Japan, Korea, the Philippines, China: four syndromesof corruption

Michael Johnston

# Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2007

Abstract Both generalizations about “Asian corruption”, and claims about greater or lesseramounts of corruption, tend to overlook the many variations existing among and withinAsian societies, and among the corruption problems they experience. I suggest that deeperinfluences in social, political and economic development, and contrasting institutionalsettings, create four distinctive syndromes of corruption, each with its own set ofimplications for relationships between wealth and power. Japan is an example of “influencemarkets” in which private interests buy or rent influence over relatively specific policyoutcomes within a strong state. Korea is a case of “elite cartels”, in which collusion andcorrupt incentives enable several kinds of elites to cooperate in governing, enrichingthemselves, and resisting rising political competition. The Philippines is marked by“oligarchs and clans”, with powerful families and their entourages plundering a weak statein a climate of uncertainty and insecurity. China experiences “official mogul” corruption, inwhich officials abuse state power with impunity, although that process is becomingincreasingly fragmented. The four syndromes may help us understand why corruption andrapid growth have coexisted in some, but not all, Asian states for long periods of time, andmay also help us understand why some of those states will adapt to new global realitiesonly with some difficulty. They also show how “consensus”-driven reforms emanating fromthe west may not only be ineffective, but may actually make matters worse.

Introduction

Is there such a thing as “Asian corruption”, in the sense of a particular pattern of corruptionthat extends across Asia, reflects distinctively regional characteristics, and is not foundelsewhere? If not, what variations are there, what are their sources, and what are theirimplications for development and reform?

Those questions are significant not just at a theoretical or typological level, but in termsof policy as well. Numerous observers have invoked notions of “Asian corruption” to

Crime Law Soc Change (2008) 49:205–223DOI 10.1007/s10611-007-9095-z

M. Johnston (*)Department of Political Science, Colgate University, Hamilton, NY 13346, USAe-mail: mjohnston@mail.colgate.edu

account for the ways extensive abuses have coexisted with – and in some cases, haveseemed to aid – rapid economic growth in a number of states in the region. Often suchcomparisons are made with reference to “African corruption” or other suggested patterns,with the inference being that there is something about Asia, its corruption, and/or its growththat has exempted many societies from the worst consequences of abusive connectionsbetween wealth and power. If such distinctions hold any validity then nuanced responses tocorruption, taking regional factors into account, would make sense as aspects of botheconomic development policy and strategies for reform.

Equally apparent, however, is that what might be called the “consensus playbook” ofreforms – transparency, enhanced public management, building up civil society, economicand political liberalization, privatization, independent judiciaries and news media – variessurprisingly little from one society to the next. Even if we do not posit a single pan-Asianform of corruption with distinctively local roots, a good idea in country A – say, the USA –might be unworkable in country B, irrelevant to corruption in country C, and downrightharmful in country D. Appropriate reforms require an understanding of the deeper, long-term forces shaping and sustaining corruption, their links to observable local characteristicsand contrasts, and careful thought as to how corruption controls might function in a givencontext. Indeed, that sort of deeper analysis is essential if we are to sort out importantcommonalities and contrasts among cases from more superficial similarities and differences –and if we are to avoid “explanations” that consist mostly of putting the label “Asian” onwhatever we see in the region.

If important variations among Asian societies are found alongside similarities tocorruption elsewhere, which are more important, and what deeper influences do theyreflect? This paper offers a discussion of Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and China asexamples of four “syndromes of corruption” (the analysis draws upon Johnston [35]).Those syndromes, I argue, reflect deeper trends and contrasts in participation andinstitutions – in the ways people pursue, use, and exchange wealth and power, and in thestate, political, and social institutions that both restrain and sustain those processes. To besure, the four syndromes do not explain all contrasts among societies – and, the discussionwill be incomplete in the sense that differences within countries, and a systematic approachto cultural factors, are left for future analysis. Nonetheless, the goal is to demonstrate thatbehind the façade of “Asian corruption” lie important variations that are as broad as anyfound globally, yet can be traced to trends in the development of specific societies.

Corruption in real societies: influences and contrasts

Understanding the variations among cases that are most important requires careful study ofthe opportunities available in societies, of the people who seek and use them, and of theinstitutions and norms that shape and constrain their choices. In a 2005 book [35] Iproposed four corruption syndromes, called “influence markets”, “elite cartels”, “oligarchsand clans”, and “official moguls”, that reflect frequently encountered combinations ofpolitical and economic participation, on one hand, and institutions – state, social, political,and cultural – on the other. Statistical analysis of country-level indicators sorted ninety-eight countries into groupings that broadly fit the expected syndromes.

The issue raised by the four syndromes is not just more versus less corruption, but rathercontrasts in kinds of corruption problems. To search for syndromes of corruption is, ineffect, to ask what are the underlying developmental processes, and problems, of which asociety’s corruption is symptomatic? Huntington [28], for example, suggested years ago that

206 M. Johnston

where economic opportunities are more plentiful than political ones, ambitious people usewealth to seek power. Where political opportunities abound and economic ones are scarce,by contrast, power pursues wealth. Where institutions are weak, other contrasts mayemerge: A weak state may be vulnerable to illicit private pressures, while weak propertyrights or civil societies might leave citizens vulnerable to official demands.

Four categories

Participation and institutions can combine in a variety of ways, and for every generalizationthere will be exceptions. The challenge is to identify categories of societies broad enough topreserve important commonalities yet specific and numerous enough to bring outsignificant contrasts. Such categories will not exhaust all possible combinations ofparticipation and institutions – far from it. They are only useful simplifications, offeredas ideal types (Weber’s idea is discussed in useful ways by Coser [16], pp. 223–224)intended to highlight patterns and connections for closer study.

Participation and institutions come in many forms, but the main issue is how wealth andpower are sought, used, and exchanged, and whether state, political, cultural and socialinstitution effectively sustain and restrain such activities. We can differentiate amongsocieties in terms of range and openness of political and economic opportunities they offer;strong institutions protect economic, political, and property rights, guarantee fair play, andprotect society from abuses by the wealthy and/or powerful. It is entirely possible for weakofficial institutions to coexist with a coercive state, and with strong social institutions andpatterns of interactions: China’s weakened Communist Party and its enduring traditions ofguanxi are case in point. Conversely, strong public institutions do not guarantee all is well:the USA, for example, scores well on institutional indicators yet, if Putnam [60] is correct,has a civil society in decline.

Still, variations in participation and institutions tend to fall into identifiable patterns.Established democracies often have mature market economies, for example. But there arealso consolidating or reforming democratic/market societies in which political competitionis still emerging; often their economies are becoming more open too. Institutionalframeworks in such societies seem likely to be moderately strong, but weaker than thosein the first group. Countries in a third group are undergoing major, simultaneous transitionsin politics and their economies: political and economic opportunities are both rapidlyexpanding, with relationships between them being difficult to predict. The weak institutionsfrequently seen in such settings are both cause and effect of rapid, broad-based, oftenunpredictable change. Finally, most undemocratic regimes, while offering few politicalopportunities by definition, have been liberalizing to varying degrees over the pastgeneration, if only because of global economic trends and pressures. Political institutions insuch societies are likely to be weak and personalized; leaders may even be widely feared,but that is not institutional strength in the sense outlined above. Not surprisingly, theireconomic opportunities are controlled and exploited by a powerful few.

