JANUARY - JUNE 2004 57

Norms, IdentityChange and EUEnlargement:

Present and FutureOriginal paperUDC 061.1EU

Received inMarch 2004

This paper analyses the European Union (EU) - Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) interaction in aperspective regarding identity as a set of constitutive norms, which are in close relation to "simple ".

regulative norms. On one hand, after the Cold War the EU found itself in a tortuous identity-transformation process (well illustrated by the present Constitution debate). The 1989 CEE, on the other,started in a power, ideology, and identity vacuum. Still, countries in the former communist camp able toconclude European Agreements escaped Yugoslav and post-Soviet instability. They are now part of EU

(and NATO}.Stability seems to be the key. But its explanation is not a simple, political/strategic one. I claim stability

was maintained due to a security regime within which Western values and norms were imported andcontributed to changing the CEE identities. In other words, EU's own constitutive norms were transmitted

to CEE through the intermediate of regulative norms this regime helped generalize.The paper also examines the possibility that EU applies the same pattern to other targets: Western

Balkans, Commonwealth of Independent States, and Turkey. It is argued that the determinant factor is bothEU's and those countries' capacity to turn EU regulative norms into constitutive norms; that is, to create

EU identities.

Theodor Tudoroiu*

Key words: European Union, EU enlargement, Central and Eastern Europe

1.1ntroductionDuring the last 15 years, one of the major pro-

blems confronting the European Union (EU) con-cerned its symbiotic relation with Central and EasternEurope (CEE). This paper analyzes the EU-CEEinteraction in a perspective that considers identity asa set of constitutive norms, which are in close relationwith "simple", regulative norms. It is argued thatCEE's evolution from post-1989 identity vacuum toTHE EU membership is a direct consequence of thetransmission ofEU's own constitutive norms throughthe intermediation of regulative norms generalized inthe framework of a CEE security regime.

First, the theoretical link between constitutiveand regulative norms is explored. Then, three key ele-ments of any analysis concerning the CEE-EU rela-tion are identified. This is followed by a presentation

*Notice about the author: Theodor Tudoroiu has a MA of the College ofEurope, Bruges, Belgium, and is currently writing a' Ph.D. thesis onCentral and Eastern European security in the Political Sciencedepartment of the Universite de Montreal. His previous publications arerelated to European and Balkan security and European integration.

of the two components of the norms transfer process:the Western genesis of norms and their Easternassimilation. Finally, Wendt's "three cultures of anar-chy" are used to explain CEE's evolution and to eva-luate the possibility of further EU enlargement.

2. Identity and Norms seen asConstitutive and Regulative Norms

The theoretical approach I intend to adopt in thispaper is a Wendt-inspired branch of constructivismemphasizing precisely "the power of identity" (Ha-senclever et al. 1997: 167). In fact, as suggested bythe title of the chapter signed by Jepperson, Wendtand Katzenstein (1996) - ''Norms, Identity, and Cul-ture in National Security" - constructivism in generalclosely associates identity and norms. This is done ina context where "culture" is perceived as "a set of (oo.)standards (...) defining what entities and actors existin a system and how they operate and interrelate" (p.56). Following these same authors, "the concept of

58 CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW

'identity' thus functions as a crucial link betweenenvironmental structures and interests" (p. 59).

Towards the middle ofthe 90s, this essential rolewas demonstrated by important empirical research.The analysis of the end of South African apartheid,performed by Audie Klotz (1995), the one dedicatedby Koslowski and Kratochwil to the end of the Sovietempire (1994) and the empirical studies of the bookedited by Katzenstein (1996) (the most importantprobably being Risse-Kappen's view of NATO as asecurity community) demonstrated that "internati-onal politics is not an autonomous sphere but alwayspart of a larger endeavor, that is, of institutionalizingboth identities and political communities as well astheir interactions" (Koslowski et Kratochwil 1994:247).

Still, in most of these analyses the norms-identity relation is unbalanced, attributing to the lattera rather secondary role: it creates the link between"environmental structures" and "interests" by modi-fying itself under the influence of internationalnorms; but it can not directly influence these norms.The CEE case is different, as the identity change wasparalleled by a transformation of the very nature ofintra-regional relations. This is the reason why I amusing Wendt's approach.

In this view, state-society complexes changetheir identities due to a process of social learningallowing them to accommodate international factors.This change, in turn, modifies the internationalmilieu and the nature of relations between the respec-tive states. Therefore, one can speak about a balancednorms-identity relation.

