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Russia’s Pivot to Asia: Visionary or Reactionary?

Jittipat Poonkham1

Introduction

Asia, in particular Southeast Asia, has rarely been a strategic priority for Russia.

Russia’s focal point of foreign policy almost always revolves around Europe. Throughout

history, a harbinger of the turn to Asia has been a reaction to a diplomatic failure of Russia in

or its exclusion from the European balance of power (for example, the Crimean War of 1854-

1856). More recently, a major turning point in Russia’s policy toward Asia is its 2012 APEC

(Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) chairmanship at Vladivostok for the first time since its

membership in 1998. President Vladimir Putin asserted Russia’s status as “an intrinsic part of

the Asia-Pacific region”, and seriously pledged to engage with the region.2 To put it differently,

it is Russia’s “turn to the East” policy (povorot na Vostok) or, simply said, Russia’s “pivot to

Asia”. The pivot has been increasingly accelerated due to the Ukraine crisis in 2014 and the

concomitant European and American economic sanctions. This raises the question of whether

Putin’s shift towards Asia is the result of a visionary strategy or merely a reactionary tactic.

The article aims to provide an overview of Russia’s pivot to Asia, especially between 2014 and

2015, by highlighting the key developments within the region in general and important bilateral

relations with such states as China, Vietnam and Thailand in particular. The article argues that

Russian foreign policy in Asia is driven by the reemerging nature of Russia’s identity as a

Eurasian power. It is part and parcel of Russia’s grand strategy in world politics.

Russia’s Grand Strategy as a Eurasian Great Power

Russia’s foreign policy identity has recurrently twisted and turned largely due to a shift

in its foreign relations with the West, which is considered a strategic priority. That is, Russia

presents itself as a European great power when it perceives the West, in particular the U.S., as

an ally and strategic partner, while Russia represents itself as a Eurasian great power when it

is marginalized or excluded from the West, thereby envisioning the West as a rival.3 For

instance, during the Dmitry Medvedev presidency (2008-2012), there was a “resetting” of

foreign relations with the U.S. under the Barack Obama administration, improving cooperation

in key domains such as concluding the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START),

supporting U.S. agendas in Afghanistan and Iran, strengthening the personal presidential

relationship, and succeeding in Russia’s entry into the WTO membership (after its 18-year

journey). Above all, Russia highlighted its identity as a European power. However, since

September 24, 2011 when Medvedev had announced Putin would stand for president in the

March 2012 election, it instigated drawbacks domestically (i.e. anti-Putinist mass protests and

the Pussy Riot) and internationally. Putin furiously blamed these on the international

“provocateurs and enemies” and tightened the grip on domestic arena – passing some

legislative initiatives clamping down on pro-democratic groups and non-governmental

organizations, ending the USAID programs in Russia, prohibiting the adoption of Russian

children by American citizens (in response to the U.S.-initiated Magnitsky Act), and the

granting of political asylum to NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden, to name just a few.

The Eurasian project has been relaunched since 2011, and increasingly accelerated after

the Ukraine crisis in 2014. The ultimate aim of Russia remains unchanged: the revitalization

1 Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University 2 Andrei Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity, 3rd Edition

(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), p. 217. 3 See Jittipat Poonkham, “A Weary Titan: Russian Foreign Policy Thinking since 1992”, Journal of Social

Science, Vol. 42: No. 1 (January-June 2012), pp. 52-64.

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and stabilization of its great power status. To achieve that, the Eurasian project comprises three

key characteristics: first, Putin’s Russia deprioritizes the West, in particular antagonizing the

United States (albeit with no direct military confrontation with it). The policies are, as follows:

(1) “pragmatism” by pursuing “selective” or “limited” engagement with the West (e.g. anti-

terrorism) and lowering the priority of relations with the NATO and other Western institutions;

(2) “economizing” relations with the EU and Western countries in particular in the realm of

energy diplomacy; and (3) “independent” foreign policy by setting the parameter that no major

international decision can be taken without Russian participation and Russia’s views should be

taken into account and respect, (coupled with China) maintaining the “Westphalian”

international order of sovereign rights and non-interference, and promoting the idea of a

“multipolar” world order, thereby implicitly challenging U.S. hegemony.

