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JCMS 2005 Volume 43. Number 4. pp. 673–93

Securitization or Securing Rights? Exploring theConceptual Foundations of Policies towardsMinorities and Migrants in Europe*

GWENDOLYN SASSE

London School of Economics

Abstract

Minority and migration issues tend to be framed either in terms of security and control

or rights. Rather than lamenting the securitization of these issues in the academic and

policy debate and advocating a focus on rights as an alternative, this article calls forthe re-conceptualization in terms of a ‘security–rights nexus’. It is argued here that

minority and migration issues and their conceptual interlock have a clear security

dimension, but that these concerns are best addressed through rights-based policies.

Through an analysis of the policy approaches of the Organization for Security and Co-

operation in Europe (OSCE) and the EU, this article traces two related dimensions of

the ‘security–rights nexus’, namely the increasing linkages between policies towards

minorities and migrants and between security and rights. Both institutions’ emphasis on

‘integration’ in minority and migration policies reflects the two interrelated dimensions

of the ‘security–rights’ nexus.

Introduction

National minorities and migrants jointly account for the growing diversity ofmost European states. In public perception, law and policy-making, the two

issue areas have become interlocked as concerns about political stability andsocial cohesion increasingly inform both policy areas. The need to match policywith the demands of diversity poses complex challenges at different levels of

*This article is based on research conducted within the framework of a Leverhulme Research Fellowship. I amalso grateful for comments on earlier versions of this article by John Packer, Jim Hughes, Eiko Thielemann,the participants of the LSE workshop ‘Minorities and Migrants in Europe’ and anonymous referees.

© 2005 The Author(s) Journal compilation © 2005 Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA02148, USA

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© 2005 The Author(s) Journal compilation © 2005 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

governance. While migration is, of course, not a modern phenomenon, the

conceptualization of national minorities and minority rights emerged with therise of nation-states and international public law. There are temporal, spatial

and policy linkages between migration and national minorities, and in cur-rent debates there is a lack of integrated analysis of the two issues. Minoritiesare frequently the result of earlier migration processes, and both immigrantpopulations and national minorities tend to be geographically concentrated.

Migration centres first and foremost on access to territory and basic fundamentalrights, while minority protection and minority rights are essentially concernedwith the preservation of cultural differences and participation in a polity. One

dimension of the interlock between minority and migration policies is thatthey tend to intersect jointly with several key policy areas, such as employ-

ment, social policy or foreign affairs. At the heart of the policy interlock liesa shared concern with security and conflict potential, inclusion and exclusion,

non-discrimination and fundamental rights.The linkages between minorities and migrants can be grouped under three

themes: political stability, social cohesion and welfare, and multi-level govern-

ance. Firstly, the position of minorities and migrants is an important marker ofpolitical stability. The perceived or actual position of minorities and migrantscan become an important driver of political mobilization, which may be poten-

tially destabilizing. Citizenship alone does not make for a clear marker of who

belongs, and of who is ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ the polity (Packer, 1999, p. 267),although it is the most important gateway to political rights. Both minorities andmigrants can be partly ‘in’ and partly ‘out’. Secondly, minorities and migrants

have significant implications for social cohesion and welfare, both at the levelof the nation-state and the EU. Recent economic and political migrants tendto be concentrated in low-paid jobs and socially disadvantaged positions. Over

time they may either become socially upwardly mobile or they become part ofethnic or social networks that facilitate cohesion. Depending on their location,educational and economic profile and historical relationship with the host state,

established national minorities can be the privileged population of a particu-lar region (e.g. the Hungarians in Romania) or the socio-economic underdog(e.g. the Turks in Bulgaria). Migration is seen as a challenge to the welfarestate (Bommes and Geddes, 2000). The differentiation of rights, particularly

socio-economic ones, based on the cultural specifics of national minoritiesor migrants, is seen as undermining the principles of the European welfarestate which is based on distribution according to socio-economic needs. This

argument has been echoed by the critics of multiculturalism, although recentresearch has questioned the underlying zero-sum assumption and the causallink between multicultural institutions and underdeveloped welfare regimes

or socio-economic crises (Banting and Kymlicka, 2004).

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POLICIES TOWARDS MINORITIES AND MIGRANTS IN EUROPE

Thirdly, recent policy concerns with migrants and minorities cut across

different levels of governance. Migration is not only a result of global orstate-based changes but also is in itself a powerful motor of change. Migra-

tion brings change to the sending and receiving societies, and shapes therelationship between both states. Thus, migration has a sub-national, nationaland international impact. The inherently international dimension explains thepolicy engagement of the EU in this area. By contrast, minority protection in

its traditional form is more static in nature and concentrates on the preserva-tion of traditional groups within a state. In the context of the EU’s eastwardenlargement ‘the respect for and protection of minorities’ has become part

of EU policy. Kin states with an active interest in a minority’s position addan international and cross-border dimension to minority issues. The position

and mobilization of national minorities is often tied up with local or regionalpolitics, thereby making minority issues a distinctly sub-national concern as

well. Both migration and minority issues affect (and are affected by) differentlevels of governance simultaneously.