For Wendt there are four forms of identity: per-sonal (or, for organizations, corporative), type, roleand collective. Every actor (individual/state) canhave only one personal/corporative identity. It is akind of platform for the other forms, which aremultiple: "We all have many, many identities, andthis is no less true of states. Each is a script or schema,constituted to varying degrees by cultural forms,about who we are and what we should do in a certaincontext" (Wendt 1999: 230). These identities areconstituted of structures that are interior ("identity isat base a subjective or unit-level quality, rooted in anactor's self-understanding", p. 224) and exterior(following the logic of self-other relation).

It is interesting that, on one hand, the preemi-nence of interior structures is acknowledged: «States(individuals) are onto logically prior to the statessystem (society)" (p. 244). But, on other hand, "Thefact that states' bodies are constituted by internalstructures in no way precludes them forming identi-ties and interests by interacting with each other" (p.245). In fact, this interaction constitutes the principalengine of identity change, a process that Wendtexamines in detail in the first chapter of his book.

With regard to definitions, this author describesthe identity of a state-society complex as "relativelystable, role-specific understandings and expectations

about self' (Wendt 1992: 397). In other words, iden-tity is "a property of international actors thatgenerates motivational and behavioral dispositions"(Wendt 1999: 224). One could notice that this per-spective is quite close to that putting in relation iden-tity and norms: "In much the same way that Wendthas distinguished between structure and agent ininternational relations theory, we will distinguishbetween norms as the regulative cultural content ofinternational politics and identities - regulative ac-counts of actors themselves" (Kowert et Legro 1996:453). Approaching norms as "regulative norms" andidentities as "constitutive norms" provides a betterunderstanding of their relation: "One would expectthe regulative norms (..) to reflect the constitutivenorms that shape the collective identity of the securitycommunity" (Risse-Kappen 1996: 368). As bothidentities and norms are "normative structures" that,through the intermediation of interests and policies,determine the states' behavior (Kowert et Legro1996: 462), it is by the study of this behavior thatidentity change may be evaluated.

The next sections will introduce a security regi-me. With regard to this subject, "Wendt (..) discussesthe identity problematic as one of whether and underwhich conditions identities are more collective ormore egoistic. Depending on where states fall on thiscontinuum from positive to negative identificationwith other states, they will be more or less willing toengage in collective security practices" (Zehfuss2002: 40). Therefore, this approach provides themeans to analyze both the identity change I consideressential for CEE and the instruments that helpedproduce this change.

3. The Three Key Elements ofCEE-EU Analysis

I have already mentioned the important role ofCEE in EU's debates. Reciprocally, for the Easternhalf of the European continent the relation with theEU is essential. One can even say that, in CEEcontext, "success" might well be related to a country'sadmission to EU. From this point of view, there areeight "successful" countries - the Visegrad 4, thethree Baltic States, and Slovenia - and two "almostsuccessful" - Bulgaria and Romania (already mem-bers of NATO but relegated to a second wave of theEU enlargement). On the other hand, the WesternBalkans and the CIS republics are clearly ''unsuc-cessful".

In my view, any analysis of this differentiationhas to take into consideration three closely inter-related elements: identity change, stability and theexistence of a special relation with EU.

Identity cbaneeThe fall of communism created not only an

ideological, but also an identity vacuum in the formerSoviet block. The previous system of values was

JANUARY - JUNE 2004 59

completely bankrupt; post-communist state-societycomplexes needed to forge new identities.

Of course, all ex-communist countries progres-sively acquired new identities, as none of them couldstay communist. But the direction of this change wasessential: it was only a Western- inspired, democraticidentity change which led to the above-mentioned"success". The EU admission was the final stage ofatrajectory marked by the assimilation of the Westernsystem of values. A quantitative proof of this state-ment will be presented later in the paper.

StabilityIn 1989, Yugoslavia seemed to be in the best

position to join EU: the burden of its communist pastwas by far the lightest. Its relations with the West ingeneral and the European Community in particularwere excellent and had been so for a long time. Butpolitical and military instability ruined any hope ofpro-Western evolution. From the siege ofVukovar tothe war in Kosovo, a decade was spent - and lost - inwarfare.

