000 INDIA TODAY MARCH 00, 1996 MARCH 00, 1996 INDIA TODAY 000

from the ministries of home, defence, ex-ternal affairs and the Research andAnalysis Wing, for study. Though Guptahas put up a brave front with assurancesthat the report will be tabled in Parlia-ment on November 19, the first day ofthe winter session, his advice to Gujralwas simple: stall or prepare to depart.

The prime minister can instinctivelyhear the time bomb ticking away, a rea-son why the report has not figured onthe agenda of UF Steering Committeemeetings. The 5,280 page report, com-prising eight volumes of interim find-ings and nine volumes of annexuresbound in black rexine, holds Tamil NaduChief Minister M. Karunanidhi and hisDMK responsible for abetting RajivGandhis murderers. Also blamed aretwo former prime ministers, V.P. Singhand Chandra Shekhar, for their laxity inassessing the threat to Rajiv.

The report has made uncharitableremarks about Finance Minister P. Chi-dambaram, criticising him for suppingwith the devil in the cause of politicalexpediency. I am fully satisfied with myinterim report and what it contains.said Jain, Each one of my conclusionsand observations is based on docu-ments on record with the commission.

Jain took over 66 months to submithis first report, after examining 110witnesses, including political luminar-ies, bureaucrats, terrorists and crankswith incredible conspiracy theories.Based on the deposition of what it callskey and credible witnesses, the reportsingles out the DMK for its severest in-dictment. The report is replete with ex-amples of the DMKs proximity to theleaders of the Liberation Tigers of TamilEalam (LTTE), whose cadres killed Rajiv.While conceding that both the Con-gress government at the Centre andM.G. Ramachandrans AIADMK govern-ment in the state were responsible forthe initial impetus to Tamil militancy,Jain holds the DMK guilty of encouragingand assisting the LTTE even after theIndo-Sri Lankan accord of 1987 pittedthe Indian Army against the Tigers.

Under the changed scenario, theLTTE made a strategic shift in their po-litical alignments, says the report.They sent personal emissaries toKarunanidhi for seeking his active sup-port in their battle against the IndianPeace Keeping Force (IPKF). These over-

tures of the LTTE towards the DMKstarted a chain of events which led toLTTEs survival and growth in TamilNadu even after the attitude of the Gov-ernment of India had changed towardsthe LTTE after the hostilities between theIPKF and LTTE in Sri Lanka. The Jain re-port also concludes that the LTTE wasgetting its supplies, including arms,ammunition, explosives, fuel and otheressential items for its war against theIPKF from Tamil Nadu. That too with thesupport of the Tamil Nadu governmentand the connivance of the law enforce-ment authorities.

The report emphasises the politicalantagonism between the DMK govern-ment in the state and the Rajiv Gandhigovernment at the Centre. Karunanidhitook over as chief minister in January1989 after his partys decisive victoryover the Congress and the AIADMK. Ac-cording to the report, 1989 signifiedthe perpetuation of the general politi-cal trend of indulging the Tamil mili-tants on Indian soil and tolerance oftheir wide-ranging criminal and anti-national activities ... LTTE activities of

UITE UNKNOWN TOit, the United Front(UF) Government hasbeen living on bor-rowed time since Jus-tice Milap Chand Jainceremonially pre-

sented his 17-volume interim report onRajiv Gandhis assassination to HomeMinister Indrajit Gupta on August 28.The commission had been asked to lookinto the circumstances of and the con-spiracy leading to Rajivs murder.

Jains findings are not unexpected,but their explosive confirmation threat-ens to trigger a chain reaction that couldshatter reputations, forge realignmentsand even bring down the fragile gov-ernment of Inder Kumar Gujral.

