Freie Universität (UC Berkeley Austausch)

The Transfer of French Jacobinism to Germany: 1789-1793

Jason Fauss

Geschichte

Prof. Dr. Arnd

March 15, 2015

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Outline

I. Introduction

A. Research Question: Why was the transfer of Jacobin ideals not successful in the

Germanic states following the French revolution?

B. Thesis: By utilizing historical transfer methodology (A → B, B1 → A) the

movement of Jacobin ideals from France to Germany from 1789 to 1793 was

unsuccessful because of 1. Germany’s political conditions (A. Geography B.

Political Culture) 2. Germany’s intellectual community and 3. France’s

militarization of Germany.

II. Historical Background

A. Jacobin Ideology

B. Timeframe (1789-1793)

III. Methodology Explained

IV. Germany’s Political Conditions

A. Geography

B. Political Culture

V. Germany’s Intellectual Community

VI. Frances’ Militarization of Germany

VII. Conclusion

VIII. Bibliography

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The Transfer of French Jacobinism to Germany: 1789-1793

History has taught us that the world is strongly connected in a plethora of ways. Through

trade states are economically tied; through diplomacy and foreign affairs states are politically

joined. States are also, however, ideologically linked. The movement of ideas and institutions

from one state or society to another is what Margrit Pernau refers to as ‘Transfergeschichte’1 in

her book, “Transnationale Geschichte”. In this essay, I will focus specifically on the ideology of

the Jacobins and shed light on the question: why was the transfer of Jacobin ideals not successful

in the Germanic states following the French revolution? I will argue that by utilizing historical

transfer methodology (A → B, B1 → A) the movement of Jacobin ideals from France to

Germany from 1789 to 1793 was unsuccessful because of 1. Germany’s political conditions (A.

Geography B. Political Culture) 2. Germany’s intellectual community and 3. France’s

militarization of Germany. I will first provide historical background, then explain the

methodology and lastly flush out three arguments in support of my thesis.

Jacobinism refers to the values and ideologies of the Jacobin Club which was the most

influential political club in the French Revolution up until the death of their leader in 1794—

Maximilien de Robespierre. The Jacobin ideology that was developing in France at the time was

considerably left wing and radical, though its promotion of a, “centralized republican state and

strong central government powers”2 is what will be the focus of this essay. A centralized

republican state was a strong grassroots desire at that time because aristocracies all over Europe

were powerfully oppressive and had infringed on the natural rights of their citizens for centuries.

Jacobinism appealed to the common man because it argued that, “any institution which does not

1 Pernau, Margrit. Transnationale Geschichte. N.p.: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2011. Print. Entire Chapter 2.2 Rey, Alain. Dictionnaire historique de la langue française, Le Robert, 1992.

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suppose the people good, and the magistrate corruptible, is evil. - Robespierre”3 In short, a move

from monarchistic feudalism to a democratic republic was what the Jacobin ideology encouraged

—along with the social contract and the freedom of all men. Many German intellectuals,

politicians, and other members of the upper middle class were sympathetic to Jacobinism and

responded by trying to set up ‘Jacobin Clubs’ at home.

This paper will begin with 1789 because this year saw the start of the French Revolution

and therefore also the start of robust Jacobin promotion. 1793 is the most appropriate year to end

with because 1793 was the year in which the Mainz Republic of Germany failed and several

months later Robespierre died, consequently crushing any notions of spreading Jacobinism

throughout Germany en masse.

Before diving deep into a historical analysis of German and French Jacobinism in the late

18th century, it is imperative that I clarify Pernau’s scholarship on ‘Transfergeshichte’. A

transfer, according to Pernau, is not just a copy of an idea or institution in another a state. When

idea A is transferred to B, it is changed through B’s interpretation and can consequently no

longer be called simply B. The alteration of B through new interpretation is referred to as B1—or

what Pernau calls a ‘Mischform’, hybrid in nature. In regards to the methodology, French

Jacobinism represents A and Germany represents B. This is only logical since Jacobinism first

began with the French. The adoption of French Jacobinism in Germany is reflected in the model

as AB. Germany’s implementation of Jacobinism, is indicated through B1A. The first two

arguments refer to the adoption of Jacobinism (A → B) and the third point refers to the

implementation of the ideology (B1 → A).

3 Lejeune, Anthony. The Concise Dictionary of Foreign Quotations. Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn, 2001. Print. 117.