Stability, then, is another key element. But itsexplanation cannot be a simple, political/strategicone. Yugoslav wars were possible because post-com-munist vacuum was filled by nationalist ideologies.Nationalism was also present in many former Sovietrepublics where it was often accompanied by diffe-rent forms of authoritarian post-or even neo-com-mumsm.

Proliferation of non-democratic systems ofvalues generated political and military instability. Onthe contrary, there was no military tension in the areaprogressively dominated by the Western system ofvalues. Democratic identity change was closelyassociated to regional stability.

This affirmation might seem incomplete, as thelatter link has no obvious explanation. I claim thatdemocratic identity change and regional stability arerelated due to an intermediate variable: an informal

CEE security regime, covering the ten "successful"and "almost successful" countries and whose institu-tional structure was based on the CSCE/OSCE, EUsEurope Agreements and NATO's Partnership forPeace (PfP).

It is through this regime that Western values andnorms were imported and contributed to changingCEE identities. In other words, EUs own constitutivenorms were transmitted to CEE through the interme-diation of regulative norms this regime helped gene-ralize.

Special relation with EUIt is generally accepted that the EU - and particu-

larly, at least in the first phase, its Europe Agreements- had a tremendous influence on CEE's overalltransformation. Table 1 illustrates the many instru-ments employed in this process.

Still, two points have to be made. First, specificactions and instruments are secondary in comparisonto the transfer of values and norms from the EU toCEE. It is the success of this transfer - and the sub-sequent identity change of CEE countries - that madepossible the creation and the efficiency of thoseinstruments. If the value transfer does not work -which is the case in Turkey, for example - the overallrelation is unsatisfactory and the EU actions andinstruments remain modest and rather inefficient.

Second, the importance of the value transfermakes illogical the separation of the EU from otherorganizations accomplishing the same mission. Iconsider the most important such organizations arethe other components of the CEE security regime:CSCE/OSCE and NATO's PfP. They played a majorrole in CEE's identity change process and their acti-ons in this domain were convergent with those ofEU.Therefore, instead of exclusively speaking of EUsinfluence on CEE I will concentrate on the globaleffect of the security regime on CEE state-societycomplexes.

Table 1 EU-CEE relations (Demetropoulou 2002: 93)

Third Step

Agenda2000-Reinforced

Fourth Step Pre-accessionStrategy

Accession ~~~~~~~------------------~Process

60 CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW

These three elements - identity change, stabilityand EUisecurity regime influence - are therefore notonly closely inter-related but also mutually consti-tutive. There could be no identity change withoutstability or without the regime's influence; stabilityitself was a product of both security regime existenceand progressive identity transformation; and regime'ssurvival and functioning was possible only due to thesuccess of the identity change process. The nextsections will further explore the mechanisms of thiscomplex interdependence.

4. The Western Genesis of NormsEU and, at a more general level, Western values

transformed CEE identities within a transfer processfollowing the next diffusion mechanism:

Western constitutive norms (international)regulativenorms eEE constitutive norms

I will first address the earlier part ofthis process,the creation of (international) regulative norms on thebasis of Western constitutive norms, id est on thebasis of Western identities. These identities, whosefundamentals are democracy and capitalism, werevery well defmed at the level of state-society com-plexes. However, in 1989 this was not the case for theEuropean Community itself.

One might say that even today things are notmuch better and, short of a comprehensive EuropeanConstitution, the European Union's identity remainsa matter of debate. But before Maastricht, despite themodest progress due to the Single European Act, EClegal texts were only superficially touching the ques-tion of democracy. They could not yet provide the setof regulative norms needed to transform the East.

This serious problem could nevertheless besolved due to the fact that ECIEU did not act alone: itor rather its CEE-oriented activities, and essentiallythe Europe agreements, were a part of the CEEsecurity regime. In the framework of this regime, itwas the CSCE that had formally defined a set ofnorms to be "exported" eastwards.

These norms originated in the famous HelsinkiDecalogue, itself inspired by UN values. In 1975,Cold War made its implementation uncertain. Fifteenyears later, in a completely modified internationalcontext, the same principles were much more attrac-tive.

Nevertheless, with the exception of the seventhprinciple, stating the respect of human rights, this wasa normative instrument exclusively focusing onEuropean stability. That is why the 1990 Charter ofParis was used to add an important update: two newprovisions, concerning democracy and market econo-my, allowing the creation of an effective set of (regula-tive) norms perfectly reflecting Western constitutivenorms.