Second, Putin’s Russia vigorously attempts to reintegrate the near neighborhood, or the

so-called “near abroad”. After the Five-Day War between Russia and Georgia in August 2008,

Medvedev declared the Russian “Monroe Doctrine” whereby the area is a “sphere of privileged

interests” where Russia has rights to protect its compatriots (sootchestveniki). Putin does not

want a region to be a power vacuum that other great powers, especially the US, could fill in,

promote Western-oriented democracy or colored revolution, and lure other states into an anti-

Russian bloc. A crisis in Ukraine can be regarded as a test case of geostrategic competition.4

In a multilateral regionalism, Putin initiated a brainchild project of Eurasian Economic

Union, which was operationalized in 2015, and includes such member states as Russia,

Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan. In bilateral relations, Russia uses every means,

in particular economic and energy leverages (and military tools, if necessary), to persuade and

dissuade others to be friendly governments. In sum, for Putin, the near abroad should be under

the tutelage of Russian hegemony, if not a new empire.

Third, Putin’s Russia “pivots” to Asia, thereby reemphasizing the level of relations with

Asian countries, in particular such great powers as China, as well as strategic partners. Russia

wishes to be a “Euro-Pacific power”. This will be the topic of the next section.

All in all, contemporary Russia has pursued a “multivector” diplomacy, by

deprioritizing the “Western” vector while reprioritizing the “Eurasian” and “Asian” vectors.

Russia’s Relations with Asia

In Russia’s foreign policy thinking, Asia has continually been a strategic underpriority,

a distant second to the West. Perennially, a transition to Asia, coupled with its Eurasianness,

happens whenever Russia’s relations with the West is deteriorating and deteriorated. Recently,

a pivotal moment is, firstly, its hosting of the APEC summit in Vladivostok in September 2012,

where Putin declared his strategy of pivot to Asia. Envisioning Russia as “an intrinsic part of

the Asia-Pacific region”, Putin designed to put his pivot to Asia within a larger context of a

Eurasian project. In his words, the idea of Eurasian Economic Union is to “become a bridge

between the European Union and the Asia-Pacific region”, by pursuing “closer integration of

economic models, regulation and technical standards among the EU, APEC, and the European

Economic Union”, which “would offer businesses the ability to operate seamlessly across a

vast area”.5 This agenda closely linked to the domestic imperative for developing the Russian

Far East and Siberia. Russia in turn allocated an unprecedented amount of financial resources

to develop the RFE.

Furthermore, a referendum-cum-annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the shooting

down of the Malaysia Airlines flight MH-17 in July 2014 unleashed Western economic

4 See John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked

Putin”, Foreign Affairs, September/ October 2014, pp. 1-12. 5 Quoted in Andrei Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity, 3rd

Edition (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), p. 218.

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sanctions, thereby limiting Russia’s options and giving Asia greater significance. As Dmitri

Trenin argues, “Russia’s pivot to Asia predates the Ukraine crisis, but it has become more

pronounced since then”.6 At first, Russia’s eastern reorientation was driven by an interest in

developing its own economy, given advantages of Asia’s growing dynamism, yet later Russia’s

pivot to Asia has become inevitable due to its tension with the West. In this section, I examine

Russia’s multilateral engagement with East and Southeast Asia, and its bilateral relationships

with China, Vietnam and Thailand, respectively.

Multilateral Relations with the Asia-Pacific

First of all, Russia has increasingly engaged with Asia’s multilateral institutions, but its

role is still limited. It repeatedly declares to support regional frameworks such as the APEC,

Six-Party Talks with North Korea, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). It also

becomes an official member of the East Asian Summit (EAS) since 2011 (along with the US)7,

and participated in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (since 1994), ASEAN Defense

Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) (since October 2010), and Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) (since

October 2010).

However, in fact, Moscow’s influence in the Six-Party Talks is very limited (compared

with other participants). For the SCO, despite their commonality in combating terrorism,

separatism, and extremism, China’s and Russia’s objectives diverge: In the long term, Russia’s

focus on safeguarding its adjacent sphere of influence, monopolizing its energy, and building

Eurasian Economic Union, might not be compatible with China’s focus on economic

integration, national resources trade, and the Silk Road economic belt. Russia’s presence in

Asia remains weak militarily, economically, and politically. More importantly, Putin has

occasionally been absent from multilateral summits, such as the EAS. For Russia, bilateralism

has prevailed over multilateralism, not only in Asia but also in the world.

Strategic Partnership with China: More than an “Axis of Convenience”8?

