jaspers philosophical faith

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Volume 2, Nos 1-2, Fall 2007 ISSN 1932-1066

Karl Jaspers and the Concept of Philosophical FaithArmin E. WildermuthUniversity of St. [email protected]

Abstract: The essay reflects on the ontological basis of Karl Jaspers' concept of philosophical faith. As a

comparison with Heidegger's existential ontology makes clear, Jaspers stresses much more the act ofphilosophizing than philosophy itself. In one sense, Jaspers' philosophy has a deontological and open aspect,in another sense this openness is threatened by his theory of the encompassing and his dogmaticunderstanding of Kant's theoretical instruments. Furthermore, Jaspers existential philosophy, and especiallyhis concept of philosophical faith, can be elucidated by a confrontation with the existential philosophy of hiscolleague at the University of Basel, Heinrich Barth, the brother of the theologian Karl Barth. This philosophywas developed out of the basic ideas of the "Marburg School," namely from Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp.There was a chance for fruitful cooperation between Jaspers and Heinrich Barth, two philosophers with aKantian background and in opposition to the dominating ontologism of Heidegger after the Second WorldWar, but it was a missed opportunity. Jaspers' existential philosophizing pushed him into an almost propheticposture, but his concept of philosophical faith, publicly known since his "atom book" of 1959, still commands

global attention.

Philosophy and Philosophical Faith

The concept of philosophical faith can be understoodadequately only if philosophy itself is clearlyunderstood. Jaspers' chief concern is to depict thesingularity and originality of philosophy; or, as hephrases it, to "elucidate" (erhellen) philosophy. For

Jaspers, this elucidation or clarification occurs notthrough an agency outside philosophy; instead,philosophy elucidates itself and philosophicalelucidation itself constitutes its innermost act.

Phrased in such terms, the weight of this definitioncannot be measured. What philosophy is meant to bebecomes clearer in its confrontation with the traditionof dogmatic revelation in the Christian churches and itsinstitutions and colonies in Europe and America down

through the ages. Missionary persuasion was not thesingle, foremost practice, however. As is well knownbrutal violence and the striving for political rule wereexercised all too often. In the face of the violence thatthe various theologies of revelation were and remaincapable of committing, however, it is nothing less thana miracle that philosophy still exists. It is doubtful

whether it will survive. Jaspers did not conceive philosophy as a purely

academic discipline fitting neatly into the range ofexisting university subjects, and especially the so-called"humanities," without any qualitative difference. Thisbecame common when "Neo-Kantianism" was thedominant philosophical orthodoxy at many Germanuniversities. Jaspers already made an impact on publiclife in 1931 when he published a small political work


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Existenz: An International Journal in Philosophy, Religion, Politics, and the Arts

http://www.bu.edu/paideia/existenz Volume 2, Nos 1-2, Fall 2007

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entitled Die geistige Situation der Zeit (The SpiritualCondition of the Age).1 He later rose to considerableprominence in the immediate post-World War IIperiod, most particularly with Die Schuldfrage (TheQuestion of German Guilt), published in 1946, in whichhe discussed the question of collective guilt. Outlawed

by the Nationalist Socialist regime, and survivingsevere harassment and danger of death, Jaspers becamea figure of outstanding ethical integrity in post-warGermany. Even after his self-exile to Switzerland andthe University of Basel in 1948, which baffled many ofhis admirers and followers, Jaspers sought to makeexistential philosophizing part of the public debatethrough radio broadcasts, introductory primers, andpolitical statements on the Federal Republic ofGermany and the atom bomb. In the 1960s, this publicrole was adopted by the representatives of neo-Marxist"Critical Theory" and "Discourse Theory", most

particularly by Jrgen Habermas, who continued toargue its merits in the public sphere. WhereasDiscourse Theory emphasized the power ofimpersonal, rational, and linguistically articulatedarguments, Jaspers' communicative interventions wereall underpinned by the "honesty" and "seriousness" ofhis personal existence. He thus became the politicalconscience of the Federal Republic of Germany wellinto the 1960s.

Let me return to the initial question: "What isphilosophy?" This question includes two issues towhich Jaspers attached even greater importance: firstly,"What is philosophizing?"; and secondly, "How doesone philosophize?" The latter two questions are highlyrelevant since Jaspers virtually replaces the "what"question with the "how" question. This shift raises afurther question: what is Jaspers' notion of traditionallyvalid philosophy? He set out his viewscomprehensively in the three volumes comprising awork daringly entitled Philosophy (1931). 2 But the titlesuggests that Jaspers does not attempt to describephilosophy per se, but rather the ways in which it istreated, which elude philosophy as such. He is

concerned with that particular activity which producesformulated philosophies in the first place:

1 Karl Jaspers, Die geistige Situation der Zeit (Berlin: Walter deGruyter, 1960) The book was written three years before thetakeover of the National Socialist regime in Germany.

2 Karl Jaspers, Philosophie (Berlin, Gttingen and Heidelberg:Springer, 1948). Hereafter this edition will be abbreviated asP.

philosophising. For Jaspers, the intention tophilosophise is founded in human existence itselfHence he argues that every human being can andshould become conscious of this intention regardless ofeducation and background. His later Einfhrung in diePhilosophie (Way to Wisdom: An Introduction to

Philosophy)3

published in 1950, and based on a series ofradio lectures aimed at a non-academic audienceincludes definitions of what philosophy is meant to beThus Jaspers expounds at length what philosophyshould not be allowed to be. He distinguishes whatKant referred to as "scholastic philosophy"(Schulphilosophie), which can be learned, from "worldphilosophy" (Weltphilosophie), which requires thedevelopment of aptitude. This recalls Jaspers' owncareer as a philosopher. When he obtained his seconddoctorate (Habilitation) at the University of Heidelbergand qualified for a professorship to teach philosophy,

his first doctorate was in medicine rather than inphilosophy. Ever since he closed ranks with Heideggerin the 1920s, he was unfavourably disposed towardsorthodox academic philosophy.4 However, this innerdisposition never prevented him from regardinghimself as a responsible member of the university as aninstitution and as someone keen to preserve theEuropean idea of the university.