All three of these themes are hinged on security concerns. Increasingly,

they have translated into calls for ‘integration’ as a policy response. The issueof rights, particularly the question of who should enjoy what kind of rights,is an intrinsic part of ‘integration’. Minority and migration issues tend to be

framed in terms of either security and control or rights. Rather than lamenting

the securitization of these issues in the academic and policy debate and advo-cating a focus on rights as an alternative, this article argues for the reframingof policy thinking on minorities and migrants in terms of a ‘security–rights

nexus’.1 Minority and migration issues and their policy interlock have a clearsecurity dimension, but these concerns are best addressed through rights-basedpolicies. Through an analysis of the policy approaches of the OSCE and the

EU, this article traces two related dimensions of the ‘security–rights nexus’,namely the conceptual link between security and rights and the increasinglinkages between policies towards minorities and migrants.

I. Framing the Debate about Minorities and Migrants

There is as yet no agreed international definition of what constitutes a nationalminority, thereby leaving the notion of minority rights in an international legaland political limbo. The paradoxical situation is that international soft law

measures and policy instruments have been created in the absence of definitionalclarity. Most definitions of a national minority describe a numerical minority

that combines objective criteria, such as specific cultural characteristics distinct1 For a related conceptual discussion about the need to manage the securitization of minority rights, seeRoe (2004).

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from the majority of the population, and subjective criteria, such as a collec-

tive sense of community.2 The distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ minoritiesis omnipresent in the policy debates about minority rights and immigration. It

remains ill defined, however, and ironically points to the overlap rather thanthe distinction between the two categories. Old minorities are often describedas ‘historical’, ‘autochthonous’ or ‘traditional’ minorities. The reference to oldand new suggests a clear dividing line based on the period of settlement. It rests

on the assumption that minority cultures – whether old or new – are somethingfixed, and ignores a considerable grey area in between the two categories, re-sulting from successive waves of migration. It is unclear how long a recently

arrived immigrant would have to reside in a polity to be considered old. Packeroffers a generous condition ‘that the minimum time necessary for the existence

of a minority is the time sufficient to bring a claim, i.e. the time to organiseand engage in claiming. … Whether of short or long duration, the existence

of a genuine need and an expressed desire relating to identity/dignity wouldappear all the justification needed to say a minority “exists” ’ (Packer, 1999,pp. 63–4). In practice, however, many states opt for less generous measures,

which base recognition and rights on the duration and type of residency.The distinction between old and new implies clearly demarcated needs and

creates a hierarchy of status. The underlying assumption is that new minori-

ties, generally defined as recent immigrants, are not entitled to the same rights

as long-established national minorities. In the context of newly independentstates, especially those emerging from the rubble of socialist era federations,singling out old and new minorities on the basis of the status quo ante becomes

particularly problematic. Slovenia is a good case in point here, as it concedesa special status of ‘autochthonous minorities’ to the Italians and Hungarians(and the Roma in certain districts), while the more numerous Croats, Serbs

and Bosnians are treated as new minorities. Any attempt to specify the timeframe of old asks for further sub-divisions of ‘newness’ to capture a range ofmigrants’ experiences. Not only do long-term resident migrants gravitate from

being new towards being old, it is also true that old minorities (or membersof old majorities) can become migrants, for example in the context of labourmobility inside the EU or migration into EU Member States.

Despite the apparent imprecision, international law and policy have in-

corporated the distinction between old and new minorities. Recommendation1201 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe contains a draftprotocol on the rights of national minorities, which includes a reference to the

citizenship criterion and a requirement of ‘longstanding, firm and lasting tieswith the state’. This definition explicitly excludes members of new minorities,

2 For the definition by UN Special Rapporteur Capotorti along these lines, see United Nations, E/CN.4/ Sub.2/384 Add. 1, 10.

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including those migrants with citizenship.3 Similarly, the Council of Europe’s

European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages of 1992 explicitlyexcludes ‘languages of migrants’ from the definition of ‘regional or minority

languages’ which, in turn, are defined as those languages ‘traditionally usedwithin a given territory of a state’. The Council of Europe’s Framework Con-vention on the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) of 1995 leaves thedefinition of minorities up to the ratifying states, but it refers to ‘tradition’ and

‘areas traditionally inhabited’ (Art. 10(2), 11(3), 14(2)). Thus, the definition ofold combines a temporal element related to the formation and persistence of aminority with a statement about the duration of their settlement. Interestingly,the complex monitoring and implementation process behind the Framework

Convention has created inroads for a wider definition of minorities. The Advi-

sory Committee overseeing the monitoring and reporting process has repeatedlyencouraged states to extend their list of national minorities to be covered by the

FCNM, to include non-citizens or the Roma. It has also warned of arbitrary andunjustified distinctions. The Advisory Committee has therefore gone beyondthe old–new dichotomy informing most signatories’ approach to the FCNM

without, however, advocating a one-size-fits-all minority rights regime acrossgroups and countries.

