Making: Essays in Honor ofWillem Riphagen (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1986). pp. 231-246.

'See J. G. Castafieda. Legal Effects of United Nations Resolutions (NewYork, Columbia University Press, 1969).

resolution 2131 (XX) of 21 December 1965: the Declaration on theInadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of Statesand the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty;

-resolution 36/103 of 9 December 1981: the Declaration on theInadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the InternalAffairs of States;

- resolution 2574 D (XXIV) of 15 December 1969 on the Question ofthe Reservation Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes of the Seabedand the Ocean Floor and the Subsoil thereof, underlying the HighSeas beyond the Limits of Present National Jurisdiction, and theUse of their Resources in the Interests of Mankind (moratoriumresolution):

- resolution 2749 (XXV) of 17 December 1970: the Declaration ofPrinciples Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and theSubsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction;

- resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970: the Declaration of Prin-ciples of International Law concerning Friendly Relations andCooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of theUnited Nations;

- resolution 2734 (XXV) of 16 December 1970: the Declaration onthe Strengthening of International Security;

- the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the HumanEnvironment (Principle 21) of 16 June 1972;

-resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974 on the Definition ofAggression; and

- resolution 34/99 of 14 December 1979 on the Development andStrengthening of Good Neighbourliness between States.

Through the so-called "coufume sauvage" or "instant cus-tor"-which as a purported new source of international law has re-mained a hotly debated issue-the reiterated practice of States (inve-terata consuetudo) over a long time period would no longer be anindispensable element for the formation of an international custom,and, instead, the other element, i.e., the conviction as to its legal force(opiniojuris), would be sufficient to evidence its existence. Some ofthose resolutions or declarations expressed clearly, and through un-equivocally imperative language, the legal position of the internationalcommunity on a given issue. Many were adopted unanimously andothers with the support of a vast segment of the Organization's mem-bership and, consequently, they are regarded by some specialists asconstituting hard law. Some of those resolutions were eventually codi-

fied through conventional instruments, thus overcoming their statusas mere propositions de iegeferenda.8

Soft law was, then, a step toward hard law in the short or mediumterm.

By the time its 1992-1996 quinquennium came to an end, the In-ternational Law Commission was able to complete the second readingof the draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Man-kind 9, a draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, 0 the secondreading of the draft articles on the law of the non-navigational uses ofinternational watercourses," the first reading of the draft articles onState Responsibility, 12 and even a set of draft articles proposed by aWorking Group of the Commission on international liability for inju-rious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by internationallaw. 13 These results of a particularly productive quinquennium signalthe beginning of the end of the work of the Commission on the pro-gressive development and codification of the great topics which arecentral to public international law. For its future work, in its 1996report, the Commission proposed to the General Assembly the incor-poration in its agenda of three possible topics, namely, diplomatic pro-tection, ownership and protection of wrecks beyond the limits of na-tional maritime jurisdiction, and unilateral acts of States, the last ofwhich is, in the opinion of this author, the most directly related to theprimary concerns of current international intercourse. 4

In conclusion, the golden era of international law which precededthe Decade yielded an amazingly vast network of international posi-tive rules of hard law, that is, de lege lata. Unavoidably, it is againstthis impressive immediate record that current and foreseeable trendsin the development of international law have to be measured.

' See B. Cheng, "United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: 'Instant' Inter-national Customary Law?", Indian Journal of International Law. vol. 5 (1965),pp. 39 and 46: and 0. Schachter and C. C. Joyner, eds., United Nations LegalOrder (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995), vol. I, p. 42.

Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighthsession, Official Records of the General Assemby, Fifty-first Session, SupplementNo. 10 (A/51/10), para. 50.

'0 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixthsession, Official Records of the General Assemby, Forty-ninth Session, Supple-ment No. 10 (A/49/10), pars. 91.

Ibid., para. 222.Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth

session, Official Records of the General Assemby. Fif y-first Session, SupplementNo. I0 (A/51/10), p. 125.

" Ibid., Annex 1.14 Ibid., para. 249.

In the environmental field, the same kind of record was built bythe international community, ever since the adoption, in 1972. of theStockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, through the con-clusion and entry into force of a wide array of hard law internationalinstruments at the general, regional and subregional levels, many pre-ceded by important soft-law resolutions that developed into treaties,as can be appreciated by the following list:' 5

1. On Nature and the En~rienment in General

- the Benelux Convention for the Conservation of Nature and the Pro-tection of the Landscape of 8 June 1982;

-the Nordic Convention on the Protection of the Environment of19 February 1974;

- the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and NaturalReources of 15 September 1968;

- the OECD Guiding Principles on the Environment of 26 May 1972;

- the OECD Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution of 14 No-vt:nber 1974;

- the OECD Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle of 14 No-vember 1974;

- the OECDCouncil Recommendation on Strengthening InternationalCooperation on Environmental Protection in Frontier Regions of21 September 1978;

- the European Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pbllu-tion of 13 November 1979;

- the Protocol to the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary AirPollution on Financing the Monitoring and Evaluation of Air Pollut-ants in Europe of 28 September 1984;

- the Canada-Europe Declaration on Acid Rain of 21 March 1984;

- the OECD Council Decision and Recommendation on TransfrontierMoements of Hazardous Wastes of I February 1984;

0 For most of these materials. see T. Scovazz and T. Treves. World Treatiesfor the Protection of the Enviromnent (Milano. Instituto per l'ambiente, 1992); andL Rummd-Bulska and S. Osafo. Selected Multilateral Treaties in the Field of theEnvirOnnienI (Carmbngc, Grotius. 1991). Sec also R. W. Hahn. T11he Internation-alization of Environmental Regulation-. Harvard International Law Journal.vot. 30(1989). pp. 421-446; M. EI-Baghdadi. -An Effort to Establish a Novel Organ-matioal Stricture for the Management of Resources on the Basis of Efficiencyand Equ '. International Review of Administrutive Sciences. vol. 54 (1988).pp_.55-611; P. Sands. "The Environment. Comrmnity and International Law".Harvard International Law Journal, vol. 30 (1989), pp. 393-420; and A. J. Barnes.

The Grmwing International Dimension to Environmental Issues7. Colunbia Jour-mlofEir',ronmental Law. vol. 13 (1988), pp. 389-396.

- the OECD Council Decision and Recommendation on Exports ofHazardous Wastes from the OECD Area of 5 June 1986;

- the Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and theEnvironment in the South Pacific of 24 November 1984;

- the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral ResourcesActivities of 2 June 1988.

2. On Flora and Fauna

- the Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in theWestern Hemisphere of 3 March 1973;

- the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natu-ral Habitats of 19 September 1979;

- the Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears of 15 November1973;

- the Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas -nd Wildlife tothe 1983 Convention for the Protection and Development of the Ma-rine Environment of the Wider Caribbean region of 18 January1990).

3. On Water Resources

(a) Europe

- the European Water Charter, Directive (67) 10 of the Council ofEurope of 26 May 1967;

- the Agreement Concerning the International Commission for theProtection of the Rhine Against Pollution of 29 April 1963;

- the Convention on the Protection of the Rhine Against ChemicalPollution of 3 December 1976;

- the Convention on the Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution byChlorides of 3 December 1976;

- the Convention Concerning Fishing in the Waters of the Danube of29 January 1958;

- the Convention on the Protection of Lake Constance Against Pol-lution of 27 October 1960;

- the Agreement Regulating the Withdrawal of Water from LakeConstance of 30 April 1966;

- the Agreement Concerning the Regulation of Lake Inari by Meansof the Kaitakoski Hydro-Electric Power Station and Dam of29 April 1959;

- ECE Recommendation 346 on River Basin Management of 1971;

- the Council of Europe draft Convention on the Protection of FreshWater Against Pollution of 12 May 1969;

- ECE Recommendation 347 to the Governments of Southern Euro-pean Countries Concerning Selected Water Problems, Committeeon Water Problems of 1972;

- the Council of Europe draft European Convention for the Protec-tion of International Watercourses Against Pollution of 4 April1974;

- the ECE Declaration of Policy on Prevention and Control of WaterPollution, Including Transboundary Pollution of 1980;

(b) Americas

- the Seventh Inter-American Conference Declaration on Industrialand Agricultural Use of International Rivers of 24 December 1933;

- the OAS draft Convention on the Industrial and Agricultural Useof International Rivers and Lakes of 1 September 1965;

- the Inter-American Act on the Use of International Rivers of3 June 1971;

- the Treaty of the River Plate Basin of 23 April 1969;

- the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation of 8 July 1978;

(c) Asia and Africa

- the Convention Concerning the General Administration of theSenegal River Basin of 26 July 1963;

- the Convention Concerning the Statute of the Senegal River of7 February 1964;

- the Act Regarding Navigation and Economic Cooperation Betweenthe States of the Niger River of 26 October 1963;

- the Convention and Statute Regarding the Better Utilization of theChad River Basin of 22 May 1964;

- the Statute and Committee for Coordination of Investigations ofthe Lower Mekong River Basin of 31 October 1957.

4. On Marine Resources

(a) General

-- the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling of

2 December 1946 and its Protocol of 19 November 1956;

(b) Atlantic Ocean

-- the International Convention for the Conservation of AtlanticTunas of 14 May 1966;

-the Convention on Conduct of Fishing Operations in the NorthAtlantic of I June 1967;

- the Convention for the Protection of Salmon in the North Atlantic

Ocean of 2 March 1982;

- the North East Atlantic Fisheries Convention of 24 January 1959;

- the Convention of Future Multilateral Cooperation in the NorthEast Atlantic Fisheries of 18 November 1980;

- the International Convention for the North West Atlantic Fisheriesof 8 February 1949 and the Protocol thereto of 15 July 1963;

- the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the NorthWest Atlantic Fisheries of 24 October 1978;

- the Convention on the Conservation of the Living Resources of theSouth East Atlantic of 23 October 1969;

(c) Baltic Sea

- the Agreement Concerning Measures for the Protection of Deep-Sea Prawns of 7 March 1952;

- the Agreement Concerning the Protection of the Salmon Popula-tion in the Baltic Sea of 20 December 1962;

- the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Re-sources in the Baltic Sea and the Belts of 13 September 1973 andthe Protocol thereto of I I November 1982;

(d) Mediterranean Sea

- the Agreement for the Establishment of a General Fisheries Coun-cil for the Mediterranean of 22 May 1963 and Amendments thereto;

(e) Eastern Europe

- the Agreement Concerning Cooperation in Marine Fishing of28 July 1962;

(f) Black Sea

- the Convention Concerning Fishing in the Black Sea of 7 July 1959;

(g) Pacific Ocean

- the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of theNorth Pacific Ocean of 9 May 1952 and Amendments thereto of17 November 1962 and of 25 April 1978;

- the Convention for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of theNorthern Pacific Ocean and the Bering Sea of 1953;

- the Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific FurSeals of 9 February 1957 and the Amending Protocols thereto of8 October 1963, 7 May 1976 and 14 October 1980;

- the Regional Agreemcnt on the Research and Management ofMarine Turtles in the American Pacific of 3 December 1986;

- the Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropi-cal Tuna Commission of 31 May 1949;

-the Eastern Pacific Ocean Tuna Fishing Agreement of 15 March1983;

- the Convention Establishing the Latin American Tuna Organiza-tion of 21 July 1989;

- the Joint Declaration on Fishery Problems in the South Pacific of18 August 1952;

- the Regulations Concerning Waling in the Waters of the SouthPacific of 18 August 1952;

- the Agreement Relating to the Issue of Permits for the Exploitationof the Marine Resources of the South Pacific of 4 December 1954;

- the Treaty on Fisheries Between the Governments of CertainPacific Islands and the Government of the United States of Amer-ica of 2 April 1987;

(h) Latin America

- Inter-American Conference Resolution IX on Conservation ofNatural Resources of 22 May 1948;

- Inter-American Conference Resolution LXXXVI on Conservationof Natural Resources: Continental Shelf and Marine Waters of28 March 1954;

- the Constitutive Convention of the Latin American FisheriesDevelopment Organization of 29 October 1982;

(i) Indian Ocean/Pacific Ocean

- the Agreement for the Establishment of the Indo-Pacific FisheriesCouncil of 26 February 1948 and Amendments thereto of 20 Jan-uary 1961;

() South East Asia

- the Agreement Establishing the South East Asian Fisheries Devel-opment Centre of 28 December 1967 and the Amending Protocolthereto of 13 January 1968;

(k) Antarctica

- the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine LivingResources of 20 May 1980;

- the Convention for the Preservation of Antarctic Seals of I I Feb-ruary 1972.

5. On the Marine Environment

(a) North Sea

- the Agreement for Cooperation in Dealing with Pollution of theNorth Sea by Oil of 9 June 1969;

- the Agreement for Cooperation in Dealing with Pollution of theNorth Sea by Oil and Other Harmful Substances of 13 September1983;

(b) Baltic Sea

- the Agreement Concerning Cooperation in Measures to Deal withPollution of the Baltic Sea by Oil of 16 September 1971;

- the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment in the

Baltic Sea Area of 22 March 1974;

(c) Mediterranean Sea

- the Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean SeaAgainst Pollution of 16 February 1976;

- the Protocol Concerning Cooperation in Combating Pollution ofthe Mediterranean Sea by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft of16 February 1976;

- the Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the MediterraneanSea by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft of 16 February 1976;

- the Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea AgainstPollution from Land-Based Sources of 17 May 1980;

- the Protocol Concerning Mediterranean Specially Protected Areasof 3 April 1982;

- the Agreement Concerning the Protection of the Waters of theMediterranean of 10 May 1976;

(d) Atlantic Ocean

- the Convention for Cooperation in the Protection and Develop-ment in the Marine and Coastal Environment of the West and Cen-tral African Region of 23 March 1981;

- the Protocol Concerning Cooperation in Combating Pollution inCases of Emergency of 23 March 1981;

(e) Caribbean Sea

- the Convention for the Protection and Development of the MarineEnvironment of the Wider Caribbean Region of 24 March 1983;

- the Protocol Concerning Cooperation in Combating Oil Spills inthe Wider Caribbean Region of 24 March 1983;

- the Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Wildlife inthe Wider Caribbean Region of 18 January 1990;

(f) Pacific Ocean

- the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment andCoastal Area of the South East Pacific of 12 November 1981;

- the Agreement on Regional Cooperation in Combating Pollution ofthe South East Pacific by Hydrocarbons or other Harmful Sub-stances in Cases of Emergency of 12 November 1981 and the Sup-plementary Protocol thereto of 22 July 1983;

- the Contingency Plan of Cartagena for the Combating of Oil Pollu-tion in the South East Pacific in Cases of Emergency of 22 July1983;

-the Protocol for the Protection of the South East Pacific AgainstPollution from Land-Based Sources of 22 July 1983;

(g) Persian Gulf

- the Regional Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of theMarine Environment from Pollution of 24 April 1978;

- the Protocol Concerning Regional Cooperation in CombatingPollution by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Cases of Emer-gency of 24 April 1978;

(h) Red Sea and Gulf of Aden

- the Regional Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea andGulf of Aden Environment of 14 February 1982;

- the Protocol Concerning Regional Cooperation in CombatingPollution by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Cases of Emer-gency of 14 February 1982.

IV Today's Soft International Law

It is not the author's intention to embark here, in any measure, onan academic and theoretical study on the "soft law" concept in interna-tional law. This analysis has already been undertaken elsewhere in anexcellent and exhaustive manner by recognized specialists. Thus, only abrief summary is presented below of the main features and conclusionsof such study. A more practical exercise is intended here, namely to offersome empirical evidence of soft law in the text of some recent interna-tional environmental instruments, in order to determine to what degreeit is possible to assert that they indicate the existence of a trend towardssoft law fbr this exercise, the political realities and conflicting interestssurrounding the international events at which such instruments wereadopted are of no interest. Only the final written products will beexamined.

It is important to note that today's "soft international law" istaking on quite a different connotation from the "soft international law"that has appeared since the 1960s. Then, as was already pointed out, softlaw rules were only the seed of what could and should eventually be-come an emerging rule or "hard international law", which would mate-rialize when the issue became mature enough to persuade States to en-gage in specific hard and effective commitments. For instance, theGeneral Assembly of the United Nations would proceed from a simpleresolution on a topic, which usually pointed to the need of subjectingsuch area to international legal regulation, to a formal or solemn decla-ration and then, finally, to a convention governing the matter, resultingusually from a diplomatic legislative conference convened for that pur-pose. Clear examples of this path of codification and progressive devel-opment of international law was the process leading to the adoption ofmost of the above-mentioned human rights treaties or of the 1982United Convention on the Law of the Sea, which had been preceded byimportant General Assembly resolutions and declarations since 1968, aswell as of many of the environmental conventions cited in this essay.Consequently, at that time, soft international legal provisions were in-tended to serve as a vehicle to promote the development of internationallaw.

Today's soft international law results, at least in the environmentalfield, from the clear, unequivocal and decisive intention not to create ordevelop international law, and if possible not to allow necessarily forthe eventual formation of an international legal rule. Provisions of softlaw create only apparent commitments, certainly non-binding ones,and allow to give to the public opinion the impression that the subject-matter that they cover is being addressed at the international level tosome extent.

The term "soft law", as coined by Lord McNair and reintroducedby R. J Dupuy in the mid-1970s, is a proposition of law rather thanconcrete operative law, and involves, consequently, a contradiction interms, just as much as the concept of "non-binding commitments" iscontradictory.' 6 Understanding the use of these terms, despite theirinherent contradiction, helps explain why many observers have failedto distinguish the fundamental difference between the original and thenew characteristics of soft international law.

The literature on soft international law, and on the non-bindingcommitments which it produces, is quite abundant. A review of thepublished works of 20 of the most prominent international legal

6 See R. J. Dupuy, The Protection of the Environment and International Law(Leiden, Sijthoff, 1975), pp. 623-627, and K. C. Wellens and G. M. Borchardt, "SoftLaw in European Community Law", European Law Review, vol. 14 (1989), p. 269.

experts on the matter makes it possible to put together the followingprevailing conceptions.

17

The conventional wisdom regarding soft international law is that:

1. Soft law lacks the requisite characteristics of internationalnormativity,'8 because:

(a) it prevents the assumption of a real burden; 19

(b) it does not create enforceable rights and duties; -

"See. for reference, the following bibliography: G. Abi-Saab, "Eloge du 'droitassourdi': quelques reflexions sur le r6le de [a soft law en droit internationalcomemporain". in Melanges RigaLr (Bruxelles. Bruylant. 1993). pp. 59-68;S. Y. Agrawala. "Mc Role of General Assembly Resolutions as Trend-Setters ofState Practice". Indian Journal of International Law, vol. 21 (1980). pp. 513-533;R. R. Baxter, "International Law In 'Her Infinite Variety' -, ICLQ, vol. 29 (1980),pp. 549-566; M. Bothe, "Legal and Non-legal Norms: A Meaningful Distinction inInternational Relations"". Netherlands Yearbook of International Law. vol. II(1980), pp. 65-95; C. M. Chinkin. 'The Challenge of Soft Law: Development andChange in International Law", ICLQ. vol. 38 (1989). pp. 850-866: A. D'Amato."Manifest Intent and the Generation by Treaty of Customary Rules of Interna-tional Law". AJIL, vol. 64 (1970), pp. 892-902; P. M. Dupuy. "Soft law and theInternational Law of the Environment", Michigan Journal of International Law,vol. 12 (1991). pp. 420-435; R. J. Dupuy, op. cit. (footnote 16 above); J. Gold,"Strengthening the Soft International Law of Exchange Arrangements", AJIL,vol. 77 (1983). pp. 443-489; Gruchalla-Wesierski, op. cit. (footnote 2 above), pp. 37-88; G. F. Handl. "A Hard Look at Soft Law", in The American Society of Interna-tional Law, Proceedings of the 82nd Annual Meeting (1988). pp. 371-373; A. Hasbi,"Lc droit international du ddveloppernent entre 'adjuration ct la conjuration:Quedques acquis ct beaucoup d'incertitudes," in Mdlanges Chaumont (Paris. Pc-done, 1984). pp. 323-346; G. J. H. van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources of Interna-tional Law (Deventer, Kluwer, 1983), pp. 179-203; R. Ida,"Formations des normesintemnationales dans un monde en mutation: Critique de la notion de soft law". inMelanges Virally (Paris, Pedone, 1991), pp. 333-340; M. Lachs, "The Threshold inLaw-Making", in Festschrififir Hermann Mosler (Berlin, Springer. 1983), pp. 493-501; F. Minch. "Comments on the 1968 Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties:Non-binding Agreements", Zeitschrift fur auslandisches 6ffentliches Rechi undV1kcerrecht, vol. 29 (1969). pp. I-1I; "La codification inachevie", in Melanges Ago(Milano. Guiffrf_ 1987). pp. 373-385; M. Reisman. 'The Concept and Functions ofSoft Law in International Politics". in Essays in Honour of Judge Taslim OlawaleElias (Dordrecht. Martinus Nijhoff, 1992), vol. I, pp. 135-144; 0. Schachter, "TheTwilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements", AJIL, vol. 71 (1977),pp. 296-304; 1. Seidl- Hohenveldern. "International Economic 'Soft Law "'. Recueldes Cour... 1979-Il, vol. 163. pp. 165-246; A. J. P. Tammes. "Soft Law", in Essaysin International and Comparative Law in Honour of Judge Erodes (Dordrecht,Martinus Nijoff, 1983). pp. 187-195: P. Weil, "Towards Relative Nonmativity inInternational Law-. AJIL, vol. 77 (1983), pp. 413-442; and Wellens and Borchardt.op. cit. (footnote 16 above), pp. 267-321.

"See Handl. op. cit. (footnote 17 above)."See Tammes. op. cit. (footnote 17 above).

See Baxter op. cit. (footnote 17 above); and Wellens and Borchardt, op. cit.(footnote 16 above).

(c) it has no legal effect because it lacks the "intent" to create suchlegal effect, although it is some times difficult to discern the levelof intent involved;

21

(d) it does not engage the responsibility of States, and does not comeunder the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and,thus, is not governed by international law; 22

(e) an apparent negative intent and a deliberate lack of formalityshows that the Parties did not intend to become legally bound; 23

and

(f) it is often the result of the difficulty in reaching hard agreements,particularly among the growing multitude of international actors,who have widely differing political and economic needs and view-points.24 To overcome deadlocks in the pursuit of a negotiatedcompromise, the participating States use soft law provisions as aback door to the creation of hard law.

2. Usually the softness of the instrument corresponds to thesoftness of its contents.2 5

3. Soft law may, however, be found as part of both binding andof non-binding instruments. If such a provision is included in a non-binding instrument, this should be presumptive evidence of the softnature of the norm. Soft norms, however, can also be found in bindinginstruments.

26

4. Consequently the form is not conclusive for distinguishinghard law from soft law 27, and the decisive element should be the pro-vision's substantive nature, that is, the nature and accuracy of the be-haviour requested or expected by the norm. 28

5. It substitutes "fake law or law of a lesser quality" for thegood law,29 and creates a "gray area" between "law" and "non-binding

2 See Minch, "Comments on the 1968 Drift Convention on the Law of Trea-

ties", op. cit. (footnote 17 above).22 See Schachter, op. cit. (footnote 17 above) and Bothe, op. cit. (footnote 17

above).2' See Monch, "Comments on the 1968 Draft Convention on the Law of Trca-

ties", op. cit. (footnote 17 above).24 See Weil, op. cit. (footnote 17 above) and Schachter, op. cit. (footnote 17

above).See P. M. Dupuy. op. cit. (tootnote 17 above).

2' See R. J. Dupuy, op. cit. (footnote 16 above) and SeidI-Hohenveldern,op. cit. (footnote 17 above).

27 See Chinkin, op. cit. (footnote 17 above).2' See P. M. Dupuy, op. cit. (footnote 17 above) and R. J. Dupuy, op. Cit.

(footnote 16 above).' See Abi-Saab, op. cit. (footnote 17 above).

agreements".3 but gray law is law in the formation and is, thus, im-portant.3'

6. Soft law is capable of producing some legal effects as long asit retains some authority for the Parties.3 2 It may even lead to the de-velopment of customary international law. At least, it imposes somemoral guidelines)' It is a "nascent legal force" that circumvents thedifficulties involved in the law-making process. 3

7. It expresses with vaue." imprecise and uncompelling lan-guage-which blurs the line between a legal and a non-legal norm:

(a) solely aspirational. hortatory, persuasive, programmatic or pro-motional provisions;'

(b) which plan out a more perfect world; 37

(c) which provide for programs rather than prescriptions, goals ratherthan duties and guidelines rather than strict obligations; -

(d) which are of a non-normative kind and of sub-legal value;39 and

(e) which, at most, commit the Parties to consult each other or tonegotiate in the future and in good faith (pacto de contrahendo).'

8. Soft law allows for a provision to be adopted unanimously,but which then is never interpreted unanimously.4'

9. It creates the expectation that relevant provisions will beused to resolve disputes.'2

10. It is constituted by contradictory norms \xhich evidencethat the international legal system has "run amok". 3

' See Tarnmes, op. cit. (footnote 17 above) and van Hoof, op. cit. (footnote 17above).

" See Abi-Saab. op. cit- (footnote 17 above) and Ida, op. cit. (footnote 17above).

- See Hand], op. cit. (footnote 17 above) and Schachter. op. cit. (footnote 17above).

" See Baxter, op. cit. (footnote 17 above) and Lachs. op. cir. (footnote 17above).

See Bothe. op. cit. (footnote 17 above).See Gold. op. cit. (footnote 17 above) and Wellens and Borchardt. op. cit.

(footnote 16 above).See Wellens and Borchardt. op- ci. (footnote 16 above).

'7See Munch. "La codification inachevie&. op. cit. (footnote 17 above).3* See R. J. Dupuy, op. cit. (footnote 16 above).

See Weil, op. cit. (footnote 17 above).• See Baxter, op. cii. (footnote 17 above)." See Hasbi, op. cit. (footnote 17 above)."See Gruchalla-Wesierski, op. cit. (footnote 2 above)."See the reference to Riphagen's view in Reisman, op. cir. (footnote 17

above).

II. The number of conventions in which evasive prescriptionsare enunciated seems to be increasing.44

12. Some authors believe that the excessive use of soft law mayhave a long-term cost, since it may ultimately weaken the entire inter-national law-making system,45 and will curb the willingness of Statesto pursue hard law or to observe it,46 while others think that its usealongside of hard law will not destroy the quality of international law,since soft law regulates areas of the law which hard law has not beenable to address.4

7

One straightforward conclusion from the above summary analy-sis is that soft law, in its current international version, is not at allequivalent to a proposition de legeferenda, simply because its objec-tive is not to indicate what the law should be but, rather, to preventthe law from taking shape altogether.

V. Some Hard Evidence of Soft International Non-Binding Commit-ments in the Environmental Field

Perhaps the most notable evidence that can be offered may beobtained from the products of the so-called Earth Summit, that is, theUnited Nations Conference on Environment and Development whichtook place in Rio de Janeiro in June of 1992.48

Although the Conference was initially expected to produce aglobal comprehensive international environmental law convention, inthe way of an "Earth Charter", and conventions on forests, on biologi-cal diversity and on climate change to deal with the most urgent pri-oritary environmental challenges of the time; it yielded the following:

- a Convention on Biological Diversity;49

- a Framework Convention on Climate Change; 50

- the Rio Declaration on Environment and Dcvelopment; 51

- a Non-legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for aGlobal Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustain-able Development of All Types of Forests.52

See R. I. Dupuy, op. cit. (footnote 16 above).4 See Reisman, op. cit. (footnote 17 above).

See Wellens and Borchardt, op. cit. (footnote 16 above).4 See Abi-Saab, op. cit. (footnote 17 above).

See A. Szdkcly and D. Ponce, "The Challenge of the 1992 Earth Summit",Transboundary Resources Report, vol. 6 (1992).

ILM, vol. XXXI (1992), p. 822.0 Ibid., p. 851." Ibid., p. 876.12 Ibid., p. 881.

Obviously. only the two Conventions purport to constitute inter-national conventional instruments to be governed by the Vienna Con-vention on the Law of Treaties.

The Convention on Biodiversity eloquently proclaims, in its pre-amble, the concern over the significant reduction and loss of biologi-cal diversity going on throughout the world as a result of humanactivities, and notes that its conservation should be fundamentallyensured in situ.

The Convention's articles on conservation provide for actionswhich the Parties -shall" undertake, but invariably "asfar as possibleand as appropriate",5' a conditional drafting language that has thedrastic effect of mitigating, if not of mutilating, any element of meas-urable obligation from the text.

With such language, it would be quite hard to determine when aState Party has in fact committed an internationally wrongful act, byacting contrary to or violating a provision of the Convention and, insuch circumstances, it would not be an exaggeration to assert that theParties remain basically free to act, depending only on their own, dis-cretional, criterion as to when it is possible and when it is appropriateto carry out the Convention's provisions.

That is certainly the result of subjecting the obligation (-shall")to such open condition (-as far as possible and as appropriate"). Theterm -appropriate" becomes an enigma in this context. It is moreproperly used in other articles, such as articles 15. paragraph 7,and 18. paragraph 1, to indicate that the alternative action expectedfrom the State Party (for instance, the taking of either legislative,administrative or policy measures to regulate access to genetic re-sources) will depend on which of the listed options (legislative.administrative or policy measures") is applicable in accordance withthat Party's legal system, but there is no doubt that, no matter whatchoice is made, there is an expectation that the Party will carry outthe obligation, that is, to take the measure which is appropriate, but totake the measure after all and in any case.

In the other context, however, that is, in the context in which theterm "appropriate" is used in articles 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, !1 and 14, itsmeaning takes on a connotation of discretionary determination, whichcan have the practical effect of diluting or lifting the obligation alto-gether.

Article 20 of the Convention contains another interesting experi-ence in -clever" drafting Its paragraph 3 provides that developedcountry Parties "may" provide developing countries with financial

"Seeaticles 5.6, 7. 8.9. 10. 11 and 14.

resources needed by them to be able to implement the Convention.Paragraph 4 indicates that developing countries are expected to imple-ment "their commitments" under the Convention depending on the"effective implementation by developed country Parties of their com-mitments under th[e] Convention related to financial resources"54,

which by virtue of paragraph 3 are hardly any commitments at all (thesame provision appears in article 4, paragraph 7, of the FrameworkConvention on Climate Change). These arc, in any case, typical exam-ples of "non-binding" commitments.

A similar, albeit not so radical case, is the language found in theFramework Convention on Climate Change. Once again, non-bindingcommitments are set out in the form of principles in article 3. Thoseprinciples call for actions that the Parties "should" take to achieve theobjective of the Convention. It is on the basis of such general non-obligations, that the developed country Parties assume, with manda-tory language, various "commitments" in article 4. In other words,there is a contradiction, as these are commitments undertaken on thebasis of non-binding obligations.

The strongest of those "commitments" appears in paragraph 2 (a)of article 4: each developed country Party "shall adopt national poli-cies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climatechange, by limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gasesand protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reser-voirs". Incomprehensibly, after providing for that obligation, theparagraph suddenly departs from its normative language and turns toa sort of speech disquisition, more typical of a preamble, by intro-ducing the following apologetic discourse: "[t]hese policies and meas-ures will demonstrate that developed countries are taking the lead inmodifying longer-term trends in anthropogenic emissions...", which iscertainly out of place in the text of a normative treaty provision.

Article 12 provides for an apparently binding obligation to com-municate information related to the way each Party "implements"the Convention, and article 13 includes a provision for the "resolutionof questions regarding implementation", all of which prompts the in-triguing question as to why, in the first place, the basic obligations ofthe Convention (article 3) which are supposed to be implemented aredrafted in a non-binding manner.

The extreme case of the Non-legally Binding Authoritative State-ment of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Con-servation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests is ofgreat interest to this essay, however, since it so vividly exemplifiesmost of what has been suggested up to this point.

" Emphasis added, as in all subsequent quotations.

It is certainly hard to conciliate a claim on the one hand, of-authoritativeness" for any international instrument, with its disquali-fication, on the other, from having any binding legal effect, much lesswhen the preamble of the document indicates that its "principles"happen to "reflect a first global consensus on forests-. The textualcontradiction could not be more evident, but that certainly was theexpress will of the international community, and such were the scopeand limits of that instrument Paragraph (d) of the preamble goes onto assert that:

"In committing themselves to the prompt implementation ofthese principles, countries also decide to keep them under assess-ment for their adequacy with regard to further international co-operation on forest issues.-

In the following paragraph, such allegations are brought down totheir real quasi-legal dimension, with the provision that "Ithese prin-ciples should apply to all types of forests". It is then not surprisingthat the term "should" appears 55 times in the document's short text,which includes not really -principles", as announced in its title but,instead, dubious "principles/elements.

The only time when any sign of mandatory effect is visible in thetext is in the assertion of the right of States to remain free to do asthey please with their forest wealth, which is in fact the only occasionwhen the term "shall" appears (in principle element 8 (g)), as well asin the reaffirmation of the sovereign right of States over such wealth(which is restated in principles I (a) and 2 (a)).

Other than that, nothing mandatory to worry about in this State-ment, consented to by all types of States and for all types of forests,at a time when the deforestation process has advanced to an averagerhythm of almost 50,000 square kilometers annually, which, thus, inno way changes, improves or adds to the already scant internationallaw applicable to forest matters. 5

The trilateral 1992 North American Free Trade Agreement offersother similar evidence, also in the environmental area which was ofparticular concern to the social sector of the three contracting Statesduring the negotiations.

Articles 904 and 907, paragraph 2, entitle each of the Parties toestablish, without discrimination, the level of protection that it con-siders appropriate for human, animal or plant life or health, the envi-ronment or consumers. Subsequently, article 1114. paragraph 2, indi-cates that:

M See A. Szcey. "The Legal proection of the World Forests After Rio '92-.in L CamIfnuilo et al eds.. The Entironment After Rio: Inteaftinal Law andEcontirs (London. Graham and Trotman. 1994). pp. 6-9.

"The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourageinvestment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmentalmeasures. Accordingly, a Party should not waive or otherwisederogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, suchmeasures as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisi-tion, expansion or retention in its territory of an investment of aninvestor. It that Party considers that another Party has offeredsuch an encouragement, it may request consultations with theother Party and the two Parties shall consult with a view toavoiding any such encouragement.

' 56

Such non-binding commitment, however, was offered to publicopinion as the proper answer to its concern over the environmentalimpact of free trade in the North American region. However, in a pub-lic presentation, the Mexican Trade Minister portrayed it as fullyenforceable.

In acute contrast, in the Maastricht Treaty, which was also nego-tiated in 1992, the Parties drafted a lot more substantive and advancedprovisions into the instrument on the environmental questions, notonly in the preamble but in the operative text as well.57

When the same European negotiators went to Marrakesh in 1994to negotiate and conclude the Agreement Establishing the WorldTrade Organization, their response to the public outcry for subjectingtrade agreements to substantive environmental controls was muchless generous.

The Marrakesh Agreement's very first preambular paragraph rec-ognizes that the Parties' relations in the field of trade and economicendeavor should be conducted, so as to allow

"... for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordancewith the objective of sustainable development, seeking both toprotect and preserve the environment and to enhance the meansfor doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needsand concerns at different levels of economic development."58

Despite such explicit and enthusiastic profession of environ-mental concern, the rest of the Agreement continues without pro-viding anything on the matter in any of its articles, nor in its Protocolor in any of its multiple supplementary Agreements, Understandingsor Annexes. Only two Ministerial Decisions adopted during the nego-

ILM, vol. XXXII (1993), p. 642. See also pp. 387-388." See article B of Title I, article 3 of Title II and articles 130r to 130t of Title

VI as well as the Declarations on assessment of the environmental impact ofcommunity measures and on the protection of animals, ibid., vol. XXXI (1992),pp. 255, 257, 285-286, 368.

" Ibid., vol. XXXIII (1994), p. 1144.

tiations. the Decision on Trade in Services and the Environment andthe Decision on Trade and Environment".59 eventually deal with theneed to determine if the environment includes more than "the protec-tion of human, animal or plant life or health"(!). mentioned in articleXIV (b) of the General Agreement on Trade in Services,0 and directthe first meeting of the Organization's General Council to establish aCommittee on Trade and Environment that will identify the relation-ship between the two fields.

In conclusion, perhaps one of the additional reasons for concernraised by the above developments is that many of the diplomats whohave participated in the drafting of such non-binding commitmentsare also members of delegations to other international legislative exer-ciseson different subject-matters. Hopefully, these other internationallegal instruments will be spared from such trend.

I Ibid.. pp. 1255 and 1267.6 Ibid.. p. 1177.

ENVIRONMENT AS A COMMON HERITAGEOF MANKIND: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE

Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao*

Planet Earth and the ecosystem it comprises could be symbol-ized as a "global village"' because of the intense interdependence thatcharacterizes its various components and features. The field of inter-national environmental law seeks to reflect and regulate these uniquefeatures.

Even though the concern to minimize the transnational effects ofan activity or conduct occurring essentially within the domestic juris-diction of a State is as old as Roman Law, typified in the maxim sicutero tuo ut alienum non Iaedas 2 international concern with suchtransnational effects of national activities and the consequent devel-opment of international environmental law is decidedly a recent one2

Some of the activities that propelled recent international concern arethe pollution of the seas, the environmental effects of nuclear weap-

* The author wishes to acknowledge with thanks the assistance rendered byDr. M. Gandhi. Legal Officer (Gr. I). of the Legal and Treaties Division. Ministryof External Affairs, Government of India.

'For a characterization of the world as a -global village", see F. Drucker. TheAge of Discontinui v: Guidelines to Our Clanging Society (New York. Harper &Row. 1969). pp. 79-80.

For a description of interdependencies involved in the context of the environ-ment, see A. Kiss and D. Shelton. International Enviromnental Laiw (New York.TransnationaL 1991). pp. 2-3. Noting that -enviromnmental problems are increasinglyinternational and are recognized as such-, the authors state:

Any significant impact on the environment can produce effects outsidenational boundaries, as evidenced by the number of countries affected as aresult of the Chernobyl nuclear power accident and the 1986 Sandoz/Baselpollution of the Rhine river. Moreover. an increasing list of phenomena arediscovered whose dimensions transcend national borders or which can beunderstood and combatted only on an international, meaning global, level:acid rain. desertification, reduction of the world genetic heritage, depletion ofthe ozone layer, global warning--the catalogue lengthens as we increase ourunderstanding of the biosphere.I For an examination of the maxim in Roman law and its relationship to the

doctrine of abuse of rights and the concept of good neighbourliness. see G. Handt."rrtoil Sovereignty and the Problem of Transnational Pollution-, AJIL vol. 69(1975), p. 50. This maxim was also applied in the Trail Smelter arbitration. UNRIAAvol . p. 1911.

'See Kiss and Shelton. op. cit. (footnote I above). p. I.

ons and other weapons of mass destruction, the exploitation of outerspace, transfrontier air pollution and acid rain, the pollution of rivers,the threat to the polar and Antarctic regions from increased humanactivity in and around the area, and more particularly the depletion ofthe ozone layer, the threat of climate change, desertification pursuantto poor industrial practices, deforestation and the threat to biologicaldiversity arising from indiscriminate consumer demands and trans-portation of hazardous wastes across the continents to dump them inthe backyards of poor and unaware States and shifting and siting ofchemical and other ultra-hazardous industrial activities in developingcountries.

Given the special and specific features of each of the above-noted activities, the international community, adopting a sectoralapproach, has addressed them each in its context and attempted toestablish for each a particular legal regime. These legal regimes incor-porated in about a hundred or more recent international conventions,as well as the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment of1972,1 could be classified conveniently, as done by one commentator,5

into (1) those dealing with the protection of the marine environment;(2) those dealing with the prevention of air pollution and the degrada-tion of the atmosphere; (3) those dealing with the preservation ofhabitats, species and biological diversity; (4) those dealing with theprevention of the pollution of rivers and lakes; (5) those dealing withthe protection of the environment from radiological emergenciesarising from peaceful uses of nuclear energy; (6) those dealing withthe control or prevention of international traffic in toxic and chemicalproducts and in other hazardous wastes, including nuclear wastes;(7) those addressing problems of interference with, and degradationof, the environment by military and related activities; (8) those dealing

' For the text of the Stockholm Declaration and other major internationalconventions on the environment, see W. Bimie and A. E. Boyle, eds., Basic Docu-ments on International Law and the Environment (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995).

For the enumeration of developments concerning the environment in the pre-Stockholm and post-Stockholm phases, see Ph. Sands, Principles of InternationalEnvironmental Law: Frameworks, Standards and Implementation (Manchester,Manchester University Press, 1995), Ch. 2, pp. 25-62.

See also A. 0. Adede, 'International Environmental Law from Stockholm toRio: An Overview of Past Lessons and Future Challenges", Environmental Policyand Law, vol. 22 (1992). p. 88.

' See A, 0. Adede, "International Protection of the Environment", inCh. Tomuschat, ed.. The United Nations at Age Fifty: A Legal Perspective (TheHague, Kluwer, 1995), p. 199.

For a collection of conventions on environmental law and a categorizationunder different headings, see E. Brown Weiss, D. B. Magraw and P. C. Szasz,International Environmental Law: Basic Instruments and References (DobbsFerry. NY, Transnational, 1992). (For reasons of economy of space, the gist of(each convention is not reproduced.)

with the protection of human health at the workplace; and (9) instru-ments attempting to address problems of the environment in general.

In addition to the above, mention may also be made of severaldeclarations of the United Nations and other significant bodiesand conferences, of the draft articles on international watercoursesadopted by the International Law Commission in 1994 and, in partic-ular, Agenda 21 adopted at the Rio Conference in 1992, as relevant tothe evolution of broad principles in the field of international environ-mental law.6

Some of the important principles now regarded as being com-prised in international environmental law are7 (1) the principle ofintegration of environment and development, (2) the principle of com-mon concern. (3) the principle of common but differentiated respon-sibility, (4) the principle of cooperation and global partnership. (5) theprecautionary principle, (6) the principle of preventing environmentalharm, (7) the principle of intergenerational and intragenerationalequity, and (8) the polluter or user pays principle.

The status and significance of these principles incorporated ininternational law 8 are of course governed first by the general princi-ples and the law of treaties, custom as a source of international lawand the interaction between these two primary sources of interna-tional law.

However, it can be stated that many of the general principles towhich a reference has been made could be regarded more as broad

6 Brown Weiss. Magras, and Szasz, op. cit. (footnote 5 above). For the Inter-

national Law Commission's draft articles on international watercourses along , ithcommentary, see the Report of the International Law Commission on the work ofits forty-sixth session, Official Records of the General Assembly. Forty-ninth Ses-sion. Supplement No. 10 (A/49/10). pp- 197-326. See also S. McCaffrey andR. Rosenstock, "The International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Interna-tional Watercourses: An Overview and Commentary". Review of European Com-munity and Internatonal Law. vol. 5, pp 89-96.

7 Principles identified here are taken from the categories adopted by the

Expert Group on International Environmental Law Aiming at Sustainable Devel-opment, convened by the Environmental Law and Institutions Programme Activ-ity Center (ELI/PAC) of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)and organized in cooperation with the Center for International Ens ironmental Law(CIEL) (document UNEPIEL.WS/2/1) and discussed at its second meeting held inWashington. D.C.. 22-24 May 1996).

'See, in this connection, for a thoughtful analysis of the nature and legalsignificance of United Nations resolutions, 0. Schachter. "United Nations Law".AJIL. vol. 88 (1994), pp. 1-23; and A. Pellet. -1he Normative Dilemma: Will andConsent in International Law-Making-. Australian Year Book of InternationalLaw, vol. 12, p. 12; for an examination of "soft" or "weak", as opposed to "hard"law. see R. R. Baxter, "International Law in 'Her Infinite Variety' ". ICLQ. vol. 29(1980), pp. 549-566. See also Ch. Tomuschat, "Obligations Arising For States With-out or Against Their Will", Recued des cours... 1993-1V. pp. 199-374; andR. R. Baxter, "Treaties and Custom". Recueil des cours... 1970-1. vol. 129, pp. 25-104.

policy postulates than as strict principles of international law givingrise to specific or immediate obligations. Some of the principles weshall now consider have also been termed "soft law" capable of pro-viding guidance to States in formulating more specific internationaland national obligations9 but not binding per se.

In addition to the above, reference has also been made to theprinciple of sovereign equality and the principle of State responsibilityor liability which are also issues well-developped or discussed exten-sively in international law.10 Over and above these concepts, the con-cept of sustainable development which was affirmed by and elab-orated at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment andDevelopment, requires also certain critical appraisal in assessing theimpact of the various principles noted above on the development ofinternational environmental law.

The World Commission on Environment and Development(Brundtland Commission), in its report of 1987 entitled "Our CommonFuture", first attempted a conceptual definition of sustainable devel-opment when it stated that:

Sustainable development is development that meets theneeds of the present without compromising the ability of futuregenerations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two keyconcepts: the concept of needs, in particular the essential needsof the world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given;

See Adede, op. cit. (footnote 5 above), p. 212, where he states that:"This author, however, holds that so far there is no accepted standard

for designating one instrument a pure 'environmental treaty' and another a'treaty for sustainable development'. Such a distinction is blury at best, sincethe new concepts which the so-called treaties for sustainable development aretrying to incorporate still need to be further clarified and articulated in otherinstruments. It is only then that they will assume precise legal meanings andgenerate international legal obligations. Thus, one of the future challengesfacing international environmental lawyers is to assist in elucidating conceptssuch as 'sustainable development', 'intergenerational equity', 'common butdifferentiated responsibility', 'common concern of makind', 'precautionaryprinciple', and 'cost internationaliziition' (or 'polluter-pays principle'). Thoseengaged in negotiating and concluding treaties in this field are called upon topay close attention to the process of incorporation of these concepts inparticular instniments to give them clear legal underpinnings."

On State responsibility and/or liability for injurious consequences arisingout of wrongful or lawful activities, respectively, see generally the work of theInternational Law Commission. The Commission at its 48th session (6 May-27 July1996) has linalized its first reading of the draft articles on State responsibility andalso progressed well on the topic of international liability. See the Report of theInternational Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session, OfficilRecords of the GeneralAssemnbl, Ffty-first session, Siquplenent No. 10 (A/51/10).For an analysis of the Commission's work on liability, see J. Barboza, "Intena-tional Liability for the Injurious Consequences of Acts Not Prohibited by Interna-tional Law and Protection of the Environment", Recueji ties CoUrs... 1994-Il,vol. 247, pp. 295-405.

and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technologyand social organization on the environment's ability to meet pres-ent and future needs."

The concept of sustainable development, thus defined, suggeststhat global development should, as a priority, meet the essential needsof the world's poor. Furthermore, development, as a process, shouldalso proceed within the limitations imposed by the state-of-the-arttechnology and social organization and within the limits of the abilityof the environment to meet present and future needs. The notion ofintergenerational equity that is also incorporated into this conceptthrows open yet another dimension of the limitation on the exploita-tion of the national resources-keeping in view the needs of conser-vation and renewability-

In so far as the concept of sustainable development also stressesthe essential needs of the world's poor, it has also embraced within itthe concept of the common heritage of mankind developed in the con-text of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. '2 Thatconcept, although limited to the resources of the international seabedarea,' 3 emphasized that the needs and particular interests of the devel-oping countries, representing the world's poorest population, shouldbe given priority in sharing the benefits arising from the explorationand exploitation of the resources of that area.

It follows that one of the important objectives of environmentallaw and policy is to ensure intergenerational equity,'4 keeping in viewthe equally important consideration of intragenerational equity. Theprinciple of intergenerational equity focuses more upon the futureneeds of mankind, while the principle of intragenerational equity deals

" See World Commission on Environment and Development, Our CommonFuture (London, Oxford University Press. 1987). p. 43-2 For the legislative history of the concept of the common heritage of man-kind, see United Nations. The ,aw of the Sea: Concept of the Common Heritageof Mankind-Legislative History of Articles 133 to 150 and 311(6) of the UnitedNations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Sales No. E.96.V3.

See also P. S. Rao. The Public Order of Ocean Resources: A Critique of theCamtemporay Law of the Sea (Cambridge. MA, MIT Press. 1975). ch. 4. pp. 84-108.

" Apart from areas already declared as common heritage of mankind, otherspatial areas can also be treated as common heritage of mankind when those areasare susceptible to such normative content. See United Nations document A/39/504AddA., pp. 97-101. See also H. Wunsche. The Principle of Common HeritageofMankind (UNITARIDS/6). pp. 437-469.

" Principle 2 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environmentarticulates this policy on intergenerational and intragenerational equity. See also.for an interesting comment A- D'Amato, -Do We Owe a Duty to Future Genera-tions to Preserve the Global Environment?". AiIL vol 84 (1990). pp- 190-212. Seef'urtler E. Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law.Common Patrimony and Intergenerational Equity (New York. Transnational,19@9).

more with the concept of social justice. The concept of sustainabledevelopment, prior to its articulation by the Brundtland Commis-sion," s did not explicitly deal with the concept of social justice. TheCopenhagen World Summit for Social Development also highlightedthe importance of social justice as an integral principle of the conceptof sustainable development.

Furthermore, the concept of intergenerational equity urges uponthe present international community to exercize self-restraint inmaking demands on natural resources and the environment with aview to conserving them and passing them on to future generationsfor their enjoyment. On the other hand, the concept of intragenera-tional equity highlights the need for the sharing of knowledge, techni-cal skills, training and technology, as well as financial resourcesamong States as expeditiously and as equitably as possible so that theentire international community could utilize natural resources, with-out any one section indulging in excessive consumption. Similarly,this concept would also require States to be more respectful of theirmutual interests in respect of shared natural resources such as water-courses, or global resources such as the atmosphere or the ozonelayer.

In this context, mention may be made of the principles con-cerning reasonable and equitable use, the duty to avoid significantharm, the duty to consult and, where appropriate, negotiate suitableregimes for the enjoyment of natural resources straddling borders andthe duty to settle disputes in a peaceful manner. Similarly, it is alsosuggested that there is a duty to cooperate and to negotiate solutionsin good faith in the case of projects resulting in significant adverseharm to co-riparian States. In this regard, as a policy it is emphasizedthat no State should have the right to veto essential developmentprojects. However, a corresponding duty is placed upon the partyengaged in a developmental project to exercize due diligence either toavoid or to minimize damage or legal harm. Furthermore, where suchharm is unavoidable, the party is obliged, within its limits, to pay

"5 Prior to the report of the Brundtland Commission, in the context of theexploration and exploitation of natural resources, concepts such as reasonable use,optimal utilization, conservation and sustainable yield were discussed. Further-more, the concept of limits to growth was also widely discussed during the 1970s.But none of these concepts, useful as they may be. are linked to the concept ofsharing or distributive or social justice or equity. Even in the context of the Stock-holm Declaration, the emphasis was more on the preservation and protection ofthe environment. Only after the report of the Brundtland Commission and with theemphasis given equally to both environment and development at the Rio Confer-ence has the concept of social justice become an integral part of the notion ofsustainable development along with economic development and environmentalprotection.

appropriate compensation and make an effort to restore the envi-ronmeLt.16

It may also be noted that, in the case of transfrontier damage,States responsible for such activities within their jurisdiction arerequired to implement the principle of non-discrimination, giving thesame access to foreign nationals to its judicial, quasi-judicial andadministrative forums as is available to its own citizens. While theprinciple of non-discrimination has some merit from the point of viewof equity and equality of human rights, it cannot be regarded yet as aprinciple of universal recognition. Its implementation in practice inareas and regions with little or no economic or political integrationcould create more problems than it attempts to solve17

The principle of integration of environment and development.which is a variation of the concept of sustainable development envis-ages according equal consideration to all issues concerning the envi-ronment in dealing with any economic and social factors connectedwith a developmental activity. It is sought to achieve this equality byrequiring an environmental impact assessment as part of the decision-making process in relation to a particular developmental activity.While in several jurisdictions of mostly advanced countries withappropriate scientific and technological skills and awareness of theenvironment as a value, a statement on environmental impact assess-ment is considered mandatory before initiating any developmentalproject or siting of a hazardous industrial activity, in most developingcountries this precondition for decisions on developmental activitiesis not yet regularly required."'

The real difficulty, however, in requiring such an assessment ormaking it a precondition, is the lack of scientific certainty on theeffects of developmental activities on the human environment, par-ticularly when such effects are the cumulative result of different acts,each of which, in isolation and without interaction with other ele-ments, would not produce any significant adverse effect on the envi-ronment, or when these effects are felt in regions or areas beyond theactual area of operation of the activity. Furthermore, the ability to

*See Article 7 of the draft artiles on inteaional watercourses (see foot-note 6 above).

" See J. Seue-Canmar -Poilution of Inernational Rivers'. Recwi/ des coum-1-111. voL 186. p. 192.

m On envimental impact assessment statements and thei appli tion as amanadatmy principle under United States legishlim see L. F. E Goldie -A Gen-eral View of Intenational Environmental Law-A Survey of pabities Trensand Limits. in A- Ci. Kim ed. The Proecnon of he Emrronnwnt and )ntema-ftindLaw, Colloquium, 14-16 October 1973 (Leiden. Srjthoff. 1975). See alsoA K. Biswas and Q. Gepiag, eds., Enwionmena Impacr Assesxtafor Devel-oping Co-aries (London, Tycooly. 191).

foresee the environmental impact of an activity could only beimproved by encouraging an integrated view of global developmentand its effects on the environment. Matters like control of climatechange, the carrying out of a hazardous activity in outer space, themonitoring of the depletion of the ozone layer, the preservation oftropical forests, and the conservation of living resources and endan-gered species can be managed in an environmentally friendly manneronly when a global view of the interacting factors can be taken andstrategies adopted in the common interest can be monitored throughinternational cooperation.

The precautionary principle, which has been incorporated insome international legal instruments, is essentially a policy statementin favour of anticipating and avoiding any damage that might occur.19

For this purpose, the decision-makers are urged to prevent and forbidcertain practices or activities which are likely to cause a serious threatof irreversible damage to the environment without waiting for abso-lute certainty and conclusive scientific evidence on which to basetheir decisions. It is a policy of common sense and should be resortedto in self-interest. However, where the benefits of a certain activity,according to existing practices, far outweigh consequences which areonly feared or otherwise suspected, it might be difficult for decision-makers to yield to the demands of the so-called precautionary princi-ple particularly when few viable alternatives exist to meet the urgentdevelopmental demands of the population at large. The difficulties de-cision-makers face in dealing with large developmental projects likeconstruction of dams for irrigation and flood control and water man-agement, or the siting of atomic energy or power plants, clearly illus-trate this point.

The principle of the common concern of humanity incorporatedin the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity20 and the 1992 UnitedNations Framework Convention on Climate Change 2' essentially sig-nifies that States are united not only in their concern for the environ-ment but are also interdependent for protecting, preventing and reduc-ing harm to the global environment. The effects of production ofCFCs, the emission of greenhouse gases and the destruction of biodi-versity have now been agreed to have cumulative, wideranging andlong-term effects on the environment, despite the fact that individual

"9 For a detailed discussion of the precautionary principle, see H. Hohmann,Precautionary Legal Duties and Principles of Modern International Environ-mental Law (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1994).

' See A. E. Boyle, "The Convention on Biological Diversity". in L. Campiglio,L. Pineschi, D. Siniscalco and T. Treves, eds., The Environment after Rio: Interna-tional Law and Economics (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), pp. I 11-126.

21 See J. F. Pulvenis, "The Framework Convention on Climate Change-, ibid.,pp. 71-110.

activities arc located within the confines of the territory of a particularState. This principle thus highlights the importance of regulating ac-tivities which may be essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of aState. on the basis of commonly agreed international standards andstrategies, adopted with a view to reducing the overall negative impacton. and conserving, the global environment. In that sense, this princi-ple could provide a necessary basis for developing mandatory inter-national standards which States could use, through their own mecha-nisms, to regulate environmentally harmful activities which areessentially within their territorial jurisdiction or control. The legalproblems that the principle of the common concern of humanity thusraises are akin to problems which arc also raised in connection withthe issue of human rights or exploitation of natural resources, such asinternational rivers shared by one or more States.

In order to determine the point at which a matter which is other-wise essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a State mightbecome a matter of international concern, it is important to identifyrelevant thresholds.2 The fixing of such thresholds would also beimportant in defining, for a given purpose, "significant adverse harm"as opposed to inconsequential or de minimis harm or injury, the for-rmer providing the legal basis for engaging liability or responsibility.