Approaching the origin of philosophizing calls fora radical, epochal break from all certainties as well fromall life-world presuppositions and objectivity(Gegenstndlichkeit), which the philosopher moreoverknows rests upon non-objectivity or "trans-thing-ness(bergegenstndlichkeit). Jaspers makes explicit referenceto an act that envisages the features of a mysticalseparation from all the conditions of worldly life (P, p33). Kierkegaard had described this act as existentiarebirth. Jaspers discovered several precursors of truephilosophizing in the great philosophers of radicaltranscendence, such as Plotinus, Cusanus, andNagarjuna, the Buddhist philosopher; and he followsKant and Kierkegaard with regard to the (sceptical-phenomenological) epochal act of attaining existentia

knowledge.

3 Karl Jaspers, Einfhrung in die Philosophie. ZwlfRadiovortrge (Zrich: Artemis, 1950).

4 About the difficult relationship between Heidegger and

Jaspers see Antonia Grunenberg, Hannah Arendt und MartinHeidegger, Geschichte einer Liebe (Mnchen: Piper, 2006) pp.13ff, 56ff, 66ff, and passim.


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Let us turn to one of Jaspers' radio lectures to gainan even better sense of how he understandsphilosophy. Notwithstanding his intention to the trans-objective-being, he made "existence" rather than"transcendence" central to his concept of philosophy.He affirms that: "Philosophy is that which

concentrates, through which man becomes himself, byparticipating in reality" (P, p.15).In what follows, I wish to approach Jaspers'

concept of philosophy and philosophizing even moreclosely, to show how he appeals to his listeners andreaders to dare to engage in philosophizing. He doesthis because he believes that philosophizing, which weall engage in consciously or unconsciously, isinevitable. I shall refer to another statement andappellative definition, such as one that occurs on thefirst page (p. V) of Philosophie:

Philosophizing is the way of man, who, historically in histime, seizes being. Only in this manifestation, and not initself, is it accessible to him. In philosophizing, a faithlacking all revelation reaches expression, appealing tothe one who is on the same way...

Existence and the Quest for Being

Jaspers' entire philosophy is guided by the "quest forbeing" (P, p. 4). There is an insurmountable hiatusbetween "real being" which Jaspers also equates withthe "absolute" (P, p. 32) and the situation of

humankind, its abilities and intentions, even thougheverything that is thought, said, dreamed, andsomehow manifested is assimilated by the medium of auniversal being. Acceptance into being(Seinsaufgenommenheit) and the failure of being(Seinsverfehlung) form a continuous dialectic to whichexistence knows it is harnessed and wherein it mustassert itself. "Being is", but at the same time itconstitutes the ongoing challenge to a graduallyenhanced "certainty of being" (Seinsgewissheit). Thequest for being cannot be brought to completion. This

insight entails a further insight, namely that as long asexistence has not fully taken hold of being, it remainsbut "possible existence" (mgliche Existenz). As Jaspersobserves, philosophizing cannot change this condition:"Philosophizing from possible existence, which seeks tobecome real through philosophical life, remains a quest"(P, p. 21).

This searching movement undertaken by existence(to which Jan Patocka also has recourse) can beidentified not only as a fundamental condition, but also

as the very "elucidation of existence"(Existenzerhellung), thus constituting a movement frompossible to real existence. The human aptitude forphilosophy presupposes this actualising movementwhich Jaspers also designates as "inner action." Hence Jaspers notes: "Philosophizing presupposes the seizing

of existence ..." (P, p. 299).While philosophizing is linked to existence, and toexisting, it also constitutes a problem of being. Thepriority of "the search for being" in Jaspers' Philosophysuggests an analogy with Heidegger's exploration ofthe question of being in Being and Time5 or what heterms the "question of the meaning of being." Jaspersand Heidegger's approaches to existence via thequestion of being, however, are distinct.

A brief comparison of their notions of existencemakes this quite clear. Jaspers defines existence invarious ways. Whereas some of his definitions are

specific, others remain indirect. Referring toKierkegaard, he notes: "Existence is that which relates toitself and therein to its transcendence" (P, p. 13). Jaspersrefers explicitly to Kierkegaard's Die Krankheit zum Tode(The Sickness unto Death) (P, p. 18). Alternatively: "ThisBeing that in the manifestation of Dasein Is Not, butcan be and ought to be and hence decides in time whetherit is eternal. I myself am this being as existence" (P, p295). Furthermore: "My Dasein ... is not existence, butmanin Dasein is possible existence" (P, p. 296).

Like Jaspers, Heidegger also adopts an indirectattitude towards existence. But unlike JaspersHeidegger is not concerned with the "philosophy ofexistence," but rather with the structures constitutingexistence, with what he calls "existentiality" (GA 2, p17). Dasein is a particular kind of being, "that in its beingto this being has a relationship to being ... Whatcharacterizes this being is that it can deduce itself fromand through this being. Understanding being is itself adefinition of the being of Dasein" (GA 2, p. 16). In a lateraddendum, Heidegger specifies that this notion ofbeing also refers to "being as a whole." He subsequentlyspecifies this definition as follows: "That being to which

'Dasein' relates in one way or another and is alwayssomehow related, we call 'existence'." Heidegger raisesthe "question of the meaning of being" as an ontologicaland an epistemological question. Ingeniously, he linksman's question about his own being, that is, his concernabout his survival or non-being, to traditional ontology

5 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Gesamtausgabe, Frankfurtam Main, Band 2). Hereafter abbreviated as GA 2.