This new normative apparatus was diffused inCEE by the CSCE itself, by the other components ofthe security regime - both Europe Agreements and PiPtexts explicitly refer to the respect of Helsinki FinalAct principles and Charter of Paris provisions (Flynnand Farrell 1999: 509) - and, at a general level, by allWestern organizations, states and NGOs interactingwithCEE.

Its complex structure, combining the "classicaldemocracy + capitalism" elements with the security-related Helsinki principles, provided an ideologicaland normative basis not only for the internal changeof CEE state-society complexes but also for thetransformation ofCEE intra-regional relations. Tran-sition towards democracy and market economy wasto be protected by the stability insured by the securityregime; and this regime's success was to be facilitatedby the above-mentioned transition.

5. The Eastern Assimilation ofWestern Norms

I shall now address the second part ofthe normstransfer process: the transformation of'Western-origi-nated regulative norms into CEE constitutive norms.As already mentioned, the approach I adopt is basedon Wendt's sociological constructivism. Basically,under the pressure of their international environment,CEE state-society complexes were subject to a lear-ning process. On one hand, this transformed theiridentities; on another, the identity change helped furt-her transform the international (regional) environ-ment.

This complex phenomenon respects thefollowing scheme:

(Western inspired) international/Europeanenvironment creation of norms importation inter-iorization identity change creation/developmentofthe regime

As we have already seen, the creation of norms(that is the transformation of Western constitutivenorms into pan-European regulative norms) tookplace within the CSCE. Their diffusion was insuredmainly by the newly created structures of the CEEsecurity regime. We might add that, mostly due totheir conditionality, the Europe Agreements were themost efficient instrument of this normative transfer.

The next stage, interiorization and identitychange, took place at the level of state-society com-plexes. It was greatly helped by the post-communistidentity vacuum and the consequent need of a newsystem of values. But the Western norms were hardlythe only candidate. Two rival systems of values werein the race: ultra-nationalism and (neo-) communism-inspired authoritarianism.

In fact, out of the 27 post-communist states, onlythe 10 members of the security regime succeeded in

JANUARY - JUNE 2004 61

adopting Western norms. The identity change of theremaining 17 countries (Western Balkans and CIS)was not Western-inspired. This can be clearly demon-strated using Freedom House's annual 'Freedom in theWorld Country Ratings'.

For each country, these ratings express citizens'degree of freedom computed on the basis of politicalrights and civil liberties evaluation. In other words,they are related to the system of values associated tothe political system of the respective country andtherefore illustrate the degree of Western-inspiredidentity transformation of its state-society complex.

The ratings range from 1(absolute freedom) to 7(no freedom). A country is free if it scores between 1and 2.5, partially free between 3 and 5.5 and not freebetween 5.5 and 7. The average regional ratings forWestern Balkans, CIS and the security regime for1990-2002 are illustrated in graph No. 1:

non-democratic trends: not only the average was, formost of the period, on the bad side of the 5.5 limit, butin 2000 it started to worsen. If one might hope that,one day, the Balkans reach the regime's present level(Croatia is a good example), this doesn't seem to bethe case for most of the former Soviet republics.

This distribution and especially the enormousdifference among members of the regime and the restof former communist countries confirm the relationbetween the Western norms assimilation and themembership of the CEE security regime. It is withinthis regime and only there that those norms andvalues were assimilated by the population and the po-litical system. Outside the regime, values of a diffe-rent nature still predominate and political systemswere able to preserve their oppressive nature due tothe legitimacy provided by nationalism or neo-com-munism.

7

6

4 ~~ -L~~~

3 +---~-----------------------------------1

2 +---------------~~~--------------------_1

1

--*- Balk. occ.-C.E.I.~Regime

Graph No.1Freedom House freedom ratings - average regional ratings for Western Balkans, CIS and the security regime, 1990-2002

The differences among the three regions areobvious. The average for the regime's membercountries rapidly decreased to values typical of the"free countries" category, continuously improvedand came very close to the Western Europe level (1.2in comparison to 1.1). On the contrary, the other tworegions preserved average ratings close to the limitseparating "partly free" and "free" countries. WesternBalkans, marked by the nationalism associated withthe Yugoslav secession war, started very late a pro-gress that brought them in 2002 at the level the regimehad had eleven years earlier. Things are even worse in

. CIS, where neo-communism, nationalism and feudal(if not even tribal) traditions combined to reinforce

Next, I return to the scheme of CEE identitytransformation. Its last part is about the effects ofthischange on the international/regional environment.More precisely, while Western Balkans and CISassociated non-Western systems of values with mili-tary instability, countries having interiorized Westernnorms added to their internal identity change anexternal one directly linked to the stability compo-nent illustrated by the Helsinki Decalogue.