Commonly considered and agreed "thresholds" are not only impor-tant to clearly distinguish and define the relative national and interna-tional jurisdictions, but also to ensure that standards established at theinternational level are properly appreciated and voluntarily imple-mented within the domestic jurisdiction for the effective realization ofthe objectives involved.

Flowing from the principle of the common concern of humanityis another principle-that responsibility to enhance the value, and toprotect, reduce and control adverse effects on the environment shouldbe shared amongst States, not on the basis of notional equality butaccording to one's share of responsibility for the cause of concern andone's capacity to contribute to a better, safer environment. The prin-ciple of common but differentiated responsibility, which was incorpo-rated in the Framework Convention on Climate Change2 and also inthe 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the OzoneLayer, places higher and immediate responsibility on developed coun-tries as opposed to developing countries. This is now recognized as alegitimate policy in light of the Rio Declaration in which developed

-"On thresholds or international standards, see V. P. Nanda, -Establishmentof International Standards for Transnational Injury,. Iowa Law Review. vol. 60(19 75). pp. 1089-1127.

21See article 4, paragraph I. of the Framework Convention on ClimateChange

countries acknowledged their responsibility in the internationalpursuit of sustainable development, because of the pressures theirsocieties place on the global environment and the technologies andfinancial resources they command. 24 It is also a principle of equity,taking into consideration the fact that carbon dioxide, which is thenumber one greenhouse gas, was mostly released by industrializedcountries rather than by the rest of the world which accounted onlyfor 10 percent of such releases.

The principle of common but differentiated responsibility is alsosensitive to the need to promote development within less developedcountries through the use of environmentally friendly technologies. 25

The need to shift from wasteful and harmful practices of utilization ofnatural resources to more environmentally friendly practices is well-recognized. It is also increasingly being realized that natural resourceslike water, air, land, energy and space cannot be utilized withoutassigning to them an appropriate economic and commercial cost,keeping in view the need for conservation and equitable sharing ofthese scarce resources among all sections of society, particularly themost needy. Moreover, in addition to allowing for a certain transi-tional period that is felt essential to enable developing States to shiftto environmentally friendly practices or technologies, it is also consid-ered necessary to develop international funding mechanisms to helpsuch States to meet the immediate and necessary financial loss orcosts which they are likely to incur in achieving more environmentallyfriendly development. There is also a need to facilitate the acquisitionof appropriate environmentally friendly technologies by less devel-oped countries on fair and equitable terms. 26 The process of moder-nization of the economies and technological practices of these coun-tries should not be viewed only from the narrow and purely economicor commercial perspectives of States possessing technology andfunds.

In the above context, the principle of global partnership andcooperation attracts an appropriate focus. 27 The approach so faradopted in highlighting the principle of cooperation is to place empha-sis on the duty of cooperation and the duties to exchange information,

" Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration.See D. J. Hunter, Sommer and S. Vaughan, eds., Concepts and Principles of

International Environmental Law: An Introduction (Geneva, UNEP, 1994).See Pulvenis, op. cit. (footnote 21 above), p. 100.

- For treaty provisions dealing with this aspect, see Ph. Sands, "InternationalLaw in the Field of Sustainable Development," BYIL, vol. 65 (1994), p. 344,notes 180-183.

to notify and consult with potentially affected States,2 to provideassistance for emergencies and to provide equal access to admin-istrative and judicial remedies to all persons whether or not they arenationals and whether they are within the territorial jurisdiction of aState or outside its borders, as long as activities conducted within thatState have resulted in damage beyond its own borders.

While some or more of these principles, as noted above, havebeen incorporated into various international instruments in recentyears and are awaiting further approval by States and the future de-velopment of the necessary State practice to ensure their incorpora-tion into customary law, it is understood that most of these principlesshould be rooted, in order to succeed, in reciprocity and the commoninterest of preserving and protecting the environment.

Viewed thus, the policies for preserving and protecting the envi-ronment require wider consensus to result in effective implementationas partlof international law. The environment could be made a com-mon cause2' if it is seen as a common heritage of mankind because ofits unifying character" and because of the need to adopt global strate-gies and reject the temptation to yield to special or selfish or narrowsectarian interests or gain temporary trade or commercial advantages.

The principle of preventing environmental harm is important andwas reflected in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, Principle 2of the Rio Declaration and Part XII of the 1982 United Nations Con-vention on the Law of the Sea. The principle was applied in the TrailSmelter arbitration, 3' the Lac Lanoux arbitration, 32 and also derivedsome suppport from the Corfu Channel case33 decided by the Inter-national Court of Justice. Stated briefly, the principle emphasizes theresponsibility of a State to prevent activities within its jurisdiction orcontrol which knowingly and willingly cause damage in other States.However, where such damage occurs, the principle also requires the

' E. Brown Weiss. "Environmental Disasters in International Law-, AnuarioJuidco Interamericano (1986), pp. 141 and 145-50, excerpts reprinted inB. H. Weston, R. A. Falk and A. D'Amato, eds._ International Law and WorldOrder A Problem-Oriented Coursebook (SL Paul, Minncsota. West PublishingCo, 1990), pp. 366-369.

-0. Schachter. International Law in Theory and Practice (Dordrecht.Martinus Nijloff, 1991).

3 The common management regime, which is the central theme of the conceptof the common heritage of mankind is vital to the preservation of today's humanOnvaronmenL See Hunter. Sommer and Vaughan. op. cir. (footnote 25 above).pp. 33-39.

" UNRAA, vol. III. p- 1907.-/2 1W, vol. XII, p. 231.

i3.c.. Reports 1949. p. 22-

restoration as far as possible of the situation that existed previouslyand/or paying appropriate compensation to the victim of the damage.

The principle that no State is entitled to cause harm to anotherState or to its citizens or resources, irrespective of the freedom it hasto conduct activities within its own territory, is widely accepted. -4 Itis equally well-recognized that States should settle their disputespeacefully, that nationals or foreign persons should exhaust all avail-able local remedies, and that States should ensure good governancethrough primacy and due process of law. Furthermore, any legal re-gime aimed at the prevention of environmental harm, and providingfor remedies in case of such harm must also ensure that operators incontrol of industrial or other hazardous activities are made primarilyanswerable for the damage they cause or are likely to cause. 35

The International Law Commission has been discussing thequestion of State liability in this context, while the principle of Stateresponsibility is dealt with separately. The principal approach so faradopted by the Commission on liability is to highlight the principle ofprevention and several articles have been developed in this regard. 36

The emphasis on prevention highlights the importance of preservingand protecting the environment as opposed to dealing with compen-sation for damage done to the environment, and it thus attempts toenhance the value of the environment as a value by itself.

Most of these principles relate to the duty to cooperate, notifyand render assistance. They also impose a duty of due diligence uponthe State to enact appropriate legislation and monitor hazardousactivities through periodic audits and inspections and by adoptingpolicies which promote accountability and transparency in the main-tenance and conduct of such activities as bear a high risk of damageor which are otherwise hazardous. 37

L. F. E. Goldie, "Development of an International Environmental Law-AnAppraisal", in J. L. Hargrove, ed., Law. Institutions and Global Environment,(Oceana, 1972). pp. 131-133.

11 A. E. Boyle, "Nuclear Emergency and International Law: An Environ-mental Perspective", BYIL, vol. 69 (1989), p. 269.

1 The concept of "prevention" elaborated by the International Law Commis-sion so far revolved around the attribution of responsibility to the State. the re-quirement of prior authorization of activities which involve a risk of causingsignificant transboundary harm, the obligation to prevent and minimize the risk ofsignificant transboundary harm, the duty to cooperate, the duty to apply the prin-ciple of non-discrimination, the duty to notify and inforii and consult other States,the duty to inform the public, the rights of the States likely to be affected, and thefactors involved in an equitable balance of interests.

3' For the latest report on the subject. see J. Barboza, twelfth report on inter-national liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited byinternational law, document A/CN.4/475. See also Report of the International LawCommission on the work of its forty-eighth session, Official Records of the Gen-

The work of the International Law Commission is nearing com-pletion as far as the question of prevention is concerned but variousquestions are still left out regarding the circumstances and limitswithin which compensation could be claimed for actual damage suf-fered. The relevance as precedents in this regard of earlier cases likethe Trail Smelter arbitration, the Corfit Channel case and the LacLanoutx arbitration is also questionable. While those cases providesome important principles for guidance. they do not deal with morecomplicated issues of damage which arise when pollution involvesmore than one actor3" or when it reaches a certain level of thresholdof harm over a period of time, or with harm or damage caused to theglobal commons, where claims could be expected to be made onbehalf of the entire international community and not on behalf of aspecific claimant capable of showing a tangible injury.39

The principles of notification and mutual assistance which havedeveloped in the context of, first, the sharing of international water-courses and, second, in the context of accidents resulting in atomicradiation' require more time, the development of a body of coherentState practice and wider consensus before they can be regarded asclear principles of international liability. Moreover, the reaction ofStates to the Chernobyl accident was quite divided and their practicewas not uniform in dealing with post-accident claims.4'

In addition to the above, the problem of fixing appropriatethresholds for determining legal harm, to which we have referredabove, is equally important in this context for quantifying actual com-pensation and for assigning appropriate shares to different actors oroperators involved.

eral Assemby, Fifty-first Session. Supplement No. 10 (A/5 1/10). pp. 238-244, forthe text of the draft articles with consolidated renumbering.

3 According to Professor Ian Brownlie. the cumulative process that results inpollution involves problems of identifying tortfeasors. of establishing evidence ofcausation, and the remoteness of damage. He is doubtful whether the changes inlaw could circumvent these problems. 1. Brownlie. -A Survey of InternationalCustomary Rules of Environmental Protection. Natural Resources Journal.val. 13 (1973). pp. 179-189.

John Woodlife explains in his article that the United Kingdom has failed toget compensation from the Soviet Union as the Chernobyl accident was unforsee-able for the latter and did not result in any direct injury which would enable theformer to get compensation. See J. Woodlife. "Cherobyl: Four years On". ICLQ.voL 39 (1990). p. 461.

a See L. Malone. "The Chernobyl Accident: A Case Study in InternationalLaw Regulating State Responsibility for Transboundary Nuclear Pollution," Co-lumbia Journal of Enironmental Law, vol. 12 (1987). pp. 203-206. See also R. Falk"The Global Environment and International Law: Challenge and Response", Kan-sas Law Review. voL 23 (1975). p. 403.

J. A. Schlickman eg al, eds, International Environmental Law and Regula-i (Saeitn, NH, Butterworth, 1991). p. 141.

In the above context, the principle that the polluter or usershould bear the cost of pollution with due regard to the public interestand without distorting international trade and investment has gainedconsiderable strength as a policy. The main objective of this principleis to internalize environmental costs and to promote the use ofeconomic instruments 42 to preserve and protect the environment. Thispolluter or user pays principle was originally recommended by theOrganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)Council in May 1972. Since then, it has acquired greater legal contentin the Western European context, having been introduced in 1987 inthe Single European Act. The polluter pays principle was also incor-porated in the 1992 Paris Convention for the Protection of the MarineEnvironment in the North-East Atlantic. The principle was also giveneffect in the Eastern European context and within the framework ofthe United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. At the globallevel, the principle was incorporated in Principle 16 of the Rio Decla-ration. It was also referred to as a legal principle in the 1990 LondonInternational Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Responseand Cooperation.

The principle as endorsed at Rio is essentially an economic prin-ciple,4'3 and could be implemented subject to some important excep-tions. It could have further several variations in its implementation.The definition of the cost of pollution prevention, control and reduc-tion measures is one that could vary from region to region and fromtime to time. It is. however, generally understood that, within theOECD, the costs of such measures could include the cost of pre-venting accidents capable of causing damage to the environment aswell as the cost of clean-up after an accident and the cost of restoringthe environment to its original value as far as possible. The 1971 Con-vention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage ofNuclear Material, as amended, evidences this, without specific refer-ence marks, but by certain limitations, e.g., concerning the amountpayable, the definition of damage etc.

State subsidies to encourage farmers and other small-scale indus-tries to adopt more environmentally friendly practices within a Stateand subsidies to be provided to less developed countries to encourage

See P. H. Sand, Intc-nmatiutal Economic Instruments for Sustainable De-velopment: Slicks. Carrots and Games", Indian, Journal qf International Lmw.,vol. 36 (1996), pp. 1-16; D. Clark and 1. Downcs, eds., What Price Bio-DivervityConserwition? (Centre for International Environmental Law, July 1995), p. 3; and"The Developing Countries Concerns Arising out of Usage of Economic lnstru-ments in Environment Control", in The Ilse o" fEconomic Istrunents in Carbon-Dioxide Mitigation: A Dcvelhqing Country Perspecctive (UN E P, 1995). pp. 65-70.

" A. Kiss, "The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development", in Cam-piglio, Pineschi, Siniscalco and Treves, op. cir. (footnote 20 above). p. 61.

and enforce more environmentally friendly practices within theirjurisdiction should also be considered as useful economic instrumentsfor the implementation of the polluter pays principle.'M

In so far as there is a direct relationship between the use of natu-ral resources resulting in degradation of the environment and thebenefits sought to be gained by the operator or user, there appears tobe no difficulty in applying the polluter or user pays principle. Butwhere such direct linkage carnot be established, application of thisprinciple would either be unreasonable or difficult. Furthermore, theimposition of standards not universally approved in this regard andwhich are not sensitive to the developmental needs of the developingcountries could also result in the erection of indirect or artificial tradebarriers.'5 In other words, it is important to ensure that the applicationof the polluter or user pays principle should not only be seen from aneconomic point of view but also from the point of view of equity.

Many of the principles discussed and related have at least onecommon thread running through them. The basic goals of enhance-ment preservation, protection. conservation and harmonious utiliza-tion of the environment, as well as the measures to be taken to preventand reduce damage to the environment would have to be approached,for their realization, as a matter of common concern of the entireinternational community.

Each State and participant involved should contribute to theachievement of these goals on the basis of both the direct responsibil-ity that they bear for the damage and their capacity to contribute tothe enhancement of the environment as a value. Moreover. the inter-national funding mechanism and transfer of environmentally friendlytechnologies to the needy countries and, much more importantly, thecapacity-building within the developing countries must be organizedas an international obligation. Articulation of standards to promote.protect and preserve the environment should be based on general andglobal consensus while implementation of these standards should beleft to States through national mechanisms. In addition to the devel-opment of international standards to preserve and protect the envi-ronment, there is also a need for fixing thresholds to define legal harm

4 For the detailed history and the component elements of the polluter paysprinciple, see United Nations. document AICN.4471.

' The recent controversy concerning United States import bars on yellow-fintuna caught by Mexican vessels on the high seas in violation of United Statesfisheries laws is a case in point. For United States measures on yellow-fin tunaimports, see General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade document DS2I/R (1991). Onthe impact of trade on the environment. see R. Repetto. Trade and SustainableDewopment (Geneva. UNEP, 1994). See also C. Stevens, -International Tradeand Environmental Standards-. Human Potential in Environment and Develop-ment. vol. I (April 1995). pp. 9-1.

and to quantify damages by way of compensation or other remedies,such as restoration of the environment.

For any effort to enhance, preserve and protect the environmentto succeed, it should project the environment as a common heritageof mankind. Inherent in such an approach is the recognition that thegoal of preserving and protecting the environment cannot be isolatedfrom considerations of development, equity and social justice.

LE DROIT AU DEVELOPPEMENT

Ahmed Mahiou

Au moment ou I'Organisation des Nations Unies fete soncinquantibme anniversaire. il est opportun de faire le bilan d'unecruvre considerable nme si elle est controvcrsde tant il est vrai quetout ce qui touche A la vie des Etats. des nations, des peuples et desindividus ne peut rester a I'abri de discussions et de passions. Nepour instaurer et maintenir la paix sur les decombres de la secondeguerre mondiale et dans le contexte de la confrontation Est-Ouest.['Organisation des Nations Unies a 6it6 une troisieme guerre mon-diale mais au prix de nombreux conflits arm~s localiss. d'une guerrefroide tenace et de t'occultation d'un certain nombre de crises latentesqui couvaient A 'ombre de I'&iuilibre de la terreur. Dans ia mesure o6Iaction politique des Nations Unies a dt4 bloque ou gne pendantune tongue pdriode, cela a contribu6 .i certains egards A accorder plusd'attention h I'action 6conomique et sociale, surtout avec I'accs Al'ind4pendance d'un grand nombre de pays du Sud. Cette action aincontestablement culmind en 1974 par [a conscration solennelle dunouvel ordre &eonomique international (NOEl) dont l'instaurationdemeure toujours une revendication l6gitime malgrd les profondschangements qui ont affect6 la soci6td internationale.

Le developpement a 6t6 le th~me dominant des debats entre IeNord et le Sud; depuis le debut des annes 60. les instances inter-nationales se sont preoccup es des voies et moyens d'att~nuer oud'cffacer He.art entre les pays ddveloppds et les pays en developpe-ment. De ces preoccupations ont 6mergd le droit international dudeveloppement. le NOEl et le droit au ddveloppement dont on a voulufaire le fondement juridique des transformations qu'il convient d'ap-porter dans les relations dconomiques mondiales. En effet, si tes fon-dements politiques. 6conomiques et sociaux du NOEl dtaient large-ment connus grce l'action du groupe des 77 et des pays non-alignds,le fondement juridique semblait plus incertain et dtait mal perqu. Cetaspect secondaire au depart parce que la lutte 6tait d'abord idolo-gique revient au premier plan car les revendications du Sud n'ont dechance de prendre forme que si elles trouvent une traduction juri-dique, avec 1"taboration de nouvelles normes et institutions suscep-tibles d'engager les Etats et les organisations internationales. Pourtrouver cette base juridique, la rdflexion et I'action se sont orient6es

vers le droit au d~veloppement dont il convient de rappeler la gen~se,le contenu et la port6e.

1. La genise du droit au developpement

Comme pour tout concept nouveau, il est malais6 d'dtablir avecexactitude la paternit6 du droit au d6veloppement ainsi que ]a date deson apparition dans le langage international, tant il y a d'auteurs etd'instances dont les pr6occupations se sont rencontr6es. Aux efforts desNations Unies se sont ajout6s ceux de la doctrine pour faire admettresinon ]'expression elle-meme, du moins les ides sous-jacentes au droitau d6veloppement.

1. L'action des Nations Unies

C'est sans doute dans les travaux des Nations Unies, notammentceux du Conseil 6conomique et social, que l'id6e d'un droit au d6velop-pement transparait, d'abord indirectement puis plus nettement pourdevenir un enjeu, au fur et ii mesure que l'id6ologie du d6veloppementp6n~tre le syst~me des Nations Unies. Le devoir des Etats d'agir enfaveur du d6veloppement 6conomique et social des individus et des peu-pies s'affirme et se pr&cise en passant progressivement du plan 6thiqueau plan juridique. Un lien plus 6troit s'6tablit entre les droits deI'homme classiques, reconnus par la Charte des Nations Unies et laDMclaration universelle de 1948, et le d6veloppement.

Le Pacte international relatif aux droits &conomiques, sociaux etculturels de 1966 est l'un des premiers textes A dtablir ce lien, en com-pl6tant la D6claration universelle dont le contenu 6conomique 6tait tr~slimit6. Certes, le Pacte n'emploie pas 'expression adroit au d~veloppe-ment >>, mais il invite les Etats ,favoriser le bien-etre g~n6ral ,> (arti-cle4), ,assurer un d~veloppement 6conomique, social et culturelconstant et un emploi productif,, (article 6, paragraphe 2); il 6num&e6galement toute une s~rie de droits relatifs au travail, A ]a sant6, r&lu-cation, etc., considdrds comme inh6rents A la dignit6 de 'homme et quiont un lien incontestable avec le ddveloppement ds lors que cette notionest comprise dans un sens large.

D'autres textes sont venus ensuite conforter l'id6e que le d~velop-pement individuel et collectif est une tfche prioritaire devant entrainerdes obligations tant A 1'6gard des Etats sur le plan national, r6gional etinternational qu'ii I'Hgard des organisations internationalesi.

' Pour ne citer que les principales rdsolutions de I'Assemblde g6ndrale, men-tionnons les suivantes qui jalonnent le cheminement des id6es relatives au droit aud6veloppement:- r6solution 2542 (XXIV) du 16 d&ernbre 1969: D&claration sur le progr~s et le

d6velopement social;

Notons que si ces textes et d'autres encore font du dveloppe-ment la notion centrale autour de laquelle s'ordonnent ou devraients'ordonner les actions des Etats et des organisations internationalesconcern&cs, ils ne mentionnent pas encore express~ment le droit audveloppement. Pour que I'expression entre effectivement dans le lan-gage onusien, il faut attendre le 21 fkvrier 1977 Iorsque la Commissiondes droits de I'homme a demandd au Secr6taire g~nfral des NationsUnies une dtude sur ,les dimensions rdgionales et nationales du droitau diveloppement comme droit de I'homme ,. Sur cette base un pre-mier rapport est 6tabli le II dCcembre 19782 suivi assez rapidementpar d'autres rapports compidmentaires 3 du 13 novembre 1980 et du31 d&cembre 1981. Peu apr~s, le 2 mars 1977. la Commission fait unpas encore plus important en r~affirmant que ,le droit au ddveloppe-ment est un droit de I'homme et que I'Hgalitd de chances en matiirede developpement est une prerogative aussi bien des nations que desindividus qui les composent ,,. Cette conception inspire directement lar~solution 34/46 du 23 novembre 1979 de I'Assembl6e gdn6rale quid6clare que ,, le droit au developpement est un droit inalienable deI'homme ,. lui dormant ainsi une reconnaissance officielle et solen-netle.

Toujours a 'initiative de la Commission des droits de I'homme,le Conseil 6conomique et social cr&e un groupe de travail de quinzeexperts, Ie 8 mai 1981. avec pour mission d'dtudier la portde et le con-tenu du droit au dveloppement. Le groupe a travailld de 1981 h 1984pour parvenir A un rapport adressd la Commission des droits de'homme en 1985 et discut6 trs Aprement pour savoir s'il fallait ounon recommander A l'Assemble gdn6rale 'adoption d'un texte sur ledroit au d6veloppement. Finalement. l'Assembl6e est saisie et elceadopte la dclaration sur le droit au ddveloppement par ]a r6solution41/128 du 4 decembre 19864.

-r.solution 2625 (XXV) du 24 octobre 1970: D&laration relative aux principesde droit international touchant les relations amicales ct la coop ration entre lesEtats;

-r6olutions 3201 Lt 3202 (S. VI) du I- mai 1974: D&laration sur I'instaurationd'un nouvel ordre 6conomique international et Programme d'action concernantson instauration;

-rsolution 3281 (XXIX) du 12 d&embre 1974: Charte des droits ct devoirs6conomiques des Etats:

-r olution 3362 (S.VII) du 16 septembre 1975 sur le dveloppement et lacoopration &:onomique internationale.

Document E/CN.4/1334.'Documents FJCN.4/1421 et 1488.'La rdsolution a t6 adopt6e par 146 voix contre I (Etats-Unis) et 8 absten-

tions. Notons qu'auparavant. I'Assemble gSndrale avait d6j5 vo6 d'autres rdso-lutions inspirnes de pr-ccupations relatives au droit au developpement: rdsolu-tions32/130 du 16 d&embre 1977; 34/46 du 23 novembrc 1979; 35/174 du15d6cembre 1980. 36/133 et 36/136 du 14 d6cembre 1981. 371199 et 37r200 du18 d6cembre 1982.

2. La position de la doctrine

Si I'on consulte les ouvrages de droit international des dcennies 70et 80, y compris ceux qui traitent dU droit international du dtveloppc-ment, le droit au d6veloppenicnt n'Wpparalt pas ou tr.s furtivement. Ona I'impression que lesjuristes refusent ou h6sitent a reconnaitre cc nou-veau droit ou, tout Ic moins, s'intcrrogent sur &t valeur en droit positif,comine le montrcnt les diff6rcntes opinions qui cherchent ii le rattachersoit aux droits humains fondamentaux, soit ai ]a dette incombant auxpays colonisateurs, soit ai I'&iuit6 qui doit trouver son expression dansles relations 6conomiques internationales.

a) La gengse du droit au (iveloppenzent est lie a1 tout un con-texte id6ologiqIe et 6thique, celui de la p6riode de la d6colonisationobi l'on voulait justifier I'aide aux nouveaux Etats; elle porte I'em-preinte d'un courant de pensde favorable A la solidarit6 internationaledans un souci de charit6 et de justice. Ce courant tiers-mondiste n6 dela rencontre de plusieurs sensibilitfs de tendance humaniste, chr6-tienne, anticoloniale, socialiste, voulait sensibiliser les opinions pu-bliques nationales et l'opinion publique internationale aux problmesdu ddveloppement. II y a done un appel a la solidaritd internationalesur la base d'un devoir moral pour les peuples comme pour les Etatsd'agir en faveur du dfveloppement et d'apporter une aide ceux quisont dfmunis. Bien que cette approche soit reque avec sympathie, onlui reproche de reposer sur une base subjective et fragile, puisque ledevoir moral est 6minemrnment fluctuant et ddpend de la perceptionque chacun peut avoir des obligations qui en dfcoulent. Comme I'arappe16 le Ministre sdn6galais des affaires dtrang res, lors de Ia Con-fdrence du groupe des 77 Li Alger en octobre 1967 : (, le probline dud6veloppement et les divers concours qu'il rcquiert de Ia part despuissances industrialisdes doivent sortir du domaine de la morale,pour ne pas dire d'un certain esprit de charit6 condescendante. Ilsdoivent constituer une obligation juridique... , 5.

Vers la fin des anndes soixante, I'ide d'une obligation jufidiquefait son chemin. C'est encore ,5 Alger qu'une voix s'61ive en 1969 pourdire: " nous devons proclamer pour le Tiers-Monde le droit au dive-loppement,; cette declaration du cardinal Duval rencontre un 6choauprbs de l'cpiscopat frant:ais dont les 6vEques font une relecture deI'encyclique Popularun Progressio pour d6couvrir, en 1971, qu'elleconstitue o un vditable trait6 sur le droit au ddveloppement , 6. Ainsi,le halo de spiritualisme et d'iddalisme qui entoure le droit au d6velop-

Citd par J. R. Henry, Mutations du droit international du ddveloppe-ment- La France et IAfrique, thirst, Nice, 1977, p. 86.

6 Voir H. Sanson, . Le droit au dcvcloppcment comme nonne mtajuridiqueen droit international du dt~veloppement ., in M. Flory, A. Mahiou ct J. R. Henry,6dit., La fornation des normes en droit international diu diveloppemnent, Paris,Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1984.

pement s'atuenuc et commence i se dissiper Iorsque les juristes vonts'en pr-occupcr pour lui donner un fondement plus solidc en Ic rat-tachant " Ia Charte des Nations Unics ct aux droits de I'homme. Leprofescur Vitally. qui est l'un des meillcurs analyses du problrme.montre de faqon convaincante le passage de ridLologic du ddvcloppe-ment au droit du d6veloppcment puis au droit au de.veloppement.travcrs une etude des rtsolutions de I'Asscmbic gncralc et des obli-gations qui en ddcoulcnt pour la communautd internationale: il con-clut quc le droit au ddvcloppcment est "a la fois un droit de l'hommcet un droit des peuples dont la nralisation incombe ii rensemble desEtats et en particulier aux Etats Ics plus ddveloppds7. Cette rdflexionscra prolonge ct approfondic par une nombreuse doctrine qui s'inter-rogera sur les liens qui peuvent exister entre le droit au daveloppe-ment ct les droits de I'homme et pour aboutir .k des conclusions diver-ses. En cffct, si pour beaucoup d'auteurs, il y a ai travers cette filiationles voies ct moyens de reconnaitre, d'ins6rer ct de rtaliscr le droit audeveloppement tant en droit interne qu'en droit internationals. pourd'autres, il serait vain. voire errond d'cdtablir une ielc filiation et deprxtendre crner des pseudo-droits de solidarit6 qui n'ont ni sujet, niobjet. ni d6biteur, mais qui sont simplemcnt des vcrux, des revendica-tions ci des incantations9.

Voir M. Virally, - La dcuxiKme d6cennie des Nations Unics pour le dcvelop-patient: essai d'intcrpr.-tation parajuridique , AFDI, 1970. vol. 16. p. 9 ct suiv.;. La Charic des droits ct devoirs 6cononiques des Etats-. ibid.. 1974, vol. 20. p. 57Lt suiv.; -06 en cst le droit international du ddveloppement ?, Revue juridique etpolitique. Indipendance et coopfration, 1975. p. 279 ct suiv.: - Panorama du droitinternational contemporain -, Reciei des cours... 1983-V. vol. 183. p. 303 ct suiv.

' Parmi une abondante litiirature- citons K. M'Baye, . Le droit au ddveloppe-mcnt comme un droit de rhomme .. Revile internationale des droits de I'homme.1972, vol. 5, p. 505; T. Van Boven, ,,Right to Development and Human Rights-.Review of the International Commission of Jurists, n' 28. p. 49; Ph. Alston. -De-velopment and the Rule of Law: Prevention Versus Cure as a Human RightsStrategy-. in Development. luman Rights and the Rule of Law (Report of theConference on Development and the Rule of Law), Oxford. Pergamon Press. 1981.p. 31; H. Gros Espiell. bThe Right to Development as a Iluman Right-. TexasInternational Law Journal. 1981. vol. 16. p. 189; A. Pellet. , Note sur quclquesaspects juridiques de la notion de droit au developpement -,. in Flory. Mahiou ctHenry, op. cit. (supra note 6). p. 71; R. Y. Rich. . The Right to Development as anEmerging Ihuman Right-. Virginia Journal of International Law. 1983. vol. 23.p. 287; i. J. Israel: -,Le droit au dt:veloppement.. RGDIP 1983. t. 87. p. 5;S. R. Chowdhury. E. M. G. Denters ct P J. I. M. de Waart. ddit. The Right toDevelopment in International Law. Dordrecht. Martinus Nijhoff. 1992-

' Les points dc vue les plus critiques sont ceux de J. Donnelly. -in Search ofthe Unicorn: the Jurisprudence and Politics of the Right to Development". Clifor-nia Western International Law Journal. 1985, vol. 15. p. 473 ct suiv.; F. Sudre citdpar M. H. Sinkondo. . De la fonction juridique du droit au daveloppcinent -. Revuede drol international et de droit compare. 1991. vol. 68. p. 275; R. Pelloux. - Vraiset faux droits de rhomme - Proble~mcs de dufinition et de classification ,,. Revuedit droit public et de la science politique en France et 6 l'itranger. 198 1. vol. 96,p. 53.

b) Pour un autre courant doctrinal, le droit au ddveloppementest une dette contractde par les puissances coloniales qui ont profitdde leur domination pour s'enrichir au d6triment des pays du Sud. Cepoint de vue, avanc6 d'abord comme argument politique et dcono-mique, s'efforce de s'inscrire comme argument juridique susceptiblede fonder et de justifier I'aide aux pays en d veloppement; celle-ci neserait que ((Ia restitution de ce dont ils ont 6t6 frustrds au cours deplusieurs sicles >>10. Les juristes du Tiers-Monde empruntent cettevoie pour lier ]'aide au prejudice engendrd par le pillage des ressour-ces avec la responsabilit6 morale qui en drcoule et qui est susceptibled'engendrer une responsabilit6 juridique". M. Bedjaoui estime que ledrbat est ouvert sur les conditions de restitution de richesses malacquises12 et la reparation des injustices passres tout en considrrantqu'iI s'agit d'un o difficile problme qui charrierait sans fin des con-tentieux aigres et grinqants,>' 3. M. Bennouna constate I'existcnced'une (<obligation qui p~se sur les anciennes puissances coloniales derrparer tous les prejudices et dommages occasionnrs dans le passdaux nouveaux Etats >,4, mais sans donner d'autres prcisions sur lestenants et aboutissants de ce rdgime de responsabilit6.

c) M. Bedjaoui qui rrcuse la lecture du droit au d6veloppementi travers les droits de l'homme, cherche apparemment a lui donner unfondement plus ample et plus stir en s'cfforqant de 'ancrer dans lejuscogens I5. II estime que le droit au ddveloppement, d'une part, est uncorollaire du droit ? Ia vie, dautre part, d6coule directement du droit?i l'autoddtermination et possbde done la m~me nature, enfin, reposesur la solidarit6 internationale lide elle-m~me Ac l'existence de ]a corn-munautd internationale et ai la prtservation de 'espce humaine. Cetriple rapprochement lui permet de conclure qu'il y a une filiationentre le droit au drveloppement et lejus cogens. Toutefois, I'argumen-tation est loin d'Etre convaincante. On peut relever une certaine con-tradiction dans la mesure o6i I'auteur, apr~s avoir rrcusd toute appro-che se rattachant aux droits de I'homme, invoque le droit a la vie et laprdservation de I'espice humaine qui sont les premiers des droits fon-damentaux de I'homme. Par ailleurs, le lien dtabli entre le droit au

IS Voir la d&claration prdcite du Ministre sdngalais des affaires 6trangres en1967.

1 Voir K. M'Baye: - Le droit au didveloppement o in Le droit au diveloppe-ment, Sijthoff et Noordhoff, 1980, p. 78 et suiv.

12 Voir M. Bedjaoui, Pour un nouvel ordre conomique international, Paris,Organisation des Nations Unies pour I'ducation, la science et la culture, 1979,p. 96.

" Voir M. Bedjaoui, . Le droit au ddveloppement - in M. Bedjaoui, ddit., Droitinternational: Bilan et perspectives, Paris, Pedone, 1991, t. 2, p. 1260.

4 Voir M. Bennouna, Droit international du diveloppement, Paris, Berger-Levault, 1983, p. 21.

'" Voir Bedjaoui, op. cit. (supra note 13), p. 1254 et suiv.

d~veloppement et le droit i l'autod~termination n'a pas ncessaire-ment toutes les implications qui lui sont attribudes: un peuple peutrevendiquer et exercer le droit A 'autod~termination en refusant lesavantages eventuels de la ddpendance et en acceptant de faire face auxgraves difficultds dconomiques qui peuvent en r~sulter parce que sadigniti6 est a ce prix. Ensuite, si la solidarit6 internationale est unenotion noble de nature A justifier Irexistence et la sauvegarde d'unecommunaut6 intemationale, elle reste encore du domaine du senti-ment et de l'6thique; elle ne correspond prdsentement et malheureu-sement A aucune norme de droit et encore moins de jus cogens; lesgraves 6vdnements de la vie internationale viennent rappeler chaquejour les carences dramatiques et parfois i'absence de solidaritd et d'in-terdependance entre les Etats, les nations et les peuples. L'interdd-pendance dconomique dans le cadre d'une &donomie-monde ne signi-fie pas forcdment l'dtablissement ni m~me la volontd d'instaurer unesolidarit6 humaine plus profonde et afortiori une solidaritd juridiqueavec toutes les consdquences qui lui sont inhdrentes. Enfin, il n'estpas stir que le rattachement au jus cogens soit un dldment de nature adonner plus de valeur juridique au droit au ddveloppement; en effet.la notion de jus cogens demeure trds controvers~e lorsqu'il s'agitd'identifier les rdgles qui en font partie; en outre la r6ffrence A l'ac-cord de la communaut6 internationale dans son ensemble - selon laformule de l'article 53 de la Convention de Vienne de 1969 sur ledroit des traitds - devient un obstacle de taille, puisque beaucoupd'Etats ddvelopp6s qui n'acceptent pas ddjA de reconnaitre au droitau ddveloppement la valeur d'une simple norrne juridique. s'opposentencore plus fermement ce qu'il puisse accdder au rang de normeimpdrative, comme nous le verrons plus loin.

d) Un autrefondement du droit au diveloppement est recher-ch6 dans le principe d'6quitd en raison non seulement des fonctionsqui sont traditionnellement reconnues i l'6quit6 en droit international(seconder, supplder ou corriger la rigueur de la rigle internationalepour dviter des consdquences injustes)T6, mais aussi et surtout en rai-son de la place dminente que l'dquitd occupe dans Ics relations econo-miques internationales7 . C'est au nom du traitementjuste et dquitableque l'Accord g6ndral sur les tarifs douaniers et le commerce (GATT)postule une participation effective de tous les Etats aux 6changes

' Voir N. Chemillier-Gendreau, -L'dquit., in Droit international: Bilan etperspectives. op. cit. (supra note 13). t. 2. p. 283; P. Reuter, ,Quelqucs rflcxionssur l6quite en droit international ,. Retue beige de droit international. 1980. p. 165;V. Lowe., The Role of Equity in International Law ,-. Australian Year Book ofInternational Law. vol. 12. p. 54.

" Voir G. Feuer. Technique juridique et valeurs morales en droit interna-tional du d~veloppernent -, AMilanges Colliard. Paris. Pedone. 1984. p. 230. et plussp6cialement p. 242 et suiv.; Sinkondo, op. cit. (supra note 9). p. 271. et plus sp-cialement p. 286 et suiv.

mondiaux, que les principes et r~gles sont modulds pour tenir comptedes niveaux de ddveloppement. C'est en s'appuyant sur 1'6quit6 quela Conference des Nations Unies pour le commerce et le develop-pement (CNUCED) et les autres institutions des Nations Unies ontoeuvrd pour faire admettre, avec plus ou moins de bonheur, tout unensemble de nouvelles normes et institutions qui ont contribu6 ai don-ner une assise et un contenu au droit au ddveloppement (stabilisationdu prix des produits de base, dfrogations au principe de la rfciprocitden droit commercial international, contr6lc des socidt6s transnatio-nales, aide au transfert de technologie, etc.). C'est encore en arguantde 1'6quit6 que les pays du Sud ont obtenu que les accords multi-latdraux ou bilatfraux de cooperation soient adaptds a leurs situations6conomiques rdelles dans la perspective de les aider Ai passer progres-sivement du statut d'assist6s A celui de partenaires.

Dans le droit international du ddveloppement, le recours Ai'6quit6 n'est plus simplement une rdffrcnce abstraite; elle est le fon-dement formel de la plupart des principes et r~gles qui lient les Etatsdont elle inspire l'interprftation et les solutions; elle est parfois la sub-stance mfme de la r~gle de droit lorsque les textes internationauxmentionnent les principes 6quitables comme sources de droit applica-bles A des situations d6termin6es. On rejoint alors la conclusion de laCour internationale de justice selon laquelle <<la notion juridiqued'6quitd est un principe g6n6ral de droit directement applicable entant que droit >> et la Cour v doit appliquer les principes dquitablescomme partie intdgrante du droit international et peser soigneusementles diverses consid6rations qu'elle juge pertinentes... >s.

Si 1'6quitd est si pr6sente en mati~re de ddveloppement, c'est queles relations 6conomiques internationales sont I'expression d'un rap-port de force et qu'il est important de les corriger "i la fois pour desraisons morales (ne pas affaiblir davantage le plus faible) et pour desraisons politiques et juridiques (ne pas susciter le rejct des rbgles, etassurer une certaine sfcurit6juridique). Le droit au ddveloppement entant que principe 6quitable devient alors un concept id6ologique n6-cessaire au droit' 9 avec pour fonction de rendre acceptable ou sup-portable l'ordre international prdvalant.

Le d6bat sur les fondements du droit au ddveloppement est loind'etre clos, ce qui n'est gubre 6tonnant. Etant au confluent de valeursdthiques, de donnfes dconomiques, de croyances id6ologiques et deprincipesjuridiques, il est normal que son profiljuridique soit difficile-

' Affaire du Plateau continental Tunisie-Libye, C.LJ. Recuel 1982, p. 60."Pour reprendre la formule de Chemillicr-Gendreau, op. cit. (supra note 16),

p. 292.

ment saisissable' . En tant que notion juridique dmergente et avantd'acqurir son autonomie, elle doit inrvitablement s'appuyer surd'autres principes ddjk consacrds, apparaitre assez inconsistante etambivalente avec diffdrents rattachements et emprunts qui semblentdonner des arguments aux adversaires du droit au ddveloppement.Mais n'en va-t-il pas ainsi que pour toute notion juridique nouvelledont 'affirmation et la consdcration sont rarement un phdnominespontand ou immddiat, mais plut6t obrissent Ai un cheminement longet complexe qui drcouvre ou recouvre ces ilots juridiques2l I1 Westpas inexact de dire que le droit au ddveloppement est d'abord unensemble de faits jufidiques avant d'Etre un concept juridique. C'estpourquoi il est utile de voir quel contenu peut lui Etre donnd pourmieux saisir ses caractrristiques et dvaluer sa portde juridique.

II. Le contenu du droit au diveloppement

Lors de rlaboration du texte de ia d&laration, le contenu du droitau dveloppement a W l'objet de discussions et d'objections vives puis-que l'on dtait encore dans une phase d'opposition et parfois de confron-tation entre les diff&ents groupes d'Etats avec les divisions Est-Ouest etNord-Sud 22. A certains 6gards, la Dclaration de 1986 reprdsente ledernier grand texte d'une p~riode riche d'intenses drbats qui s'estouverte Ai la fin des anndes soixante et s'est achevde au milieu desannees quatre-vingt. Mme si le juriste peut estimer que les contro-verses ont 6t6 excessivement iddologiques, poldmiques et parfoisdloignres du droit, il n'en demeure pas moins qu'elles ont dtd trisfcondes en interpellant la plupart des principes et regles du droitinternational, en incitant ,t leur approfondissement, leur rrinterpr6-tation ou leur revision dans l'optique du droit international dud~veloppement et d'un nouvel ordre 6conomique international 3 .C'est prrcisdment cette optique qui a suscitd les craintes des paysd~veloppds sur le contenu qu'il convient de donner au droit aud~veloppement, notamment au regard des droits de l'homme, du droit

' Voir G. Abi-Saab. - Le droit du dveloppement -,. Annuaire suisse de droitinternational, 1988. vol. 44. p. 9.

' Voir R. J. Dupuy. ,Theme et variations sur le droit au d6veloppement,.Melanges Chaumont. Paris. Pedone. 1984. p. 263 ct sui.

-Voir C. A. Colliard, - L'adoption par 'Assemble gdndrale de [a d6clarationsur Ic droit au ddveloppement (4 decembre 1986) .. AFDL. 1987. vol. 33, p. 614 etsuiv.

-- Voir M. Hory. Droit international du diveloppement, Paris. Presses univer-sitaires de France, 1977; A. Pellet. Le droit international du diveloppement. 2' dd.,Paris, Presses universitaires de France. 1987; M. Benchikh. Droit internationaldu sous-diveloppement. Paris. Bergcr-Levrault. 1983; Bennouna. op. cit. (supranote 14); G. Feuer et H. Cassan. Droit international du diveloppement, 2' 6d..Paris, Dalloz, 1991; 1. Seidl-Hohenvelden. - International Economic Law ,, Recueides cours... 1986-111, vol. 198. p. 9 et suiv.

des peuples a disposer d'eux-memes, du droit international du dave-loppement et du NOEL.

I. Droit au dkveloppement et droits de I'homme

Etant donnd que la gen c du droit au drvelopement s'est inscritedans la perspective des droits de 'homme, la question se pose de savoirdans quelle mesure et comment s'effectue la jonction entre ls deux. Lesdroits de 'homme sont habituellement des droits prrcis et concrets per-mettant it chaque personne de revendiquer leur respect face aux auto-rites dtatiques qui refusent de leur donner effet. Le droit au ddveloppe-ment par son caract~re trs grndral et abstrait ne peut pas ou peutdifficilement s'incarner dans une obligation ayant un titulaire et unddbiteur clairement identifiables. Pour sortir de cette difficult6, on a6voqu6 l'ide selon laquelle le droit au ddveloppement serait la sommeou la synth se de tous les droits 6conomiques et sociaux dont il permet-trait la rdalisation; c'est lorsque le ddveloppement est effectivementengagd que l'on peut satisfaire le droit it la sant6, au travail, it I'6duca-tion, etc. Cette approche fait comprendre l'intert ou ]a priorit6 querevt le drveloppement ainsi que les interconnexions qu'il entretientavec d'autres droits de l'homme, mais elle ne suffit pas pour donner uncontenu autonome et drfinir un droit sp&cifique. On a sugg~r6 dgale-ment d'analyser le droit au d~veloppement par rrfrence A une perspec-tive historique et A une classification qui le range dans les droits de'homme de ]a troisi~me g~nration (droits de solidarit6 incluant le droit

• l'environnement et le droit t la paix), venant compldter ceux de lapremiere grnration (droits civils et politiques) et de la deuxi~me g6n-ration (droits &onomiques et socaux)24. Lt encore, cette approche meten relief i'6volution des conceptions en mati~re de droits de 'homme,mais sans vraiment justifier les tenants et les aboutissants d'un droitau drveloppement comme notion juridique ayant un contenu propreet des effets prdcis.

En adoptant la DMclaration de 1986, 'Assemblre gdndrale n'a pasretenu une notion unitaire, puisque le droit au drveloppement rev&d6jit une double dimension, collective et individuelle. Dans sa dimen-sion collective, son objet est le drveloppement global des Etats,nations et peuples, y compris les minoritrs qui les composent; dans sadimension individuelle, il recouvre les droits civils et politiques ainsique les droits 6conomiques, sociaux et culturels. Si, dans un souci de

2 Voir K. Vasak, . La Ddclaration universelle des droits de rhomme, 30 ansaprs ,, Courrier de WUNESCO, novembre 1977; Pour une troisi~me g~ndrationdes droits de 'homme,, in Mdlanges Pictet. La Haye. Martinus Nijhoff, 1984,p. 837 et suiv.; Ph. Alston, "A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: ProgressiveDevelopment or Obfuscation of International Human Rights Law?", NetherlandsInternational Law Review, 1982, p. 307 ct suiv.; A. Holleaux, ,,Les lois de latroisi me gen~ration des droits de 'homme: dbauche d'dtude comparative-,Revuefran~aise d'administration publique, 1980, p. 527 et suiv.

compromis, ces deux dimensions sont accept~es par tout le monde.des divergences surgissent A propos de la hidrarchie entre elles; alorsque les pays d6veloppds mettent [accent sur i'aspect individuel ens'opposant a ce que les ndcessit6s du ddveloppement national serventd'alibi pour mettre en cause les droits civils et politiques, les pays duSud mettent I'accent sur [aspect collectif en arguant des particularitdsde leurs soci6tds o6 les droits individuels sont relativisds par leurinsertion dans des valeurs communautaires. Bien que ces divergencesse soient beaucoup attdnu6es, elles persistent et se manifestent i l'oc-casion des ddbats que suscite le difficile processus de d6mocratisationqui est A 'ceuvre dans [a plupart des pays en ddveloppement.

2. Le droit au diveloppement et le droit des peuples i disposer d'eux-mimes

S'il y a une filiation qui ne fait pas de doute. c'est celle qui s'est6tablie entre le droit au dveloppement et le droit des peuples .i disposerd'eux-mEnes, compte tenu de la signification et de la port6e acquisespar ce dernier principe. Alors que dans une premi&e phase, celle desanndes 60. le droit .t I'autoddtermination avait une signification essen-tiellement politique en cc qu'il justifiait I'acc~s A [inddpendance denouveaux Etats. it va s'enrichir et s'approfondir au cours des anndes 70pendant lesquelles it est apparu que la souverainet6 serait incornplte sielle se limitait A son aspect politique et excluait son aspect 6conomique.Le glissement de la souverainet6 politique rers la souverainetd &ono-mique s'opire avec I'affirmation de Ia souverainetd sur les ressouroesnaturelies et c'est tout A fait logiquement qu'un second glissement vas'operer pour introduire le droit au d6veloppement.

Cela ne veut pas dire pour autant que la parent entraine une assi-milation entre des principes qui se d&luisent les uns des autres. II estincontestable que le droit des peuples ai disposer d'eux-m~mes est unerigle fondamentale ayant la nature de jus cogens en tant que seulesource pouvant Idgitimer la naissance et [existence d'un Etat dansI'ordre international. La souverainet6 pernanente sur les ressourcesnaturelles est i la fois un droit plus pr6cis et second par rapport audroit i I'autoddtermination dont ii est ddriv6; quoi que I'on dise,'existence d'un Etat comme membre de la communautd internatio-

nale n'est pas en cause du seul fait qu'il n'exerce pas une totalemaitrise sur ses ressources naturelles; on constate m~me paradoxale-ment un abandon des nationalisations et un recul du contr6le dessocidt&s transnationales qui sont de nouveau invit6es ,i participer A lamise en valeur et A la gestion des ressources naturelles5. Le droit au

' Ce retoumement de situation est la cons~quence de I'&chec des politiqlies&atiques. de l'effondrenent du bloc socialiste et des encouragements des institu-tions financieres internationales.

d6veloppement est encore plus vague et moins contraignant dans lamesure oOi le concept de ddveloppement n'a aucune d6finition 6co-nomique reconnue et encore moins juridique; il y a autant de concep-tions du ddveloppement qu'il y a de conceptions de l'homme et de lasoci6t6 et la communautd internationale est loin de parvenir A unaccord, malgr6 les progr~s r6cents avec la reconnaissance d'un (,d6ve-loppement durable) bi l'issue de la D6claration de Rio du 13 juin199226.

La Ddclaration de 1986 constitue h bien des 6gards une sorted'auberge espagnole o6 chacun peut trouver ce qu'il apporte, ce qui apermis de satisfaire A rHpoque les pays en d6veloppement, les paysd6veloppds occidentaux et les pays socialistes. Pour les premiers, ils'agissait de lier et de conforter un certain nombre de principes col-lectifs: droit des peuples At disposer d'eux-m.mes, souverainetd surles ressources naturelles, libre choix des modules de d6veloppement,participation au processus de d6cision internationale, droit at uneassistance internationale. Pour les seconds, il s'agissait de r6affirmerla primaut6 du respect et des r~gles dtablies, notamment celles rela-tives aux droits de I'homme, aux libert6s fondamentales et aux prin-cipes libdraux d6mocratiques. Pour les troisi~mes, il s'agissait de met-tre I'accent sur ia coexistence pacifique, le droit de vivre en paix et led6sarmement. Cet aspect h6ttroclite ne facilite pas l'c1aboration etI'affinement de la notion de droit au ddveloppement dont l'insertiondans I'espace normatif international reste largement subordonne itI't6volution de la coop6ration entre les Etats.

3. Le droit au developpement, le droit international du d~veloppe-ment et le NOEl

Le contenu du droit au ddveloppement ne peut 8tre saisi, enrdalit6, que si on le replace dans le contexte de son dmergence, c'est-i-dire au moment o6 le droit international du ddveloppement et leNOEl pi6tinent et ne parviennent gure it trouver les voies et moyensd' une transposition juridique efficace par suite des objections et oppo-sitions des pays d6velopp6s ainsi que des 6checs rencontrds par laplupart des pays du sud dans leurs politiques de d6veloppement. Eneffet, les revendications du groupe des 77, aprts avoir trouv6 un 6chofavorable dont la manifestation la plus spectaculaire date de 1974,ann6e de 'adoption de la d6claration sur ie NOEl et de la Charte desdroits et devoirs 6conomiques des Etats, ont commencd A se dis-perser, i se fractionner et A se perdre au sein des diffdrentes instancesinternationales. I1 faut donc mener un combat incessant sur chaque

' Voir A. Ch. Kiss et S. Doumbe-Bille, . La Conf&ence des Nations Uniessur I'environnement et le d6veloppement (Rio-de-Janeiro. 3-14juin 1992)0,. AFDI,1992, vol. 38, p. 823 et suiv.

revendication devant chaque forum particulier, pour expliquer etdefendre par des argumentations spcifiques le bien-fond6 de la posi-tion de chaque Etat. Dans une telle stratdgie de ngociation o i il s'agitd'examiner concrtement les r~gles les unes apris les autres et lessituations cas par cas, il est 6vident que les pays du Sud sont loind'8tre dans la mme situation. Non seulement il y avait ddj, la distinc-tion entre les pays les moins avancds et les autres, mais d'autres61lments de diversification et de division apparaissent sur de nom-breux fronts comme I'acc~s au marchd international, la hausse du prixdes matires premieres et notamment des hydrocarbures, I'acquisitionet la maitrise de la technologie, le contr6le des investissements et dessocidt~s transnationales, les droits sur les ressources des zones mari-times, etc. Autrement dit, le front commun constitu6 depuis la fin desann6es 60 et consolid6 pendant les annSes 70, commence ai se I6zarderau dbut des ann6es 80, alors mEme qu'aucune avancde substantielledu NOEl n'est encore intervenue.

L'dmergence d'un droit au dfveloppement apparait ainsi commeune bonne stratdgie pour cristalliser i nouveau une revendication col-lective, donner une plus grande coh6rence aux principes et ri~gles6pars du droit international du ddveloppement et une meilleure assisejuridique au NOEI-7 . Le droit international du d6veloppement qui re-groupe 'enemble des r~gles regissant les rapports Nord-Sud en tenantcompte de la finalit6 du d~veloppernent, pour se distinguer du droitinternational 6conomique, iWest qu'une construction doctrinale poursingulariser, presenter et expliquer les ddrogations introduites enfaveur des Etats selon leur niveau de ddveloppement; bien qu'il aitintroduit les techniques et mithodes permettant de contester les riglesexistantes. il ne peut A lui seul donner un fondement satisfaisant auxrevendications du Ters-Monde. Avec le NOEl un pas de plus estaccompli par une radicalisation des objectifs et la definition de tac-tiques devant servir A les atteindre par la rdforme des ri~gles, institu-tions et procedures gouvernant les relations conomiques internatio-nales. I1 manquait I'dldment strat~gique, c'est-A-dire le moyen defonder juridiquement I'action de tous les agents impliquds dans laconduite des rfformes qu'il s'agisse des Etats d6velopp~s ou en d&ve-loppement, des organisations internationales. des socidtds transnatio-nales, des peuples ou des individus. Le droit au d~veloppement va etre

Voir W. D. Verwey. ,-The New International Economic Order and theRealization of the Right to Development and Welfare - A Legal Sur. ey -. inF. E. Snyder et S. Sathirathai. &lit.. Third World Attitudes Toward InternationalLaw. La Haye, Martinus Nijhoff. 1987, p. 825 et suiv. Toutefois. selon un autrepoint de vue. , faire du droit au ddveloppement un principe d'un nouvel ordrejuridique n'a pas de sens. Ce droit au d4veloppement ne peut itre un principec'est-A-dire un soubassement juridique de la sociat6 internationale, il en est unobjectif,,; voir F. Borella. - Le nouvel ordre &6onomique international et le forma-lisme juridique .Milanges Chaumont, op. cit. (supra note 21), p- 81 et suiv.

cet 616ment strat~gique dont le contenu correspond incontestablementA ia conjoncture du moment en essayant de faire la synth~se entre desexigences diverses en matinre de d~veloppement, de droits deI'homme, de cooperation intemationale et de participation de tous "tI'dpanouissement individuel et collectif de i'etre humain28. 11 reste ad6terminer la port6e juridique d'une notion qui semble s'etre dilueau fur et h mesure que les Etats se sont efforc6s de la cerner et de luiaccorder un statut correspondant Zi leurs attentes respectives.

!11. La portie du droit au developpement

Reconnaitre un droit c'est naturellement et traditionnellementrechercher les crdanciers de ce droit et les d6biteurs de I'obligation cor-respondante. Une partie de la doctrine s'est effectivement engag e danscette voie pour aboutir A des conclusions contradictoires, les unes pournier et les autres pour justifier I'existence d'un droit au ddveloppement.Cette approche r6sulte du fait que le droit au d~veloppement est appr6-hend6 comme un droit de 'homme, alors qu'il n'est pas que cela ainsique nous 'avons vu pr&&lemment. On peut se demander si une telleapproche est pertinente pour rendre compte des tenants et aboutissantsd'un droit aussi composite et complexe que le droit au ddveloppemento6i chaque acteur concern6 est A la fois titulaire de certains droits et decertaines obligations. C'est ce qu'il convient de montrer en examinantrespectivement la position des Etats, des organisations, des individus etdes autres groupes ou collectivit~s (peuples et populations, communaut6internationale).