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Put differently, Heidegger combines the philosophy oflife with ontology to form a new type of "fundamentalontology," wherein he integrates existential analytics.Hence, Heidegger's work is not about existence as such;rather existence serves him as the site to clarify the"question of the meaning of being."

While Heidegger developed an existentialanalytics of Dasein (Daseinsanalytik) in Being and Time, Jaspers undertook a form of practical-intuitive"hermeneutics of the origin" (Ursprungshermeneutik). Itwould be more appropriate to call this an "elucidationof the origin" (Ursprungs-Erhellung), from whichreflection and human action subsequently arise. Informulaic terms, the distinction between Heideggerand Jaspers can be described thus: whereas Heidegger'snotion of existence is ontological, Jaspers' notion isdeontological. This distinction runs through anddetermines both philosophies. Notwithstanding their

apparent analogous similarities, Heidegger's and Jaspers' philosophies pursue different objectives:whereas Heidegger aims at overcoming metaphysics, Jaspers strives to incorporate metaphysics in themovement of existence and adopts, in Kantian terms,the position of Practical Reason. In his principal work,he observes quite casually: "Existential philosophy ismetaphysics. It believes in what it emanates from."Elsewhere he asserts just as casually: "Philosophy isorigin [Philosophie ist Ursprung]." Or in moredifferentiated terms: "Philosophy is consciousness ofbeing emanating from another origin [Philosophie istSeinsbewusstsein aus anderem Ursprung]."

This "other origin" is often referred to as"transcendence." The concept of the "origin," however,places irreducibility and self-manifestation (Sich-selbst-Bekundendes) at stake. Jaspers' existential philosophy ismeant to grow out of the transcendent origin and at thesame time out of the actual conditions of real life toreach expression and to become an instance of life as anarticulated philosophy. Such a life-based, efficaciousconcept of philosophy went beyond orthodox academicphilosophy at the time. Initially, Jaspers did not realise

that his existential approach was radically distinct fromHeidegger's ontology. In a note written later in hiscareer (that is, post-1945), he described this difference asfollows:

Philosophy bears witness to itself in the reality of life, ofjudgement, and of action, reaching down into thebottom of the soul, into every corner of the house, intoall modes of communication ... Here I probably differradically from Heidegger, for whom philosophy would

appear to exist in the work itself, or also as theexperience of thought removed from his own life,which regards itself as unconcerned in private andphilosophical terms, he steps out of the reality of Daseininto the quiet space of philosophy closing the doorbehind him and the two spheres remain strictlyunrelated. But what occurs in that sheltered, closed

space is supposed to bear upon the history of the worldand the history of being.6

The Elucidation of Existence and the Step toward the

Encompassing or Periechontology

In 1935, Jaspers held a series of five lectures on "Reasonand Existenz" (Vernunft und Existenz)7 at theRijksuniversiteit Groningen. In these lectures heexpanded his philosophy of existence of 1931 with theconcept of the encompassing (das Umgreifende).8 It is

worth asking whether this addition actually constitutesan expansion, or perhaps rather an unintendedconstriction, or even an ontologizing of his existentiaapproach. Comparing it with his previous account ofthe problem of existence would appear to suggest thisThe second volume of Jaspers' three-part Philosophy The Elucidation of Existence is without doubt the mostsubstantial; it provides a broad and profound accountof how the constitution of existence occurs. Amongothers, communication, historicity, freedom, boundarysituations (Grenzsituationen), and unconditional action(unbedingte Handlung), are all aspects of the method ofthe elucidation of existence that have become famousand which brought Jaspers' method to publicawareness. I refer deliberately to "aspects" here ratherthan to Heidegger's "existentials" or "structures," whicheasily take on a life of their own. Jaspers' aspects areaspects of existence itself as well moments of "being-oneself" (Selbstsein). Without a doubt, thecomprehensive philosophy outlined by Jaspers ispreeminently focused on the individual subject, onfirst-person experiences, on the "I myself," on account of

6 Karl Jaspers, Notizen zu Martin Heidegger, Hg. H. Saner(Mnchen: Piper , 1978) Nr. 246, p. 259f. Abbreviated asNotizen.

7 Karl Jaspers, Vernunft und Existenz. Fnf Vorlesungen(Mnchen: Piper, 1960).

8 Karl Jaspers would have rejected the term "ontologyzing"

regarding his theory of the encompassing. The termPeriechontology is extensively used in Jaspers' philosophicallogic Von der Wahrheit (Mnchen: Piper, 1947) pp. 158f,601ff.


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Cartesian and Kantian ontological requirements. Whilemany critics have taken issue with the lack of anexplicit systematic approach in Jaspers, his method ofelucidation effectively refutes this criticism. Jaspersholds that no clarifying "deduction" is required toreveal the deontological essence of human existence,

just as Kant refused to apply an abstract-theoretical"deduction" to buttress the Critique of Practical Reason.For Jaspers, existence suffices in itself, and proves itselfthrough the practical reality of life.