These intentionally general groupings, I argue, correspond to four major syndromes ofcorruption: influencemarkets, elite cartels, oligarchs and clans, and official moguls. The proposedconnections are summarized in Table 1; brief descriptions of each corruption syndrome follow.

Influence market corruption Influence markets deal in access to decision makers and policyimplementers within strong state institutions; often politicians serve as middlemen, tradingconnections for contributions both legal and otherwise. Mature market democracies offerextensive political and economic opportunities, and generally have strong, legitimate

Japan, Korea, the Philippines, China: four syndromes of corruption 207

institutions. They resemble each other in important ways, which may help explain why theyare often held up as reform ideals. But many of these countries have not “solved”corruption problems; rather, they have fit their rules to economic realities as well aspersuading people to follow the law, in the process becoming quite accommodating towealthy interests. In part for those reasons, corruption in well-institutionalized marketdemocracies (or at least, the high-level bribery influencing corruption index scores) will bethe exception, and is unlikely to cripple economic development. But these societies stillhave corruption problems worth worrying about. Banks and investment markets inInfluence Market countries are often the repositories, or participate in the laundering, ofcorrupt gains from elsewhere, and their multinational businesses have made illicit deals inmany other societies. Competitive politics in these societies can check some kinds ofcorruption while encouraging others: Citizens can oust a corrupt government, but the costsof running for office encourage politicians to put their connections out for rent. Furthercosts come in the form of reduced public trust and widespread perceptions of abuses ofpower and privilege. Such costs may be intangible, but over time they do little for thelegitimacy and responsiveness of democratic politics.

Elite cartel corruption In other societies politics and markets are becoming morecompetitive, but institutions are weaker. There, networks of elites may collude, usingcorrupt incentives and exchanges to shore up their positions. Official institutions that areonly moderately strong will both facilitate and (from the elites’ standpoint) necessitate suchlinkages. Power and its links to wealth are in flux, creating new opportunities and risks forelites; much corruption may be defensive in nature as elites protect their economic, politicalor policy advantages. Those involved can have a variety of power bases, such as business,the military, the bureaucracy, a political party, or ethnic or regional social ties, and corrupt

Table 1 Projected syndromes of corruption

Syndrome Participation Institutions

Political opportunities Economic opportunities State/societycapacity

Economicinstitutions

Influence markets Mature democracies Mature markets Extensive StrongLiberalized, steadycompetition andparticipation

Liberalized, open; steadycompetition; affluent

Elite cartels Consolidating/reformingdemocracies

Reforming markets Moderate Medium

Liberalized; growingcompetition andparticipation

Largely liberalized andopen; growingcompetition; moderatelyaffluent

Oligarchs andclans

Transitional regimes New markets Weak WeakRecent major liberalization;significant but poorly-structured competition

Recent majorliberalization; extensiveinequality and poverty

Official moguls Undemocratic New markets Weak WeakLittle liberalization oropenness

Recent majorliberalization; extensiveinequality and poverty

208 M. Johnston

linkages may integrate elites in both the public and private sectors. These systems will notbe wholly undemocratic or uncompetitive, and in some respects elite cartel corruption willbe a stabilizing force. But corruption in these cases plays a different role, with implicationsfor development that contrast with the Influence market model. Reformers, too, areconfronted with differing kinds of realities.

Oligarch-and-clan corruption In other societies major political and economic liberalization –often, simultaneous if poorly integrated transitions – and weak public-private boundaries put awide variety of opportunities in play in a setting of very weak institutions. The dominant formof corruption will consist of a disorderly, sometimes violent scramble among contendingoligarchs seeking to parlay personal resources (e.g. a mass following, a business, abureaucratic beachhead, judicial or organized crime connections, or a powerful family) intowealth and power. Unlike the elite cartels syndrome, in which relatively established elitescollude within a moderately strong institutional framework, oligarchs are contending freeagents in a climate of pervasive insecurity. Inability to enforce contracts or defend propertythrough courts and law enforcement increases the incentive to resort to violence [66], makingpolice and military services, and mafiya protection, all the more marketable. As in elite cartelcorruption both political and economic stakes are in play, but in an oligarchs-and-clanssituation it may be difficult to say just what is public and what is private, who is a politicianand who is an entrepreneur, or even who is clearly corrupt and who is an innovator. There isconsiderable political competition in this type of case, but it too can be unpredictable and mayhave shallow social roots. Factions can be unstable and poorly disciplined; oligarchs, bothseeking rapid enrichment and needing to buy support again and again, will exploit anyfragments of government authority that may come to hand. Anti-corruption efforts, in suchsettings, will often be smokescreens for continued abuse or ways to put key competitorsbehind bars. Privatization can become a legalized carve-up of state resources or outright theft.

Official mogul corruption In a final group of countries institutions are very weak, politicsremains undemocratic or is opening up only slowly, but the economy is being liberalized atleast to a degree. Civil society is weak or nonexistent. Opportunities for enrichment abound.but politics and power are personal, and are often used with impunity. Here, economicmoguls are top political figures or their clients; they face few constraints from the stateframework or from competitors. Of our four corruption syndromes this one is the leastfocused upon influence within official state processes: institutions and offices may bemerely useful tools in the search for wealth. Neither rulers nor counter-elites (if any) arelikely to enjoy much sustained popular support or credibility beyond that created throughpatronage or intimidation; as a result some official mogul cases can be fragmented orunstable. Military leaders are thus useful partners, and in some cases are dominant, in suchregimes, often using past corruption as a pretext for taking power. Development of civilsociety is inhibited by both corruption and the political hegemony underlying it, and peoplewill thus have little recourse in cases of official abuse.

These four corruption syndromes are ideal types at this point, highlighting contrastsamong corruption problems I suggest we will find when participation and institutionalfactors combine in certain commonly-observed ways. No country will have just one kind ofcorruption, and no syndrome will fit any one case in every detail. A few overall contrastsare worth noting too. As we move from Influence Markets toward Official Moguls we shiftfrom corruption structured along lines of official roles and processes to that which isscarcely institutionalized at all. The former seeks to convert wealth into bureaucratic

Japan, Korea, the Philippines, China: four syndromes of corruption 209

influence or electoral success, while the latter is the open exploitation of power, and of theweak by the strong. Influence markets and elite cartel corruption involve repeated transactionsand influence or access usable over a long term; indeed, elite cartel corruption may be usedprimarily to forestall change. In oligarch-and-clan and official mogul cases, however,corruption is less predictable, often involving targets of opportunity in rapidly changingsocieties or the whims of leaders acting with impunity. Finally, in the latter sorts of casescorruption may be not the exception but the norm, at least in segments of society. Perhapsmore than any other, that contrast suggests the differing expectations, relationships betweenwealth and power, and reform challenges to be found among syndromes of corruption.

Four groups of cases

Do these four scenarios have anything to do with reality? In the book-length analysis ([35],Chapter 3) K-means cluster analysis using indicators of participation and institutionalstrength suggested that these groupings are sufficiently coherent to merit further study. Fourstatistically significant clusters were found, and they generally fit the categories discussedearlier. Influence market (N=18) countries included Austria, Canada, Germany, TheNetherlands, Norway, Sweden, the UK, and the USA. The elite cartels group (N=21)included Argentina, Belgium, Chile, Italy, South Korea, Poland, Spain, and Zambia amongothers. Oligarchs and clans (N=30) were exemplified, inter alia, by Albania, Colombia,Ecuador, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Russia, and Venezuela. Finally, official mogulscases (N=29) included Algeria, Chad, China, Indonesia, Jordan, Nigeria, Syria, Tanzania,and Zimbabwe. The suggestion is emphatically not that countries in each group aresomehow alike; rather, it is that they experience similar corruption problems reflectingcommon underlying patterns of participation and institutions. Case studies ([35], Chapter4–7) generally bore out the expected dynamics and contrasts of corruption.