Since 1989, there was absolutely no militarytension between countries characterized by the adop-tion of Western norms. This helped create a stable,pacific regional environment favoring the further de-velopment of the security regime. In turn, the regime

62 CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REvrnw

helped reinforce the pacific trend, thus protecting thetransformation process within the respective states.

6. A Voyage through the ThreeCultures of Anarchy

One of Wendt's important contributions to thestudy of international system's evolution is his theoryconcerning "the three cultures of anarchy". Fol-lowing this approach, there can be an evolution (notmandatory but at least unidirectional, except for exo-genous shock) between the three possible "cultures ofanarchy": from Hobbes (enemies) to Locke (rivals)and then towards Kant (friends). The existence of aKantian culture does not mean absolute harmony: allthree cultures share three degrees of internalization ofthe norms (by force, price and legitimacy), whichsimultaneously influence international relations.

Since 1989, CEE has followed exactly this tra-jectory. Acting under the pressure off actors related toconstraint, interest and legitimacy, CEE states foundthemselves in a continuous identity transformation,which made them evolve from the Hobbesian anar-chy (the security vacuum of 1989-90) to a Lockeanculture (the CEE security regime) preparing the recentpassage to the Kantian culture ofthe enlarged EU.

This evolution was largely influenced by the EUand especially by its Europe Agreements. But it couldhave not been so rapid without the contribution ofother structures and above all without the normgenesis and diffusion process that took place withinCSCE.

A logical question envisions the possibility ofextending this evolution to other areas. Of course,Bulgaria, Romania and, very probably, Croatia, arealready on their way. In fact, Bulgaria's main problemis the link Brussels sees between Sofia's and Bucha-rest's adhesion. In contrast, Romania's laggardness incompleting the negotiation process is a matter ofserious concern. If the conclusion of negotiations in2004 is missed, Bucharest might have to wait for somemore years. And, given the extreme efficiency ofZagreb's efforts towards accession, one could eventake into consideration a Romania-Croatia simulta-neous enlargement sometime in 2009-2011. Still, thepoint is that, even in Romania, the identity change isfollowing its course in the good direction. Speed mightbe unsatisfactory, but this is a secondary matter.

Turkey, on the other hand, does not seem to fol-low. Instead of assimilating Western norms, itssociety is more and more attracted by Islamic values.Of course, one might claim that Turkish Islamists arenot fundamentalist and should be seen as a Muslimequivalent of Christian-Democrats. Indeed, no anti-democratic political action can be pointed out. Butthis is at least in part due to Turkish military pressureand to the EU conditionality. Furthermore, the ques-tion is not if that society's transformation is from

secular towards fundamentalist Islamic values ortowards moderate Islamic ones. The question is ifTurkey's identity change is due to the assimilation ofthe Western democratic system of values. As this isnot the case, there is an evolution that clearly dis-tances Turkish society from the CEE pattern and,consequently, makes improbable its admission intotheEU.

The Western Balkans (Croatia excepted) are inno better situation. In Serbia, ultra-nationalist andanti-Western views are still predominant. It mighttake a generation to change that. Bosnia and Kosovoare international protectorates, which have to becomereal states before even thinking about the EU adhe-sion. Albania and Macedonia, while in a better posi-tion, also need huge improvements of their internalsituation. Overall, most of the region is highly unpre-pared to follow the CEE pattern of identity change.Still, it has a tremendous advantage: the proximity ofthe EU and its involvement are slowly pushing thingsin the good direction. It might be long, but the finalresult can be positive.

The Commonwealth of Independent Statesseems, on the contrary, unable to follow a similar tra-jectory. Its limited democratic or clearly authoritarianregimes cannot provide the framework required by aWestern-inspired identity change. Therefore, officialstatements claiming the political will - or interest - tocreate conditions for a (remote) EU enlargement inthat region cannot be taken into consideration. Onemight say that CIS external border seems to be the"natural limit" ofthe EU expansion.

