“COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS TO IMPROVE LOGISTICS DURING HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS"

Lieutenant Colonel Gary Crichard

JCSP 37

Master of Defence Studies Disclaimer

Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do

not represent Department of National Defence or

Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used

without written permission.

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the

Minister of National Defence, 2011.

PCEMI 37

Maîtrise en études de la défense Avertissement

Les opinons exprimées n’engagent que leurs auteurs et

ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de

la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce

papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite.

© Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le

ministre de la Défense nationale, 2011.

1

2

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE - COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES JCSP 37 - PCEMI 37

“COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS TO IMPROVE LOGISTICS DURING HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS"

By Lt Col Gary Crichard, REME

This paper was written by a student

attending the Canadian Forces College

in fulfilment of one of the requirements

of the Course of Studies. The paper is a

scholastic document, and thus contains

facts and opinions, which the author

alone considered appropriate and correct

for the subject. It does not necessarily

reflect the policy or the opinion of any

agency, including the Government of

Canada and the Canadian Department of

National Defence. This paper may not

be released, quoted or copied, except

with the express permission of the

Canadian Department of National

Defence.

Word Count: 17,902

La présente étude a été rédigée par un

stagiaire du Collège des Forces

canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des

exigences du cours. L'étude est un

document qui se rapporte au cours et

contient donc des faits et des opinions

que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et

convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas

nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion

d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le

gouvernement du Canada et le ministère

de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est

défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de

reproduire cette étude sans la permission

expresse du ministère de la Défense

nationale.

Compte de mots : 17,902

1

Contents INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................2

Methodology ....................................................................................................................5 Terminology.....................................................................................................................8

THE MILITARY CONTEXT ..............................................................................................9 Environment Change ....................................................................................................... 9 Conducting Comprehensive Operations. .......................................................................14 Whole of Government Approach. ..................................................................................18

THE ACTORS ...................................................................................................................21 Historic Perspective ....................................................................................................... 23

UN HROs...................................................................................................................24 Single State Organisations .........................................................................................28 NGOs .........................................................................................................................29

The Concept of Operations ............................................................................................33 UN - Modus Operandi ...............................................................................................34 NGO - Modus Operandi.............................................................................................36 Military - Modus Operandi ........................................................................................40

Friction ...........................................................................................................................45 WORKING TOGETHER .................................................................................................. 55

The Philosophy of the Log Cluster ................................................................................55 How The Log Cluster Works .........................................................................................65 Taking the Log Cluster Forward....................................................................................72

CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................78 BIBLIOGRAPHY..............................................................................................................83

2

"COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS TO IMPROVE LOGISTICS DURING HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS"�

Coordination between civilian and military actors is essential during an emergency response. The increasing number and scale of humanitarian emergencies, in both natural disaster and conflict settings, has led to more situations where military forces and civilian

relief agencies are operating in the same environment.1

� Sir John Holmes, former Emergency Relief Coordinator and United Nations Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs

January 2007 - September 2010

INTRODUCTION

Famines in Africa, the Boxing Day tsunami, hurricanes and earthquakes; have

again conjured up images of people in need of humanitarian assistance. Every year some

125,000 people are reported killed and 300 million cumulatively affected by around 450

natural disasters, according to the database maintained by the Centre for Research on the

Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the University of Leuven, Belgium.2 Add to these

statistics man-made disasters such as the Kurds in Northern Iraq, Somalia, the Balkans

and Afghanistan, and the magnitude of the relief effort becomes manifestly apparent.

Humanitarian Relief Organisations (HROs) endeavour to reach out to all in need,

persevering to provide disaster relief in the most effective manner. Increasingly

benefactors are subjecting the HROs to greater scrutiny and emphasising the obligation to

1 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Humanitarian Civil-Military," http://ochaonline.un.org/AboutOCHA/Organigramme/EmergencyServicesBranchESB/CivilMilitaryCoordin ationSectionCMCS/tabid/1274/Default.aspx; Internet; accessed 10 December 2010.

2 David Stromberg, "Natural Disasters, Economic Development, and Humanitarian Aid," Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 21, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 199.

http://ochaonline.un.org/AboutOCHA/Organigramme/EmergencyServicesBranchESB/CivilMilitaryCoordin

3

ensure donations are efficiently and effectively utilised. Sponsors have become more

interested in understanding how their money is spent and they expect accountability and

transparency. Expenditure of the limited funds has therefore become a crucial issue. In

most relief operations logistics accounts for about 80% of the financial effort. Ensuring

that this element is as economical as possible is imperative. Until recently however

humanitarian logistics was not at the forefront of planning and was given scant attention.

Logistics skills within the various humanitarian organisations remained underdeveloped

and uncoordinated.

In contrast, centuries of warfare have honed the art of military logistics.

Maintaining supply lines, whilst disrupting those of the enemy has long been considered a

crucial element of military strategy. The science of logistics and supply management has

been a vital factor for ensuring victory on the battlefield. The military have continued to

develop tools and techniques to improve their logistic endeavours, with noteworthy effort

in 1959 by US retired Rear Admiral, Henry E. Eccles, to produce a theory of logistics.3

Despite the importance of logistics, the primacy of operations has always remained

paramount. Failure for the military has never been an option and consequently costs and

economy of effort have often been a secondary consideration. The end of the Cold War,

however, resulted in financial cutbacks and imposed restrictions on military spending as

part of the peace dividend. Subsequent military operations and planning would need to be

more cost-effective, and logisticians would be obliged to adopt lean processes and

3 Henry E. Eccles, Logistics in the National Defense (Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: The Stackpole Company, 1959).

4

implement more efficient methods.4 The early 1990s was a period of intense military

effort to seek and adopt improved logistic support theories, in order to enhance

productivity and reduce overall costs.

The 1990s also experienced increased interaction between United Nations (UN)

HROs, the multitude of Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and the military.

Relations during humanitarian operations were sometimes strained, but when there was

proactive cooperation between the various parties, particularly in the field of logistics, it

often led to economies of scale and mutually beneficial results. The escalating cost of

logistics during humanitarian operations became increasingly important to the HROs and

measures to reduce expenditure were sought. It soon became apparent that although

collaboration had its benefits, there were significant areas of friction that constrained, not

only, cooperation between the assorted civilian agencies, but also curtailed relations with

the military. Over the next two decades efforts were made to address obstacles and

improve collaboration, with varying success. More recently a new approach has been

adopted, resulting in the formation of global and regional groupings responsible for

specific areas of humanitarian operations. In 2006 the 'Cluster Approach' was formally

approved, bringing together interested parties from the UN, government organisations and

NGOs, in order to collectively seek methods for improving humanitarian relief

operations.5 Various clusters were formed, including the 'Logistics Cluster', led by the

World Food Program (WFP). The collaborative nature of the cluster approach

4 Peter Tatham and David Worrell, "Lean Thinking in an Uncertain Environment: The Implications for UK Defence Acquisition," International Journal of Defence Acquisition Management, vol. 3 (2010): 2.

5 Inter-Agency Steering Committee, Guidance Note on Using the Cluster Approach to Strengthening Humanitarian Response (IASC Working Group, 24 November 2006), 3.

5

acknowledged the significant expertise and experience each of the diverse organisations

could bring to the grouping, and formalised the requirement to include the military. The

development of the logistics cluster is still in the embryonic stage.

The collaborative efforts undertaken by Humanitarian Relief Organisations

(HROs) to improve logistics, and to integrate the military into that process, should lead to

closer cooperation, improved efficiency and enhance the ability of the HROs to save lives

during disaster relief operations.

Methodology

The changing strategic environment progressively led the military to adopting a

broader approach to operations. As the military became more involved in humanitarian

assistance, interaction with the various HROs increased. Attempts at closer integration

with the humanitarian agencies resulted in varying degrees of success. Logistics,

however, was viewed as an area where collaboration could have substantial benefits.

The implementation of the 'Whole of Government' approach promoted the joint

employment of diplomatic, defence, development, and commercial resources. It

formalised the requirement for the military to integrate and operate with other agencies.6

The military was faced by a plethora of humanitarian actors, officially categorised as

6 Andrew Leslie, Lt Gen., Peter Gizewski, and Michael Rostek, "Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Canadian Forces Operations," Canadian Military Journal vol. 9, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 1.