Asian societies: four groupings

The statistical analysis outlined above was intended to test the notion that participation andinstitutional factors group together as expected. By itself it could not tell us what a

Table 2 Asian cases classified by cluster analysis ([37], Chapter 3)

Groups Countries

Group 1: Influence markets JapanGroup 2: Elite cartels South KoreaGroup 3: Oligarchs and clans Bangladesh

IndiaMalaysiaNepalPakistanPhilippinesSri LankaThailand

Group 4: Official moguls ChinaIndonesiaMyanmar

210 M. Johnston

country’s corruption is like. But if the expected variations have statistical strength – as infact they did – then countries in each group merit further examination as case studies testingour substantive propositions about variations in corruption. Further, if indicators ofparticipation and institutions did in fact define a distinctively Asian pattern that would beapparent in the results too.

The data available allowed the classification of 98 societies, thirteen of them in South,Southeast, or East Asia (see Table 2; several middle eastern cases that are geographically inAsia but not usually included under “Asian corruption” rubrics were included in theanalysis but are not discussed in this paper). Asian countries fell into all four of theprojected categories, but were most numerous in the oligarchs and clans category (Africancases, by contrast, appeared in groups two, three, and four, but were most concentrated inthe official moguls grouping).

To the extent that these groupings, and the reasoning behind them, are persuasive, there is adefinite “regional flavor” to this distribution of cases. But there is no single Asian type, as all fourcategories in the full 98-country analysis include other countries and regions as well. For example,group three (oligarchs and clans), in which Asian societies were most numerous, included a totalof thirty countries ranging from Albania to Ecuador to Russia to Trinidad and Tobago.

Equally, there is no clear tendency for rapidly growing economies to be concentrated inany one category; Japan and South Korea are major economies on the world stage, but soincreasingly are India and China. Other countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia have alsoexperienced periods of significant, sustained economic expansion. I will suggest in a laterdiscussion, however, that influence market and elite cartel corruption may be most compatiblewith sustainable and relatively broad-based growth (though they are in no sense “functional”for development), and that in India, China and elsewhere we might usefully ask what sorts ofalternative social institutions, not likely to be reflected in statistical assessments ofinstitutional quality, might help a society withstand the economic effects of corruption. Thatdiscussion will be conjectural but may also point to specific ways we can incorporate localinfluences into our analysis without resorting to notions as broad as “Asian corruption”.

Influence markets in Japan: leaders, factions, and tribes

Japan’s influence markets connect private interests to decision makers within a strong, well-institutionalized state. Politicians and contributions, some of the latter legal and others not, areintegral to that process. A strong, centralized, and remote bureaucracy raises the value ofmediation by politicians who have cultivated their own bureaucratic and parliamentary networks.

Influence Markets are no means alike, and Japan’s version reflects a variety ofinfluences. Norms of reciprocity and attitudes toward authority shape deals and thefactional divisions they perpetuate. The amounts of money involved can be astonishing:when former LDP Deputy Secretary General Kanemaru Shin was arrested for tax evasion in1993, the valuables seized from his home were worth an estimated ¥3.6 billion, thenroughly $30 million. Boisseau ([9], pp. 133–135) estimates that by the early 1990s the LDPspent about $8 billion annually to keep its machine running; some funds were raised legallybut most were not. Kickbacks to LDP politicians from the winners of public workscontracts ran a flat 3% of the value of the contract ([33], p. 208). When we consider that inthe mid-1980s domestic construction outlays in Japan totaled ¥53.6 trillion yearly ([80],p. 1) – around $225 billion at then-current exchange rates – or that in the early 1990saround 15% of the LDP’s reported contributions come from real estate and constructioninterests ([80], p. 11) – we can sense the scale of the process.

Japan, Korea, the Philippines, China: four syndromes of corruption 211

Best-known of Japan’s corruption cases was the Lockheed scandal that began in 1976.Lockheed paid around ¥500 million (about $1.6 million in 1976) to Prime Minister, andlongtime LDP faction leader, Tanaka Kakuei. Tanaka was convicted of corruption in the1980s, but because of appeals served no jail time; the case effectively ended with his deathin 1993. Another 460 persons were questioned and seventeen Diet members were named inconnection with payments, but no other charges were filed.

The Sagawa Kyûbin case of 1991–1993 did more than any other to bring down the LDPin 1993. Sagawa, a trucking and delivery firm seeking permission to expand, gave largesums to LDP politicians and organized crime factions. Kanemaru Shin was dealing withSagawa, and thus at least indirectly with organized crime, while working to elect PrimeMinister Takeshita. Revelations of his connections both undermined trust in the LDP andworsened resentments among younger and rural candidates who, shut out of the spoils, stillhad to compete with fellow LDP politicians supported by Sagawa.

Behind the scandals

Blechinger ([6], p. 57) has described Japan’s party-business links as a kind of mutualservices agreement, with the LDP dealing in access and business funding party operations.Modified one-party politics [55] created just enough political competition to make itworthwhile for backers to put up cash to keep the LDP in power and a near-monopoly overaccess that gave factional leaders leverage over donors. Corruption did not prevent a four-decade economic miracle; indeed, it fed upon prosperity. But Japanese influence marketshave had significant political costs, aggravating the factional splits that brought the LDPdown, temporarily, in 1993 and perhaps contributing to Japan’s ineffective economicadaptations following the burst of the late-1980s bubble.

The strength of bureaucratic institutions raised the ante: Important decisions were madeby high-status bureaucrats who followed through with great efficiency. A lack of accesscould mean not even being invited to bid on construction contracts, or – for an aspiringpolitician – not being able to take credit for projects in a constituency. Trading in influenceat high levels required a zoku ([33], pp. 209–210; [7]) – a network or political tribe. A zokulinked Diet members with a particular policy or economic to businesses and bureaucrats;some zoku members became virtual industry spokespersons ([7], p. 3).

If the LDP held a near monopoly, why was politics so expensive? High costs reflectedboth factional contention within the party and the way Diet members were elected before1994 [14, 65]. Most districts elected between two and six diet members on a ballot onwhich parties did not designate an official list of candidates. Various factions’ candidatesthus ran against each other; unable to differentiate themselves on policy, candidates had tobuy electoral support. This they did by attending weddings, funerals, and other familyoccasions (or sending local agents to such affairs) and giving cash, often enclosed in anornate gift card [59]. One rank-and-file Lower House member reported in 1976 that he gaveout 93 such gifts in a typical month, the costs of which could easily exceed $1 millionannually [32]. Finding money on that scale meant backing an LDP faction leader whoseprestige within the party was enhanced, in turn, by a large following.