In the corridors of power, the Jain re-port on the May 21, 1991, assassinationin Sriperumbudur, Tamil Nadu, is al-ready causing convulsions. When itcame up for discussion in the Cabinet af-ter it was presented, no minister was will-ing to take a stand on it. To be precise, allof them wanted to defer discussion in-definitely. Even Gupta decided to washhis hands off this incendiary device bysuggesting that the Cabinet refer the re-port to a committee of secretaries, drawn

DAMNINGTHE DMK

Exclusive!Jain Commission Revelations

NOT ABOVE SUSPICION: Jain points to DMK chief Karunanidhi facilitating the Tigersactivities even after the Indian Army began anti-LTTE operations in Sri Lanka The inquiry into Rajiv Gandhis killing indicts the DMK for

colluding with the LTTE. Its disclosures could endangerthe fragile Congress-United Front relationship.

C O V E R S T O R Y

RAJIVS LAST MEETING: A victim of politicalnegligence or something more?

QB y P R A B H U C H AW L A

AN IB REPORT CITED BY THE JAIN COMMISSION SAYS KARUNANIDHI TOLD AN

LTTE FUNCTIONARYTHAT EPRLF LEADER PADMANABHA WAS A BETRAYER.

H.K. RAJASHEKAR

Exclusive!Jain Commission Revelations

arms smuggling, abduction of Indiancitizens and officials and intimidationof the law enforcement machinery weretolerated. Citing the brutal murder ofEPRLF leader K. Padmanabha, alongwith 15 others in Madras on June 19,1990, Jain has resurrected memories ofthe impunity with which the LTTE couldoperate in India.

HE commission has quotedtwo reports of the Intelli-gence Bureau (IB) thatspeak of Karunanidhi notbeing averse to the elimina-

tion of EPRLF leaders by LTTE hit squads.These reports, filed on June 28, 1990(nine days after Padmanabhas mur-der) referred to the chief minister in-forming Natesan (an LTTE activist) toprovide advance information regardingLTTE movements and also sought detailsof locations of LTTE hideouts to direct thepolice to keep away from such places.The IB also recorded the opinion ex-pressed by the chief minister regardingPadmanabha being a betrayer. An-other report quoted by Jain claims thechief minister also told Natesan that

killing of Padmanabha was a necessityand so also of Vardaraja Perumal andthat Natesan should ensure that he(Karunanidhi) was taken into confi-dence before such acts are committed.The commission has also recorded theevidence of former state home secretaryR. Nagarajan, which further indictsKarunanidhi: Nagarajan has deposedthat the DGP informed him that the chiefminister has asked him (DGP) that thepolice need not evince keen interest totrace out the culprits in the Padman-abha massacre till his arrival the nextday for further instructions from him.To drive home the point, the commis-sion has quoted extensively from Chi-dambarams speech to the Lok Sabhaon February 25, 1991, in which heclaimed that the movement of seniorEPRLF leaders was conveyed by the statepolice to the LTTE. Padmanabhaskilling is important because it was thesame hit squad that was later deployedto eliminate Rajiv.

If that isnt enough to damageKarunanidhi, the commission hasquoted other documents and variousstatements given to it by former LTTE ac-

tivists. For example, Kasi Anandan, a se-nior member of the 10-member centralcommittee of the LTTEs political wing,admitted in his deposition on September11, 1996, that the LTTE had veryfriendly relations with Karunanidhi. Inthe days of Karunanidhi as CM, move-ment of LTTE was more free. Local ad-ministration was also friendly in TamilNadu. Anandan even disclosed thatthe LTTE was able to communicate fromJaffna to Tamil Nadu when theV.P. Singh government was at the Cen-tre and the Karunanidhi government inTamil Nadu.

Jain has recorded vivid details of theLTTEs free access to Karunanidhi andkey state government officials. Anan-dan revealed that he, along with an-other LTTE leaders, used to meetKarunanidhi in strict privacy: I havemet Karunanidhi several times aloneand once or twice with Natesan. Nei-ther the Tamil Nadu government northe Centre had any clue as to what tran-spired in these meetings.