Jaspers' claim that both human existence and the"modes of being of the encompassing" have their ownproper "philosophical logic" recurs time and againalongside the method of elucidating existence. The"World Orientation" of the first volume of Philosophy iselevated further by the tenet of the "Orientation of theEncompassing" the horizon of all horizons fromwhich everything objective and determinable should be

understood. The encompassing is nothing tangible andobjective, but understanding its reality is madepossible, and at the same delimited, by a number of"modes of the encompassing." Only through acts oftranscendence, which transcend all limits of objectivityand materiality, does the non-objective "horizon" comeindirectly into view. All modes of the encompassingcan be telescoped onto this furthermost horizon, butcome against up their own boundedness and failure, ifthey fluff themselves up into "being in its entirety."These modes are divided into two groups: the firstgroup comprises Existence, Dasein, Consciousness inGeneral, and the Spirit, each of which represents aparticular mode of the encompassing which we are; thesecond group consists of Transcendence and the World,that is, of the encompassing which we are not.Transversal "reason" is a somewhat floating and non-solidified mode of the encompassing. It is the tie orlinkage between all modes of the encompassing. Jaspers refers to this insight into the schematicorientation in the panorama of the regions of being asthe "basic knowledge" (Grundwisssen) required for theelucidation of existence.

However, this proclaimed basic knowledgethreatens the character of Jaspers' elucidation ofexistence. While existence is also pivotal to his theory ofthe encompassing, it becomes a medium of thetransformation to "being-as-such." Existence itself is"being," but is inserted as a specific mode of being intogeneral being, and hence loses sharply delineatededges. The particular character of existence has oftenbeen highlighted, since it is identical with original, that

is, primordial philosophizing. In Jaspers' case, wemust emphasize the verbal meaning of"philosophizing" since he is concerned with preservingthe appellative character of philosophy and itsmovement of thought in order to distance all attemptsof allegedly grasping reality itself or to claim that one

has discovered being residing in reality through and inphilosophy. Existence and philosophizing rest upon noother source than self-knowledge and self-apprehension (Selbsterfassung). Once all reliableobjectivity and putative insights into reality have beenblown asunder, it becomes necessary to introduce aconcept of knowledge capable of grasping existentialself-justification and self-transcendence. Faith, andmore precisely "philosophical faith" assume theirunique significance at the very place of possibleexistence, about which there is nothing solid, factual, orself-contained. This insight can be likened

metaphorically to a plant that must be watered withutmost care, and a spring that can easily run dry.

Periechontological basic knowledge occupies acentral position in the confrontation with "revelation." Iserves Jaspers as armour designed to protect himagainst the onrush of a challenge shifted into theincomprehensible. What he calls "transcendence" assistshim in transforming religious insight andunderstanding into ciphers, that is, in transcending thatreality which we are not and which appears to speak toman from another dimension. Notwithstanding itsnon-objective ontology, Jasper's relationship with thisdimension is ambivalent: on the one hand, he mustpractise asceticism in the face of his basic intention todissolve all approaches into gnostic objectivations; onthe other hand, he realizes that it is precisely theincomprehensibility of revelations (and theirinstitutionalization) that drives him towardphilosophical knowledge and existential self-becomingThe elucidation of existence is thus enhanced by theadmitted unknowability of the darkness announcingitself threateningly in revealed faith and foreverentailing aberrations and undoings.

Critique of post-Kantian Philosophies:Fichte, Schelling, Hegel

Jaspers discovers this darkness not merely in hencounter with revelation, but also in the entireintellectual development of Germany after Kant. In his


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study of Schelling,9 Jaspers explores the dissociation ofGerman Idealism from Kant. He asserts that greatnessand fate were closely related at the time:

The great truth in German Idealism resided inunderstanding the need to complement, appropriate,and continue Kantian philosophy against Kantian

orthodoxy. But it was a particular German fate toapproach this task by forsaking the Kantian way ofthinking ... Sorcery took the place of high philosophy,and, since it also contained a truth, had even greaterseductive power (Schelling, p. 317f).

Furthermore: "One has always sensed how profoundthe break between the Idealists and Kant was, butperhaps not made it perfectly clear until now..."(Schelling, p. 313). And finally:

The break in the mode of thought took effect in oneparticular area of German education in the 1790s ...

Prior to this break, the spirit of Lessing, Goethe, Kant,and Humboldt abided ... With the break somethingquite different arose, the spirit of sorcery, subsequentlyknown as Romanticism; in philosophy this spiritreached its utmost expression in Fichte, Schelling, andHegel (Schelling, p. 314).

The backlash followed promptly and occurred "amidstthe platitude of materialism and positivism,purportedly scientific world views"; thereafterKierkegaard and Marx launched their own counterstrikes (Schelling, p. 315). Nor could the Neo-Kantianphilosophies embracing Otto Liebmann's rallying cry

"Back to Kant!" overcome the break anymore. Jaspersconsidered the rejection of Kantian philosophy, and thefailure to recognize its merits, a never-ending disaster.

Jaspers' analyses and critique concern not onlySchelling, but indirectly Heidegger as well. One of hisnotes on the latter reads thus:

He lacks a consciousness of truth in favour of self-exorcizing sorcery, which leaves behind a void ... Headheres to Schelling, Eckhart, gnosis lacking anawareness of origin and suffering an impoverishmentof former sense; verbatim borrowing in decisive

places.10

The "sorcery" and "gnosis" that he makes out inSchelling is also at work in Heidegger. For Jaspers,Heidegger's philosophy accounts for his political

9 Karl Jaspers, Schelling, Grsse und Verhngnis (Mnchen:Piper, 1955) pp. 313-323. Hereafter this edition will beabbreviated as Schelling.

10Notizen, Nr. 180, p. 102.

aberration. It seems that Jaspers was alone in hisharsh critique against Heidegger, but he had aphilosophical partner in Basel who also was involved ina polemic against Heidegger's ontologism: HeinrichBarth.