1. Pour les Etats

I1 est important de noter que la plupart des dispositions de laDclaration de 1986 commencent par 'expression suivante: les Etatsdoivent... >, ce qui a pour cons&luence d'en faire des d6bitcurs de touteune srie d'obligations l'gard des individus et des peuples ou entreeux afin de cr6er les conditions favorables A la rialisation du droit auddveloppement. En revanche, ]a solution est moins claire stir 'autrepoint essentiel non tranch6 par la Diclaration qui n'a pas voulu attri-buer explicitement la qualit6 de titulaires du droit au ddveloppementaux Etats du Sud et celle de ddbiteurs A ceux du Nord. C'est indirecte-ment ou par prdtrition qu'on peut d&Iuire l'une ou rautre qualit6 sanspour autant que les droits des uns et les obligations des autres soientsuffisamment pr&cis et contraignants. Hormis le rappel de certainsprincipes fondamentaux classiques (droit des peuples A disposer d'eux-m~mes, souverainetd sur les richesses et ressources naturelles, coopdra-tion entre les Etats), nous sommes plut6t sur le terrain de la ((soft law>'

" Voir Colliard. op. cii. (supra note 22), p. 624.

dont chacun peut prttendre tirer avantage pour appuyer son point devue, defendre ses droits et intdrets et refuter les revendications desautres. Chacun des articles porte l'empreinte de I'ambivalence puis-que chaque obligation est 6nonc6e en termes souples et nuances et,lorsque l'obligation est plus ferme ou imperative, elle concerne davan-tage le comportement que le rsultat (devoir de coopdrer, de formulerdes politiques ou de prendre des mesures, de respecter les grandsprincipes du droit international). A cet igard, il est permis de s'dton-ner de l'opposition des Etats-Unis et de I'abstention de quelquesautres Etats ddveloppds9 puisque non seulement leurs engagementsinternationaux ne se trouvent pas aggrav(s par les dispositions de laDeclaration. mais celles-ci leur offrent des moyens de pression sur lespays en d~veloppement par le lien 6tabli entre les droits de 'hommeet les politiques de developpement. Du fairt de ce lien. les pays du Sudsont contraints d'accepter que I'ordre juridique international vienneinterf6rer dans l'ordre juridique interne, alors que durant la phase derevendication d'un NOEl, ils avaient rnussi A dviter pareille interfd-rence, en occultant les aspects internes du sous-developpementl.D1sormais, ils ont l la responsabilit6 premibre de la creation des con-ditions nationales , - en plus des conditions internationaics - favo-rabies A la r.alisation du ddveloppement et ils doivent s'en acquitterdarns le respect et la jouissance des droits de P'hommne , (article 3,alindas I et 3). De ce fait, les pays du Tiers-Monde ne sont pas sim-plement titulaires du droit au developpement, ils sont egalementd.biteurs d'obligations en liaison directe avec ce droit; ils ne peuventplus revendiquer l'un sans avoir .x rendre compte de la mani~re dontils accomplissent les devoirs affdrents aux autres droits de l'homme.Les Etats developpes, dans ia mesure o0 ils ont le devoir d'aider lesb&Mificiaires du droit au developpement, sont en droit de veiller au,m plein respect des droits de l'homme et des libertes fondamentales *et A la participation active libre et utile au developpement * de tousles individus, ainsi qu'i a la r6partition equitable des avantages qui enr6sultent *. C'est en quelque sorte la legitimation d'un certain droit deregard dans les affaires int6rieures par le biais du developpement.nmme si cette ing~rence doit etre comprise avec toute la prudence qui

I L'opposition amficaine est motiv&e scion rexplication du vote par I'aspectconfus et imprncis de la Dclaration. le lien d-veloppement/dcsarmement et l'id6eque le d~veloppement d€pend des transferts du Nord vers le Sud. L'abstention desamtres pays (Danernark. Finlande, R4pmblique f6drale d'Allemagne, Irlande,Islande, IsrEi Japon et Royaume-Uni) sc fonde sur deux raisons majeures: laprioite des droits individuels sur les droits des peuples et le refus de considrcrque rassistance au dveloppetnent est une obligation du droit international (voirR. Rich, "The Right to Development: A Right of Peoples?-. in I. Crawford, 6it.The Rights of Peoples. Oxford. Clarendon Press, 1988. p. 39).

" Voir A. Mahiou. - Nouve ordre international et ordres internes des pays end£veloppesnent , M.langes Gonidec. Paris. Librairie gt6blak de droit et de juris-prudence, 1985, p. 511 et suiv.

s'impose, contrairement A ceux qui parlent d'un droit ou devoir d'in-gdrence 31.

2. Pour les organisations internationales

La Declaration principale sur le droit au d~veloppement ne men-tionne pas les organisations internationales et le r6le qui leur incombe;leur ombre plane cependant Iorsque certains articles parlent de lacooperation ou de I'assistance internationales puisque celles-ci s'effec-tuent essentiellement par le biais des organisations internationales. Cesilence s'explique par le fait que deux autres resolutions votbes le m~mejour les concernent directement; l'une est frappante par la longueur deson intitul6 qui explicite nettement les preoccupations pratiques:"Autres m6thodes et moyens qui s'offrent dans le cadre des NationsUnies pour mieux assurer la jouissance des droits de 'homme et deslibert6s fondamentales,, (resolution 41/131): i'autre d'un intitul6 tr~sbref < Droit au d6veloppement > (r6solution 41/133) concerne Ia mise enoeuvre de ce droit et exige des efforts au plan international et nationalen accord avec les principes du NOEl, la Charte des droits et devoirs&6onomiques des Etats et la strat6gie pour la troisi me d6cennie pour leddveloppement, notamment en ce qui concerne I'aide 6conomique, lastabilit6 mon6taire et le problme de la dette. Ces deux r6solutions seveulent opdrationnelles en pr6cisant les voies et moyens pour donnereffet la D6claration principale, en s'adressant directement aux orga-nisations internationales ainsi qu'aux Etats et en dessinant ,,une sortede programme 6conomique,,32 que les pays d6velopp~s refusent d'ava-liser 33.

Ce refus est tr~s significatif de la volont6 des pays occidentauxd'empcher les organisations internationales et sp6cialement lesNations Unies de s'occuper de la mise en oeuvre du droit au ddvelop-pement selon une strat6gie qui a longuement miri A travers les multi-ples techniques utilis6es pour pr6cis~ment donner effet A des r6solu-tions dont la valeur juridique reste toujours l'un des points les plus

- A propos du d~bat relatif .i I'ingtrence humanitaire. voir M. Bettati ctB. Kouchner, ddit., Le devoir d'ingerence, Paris, Denocl, 1987; M. Bettati, ,Undroit d'ingdrence?,. RGDIP, 1991, t. 95, p. 639 et suiv.; M. J. Domestici-Met,-Aspects juridiques r&cents de 'assistance humanitaire*, AFDJ, 1989, vol. 35,p. 117 ct suiv.. E. K. Kovassi, , SC-curit ct droit d'ingdrence dans les rapports entre['Europe et I'Afrique , Melanges Merle, Paris, Economica, 1993, p. 249 et suiv.;0. Ksorten et P. Klein, Droit d'ingerence ou obligation de reaction ?, Bruxelles,Bruylant, 1992.

32 Selon I'obscrvation de Colliard, op. cit. (supra note 22), p. 615.

"La rdsolution 41/131 s'est heurtde At I'opposition des Etats-Unis et I'absten-tion de 21 pays ddvelopps, tandis que la r~solution 41/133 s'est hcurt6e A I'oppo-sition de I I d'entre eux et I'abstention de 12 autres.

controvers~s en droit internationall. Parce que justement I'effet ju-ridique obligatoire des resolutions est conteste. les Nations Unies onteu recours, sous la pression du groupe des 77. a un syst~me trs6labord de surveillance, de suivi et d'dvaluation permettant peu a peud'exercer une sorte de contrainte institutionnalisde sur les Etats. fai-sant naitre le sentiment qu'ils ont des obligations !i remplir. La doc-trine n'a pas manqu6 de relever le paradoxe de l'existence d'instru-ments de mise en oeuvre de textes non obligatoires par eux-m~mesalors que le droit international se caractdrise plutrt par la carence detels instruments 35 . Cette strategie qui a parfois atteint ses objectifsdans le pass6 en harcelant les pays ddveloppds travers les mtcanis-mes onusiens, a cependant moins de chances de se ddployer actuelle-ment. En effet. son succes correspond t un contexte particulier quin'existe plus: la division Est-Ouest dont les pays en developpementont su jouer a pris fin, la forte solidait6 des pays en dveloppementWest plus qu'un souvenir que ]'on ranime pour certaines commdmo-rations; la preeminence occidentale (et plus particulierement am6-ricaine) .i propos de toute action dans l'ordre international rendpratiquement impossible toute initiative sans son aval au sein desorganisations internationales universelles ' . Pour que celles-ci pren-nent en charge ce qui leur incombe au titre au droit du ddveloppement.il faudrait que les pays occidentaux prennent davantage consciencequ'il est de leur intr~t de voir les pays du Sud s'ancrer dans le ddve-loppement 6conomique et social afin de leur dviter des crises gravespouvant aller jusqu'.i I'effondrement37.

C'est ici que la notion de communaut6 internationale prend unecertaine signification et que l'on peut se demander si et comment ellepeut 6tre F'un des ddbiteurs d'une crdance individuelle et collectivecomme le soutiennent certains auteurs 3'. Admettre ainsi que la com-munautd internationale est un sujet de droit international ne va pas desoi et on ne voit pas pour l'instant qui %a I'incarner juridiquement

' II strait vain de vouloir mentionner la trop abondante littdrature sur le sujet(voir P. Daillier et A. Pellet. Droit international public. 5' 6d., Pans. Librairieg~n&ale dc droit et de jurisprudence. 1994, p. 360 et sui,.)

" Voir Pellet, op. cir. (supra note 23). p. 46: Flory, Mahiou et Henry. op. cit.(supra note 6); P. Slinn, -Implementation of International Obligations TowardDeveloping State,s: Equality or Preferential Treatment-", in V. E. Butler. 6dit..Control over Compliance with International Law, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff.1991. p. 165.

' Voir G. Blanc. Peut-on encore parler d'un droit du di~veloppement ?, Jour-nalde droir international, 1991. p. 903 et suiv.

" Voir Y. Daudet. 6dit., Les Nations Unies et I di.vcloppernent - le cas deI'Afrique. Paris. Pedone. 1994.

" Voir K. M'Baye. - Le droit au d~veloppement et les droits de I'homme,.Revue sinFtaliise de droit. 1977. p. 37; Vasak. , Pour une troisime gnfration desdroits de I'homme,. op. cit. (supra note 24), p. 841.

pour 8tre titulaire de droits et d'obligations, i moins de considdrer lesNations Unies comme dtant son mandataire parce que c'est l'organi-sation la plus universelle. II n'en demeure pas moins que ia notion decommunaut6 internationale n'est pas simplement une figure de rh6to-rique juridique depuis la multiplication des textes internationaux quis'y referent expressdment' 9 et la reconnaissance de l'existence et dela protection d'un patrimoine commun de I'humanitd; cela a une inci-dence normative en cc sens que ['on tend A identifier des int&rtssup~rieurs A ceux des Etats et appelant une action solidaire de touspour en assurer la ddfense4° . Certains auteurs ont voulu d'ailleurs tirerune conclusion plus vigoureuse encore en soutenant que le droit auddveloppement 6tant une condition de I'existence de la communautdinternationale revt de cc fait m6me le statut de norme imp6rative dudroit international; mais nous avons vu pr6c&iemment que cetted6duction n'est pas convaincante en rHtat actuel du droit interna-tional.

3. Les individus

Etant donnd que la probldmatique de la Dclaration de 1986 estcelle des droits de 'homme, il n'est pas surprenant que le droit au ddve-loppement s'ordonne autour de l'dtre humain; selon rarticle 1, alinda 1,"Ie droit au ddveloppement est un droit inali6nable de I'homme> etselon I'article 2, alin6a I, o 1tre humain est le sujet central du ddvelop-pement et doit donc 6tre le participant actif et le bdn6ficiaire du droitau d6veloppement >. C'est ii partir de ces prdmisses que l'on dduit etcanalise les droits et devoirs des autres sujets du droit au d6veloppe-ment. Sur ce point, la t6nacitd occidentale a portd ses fruits face auxr6sistances des pays socialistes de rHpoque et des pays en ddveloppe-ment qui rdpugnaient 4 donner la priorit6 A une conception individua-liste des droits de 'homme et du ddveloppement. 12individu st bien lepremier titulaire de tout un ensembe de droits que lui reconnait le droitinternational et que doit lui reconnaitre le droit interne de chaque Etat,lequel est ainsi tenu d'une obligation solennellement proclam6e.

Toutefois, l'individu n'a pas que des droits et, sur l'insistance deI'ensemble des autres pays, on a introduit la r~fdrence aux devoirsenvers les collectivit6s dont il est membre; on retrouve ici l'influence

' II s'agit non seulement des nombreuses rdsolutions des Nations Unies maisaussi de conventions aussi importantes que celles sur le droit des trait6s. I'cspaceextra-atmosphdrique, le droit de la met, a protection du climat ct la conservationdes ressources biologiques.

o Voir R. J. Dupuy, . Communautd internationale ct disparitds de ddveloppe-ment ,, Recueji des cours... 1979-IV, vol. 165; B. Conforti, , Humanitd et renou-veau de la production normative, Milanges R. J. Dupuy. Paris, Pedone, 1991.p. 113 et suiv.; P. M. Dupuy, , Humanitt, communautd ct efficacithd du droit o, ibid.,p. 133 et suiv.

latino-amdricaine4' et africaine2. qui accorde une place importantela notion de devoir individuel. Scion I'article 2. alinda 2, le pleinrespect des droits de I'homme et des libertes fondamentales tientcompte des xdevoirs envers la communaut6, qui seule peut assurer'entier et libre dpanouissement de I'Utre humain ,. Ii y a ainsi un con-

sensus pour trouver une conception dquilibre o6i le droit au dive-loppement pr~scnte en mdme temps des aspects individuels et desaspects collectifs. avec toute la richesse et la complexitd que comporteun tel droit, surtout ds lors que d'autres collectivitds ou groupes peu-vent Ic revendiquer.

4. Les autres collectisites ou groupes

Le peuple est., avec l'homme, le principal titulaire et bendficiairedu droit au ddveloppement. Toutefois, r'allusion au peuple ne va passans ambiguitd. surtout en raison de la liaison avec le principe fonda-mental du droit des peuples ai disposer d'eux-mmes et son corollaire,Ic droit ai la pleine souverainet6 sur les richesses et ressources natu-relies. Cela a pour cons&juence de faire apparaitre les droits du peu-pie comme des droits de I'Etat ct plus pr~cisdment du nouvel Etat qui6merge b 'issue du processus de d~colonisation. Mais d'autres dispo-sitions de la Iclaration introduisent une sorte de dissociation afinque le peuple puisse veiller sur l'int6ret gdndral et soit en droit d'exi-ger cela de l'Eta 3 . Ainsi, 'ensemble de la population doit bWndficierde I'amilioration du bien-tre, participer activement et librement audeveloppement avec une repartition dquitable des avantages qui enr~sultent. Ceci induit un syst me de fonctionnement d~mocratique deI'Etat et un minimum de solidarit6 et de justice sociale entre lesdiffdrentes composantes de la population. L'attention particulireaccordie aux femmes en tant que groupe spdcifique est pr.sente bienque timore car il est simplement indiqud qu'elles doivent avoir uneparticipation active dans le processus de ddveloppement; or, onconnait leur importante contribution aux activits dconomiques de Ia

"' Voir la D6claration amricaine des droits et devoirs de I'homme adoptwe hkBogotA en mai 1948 et a Convention interamriaine des droits de I'homme du22novembre 1969.

1 Voir la Charte africaine des droits de I'homme et des peuples du 27 juin1981.

1 La Charte africaine des droits de I'homme ct des peuples a 6te sans douteune source d'inspiration sur ce point, du moins d'apr~s certaines interpretations deson article 21 (voir F. Ouguergouz. La Charte africaine des droits de I'hornme etdespeuples. Paris, Presses universitaires de France. 1993. p. 182) Notons gale-ment la clause de sauvegarde contenue dans la r6solution II adoptdec en mimetemps que la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer du 10 d6cernbre1982 scion laquelle. dans le cas d'un territoire dont le peuple n'a pas encore exercdson droit A I'autodltermination. - les dispositions relatives A des droits ou intftrsvisds dans la Convention sont appliqu6es au profit du peuple dc c territoire dansle but de promouvoir sa prospititi ct son ddveloppennent -.

plupart des socictes sans qu'eles en retirent le legitime profit dontelles sont parfois exclues; la Dclaration aurait pu 8tre plus exigeanteet plus explicite pour rdpondre " I'attente des femmes.

Une autre lacune de la D6claration concerne les minoritds.Certes, i travers le respect des droits de I'homme et ]a participationde tous, sans distinction de race, de sexe, de langue ou de religion, lesmembres des minoritds sont protdgds individuellement. II reste queI'aspect collectif du droit au d6veloppement serait davantage couvertsi les droits des minorit6s dtaient reconnus formellement en tant quetels 4.

Cette br~ve analyse du droit au d6veloppement est loin d'6puisertoute la substance d'une notion fiche et prometteuse mais dont la con-s6cration et la mise en oeuvrc demeurent probldmatiques. DepuisI'adoption de la D6claration en 1986, peu de r6sultats tangibles sontvisibles 45, surtout que le dialogue Nord-Sud est en panne; les pays duSud trop pr6occupds par leurs difficultds internes participent de moinsen moins a 1'diaboration et A I'application des d6cisions internatio-nales qui sont devenues, en mati~re 6conomique, I'apanage d'unetroika constitude par les Etats-Unis, I'Union europ6enne et le Japon.Dans Ia conjoncture actuelle, les pays en d6veloppement ne doiventpas trop se faire d'illusion sur la d6marche consistant A donner uneconsistance juridique au droit au d6veloppement, mais ils ne doiventpas pour autant y renoncer car le jeu en vaut la peine et surtout il n'ya pas, pour le moment, d'autre strat6gie de remplacement pour fairevaloir un certain nombre de revendications ldgitimes et introduire unpeu plus d'6quitd dans les relations dconomiques internationales.

" Notons que lors des consultations globales sur le droit au ddveloppement en1990, celles-ci ont dt 6largies au-del, des repr6sentants des Etats pour inclure Icsrepr6sentants d'organisations non gouvernementales c ceux des populationsautochtones (voir R. L. Barsh, "The Right to Development as a Human Right:Results of the Global Consultation", Iluman Rights Quarterly, 1991, vol. 13, p. 322et suiv.).

" Voir Question de la realisation du droit au developpernent - Rapport d'en-semble itabli par le Secritaire giniral conformnment it la resolution 1990/18 de laCommission des droits de I'homnme (document des Nations Unies E/CN.1991112et Add. I).

LE DROIT AU DEVELOPPEMENTEN TANT QUE DROIT DE UHOMME

Salifou Fomba

Introduction

Scion le Juge M. Bedjaoui, le droit au dveloppement est un droitde I'Etat ou du peuple, bien avant d'Wre un droit de I'individu, et cenWest pas la lecture individuelle mais I'approche collective et commu-nautaire du droit au dveloppement qui situe la nature vdritable duproblbne et des solutions qu'il dolt comporter'. Cette opinion est d'au-tant plus juste qu'il importe d'eviter d'avoir une approche artificielledu rapport entre l'individu. le peuple et l'EtaL Sous le bdn~fice decette rdserve trs pertinente. l'objet de cette 6tude est de poser unregard de o codificateur * sur ie thime d'actualit6 qu'est le droit aud~veloppement en tant que droit de U'homme. L'expression ,< droit deI'homme A un d~veloppement durable)D peut 8tre considdre commeen etant la version la plus r6cente2 . Pour ce faire, nous allons nousefforcer d'aborder le sujet sous l'angle d'une eventuelle contributionde la notion de droit au ddveloppement A la codification etlou au dt.ve-loppement progressif du droit international des droits de I'homme3.

Concretement parlant, il s'agira de tenter de rtpondre ii un certainnombre de questions. On peut les r6sumer ainsi: la notion de droit aud~veloppement comme un droit de I'homme n'st-elle ou ne serait-ellequ'une vue de l'esprit ? En d'autres termes, cc droit existe-t-il ? Si oui,quels en sont le fondement juridique, ie destinataire, le contenu et laport6e juridique ? Si non, est-il souhaitable. et surtout possible, qu'untel droit existe ? Sous quelle forme juridique ? Pour quels destina-

IM. Bedjaoui, - Propos libres sur le droit au diveloppement. in MilangesAgo, Milan, Giuffre. 1987. vol. II, pp. 15-44.

2 Voir Question de la rialisation du droit au diveloppement -Rapport duGroupe de travail sur le droit au diveloppement sur les travaux de sa troisiimesession, document des Nations Unies E/CN.4/1995/27.

3L'aricle 15 du Statut de la Commission du droit international ddfinit cesdeux notions ainsi: Ia codification consiste A - formuler avcc plus de precision ct[-la systematiser les rglcs du droit international dans des domaines dans lesquelsil existe deja une pratique etatique considerable, des prdc&Ients et des opinionsdoctrinales '; le devcloppement progressif, lui. consiste - h r-diger des conventionssur des sujets qui ne sont pas encore reglds par le droit international o relative-ment auxquels le droit West pas encore suffisamnent ddvelopp dans [a pratiquedes Etats. .

taires, avec quel contenu et quelle portde juridique? Dans quellemesure apporterait-on ainsi une contribution au d&veloppement pro-gressif du droit international des droits de 'homme ?

1. La notion de droit au diveloppement comme un droit de I'hommeexiste-t-elle en droit international positif?

Ainsi posee, cette question invite naturellement A faire le tour dessources du droit international pour savoir si l'une d'elles est porteusede cette notion, et dans i'affirmative, Ai en 6tablir le degr6 d'acceptationinternationale. En faisant 1'6conomie de longues recherches sur sessources lointaines et proches, l'on sait que la notion de droit au ddvelop-pement comme un droit de I'homme a td consacr6e par la fameuseD6claration de I'Assemblde g6n6rale des Nations Unies de 1986 sur,justement, le droit au ddveloppement4 . D~s lors, la question se pose desavoir si cette ,(forme d'acte juridique > qu'est la Ddclaration fait ounon partie du droit international positif. Mais cela renvoie A d'autresquestions plus complexes qui d6bordent quelque peu le cadre de lapr6sente 6tude. On en citera trois. Existe-t-il une vdritable thdorie desactes juridiques internationaux pouvant s'inspirer un tant soit peu del'ordonnancement juridique qu'on trouve A l'int6rieur de I'Etat?Quels seraient alors le r6Ie et la place de la D6claration de 1986 danscet ddifice ? Et quel en serait I'effet juridique pour les Etats ? Autantde questions dont il est toujours intdressant de d6battre th6orique-ment. Mais force est de reconnaitre le caract~re peu ,<op6rationnel>que de tels d6bats prennent souvent. Aussi nous nous bornerons Afaire ici quelques observations 616mentaires. Elles s'articulent autourd'une ide centrale: pour construire une thdorie des actesjuridiquesinternationaux, et partant, en d6terminer le degrd de juridicit6, il faut,A l'instar du droit interne, recourir A deux critres essentiels, la formeet le fond. Or, selon qu'on mettra 'accent sur run ou I'autre, on auraune approche diff6rente de la question, aboutissant ainsi hi des conclu-sions diffdrentes.

En appliquant ces deux critires d'appr6ciation au texte de laDclaration de 1986, l'on peut faire des remarques de deux ordres.D'abord, il s'agit d'un texte qui a la forme d'une resolution de 'As-semblde g6ndrale des Nations Unies5. La question se pose ds lors desavoir si un tel acte trouve un 6cho dans ce qui doit tre considdr6comme le dogme de la thdorie des sources du droit international,c'est-a,-dire I'Article 38, paragraphe 1, du Statut de la Cour inter-nationale de Justice; encore que rHnum~ration des actes qui y sont

Rdsolution 41/128 du 4 d&embrc 1986, adoptie par 146 voix contre I avec8 abstentions.

On ne tirera pas ici argument de la nature juridique et des pouvoirs deI'Assembl6e g6ndrale en vertu de la Charte.

mentionnes ne soit pas complete du point de vue de la terminologieusit e par l'ensemblc des sujets du droit international. II n'est doncpas possible d'examiner la Ddclaration de 1986 A ]a lumire de I'Arti-cle 38. Ensuite, du point de vue du fond, il s'agit d'un texte qui vdhi-cule une valeur fondamentale de la civilisation humaine tout court,savoir le thime multidimensionnel du developpement. Une questionon ne peut plus fondamentale pour I'existence humaine dans sa diver-sitd.

Parmi ces deux crit~res, lequel convient-il de privikgier si tantest qu'il faille prendre position ? En partant du constat de l'imperfec-tion, A tous gards, de la soci~t6 internationale par rapport , la socidtdinterne, nous pensons qu'il est peu utile de se perdre dans des con-siderations d'ordre formel. Au contraire, nous sommes d'avis qu'ilfaut attacher beaucoup plus d'attention A ]a valeur matdrielle des tex-tes. c'est---dire a leur contenu concret. Au surplus. on peut utilementattirer I'attention sur une resolution importante adopt~e par l'Institutde Droit international en 19876. Ce texte propose un vdritable statutjuridique pour les rdsolutions de I'Assembl~e gdn6rale des NationsUnies. En effet, les conclusions qui y sont contenues portent sur lesquestions suivantes: statut des rdsolutions, catdgories de resolutions.standards et exigences de procddure, libelk6 des rdsolutions, adoptiondes r6solutions, mise en oeuvre des rdsolutions, probkmes particuliersaux resolutions dtclaratoires de droit et problmes particuliers auxrdsolutions developpant le droit. II serait intdressant d'dtudier le textede la Dclaration de 1986 A ]a lumire de ce guide mfthodologique fortutile 6tabli par l'nstitut de Droit international.

I!. Quelle est la porte ratione personae et ratione materiae du droit audiveloppement comme un droit de I'homme?

Le paragraphe I de I'article premier de la Declaration de 1986consacre expressis verbis le droit au developpement comme un droitde I'homrne:

, Le droit au developpement est un droit inalienable del'homme en vertu duquel toute personne humaine et tous les peu-pies ont le droit de participer et de contribuer A un developpe-ment dconomique, social, culturel et politique dans lequel tousles droits de I'homme et toutes les libertds fondamentales puis-sent etre pleinement r6aisds. et de bWndficier de ce develop-pement.,

iI en ressort clairement que la port6e ratione personae de ce droits'itend non seulement A I'homme en tant qu'individu, mais aussi aupeuple. Son caract~re individuel et collectif est ainsi soulign6. Quant

6 Voir Annuaire de I'Institui de Droit intemational. 1987. vol. 62-11, p. 275.

• sa portdc ratione materiae, elle concerne deux sortes de droits. Lepremier, c'est le droit pour chaque individu de participer et de con-tribuer Ai un ddveloppement global qui repose sur la pleine r~alisationde tous les droits de 'homme et toutes les libert6s fondamentales. Lesecond, c'est le droit pour chaque individu de b6ndficier de cc d6ve-loppement global, d'en partager les fruits. Certes, les deux droits sontcompldmentaires. Mais les ldments de cette definition mat6rielle sou-I6vent la question mme de 'autonomie technique de la notion dedroit au ddveloppement.

111. La notion de droit au diveloppement comme un droit de I'hommeest-elle une notion autonome ?

D'embl6e, on peut re-pondre que cette notion n'apparait pascomme ayant une autonomie conceptuelle propre, mais plut6t commeune notion g~n6rique de renvoi. C'est ce qui ressort clairement du libell6du paragraphe I de I'article premier de la DNclaration de 1986, o i l'onparle de -droit de participer et de contribuer A un d6veloppement&6onomique, social, culturel et politique dans lequel tous les droits deI'homme et toutes les libert6s fondamentales puissent tre pleinementr6alis~s)s.

On constate donc que le droit au ddveloppement renvoie ,i tous lesdroits de I'homme qu'ils soient civils, politiques, 6conomiques, sociauxou culturels En tant que catdgorie conceptuelle, le droit au ddveloppe-ment n'est que le contenant unique dc ce contenu pluriel. Ds lors, onpeut se poser la question de savoir s'il est n6cessaire de consacrer for-mellement la notion de droit au d6veloppement comme un droit del'homme.

IV. Est-il necessaire de codifier [a notion de droit au diveloppementcomme un droit de 'homme ?

Nous pensons qu'il n'est pas besoin de consacrer plus formelle-ment la notion de droit au d6veloppement comme un droit de I'homme.Car elle existe d6jA - du point de vue de ia forme - dans la resolutiond6claratoire de 1986 en tant que notion g6n6rique de renvoi, ce qui sem-ble plaider contre la n&essit6 de la consacrer dans un instrument juri-dique international plus formel, tel qu'une convention. Ce serait m~medans une certaine mesure superfdtatoire, car il ne servirait A rien de luiconfdrer une autonomie formelle, si celle-ci ne reposait pas sur uneautonomie de contenu, de fond. Or, ce contenu matdriel est ddjA refl6t6dans les instruments qui conferent aux individus des droits civils poli-tiques, &onomiques, sociaux et culturels, dont la rdalisation effectivepermet d'atteindre le plein dpanouissement humain.

Donc. plut6t que de chercher A codifier la notion elle-mme, ilfaut s'atteler A developper les r&gles juridiques r~gissant les notionsauxquelles renvoie la notion fondamentale, fondatrice. 11 sc trouveque ces notions de renvoi sont dej-a consacrdes par des instrumentsinternationaux de porte universelic ou r6gionale. Le probleme est deles rendre plus efficaces, notamment en ddveloppant les rglcs concer-nant les mecanismes d'application. de contr6le et de sanction desdroits 6nonc~s dans les differents textesjuridiques7 . Mieux, toutc poli-tique juridique dans cc sens devrait s'attacher a poser des normes plusa impdratives v pour les Etats, en termes d'obligations non seulementde resultat, mais aussi et surtout de moyen. Cela est d'ailleurs con-firm6 par I'approche retenue par la Commission des droits deI'homme des Nations Unies, en cc qui concerne la question du droitau diveloppement comme un droit de I'hommes. Celle-ci part dupr~suppos6 suivant: le droit au developpement en tant que droit deI'homme existe, c'est une sorte de droit naturel. Cela suffit largementpour IMgitimer cette notion et lui assurer une reconnaissance interna-tionale. IMs lors, le vrai ddbat ne porte plus sur son existence et sareconnaissance. mais pluttt sur la manire de rendre cc droit effectif,d'une part en identifiant les obstacles A sa rdalisation. et d'autre parten d~gageant les voies et moyens d'y rcm&tier. Dou la n&essitd declarifier - de lege lata ou de lege ferenda - les obligations res-pectives des differents acteurs de la realisation du droit au develop-pement.

V. Quelles sont, de lege laa, les implications de la notion de droit audiveloppemnent pour rindividu, I'Etat et la communaut interna-tionale ?

En partant du fait que la base actuelle du droit international con-crrnant cette question se trouve dans la D6claration de 1986. on peut,dans une certaine mesure, considerer cc texte commne dtant la le laa.Apres tout, cc texte ne fait que renvoyer, quant au fond, aux obliga-

'II s'agit notammcnt des textcs suivants: DIlaration universelle des droitsde I'hommc; Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques de 1966; Pacteinternational relatif aux droits &conomiques, sociaux et cuturels de 1966; Conven-tion internationale sur I'6limination de toutes les formes de discrimination racialede 1965; Convention sur I'elimination de toutes les formes de discrimination 1iI'gard do; fcmmes de 1979; Convention relative aux droits de I'enfant de 1989.Convention internationale sur la protection des droits de tous les travailleursmigrants ct des membrcs de leur famiile de 1990; ainsi que des conventions rcgio-nales sur les droits de I'homme.

'Voir Question de la realisation du droit au diveloppement-Rapport duGroupe de travail sur le droit au developpement sur so desieime session, docu-ment E/CN.4/1995/1 I et Question de la realisation du droit au developpeent-Rapport du Groupe de travail sur Ie droit au developpement sur les trawwvn de sotroisime session. document E/CN.4/1995127.

tions de respect des tous les droits de 'homme par ailleurs codifies.Or, il ne fait aucun doute que ces droits sont plus ou moins acceptdset appliquds par les Etats. En r6alit6, pour l'individu il n'y a'pas deproblme, dtant donn6 qu'il n'est pas sujet direct du droit interna-tional, mais plut6t son destinataire et son b6n~ficiaire particulier.Aussi allons-nous passer en revue les obligations mises Ai a charge desEtats et de la communautd internationale par la D6claration de 1986.

En laissant de c6td la question de sa valeurjuridique, il convientd'abord de se tourner vers le prdambule. On y trouve, d'une part, des,obligations primaires,,, et d'autre part, des ((obligations secon-daires,,9. La premiere cat6gorie recouvre deux exigences fondamen-tales pour les Etats: premi~rement, l'obligation que la Charte des Na-tions Unies leur impose de promouvoir le respect universel et effectifdes droits de I'homme et des libertds fondamentales pour tous sansdistinction aucunel°; et, deuxibmement, l'obligation de crder les con-ditions favorables au d6veloppement des peuples et des individus.Pour ce qui est des principes pouvant etre consid6rds comme ddcou-lant des ((obligations primaires-', il faut mentionner: l'rection de'dtre humain en sujet central du processus et en principal b6n6ficiaire

de toute politique de ddveloppement, l'importance 6gale de tous lesdroits de 'homme, la non-s61ectivitd dans leur mise en oeuvre et l'6ga-lit6 des chances des individus en matiire de d6veloppement.

En ce qui concerne la port6e du dispositif, la partie la plus juri-dique de la D6claration de 1986, on constate qu'il stipule un certainnombre d'obligations uti singidi et/ou erga omnes. Certaines ne sonten fait que la formulation expresse des principes ddji 6nonc6s dansle pr6ambule. Au nombre de celles-ci, on peut citer: l'obligationd'appliquer le principe du ,,ddveloppement humain> selon lequel'homme est au d6but et A la fin du processus de ddveloppement etl'obligation d'assurer le plein 6panouissement de l'Htre humain par lapromotion et la protection d'un ordre politique, social et dconomiqueapproprid' 1.

La D6claration insiste en outre beaucoup sur l'obligation ergaomnes de coop6rer la mise en euvre du droit au ddveloppement12.En effet, il est notamment demand6 A tous les Etats d'assurer le pleinrespect des principes du droit international touchant les relations ami-

' Pour autant que ces exprcssions aient un sens et soient appropri6es ici. Entout cas. elles sont emprunt6es d la terminologic employ6e par la Commission dudroit international dans ses travaux de codification concernant la responsabilit6des Etats.

'0 Voir I'Article I, paragraphe 3, de la Charte."Voir l'article 2, paragraphes I ai 3, et ['article 3, paragrnphe I, de la Dclara-

tion. Ces dispositions se recoupent d'ailleurs dans une sorte de litanie.2 Voir larticle 3, paragraphes 2 et 3. et I'article 4, paragraphe 1.

cales et la cooperation entre les Etats confornmment 5i la Charte desNations Unies et de coopirer pour assurer le developpement et eniminer les obstacles, le but etant de crder un nouvel ordre econo-

mique international qui soit plus juste et favorable A la pleine jouis-sance des droits de 'homme.

Tirant patti de l'in-galit6 des Etats, on a mis A la charge de lacommunautd internationale une obligation particuliere. celle d'assurerun developpement plus rapide des pays en dveloppemcnt, en leurapportant une assistance internationale efficace t3. Le respect univer-sel et effectif de tous les droits de l'homme et des libertes fondamen-tales au profit de tous, sans distinction aucune, est une exigence fon-damentale 4. On rappelle 6galement le devoir d'accorder une attentionurgente et egale aux droits civils, politiques. 6conomiques, sociaux etculturels, ainsi que celui d'6Iiminer les obstacles au d6veloppementresultant de leur non-respect is.

La reconnaissance du lien etroit entreu desarmement * et 4c dve-loppement * est faite sous forme d'obligation erga omnes16. en termesde resultat et de moyen. En effet, il est demand6 aux Etats troischoses: a) promouvoir la paix et la scurite internationales. car c'estla condition sine qua non pour r aliser le developpement. et pour cefaire, b) tout mettre en uvre pour realiser le desarmement general etcomplet sous un contr6le international effectif et, c) affecter les res-sources financieres ainsi libdr-s au ddveloppement global, en particu-lier celui des pays en d€veloppement.

Une obligation est 4galement impos$e aux Etats de prendre desmesures unilat6rales pour rialiser le droit au d6vcloppement T'7 !1s'agit de traduire in concreto le principe d'dgalitd des chances de tousdans I'accks aux re-ssources de base, Ai i'lucation. aux services desantW. A I'alimcntation. au logement, A I'emploi ct h une repartitionequitable du revenu. Un accent particulier est mis sur le respect duprincipe fondamental de la participation populaire en tant que facteurimportant du devcloppcmcnt ct de la pleine rcdalisation de tous lesdroits de l'hommeg'. Les femmes doivent jouer un r6le actif bk cetdgard. et 'Etat est tenu de combattre routes les injustices socialesdont celles-ci sont victimes' . D'autre part, et cela est important, laDeclaration de 1986 oblige expressis verbis les Etats .k ne pas violer

'3 Voir I'article 4. paragraphe 2.Voir Iarticle 5 et I'anicle 6. paragraphe I.

"Voir I'article 6. paragraphes 2 et 3."Voir I'article 7.1 Voir I'arcle 8. paragraphe I.Voir 'article 8. paragraphe 2.Voir ]'article 8. paragraphe I.

les droits dnoncds dans la Ddclaration universelle des droits deI'homme et dans les Pactes internationaux relatifs aux droits de'homme 2°.

Enfin une autre obligation existe, et pas des moindres: le devoirpour les Etats de prendre des mesures unilat6rales et collectives pourassurer l'exercice intcgral et un renforcement progressif du droit aud6veloppement21 . Ces mesures peuvent consister i formuler, adopteret mettre en oeuvre des decisions ou initiatives d'ordre politique, lgis-latif et autre. II convient de remarquer ici que le mandat du Groupe detravail sur le droit au ddveloppement cr66 par la Commission desdroits de 'homme -22 peut 8tre placd dans ce cadre. En effet, le r6le duGroupe est double: identifier les obstacles hi la r6alisation de la D6cla-ration de 1986 et proposer les voies et moyens d'y remddier. Par con-s6quent, le Groupe d'experts, ? la fin des ses travaux, en 1995, a pro-pose I'adoption d'un certain nombre de mesures tant au niveaunational qu'au niveau international 23 Ses conclusions et recomman-dations doivent 8tre consid6r6es comme s'inscrivant dans la perspec-tive d'un d6veloppement progressif du droit au ddveloppement. D'oiune approche de legeferenda des implications normatives et institu-tionnelles de cette notion.

VI. Quelles seraient, de lege feretnda, les implications de la notion dedroit au diveloppement pour l'individu ?

Poser le postulat selon lequel le droit au d6veloppement existe entant que droit de I'homme conduit A soulever la question des cons6-quences actuelles, mais aussi et surtout futures, d'un tel droit. Aussiimporte-t-il de s'arreter un instant sur la question des implications nor-matives et institutionnelles futures dudit droit. Limplication normativeessentielle est que tout individu aurait ainsi un droit dont il pourraitpleinement jouir, la contrepartie normative 6tant le devoir pour l'Etatet la communaut6 internationale d'en assurer 'exercice effectif. Quantaux autres implications juridico-institutionnelles, elles peuvent s'arti-culer autour des points suivants: la dimension horizontale et verticaledu droit au d6veloppement, le problbme de son opposabilitd i l'Etat quelqu'il soit et ob qu'il soit, le problme du contr6le de la 1dgalit6 ou de lamise en oeuvre du droit au ddveloppement par 'Etat, ainsi que leproblme des organes et m6canismes de contr6le - nature, comp6tence,proc&lure, etc. La premiere implication serait donc la reconnaissance

Voir ['article 9, paragraphe 2.21 Voir I'article 10.22 Voir la rlsolution 1993/22 de la Commission des droits de I'homme.23 Voir Question de la realisation du droit au developpement- Rapport du

Groupe de travail stir le droit at developpernent sur sa cinquine session, docu-ment E/CN.4/1996/24, par. 172-297.

de la dimension A la fois horizontale et verticale de ce droit. Cela vou-drait dire que l'individu aurait le droit de s'en prevaloir, selon le cas,i 'encontre de son Etat national mais aussi de tout Etat 6tranger24.Une deuxibmc implication cssentielle serait ]'institution d'un vdritablecontr6le de hdgalit , qui pourrait ou devrait s'exercer tant au niveaunational qu'au niveau international. Ainsi seraient comptents nonseulemcnt les tribunaux nationaux, mais aussi d'dventuelles juridic-tions internationales. II faut noter ici qu'il n'existe pas encore de courinternationale mondiale des droits de l'homme et que la fortune descours r~gionales est indgale. Cela dit, c'est un viritable droit de re-cours individuel qui serait ainsi 4tabli. Certes la question se pose dudegrd de cr~dibilitd et de faisabilitd d'un tel mcanisme.

Darns P'article pr~cit6. le Juge Bcdjaoui met en garde contre Idanger d'un tel schema Sclon lui, w la logique interne d'un droit aud~veloppement rilamd par l'individu contre la communautd interna-tionale tourne court, car le moins que l'on puisse dire serait que cedroit rie peut pas &re opdrationne! pour l'instant, faute de mecanis-mes efficaces d'application ,2. 13s lors, ajoute-t-il, (qjue reste-t-ild'autre A l'individu candidat au d~veloppement ? Sc retourner contreI'Etat ou la collectivit A laquelle il appartient. c'est-A-dire r~iuire ledroit au d~veloppement en tant que droit de I'homme .A une interpel-ation de I'individu contre l'Etat dans le cadre national? 2 Pour le

Juge Bedjaoui. c'est li precisement o6s se situent a le pifge et le dangerde l'ancrage du droit au developpement dans les droits de l'homme.dont on n'a que trop tendance .A en privil6gier la jouissance A la seule&6helle individuelle,2. Poursuivant son raisonnement, il voit dartsune telle approche la source d'une double erreur. Le premier argu-ment a contre ,* est le fait que le droit international actuel n'a peut-etrepas la vocation et sfrement pas !'a outillage * pour intervenir 16gitime-ment et efficacement dans Ics rapports intenes entre I'Etat et son res-sortissanL Le deuxiime argument hostile est que I'Etat le mieux dis-posd A assurer A son citoyen son droit au developpement se heurte Aune cruelle impasse, des lors que l'environnement international blo-que l'lan de cet Etat vers le d veloppementO Par consequent, pensele Juge Bedjaoui, le droit international designerait un w bouc dmis-

2' Moublions pas que ks droits de rlhomme de r'individu migrant sont 6gale-nerit importants et pnis en compte par Ics grands instruments inteMationaux,

taiment la Convention internationale sur la prtection des droits de tous lestruvailleurs migrants et des membres de leur famille de 1990.

25 Un tel contr6le est quasi inexistant dans le droit international actud desdrits de rhomm.

I Dedjaoui. op. -it. (supra note 1). p. IS.2 Ibida/bid39/bid

saire >, dans une situation dont I'Etat ainsi interpell6 n'est pas respon-sable. Aussi, o une approche du droit au ddveloppement A partir desdroits de I'homme en tant que droits individuels aboutirait A unedangereuse occultation du probl me international de fond >>30. Enfin,lorsqu'il souligne le caract~re injuste et inefficace du recours de rin-dividu contre 'Etat pour la satisfaction du droit au d6veloppement,dans un cadre d'occultation des donnfs internationales v6ritables, leJuge Bedjaoui ne manque pas, a raison, de fustiger la fragilit6 des jeu-nes Etats africains Ai cet dgard 31 .

D'une faqon gfnfrale, nous partageons les opinions 6mises parl'minent juriste du Tiers-Monde. Cela dit, pour etre complet sur laquestion de 'approche de lege ferenda du droit au ddveloppementcomme un droit de l'homme, il convient de mentionner la position duGroupe de travail de la Commission des droits de I'homme. D'abord,le Groupe d'experts, consid6rant que le droit au ddveloppement vaplus loin que le d6veloppement lui-m0me, reconnait que I'approche dud6veloppement centrde sur les droits de I'homme est une nouveautd32.Aussi le Groupe identifie-t-il une double condition sine qua non de lar~alisation du droit au ddveloppcment: la d6termination des crit~reset objectifs minimaux et la mise en place d'un m6canisme permettantde rendre des comptes 33. D'autre part, le Groupe est d'avis qu'il fautopfrer un d6veloppement progressif du droit international des droitsde rhomme. En effet, les experts constatent que si le m6canisme demise en oeuvre du Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et poli-tiques a dt6 renforcd par le Protocole facultatif s'y rapportant, celuidu Pacte international relatif aux droits dconomiques, sociaux et cul-turels est la traine. Aussi recommandent-ils que la question des pro-tocoles facultatifs se rapportant a ce dernier Pacte soit examin6e d'ur-gence, le but dtant de renforcer le principe du caractbre universel,indivisible et interd6pendant de tous les droits de l'homme reconnusau plan international 34 . Du coup, cela pose le problime des implica-tions de legeferenda du droit au d6veloppement en ce qui concemeles Etats et la communautd internationale.

ibid., p. 19.ibid., p. 20.

'2 Voir Question de la realisationt do droit ou diveloppernent - Rapport du

Groupe de travail stir le dreit au di;veloppenent sur les travatu de sa troisi~Mesession, document EICN.411995/27, par. 63.

"Ibid.Ibid., par. 81.

VII. Quelles sersient, de legeferenda, les Implications de Is notion dedroit au diveloppement pour les Etats et Ia communauti interna-tionale ?

Pour rtpondre 5i cette question, il convient d'examiner les rapportsdu Groupe de travail de la Commission des droits de i'homme' 5. Pour6tablir ses rapports, le Groupe d'experts a demand6, par 'interm6-diaire du Secrdtaire general des Nations Unies, aux Etats, organisa-tions intemationales et organisations non gouvernementales de luifoumir des informations sur la faion dont ils pergoivent la questiondu droit au diveloppement, les obstacles ,t ce droit et les voies etmoyens d'y remiddier. Nous allons donc tenter de faire un bilan som-maire des rdponses reques par cat~gone.

a) Les Etats et le droit au diveloppement

A la question de savoir si les Etats appliquent la Dclaration de1986, le Groupe de travail a requ un nombre limit6 de reponsescrites36.mais il a ausi entendu plusieurs exposes oraux sur ce point.

Selon le Groupe, malgr6 leur nombre limit6, ces r~ponses 6crites peu-vent tre consid~rees comme relativement reprtsentatives des preoc-cupations et des vues A la fois des pays dtvelopp~s et des pays endoveloppement. Cela dit. les diverses opinions exprimtes sont rtvtla-trices des differences qui existent entre les pays. Ndanmoins, ellesfournissent des 6lments pour entreprendre une analyse prtliminairede la question examinee.

De ces r~ponses varites, on peut recenser les 616ments suivants:une vision globale des diffdrentes dimensions du droit au developpe-ment 37; une pratique nationale accordant ]a priorit6 Zi certains aspectsdu droit au ddveloppement par rapport At d'autres; le constat de rin-terdependance entre les dimensions nationale et internationale de laquestion; ]'identification de certaines conditions pr~alables ntces-saires au developpement': rimportance accordee at ]a participation

"- Voir surtout Question de la rialisation du droit au diveloppement - Rap-port du Groupe de travail sur le droit au diveloppement sur sa deiriime session,document E/CN.4/1995/II et Question de la rialisation dig droit au diveloppe-ment- Rapport du Groupe de travail sur le droit au diveloppement sur lestravamr de sa troisiime session, document EICN.4/1995/27.

Voir Rapport du Secritaire gniral etabli en application de la reFsolution1993)22 de la Commission des droits de I'homme. document EJCN.4/AC.45/1994/4et Add.I.

' II s'agit des aspects suivants: indivisibilitE; dimensions indi iduellcs et col-lectives; droit de participer An la rnalisation du developpement et de bWndficier deses risultats; dimensions 6conomiques. sociales. culturelles et politiques du droitau diveloppement.

3 Telles que ]a pix. le respect du droit international ou le non-recoursI'agression.

populaire au ddveloppement39 ; l'identification de mesures pouvant etdevant tre prises sur le plan national; la perception du droit auddveloppement comme un moyen permettant I'exercice de tous lesdroits de I'homme; le constat de la n&essitd d'instaurer un environ-nement dconomique favorable au d6veloppement A I'chelon interna-tional 40; la reconnaissance du r6le essentiel et primordial de 'Etatdans la r6alisation du droit au d6veloppement; l'importance accord6eau renforcement de la coopdration et I'aide intemationales; ou encorele constat de la n6cessit6 de crder des m6canismes efficaces pour pro-mouvoir et surveiller I'application du droit au d6veloppement.

b) Les organisations internationales et le droit au diveloppement

Le Groupe de travail a entrepris des consultations aupr~s desreprdsentants de plusieurs institutions et organismes internationauxdans un double objectif: d'une part, recueillir des renseignements surl'application du droit au d6veloppement dans leurs programmes etactivitds et 6valuer les obstacles Ak cette application; d'autre part, faireune prospection des voies et moyens par lesquels ils ont appliqud ledroit au d6veloppement ou pourraient le faire A l'avenir. Les observa-tions 6crites et orales ont mis en 6vidence les problmes que pose'application de ]a IMclaration de 1986.

Si certains repr6sentants ont d6clar6 avoir, tacitement ou formel-lement, pris en compte les principes et objectifs dnonc6s dans laD6claration, il demeure que cette reconnaissance, en se limitant auxprincipes gdndraux, laisse enti~re la question de leur traduction in con-creto41. Trois grandes difficult6s ont dt6 recensdes: a) linsuffisancedes transferts de ressources multilatdraux, bilatdraux et priv6s, parrapport aux besoins croissants; b) la repartition in6gale de cesressources, dont une trop petite partie est consacrde au domaine so-cial, ind~pendamment des objectifs essentiellement 6conomiques; etc) 'approche exclusivement sectorielle motiv6e par la croissance6conomique. Heureusement, une r6orientation a 6td amorc~e a cet6gard, sous r'influence, en particulier, de certaines confdrences mon-

" Notamment pour les femmes, les groupes vulndrables et les populationsautochtones.

' Dont les obstacles ont pour nom, entre autres: relations commercialesinternationales, protectionnismc, dete, amcnuisement de I'aide internationale,sanctions ct autres mesures coercitives.

' Voir Question de la rialisation dai droit au diveloppemnent- Rapport duGroupe de travail sur le droit au dtveloppenent sur so deutxibne session, docu-ment E/CN.4/1995/1 I, par. 32. A noter que le Fonds des Nations Unies pour lapopulation avait fait figurer le droit au diveloppement dans [a documentation pourla Confdrence internationale sur la population et le ddvcloppcment tenuc au Caireen 1994.

diales r~centes' -. Ainsi. par exemple. la Conftrence mondiale sur lesdroits dc I'homme tenue A Vienne en 1993 a adopt6 les conceptsEnoncs dans la Dclaration de 1986. II en decoule au moins deuxconsquences: l'obligation de coop~rer au niveau international et ledevoir d'int~grer ces concepts dans les politiques et programmes detous les organes et institutions des Nations Unies en fonction de leursdomaines de competence, ainsi que des institutions n4es des accordsde Bretton Woods, dont la toute nouvelle Organisation mondiale duCommerce". Sur un plan gdn~ral, il ressort des rapports publi~s pardiffdrents organes des Nations Unies que les objectifs vis~s par lacommunaut6 internationale lorsqu'elle avait institu6 le droit aud~veloppement ne sont pas encore atteints pour toutes les personneset tous les peuples, et cc pour diverses raisons'.

c) Les organisations non gouvernemnentales et le droir au ddvelop-pement

Darts ce cas 6galement. le Groupe de travail a requ un nombrelimit6 de rdponses 6crites, mais il a aussi entendu des exposes oraux.I! en ressort que si certaines organisations non gouvernementales ontune approche globale de la mise en oruvre du droit au d6veloppement.en menant leurs activit6s tant sur le plan national que sur le plan inter-national. leur attention a 6td focalise ces dernires annes sur 1'envi-ronnement dconomique internationals. Pour le reste, en ce qui con-cerne la porte ratione materiae de leurs r~ponses, les organisationsnon gouvernementales ont mis I'accent sur le fait que le ddveloppe-ment est un processus global et multidimensionnel; que le droit aud~veloppement est fondd sur certains principes essentiels que lesEtats doivent respecter46; que la pauvretd et les indgalit~s croissantessont des obstacles importants. Elles ont dgalement insistd sur I'insuf-fisance de la participation populaire au ddveloppement; la n6cessitdd'une d~mocratie adapt~e aux rdalit~s locales; les insuffisances desinstitutions financires internationales; et la reconnaissance du r6leprimordial des Etats dans la misc en oeuvre des dimensions indivi-

En particulier, [a huitime session de la Confcrence des Nations Unies surle commerce et le divcloppcmcnt (Carthag~nc. 1992): le Sommet - Plan !te Terre -(Rio. 1992); la Conference mondiale sur les droits de I'homme (Vienne, 1993); laConference internationale sur la population et Ic d6veloppement (Caire. 1994): leSommet mondial pour le ddveloppcment social (Copenhague, 1995); la quatnrneConf6rence mondiale sur les fcmmes (Beijing, 1995).

1 Voir Question de la realisation du droit au diveloppement- Rapport duGroupe de travail sur le droit au diveloppement stir so deuriene session, docu-ment E/CN.4/1995/I I. par. 37.

+ Ibid., par. 42Voir Rapport du Secritaire gneral prisenti en application de la risolution

1993/22 de la Commission des droits de lhoinne. document EJCN.4/AC.45/1994/5.

11 s'agit des principes suivants: non-discrimination. 6galit6, 6quitd. justicesociale, solidarit6 et autosuffisance

duelles et collectives du droit au ddveloppement. Elles ont identifi6pas moins de treize obstacles a l'exercice de cc droit4 7 et propos6un train de quatorze mesures en vue de sa rdalisation tant au niveaunational qu'au niveau international8 . II faut noter que ces proposi-tions sont tris importantes, dans la mesure o6 elles invitent ,i unert~flexion approfondie sur la d6licate et difficile probl6matique desgrandes mutations qualitatives de l'ordre social, 6conomique, finan-cier, politique et juridique actuel du monde.

d) Les obstacles nationaux et internationaux t la realisation dudroit au diveloppement

La question centrale est d'identifier les facteurs tous azimuts quifont particulirement obstacle i la r6alisation du droit au d6veloppe-ment qui est consid6r6 non seulement comme un droit universel detous les individus et de tous les peuples, mais aussi comme un droitmettant en 6vidence l'indivisibilit6 et l'interddpendance de tous lesdroits de 'homme, qu'ils soient 6conomiques, sociaux, culturels,civils ou politiques. Cette conception du droit au ddveloppement a desimplications normatives et institutionnelles qui s'articulent autour dequestions fondamentales telles que I'existence de lege lata de normesjuridiques claires et prdcises ou l'opportunit6 d'en adopter de legeferenda, 'attribution et la mise en oeuvre de ]a responsabilitd de leurapplication ou encore ]a coop6ration internationale dans ce domaine.Enfin, il faut noter ici que dans les r6ponses 6crites et orales qu'ils ontfournies au Groupe de travail de ]a Commission des droits deI'homme, les Etats ont mis I'accent sur les obstacles tant nationauxqu'internationaux4 9.

e) Les conclusions et recommandations du Groupe de travail

La question pertinente qui se pose ici est de savoir si, et dansquelle mesure, les conclusions et recommandations du Groupe de tra-vail donnent plus au moins clairement des indications sur d'6ven-tuelles normes juridiques et institutionnelles existantes ou Ai 6tablirsur ia question du droit au ddveloppement. Les vues du Grouped'experts constituent en fait une synthise des enseignements tirds desr6ponses 6crites et orales fournies par les diffdrents acteurs de lascine internationale que sont les Etats, les organisations interna-tionales et les organisations non gouvernementales. Ces r6actionsdiverses sont porteuses d'un certain nombre de principes - anciensou nouveaux - d'essence philosophique, morale, politique ou juridi-

" Voir Question de la rialisation du droit au diveloppetnent- Rapport duGroupe de travail sur le drout au diveloppement sur les travaux de sa troisimesession, document E/CN.4/1995/27, par. 47.

41 Ibid., par. 48-49."Ibid., par. 30-35.

que. dont tl taudrait tirer les consequences du double point de rucnormatif et institutionnel 1. C'est de cette mani&e que I'on pourraidentifier clairement les possibilitds r6elles ou virtuelles d'6volutiondu droit international des droits de I'homme, lequel cst intimement lidau droit international dconomique, et partant, au droit internationaltout court.