“Now Russia-China cooperation is advancing to a new stage of comprehensive

partnership and strategic interaction. It would not be wrong to say that it has reached

the highest level in all its centuries-long history.” – Vladimir Putin (May 2014)9

In addition, Russia emphasizes its relationship with great powers in Asia such as China,

India and Japan. It specifically relies on a “strategic relationship” with a rapidly rising China.

Moscow and Beijing share a common interest in, firstly, countering the preponderance of

American power and dominance in the Asia-Pacific; secondly, in continuing a Westphalian

world order based on international law and multipolarity; and thirdly, in fostering emerging

regional and international informal clubs such as BRICS in order to challenge the U.S.-led

world order.

The crucial factor in Russia-China relationship is obvious personal ties between

Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, a Chinese President. Both first formally met in 2010 (when

Putin was prime minister, while Xi was vice-chairman of the PRC and heir-in-waiting), but

6 Dmitri Trenin, From Greater Europe to Greater Asia? The Sino-Russian Entente (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow

Center, April 2015), p. 1. 7 Before that, Russia became an ASEAN dialogue partner in 1996, and signed the Treaty of Amity and

Cooperation (TAC) in 2004. 8 Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics (Baltimore: Brookings Institution

Press, 2008). 9 Quoted in Douglas E. Schoen, and Melik Kaylan, The Russia-China Axis: The New Cold War and America’s

Crisis of Leadership (New York and London: Encounter Books, 2014), p.viii.

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their real friendship began on October 7, 2013, when Putin celebrated his birthday at the APEC

summit in Bali, and Xi was the only foreign guest invited to the small party. When Xi had

inaugurated as the Chinese President in March 2013, his first foreign visit was Russia.

Likewise, when Putin returned to his third-term presidency, his first foreign visit was China.

Since the onset of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, China has been playing an important role

for Russia in part because China is the largest economy outside of the countries that have

imposed sanctions on Russia. Since 2009, China, instead of Europe, has been Russia’s largest

trading partner, with overall trade reaching $95 billion in 2014. In the energy sector, Russia

needs to diversify its energy supplies from Europe, a largest importer in the world, to the East.

Russia opened the East Siberian-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) oil pipeline, destined for Daqing, in

2009, and a second phase in 2012, exporting more than 30 million tons of oil per year to Asian

markets particularly to China. In May 2014, Gazprom signed a $400 billion deal with China

National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), to supply natural gas to China over a thirty-year

contract.

Militarily, both countries have been cooperating in arms trade, military technology

transfer, and military exercises. Since 2013, Russia has re-supplied arms to China, such as

exporting twenty-four Sukhoi Su-35 fighters. In May 2014, the Russian and Chinese navies

held large-scale joint drills in the East China Sea. In May 2015, they had a joint military

exercise in the Mediterranean. Financially, in December 2014, when the ruble fell sharply and

precipitated Russia’s economic recession, China has offered Russia credit lines in yuan

currency, if necessary.

Thus, in terms of bilateral relations, Russia and China are moving beyond what Bobo

Lo called “axis of convenience” toward the “Sino-Russian entente”, in which Trenin defined

as “a harmonious association of two major powers based on the commonality of some key

interests; mutual resentment of the global hegemon, that is, the United States; a measure of

foreign and security policy coordination; and a degree of empathy between their leaders”.10 In

2014, Putin and Xi met five times, and in 2015, at least three times: in Moscow in May

(where Xi joined Putin to celebrate the seventieth anniversary of the Victory Day over Nazi

Germany), in Ufa in July (during the BRICS summit) and in Beijing in September (where, in

return, Xi expects Putin to come to Beijing to celebrate the anniversary of the Victory Day over

Japan). In May 2015, Xi and Putin signed 32 agreements in Moscow.

Moreover, in the realm of global governance, Russia closely collaborated with China

to delegitimize and bypass the U.S.-led international institutions, thereby establishing non-

Western institutions such as the BRICS, SCO, and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

(AIIB). In 2015, the SCO will add India and Pakistan as new members. BRICS, now with a

development bank of its own, will seek to become an alternative to the G7 and the IMF. Russia

will host the 2015 BRICS summit in Ufa.

In a triangular diplomacy, to a certain extent, China balanced a momentum of US-

Russia rivalry. For example, during the APEC summit in Beijing in November 2014, Xi put

himself in a central position between Obama and Putin in many settings. Nowadays, despite a

progressing Sino-Russian entente, Moscow tends to be Beijing’s junior partner.

