jan uythoven, ab/btlhccwg, 3 may 2006 page 1 450 gev commissioning machine protection needs to be...
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Jan Uythoven, AB/BT LHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 1
450 GeV Commissioning450 GeV CommissioningMachine ProtectionMachine Protection
Needs to be commissioned to: Prevent damage with the used, higher intensities at injection Prepare for the next phases of commissioning
The commissioning of the MPS needs to be well defined and procedures agreed upon BEFORE we get there
Good example JW note for CNGS commissioning: “Interlocked Equipment of the CNGS and LHC Transfer Lines”, edms 714582
Took about 8 months to get this all written down and agreed For LHC @ injection: can not be treated in one presentation
All MP systems should be active from the start of operation with and without beam
Avoid masking interlocks for start up Systems need to be verified once they are ‘obligatory’ =
their protection is required Need a reliable limitation of LHC and SPS intensity!
Jan Uythoven, AB/BT LHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 2
First tests without beamFirst tests without beam
Commissioning of MPS and connected equipment First test in the laboratory Followed by equipment test in the machine Followed by hardware Commissioning
Equipment tests under ‘normal operating conditions’ Interface between systems
A maximum of functions should be tested without beam Individual equipment, interface between systems, Post Mortem
analysis, Sequencer, Safe Beam Parameters, etc. Also if they can only be tested partially without beam, the partial
tests should be done as soon as possible
Copy JU “Cham06”
3
Discussion : first pilot @ 450 GeV
•Some very central systems will be tested and ready to go:
•The Beam Interlock System
•Key beam interlock clients:
• Vacuum
• Access
• Powering interlock system
• Dump system
• Critical BLMs
• Experiments(*)
Un-maskable input signals to the BIS
Does not mean that those systems are 100% operational – e.g. Dump
System
(*) The experiments request un-maskable inputs, they must therefore be ready during the machine checkout with all other un-maskable inputs !
From JW “Cham06”
Jan Uythoven, AB/BT LHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 4
Systems to CommissionSystems to Commission The core of the system
The Beam Interlock System (BIS) The LHC Beam Dumping System (LBDS)
All the systems connected to it BLM QPS – PIC – WIC FMCM Injection system Collimator System ….
Related systems Hardware
Safe Beam Parameters Beam Presence Flag
Software Post Mortem system Management of critical settings Software Interlock System Sequencer
Beam Energy Tracking
Beam Dumping System
4 x DCCT Dipole Current
(4/5, 5/6, 6/7, 7/8)
RF turn clock
Powering Interlock System
Quench Protection
Power Converters
Discharge Switches
AUG
UPS
Cryogenics essentialcircuits
auxiliarycircuits
Safe LHCParameters
Beam Current Monitors
CurrentEnergy
Energy
SafeBeamFlag
Required also for safe beam
SPS ExtractionInterlocks
TL collimators
Timing PM Trigger
BLMs aperture
BPMs for Beam Dump
LHC Experiments
Collimators / Absorbers
NC Magnet Interlocks
Vacuum System
RF + Damper
dI/dt beam current
BLMs arc
BPMs for dx/dt + dy/dt
dI/dt magnet current
OperatorsSoftware Interlocks
Screens
Machine Protection System and connected equipment
Injection Kickers
LHCBeam
Interlock System
Access Safety System
Beam DumpTrigger
Required for unsafe beam
Jan Uythoven, AB/BT LHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 6
ProceduresProcedures
Need to check that previous diagram is complete + Need to define the subsystems
Have to agree upon checks to be performed on these systems for the different phases Phases also to be defined in more detail
Check interplay between the different systems First outline on the next slides, based on
“Chamo06” presentations
7
Stages for Machine Protection
Comm. before first beam
First pilot 1012 protons 43 bunches156 bunches
936 bunches
0.45 / 7 TeV 0.45 / 7 TeV 0.45 / 7 TeV 0.45 / 7 TeV 0.45 / 7 TeV
SAFE at 450 GeV
Hardware commissioning
Machine checkout
Beam commissioning
43 bunch operation
?75ns ops
25ns ops IInstall Phase II and MKB
25ns ops II
Stage I II III IV
No beam Beam Beam
‘Just’ SAFE at 7 TeV
From JW “Cham06”
System
Commissioning before
beam possible ?