Further, Jain records thatKarunanidhi and top state officialswere directly involved in getting many

000 INDIA TODAY MARCH 00, 1996

C O V E R S T O R Y

MARCH 00, 1996 INDIA TODAY 000

JAIN REVEALS THAT VITAL WIRELESS MESSAGES BETWEEN LTTE OPERATIVES IN TAMIL

NADU AND JAFFNA WERE DIRECTLY RELATED TO RAJIVS ASSASSINATION.

n EXTRACTS FROM INTERIM REPORT

jains soft targetsIN HIS INTERIM REPORT, JUSTICE M.C.JAIN HAS NOTmerely come down hard on the DMK and its leaderM.Karunanidhi, he has also imputed motives to V.P. Singh,charged Chandra Shekhar with negligence and beratedFinance Minister P. Chidambaram for duplicitous con-duct. Extracts:

ON V.P. SINGH: It can safely be concluded that the growingconnivance of the DMK government with the LTTE havingbeen brought to the knowledge of the National Front gov-ernment, effective steps were not taken by the Centralgovernment to check it, whatever may be the reasons.

It appears that V.P. Singh only extends lip sympathywhen he states that he has the highest regard for theGandhi family and Rajiv Gandhis security was his per-sonal concern. If such was his concern, then he ought tohave considered the question not ina myopic way but with farsighted-ness ... It is unbelievable thatV.P. Singh could be swayed by theopinion of the security and bureau-cratic experts. But it appears that thequestion of Rajiv Gandhis securitywas examined with a closed mind ...A very serious question which re-quires consideration by the Com-mission is whetherV.P.Singh wasactuated by malice, bias or animus innot providing security of such na-ture and level as would have pro-tected Rajiv Gandhi ... Extraneousconsiderations also appear to havebeen very much in focus ... RajivGandhi was not given due attentionin respect of the capability availablein the state and in respect of thethreat scenario of Rajiv Gandhi, theconsideration thus was not an hon-est one ... The required seriousness,anxiety and concern was lackingand responsibility of security wasshifted to states without taking intoaccount the non-availability of the required nature andquality of proximity security unit in the states and sucha casual consideration of the question cannot be said tobe prompted by genuine and bona fide intentions ...

ON CHANDRA SHEKHAR: Blame lies equally at the door ofthe government headed by Chandra Shekhar lookinginto the time, place and the situation. The nature andquality of security needed under the circumstances pre-vailing under Chandra Shekhars time was not provided.Alternative security scheme was devised during the timeof V.P. Singhs government and that the amendment ofthe SPG Act was not thought of then, cannot be pleadedin defence by him. The threat scenario during this periodhad drastically changed and required a completestreamlining of the security arrangements for Rajiv

Gandhi, which was not contemplated at all ...After the dismissal of the DMK government during the

period of Chandra Shekhar, there was a crackdown on theLTTE. How effective was the crackdown can be assessed bythe fact that it was this period during which the intelli-gence group of LTTE cadres led by Sivarasan went abouttheir job undeterred and managed to carry out the as-sassination of Rajiv Gandhi. During March 1991, freshwireless sets were installed by the LTTE in Madras whichwere extensively used to pass coded messages to LTTE In-telligence HQ at Jaffna ...

ON P. CHIDAMBARAM: In the speech (Lok Sabha, February25, 1991) ... he demanded a public inquiry into all thathas happened in Tamil Nadu affecting ... national secu-rity and public order. According to him it was not only a

matter of law and order but a prob-lem affecting national security andhe demanded an assurance from theprime minister that the public in-quiry committee will be constitutedto go into all that has happened inthe latter half of 1989 and in 1990,into all that the DMK did in further-ance of its clandestine and secret ob-jective of carving out a separateTamil Nadu in support of se-cessionism ...