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Pernau’s analysis of unsuccessful transfers will be most helpful in this essay. She writes,

“ein Transfer kann gelingen, er kann aber auch scheitern. Gelungen ist ein Transfer, wenn es zur

Rezeption in der Zielkultur kommt. Diese Rezeption kann wiederum ganz unterschiedliche

Formen annehmen...ein Transfer kann auch scheitern, weil das fremde Kulturgut ignoriert wird,

sich Widerstand dagegen erhebt oder es schlichtweg verboten wird.”4 I argue that Germany’s

political and intellectual climate had strong enough ‘Widerstand’ (resistance) to Jacobin ideology

that it led to an unsuccessful transfer. This ‘Widerstand’, as previously articulated in my thesis, is

seen through Jacobinism’s adoption (arguments 1 and 2) and Jacobinism’s implementation in

German society (argument 3).

Germany’s political climate from 1789-1793 was not hospitable to the transfer of Jacobin

ideology because A. Geographically the states were not unified and B. Aristocratic values were

still deeply cherished by the majority of Germanic citizens. In his book, "Literarischer

Jakobinismus in Deutschland: 1789-1806" Inge Stephan writes that, ““ein revolutionäres

Zentrum, das eine vergleichbare Funktion wie etwa Paris für eine Revoluion hätte übernehemen

können, gab es wegen der nationalen Zersplitterung nicht.”5 Nearly every developed state has a

central location or capital in which the government resides. This centralized government location

—such as Paris—made it possible for the French to revolt so directly. The French government

was not some vague, fictitious institution that ruled the land; it could literally be seen and burned

to the ground by the common man. But because the Germanic states weren’t unified, they lacked

a central government and tangible enemy. This proved damaging to the manifestation of

Jacobinism through revolution because instead of one large revolt at the capital, there were

4 Pernau, Margrit. Transnationale Geschichte. N.p.: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2011. Print. 48-49.5 Stephan, Inge. Literarischer Jakobinismus in Deutschland: 1789-1806. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 1976.

Print. 24.

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multiple small revolts consolidated to their individual localities that ultimately could not hold

their own against the Prussian and Austrian troops. Walter Grab expands on this point in his

book, "Jakobinismus und Demokratie in Geschichte und Literatur: 14 Abhandlungen" when he

writes, “nur ein entschlossenes, gemeinsames und gleichzeitiges Vorgehen aller antifeudaler

Klassen in den verschiedenen Kleinstaaten hätte es vermocht, das monarchische und

aristokratische Herrschaftsprinzip zu beseitigen. Die territoriale Zersplitterung und die

ungleichmäßige ökonomische Entwicklung Deutschlands machte einene derartigen

Zusammenschluß illusorisch.”6 Because of Germany’s fragmented territory, the independent

revolts were, unfortunately, the only forms of French revolution-style protest.

In his book, “German History, 1770-1866” James J. Sheehan researches several of these

revolts writing that, “a few weeks after the fall of the Bastille, for example, peasants and

burghers gathered in Saarbrücken, where they protested against high taxes and unfair labour

services, and then presented the duke with a list of forty specific demands for reform”7. To many

historians this would seem like a quite successful uprising. In fact, it is on official record by

regionalgeschichte.net that, “die Fürsten von Saarbrücken verlieren ihre Herrschaft”8 following

their 1789 revolt. Saarbrücken effectively revolted and brought about reform through a change in

leadership. Saarbrücken’s ‘success’ cannot, however, be hailed as proof that Jacobinism was

efficaciously transferred from France to Germany. Indeed, Jacobinism is reflected very

minimally, if at all, in the revolt given that Saarbrücken merely wanted a new Fürst and trusted

him to do the reforming. Were the revolution Jacobin in nature, it would have eliminated

completely the role of a Fürst and instead have implemented the vote, a democratic process,

6 Grab, Walter. Leben Und Werke Norddeutscher Jakobiner. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 1973. Print. 22-23.7 Sheehan, James J. German History, 1770-1866. Oxford: Clarendon, 1989. Print. 215.8 "Saarbrücken Im Saarland: Regionalgeschichte." Saarbrücken. Institut Für Geschichtliche Landeskunde

an Der Universität Mainz E.V., 31 Mar. 2014. Web. 05 Feb. 2015. <http://www.regionalgeschichte.net/saarland/staedte-doerfer/orte-s/saarbruecken.html>.

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checks and balances, etc. Thus, the revolt in Saarbrücken was a success in that it created minimal

change locally, but a failure because it had no impact on the spread of Jacobinism, because the

movement started local and remained so affording Jacobinism no opportunity to latch onto

Saarbrücken’s revolutionary steam.