La Commission des droits de l'homme, par sa rdsolution 1996/15,a cr& un groupe intergouvernemental d'experts ayant pour mandatd'dlaborer une stratdgie d'application et de promotion du droit auddveloppement, tel que celui-ci est 6noncd dans la D6claration sur ledroit au ddveloppement, sous ses aspects intdgr6s et multidimen-sionnels. en tenant compte notamment des conclusions du Groupe detravail sur le droit au ddveloppement. I sera donc intdressant desuivre les travaux de ce nouveau groupe pour savoir si on va ddgagerquelques orientations dans le sens d'une meilleure codification oud'un ddveloppement progressif du droit international.

Conclusion

Le droit au ddveloppement comme un droit de I'homme existe dansla mesure o6 il a dtd proclamd, notamment par la l6claration de I'As-sembl&e gtn6rale des Nations Unies de 1986. Certes, cn 'Htat actueld'une conception timide de la thdorie g6ndrale des actes juridiquesinternationaux. il s'agit plut~t d'un droit timou o. Mais cela, c'est laforme. Sur le fond, cc texte vdhicule une valeur philosophique fonda-mentale pour l'humanit6. Nul ne saurait le nier. Toutefois, du point devue technique. il est permis de considdrer que ce n'est pas une notionautonome, mais plut6t une notion g~n6rique qui renvoie / touts lesautres cat6gories plus au moins autonomes de droits de i'homme ddjh.existantes. Aussi nous pensons que le problme nest pas tant de changerde ,chapeau juridiquea parce que ce dernier serait trop grand, maisplut6t de consolider la - tte porteuse o parce qu'elle n'est pas suffisam-ment forte. En d6finitive, il ne serait pas tellement utile de cherchcr ?spasser d'une simple d6claration Ai un texte plus ferme, par excmple, unecon.ention sur ie droit au dveloppement. A notre avis. mieux vaut, etc'est M le wrai debat. se pr&,ccuper d'61aborer, par exemple. une con-vntion gdn6rale sur les svies et moyens permettant d'obtenir unemeilleure application des droits civils, politiques. &onorniques, sociauxet culturels. Car, en fait de droit au d6veloppement, c'est bien de cela

'< Pour la Iiste compltc, voir Question de la rialisation diu droit au dihelop-pement-Rapport du Groupe de travail str le droit au developpement sur sadeaxigme session, document EICN.4/1995/I I. par. 77-94. ct Question de la realisa-tion du droit au diveloppement - Rapport du Groupe de travail sur Ie droit aiddtiFrloppement sur les travau-r de sa troisiene session, document E/CN.4/1995127,par. 70-97.

i. ., a L. i UI i, I, - ,- I IUUL lllI tII 9

UL U4 lll- -6- - UJVL SC

profile l'ensemble des grandes preoccupations du monde contempo-rain - .i la fois des individus, des peuples et des Etats. Certes il y a l1un grand rdve de juriste. Mais un rdve porteur d'espoir!

PEACE THROUGH DISARMAMENT?LEGAL ASPECT

Chusei Yamada

Introduction

1. With the end of the scourge of World War II came the dawn ofthe nuclear age. Fr the last half century. mankind has endeavured tomeet the challenge of this age and to attain peace and security. One and,for that matter, the major part, of such endeavours has been in the fieldof disarmament. The United Nations is now at the turning point after50 years from its inception. At the same time, we are now in the middleof the decade which the United Nations has designated as the "Decadeof International Law". It would therefore be most appropriate to reviewthe legal regimes in the field of disarmament which the internationalcommunity has developed over the last 50 years and to consider waysand means of consolidating and strengthening such regimes for futuregenerations.

2. The word "disarmament'" is often used as a synonym of armscontrol, i.e., quantitative limitations on certain weapons, In this paper,however, it is used in a wider context so as to include any restriction onweapons, whether on production, possession, deployment or use of suchweapons. The legal regimes of existing disarmament agreements can beclassified broadly into the following three categories, though some of theagreements may contain elements belonging to different categories.

(1) Demilitarization: Non-military use of certain areas;

(2) Arms control: Restriction on the production, possession ordeployment of certain weapons; and

(3) Laws of warfare: Restriction on, or prohibition of, the use ofcertain types of weapons in time of war.

The conceptual characteristics and legal implications of each re-gime are discussed in section ii below.

3. The present study is limited to the multilateral disarmamentagreements which are open to universal participation and to such re-gional agreements forming a component part of the universal system

establishing nuclear-weapon-Iree zones.I twlateral agreements such asthose between the United States of America and the Russian Fed-eration (SALT, INF, START, ABM, etc.) and regional agreementssuch as those for Europe (CFE Treaty, Open Skies Treaty, etc.), how-ever important disarmament agreements as they may be, are allexcluded from the study.

1. Past Disarmament Efforts

1. Demilitarization Regime

4. Demilitarization is one of the most effective means of disarma-ment. It reserves a certain area for exclusively peaceful use. The Antarc-tic Treaty 2 makes the whole of Antarctica (the area South of 60' SouthLatitude) a demilitarized zone. It stipulates that "Antarctica shall beused for peaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited inter aliaany measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of mili-tary bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers,as well as the testing of any type of weapons" (article I, paragraph I).The same is true for the moon and other celestial bodies within thesolar system (other than the earth): the Outer Space Treaty 3 forbidsany military use of celestial bodies (article IV). The same prohibitionis reaffirmed by the Agreement on Celestial Bodies4 though withlesser significance as yet due to the fact that the latter agreement hasbeen ratified by only a handful of States which do not at present pos-sess the capability to explore outer space.

5. Accordingly, under existing positive international law, com-pletely demilitarized areas are the following: Antarctica on the earthand the moon and other stars (excluding man-made satellites) in outerspace.

2. Arms Control Regime

6. Efforts for arms control agreements are designed to reduce therisk of outbreak of war through restrictions on the production, posses-sion and deployment of certain types of weapons in peace-time. The

In the text, short titles are used for each agreement. The full titles are givenin footnotes. The dates are those on which instruments were open for signature byStates.

2 Antarctic Treaty of I December 1959, United Nations, Treaty Series,vol. 402, p. 7 1.

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explorationand Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies of 27 Jan-uary 1967, ibid., vol. 610, p. 205.

" Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celes-tial Bodies of 18 December 1979, ibid., vol. 1363. p. 3.

multilateral arms control regime so far achieved relates entirely to nu-clear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

a. Nuclear Disarmament

7. Nuclear disarmament agreements form the core of all disarm-ament efforts as it is nudear war that could annihilate mankind. Thereexist. in the arsenal of nudear-weapon States nuclear warheads thatcould destroy the whole population on earth more than seral times;this is what is called "orkill. It is therefore natural that theoverwhelming majority of multilateral disarmament agreements relatesto nuclear disarmament. These agreements can be classified into the fol-lowing categories:

(a) nuclear non-proliferation;

(b) limitation on deployment of nuclear weapons;

(c) muclear-free zones;

(d) nuclear testing.

(a) Nuclear Non-Proliferation

8. The NPT5 which was extended in 1995 for an indefiniteperiod constitutes the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferationregime. Since its content is so well known, it does not require anycommentary. Its purpose is to prevent any State other than the fivenuclear-weapon States (the United States, the Russian Federation.China, the United Kingdom and France) from becoming nuclear-weapon States. It would only suffice to note, for the present study.that the NPT does not place on the five nuclear-weapon States anyobligation relating to the use or deployment of their nuclear weapons.Their obligations are those of not transferring their nuclear weaponsand technologies to non-nuclear-weapon States (article 1) and of pur-suing disarmament negotiations in good faith (article VI).

9. The dissolution of the Soviet Union constituted a crucial testfor nuclear non-proliferation. There was at least a theoretical possibil-ity of that the number of nuclear-weapon States would almost doubleas a result of the break-up of the Soviet Union, as the Soviet nucearweapons were deployed in the territories of the several Republicswhich formed the Soviet Union. It was indeed fortunate for the causeof nuclear non-proliferation that an agreement was reached to the ef-fect that the Russian Federation would be the sole successor State to

I Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of I July 1968, ibid.vol. 729, p. 161.

the NPT and that all the other Republics which became independentwould join the NPT a new as non-nuclear-weapon States.

(b) Limitation on Deployment of Nuclear Weapons

10. The Seabed Treaty 6 prohibits emplanting or emplacing onthe seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, beyond12 miles from the baseline of the coastal State from which the breadthof its territorial sea is measured, any nuclear weapons as well as struc-tures, launching installations or any other facilities specially designedfor storing, testing or using such weapons (articles I and II).

11. There are several other agreements which limit the deploy-ment of nuclear weapons. Demilitarization, by itself, forbids the de-ployment of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, Antarctica is made free ofnuclear weapons. The Outer Space Treaty is more specific on thisquestion. It not only forbids to instal nuclear weapons in orbit aroundthe earth or on celestial bodies but also to station them in outer spacein any other manner (article IV). The Agreement on Celestial Bodiesreaffirms this prohibition of emplacement of nuclear weapons oncelestial bodies, including their emplacement in orbit around thosebodies.

12. With those legal limitations on deployment prescribed invarious agreements, a nuclear-weapon State can deploy its nucleararsenal in the following areas: on its territory and its contiguous zone,including underground and in the air, as well as on the high seas andunder water (both beyond the contiguous zone) and in the air spaceover the high seas. It can also deploy its nuclear weapons in the terri-tory of other States with their consent.

(c) Nuclear-Free Zones

13. Nuclear-free zones which are established on the initiative ofStates in certain regions contribute to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and at the same time expand the limitation on thedeployment of nuclear weapons. The Treaty of Tlatelolco7 makes thewhole of Latin America a denuclearized zone. It is to be noted thatfive nuclear-weapon States outside the region have accepted thisnuclear-free zone by ratifying its Protocol II, while some of themattached declarations and reservations on transit and transport privi-leges and the rules of international law (law of the sea). The Treaty of

6 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and

Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and Ocean Floor and in theSubsoil Thereof of I I February 197 1, ibid., vol. 955, p. 115.

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and theCaribbean of 14 February 1967. ibid., vol. 634, p. 326.

Rarotonga' establishes the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. All thenuclear-weapon States have now finally accepted this Treaty. TheTreaty of Pelindaba9 establishes a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa,and Southeast Asia has also been declared nuclear free since 1995.10

(d) Nuclear Testing

14. Nuclear testing has two consequences. First, it contaminatesthe environment. Second. it contributes to the development of nuclearweapons. In other words, restricting or banning nuclear tests wouldeither prevent environmental pollution or restrain nuclear-weapon pro-grammes of nuclear-weapon States. Existing agreements for the re-striction of nuclear testing are more relevant to the first aspect, as theyprohibit nuclear tests in a certain environment. They do not restrictnuclear testing as such, while it is true that these restrictions result, inreality, in placing some constraints on the numbers and size of the tests.

15. The Partial Test Ban" prohibits the carrying out of anynuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion atany place in the atmosphere, beyond the limits of the atmosphereincluding outer space, or under water, including territorial waters orhigh seas. Testing of nuclear weapons on celestial bodies in outerspace is also prohibited by the Outer Space Treaty (article IV) and theAgreement on Celestial Bodies (article 3). This leaes only the under-ground as a place where nuclear testing is permitted. There are furtherrestrictions to this. Underground testing is not permitted in Antarctica(Antarctic Treaty, article V) and in the nuclear-free zones in LatinAmerica (Treaty of Tlatelolco, article I, paragraph I(a)) and the SouthPacific (Treaty of Rarotonga, article 6). It is particularly to be notedthat French acceptance of the Treaty of Rarotonga in March 1996legally confirmed its decision to close down its M ururoa Atoll nuclear-test ground located within the region.

16. Underground nuclear tests could provide nuclear-weaponStates with all necessary data and technology to retain reliability oftheir existing nuclear arsenal as well as to further develop such arse-nal. The adoption by the General Assembly of the United Nations, on10 September 1996, of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty istherefore crucially important.

'South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty of 6 August 1985, ILM. vol. XXIV(1985). p. 1442.

' African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty of I I April 1996, ibid.,vol. XXXV. p. 705.

' Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone of 15 December1995. ibid., p. 639.

" Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Spaceand under Water of 5 August 1963. United Nations. Treaf Series. vol. 480. p. 43.

b. Other Weapons of Mass Destruction

17. Chemical and biological means of warfare have been con-demned by the conscience of the world as criminal and their use haslong been prohibited by laws and customs of war. Yet chemical weaponshad been stockpiled and the research on biological warfare had notbeen abandoned. However, epoch-making progress has been achieved ineliminating these heinous weapons from our planet.

18. The Biological Weapons Convention' 2 and the ChemicalWeapons Convention13 prohibit under any circumstances to develop,produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain these weapons andalso obligate States to destroy such weapons they possess. TheChemical Weapons Convention has an elaborate and intrusive verifi-cation regime and also establishes an international agency to admin-ister such verification as in the case of the NPT.

19. The deployment of these weapons of mass destructionhas been prohibited in certain areas together with nuclear weapons.These prohibitions were provided, as described in paragraphs 10through 12 above, under the Antarctic Treaty, the Outer-Space Treaty,the Seabed Treaty and the Agreement on Celestial Bodies. However,these restrictions have been superseded since the existence of suchweapons is now totally banned.

3. Laws of Warfare

20. Since the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868, followed by the1907 Hague Convention, 14 laws and customs of war have been devel-oped on the basis of the principle of international law that the right ofbelligerents in an armed conflict to choose methods or means of war-fare is not unlimited, and also the principle which prohibits the use inarmed conflicts of weapons and methods of warfare of a nature tocause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. After WorldWar II, these rules have been reaffirmed by the four Geneva Conven-tions of 1949 and the two Additional Protocols' 5 to protect the victims

2 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stock-piling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destructionof 10 April 1972, ibid., vol. 1015, p. 163.

'" Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpilingand Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction of 13 January 1993, ILM,vol. XXXII (1993), p. 800.

" Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 18 Octo-ber 1907, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Hague Conventionsand Declarations of 1899 and 1907 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1915).

IS Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Woundedand Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949, United Nations, TreatySeries, vol. 75, p. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition ofWounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of 12 August

of war. But they only provide a general formula repeating what is nowa principle of customary law as stated in the preceding sentence (seearticle 35 of Protocol 1). In view of the vast development of weapons,there was a need to legislate explicitely what specific types of weap-ons are to be prohibited weapons.

21. The Geneva Protocol, 6 which was concluded in 1925. pro-hibits the use in war of poison gases and of bacteriological methodsof warfare. As discussed in paragraphs 17 and 18 above, chemicalweapons and bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons are nowremoved from the earth by the Chemical Weapons Convention andthe Biological Weapons Convention. Coupled %%ith the prohibition onthe use of these weapons under customary law, mankind is finally freefrom such heinous means of warfare.

22. The ENMOD Convention, 7 while it appears to be a disar-mament agreement by emphasizing the need for progress in the fieldof disarmament in its preambular paragraphs, is a law of warfare. Itstipulates in the operative part the prohibition of the engagement inmilitary or any other hostile use of environmental modification tech-niques (article I), such techniques being those for changing-throughthe deliberate manipulation of natural process-the dynamics, com-position or structure of the earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hy-drosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space.

23. The Inhumane Weapons Convention' 8 is a follow-up of thelaws and customs of war of the 1907 Hague Convention. Its purposeis to prohibit or restrict the use of certain conventional weaponswhich may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indis-criminate effects. It is an umbrella treaty to which protocols on regu-lating specific categories of weapons are annexed. It prohibits the useof any weapon the primary effect of which is to injure by fragments

1949, ibid. p. 85; Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of Warof 12 August 1949, ibid., p. 135; Geneva Convention relative to the protection ofCivilian Persons in Times of War of 12 August 1949, ibid-, p. 287; Protocol Addi-tional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protectionof Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol 1) of 8 June 1977. ibid..vol. 1125, p. 3; and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August1949. and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Con-flicts (Protocol II) of 8 June 1977, ibid.. p. 609.

1 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating. Poisonousor Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of 17 June 1925,League of Nations. Treaty Series, vol. XCIV (1929). p. 65.

" Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use ofEnvironmental Modification Techniques of 18 May 1977, General Assembly reso-lution 31172 of 10 December 1976, annex.

" Convention on the Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Con-ventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to HaveIndiscriminate Effects of 10 April 1981, document A/CONF.95/15 and Corr. 2.annex.

which in the human body escape detection by X-rays (Protocol 1);prohibits or restricts the use on land of mines, booby-traps and otherdevices in such a way as to endanger the civilian populations (Proto-col I1); and also prohibits or restricts the use of incendiary weapons(Protocol 111). The treaty establishes a review mechanism and Partieslater adopted the text of the Protocol on blinding laser weapons (Pro-tocol IV of 13 October 1995) and the amendment of Protocol 11 onland-mines (3 May 1996).

24. There exists no treaty which explicitly prohibits the use ofnuclear weapons. It is the most contentious issue whether under gen-eral international law, the use of nuclear weapons is totally prohibitedor whether only such use as would also apply to conventional weap-ons under the laws and customs of warfare is prohibited. The advi-sory opinion rendered by the International Court of Justice on 8 July1996, in response to a request by the General Assembly of the UnitedNations, did not solve the question.

II. Review of Existing Agreements

1. Legal Implications of Disarmament Agreements

25. Arms control agreements as classified in this paper constitutean entirely different body of law from that of the laws of warfare. Armscontrol agreements place quantitative restrictions on specific weapons.They are based on a security concern and its purpose is to prevent war.Such agreements operate only in time of peace and would becomescraps of paper as it were if war breaks out. The rationale for thisargument is that since the purpose of arms control agreements is toprevent a war from occurring, such agreement would no longer be validin time of war when it failed to accomplish its purpose. That certainlywas the case of all arms control agreements such as naval armamentlimitation treaties concluded before World War II.

26. What would be the fate of current arms control agreements?The Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Con-vention belong to the category of arms-control agreements, though theChemical Weapons Convention has an element of laws of warfare, as itprohibits the use of chemical weapons (article I, paragraph 1(b)). Assuch, they would lose validity in time of war. It could be argued, none-theless, that, since the use of these weapons is prohibited under inter-national law, there is no justification for these agreements not to bebinding in time of war. It must be noted, however, that, even if theyremained in force in time of war, many of the provisions of the Chemi-cal Weapons Convention, particularly those concerning intrusive veri-fication could simply not function in reality in an environment ofarmed conflict.

27. Nuclear arms control agreements raise most difficult prob-lems as to the evaluation of their legal status in time of %%ar A majorelement to be considered here is that there exists no positive universalagreement which prohibits the use of nuclear weapons in time of war.The Partial Test Ban will certainly cease to be operative if nuclear warbreaks out. It is absurd to argue that a test ban is still in force whilenuclear dev ices are exploding in military use. Some extremists arguethat the Partial Test Ban remains in force in time of wkar and as itprohibits any nuclear explosions, it prohibits the use of nuclear weap-ons in the environment defined by it. It is not proper to attempt to dealwith such an important issue as the use of nuclear weapons througha back-door. The NPT is a borderline case. Non-nuclear-weaponStates might take the stand that it has become inoperative in time ofwar and there is no need to invoke the right of withdrawal (article X,paragraph I) in such a case to relieve themselves from the obligationsin the Treaty. In any event, it is apparent that the verification regime,which safeguards the nuclear non-proliferation regimes, would ceaseto function in time of nuclear war. It is most likely that the SeabedTreaty and nuclear-weapon-free zone agreements would meet thesame fate, depending on the military necessity of the nuclear-weaponStates.

28. On the other hand, laws of warfare are based on a conceptdistinct from that of arms control agreements. They are qualitativearmaments regulations and their aim is to protect the human rights ofthe victims of war. Accordingly, they are now denominated "humani-tarian laws". They apply only in time of war. More precisely, theyapply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict, toarmed conflict not of an international character and to internal armedconflict. There is an effort to expand their application to emergencysituations. As different as they may be from arms control agreementstheir regulation of the use of specific weapons is no doubt strength-ened by the existence at the same time of arms control agreementsprohibiting the production and possession of such weapons.

29. Demilitarization agreements belong yet to another category.They are more similar to arms control agreements than to laws of war-fare as they are based more on security considerations rather than onhuman rights concerns for the victims of war. Nevertheless. it shouldbe pointed out that demilitarization agreement such as the AntarcticTreaty, the Outer Space Treaty and the Agreement on Celestial Bodieswere all originally designed to provide for international cooperation inthe exploration and peaceful use of Antarctica and outer space for thecommon benefit of mankind. Disarmament elements in these agree-ments are rather a by-product of the main goal. As such, it could wellbe argued that they should remain in force also in time of war, thoughfull implementation of all the provisions could not be expected.

2. Cause of the Success of Existing Agreements

30. In considering future course of actions to be taken in con-cluding further multilateral disarmament agreements, it is worthwhileto ponder over the reasons why it was possible for States to agree onexisting disarmament agreements. It might sound cynical, but mostagreements were made possible because they did not conflict, at the timeof their conclusion, with the vested interests of States. When the Antarc-tic Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty were negotiated, there existed nomilitary use either in relation to Antarctica or outer space. The SeabedTreaty is another example. There was no fixture deployment of nuclearweapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed. There wasno such need, as vast underwater areas were available for submarinesfitted with nuclear weapons which were less detectable than fixed struc-tures on the seabed. The NPT did not change the status quo whichexisted at the time of signing of the Treaty in 1968. In fact, it froze thatstatus quo. Nuclear-free zones were initiated and promoted by non-nuclear-weapon States. They also froze the status quo in the respec-tive regions. The Partial Test Ban did prohibit atmospheric and under-water tests which had been actually conducted. However, it wasall-apparent by that time that such tests could no longer continue inthe light of their radioactive contamination of the earth. As to chemi-cal weapons, during World War II both sides possessed vast stocksthereof. However, chemical weapons were not used in combat per-haps due to the fear of retaliation. Both sides knew that these weap-ons were non-usable in reality.

Ill. Consolidating Future Disarmament Efforts

I. Pre-empting Future Armaments

31. The argument in paragraph 30 above might seem to belittlethe value of existing agreements. On the contrary, they are importantlegal instruments conducive to world peace and security. The lessons wemust learn from this is that we should be imaginative and alwaysforward-looking, trying to pre-empt futuristic weapons and militarymethods.

32. As an example, the question of new types of weapons of massdestruction so far non-existent, which would utilize such energy as laseror fuel-air explosive bombs (FAE), might be addressed now. It is mucheasier to regulate such weapons before they are developed and possessedby States.

. Strengthening the Prohibition of Specific Weapons

33. As noted in paragraph 23 above, the Inhumane WeaponsConvention establishes a mechanism for strengthening the prohibitionof specific weapons by its review process. Restrictions on anti-personnelland mines are far from satisfactory in view of the large number of ci-vilian casualties. The restrictions on sea-mines formulated as far backas 1907 need to be reviewed. There is only a legally non-binding resolu-tion with respect to small-calibre weapons systems. These are the weap-ons for which follow-up is called for by making use of the review process.It should be stressed here again that the laws of warfare on the restric-tion and prohibition of the use of specific weapons would be more effec-tive if they were accompanied by the parallel disarmament agreementson the prohibition of the production and possession of such weapons asnoted above.

3. Nuclear Disarmament

34. Future action must also be directed toward attacking the realand hard-core issue of disarmament. That is, to dismantle the nucleararsenal. Most of existing disarmament agreements relating to the nu-dear issue explicitly declare that the measures embodied therein are notan end in itself but a step toward the final goal of the elimination ofnuclear weapons. Such declarations must not be allmved to remain onlyas empty slogans.

35. The real test for the NPT was not the question of its indefiniteextension but it is the progressiwe role it fulfils as a step toward the finalgoal of a nudear-free world. The progress in nuclear disarmament.including the eventual possibility of nuclear-weapon States becomingnon-nuclear-weapon States, will strengthen the non-proliferation regimeby reducing inherent discriminatory elements in the Treaty and thusinducing non-parties to join the regime. A comprehensive nuclear-weapon test-ban is another effort in the same direction.

36. The reduction of nudear weapons have so far been negotiatedsolely by the United States and the Russian Federation. They have con-cuded significant agreements to reduce their delivery systems. Yet theirstock of nuclear warheads is still larger at present than in 1968 whenthe NPT was concluded. The other three nuclear-weapon States are yetto join in this effort. It is the primary responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States themselves to engage in efforts for nuclear-weapons re-ductions. However, now that the Cold War is over, there must be multi-lateral endeavours where both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon Stateswould discuss the tole spectrum of security problems. including nu-dear weapons.

4. Verification

37. Verification provides trust in disarmament agreements. Itsimportance should not be underestimated. The NPT has an elaborateverification regime by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Yet itproved insufficient as evidenced in the case of Iraq. The ChemicalWeapons Convention has an intrusive verification regime. The incidentinvolving the use of Sarin gas by some religious cult sect in Japan, whichtook place in 1995, illustrates the difficulty of such verification. Otherdisarmament agreements do not have an inspection regime as such,while some of them have general provisions for open access for that pur-pose. It is true that a certain disarmament regime requires a treaty-specific verification system. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban cer-tainly needs its own verification system. Nevertheless, it might be usefulto give thought to an idea of a unified verification regime covering sev-eral agreements which lack adequate verification measures.

5. Legal Validity of Disarmament Agreements in Time nf War

38. As discussed in paragraphs 25 through 29 above, the legalvalidity of demilitarization agreements and arms control agreements intime of war is rather precarious. It is desirable that future agreementsinclude provisions which explicitly specify whether the treaty as a wholeor specific provisions may apply in time of war.

Conclusion

39. It must be borne in mind that disarmament is not an end initself but it is only a means through which we attempt to attain the peaceand security of mankind. Disarmament efforts therefore would bearfruit only when security concerns are met and alternate means forsecurity are provided. Confidence-building is also a vital element infomenting an environment conducive to disarmament. Accordingly, theUnited Nations must provide the necessary guidance for a concertedand coordinated disarmament approach.

AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINALRESPONSIBILITY OF STATES?

Robert Rosenstock

ltroduction

This article will examine the question of the inclusion of the notionof so-called crimes by States in the Commission's draft on the topic ofState responsibility. It will seek to do so in a broad context-

The record of accomplishment of the International Law Commis-sion ever the better part of the last half century is impressive. It hasproduced both instruments codifying and developing major areas ofinternational law and instruments dealing with ad hoc problems) Thisrecord is a reflection of the quality of the Commission and the assist-ance it has received in the form of comments along the way by Gov-emments and by scholars. Where these comments have been thought-ful and forthcoming, the Commission has been well placed to producefinal drafts which are acceptable to States and intellectually sound.The difference between the draft Code of Crimes against the Peaceand Security of Mankind that emerged on first reading and the textwhich emerged on second or final reading is a case in point. WhereGovernments have been casual or otherwise not forthcoming or indisagreement on issues which the Commission has failed adequatelyto bridge, the results have been stillborn drafts or unratified con-ventions.

2

'Examples of the former include the law of the sea. diplomatic and consularprotoction, the law of treaties; examples of the latter include the Convention on thePrevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons.including Diplomatic Agents. and the draft Statute for an International CriminalCourt-

2 Examples falling within this category may be thought to include the productsof the Commission's work on: arbitral procedure. status of the diplomatic courierand the diplomatic bag. most-favored-nation clauses, succession of States in re-spt of States property, archives and debts and perhaps jurisdictional immunitiesof States and their property. While there may be specific causes in each case, ageneral problem that can be found in all of these examples is a failure of commu-nication between States and the Commission. A failure that the record suggests isnot a failure of the Commission to heed the views of States but a failure of Statesto communicate them. Of course, it is not suggested that the fact that instrumentsin fonoe do not result from a particular exercise means that the effort made nocontribution but rather that the contribution fell short of what might have been.

At present, the major codification exercise before the Commis-sion is the law of State responsibility. The Commission finished its"first reading" of a draft on the topic in 1996, albeit in less than unan-imous agreement on key aspects. 3

The topic on State responsibility is a vast one cutting across allof international law. It raises a number of questions which the Com-mission has sought to answer in its draft. The draft which has emergedon first reading will now be available for comment by States andscholars. The three main parts of the draft: (I) origin of internationalresponsibility, (2) content, forms and degrees of international respon-sibility, and (3) settlement of disputes, raise a number of importantand difficult issues. This is all the more true as the Commission has,on several key issues, such as restrictions on reparation, limits oncountermeasures, dispute settlement and the notion of "crimes byStates", by no means confined itself to codification of existing law.There is, moreover, not unanimity within the Commission on thesematters. The early and considered views of States and scholars on thisdraft will be essential if the Commission is to produce a second orfinal draft which is generally acceptable to States and which is intel-lectually sound.

This essay will focus on one of the important and difficult ques-tions, namely the decision of the Commission in 1976 to divide inter-nationally wrongful acts by States into two major categories: "inter-national delicts" and "international crimes". This division is highlycontroversial. At the forty-sixth session of the International LawCommission, in 1994, some faint signs began to appear of efforts tonarrow some, though not all, of the gaps between those members whofavoured retaining the qualitative distinction between "crimes" and"delicts" and those who viewed internationally wrongful acts byStates as lying along a quantitative continuum ranging from trivial toextremely serious wrongful acts.4 In a footnote to the word "crime"the first time it appears in Part Two of the draft articles, the Commis-sion at its forty-eighth session, in 1996, stated the following:

'The practice and rules of the Commission are to produce a completed firstdraft or "reading". The draft is submitted to Governments and the General Assem-bly of the United Nations for written and oral comments. The Commission thenundertakes a second reading and produces a final draft which it submits to theGeneral Assembly.

' Professor Pellet stated at the 2341st meeting that, "if the word 'crime' gaverise to concern.., that word could simply be replaced by another. It would, how-ever, be quite impossible, in his view, to discard the idea behind article 19 becausethe differentiation between ordinary internationally wrongful acts and those thatwere particularly serious for the international community as a whole was, quitesimply, a reality that was rooted in positive law". Yearbook... 1994, vol. 1, p. 82.

"The term 'crime' is used for consistency with article 19 ofPart One of the articles. It was. however. noted that alternativephrases such as 'an internationally wrongful act of a serious na-ture' or 'an exceptionally serious wrongful act' could be substi-tuted for the term *crime' thus, inter alia, avoiding the penalimplication of the term."5

While this language does not eliminate the problems created by aqualitative distinction, it at least cames the promise of avoiding thepenal implications of the use of the term 'crime'. The author is a com-mitted advocate of the view that the notion of "crimes by States" isvariously unsound and without legal or conceptual foundation. Thisarticle is, in part, an unabashed piece of advocacy for that view. It isthe author's hope that those, both Governments and scholars, %%hoagree that the qualitative distinction between "delicts" and "crimes" isill-advised, %%ill weigh in support of that view. It is furthermore theauthor's hope that those with more objective, contemporar) and pro-ductive arguments in favour of the distinction between "crimes" and"delicts" than have been available to date will also Aeigh in.

Even if the Commission had not completed its first reading onState responsibility, this would be an appropriate time to reexaminethe issue of "crimes by States", which was elaborated by the Commis-sion in the 1970s. Since that time, the Cold War ended, apartheid isgone and much time has nob passed since the end of colonialism.These, no longer contemporary, elements not only infused the 1970sdebate concerning so-called crimes of States with passion and agita-tion propaganda at the cost of reason, they made it appealing for any-one seeking African and East European support in an election to carrfavour with both groups by advocating the notion.

In order to reach a sensible answer to the question whether thenotion of so-called crimes of States should be retained, it will be use-ful, inter alia, to examine the basis, if any, in State practice for such anotion, %%hat particular consequences can be assigned to the situationof a "crime" that are different from those of a "delict" or. more par-ticularly, different from a violation of an erga omnes obligation notdenominated as a "crime" and whether the inclusion of the notion ofsuch "crime" will create any special requirements or problems in thearea of dispute settlement- Finally, it may be worth reflecting v% hethertossing the notion of "crime" around in the context of the conduct ofStates will adversely impact on the developments in the field of crimi-nal responsibility of individuals (viz, the creation of the InternationalTribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Vio-

5 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of itm forty-eighthsessim Official Records of the General Asembly., Fifty-first Session, SupplementNo. 10 (A/51110), p. 141.

lations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territoryof the Former Yugoslavia since 1991; the International Criminal Tri-bunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide andOther Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Com-mitted in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsiblefor genocide and other such violations committed in the territory ofneighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994;the draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind;and the work in the General Assembly on the Commission's draftStatute for an International Criminal Court).

Background

The International Law Commission adopted the article containingthe idea of "crimes of States", article 19 of Part One, in 1976.6 A briefhistory of the Commission's consideration of the notion of "crimes ofStates" and related issues may help to illuminate some of the issues.

The fact that article 19, as drafted, is internally less than whollyconsistent; the inbuilt circular reasoning of its paragraph 2; the factthat its specific examples are so strikingly dated; the fact that it oughtto make the hair of any serious lawyer stand on end to see phraseslike "such as" in a context that purports to be establishing crimes; theabsence of any notion of mens rea; the separation of the term "equalrights" from "self-determination", the Charter of the United Nations

Yearbook... 1976, vol. 11 (Part Two), pp. 72 and 95.

Article 19 reads as follows:"International crimes and international delictsI. An act of a State which constitutes a breach of an international obli-

gation is an internationally wrongful act, regardless of the subject matter of theobligation breached.

2. An internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by aState of an international obligation so essential for the protection of funda-mental interests of the international community that its breach is recognizedas a crime by that community as a whole constitutes an international crime.

3. Subject to paragraph 2, and on the basis of the rules of internationallaw in force, an international crime may result, inter alia, from:

(a) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importancefor the maintenance of international peace and security, such as that prohib-iting aggression;

(b) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential impor-tance for safeguarding the right of sclf-determination of peoples, such as thatprohibiting the establishment or maintenance by force of colonial domination;

(c) a serious breach on a widespread scale of an international obligationof essential importance for safeguarding the human being, such as those pro-hibiting slavery, genocide and apartheid;

(d) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importancefor the safeguarding and preservation of the human environment, such asthose prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the seas.

4. Any internationally wrongful act which is not an international crimein accordance with paragraph 2 constitutes an international delict."

to the contrary notwithstanding; the general vagueness of the articlewhich purports to create or even codify, if you will, criminal law of anovel nature; the norm asserted in paragraph 4 preventing the appli-cation of the notion of delict and its consequences to a so-called crimeare all problems that may not be systemic and that could theoreticallybe cured by redrafting. The totality of these defects, however, makesany redrafting a daunting task and creates doubts that the theoreticalability to cure the many defects can in practice be carried out.

The issue as to whether there should be different categories ofwrongful acts was first raised in the Commission in 1956 by the thenSpecial Rapporteur on State responsibility. Mr. Garcia Amador.7

Mr. Garcia Amador suggested a category beyond "delicts" that wouldbe "punishable" and which in various ways resembled the categorydescribed in paragraph 3 of article 19.

The Commission rejected the proposed distinction.8 But for theCold War and some of the weird notions and openings for opportun-ism it spawned, the matter might have died there. The Soviet bloc,however, spurred on by the writings of Professor Tunkin, took up thecudgels and argued for broadening the topic of responsibility beyondthe field of the treatment of aliens. Professor Tunkin and his Sovietbloc colleagues urged the inclusion of primary rules including ruleswhich inescapably encompassed the notion of the criminal responsi-bility of States. 9 In addition to appealing to the Soviet bloc, the notionof the criminal responsibility of States had immediate appeal to thenewly independent African and Asian States eager to declare coloni-alism illegal and to criminalize the flagrant and institutionalized viola-tion of human rights involved in the practice of apartheid.

In 1960, Mr. Garcia Amador ceased to be a member of the Com-mission. In 1962, the Commission appointed a subcommittee toreview the question of the scope and nature of the Commission'swork on the topic. Some Commission members favoured restrictingthe work to primary rules concerning responsibility for aliens, others,such as those from the Soviet bloc, wanted to focus on peace and

' Yearbook... 1956, vol. 11. pp. 182-83 and 211-213, document A/CN.4/96. TheGarcia Amador approach was a little more attached to State practice and devoidof the anomalies of article 19 in that he related it to criminal acts by individualsacting as organs of the State. He also, it may be noted, sought to raise the issue interms of its consequences i.e., a distinction between -merely wrongful" and "pun-ishable" rather than tackling the issue in its politicized abstract while leaving con-sequences to be worried about later.

'Ibid. vol. 1. pp. 228. 231. 237-242 and 246.'Yearbook.. 1962, vol. i. pp. 29 and 37. The Soviet bloc onslaught commenced

at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. in 1960.with the usual near identical statements by substantially the entire bloc (see docu-ments A/C.6/.5/SR.651.653, 654. 655.657, 658 and 662). It was reflected in the workof the International Law Commission by 1962.

security issues with the focus on the substance of the rules which, ifbreached, would give rise to responsibility, i.e., a text the main func-tion of which would be to set forth primary rules in the crucial butlimited area of peace and security. The third or compromise position,which eventually carried the day, was to broaden the topic of Stateresponsibility from responsibility for injury to aliens to cover all theconsequences of the breach of any primary obligation and also to limitthe topic to secondary rules.'0

How the decision to restrict the topic to secondary rules, the So-viet objectives to the contrary notwithstanding, mutated into an edi-fice that included something like article 19, which is as clear a state-ment of a primary rule as one can imagine, is not apparent even onreading through the records. Of course, if one were to abandon thesearch for a logical link, one might wonder if a cynical or opportunis-tic deal was implicitly made. In exchange for Soviet acceptance of anoverall scope beyond that of merely peace and security and a primaryfocus on secondary rules, the Soviets would be handed the crownjewel of the agitation propagandist, the highly emotionally chargednotion of "international crimes" committed by States.

The work of the Commission on State responsibility lay rela-tively dormant for some years as the Commission focused on othertopics. The debate in the Commission in the late 1960s reflected con-tinued Soviet hammering on the peace and security issues. By 1969,the Commission was agreeing to recognize "the greater or lesserimportance to the international community of the rules giving rise tothe obligations violated, and the greater or lesser seriousness of theviolation itself". And, "... cases in which.., a particularly seriousoffence might also give rise to the establishment of a legal relationshipbetween the guilty [sic] State and a group of States, or... the entireinternational community".I

0o The Commission explained the distinction between "primary" and "secon-dary" as follows:

"in its previous drafts, the Commission has generally concentrated ondefining the rules of international law which, in one sector of inter-Staterelations or another impose specific obligations on States, and may. in acertain sense, be termed 'primary'. In dealing with the topic of responsibility,on the other hand, the Commission is undertaking to define other rules whichin contradistinction to those mentioned above, may be described as 'scon-dary' inasmuch as they are concerned with determining the legal conse-quences of failure to fulfil obligations established by the 'primary' rules... Only[these 'secondary' rules fall] within the sphere of responsibility proper."Yearbook... 1973. vol. II, pp. 169-170, document A/9010/Rev.l, paras. 40-41." Yearbook... 1969, vol. I, p. 233, document A'7610/Rev.l, para. 81. N.R. the

revealing use of the term "guilty". Reference to use of this term in connection withthe notion of the "war of aggression" certainly existed during the League ofNations days in draft treaties and in preambular languages. What is not noted isthat these references in all identifiable cases contemplated individual criminalresponsibility, not the criminal responsibility of a State.

By 1973, the Commission had reached the point of expresslywondering whether contemporary international law should acknow-ledge a distinct and more serious category of internationally wrongfulacts, which might perhaps be described as "'international crimes". Thereasons for such a step were not articulated. This notion received loudsupport from the Soviet bloc and some developing countries whichtended to look to Moscow for inspiration or were at least susceptibleto Soviet agitation propaganda, and some quieter support from otherquarters. Various members of the Commission were attracted in gen-eral terms by the notion of a class of wrongful acts which might havemore serious consequences than others, though there was not anyconsensus as to what those consequences might be. Some memberslooked to more severe consequences in terms of damages or punish-ment; others looked to the class of States entitled to react to thewrongful act. The discussion was preliminary and inconclusive. 2

Article 19

By the mid-1970s, the Special Rapporteur, Professor, later Judge,Ago, had become completely convinced, if he ever had any doubts, thatit was useful to distinguish between "delicts" and "crimes". Under hisleadership, the Commission provisionally adopted article 19 in 1976. Aself-confident, determined and respected Special Rapporteur, avidlysupported by the members from the Soviet bloc and a handful of indi-viduals from the Third World, was a formidable force in 1976.

Such argumentation as was supplied in support of the final slideover the brink relied on casual usage of florid language by politicians invarious contexts lacking any clement of opinio juris and not intendedto result in anything like article 19, recent acceptance by many mem-bers of the international community of the notion of jus cogens in thecontext of the law of treaties and some obiter dicta in the case con-cerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd..'3 aswell as dicta in other International Court of Justice decisions or advi-sory opinions. Why the relationship betweenjus cogens and article 19did not strike the members of the Commission as being about as con-vincing as attempting to argue that for a court to find a contract contrabonus mores and decline to enforce it (e.g., a contract to discouragemarriage) implied that the act involved was criminal is unclear. It isone thing to have a policy safeguarding certain interests of the na-tional or international community and quite a separate matter to de-nominate particular conduct contrary to that policy as criminal. Thisdistinction should be easy to perceive at the international plane where

2 Yearbook.. 1970, vol. 1. pp. 184 et seqT Yearbook.. 1973, vol. 1, pp. 5-14, andvol. IL p. 172, document A/9010/Rev.1.

1 .CJ. Reports 1970, p. 3.

there is an appropriate system for declaring treaties void ab initio. Theacceptance of the notion ofjus cogens was conditioned on acceptanceof the system, i.e., on express acceptance of a role for the Interna-tional Court of Justice. 4 There is no comparable institution for de-nominating certain actions as criminal, no likelihood States wouldconsider accepting one and no basis whatsoever for dealing with thenotion of States as criminals. 5

International Court of Justice Dicta

The leap from the dicta in Barcelona Traction (mention of "obli-gations of a State toward the international community... obligationswhich by their very nature.., are the concern of all States" 16) to arti-cle 19 is even more gravity-defying. In Barcelona Traction the Courtdeclined to find responsibility because it did not recognize thestanding of Belgium to bring action on behalf of the Belgian share-holders of a Canadian corporation which had been allegedly de-frauded by Spanish authorities. The most that could plausibly beinferred from this dicta is the Court's inclination not to be thought todeny completely the existence of erga omnes obligations, not thatthere are qualitatively different kinds of obligations. In other words,the Court was speaking to the scope of application, to whom the obli-gation ran, not the nature of the obligation, civil or criminal.

What seems to have happened is that a large majority of themembers of the Commission became caught up in the mood of themoment. As the commentary puts it, "... there has gradually arisen theconviction".'7 A revealing statement, suggesting that what transpiredwas more a decision based on general circumstances and not a con-clusion flowing from practice, various general statements in the com-

'4 See the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, particularly arti-cles 53, 64 and 66(a) thereof.

'" For an excellent discussion of the inadequacy of the International Courtof Justice to perform this function from a strong supporter of the Court, seeG. Arangio-Ruiz, fifth report on State responsibility, document A/CN.41453/Add.3.para. 106 et seq. What is probably the definitive comment on the role of the Courtin such matters: "... let us be realistic: The idea that a significant part of UNmember States would be prepared to involve the Court in the issues listed inArticle 19 is simply utopian". B. Simma, "Intemational Crimes: Injury and Coun-termeasures-Comments on Part 2 of the ILC work on State responsibility", inJ. H. H. Weiler. A. Cassese, M. Spinedi, eds., International Crimes of State:A Critical Analysis of the ILC's Draft Article 19 on State Responsibiliy (Berlin,W. de Gruyter. 1989), p. 307. In fairness, it must be acknowledged that in itsdiscussion of the content of article 19, as opposed to the rationale for its existence,the Commission admits that peremptory norms and crimes are not quite the samething.

I. C.J. Reports 1970, p. 32.' Yearbook... 1976, vol. II (Part Two), p. 102, para. (15) of the commentary to

article 19.

mentary to the contrary notwithstanding."5 Perhaps some thought thatif a notion such as jus cogens could be swallowed by those who hadoriginally expressed doubts maybe anything would fly.

A careful reading of the Commission's commentary to article 19does not take the matter much further. There is an acknowledgementthat "[fOormerly, the % iew was generally shared that the rules of gen-eral international la%% relating to State responsibility provided for asingle regime of responsibility applying to all internationally wrongfulacts of the State, whatever the content of the obligations breached bysuch acts".'9 One might have expected such a statement to lead to acareful analysis of the reasons for that view and why it had changedor should change.

The decision of the International Court of Justice in the South-West Africa case is lightly discussed and great stress placed on somedicta in the advisory opinion of the Court on the Reservations to theConvention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-cide. - The Commission and the commentary ignore the fact that theConvention speaks to crimes by individuals and that there is no basiswhatsoever anywhere in the advisory opinion on which to ground anotion of "crimes by States". The most that can be squeezed out ofthe dicta is that some of what is in the Convention has become cus-tomary international law and perhaps some basis for the notion oferga omnes violations. Even if weight can be accorded to isolateddicta, the most the sum of all the dicta in question can be made tosuggest is the existence of certain erga omnes obligations. One couldimagine a reasonable and logical inference from these dicta as being ascheme or regime pursuant to which certain internationally wrongfulacts are deemed to breach an obligation essential for the protection offundamental interests of the international community and thus anobligation vis-d-vis all other States. A valid rationale for an ergaotnnes rule or a norm which could even qualify asjus cogens. This is,

Ibid., pp. 117-118. para. (54) of the commentary to article 19.Ibid., p. 97, para. (6) of the commentary to article 19.Presumably, the Commission swept the legislative history of the Genocide

Convention under the rug because it clearly demonstrated that, at the time theGenocide Convention was adopted. States had in mind the civil responsibilht\ ofStates, not criminal responsibility, and that %%as a "former" view. no longer sharedby Professor Ago and his colleagues. See S. Rosenne, "War Crimes and StateResi"-nsibility", Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (1993). pp- 63 et seq. It is onething to establish conduct by an individual as criminal and imputable to a State asparens patriae which in turn is civilly liable, and quite another to assert that theState is also criminally liable. Those who imply the latter result do not explain bywhat alchemy, logic and experience or procedent they transfer the mens rea of theindividual to the legal person of the State. Perhaps the answer is that they meancrime when they speak of individuals and something else when they speak ofStates. Humpty Dumpty said "words me-an what I say they mean". Mr. Dumptcame to a bad end.

however, hardly a basis for concocting notions of penal responsibilityof States or the use of terms suggesting such responsibility.

The Commission simply ignored the record and confused a nec-essary condition with a sufficient condition. The existence of a notionof erga onnes violations is a necessary condition if one were to de-velop a viable notion of "crimes of States", but assuredly not a suffi-cient one. To suggest, as the commentary does, that the "Naulilaa"award's 21 recognition of Portugal's right to take countermeasures or,more precisely, armed reprisals, was an implicit recognition of a sepa-rate category of wrongful act, strains the imagination and, inter alia,ignores the developments in the law concerning the use of force ef-fected by the Charter of the United Nations. The commentary sug-gests that the finding that the breach of the initial obligation and thefailure to make reparation were independent bases for reprisal consti-tutes recognition of "different forms of responsibility". Even if it werenot from an era which, as even the commentary admits, made no dis-tinction based on the character of the obligation breached, all the"Naulilaa" award demonstrates is the lack of any need for the distinc-tion given the flexibility of the system.

This "argumentation" by the Commission in the 1976 commen-taries is followed by a series of analogies, namely (a)jus cogens andthe law of treaties, discussed above; (b) individual responsibility forcertain crimes; and (c) a description of the system of the Charter ofthe United Nations. In addition to these analogies, various writers arerelied upon, not surprisingly beginning with Mr. Tunkin. In lieu of any-thing better, the commentary cites authorities such as Philip Jessup asimplicitly supporting the idea of "international crimes of States" onthe grounds that they recognize the existence of erga omnes vio-lations.2

2

For those who do not find arguments by analogy as very satis-factory bases for creating an entirely novel legal notion, there is thetotal absence of State practice to support such a leap. For those whomight not find citation of Tunkin et al. a sufficient basis, there is theabsence of any discussion of what might be the consequences of sucha novel invention as "crimes of States". The absence of any discussionof such consequences, the truly critical issue, is explained away as theproduct of forbearance, since such questions must be taken up in an-other Part of the Commission's draft. When the Commission dealtwith Part Two in the 1980s and 1990s, there was insistence, on the partof the proponents of article 19, on not reopening Part One. Serious

21 Responsibility of Germany arising out of daino, ge caused in the I'orluguesecolonies of southern Africa, UNRIAA, vol. 11, pp. 1025 et seq.

22 Ph. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nattions: An Introduction (New York,MacMillan, 1948), pp. II et seq.

reflection in the Commission was, in short, stifled as premature in thebeginning and precluded thereafter.

The trendy 1970s nature of what was going on when article 19was adopted is crystal clear from the content of the article and theapparent total lack of concern to link any leap to the notion of crimi-nal responsibility of States with some idea of the legal consequencesfor States or the international legal system of such a notion beyondnoting in general terms that -the only justification.., is to enable theconsequences... to be differentiated...". 23 The fact, as noted above, thatthe elaboration of the substance laden article 19 was inconsistent withthe decision to limit the entire exercise to secondary rules was ignoredentirely. The more subtle, inclusive, useful and, in various ways, lesstroublesome notion of erga omnes obligations, devoid of the excite-ment of the use of the glaring word "crime" as it was, was not onlyapparently ignored but worse yet, implicitly prejudiced by the formu-lation of article 19.

Article 19 is a reflection of the political climate and mood of the1960s and 1970s and little more. The complete absence of State prac-tice provides no basis for regarding the notion as lex lata; nor do pre-posterous assertions by the Commission in its commentary, such as... conventional instruments-including, in particular, the UnitedNations Charter...-which show that breaches of certain internationalobligations are recognized as international crimes". 24

Indeed, if one were to take account of State practice, one wouldhave to note that the documents relating to the surrender of Germanyand Japan and the statutes and judicial decisions relevant to theNiimberg and Tokyo International Military Tribunals do not speak ofthe criminal responsibility of States. Considering the horrors of theSecond World War and the deeds perpetrated by the axis powers, it isreasonable to assume that had there been any basis for speaking of"crimes of States", there would have been some hint of it in one oranother of these documents. In fact. the Judgment at Ntirnbergstates the following: "Crimes against international law are committedby men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individualswho commit such crimes can the provision of international law beenforced"."- That statement seems to the author as valid today as itwas then.

? See Yearbook_.. 1976. voL II (Part Two), p. 117. para. (52) of the commentaryto article 19.

- Yearbook... 1976, vol. II (Part Two). p. 120, para. (64) of the commentary toarticle 19.

5 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression: Opinion and Judgement (United StatesGovernment Printing Office., 1947). p. 53. N.B. the implication that to focus onso-called crimes of States will, in the informed opinion of the Judgement. weakenthe focus where it counts-i.e., on individuals.

The issue, therefore, is whether there is a compelling basis forendorsing the notion of "crimes of States" as a statement de legefe-renda or an example of progressive development. While some publi-cists from some nations endorse the concept some of the time, noneprovide compelling legal or logical grounds for regarding the notion asexisting.2 6 That the 1976 commentary expresses in strong terms that itwould be a mistake to believe there is only one regime of responsibil-ity is undeniable. But saying it did not make it so in 1976, and doesnot make it so in 1996. State practice, if it existed, could, but there isno such State practice. Indeed, one of the noteworthy aspects of thecommentary to article 19 is its one sidedness and its failure to ac-knowledge the existence, much less analyse the substance of, contraryviews, the requirements of the Statute of the International Law Com-mission to include differing views in the commentary to a draft sub-mitted on first reading to the contrary notwithstanding.27 The explicitrejection of the idea of "crimes of States" by such States as Australia,France, Greece, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States under-lines the non-existence of the idea as lex lata and some of the prob-lems that will be created by efforts to press the notion as a matter ofprogressive development of the law.

Aside from the delicious base it provides for agitation propa-ganda, the case for creating the notion of "crimes by States" thereforedoes not seem very compelling unless there were to be some basis inPart Two of the Commission's draft articles on State responsibilitydealing with consequences of a breach which would seem to requireor be importantly enriched by the existence of two separate regimesof responsibility and that one of them be denominated as "crimes".

Consequences of a Breach

A normal reader, even a trained lawyer, on reading the term"crime"' would be likely to assume that we have entered the realm ofpenal law and that some form of collectiv punishment or guilt is envis-aged by way of consequences. Indeed, it is hard to imagine why anyonewould choose to use the word "crime" absent an intent to inflict punitivedamages of some sort. While one can only guess at what the Commissionhad in mind in 1976, it seems reasonable to assume that it did not havein mind collective guilt or punishment in violation of the rule impossi-

' See A. J. J. de Hoogh, Obligations Erga Omnes and lternational Crimes:A Theoretical Inquiry into the Inplementation and Enforcement of the Interna-tional Responsibility of States (The Hague. Kluwer, 1996). While the author of thisarticle is not prepared to agree with all of de Hoogh's positions, some of which aretaken as givens when they should be challenged, such as article 19 itself, this is thebest work on the issues written to date.

27 Statute of the International Law Commission, Article 20(b).

bile est quod societas delinquat.2 One must assume that the SpecialRapporteur and the Commission knew that the term "crime". in addi-tion to creating the impression of collective punishment, would sug-gest the idea of impartial trial and judgement. Whether the Interna-tional Court of Justice was considered a suitable institution is notindicated, but it seems unlikely on a %ariety of grounds. -9 The Com-mission was doubtless aware that Article 36. paragraph 2. of the Stat-ute of the International Court of Justice deals with "reparation... forthe breach of an international obligation" and that consequently thereseems a potential clash between draft article 19 and the Statute of theCourt. One must also assume the Special Rapporteur Professor Ago.and the members of the Commission recognized that facilitating theuse of an emotive term such as "crime" would, in specific instances.elevate the level of the dispute when what is likely to be needed is tolower the level of accusation and counteraccusation.

In light of the Commission plunging ahead with article 19 in spiteof all the obstacles or grounds for caution, one must assume that theCommission envisaged important consequences flowing from the dis-tinction. It would, after all, have been a far simpler matter to recognizethat there are a range of more and less serious breaches and that theconsequences should relate to the seriousness. Indeed. common senseand well-established practice led to the conclusion that such a notionmust be presumed to exist for what the Commission calls delicts andfor other wrongful acts as well. The Commission even suggests thatsuch a range of consequences would be necessary for so-calledcritMs.

30

It is possible that the Commission had in mind the notion of faultof more precisely the intentional commission of a wrongful act, but

3 The Commission in its commentary to article 30 of Part One did. however,take the position that countermeasures may not only be used to -secure perform-ame bi to inflict punishment". Yearbook-. 1979. vol. II (Part Two). p. 116.parm(3) of the commentary to article 30. In its commentary to article 19. theCmimission says it uses the term -crime" -because it has come into common usemiepnetice of States.... Yearbook.- 1976. vol. Ii (Part Two), p 118. para. (59)ethecrimmentary toarticle 19. The absence of convincing examples of meaningful"muonng use" is striking- Some scholars suggest that punitive damage awardsapi vue commercial corporations provide a basis for ignoring the impossi-be e adnw This ignores the distinction between profit motivated purchasers of*ats and posple who happen to find themselves resident or nationals of a Stateas rid as ownuous otlier differences between a State and a private corporation.