6

Intergovernmental Organisations, Single State organisations and NGOs.7 The history of

humanitarian assistance lead to a greater understanding of how each institution evolved.

Within the various UN organisations the World Food Programme (WFP) emerged as

having the predominant logistic humanitarian role and was selected to lead the formation

of a global logistic forum. At this embryonic stage the WFP was only able to tentatively

draw on support from other UN HROs and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency

(MSB), a Single State organisation. The WFP endeavoured to reach out to the multitude

of NGOs, with only partial success. By necessity, attempts to increase logistic

collaboration with NGOs were limited to larger organisations such as the Red Cross,

M6decins Sans Frontieres and World Vision International.

The multitude of humanitarian actors employed diverse modus operandi, resulting

in particular traits and idiosyncrasies. However, the majority of HROs believed aid should

be distributed according to needs and priorities, following the notions of humanity,

neutrality and impartiality. In addition the UN had to follow international protocol and

observe the sacrosanct principles of national sovereignty. Conversely NGOs had far less

bureaucratic processes and were able to react to humanitarian disasters in a relatively

faster manner. The speed of response, however, often resulted in NGOs deploying ill-

prepared and dependent on ad hoc logistical arrangements for support. The military, on

the other hand, exhausted considerable time planning for operations and had extensive

logistic assets at its disposal, but it was relatively inexperienced at providing HA.

7 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, MC 411, NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Cooperation (Belgium: NATO Standardisation Agency, 18 January 2002), 3-1.

7

Cultural, institutional and philosophical differences created obstacles to

collaboration between the various HROs and military. Personal interpretations of the

three guiding humanitarian principles played a significant role in distancing the various

actors. Much of the friction was also generated by a fear of loss of autonomy and funding

rivalry, which dissuaded NGOs from pursuing closer integration of their logistical effort.

Conflicting agendas and ill-informed perceptions exasperated the situation. But, it was

believed that much of this friction could be alleviated by opening up lines of

communication between humanitarian logisticians, thereby leading to closer interaction.

A review of the international disaster relief system commenced in 2004 and

resulted in the introduction of 'global clusters', each responsible for separate areas of

humanitarian response. Based on previous experience, the WFP was confirmed as the

global logistics cluster lead. The cluster brought together the various HROs and

incorporated military logistic organisations into the process. The WFP strengthened by its

enhanced leadership role, demonstrated excellent coordination during subsequent relief

operations. Closer integration of the HROs began to improve interrelations and increased

the exchange of ideas and information. The cluster approach facilitated joint training,

enhanced mutual understanding and encouraged production of a common strategy. The

improved logistic affiliations resulted in far greater synchronisation of the provision of

logistics in the humanitarian environment. The ability to collect, analyse, disseminate and

act on key data information has been fundamental to improving successful effective

response. The military has been able to contribute considerably to this area of

development.

8

The development of a strategy for increasing collaboration between the various

HROs is still in its infancy, but has demonstrated considerable progress. The integration

of HROs and the military has rapidly improved with the introduction of the logistics

cluster. Much effort has been made to improve the humanitarian logistic response to

disasters, in order to make the process more efficient and effective. The logistics cluster

approach is not yet quintessential, but the concept has focused the various logistic

organisations on the primary task of improving humanitarian response and ultimately

saving lives through collectively drawing on strengths and good practice.

Terminology

Following the end of the Cold War, it was predominately Western military forces,

using NATO doctrine, that were engaged in providing humanitarian assistance during

disasters. The generic term 'the military' will be used to describe these forces. A disaster

constitutes any unanticipated and often abrupt incident that causes great damage,

destruction and human suffering.8 Disasters can be either natural or man-made. Complex

Humanitarian Emergencies (CHE) are disasters that, due to their nature, are beyond the

mandate or capacity of any single HRO. Requiring an international response, CHE also

necessitate the use of the military for purposes of civilian safety, security, or logistics

expertise.9 The use of the military may either be the last resort in a natural disaster or the

8 F. Vos, J. Rodriguez, R. Below, and D. Guha-Sapir D, Annual Disaster Statistical Review 2009: The Numbers and Trends (Brussels: Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, CRED; 2010), 5.

9

first within a conflict scenario, but it is assumed that disasters will generate human

activity likely to involve the military. NATO logistic and support concepts are grounded

in joint doctrine publications.10 This paper will detail the formation of the 'logistics

cluster' led by the WFP, facilitating the production of policy guidance, the sharing of

information, training, education and logistic partnerships. These will form the foundation

for increasing the collaborative efforts and improving logistics during disaster relief

operations.

THE MILITARY CONTEXT

Environment Change

Warfare and conflict are changing in nature. The notion of the well understood

20th century model of conventional warfare is fast disappearing and the focus on

conventional state-on-state military conflicts has migrated to a more nebulous collection

of uncertain threats.11 The end of the 'great confrontation', the Cold War, released

9 United States Institute of Peace, "Taking It to the Next Level: Civil Military Cooperation in Complex Emergencies," http://www.refugeeresearch.net/sw/node/6359; Internet; accessed 12 December 2010.

10 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, AJP-4(A), Allied Joint Logistics Doctrine (Belgium: NATO Standardisation Agency, December 2003).

11 David W. Barno, "Military Adaptation in Complex Operations," Prism, vol. 1, no. 1 (December 2009): 32.

http://www.refugeeresearch.net/sw/node/6359http:threats.11http:publications.10

10

antagonists who had been kept in place by the two superpowers and the consequence was

a series of conflicts that were of an intra-state rather than inter-state nature.12 The 'peace

dividend' resulted in dramatic cuts to conventional forces and the end of the 'industrial

army.'13 Rather than preparing to fight a large-scale conventional war, many of the

remaining military personnel were deployed in peacekeeping and peace enforcement

roles, often providing humanitarian assistance. Much of the military doctrine to undertake

these roles was outdated and needed to be revised urgently.

During the Cold War, Western military doctrine had emphasised the decisive use

of overwhelming force.14 Comprehensive operations were considered no more than how

to best deploy combined arms, in order to defeat the Soviets on the European battlefield.15

The proficiencies associated with stabilisation and reconstruction operations withered, as

the military became increasingly adept at high intensity Net Centric Warfare.16 Industrial

war had its clear-cut strategic goals, and the military doctrine reflected the belief that

political objectives could be attained through force. In contrast to these hard strategic

aims and correlated conventional operations, the emerging irregular warfare and

humanitarian assistance roles were far more complex and challenging in nature. The "war

12 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Penguin, 2005), 267.

13 Ibid.

14 Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M. Cronin, "Through the Complex Operations," Prism, vol. 1, no. 1 (December 2009): 10; and James Dobbins, "Organizing for Victory," Prism, vol. 1, no. 1 (December 2009): 51.

15 Barno, Military Adaptation in Complex Operations, 29; and Dobbins, Organizing for Victory, 53.

16 Binnendijk, Through the Complex Operations..., 10.

http:Warfare.16http:battlefield.15http:force.14http:nature.12

11

amongst the people," as coined by British 1991 Gulf war veteran General Sir Rupert

Smith, required the military to take a more holistic view of the 'battlefield', and consider

political, economic and humanitarian aspects of the operation.17 The predictability of the

Cold War, from the military doctrinal perspective, had been replaced by a confusing

global system in which the role of the military was no longer as well defined or

structured.

Believing that a revolution in military affairs was underway, academics and

policymakers began a process of revising military doctrine.18 In addition to War-fighting,

the secondary role of the military was considered by many to be that of keeping or

enforcing the peace, particularly during comprehensive operations. Using the military to

undertake post-conflict reconstruction or Humanitarian Assistance (HA) operations was

considered inappropriate. Limited funds and resources were therefore allocated to

conduct what became known as 'Phase IV' or post-conflict operations. Instead Western

governments and the military relied on the UN humanitarian organisations and NGOs to

undertake the task.19 The American invasion of Panama in 1989, Operation JUST

CAUSE, demonstrated that reliance on civilian organisations was not necessarily

infallible. The operation was well-planned, carefully rehearsed and initially achieved a

17 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force, 270.