However, even if Germany was unified, a successful transfer of Jacobin ideals would

have been difficult given that the average citizen still deeply cherished aristocratic values.

Sheehan writes that, “these people were much too deeply embedded in the existing order to lead

a revolution.”9 More specifically, Sheehan is referring to the feudalistic monarchies governing

the various Germanic States at the outbreak of the French Revolution. At that time, the average

German citizen was not enthusiastically supportive of the feudal monarchy in which he/she lived,

but he certainly was not about to risk his/her life to defend alien ideas of democracy and

republicanism. In his book, “Black Bread—White Bread: German Intellectuals and the French

Revolution” Thomas P. Saine notes that, “what mattered most, in their opinion, was not the form

of government, but the extent to which the policy of the ruler was progressive and enlightened—

even if that ruler was an autocrat.”10 The Germanic Volk, though suppressed, was pleased

enough with an autocrat as long as the autocrat was promoting adequate policy. This reflects

more Machiavellian or enlightened absolutism values, because the notion of democracy is

unimportant as long as the state or region is stable and effectively governed. This philosophy is

reflected in the Saarbrücken revolution where the aim was not to implement a democracy, but to

reform the monarchy’s leadership. Saine explains this further when he writes, “the Germans who

sympathized with the French Revolution were, however, generally well enough pleased with the

solution of constitutional monarchy at which the French had arrived in September, 1791, that

9 Sheehan, James J. German History, 1770-1866. Oxford: Clarendon, 1989. Print. 217.10 Saine, Thomas P. Black Bread--white Bread: German Intellectuals and the French Revolution.

Columbia, SC, USA: Camden House, 1988. Print. 276.

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they had no desire to see the Revolution carried any farther”11 Here we can see that the average

citizen’s disposition towards a government reflecting Jacobin ideology—democratic republic—

was not favorable. Instead, the long-held structure of absolutism was still dominant in the

German Volk’s value system.

Second, from 1789 to 1793 Germany’s intellectual community produced enough

‘Widerstand’ to make a transfer unsuccessful. One style of ‘Widerstand’ used very effectively by

the intellectual class was their portrayal of Jacobinism as wild and barbaric—not to be supported

if one was rational. Konrad Engelbert Oelsner, for example, criticized the Jacobins when he

wrote, “‘überhaupt streben diese Leute [the Jacobins] nach einer wilden Demokratie, das

allergefährlichste Ungeheuer, so gedacht werden kann. Sie wäre ein untrügliches Mittel, die

civilisirteste Nation in die tiefste Barbarey zu stürzen‘“ – Oelsner (Saine, 292). A ‘wild

democracy’ founded by barbaric revolutionaries certainly sounded risky to the German Volk

who were trying to decide whether or not they should support the Jacobins. Because revolutions

are at their core a gamble, the Jacobins were asking the German Volk to be trusting and take a

risk. It then begs the question: how risky was the German Volk at that point in history?

Yet again, the intellectual community would be at play in shaping the Volk’s decision to

not go for the gamble as the French had. J.B. Metzler further explains this when he writes in the

preface of Walter Grab's novel, "Leben Und Werke Norddeutscher Jakobiner" that, “die Merzahl

der deutschen Intelligenz neigte den staatstheoretischen und politischen Prinzipien Immanuel

Kants zu, die in dessen moralphilosophischen Abhandlungen niedergelegt waren. Für den

Königsberger Philosophen und seine meisten Anhänger und Schüler bedeutete die Revolution

nichts anderes als eine Umwälzung im bloßen Denken.”12 Kantian ethics—which view

11 IBID., 275.12 Metzler, J.B.. Leben Und Werke Norddeutscher Jakobiner. Stuttgart, 1973. Print. XII-XIII.

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rationality as the ultimate good—would not have been huge supporters of the fledgling, untested

Jacobin ideology. For a society educated by the philosophies of Kant, Jacobi, and Fichte,

anything irrational was dangerous and foolish. Saine writes that, “…according to the political

theory most of them had learned, “democracy” was the degenerative hypostasis of the

“republican” form of government, just as “despotism” or “tyranny” was the degenerative form of

“monarchy”.”13 This means that if the German Volk were to accept Jacobinism, they would be

endorsing what was previously thought of as ‘degenerative’. Doing such could only come with

great risk.