P. Chidambaram, in his deposi-tion on 21.11.1996, stated (Annex-ure M-122): My speech inParliament reflected the position ofmy party on the issue of the dis-missal of the DMKgovernment andproclamation of Presidents rule inTamil Nadu. that was a politicalstatement made on behalf of myparty in the debate on PresidentsRule. I offered in my speech to leadevidence to substantiate the allega-tions on behalf of the party. I had nodifference with what I had expressed

in Parliament on behalf of the party ... Although Chi-dambaram adhered to the contents of his speech in theLok Sabha made on 25.2.91, it looked from his deposi-tion that he has gone a little mild and soft in his deposi-tion as compared to the contents of his speech ... Can aMember of Parliament be allowed to speak anything helikes in total disregard of the truth? ...

It may be stated that Chidambaram was there in thegovernment of P.V. Narasimha Rao and besides that, hewas also given additional charge relating to matters con-nected with the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi ... It was ex-pected from P. Chidambaram that he would place allmaterial and adduce all ... evidence with regard to thefacts and accusations mentioned and levelled by him in hisspeech ... on 25.2.1991 ... Why he did not choose to act,is best known to him.

JOB DONE: Justice Jain says, Each of myobservations is based on documents

SHYAM TEKWANI

SONDEEP SHANKAR

T

LTTE cadres released from police cus-tody. The interim report contains an IBaccount of the interference during theraid on a LTTE hideout on November30, 1990. At least two key LTTE cadres,Kiruban and Anandan, were let offdue to instructions from above: Aposse of policemen converged on theThillai Nagar hideout of LTTE inTiruchirappalli in the early hours oftoday (Nov.30) and laid siege to thepremises that had 19 LTTE cadres in-cluding Kiruban and Kasi Anandan,the LTTE representative liaising withthe Tamil Nadu Government. Thecadres refused to let the police in andissued an ultimatum tothe effect that if the siegewas not lifted by 12 noontoday, all the cadres wouldconsume cyanide andcommit suicide.

According to the report,the Madras-based LTTEcadres tried to contact theTamil Nadu home secretaryand V. Gopalaswamy, DMKmember of Rajya Sabha, toconvey the message andseek their intervention tosettle the matter .... Kumar,the (LTTE) propagandist,managed to meet the chiefminister of Tamil Nadu atAnna Arivalayam (DMKparty office), Madras. Ac-cording to Kumar,Karunanidhi expressed in-ability to intervene since in-action would inviteproblems for his govern-ment .... However, Karuna-nidhi offered to let outAnandan, the elderly LTTErepresentative but declinedto consider the case ofKiruban, who heads theLTTE set-up in Tamil Nadu.

Other intelligence re-ports specifically name

six important LTTE functionaries whowere present in the hideout but werenot arrested. These were Kirubanalias Salim (in charge of the TamilNadu unit), Menon (in charge ofTrichy), Romeo (in charge of Salem),Aruna and Radha (navigators) andKesavan (in charge of shore opera-tions). The commission didnt con-sider the IBs report alone but alsosecured corroborative evidence from

other agencies. Says the report, Letus see whether this version of the IBgets substantiated by the other evi-dence available before the Commis-sion. Kasi Anandan, who was the keyLTTE functionary, was present in thehouse and was not arrested.

NANDAN told the com-mission on September 10last year: In November1990, I was at Truchi atThillai Nagar, at the

house maintained by Kumar. Therewas a raid of that house. Some boyswere arrested. Kumar, Radhayan,

Suresh and about six or seven otherswere rounded up. I was also roundedup. That house was sealed and we werereleased ... At that time the govern-ment had started arresting LTTE boys. Iwas released even without protest andI do not know how I was released.

Even Jaffar Ali, the then DIG, CID, inhis deposition to the commission onMarch 10, 1997, stated: Kasi Anandanalone was released on the instructions of

Mr Nagarajan (Tamil Nadu home secre-tary). When I asked Mr Nagarajan aboutthis, he informed me that Kasi Anandanhas been living in Tamil Nadu for somany years and he has not committedany offence. So he has asked for his re-lease. Only Kasi Anandan was released.