Korea: “money politics” and control

Korea’s elite cartel corruption outwardly resembles the “money politics” seen in Japan.Large payments by businesses to political elites – both as “contributions” to parties or

212 M. Johnston

foundations and as outright bribes – bought favorable access to credit and major policyfavors. But Korea’s corruption has been more centralized, and was less a quid pro quosystem than a continuous incentive flow supporting an elite network capable of ruling inways that weak official and social institutions could not ([71], p. 50; [51], p. 582; [69],p. 209). Those networks included, in varying interrelationships, Presidents, their families,and their personal entourages; heads of the chaebols (huge family-controlled conglom-erates); bureaucratic elites, and military leaders. These networks were bound together inpart by corrupt incentives, but also by regional and family loyalties, the threat from theNorth, and the wish to stave off political and economic competition. A weak civil societyand traditional attitudes toward authority facilitated this style; so did its ability, from themid-1970s onwards, to deliver rising living standards on a breathtaking scale.

Bringing power and money together

Park Chung Hee played a particularly critical role in the emergence of Elite Cartels. Park, aformer General, was a member of a junta that took power in 1961, and was electedPresident in 1963, 1967, and 1971 – the last time, after amending the Constitution to allowhimself a third term. After declaring martial law in 1972 he became more brutal; again theConstitution was amended to ratify and extend his powers. His governments were notableboth for repression and for launching spectacular chaebol-driven growth [37, 51, 78, 79].As growth accelerated, the chaebols became integral to a more equal alliance betweenofficial power and family/corporate wealth. By the 1980s those power centers werevirtually unified ([75], p. 470; [69], p. 216; [11], p. 33–34; [37], p. 97ff).

“Money politics” was simple in important respects: chaebols made payments to politicalleaders, their parties, or their pet charities. During the 1980s and early 1990s, suchcontributions ran as large as 22% of net profits ([78]: 9). This immense cash flowunderwrote party and legislative organizations and rewarded key bureaucrats and militaryfigures for loyalty. A significant portion also funded gift-giving and vote-buying similar tothat in Japan ([37], p. 99; [53], pp. 168–172). Some money stayed in the pockets of toppoliticians, although in the Park years it seems personal enrichment was secondary tobuilding political networks [37]. Later, as democratization proceeded, funds were slipped toopposition leaders in order to keep them compliant ([61], p. 220). In return chaebols gotaccess to capital and foreign exchange on preferential terms, light regulation, and laborpeace guaranteed by state repression.

Elite cartels produced both wealth and control: stability attracted investment, and Parkcould reward development “winners”, making productivity and export growth, as well asloyalty, keys to admission to the cartel. The extent of Park’s self-enrichment remainsunclear; he was often portrayed as resisting the personal temptations of money politics([11], p. 34). Some funds went to projects such as the “New Village Movement”, whichostensibly improved the quality of rural life but in reality was a slush fund. After Park’sassassination in 1979 about $500,000 was discovered among his effects ([38], p. 188), atrivial sum by comparison to the fortunes amassed by others.

Post-transition corruption

Kim Young-Sam, winner of the first competitive civilian presidential election, took office in1993 with reform as a stated priority. He mandated investigations of “money politics” underpredecessor Roh Tae Woo, inquiries that eventually included the leaders of the top thirtychaebols. Roh had taken in at least $650 million; four top Chaebols kicked in between $27

Japan, Korea, the Philippines, China: four syndromes of corruption 213

million and $33 million. Nine businessmen were indicted, and five convicted; Roh himselfwas convicted and sentenced to jail. Kim Dae-Jung, later the first opposition candidate tobecome president, accepted $2.6 million from Roh, and suspicions extended to, but weredenied by, Kim Young-Sam as well ([53], pp. 172–177; [51], pp. 573–574; [7], pp. 3–4; [69],pp. 207; [38], pp. 196–197). Chun Doo Whan, President from 1981 to 1987, was brought totrial in 1996, convicted, and condemned to death (a sentence later commuted). Corruptionwas not the only issue; charges included his roles in a military coup in 1979 and the Kwangjumassacre of protesting students in 1980. But Chun practiced “money politics” with particulareffectiveness: contributions ran as high as $1.2 billion, with Chun retaining $270 million anda share also helping buy off the opposition ([61], p. 220; [51], p. 171; [52], p. 575; [7], p. 4;[69], p. 207; [63], pp. 698–708; [37], p. 96; [38], pp. 187–188; [41], pp. 175–177).

Corruption not only enriched the national elite but also helped protect their sometimes –shaky hegemony. In economic development terms the result was both early benefits anddeferred costs. Chaebol-driven growth enabled Korea to exploit niches in internationaltrade. Low capital and labor costs and light regulation were available to those who paid up,and the biggest favors flowed to successful exporters. But as Korea’s maturing economytook on more global competitors drawbacks became apparent. Politicized lending led toovercapacity and overextension of product lines; environmental and labor regulations wereweak and poorly enforced. Corporate governance was opaque [5], with many chaebols’balance sheets existing mostly in the minds of family executives. The practice ofunderwriting each others’ loans turned corporate debt – often exceeding assets by spectacularmargins – into a house of cards. These accumulating risks, and the lack of incentive forpolitical leaders to demand accountability, deepened the 1997–1998 financial crisis.

In politics too elite cartel corruption bought short-term predictability but raised longer-term problems. Before 1987 presidents ran dictatorial regimes yet faced periodic challengesto their power; after the transition electoral competition gradually increased. In either phasebuilding a power base while staying within the rules was a doubtful proposition. Elite cartelcorruption did nothing to build meaningful parties or strengthen civil society. It likelyhelped maintain order during the transition: Sharing political money with opposition leaderswas a way to pacify them in the short term while accumulating damning evidence for uselater on. But building a durable constitution and party system, credible corruption reform(as opposed to spectacular trials of past Presidents), and creating a strong civil societyremain challenges today.

The Philippines: oligarchs, clans, and a weak state

Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos may dominate popular images of corruption in the Philippines,but reality is more complex. Entrenched oligarchs, their families, and their personal clientshave engaged in pervasive corruption, inhibiting the growth of democratic forces whileenriching themselves in both the public and private sectors. The nation is dominated by abouteighty families ([62], pp. 209–210; [67]; [52], p. 577; [68]); some are provincial dynasties,while others have risen to prominence through banking or industry [18, 30, 31, 50]. Someoligarchs have turned segments of the state into fiefdoms; others have used corrupt influenceto keep the state out of their business dealings. Still others have simply stolen from the nation.The Marcos era – especially the long period of martial law (1972–1986) – complicated thepicture: favored families thrived while others saw property and privileges vanish. Corruptionhelped mobilize the “People Power” revolution of 1986, since which time reforms haveproliferated. Still, the oligarch-and-clan syndrome remains very much alive.

214 M. Johnston

Oligarchs and Clans derive much of their power and wealth from outside the state – tothe extent that that distinction makes much difference – and exploit the state much moreeffectively than the state exploits them ([29], p. 424). Guaranteeing corrupt deals and in asetting of weak institutions is a chronic problem, however, and thus Presidents are handyfriends to have. Violence is part of the story too ([52], p. 582), particularly in remote areas.Oligarchs-and-clans corruption has done immense damage: powerful oligarchs and weak,faction-dominated official agencies inhibit grassroots democracy, a strong and independentcivil society, and (until 1986 at least) credible elections. On the economic side, oligarchicprivilege makes for a fragmented and unpredictable economy.