The German Volk’s lack of risk-taking is further explained by Saine when he writes

about the approach of the German Volk in regards to government reform. The German Volk was

fully aware that their government was not perfect, but did it need to be burned to the ground and

subject to the guillotine in order to be improved? Saine answers this question when he writes,

“liberals and intellectuals hoped all along that the French example would encourage German

rulers to introduce reforms and improve conditions in their states voluntarily, obviating the

necessity of revolution or dramatic change in the form of German governments, for which, as we

have seen, even politically advanced German writers such as Forster and Rebmann considered

the Germans to be as yet unready.”14 Though Germans were sympathetic to Jacobinismus, they

were not prepared to dramatically launch feet first into a revolution. Thus, the intellectual

community—after framing the Jacobin ideology as barbaric and wild—also worked to train the

German Volk to be more conservative than risky, leading them to ultimately not take the Jacobin

gamble.

13 Saine, Thomas P. Black Bread--white Bread: German Intellectuals and the French Revolution. Columbia, SC, USA: Camden House, 1988. Print. 280.

14 IBID., 278.

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Moreover, even if the German Volk was a trusting people, the intellectual community

alienated the Jacobins so effectively that a transfer could not have been possible. Saine writes

that, “...the French Revolution had not found any admirers among German statesmen or

philosophers, only among poets, “Romanschreiber,” and “philanthropische Kosmopoliten” such

as Campe…but poets are not obligated to be real people in touch with the real world.”15 The

Jacobin ideology promoted lofty, shining values that sounded nice in a poem or song but were

perhaps unrealistic. To insult the Jacobin Club for being out of touch with the real world is a

harsh criticism. The crowd the Jacobin’s needed to appeal to most were the peasants and artisans

because only they were capable of fueling ideology into action. With such a criticism, the

intellectual community was cutting off the Jacobin’s most powerful and necessary tool. Ideology

is always important, but without the muscle of the working class, Jacobinism was dead in the

water.

Referring back to Pernau’s methodology, the transfer was arguably unsuccessful because

it lacked societal endorsement. Pernau writes, “...der Fokus der Transferforschung bislang [liegt]

auf der Seite der aufnehmenden Kultur...ein Transfer nur dann gelingen kann, wenn ein

Bedürfnis danach besteht, d,h. wenn er eine bestimmte Aufgabe innerhalb der Rezeptionskultur

erfüllt...”16 The ‘Rezeptionskultur’ in our applied model refers to the ‘aufnehmenden Kultur’ (B)

which was German culture. In this regard, the societal endorsement was missing on part of both

German intellectuals and the common German Volk. Thus, since both facets of German society

at the time of the transfer were inhospitable to Jacobinismus, a successful transfer was highly

improbable.

15 Saine, Thomas P. Black Bread--white Bread: German Intellectuals and the French Revolution. Columbia, SC, USA: Camden House, 1988. Print. 285-286

16 Pernau, Margrit. Transnationale Geschichte. N.p.: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2011. Print. 46.

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Third, and lastly, French militarization of Germany in 1792-93 was the last straw, killing

any possibility of a successful transfer. On October 21, 1792 the French military led by General

Custine took over Mainz after a brief period of weakness on part of the Prussians and

Austrians.17 The Jacobins saw this as an opportunity to strong arm their ideology into Germany

society. With minimal support domestically, the German Jacobins turned to their only other

hope: the French military. On March 18, 1793 independence from the monarchy was declared

and The Mainz Society of the Friends of Liberty and Equality (or just The Republic of Mainz)

was established by the German Jacobin Club. From this point on, the German Jacobins were no

longer a grassroots movement; they were a puppet movement. Grab clarifies this when he writes,

“daher blieb die deutsche jakobinische Bewegung währen der ganzen Epoche der fanzösischen

Republik nicht nur ideologisch, sondern auch militärisch auf den Beistand Frankreichs

angewiesen.”18 With the French now being both the ideological and military motor, Jacobinism

was perceived as something foreign and outsourced.

This outsourcing and distancing from German culture, politics, and intellectualism made

it very difficult for the revolutionaries to gain public support. Just a year earlier, King Louis

XVI of France declared war on Prussia and Austria followed by a victory in the Battle of

Valmy.19 News of the slaughter of Germans by the French was spreading with celerity

throughout the Germanic Confederation and the marriage of German Jacobinism with the French

military looked like treason to most locals. German nationalism was moving like wildfire

throughout the confederation but not because they were embracing Jacobin ideals and promoting

a free, democratic state. Nationalism was rising because the French were an enemy and the

17 Soboul, Albert. The French Revolution, 1787-1799; from the Storming of the Bastille to Napoleon. New York: Vintage, 1975. Print.