The fact that Anandan was releasedis not disputed by anyone. An im-pression is created by the different ver-sions that the entire state machinerywas, in one way or the other, involved insupporting the LTTE at that time. Evi-dently, the police was not given a freehand to deal with the LTTE.

Indeed, the Jain Commission re-port has raised doubts overthe DMKs committment tothe Centrally-sponsoredaction plan for handlingthe LTTE. It has alleged thateven coded messages be-tween the Centre and thestate government werepromptly relayed to theLTTE leaders in Jaffna.There is evidence to showthat, during this period,some of the most vitalwireless messages werepassed between the LTTEoperatives based in TamilNadu and Jaffna. Thesemessages, which were de-coded later, are directly re-lated to the assassinationof Rajiv Gandhi.

To substantiate thispoint, Jain has quotedfrom a speech by the thenprime minister ChandraShekhar in the Lok Sabhaon January 10, 1991. Hehad said: Certain infor-mation that were justgiven to the chief minister(Karunanidhi) has gone tothe LTTE headquarters notonly in Tamil Nadu buteven in Jaffna. This is

something very serious.Various intelligence reports in July

1990, recorded by Jain, also suggestedthat LTTE functionary Kiruban had ap-proached Gopalaswamy and the ChiefMinister of Tamil Nadu for providingmore landing points to bring in injuredTigers from across the Palk Straits. AsJain records, The chief minister re-portedly suggested a point from Malli-pattinam, preferably in the coastal

000 INDIA TODAY MARCH 00, 1996

C O V E R S T O R Y

areas of Thondi, as the possible choicefor the purpose. Thus, it appears,changes in landing points along thecoast were always effected in consulta-tion with DMK leaders.

The commission has also referred tosome reports that indicatedKarunanidhi was personally instru-mental in ensuring things wentsmoothly for the LTTE. At one stage,when the Tigers were hit by a paucity offunds, Karunanidhi is reported to havesuggested floating an organisationcalled The Relief Association for SriLankan Tamils to facilitate the diver-sion of Government funds. LTTE activistsAnandan and Natesan were mooted asoffice-bearers.

Karunanidhis reckless stylealarmed even his political allies. MuftiMohammed Sayeed, home minister inV.P. Singhs regime, cautionedKarunanidhi about the worseningsituation in the state. Giving details ofthe LTTES Growing presence in TamilNadu, Mufti reprimanded the chiefminister for the DMKs perceived close-ness to the LTTE. In a letter dated May 15,1990, Mufti advised Karunanidhi to is-sue instructions to all concerned in thestate government that they would takefull care to pre-empt the possibility ofany impression being created thatTamil militants could deal directly withstate government functionaries. Pre-dictably, Karunanidhi wrote back aweek later refuting most of the thenhome ministers apprehensions.

Earlier, V.C. Pande, then cabinetsecretary, had been more categoricalin his directive to the state govern-ment. On April 12, 1990, he wrote astrong letter to then Tamil Nadu chiefsecretary M.M. Rajendran: The LTTEappears to have established a fairlyelaborate network, apparently with-out any hindrance, not only in thecoastal areas but in the interior areasalso. Instead of committing itself tocorrective action, the state govern-ment threw the ball back into the Cen-tres court. In his reply to Pande, datedApril 25, 1990, Rajendran only said:Unless we take urgent measuresto equip the state police with modernweapons, at least for selectedtask forces, our efforts may not havethe desired effect.

The evidence against theKarunanidhi Government appears tobe quite damning, particularly sincethe commission has been rather dis-missive of the DMKs protestations of in-nocence. Deposing before thecommission on January 17 this year,Karunanidhi asserted: I had sup-ported the LTTE along with other parties,

MARCH 00, 1996 INDIA TODAY 000

n VERMA COMMISSION REPORT

archival valueT WAS PRECISE AND IT DAMNED. THE JUSTICE J.S.VERMACommission, set up within a week of Rajiv Gandhis assassination toprobe the security lapses that led to his killing in Sriperumbudur, filedits report in June 1992. In the ensuing five years, neither has any of

its recommendations been implemented nor any of the indicted individualsbeen punished for dereliction of duty.