The Ferdinand and Imelda show

When Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos became President and First Lady in 1965 their jointnet worth was only about US$7,000. By 1986 that figure had climbed to between US$5–10 billion. During Martial Law Marcos imposed a special tax on coconuts and copra to becollected by an agency run by Eduardo Cojuangco, a member of his inner circle. With theproceeds Cojuangco acquired a bank, using a subsidiary to buy coconut processingfacilities. Marcos then ordered that subsidies for the whole industry be restricted to thatsubsidiary, creating a virtual monopoly ([75], p. 471). Similar maneuvers created a sugarexporting monopoly for crony Robert Benedicto; eventually his firm was empowered to setdomestic prices. Marcos backers Herminio Disini and Lucio Tan put competing cigarettecompanies out of business with the help of favorable import-export policies; kickbacks andequity interests in such dealings flowed to Marcos himself ([2]; [27], Chapters 2, 3; [75],p. 471; [10]). Imelda Marcos built a business empire of her own, diverting aid, bribeincome, and organized crime money into a series of bank and asset accounts. As Mayor ofMetro Manila, Minister of Human Settlements, and head of a regional developmentauthority she awarded lucrative construction contracts in exchange for a percentage of theaction. But the much of the wealth came from outright theft: during the Marcoses’ reign anestimated US $5 billion disappeared from the national treasury.

Marcos may have rearranged the oligarch-and-clan system in favor of selected croniesduring Martial Law but he did little to change it fundamentally. Once he was toppled in1986, there was little to restrain powerful families from regaining or extending theirinfluence. McCoy [49] describes the rise, fall, and restoration of the Lopez family, whobegan with large landholdings in the Western Visayas sugar region and, with presidentialconnections over the years, became powerful in the media, transportation, and energysectors as well as politics. During Martial Law Marcos moved against the Lopez empire andcrushed its principal figures, one of whom had been his own Vice-President. After 1986,however, the Lopezes were back – aided at first by President Aquino, who restored many oftheir industrial holdings, and later by building a new satellite-based media empire. By thetime General Fidel Ramos became president in 1992, Eugenio (Geny) Lopez, a fifth-generation family leader, was a close presidential associate. McCoy portrays the Lopezes’return as part of a post-1986 restoration of elite family power in a weak state ([49], pp. 513–517; see also [29, 52, 75]).

A tenacious syndrome

The damage produced by Philippine corruption is difficult to overstate. In 1999 theOmbudsman’s office estimated losses due to corruption at about 100 million PhilippinePesos (about US $2.5 million) daily; World Bank estimates put the loss at around one-fifth

Japan, Korea, the Philippines, China: four syndromes of corruption 215

of the national government budget, or at about 3.8% of GDP ([3], pp. 7, 8–10; Appendices1 and 2). Such figures are approximations at best, but if corruption did siphon off three to4% of GDP that, in most years, would be the difference between stagnation and solidgrowth. Such losses further enrich the oligarchs, perpetuate a weak and ineffective state,inhibit political and economic challenges to the oligarchs, and reflect massive transfers ofwealth into the hands of a few families – and then, most likely, out of the country.

China: riding the tiger – for now

China is a fragmented case of official mogul corruption: in a climate of rapidly growingeconomic opportunities, tightly controlled (official) political opportunities, and weakinstitutions, officials at all levels and in many sections of the country engage in corruptactivities with little to stop them. Corruption is pervasive and diverse; weakening partydiscipline and the absence of effective rule of law enabled cadres, already enjoyingconsiderable privilege ([21], p. xviii), to amass and exploit fragments of power, which inturn became a path to wealth.

When the People’s Republic was proclaimed in October, 1949, eradicating pastcorruption was an early priority. Still, in the years before Mao’s death in 1976 and thelaunch of market reforms in 1978, corruption was a continuing problem. Favoritism wascommon; production, in the centrally planned economy, was often falsely reported ([45],p. 111), less for self-enrichment than to avoid punishments for falling short of targets.Corruption for monetary gain was frequent but generally controlled in terms of both scopeand the stakes involved [25]. Also controlled were basic ideas about what corruption wasand what caused it: officially it reflected surviving feudal traditions and bourgeois values,or just individual deviance. Controls emphasized well-publicized trials and punishments,ideological discipline, and periodic mass campaigns [26].

In 1978 Deng Xiaoping launched the market-oriented reforms that have touched off aneconomic boom of historic proportions [20, 21, 70, 77]. But liberalization, whilelegitimating many specific market mechanisms, did not create well-institutionalized,national markets as such. Official profiteering (guandao) became a major problem, takingon various forms such as moonlighting, speculation, taking gifts, and bribery; officials havebeen able to create lucrative monopolies and administrative bottlenecks in a kind of graysector neither clearly public nor private. Judicial institutions were reconstructed, butbecame politicized and unaccountable [23], as did lending and credit. State bureaucraticcapacity lags far behind the spread of markets, and the party has experienced organizationaldecay. ([22], p. 285; [12, 24, 47, 76]).

The early results were impressive but uneven. For the first 15 years of reform a two-track price system created incentives to buy commodities at artificially low planned pricesand re-sell them on the market at much higher prices. Many managers over-stated or simplyskipped production under the plan and moved directly to the market. Such dealings couldbe covered up by cutting bureaucrats in on a share of the profits. Bureaucrats, in turn, wentinto business, often at their desks in state offices. Teachers compelled students to buy booksand supplies from them, railway workers traded in scarce freight and passenger space, andmilitary officers sold fuel, supplies, and special license plates exempting holders frominspections, tolls, and fees ([17], p. 268; [26]; [36]).

Decentralization created pockets of impunity, often in the gray area between state andmarkets [36]. Managers could tap into the cash and commodity flows of their enterpriseswith little risk of punishment [12]. Party cadres and bureaucrats raised their own salaries,

216 M. Johnston

spent public funds on housing and extravagant banquets, speculated in foreign exchange,and earned black-market fortunes. City officials might wink at local manufacturers’ taxobligations while levying special fees upon goods from elsewhere ([75], p. 807). Officialscolluded with entrepreneurs using interlinked powers, assets, and political connections [13].State and party power remain important, but ineffective oversight and weakened politicaldiscipline have turned scattered fragments of authority into valuable commodities forexploitation. Not only party and state officials, but also professionals such as reporters,lawyers, teachers, and doctors solicit money and favors with little systematic restraint.International investors found that officials at many levels expected payments. A contractmight describe desirable outcomes but it did not guarantee results or protect rights.

Much corruption is straightforward bribery, but city and provincial officials often operateunder-the-table business ventures too. The rewards are large but, for those few caught, thepunishments are even greater: Hu Changqing, a former Vice-Governor of Jiangxi Province,was sentenced to death in 2000 for bribery and unexplained wealth. In that same yearZheng Daofang, deputy head of transportation in Sichuan province, was sentenced to deathon bribery charges while his wife and son were imprisoned for unexplained wealth.Corruption allegations become weapons in factional struggles. In Beijing in the 1990sMayor Chen Xitong, his family, and cronies amassed great wealth, much of it in real estateand construction. In time they came to be seen as a political threat by national Party leaders.Chen was forced out; along with his wealthy and powerful son Chen Xiaotong and 40 otherlocal officials he was tried and imprisoned on corruption charges. A senior Vice-Mayorcommitted suicide, and the city’s party secretary was later convicted of corruption [1, 4, 8,46, 57, 74].