A substantial amount of the literature on national minorities and minority

rights centres on these definitional aspects and the historical evolution of the

political and legal salience of national minorities (Jackson-Preece, 1998; Packer,1999). Minorities and minority rights have traditionally been addressed bypolitical scientists working on conflicts and conflict regulation (Lijphart, 1977;

Horowitz, 1985; McGarry and O’Leary, 1993, Lapidoth, 1997), philosophersand political theorists supporting or criticizing multiculturalism (Taylor, 1992;Kymlicka, 1995; Barry, 2000; Loobuyck, 2005) and human rights or EU

lawyers (Thornberry, 1990; De Witte and Toggenburg, 2004; Steiner and Alston,2000). This admittedly schematic characterization of the relevant literaturecaptures three key concerns surrounding the discussion about minorities

and minority rights: first, a concern for political and institutional responsesto conflicts and conflict potential tied to minorities; secondly, a normativeconcern for the problems of reconciling the recognition of cultural differenceand group-differentiated rights with equality and individual rights; and thirdly,

a concern for the tension between human rights and minority rights and theuncertain patchwork of legal measures on minority rights.4 More recently,

3 The recommendation was rejected by the heads of states and governments at the Vienna summit of theCouncil of Europe in October 1993, due to its outspoken endorsement of minority autonomy.4 Minority rights are located in the space between Articles 1 and 27 of the International Covenant on Civiland Political Rights: Article 1 restates the provision in the UN Charter that ‘all peoples have a right to“self-determination”, which allows them “freely [to] determine their political status and freely pursuetheir economic, social and cultural development’, and Article 27 stipulates that ‘in states in which ethnic,

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studies analysing post-communist developments in Europe have merged these

three streams (Kymlicka and Opalski, 2001; Thornberry and Estébanez, 2004;Toggenburg, 2004; Malloy, 2005; Weller, 2005).

The relationship between human rights and minority rights is firmlyanchored in the debates about national minorities. By comparison, the studyof migration is more clearly polarized into ‘security-based’ and ‘rights-based’approaches. Migration (or immigration) has emerged as a separate field of

research dominated by historians, political scientists, economists and lawyers.In European studies, in particular, it is one of the fastest-growing bodies ofliterature. The study of migration is concerned with identifying the causesof migration, and the categorization of migrants – for example high- v. low-

skilled migrants (Muus, 2001, pp. 33–8), periods of migration – for example

migrants from former empires, labour migrants, family members, asylum-seekers/refugees, ‘illegal immigrants’, ethnic Germans and EU migrants

(Geddes, 2000; Stalker, 2002) and the features of migration – for exampleglobalization, acceleration, differentiation, feminization and politicization ofmigration (Geddes, 2000, p. 17).

This tendency towards classification mirrors the definitional debates in thestudy of national minorities. The predominant concerns in migration studiesare domestic and international policies towards refugees, asylum-seekers and

economic migrants, and the efficient implementation of policy (or lack thereof)

(Jordan et al., 2003, p. 210). The discussion about appropriate redistributiveor regulatory policy responses is informed by cost–benefit calculations(Weinstein, 2002), namely the question of whether migration represents an

economic resource or a liability the burden of which has to be shared withinstates, across states and at the supranational level (Thielemann, 2003, 2004).The overarching perception of a ‘migration crisis’ (Weiner, 1995) is linked to

a ‘discursive securitization’ of migration (Guiraudon and Joppke, 2001, pp.1–27). This security bias can be of a very technocratic and bureaucratic kind(Lavenex, 1999), although alternative views of security are equally relevant

in this context, for example the UN’s definition of human security or a widerdefinition of ‘societal security’ (Wæver et al., 1993). The security-basedapproach concentrates on the need to control migration in view of its perceivedpotential threat to internal or external stability and welfare. This approach has

been challenged by a rights-based approach to migration and ‘postnationalcitizenship’ (Bogusz et al., 2004; Castles and Davidson, 2000; Cholewinski,

religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right,

in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice theirown religion, or to use their own language’ (repr. in Steiner and Alston, 2000, pp. 1381–94). The UN Hu-man Rights Committee elaborated in its comment on Article 27 in 1994 that the individuals protected donot have to be citizens or even permanent residents and may include migrant workers.

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2000; Jacobson, 1996; Soysal, 1994). In between lies a field of studies that

spells out the ‘anxiety politics’ surrounding migration issues and points to thepitfalls of control policies, for example the indirect effect on resident ethnic

minorities, economic growth and international relations (Boswell, 2003;Geddes, 2003; Lavenex, 1999).

II. Exploring Policy Linkages: The Security–Rights Nexus

In policy-making the security–rights nexus has so far been implicit rather thanexplicit. It is most tangible in national and European-level calls for the ‘integra-

tion’ of minorities and migrants. Not only is there a conceptual link betweensecurity and rights, there is also an area of overlap in policy-making towards

minorities and migrants. Institutions like the OSCE and the EU illustrate thisdual trend most clearly. Minority protection, as defined and encouraged byinternational institutions like the OSCE and the EU since the 1990s, is closelytied up with security considerations, most notably the concern about a potential

overspill of conflict, and the import of a host of political and socio-economic in-stability and migratory pressures. The promotion of human and minority rightsabroad can thus be part of a strategy to prevent immigration. The securitizationof minority issues can deflect from the underlying principle of minority rights

(Kymlicka, 2004). However, the focus on security also creates a link between

groups recognized as ‘national minorities’ and recent immigrants. The lackof integration of minorities, however defined, undermines societal cohesion

and can give rise to political mobilization against the host polity, for examplein the form of separatism or fundamentalism. A lack of integration gives riseto security concerns, but, in turn, the call for integration has developed into

a policy panacea. If taken seriously, integration involves a degree of culturalrecognition, as well as political and socio-economic participation. It thereforecombines a concern for security with a concern for rights.