18 Canadian Forces College, "Into the Future: Emerging Operational Concepts" (Joint Command and Staff Program 37 C/DS/543/WAS/LD-06, 2011), 1.

19 Richard G. Lugar, "Stabilization and Reconstruction: a Long Beginning," Prism, vol. 1, no. 1 (December 2009): 8.

http:doctrine.18http:operation.17

12

decisive military success.20 The US military planners failed, however, to take into

consideration the second and third order effects of their operation. In particular the

removal of the country's security forces resulted in widespread looting and the country

spiralled into chaos. The military had achieved its operational objectives, but the political,

social and humanitarian elements of the conflict had been overlooked. In the past military

theorists had called such matters, "the fog of war," but clearly the military needed to focus

more attention on these additional tasks.21 Military doctrine needed to incorporate post-

conflict operations and consideration for humanitarian assistance into the planning.

Following the 1991 Gulf War, the military became intimately involved in a post-

conflict humanitarian operation. The government of Saddam Hussein put down a

rebellion by the ethnic Kurds, resulting in over a million refugees fleeing to the remote

mountain areas of northern Iraq and south-east Turkey. The UN was ill-prepared to

orchestrate a response to the ensuing crisis. The coalition forces, led by the United States,

mounted Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. This was the first significant combined

military and humanitarian aid effort since the immense complex emergency that followed

the end of World War II.22 Military forces from 14 nations and HROs (made up of UN

agencies, NGOs and government donors) from an excess of 30 countries, collaborated

20 David R. Hogg, Lt. Col. "Rapid Decisive Operations: The Search for the Holy Grail of Joint Warfighting." In Transformation Concepts for National Security in the 21st Century, edited by Williamson Murray. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, (2002): 389; http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA401661; Internet; accessed 1 January 2011.

21 Vego, Milan N. "Systems versus Classical Approach to Warfare." Joint Force Quarterly 52, (1st Quarter 2009): 47.

22 T. W. Sharp, and others, "Military Assistance in Complex Emergencies: What Have We Learned since the Kurdish Relief Effort?" Pre-Hospital and Disaster Magazine, vol. 16, no. 4 (October-December 2001): 198; http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12090199; Internet; accessed 13 December 2010.

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12090199http://www.dtic.mil/cgihttp:tasks.21http:success.20

13

and cooperated to facilitate a successful relief effort. The military were not only essential

for security, but were instrumental in providing logistical infrastructure to deal effectively

with the emergency phase of the crisis. There seemed limited justification for distancing

the military from post-conflict political, social and humanitarian operations.23 The

operation was regarded as a model of how military logistics could be incorporated into

efforts to assist HROs with CHE.

The successful co-operation between the military and HROs during the Kurdish

crisis was, however, not replicated in Somalia. Following the collapse of the Siad Barr6

government in early 1991 the country plummeted into a state of violent chaos.24 As the

security situation deteriorated, effective humanitarian relief for the more than 1 million

people threatened with starvation became impossible. The UN established a military task

force to undertake Operation RESTORE HOPE. The military presence initially improved

the security environment and provided substantial logistic support to the HROs. As the

operation continued the high level of cooperation and coordination, between the military

and civilian organisations, that had been generated in Northern Iraq was missing. The

military did not easily assimilate into the well established humanitarian effort and was

unable to coerce the warring factions into non-interference, as it had in Iraq.

Communications between the two parties began to deteriorate and the relationship

23 Major S.A. Hawley, "Is Greater Coordination between the Humanitarian Operations of the Military and Non-Government Organisations a Measure That Is Achievable, Will It Produce Benefits and How Could It Be Better Achieved?" (Shrivenham: British Advanced Command and Staff Course, May 2000), 18.

24 Sharp, Military Assistance in Complex Emergencies...,199.

http:chaos.24http:operations.23

14

became acrimonious. Fewer joint logistic planning meetings meant the ensuing relief

efforts became disjointed. In 1993 the military mission changed to that of solely

providing security and enforcing the peace. Military logistic support to the humanitarian

operation was reduced and collaboration with the HROs withered. Consequently, lack of

clear military purpose and loss of political and public support for the multilateral relief

effort, particularly following the death of 18 servicemen, led to a disengagement policy

decision and the removal of US forces. Somalia subsequently spiralled into renewed

violence and the re-occurrence of the CHE which continues today.25 The ad hoc

arrangements for providing military logistical support to HROs in Somalia proved

ineffective and counter-productive. From an operational perspective the military needed

to implement post-conflict strategies that would promote the peace process and enable

humanitarian efforts to be more effective.

Conducting Comprehensive Operations

The military began to develop the concept of Security Sector Review (SSR) as a

process for reforming and rebuilding a state's security sector in order to enforce the peace

and improve humanitarian assistance. In 1995, the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR)

deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina and replaced the UN Protection Force

(UNPROFOR). The initial lack of security represented a decisive obstacle to the

25 Humanitarian News, "USAID-DCHA Somalia Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #1, Fiscal Year (FY) 2011," http://humanitariannews.org/20110125/usaid-dcha-somalia-complex-emergency-fact-sheet-1-fiscal-year-fy-2011; Internet; accessed 15 December 2000.

http://humanitariannews.org/20110125/usaid-dcha-somalia-complex-emergency-fact-sheet-1http:today.25

15

promotion of sustainable development, democracy and peace.26 The military were

therefore used to assist HROs with moving logistical supplies forward to those needing

HA. As security was restored through force, subsequent reconstruction and logistical

efforts brought the military and HROs closer together, often in an uneasy alliance. The

corollary of collaborative efforts with civilian agencies began to demonstrate tangible

military benefits.27 Restoration of the road network diminished the isolation of rural

areas.28 Troops were able to move around more freely and react in a timely fashion to

instances of insurrection. Better roads reduced infrastructure reconstruction costs and

encouraged both commerce and improvements in productivity. Consequently, sustainable

economic growth created jobs, reduced poverty and began to provide the tax revenues

needed to maintain competent institutions of governance, enforce the rule of law and

sustain public services.29 Jobs absorbed surplus labour that might otherwise have been

drawn into organised crime or militias. Focusing on security, governance and economic

development was seen to have substantial military advantages. Providing logistical

support directly or indirectly to HROs was viewed as a significant means of improving

the post conflict environment. It demonstrated the necessity for military planners to

address such issues and improve cooperation with HROs.

26 Natsios, Time Lag and Sequencing..., 70.

27 Dolan, "The Defence Forces and the NGOs"...,129.

28 Natsios, Time Lag and Sequencing..., 75.

29 Ibid., 71.

http:services.29http:areas.28http:benefits.27http:peace.26

16

The evolving theories and doctrine increasingly supported the view that a more

comprehensive military approach was required for contemporary operations in complex

environments.30 This new approach would entail both traditional and non-traditional

military activities being carried out collaboratively, within a broader systemic operational

design.31 In addition to the immediate military threat, a myriad of societal issues needed

to be confronted. War-fighting, peacekeeping and HA could all take place simultaneously

in the so-called 'Three Block War' environment, as described by US Marine General

Charles Krulak.32 As part of the collective effort the military would make logistical

support to the humanitarian operation available. Addressing these challenges was

identified as a crucial element to achieving peace and stability.33 In the US, three

presidential decision directives between 1994 and 2000 attempted to address the

multifaceted problems associated with comprehensive operations.34 Within the Pentagon,

processes were rewritten to facilitate better working relationships with the various non-

Department of Defence and non-state actors, who were increasingly involved in providing

services in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. The new international approach to

regional crisis began to evolve and became known as humanitarian intervention.

30 Kilcullen, David J. "Strategy and Terrorism: Countering Global Insecurity," The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 28, no.4 (August 2005): 609, 615.

31 Leslie, Lt Gen, Developing a Comprehensive Approach..., 11.

32 Charles Krulak, "The Three Block War: Fighting in Urban Areas," Vital Speeches of the Day, vol. 64, iss. 5 (15 December 1997): 140.