Tax fraud and embezzlement are major moneymakers ([70], Chapter 3). Two taxbureaucrats and a former prosecutor created corporations in the late 1990s that repeatedlyshipped empty containers between Guangdong and Hong Kong, backed by boguspaperwork claiming $7 billion in VAT rebates on fictitious exports. The three officialsand four others received death sentences in early 2001 [58]. Xu Jie and Du Jiansheng, twobureaucrats from Guizhou Province, were given death sentences in late 2000 forembezzlements totaling nearly $9 million [15, 57]. Increasingly Chinese corruptioninvolves collusion among local officials and their business favorites. An embezzlementring in Hebei province, fraudulent dealing in land leases by twenty bureau or departmentheads, and a corruption ring involving Public Security officials and a business leader inQuinghai Province are examples ([23], p. 86).

As central political and bureaucratic control weaken cadres fall back upon traditionalpractices and norms [47] or just go through the motions. Older and more personal modes ofgetting things done – notably kinship and the ties and reciprocities of guanxi – resurface, attimes in updated forms [19, 42, 44, 56]. Party leaders have responded with periodicdiscipline campaigns, but they failed to re-energize cadre commitments or localorganization. A party self-evaluation concluded that half of the party’s rural cells were“weak” or “paralyzed”; meanwhile party presence within new businesses is nearlynonexistent [54]. Manion [48] notes that reform efforts suffer from tensions between theparty’s Central Discipline Inspection Commission and the state’s Supreme People’sProcuratorate, and from the leadership’s own mixed messages. Gong argues that ideologicalpurity conflicts with the practicalities of governing, particularly during an era of rapidchange; party discipline inhibits the development of an autonomous and effectivebureaucracy; and political goals conflict with effective policy implementation. Lacking acoherent overall mission, functionaries “become an elite group in itself and for itself” ([21],pp. xviii–xix, and Chapter 8) – a good working definition of official mogul corruption.

Japan, Korea, the Philippines, China: four syndromes of corruption 217

Syndromes, Asian corruption, and reform

Much more could be said about any or all four of our cases, and about the extent to whichour syndromes do and do not apply to the corruption problems they experience. Theargument is not that all corruption in any one country exactly fits one syndrome and onesyndrome only; indeed, it is quite possible for a society to experience one syndrome ofcorruption in a particular region, or in a sector of government or the economy, whileexperiencing another elsewhere. The syndromes scheme can, however, help us make senseof the most important corruption problems occurring in a society, and of the underlying trendsand imbalances shaping those problems; an understanding of those deeper influences, in turn,can give us important pointers about reforms to implement and others to avoid.

If the scheme has any validity in itself, and if our four cases are bona fide tests of theways countries were categorized by the cluster analysis, then notions of “Asian corruption”need reassessment. There does not seem to be a distinctive form of corruption found acrossAsia, and only in the region. Japan’s corruption seems to have much in common with thatof other advanced market democracies; Korea’s style of corruption resembles that found inplaces as different as Italy and Botswana. India’s oligarch-and-clan corruption, while not asdisruptive or (by any means) violent as that found in Russia, the Caucasus, and many otherplaces, still seems to have much in common with numerous other societies emerging fromexperiences with centrally planned, heavily bureaucratized economies. And China’s officialmoguls, while operating in a much more decentralized manner than their counterparts did in(say) Daniel arap Moi’s Kenya or Suharto’s Indonesia, do exercise personal control offragments of party–state authority as they enrich themselves and their clients with fewconstraints. At the same time there is a predominant tendency toward oligarch-and-clancorruption, the most hazardous of the four syndromes in developmental terms, in Asia – butthat syndrome is also found elsewhere, and does not seem to reflect exclusively (or evendistinctively) Asian influences.

To be sure, the analysis does not attempt to incorporate cultural factors. Statisticalevidence on social and political institutions would, in an ideal world, be far more extensivethan the indicators used in the classification. Moreover, both the data analysis and casestudies are in effect snapshots rather than moving pictures in terms of their depiction ofcorruption problems. Change is to be expected; twenty years ago or 20 years hence wemight expect contrasting results, as patterns of participation and institutions evolve.

What can be said about corruption and development? First, and something of a repetitionof an earlier point, there does not seem to be a distinctive Asian flavor of corruption thatdoes good things for development. Japan’s corruption reflects the power of business in analready-developed political and legal system; the LDP’s modified one-party rule that wasboth cause and effect of much corruption pre-1993, and the somewhat more shaky powerthe party has held since then, probably did make needed economic adaptations moredifficult – a cautionary tale for Korea, should its style of corruption shift in Japan’sdirection. But like the USA, perhaps, the real costs of Influence Market corruption in Japanseem to have come, not in the form of a devastated economy, but rather in political terms asthe scope and credibility of political competition suffered.

Korea, by contrast, may have been aided in its stunning economic growth, and in itssomewhat surprising transition to democracy, by its particular style of corruption. Elitecartels may have hung together for all the wrong reasons, but they provided a measure ofpredictability that very likely aided economic growth, and the sort of political security thatallowed top figures to accommodate democratizing pressures gradually rather than lapsinginto the sorts of political repression and voracious hand-over-fist corruption [64] that might

218 M. Johnston

have been expected from elites with a strong sense of insecurity. Indirect support for thatargument is provided by the fact that institutions that might elsewhere have been thebackbone of democratic rule – constitutions, party systems, civil society – were quite weakduring much of Korea’s early democratic phase, and could benefit from considerablestrengthening even today. The point is not that the Elite Cartel syndrome is “goodcorruption”, but rather than in certain circumstances the elite stability it encourages andrewards may have indirect benefits for society. Too much should not be made of thatargument – Korean democracy had other sorts of strength, and corruption was scarcely themidwife at its birth. Still, it is difficult to imagine corrupt interests in Russia, for example,contributing much to democratization.

What, then, are we to make of rapid economic growth in India and China – twoeconomically liberalizing countries experiencing the most disruptive sorts of corruption andyet two emerging economic superpowers? One hint is that few of the other Asian countrieslisted in the oligarchs and clans, or the official moguls, groupings are experiencing anythinglike India’s and China’s successes. Are there then factors at work in India and China thatmight mitigate the economic costs of extensive corruption – factors such as the traditionalrole of “middlemen” in the former, and guanxi linkages and reciprocities in the latter – byreducing transaction costs and unpredictability, and by imposing a set of norms,expectations, and social sanctions that the formal institutional apparatus fails to provide[40]? Neither middlemen nor corruption are new in India, even though its emergence on theworld economic stage is more recent than that of China’s; but in fact India has been a solidperformer in terms of economic growth since the 1970s. Triesman [73] argues thatintegration into the world economy helps check some of the excesses of corruption; do thenew kinds of management expertise, partnerships, incentives, and expectations that areflowing into China and India partially counteract the new opportunities for corruption thathave also emerged?

The fact is we will never know. Measuring the effects of corruption on any aspect ofsociety would require that we know what would have happened without corruption –something we cannot determine, in part because we cannot re-run the past and also becausethe world has yet to see its first totally corruption-free society. Most of the statisticalestimates of the economic effects of corruption rest upon one-dimensional indices that areof doubtful validity [34, 39, 72]; worse yet, using those indices in cross-sectional statisticalcomparisons is to assume that corruption is the same thing, with the same causes andeffects, everywhere – varying only in degree. If the syndromes notion and our case studieshave accomplished nothing else, they are intended to rebut that sort of assumption. It isintriguing to speculate, however, on the ways differing societies respond to corruption, and –more complex yet – on the importance of social institutions such as guanxi and middlemanpractices through which corruption, and responses to it, are mediated. In that sense, whilethere may not be distinctive forms of “Asian corruption”, there may be very important Indian,Chinese, Korean, and Japanese – or even “Asian” – ways of dealing with corruption. Oursyndromes analysis cannot yet tell us much about those factors, but such a level of analysisseems a promising place to look for relatively specific implications of cultural and historicalvariables as influences upon economic and political change.