Three basic approaches have characterized European immigration policies

since 1945: assimilation (e.g. France), the guest worker (Gastarbeiter) sys-tem which restrict immigrants’ access to citizenship and political rights (e.g.Germany), and accommodative policies ranging from welfare provisions in

Sweden and pillarization in the Netherlands to an emphasis on integration andrelatively easy access to citizenship in the UK (Rex and Singh, 2003, p. 6).Brubaker identified a ‘differentialist turn’ in the 1980s and 1990s (Brubaker,

2001), a shift towards greater sensitivity to difference in immigration policiesas well as in other policy areas, such as the rights of indigenous people, au-

tonomy claims and the preservation of regional cultures and other particularidentities. This trend gradually exhausted itself and led to a ‘return to assimila-tion’, defined as the replacement of the focus on the persistence of difference

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with the idea of civic integration based on citizenship and basic commonalities

(Brubaker, 2001; Joppke, 2004). This shift in emphasis grew out of a growingconcern over the lack of integration by immigrants and long-term residents.

While governments have not refrained from restrictive entry policies, theyhave become more careful about avoiding overtly discriminatory policiestowards resident migrants and refugees in order not to jeopardize inter-ethnicrelations (Boswell, 2003, p. 4). Where ethnic minorities have been granted

voting rights, political parties have had to address the concerns of residentminorities, thereby shaping less discriminatory integration policies (Boswell,2003, p. 24). Concerns about internal security have therefore also been tied

up with rights, political or otherwise.The term ‘integration’, increasingly applied to both migrants and national

minorities, is not unproblematic. A whole range of issues, groups and policiesfall within this broad catch-all policy recommendation. ‘Integration’ comes

with the normative seal of approval and seemingly avoids the securitization ofthe issues at stake. However, integration strategies often involve elements ofcontrol. An emphasis on integration, especially socio-economic integration,

can also be a convenient way of transferring the burdens and costs of cohesionon to immigrants or minorities themselves (Geddes, 2003, p. 5). A distinctioncan be made between different types of integration, such as structural integra-

tion (labour market, housing, income); socio-cultural integration (interpersonal

contacts, participation in society’s institutions); and political-legal integration(political rights, naturalization procedures, anti-discrimination and specialconsultative bodies on certain issues) (Junger-Tas, 2001, pp. 8–11). The dif-

ferent types of integration are predicated on different sets of rights, rangingfrom social and economic rights to cultural rights to political rights. Thus,despite its inherent pitfalls, the term ‘integration’ combines a security concern

with scope for addressing these concerns through rights. That this does notnecessarily make for a straightforward policy response is already obviousfrom some of the theoretical discussions. Kymlicka emphasized the need to

distinguish between minority rights, understood as self-government rights,and ‘polyethnic’ rights for immigrants (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 24). Accordingto this definition, ‘polyethnic’ rights include the right to express one’s ethnicpeculiarity without fear of discrimination, public funding for various cultural

practices and exemption from certain laws and regulations, especially in con-nection with religious practices. Kymlicka’s distinction is less clear-cut whenthought through empirically.5 Demands of national minorities cannot be re-

duced to calls for self-government, and many old minorities demand cultural

5 Kymlicka points to a third category of rights – special representation rights – which tries to capture thedemands of national minorities and immigrant groups as well as non-ethnic social groups (Kymlicka,1995, pp. 31–2).

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rights and public funding for their activities, which would fall squarely within

Kymlicka’s category of ‘polyethnic’ rights.Despite the widespread references to civil, political, social and economic

rights in legal, political and public discourse, the distinctions between differ-ent sets of rights remain fuzzy. The processes of globalization, migration andEU integration have further blurred the distinctions in the context of changingnotions of sovereignty and territory. In the classic account by Marshall (1992),

social rights were not necessarily tied to citizenship, a political and economicreality that still holds today. Immigrants often enjoy civil and social rightsbefore gaining access to explicit political rights, which remain tied to citizen-

ship, or at least a long-term residence status.6 By comparison, political rightsare inextricably linked to issues of identity and the demos. Citizenship marks

the recognition of the more permanent outcomes of migration. The politicalrights of minorities, whether national minorities or migrant communities, are

also critically shaped by the institutional features of the voting and decision-making processes of a political system. Cultural rights, defined as the rightto learn about, preserve and express one’s cultural identity, are often centred

on a minority’s language. The right not only to learn but also to use one’sown language in public – for example when dealing with administrations orcourts – moves cultural rights beyond the private sphere and into the political

domain. Minorities and migrants have a bearing on the whole catalogue of

rights. On balance, political and economic migrants have been at the receiv-ing end of social and economic rights, while in the case of national minoritiesthe emphasis is generally on their distinctive cultural rights and identity, and

political representation.

III. The Security–Rights Nexus and the OSCE

The CSCE/OSCE and the Council of Europe have been Europe’s foremostinstitutions developing norms and soft law measures on the protection of na-

tional minorities. The CSCE/OSCE process from 1990 onwards establishedan explicit link between democracy, conflict prevention and minority protec-tion. The security–rights nexus is at the heart of the OSCE’s self-definition.