33 Leslie, Lt Gen, Developing a Comprehensive Approach..., 9.

34 Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, with Christina Briggs, and Anja Miller, "Managing the Pentagon's International Relations," Chap. 9 in Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future (Cambridge, Mass.: Preventive Defense Project, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, September 2000), 256.

http:operations.34http:stability.33http:Krulak.32http:design.31http:environments.30

17

Gradually, the notion that the military had a role to play in providing HA, in order

to save lives and alleviate suffering during complex operations, began to be tacitly

accepted by most HROs. This recognition was based on the proviso that the military was

used primarily when the severity of the security situation restricted civilian agencies from

participation. In such circumstances it was emphasised that the military should act

impartially and on the basis of need.35 The HROs acknowledged that in certain

circumstances they were unable to provide relief effort, and that the military were best

placed to provide assistance and logistical support. Using military resources to achieve

these goals, however, was not accepted by all. Some members of both the military and

HROs continued to question the legitimacy and capability of the military to undertake

such tasks. In 2000, during the US presidential campaign, Condoleezza Rice, George W

Bush's senior foreign policy adviser, spoke dismissively of stability operations, declaring

that "we don't need to have the 82nd Airborne escorting kids to kindergarten."36 The

inference was that the military should have a limited role in HA. Following the 2003 Gulf

War, the most senior British officer with the US land forces stated that General Tommy

Franks, the US coalition commander showed little interest in the post war period. "I am

quite sure Franks did not want to take ownership of Phase IV," Major-General Albert

Whitley dismissively wrote.37 This lack of enthusiasm for military involvement in post

35 Oxfam International, "Quick Impact, Quick Collapse: The Dangers of Militarised Aid in Afghanistan," http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/quick-impact-quick-collapse; Internet; accessed 12 December 2010.

36 Peter van Ham, "Combating Terrorism," NATO Review (Autumn 2005); http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue3/english/analysis.html; Internet; accessed 12 February 2011.

37 Ewen MacAskill, "US Post-War Iraq Strategy a Mess, Blair Was Told," The Guardian Newspaper (14 March 2006): http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2006/mar/14/uk.topstories31; Internet; accessed 1 February 2011.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2006/mar/14/uk.topstories31http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue3/english/analysis.htmlhttp://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/quick-impact-quick-collapsehttp:wrote.37

18

conflict ensuing humanitarian relief effort, resulted in the limited provision of logistical

assets and contributed to prolonging the military's presence in Iraq.

Whole of Government Approach

Despite some reservations regarding the use of the military to provide logistical

support to humanitarian aid, the general principle of the 'comprehensive approach to

operations' increasingly began to be adopted by the military.38 Derived from the 'Whole

of Government' terminology, the comprehensive approach envisaged the military working

in partnership with previously separate government and non-government agencies to

achieve policy objectives.39 This meant that military logisticians began to work closely

with their counterparts in HROs. By 2007, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the military

attempted to pursue elements of counterinsurgency doctrine that focused on public

security, local governance and economic growth.40 The military increasingly embarked on

logistical humanitarian tasks, often in conjunction with civilian government agencies and,

occasionally, multinational partners including NGOs.41 These new initiatives were

38 United States, Department of Defense, Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations: Joint Operating Concept (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, vol. 2, December, 2006).

39 Christopher M. Schnaubelt, "Complex Operations and Insurgency Operational Art," Prism, vol. 1, no. 1 (December 2009): 37.

40 William M. Frej and David Hatch, "A New Approach to the Delivery of US Assistance to Afghanistan," Prism, vol. 1, no. 1 (December 2009): 89; and Dobbins, Organizing for Victory..., 55, 61.

41 U.S., DoD, Military Support to Stabilization..., 2; and Hope, Winning the Firefight is Not Enough..., 12.

http:growth.40http:objectives.39http:military.38

19

relatively successful, however, civil-military cooperation was not an invention of the

21st-century; delegates who attended the Hague peace conferences in 1899 and 1907

attempted to impose international controls on the conduct of war and within this

framework considered two strands: peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance.42 The

collaborative logistical efforts in 2007, by HROs and the military, started to demonstrate

that both parties could work together to produce more efficient and effective relief effort.

Although civil-military cooperation was not a new concept, the Whole of

Government approach formalised the process and highlighted the need for the political,

economic and humanitarian actors to interact, cooperate and collaborate.43 Despite

differences in approach and opinion, increased interaction during comprehensive

operations began to draw attention to areas of common ground, where both the military

and HROs could benefit from collaboration. The field of logistics was of particular

interest and both parties began to explore when and how closer cooperation could be

achieved. The military had long recognised that vital to the success of all major

operations were the critical factors of logistic support and sustainment. Failure to

establish reliable logistical organisations or guarantee the protection of lines of

communication would, invariably, lead to major setbacks and often to defeat. Logistics

had played a crucial role in the success or failure of military campaigns since ancient

times. Alexander the Great, Hannibal Barca, and the Duke of Wellington were all

42 Michael P. Dolan, "The Defence Forces and the NGOs: A Cultural Collision or a Meeting of Minds?" The Quarterly Journal vol. 2, no. 3 (September 2003): 129.

43 Leslie, Lt Gen, Developing a Comprehensive Approach..., 13.

http:collaborate.43http:assistance.42

20

considered logistical geniuses.44 Over the millennia the military had developed and

refined the art of logistics and had learnt that a balance needed to be struck between the

requirements for adequate logistic support and purely operational desires.45 The subject of

logistics was an area of common interest between the military, UN and other HROs.

Military lessons learnt could be shared and developed with civilian counterparts and

collectively the parties could work towards improving the efficiency and effectiveness of

logistical support to disasters and other humanitarian operations.

From the end of the Cold War the military have increasingly undertaken various,

often markedly different, humanitarian assistance roles.46 The operations transpired from

diverse political and social dynamics and were not always successful from an HA

perspective. In northern Iraq after 1991, the military was able to provide everything

logistically from medical care, sanitation, food and other emergency supplies and

services. In subsequent missions, such as the Balkans, the military focused on indirect

logistical support to HROs, and in Afghanistan it engaged in collaborative nation-building

and longer-term development projects. In each situation the relationship between the

military and HROs was rarely formalised and often ad hoc. Collaborations were often

marred by misunderstanding and sometimes mistrust. Improvements in logistic support

and the benefits of economies of scale were limited and coordination was sometimes

44 Milan N. Vego, "Operational Logistics," Joint Operational Warfare, ed. Naval War College (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007): VIII-75.

45 Ibid., 79.

46 Thomas G. Weiss, What's Wrong with the United Nations and How to Fix It (Cambridge: Polity press, 2009), 214.

http:roles.46http:desires.45http:geniuses.44

21

ineffective. There were, however, sufficient successes to encourage both the military and

HROs to explore further, how collaborative efforts might be utilised to improve logistic

support during the disaster relief operations. The growing rate, at which the military

served alongside and, increasingly, in partnership with various HROs, highlighted the

requirement for formalising relations. When responding to natural or technological

disasters, or to complex humanitarian emergencies, it was essential that the military and

the various HROs had knowledge of each other's character and modus operandi.

Acknowledging and comprehending the differences between the multitudes of actors,

would make development of collaborative logistic effort far more achievable.

THE ACTORS

In humanitarian emergencies, the defining of the lines between man-made crisis

and natural disaster makes no significant difference to the victims or responders. The

"crisis and its effects, not the classification of its cause" is paramount.47 In the same vein,

the differences in philosophy and modus operandi between the various HROs and the

military are of little consequence to those in need of assistance. In order, however, for the

multitude of HROs logistic support functions to work together and to integrate the

military into the process, it is necessary to define the actors. Military doctrine recognises

47 Peter Walker and Daniel Maxwell, Shaping the Humanitarian World (London. Coutledge Global Institutions, 2009), 13.

http:paramount.47

22

that the axiom 'civilian organisations' comprises many different groupings.48 NATO

doctrine, ''Civil-Military Cooperation", distinguishes between the three principal types of

civilian humanitarian agencies that the military will encounter: Intergovernmental

Organisation (IGO), Single State Organisation and NGO. Each of the agencies operates in

different manners and consists of numerous subdivisions. IGOs, sometimes called

International Organisations, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

and WFP, derive their mandate directly from the 192 member states.49 Whereas the

Single State, national organisations like the United States Agency for International

Development (USAID), and the European Communities Humanitarian Aid Office are

directly controlled by their governments and funding is channelled through various

government mechanisms. Lastly the most diverse group, the plethora of NGOs, range

from large global organisations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross

(ICRC), to a few individuals striving to provide humanitarian assistance. Each of these

actors plays a distinctive role in their capacity as an HRO. Understanding how each

evolved through history, enables a better understanding of the differences between the

HROs, their beliefs and methodologies.