Reform: beyond the “consensus playbook”

We have learned immense amounts about both corruption and reforms since both regainedtheir place on the world policy agenda after the end of the Cold War. It remains striking,however, just how much the most frequently proposed strategies for reform resemble each

Japan, Korea, the Philippines, China: four syndromes of corruption 219

other – even when the focus is upon very different societies – and how much those reformsreflect the experiences and worldviews of affluent market democracies, and of theinternational organizations and businesses based in such places. Thus in country aftercountry anti-corruption groups are urged to pursue transparency, build up civil society,improve the quality of public management, install competitive elections, livelier parlia-ments, and independent judiciaries, and encourage a free press. Anti-corruptionorganizations are founded by the dozen; many of them run into stiff opposition, someencounter political repression, and all find it rough going when the flow of externalresources comes to an end. In place after place reform is depicted as a public good – as theinstallation of civic values and procedures that will benefit all, particularly in economicterms. Yet in most societies reform, thus defined, quickly runs into collective actionproblems as citizens realize corruption-fighting is arduous, risky work, and that they canabandon the effort to others while still benefiting from any eventual successes. Worse yet,good ideas and “best practices” in some contexts can be counterproductive elsewhere: Kenya’sMoi, for example, dramatically increased the scale of cronyism when he was faced by the threatof competitive elections and his supply of traditional patronage rewards ran dry [43].

Here again our syndromes may be of value, at least at a general level. Rather thanmoving directly to institutional and management styles that keep corruption under controlin advanced societies – styles that themselves, just like lower levels of corruption, areoutcomes of deeper developments rather than independent causes of progress againstcorruption – perhaps we should attack the deeper participation and institutional issues thatshape countries’ divergent corruption difficulties. Rather than aiming for more transparencyin the Philippines, where official institutions are already weak, maybe we should ease theclimate of insecurity that enables oligarchs to build followings and seek immediate short-term enrichment. Rather than trying to export civil-society and other liberal politicalstrategies to China, perhaps we should concentrate on the gradual growth of rule of/by law,and of social groups that, while not competing directly with the Party, might eventually putsuch legal options to use. Rather than asking any extensively corrupt society to aspire to bethe next Denmark or Finland, perhaps we should emphasize useful halfway states, such asbecoming the next Korea for a generation or two while Elite Cartel corruption compensates,de facto, for weak institutions. And wherever we seek reform, we must remember that theeradication of any one sort of corrupt practice does not necessarily mean that rationaladministration and honest, open markets will fill the gap – or even that what follows thereduction of corruption will necessarily be any better at all.

References

1. ABC News.com (2000). A big start: Trials open in china’s biggest corruption scandal. RetrievedOctober 9, 2003 from http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/china000913.html.

2. Aquino, B. (1987). Politics of plunder: The Philippines under Marcos. Quezon City, Philippines: GreatBooks Trading.

3. Batalla, E. C. (2000). De-institutionalizing corruption in the Philippines: Identifying strategic require-ments for reinventing institutions. Philippines: Transparent accountable governance. Retrieved July 13,2005 from http://www.tag.org.ph/references/PDFfiles/batalla.pdf.

4. BBC News Online (1998). The corrupt comrade, 31 July. Retrieved September 10, 2007 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/143163.stm.

5. Beck, P. M. (1998). Revitalizing Korea’s chaebol. Asian Survey, 38, 1018–1035.6. Blechinger, V. (1999). Changes in the handling of corruption scandals in Japan since 1994. Asian-Pacific

Review, 6, 42–64.

220 M. Johnston

7. Blechinger, V. (2000). Corruption through political contributions in Japan: Report on recent briberyscandals, 1996–2000. Paper presented at a conference on Bribery and Party Finance, sponsored byTransparency International, Villa La Pietra, Florence, Italy, October.

8. Bo, Z. (2000). Economic development and corruption: Beijing beyond ‘Beijing’. Journal ofContemporary China, 9(25), 467–487.

9. Boisseau, J.-M. (1997). Gifts, networks and clienteles: Corruption in Japan as a redistributive system. InD. della Porta, & Y. Meny (Eds.) Democracy and corruption in Europe (vol. 9 (pp. 132–147). London:Pinter.

10. Chaikin, D. (2000). Tracking the proceeds of organized crime: The Marcos case. Presented at theTransnational Crime Conference, Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra, March, 9. Retrievedfrom September 10, 2007 http://www.aic.gov.au/conferences/transnational/chaikin.html.

11. Cheng, T.-J., & Chu, Y.-H. (2002). State-business relations in South Korea and Taiwan. In L. Whitehead(Ed.) Emerging market democracies: East Asia and Latin America (vol. 3 (pp. 31–62). Baltimore: TheJohns Hopkins University Press.

12. Cheng, W. (2004). An empirical study of corruption within China’s state-owned enterprises. The ChinaReview, 4, 55–80.

13. Choi, E. K., & Zhou, K. X. (2001). Entrepreneurs and politics in the Chinese transitional economy:Political connections and rent-seeking. The China Review, 1, 111–135.

14. Christensen, R. V. (1996). Strategic imperatives of Japan’s SNTV electoral system. ComparativePolitical Studies, 29, 312–334.

15. CNN.com/world (2001). Seven sentenced to die in China corruption case. Retrieved September 10, 2007from http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/03/02/China.execute/.

16. Coser, L. A. (1977). Masters of sociological thought: Ideas in historical and social context (2nd ed.).New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

17. Dryer, J. T. (1994). The People’s Army: Serving whose interests? Current History, 5.18. Girling, J. L. S. (1997). Corruption, capitalism and democracy. London: Routledge.19. Gold, T., Guthrie, D, & Wank, D. (Eds.) (2002). Social connections in China: Institutions, culture, and

the changing nature of Guanxi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.20. Goldman, M., & MacFarquhar, R. (Eds.) (1999). The paradox of China’s post-Mao reforms. Cambridge,

MA: Harvard University Press.21. Gong, T. (1994). The politics of corruption in contemporary China: An analysis of policy outcomes.

Westport, CT: Praeger.22. Gong, T. (1997). Forms and characteristics of China’s corruption in the 1990s: Change With Continuity.

Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 30, 277–288.23. Gong, T. (2002). Dangerous collusion: Corruption as a collective venture in contemporary China.

Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 35, 85–103.24. Gong, T. (2006). Corruption and local governnance: The double identity of Chinese local governments in

market reform. The Pacific Review, 19, 85–102.25. Hao, Y., & Johnston, M. (1995). Reform at the crossroads: An analysis of Chinese corruption. Asian

Perspective, 19(1), 117–149.26. Hao, Y., & Johnston, M. (2002). Corruption and the future of economic reform in China. In A. J.

Heidenheimer, & M. Johnston (Eds.) Political corruption: Concepts and contexts (Chapter 31 ((pp. 583–604)3rd ed.). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.

27. Hawes, G. (1987). The Philippine state and the Marcos regime: The politics of export, Ithaca. NY:Cornell University Press.