The CSCE Paris Charter of 1990 stipulated that ‘peace, justice, stability anddemocracy, require that the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identityof national minorities be protected and conditions for the promotion of that

identity be created.’7 The CSCE 1990 Copenhagen document shifted the em-

6

Marshall’s main concern was neither minorities nor migrants, but the lack of a social dimension to tradi-tional notions of citizenship (see Marshall, 1992).7 The text cited is in the ‘Human Dimension’ section; see «http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/ summits/paris90e.htm#Anchor-Huma-3228». The OSCE Hague Recommendations on the education rights

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phasis from non-discrimination of minorities to state responsibilities towards

minorities. Despite its Europe-wide remit, the organization’s focus has beenon post-communist eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. As the OSCE

represents state interests, the principles of territorial integrity and security havebeen of primary importance, and political power games between the MemberStates have partly undermined the effectiveness of the organization.8 Overall,the emphasis of the OSCE (and the Council of Europe) has remained on the less

controversial right to ‘participation’. Participation is an essential component ofany kind of ‘integration’, but remains a vague policy recommendation. Article15 of the Council of Europe’s FCNM of 1995 goes some way towards spelling

out the substance of the concept: ‘The Parties shall create the conditions neces-sary for the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities

in cultural, social and economic life and in public affairs, in particular in thoseaffecting them’ (Council of Europe, 1995).

The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) has beenthe OSCE’s most visible instrument in the area of minority protection. Hismandate, a product of the early 1990s, is firmly tied to the notion of conflict

prevention (Kemp, 2001). The HCNM’s policy recommendations have con-centrated on cultural (linguistic and educational) and political rights, rang-ing from access to citizenship and naturalization procedures in Estonia and

Latvia, to territorial autonomy in the case of Crimea. Over time, social and

economic rights have entered his catalogue of recommendations (see below).The potentially intrusive nature of the HCNM’s criticisms and recommenda-tions regarding a country’s minority rights regime is counterbalanced by the

inbuilt limits of the institution. The effectiveness of this small-scale, highlypersonalized and immediate model of policy intervention depends criticallyon the person filling the post, the political will of the states participating in the

OSCE, and the back-up of important national or European-level actors, suchas the EU during the process of EU accession.

The emphasis of the CSCE/OSCE has been on minority protection, although

since its foundation the organization has had a migration dimension. The finalHelsinki Act and several follow-up documents addressed aspects of migration,such as human contacts and family reunification. The 1990 Copenhagendocument expressed the view ‘that freer movement and contacts among

their citizens are important in the context of the protection and promotion ofhuman rights and fundamental freedoms’ (CSCE, 1990, para. 19). The notion

of national minorities (1996), the Oslo Recommendations on the linguistic rights of national minorities(1998), and the Lund Recommendations on the effective participation of national minorities in public life(1999) subsequently attempted to define a European standard of minority protection (see «http://www.osce.org/hcnm/documents/recommendations/index.php3»).8 See the discussion by James Hughes of the controversial closure of the OSCE missions in Estonia andLatvia in this special issue.

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of migrant ‘integration’ first appeared at the CSCE summit declaration in

Budapest in 1994 when the participating states pledged to ‘continue to promotethe integration of migrant workers in the societies in which they are lawfully

residing’, while stating that ‘a successful process of integration also dependson its active pursuit by the migrants themselves’ (CSCE, 1994, para. 31). Theissue of migration did not top the OSCE’s agenda in practical policy terms,although the emphasis on national minorities and their security dimension,

as reflected in the HCNM, were partly shaped by concerns about migratorypressures.9

The OSCE has revisited migration issues from late 2003 onwards within

the context of a new emphasis on tolerance and non-discrimination. In De-cember 2003 the OSCE Maastricht ministerial council called upon the OSCE

Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to reinforceits activities aimed at ‘combating discrimination against migrant workers and

at facilitating the integration of migrant workers into the societies in whichthey are legally residing’ (OSCE, 2003, Decision No. 4/03). At the OSCEministerial council in Sofia in 2004, the participating states expressed their

commitment to ‘take steps, in conformity with their domestic law and interna-tional obligations, against discrimination, intolerance and xenophobia againstmigrants and migrant workers’ as well as to ‘consider undertaking activities to

raise public awareness of the enriching contribution of migrants and migrant

workers into society’ (OSCE, 2004, Decision No. 12/04). Similarly, the 2005human dimensions seminar on ‘Migration and Integration’ in Warsaw aimedto move beyond the cost–benefit calculations in migration policies by focusing

on practical solutions for the social and political integration of immigrants andrefugees inside the host state in order to prevent processes of marginalizationand a perception of migrants as a threat to the state’s identity or security (OSCE,

2005a). At the same time the responsibilities of migrants vis-à-vis the hostcommunity were stressed, most importantly a ‘genuine effort to integrate andto be integrated’. It was suggested that ‘successful integration is possible only

if adequate legal and socio-economic frameworks are established to ensure thatnewcomers do not have to renounce their own identity, lifestyles and beliefsin order to adopt the identity of the receiving society, but may benefit fromboth’ (OSCE, 2005a). Simultaneously, the OSCE has increasingly stressed

the social and economic aspects of minority protection which, by definition,are closer to the key concerns of new minorities. The costs of marginalizationand exclusion, as well as the link between the settlement areas of minorities

and underdevelopment, have become part of the OSCE’s agenda. Generally,the OSCE takes the view that the economic and social concerns of minorities