48 NATO, MC 411, NATO Military Policy ..., 5; and Kristin M. Hauhevik and Benjamin de Carvalho, "Civil-Military Cooperation in Multinational and Interagency Operations," NUPI Series on Security in Practice no.2 (2007): 8.

49 United Nations, "UN at a Glance," http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml; Internet; accessed 11 November 2010.

http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtmlhttp:states.49http:groupings.48

23

Historic Perspective

Documented evidence of humanitarian assistance is apparent throughout history

and can be traced back to at least the 23rd century B.C. in the form of the tomb

inscriptions of Harkhuf, the governor of Aswan, Upper Egypt. He led several official

journeys to Nubia. These trips were not just trade expeditions, but also military and

diplomatic missions, bringing medicines to distant lands.50 It was, however, the turn of

the 19th century that saw the galvanisation of humanitarian aid and its rapid globalisation.

Famine and war were the basis for the emergence of modern, internationally connected

humanitarian actors. Action was shaped by the constantly competing agendas of

compassion, political reform and the need for containment, in order to maintain security

and stability.51 It was the scene that greeted Swiss businessman, Jean Henri Dunant that

cemented the fundamental ideals and methodologies of humanitarianism. On 24 June,

1859, Dunant witnessed the aftermath of the battle between the French and Austrian

armies in northern Italy. He set about organising assistance for the 40,000 wounded and

dying soldiers on both sides. His actions were unprejudiced and he sought volunteers

from both sides to assist him in his endeavours. Many of Dunant's ideas would later

underpin the formation of the Red Cross and Crescent movement in 1863 and codification

of acceptable military behaviour in times of war, now collectively known as International

50 Andr6 Dollinger Reshafim, "Tomb Inscriptions of Harkhuf," http://www.reshafim.org.il/ad/egypt/texts/harkhuf.htm; Internet; accessed 10 December 2010.

51 Walker, Shaping the Humanitarian World..., 21.

http://www.reshafim.org.il/ad/egypt/texts/harkhuf.htmhttp:stability.51http:lands.50

24

Humanitarian Law (IHL).52 Historian John Hutchinson sees the rise of the Red Cross as

part of the professionalism of military medicine and development of the medical logistic

supply chain. 53 But much of Dunant's philosophy led the League of Nations to establish,

in 1927, the International Relief Union (IRL), which was specifically set up to respond to

assist victims of disasters.

UN HROs

After World War II, the creation of the UN provided a new home for international

humanitarian organisations. One of the first UN agencies to take up tenure was the UN

Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), which assisted in the repatriation of

millions of people across Europe and ran displaced persons camps in Germany. Its

multilateral and neutral stance succumbed to the realpolitik of the Cold War and it was

replaced by the more politically driven Marshall Plan. The UNRRA ethos eventually

migrated, in January 1951, to the formation of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees

(UNHCR). With the reduction of colonialism and the independence of Africa and Asian

states from the 1950s, the UNHCR's operations continued to expand. Before its demise,

the UNRRA also gave rise to the UN International Children's Emergency Fund

(UNICEF) and, in conjunction with the Marshall Plan, the Food and Agriculture

52 International Committee of the Red Cross, "About the International Committee of the Red Cross," http://www.icrc.org/eng/who-we-are/index.jsp; Internet; accessed 25 November 2010.

53 John F Hutchinson, Champions of Charity: War and the Rise of the Red Cross (Boulder, Westview Press: 1996), 14.

http://www.icrc.org/eng/who-we-are/index.jsp

25

Organisation (FAO). The FAO later subdivided to create the WFP. The WFP would

subsequently become a key provider of logistic support to humanitarian operations.

During the 1960s the IRL generally proved ineffective at managing natural

disasters. In response nation-states took up the mantle of providing humanitarian

assistance independently. When necessary they were supported by the work of the League

of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Frustration with poor information fidelity

and inadequate coordination of the provisioning of logistic supplies resulted in the UN

setting up the Office of the Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO) in 1972. It was,

though, the graphic television pictures of the 1980s and in particular the famine in

Ethiopia in 1985 that focused the world's attention on the plight and suffering of the

people surviving in disaster areas. The UNDRO was logistically overwhelmed and unable

to coordinate a robust response to the crisis. The UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-

Ghali instigated a number of reforms that in 1992 resulted in the UNDRO ceasing to

function as an organisation. The UNDRO was in due course replaced by the Office for

the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).54 This organisation was established

as the UN Secretariat and was responsible for bringing together the various humanitarian

actors within the UN, including those responsible for logistic support.

Numerous UN organisations were involved in the provision of various forms of

humanitarian assistance during relief operations, but only a handful provided intrinsic

54 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "About OCHA," http://ochaonline.un.org/; Internet; accessed 10 December 2010.

http:http://ochaonline.un.orghttp:OCHA).54

26

logistic support. OCHA was tasked with identifying leaders for all functional areas of

HA.55 In doing so it identified the WFP as having the predominant logistic role, with

other organisations having a vested interest. The WFP was the UN's frontline agency in

the fight against global hunger. Its purpose was to prepare for and respond to

emergencies, as well as plan to reduce chronic hunger and under-nutrition globally.56 As

the lead UN logistic agency it was responsible for managing the UN Humanitarian

Response Depot (UNHRD) network from five strategically placed hubs, located in

Ghana, United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, Panama and Italy. From these locations the WFP

was able to provide other HROs with quick and efficient logistic support.57 The WFP was

the intuitive lead for heading a global logistic grouping, but other organisations would

also play a pivotal role. The primary function of the UN International Children's

Emergency Fund (UNICEF) was to meet children's basic needs, to protect their rights and

to help children reach their full potential in the given circumstances.58 UNICEF was also

able to offer its logistic response facilities to partner agencies, including access to

emergency stockpiles in a Copenhagen warehouse.

55 John Kizler, Ren6 Reese, and Deborah Jacobs, "Humanitarian Supply Network: Multi-Agency Guide for Logistics Cooperation" (Prototype prepared in support of Adaptive Logistics Network/Multinational Experiment 6 Objective 4.5 Version 0.8, November 2010), 13; and http://ochaonline.un.org/.

56 World Food Programme, "Fighting Hunger Worldwide," http://www.wfp.org/; Internet; accessed 10 December 2010.

57 International Committee of the Red Cross, "History of the ICRC," http://www.unhrd.org/http://www.wfp.org/; Internet; accessed 25 November 2010.

58 United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, "About UNICEF," http://www.unicef.org/; Internet; accessed 10 December 2010.

http:http://www.unicef.orghttp://www.unhrd.org/http://www.wfp.orghttp:http://www.wfp.orghttp:http://ochaonline.un.orghttp:circumstances.58http:support.57http:globally.56

27

With its considerable assets and logistic supply facilities, UNICEF also became a

key partner of the WFP. In addition the WFP received direction and assistance from

OCHA and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), whose responsibility is

to direct and coordinate international action to safeguard refugees and protect their rights

worldwide.59 Collectively the UN began to seek methods for improving logistics during

humanitarian relief operations, but in those formative years the WFP could only

tentatively reach out to other HROs, including Single State organisations and NGOs. To

promote integration of the military, the UN established the Civil-Military Coordination

Section (CMCS). This was responsible for providing guidance to the international

humanitarian community on civil-military coordination. Although this did not align the

logistic elements of the military into the WFP grouping, the CMCS endeavoured to detail

the appropriate and needs-based use of Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA), in

order to facilitate, assist and support humanitarian aid and disaster response operations.60

Coordination of the logistic grouping was in an embryonic stage. These were the initial

efforts of the WFP to formalise the logistic support relationships within the UN and with

the military, but there was still limited coordination with Single State Organisations and

NGOs.