3See fonmnote 15 above. See also Oppenheim's International La.. 9th ed..ILUtigs aid A. Watts, eds. (HMarlow. Essex. Longman, 1992). vol. I: Peace.0t335, fhoemwe 13. contra, to the effect that there would be nothing to prevent theCam fron Rftg crininal responsibility if so authorized by a treaty. (No sup-

P umentatim is pividal.)YwmbmkL 1976. vol. U (Pan Two). p. 117. para. (53) of the commentary to

no such statements were made at the time. It is, in any event, not veryplausible to attempt to transfer the notion of mens rea from the realmof criminal law vis-6-vis individuals to the law of State responsibility.And if the Commission had had the notion of fault in mind in 1976 orsubsequently, would not such a notion have a place in the realm cov-ered by the term "delicts" as well? Indeed, the language of article 42dealing with reparation strongly suggests, at the least, that the omis-sion of fault elsewhere was conscious. 3'

Since the Commission, in 1976, declined to involve itself in thelegal consequences of the neologistic elements of article 19 save for afew comments in passing by individual members, it was left for thefuture members of the Commission and future Special Rapporteurs todetermine what the consequences might be and, in the end, whetherthey were such as to justify or mandate the retention of article 19 ofPart One. Indeed, the case for the retention of article 19 or any otherregime which seeks to elaborate qualitatively different categories ofinternationally wrongful acts, depends on the establishment of anoverwhelming need for it emerging from the analysis of the conse-quences. As de Hoogh puts it, on "whether it is possible to envisage aregime of responsibility applicable to international crimes that wouldbe substantially aggravated compared to the regime of responsibilityapplicable to international delicts".3 2

Before embarking on an examination of what the Commissionhas done with regard to consequences, it should be noted that nothingin the system of the Charter of the United Nations in general or Chap-ter VII of the Charter in particular requires or is facilitated by such adistinction. The Charter system was created at a time when no suchdistinction between categories of breaches existed. The Charter sys-tem has functioned without experiencing any impediment flowingfrom such a unitary view of the responsibility regime. Indeed, giventhat the role of the United Nations in this area is to restore or maintainpeace, any regime focused on secondary rules of State responsibilityis largely irrelevant. This is true because the Charter system is a self-contained system in which Articles 1, 2, 23, 24, 25 and Chapter VIIprovide the necessary basis and flexibility for such action as is con-templated and as has been taken to date. The Commission is welladvised not to attempt to include the Charter system in its regime forState responsibility and expressly to exclude it. In fact, this is basi-cally the approach recommended by Professor Riphagen when he

31 Article 42 provides in paragraph 2 that: "In the determination of reparation,account shall be taken of the negligence or the wilful act or omission of: (a) theinjured State; or (b) a national Ithereof]" (emphasis added). Report of the Intena-tional L.aw Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session, Official Recordsof the General Assembly, Fifty-first Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/51/10). p. 141.

" De Hoogh, op. cit. (footnote 26 above), p. 397.

served as Special Rapporteur and the one the Commission has fol-lowed in article 39 of its draft

3 3

Thc Commission, in its commentary to article 30 of Part One sug-gests that countermeasures to acts of a criminal character could bepunitive in nature 3-- a not particularly appealing rationale for theinclusion of the concept and not one that the Commission has fol-lowed, at least not expressly.

The somewhat baroque and theoretical matrix within which theCommission has dealt with consequences of a breach involve "objec-tive" and "subjective viewpoints" within the framework of "substan-tive and instrumental consequences". The distinction between theobjective and subjective viewpoints is well explained by the mostrecent Special Rapporteur. Professor Arangio-Ruiz, as follows: 35

Objective viewpoint-"whether and in what way the severity of thebreaches in question aggravates the content and reduces the limits ofthe consequences-substantial and instrumental--that characterizean ordinary [sic] erga omnes breach"; subjective viewpoint-whetherthe importance of the rule breached involves any changes in the rela-tionship between the wrongdoer and all other States or the injuredStates themselves. The substantive consequences are the sum of thelegal obligations of the wrongdoer resulting from the act or omissionand the instrumental consequences, the measures that may be takenin response. In his analyses of the substantive consequences, Profes-sor Arangio-Ruiz identified what in his yiew were the only aspectsconcerning which the question of a different regime for "crimes" couldresult in a different regime in terms of substantive consequences-namely, are those forms of reparation subject to certain limits withregard to delicts subject to lesser or no limits when the wrongful actis a "crime"? Professor Arangio-Ruiz implicitly recognized a lack ofany basis in State practice for a distinction based on a division ofwrongful acts into the categories of "delict" and "crime".

Professor Riphagen, the previous Special Rapporteur. shared theview that a special regime for the consequences of a "crime", saveperhaps for the Charter's provisions concerning aggression, does not

reflect lex iata.-6 Professor Riphagen differentiated the regime for the

" Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighthsession, Official Records of the General Assembly. Fifty-firs: Session, SupplementNo. IO (A5I1/IO). pp. 139-140.

" Yearbook... 1979, vol. 11 (Part Two), paras. (2) and (22) of the commentaryto article 30.

' See Arangio-Ruiz, fifth report on Stale responsibility, op. cit. (footnote 15above), para. 61 et seq.

' Yearbook... 1983. vol. !1 (Part One). pp. II and 13. document A/CNA/366and Add.. paras. 58 and 67.

consequences of a "crime" and that of any other delict only with re-gard to the instrumental consequences, treating the substantive con-sequences as the same for both "delicts" and "crimes". He would notonly forbid any State to recognize as legal the situation created bysuch a "crime "or assist a perpetrator in maintaining the situation cre-ated by the "crime", but would obligate all other States to afford "mu-tual assistance in carrying out the [aforesaid] obligations".37

The propriety or legal soundness of this approach is not as ques-tionable as its necessity. Is a State free to recognize as legal the resultsof a situation brought about by delictual conduct, particularly thatwhich violates an erga omnes obligation? Is a State free to aid andabet a wrongdoing state in maintaining the consequences of its delic-tual conduct that violates an erga omnes obligation? If the answer toeither of these questions is negative, then the provisions seem thinjustification for including such a notion as "crimes of States", not tomention the problems created by the a contrario implications in thebroader, erga ornnes, context. It is not altogether clear what the prac-tical effect could be of the requirement of mutual assistance with re-gard to non-recognition and not aiding and abetting. To the extent thatthe situation involves a use of force, in contravention of the Charterof the United Nations, and self-defence, or other conduct which canplausibly be said to threaten the peace, the cases in which assistanceby third States seems most pressing, the regime of the Charterwhereby third States are, in appropriate circumstances, free to aid butobligated to do so only on decision by the Security Council, seemspreferable and sufficient. The remaining relevant cases that could beplausibly denominated as "crimes" but which would not amount tothreats to the peace are likely to be so few and far between as to makethis an insufficient ground to institute the notion of "crimes of States".

Professor Arangio-Ruiz, who served as Special Rapporteur from1987 until May of 1996, raised the question as to whether the require-ment of a demand can be satisfied by a demand from anyone but theprincipal victim, if any, suggesting that it might be relevant to distinc-tions in Part Two based on article 19 of Part One. To the extent thatthis concern is valid, it should be equally valid for all erga omnes vio-lations or, as article 40 as currently drafted establishes, for cases inwhich the prime victim is not a State.38

So far as claims for reparation are concerned, there would seemto be no basis for going beyond what is already in or what could be

" Yearbook... 1982, vol. 11 (Part One), p. 48. document AICN.4/354 and Add.Iand 2 (proposed article 6).

"a Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighthsession, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-first Session, SupplementNo. /0 (A/5I/10), p. 140.

added, without any need for article 19 of Part One. to the articlesdealing with delicts. There seems no basis for distinguishing betweenthe moral damage caused by violation of an erga omnes obligationsuch as those contained in the Universal Declaration of HumanRights or one of the Human Rights Covenants and a particular act thatwas unfashionable enough or whose prohibition was regarded asinsufficiently threatening to the governing elites of the majority ofStates to make it on to the article 19 list. So far as the right to takecountermeasures is concerned, there seems, save for the inherent rightof individual or collective self-defence as recognized in the Charter,with one possible exception little basis for granting States "indirectlyinjured" by a -crime" or by a violation of an erga omnes obligation aright to take countermeasures. The one possible exception, would bethe idea of a right of humanitarian intervention uti singuli. Whilehumanitarian intervention pursuant to a recommendation or decisionby a competent United Nations organ should raise relatively few con-cerns and for reasons already stated does not depend on the existenceof a notion of "crimes by States", the question of a right of human-itarian intervention uti singuli is more complex and debatable andshould not be resolved as an incidental consequence of article 19 ofPart One of the draft articles on State responsibility. As noted above,some scholars suggest that, although countermeasures are not accept-able legally if they go beyond being means to compel compliance withprimary or secondary obligations and constitute punishment, thatlimitation may not exist in the case of "crimes'. 3 9 To grant explicitlyso broad a right of countermeasures uti singuli would seem question-able, to grant such a right upon approval of the community of States,redundant in the light of Chapter VII of the Charter.4

So far as measures involving the use of force are concerned.Article 2 and Chapter VII of the Charter state the law and it is neithernecessary nor appropriate for the Commission to involve itself inthese issues as part of its draft articles on State responsibility. Inaddition to it being unnecessary from a legal point of view for theCommission to do so, particularly in the context of State responsibil-ity, it would be imprudent on several levels. It is highly questionablewhether such issues should be dealt with by a body of independentexperts rather than a body of governmental representatives such as

See K. Zemanek. -The Unilateral Enforcement of Obligations-. Zeitschriftfar auslindisches offentiches Recht und Vilkerrecht (1987). pp. 32 and 37-38, onthis issue and in general. for a particularly illuminating analysis of the structure ofthe International Law Commission's handling of primary and secondary rules, theplace and limits of countermeasures (reprisals) therein, and a proper view of -self-contained" regimes.

' See, for example. E. Jimcnez de Arechaga, "Crimes of States, Jus Standiand Third States", in Wciler, Cassese. Spinedi. op. cit. (footnote 15 above). p. 255.

produced the Declaration on Principles of International Law Con-cerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accord-ance with the Charter of the United Nations. 4'

With all this in mind, the Commission decided at its forty-seventhsession not to reopen the discussion of Part One and reconsider thequestions posed by article 19. The Commission also decided not topostpone the consideration of the consequences of article 19 to a sec-ond reading when both article 19 and the consequences could havebeen considered together, as suggested by then Professor, now Judge,Vereschetin when he was Chairman of the International Law Com-mission at its forty-sixth session. Instead, the Commission decided totreat article 19 as a given for the purposes of completing the firstreading of Parts Two and Three. Part One was argued to have beencompleted on first reading in 1976.

In considering the consequences of article 19 for Parts Two andThree, the Commission had before it the proposals of ProfessorRiphagen, the results of its preliminary consideration of the Riphagenproposals and the far more extensive and ambitious proposals put for-ward by Professor Arangio-Ruiz.

Professor Riphagen and Professor Arangio-Ruiz were in agree-ment in large measure that the substantive consequences of a "crime"and a "delict" were largely the same. Professor Arangio-Ruiz alsoagreed in large measure with Professor Riphagen's proposals forinstrumental consequences. Professor Arangio-Ruiz, however, alsorecommended the creation of a complex regime for handling accusa-tions that a "crime" had been committed by a State. He proposed thatthe General Assembly and the Security Council be authorized to de-cide whether "... the allegation is sufficiently substantiated as to jus-tify the grave concern of the international community..." and if it sodecided, States Members of the United Nations party to the State re-sponsibility convention could "bring the matter to the InternationalCourt of Justice by unilateral application for the Court to decide by ajudgement whether the alleged international crime has been or is beingcommitted..... States were to be barred from taking countermeasuresuntil this matter was decided, though they were to be permitted totake "... such urgent, interim measures as are required to protect therights of an injured State or to limit the damage..." subject to the re-quirement of proportionality.4 2

4' General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970.* G. Arangio-Ruiz, eighth report on State responsibility, document A/CN.4/

476 and Add. I and Corr. I.

Professor Arangio-Ruiz's complex scheme was not endorsed bythe Commission which in turn led Professor Arangio-Ruiz to resign asSpecial Rapporteur."3

The reasons Professor Arangio-Ruiz's proposals were not ac-cepted included but were not limited to the fact: that some membersthought aspects of it were contrary to the Charter; that given thelength of time it would take for a matter to be handled by the GeneralAssembly or the Security Council and then the International Court ofJustice it was impractical; the unfairness of putting greater hurdles inthe way of countermeasures against a "crime" than in response to a"delict"; the unlikelihood that States would be prepared to accept thecompulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in theextremely sensitive area of so-called crimes.

The regime finally adopted by the Comminsion for dealing withthe particular consequences of an act denominated as a "crime" iscontained in articles 51, 52 and 53, which in turn affect articles 43and 45.44 Article 40, moreover, provides that all States may be re-garded as injured States when the right which was infringed by the actof a State "has been created or is established for the protection ofhuman rights and fundamental freedoms"; and "if the internationallywrongful act constitutes an international crime....

Article 52 removes two limitations on the right of the injuredState to restitution in kind when the internationally wrongful act is a"crime", namely, %here the burden on the wrongdoing State is dispro-portionate to the benefit to the injured State and where restitution inkind would jeopardize the political independence or economic stabil-ity of the wrongdoing State would be jeopardized.

The other consequence of the internationally wrongful act beingdenominated a "crime" would be that all States would be obligated:

(a) not to recognize as lawful the situation created by the"crime";

(b) not to render aid or assistance to the State which has com-mitted the "crime" in maintaining the situation so created;

(c) to cooperate with other States in carrying out the obliga-tions under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above; and

(d) to cooperate with other States in the application of meas-ures designed to eliminate the consequences of the "crime".

"See docuuments AICN4/SR2436 and 2-t'Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth

session, Official Records of the General Asscmbly. Fifty-first Session. SupplementNo. 1O (AI5 1/10), pp. 142-143 and 146.

The totality of the consequences derived from denominating awrongful act as a "crime" do not, in the writer's opinion, amount to acompelling case for maintaining the distinction. The a contrario impli-cations vis-li-vis other crga ornnes obligations, moreover, are seri-ously disturbing. By the very application of these consequences to"crimes", the Commission appears to be denying them to other ergaomnes violations as well as other situations of wrongful acts to whichat least some of them ought to apply. What possible reason could existfor not applying most if not all of these consequences to all ergaomnnes violations?

Finally, there is the question as to whether it is necessary to havea regime for determining if a particular wrongful act is a "crime". Theconsequences of denominating a wrongful act a "crime" as set out inarticles 51 and 52 do not seem to require a special regime, both be-cause they are not so significant and because they arise only at theaward stage after a determination. A plausible case can, however, bemade that, although States are free to take the measures contained inarticle 53, if they are to be obligated to take such steps, an authorita-tive prior determination would be extremely helpful, if not essential.The problems in elaborating a regime that States could reasonably beexpected to accept and that could issue a determination which wouldbe effective for all States are enormous. Are the provisions of arti-cle 53 in their present form, or in any form, necessary?

These questions, like so many others, raise the issue as towhether the category of "crimes" is necessary. This issue in this con-text should be answered in light of the question whether there are actsthat the international community would denominate as "crimes"which are not also a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or anact of aggression. If the acts constitute threats to the peace or more,they provide a basis for action by the Security Council, including theaction provided for by article 53 as well as more rigorous action. Ifthis does not convince the proponents of the notion of "crime" to dropthe idea, thought will need to be given to whether it is necessary orpossible to create a mechanism for determining whether a "crime" hasbeen committed which in no way, legally or practically, cuts across theauthority and ability of the United Nations to act under Chapter VIIof the Charter.

CoScluIson

There is no basis in State practice for distinguishing between "de-licts" and "crimcs". There does not, in the view of the writer, seem to beany logically or politically compelling reason tocreate such a distinction.Nothing in the Commission's work on the consequences of a breachappears sufficiently significant to compel the creation of a new category

of wrongful acts. Indeed, the creation of such a category. in addition tonot producing any compelling positive result, raises problems con-cerning, infer alia, the treatment of erga omnes violations.

The timely views of States as expressed in the General Assemblyand in written comments should address themselves to a number ofimportant questions posed by the Commission's now completed draftarticles on State responsibility. The question of "crimes by States" isone of the areas on which such comments are essential. In additionto. or as part of the comments on the utility of retaining the notion of"crimes by States", it would be helpful if the comments addressed thegeneral question of the consequences of denominating an act as crimi-nal and the specific question of whether there should be punitive dam-ages as suggested by the then Special Rapporteur Professor Ago, andif so, who should be empowered to so determine.

The Commission is likely to pay heed to such comments as it hasto those submitted in response to first drafts on other topics, mostcurrently the draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security ofMankind. It is only by a positive interaction between States and theCommission that viable answers will emerge to the question whetherthere should be a qualitative distinction among internationally wrong-ful acts and the other key question raised by the draft presented bythe Commission.

VIVE LE CRIME!REMARQUES SUR LES DEGRES DE L'ILLICITE

EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL

Alain Pellet

I. Le 6juillet 1976, la Commission du droit international adop-tait l'unanimit6 le texte de I'article 19' de la prernire partie de sonprojet d'articles sur la responsabilit6 des Etats2. Ainsi se trouvait con-sacr.e la distinction entre les ,,crimes,, d'une part, et les oddlits ,intemationaux d'autre part. En ddpit des critiques de la doctrine con-servatrice et malgre de vives pressions de certains de ses membres etde quelques Etats, minoritaires mais influents, au sein de l'Assembl&egfndrale, pour qu'elle renonce a la distinction 3, la Commission I'a fer-mement maintenue en 1996, lorsqu'elle a adopt6 la seconde pattiede son projet d'articles, dont le chapitre V est consacrd aux consd-quences des <Crimes intemationaux ,'.

De tris fortes raisons, tant th~oriques5 que pratiques, militent enfaveur du maintien de la distinction entre deux cat6gories distinctes

Alors article 18.2 Annuaire... 1976. vol. 1, p. 256.

' Ces prcssions se sont traduites par un compromis que reflte la r-solution50/45 de I'Assemblec genErale en date du I I decembre 1995 et appelant la Commis-sion A . reprendre ses travaux concernant le projet d'articles sur ]a responsabilitddes Etats dc manire a ce que la premiere lecture puisse etre achevde [en 19961 entenant compte des opinions divergentes exprimees au cours du d~bat qui s'estddroulI sur le sujet A la Sixi~me Commission afin que des approches alternati-ves puissent Etre ddvelopp&es en cas de besoin.. Les -opinions divergentes,auxquelles fait allusion I'Assembl6e concernent Ic bien-fondd de la distinctionentre crimes et ddlits et les ,approches alternatives , qu'elle suggere auraientconsist6, pour la Commission, Ai r6diger la seconde partie de son projet concernantle contenu, les formes et les degrds de la responsabilit6, en distinguant deux hy-potheses: le maintien de cette distinction ou sa suppression.

' Articles 51 a 53. Voir le Rapport de la Commission du droit international surles travaux de sa quarante-huitieme session, Documents officiels de IAssembldeginirale, cinquante et unime session. Suppldnent n'1O (A/5 1/10). pp. 188-206.

1 La littdrature consacrc aux crimes internationaux de I'Etat est considdrable.On se bornera A mentionner J. Weiler. A. Cassese et M. Spinedi, 6dit., InternationalCrimes of State -A Critical Analysis of the ILC's Draft Article 19 on StaleResponsibility. Berlin-Ncw York. W. de Gruytcr, 1989. 368 p. et a renvoyer ii lalitt~rature citde par Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz dans son cinquime rapport (documentA/CN.4/453 ct Add.I i 3) et P. I. Dupuy. , Responsabilitd et 1dgalitd , in Soci&tefranraise pour le droit international, Colloque du Mans, La responsabilite dans lesysteme international. Paris, Pddone, 1991. note 13, pp. 268-269.

de faits internationalement illicites, m~me si l'on peut 6prouverquelque doute sur le bien-fond6 des excmples dont la Commission acru devoir assortir sa definition (I). En revanche, les appellations rete-nues, dont la connotation prnaliste est trompeuse, les consequencesque la deuxi~me partie du projet d'articles de la Commission du droitinternational tire de cette nrcessaire distinction et les incertitudes quien rdsultent quant Ai I'unicit6 ou A la diversit6 du rrgimejuridique descrimes risquent d'Ztre source de confusions auxquelles on veutesprrer qu'il sera portd rem~de A ]'occasion de la seconde lecture duprojet (II).

I.

2. Earticle 19 du projet d'articles sur la responsabilit6 des Etatsest ainsi r&Iig6:

,, 1. Le fait d'un Etat qui constitue une violation d'une obli-gation internationale est un fait internationalement illicite quel quesoit l'objet de l'obligation viole.

<,2. Le fait illicite qui rdsulte d'une violation par un Etatd'une obligation si essentielle pour la sauvegarde d'int&rts fon-damentaux de la communautd internationale que sa violation estreconnue comme un crime par cette comnmunaut6 dans son ensem-ble constitue un crime international.

<<3. Sous rfserve des dispositions du paragraphe 2 etd'aprbs les rZgles du droit international en vigueur, un crime inter-national peut notamment rtsulter:

,<a) d'une violation grave d'une obligation internationaled'importance essentielle pour le maintien de la paix et de la sdcu-rit6 internationales, comme celle interdisant I'agression;

< b) d'une violation grave d'une obligation internationaled'importance essentielle pour la sauvegarde du droit des peuples

disposer d'eux-memes, comme celle interdisant l'6tablissementou le maintien par la force d'unc domination coloniale;

<< c) d'une violation grave et a une large 6chelle d'une obli-gation internationale d'importance essentielle pour la sauvegardede l'tre humain, comme celles interdisant lesclavage, le gtno-cide, I'apartheid;

- d) d'une violation grave d'une obligation essentielle pourla preservation de I'environnement humain, comme celles inter-disant la pollution massive de I'atmosph~re ou des mers.

,,4. Tout fait internationalement illicite qui n'est pas uncrime international conforncdment au paragraphe 2 constitue unddlit international , 6.

Autant la construction intellectuelle rdsultant des paragraphes 1.2 et 3 de cette disposition ne mfrite pas les critiques, parfois acerbes,dont elle a fait, et continue de faire l'objet et autant les problmesposes par la determination des crimes internationaux paraissent sur-montables, autant les exemples donnds au paragraphe 3 semblent dis-cutables dans leur principe et dans leur dnoncd.

3. La codification du droit de la responsabilitd internationaleentreprise par la Commission du droit international depuis le milieudes ann~es 1950' a td loccasion d'unc rdflexion sans pr&6&dent surle concept m.me de responsabilitd internationale de I'Etat, dont lesens et la porte ont dtd pr&cisds de maniitre remarquablement nova-trice.

Dans la conception dominante classique. toujours d6fendue parune partie de la doctrine, tout particuli~rement en France, [lI]a res-ponsabilitd consiste [...] dans une obligation de rdparer le dommage ,g.Dans son deuxi~me rapport, Ago opposait cette definition a cellescion laquelle ]a responsabilit6 serait definie par le droit de rfagir quien r~sulterait au profit de la victime de l'acte illicite et il se prononqaiten faveur d'une voie moyenne combinant les deux approches etempruntant i chacune9 . Tr~s logiquement, il en d luisait une ddfini-tion tr s gdndrale de la responsabilit6, terme qui d.signerait (l 'ensem-ble des relations juridiques nouvelles auxquelles un fait internatio-nalement illicite d'un Etat peut donner naissance ,H0. Pour la (, v~rit6historique *, on peut relever que le Rapporteur special ne prenait pasle contre-pied de la these traditionnelle: il ddfinissait toujours la res-

6 Le projet d'articles stur la responsabilitd des Etats adoptd en premiere lecturepar La Commission du droit international est reproduit dans lc Rapport de [a Com-mission du droit international sur les travaux de sa quarante-huiti&em session.Documents officiels de I'Assemblie ginerale, cinquante et unidme session. Sup-pliment n' 10 (A/51/10), pp. 148-172-

7 Un premier Rapporteur spciaJ, F. V. Garcia-Amador a 6ti nommd en 1955:celui-ci a rddigd six rapports sur le sujet de 1956 5 1961. Ce nest cependant qu'hpartir de 1969 que. sous 'impulsion de R. Ago. la Commission s'est engag6e dansune vigoureuse rdflexion en profondeur sur [a notion mdme de responsabilit6 endroit international.

'Jean Combacau in J. Combacau et S. Sur, Droit international public. Paris,Domat-Montchrestien. 1995. p. 535 Dans le mme sens. voir egalement. G. Cot-tcreau, * Systeme juridique et notion de responsabilitc-., in Socidtd franqaise pourle droit international, op. cit. (supra note 5), pp. 3-90. not. pp. 21-2.

'Annuaire... 1970, vol. 11, pp. 193-195. par. 16A 18.10 Troisien rapport, Annuaire.. 1971, vol II (premiere partie), p. 213, par. 19.

ponsabilit6 par ses consdquences; simplement - mais c'6tait d6j.i uneavancde considdrable -, il dlargissait celle-ci en se gardant de leslimiter A l'obligation de r6parer.

Cette approche continue h impr6gner nom~re de dispositionsadopt~es ultdrieurement par la Commission du droit international etd'abord l'intitul6 meme des deux premieres parties de son projet quiopposent I',, Origine), (premiere partie) aux ,< Contenu, formes et de-gr6s >> de la responsabilit6 internationale (deuxiime partie), ce quiparaft bien impliquer que les obligations risultant du fait internatio-nalement illicite constituent le e contenuo mime de ]a responsabilit6.

4. On peut, et l'on devrait sans doute, aller plus loin dans le sensde I'-objectivisation >, de la responsabilit6 qui est la situation rnmeengendr6e par le manquement, sans qu'il soit besoin, ce stade, de sepr6occuper des cons6quences de cette situation qui, a la limite, peutn'en produire aucune. C'est du reste cc qui r6sulte du texte du cdlbrearticle premier du projet d'articles:

,Tout fait internationalement illicite d'un Etat engage saresponsabilit6 internationale >>.

La responsabilit6 est la situation resultant du fait internationa-lement illicite. A son tour, elle produit, le cas 6chdant, des cons6-quences: obligations de cesser le comportement illicite, de rdparer etde donner des assurances et des garanties de non-rfptition pourI'Etat responsable, droit de prendre des contre-mesures pour I'Etat oules Etats 16s6s. Apr~s tout, lorsque je grille un feu rouge. je suis res-ponsable, du seul fait que j'ai viol6 une obligation juridique, que monacte ait ou non causd un dommage, qu'un gendarme se soit ou nontrouvd 1I pour verbaliser.

Cette conception <(objective ,,It de la responsabilit6 t6moigne desprogr~s - relatifs - de la solidarit6 internationale. Dans une socidt6oil les souverainetds dtaient juxtaposdes et oi la notion mfme de,, communaut6)) internationale n'avait aucune place, la responsabilit6pouvait, sans inconvenient, 8tre conque sur un fondement purementinter-subjectif, c'est-a-dire tre dffinic par les effets qu'elle produitdans les relations des Etats entre eux. Ceci n'est plus possible ds lorsque l'on admet que le droit n'est plus seulement le garant de l'ind6-pendance des Etats, mais est aussi le reflet et le gage de leur inter-

" -Objective,, en ce qu'elle s'oppose hi la conception inter-subjective tradi-tionnelle, mais eli ne doit pas etre confondue avec la respon.sabilitd sans manque-ment au droit, dont le fait gt6rateur est le risque ou le dommage et qui fait lobjetd'un autre sujet 6tudi6 par la Commission du droit international sous le titre:,< Responsabilitd pour les consdquences pri'judiciablcs d&coulant d'activit6s qui nesont pas interdites par le droit international ,.

d4pcndance et de leurs intdrEts communs, dont la ,communauteinternationale ,, aussi imparfaite soit-elle, est le dpositaire' 2.

5. Que l'on retienne la position de compromis prdsent~e parAgo13 ou celle, plus radicale, retenue ici, i'analyse du rdgime de laresponsabilit6 internationale s'en trouve ncessairement modifi~e.D'une part. ses consdquences cessent d'Etre univoques (obligation derdparer) et comprennent. d'une faqon plus gdndrale (et correspondantmieux ht l'obscrvation de la rt~alit6), l'ensemble des reactions bi I'illicitereconnues en droit international 4, y compris le droit pour les Etats16s s de prendre. bi certaines conditions, des contre-mesures 5 . D'autrepart, il devient logique et, a vrai dire. ineluctable, de distinguer deuxcategories de faits internationalement illicites: ceux qui concernentuniquement les relations de certains Etats entre eux et qui ne mettentpas en cause les fondements m~mes sur lesquels reposent la fragileintegration de la socidt6 internationale en une communaut6 veritable,d'une part; ceux qui. au contraire, menacent les intr&ts fondamen-taux de celle-ci. d'autre part.

Malgr6 une these souvent soutenue, it n'y a pas l1 une simplediff&ence de degrds 16 entre ces deux categories de faits internatio-nalement illicites, mais, bel et bien, une difference de nature: par leurnature meme, les premiers mettent en cause les seuls interfts desEtats concernds, alors que les seconds atteignent la socidtd interna-tionale des Etats (et, peut-Etre, des individus-c'est alors d',hu-manit6,* qu'il faut parler) clans son ensemble. Ceci justifie la distinc-tion entre deux formes. bien diffdrentes, de responsabilits, ayant desconsdluences et des rdgimes juridiques nettement sdpards.

Ce n'est pas la pure argutie thdorique. Qui ne voit qu'entre ung6nocide et la violation banalc d'une clause d'un traitd de commerceentre deux Etats, it n'existe pas de commune mesure ? - sinon une:l'un et I'autre sont l'origine de la responsabilit6 de I'Etat auquel le

'2 Sur le concept juridiquc de communauti internationale et ses effets dans ledomaine de la formation du droit, voir Ch- Tomuschat. -,Obligations Arising forStates Without or Against Their Will -, Recuedi des cours.. 1993-1V. vol. 241.pp. 195-374. passim et, plus particulicrement, pp. 232-240.

'" Mdme si elle a paru i certains tris . rdvolutionnare ,. au moment oi elle adtd present6ce. Prosper Weil. qui l'interprete de maniere sans doute trop radicale, laqualifie encore d'. approche rvolutionnaire , (. Le droit international en quf3te deson identitd -Cours gcnra de droit international public,, Recued des cours...1992-V. vol. 237. p. 339).

Voir supra n* 4.5 Curicusement. les Etats et les autcurs qui sont le plus favorables .i ['exten-

sion du droit de riposter a I'illicite par des contre-mesurs sont aussi les plusrdicents pour admettre Ic bien-fond& des nouvelles approches de la responsabilit6.seules susceptibles, pourtant. d'en justifier l'usage au plan th6orique.

'6 A cel egard 6galement (voir supra n' 3). I'initulk de la deuxi!me partie duprojet d'articles de la Commission du droit international est critiquable.

comportement illicite peut 8tre attribu6. Mais, au-delA, c'est-A-dire ence qui concerne les consequences de ces actes, il est clair qu'ellesdoivent Etre, et qu'elles sont, soumises A deux regimes, distincts, deresponsabilitd: le non-respect de la clause commerciale, pour regret-table qu'elle soit, comme tout manquement au droit, n'a d'incidencesque dans les rapports des Etats parties au trait6 la contenant; le g~no-cide, lui, 6branle les fondements mmes de la soci~t6 internationalecontemporaine.

6. Une objection peut cependant venir A I'esprit: plut6t que ]anature de l'obligation viole, n'est-ce pas son degrd de g~n~ralit6 etd'opposabilit6 qui explique ]a difference entre les deux formes deresponsabilitd qui en d~coulent? En d'autres termes, la diff6-rence-qu'aucun esprit sens6 ne peut drcemment nier-entre laresponsabilitd encourue pour le manquement A des obligations A lacharge de 'Etat en matiire commerciale, d'une part, et pour un gino-cide, d'autre part, ne tient-elle pas A la nature erga singulum (ou sin-gulos) du premier et erga omnes du second, sans qu'il soit besoin derecourir A des cat~gorisations diffdrentes des deux faits intemationale-ment illicites ? Apr~s tout, comme l'a relevd la Cour internationale deJustice dans son crlibre dictum de 1970:

,,Une distinction essentielle doit [...] etre dtablie entre lesobligations des Etats envers la communaut6 internationale dansson ensemble et celles qui naissent vis-A-vis d'un autre Etat dansle cadre de la protection diplomatique. Par leur nature mime, lespremieres concernent tous les Etats. Vu limportance des droitsen cause, tous les Etats peuvent tre considdrs comme ayant unintrrt juridique 4 ce que ces droits soient protrg~s; les obliga-tions dont il s'agit sont des obligations erga omnes ,,7.

Toutefois, s'il nest pas douteux que les crimes, au sens de I'arti-cle 19 du projet d'articles de la Commission du droit international,constituent des violations d'obligations erga omnes, ]a rrciproquen'est pas exacte. Les Etats riverains sont tenus d'accorder A tous lesnavires le droit de passage en transit dans les d~troits servant A ]anavigation internationale; il s'agit IA, assurrment, d'une obligationerga omnes, mais son non-respect n'est pas un crime. C'est que, si lar~gle confere bien des droits A tous les Etats, elle n'est pas d'uneimportance o essentielle pour la sauvegarde d'int~rts fondamentauxde ]a communaut6 internationale dans son ensemble>>. Sa violationest, certes, contraire A un droit qui appartient A tous, mais elle n'af-fecte que celui qui en est la victime et la solidarit6 internationale estinsuffisante pour que, dans l'tat actuel de son daveloppement, le

" Arret du 5 f~vrier 1970, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company.Limited (nouvelle requite, deuxiime phase), CLJ. Recued 1970, p. 32.

droit international puisse tirer des consequences particulires du non-respect de 'obligation erga omnes. ce qui reviendrait en pratiquefaire de ia coutume g~ndrale un jus cogens gdntralisd.

Il est vain, A cet 6gard, de tenter de transposer dans ia sphereinternationale les mtcanismes juridiques existant dans les droits inter-nes: h la difference des collectivit6s nationales. fortement intdgr~es.oi I'application de la contrainte est concentr e aux mains de I'ap-pareil dtatique. la socidt6 internationale est caract~ris& par lafaiblesse relative des solidaritds et par la d~centralisation de la con-trainte. Les rflexes communautaires y sont trop embryonnaires pourque tous les Etats aient le sentiment d'une atteinte A un <, inttrtt juri-dique , du seul fait que toute rigle de droit, quelle qu'elle soit, estviol6e s. C'est peut-8tre regrettable, mais c'est ainsi; et la notion decrime international, qui traduit I'affleurement, dans l'ordre interna-tional, de sentiments communautaires, ne saurait envahir tout lechamp de la responsabilitd internationale; elle est sans doute appeleA s'y d~velopper A mesure que s'affirmeront les solidarit~s entreEtats, mais, pour l'heure, elle ne peut caracttriser qu'un tres petitnombre de faits internationalement illicites qui sapent les fondementsnmes de cette communautd naissante' 9.

C'est donc . tr~s juste titre que la Commission du droit interna-tional, dans la definition du crime donnte AI. article 19, paragraphe 2.de son projet, met l'accent sur le caract re << essentiel , de l'obligationviole o pour la sauvegarde d'intdrfts fondamentaux de la commu-naut6 internationale dans son ensemble ,,. Et il n'est pas sans inttretde relever que, ce faisant, elle rejoint la Cour internationale de Justicequi, dans 'affaire de la Barcelona Traction, a sembl n'admettre une,actiopopularis > que si les droits en cause presentaient une <,impor-tance exceptionnelle °. Le qualitatif s'ajoute I6gitimement au quan-titatif: il ne suffit pas que 'obligation %iolte soit erga omnes, il fautencore qu'elle soit d'une importance ,essentielle o pour tous.

7. Ceci pose, de faron aigue. la question de la determination deces obligations. Quoiqu'on en ait dit. le projet d'article 19 va aussi loinqu'il est possible dans la prdcision A cet 6gard et l'on a beau ironiser

"Contra: G. Arangio-Ruiz. qui. dans son deuxiRme rapport sur [a res-ponsabilitd des Etats, estime que toute violation d'une obligation internationaleentraine un -dommage juridique,- (Annuaire... 1989. vol. II (prernire partie), p. 6.par. 14). Si cela 6tait le cas. tous Ics Etats seraient l&6s par la violation de n'im-porte queue norme du droit international gdnral.

' Voir en cc sens R. Ago. cinquiame rapport sur la responsabilite des Etats.Anniaaire... 1976, vol. II (preniu'e pattie), p. 55, par. 147-148.

' Voir supra note 17.

sur son caract~re tautologique, la double prdcision scion laquelle 1° Ianorme viole doit atre o essentielle pour la sauvegarde d'int6rets fon-damentaux de la conununaut internationale-; et 20 sa violation doittre reconnue comme un crime par cette communautd dans son

ensemble, est suffisante pour dtterminer si un fait internationalementillicite constitue un crime.

Sans doute, ceci laisse-t-il une part non n~gligeable A la subjec-tivit6 de l'interpr6te. Mais l'incertitude n'est pas plus grande quecelles de quantitds de notions reques et constamment appliqures endroit international. On n'ose dvoquer ici iejus cogens, dont la drfini-tion, donne ii I'article 53 de la Convention de Vienne inspire tr~s visi-blement celle du crime international2l et fait lobjet du mme genre decritiques - et tout aussi infond6es. Mais il suffit de penser a desnotions aux contours aussi flous que celles de due diligence ou de((standard minimum ), dont l'incertitudc n'a jamais emp8ch6 I'appli-cation, tant il est vrai que le droit international est affaire d'esprit definesse plus que de gdom~trie. De mme, on ne reproche pas h l'Arti-cle 38. paragraphe i.c), du Statut de la Cour internationale de Justicede drfinir la coutume comme o preuve d'une pratique gdndrale accep-tre comme 6tant le droit ,,22. Pourquoi serait-il plus dangereux ou plusinacceptable de drfinir le crime (ou la norme imprrative) en fonctionde sa reconnaissance comme tel par la communaut6 internationaledans son ensemble ? Tout au plus peut-on regretter la contraction dela formule de l'article 19 du projet d'articles par rapport . celle del'article 53 de la Convention de 1969 qui a le merite de prrciser quecette communaut6 est celle o des Etats>; mais, s vrai dire, dans lemonde tel qu'il est, cela va presque de soi, et il est, de toutes mani~res,ais6 de revenir sur cette omission lors de la seconde lecture du projetd'articles.

8. Sans doute aussi, n'existe-t'il aucun mcanisme institution-nel charg6 d'effectuer cette determination. Mais ceci est la r~gle gdnd-rale dans l'ordre international ob, en I'absence d'organe investi dupouvoir de dire le droit, c'est At chaque Etat qu'il appartient d'ap-prrcier les manquements au droit en cc qui le concerne23. Toutefois, si

2: Voir d'aillcurs les r~frences constantes au juN cogens durant les travaux

prdparatoires de I'article 19, notainmment dans le cinquieme rapport dc R. Ago(supra note 19. pp. 33-34. par. 98-99, ct pp. 55-56. par. 149-152) ct dars le Rapportde ]a Commission sur les travaux de sa vingt-huitirme session, Annuaire... 1976,vol. 11 (deuxiOne panic), pp. 94-95, par. 16-18.

22 ,, Acccpt4e,, par qui ? l'article 38 ne le prcic pas. Le projet d'article 19 estplus precis sur cc point.

2' ,Dans I'6tat actuel du droit international gcn~ral 1.1, chaque Etat apprrciepour lui-mrme sa situation juridique au regard des autres Etats,, (sentence arbi-trale du 9 drcenbre 1978, Accord rehitif aicr services aeriens du 27 mars 1946(Eits-Unis dAmrique/France), RSA. vol. XVIII, p. 483).

cere carence est a theoriquement normale ., elle est difficilementacceptable ds lots que les inr 6its essentiels de la communautd inter-nationale dans son ensemble sont en cause: il semble logique etn6cessaire que 'existence d'un crime soit apprecide Ic plus objective-ment possible par un tiers impartial, dans I'intdret tant de ]a ou desvictimes que de I'Etat qui serait injustement accuse d'un tel com-portement.

On peut. il est vrai, relevcr que les Nations Unies, dont on peutl itimement considerer qu'elles representent ]a communautd inter-nationale organise, sont dotees de moyens de constatation et deripression des manquements les plus graves au droit international.C'est ce qui avait conduit le Professeur Arangio-Ruiz ak prdconiserdans son septieme rapport sur la responsabilit des Etats, le recoursA un m6canisme complique de determination de I'existence des crimesinternationaux. qui aurait fait intervenir I'Assemblee gcndrale. le Con-seil de s4curit6 et [a Cour internationale de Justice". Trop lourd. troplent. probablement incompatible avec la Charte. cc mmcanisme a 6t6

arte par la Commission.

il n'en reste pas moins que la constatation d'un crime et sa sanc-tion peuvent certainement Etre le fait des organes des Nations Unies"- .On peut estimer en particulier que Ic Conseil de securit. a Ic mono-pole de la constatation d'une agression et en tout cas de sa repression.De m me, b de nombreuses reprises depuis 1990, le Conseil de sdcu-rite a constatd certains manquements graves au droit international hu-manitaire rant par des Etats que par des individus. En soi, ces consta-tations ne sont pas critiquables; mais elles sont alatoires en cc sensque la saisine du Conseil est elle-mEme incertaine et que. saisi, il peutrefuser de prendre une decision ou en Etre emp&h par le veto de Funde ses membres permanents. En d'autres renes. il peut. de fa4;on inci-dente. contribuer a i'application du droit international et constater'existence d'un crime iorsqu'il s'acquitte de sa responsabilit46 princi-

pale en matiere de maintien de la paix et de la securite internationales.mais IA n'est pas sa fonction et son hypothetique intervention laisseentiere la question generale de la determination des crimes interna-tionaux.

9. C'est ce qui a conduit un groupe important de membres de iaCommission du droit international Ai suggerer. lors de sa quarante-

: Document AKCN.4/469. pp. 3942. par. 100- 112 et Add-. p. 4.Voir i cet -ard Ics d-vcloppemcnts consacrds par R. Ago au - fait que la

Ciarte des Nations Unies ranache dcs consequences sp~cialement dctermindcs ala violation de ceitaines obligations internationales - (cinquiifne rapport. supranote 19. p. 33. par - 98 ct pp. 35-36. par- 102-105).

huiti~me session26 , d'insdrer dans le projet un article prdvoyant A lacharge des Etats parties un diff6rend concernant l'existence d'uncrime de recourir au tribunal prvu par la troisi~me partie du projetpour arbitrer les diff6rends relatifs aux contre-mesures27 .Cette propo-sition s'inspirait des m~mes ndcessit6s que celles qui sont At l'originede l'article 66 de la Convention de Vienne sur le droit des trait6s28, quiconfie A un tribunal arbitral ou A la Cour internationale de Justicecomp6tence pour trancher les diffdrends relatifs ii l'existence ou A'application d'une norme de jus cogens. En outre, pour 6viter les

exc~s, cette proposition pr6voyait un (, filtre o par une commission deconciliation, dont l'intervention 6tait destin6e A 6viter A un Etataccusd A tort de crime l'opprobre d'un proc6s injustifi.

Pour des raisons obscures29, la Commission a d6cid6 de ne pas seprononcer dans l'imm6diat sur cette proposition qui a cependant lemdrite, au m~me titre que 'article 66 de la Convention de Vienne,d'instituer un m6canisme impartial de d6ternination d'institutionsjuridiques dont la mise en oeuvre intdresse la communaut6 internatio-nale dans son ensemble. On ne peut qu'espdrer que, comme la Com-mission du droit international I'a d'ailleurs prdvu, le probl~me serar6examin6 en seconde lecture et qu'il sera rem6di6 A la grave lacunedont le projet est actuellement entach6.

10. Il n'est pas douteux que le probl~me de la d6ternination descrimes se pose dans les memes termes que celle des r~gles de jus co-gens - A tel point que l'on peut se demander s'il ne serait pas plussimple de d6finir le crime international comme la violation d'unenorme imperative du droit international g6n6ral 3°, tant est 6vidente laparent entre les deux notions.

Dans son rapport de 1976, la Commission du droit internationala estim6 que, ( s'il peut etre vrai que le manquement A une obligation6tablie par une riigle dejus cogens constituera souvent un crime inter-national, on ne peut cependant pas nier que ]a cat6gorie des obliga-tions internationales pour lesquelles aucune ddrogation n'est admise

' Document ILC (XLVIII)/CRD.4/Add.l. Voir aussi le commentaire de['article 51 du projet d'articles dans le Rapport de ]a Commission sur les travauxde sa quarante-huiti~me session, Documents officiels de IAssemblde ginirale,cinquante et uni~me session, Suppliment n' 10 (A/51/10), p. 190, par. 9-12.

.7 Articles 58 60.2 Voir d6jbk en ce sens le cinquiime rapport de R. Ago, supra note 19, p. 56,

par. 152."' Voir les comptes-rendus des seances des I I et 12 juin 1996, documents

AICN.4/SR.2458 et 2459.' En ce sens, voir I. Brownlie, Principles of International Law, Oxford,

Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 4 15 et suiv., ou P. M. Dupuy, , Le fait gdndrateurde la responsabilit6 internationale des Etats ,, Recueji des cours... 1984-V, vol. 188,p. 56, ou Dupuy, op. cit. (supra note 5), p. 270.

est plus vaste que celle des obligations dont la violation est neces-sairement un crime international * 3 1. Cette affirmation n'est que par-tiellement 6clair6e par le cinqui~me rapport de Roberto Ago, qui. dansun passage passablement obscur, explique que w [t]ous les crimes nesont pas egaux et ne justifient pas des chitiments egaux. [..O]n nesaurait voir un vdritable crime international dans une pratique discri-minatoire ou dans une atteinte A la libre utilisation d'un bien communde 'humaniti que si ces faits revEtent une gravite particulicre, car ]'onpeut imaginer toute une gamme d'hypotheses d'importance di-verse *

2. lndependamment du caractere discutable de l'emploi du

mot a chtiment,33 cette aexplication , est doublement critiquable.En premier lieu. elle postule l'ldt~rogenetd du regime juridique descrimes3'. En second lieu, eile traduit une conception excessivementextensive de [a notion meme de jus cogens; si la discrimination estcertainement interdite en droit international, seule sa pratiquesystnatique, comme dans le cas de l'apartheid, tombe sous le coupdune norme imperative; de meme, il est fort douteux que la notion dpatrimoine commun de F'humanit6 constitue, par elle mme, un prin-cipe de jus cogens. Ici encore, il convient de manier avec precautionet moderation des concepts w communautaristes qui. dans une so-cidti internationale encore trs peu integnie, ne sauraient constituerque des exceptions rarissimes, mais appelees bt devenir plus nom-breuses avec les progres de la solidarit6 internationale.

11. Toutefois, si les raisons avancees en 1976 pour distinguercrimes internationaux et violations du jus cogens ne convainquentpas, il en est une autre, mieux fonde: les normes imperatives du droitinternational gendral constituent le - soubassement * juridique de lasocit6 internationale, son w ordre public-; de ce fait, elks incluenttoutes les normes 4, socialement indispensables , soit pour des raisonsrelevant de ]a morale minimale maintenant universelle comme I'inter-diction du genocide ou de I'agression. soit parce que. comme le prin-cipe pacta sunt servanda, elles sont * logiquement imperatives *. Maisil est bien Evident que toute violation de cette seconde categorie denormes imperatives ne constitue pas un crime, faute de quoi la viola-tion de tout traitd serait - criminelle *.

L'objection est cependant plus thorique que rdelle et elle seraitsurmontee si on limitait la definition des normes impratives b cellesqui sont a socialement necessaires * et acceptes comme telles par lacommunaute internationale dans son ensemble. Bien qu'elle nedecoule pas de la definition de l'article 53, cette limitation parait con-

" Annwaire_. 1976. vol. I! (deamumw paric), p. I I1. par. 62-Voir cinquiime rappon (supra note 19). p. 566 par. 150.Voir infra n* 18.

WVoir infra n 29-30.

forme A la tendance doctrinale dominante et le moment cst sans doutevenu de se demander s'il ne serait pas plus simple, plus logique, etplus efficace de dtfinir le crime international de 'Etat comme la vio-lation d'une norme dejus cogens. Cet inflchissement aurait en outrele double mrrite de renforcer et de stabiliser les definitions des deuxconcepts qui se compl .teraient mutuellement: il deviendrait clairqu une norme ne pourrait etre considdre comme imperative que si saviolation est reconnue comme un crime par la communaut6 intema-tionale dans son ensemble, ce qui pourrait etre de nature A rassurertous ceux qui d~noncent les risques d'extension abusive de la notionde jus cogens; .t l'inverse, le concept de crime v bdndficierait, dustatut, maintenant acquis, du concept de norme impdrative, notion((dissuasive , qui, malgr6 les craintes exprim&es par certains Etat, n'adonnd lieu A aucun abus depuis sa conscration en 196935.

12. II faut bien reconnaltre qu'en revanche 'dnum~ration descrimes internationaux de r'Etat figurant au paragraphe 3 de l'article 19du projet d'articles de la Commission du droit internationa3 6 n'estguire appropride et suscite quantit6 d'objections et de critiques.

Comme l'a dcrit r&cemment le Professeur Prosper Weil37 : ((Cesexemples [...] comportent plusieurs niveaux d'incertitude et accu-mulent impr&ision sur impr&cision. Ce ne sont, tout d'abord, que desimples exemples, sans aucun caract~re exhaustif (- un crime interna-tional peut notamment rrsulter... )). Bien mieux: k l'int6rieur dechaque cat6gorie d'exemples est ins~r un autre exemple (o une viola-tion grave... comme celle... *), lui aussi purement illustratif. (...] En se-cond lieu, les exemples donnds font appel A des concepts eux-memeslargement ouverts et ind~terminrs: violation (grave a (quantitative-ment ou qualitativement ?); violation <(A une large 6chelleo; obliga-tions od'importance essentielle a; ,,agression o (agression arm~e ou6galement agression &conomique ?) 38.

" Comme l'a &tit [an Brownlic A propos du jus cogens, ', [tlhe vehicle doesnot often leave the garage. (,l'engin ne quitte pas souvent le garage-) (inA. Cassese and J. Weiler, &Iit.. Change and Stability in International Law-Making,Berlin, de Gruytcr, 1988, p. 110). 11 est de r essence meme du caractire imptatifdes normes de jus cogens de navoir pas A manifester leurs effets; elles sont audroit cc que la dissuasion nucldaire est A la s.curitd: conscients dc leurs effetsradicaux (nullitd absolue des trait6s contraires, crimes), les Etats les respectent

naturellement ,.Voir supra n" 2.

" Dont I'auteur de la prdsente contribution est tr.s loin de partager par ailleursla franche hostilit6 As rHgard de la notion m~me de crime international.

3" Weil, op. cit. (supra note 13), pp. 297-298. Voir aussi les critiques, plusmodfrees, de P. M. Dupuy, - Observations sur le crime international de I'Etat ,,RGDIP. 1980, t. 84, pp. 463-467.

Le second argument rekve d'une conception du droit troprigide: le qualitatif ne saurait etre exclu de la sph&e du droit qui n'estni une science exacte ni un assemblage de normes abstraites et quis'accommode de regles renvoyant A la subjectivatd de i'interpr~te enfonction des circonstances3 La premicre critique de I'dminent auteurn'est, en revanche. que trop fond6e et i est, en effet, extremementdiscutable de faire figurer dans un texte A vocation normative des, exemples, de l'institution juridique dont il s'agit de r~glementer leregime et, plus encore. d'assortir les exemples de , sous-exemples ,.Ceci est d'autant plus regrettable en l'espoce que, comme tout projetde la Commission du droit international, celui consacr6 ii ]a respon-sabilite des Etats fait l'objet de commentaires o6i des illustrationseussent parfaitement eu leur place.

De deux choses 'une en effet : ou bien l'on 6ablit un projet d'ac-cord cadre et l'on se borne a ddcrire les rigles secondaires qui sontl'objet mime de la responsabilitd internationale, ou bien l'on rddige una code des crimes internationaux ,, ce qui est tout ii fait envisagea-ble. mais celui-ci doit Etre aors exhaustif et rfleter effectivement ledroit en vigueur. Le , code-croupion constitu6 par le paragraphe 3de I'article 19 ne r~pond ni d I'une. ni ,i I'autre de ces exigences.

13. En proc~dant comme elle i'a fait en premiee lecture, laCommission se condamne non seulement a etre incomplete, maisaussi a figer un droit en devenir dans une formalisation prdmatur6e.Comme I'a indiqu, la Commission du droit international en 1976,

[d]es faits internationalement illicites qui ne sont pas consider&scomme des crimes par le droit international d'aujourd'hui pourrontmanifestement I'Etre sur la base du droit international de demain,, 4 'et, A l'inverse, on peut enoisager. mEme si c'est moins probable, qu'uncomportement qui apparait aujourd'hui comme un crime perde cccaractare a l'avenir, alors que la notion meme de crime est. pour sapart, inh6rente A l'existence de la soci&td internationale.

Ceci est tout particuli~rement 46vident si l'on garde presents Al'esprit les rapports etroits qui existent entre les notions de crime etdejus cogense. De meme que I'article 64 de ia Convention de Viennede 1969 r6glemente les effets de la - survenance d'une nouvelle normeimperative du droit international g&n4ral * sur les traits en vigueur,de m&ne il faut admettre qu'un tel dv~nement entrainera l'existence

SCf. en droit interne. les notions de - bonnes mrurs - ou de - gestion de bonpIre de famille . ou. en droit international. celles de due diligence ( .oir supra n* 7)ou d'- infraction grave au droit humanitaire.

'0 Encore que prematur6 - voir infra no 13 et 14.

' Annuaire... 1976. voL I1 (dcuxiine palie). p. I 11, par. 64.

'- Voir supra n 0 Oct I I.

de nouvelles cat6gories de crimes ou 1'Hlargissement de la d6finitionde celles qui existent.

I! convient, A cet 6gard, de se garder de tout effet de mode enqualifiant de crime un comportement certes contraire au droit inter-national mais ne prdsentant pas ce caractre au regard de la d6finitionstricte retenue par la Commission, qui exige, Ai juste titre, une recon-naissance par la communaut6 internationale dans son ensemble. Enproc6dant ainsi, on fait peser sur le concept m~me de crime lesoupqon immdritd de n'8tre qu'un ((gadget juridique,, au serviced'objectifs purement id6ologiques et politiques, ce qu'il n'est pas.

14. Or, certains des exemples donnds par la Commission dudroit international encourent de tels reproches. Encore faut-il, iciencore, savoir raison garder. Ainsi, I'agression constitue certainementI'arch6type du crime international de i'Etat dans un monde qui a faitde l'interdiction du recours ii la force arm6e l'un des fondements dela socidtd internationale 43; on peut cependant s'interroger sur le carac-tare appropri6 de cet exemple dans un texte gn6ral de codification dudroit de la responsabilit6, tant la sanction de I'agression renvoie audroit de la Charte. De m(me, il est injustifid de reprocher A la Com-mission d'avoir n6glig6 la violation des droits de I'homme4a: elle lesmentionne parmi les crimes lorsqu'il s'agit de manquements desdroits fondamentaux qui se heurtent i. la r6probation de la commu-naut6 internationale dans son ensemble. Et les critiques portant surI'inclusion dans la liste des crimes des violations graves d'obligationsessentielles pour la sauvegarde du droit des peuples As disposer d'eux-mmes4 5 ne sont pas davantage fond6es - m8me si 'exemple donnd(l'6tablissement ou le maintien par la force d'une domination colo-niale), pour exact qu'il soit, ne pr6sente plus gu~re, 4 I'heure actuelle,d'intrt pratique: le principe de I'galitd de droits des peuples et deleur droit ii disposer d'eux.m~mes fait aujourd'hui, sans aucun doute,partie de l'ordre public international dont la remise en cause constituepr6cis6ment un crime.

41 II n'en a pas toujours dtd ainsi et cette constatation met bien en 6vidcnce larelativitd temporelle des crimes.

" Cf. P. Well, qui s'offusque de cc que o [ll'atteinte . la libertd d'expression,les arrestations arbitraires et la torture, le refus d'un procs dquitable, par cxemplene seraient donc pas constitutifs d'un crime international, mais d'un simple ddlit,surtout s'il s'agit d'agissements pratiqus , . une petite 6chellc >,... ., op. cit. (supranote 13), p. 298. Aussi condamnables que soient ces manquements, ce ne sont, eneffet, pas des crimes s'il s'agit de manquements commis exceptionnellement (,,.petite dchclle ,,) et I'on peut in~me se demander si ccrtains d'entre eux - ies attein-tes la liber6 d'expression surtout - sont vtritablement , reconnus , comme descrimes par la communautd internationale dans son ensemble. La morale minimalede la socidtd internationale n'est pas forcdment - pas encore ? - celle des espritsdclairns!

" Ibid.

En revanche, on peut avoir quelque doute sur le bien-fond6, en1976 et peut-Etre meme encore aujourd'hui, du quatriime exemple re-tenu par la Commission: la preservation de 'environnement humainest certes une preoccupation croissante de la communautd interna-tionale, mais de I- -, criminaliser, Ics comportements qui lui portentatteinte, fussent-ils , massifs >,, il y a un pas qu'il est sans doute aven-tureux de franchir, comme le montrent les tatonnements de la Com-mission du droit international elle-m~me dans ses tentatives de codi-fication du droit de la aresponsabilitd pour les consequencesprdjudiciables des activites qui ne sont pas interdites par le droit inter-national ,,. II est du reste quelque peu paradoxal que les m~mes faitspuissent apparaitre a la fois comme des activit6s non interdites etcomme des crimes internationaux... et si la piste ouverte par la Com-mission m6rite peut-tre d'ftre exploree, ce ne peut Etre qu'avec ]aplus grande prudence et en opdrant des distinctions conceptuelles quenglige i'alinda d) de l'article 19. paragraphe 3.