Jaspers and Heinrich Barth

The literary nucleus of Jaspers' book on revelation is apiece he contributed to a valedictory volume for thephilosopher Heinrich Barth (1890-1965),11 his colleaguein Basel, on the occasion of the latter's seventiethbirthday. It is entitled Der philosophische Glaubeangesichts der christlichen Offenbarung (Philosophical Faithand the Christian Revelation),12 and is more containedand more specific than his later, more comprehensivework. Other contributors to Heinrich Barth'svaledictory volume included Karl Barth, Hermann

Diem, Emil Brunner, Fernand Brunner, Alfred deQuervain, and Gerhard Huber. These names suggest just how important Heinrich Barth was at the timealthough he has never been afforded the recognition herightly deserves up to this day. 13 Barth's name occurson several occasions in Jaspers' writings, 14 such as(somewhat amusingly) in his correspondence withHannah Arendt.15 For his part, Heinrich Barth tookissue with Jaspers' philosophy explicitly in an essayabout Jaspers' concepts of faith and history,16 buessentially his views concurred with Jaspers

11 Heinrich Barth was professor of philosophy at the

University of Basel, from 1928 to 1960. As a philosopher hehad a great impact on the theology of Emil Brunner. Aboutthe controversy between Karl Barth and Emil Brunner seeFrank Jehle, Emil Brunner, Theologe im 20. Jahrhundert(Zrich: Theologischer Verlag, 2006) pp. 293ff.

12 Karl Jaspers, "Der philosophische Glaube angesichts derchristlichen Offenbarung," in: Philosophie und christlicheExistenz. Festschrift fr Heinrich Barth zum 70. Geburtstag am3. Februar 1960, hgg. von Gerhard Huber (Basel 1960), pp. 192. See Alan M. Olson, "Isaac and Ishmael Revisited," in:Existenz, Volume 1, Nos 1-2, Fall 2006, p. 60.

13 Karl Jaspers, Der philosophische Glaube angesichts derOffenbarung (Mnchen: Piper 1962). Abbreviated as PGO.

14PGO p. 498f.

15Hannah Arendt/Karl Jaspers Briefwechsel 1926-1969, hgg. vonL. Khler und H. Saner (Mnchen: Piper, 1985) p. 129f.

16 Heinrich Barth, "Karl Jaspers ber Glaube und Geschichte,"

in: Theologische Zeitschrift, hgg. von der TheologischenFakultt der Universitt Basel, Jahrgang 6, 1950 (Heft 6) pp.434-460 (Basel: Reinhardt).


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throughout. A certain tension clouded their personalrelationship from the outset, since Heinrich Barth hadhoped for quite a considerable time that he would beappointed to the chair of philosophy in Basel to whichJaspers was ultimately appointed. Later, when HeinrichBarth was supposed to be promoted to the rank of full

professor of philosophy, Jaspers expressed reservations.While this might be brushed aside as academic gossip,it is in actual fact worth mentioning because HeinrichBarth embodied precisely what Jaspers consideredinadmissible in philosophical terms: a philosopher whowas at the same time a believing Christian.17 I mightadd that Heinrich Barth was after all the brother of thefamous Karl Barth, full professor of theology at theUniversity of Basel, whose Dialectical TheologyHeinrich Barth helped shape decisively in its earlystages.18 Moreover, Heinrich Barth adhered to the so-called "Marburg School," attended lectures held by

Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, and Ernst Cassirer, andaligned himself with "Critical Idealism" in the 1920s. Hedeveloped his philosophy of existence along the lines ofKant's Critique of Practical Reason and the "MarburgSchool,"19 whereas Jaspers adopted a revolutionarystance in his attempt to "transform" philosophy and theBiblical tradition.

Without a doubt, there were striking personaldifferences between Jaspers and Heinrich Barth. When

17 Another colleague of Jaspers at the University of Basel, thetheologian Fritz Buri, tried to integrate Jaspers existentialtheories of existence, periechontolgy and ciphers in thehorizon of his own theology. See Hans Saner, "Einmtigkeitund Differenz. Zur Philosophischen Begegnung von FritzBuri und Karl Jaspers," in: Internationale Fritz Buri-Gesellschaft (Luzern) Bulletin 1, 1998, pp. 23-45.

18 See Heinrich Barth, "Gotteserkenntnis" Aarau 1919, in:

Anfnge der dialektischen Theologie. Teil I Karl Barth, HeinrichBarth, Emil Brunner, hgg. von Jrgen Moltmann (Mnchen:Kaiser, 1962) pp. 219-255. Karl Barth confessed that thecontribution of his Brother Heinrich Barth for the secondedition of his "Rmerbrief" (1921) was very important,especially the texts about Plato and Kant, see op. cit. p. 107.

19 Sometimes Heinrich Barth characterised himself as a"Latecommer of the Marburg School." As we can read in hisreview of Hermann Cohens philosophy of religion he wasinspired by his concept of "origin" (Ursprung), see"Hermann Cohens religionsphilosophische Schriften," in:Bltter fr Deutsche Philosophie, Band 5, 1931/32 (Heft 1)pp. 454-474 (Berlin). About the problem of origine inHeinrich Barth see Gnther Hauff, "Ursprung undErscheinung, Zu Heinrich Barths Vermchtnis," in: In-Erscheinung-Treten. Heinrich Barths Philosophie dessthetischen (Basel: Schwabe, 1990) pp.41-49.