Ironically, the P.V. Narasimha Rao government that instituted the in-quiry was also responsible for the non-action. When the report was firsttabled in Parliament in December 1992, the Union Home Ministry, headedby S.B. Chavan, rejected the com-missions findings. But under pressurefrom Congress MPs , the Governmentquickly backtracked and within sixmonths accepted the report in toto.

It took the Government another twoyears to form a Group of Ministers (GOM)comprising Chavan, Arjun Singh,V.C. Shukla, Jagdish Tytler, H.R. Bhard-waj and Satish Sharma to advice the Cab-inet on what action needed to be taken.Within two months, the GOM recom-mended the prosecution of senior officersbut it remains a decision that still has tobe acted upon. The commission detailedthe roles played by the Centre, the TamilNadu Police and the Congress andnamed the people whose decisions, orlack of them, led to the lapses that facili-tated the assassination:n The Tamil Nadu Police, Verma said,had failed to strictly enforce the pre-scribed standards of security. Vermablamed the state police for not ensuringRajivs proximate security at the publicmeeting in Sriperumbudur. This enabledthe entry of unauthorised persons, in-cluding the LTTEs human bomb. The GOMrecommended action against IGP R.K. Raghavan and F.C. Sharma, the thenIGP (intelligence). The state government then headed by Jayalalitha, how-ever, dropped the charges. The 12 policemen suspended soon after the blastfor having deserted their place of duty were also reinstated.n It was only in 1996 that the explanation of four Central government offi-cers was called for. Former cabinet secretary Vinod Pande, Intelligence Bu-reau chief M.K. Narayanan, home secretary Shiromani Sharma andsecretary security G.S. Bajpai were let off the hook by the Central Adminis-trative Tribunal on the ground that the proceedings were inititated aftertheir retirement. According to government rules, officials are immune frompast actions if they are two years into retirement. The Narasimha Rao gov-ernment did not call for their explanation early enough.n Congress functionaries, including the local Lok Sabha candidate Mara-gatham Chandrashekhar, had, said Verma, been party to a security lapse. TheCongress workers exhibited a total lack of awareness of their obligation toco-operate with the police force ... and their intransigence created impedi-ments in effective access control, necessary for Rajivs security. The Con-gress ignored recommendations to initiate disciplinary action against them.

Five years after Justice Verma submitted his report, the findings havebeen relegated to the fate that most commissions of inquiry meet: lost in thebureaucratic and political maze.

JAIN CONCLUDES THAT THE GOVERNMENTS OF V.P. SINGH AND CHANDRA SHEKHAR

FAILED TO PROVIDE COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY COVER TO RAJIV GANDHI.

I

IN VAIN: Was Vermas report tooinconvenient for the Congress?

YASBANT NEGI

A

but after the murder of Padmanabha,I withdrew my support. Jain is, how-ever, disinclined to accept this denial:It cannot be found that after June 19,1990, the DMK government in TamilNadu gave no support to the LTTE.

OWEVER, it is curiousthat Jain has been re-markably selective in hisindignation. While at afew places in the report

he has reprimanded the Rajiv govern-ment at the Centre and its AIADMK ally,M.G. Ramachandran, for the initialsoftness towards the LTTE, at others hehas absolved them of helping theTigers politically and financially.

In fact, Jain has praised MGR, whoonce paid Rs 5 crore to the LTTE, fordealing with V.Prab-hakaran, the LTTE-supremo, decisively.The report says: Anaffirmation of thepolicy of the govern-ment of India is seenin a severe repri-mand to V. Prab-hakaran by MGR,the then chief minis-ter of Tamil Nadu,after the SAARC meet-ing when Prab-hakaran was told byhim that he shouldcarry out his strug-gle from his owncountry if he wasnot willing to playby our rules.