59 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "The UN Refugee Agency," http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home; Internet; accessed 12 December 2010.

60 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Civil-Military Coordination Section," http://ochaonline.un.org/AboutOCHA/Organigramme/EmergencyServicesBranchESB/CivilMilitaryCoordin ationSectionCMCS/tabid/1274/Default.aspx; Internet; accessed 10 December 2010.

http://ochaonline.un.org/AboutOCHA/Organigramme/EmergencyServicesBranchESB/CivilMilitaryCoordinhttp://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/homehttp:operations.60http:worldwide.59

28

Single State Organisations

In addition to UN humanitarian organisations, individual governments can be

major actors in their own right. Nations can directly provide humanitarian assistance or

have a significant impact on relief efforts through implementation of their international

commerce and trade arrangements. These Single State humanitarian agencies deliver aid

through various means, including straight to the governments of developing countries,

through international bodies and directly to charities and projects. Some governments and

international bodies candidly use aid as a foreign policy tool. The Washington-based

USAID and the London-based Department for International Development (DfID) both

have their own humanitarian assistance programs.61 Foreign aid and humanitarian

support is used to advance the political and economic interests of the State. These

national organisations are employed to project foreign policy in conflict zones, as well as

through development assistance programs across the world. Many are intimately involved

in supply and logistic activities but few are effectively engaged with the WFP logistic

grouping. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is the government's

lead agency for development assistance. Augmented by the Stabilisation and

Reconstruction Task Force (SRART), CIDA is designed to provide support to

comprehensive operations and to coordinate the whole of government approach.

However, CIDA concentrates on a group of 20 'countries of focus'.62 It does not offer to

61 Department for International Development, "DFID, "http://www.dfid.gov.uk/; Internet; accessed 10 December 2010.

http://www.dfid.gov.ukhttp:focus'.62http:programs.61

29

provide logistic support representation at the WFP logistic forums. Likewise the

European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) does not

contribute to the UN logistic support debates. This is despite ECHO's mandate being to

ensure the rapid distribution of goods and services directly to the victims of disaster or

armed conflict outside the European Union.63 ECHO does not intervene directly on the

ground. The HA provided is mainly mobilised and implemented by its partners. The sole

significant Single State organisation that was willing to become involved, with the WFP

collaborative development of supply and logistics, was the Swedish Civil Contingencies

Agency (MSB). The task of the Swedish MSB is to develop societal capacity to prevent

and prepare for emergencies and disasters. It does not deploy, but supports the

stakeholders involved and collaborates, in order to learn from crises.64 The MSB focuses

on the logistic response to relief efforts and was able to provide detailed analysis to the

embryonic WFP global logistic grouping.

NGOs

The third of the principal HROs actors, engaged in the provision of varying

degrees of supply and logistics support, are the NGOs. Professional associations,

62 Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada," Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force," http://international.gc.ca/start-gtsr/index.aspx?lang=eng; Internet; accessed 28 December 2010, and Kizler, Humanitarian Supply Network..., 14.

63 European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, "About ECHO," http://ec.europa.eu/echo/index en.htm; Internet; accessed 28 December 2010.

64 Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, "About MSB," http://www.msb.se/en/; Internet; accessed 28 December 2010.

http://www.msb.se/enhttp://ec.europa.eu/echo/indexhttp://international.gc.ca/start-gtsr/index.aspx?lang=enghttp:crises.64http:Union.63

30

foundations, multinational businesses or simply groups with a common interest in

humanitarian assistance activities, NGOs come in all shapes and sizes.65 Organisations

such as Save the Children Fund (formed in 1919) and Oxfam (1942) have steadily grown

in numbers since the 1950s. In 1971, a group of French doctors rebelled at the insistence

of the international community of the Red Cross (ICRC) on absolute public discretion and

left the organisation, founding M6decins Sans Frontieres (Doctors without Borders).

Attempts to quantify and analyse the diversity of agencies are fraught with difficulties.66

In recent years a startling phenomenon has been the rapid growth in the number, size,

resources, and influence of NGOs. It is estimated that there are now an excess of 40,000

international NGOs and considerably more at the national level.67 Currently, there are

3,051 recognised NGOs with consultative status within the UN Economic and Social

Council (ECOSOC).68 From the smallest to the largest NGO, sustainment and provision

of supplies to disaster locations has proven to be a crucial activity. Movement of men and

materiel to disasters requires considerable planning, if the relief effort is to prove

effective and long-term. With such an array of NGOs, cooperation was a challenging

undertaking and initial collaborative efforts were restricted, by necessity, to larger

organisations, most likely to be deployed to disaster relief operations. The first of such

NGOs was the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the oldest and largest

international HRO outside of the UN system. Founded on the Geneva Conventions of

65 Kizler, Humanitarian Supply Network..., 30.

66 Dolan, "The Defence Forces and the NGOs"..., 126.

67 Ibid., 129.

68 NGO Branch, United Nations Economic and Social Council, "NGO Related Frequently Asked

Questions," http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/faq.htm; Internet; accessed 30 January 2011.

http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/faq.htmhttp:ECOSOC).68http:level.67http:difficulties.66http:sizes.65

31

1949 and Jean Dunant's inaugural principles, it is a neutral and self-governing

organisation, whose proclaimed humanitarian mission is to guard the lives and dignity of

victims of armed conflict.69 As with all NGOs it receives private and public contributions,

but the organisation is often considered in a category by itself. The ICRC claims specific

recognition in international humanitarian law, for which it is designated the custodian.70

Despite having considerable logistic infrastructure, the ICRC has historically been

reluctant to align itself with other organisations, including the WFP. Similarly, M6decins

Sans Frontieres (MSF) has promoted its independence as an international medical relief

organisation. MSF offers assistance to populations in distress, to victims of natural or

man-made disasters and to victims of armed conflict, without discrimination and

irrespective of race, religion, creed or political affiliation.71 Fiercely independent, the

MSF international headquarter in Geneva is disinclined to engage in collaborative efforts;

this is also the case for the MSF country / regional representatives, which act as

autonomous legal entities.

Several other large NGOs, with considerable interest in logistic operations, proved

more inclined to consider collaborative efforts to improve logistics during humanitarian

relief operations. The Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) is one

of the world's largest private international humanitarian organisations. It is dedicated to

69 ICRC, About the International Committee of the Red Cross.

70 Thomas G. Weiss, What's Wrong with the United Nations and How to Fix It (Cambridge: Polity press, 2009), 5.

71M6decins Sans Frontieres, "About MSF," http://www.msf.ca/about-msf/; Internet; accessed 2 January 2011.

http://www.msf.ca/about-msfhttp:affiliation.71http:custodian.70http:conflict.69

32

helping families in poor communities improve their lives and overcome poverty. Women

are at the heart of CARE's community-based efforts.72 CARE has demonstrated its

commitment to enhancing supply processes and logistic support by its involvement in the

WFP led global logistic forum. Other significant supporters of logistic reform are World

Vision International (WVI) and Action Contre La Faim (Action against Hunger) (ACF).

World Vision is a Christian relief, development and support organisation devoted to

working with children, families and communities to overcome poverty and

discrimination. World Vision undertakes community development, disaster relief and

advocacy.73 ACF is committed to ending world hunger and is a relatively new

organisation, considered among the 'second-generation' of HROs. It focuses on the

politics of humanitarian relief and seeks to influence international political actors and

outcomes, not just mitigate atrocities on the ground. ACF is particularly influential in the

fight against malnutrition.74 These substantial NGOs have considerable logistic

experience and expertise. They routinely move millions of tons of food and non-

perishable items around the world. Collaboration between these organisations' logistical

infrastructure and faculties could produce considerable economies of scale. However,

many of these NGOs have dissimilar modus operandi and manage their logistic supply

differently.

72 Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, "Defending Dignity, Fighting Poverty," http://www.care.org/about/index.asp; Internet; accessed 10 December 2010.