Bilateral Relations with Southeast Asia: “Asia Is Not Just China”11

Between 2000 and 2013, Moscow substantially increased its trade volume with the

ASEAN states almost elevenfold. However, the volume of mutual trade remains modest.

10 Dmitri Trenin, From Greater Europe to Greater Asia? The Sino-Russian Entente (Moscow: Carnegie

Moscow Center, April 2015), p. 19. 11 Fyodor Lukyanov, an editor-in-chief of the journal, Russia in Global Affairs, said during Medvedev’s trip in

2015 that “For Russia, Asia is not just China.” Quoted in “Russia Expands ‘Pivot’ East Beyond China to

Vietnam and Thailand”, The Moscow Times, April 9, 2015.

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Russia’s total trade with ASEAN grew by 9.9 percent from $18.2 billion in 2012 to $19.9

billion in 2013, with the 7.5 percent increase in ASEAN exports to Russia, from $4.9 billion in

2012 to $5.2 billion in 2013; and the 10.7 percent increase in ASEAN imports from Russia,

from $13.3 billion in 2012 to $14.7 billion in 2013.12 After 2012, Russia’s presence in the

region seems to be increasingly greater. Russia has contributed to the military dimension

through its role as an important arms supplier. In the economic realm, Russia provides the

region with many commodities, especially natural resources and energy. With the exception of

energy and arms, Russia’s export is largely uncompetitive. Overall, Russia’s role and influence

in ASEAN, with the exception of Vietnam, remains too weak.

Vietnam: A Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

“Vietnam is the Eurasian Economic Union’s first international partner.” – Dmitry

Medvedev (May 2015)13

The year 2014 marks the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty on Principles of Friendly

Relations between Russia and Vietnam, which was a starting point in their post-Cold War

bilateral relations. Their cordial relationship advanced to a strategic partnership, during Putin’s

first visit to Hanoi in March 2001, and was officially upgraded to the status of a

“comprehensive strategic partnership” in 2012. At the conclusion of his visit to Hanoi in

November 2013, Putin referred to Vietnam as “a key partner of Russia in the Asia-Pacific

region”.14

In ASEAN, Vietnam is the only strategic partner of Russia and a gateway to ASEAN,

with which Russia incessantly attempts to engage. Russia has had a comprehensive cooperation

with Vietnam, ranging from the high level of political confidence and trust between two states

to trade and investment relationship, robust military cooperation, and wider cooperation on

joint oil and gas exploration. Economically, trade and investment are considerable, though

modest. In 2014, total trade between Russia and Vietnam was $2.5 billion. In terms of debt

restructuring, Russia wrote off $9.53 billion of the $11.03 billion debt that Vietnam owes

Russia, and granted an extension for the payment of the balance until 2016-2022. There is also

an increase in mutual investment partnership, including building hydroelectric (such as the Hoa

Binh hydropower station) and nuclear power plants (such as the first nuclear power plant at

Ninh Thuan).

Militarily, Russia is Vietnam’s largest arms supplier, including military weapons,

equipment, and technology. In 2009, Vietnam purchased $2 billion for six Kilo-class diesel

submarines and twelve SU-30MKK fighter jets. Vietnam has granted Russia permission to set

up a ship maintenance base at the port of Cam Ranh Bay where Russia will provide training

for Vietnamese submariners, despite the fact that Moscow had ended a 25-year lease of the

naval base in 2002. Since 2012, Russia has been tacitly intending to reconstruct its former naval

base in Cam Ranh Bay as a prospective logistics base for Russian naval activities in the region

(correspondent to its naval modernization of the Russian Pacific Fleet by 2020), and as a hub

12 ASEAN, “Overview of ASEAN-Russia Dialogue Relations”, http://www.asean.org/news/item/overview-of-

asean-russia-dialogue-relations. 13 Dmitry Medvedev’s twitter, 29 May 2015, https://twitter.com/medvedevrussiae/status/604346644780466177 14 Quoted in Vitaly Kozyrev, “Russia-Vietnam Strategic Partnership: The Return of the Brotherhood in Arms?”,

Russian Analytical Digest, Vol. 145: No. 31 (March 2014), p. 9. See also Vladimir Mazyrin, “Russia and

Vietnam: Building a Strategic Partnership”, in ASEAN-Russia: Foundations and Future Prospects, eds. Victor

Sumsky, Mark Hong, and Amy Lugg (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), pp. 173-183.

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for the Vietnamese submarine fleet.15 This might tentatively be contributing to Vietnam’s

hedging strategy against China.