Not that these

apparent double standards are likelyto get much prominence in todayscharged political climate. The JainCommission report is calculated tobecome a political football that couldend up unsettling the cosy relation-ship between Congress PresidentSitaram Kesri and Prime Minister Gu-jral. The battle lines have clearly beendrawn. Congress Vice-president Ji-tendra Prasada fired the first salvo onSeptember 17. In a letter, Prasada toldthe prime minister: Now that theJain Commission has submitted its in-terim report, the country should betaken into confidence. It is all themore necessary to do so in order toensure that the report does not be-come a subject of baseless specula-

tions. With an eye on Sonia Gandhi,Prasada managed to get the CongressWorking Committee to demand pre-sentation of the report in the next ses-sion of Parliament.

Prasada is furious with the casualresponse he got from both the primeminister and the home minister. WhileGujral didnt bother to reply, Guptawrongly informed him that the reportwas being processed by the committeeof secretaries. Gupta subsequentlycorrected himself. But an incensedPrasada sent yet another angry mis-sive to the home minister saying, Ifeel deeply disturbed at the Govern-ments procrastination in this mat-ter. He also warned Gupta, I may beforced to take some drastic step be-cause my conscience doesnt permit

me to remain a silent and helplessspectator in this matter.

Responding to this, the home min-ister promptly conveyed the Govern-ments resolve to place Justice Jainsreport on the opening day of the com-ing session along with an action takenreport. Gupta also stressed thatThere is no need, in my opinion foryou to threaten the Government withsome drastic steps in case the reportis not tabled.

While Prasadas plan to make anissue of the Jain report can be partlyexplained by his desire to upstageKesri within the Congress, the UFswariness stems from a fear of thehavoc the report can cause among itsconstituents. After the report is made

public, it will become untenable forGujral to retain the DMK in the UF. TheCongress, on whose support the UFGovernment rests, will not counte-nance this. According to a senior Con-gress functionary, It will be totallyunethical to support the DMKs par-ticipation in the Government if the in-terim report holds it responsible forcausing our leaders death.

Given Sonia Gandhis divine statusin the party, it is certain Congressmenwill delight in competitive DMK-bash-ing, if only to impress 10 Janpath.There is the possibility thatG.K. Moopanars Tamil Maanila Con-gress (TMC) will see the report as an ex-cuse to detach itself from the DMK. Evenso, the TMC will have to suffer theembarrassment of Jains strictures

against Chidam-baram (see box).

At the same time,it is unlikely that theUFs other con-stituents will meeklyacquiesce to the ex-clusion of the DMK atthe Congress be-hest. The forcibleexclusion of a con-stituent will surelybe seen as a violationof the federal princi-ples that led to the UFexperiment in thefirst place. If re-gional groups likethe Telugu Desamand the Asom GanaParishad and theLeft parties make an

issue of it, it could well signal the end ofGujrals prime ministershipand ofthe UF. In upholding the memory of theslain leader, Kesri may find himselfforced into an election that neither henor his party is prepared for.

Despite 12 extensions and theridicule he suffered, Jains findingsmay prove as devastating as the bombthat went off in Sriperumbudur sixyears ago. But the judge is unfazed bythe implications of his findings. Ihave done my job to the best of myability, he says, even under ad-verse circumstances and non-coop-eration. Now, it is for the Governmentto do whatever it wants to do. That is,if the Government survives the devas-tation of the Jain explosion. n

000 INDIA TODAY MARCH 00, 1996 MARCH 00, 1996 INDIA TODAY 000

C O V E R S T O R Y

THE COMMISSION FEELS CHIDAMBARAM CHANGED TACK FROM HIS HAWKISH

ANTI-DMK STANCE OF 1991 AND DIDNT PROVIDE ADEQUATE INFORMATION.

PRAMOD PUSHKARNA

H