73 World Vision International, "Who We Are," http://www.wvi.org/wvi/wviweb.nsf; Internet; accessed 2 January 2011.

74 Action Contre La Faim, "Action against Hunger," http://www.actioncontrelafaim.org/english/; Internet; accessed 2 January 2011.

http://www.actioncontrelafaim.org/englishhttp://www.wvi.org/wvi/wviweb.nsfhttp://www.care.org/about/index.asphttp:malnutrition.74http:advocacy.73http:efforts.72

33

The Concept of Operations

The plethora of civilian humanitarian agencies that the military is likely to

encounter is equally matched by the multitude of differing concepts of operation

employed by those actors. The history of HROs promotes an understanding of why things

are the way they are, but it is also imperative to identify the actors' disparate mandates,

specialisation, ethos and modus operandi. Blanket terms cannot realistically capture the

tremendous depth and variety of actors, but it is permissible to generalise that

fundamental to all civilian humanitarian organisations are the three basic principles of

humanity, neutrality and impartiality.75 HROs insist that help should be offered to

everyone in need, wherever found. In times of suffering, those who are most vulnerable

will receive particular attention, such as children, women and the elderly. The dignity and

rights of all victims are to be respected and protected. Humanity is closely linked to

neutrality, which often puts HROs at odds with UN and governmental organisations.

Humanitarian assistance, HROs believe, must be offered without influencing the outcome

of conflicts or disputes. Aid should not entail involvement in hostilities or engagement in

contentious religious, political or ideological discord. This often makes HROs reluctant to

work alongside military organisations. This is amplified by the requirement for

impartiality, in which humanitarian assistance must not favour one group of beneficiaries

over another. Relief efforts should not discriminate due to ethnic origin, gender,

nationality, political opinions, race or religion. Aid should be distributed according to

75 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civilian Defence Assets in Disaster Relief: "Oslo Guidelines", (Geneva: Switzerland, November 2006), 7.

http:impartiality.75

34

needs and priorities. The notion of humanity, neutrality and impartiality characterises the

general ethos of all HROs.

UN - Modus Operandi

In addition to the three guiding principles adopted by HROs, the UN has

supplementary regulations that must be observed. The issue of national sovereignty is

crucial to the UN's concept of operations. The UN will only work in a country by

invitation or if a specific UN Security Council resolution authorises entry to that country.

The national sovereignty caveat applies even when the UN wishes to assist with a

humanitarian relief operation. To provide humanitarian assistance, the UN must first seek

the consent of the affected country or request a Security Council resolution to permit the

violation of territorial integrity.76 Seeking authorisation to enter a country can cause

considerable delays to any relief effort. This can result in a disparity in response times

from other HROs, making collaborative logistic efforts challenging. Working within its

charter, the UN habitually selects to focus most of its assistance through the civil

administration of host governments in each country, thus further complicating logistic

coordination with other HROs.

When a conflict occurs, the UN will often attempt to negotiate on behalf of all

HROs, including NGOs. It will work to gain access and exemption from customs for all

76 Ibid.

http:integrity.76

35

personnel and logistic relief supplies. By emphasising the three core principles of

humanitarian aid, the UN will seek from the receiving government the guarantee of

protection from violence for aid workers. This coordinating role at the national level is an

essential UN task at which many NGOs have little experience or success.77 The UN is,

however, constrained from liaising with rebels or illegitimate antagonists, for fear they

may legitimise them or their behaviour. This restricts the ability of the UN to negotiate

directly or indirectly with all interested parties. This results in the UN being unable to

engage in collaborative efforts with HROs who do not follow these guidelines.

Collectively UN organisations strive to uphold international conventions that

prevent political and military actors from encroaching on the humanitarian space and

impeding relief efforts. Sticking to humanitarian principles is often extremely difficult,

particularly in an armed conflict. Recent comprehensive operations in Afghanistan and

Iraq have resulted in a blurring of the lines between the military and HROs. Aid was

perceived to have been used to secure victory over insurgents.78 In such circumstances,

UN humanitarian aid agencies have sought to disentangle themselves from the military in

order to not be confused with the combatant military force. All UN military or civil

defence assets that could be perceived as belligerents, or from forces actively engaged in

combat in the affected area, will not be used to support UN humanitarian activities.79 This

77 Major A. J. Duncan, "Is the Use of Military in Complex Humanitarian Aid Operations a Political Quick Fix, or Can It Be the Cornerstone That Leads to Long-Term Solutions?" (Shrivenham: British Advanced Command and Staff Course, May 1998), 7.

78 Wassenhove, Humanitarian Aid Logistics..., 478.

79 UN, Oslo Guidelines..., 7.

http:activities.79http:insurgents.78http:success.77

36

self-imposed constraint of working with the military results in the UN being reluctant to

undertake collaborative efforts with military forces and complicates considerably the

ability to integrate the military into logistic planning.

NGO - Modus Operandi

It is hard to generalise about the modus operandi of NGOs, as they constitute such

a heterogeneous group. NGOs often describe themselves as sharing a common culture,

despite the various ranges of sizes, ethos, organisational structures and funding bases.80

With more than 40,000 NGOs working internationally and growing, it is almost

impossible to draw general applicable conclusions. However, the hallmark of NGOs is

that, by and large, their activities are predominantly at grass roots level. NGOs are often

on the ground and committed to local environments for long periods of time. It can be

said that they better understand the community and are therefore able to identify and

respond quickly to a developing crisis. By implication they are able to implement aid in a

manner to mitigate or reduce the possible negative impacts of developmental aid.

Generally, NGOs are less bureaucratic than their UN counterparts, action orientated and

consequently able to offer rapid and flexible responses to regional situations.81 This does

not necessarily translate to a more effective or coordinated management system.

80 Dolan, "The Defence Forces and the NGOs"..., 134.

81 Chigas, Diana. "Capacities and Limits of NGOs as Conflict Managers." Chapter 31 from Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, edited by edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela R. Aall, 553. Washington, DC: United States Institute of peace press, 2008.

http:situations.81http:bases.80

37

With limited bureaucratic processes, NGOs' internal structures tend to be

egalitarian, with women usually well represented. In smaller organisations the flat

management structures require relatively small amounts to be spent on administration.

However, as organisations grow in size and the requirement for comprehensive

accounting measures increases, the necessity to follow strict business lines drives up

costs. Increased size and accounting procedures often results in a corporate hierarchy

developing at the headquarters level. Generally, as independent non-state actors, NGOs

are able to circumnavigate many of the restrictions placed upon their UN counterparts.

Most NGOs need only apply for travel visas and fulfil any local restrictions, in order to

undertake humanitarian relief operations. With the notable exception of the ICRC, the

majority of NGOs are able to enter particular countries without recourse to international

charters, sovereignty integrity concerns or restrictions as to whom they may conduct

discussions with.82 The ICRC conversely has clear and carefully detailed doctrine and its

disciplined staff abides by them. The ICRC will only operate in international war zones

and civil wars such as Somalia and Rwanda, and then only with the consent of warring

factions.83 Within the multitude of NGOs there are differing management structures and

divergent restrictions on how and where the organisations can deploy. Internal rules and

regulations diminish the ability of the NGOs to pool resources effectively.

82 Dolan, "The Defence Forces and the NGOs"..., 138.

83 Thomas G. Weiss, Military Civilian Interactions: Humanitarian Crisis and the Responsibility to Protect (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., edition 2, October 2004), 5-6.

http:factions.83

38

Although the bureaucratic processes within NGOs are diverse, individuals

working for these organisations tend to be relatively homogeneous, in that they are goal

orientated, highly motivated, single-minded and morally guided. NGO members are

generally young, liberal and often characterised as non-combatant.84 These personal

characteristics, combined with overarching purpose and approach, frequently result in an

institutional distrust of authoritarian organisations such as the UN and, particularly, the

military, which represent the anti-thesis. The members’ personal traits also tend to

encourage the organisations to respond as rapidly as possible to humanitarian events.85

Concerted efforts to reach disaster areas swiftly can often be at the expense of ensuring

that a robust logistic plan is in place before deployment. The focus upon the immediate

response, and dealing with unexpected events, results in many members of NGOs with

smaller capacity, having to pull out of one disaster and then head off to the next.