I embarked on my degree course in philosophy at theUniversity of Basel in 1949, Jaspers was a celebrity; hislectures were marked by overwhelming eloquence, hefilled the main lecture theatre on every occasion, and heself-assuredly promulgated his knowledge, whichextended far beyond European philosophy; he stood

tall and dignified, and carried himself like a true man ofthe world. By stark contrast, Heinrich Barth wasseverely handicapped, lectured at impossible hours(from 7 to 8 a.m. in the summer term), hunched overhis manuscript, speaking in a quiet voice and adverseto any rhetorical pose. Attendance at his lectures wasscant and his seminar groups could often be countedwith two hands; classes were held in the crampedpremises of the philosophy department on theMnsterplatz; minutes had to be taken, philosophicatexts were interpreted in class, and only original-language texts were permitted. For many students

Jaspers' Swiss colleague was simply non-existent. Nocould they be blamed, since the philosophy of HeinrichBarth was accessible only in a handful of essaysFollowing the breakdown of philosophical intercoursebetween Switzerland and Germany after 1933, no onecould recall Barth's Philosophie der praktischen Vernunf(Philosophy of Practical Reason),20 published in 1927. Thetwo-volume Philosophie der Erscheinung (Philosophy of

Appearance)21 was misconstrued as a monographTogether, however, both volumes reveal that alcognition proceeds from the manifestation ofappearance, the appearing (or emerging) of appearance(Erscheinen der Erscheinung), the "phainesthai," (in theGreek grammatical sense of medium) even though thiswas never regarded as the starting point proper. Theclear focus on appearance in his philosophy gave rise toa fundamental difference not only between HeinrichBarth and Jaspers, but also between Heinrich Barth andthe theology devised by his brother Karl Barth. Hismajor work Erkenntnis der Existenz. Grundlinien einer

philosophischen Systematik(Cognition of Existence.Outlinesof a Philosophical Systematics) was published in 1965,22

the year of his death, and was brushed off as a belated

20 Heinrich Barth, Philosophie der praktischen Vernunft(Tbingen: Mohr, 1927).

21 Heinrich Barth, Philosophie der Erscheinung, EineProblemgeschichte, Erster Teil: Altertum und Mittelalter(Basel:Schwabe, 1947, 1966) Zweiter Teil:Neuzeit (Basel: Schwabe,1959).

22 Heinrich Barth, Erkenntnis der Existenz, Grundlinien einerphilosophischen Systematik (Basel: Schwabe, 1965).


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work of existential philosophy. It is doubtful whether Jaspers ever undertook a thorough reading of thiswork.

I would like to offer a brief personal comment atthis juncture. I am sure you will forgive a formerdoctoral student, who sat his examinations with both

Heinrich Barth and Jaspers, if my remarks aresomewhat coloured by juxtaposing these twophilosophers. I quite readily admit that my criticalthoughts on Jaspers are rooted in that formativeexperience. Following this brief anecdotal digression, Iwould like to consider the similarities and differencesbetween these two different philosophies.

Both philosophers are influenced by Plato, Augustine,and Kant, whom Jaspers heralds as the "founders of

philosophizing."23 Heinrich Barth emerged from the"Marburg School," whereas Jaspers waged a battleagainst Southwest German Neo-Kantianism (Heinrich

Rickert).

Jaspers has recourse to "Biblical religion"; and Biblicalwritings have a formative influence on both his workand Heinrich Barth's. But the dissociation of "Christianreligion" (as practised by the churches) from Biblicalfoundations divided them.

Both espouse the concept of a philosophy of realityinitiated by the later Schelling and subsequently byKierkegaard and develop it into existential thought.Jaspers speaks of "possible existence" (mglicheExistenz), whereas Heinrich Barth is interested in

existence as "entering-into-appearance" or "becomingmanifest" (In-die-Erscheinung-Treten) and existence asthe "event of cognition" (Erkenntnis-Ereignis).

The existential philosophy of both Jaspers and HeinrichBarth has a deontological nature. Both philosophersemphasize the idea of "oughtness" (Sollen) as essentialfor the reality of existence, because they are convinced,that this reality, open to the future and incompatiblewith worldly beings, can never be reached in terms ofrational explanations existence can only indirectlybecomes an 'object' according to special ways ofexistential elucidation."

Both Jaspers and Barth strictly and fundamentallyobserve the independence of philosophical cognitionfrom that of revelation.

The question remains whether Jaspers andHeinrich Barth, who both worked at the same

23 Karl Jaspers, Die grossen Philosophen, Erster Band (Mnchen:Piper, 1959) pp. 231-616.

university and who had much in common, might nothave collaborated more fruitfully had there been fewerreservations between them. Regrettably, thiscollaboration never happened. Jaspers' philosophizingbecame very dogmatic after his Groningen lectures. Henever altered the categories of his system which he

brought to bear against all philosophies with an almostclinical thoroughness. Were we to devise a formula thatbears out the comparison between these twophilosophers, it might sound like this: Jaspers' notion ofphilosophy was extensive, reaching out towards a"World History of Philosophy" and a "WorldPhilosophy"; by contrast, Heinrich Barth's notion ofphilosophy was intensive, dedicated to analysing thefoundations of philosophy from Plato to the presentWhile Jaspers was convinced that Europeanphilosophy was coming to an end, Heinrich Barthaccessed largely unexplored dimensions of

philosophical reflection through his work on theproblem of appearance, of the act of appearing, of thetranscendental basis of all understanding and anovercoming of the subject-object dichotomy.

Philosophical Faith and Reading Cipher-Script

Heinrich Barth's critique of Karl Jaspers is ambivalentBasically, it is positive, holding in high regard theimmense achievement of Jaspers and his ownexistential commitment; and yet Barth doubtedwhether Jaspers' philosophy is the best instrument totackle the tasks at hand. He felt particularly ambivalentabout Jaspers' acceptance of revelation-based religiousfaiths, which came with an uncharitable attitudetowards the religious understanding arrived at bybelievers in the various "denominations" and religiousorganisations. Without a doubt this critical diastasis alsoreveals Heinrich Barth's inner conflict as a philosopherstriving to accord equal respect to both theindependence of philosophy and religious truths intheir own right.