15. L'arbre ne doit pas cacher la for& Les critiques, dont cer-taines sont justifies, que l'on peut adresser i I'article 19 dans saredaction actuelle, ne doivent, en aucune manire, conduire au retouren arricre que constituerait I'abandon de la distinction entre deuxcategories, nettement diff6renciees, de faits internationalement illi-cites donnant les uns et les autres, mais diff6remment, lieu it respon-sabilitt internationale. Ce serait revenir A l'idde que la socidt6 inter-nationale demeure fondde sur la juxtaposition pure et simple desouverainetds dont le droit devrait se borner a assurer la coexistence.Or, si elle est tris loin d'-tre o institutionnelle , au sens obm l'entendentcertains auteurs, elle n'est plus exclusivement << relationnelle ,,46

comme l'attestent la , mondialisation , (ou la o globalisation >) et lessolidaritds plus profondes qu'elle traduit -pour le pire ou le meil-leur... - et son ancrage juridique manifestd par les notions, en partienouvelles, en tout cas nouvellement consacr6es. de ,communautintemationale , dejus cogens ou de crime international.

!1.

16. I1 est vrai que ce dernier concept susciterait peut-etre moinsd'incomprdhensions et de r~ticences si le r-gime juridique des crimesinternationaux de l'Etat dtait clairement d~fini. Or autant la d6finitiondonn6e A I'article 19 du projet d'articles de la Commission du droit

' Sur ceue distinction, voir notamment W. Friedmann, The Changing Struc-ture of International Law. Londres. Stevens, 1964, 410 p.. ou R. J. Dupuy, Droitinternational public. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France. coil. -Que sais-je ? 'n' 1060, 1993, 128 p.. ou .Communaui internationale et disparits de d~veloppe-ment - Cours gdn6ral de droit international public ., Recueil des cours... 1979-1V,vol. 165, pp. 46-66.

international est globalement acceptable - sous r6serve de la sup-pression du paragraphe 3 et d'amdnagements r~dactionnels -, autantle r6gime juridique des crimes envisagd par les articles 51 A 53 adoptdsen premiere lecture en 1996 prate le flanc A la critique, au pointd'ailleurs que, si l'on devait s'en tenir A ces dispositions, on pourraits'interroger sur ia pertinence de la distinction entre crimes et ddlits.Celle-ci se trouve d'ailleurs obscurcie par la terminologie meme qu'aretenue la Commission et qui entache d'incertitude tout le rcgime ju-ridique de la responsabilitd en droit international en empruntant unvocabulaire pdnaliste qui n'a pas sa place dans les relations entreEtats.

17. On a beaucoup dit et 6crit que la responsabilit6 internatio-nale pr6sentait un caractre exclusivement civil. Comme toute analo-gie avec le droit interne, cette affirmation sans rigueur est trompeuse.Cette confusion tient A l'erreur de la doctrine traditionnelle qui limitela responsabilitd internationale A I'obligation de rdparer 47 : rdduite h safonction ,, r6paratoire >,, la responsabilit6 renvoie indvitablement A lad6finition civiliste selon laquelle < <a responsabilit6 se d.finit commel'obligation de r6parer le dommage caus6 A autri >48. Or, si cela est,indiscutablement, 6galement exact en droit international49, la situationr6sultant d'un fait internationalement illicite y est infiniment pluscomplexe; I'Etat responsable n'est pas seulement tenu de r6parer lescons6quences dommageables de son comportement: outre qu'il doitaussi y mettre fin et, le cas 6ch6ant, donner des garanties de non-r6p6tition, il s'expose 6galement A des r6actions licites de la part de laou des victimes 5°. En ce sens, la responsabilitd internationale s'appa-rente alors A la responsabilit6 p~nale.

Ni civile, ni p6nale51, mais tenant de I'une et de I'autre, la respon-sabilitd internationale pr6sente des caract~res propres et ne saurait

'7 Voir supra n' 3.J. Carbonnier, Droit civil. Les biens et les obligations, Paris, Presses Uni-

versitaires de France, coil. Thdmis, 1964, t. II, p. 569. Le grand civiliste frangaisdduit cette d~finition des articles 1382 et s. du Code civil franqais: -Tout faitquelconque de I'homme, qui cause A autrui un dommage, oblige celui par la fauteduquel il est arriv. Ai le rdparero.

" - [C]'est un principe du droit international voire une conception g6n~rale dudroit que toute violation d'un engagement comporte l'obligation de r6parer (Arrtdu 13 septembre 1928, Usine de Chorz6w (fond), C.P.J.i. sirie A, n* 17, p. 29).

'o Voir supra n' 3 et 4.' Dans son cinquibme rapport, G. Arangio-Ruiz adopte la position, en fait trbs

voisine, selon laquelle la responsabilitd internationale pr~sente des ,16ments ci-vils et pinaux (document AICN.4/453/Add.3, p. 33, par. 148- soulignd dans letexte).

Etre assimilte aux categories du droit interne tant it est vrai que lasocidt6 des Etats a peu A voir avec la communaut, nationale.

18. Dans cette perspective, les vocables ,d~lits, et ,crimes,,adoptds par la Commission du droit international sont particuli~re-ment mal venus; et ceci est sans doute plus vrai encore pour le pre-mier que pour le second.

Sans doute. le droit civil connait-il la notion de delit. I1 n'en restepas moins que, d'une part, le mot dvoque in6vitablement, d'abord etsurtout. le droit pnal et que, d'autre part, son voisinage avec le terme" crime,, accentue encore cette connotation p~naliste. Or, ddsignant" ft]out fait internationalement illicite qui n'est pas un crime inter-national >52, le ddlit international ne s'apparente ni de pros. ni deloin ai la notion de dtlit penal et n'appelle -ou ne devrait appeler5 3-

aucune reaction de la socidt internationale en tant que ,corps so-cial)-. Certes, ii peut en rtsulter une I6gitimation des contre-mesures.dans des conditions que les articles 47 . 50 du projet d'articles de laCommission du droit international dtcrivent de maniire imparfaite etdiscutable, mais I'Etat victime qui y recourt agit pour la defense deses seuls inttrts propres et dans un cadre purement inter-6tatique; enaucune mani~re il ne s'agit de d~fendre l'ordre public international oude r~primer un manquement au droit dans l'int~rdt de la communaut6internationale dans son ensemble.

Pour des raisons voisines a celles qui conduisent la plupart desauteurs Zt bannir l'ide de v faute ,, dans le cadre de la responsabilit6internationale - ., le mot ,, d~lit - n'y est pas A sa place: m8me si cecin'est pas ie cas des vd lits civils >-. il implique une condamnation mo-rale qui ne cadre pas avec I'< objectivit6,, de la definition meme dufait internationalement illicite donne par l'article 3 du projet d'arti-cles, qui repose sur deux 616ments - un manquement (la ((violationd'une obligation internationale de l'Etat ,) cornmis par 'Etat oupouvant lui Ptre attribu6 (<, un comportement consistant en une actionou en une omission [...] attribuable d'apr~s le droit international AI'Etat >,) - et qui ne fait appel A nulle apprtciation morale, qualitativeou subjective.

2 Article 19. paragraphe 4. du projet d'articles prcit6, n' 2.

" L'obscur alinda c) de I'article 45. paragraphe 1. du projet d'articles paraitaccepter l'id&e de dornmages-intdrets punitifs pour tous les faits internationalementillicites; c'est une ide fort contestable en mati,'e de . dWlits - voir infra n' 24.

' Voir notamment D. Anzilotti. , La responsabilit6 internationale des Etats hiraison des dommages soufferts par des 6trangers,. RGDIP. 1906. t. 13, p. 289 etsuiv. ou H. Kelsen. , Unrecht und Unrechtsfolge im V61kerrecht -, Zeitschriftfiir6ffentliches Recht, 1932, p. 481 et suiv. Voir gaiement I'ensemble des r6fdrencesdonntes par Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz dans son deuxiime rapport (supra note 18).chap. 5. pp. 51-60.

19. On 'a vu55, ceci n'est pas exact en ce qui concerne la d6fini-tion des crimes internationaux de 'Etat, qui comporte une dimensionqualitative ('importance de 'obligation viol6e56, et le caract~re essen-tiel de celle-ci (<pour la sauvegarde d'int6r.ts fondamentaux de lacommunaut6 internationale,,), et qui, par voie de consequence, faitn6cessairement appel A la subjectivit6 de l'interpr te.

Cette subjectivit6 implique-t-elle un jugement de valeur qui justi-fierait 'emploi du mot ( crime)) ? On peut le penser et estimer qu'il n'ya rien de choquant A d6finir 'Allemagne nazie comme un "Etatcriminel > avec la connotation clairement n6gative et l'opprobre moralequi s'attachent A 'expression; du reste, apr~s la seconde guerre mon-diale, le traitement appliqu6 A ce pays a clairement W opunitif ,. Lam~me remarque peut Etre faite en ce qui concerne les mesures ddcid6escontre rlraq A la suite de l'invasion du Koweit 57. Le recours A un vo-cabulaire pnaliste est, sans aucun doute, infiniment moins choquantpour ddsignerdes faits internationalement illicites qui v portent atteinteau fondement mime de ce que doit etre la conduite des relations inter-nationales... >58 et qui appellent une r6action de la communaut6 inter-nationale que dans le cas de comportements qui ne portent atteintequ'aux int6r.ts propres A tel ou tel Etat ou groupe d'Etats.

20. Dans son Rapport de 1976 A 'Assembl6e g~n~rale, la Com-mission du droit international justifie 'adoption du mot ((crime > dela mani~re suivante:

o Apris mare r6flexion, la Commission a opt6 pour le choixde cette d6nomination, vu qu'elle est devenue d'un emploi cou-rant dans la pratique des Etats ainsi que dans les ouvrages scien-tifiques contemporains, et qu'elle est fr6quemment employ6edans les rdsolutions 6manant d'organes de la SDN d'abord, etpuis de 'ONU, ainsi que dans des instruments internationauximportants, dont la <,D6claration relative aux principes du droitinternational touchant les relations amicales et la cooprationentre les Etats conform6ment A la Charte des Nations Unies> etla oDefinition de 'agression ,> adopt6e par 'Assembl6e gdn6rale[r6solutions 2625 (XXV) et 3314 (XXIX), respectivement], lesconventions sur le g6nocide et sur 'apartheid, etc. o59

" Supra n* 6 et 7.s Bien que, dans IHtat actuel du texte de la Commission, ce crit~re n'ap-

paraisse expressdment que dans les exemples donnds au paragraphe 3, et non dans[a ddfinition du paragraphe 2 de I'article 19.

" Voir notamment les resolutions 667 (1990), 674 (1990), 686 (1991) ou 687(1991) du Conseil de s&urit6, bien qu'aucune n'utilise le mot -crime-.

5' Rdsolution 667 (1990) du Conseil de sdcurit6 du 16 septembre 1990, pr~am-bule, alin6a 6.

" Annuaire... 1976, vol. 11 (deuxi6me pattic), p. 110, par. 59.

II y a beaucoup de force dans cette dMfense de I'appellation re-tenue par rarticle 19 du projet et il est exact qu'en recourant au motocrime,, la Commission n'a rien inventd': les Parties contractantesA la Convention de 1948 pour la prevention et ]a repression du crimede genocide confirment que celui-ci ,est un crime du droit desgens DI et, dans son arret du I I juillet 1996, la Cour internationale deJustice a reconnu que la Convention n'excluait pas ]a responsabilit6d'un Etat A raison d'un acte de g6nocide perpttrd par I'Etat lui-m~me62; et I' on retrouve la mdme terminologie dans la Conventionde 1973 sur I'apartheid; la resolution 2625 (XXV) qualifie la guerred'agression de ((crime contre la paix)) et la resolution 3314 (XXIX)reprend cette qualification en pr&isant que v []'agression donne lieuh responsabilit6 internationale ,; et, depuis 1976, le Conseil de s&u-ritd et I'Assemblde gdndrale ont, en diverses circonstances, qualifi6certaines actions de v criminelles ,, sans qu'il soit toujours clair quecette qualification visait I'action des Etats eux-memes ou celle deleurs agentsI3. Au surplus, depuis vingt ans, le vocabulaire retenu parla Commission a dtd largement utilis6 par de tr~s nombreux auteurs,si bien qu'il parait aujourd'hui consacr6 et difficilement contournable,au moins pour ce qui est du o crime ,,.

21. Ceci 6tant, si cette terminologie devait etre un obstacle pourune large acceptation de la r~aliti juridique indiscutable que recouvrele terme , crime >, il n'y aurait qu'un inconv6nient limitd i abandon-ner le mot; et cet abandon nemp&hera pas la chose d'exister.

I1 n'est, A vrai dire, pas ddraisonnable de renoncer A tout vocabu-laire de substitution, en ce sens qu'il n'est pas indispensable d'op-poser les faits internationalement illicites d~nomm6s o dtlits >, par leprojet actuel, aux crimes. I1 suffirait de prdciser que, si tout << fait d'unEtat qui constitue une violation d'une obligation internationale est unfait internationalement illicite quel que soit l'objet de l'obligationviolde>> (comme le fait l'actuel paragraphe I de l'article 19), la vio-lation d'une norme impdrative du droit international g~nfral64 (jus

' Contrairement 5 ce qui est le cas pour I'expression < delit international,,dont la Commission du droit international reconnait que si elle peut se pr',.aloirdun usage -courant [] dans la litt~rature franqaise, italienne, espagnole ouallemande, elle ne correspond pas i la terminologie anglophone et n'est pas con-sacrte par la pratique. Elle se promet du reste de revenir ,sur ce point -i unmoment ult&rieur, (ibid, pp. 112-113, par. 72)

" Article premier.

' Application de la Convention pour la prevention et la ripression du crimede genocide (Exceptions prdliminaires), n' 32-

' Cf. ]a rdsolution 808 (1993) du Conseil de s&uritd du 22 f~vrier 1993, quiqualifie de -crimes- - les violations gdndralis&es du droit international humani-taire sur le territoire de 'ex-Yougoslavie ., notamment le , nettoyage ethnique ,.

6' 1 ne serait. en revanche, pas lgitime de substituer ]a notion de violationd'une obligation erga omnes A celle de crime international - voir supra n' 6.

cogens) produit des effets particuliers qui seraient d~taillds dans laseconde partie du projet.

Une telle solution permettrait de rdsoudre l'une des plus gravesdifficultds rencontr6es par la Commission lors de la redaction de lapremiere et, surtout, de la deuxi~me, parties du projet d'articles sur laresponsabilit6 des Etats et qui repose en grande partie sur unequerelle de mots, sans v~ritable porte autre que purement nomina-liste. Une telle ddcision devrait cependant tre assortie d'un certainnombre de precautions:

- en premier lieu, cette initiative devrait s'accompagner d'un effortde precision de la ddfinition de la notion mime dejus cogens, res-sentie nagu~re par les pays occidentaux comme un ((concept deguerre froide >,; il ne s'agirait pas de revenir sur la d6finition donnepar la Convention de Vienne de 1969, mais de profiter du climatinternational d'apaisement pour reserrer les exemples en mettanten 6vidence le caractire manifestement essentiel que doit revatirune norme et la reconnaissance gdndrale dont elle doit faire l'objet,pour pouvoir 8tre qualifide d'< imp&ative ,65 ;

- en deuxi~me lieu, il devrait 8tre clairement precisd que seules lesnormes osocialement imp6ratives,* relvent du jus cogens, Al'exclusion de celles qui sont logiquement n6cessaires66 ;

- en troisi~me lieu, ce ,toilettage terminologique o devrait 8tre expli-citement justifid par le souci de ne pas cr6er d'ambigutds en inci-tant A des comparaisons avec le droit interne; ce serait l'utile occa-sion de rappeler que la responsabilitd des Etats au regard du droitinternational n'est ni o civile a, ni << p6nale a mais diff~rente et, toutsimplement ,< internationale o, ce qui laisse ouverte la question dela responsabilit6 p6nale des personnes priv6es, trait6es par ailleurspar la Commission du droit international;

- enfin, et peut- tre surtout, il faudrait prendre le plus grand soin dene pas ((jeter le bb avec I'eau du bain >> et, au pr6texte de renon-cer A une terminologie source de malentendus, de ne pas m6con-naitre la distinction 6vidente, claire et n6cessaire entre deux cat6-gories de faits internationalement illicites.

Bien entendu, ii ne %aurait tre question de donner des exemples dans leprojet lui-mme - procd d~testable dans un texte de codification (voir supran' 12) - mais de les pr6senter avec rigueur dans les commentaires du projet, unerigueur qui fait dfaut tant dans les commentaires des articles relatifs au jus cogensdans le projet d'articles sur le droit des traits (cf. Annuaire... 1966, vol. II. pp. 269-271 et 284-285) que dans ceux de I'article 19 du projet sur la responsabilitd (cf.Annuaire... 1976, vol. I! (deuxiime partie), pp. 96-101, par. 22-32).

Voir supra n' II.

22. Force est cependant de reconnaitre que, dans son dtatactuel, le projet de la Commission du droit international occulte cecaract~re ncessaire de la distinction, tant ses articles 51 A 53 n'entirent que des consdquences limit~es. anodines mEme, qvi en viennentA faire douter que l'opposition entre crimes et d~iits - quelle que soitleur appellation - produise de rdels effets pratiques.

Mais il ne faut pas se m6prendre sur la cause r~elle de cetteimpression erron~e: elle ne tient nullement A l'inexistence du carac-t~re propre des crimes, par opposition aux ddlits. mais au fait que leregime juridique de ceux-ci. tel que la Commission du droit interna-tional I'a ftx6. est infiniment trop rigide et comporte des cons&quencesqui, en bonne logique, devraient s'appliquer aux seuls crimes et, enaucune maniere. aux autres faits internationalement illicites.

Ces regrettables confusions tiennent probablement A la mtthodemme suivie par la Commission pour ]a redaction de la deuxi~mepartie du projet d'articles. Conformdment aux propositions de sonRapporteur sp&ial, le Professeur Arangio-Ruiz 67, elle a, en effet. 6tu-di6 dans un premier temps les consdquences des ddits sans se prfoc-cuper du regime juridique des crimes. Ceci pouvait paraitre logique etrHtait en effet si la m6thode avait &6 suivie jusqu'au bout et si, apr~savoir termin6 son analyse du rdgimejuridique des ddlits et d'eux seuls,la Commission s'6tait attele i celle des crimes et d'eux seuls. Mais,en pratique, la Commission du droit international et son Rapporteursp&ial n'ont pas maintenu strictement cette distinction rigoureuse et,se fondant sur des exemples qui portaient, indiff6remment, sur descrimes ou sur des dtlits. ils en ont tird abusivement des consequencesindiff6rencites, ,,gonflant- ainsi de mani~re fort excessive les con-sequences vde droit commun qui s'attachent i la responsabilite.alors qu'une analyse plus rigoureuse et plus r6aliste des prdc&dentsaurait trbs probablement incite la Commission A plus de precaution enmati~re de dflits.

23. Du fait de la m~thode , mixte >, retenue. la Commission dudroit international et son Rapporteur special ont en effet dt6 amendsi se prononcer prdmaturtment sur certains points et .t imputer auxdelits des constquences qui d6coulent des seuls crimes.

Ainsi par exemple, il 6tait parfaitement illogique de se penchersur ale problme de la pluralit6 d'Etats dgalement ou intgalementIdsts *6, sans se prdoccuper du regime particulier des crimes dont la

67 Cf. le rapport prdliminaire. Annuaire... 1988. vol. II (premiere pattie),

pp. 8-10. par. 10-18."Voir sur ce point le chapitre IX du troisi~me rapport de G. Arangio-Ruiz et

le chapitre V111 de son quatri nme rapport, Annuaire... 1991. vol. II (premiere par-tie), pp. 28-30 et Annuaire... 1992. vol. II (premiere partie), pp. 45-52.

probldmatique des Etats diffdremment ls6s est un 616ment essentiel.Malgr6 les efforts justifids du Rapporteur spdcial69, la Commissionn'est pas revenue sur le texte - fort insuffisant - de ce qui est de-venu rarticle 40 du projet. Du m~me coup, le projet ne prend que demani~re tout A fait marginale 70 en compte le problime de la capacitdde rdagir des Etats non directement atteints par un crime, pourtantnettement posd, sous un angle il est vrai purement procedural, par laCour internationale de Justice en 197071. De mme, il est remarquableque, lorsque la Commission s'est int6ress6e aux contre-mesures, elleI'ait fait sur la base de rapports de M. Arangio-Ruiz qui se fondaientindiff6remment sur des exemples concernant la violation d'obliga-tions v ordinaires , ou imperatives 72.

Ds lors, la Commission du droit international en est venue Ainclure dans ses projets d'articles 41 s 50 des cons&luences accep-tables pour les crimes mais clairement excessives pour les simplesd6lits. Et cet amalgame s'est trouvd encourag6 par la position du Rap-porteur sp&cial qui a manifest6 une tris nette tendance h vouloirr6introduire dans le r6gime juridique gdndral de la responsabilit6 inter-nationale la notion de faute qui en est traditionnellement bannie 73 etqui n'est guire admissible dans la soci&6 internationale que pour lescrimes justement, dont le caractre intentionnel et ddlibr6 est sansdoute une composante essentielle.

24. Le rdsultat de tout cela est un gonflement abusif des con-sdquences des d6lits et un v rtr~cissement >, corrflatif, et tout aussiabusif, de celles qui sont particuli&es aux crimes. Les exemples ensont nombreux. On peut mentionner en ce qui concerne les cons&quences o(de base a de ia responsabilit674 :

' Voir le Rapport de la Commission du droit international sur les travaux desa quarante-septi me session, Documents officiels de 1Assemblie gdndrale, cin-quantime session, Supplsment n' 10 (A/50/10), pp. 118-121, par. 273-281.

o Cf. I'article 53.7' Voir supra n* 6.7, Voir les troisitme et quatriRme rapports, Annuaire... 1991, vol. II (premi~re

partie), pp. 2-37 et Annuaire... 1992, vol. 11 (premiere partie), pp. 2-52, qui fourmil-lent d'exemples portant sur les rdactions un recours bk la force arm6e. soit -A uncrime international par excellence.

7' Voir les deuxi~me et huiti me rapports, Annuaire... 1989, vol. II (premi'Irepartic), pp. 51-60, par. 164-170, et document A/CN.4/476/Add.I, par. 48-55. R. Agoaccordait, lui aussi, une place importante la notion de faute (voir o La colpanell'illecito internazionaleo, Scritti giuridici in onore di Santi Romano, Padoue,CEDAM, 1940, pp. 177-206, reproduit in R. Ago, Scritti sulla responsabilita inter-nazionale degli Stan, Camerino, Jovene, 1979, pp. 271-302.

" C'est-A-dire les cons&luences qui ddcoulent, scion la Commission, indiff6-remment des crimes et des dMlits (cf. I'article 51 du projet).

- la connotation punitive du paragraphe 2 de l'article 42 qui enjointde tenir compte de la ngligence ou de F'action ou omission decaractere ddlib er pour le calcul de la reparation, ce qui revient aconsacrer la possibilite de dommages punitifs, acceptables en casde crimes. mais fort douteux comme cons6quence de delits;

- dans le mime esprit. le paragraphe 2.c) de I'article 4573 ne devraitpas tronver application en cas de dWlit;

- il est fort douteux qu'il existe une obligation g6n~rale de donnerdes assurances ou des garanties de non-ripitition de faits interna-tionalement illicites ne constituant pas des crimes76

- quant au regime des contre-mesures (articles 47 it 50). ii est, dansl'ensemble assez adapt6 a I'hypothise d'un crime mais il est troplaxiste s'agissant des simples dlitsP.

A I'inverse, le chapitre consacri aux crimes internationaux3frappe par son caractere extrbmement limitd et les sptcificit~s parfoisfort discutables reconnues aux cons6luences des crimes. En particu-lier, on peut avoir quelque doute sur l'opportunit6 de renoncer A exi-ger la proportionnalitd de la restitutio in integrum en cas de crime ousur la possibilit6 pour un Etat de 4c reconnaitre comme licite * unesituation cr6e par un fait internationalement illicite quel qu'ii soit oude prEter assistance a I'Etat responsable pour maintenir la situationainsi cr6e, alors que les alineas a) ct b) du projet d'article 53 neI'excluent que dans le cas des crimes.

I ne serait pas necessaire de tirer des cons&luences artificiellesde la distinction entre crimes et deits pour la justifier si l'on faisait decelle-ci une analyse rigoureuse et si I'on d.barassait le d~lit de con-s~quences punitives qui ne relivent pas de cette notion pour rendreainsi au crime ce qui lui appartient en propre.

7alEln cas d'attcinte grave aux droits de I'Etat 1&6 -. la satisfaction peutprendre la forne de . dommages-int6rts correspondant i la gravitd de I'attinte .

!1 H est vrai que I'article 46 du projet ne donne droit 5 I'Etat t&4 d'obtenir detelles assurances ou garanties que . le cas &6hiant-. mais cette disposition nepracisc pas de queUes hypodhises if s'agit et son commentaire (Annuaire.. 1993.vol 11 (deuxi-ewc pattie). p. 86. par. 5) n'est d'aucun secours pour le dMerminer.

7 La prtsente contribution n'est pas le cadre appropri6 pour dvelopper lescritiques qu'appellent ces dispositions; scion Iauteur elles tiennent surtout auxfaits qu'eles constituent une prime aux Etats puissants et que [a Commission s'enremel. pour Ics re-6quiibrer. aux obligations de ntiement de la troisibme pattie duprojet d'artidcs. obligations qui lii paraissent aussi iffralistes que mal congues. !]est vrai cependant quc l'adjonction in exlremis en 1996 de Iobligation de nftocieravant d'entreprndre des contre-mesures. prvuc I I'artile 48. paragraphe I, duproet, aniue quclque peu le caract&c choquant de ces articles.

U Chapitre IV de ia damibm partic du projet. artickles 51 A 53.

C. raricle 52. alina a).

25. Le rdgimejuridique des crimes tel qu'il ressort du projet dela Commission du droit international paralt donc hautement discu-table. On peut se demander en outre s'il n'est pas incomplet sur despoints importants. Outre les lacunes, certaines, du projet pour ce quiest du droit de reaction de tous les Etats 0, la question se pose notam-ment, A propos

- dc la probable incidence de la nature du fait internationalement illi-cite sur les circonstances excluant l'illicritd8 l, ou

- de 1'Hventuelle ( transparence) partielle de 'Etat en cas de crime.

Ce dernier point, il est vrai, est particuli~rement drlicat. II posedeux problmes fondamentaux: celui des liens existant entre lescrimes contre la paix et ]a srcurit6 de P'humanit6 et les crimes inter-nationaux de 'Etat d'une part et, au-del, celui de l'unitd ou de ladivcrsit6 du regime de ces derniers, d'autre part.

26. La seule disposition du projet d'articles de la Commissiondu droit international 2 qui aborde ]a question des rapports entre laresponsabilitd de 'Etat et celle des individus qui agissent en son nomest l'alin~a d) de I'article 45, paragraphe 2, aux termes duquel,

,si le fait internationalement illicite rcsulte de fautes gravesd'agents de I'Etat ou d'agissements criminels d'agents de I'Etatou de personnes privdes, [la satisfaction peut prendre la formed']une action disciplinaire Ai I'encontre des responsables ou [de]leur chAtiment ,.

Ceci ne concerne qu'un aspect de la question: la sanction de rin-dividu responsable, suppose v satisfaireo I'Etat Isd et drcid6e etinflig6e par l'Etat conformrment A son droit interne. Mais, depuisNuremberg, il est acquis que, dans certains cas, la personne physiquequi a commis certaines catrgories de crimes internationalementdcfinis engage sa responsabilit6 individuelle au plan international.Telle est la nature essentielle des crimes contre la paix et la s&urit6de I'humanit6, objets du projet de Code adoptd en seconde lecture parla Commission du droit international apris des dizaines d'ann6es

" Voir supra n" 22 et les developpements trks fins (et sceptiques) quc DenisAlland consacre A ce probI~me (Justice privie et ordre juridique internationalParis, P6done, 1994, pp. 347-37 1).

"' Dont on pcut se demander si clio pcuvent exclure I'illic6it6 d'un crime...'2 Voir ccpendant galement I'article 8 relatif i l', attribution I'Etat du com-

poricinent de personnes agissant en fait pour le compte de I'Etat.,

d'atermoiementsl. Or ces crimes"' sont, le plus souvent, pour ne pasdire toujours, commis au nom de I'Etat ou .x son instigation. Leproblime se pose donc d'6tablir les rapports entre ceux-ci et lescrimes intemationaux de I'Etat lui-meme. Le projet de Code renvoiela question au sujet concernant la responsabilit6 des Etats15; mais leprojet d'articles sur ce thbme ne I'aborde pas'.

27. En bref, les 6lments essentiels des rapports que ces deuxnotions entretiennent entre e!les peuvent 6tre prtsentds ainsi: 1P lesfaits qui constituent des crimes contre la paix et la s4curit6 de 'hu-manite sont 6galement, s'ils sont commis au nom de I'Etat, des crimesinternationaux de celui-ci; 20 dans ces hypothises, I'Etat devient

transparent,, et les agents par lesquels il a agi (et/ou qui ont agi sousson couvert) voient leur responsabiliti individuelle engage sansqu'ils puissent se prdvaloir de leur qualit6 officielle 7 ; 30 le chftimentdes dirigeants qui ont commis ces crimes a ne libire pas pour autantI'Etat lui-mnme de sa propre responsabilit6 pour un tel faits,,o 40 maisb rlinverse, tous les crimes internationaux de I'Etat n'entrainent pasncessairement Ia responsabilit6 individuelle des agents qui les ontcommis: ce n'est vrai que pour les crimes contre la paix et la scurittde I'humanit., que la Commission du droit international a d~finis Ajuste titre comme ales plus graves parmi les plus graves 38.

"Le Code des crimes contre la paix ct la s~curit6 de I'humanitd s'abstient dedfimir caux-ci; voir cependant les anicles I, paragraphe 2. et 2. paragraphe 1. quien donnent les elmcnts ssentiels (voir le Rapport do la Commission du droitinternational sur les travaux de sa quarante-huitibme session. Documents officielsd IAssemblie ginrale. cinquante ef uniime session. Suppliment n' 10 (A51/10).pp. 30 et 34.

" Le projet de Code en retient cinq catdgories: I'agression. le g6nocide. lescrimes contre rhumanit. les crimes de guerre et. de maniere fort regrettable (carits ne prsentent pas. juridiquoment. les memes caracicres), los - crimes contre iepersonnel des Nations Unies et le personnel associe..

IArticle 4: . Le fait que le present Code prdvoie la responsabilit6 des indi-vidus pour les crimes contre la paix et la scuriti de I'humanit6 est sans prejudicede toutc question de responsabilit6 des Etats en droit international -.

' Alors que la Commission avait entrevu Ia question en 1976 (Annuaire...1976, vol. 11 (deuxieme partie) p. 96. par. 21). En revanche, malgre un titre promet-teur (-La responsabilit6 pour crime international: tatique. individuelle ou lesdeux .). la section 3 du chapitre 11 du cinquieme rapport de G. Arangio-Ruiz(document A/CN.4/453/Add.3) n'aborde pas La question sous cet angle.

r Cf. les articles 2, paragraphe 1. et 7 du projet do Code des crimes contre lapaix et la s4curit6 do I'humanite.

- Rapport de la Commission du droit international sur ls travaux de savingt-huitibne session, Annuaire... 1976, vol. I1 (deuxieme pattie), p. 96, par. 21.

" Annuaire... 1983. vol. 11 (deuxikmc patic). p. 14. par. 47.

28. Cette coincidence imparfaite entre ocrimes internationauxde 'Etat >, d'une part, et o crimes contre la paix et la s~curit6 de I'hu-manitd >, d'autre part, pose le problime de l'unicit6 de la responsa-bilit6 pour crime en droit international: si un crime de I'Etat conduit& percer le voile 6tatique et A sanctionner internationalement les indi-vidus par lesquels il a agi dans certains cas et pas dans d'autres, cecisemble dtablir, prima facie, 'existence de deux catdgories de crimesinternationaux de i'Etat.

En rdalit6, cette ddduction n'est nullement indluctable. On peuttris bien considdrer que la o criminalisation ,, de certains comporte-ments individuels au plan international est inddpendante de celle descomportements de 'Etat. La meilleure preuve en est que certains faitspeuvent tris certainement 8tre qualifids de crimes contre la paix et lasdcurit6 de I'humanit6 sans que leurs auteurs appartiennent A I'ap-pareil 6tatique (ils peuvent, par exemple, Etre le fait d'organisationscriminelles et terroriste-s puissantes contr6lant une partie du territoiredtatique) et que, sauf pour le crime d'agression 9 , les ddfinitions quedonne le projet de Code des diffdrents crimes contre la paix et la s6cu-ritd de l'humanit6 qu'il vise ne renvoient pas au crime correspondantde i'Etat 1 . Ds lors il apparait que la large coincidence entre les deuxnotions relve bien davantage de la frdquence statistique que de landcessitd conceptuelle. II en rdsulte que la o transparence s de 'Etatn'est pas une consdquence de cette notion, mais de celle, diff6rente,de crimes contre la paix et la s6curit6 de I'humanit6 eux-mmes92.

29. Ceci ne rdsout cependant pas le probl6me, plus g6ndral, dela pluralit6 ou de l'unicitd du rdgime juridique des crimes internatio-naux de I'Etat.

Dans son rapport de 1976 A I'Assembl6e gdndrale, la Commission6crivait A ce sujet avoir:

v ... reconnu qu'il serait errond de croire qu'il existe, en mati~rede responsabilitd internationale un r6gime de base unique s'ap-pliquant A tous les faits internationalement illicites sans distinc-tion et auquel s'ajouteraient simplement des consdquencessuppldmentaires en cas de faits illicites constituant des crimesinternationaux. Cela peut etre vrai pour certains crimes ddter-min6s, mais rien ne dit qu'il n'y en a pas d'autres pour lesquelsI'applicabilit6 de certaines formes particuli~res de responsabilit6exclurait I'applicabilit6 des cons6quences prdvues pour les autresillic6itds. Il faut 6carter i'ide de 'existence d'une sorte de plus

0 Article 16 du projet de Code." Cf. les articles 17 h 20.'- On ne peut, dis lors, qu'approuver la Commission de navoir pas , codifi6,,

cet aspect de la question, mime s'il eOt probablement 6t6 utile qu'elle s'enexplique.

petit dinominateur commun du regime de la responsabilitd inter-nationale ,93.

Ce n'est pas limpide, mais il semble s'en dduire que, tout enreconnaissant 'existence de deux categories distinctes de faits inter-nationalement illicites, [a Commission du droit international envisa-geait alors la possibilitO de rdgimes variables A I'intdrieur de chacuned'elles, au moins en ce qui concerne les crimes. Autant il va de soiqu'il peut exister des regimes speciaux de responsabilite ddcoulant der~gles particuki res, convenuonnelles, voire coutumibres, du droitinternational 4 et ceci que l'on soit en prsence de crimes ou ded~lits95, autant ridge d'une a diversification de droit commun,* setraduisant par r'existence de sous-catdgories susceptibles de codifica-tion parait discutable, et c'est Ajuste titre que, finalement. ]a Commis-sion s'en est tenue A I'opposition drlits/crimes, qui seule rdpond AI'id& que la difference entre les uns et les autres est de nature et nonde degrs9.

30. Dans cet esprit, il ett W logique, conform6ment aux posi-tions adopt6es par son second Rapporteur sp~cial7 , d'dtudier et decodifier s~par~ment les consequences des crimes. d'une part, et dessimples ddlits, d'autre part9s, quitte is constater i'existence de certainspoints communs entre los regimes applicables aux uns et aux autres.Mais, sur ce point, [a Commission de 1996 a pris le contrepied de sadevanci~re de 1976, en pr6voyant bel et bien un regime de base uniquede responsabilit6 auquel celui, sp6cial, des crimes ajoute des con-sdquences supplkmentaires. Elle retombe ainsi dans une incoherence,symdtrique i celle qui affectait le raisonnement suivi il y a vingt ans:en 1976, elle excluait l'id~e d'un plus petit ddnominateur communentre crimes et d~lits mais postulait 'existence de rdgimes juridiquesdiversifies sclon les crimes; en 1996, elle fait exactement le contraireet exclut, is juste titre, une pluralit6 de regimes. mais elle se rallie il'id&k du plus petit d~nominateur commun. Dc ce fail elle sembleaccrniiter l'idde. fausse, que les crimes sont une ovariante, des

" Annuaire... 1976, vol. II (deuxiame pattie), p. 109, par. 54.

" Tel est le cas de l'agression dont l'une des consequences. r-glement6e tant

par I'Article 51 de la Charte que par la couturme. est le droit de I6gitime ddfenseindividuelle ou collective - cf. Cour internationale de Justice. arr~t du 27 juin 1986.Actimts ,nihtaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (fond) C.LJ.Recueil 1986. pp. 102-106.

' Cf. lParticle 37 du projet d'articles.SVoir supra n" 5.* Cf. le septicmc rapport de Willem Riphagen, Annuaire... 1985, vol. 11 (pre-

mitre partie). commentaire du projet d'article 14, p. 14.

Conformdment aux propositions initiales de G. Arangio-Ruiz dans son rap-port prdliminaire (volt supra note 67); malheureusement, les deux m6thodes sesont ensuite ml&s. du fait surtout de I'utilisation d'exemples tirds indiff6remmentde pr~cddents portant sur des crimes ou sur des d6lits (voir supra n' 22 et 23).

d lits; ils ne le sont pas: ils sont une autre cat6gorie de faits intema-tionalement illicites.

31. II est certain que la codification du r6gime juridique descrimes se trouve compliqude et quelque peu obscurcie par le fait quela Charte des Nations Unies, indiffdrente aux d61its, tire des consd-quences - ou permet de tirer des consequences - des crimes ou, entout cas, de certains d'entre eux, et d'abord de I'agression. Ce n'estpas une raison suffisante pour inclure le ,, droit de la Charteo dans leprojet d'articles relatif ? la responsabilit6. Les deux syst~mes de nor-mes rdpondent A des objectifs et i des logiques difffrents: les NationsUnies ont vocation A maintenir la paix et la sfcurit6 internationales,non A assurer le respect du droit mme si l'un, fort heureusement, vasouvent avec I'autre; ds lors, ce n'est qu'incidemment que lesmfcanismes de ]a Charte peuvent 8tre utilisis pour sanctionner tel outel crime international de l'Etat; au contraire, corollaire nfcessaire dudroit, la responsabilit6 est ]a sanction de droit commun des manque-ments dont il est l'objet.

On peut, ds lors, se demander si la redaction du projet d'article3999 est approprife: le droit de ]a responsabilit6 n'est pas subordonn6

celui des Nations Unies, il en est distinct. Les rapports entre lesdeux corps de r~gles ne posent ni plus, ni moins, de problmes queceux de n'importe quelle norme de droit international gdndral avec laCharte: dans un cas d6termin6, l'Article 103 de celle-ci conduira A lafaire pr6valoir sur un accord contraire - y compris l'6ventuel traitdqui consacrerait le projet d'articles sur la responsabilit6; mais cecin'emp-echerait nullement le droit de la responsabilitd de s'appliquer enI'absence de rigles spciales. Ceci est vrai pour les rfgles applicablesaux ddlits comme aux crimes.

32. Comme I'a 6crit Paul Reuter, ,<Ia responsabilit6 est au ccrurdu droit international, [..] elle constitue une part essentielle de ce quel'on pourrait considfrer comme la constitution de Ia Communaut6intemationale >,100. De cette << part essentielle >, le regime des crimesest le cceur. ls sont le minimum sur lequel la communautd internatio-

, Les consequences juridiques d'un fait internationalement illicite d'un Etatdnonc~es dans les dispositions du pr6sent article sont, s'il y a lieu, soumises auxdispositions et procedures de la Charte des Nations Unies relatives au maintien de]a paix et de la s&:urit6 internationales,.

" <<Trois observations sur la codification de la responsabilit6 internationaledes Etats pour fait illicite ,, in Le droit international au service de la paix, de lajustice et du dcveloppement - Milanges Michel Virally, Paris, P&lone, 1991, p. 390

(6galement reproduit dans P. Reuter, Le diveloppement de l'ordre juridique inter-national - Ecrits de droit international, Paris, Economica, 1995, pp. 574-575).

nale ne peut transiger, sauf A perdre le peu de cohtsion acquise aucours des sibcles et qui demeure fragile et fragmentaire.

II apparait donc essentiel que cet acquis modeste et precieux soitprserv6 et renforcd. La codification soigneuse des rfgles applicablesaux crimes internationaux de rEtat peut y contribuer puissamment sila Commission du droit international sait se garder de deux 6cueilsredoutables: 'aventurisme et ia frilosit6. Au nom d'excellents senti-ments, cerains de ses membres s'essaient A promouvoir une defini-tion et un rime juridique des crimes qui, caiques sur ceux admisdans les droits internes ne correspondent nullement aux caractirespropres A ]a socidtd internationale et vont tr~s au-deli de ce qu'uneconception, aussi extensive soit-elle, de la notion de a ddveloppementprogressif, permet d'envisager. D'autres - les memes parfois'01... -,inspirds par une vision trop exclusivement cynique des rapports entreEtats, s'emploient i faire revenir la Commission , une conceptionpurement inter-subjective de la responsabilite internationale. incom-patible avec la notion mene de crime international, quel que soit lenor qu'on lui donne, et i d.barrasser les Etats les plus puissants desmaigres contraintes que leur impose le droiL

Le projet actuel oscille en partie entre ces deux tentations con-radictoires, empruntant tant6t & l'une, tant6t i 'autre, sans s'en teniri une approche coh~rente et claire de I'indispensable concept dea crime international de I'Etat ,. Sa seconde lecture peut et doit etre'occasion d'une approche quilibr6e et cohdrente de ce proble.me cru-

cial, dont ia solution sera le point d'orgue du grand-truvre de la Com-mission du droit international que constitue, apr~s la codification et ledveloppement progressif du droit des traittis, ceux du droit de la res-ponsabihtd des Etats.

w' Les titonnements ct les contradictions - auxquelles I'auteur du presentarticle n'-chappe pas - dont tenoignent les interventions des nrembres de laCommission montrent I'ampleur des difficults.

SINE DELICTO (CAUSAL) LIABILITYAND RESPONSIBILITY FOR WRONGFUL ACTS

IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

Julio Barboza

Introduction

Responsibility for a wrongful act, i.e., an act in breach of a State'sinternational obligation, is the classical form of accountability in inter-national law: certain new legal obligations of the author State conse-quently arise as reparation to the wrongful act, Sine delicto liability, onthe other hand, also attaches certain consequences to acts-whichmay or may not be acts of a State-causing transboundary damage,but such acts are not prohibited by law. As we shall see later, the con-sequences are imposed by the primary obligation itself, they are notnew obligations.

Sine delicto liability generally applies to hazardous activities,which abound in today's life due to modem technology. Such activi-ties employ substances, objects or technologies which, in relation tothe place, the environment or the manner in which they are con-ducted, are likely to cause significant transboundary harm to persons,their property or the environment, despite all of the precautions whichmay be utilized in carrying them out

The Meaning of Certain Terms

Before delving into the substance of the subject, a few other re-marks seem to be in order. References must be made to some peculiari-ties of Anglo-American legal terminology in the field of responsibility.As there is a certain amount of confusion regarding the exact meaningof certain terms, an explanation is necessary.

"Responsibility" versus "Liability"

The meanings of the words "responsibility" and "liability- as pres-ently used by the International Law Commission and by most UnitedNations bodies are not quite the same as the original sense of such terms

in Anglo-American law.' Other official languages of the United Na-tions do not have two different words to express the notion of respon-sibility: both French (responsabiliti) and Spanish (responsabilidad)have only one word to encompass the meanings of the two above-mentioned English terms.

The choice of the word "liability" in the title of this topic stemsfrom an exchange of views in the Commission during its twenty-fifthsession, in 1973. It was suggested by Mr. Kearney, the American mem-ber, that:

"... the term 'responsibility' should be used only in connectionwith internationally wrongful acts and that, with reference to thepossible injurious consequences arising out of the performanceof certain lawful activities, the more suitable term 'liability'should be used". 2

Therefore, the term "responsibility" refers to the legal conse-quences of breaching an international obligation, i.e., the responsibil-ity for wrongful acts. That is the classical meaning of the word and itcorresponds to the rooted belief that there can be no real responsibil-ity unless there is wrongful conduct.3

A complete discussion on this aspect may be found in the preliminary reportof Professor Quentin-Baxter, Yearbook... 1980, vol. II (Part One), pp. 250-252,document A/CN.4/334 and Add.1 and 2; in his fifth report, Yearbook... 1984, vol. 11(Part One), pp. 170-171, document A/CN.4/383 and Add.l; and in the second reportof Ambassador Julio Barboza, Yearbook... 1986, vol. II (Part One), pp. 145-146,document A/CN.4/402.

2 Yearbook... 1973, vol. 1, 1243rd meeting, p. 211, para. 37.' "Responsibility", however, has yet another meaning: this term may be used

to refer to a set of obligations incumbent on a certain person. In the "'InformalComposite Negotiating Text" (Rev.2) of the Third United Nations Conference onthe Law of the Sea, "States are responsible" is translated as: "... il inconibe auxEtats de veiller...". Such seems also to be the meaning of "responsibility" in Prin-ciple 21 of the Stockholm Declaration: "States have, in accordance with the Char-ter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign rightto exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies andthe responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do notcause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits ofnational jurisdiction" (emphasis added). "Responsibility" is used in the same sensein paragraph 14 of General Assembly resolution 2749 (XXV) of 17 December 1970:

"Every State shall have the responsibility to ensure that activities in thearea.., shall be carried out in conformity with the international regime to beestablished... Damage caused by such activities shall entail liability".Here, as indicated by Goldie, "[tlhe term responsibility ... includes the attribu-

tion of the consequences of conduct in terms of the duties of a man in society" andliability "designat[es] the consequences of a failure to perform the duty, or to fulfilthe standards of performance required. That is, liability connotes exposure to legalredress once responsibility... ha[s] been established". (L. F. E. Goldie, "Conceptsof Strict and Absolute Liability and the Ranking of Liability in Terms of theRelative Exposure to Risk", Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, vol. XVI(1985), pp. 180 and 182).

Goldie admits, regarding the use of both words, that "... at times,publicists and judges may employ [them] almost interchangeably orsynonymously..." 4

In the final analysis, then, "responsibility" and "liability" may beused interchangeably; that should be enough to dissuade the continu-ance of this little research into the intricacies of the Anglo-Americanlegal language. We must rather look for the substantive differencesbetween these two forms of accountability.

However, there is a growing tendency in United Nations legalparlance to refer to "responsibility" and "liability" as a shorthand forState responsibility for wrongful acts and international liability foracts not prohibited by international law, respectively. That is perhapsa consequence of the work of the International Law Commissionwhere these subjects are dealt with under different topics. This ten-dency is such that the meaning of these terms in international law mayvery well lose their original significance. In the present article, theseterms will be used as in the United Nations.

Fault

The word "fault" in English, like its equivalent "faute" in French,has two meanings. One is objective and refers to the contrast betweenthe conduct required by an obligation and the conduct actually fol-lowed by the actor in question. The other is subjective and refers tothe intention of the actor who committed fault in the former meaningof the term. It implies what is known as culpa lato sensu, i.e., negli-gence and dolus.

This double meaning of "fault" needs to be borne in mind withregard to the comments below.

"No Fault Liability", "Objective Liability", "Strict Liability", "Respon-sabiliti pour risque"

Liability without fault (no fault liability) usually refers to "fault"in the sense of intention, and is usually known in civil law countries asresponsabilite objective in French or responsabilidad objetiva inSpanish. Although ambiguous, there is no doubt that this is a correctdenomination, as it refers to a type of liability the occurrence of whichdoes not require culpa or intention.

There is ambiguity due to the two possible meanings of the word"fault", which as we have seen before, may be objective or subjective.Objective liability then may originate in the breach of an obligation(wrongful act), without regard to the intention of the author, but it may

'Ibid.. p. 180.

also arise without breach of an obligation, as with acts not forbiddenby international law. In this latter case, fault is absent, not only in themeaning of culpa but also in its objective meaning, for no breach ofobligation is required to give rise to this type of liability.

This explains why sine delicto liability is not unequivocally des-ignated by the term "objective liability" or "no fault liability".

With regard to the term "strict liability", we must, however, becautious. This is the name used in Anglo-American law to refer tono-fault liability applying mainly to certain torts. There are continen-tal European writers who consider "strict liability" as an "objectiveand relative responsibility", 5 that is, apparently, a no-fault responsibil-ity for a wrongful act. Perhaps this is the theory underlying the com-mon law strict liability, but not necessarily strict liability applied insome statutory fields. 6

Responsabiliti pour risque

In the case of hazardous activities,7 then, sine delicto liability is,in an overwhelming proportion of cases, a mechanism similar to that

See R. Pisillo Mazzeschi, Due diligence e responsabilit internazionale delloStato (Milano, 1989), p. 27, who maintains that in the hypothesis of responsibilityarising from the mere existence of a conduct contrary to the obligation. "... si parlainvece comunemente di una responsabilit- oggettiva (e talora di responsabilitaoggettiva relativa); regime che corrisponde, grosso modo, nella dottrina anglosas-sone, alla c.d. strict liability" [one would normally rather speak of objective respon-sibility (and, sometimes, of relative objective responsibility); this being a regimewhich corresponds, in general terms, in the Anglo-Saxon doctrine, to strict liabil-ity]. He quotes, as a source, B. Conforti, Diritto Internazionale, 3rd ed. (Naples,1989), pp. 346-347.

6 Referring to "abnormally dangerous conditions or activities", Prosseracknowledges that:

... the courts have recognized a new doctrine, that the defendant's enter-prise, while it will be tolerated by the law, must pay its way. There is a strongtendency, where there is blame on neither side, to ask, in view of the exigen-cies of social justice, who can best bear the loss and hence to shift the loss bycreating liability where there has been no fault. An entire field of legislation,illustrated by the workmen's compensation acts, has been based upon thesame principle".

W. L. Prosser, The Law of Torts (St. Paul, Minnesota, 1978), p. 494.An example of sine delicto liability which does not originate in an activity

involving risk may be found in article 110 of the 1982 United Nations Conventionon the Law of the Sea regarding the ight to detain and visit a foreign ship by anofficer on the high seas, when there are reasonable grounds for certain suspicions.Paragraph 3 of the article reads:

"If the suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided that the shipboarded has not committed any act justifying them, it shall be compensatedfor any loss or damage that may have been sustained".There may be a legal policy behind this provision, perhaps that of making sure

that ships are not stopped on the high seas by a warship under one pretext oranother. Regarding hazardous activities, one important policy reason for repara-tion under a no fault liability regime may be that the acts which in effect causedthe damage were likely to produce harm.

of responsabiliti pour risque in French law, or responsabilidad porriesgo in many Latin American internal legal orders. Responsabilitipour risque may be traced back to Roman Law, where individualswere held responsible for the maintenance of \vild animals. It is alsoa feature of the municipal law of many countries: activities which arehazardous, but tolerated because they are socially useful, are ideallysuited to the application of such liability.

Some time ago, we suggested "responsabilite causale"8 but "sinedelicto liability" seems preferable now as the main feature is not torequire the breach of any obligation.

The Differences between "Responsibility" and "Liabilit-t"

The main difference between "responsibility' and "liability' is, ofcourse, that, with respect to the former, there is a breach of an obliga-don. while, with respect to the latter, no obligation must be breached forthe legal consequences to arise. In the former case, the consequencesfollow a wrongful conduct, in the latter, they originate from a lawful one.This results in a wholly different attitude of the law in each of the twosituations, which is reflected by the other differences examined below.

The Principles are Different

As fault is absent, sine delicto liability is permeated by values dif-ferent from those underlying responsibility for wrongful acts. The for-mer are inspired by social considerations, mostly absent in the latterwhich leads to the use of different mechanisms. Speaking in aristote-lian terms, responsibility is guided by the notion of commutative jus-tice, and liability by that of distributive justice.

Hazardous activities are sometimes permitted because they aresocially beneficial, even though they may, and in the long run usuallydo, cause some harm to individuals. This means that, although the actresulting in damage is not prohibited, the individuals who suffer fromthe harm must be compensated. The assumption is that these damagesare costs of the enterprise which benefits from the activity. If the costswere supported by the .ictims, there would be a case of unjust enrich-ment; the victims would be partially financing the operators. Suchcosts, therefore, must be internalized.9

'See J. Barboza. "La responsabilite 'causale' devant [a Commission du droitinternational", AFDI. vol - 4(1988), pp. 513-522.

' In the opinion of Professor Goldie. the economic analysis of the cost ofultrahazardous activities show hidden subsidies in the form of external or socialcosts of the enterprise which should be internalized. The creation of risk involves,then, "an expropriation of equal rights of amenities, and, in the international arena.of equaliy and sovereign autonomy- (emphasis added). Goldie, op. cit. (footnote 3above). p. 248.

Referring to workmen's compensation statutes where, in hisopinion, a form of sine delicto liability applies, Prosser underlines thecentral features of this type of accountability:

"The human accident losses of modem industry are to betreated as a cost of production, like the breakage of tools or ma-chinery. The financial burden is lifted from the shoulders of theemployee, and placed upon the employer, who is expected to addit to his costs, and so transfer it to the consumer. In this he isaided and controlled by a system of compulsory liability insur-ance, which equalizes the burden over the entire industry.Through such insurance both the master and the servant are pro-tected at the expense of the ultimate consumer". 0

This analysis shows that the costs represented by the damagescaused by these types of activities do not actually lie with the opera-tor. In fact, liability is usually channelled to the operator because thisindividual is in the best position to pass such costs onto consumers,by raising the prices of his services or goods. That completes the cir-cle: the costs originating in the hazardous nature of a socially benefi-cial activity are spread throughout society. This logic does not applyto wrongful acts, where a great deal of emphasis is placed on fault, inits definition both of breach of an obligation and of intention."

Therefore, there is a need for expeditious procedures which donot require the proof of fault or the proof of the breach of an obliga-tion: only proof of causation should be required. Pragmatic consider-ations prevail in this field. As prohibiting such activities is virtuallyout of the question, reparation of the damages caused must beprompt. This would be impossible if the innocent victim had the bur-den of proof.'2

This also explains why the predominant concept in liability isthat of the balance of interests between the different parties con-cerned. The balance of interests dictates the lawfulness of certain haz-ardous activities after weighing the benefit to society as a whole from

I Prosser, op. cit. (footnote 6 above), pp. 530-531.

Admittedly, there are other cases of sine delicto liability aside from thoserelated to hazardous activities, but they are very few, and nevertheless the liabilityimposed responds to reasons of legal policy, as with liability. In hazardous activi-ties, one important reason may be that the acts which in effect caused the harmwere likely to produce harm (see footnote 7 above).

12 A proposal by the Commission of the European Communities for a Councildirective on civil liability for damages caused by waste, although dating back someyears ago, gives convincing arguments on the principle of no-fault or strict liabilityin its point 4: No-fault or strict liability. As this principle implies automatic liabil-ity, it will ensure that victims receive compensation, the environment will recoverand economic agents are held liable in keeping with the objectives of the Directive(document COM (89) 282 final-SYN 217).

the activity, against the interests of the injured parties. The disruptionof the balance, which is brought about by the operation of such activi-ties, must be restored by some sort of reparation to the individualvictims.

Primary and Secondary Norms

A much quoted paragraph of the 1973 Report of the InternationalLaw Commission to the General Assembly read:

"Owing to the entirely different basis of the so-called respon-sibility for risk and the different nature of the rules governing it,as well as its content and the form it may assume, a joint examina-tion of the two subjects could only make both of them more diffi-cult to grasp".' 3

In saying that the rules governing the responsibility for risk wereof a different nature than those of responsibility for wrongful acts, theCommission was referring to the so-called primary and secondaryrules, a distinction it has been making for several years now." Usingthe terms "primary rules" and "'secondary rules" was another way ofexpressing the point that responsibility originates from a wrongful actand liability from a lawful one.

Non-prohibited acts, by definition, do not breach any obligationand therefore pertain to the primary rules.