First pilot beam 10^12 43 bunches
1.7 10^12
156 bunches 6 10^12<N<1.4
10^13
936 bunches >5 10^13
Powering interlock system YES
Beam interlock system YES
Safe distribution of energy YES
Safe beam flag PARTIAL
Beam presence flag PARTIAL
Safe distribution of mode YES
Safe distr. of squeezing factor PARTIAL
Beam interlocks SPS to LHC YES
Injection protection NO
Access system YES
Vacuum system YES
Magnet current change monitor YES
BLMs, collimators & apertures PARTIAL
BLM in the arcs PARTIAL
Collimators and beam absorbers
NO
Beam position change monitors NO
Fast beam current decay monitors
NO
Transverse feedback NO
RF NO
Experiments PARTIAL
Beam Dumping System PARTIAL
TCDQ / TCS NO
BPM for BDS NO
Injection See V. Kain’s presentation !
From JW “Cham06”
9
System
Commissioning before
beam possible ?
First pilot beam 10^12 43 bunches
1.7 10^12
156 bunches 6 10^12<N<1.4
10^13
936 bunches >5 10^13
Post-mortem PARTIAL
Software Interlock System PARTIAL
Critical settings management YES
Sequencer PARTIAL
Critical softwareInjection
Checks will need to be repeated when going up in intensity!
Jan Uythoven, AB/BT LHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 10
PhasesPhasesAs taken from LHC-Com web pagesAs taken from LHC-Com web pages
Beam at 450 GeV safe up to of 1e12 p+, with nominal emittance Phase 1
1 x 1, 1e10 p/ bunch: safe 43 x 43, 3e10 p/bunch: int. in one beam = 1.3e12 p+
Above the safe threshold: MP system needs to be commissioned at the first step of intensity increase
Will need to be (partly) re-checked for intensity dependent effects at the following sub stages
Check again at 156 bunches Check again …intermediate… ? Check again at 936 bunches Check again at 2808 bunches
Will need to repeat (part of) the check when operating conditions change
Optics (squeeze ) Emittance Polarities of the magnets of the experiments Ion operation
Jan Uythoven, AB/BT LHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 11
Different SystemsDifferent Systems
Can only commission one system at a time. Proposed logical order of commissioning:
1. Injection Systema) But needs some collimation
2. Beam Dumping Systema) But needs some collimation, BLMs and BPMs
3. Other Systems – expected or unexpected beam dependence (BPMs, FMCM, noise pick-up in general)
4. BLM System5. Collimation System
Jan Uythoven, AB/BT LHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 12
Injection SystemInjection System
Special injection BIC Check all the inputs – can this be done completely without
beam? additional input: SPS safe beam intensity, SPS intensity, LHC
beam presence, LHC beam intensity, LHC energy
TL collimation system Mainly after the TI 8 TED, so can not be tested independently
of the LHC 7 collimators per line (momentum TCDI at start of the lime) 6 betatron collimators in last 300 m
TCDIs need beam for setting-up TCDI beam commissioning needs LHC beam permit
Jan Uythoven, AB/BT LHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 13
Injection System ctd.Injection System ctd. Check setting of active element. These settings (MCS) and
read backs will now need to be interlocked. Verify interlocking.
magnet currents with ROCS surveillance and Fast Magnet Current Change Monitor
Septa, kickers (voltage and timing)
Check position of protection elements TDI, TCLIs, TCDD Alignment with beam, use transmission measurements Check that BLM readings in this area as expected
TCLIs enhance performance of TDI. TCLIs are needed above 50% of nominal injected intensity and can be commissioned later
14V. Kain AB/OP
Systems concerned (3)Passive Protection: TDI-TCDD-TCLI
• 4.25 m long TDI, mask TCDD and auxiliary collimators TCLI to protect against MKI failures
– setting for TDI-TCLI 6.8 to protect LHC at 7.5
– need beam for setting-up From VK “Cham06”
Inject and Dump Mode
very useful: needs to be
commissioned
15V. Kain AB/OP
Systems concerned (6)Software
• Software interlocking system (SIS)• Trajectories, screen positions, MCS, maximum allowed injection intensity …
• Management of Critical Settings (MCS)• Remote management of interlock settings in a secure way (needs SIS)
• MKI, MKE, TDI, TCLI, TCDI, ROCS, BLMs, BPCE, MSE
• First version for extraction/transfer tests 2006. Single client.