7. Conclusions

The fundamental element of the EU-CEE rela-tion (and of the latter's absorption by the former) isidentity change. Nevertheless, this change has to beconsidered in close association with regional stabilityand with the contribution of other organizations be-sides EU. Western constitutive norms generated simi-lar CEE constitutive norms through the inter-mediation of international regulative norms createdand transmitted in the framework of a CEE securityregime whose components were CSCE/OSCE, ED'sEuropean Agreement and NATO's PfP.

Only ex-communist state-society complexeshaving successfully completed this identity trans-formation were able to migrate from the Hobbesiananarchy (the security vacuum of 1989-90) to aLockean culture (the CEE security regime) and thento the Kantian culture ofEU. Bulgaria, Romania andCroatia will soon follow the same trajectory. But theremaining Western Balkans might need a generationto imitate them while Turkey and the Commonwealthof Independent States, sharing different systems ofvalues, are unlikely candidates for the future EUenlargement. •

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BIBLIOGRAPHYCSCE (1975) Acte Final, Conference sur la Securite et la

Cooperation en Europe, Helsinki, ler aoiit 1975.CSCE (1990) Charte de Paris pour une nouvelle Europe, Conference

sur la Securite et la Cooperation en Europe, Paris, 19-21 novembre 1990.Demetropoulou, Leeda (2002), 'Europe and the Balkans:

Membership Aspiration, EU Involvement and Europeanization Capacityin South Eastern Europe', Southeast European Politics, 3(2-3),November2002,pp.87-106.

Flynn, Gregory et Henry Farrell (1999) 'Piecing Together theDemocratic Peace: The CSCE, Norms, and the "Construction" ofSecurity in Post-Cold War Europe', International Organization 53(3),SununerI999,pp.505-535.

Freedom House, www.freedomhouse.org consulted December 10,2003.

Hasenclever, Andreas, Peter Mayer et Volker Rittberger (1997)Theories 0/ International Regimes. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.

Jepperson, Ronald 1., Alexander Wendt et Peter J. Katzenstein(1996), 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security' in Peter J.Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identityin World Politics, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 33-78.

Katzenstein, Peter J. (ed.) (1996) The Culture of National Security.Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia UniversityPress.

Klotz, Audie (1995), Norms in International Relations: The Struggleagainst Apartheid, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

For these authors, "identities ( ..) are prescriptive representations ofpolitical actors themselves and of relationships to each other" (Kowert etLegro 1996: 453).

Risse-Kappen defines norms as "collective expectations of properbehavior for a given identity" (Risse-Kappen 1996: 368).

For a complete presentation of this regime see Tudoroiu (2003).I. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty.II. Refraining from the threat or use offorce.III. Inviolability of frontiers.IV.Territorial integrity of States.V.Peaceful settlement of disputes.VI. Non-intervention in internal affairs.VII. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including

Koslowski, Rey et Friedrich V. Kratochwil (1994), Understandingchange in international politics: the Soviet empire's demise and theinternational system', International Organization, 48(2), Spring 1994,pp.215-247.

Kowert, Paul et Jeffrey Legro (1996) 'Norms, Identity, and TheirLimits: A Theoretical Reprise' in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture 0/National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York:Columbia University Press, pp. 451-497.

Risse-Kappen, Thomas (1996) 'Collective Identity in a DemocraticCommunity: The Case ofNATO' in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture0/ National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York:Columbia University Press, 357-399.

Tismaneanu, Vladimir and Mircea Mihaies, Incet, spre Europa. Iasi:Polirom, 2000.

Tudoroiu, Theodor (2003), 'Le regime de securite de I'EuropeCentrale et Orientale post-communiste', paper presented at the Colloqucdes etudiants des cycles superieurs du Groupe d'etude et de recherche surla securite internationale (GERSI) "Relations internationales et etudes desecurite", Mars 29, 2003, Montreal, Quebec.

Wendt, Alexander (1992) 'Anarchy Is What States Make ofIt: TheSocial Construction of Power Politics', International Organization 46,pp.391-425.

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NOTESthe freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.

VIII. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples.IX. Cooperation among States.X. Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.

(CSCE 1975: la)All data was found at www.freedomhouse.org.EU's influence took all these forms, especially if one regards its

conditionality policy towards CEE. ptp was closer to the first twofactors while CSCEIOSCE exclusively used the legitimacy component.

The title of a book on this subject can be quoted as a goodintuitive description of the situation: "Slowly, towards Europe"(Tismaneanu and Mihaies 2000).