18 Grab, Walter. Jakobinismus Und Demokratie in Geschichte Und Literatur: 14 Abhandlungen. Frankfurt Am Main: Lang, 1998. Print. 23.

19 Blanning, T. C. W. The French Revolutionary Wars, 1787-1802. London: Arnold, 1996. Print.

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monarchy was promoting the classic ‘rally around the flag’ concept. Though there was no

unified German flag to rally around, the 39 independent confederate states had their own unique

coat of arms and acted nationalistic by were preparing to defend their locality against French

intervention. The German Jacobins made a fatal mistake in their transfer when they preserved a

strong relationship with the French just as the locals were becoming considerably Francophobic.

Furthermore, foreign militarization only made the transfer more impossible because it

resulted in significant backlash and hatred for anything French by the locals. In “The Oxford

Handbook of Modern German History,” Helmut Walser Smith goes into detail about this

occupation writing, "whether through newly-instituted taxes, formal requisitions, or simple

confiscation, the revolutionary troops took everything that was not nailed down."20 To the locals

suffering under this new occupation, Jacobinism didn’t look anything like the freedom,

democracy, and sovereignty. Their livelihoods had been disturbed and their privacy taken

forcibly. It should have come as no surprise to the Jacobins when the locals refused to support

and defend their newfound republic against Prussian and Austrian troops. Without public

support, the already weak republic didn’t stand a chance against the Prussian and Austrian troops

who swiftly crushed the French occupation on July 22, 1793. Reidar Maliks writes about the end

of German Jacobinism in his book, “Kant’s Politics in Context” saying, "just as French

radicalism abated after 1794, it also diminished in Germany, and in hindsight it is clear that the

German Jacobins were never a serious threat to the governments of Prussia or the other German

states."21 Thus, with only 5 months to their name, The Mainz Republic soon perished and with it

the transfer of French Jacobinism to Germany.

20 Smith, Helmut Walser. The Oxford Handbook of Modern German History. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011.

Print. 151.

21 Maliks, Reidar. Kant's Politics in Context. Corby: Oxford UP, 2014. Print. 89-90.

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When Pernau’s methodology is applied to the transfer of French Jacobinism to Germany,

it becomes evident that given Germany’s political climate, the response of the intellectual

community and French militarization, a transfer was highly unlikely. The applied methodology

focuses primarily on Pernau’s assertion that a successful transfer requires support and

endorsement by the receiving culture...neither of which Germany had sufficient amounts of.

Bibliography

Blanning, T. C. W. The French Revolutionary Wars, 1787-1802. London: Arnold, 1996. Print.

13

Grab, Walter. Jakobinismus Und Demokratie in Geschichte Und Literatur: 14 Abhandlungen.

Frankfurt Am Main: Lang, 1998. Print.

Lejeune, Anthony. The Concise Dictionary of Foreign Quotations. Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn,

2001. Print.

Maliks, Reidar. Kant's Politics in Context. Corby: Oxford UP, 2014. Print.

Metzler, J.B. & Grab, Walter. Leben Und Werke Norddeutscher Jakobiner. Stuttgart: J.B.

Metzler, 1973. Print.

Pernau, Margrit. Transnationale Geschichte. N.p.: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2011. Print.

"Saarbrücken Im Saarland: Regionalgeschichte." Saarbrücken. Institut Für Geschichtliche

Landeskunde an Der Universität Mainz E.V., 31 Mar. 2014. Web. 05 Feb. 2015.

<http://www.regionalgeschichte.net/saarland/staedte-doerfer/orte-s/

saarbruecken.html>.

Rey, Alain. Dictionnaire historique de la langue française, Le Robert, 1992.

Saine, Thomas P. Black Bread--white Bread: German Intellectuals and the French Revolution.

Columbia, SC, USA: Camden House, 1988. Print.

Sheehan, James J. German History, 1770-1866. Oxford: Clarendon, 1989. Print.

Smith, Helmut Walser. The Oxford Handbook of Modern German History. Oxford: Oxford UP,

2011. Print.

Soboul, Albert. The French Revolution, 1787-1799; from the Storming of the Bastille to

Napoleon. New York: Vintage, 1975. Print.

Stephan, Inge. Literarischer Jakobinismus in Deutschland: 1789-1806. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler,

1976. Print.

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