Notwithstanding Jaspers' highly developed

awareness of the historical uniqueness of each andevery instance of becoming, he assumes a timelesshuman being capable of attaining the highestrealisation, albeit with varying cultural nuancesAllusions to neo-Platonic and mystical intentions ofself-redemption can hardly be dismissed. Regardless ofwhether or not this is justified, we should uphold Jaspers' insight that human existence in its particulamanifestation does not fit altogether into the world


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horizon and so cannot be accounted for in these terms.The notion of "Existenz" living "from another origin,"from its own utterly distinctive origin, is something likean epiphany of transcendence itself. While this mightbe a mere "cipher" in Jaspers' terminology, it doescontain a truth that lays claim to a quasi-ontological

status. In its reality, existence differs from all otherbeing and beings. It is justified by "freedom," which isnon-deducible but self-evident, as with Kant. The non-deducibility of the freedom of existence marks thebreakthrough past the allegedly closed anddisenchanted being-of-the-world (Weltsein). Neither isthe particular nature of the being of existenceobliterated as a "mode of the encompassing." Thisparticularity is constitutive for existence and must bemade manifest through keeping a constant distancefrom all hardening. Paradoxically, it follows thatprecisely the dark thoughts of revelation, the petrifying

of world-concepts into gnostic realities, and the declineof scientific research into scientific superstition allbecome negative incentives to unmask, combat, andovercome these very things as challenges, aberrations,and temptations, thereby affirming being-in-itself, thatis, the selfhood of existence (Selbstsein der Existenz).

In simplified terms, philosophical faith transformsand replaces with ciphers the revelations handed downand their substantialized appearances of transcendence.This occurs through a particular "operation," namelythe suspension of the arbitrariness (Eigenmchtigkeit) ofphenomena. Their potential capacity to harden intoexistential challenges and their graceful potential tobecome ciphers is rigorously left to the discretion of theauthenticating disposition of existence. Those aspiringto be ciphers, be they human beings, landscapes, towns,places or myths, rituals or laws, and others, are at firstleft to exist as phenomena. However, the transcendentintention of the subject, which penetrates into thehorizon of all horizons of the phenomenality of being,transforms these aspirants into ciphers oftranscendence. The transformative power thus residesentirely in the subject so that each allusion of

"condescension" must be regarded as gnosis andreversal. But I wish to emphasise once more that Jaspers' point is not that religious knowledge and itssymbols should be destroyed. Rather, he is concernedwith altering their comprehensibility andunderstanding their incomprehensibility; that is, heaspires to another "conceptual mode," of a mode ofthought capable of coming to terms with the non- or

misunderstood. In any event, the phenomenality ofciphers as such remains intact.

This prompts further deliberations. In anontological sense, ciphers are nothing, and yet notnothing either. They have a floating character, which onsome occasions refers beyond itself, and on others

collapses into objectivity and bodily existence. They aredestroyed in both cases. There must be an existentiaimpetus that preserves their condition of being-something-and-not-nothing (Etwas-und-nicht-Nichts-Seins) and thus allows them to mirror existence itselfBeing-oneself and recovering from not-being-oneselffuse into a movement that drives existence at once intoitself and beyond itself. It is accepted that existence-itself bears something dark and incomprehensible, evennegative, and continuously integrates this aspect. Thequestion has been raised, and quite rightly, why ciphersare needed at all. Kant employed the concept of ciphers

in his Critique of Judgment24 with reference to a possible"interpretation of cipher-script ... through which naturespeaks to us in its beautiful forms." In Jaspers, cipher-script is much more than an "interpretation" of nature'sbeautiful figurativeness, for with him everything canbecome a cipher. This should be understood entirely interms of an existential-personal hermeneutic, whichmight prompt one to think of once-fashionable"individual mythology" (Harald Szeemann). Butciphers thicken into cultural symbols, and thus becomeeffective in the lifeworld. We now need to inquirewhether the floating, independent existence of suchsymbol-ciphers could not perhaps have repercussionson the living. The distinct phenomenality of cipherscannot simply be a reflex of deep existential events, forhow could a new and more profound existentialknowledge be awakened by a deepening in the self-evidentiality of the ciphers? The later Schelling'spositive philosophy advances not only into anincreasingly deeper gnostic reality, but opens up theway to new existential knowledge that is, as long asone adheres to reading ciphers. Kierkegaard alreadypractised the development of ciphers with regard to

contents in a theoretical-secular form in hispseudonymous writings. Curiously, Jaspers evincessuch a mindset at the end of his book on the atombomb, namely in those passages in which he employsthe notion of immortality as a cipher and penetrates its

24 I. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, 42, 120.


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content.25 This cipher focuses on the possible non-reality or annihilation of the world as a whole in theface of the total threat confronting mankind in the formof nuclear disaster. The detour through a nothingnessthat we ourselves might bring about inflames the worldof appearances, altering their radiance.

The Politics of Philosophical Faith

Jaspers delineated a new situation of world history, oneto which we have grown accustomed in recent decades.In formulaic terms, the reality of existence and thereality of humankind have amalgamated into a singleentity. Jaspers therefore declares that thinking must be"reversed" (A, p. 298), and that "rethinking" is called for(A, p. 231), a "turn" (A, p. 283), a "reversal" (A, p. 322), aradical "revolution of the mode of thought" (A, p. 321),all emanating from freedom. Such Kantian statements

move philosophical faith into the political sphere;indeed, such faith now becomes politics itself. Theapocalyptic threat also fuels Jaspers' subsequent book-length account of philosophical faith (published in1962), namely to safeguard "the survival of mankind"through universal communication. He argues that oneshould aspire to reduce everything that separates theossified theologies of revelation.