9 For the HCNM’s Roma policy, see Rachel Guglielmo and Timothy Waters in this special issue.

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are best expressed and addressed through political participation, employment

and education (OSCE, 2005c).In 2004 the OSCE parliamentary assembly asked the HCNM to prepare a

study on ‘new’ minorities in established democracies. Although the HCNM’soffice came to the conclusion that this task went beyond its mandate, it ac-knowledged that many of the issues and policies arising were similar to thoseof old minorities, and encouraged a debate between people and institutions

dealing with these issues. The HCNM concluded that established minoritiesin new or old democracies are seen to be involved in conflicts more often thannew minorities in established democracies, and that the greatest potential for

conflict arises from a minority’s claim to its identity clashing with a majori-ty’s interest in reinforcing the state’s identity. By contrast, the expectations

of new minorities were deemed to be lower than those of a minority that hassettled in an area for generations (OSCE, 2005b). Nevertheless, HCNM Ekeus

stressed the comparable social tensions arising from both established and newminorities, especially in situations involving a value transfer on the part of themajority, or unequal employment opportunities.

It is too early to judge the effective translation of any of these declarationsinto policy outcomes, but they signal a growing supranational awareness ofthe link between policies towards minorities and migrants.10 Moreover, they

extend the security–rights nexus that has always characterized the OSCE’s

approach to minority protection as a means of conflict prevention to includemigrant communities. A gradual widening of the definition of minorities andminority protection within the OSCE feeds into the securitization of minori-

ties and migrants, for example through explicit references to risks of crimeand terrorism resulting from the lack of integration of minorities. However,the OSCE’s emphasis on ‘participation’ and ‘integration’ is closer to a call for

rights than control mechanisms. The OSCE’s political leverage has continu-ously weakened since the 1990s, but just as it made a significant contributionto the definition of minority rights in the 1990s, it is now at the forefront of a

reconceptualization of the link between minorities and migrants.

IV. The Security–Rights Nexus and the EU

Minority-related issues (both old and new) have increasingly risen up the EU’sagenda through enlargement, the common foreign and security policy and

the evolution of justice and home affairs. The EU’s engagement in post-1989

10 The fact that there is an institutional overlap between the international actors engaged in both minority- and

migration-relevant processes (EU, OSCE, Council of Europe, UN, etc.) underpins the link between the twopolicy areas though it does not per se guarantee integrated policies and policy outcomes (Toggenburg, 2004).The European Parliament has been in favour of the protection of third-country nationals and minorities alike(see, e.g., the Vetter report of 1970 calling for rights of political participation for immigrants).

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central and eastern Europe (CEE) provides a particularly fertile ground for

analysing the security–rights nexus. The experience of genocide, expulsion,coercion or accommodation has characterized the emergence and development

of many of the states in the region. After 1989 most of the post-communistcountries prioritized the strengthening of central state capacity and the positionof the titular nationality, thereby running the risk of discriminating against,alienating and politicizing minority groups. The violent disintegration of the

former Yugoslavia and a number of intractable post-Soviet conflicts, resultingin a dramatic increase in refugees and asylum-seekers in the EU, as well as aperception of further conflict potential in view of sizeable minorities in many

east European countries informed the EU’s approach. In Latvia, for example,the titular nationality accounts for only 58 per cent of the population, and

countries like Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria have to accommodate politi-cally organized Hungarian and Turkish minorities of 7–10 per cent. Moreover,

most CEE countries must develop policies tackling the social exclusion of thelarge Roma populations.

A mixture of humanitarian, ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security concerns informed

the push for a greater internationalization of minority rights in the early 1990s.The EU explicitly adopted the CSCE norms on minority protection in thecontext of the Badinter Arbitration Committee and the EU foreign ministers’

declaration on the guidelines on recognition of new states in eastern Europe

and the Soviet Union, and the declaration on Yugoslavia of 16 December 1991.Subsequent EU involvement in the Balkan region provides ample illustrationof the security–rights nexus at work. The cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and

Macedonia, in particular, combine a peace-keeping mission with a complexinstitutional model of power-sharing between different ethnic groups. TheEU’s activity in the Balkans illustrates the interlinking of its policy priorities

for securing and stabilizing its borders, promoting the protection of minoritiesas a norm, and averting migration.

The EU’s eastward enlargement also carried the CSCE/OSCE-inspired

security–rights rationale forward. The political Copenhagen condition of EUmembership (1993) stipulates the need for ‘stability of institutions guaranteeingdemocracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection ofminorities’. During the EU’s southern enlargement in the 1970s, a country’s

democratic credentials had been a prominent point of reference, thoughnot an explicitly formulated condition. The link between human rights andconditionality had been an integral part of the EU’s external relations since

the Luxembourg European Council of 1991 (De Witte and Toggenburg, 2004;Smith, 2001). Eastern enlargement merged and extended these elements ofconditionality in an international context that highlighted the salience of

minority issues and the potential for ethno-regional conflict amidst multi-

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faceted transition processes. The Commission’s emphasis on two types of

minorities during the accession process – the Russophones in Estonia andLatvia, and the Roma across CEE – reflects the security concerns on the part

of the EU Member States.11

By comparison, established minorities like theHungarians in Slovakia and Romania or the Turks in Bulgaria were hardlycommented on in the Commission’s monitoring exercise.