• Extraction/transfer/injection data analysis and diagnostics• Shot-by-shot beam quality check to allow next extraction/injection
• Analysis after abnormal situation e.g. interlock (post mortem)
• First versions planned for CNGS commissioning/Sector Test.
• LHC injection sequencer• setting-up of TDI/TCDD/TCLI
• inject & dump
From VK “Cham06”
16V. Kain AB/OP
Timeline: Systems required for different commissioning stages
installed & prototype testneeded, but may not be fully available
installed & fully operational
beam 1beam 2
2006 2007
Need almost everything
Jan Uythoven, AB/BT LHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 17
Beam Dump SystemBeam Dump System
Check and optimise settings of active elements MKD, MSD, MKB
Check amplitude and fine timing (2 x 15 individual MKD systems) Optimisation requires local HARDWARE changes!
Check interlocking of these settings, BPM interlock LSS6 Check and optimise settings of protection elements
TCDQ and TCS (partial commissioning required, setting at ± 10 ) Dependence of collimator system and orbit feedback
Check apertures MSD, MKD, TCDS, TCDQ, TCS, TCDQM Check that BLM readings agree with expectations
Check Post Mortem, commissioning of the extraction lines (TD) IPOC, XPOC Interlock on PM !
Check re-triggering with beam (sweep across TCDS, TCDQ)? Commissioning of abort gap watchdog
Present MKB system limits LHC max intensity at full energy to half nominal but full intensity up to 2 TeV
See BG “Cham06”
Jan Uythoven, AB/BT LHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 18
BIC SystemsBIC Systems
Injection BIC Ring BIC Can all be tested without beam?
Additional tests with beam? Want to see the whole chain working
emc
Jan Uythoven, AB/BT LHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 19
BPM SystemBPM System
Check dependence of beam position on measured beam intensity
Number of bad BPMs acceptable? Special attention:
Interlocked BPMs in dump area Test dumping beam for different orbits in dump area, part
of tests LBDS Stability of beams, especially collimator area
Will need a working orbit feedback
Jan Uythoven, AB/BT LHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 20
BLM SystemBLM System
Check dependence of measured beam losses on beam intensity All linear? Agrees with models? Differences understood? If not: acceptable?
Test a beam dump initiated by a BLM, triggered by beam loss?
Procedures of adjusting BLM thresholds (MPWG)
Jan Uythoven, AB/BT LHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 21
CollimatorsCollimators
See talk Ralph Collimators interaction with
Injection system collimators Beam dumping system collimators Beam loss monitors (for setting up) Beam position monitors (for setting up)
Orbit feedback
Interaction with optics Beta beat
Need ‘global coordination’
Jan Uythoven, AB/BT LHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 22
Safe Beam FlagSafe Beam Flag
Need to check the proper functioning of the safe beam flag In this stage only intensity dependence
Jan Uythoven, AB/BT LHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 23
Systems not discussed in Systems not discussed in detaildetail
Further QPS tests? RF
phasing with LBDS, max frf
dI/dt beam current Screens out Software interlocks
Jan Uythoven, AB/BT LHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 24
Conclusions and Conclusions and DiscussionDiscussion
The Machine Protection System is complicated, already at injection Many tests can be done before beam operation (esp. BIC) Main systems identified
BIC, Injection, LBDS, BLMs, Collimators Other systems….(MCS, QPS, FMCM, dI/dt, Software interlocks, Sequencer) Many cross links between systems
This presentation is useless without follow-up Soon! Sub-groups?
Detailed and agreed upon procedures will be required Start with overview tables as presented at Chamonix by JW and VK Define more details
By the people responsible for equipment or systems Plus check links between the different systems
Document procedures and check consistency (see next talk: “LHCCWG Web Follow Up”)
Documentation of test results required Profit from experience of Hardware Commissioning?
Jan Uythoven, AB/BT LHCCWG, 3 May 2006 Page 25
Conclusions and Conclusions and Discussion, ctd.Discussion, ctd.
How do we move between the different phases of MPS commissioning?
Use sequencer to be sure not to run outside the bounds of commissioned operating conditions?
Is this safe enough? Operation in certain mode allowed, depending on
Intensity, Energy, Squeeze, Ions,… Who is looking after the sequencer, what will it do?
Use Safe Beam Parameter system to create interlock when“intensity x energy” is outside the commissioned region?
ICFA-HB2006 workshop end of this month Session on commissioning MP Systems Experience from other labs