In the realm of the oil and gas sector, Russia and Vietnam succeeded in developing joint

ventures, notably a flagship company Vietsovpetro, which has been active on Vietnam’s

continental shelf. Recently, both countries also facilitate other joint ventures to expand oil and

gas exploration in Vietnam, in particular in the South China Sea. As a quid pro quo, Russia

allowed Vietnamese partners into an energy investment in Russia, notably in Siberia. The

pioneer is PetroVietnam.

During April 6-7, 2015 visit to Vietnam, Dmitry Medvedev held talks with his

Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Tan Dung. First, Medvedev urged Vietnam to negotiate on a

free trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union, which he claimed that both leaders

“have agreed on most contents of the agreement. I think this is the factor that would promote

bilateral trade”.16 Second, Russia and Vietnam intended to boost trade volume by fourfold to

$10 billion in 2020. Medvedev also proposed conducting more trade and investment in national

currencies. Third, the two leaders agreed to expand oil and gas exploration in the highly

contested South China Sea. Medvedev wants to see more Vietnamese investment in Russia oil

sector (Russia’s Zarubezhneft and Vietnam’s PetroVietnam are already implementing joint

projects) and is offering corresponding incentives, such as tax benefits. During the visit,

Medvedev and Dung witnessed the signing of several energy cooperation agreements,

including Russia’s Gazprom Neft’s intention to buy 49 percent of a 6.5 million-ton oil refinery

in central Vietnam.17 Last but not least, many documents were signed after Russian-Vietnam

talks, including strengthening many areas of cooperation, such as investment, healthcare,

friendship society, railways and electric power stations. 18 In short, Medvedev’s trip

significantly cultivated closer ties in the Russo-Vietnamese strategic partnership.

Thailand: A Symbolic Relationship?

“When a friend is in trouble, moral support from allies is needed. Russia still chooses

to be friends with Thailand today, and we will ensure the bond of friendship remains

tight.” – General Prayut Chan-o-cha (April 2015)19

Russia and Thailand have had long-standing diplomatic relations since King

Chulalongkorn’s memorable visit to St. Petersburg in 1897. After the Cold War, they have been

through ups and downs, particularly during the Abhisit Vejjajiva government when it

infamously extradited Viktor Bout, the Russian arms dealer, to the US in 2010. The mechanism

in facilitating their relationship is a Joint Commission (JC), which was signed in 1993 and

started in 1997. A major turning point in Russia-Thailand relations was between the Thaksin

Shinawatra and Putin administrations, when both leaders paid official visits (to Moscow in

2002 and to Bangkok in 2003, respectively). They enthusiastically invigorated their

cooperation in many domains, such as encouragement and mutual protection of investments,

promotion of tourism (in particular by allowing Thais or Russians to stay in their respective

15 Kozyrev, “Russia-Vietnam Strategic Partnership: The Return of the Brotherhood in Arms?”, pp.10-11. 16 “Vietnam Close to Free Trade Deal with Russia-Led Trade Bloc — Medvedev”, The Moscow Times, April 6,

2015. 17 “Russia Expands ‘Pivot’ East Beyond China to Vietnam and Thailand”, The Moscow Times, April 9, 2015. 18 “Dmitry Medvedev’s Visit to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, April 7, 2015,

http://m.government.ru/en/news/17558/ 19 “Prayut Reaches Out to Moscow: Boosting Trade Tops Medvedev’s Agendas”, Bangkok Post, April 9, 2015.

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countries without visas for a thirty-day period), cooperation in education, space technologies,

military and defense, and so on.20

However, Thai-Russia relations remain modest. In 2014, a total volume of trade was $5

billion, increasing from the previous year, though Thailand has had a persistent trade deficit

vis-à-vis Russia since 1992. As for the volume of tourism, approximately 1.7 million Russian

tourists came to Thailand in 2014, dropping from 1.9 million Russians over the previous year,

due largely to the fall of the ruble currency.

The military coup led by General Prayut Chan-o-cha in May 2014 has been

diplomatically shunned by democratic Western powers, thereby forging Thailand in closer ties

with China and Russia. Thailand seems to pursue a hedging strategy with China and Russia

against the West, especially the U.S.