The ‘respect for and promotion of minorities’ could be interpreted as a

negative right, namely the protection from discrimination, or as a positiveright to one’s culture and the right to effective participation. The wording ofthe EU’s political condition avoids the stronger notion of ‘minority rights’.

It also does not refer to ‘national minorities’ and does not specify what typesof minorities are covered. Some analysts have interpreted the EU minority

condition as advocating collective rights and positive discrimination, which,in turn, are likely to increase ethnic segregation, facilitate political instrumen-

talization and result in social and political conflict potential (Riedel, 2001).In fact, there is little evidence to back this claim: firstly, the EU’s minority‘condition’ lacked a firm foundation in EU law and concise benchmarks and

enforcement mechanisms.12 The practices of the current Member States rangefrom elaborate constitutional and legal means for minority protection andpolitical participation to constitutional unitarism and the outright denial that

national minorities exist. The EU had to base its monitoring exercise on a set

of values and non-EU documents, namely the European Convention on Hu-man Rights, the major OSCE documents of the early 1990s, the UN declara-tions and the FCNM of 1995.13 Secondly, minority rights have never been an

internal political priority of the EU. Thirdly, the fact that the question of whatconstitutes a ‘national minority’ or a ‘minority’ and the deeply disputed natureof minority rights in international law further blurred EU conditionality in this

area. Fourthly, the first Copenhagen criterion had to be ‘fulfilled’ by the timethe accession negotiations got underway, thereby limiting the EU’s leverageonce negotiations had started. Last but not least, the minority criterion did not

figure prominently in the EU’s pre-accession funding priorities. The paradoxis that, despite these caveats, politicians and analysts have continuously em-phasized the EU’s success in promoting stability and minority protection inCEE through its conditionality for accession.

11 For a critical discussion of the role of the OSCE and the EU in Estonia and Latvia, see James Hughesin this special issue.12 The norm of ‘non-discrimination’ is firmly anchored in the acquis and, as such, forms part of the thirdCopenhagen criterion. The accession countries had to transpose the Council directives of 2000, a process

that has been as slow and fitful as in the old Member States.13 The regular reports frequently reminded the candidate states to sign and ratify the FCNM despite thefact that several EU Member States, such as Belgium, France, Greece, Luxembourg and the Netherlands,have not done so.

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International actors and a vaguely defined European norm of minority pro-

tection have framed the debates and perceptions in CEE and affected the timingand nature of specific pieces of legislation, such as the gradual modification

of restrictive citizenship and language laws in Estonia and Latvia. Neverthe-less, the policy outcomes have remained ambiguous, or failed to address theunderlying issues at stake, as the exceedingly high number of stateless residentsin Estonia and Latvia illustrates. The cases of Slovakia and Romania confirm

that the EU’s political leverage is greatest in the early phase of transition fromundemocratic regimes. Here the EU has helped to legitimize reformist forcesand, in the presence of organized minority interests (e.g. the Hungarian parties

in Slovakia), this process has encouraged ethnically inclusive governments.EU conditionality has anchored minority rights in the political rhetoric of the

candidate states, but the EU had little to offer in terms of substantive guidance,as the lack of benchmarks, inconsistencies and the limited scope for follow-up

on implementation in the Commission’s regular reports demonstrate (Hughesand Sasse, 2003). The overall impact of the EU’s monitoring exercise is bestunderstood as having a ‘lock-in effect’ and reinforcing domestic trends (Sasse,

2005; Schimmelfennig et al., 2003). Ultimately, the security risks associatedwith minorities in the accession countries were deemed to be relatively smallby the EU and the Member States, a perception that weakened the push for

the implementation of the rights of minorities. Security perceptions are by

definition shaped by political motivations. The point here is not whether or notthe EU’s security perceptions were misconceived, but that security and rightsconsiderations are closely intertwined.

Even though the EU’s Constitutional Treaty was voted down in nationalreferendums, the inclusion of explicit references to minorities in its text remainsnoteworthy and is likely to reappear in a different context. Article I-2 of the

draft Constitutional Treaty of 18 June 2004 stipulates the Union’s values andrefers to ‘the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality,the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons

belonging to minorities’.14 This formulation anchors the first Copenhagencriterion, including the minority ‘condition’, in EU law. Article 6 of the TEUhad copied the Copenhagen formulation, though it had dropped the referenceto minorities. The EU’s as yet non-binding Charter of Fundamental Rights,

which would have been part of the Constitutional Treaty, contains an even moreexplicit reference: Article 21 lists ‘membership of a national minority’ as aground of discrimination which shall be prohibited, while Article 22 enshrines

the Union’s respect for ‘cultural, religious and linguistic diversity’. The con-cept of ‘minority protection’ hovers between the prohibition of discrimination

14 The HCNM had lobbied for the inclusion of a reference to minorities in order to reinforce the EU’s com-mitment to the Copenhagen accession criteria.