28. Huntington, S. P. (1968). Political order in changing societies. New Haven: Yale University Press.29. Hutchcroft, P. D. (1991). Oligarchs and cronies in the Philippine State: The politics of patrimonial

plunder. World Politics, 43, 414–450.30. Hutchcroft, P. D. (2002). The politics of privilege: Rents and corruption in Asia. In A. J. Heidenheimer,

& M. Johnston (Eds.) Political corruption: Concepts and contexts (vol. 27 ((pp. 489–512)3rd ed.). NewBrunswick, NJ: Transaction.

31. Hutchcroft, P. D. (2003). Reflections on a reverse image: South Korea under Park Chung Hee and thePhilippines Under Ferdinand Marcos. Presented at The East Asia Institute, Korea University, and theAsia Center, Harvard University, 2000, revised 2003.

32. Iga, M., & Auerbach, M. (1977). Political corruption and social structure in Japan. Asian Survey, 17,556–564.

33. Johnson, C. A. (1995). Japan: Who governs? The rise of the developmental state. New York: Norton.34. Johnston, M. (2002). Measuring the new corruption rankings: Implications for analysis and reform. In A. J.

Heidenheimer, & M. Johnston (Eds.) Political corruption: Concepts and contexts (Chapter 44 ((pp. 865–884)3rd ed.). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.

Japan, Korea, the Philippines, China: four syndromes of corruption 221

35. Johnston, M. (2005). Syndromes of corruption: Wealth, power, and democracy. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.

36. Johnston, M., & Hao, Y. (1995). China’s surge of corruption. Journal of Democracy, 6, 80–94.37. Kang, D. C. (2002). Crony capitalism: Corruption and development in South Korea and the Philippines.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.38. Kang, D. C. (2002). Bad loans to good friends: Money politics and the developmental state in Korea.

International Organization, 56, 1.39. Khan, M. H., & Sundaram, J. K. (Eds.) (2000). Rents, rent-seeking and economic development.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.40. Khanna, J. & Johnston, M. (2007). India’s middlemen: Connecting by corrupting? Crime, Law and Social

Change, 48, 151–168.41. Kim, J. (2002). Clientelism and corruption in South Korea. In S. Kotkin, & A. Sajó (Eds.) Political

corruption in transition: A skeptic’s handbook (pp. 167–185). Budapest: Central European University Press.42. Kipnis, A. B. (1997). Producing Guanxi: Sentiment, self, and subculture in a North China Village.

Durham, NC: Duke University Press.43. Klopp, J. M. (2000). Pilfering the public: The problem of land grabbing in contemporary Kenya. Africa

Today, 47, 7–26.44. Ku, H. B. (2003). Moral politics in a South Chinese Village: Responsibility, reciprocity, and resistance.

Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.45. Kwong, J. (1997). The political economy of corruption in China p. c1997. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.46. Lü, X. (1999). From rank-seeking to rent-seeking: Changing administrative ethos and corruption in

reform China. Crime, Law, and Social Change, 32, 347–370.47. Lü, X. (2001). Cadres and corruption: The organizational involution of the Chinese communist party.

Stanford: Stanford University Press; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.48. Manion, M. (2004). Corruption by design: Building clean government in Mainland China and Hong

Kong. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.49. McCoy, A. W. (1993). Rent-seeking families and the Philippine State: A history of the Lopez family. In

A. W. McCoy (Ed.) An anarchy of families: State and family in the Philippines (pp. 429–536). Madison,WI: University of Wisconsin.

50. Montinola, G. (1999). Politicians, parties, and the persistence of weak states: Lessons from thePhilippines. Development and Change, 30, 739–774.

51. Moran, J. (1998). Corruption and NIC development: A case study of South Korea. Crime, Law andSocial Change, 29, 161–177.

52. Moran, J. (1999). Patterns of corruption and development in East Asia. Third World Quarterly, 20(3), 569.53. Park, B.-S. (1995). Political corruption in South Korea: Concentrating on the dynamics of party politics.

Asian Perspective, 19, 163–193.54. Pei, M. (2002). China’s governance crisis. Foreign Affairs, 81, 96–109.55. Pempel, T. J. (1998). Regime shift: Comparative dynamics of the Japanese political economy. Ithaca:

Cornell University Press.56. Peng, D. R. Y. (2004). Kinship networks and entrepreneurs in China’s transitional economy. American

Journal of Sociology, 109, 1045–1074.57. People’s Daily Online (2001). Corruption crackdown gathers pace. Retrieved October 9, 2003 from

http://fpeng.peopledaily.com.cn/200103/18/eng20010318_65274.html.58. People’s Daily Online (2001). Details of Xiamen smuggling case exposed. Retrieved September 10, 2007

from http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200107/25/eng20010725_75780.html.59. Pharr, S. (2005). Contributions, covenants, and corruption: Politicians and society in Japan. InM. Johnston (Ed.)

Civil society and corruption: Mobilizing for reform (pp. 23–32). Lanham, MD: University Press of America.60. Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. New York:

Simon and Schuster.61. Pye, L. W. (1997). Money politics and transitions to democracy in East Asia. Asian Survey, 37, 213–228.62. Riedinger, J. (1995). The Philippines in 1994: Renewed growth and contested reforms. Asian Survey, 35,

209–216.63. Schopf, J. C. (2001). An explanation for the end of political bank robbery in the Republic of Korea.

Asian Survey, 41, 693–715.64. Scott, J. C. (1972). Comparative political corruption. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.65. Seligmann, A. L. (1997). Japan’s new electoral system. Asian Survey, 37, 409–428.66. Varese, F. (2001). The Russian Mafia: Private protection in a new market economy. Oxford: Oxford

University Press.67. Sidel, J. T. (1997). Philippine politics in town, district, and province: Bossism in Cavite and Cebu.

Journal of Asian Studies, 56, 947–966.

222 M. Johnston

68. Sidel, J. T. (2000). Capital, coercion, and crime: Bossism in the Philippines. Stanford, CA: StanfordUniversity Press.

69. Steinberg, D. I. (2000). Continuing democratic reform: The unfinished symphony. In L. Diamond, & B.-K. Kim (Eds.) Consolidating democracy in South Korea (Chapter 8 (pp. 203–238). Boulder, CO: LynneRienner.

70. Sun, Y. (2004). Corruption and market in contemporary China. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.71. Tat, Y. K. (1996). Corruption and its Institutional Foundations: The Experience of South Korea. IDS

Bulletin, 27, 2.72. Thomas, M. A. (2007). What do the worldwide governance indicators measure? Unpublished

manuscript. Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD (revised manuscript, January).73. Triesman, D. (2000). The causes of corruption: A cross-national study. Journal of Public Economics, 76,

399–457.74. Voice of America (2000). China corruption. Retrieved from September 10, 2007 http://www.fas.org/

news/china/2000/000308-prc1.htm.75. Wedeman, A. (1997a). Looters, rent-scrapers, and dividend-collectors: Corruption and growth in Zaire,

South Korea and the Philippines. Journal of Developing Areas, 31, 457–478.76. Wedeman, A. (1997b). Stealing from the farmers: Institutional corruption and the 1992 IOU crisis. China

Quarterly, 152, 805–831.77. Wong, L. (2004). Market reforms, globalization and social justice in China. Journal of Contemporary

China, 13, 151–171.78. Woo, J. E. (1991). Race to the swift: State and finance in Korean industrialization. New York: Columbia

University Press.79. Woo-Cumings, M. (Ed.) (1999). The developmental state. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.80. Woodall, B. (1996). Japan under construction: Corruption, politics, and public works. Berkeley:

University of California Press.

Japan, Korea, the Philippines, China: four syndromes of corruption 223