The nuclear threat subjects the abstract category ofthe "whole" to a global, all-embracing incarnation, onethat affects all humankind. Seizing existence nowcorresponds to humanity grasping hold of theplanetary basis through its consciousness, itsinstitutions, and the "rational community" (A, p. 301 ff).The weakest link in the hierarchy of powers, the veryconcept of philosophical faith, must compete againstthe "religious powers professing violence" whichdominate politics. Unlike Heidegger, Jaspers expects noreversal of fate. He opposes Heidegger's ontologicalself-disempowerment, and he regards his own writingas an agency in this colossal process of change andreversal. He knows this endeavour is utopian, butconsiders it not an entirely lost cause notwithstanding

the slim realistic chances of success. The last forbiddenresort would be to initiate a "philosophical religion" asSchelling did. Nor can Jaspers envisage a syncretisticworld religion or world wisdom, even though theappeal to rationality, from which all existing beings

25 Karl Jaspers, Die Atombombe und die Zukunft des Menschen.Politisches Bewusstsein in unserer Zeit (Mnchen: Piper, 1960)p. 493ff. Abbreviated asA.

originally live and act, suggests this. What remains isthe continuously self-renewing movement of reasonand its universal communication. Reason must beneither expected nor employed as a "tool," but abidesamong us as a shared asset or an open book, andremains unrecognised as an "absolute," as Hegel stated

in his Phenomenology,26

or as Jesus said: "The Kingdomof God is at hand, it is within you!" Philosophical faithrefers to itself and to an origin; through its self-elucidation it constitutes at the same time the faith inthe philosophical per se, as the only substance of theoccurrence of reason. Jaspers hence insists on theconsciousness of "presence," which can only be graspedif its aspect of eternity is recognized in the here andnow. Jaspers hence raises the thought of immortality toan illuminating cipher.

The existence of technical means to terminate thesurvival of humanity prises open a new dimension for

philosophical faith. The individual apprehension ofexistence runs parallel to humanity taking hold of itsexistence through preserving the material conditions oflife. Individual death and the death of humanity movecloser indeed most tangibly in the delusions ofpathological, power-hungry individuals. Adolf Hitler issupposed to have said: "We can perish. But we will takea world with us." The individual lifetime and universaltime merge in the absolute defined within the compassof individual power obsessions. Philosophical faith isradically opposed to such an absolute mindset. If it isfaced with possible extinction in the cosmic sensehowever, the materiality of the world itself becomes abasic moment of existence. It follows that existence isthe conscious manifestation of the being-of-the-worldHeidegger's "being-in-the-world" (In-der-Welt-Sein) andHeinrich Barth's "entering-into-appearance" (In-dieErscheinung-Treten) suddenly reveal their cosmicconcreteness.

Jaspers also detects the incommunicable, dark, andabsoluteness of the politics of violence in our encounterwith "revelation." But a simple parallel cannot bedrawn. Misunderstood revelation also compels

existence to examine itself, and the apocalypse ofhuman self-annihilation impels concrete, practicaaction. Current public discourse in the media is alsolargely determined by this dual encounter. Fear of theviolent potential of religious fundamentalism aboundsas does the proliferation of nuclear weapons among

26 G. W. F. Hegel, Phnomenologie des Geistes (Hamburg:Meiner, 1948) p. 64.


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both states and terrorist groups. The dangers haveintensified since Jaspers published The Atom Bomb andthe Future of Man in 1960 and since the end of the so-called "Cold War" in 1989. They can, however, nolonger be perceived in terms of the Manichean dualityof two superpowers. The new, asymmetric wars and

the elusive war of the secret services against globalcrime have fundamentally changed the world politicalsituation.

Today, philosophical faith is being challenged bythe renewed political role of religion and culture, giventhat such faith is embedded in both due to its historicalactuality. In what constitutes a countermove to theongoing globalization of markets and ofcommunication technologies and media, religion andculture have reawakened reactively, becoming islandsfor the formation of identity and outlook. This reactionproduces differences within, and also between,

individual civilizations. Interreligious and interculturaldialogue remains largely utopian; and interethnicviolence and murderous strife are now the dominantrealities. Can philosophical faith actually assume apractical role in this context? It would appear doomedto powerlessness once a conflict has erupted. And yetthere are shining examples, most of all MahatmaGandhi, who has almost become a cipher today. Jasperspoints out Gandhi's particular predicament in thecontext of the British Empire, but also mentions hislimited function as a role model. Even if philosophicalfaith only abides secretly in individuals at times, itremains an unbroken hope. Precisely because religionand culture become disruptive powers, a "mode ofthought" which at once embraces and underminesthem has a chance to discover some basis formediation. The opportunity resides precisely in the factthat philosophical faith rests upon no dogma, apartfrom having recourse to itself, which can becomeoperative through hazardous rationality in what isperhaps a hopeless position.

What I have phrased in such dreadfully simpleterms almost amounts to declaring the obvious, yet it

also constitutes a looming imperative, as we all know.Nonetheless, embracing such banality, althoughappearances are deceptive, requires a "reversal," a"turning round of thought," a "revolution of the modeof thought," to the point of accepting the singularity ofthat imperative. Religion and culture rest uponconscious and unconscious dogmas, whereasphilosophical faith knows only one dogma whichmay be called the dogma of rationality.

While philosophical faith can have an isolatingeffect, it also opens up communicative possibilities. Inhis work Philosophy, Jaspers already placedcommunication at the centre of the elucidation ofexistence. The vision of a community of all existencescould become present. Jaspers continued on his path

and expanded philosophical faith into a projected"World Philosophy." Within this aspiration, heenvisaged that a further apprehension of existenceshould unfold in the dimension of world history. Hebelieved that such a task was interminable. This can beunderstood, however, as a sign that philosophical faithwill continue to have a future.

jaspers philosophical faith

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