The Special Rapporteur on the liability topic, 5 in summarizingthe debate on his seventh report in the International Law Commissionstated that:

"On the question of the separation between the presenttopic and that of State responsibility, he would draw attention toparagraph 146 of the Commission's report on its thirty-ninth ses-sion, which pointed out that: 'Contrary to State responsibility,international liability rules were primary rules, for they estab-

" Yearbook-.. 1976, Vol. II (Part Two), p. 70, para_ 65-" For those who are not familiar with the Commission's work, primary rules

impose primary obligations, and secondary rules. secondary obligations. Primaryobligations are those imposed on States directly by international law, be it generalor particular, such as the obligation of a coastal State to permit the innocentpassage of foreign ships through its territorial waters, or the obligation of receivingStates to ensure the security of foreign embassies. If an obligation is breached, asecondary rule comes into play which imposes on the acting State a secondaryobligation, i.e., reparation. Secondary rules govern the field of responsibility, andthe obligations they impose (secondary obligations) are dealt with in Part Two ofthe draft articles on State responsibility.

" The author of this article is Special Rapporteur of the International LawCommission on the subject of -international Liability for the Injurious Conse-quences of Act% not prohibited by International Las".

lished an obligation and came into play not when the obligationhad been violated, but when the condition that triggered thatsame obligation had arisen...' 16

To the above must be added that, if the primary obligation ofpaying compensation for the harm caused by the activity is not com-plied with, then and only then would the secondary obligations, whichconstitute the legal consequences of the breach of a primary interna-tional obligation, apply.

The Consequences are Different

The following are the consequences of a wrongful act, according toarticle 42, paragraph 1, of the draft articles on State responsibility (PartTwo), which are deemed to codify in this respect customary law: (a)restitutio naturalis, (b) compensation by equivalent, (c) satisfactionand (d) guarantees of non-repetition. 7

In cases of lawful acts, not all of these consequences would ap-ply: satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition certainly would notapply.

Compensation by equivalent may be applicable whether the ante-cedent act is wrongful or not, although the regime regarding the bur-den of proof may be different. In addition, as will be seen later, com-pensation may be subject to different rules, depending on whether itcorresponds to a wrongful act (responsibility) or to a lawful one (lia-bility). In the field of liability, maximum limits (ceilings) may be im-posed upon compensation, whereas in that of responsibility, the Chor-z6w rule imposes in integrum restitutio.18

Other Features are Also Different

There are other differences between responsibility and liability:

1. First, when damage is caused by an event which a State had anobligation to prevent, that State may normally be relieved of responsi-bility by proving that the event could not have been prevented by

" Yearbook... 1991, vol. I, p. 136, para. II. The condition which triggers theconsequence is the damage caused.

"7 Regarding cessation, the Commission did not consider it to be a conse-quence of the breach of the obligation, but rather the fulfilment of the primaryobligation. Cessation, whether or not a consequence of the breach, would defini-tively not apply to the field of sine delicto liability, since the payment of compen-sation is the condition for the operator to legally continue, i.e., to not be obligatedto cease, the activity.

'K See the Chorz6w Factory case, P.C.LJ, Series A, No. 17, p. 47.

using other means than those employed, whereas liability would pro-vide for no such relief.'9

2. Regarding the attribution of conduct to the State: as stated inPart One of the draft articles on State responsibility, the conduct ofcertain persons is attributed to the State (it is afait de I'Etat) whenthat person is (a) an organ of the State, acting in such capacity (arti-cle 5); (b) an organ of a territorial public entity of such State (article 7,paragraph 1) or an organ of an entity not pertaining to the structure ofthe State, but authorized by the domestic law of that State to exercisethe prerogatives of public power (article 7, paragraph 2); (c) exercisingthe prerogatives of public power in certain circumstances (article 8,paragraphs 1 and 2).

For the purposes of liability, there does not seem to be any actualattribution of conduct to the State when it is made liable for the dam-age caused by a privately conducted activity. i.e., no act of the opera-tor of a hazardous activity is considered afait de I'Etat. Instead thereseems to be an attribution to the State of the consequences of otherpeople's conduct.

There are few examples of State liability in international law. Oneis that of the 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in theField of Nuclear Energy,' as modified by the 1963 Brussels Conven-tion Supplementary thereto2' (article 3, paragraphs (b) and (c)), andalso the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Dam-age" (article VII, paragraph 1). where in case of the damage exceedingcertain limits, the State is required to provide the funds for theamount not being covered by the operator or his insurance. Theoperator is strictly liable under those Conventions and the State is notallowed to raise any defenses. Therefore, there seems to be no reasonwhy such obligation of the State, which places itself "in the shoes" ofthe private operator for the payment due, should not be consideredState liability. The State here seems to be indirectly liable in its capac-ity as territorial sovereign, the decisive consideration for the attribu-

,, Obligations to prevent a given event are included in article 23, Part One, ofthe draft articles on State responsibility, in respect of which the International LawCommission has stated that: -The State can obviously be required only to act insuch a way that the possibility of the event is obstructed, i.e.. to frustrate theoccurrence of the event as far as lies within its power. Only when the event hasoccurred because the State has failed to prevent it by different conduct, and whenthe State is shown to have been capable of preventing it by different conduct, canthe result required by the obligation be said not to have been achieved", Year-book.. 1978. vol. II (Part Two). pp. 82-83, para. (6).

31 United Nations, Treaty Series. vol. 956, p. 251.23 International Atomic Energy Agency. International Conventions Relating

to Ciil Liability for Nuclear Damage. Legal Series, No. 4. rev. ed., p. 43.-- United Nations, Treaty Series. vol. 1063, p. 265.

tion of consequences is that the activity was conducted under theState's jurisdiction or control by private operators.23

3. When an obligation is breached by a continuous act, respon-sibility rules impose the obligation of cessation, whereas in the fieldof liability the continuation of the activity is of the essence if compen-sation is to be paid for the damages.

4. As to reparation, responsibility requires a full reparation (inintegrun restitutio) which should, as it were, wipe out all the conse-quences of the illicit act. 24 The key idea of reparation, according to theChorzrw Factory decision, is to create the conditions which in allprobability would have existed had the wrongful act not occurred. Aswe have seen, such reparation is obtained by the methods which inter-national law has regarded as suitable, namely, restitution in kind, com-pensation by equivalent, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition,combined so that all aspects of the harm are covered. In brief, it hasbeen general international law that has imposed, through secondaryrules, the obligation of reparation as a consequence of the violation ofa primary rule. The content, forms and degrees of reparation have alsobeen established by international custom and were generally declaredby the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Chorzdw Fac-tory case.

Such full reparation is not necessarily due in the case of liability,where the damage is produced by an act which is not prohibited bylaw. Therefore, the compensation is ascribed to the operation of theprimary rule: it is a conduct imposed by the primary rule itself. Theredoes not appear to be a clear international custom with respect to thecontent, form and degrees of reparation corresponding to the damagein sine delicto liability, but there are some indications in internationalpractice that they are not following the same lines as the Chorz6wrule. Restitutio in integrum is not as rigorously respected in this fieldas in that of wrongful acts, as illustrated by the existence of thresholdsbelow which the harmful effects do not meet the criterion of reparabledamage, as well as the imposition, in legislative and international prac-tice, of ceilings on compensation. Both the upper and lower limita-

2' Under the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by

Space Objects, where naturally all the agents launching objects to the space ormanning them are State organs, the compensation is to be paid by the State (UnitedNations, Treaty Series, vol. 961, p. 187). It may be a matter of speculation whetherthe State is liable because the acts of the State organs constitute afait de IEtat. orbecause the operation was performed under the jurisdiction or control of the State.

2, See the Chorzdw Factory case (footnote 18 above). Article 42, Part Two, ofthe draft articles on State responsibility as provisionally adopted on first readingby the International Law Commission reads: "The injured State is entitled toobtain from the State which has committed an internationally wrongful act fullreparation....

tions, which were imposed for practical reasons, create a category ofnon-recoverable harmful effects. 25

5. Last. but certainly not least, in the field of responsibility fora wrongful act, the decisive factor is the wrongfulness of the act,regardless of whether or not damage ensues. Damage, is, on thecontrary, essential to sine delicto liability: it triggers the impositionof consequences.

Regarding responsibility, the International Law Commission didnot accept the existence, besides the subjective and objective ele-ments of responsibility, of a third constitutive element of an interna-tionally wrongful act, usually called "damage". Such, at least, was itsposition when provisionally approving Part One of the draft articleson State responsibility.26

Cmclusion

All of the previous differences unequivocally point to liability andresponsibility as two different legal species. Though in most languagestheir name may be the same (responsabilit, responsabilidad), someauthors like Ago attribute this to the fact that legal language is rela-tively poor. Some others go as far as to use a different name for whatis generally known as liability: liability would be only a form of guar-antee given by the operator as a condition for the legality of the activ-ity conducted.'

' The Chorzw rule. however, obviously serves as a guideline, although not astrict benchmark, in the field of sine deicto liability as well, because it is reason-able and embodies the element of justice. The exceptions are due mainly to practi-cal reasons: sometimes a ceding is fixed in order to limit the amounts insured, anda threshold sometimes acknowledges the fact that we are all today both pollutersand victims of pollution. It is evident, however, that the law must seek reparation.as far as possible, for all damages-

' Most of the members of the Commission -... recognized that the economicelement of damage referred to by certain writers was not inherent in the definitionof an internationally wrongful act as a source of responsibility, but might be partof the rule which lays upon States the obligation not to cause certain injuries toaliens. Furthenrm with regard to the determination of the conditions essentialfor the existence of an internationally wrongful act, the Commission also recog-nized that under international law an injury, material or moral, is necessarily inher-eot in every violation of an international subjective right of a State. Hence thenotion of failure to fulfil an international legal obligation to another State seemedto the Commission fully sufficient to cover this aspect, without the addition ofanything further". Yearbook. 1971. vol. II (Part One), p- 223. document ACN.4/246 and Add. 1-3. para. 74.

' See R. Quadri. Diritto Internazionale Pubblico. 5th ed. (Naples. Liguori.1968), pp. 590-591. However, we have seen that it has been called responsabilipour risque in French law, and something equivalent in most legal systems of theworld. It seems too late now to change that name into one different from -liability"or -responsabiliti".

RESPONSABILITE INTERNATIONALEDE UINDIVIDU EN MATIERE CRIMINELLE

Doudou Thiam

Pendant longtemps, les juristes ont considdr6 que les violationsdu droit international ne pouvaient Etre le fait que des Etats. Les actescommis par des agents de I'Etat disparaissaient derriere I'6cran queconstituait P'Etat.

Cette conception traditionnelle qui exclut toute responsabilitdinternationale de l'individu en maticre penale fut encore soutenue auproc&s de Nuremberg par les avocats des accuses. L'avocat de VonRibbentrop dclarait. en particulier, que v les hommes d'Etat sontcharges des interets de leurs peuples. Si leur politique dchoue, le payspour le compte duquel ils agissent doit en supporter les consequenceset c'est I'histoire qui portera sur ces hommes un jugement. Mais, aupoint de vue juridique, ils ne sont responsables qu'envers leur proprepays des actes dont on accuse celui-ci, actes considCres comme desviolations du droit international. Le pays 6tranger, ldse par ces actes,ne peut rendre responsable celui qui les a commis,-' .

Cette th6orie a requ un dmenti dans le jugement de Nuremberg,selon lequel [cle sont des hommes et non des entites abstraites quicommettent des crimes dont la repression s'impose comme sanctiondu droit international >.2. L'volution ne s'est pas faite sans de nom-breuses tentatives demeurees vaines.

DejA au cours de la premiiere guerre mondiale, une d6claration du18 mai 1915, publide par les Gouvernements de la France, de laGrande-Bretagne et de la Russie indiquait ce qui suit: ,< En presencede ces nouveaux crimes de la Turquie contre I'humanitd et la civilisa-tion, les Gouvernements [de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne et de laRussie] font savoir publiquement A la Sublime Porte qu'ils tiendrontpersonnellement responsables desdits crimes tous les membres duGouvernement ottoman ainsi que ceux de ses agents qui se trou-

Cite dans Le statut et le jugement du Tribunal de Nuremberg: Historique etanalyse. Mimoire du Secritaire giniral des Nations Unies. document A/CN.4/5.p. 42.

2 Procjs des grands criminels de guerre devant I Tribunal militaire interna-tional. Nuremberg. 1947, p. 235.

veraient impliqu6s dans de pareils massacres A3. Les crimes vis6s6taient ceux commis contre la minoritd armdnienne dans ce pays.

A la fin de la premiere guerre mondiale, le Trait6 de Versailles6tablit le droit des puissances victorieuses de traduire devant les tribu-naux militaires, apr~s la conclusion du Trait6 de paix, les individusennemis auxquels 6taient imput6s des crimes de guerre. L'article 229de ce Trait6 visait notamment les auteurs d'actes commis contre lesressortissants de plusieurs pays qui devaient 8tre jugds par des tribu-naux militaires compos6s de membres appartenant aux puissancesintdress6es. C'est sur la base de ce Trait6 que fut demand6e aux Pays-Bas, oi il s'6tait r6fugi6, I'extradition de l'Empereur Guillaume II deHohenzollern. Cette extradition ne fut pas accord6e, parce que lespoursuites, selon le gouvernement requis, manquaient de base 16gale.Les Pays-Bas d6clar~rent neanmoins que ,si, dans l'avenir, il 6taitconstitud par la Socidt6 des Nations une juridiction internationalecomp6tente pour juger, dans le cas d'une guerre, des faits qualifijscrimes et soumis a des sanctions par un statut antirieur aux actescommis, il appartiendrait aux Pays-Bas de s'associer At ce nouveauregime A4.

II convient d'examiner les bases conventionnelles de la respon-sabilitd p~nale de l'individu avant d'examiner les principes qui gou-vernent cette responsabilitd.

1. Les bases conventionnelles de [a responsabiliti internationale

C'est apres la seconde guerre mondiale que l'mergence de 'indi-vidu comme sujet de droit international en mati~re criminelle entrar6ellement dans les faits. LAccord du 8 aoit 1945 crda le Tribunal mili-taire international de Nuremberg. La Charte approuv6e le 19 janvier1946 par le commandement supreme des forces allies en Extreme-Orient cr6a le Tribunal militaire international en Extreme-Orient. LaLoi n' 10 du Conseil alli6 de contr6le du 20 d6cembre 1945 fournit Atchaque autorit6 d'occupation une base juridique pour poursuivre lesddlinquants autres que ceux qui devraient 8tre jug6s par un tribunalmilitaire international.

Plus tard intervinrent les Conventions de Gen~ve de 1949 et lesProtocoles additionnels relatifs A la r6pression des infractions et desinfractions graves auxdits instruments.

' Mdmoire de la ddlkgation nationale arm6nienne depos6 par la ddldgationhell6nique le 14 mars 1919, Recued des acres de la Confdrence de la paix, 1919-1920, Partie IV B(2) - Commission des responsabilit6s des auteurs de [a guerre etsanctions, Paris, 1922, p. 511.

' Note du Gouvernement n6erlandais du 23 janvier 1920, cite dans le mimo-randum prdpard par le Professeur V. Pella et publi6 sous le couvert d'unc note duSecrdtariat, Yearbook... 1950, vol. 11, document A/CN.4/39, par. 61.

Malgrd le jugement du Tribunal de Nuremberg qui avait rejet66nergiquement la thdorie de la responsabilitd p~nale de I'E tat, certainsauteurs ont continu6 A soutenir cette thdorie. Un des plus tenaces 6taitVespasien Pella. Dans un m6morandum prdsentd par le Secrdtairegdniral de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, Vespasien Pella ddfen-dait encore avec conviction la th&se de la responsabilit6 intcrnationalepenale de I'Etat

a Si ,*, ecit Pella. , sa responsabilit6 p~nale a 6t6 dfiment 6tablie,I'Etat rebelle contre lequel on a eu recours A des mesures de con-trainte impliquant i'emploi de la force armde, ne pourra se dro-ber derriiere I'argument fallacieux qu'il a dGi s'inciner devant lacontrainte et non pas devant ]a justice. Faute de la reconnais-sance d'une telle responsabilit6. il continuera, au contraire, A seconsiderer, comme Etat vaincu et non pas comme Etat coupable[...]. Si, done, I'on admet la responsabilit6 penale d'un Etat, cedernier devra reconnaitre que les sanctions dont il porte le poidsne sont plus la consequence de sa defaite, c'est-A-dire l'effet d'unrapport de force. Ces sanctions auront dtd imposees par une deci-sion de la justice internationale constatant qu'un crime contre lapaix et la securit6 de l'humanitd a dt comis.,,

ExaminanL ensuite, les arguments invoquds contre ]a respon-sabilit6 pnale de l'Etat, Vespasien Pella les combat sans complai-sance.

L'argument selon lequel les Etats dtant de simples fictions inca-pables, par leur nature, de commettre des crimes, toute sanction prisecontre eux serait en fait une sanction contre l'ensemble des particu-hers qui relevent de ces Etats est. selon Vespasien Pella. un argumentfallacieux, car ,, ia nation entire dont I'Etat n'est que le repr&sentantjuridique, peut subir les cons&luences des mesures prises contrel'Etat, en raison des crimes commis par les organes de l'Etat *.

II est faux de pr~tendre, poursuit I'auteur, que la partie de ]apopulation n'ayant pas consenti A la commission des crimes seraitinjustement frapp&. - 11 est indvitable que [...] Ila partie de la popula-tion qui s'est oppose ouvertement ou clandestinement aux crimescommis soit presque toujours 6prouve. Mbme dans I'applicationordinaire des peines, il arrive qu'une peine entraine des souffrancesmorales ou 6conomiques pour les parents innocents du ddlinquant o.

Selon Vespasien Pella, < f[lie fait m~me que ce ne sont pas seule-ment les ddtenteurs du pouvoir mais I'Etat tout entier qui peut &rel'objet de mesures plnales, peut contribuer A favoriser le dveloppe-ment d'une opposition contre les criminels qui se trouvent A la tete deI'Etat *.

Enfin, le m~me auteur s'appuie sur I'Article 51 de la Charte,relatif Ai la 16gitime d6fense. Cette disposition qui r6serve aux Etats ledroit de 1dgitime d6fense individuelle ou collective introduirait, endroit international, ,, ... une institution de droit plnal, qui impliquel'existence de la responsabilit6 p6nale de l'Etat >0.

La tendance A considdrer les Etats comme p~nalement respon-sables semble s'expliquer par le fait que la plupart des crimes en causesont des crimes massifs qui ne peuvent, apparemment, etre commisqu'avec les moyens de I'Etat, par des personnes investies d'un pou-voir de commandement. De ce fait, on a tout naturellement confonduI'Etat avec les agents qui ont utilis6, A des fins criminelles, les moyensmis A leur disposition pour exercer leur mission.

A cette explication s'ajoute le fait que le projet d'article 19 sur laresponsabilit6 internationale des Etats, adopt6 en premiere lecture paria Commission du droit international, d6signe les faits internationale-ment illicites d'un Etat ayant une extreme gravit6 sous le nom de"crimes intemationaux ,,.

I est juste de rappeler toutefois que la Commission du droitinternational a eu, A plusieurs reprises, l'occasion d'indiquer, dans sescommentaires, que le mot <crime>, peut 8tre pris dans deux accep-tions diff6rentes.

Dans une premiere acception, le mot <crime>> s'applique A unmanquement d'une extreme gravitd par un Etat A une obligation inter-nationale. Cette acception n'implique et ne peut pas impliquer l'appli-cation d'une sanction p~nale A l'Etat auteur de ce manquement. Elleentraine des consdquences autres que p~nales, qui tendent A faire ces-ser le fait illicite ou "i en rdparer les consequences pr~judiciables.

Dans une seconde acception, le mot o crime s'applique au man-quement le plus grave que peut commettre un individu Ai une obliga-tion qu'impose le droit international p6nal. Ce manquement est uneinfraction dont l'auteur est passible d'une sanction pdnale.

La pr~sente 6tude ne s'int~resse qu' la seconde acception dumot crime, celle qui engage la responsabilit6 p nale de l'individu.

A plusieurs reprises, la Commission du droit international a misen garde contre toute confusion entre ces deux sens du mot « crime .Elle I'a fait A l'article 4 du projet de code des crimes contre la paix et]a s~curit6 de P'humanit6 qui stipule que: < Le fait que le present Codepr~voie ]a responsabilit6 des individus pour les crimes contre la paix

'Ibid., pars. 69, 70 et 77.

et ia securitt de l'humanitd est sans prejudice de toute question deresponsabilite des Etats en droit international ,,.

Le commentaire de cet article 4 indique que a le chfitiment per-sonnel d'individus-organes de l'Etat on'dpuise certes pas la respon-sabilit6 internationale incombant A l'Etat pour les faits internationale-ment illicites qui, de par le comportement de ses organes, lui sontattribu6s dans de tels cas,. La responsabilitd de I'Etat peut donc sub-sister sans qu'il puisse s'en degager en invoquant la poursuite ou lapunition des individus auteurs du crime ,.

Dans les statuts des tribunaux criminels internationaux rcem-ment cres pour connaitre des crimes commis dans l'ex-Yougoslavieet au Rwanda, cette orientation n'est pas dementie. Le rapport duSecritaire gen4ral, 6tabli conformement au paragraphe 2 de la rtsolu-tion 808 (1993) du Conseil de securiti, precise que x [dians pratique-ment toutes les observations &rites que le Secrdtaire g~ndral a reques,il est suggerE que le statut du tribunal international contienne des dis-positions concernant la responsabiit6 p~nale individuelle des chefsd'Etat, hauts fonctionnaires et personnes agissant dans l'exercice defonctions officielles *".

Le commentaire du statut de ce Tribunal precise encore queal'expression wpersonnes presumes responsables de violationsgraves du droit international humanitaire,, prise dans son sens ordi-naire, design[e] les personnes physiques 1 l'exclusion des personnesmorales ,. I1 ajoute: a La question se pose toutefois de savoir si unepersonne morale, tefle une association ou une organisation, peut Etreconsid re en tant que telle, comme auteur d'un crime, ses membresdtant alors, pour cette seule raison, soumis A la juridiction du Tribunalinternational. Le Secrdtaire general pense que ce concept ne devraitpas etre retenu en ce qui concerne le Tribunal international. Les actescriminels inoncds dans ce statut sont executes par des personnesphysiques; ces personnes seraient soumises A la juridiction du tri-bunal international, inddpendamment de leur appartenance A desgroupes*1' .

Enlin, le statut du dernier-ne des tribunaux internationaux, cr&par la rdsolution 955 (1994) du Conseil de s&curit6 pour connaitre descrimes commis au Rwanda contre le droit humanitaire, va dans le

6 Rapport de la Commission du droit international stir les travaux de saquaranse-huitime sessio Documents offciels de IAssembWe ginrale,cinquwnme-unieme session. SuppWlment n 10 (A/51/10). p. 47.

7 Ibid. par. (2) du commentaire relatif t I'article 4.' Document Sn25704. par. 55.9bid., pr. 50.0Ibid. par. 51.

meme sens"t . L'article 6 de ce statut est consacrd A ,la responsabilitdp~nale individuelle o.

II existe donc, depuis le procis de Nuremberg, une ligne de pen-s~e constante seion laquelle la responsabilitd internationale en matirecriminelle est une responsabilite de l'individu et de l'individu seul, A'exclusion de I'Etat.

Reste maintenant A examiner les principes g~ndraux qui gouver-nent cette responsabilitd.

I. Principes genkraux de la responsabilite internationale de I'individuen matiire criminelle

Ces principes rdsultent du statut et du jugement du Tribunal deNuremberg. 12Assembl6e g~n6rale des Nations Unies a chargd la Com-mission du droit international de formuler ces principes par sa r6solu-tion 95 (1) du I I d6cembre 1946. Le texte de ces principes adoptd par laCommission en 195012 a 6t6 soumis A I'Assemblde A sa cinquieme ses-sion. Le nouveau projet de code des crimes contre la paix et la s6cu-ritd de l'humanitd tient largement compte de ces principes qui sontrepris dans sa premiere partie.

Ces principes peuvent tre divisds en deux categories. Certainss'appliquent A tout individu auteur d'un crime international. D'autres,qui ont un champ plus limit6, ne s'appliquent qu'aux individus agentsde I'Etat.

1. Principes s'appliquant i tout individu auteur d'un crime interna-tional

II s'agit des principes I, II, V et VII formulas par la Commission dudroit international.

Le principe I consacre la responsabilit6 internationale de l'individuen matii-re p6nale. Selon ce principe v [t]out auteur d'un acte qui cons-titue un crime de droit international est responsable de ce chef et passi-ble de chitiment >.

Par le mot vauteur*, il faut dvidemment entendre la personnephysique A 'exclusion de I'Etat, en application du jugement deNuremberg qui, sur ce point, a 6td tr6s explicite.

Le principe II r6affirme I'autonomie du droit international penal.En vertu de ce principe, (< [Ile fait que le droit interne ne punit pas un

Document S/RES/955 (1994).1' Rapport de la Commission du droit international sur les travaux de sa

deuxi~me session, Documents officiels de l'Assemblie gdnirale, cinquiime ses-sion, Supplement n" 12 (A/1316), pp. 12-16.

acte qui constitue un crime de droit international ne ddgage pas laresponsabilit6 en droit international de celui qui I'a commis. o II enrdsulte que ]a responsabilitd internationale de l'individu, en matirep nale. aussi bien en ce qui concerne les faits que leur qualification etleur sanction, relve d'un regime diffd'ent et obtit, en consequence, ides r~gles distinctes Ainsi, un acte qualifi6 d'homicide par le droitinterne peut Wtre qualifi6 de genocide par le droit international si cetacte r~pond ai la definition que donne de ce crime la Convention du9 d&cembre 1948 sur la prevention et la repression du crime de gmno-cide.

Cette autonomie du droit international plnal peut entrainerd'autres consequences importantes et notamment en ce qui concernel'application de la r gle non bis in idem qui connait, en droit interna-tional penal, une exception importante. Ainsi, un individu jug. et con-damn6 pour assassinat pourrait h nouveau Etre jug6 s'il est dtabli que'acte pour lequel il a dejh W jugd relive d'une autre qualification, et

constitue, par exemple, un crime contre la paix et la sdcuritd de l'hu-manitd. Le nouveau projet de code 6tablit cette exception qui a &6dgalement reprise dans les statuts des tribunaux internationaux cr6dspour connaitre des crimes commis dans 'ex-Yougoslavie et auRwanda-

Le principe V est relatif aux garantiesjudiciaires universellementreconnues et ne ncessite pas de longs commentaires. Ces garantiesse retrouvent aussi bien dans la Dclaration universelle des droits dei'homme de 1948 que dans le Pacte international relatif aux droitscivils et politiques du 16 dcembre 1966.

Enfin le principe VII est relatif a la complicitd. Selon ce principe,la complicit6 d'un acte qui constitue un crime de droit internationalest un crime de droit international. Ce principe qui parait 6vident asuscitd de longs dbats i Ia Commission du droit international parceque la notion de complicit6 a un contenu variable selon les systimesjuridiques. Elle peut englober des faits non seulement antdrieurs A'acte principal ou concomitants avec lui, mais aussi des faits pos-

tdrieurs A cet acte. Dans le systime du common law, on appelle cesfaits , accessories after the facts,*. Dans d'autres syst~mes juridi-ques, de tels faits constituent des infractions autonomes et non desactes de complicit6. Ainsi, en droit franqais, le recel est une infraction,alors que dans d'autres syst mes juridiques, il relive de la complicitd.

2. Principes relatifs i la responsabilite pinale des agents de I'Etat

11 s'agit des principes III et IV

I1 arrive parfois que l'individu, agissant en sa qualit6 d'agent ou dereprsentant d'un Etat, commette un acte ayant un caracthre criminel.

Certains actes criminels ne peuvent d'ailleurs tre commis que par desagents d'un Etat. II en est ainsi, par exemple, de la plupart des crimescontre la paix et la s6curit6 de 'humanitd. La commission de ces cri-mes implique, n~cessairement, 'exercice d'un pouvoir de commande-ment. C'est le cas notamment de I'agression.

Selon le principe III v [Ile fait que l'auteur d'un acte qui constitueun crime de droit international a agi en qualit6 de chef d'Etat ou degouvernant ne d6gage pas sa responsabilitd en droit international,,.On se souvient de la rigle invoqu6e par les avocats des accuses auprocis de Nuremberg, selon laquelle les hommes d'Etat ne peuventpas 8tre tenus pour p6nalement responsables de faits commis dans'exercice de leurs fonctions.

Le principe III est nouveau A cet 6gard et constitue un revirementcomplet par rapport A ce qui dtait considr6 comme dtant le droit.

Le principe IV est relatif Ai la responsabilit6 des agents de l'Etatayant exdcutd I'ordre d'un sup~rieur hidrarchique. Seion ce principeo [Ile fait d'avoir agi sur 'ordre de son gouvernement ou celui d'unsup6rieur hidrarchique ne d6gage pas la responsabilit6 de 'auteur endroit international s'il a eu moralement la facult6 de choisir o.

L'expression ,,s'il a eu moralement la facult6 de choisir,, estrelative A la situation de contrainte oi) se trouverait I'auteur. A cesujet, on s'est parfois demand6 si I'argument tir6 de la contrainte peut8tre invoqud en cas de crimes contre I'humanit6, dtant donnd lesmobiles de ces crimes qui sont, par d6finition, des mobiles politiques,raciaux ou religieux. Le mobile est incorpor6 dans la ddfinition m medu crime contre I'humanit6. Celui-ci suppose que 'auteur a agi, ins-pir6 par ces seuls mobiles, ind6pendamment de toute contrainte.Lorsque tel est le cas, quelle situation de contrainte 'accus6 peut-ilinvoquer?

Aussi la jurisprudence des tribunaux militaires internationaux etnotamment des tribunaux militaires dtablis en Allemagne en vertu dela loi n0 10 du Conseil alli6 de contr6le, exige-t-elle des conditions tr~srestrictives. La contrainte doit consister dans 'existence d'un p~rilimminent, visant I'int6grit physique ou la vie. Mais les tribunaux ontparfois exig6 des conditions encore beaucoup plus igoureuses. II peutexister, dit un jugement, des situations ,ou l'ordre juridique exigeexceptionnellement d'une personne une conduite d6passant la naturehumaine et qui consiste A surmonter l'instinct de conservation> 13

Lorsque, par exemple, un agent consent k exercer une fonction

" Cit6 dans H. Meyrowitz, La ripression par les tribunaux allemands descrimes contre I'humanitd et de I'appartenance a tine organisation criminelle, enapplication de la loin" 10 du Conseil de contr6le allig, Paris, Librairie gdndrale dedroit et de jurisprudence, 1960, p. 406.

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Edmundo Vargas Carrefio

1. General Comments

The topic of humanitarian intervention is not new, but it hasregained importance in the post-Cold War environment, which hasopened the door for the international community to seek to protect, saveor aid people gravely affected by certain situations through SecurityCouncil action, including the use of armed force.

In the 1970s and 1980s when the Cold War was still being wagedand in light of the frustration resulting from the Security Council'sinertia, some international jurists asserted that, under certain cir-cumstances and conditions, it would be possible for a State to intervenein another through use of force, if, by so doing, the violation of humanrights was prevented or a despotic regime was eliminated.' Two suchsituations, e.g. unilateral and collective interventions for humanitarianreasons, will be the subject of this essay.

Generally speaking, the notion of humanitarian interventionapplies to a situation where a State or a group of States enters into theterritory of another State by using force, with the objective of aidingthat State's inhabitants when their fundamental human rights havebeen affected by an internal conflict or by the actions of their Govern-ment. In this sense, even though it was fornulated more than 75 yearsago, Rougier's classical definition of humanitarian intervention stillstands. According to that definition, "[Ila 'thdorie de 'intcrvention

' See R. Lillich, ed., Hunaniturian Intervention and the United Nations (Char-lottesville. VA, University Press of Virginia. 1973); J, N. Moore, ed., Law and CivilWar in the Modern World (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974);W. M Reisman and NI. S. McDougal. "Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the[bos". in Lillich, op. cit., pp. 167-195; W %. Reisman, "Coercion and Self Determi-nation: Construing Charter Article 2 (4)", AJIL, vol. 78 (1984). pp. 642-645; "Hu-manitarian Intervention and Fledging Democracies", Fordham International LawJournal. vol. 18 (1985), pp. 794-805; J. P. Fonteyne, "The Customary InternationalLaw Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity under the UNCharter". California Western International Law Journal, vol. 4 (1974), pp. 203-270;M. Bazyler, "Re-examining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light ofAtrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia", Stanford Journal of International Law,vol. 23 (1987), pp. 547-619; F. R. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry intoLaw and Morality (Dobbs Ferry, NY. Transnational, 1988); and S. G. Simon, "TheContemporary Legality of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention", CaliforniaWestern International Law Journal, vol. 24 (1993). pp. 117-153.

d'humanitd' est proprement celle qui reconnaft pour un droit 'exer-cice du contr6le international d'un Etat sur les actes de souverainet6int~rieure d'un autre Etat contraires 'aux lois de l'humanit6" '.2

For classical international jurists, like Grotius and Vattel, hu-manitarian intervention was perfectly legitimate. According to theirteachings, a foreign prince-or sovereign--could lawfully act in theterritory of another prince or sovereign who treated his subjects inhu-manely. 3 Even though these and other authors expressed themselvesin favour of intervention for humanitarian reasons, later on, in thecourse of the nineteenth century and during the first decade of thepresent one, a new way of thinking-both European4 and LatinAmerican s - rejected said views, on the basis of the principle of non-intervention.

Despite the fact that an ambivalent theory regarding the lawfuluse of force prevailed during the time prior to the adoption of theCharter of the United Nations, in practice, there were numerous casesof intervention where humanitarian considerations-obvious in somecases, controversial in most and non-existent in others-were invokedby the intervening State or States.

Currently, humanitarian intervention should be analysed in thecontext of certain guiding principles of contemporary internationallaw, specially those of non-intervention, the prohibition of the use orthreat of force in international relations and respect for human rights,including political fights.

Sometimes, the harmonization of these principles is not easy. Itis precisely when armed action, either individual or collective, takesplace that the contradictions among these principles are most evident.

On the one hand, recourse to force might mean endangering theinternational community's main objective, in other words, the mainte-nance of international peace and security; on the other hand, anarmed operation destined to protect the lives of people or their funda-

2 [The 'theory of humanitarian intervention' is precisely that which recognizesas a right the exercise of international control by a State over the acts of internalsovereignty of another State which are contrary 'to the laws of humanity'].A. Rougier, "La th~orie de l'intervention d'humanitd", RGDIP, vol. 17 (1910),p. 472.

'H. Grotius, De Juri Belli Ac Pacis (1853), ch. XXV, p. 438; E. de Vattel, Ledroit des gens ou principes de la loi naturelle appliquie at la conduite et auxaffaires des Nations et des Souverains (Paris, Guillaumin et Cie, 1863), p. 55.

For example, A. Carnazza, Traiti de droit international en temps de paix(1880), p. 557; and P. Pradier Foder6, Traiti de droit international europi'en etams'ricain (1885), p. 655.

' For example, A. Bello, Obras completas (1886), vol. X, p. 35; L. Pereira,Principios de Direito International (1902), vol. 1. pp. 97-98; and I. Fabella, Interven-tion (Paris, Pedone, I%), p. 40.

mental rights might address another essential objective of the contem-porary international community, such as respect for human rights.

Even though this essay will only cover humanitarian interven-tion. be it individual or collective, it is important to bear in mind thatthere are many other related topics, to which it is impossible to referin an article such as this. One of these topics, for example, is humani-tarian aid, frequently confused with humanitarian intervention. Theobjective of humanitarian aid is to help all the victims, without distinc-tion or discrimination and without resorting to the use of armed forceagainst any sector of the population, although there is a possibility ofemploying military elements in order to provide logistic support. Onthe contrary, in the case of humanitarian intervention, the use of forcehas as its objective the protection of a segment of the populationwhose human rights have been disregarded either by a rival group orby the Government.

This distinction between humanitarian intervention and humani-tarian aid is implicit in the Judgment of the International Court of Jus-tice in the case concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities inand against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),where the Court, on the one hand, specifically rejected the use offorce on the part of a State as an "appropriate method to monitor orensure" respect for human rights,' while, on the other hand, itaccepted -humanitarian aid" as lawful, declaring that -Ithere can beno doubt that the provision of strictly humanitarian aid to persons orforces in another country, whatever their political affiliation or objec-tives, cannot be regarded as unlawful intervention, or as in any otherway contrary to international law".

IL The Principle of Non-Intervention

There is little doubt that non-intervention--or the obligation not tointervene in the internal or external affairs of a State--constitutes avxev-established principle of contemporary international law

The determination of what constitutes an act of intervention, asconduct contrary to international law, has not aliays been easy8 None-

' CJ. Reports 1986. p. 134.7IdL. p. 124.bOpphein defines intervention as "dictatorial interference by a State in the

affairs of another State for the purpose of maintaining or altering the actual condi-tions of things-. Oppenheim's International Law, 8th ed, H. Lauterpach, ed. (Lon-don, Longnians, 1955), voL 1: Peace. p. 305.

theless, it is possible to indicate certain fundamental criteria that canhelp to describe this phenomenon.9

In the first place, as for the subject of an intervention, only Statescan be potential subjects. It is true that, in international practice, onecan find examples of abusive conduct on the part of some privateenterprises or other non-State entities that intervene illegally in theinternal affairs of a State, but such conduct, unless it is sponsored bya foreign State, should be regulated only by the internal law of theaffected State.

As for the substance of the intervention, it consists of executingactions intended to bend the will of another State. Of course, conceptssuch as excess, abuse and distortion are implicit. Therefore, we aretalking about a deformation of normal relations between States and adeviation from the regular negotiating channels, thus perturbing theregular methods of conducting international relations.

As for the means, intervention may vary according to the circum-stances. In international practice, one can find various instances ofintervention, both military and non-military, even though the formerrepresents the most extreme and grave example of intervention which,as shall be seen later, constitutes a violation of fundamental provi-sions of contemporary international law.

Finally, a fundamental element is that interference occurs withregard to matters exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of theState concerned, a matter which, as indicated by the Permanent Courtof International Justice, is relative and "depends upon the develop-ment of international relations".'0

The principle of non-intervention owes its origin to a LatinAmerican contribution. This region had suffered the experience ofpainful armed interventions, some of them based on supposedly hu-manitarian reasons. Latin American efforts to secure a legal status tosaid principle were eventually recognized for the first time in 1933 inthe Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States. Article 8established that: "No State has the right to intervene in the internal orthe external affairs of another".

After having been reiterated in several resolutions and declara-tions of Inter-American Conferences, the principle of non-interven-

' Similar criteria are found in the Exposicidn de Morivos respecto de los casosde violaciones al Principio de No IJteri'encion prepared by the Inter-AmericanJuidical Committee, of which the author of this essay was Special Rapporteur. SeeInter-American Juridical Committee, Recommendations and Reports 1974-1977,vol. II, pp. 97-104.

'0 Advisory opinion with regard to the Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunisand Morocco, P.C.J., Series B. No. 4, p. 24.

tion was later embodied in Article 18 of the Charter of the Organiza-tion of American States (OAS) in the following terms:

"No State or group of States has the right to intervene, di-rectly or indirectly, for any reasons whatever, in the internal orexternal affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle pro-hibits not only armed force but also any other form of interfer-ence or attempted threat against the personality of the State oragainst its political, economic, and cultural elements."

Likewise, other regional organizations, such as the League ofArab States and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), haveexplicitly included the principle of non-intervention in their constitu-ent instruments.I I

On the other hand, among the principles embodied in the Charterof the United Nations, there is none which expressly prohibits a Stateor group of States from intervening in the affairs of another State. Itis possible that this omission might be due to the fact that, when thefirst draft of the Charter was prepared, as well as during the debate atthe San Francisco Conference, the concepts of intervention and theuse of force did not seem to represent two distinct categories. Thisexplains why, for the first commentators on the Charter, such as Kel-sen, the obligation of a State not to intervene in the affairs of anotherState was implied in the obligation arising from Article 2, paragraph 4,of the Charter to refrain from the use or threat of force.1 2 Othersauthors, like Jim~nez de Archaga, believe that the prohibition for theOrganization to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction,contained in Article 2, paragraph 7, would also include States, sincethe Charter may not authorize States to do what the Organization it-self may not do and that the principles which have been establishedin Article 2 are applicable both to the Organization as well as all itsMember States.'

3

In any case, the principle of non-intervention is derived fromother provisions and principles of the Charter, particularly that whichrecognizes the sovereign equality of States, since such equality wouldlack any value if States could intervene in the internal affairs of otherStates.

Therefore, it is not surprising that the International Court of Jus-tice explicitly rejected, in its first Judgment with respect to a conten-

" See Article 8 of the Pact of the League of Arab States and Article 3 of theOAU Charter.

'2 H. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Anah'sis of Its Fun-damental Problems (London. Stevens, 1950). p. 770.

" E. Jimdnez de Ar&:haga. El derecho internacional contempordneo (Madrid,Tecnos, 1980), p. 137.

tious case, the so-called right to intervene, as contrary to internationallaw. In the Corfu Channel case, it indicated that:

"The Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention asthe manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the past,given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot, whateverbe the present defects in international organization, find a placein international law. Intervention is perhaps still less admissiblein the particular form it would take here; for, from the nature ofthings, it would be reserved for the most powerful States, andmight easily lead to perverting the administration of internationaljustice itself". 14

Several years later, the Court reiterated the validity of the princi-ple of non-intervention in an even wider sense, reaffirming that saidprinciple "involves the right of every sovereign State to conduct itsaffairs without outside interference", 15 and that it "forbids all Statesor groups of States to intervene directly in internal or external affairsof other States".1

6

In 1949, shortly after its creation, the International Law Commis-sion included this principle in the draft Declaration on the Rights andDuties of States, stipulating in article 4 that '[e]very State has the dutyto refrain from intervention in the internal or external affairs of anyother State".'

7

Later, in successive resolutions of the General Assembly of theUnited Nations, particularly resolution 2131 (XX) of 21 December1965 entitled "Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in theDomestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independenceand Sovereignty", as well as resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October1970, whereby it adopted the Declaration on Principles of Interna-tional Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation amongStates in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the prin-ciple of non-intervention was recognized as one of the fundamentalprinciples of contemporary international law.

Even though the above antecedents leave no doubt that the prin-ciple of non-intervention constitutes one of the fundamental pillarsupon which contemporary international law rests, this does not meanthat is an absolute principle. Even resolutions 2131 (XX) and 2625(XXV), which reproduce the final part of Article 2, paragraph 7, of theCharter, have explicitly indicated that said principle, as formulated in

.LC.J. Reports 1949, p. 35.'s Case concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against

Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), LC.J. Reports 1986, p. 106.16 Ibid., p. 108.

'7 Yearbook... 1948, p. 135.

the above-mentioned resolutions, may not in any way affect the pro-visions of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the mainte-nance of international peace and security. Moreover, as will be exam-ined later, in the present state of international relations, human rightsmay not be considered as a matter exclusively within the domesticjurisdiction of States, which is why, on an international level a Statemay not invoke the principle of non-intervention to justify its conductwith regard to the treatment of people under its jurisdiction.

I1. The Prohibition of the Threat or Use of Force

According to Article 2 paragraph 4, of the Charter of the UnitedNations:

"All Members shall refrain in their international relationsfrom the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity orpolitical independence of any State, or in any other manner incon-sistent with the Purposes of1the United Nations."

This is one of the most fundamental provisions of contemporaryinternational law and the cornerstone of peaceful relations amongStates. In this respect, it is worth remembering that the InternationalLaw Commission has indicated that the provision of the Charter pro-hibiting the use or threat of force in international relations constitutesan example ofjus cogens.Is

For its part, the International Court of Justice has reiterated thevalidity of the prohibition by the Charter of the use of force in inter-national relations. 9

The principle contained in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charterhas been confirmed and developed by General Assembly resolutions,in particular resolution 2625 (XXV), resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 De-cember 1974 on the Definition of Aggression and resolution 42f2-2 bywhich the Assembly adopted, on 18 November 1987, the Declara-tion on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Re-fraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations.

Despite what has been said, there is no consensus in the doctrineas to the scope and extension of said norm. Therefore, the last para-graph of resolution 2625 (XXV) admits that there are "cases in whichthe use of force is lawful".

For the majority of the doctrine, force in international relationsmay only be used lawfully when it has been ordered or authorized bya competent international organ or when it is exercised as a legitimateact of individual or collective self-defence. As Jimdnez de Ardchaga

" Yearbook-.. 1966. vol. II, p. 247, document A/6309/Rev.I.,1 Nicaragua case (see footnote 15 above). p. 90.

has written, the use of force in international relations has the samestatus as in municipal law: it is a crime, or a sanction, or an act ofself-defence.

20

On the contrary, other authors, interested in conferring greaterdiscretionary power to States to use force, without renouncing thevalidity of the norm contained in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter,have interpreted it in a wider sense, arguing that, in addition to the twoexceptions above, there would be other situations in which recourseto the use of force would be justified. Oscar Schachter, who hasstudied this matter in depth, has divided into the following categoriesthe alleged circumstances in which the use of force would be permis-sible according to these authors:

(1) where force is used in a foreign State with the consent ofthe dejure Government of that State (referred to sometimesas "Intervention on Invitation");

(2) where force is used to recover territory illegally occupied bya foreign State;

(3) where force is used for humanitarian objectives to preventor suppress atrocities and massive violations of humanrights;

(4) where force is used to assist a people struggling for nationalliberation;

(5) where force is used to assist a people struggling for demo-cratic rights against a repressive regime;

(6) where force is used to protect or secure legal rights when noother means are available.21

Among the situations mentioned by Schachter, those which in-terest us for the purposes of this essay are interventions carried outwith the purpose of preventing or suppressing atrocities and massiveviolations of human rights and cases where force is used against arepressive regime, in other words, what is usually referred to ashumanitarian interventions.

IV. Non-Intervention and Human Rights

Under contemporary international law, there is no doubt that hu-man rights issues do not belong exclusively to the domestic jurisdictionof States. In reality, very few topics are as regulated by treaties andinternational conventions, as well as by customary international law, as

. Jim~nez de Artchaga, op. cit. (footnote 13 above), p. 177.20 O. Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice (Dordrecht,

Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), p. 113.

are human rights. In order to protect these rights, several organs havebeen created in the framework of both the United Nations and re-gional organizations.

The International Law Commission. while reiterating the impor-tance of non-intervention as a fundamental principle of contemporaryinternational law, has nonetheless indicated its limited scope, espe-cially due to "the decline in the number of situations qualifying asinternal affairs and to the emergence of situations, affecting humanrights in particular, in which the internal jurisdiction exception wasunwarranted". z2

For its part, the doctrine has, in a practically uniform manner.confirmed this view, which means that, on the one hand, States maynot invoke as an internal affair the manner in which they treat peopleunder their jurisdiction and, on the other, that States and internationalorganizations do not cease to respect the principle of non-interventionwhen they adopt measures against States that violate human rights, ifsuch measures are compatible with other norms of international law.

As for the measures which other States may adopt regardingthose States which commit grave violations of the human rights ofpersons under their jurisdiction, as long as they are compatible withother provisions of international law, they may not be consideredunlawful interventions. Thus, for instance, diplomatic statements orexpressions of preoccupation and disapproval regarding human rightsviolations are perfectly lawful.

Nonetheless, in view of the ever greater importance attached bythe international community to the task of ensuring respect for humanrights, it would seem to be more appropriate for States to direct theircriticism through the organs and procedures which international trea-ties, both regional and universal, have established to promote suchrights. In this regard, the International Court of Justice stated in theNicaragua case:

"... where human rights are protected by international conven-tions, that protection takes the form of such arrangements formonitoring or ensuring respect for human rights as provided forin the conventions themselves."' -'

Consequently, the promotion of fundamental human rightsseems to be one of the most effective achievements of contemporaryinternational law. Such action, as already mentioned, can take placeeither through regional systems established for that purpose or

I Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-seventh session. Official Records of the General Assembly. Fiftieth Session, Sup-plement No. 10 (A/50/1O), para. 75.

23 LCJ. Reports 1986. p. 134.

through the United Nations. The coexistence of the two systems-re-gional and global-certainly calls for an adequate coordination, but ifthis cannot be achieved and one would have to choose between thetwo, according to a great Latin American jurist whose prolific activityin the area of international law took place within the United Nationssystem, "la preferencia en materia de derechos humanos debe ser parael regionalismo. No s6lo por constituir un sistema mucho mis perfec-cionado, sino sobre todo porque en el piano regional el problema sesimplifica. En el piano mundial las oposiciones son casi insolubles:diversos niveles de civilizaci6n; diversos estilos de vida y diversasfilosofias disputan entre si, y el comtin denominador s6lo se logra enlIfneas de una evasiva generalidad. En el piano regional, en cambio, elcomtin denominador existe y la unidad jurfdica tambi~n." 24

The main regional systems for the protection of human rights arethe European, the Inter-American and the African systems. Theirappropriateness and effectiveness for the protection of human rightshave been demonstrated, both by the respective constituent instru-ments of the regional organizations and the treaties they have adoptedfor the protection of human rights-the 1950 European Conventionon Human Rights, the 1969 American Convention on Human Rightsand the 1981 African Charter on Human and People's Rights-as wellas by abundant practice developed under these systems. The Euro-pean and Inter-American systems have even established judicialorgans, which, from the viewpoint of legal security represent a greaterguarantee for the protection of these rights. Likewise, and as long asthis does not imply the use of force, the above regional systems havehad at their disposal the necessary means to persuade and even sanc-tion States which have violated their commitment to respect the hu-man rights protected by the instruments to which they are parties.

Even though the Charter of the United Nations does not dealwith the protection of human rights with the precision and elaborationwhich might be called for today, the Preamble and Articles 1, 55, 56,62, 68 and 76, paragraph (c), do not only indicate principles and objec-tives but also set out legal obligations for Member States, as has beenconfirmed by the International Court of Justice.

2 [... the preference in the area of human rights should go to regionalism. Thisis so not only because the latter constitutes a more perfected system, but above allbecause the problem is simplified on a regional basis. On a global scale, the diver-gences are almost insoluble: different levels of civilization; different lifestyles anddiverse philosophies vie with one another, and a common denominator can onlybe found through an evasive generality. Whereas, on the regional scale, the com-mon denominator exists and so does legal unity.] E. Jimnez de Archaga, "Elderecho y la justicia, resguardos de la libertad". Revista del Instituto Interameri-cano de Derechos Humanos, vol. 1 (1985), p. 33.

The Court, in cases where it referred to this matter, left no doubtwhatsoever that the obligation to respect human rights is based ongeneral international law. 5 It has indicated that the principles andrules of international law concerning the basic rights of the personengender obligations erga ommes;26 that the human rights clauses ofthe Charter of the United Nations contain binding legal obligations;2"and that to deprive human beings of their freedom and to subject themto physical constraint and conditions of hardship is in itself manifestlyincompatible with the principles of the Charter, as well as with thefundamental principles enunciated in the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights.2"

It must be noted that several important human rights treatieshave been concluded under the auspices of the United Nations, suchas the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights; the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of AllForms of Racial Discrimination; the 1973 International Convention onthe Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid; the 1979Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination againstWomen; the 1984 Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhu-man or Degrading Treatment; the 1989 Convention on the Rights ofthe Child; and the 1990 International Convention on the Protection ofthe Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families.

In the majority of States, these treaties have been incorporatedinto the respective internal legal systems, either through a constitu-tional provision or through jurisprudence, and consequently, thehuman rights protected by these instruments have acquired completelegal validity in such systems.

The practice of United Nations organs is eloquent as far as thepriority given to the task of promoting respect for human rights andfundamental freedoms. All its organs have been striving in this direc-tion, starting with the General Assembly which has, on a yearly basis,adopted significant resolutions on general or specific human rightsitems or has called the attention of certain States to their lack ofrespect for human rights.

I See N. Rodley. -Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention: The CaseLaw of the World Court", ICLQ. vol. 38 (1989), pp. 321-333.

' Case concerning the Barcelona Traction. Light and Po'er Company. Ltd.,I.CJ. Reports 1970, p. 32.

1 Advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the ContinuedPresence of South Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Secu-rity Council Resolution 276 (1970). L CJ. Reports 1971. p. 57.

2 Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran.ICJ. Reports 1980, p. 42.

At the United Nations, progress has been made during the lastfew years towards a certain consensus that serious, massive or sys-tematic violations of human rights have not only ceased to be a matterof exclusive concern to the States that commit them, but also that theinternational community has the obligation of contributing to prevent,suppress and sanction such human rights violations.

Thus, the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, JavierPerez de Cu~llar, indicated in his 1991 annual report to the GeneralAssembly that the principle of non-intervention could not be used asa protective barrier which would allow massive or systematic viola-tions of human rights to be perpetrated with impunity. He stated, onthat occasion:

"It is now increasingly felt that the principles of non-inter-ference with the essential domestic jurisdiction of States cannotbe regarded as a prospective barrier behind which human rightscould be massively or systematically violated with impunity. Thefact that, in diverse situations, the United Nations has not beenable to prevent atrocities cannot be cited as an argument, legal ormoral, against the necessary corrective action, especially wherepeace is also threatened... We need not impale ourselves on thehorns of a dilemma between respect for sovereignty and the pro-tection of human rights... What is involved is not the right ofintervention but the collective obligation of States to bring reliefand redress in human rights emergencies. '29

United Nations activities in the field of human rights have notbeen limited to the General Assembly, the Commission on HumanRights, the Economic and Social Council and relevant subsidiaryorgans. The High Commissioner for Human Rights has begun to carryout important tasks and the Secretary-General has been increasinglyinvolved in this area. Moreover, the Security Council has determinedin important resolutions that certain violations of human rights con-stitute a threat to the peace, thus calling for action under Chapter VIIof the Charter.

The first precedent in this regard dates back to the case of Rho-desia when a white minority unilaterally declared itself independentand institutionalized a regime of racial discrimination, thus prompting

' Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, OfficialRecords of the General Assembly, Forty-sixth Session, Supplement No. I (A/46/I),p. 5.

the Security Council to impose several economic sanctions.3 Similarsanctions were also imposed on South Africa. 31

In the post-Cold War era, the Security Council has taken actionin crises involving human rights violations, including the lack ofrespect for poitical rights, adopting in some cases economic or diplo-matic sanctions and even authorizing the use of force in accordancewith the powers conferred upon it by Chapter VII of the Charter.

United Nations practice is unequivocal proof of the validity ofthe methods employed to protect and even restore respect for humanrights. These means include, inter alia, the documenting and reportingof violations, the condemnation by a political organ of the conduct ofthe violating State, the imposition of economic or diplomatic sanc-tions and, under very special and exceptional circumstances, to bereviewed later in this article, the possibility of the use of armed forceunder the terms of Chapter VII of the Charter.

\: Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention

Among contemporary writers, particularly American authors, onefinds strong arguments in support of armed intervention as an excep-tion to the prohibition of the threat or the use of force if it is aimed atthe protection of fundamental human rights, especially the right to life,endangered by massacres, extra-judicial executions and other atrocities,or if a despotic tyranny can be ovrthrown through the use of force. 32

In general, those who favour this type of unilateral armed inter-vention maintain that no other valid option exists, that it does notconstitute a violation of Article 2, paragraph 4, since such interventionis not intended to affect the territorial integrity or the political inde-pendence of the invaded State, and that it is not incompatible with thepurposes of the United Nations. On the contrary, the intervention'sobjective would be to reestablish respect for human rights, one of thepurposes of the Organization.

The starting-point for these positions, especially when presentedbefore the end of the Cold War, is the ineffectiveness of UnitedNations organs in achieving their purposes. Professor Richard Lillich,for example, referring to India's intervention in Bangladesh indicated

I See M_ S. McDougal and W. M. Reisman, "Rhodesia and the UnitedNations: The Lawfulness of International Concern". AJIL. vol. 62 (1968), pp. 1-19.See also Security Council resolutions 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966. 232 (1966) of16 December 1966,253 (1968) of 29 May 1968, 277 (1970) of 18 March 1970 and 388(1976) of 6 April 1976.

11 See Security Council resolutions 282 (1970) of 23 July 1970 and 418 (1977)of 4 November 1977.

32 See footnote I above.

that "the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, whether unilateral orcollective, surely deserves the most searching reassessment given thefailure of the United Nations to take effective steps to curb the geno-cidal conduct and alleviate the mass suffering..."33.