Personnel working for NGOs frequently find themselves in difficult circumstances, with

limited resources. Staff are therefore often under considerable pressure, resulting in high

stress levels and rapid employee turnover.86 According to the US Institute of Peace,

individuals typically only work 6 to 12 months for NGOs.87 This turnover reduces the

opportunity to invest in learning and the time needed to identify lessons learnt. Supply

and logistics are frequently under-resourced, and the fire-fighting culture invariably

84 Cheryl Benard, "Strengthening the Partnership," Rand Corporation (February 2005); http://www.rand.org/commentary/2005/02/22/ITM.html; Internet; accessed 12 December 2010, 2.

85 Ibid.

86 Julia Streets, and others, Cluster Approach Evaluation Two: Synthesis Report (Inter-Agency Standing Committee, April 2010), 32.

87 United States Institute of Peace, "Taking It to the Next Level: Civil Military Cooperation in Complex Emergencies," http://www.refugeeresearch.net/sw/node/6359; Internet; accessed 12 December 2010, appendix 1.

http://www.refugeeresearch.net/sw/node/6359http://www.rand.org/commentary/2005/02/22/ITM.htmlhttp:turnover.86http:events.85http:non-combatant.84

39

results in limited planning, preparation and poorly coordinated effect.88 Development of

logistics has traditionally languished within NGOs, resulting in poor coordination during

relief efforts.

After the Great Lakes experience in Rwanda in 1994, many NGOs acknowledged

their lack of strategic planning and uncoordinated approach.89 Lack of logistic

preparation and synchronization meant that most NGOs were obliged to rely on the

French, US and other military contingents to provide essential services. These included

security, logistics, information sharing and even direct delivery of aid assistance.

Subsequently the largest 200 humanitarian NGOs decided to begin the process of

increasing their planning capacity and implementing minimum acceptable standards of

medical care, food provision, sanitation, shelter and water supply for refugee support

tasks.90 These NGOs began to implement more robust logistical support arrangements and

strove to be able to provide a guaranteed level of relief effort. Presently however, from

the multitude of NGOs, only a limited few are able to operate during comprehensive

operations and logistically sustain themselves for extended periods. In order to overcome

this challenge and have a significant impact on the ground, many NGOs resort to reliance

on other organisations and collaborative endeavours. These partnerships in the field allow

NGOs to use their combined resources and capabilities to execute programs equivalent in

size to much larger organisations, like World Vision International or CARE. Unplanned

or spontaneous cooperation often complicates further the humanitarian logistics process.

88 Wassenhove, Humanitarian Aid Logistics..., 482.

89 Dolan, "The Defence Forces and the NGOs"..., 147.

90 Ibid., 140.

http:tasks.90http:approach.89http:effect.88

40

This activity reduces the effectiveness of the supply chain, which by necessity needs to be

fast and agile when responding to sudden onset disasters. Managing the transition

between steady state and surge situations, even when predetermined, remains a challenge

for the humanitarian logisticians preparing and executing their organisations response.

Without the rapid establishment of supply and distribution channels for aid resources,

disasters will certainly be more protracted and damaging for the affected population.91

Impromptu collaborative logistical systems are of limited benefit, if they do not provide

protracted and efficient support. Predetermined and established logistical processes would

introduce a far more effective and robust system that could provide preventative aid to

stave off much worse disasters later. Having demonstrated that many NGOs are willing to

work in partnership and establish joint ventures, in order to launch themselves into

complex humanitarian relief environments, the challenge for the WFP is to encourage

those NGOs to work alongside UN and military logistical organisations.

Military - Modus Operandi

In spite of provisions in several articles of the UN charter, the UN does not have a

standing army. The soldiers who serve on UN operations remain part of the armed forces

of their own country, with a critical relationship between authority, legitimacy and

accountability that provides the functional backbone for their deployment.92 Importantly

91 Graham Heaslip, "Supply Chain Management," http://business.nuim.ie/people/graham-heaslip; Internet; accessed 30 December 2010.

http://business.nuim.ie/people/graham-heasliphttp:deployment.92http:population.91

41

logistics remains a national responsibility for most military operations. As an

organisation, the military is somewhat heterogeneous and forces retain their national

characteristics. All militaries tend to exhibit highly centralised hierarchical management

systems that are inherently conservative in nature. Military structures require the

subordination of an individual into the group or community. This trait is somewhat out of

step with contemporary social norms.93 In most militaries the leadership is still

predominantly male with a correlating age and rank that can make a 50-year-old officer

the counterpart of an NGO country director half his age.94 Studies have shown that

military management has evolved to become 'conventional' in nature, centred on the

principles of planning, organising, coordinating and controlling. Military management

idiosyncrasies, however, remain. Implicit to military learning is the ability to command

and control. Military literature from the turn of the 20th century assumed that the

headquarters would invariably assume responsibility for providing effective humanitarian

coordination.95 Now considered as an unrealistic aspiration, the perception remains that

the military would prefer to lead, and therefore control, whenever possible. Other military

peculiarities include the propensity by individuals to adopt a seemingly contradictory

communicative style when dealing with outside agencies (i.e. collaborative and assertive

talking). 96 The military gives the impression of being cooperative, but is authoritative in

92 Dolan, "The Defence Forces and the NGOs"..., 136.

93 Hawley, "Is Greater Coordination between the Humanitarian Operations"..., 18.

94 Benard, Strengthening the Partnership.

95 Hawley, "Is Greater Coordination between the Humanitarian Operations"..., 36.

96 Delphine Resteigne and Joseph Soeters, "Managing Militarily," Armed Forces and Society vol.

35, no. 2 (2 January 2009): 327.

http:coordination.95http:norms.93

42

its demeanour. This trait can appear antagonistic to civilian counterparts, who find such a

stance abhorrent.

In general, the military possesses capabilities that are highly valuable in times of

humanitarian crisis; the most obvious being its physical resources in terms of equipment,

stores and skilled manpower. The military has the ability to move enormous volumes of

personnel, equipment and commodities over long distances, at short notice by means of

its air, sea and ground-based assets. Once in location the military can sustain itself for

extended periods of time, even in the most adverse of environments. In Rwanda in 1994,

23 Parachute Field Ambulance, Royal Army Medical Corps from the UK, deployed to the

south-west of the country during the bleakest period of the country's genocide. It

demonstrated the ability of the military to move into the most arduous of locations and

remain fully self sustained. This military self-contained surgical facility contained more

doctors, nurses and psychiatrists than all the combined deployed NGOs.97 On most

operations, military logistics remains a national responsibility and this deployment

indicated the scale of logistical infrastructure that a military was able to provide at the

grass roots level. The unit was highly agile and able to react to the changing situation.

Crucial to the military capability in all such deployments is the 'chain of command,'

namely the line of authority and responsibility along which orders are passed. This

command and control tactic guarantees the provision of highly disciplined personnel

working to a common aim.98 The combination of agility (creativity, improvisation and

97 Hawley, "Is Greater Coordination between the Humanitarian Operations"..., 36.

43

adaptability) and discipline (structure, doctrine and process) provides the foundation for a

successful response to a crisis.99 Humanitarian disasters require the responders to be fast

and agile, and the military has shown that it is able to mobilise large logistic endeavours

and deploy them to extreme environments for sustained periods of time. The experience

the military has in this field could provide valuable lessons learnt to HROs.

Implementation of military logistic processes and selective use of their logistic assets

could greatly enhance a disaster relief operation.

The military may pride itself on its experience overseas and its ability to deploy to

remote locations, but it invariably lacks the local knowledge of NGOs who may have

been in an area for some time carrying out development projects. In the 1994 Rwandan

refugee crisis, military engineers had to be prevented from piping water from a river three

miles away to a holding tank, where it would be treated and used to supply the Kibeho

refugee camp. Such an undertaking would have resulted in a dependency that could not

be maintained after the military's departure.100 This demonstrated the lack of experience

within the military, when dealing with humanitarian disasters. The military was also

unable to commit to long-term logistic support projects it undertook. A significant trait of

the military is the requirement to undertake and bring missions to a successful and speedy

conclusion. Maintaining a military f