After his visit to Vietnam, Prime Minister Medvedev embarked on a trip to Bangkok

between April 7 and 8, 2015, which marked the first visit by a Russian prime minister in 25

years. Medvedev held talks with Thai Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha. First of all,

both leaders witnessed the signing of five intergovernmental memorandums of understanding

(MOUs) on increasing cooperation on energy, tourism, culture, anti-narcotics, and investment,

coupled with five business-to-business MOUs.21 Second, Russian and Thai prime ministers

promised to strengthen a number of bilateral cooperation initatives. For instance, they hoped

to increase the volume of their trade from $5 billion to $10 billion over the next year. Russia

agreed to import some products from Thailand, such as rice, fruit, pork, seafood, and rubber.

Notably, Moscow promised to buy at least 80,000 tons of Thai rubber. They also mentioned

the promotion and increase in the volume of tourism. Third, the Thai prime minister invited

Russia to join its Rubber City Project, invest in Special Economic Zones at borders, and join a

project entitled “Sister Cities for Commercial Cooperation”. In return, Medvedev also invited

Thailand to take part in a free trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union and invited

Thai investors to join the new Far Eastern Economic Zone. Fourth, the two leaders discussed

the celebration of 120-year diplomatic relations between the two countries in 2017. Russia will

establish Russian Cultural Center in Bangkok to commemorate the event.22 At a joint press

conference, General Prayut overwhelmingly praised Russia as a “good friend” to Thailand,

amidst the recent military rule and the concomitant Western pressures. In the near future,

Russia officially invited the Thai prime minister to visit Russia, and the sixth Joint Commission

(JC) upcoming meeting will be held in Moscow in July 2015.

Nevertheless, there was no major breakthrough during the visit. Unlike the Russia-

Vietnam partnership, the Russia-Thailand relationship is full of symbols and too many

promises, given their very vague, broad MOUs. Some claimed that the Thai-Russia

“friendship”, despite their long diplomatic history, is likely to be short-term, temporary and

symbolic.23 More importantly, actualimplementation has yet to take shape, though is still

20 See Ekaterina Koldunova, and Paradorn Rangsimaporn, “Russia-Thailand Relations: Historical Background

and Contemporary Developments”, in ASEAN-Russia: Foundations and Future Prospects, eds. Victor Sumsky,

Mark Hong, and Amy Lugg (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), pp. 160-172. 21 They include: (1 ) Memorandum of understanding between Inter RAO – Engineering LLC, Power Machines

OJSC and Turbo Machinery (Thailand) Co., Ltd; (2) Memorandum of understanding between Research and

Production Company “Armastek”, LLC, Russia and “Panjawattana Plastic”; (3) Memorandum of Understanding

between JSC “Russian Railways” and Banpu Public Company Ltd. in relation to the Kalimantan Railway

Infrastructure and Sea Coal Terminal Project in Indonesia; (4) Memorandum of Understanding between Non-

Commercial Partnership for Development and Use of Navigation Technologies (GLONASS) and GEORADIUS

Thailand Private Limited; and (5) Memorandum of Understanding between Moscow State Regional University

and Siam Technology College. 22 “Thai-Russia Relations: Russia, Thailand Sign Cooperation Pacts”, The Nations, April 8, 2015. 23 For example, Thitinan Pongsudhirak, the director of the Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS),

Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, asserted that “The Thai government’s recent embrace of

China and warm welcome of Russia are likely to be short-term, expedient moves to counter Western posturing.

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underway. One example is that although General Prayut claimed that Thailand was interested

in purchasing Russian arms, Thai military elites, which formerly have had a preference for

Western arms suppliers, made a decision to buy three China-made submarines instead of

Russian ones in July 2015.

Conclusion

Since 2014, Russia has been inevitably looking eastward, but its pivot to Asia remains

very much a work in progress. For Putin, this is a unique opportunity to pursue his nation’s

reengagement with Asia, which is a part of a full-fledged Eurasian grand strategy. Russia is

increasingly becoming a visible and proactive player in Asia’s regional architecture and

bilateralism. However, Putin’s policy, firstly, remains rather ambiguous; Moscow’s true goals

in the region are obscure. Secondly, it still encounters many challenges – such as a precipitous

drop in oil prices, the Ukraine crisis and Western sanctions, and an economic recession – that

need a more nuanced, long-term and coherent strategy. Medvedev’s trip was a small step

forward for Russia in Asia. Thus far, Russia’s policy in the Asia-Pacific rests on the appearance

rather than the reality of power in the region.

… Thailand is playing a costly game in cozying up to these authoritarian powers”. “Between Democracy and

Authoritarianism”, Bangkok Post, April 10, 2015.