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on the basis of ethnic origin, race or nationality as the minimum standard, on

the one hand, and the preservation and promotion of the separate identity ofminority groups, on the other. The EU’s directives of 2000 (‘equal treatment

directive’ and ‘race equality directive’) link the two poles of ‘minority protec-tion’ (Toggenburg, 2001; De Witte, 2004). The directives apply to both publicand private actors and include scope for positive action. For the time being,they are the main channels for the promotion of minority identities, including

migrant communities.Compared to the EU’s recent and hesitant engagement in minority protec-

tion, migration has acquired a more distinct EU dimension. The common

market and freedom of movement have turned immigration into a commoninterest (Geddes, 2000, p. 3). A significant rise in irregular migration in the

late 1980s spurred EU policy-making, although the discussions about im-migration and asylum policies at the supranational level preceded the surge

in migration (Guiraudon, 2000, pp. 253–4). Generally speaking, a period ofminimal supranational involvement (1957–86) was followed by informal inter-governmentalism (1986–93), which galvanized into formal intergovernmental

co-operation (1993–99) and a gradual communitarization (1999–) through thenew Amsterdam Treaty objective to create an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ (Geddes, 2003, pp. 131–9). Until the Amsterdam Treaty, migration

and asylum policies were formulated at the intergovernmental level (Schen-

gen agreement, Dublin convention), then they gradually moved into the EU’sfirst pillar. The security–rights nexus is illustrated by the Amsterdam Treaty,as it also extended the anti-discrimination provisions to include gender, race,

ethnicity, religion, age, disability and sexual orientation, and paved the way forthe two Council directives of 2000. The Amsterdam Treaty also stipulated that,within five years, the Council unanimously had to adopt measures on asylum,

refugees and displaced persons; on the absence of controls of persons crossinginternal borders (both EU citizens and third-country nationals); on the cross-ing of external borders (including visa rules for stays of no more than three

months); and on the freedom of movement of third-country nationals withinthe EU (for periods shorter than three months).

The rights of legally resident third-country nationals, which have graduallygained in prominence at the EU level since the late 1990s (Geddes, 2000, pp.

157–70), provide the most explicit link between minorities and migrants inEU law and policy. It is in this area that the EU has embraced the conceptof ‘integration’ most explicitly. The Commission’s communication on

immigration, integration and employment of June 2003, the Commission’sfirst annual report on migration and integration of June 2004 and the EuropeanCouncil conclusions and JHA Council conclusion on immigrant integration

policy in the EU of November 2004 reflect a growing emphasis on this area,

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which originated at the Tampere European Council in 1999. The EU defines

‘integration’ as a two-way process (similar to the OSCE definition) that hingeson shared responsibilities of the host state and the legally resident third-country

nationals. Employment, a basic knowledge of the host society’s language,history and institutions, and participation in the democratic process, especiallyat the local level, have been singled out as key channels of integration. Despitea move towards policy co-ordination at the EU level, the primary responsibility

rests with the Member States, thereby mirroring the area of minority protection.Two recent Council directives, however, take the issue of integration forward:directive 2003/86/EC of September 2003 on the right to family reunification

and directive 2003/109/EC of November 2003 on the status of third-countrynationals who are long-term residents. These directives must be transposed by

the Member States by October 2005 and January 2006 respectively. Despitethe emphasis on a permanent residence status or naturalization as a reward

for integration, these measures leave the receiving states with a loophole byaccepting ‘unfitness’ to integrate as grounds for refusal of admission.15 TheCommission’s first annual report on migration and integration of July 2004

demonstrates that the boundaries between old and new minorities are in flux: thereport separates the integration of national or ethnic minorities and long-termresident immigrants from the integration of recently arrived immigrants and

refugees (Commission, 2004, p. 17). While the use of the terms ‘immigrants’,

‘ethnic minorities’ and ‘national minorities’ is not particularly precise, the reportunderpins the recognition that the policy tools for the integration of differentminority and migrant groups are similar.

Conclusion

Minorities and migrants are intrinsically linked to security issues and rights.Both policy areas – and the interlock between them – would therefore benefitfrom a reconceptualization in terms of a security–rights nexus, which pos-

its that expanding rights can be an effective policy response to the securityconcerns that arise from minority and migration issues. Securitization andsecuring rights are, in fact, two sides of the same coin. The recognition of

this security–rights nexus helps to break through the either/or approachescharacterizing the formulation and interpretation of policies and norms. TheOSCE and the EU provide good examples of the two key dimensions of this

security–rights nexus: first, while the OSCE has concentrated more on minorityrights and the EU has developed more competences in the area of migration,

both institutions increasingly engage in both areas and recognize an overlap15 See Cholewinski in this special issue. For the application of the directive to the Russophones, seeHughes.

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between them. Secondly, while security considerations have been paramount

for both the OSCE and the EU from the early 1990s, rights have become anincreasingly prominent part of their policy approaches. Both institutions have

developed a common vocabulary to describe the concept of ‘integration’. Thisconcept may be flawed by ambiguity over its meaning, but it neverthelessreflects a supranational recognition of the underlying security–rights nexus indeveloping policies to manage minority and migration issues.

Correspondence:

Gwendolyn Sasse

European Institute

London School of Economics

Houghton StreetLondon WC2A 2AE, UK

Tel: +44 (0)207 955 7538 Fax: +44 (0)207 955 7546

email: [email protected]

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