For Professor Michael Reisman from Yale University, Article 2,paragraph 4, of the Charter was never conceived as "an independentethical imperative of pacifism", but should be regarded as an elementof the collective security system set up by the Charter. This system,according to Reisman, has failed due to the paralysis of the SecurityCouncil which has been unable to accomplish the tasks with which ithad been entrusted. In his judgement, the situation of the internationalorder would be similar to that of the "Wild West" of the United Statesin the nineteenth century, when it became clear that the sheriff wasincapable of maintaining order. As it is necessary to maintain a mini-mum order in the international system, in particular, to ensure respectfor the fundamental principle of political legitimacy in contemporaryinternational politics-i.e., "the enhancement of the ongoing right ofpeoples to determine their own political destinies"-Article 2, para-graph 4, should be interpreted in terms of this key postulate. AlthoughReisman admits that "all interventions are lamentable", "some mayserve, in terms of aggregate consequences, to increase the probabilityof the free choice of peoples about their Government and politicalstructure".

34

Nonetheless, this interpretation of the Charter of the UnitedNations, which would allow the unilateral use of force for humani-tarian reasons, does not have the support of the vast majority of pub-licists, which consider Article 2, paragraph 4, as a fundamental normof contemporary international law, to which there are no exceptionsother than those established by the Charter itself.

Nor does State practice confirm this alleged right to human-itarian intervention as a valid exception to the prohibition of the useof force. In those cases where unilateral humanitarian interventionhas been invoked, i.e., India in East Pakistan (1971); Tanzania inUganda (1978); Viet Nam in Cambodia (1978); France in the CentralAfrican Republic (1979); and the United States in Grenada (1983) andPanama (1989)-perhaps with the sole exception of the French inter-vention in the Central African Republic-, the humanitarian motive

" R. Lillich, Rapporteur, "The International Protection of Human Rights byGeneral International Law, Second Interim Report of the Sub-Committee", inReport of the International Committee on Human Rights of the International LawAssociation, 1972, p. 54, quoted in AJIL, vol. 67 (1973), p. 277.

' Reisman, "Coercion and Self Determination: Construing Charter Arti-cle 2 (4)", op. cit. (footnote I above), pp. 643-644.

was either not mentioned or it was secondary to the other reasonsinvoked by the intervening State.

Indeed, although India alluded to the killings caused by Pakistan,it maintained that its actions were necessary to protect its border frommillions of Bengali refugees entering its territory.35 Tanzania allegedself-defence.36 Viet Nam's main justification was that its interventionhad been requested by the Government in power in Cambodia.37 TheUnited States basically alleged that the intervention in Grenada wasrequested by the Governor-General of the country, that it was aresponse to an appeal from members of the Eastern Caribbean Statesexercising regional collective self-defence and that the main objectivewas to protect United States citizens in Grenada; 38 in the case ofPanama, President Bush maintained that the four objectives for whichhe had ordered United States troops to that country were "'to safe-guard the life of American citizens, to help restore democracy, to pro-tect the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaties, and to bring GeneralManuel Noriega to justice".39

Nonetheless, none of these explanations or justifications havebeen approved by the United Nations. On the contrary, there is noresolution from any United Nations organ that has recognized the uni-lateral right of a State to intervene in another State for humanitarianreasons without the latter's consent

Regarding the Indian intervention in East Pakistan, the GeneralAssembly, by a vast majority, besides condemning India's interven-tion, called for "an immediate cease-fire and mutual troop withdrawalby India and Pakistan".40 Even though, with respect to the interven-tions of France in the Central African Republic and of Tanzania inUganda, the end of the Bokassa and Amin regimes of terror and graveviolations of human rights were well received by the internationalcommunity, the military interventions per se were not backed by any

' V. P. Nanda, -Tragedies in Northern Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia and Haiti :Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention Under International Law",Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, vol. 20 (1992). p. 317.

' Schachter, op. cit. (footnote 21 above), p. 124; and N. Ronzitti, RescuingNationals Abroad through Military Coercion and Intervention on Grounds ofHumanity (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), p. 102.

" Schachter, op. cit. (footnote 21 above), p. 125; and Ronzitti, op. cit. (footnote36 above). p. 99.

' Nanda, op. cit. (footnote 35 above), p. 323. See also "The United StatesActions in Grenada", AJIL, vol. 78 (1984). pp. 131-175.

' President's Remarks Announcing the Surrender of General Manuel Noriegato the United States Authorities in Panama, quoted in Nanda, op. cir. (footnote 35above), p. 328. See also 'Agora--US Forces in Panama: Defenders, Aggressors orHuman Rights Activists.r, AJI-, vol. 84 (1990), pp. 494-524.

' Resolution 2793 (XXVI) of 7 December 1971, adopted by 104 votes in fa-vour. I I against and 10 abstentions.

decisions of either the United Nations or of the OAU. As for VietNam's intervention in Cambodia, no United Nations organ adoptedany resolution and a vast majority of States refused to recognize theregime imposed by Viet Nam on Kampuchea, even though said inter-vention put an end to Pol Pot's regime characterized by possibly thegreatest violation of human rights in the second half of the twentiethcentury.

As for the intervention of the United States in Grenada andPanama, they were expressly condemned by the General Assembly ofthe United Nations and, in the case of Panama, even by the OAS.41

The above notwithstanding, some publicists, in light of the suc-cess of certain armed interventions, have elaborated theories of whatcould be "a paradigm of how an intervening nation must act in orderto legally intervene unilaterally for humanitarian reasons". 4 2

Steve Simon, for example, maintains that :

"... a nation must be driven by humanitarian motives to intervenefor humanitarian purposes. Second, the targeted nation must begrossly violating its citizens' human rights. Third, the missionmust be narrowly targeted to human rights violations with aslittle blood as possible spilled in the process of liberating peoplefrom those human rights abuses. Fourth, the territory of the for-mer nation must not be conquered or annexed by the interveningnation. Fifth, the intervening army must pull out as quickly aspossible after the purposes of the mission have been completed."4 3

Similar criteria have also been put forward by Tom Farer re-garding cases in which humanitarian interventions could be lawful. Headded that "the intervening State [must] immediately report the inter-vention to the Security Council and the political organs of any subglo-bal arrangements with jurisdiction over the parties" and that the inter-vening State "should be required to announce its acceptance of WorldCourt jurisdiction over any challenge to it action. '4

"' The United States intervention in Grenada was condemned by the GeneralAssemb!y of the United Nations in resolution 3817 of2 November 1983 adopted by108 votes in favour, 9 against and 27 abstentions. As for Panama, the OAS Perma-nent Council approved on 22 December 1985, resolution 534, the operative part ofwhich condemned the American military intervention in Panama, urged an imme-diate cessation of hostilities and bloodshed, and called for the withdrawal of for-eign troops. Several days later, the General Assembly of the United Nations, inresolution 44/240 of 29 December 1992, deplored the intervention in Panama insimilar terms.

42 Simon, op. cit. (footnote I above), pp. 147-148.41 Ibid., p. 148.. T. Farer, "A Paradigm of Legitimate Intervention", in L. Fisler Damrosch,

ed., Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts (New York,Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), pp. 327-328.

In search of some degree of legality for humanitarian interven-tions, scholars such as Stanley Hoffmann of Harvard have gone as faras to propose:

"... a treaty, open to... all States, that would define rigorously thecircumstances in which collective intervention for humanitarianpurposes could be undertaken, for a limited period, by a group ofStates whose action would be authorized by a strong majority ofthe treaty's signers."' 5

Generally speaking, the result obtained by such armed interven-tions would seem to be the most eloquent argument for their justifica-tion. Besides the French intervention which put an end to the tyrannyof Bokassa in the Central African Republic, the cases of Grenada andPanama are usually mentioned. Thus, Michael Reisman has asked:"Would Grenada be better off if it were still under the renegades whomurdered Bishop and seized power? Would Panama be better off ifNoriega were still the dictatorT 6

Nevertheless, it is important to note that other so-called humani-tarian interventions did not produce such positive results. This wascertainly not the case of India's intervention in Bangladesh whichcaused more deaths than those provoked by Pakistan; nor of Tanza-nia's intervention in Uganda which resulted, from the human rightspoint of vie%%, in the substitution of one opprobrious regime by an-other. In the final analysis, the examples of the Central African Re-public, Grenada and Panama prove that armed humanitarian interven-tions may only occur when one is dealing with small countries andwhen there is a very special link with, or interest of, the interveningState.

It is thus obvious that armed unilateral intervention based on hu-manitarian reasons would not be possible in the case of medium-sizedor relatively bigger States. Could an armed intervention even havebeen thought of in Franco's Spain? Or in Argentina or Chile duringthe military dictatorships in those countries? Or in South Africaduring the apartheid period? These four countries did not begin toevolve into Etats de droit, respectful of human rights, through militaryintervention-which would have been impossible to carry out-butthrough other means.

Therefore, unilateral armed humanitarian interventions have nojustification in contemporary international law. This was confirmedby the International Court of Justice in the much quoted Nicaragua

"I S. Hoffmann, -Delusions of World Order", New York Review of Books.9 April 1992, quoted in ibid., p. 359.

1 W, M. Reisman. "Haiti and the Validity of International Action", AJIL,vol. 89 (1995). p. 83.

case, which stated the following with regard to an intervention basedon the ideological or political nature of a certain regime:

"The Court cannot contemplate the creation of a new ruleopening up a right of intervention by one State against anotheron the ground that the latter has opted for some particular ideol-ogy or political system. 4 7

Furthermore, referring specifically to the alleged right of a Stateto intervene in another on the basis of human rights considerations,the Court maintained:

"In any event, while the United States might from its ownappraisal of the situation as to the respect for human rights inNicaragua, the use of force could not be the appropriate methodto monitor or ensure such respect. With regard to the steps actu-ally taken, the protection of human rights, a strictly humanitarianobjective, cannot be compatible with the mining of ports, the de-struction of oil installations, or again with the training, armingand equipping of the contras. The Court concludes that the argu-ment derived from the preservation of human rights in Nicaraguacannot afford a legal justification for the conduct of the UnitedStates..."48

A jurist who has distinguished himself in the defence of humanrights has commented on this important Judgment as follows:

"The Court's confirmation of the inapplicability of the doc-trine [of humanitarian intervention] should not be seen as a set-back for human rights. There is nothing in its history to suggestthat it was ever more than a rare and arbitrary alleviation of thehapless plight of those who happened to be suffering in a smallcountry where the political interests of a militarily more powerfulcountry conduced to the intervention. '49

VI. Collective Humanitarian Intervention

If armed intervention by one State in another is prohibited by con-temporary international law, even though humanitarian reasons mightbe invoked, said prohibition also extends to a group of States. In thisregard, it is significant to note that, on the basis of Article 18 of the OASCharter, the constituent instruments of the other main regional organ-izations, as well as resolutions 2131 (XX) and 2625 (XXV) of the GeneralAssembly of the United Nations categorically state that "[n]o State orgroup of States has the right to intervene...".

SI.C.I. Reports 1986, p. 133." Ibid., pp. 134-135.

Rodley, op. cit. (footnote 25 above), p. 332.

In any case, that type of intervention may not be carried out bya regional organization unless it has been approved by the SecurityCouncil. Even though regional organizations have ample powers todeal with such matters relating to the maintenance of internationalpeace and security as are appropriate for regional action, in accord-ance with Article 53, paragraph 1, of the Charter. the application ofcoercive measures by regional arrangements or agencies requires Se-curity Council authorization. In practice, there have been few collec-tive armed interventions by regional organizations without SecurityCouncil authorization.

In that regard, perhaps one example is the intervention in theDominican Republic in 1965 endorsed by the OAS. The Tenth Con-sultative Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of OAS MemberStates took place as a result of the serious internal situation in thatcountry. At that meeting, it was agreed to send a Special Commis-sion to try and reestablish peace, obtain a cease-fire and allow allforeigners willing to do so to leave the Dominican Republic. None-theless, the Consultative Meeting later approved a resolution trans-forming the forces sent to Dominican territory into an Inter-Americanarmed force, establishing a unified OAS command, with Brazil beingasked to designate the commander and the United States the sub-commander of said force. This intervening force was called "the Inter-American Peace Force", and remained in the Dominican Republicuntil general elections took place and the new Government requestedits withdrawal. This intervention, rejected by several OAS States, pro-voked a veritable crisis within the Organization, which it took severalyears to overcome.

It should be noted that the Charter of the United Nations pro-vides that the Security Council itself may utilize regional arrange-ments or agencies for enforcement action. However, the provisioncontained in Article 53, paragraph 1, has not been used. Yet nothingprecludes that, in the future, as effective cooperation between regionalorganizations and the United Nations is being enhanced, the SecurityCouncil may delegate to regional organizations some of its authoritywith respect to humanitarian crises.

In the last five years, a close relationship has developed between,on the one hand, the Security Council and the Secretary-General ofthe United Nations, and on the other, the competent organs ofregional organizations. acting in coordination with regard to humani-tarian emergencies or in situations where basic human rights havebeen violated. Thus, there are numerous Security Council resolutionsreferring to the European Community-and later to the EuropeanUnion-with respect to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia; to theOAU in connection with Somalia, Liberia and Rwanda; or to the OAS

in the case of Haiti. In some of these resolutions, the Security Councilhas even recognized the importance of cooperation between theUnited Nations and regional organizations in the context of Chap-ter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations.50

Vii. Humanitarian Intervention by the United Nations

In the United Nations, the possibility of collective action which mayinclude the use of armed forced is envisaged in Chapter VII entitled"Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, andacts of aggression". Article 39 establishes that the Security Council"shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of thepeace, or act of aggression, and shall make recommendations, or decidewhat measures shall be taken... to maintain or restore internationalpeace and security." These measures can be of two kinds: there are thosewhich do not imply the use of armed force which, according to Arti-cle 41, "may include complete or partial interruption of economic rela-tions and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means ofcommunications, and the severance of diplomatic relations"; if thesemeasures are inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, according toArticle 42, the Security Council "may take such action, by air, sea, orland forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore internationalpeace and security.., including demonstrations, blockade, and otheroperations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations."

The conditions created by the post-Cold War period have re-estab-lished the importance of these provisions which, although included inthe Charter, remained a dead letter for many years.

The agreement in 1990 to expel Iraq from Kuwait by force seemedto be an application of the collective security system set up by the Char-ter in 1945. This was followed by resolution 688 (1991) of 5 April 1991in which the Security Council expressed its concern regarding the re-pression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, includingin Kurdish-populated areas, which "threaten[ed] international peaceand security in the region". Although this resolution did not order orauthorize the use of force, it opened the door for the Security Councilto possibly determine, in the future, that similar situations constitute athreat international peace and security and, consequently, to make useof its powers under Chapter VII.

It is true that with respect to previous conflicts which could havebeen deemed internal, such as Rhodesia and South Africa, where theexception of Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter could have applied,the Security Council had also made a determination that these situ-

' For example, resolutions 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992 and 841 (1993) of16 June 1993.

ations constituted threats to international peace and security and hadadopted sanctions; but, except for a case of limited importance," thisnever included the use of force.

After 1991, in the cases of the former Yugoslavia. Somalia, Libe-ria. Haiti and Rwanda, the Security Council made use of the powersconferred upon it by Chapter VII of the Charter declaring that suchsituations constituted a threat to international peace and security and,aside from adopting important economic, diplomatic, humanitarian,political and judicial measures. 52 establishing a multinational militaryforce or authorizing States to use force.

As regards the use of armed force, a generic reference was madein all of these situations to Chapter VII of the Charter, but withoutinvoking any specific articles. Nonetheless, in all these cases, it seemsevident that the relevant measures were adopted in implementation ofthe general provisions of Article 42 of the Charter.

A significant evolution occurred in practice with respect to thesecrises: "peace-keeping" operations were initially established and later,as the situation deteriorated, they were transformed into "peace-making" or "peace-enforcement'" operations with a multinational mili-tary contingent attempting to fulfil its mandate under difficult con-ditions.

Thus, although in the Haiti and Rwanda cases, peace-keepingoperations were established at the outseL5 3 the Council acting underChapter VII, later authorized Member States to form multinationalforces using "all necessary means". This authorization, which impliesthe granting to any State of the discretionary pow~er to use armed

" Resolution 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966 authorized the use of force in supportof an oil embargo against Rhodesia. but in that case it was limited to preventing anoil tanker from docking at a designated port.

'2 These measures have included, inter alia, a call for cease-fire; a completeand general embargo in deliveries of weapons and military equipment; economicsanctions; a ban on militar% flights; the establishment of safe areas, the estab-lishment of a commission of experts to examine and analyse information relatingto evidence of serious violations of international humanitarian law, including pos-sible acts of genocide; and the establishment of an international tribunal for theprosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humani-tarian law. See. e.g., Security Council resolutions 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991;733 (1992) of 23 January 1992; 752 (1992) of 15 May 1992; 780 (1992) of6 October1992; 781 (1992) of 9 October 1992; 788 (1992) of 19 November 1992; 808 (1993) of22 February 1993; 812 (1993) of 12 March 1993: 814 (1993) of 26 March 1993; 817(1993) of 7 April 1993; 841 (1993) of 16 June 1993; 894 (1994) of 14 January 1994;918 (1994) of 17 May 1994; 935 (1994) of I Jul. 1994; and 942 (1994) of 23 Septem-ber 1994.

11 The Security Council, by resolution 867 (1993) of 23 September 1993,authorized the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)and, by its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993, established a United NationsAssistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).

force through a multilateral arrangement, marks the beginning of theinstitutionalization of collective interventions with humanitarianobjectives.

In the case of Haiti, the President, who was democraticallyelected by a vast majority in elections supervised by the UnitedNations and by the OAS, was deposed in September 1991 by a coupd'Etat. The Security Council, after intense and unsuccessful effortsby the OAS and in light of the continuing grave violations of humanrights by the defacto authorities, decided on 16 June 1993, by resolu-tion 841 (1993), to act under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UnitedNations, determining "that, in this unique and exceptional circum-stances, the continuation of this situation threatens internationalpeace and security in the region". Later, in view of the non-compli-ance by the defacto regime with the Governors Island Agreement, theSecurity Council, by resolution 940 (1994) of 31 July 1994, "author-ize[d] Member States to form a multinational force under unified com-mand and control" and "to use all necessary means to facilitate thedeparture from Haiti of the military leadership... the prompt return ofthe legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimateauthorities of the Government of Haiti." After the failure of variousother efforts, the President of the United States, William Clinton, on17 September 1994, sent a high-level mission headed by former Presi-dent Carter to Haiti. In view of an imminent invasion and after intensenegotiations, the defacto authorities agreed to resign after the HaitianParliament's approval of an amnesty law or, in any case, before 15 Oc-tober 1994. On 19 September 1994, in the first phase of the militaryoperation, a multinational force spearheaded by United States troops,but also including elements from other nations, landed in Haiti with-out opposition.

After fighting erupted between the armed forces of the Govern-ment of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, the situation inRwanda deteriorated considerably after the death of the President ofRwanda in a plane crash in 1994, despite a number of cease-fire agree-ments, giving way to massacres and grave violations of human rightsby both factions, costing thousands of lives. Confronted with this situ-ation, the Security Council, by resolution 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994,determined "that the situation in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peaceand security in the region", thus empowering it to act under ChapterVII of the Charter. Later, by resolution 929 (1994) of 22 June 1994, theCouncil agreed that a multinational operation might be set up for hu-manitarian purposes in Rwanda. Acting under Chapter VII, it author-ized Member States to conduct the operation using all necessarymeans to achieve their humanitarian objectives. On 23 June, inaccordance with the authorization provided by resolution 929 (1994),an armed intervention by a multinational force led by France ("Oper-

ation Turquoise") took place, which established a "humanitarian pro-tected zone", covering almost one fifth of Rwanda, and put an end tothe civil war. On 19 July 1994, a broad-based Government of nationalunity was formed

Despite their success and the achievement of the Security Coun-cil's objectives, these operations have not been exempt from criticism.For example, it has been noted that, although the Security Councilordered the establishment of a multinational force, in practice thisforce was composed mainly of the armed forces of just one coun-try--the United States in Haiti and France in Rwanda-thus pointingto the desirability of defining in the future what should be understoodas a "multilateral military force". In addition, in the case of Haiti, ithas been observed that the Carter Mission, which immediately pre-ceded the intervention, reached an agreement with the de factoauthorities whose terms were worked out without any consultationeither with the Security Council or with other competent internationalorgans involved in the crisis, or with the Special Representative of theSecretary-General of the United Nations and the OAS, or with thelegitimate Government of Haiti. thus affecting the multinational char-acter of the decision adopted by the Security Council.55

Even so, armed humanitarian intervention undertaken or author-ized by the Security Council represents a huge leap forward with re-spect to the prior practice of unilateral interventions, so contrary tocontemporary international law.

Of course, these decisions, adopted under Chapter VII of theCharter of the United Nations, raise no problems with regard to inter-national law and, from the point of view of the promotion of humanrights, they imply significant progress, since grave violations of thoserights are considered to constitute a threat to international peace andsecurity, which authorizes the international community to adopt suchextreme measures.

With the institutionalization of the mechanism foreseen in Chap-ter VII of the Charter as a useful means for confronting situationswhere human rights are gravely violated, one of the main argumentsof the proponents of armed unilateral humanitarian intervention-theineffectiveness of United Nations organs-no longer exists.

Even though collective humanitarian interventions undertakenor authorized by the Security Council are entirely lawful and their

, See, for example, the Interi, Report on the Situation of Human Rights inHaiti Submitted by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rightspursuant to Commission Resolution 1994180 and Economic and Social CouncilDecision 1994/226, document A/49/513, annex. para. 146.

55 Ibid.

basis, which consists in linking respect for human rights to interna-tional peace and security, appears to be legitimate, they have, in prac-tice, raised some problems. There are certain lacunae which it wouldbe worthwhile to address through the adoption of general criterialeading to the consolidation of the legality and legitimacy of suchinterventions.

First of all, in our view, there should be a certain consensus as tothe determination of the existence, within a State, of a situation char-acterized by grave violations of human rights, as these have been de-fined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Interna-tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and, moreover, as to theconviction that such situation will persist if the international commu-nity does not take action through the Security Council.

Such a consensus must obviously be reflected by the qualifiedmajority in the Security Council; but an important element for Statesto take into account, especially if the situation is to be qualified as athreat to international peace and security, might be the position ofStates which belong to the same region as the State accused of vio-lating human rights, since it is precisely those States which are morelikely to suffer the consequences of such violations.

Regional organizations are called upon to take an active role indealing with matters regarding the respect of human rights. They havethe means and the experience to do so and they have demonstratedtheir effectiveness in this area. Therefore, it would seem important tostrengthen them in the fulfilment of their tasks.

In cases where the Security Council would be seized of the mat-ter, it is important to achieve coordination between the UnitedNations and the respective regional organizations. The successfulinitial experience in the Haiti crisis, where a joint United Nations/OAS International Civil Mission was constituted and where the sameperson-the Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, DanteCaputo-was the Special Representative of both the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Secretary-General of the OAS,may serve as a precedent for similar situations which may arise in thefuture.

In any case, it is important to underline that, before adopting anydecision which entails the use of armed force under the terms ofArticle 42 of the Charter, the Security Council should strive to remedythe situation without resorting to that extreme measure. In this con-text, recourse to regional arrangements or agencies, foreseen in Arti-cle 33 of the Charter in Chapter VI related to the settlement of dis-putes, is a measure which might be of great usefulness in situationsrelating to human rights.

This possibility is one of the many options open to the SecurityCouncil in the framework of Chapter VI, that is, before determiningthat a situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security.Even if the Security Council. in light of the failure of other measures,were to so characterize a situation, thus authorizing itself to act underChapter VII of the Charter, use of the means provided for in Arti-cle 41, which do not involve the use of armed force, would be prefer-able.

Finally, after having exhausted all prior options and having dem-onstrated that there are no other efficient means available to put anend to a situation characterized by grave human rights violations, thedecision to resort to the use of armed force under any of the modali-ties envisaged in Article 42 or by later United Nations practice shouldbe implemented collectively and not by just one State, irrespective ofhow important or well-meaning it may be. After all, it is the interna-tional community which is reacting, legally and legitimately, to thehorror of the suffering of a people.

REFLECTIONS ON THE TEACHING, STUDY,DISSEMINATION AND WIDER APPRECIATION

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Qizhi He

The General Assembly, by its resolution 44/23 of 17 November1989, proclaimed the 1990s to be the United Nations Decade of Inter-national Law. This paper is devoted to one of the four stated purposesof the Decade, i.e., "to encourage the teaching, study, disseminationand wider appreciation of international law".

Importance of the Issue

The increasing interdependence c States in a world which changeswith dramatic rapidity makes the role of international law ever moreimportant in the effective conduct of international relations. Fbr Statesto take part in the shaping of world affairs, expertise in internationallaw is vital.

Thus, the topic of fostering and supporting the teaching, study, dis-semination and wider appreciation of international law should occupyan important place in promoting activities for the Decade. This has beenwidely recognized by a large number of States, as well as by many mem-bers of the International Law Commission.

It seems to be clear that the principal and immediate aim is toimprove the technical competence of those who might be involved in thepractical application of international law. How'ever, there is still a larger

objective in prospect that is, to promote acceptance of and respect forinternational law by the international community as broadly as possible.This can be explained as follows. First of all, as pointed out at the outset,international law is an indispensable medium for regulating interna-tional relations in an increasingly interdependent vrld on a legal basis.Second, it is not possible to achieve that objective without the adroit and

innovative use of this medium supported by the international commu-

nity. Third, this support finally resolves itself into a question of under-

standing and endorsement by the individuals and organizations who

constitute the member States of the international community. Even in a

more manageable municipal system of a developed country, it is not pos-sible to administer justice on the basis of the rule of law without the

substantive understanding and support of the members of the cornmu-

nity. The need for understanding and support is obviously greater in thecase of a system which undertakes to regulate inter-State relations onthe basis of international law.

Perhaps, doubts may be raised as to the necessity of such require-ment as regards the general public, beyond those actually or potentiallyinvolved in the application of international law. But whether it is neces-sary or not must be measured by the importance of the subject. Inter-national law is important to all countries including both developed anddeveloping countries, strong and weak nations, as well as big and smallStates. Here, it might suffice to say that, while it is needed by the bigpowers to play their leading role in world affairs, international law isalso essential for the developing countries and the medium and smallStates to safeguard their interests in a world of turbulence, as it isalways the weak ones to be worst affected by anarchy. It must be actuallyrealized that if anarchy is to be avoided, the relations between Statesmust be regulated by legal norms.

Contributions by the United Nations

The United Nations, as a world organization dealing with interna-tional legal matters, has long been involved in the important subject ofthe teaching, study, dissemination and wider appreciation of interna-tional law. Its work actually may be traced back to the mid-1960s.

It was as early as 1963 that the General Assembly, by its resolution1968 (XVIII) of 16 December 1963 decided to establish the "SpecialCommittee on Technical Assistance to Promote the Teaching, Study, Dis-semination and Wider Appreciation of International Law." The SpecialCommittee, after three consecutive annual sessions (1963-1965), pro-duced a report constituting the start of the "United Nations Programmeof Assistance in the Teaching, Study, Dissemination and Wider Appre-ciation of International Law" as it is known today. This report, endorsedby General Assembly resolution 2099 (XX) of 20 December 1965, set thebasic pattern of the activities which have been carried out by the UnitedNations in this area.

In this report, it was decided to establish a "Programme of assist-ance and exchange in the field of international law" consisting of stepsto encourage and coordinate existing international law programmescarried out by States and by organizations and institutions, as well as ofdirect assistance and exchange such as seminars, training and refreshercourses, fellowships, advisory services of experts, the provision of legalpublications and libraries and translations of major legal works.

In the following years up to the present, the General Assembly hasrepeatedly reaffirmed these objectives after examining the agenda itemon the United Nations Programme of Assistance in the Teaching, Study,

Dissemination and Wider Appreciation of International Law. While fac-tors relating to the availability of human or financial resources for theProgramme may have changed to some extent. the Programme hasremained in the main faithful to the objectives originally set by the Gen-eral Assembly and has been implemented in a consistent manner.

With regard to the activities performed by the Programme, theyfall into tv categories: training and publications. As regards training,it mainly takes the form of seminars, such as the Geneva InternationalLaw Seminar which is held every year in conjunction with the sessionof the International Law Commission; the United Nations Institute forTraining and Research (UNITAR) International Law Fellowship Pro-gramme is also held annually in conjunction with the summer coursesin the Hague Academy; the UNITAR Regional Training and RefresherCourses held every one or tv years on a rotation basis in three regions:Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. and Asia and the Pacific; andthe Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe Fellowship on the Law of the Sea- Allthese training courses bear a common denominator of enabling youngpublic officials and university teachers, mainly from developing coun-tries, to enhance their knowledge of international law.

The publication works of the Programme, such as the Yearbook ofthe International Law Commission, the Reports of InternationalArbitral Awards, the United Nations Juridical Yearbook, etc., are alldesigned to make international law more readily available, and areextremely useful to increase the knowledge and understanding ofinternational law.

All in all, the United Nations has done a great deal of work infacilitating and furthering the cause of the teaching, study, dissemina-tion and wider appreciation of international law. The important con-tribution already made by the United Nations in this field will not beoverlooked when taking stock of the efforts for the attainment of theobjectives of the Decade.

Main Challenges

For a profound understanding of international law, it seems neces-sary to look at its historic background and development. A lawyer with-out a sense of history is a poor vrkman. In every stage of history, newforces in the process of transformation asserted themselves in new prin-ciples, norms, rules and institutions. The days when the system wasclosely connected only to European traditions have gone by. Instead,existing international law is essentially a reflection of the world ordertoday.

In the old days, at the Berlin Conference, held towards the end ofthe nineteenth century, only about a dozen countries %vere represented

and could be called "quasi-legislators" exercising "international legisla-tive" powers to formulate a convention for Africa, although none ofthem came from that continent. There were only piecemeal changes un-til the Second World War. Thereafter, a host of colonies gained inde-pendence, culminating in the 1960s when 44 new States were born. Thischange found a clear expression in the composition of the United Na-tions, whose membership has expanded in an extraordinary speed fromthe original 51 members to the present 185 members, with a majorityof incoming members being newly independent States.

Such a tremendous change in the structure of international societyis bound to cause major changes in international law. As principal sub-jects of international law, the new States have played an active part inthe making of international law with plenary powers to create its prin-ciples, rules and regulations, such as the "normative" resolutions of theGeneral Assembly and many conventions, including the United NationsConvention on the Law of the Sea.

The quantitative expansion mentioned above has taken place si-multaneously with qualitative changes in terms of subject-matter(ratione materiae). Thanks to scientific and technological develop-ments and in the light of the magnitude of socio-economic problemsfacing the international community, the scope and reach of interna-tional law have been widely extended to regulate matters ranging fromthe oceans and airspace to outer space, from the depletion of naturalresources to environmental pollution and degradation, from socio-economic underdevelopment to problems of refugees and displacedpersons. Hence, both quantitative and qualitative changes haveresulted in the fact that international law now regulates an ever-increasing array of human activities.

However, in spite of the multitude and complexity of the prob-lems, the world today is, in the final analysis, confronted with twomajor challenges: maintaining peace and promoting development.

International law since its early beginning was preoccupied withthe regulation of the use of force in international relations. A newattempt to outlaw war was made with the Charter of the UnitedNations. With the end of the Cold War, a large scale world war is lesslikely to happen, but local and internal strife in the form of armedconflict still ravages a number of countries. Even the peace-keepingactivities of the United Nations cannot keep the peace, which remainsa vexed question for the international community.

The problem of peace is closely connected with that of develop-ment. Huge economic discrepancy between rich and poor, North andSouth, developed and developing countries is a dominant factorleading to world instability. It is widely recognized that the narrowingof such discrepancy is an urgent necessity.

In the face of these serious challenges to the world community,international law must assume its important role in finding propersolutions which could be acceptable to the parties concerned, as wellas in continuing to play its role for the peaceful settlement of disputesto enhance international cooperation.

Effective Measures

Given the objectives of the United Nations Decade of InternationalLaw, it is significant and meaningful to further consider the effectiveways and means to enhance the knowledge and understanding of inter-national law for fulfilling the tasks required by the Decade.

The teaching, stud. dissemination and wider appreciation of inter-national law are all closely related to the cause of promoting acceptanceof and respect for international law. Among these four items, teachingand study are generally recognized to take a primary position. While theactivities of teaching and research are helping and complementing eachother, both of them tend to provide a basis and create conditions forincreasing the knowledge of international law. Such a purpose can onlybe attained through dissemination and wider appreciation. In this way,dissemination and wider appreciation are also essential for imple-menting the important role of international law.

A number of suggestions were made for enhancing the teaching,study, dissemination and wider appreciation of international law onvarious occasions and in different fora. Among them, the followingdeserve serious consideration.

In the first place, respect for international law depends on abroad support at the decison-making levels. This is a decisive factor forbuilding an international order on the basis of the rule of law. Hence,the decision-makers of both dexeloped and developing countries shouldhave a better knowledge of international law and should seek advice oninternational law for resolving important inter-State issues. For thispurpose, there is a need for specially designed short courses for deci-sion-makers.

Second, jurists of all countries, including both developed anddeveloping States, should offer their expertise and be innovative inapplying international law to the peaceful settlement of disputes whichcould be acceptable to all parties concerned. Here we lay emphasis onthe word "innovative", so that the applicable law would reflect theinterests and feeling of justice of the parties concerned. This is the mosteffective way to prevent disputes from escalating into armed conflicts-

Third, the work of the United Nations Programme of Assistance inthe Teaching, Study, Dissemination and Wider Appreciation of Inter-national Law, discussed above, should be further strengthened. The

point at issue concerns the substance of the law, which appears to manydeveloping countries to be a code made in Europe for Europeans as abuttress for maintaining the status quo, i.e., designed to legitimize theexisting distribution of possessions and powers among States. How-ever, there have been many changes since the resurgence of devcl-oping countries, who have already played an active part in formulatinglaws as expounded above. But the respect for the law will only beachieved, if the practice, including the Judgments of the InternationalCourt of Justice, the elaboration of new conventions, etc., can con-vince the developing countries that the applicable law provides stabil-ity as well as change, and therefore, reflects the feelings of justice feltin the whole world. Today, the develoment of international law doesnot always stand against the interests of the have-nots, though im-provements in this field are still a great necessity. Anyhow, moderninternational law must take account of the changing needs of devel-oping countries, if it is to retain the confidence of the whole inter-national community. On this issue, there is ample room for the UnitedNations Programme of Assistance to spread knowledge and under-standing of international law, especially to developing countries. Thiscan be done in many ways. The United Nations Development Pro-gramme (UNDP) can also provide assistance in this area.

Fourth, the teaching, study, dissemination and wider apprecia-tion of international law should be enhanced everywhere in the world.Ideas should not lag far behind development.

As to teaching, basic international courses should continue to becompulsory for undergraduate students in law schools. Wherever pos-sible, they should also be taught in departments of political science,social science and other relevant departments. In addition, specialcourses should be offered to undergraduate and graduate students insuch areas as the law of international organizations, international eco-nomic law, trade law and intellectual property law, international envi-ronmental law, human rights law, law of the sea, air law, space law, lawof armed conflicts, etc.

Satisfactory teaching must go hand in hand with meaningfulscholarly research and investigation. Legal research materials shouldbe available to academics, students and scholars at large.

Greater efforts should be made towards improving the facilitiesof international law libraries. Governments of developing countriesshould allocate more funds for much needed improvement in libraryfacilities, in addition to assistance and donations from institutions indeveloped countries.

Governments of developing countries should be encouraged tocompile and publish digests of international law, mainly containing thepractice of their own countries, judicial decisions relating to intema-

tional law, cases, treaty series and other relevant documents on for-eign relations.

Finally, the value of cooperation between States in their activitiesin this area should be stressed. This can be carried out in variousforms, such as seminars, symposia, training courses, exchange ofteaching staff and students.

Other expressions of international cooperation may include thepossibility of preparing model curricula for law schools or law depart-ments of higher educational institutions, and the publication of moreinternally-oriented works on international law, etc. All these coopera-tive activities could be carried on among developing countries, as wellas between developed and developing countries.

In summing up, effective and practical measures should be takento strengthen the teaching, study, dissemination, and % ider apprecia-tion of international law in all countries, in particular the developingcountries, so that the general populace of these countries would bemore conscious of the importance of the rule of law in the interna-tional community for the maintenance of international peace andsecurity, as well as for world economic growth and the economicdevelopment of developing countries in particular.

FUTURE TOPICS FOR THE CODIFICATIONOF INTERNATIONAL LAW VIEWED

IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Husain Al-Baharna

1. Introduction

Probably no other question is of such deep practical consequenceto the International Law Commission as the selection of topics for codi-fication. It is trite to say that the success of codification depends largelyupon it.

The question of the selection of topics for codification and develop-ment of international law has not been an easy one, even at the best oftimes. It has become all the more daunting due to the vast changes inthe socio-economic and political conditions of the world society. Nolonger is there consensus amongst States concerning all the problemsneeding international legal regulation. Whereas the developing coun-tries of the South consider it necessary to regulate by law the socio-economic problems confronting the world society, the industrializedcountries of the North consider such an exercise to be futile.

The enquiry into the future topics of codification has now reacheda certain critical phase, due to the near completion of codification of theprincipal subjects of classical or traditional international law. But howdoes one identify the new subjects or areas that are suitable for codifi-cation? One cannot proceed upon one's hunches. Nor can one be influ-enced by one's pet notions and ideas. One needs a scientific method ormethods to help in identifying the future topics for codification. It maybe useful in this context to ascertain haw the Commission had in thepast dealt with this question. Such a method would impart a certaindegree of objectivity to the whole exercise.

11. Identification of Topics in Historical Perspective

The Statute of the Commission stipulates in Article 18, para-graph 2. that, "[w]hen the Commission considers that the codificationof a particular topic is necessary or desirable, it shall submit its rec-ommendations to the General Assembly". As the expressions "neces-sary" or "desirable" are not self-explanatory in themselves, and in anycase they are subjective in nature, it would be helpful to examine how

topics came to be chosen for codification in practice. The Secretary-General's memorandum entitled Survey of International Law in rela-tion to the work of Codification of the International Law Commission(hereinafter referred to as the "1948 Survey") provides some usefulinsights into this problem.'

a. The 1948 Survey

Interestingly, the 1948 Survey states that "the existence of agree-ment-or the measure of such agreement--on any particular topic can-not be regarded as an adequate criterion for the selection of topics forcodification". More positively, it avers that "a topic is ripe for codifica-tion.., if the importance of the subject-matter-from the point of viewof the necessities of international intercourse, of the wider needs of theinternational community, and of the authority of international law-requires that, notwithstanding any existing disagreements, an attemptshould be made to reduce it to the form of a systematized and precisebranch of international law".2 In the same memorandum, it is statedthat the decisive criterion for the selection of a topic is the "need forcodifying it".3 The need-based criterion has further been explained inthe 1948 Survey. It is postulated that a subject of small dimensionswith regard to which general agreement could be taken for grantedwould not be a "necessary or desirable" subject for codification. Onthe other hand, it is claimed that a new topic requiring regulationsatisfies the test of desirability and necessity.4 Having thus clarifiedthe notion of selection of topics, the 1948 Survey proceeded toexamine the gaps and uncertainties in the law as regards the followingtopics:

(i) the general part of international law;

(ii) States in international law;

(iii) jurisdiction of States;

(iv) the individual in international law;

(v) the law of treaties;

(vi) the law of diplomatic intercourse and immunities;

(vii) the law of consular intercourse and immunities;

(viii) the law of State responsibility; and

(ix) the law of arbitral procedure.

United Nations publication, Sales No. 1948.V.1 (I).2 lbid., p. II.'Ibid., p. 13.

As was stated in the 1948 Survey: "For any such need is covered by the othermajor task of the Commission, namely, the development of international law". Ibid.

The 1948 Survey found that every one of the above subjects wasa topic fit for codification, thereby avoiding the problem of selection.So far as the Commission is concerned, it selected after reviewing the1948 Survey, the following 14 topics for codification:

(i) recognition of States and Governments;

(ii) succession of States and Governments;

(iii) jurisdictional immunities of States and their property;

(iv) jurisdiction with regard to crimes committed outside the na-tional territory;

(v) regime of the high seas;

(vi) regime of territorial waters;

(vii) nationality including statelessness;

(viii) treatment of aliens;

(ix) right of asylum;

(x) law of treaties;

(xi) diplomatic intercourse and immunities;

(xii) consular intercourse and immunities;

(xiii) State responsibility; and

(xiv) arbitral procedure.

Since 1949, the Commission completed work on nine of theabove-mentioned topics- As a result, the following topics still awaitconsideration:

(i) recognition of States and Governments;

(ii) jurisdiction with regard to crimes committed outside national ter-ritory;

(iii) treatment of aliens;

(iv) right of asylum: and

(' succession in respect of membership of international organi-zations.

The next important development in the identification of topicsfor codification took place in 1971, with the publication of a workingpaper entitled Survey of International Law prepared by the Secretary-General.5 The 1971 Surey considered its principal task to be that ofdiscarding topics from the 1949 list and of devising a new list. It also

5 Yea..ook.. 1971. vol. If (Part Two), document -VCN.4245 (hereinafter re-ferred to as the -1971 Survey").

considered it to be necessary "to indicate, if only in the broadest termsor by implication, the scope of the work which remains to be done..." 6

b. The 1971 Survey

There are important differences in the approaches of the 1948 and1971 Surveys: the former is mainly based on the law which was devel-oped between States over previous centuries, and the latter takes cogni-sance of changes in the international community necessitating legalregulation. Accordingly, the 1971 Survey adopted a different methodol-ogy or criterion for choosing topics for the long-range programme ofwork of the Commission. It was suggested that the Commission, inbringing up to date its long-term programme of work, should take intoaccount "the international community's current needs." 7 This sugges-tion holds good even to this day. A close study of the 1971 Surveywould seem to suggest that the needs of the international communityrequired codification of the law relating to (i) international water-courses; (ii) the environment; and (iii) extradition. The 1971 Surveyalso expressed an interest in the codification of: (i) jurisdictionalimmunities of States and their property; (ii) liability for injuriousconsequences arising out of the performance of certain lawful activi-ties; and (iii) unilateral acts.' Of these topics, the law of the non-navi-gational uses of international watercourses, jurisdictional immunitiesof States and their property and liability for injurious consequencesarising out of the performance of lawful activities were since placedon the agenda of the Commission.

In a critique of the International Law Commission, the UnitedNations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) examined thereasons why the Commission was "bypassed" in the codification ofconventions on (i) the law of the sea; (ii) the law of economic rela-tions; (iii) the law of outer space; (iv) violence control (e.g., the prohi-bition of mercenaries); or (v) human rights, which were considered tobe the most important areas in the development of international law.9

The UNITAR Study points to two factors that were responsible forthis. For one, the Commission itself was, it is stated, never keen to

6Ibid., p. 5.Ibid., p. 3 (emphasis added).See ibid., p. 61, where the following is stated: "The subject of unilateral acts

appears, in any case, to be important enough to merit attention by the Commissionat some stage in the future, whatever the precise form which may eventually bechosen for its codification". It was also noted that the topic "might prove to be ofconsiderable practical value to States in their dealings with one another, at themoment no comparable agreed text exists to which reference can easily be made".

' M. El Baradei, Th. M. Franck, R. Trachtenberg, The International Law Com-mission: the Need for a New Direction (New York, UNITAR, 1981) (hereinafterreferred to as "the UNITAR Study").

take up "areas of international law where the elements of progressivedevelopment... outweighed the elements of codification";'( moreover.the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the Gcneral Assembly was largely re-sponsible for the "conservative orientation of the work of the Com-mission"." In other words, the Commission was blamed along withthe Sixth Committee for confining it% task to "codification". It waspointed out that the majority of the members of the Commission be-lieved "that the Commission's essential function is to codify and illu-minate the major aspects of traditional international law". " It wasconcluded that the Sixth Committee has been reluctant to entrust tothe Commission "high priority issues", because it considered that theCommission is not "quite receptive to innovation". 3

c. Recent Surveys by the Commission (1991-1993)

In recent years, the Commission itelf had examined the questionof future topics in connection with its deliberations on the long-termprogramme of work- In its enquiries, the Commission appears to havbeen influenced by the same factors as in the aforementioned Surveys.A Working Group set up by the Commission on this issue consideredthat "the new topics envisaged should respond to the most pressingneeds of the international community and that most of them had to beof a predominantly practical rather than theoretical nature".'4 In 1991,the Working Group proposed the following topics for the Commis-sion's long-term programme of work:

(i) international economic law

- international legal regulation of foreign indebtedness;

- the legal conditions of capital investment and agreements per-taining thereto;

(ii) legal aspects of the protection of the environment

- legal aspects of the protection of the environment of areas notsubject to a national jurisdiction (global) commons);

- the law of confined international groundwaters;

(ii) the legal effects of resolutions of the United Nations;

(iv) extraterritorial application of national legislation;

0bid. p. 7." ibi., p. 8.12 Ibid quoting Yearbook.. 1971. voL 1. p. 376. pala. 51."lbid. p. 13.,aYearbook- 1991, vol. 1 (Part Two). p. 134, Annex. para 7.

(v) other legal matters

- the law concerning international migration;

- rights of national minorities;

- extradition and judicial assistance;

- international commissions of inquiry (fact-finding).5

This list, however, became somewhat obsolescent with the elec-tion of new members to the International Law Commission in 1992.The latter set up their own Working Group which examined de novothe question of the long-term programme of work and laid down itsown procedure for the selection of topics, according to which desig-nated members of the Commission prepared a short outline or anexplanatory summary of each of the topics included in a pre-selectedlist. 16

The following topics were selected by the Working Group forsuch outlines:

(i) the legal conditions of capital investment and agreements per-taining thereto;

(ii) ownership and protection of wrecks beyond the limits of na-tional maritime jurisdiction;

(iii) jus cogens;

(iv) State succession and its impact on the nationality of natural andlegal persons;

(v) State succession in respect of mcmbership in internationalorganizations;

(vi) the law concerning international migrations;

(vii) the law and practice relating to reservations to treaties;

(viii) extraterritorial application of national legislation;

(ix) the law of (confined) international groundwaters;

(x) global commons; and

(xi) rights and duties of the states for the protection of the humanenvironment.

Of these topics, the Commission selected only (i) reservations totreaties; and (ii) State succession and its impact on nationality forinclusion in its long-term programme of work. This selection confirmsthe aforementioned critique of UNITAR that the majority of the mem-

"Ibid., para. 8.16 Yearbook.. 1992, vol. II (Part Two), p. 54, para. 369.

bers of the Commission hold the view that the latter's proper role isto codify the traditional aspects of international law.

It is evident from the work carried out by the International LawCommission over the years that, for the most part, it confined itselfto "codification" of traditional international law. In the process, themandate of the "promotion of the progressive development of inter-national law", which has been entrusted to the Commission under itsStatute, has largely remained unfulfilled.17 The concept of "progres-sive development of international law" is, however, distinct from thatof "codification of international law". While the former is defined as"the preparation of draft conventions on subjects which have not yetbeen regulated by international law or in regard to which the law hasnot yet been sufficiently developed in the practice of States", the latteris defined as "the more precise formulation and systematization ofrules of international law in fields where there already has been exten-sive State practice, precedent and doctrine". '8 The drafters of the Stat-ute appear to have conceived progressive development as a means forthe creation of new rules of international law. On the other hand, codi-fication was meant to be a restatement of international customarylaw. The international community of States, it appears, has conferredon the Commission two distinctive functions, one which is in the na-ture of legislation 9 and another which is in the nature of performingjuristic tasks. The distinction between "development" and "codifica-tion" has, unwittingly, been sidelined with dismal consequences so faras the development of international law is concerned. It may be nec-essary to restore the original intention of the drafters of the Statute asregards the progressive development of international law, if we are tomake strides in the choice of new topics. Given, however, the pastrecord of the Commission and of the Sixth Committee as regards"codification" and "development" of international law, one cannothold out much hope for revolutionary changes in the matter of selec-tion of topics. And yet the key to change consists in the realization ofthe object of the "promotion of development of international law".The identification of new topics for codification will then have to takeinto consideration the perspective of progressive development ofinternational law.

'7 See Article I of the Statute.1" See Article 15 of the Statute.i' The Commission has, some time ago. described its role as follows:

'The work done by the Court, at the judicial level, and that done by theCommission, at the legislative level, are complemenitary and make thosebodies, respectively the principal judicial arid legal organs of the UnitedNations system". Yearbook... 1974, vol. I1 (Pan One), p. 310. documentAJ960I/Rev.I, para. 208 (emphasis added).

111. Future Topics

Before outlining the areas or topics for future codification, it maybe useful to describe the status of the topics on the current agenda ofthe Commission and to salvage topics from the past Surveys.

a. Current Programme of the Commission

On the current agenda of the Commission, there are the followingfive items:

(i) State responsibility;

(ii) international liability for injurious consequences arising out of actsnot prohibited by international law;

(iii) draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind;

(iv) reservations to treaties; and

(v) State succession and its impact on the nationality of natural andlegal persons.

As may be expected, work on some of these topics is far moreadvanced than on others. In conformity with its programme of workestablished in 1994,0 the Commission completed in 1996 the secondreading of the Draft Code of Crimes and the first reading of the draftarticles on State responsibility, while a Working Group prepared amore comprehensive draft on international liability for acts not pro-hibited by international law. That means that the new Commissionelected in 1996 will have on its agenda the second reading of the draftarticles on State responsibility, in addition to the topics of reserva-tions to treaties and State succession and its impact on nationality; itwill also have to decide about its future work on international liabilityfor acts which are not prohibited by international law.

b. Inclusion of Topics from the 1948 and 1971 Surveys

There now appears to be general consensus amongst Statesand scholars that only topics of demonstrable interest to the interna-tional community should be included in the future work-programme ofthe Commission. 21 Of the remaining topics of the 1948 Survey, onlytwo, that of treatment of aliens and of the right of asylum, seem to beof practical interest to the international community of States. And ofthe 1971 Survey, the topic of extradition has in recent times acquired

o Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixthsession, Official Records of the General Assembly Forty-ninth Session, Supple-ment No. 10 (A/49/10), para. 390.

2 1. Sinclair, The International Law Commission (Cambridge, Gratius Publi-cations, 1987), p. 44.

practical importance due to the flight of terrorists and drug-traffickersfrom judicial investigations. The topic of the environment suggestedby the 1971 Survey and, anew, in 1994 and 1995, is the object of codi-fication by the United Nations Environment Programme, the Interna-tional Maritime Organization and other organizations and, conse-quently, may not be included.

c. New Topics

1. Past Proposed Topics

Inquiry into new topics calls for circumspection and vision alike.As it happens, the topics on which the Commission had worked in thepast, or is currently engaged in, centre for the most part on traditionalinternational law. However, as the Commission is not constrained by itsStatute to confine itself to subjects that are traditional, it should notfight shy of taking on topics where there is no strongly established Statepractice.

It appears that there is a need for the development of principlesand norms as regards the following subjects: (i) the new internationaleconomic order; (ii) international law of evidence; and (iii) the law con-cerning international migration. A few words on each of them may bein order.

The first topic was taken up for study and deliberation by theInternational Law Association in 1978, and the private law aspects of thesubject are being studied by the United Nations Commission on Inter-national Trade Law. The International Law Commission could possiblyexamine in a phased manner the public law aspects of the new interna-tional economic order. To start with, the Commission could vrk oninternational norms governing foreign investment. The topic has gener-ally been studied from the point of view of nationalization and expro-priation. That vuld be taking a limited view of the topic. What isneeded is a comprehensive approach that examines the topic from theangle of fr-e international trade. Should it be necessary to have an eoo-nomic perspective on it, the United Nations could commission a commit-tee of international economists to prepare such a study. The Sixth Com-mittee too could play a useful role in guiding the Commission's work onthis item.

The second topic belongs to international procedural law. So far,codification has, by and large, confined itself to international substan-tive law.2 It now appears to us that the time has arrived for codifyinginternational law of evidence. To start with, the Commission could

2 Except probably in the case of the topic of arbitral procedure.

work on international norms governing admissibility and proof of evi-dence. The Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Nica-ragua case 23 evidences the need for such rules. And as the work ofinternational courts and arbitration tribunals expands, the need forinternational norms on evidence becomes all the more imperative.

The third topic, the law concerning international migration, isprobably the most radical of the suggested topics. Professor Guil-laume Pambou-Tchivounda has presented a schematic outline for it,which now appears in a document of the United Nations.24 In ouropinion, this topic opens up an altogether new field of enquiry, studyand deliberation. Its potential for the development of international lawis vast indeed.

2. Topics Proposed at Present

In its report on the work of its forty-eighth session, submitted tothe General Assembly, the International Law Commission included asection on the long-term programme of work.25 Under this title, theCommission selected new topics for future study by the Commission.The selection was made from a "general scheme" of topics, classifiedunder 13 main areas of public international law (e.g., sources, Statejurisdiction, international criminal law, international spaces, etc.).

The Commission gave preference to three main topics which itidentified as more appropriate for codification and progressive devel-opment. These three topics were the following:

(i) diplomatic protection;

(ii) ownership and protection of wrecks beyond the limits of nationalmaritime jurisdiction;

(iii) unilateral acts of States.

We believe that topics (i) and (iii) are of a greater importance forthe Commission's work, at present, than topic (ii) on the problems ofshipwrecks. Moreover, we think that there are a few more interestingtopics, mentioned under the "general scheme", which could possiblybe selected in the future as appropriate for consideration by the Com-mission as part of its programme of work.

I Case concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and againstNicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14.

24 A/CN.4/454, pp. 39-47.Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth

session, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-first Session, SupplementNo. 10 (A/5 1/10), Annex If.

IV. CouClusIem

The work of the International Law Commision has been subjectedto critical review and analysis by Govnjnents and sholars for thelast 46 years' Whatever view one holds of the Commission's work, ithas to be reckoned that the selection of topics remains a crucial matter.

The work of the Commission in the selection of topics for itsfuture work-programme was facilitated earlier by the Surveys of 1948,1971 and 1991-1993 which between them covered comprehensivelythe topics and areas that are suitable for codification. It has been seenthat all these Surveys emphasized the importance of predicating atopic on the needs of the international community of States. But, forunderstandable reasons, the 1948 Survey had a relatively easier taskthan the 1971 Survey in identifying the topics for future codification.Whereas in 1948, the whole field of international law was potential forcodification, in 1971 the field was far more restricted, owing, on theone hand, to the successful completion of work by the Commissionconcerning the law of the sea, diplomatic and consular relations, thelaw of treaties and, on the other, due to the creation of new forumsfor codification.

The criticism has sometimes been levelled that the topics forcodification have by and large centred on traditional international law.The UNITAR Study attributed this to the feeling by the majority ofthe members of the Commission that its proper role was to codify thetraditional areas of international law.27 Given, however, the requisitepolicy directive, the Commission would be able to take on topics thatare not traditional. The Commission indeed took on a non-traditionalsubject, like the non-navigational uses of international watercourses,when the General Assembly required it to do so. It is, therefore, forthe General Assembly to give a lead to the Commission in the matter,and indeed reorient the attitude of the members of the Commission inthe matter of selection of future topics.

It has been suggested heretofore that the future work-programmeof the Commission should extend to topics that have remained on thelist of topics mentioned in the Surveys of 1948 and 1971, and to newtopics that have recently surfaced- These topics are:

(i) treatment of aliens;

(ii) right of asylum;

(iii) extradition;

2 F, socm acute observations on this issue, scc 0. Schadte "UnitedNatio.s Law". AJIL (1994), pp. 4-6.

-1 UNITAR Study, op. ci. (footnote 9 above), p. 10.

(iv) legal aspects of the new international economic order;

(v) international law of evidence; and

(vi) law concerning international migration.

These topics are not all traditional, nor are they all radical. They,are in fact, a mix of the traditional and the modem. The inspiration forthem comes, on the one hand, from the previous exploratory Surveysand, on the other hand, from Article 1328 of the Charter of the UnitedNations. While maintaining continuity with the earlier Surveys, anattempt has been made in this study to look to the future from theperspective of "progressive development of international law" ratherthan of codification sirnpliciter. The time has anived for giving to theelement of "progressive development" greater weight than what hashitherto been the case.

' It will be remembered that Article 13 requires the General Assembly to"initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of... encouraging theprogressive development of international law and its codification". The Statute ofthe International Law Commission also mentions these twin tasks in Article I, asstated above.