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ieclassified and approved for elease b\r ~\JSA on 09- '17-2008 Lffsuantto E .O. 12958, as mendecl. FOi.A Case #52925 .

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ARMY SECURITY AGENCY

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EUROPEAN AXIS 'SIGNAL IN'rELLIGENCE\' IN WORLD WAR al '\.J ~

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·AS REVEALED BY .''TICOM 11 INVESTIGATIONS em ~ t,n . 'J

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AND BY OTHER PRISONER OF WAR INTERROGATIONS-i ~ • . o( p;wq

AND CAPTURED MATERIAL . PRINCIPALLY GERMAN o ,.,,:.-J \ . , . . ' . . :ai~

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VOLUME 7--GOl!:RI'NG'S 1'RESEARCH 11 %3UREAU , . ' •

\Rs;Fil~ No. \~41-~·. ' i

. Prep~red ~der the d1recti:l ofNµt~~ No~ \ q /7q 6 . . I I :1

CHIEF, . ARMY SECURITY. AGE W°t . ·. \\ · . \Inde~ed ·

' i .May 1946 · . L.:J. =. ;.::.:.:..N-~r:;r_;,-,, U-~·.

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VOLUME 1

Chapter I~ 1 Introduction

Chaptar II. ~ The History and Organization ot the FA.

Chapter iII.~lP Evaluation of the FA. \

Appendix I • ...,_~ Alphabetical Listing by Country,:or. Systems . 'Worked on by the FA.

Appendix II-t~Tre.nslation of a Forchl_lllgsamt Directive h :::a:+: n~ J... Signed by Schapper. I L 1 r, ~ F,,.,

It, \l ~ ~ vd:' •·v .,/A "'-\" b1o~ r._~ l.., ot G~~<1 .e ~ fc.\i.. ... ~ j'"'i , 'hf V. ~t''!X ~

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DOCID: 3486670 ,. Short summary

operations The discovery Scope of this

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Chapter I - Introduction , ParagraJ?..h

of the history, 01•ganization and of the FA • . .: • . • • • • • . • . .• • l of' the FA by TICOM. • • • " • • • • • • 2 p.~:pe:r and indication of sources used~ • 3 .

1. Short summary of the history, organization,, and operations of the FA. Goer1ng 0s Hesearch}?ureau, ce~liea "Goering vs" by 'l1J~:Cr:.·1 because ·O:f 1 ts final responsibility to Reichsmarschal Hermann Goering:, was composed of about 2000 persons . . The main office, under . the direction of a G'ot t­fried Schl}.PPer who held the civi:J. service rank of a Minis­terial Direktor, was divided into six rilain se.ctions {Hs.upt­abteilungen) indicated by Roman numerals, and fifteen .sect­ions (Abteilungen) indicated by arabic numerals. In· a.dd1- · tlon there were one branch office and at lea.st four Regional Offices besides an undetermined number of intercept stations, Main Section IV.P or about 180 persons, was the cryptanalytic br·anch and handled that portion of the -raw material . ( ~· ossibly 20;%) which was in code or cipher. Goering" s ResEiarch Bureau was charged with providing the Nazl state with reliable dip­lomatic~ economic, and political in:rormation to ·be derived from mog!_!-ori~g_e.11 -1ntier.nal German telephone,_, tcleg:k.~a.ph,

· - a.nd wireless _ commu@_~a.t'i.ons (including such ~ommunicat.tons frnnf wi tlfin ·Germany . t.~ foreign countries) ; f'oreignw'lpel es.s communl<~a.tions of' a ~commercial arid' d.iplomat1c nature ;/:ror-

. eign press a.nd nevs broadcasts ,and speeches of politicians; and .from the study of available newspapers and phriodicals. Tc secure the raw materials for this project it · operated. its own intercept and monitoring service. The Research . . Bureau collabora.-ted ·w·1 th the Abwehr and Ge3 ta.po in censox•1ng

. all comrnunica.tions in Germany and in German occupied terri­tory. The :tnformatlon produced T.las distributed ln the f~ of . f'inished reports (of various types) to Goering and Hitler· .:.) nd to the top Nazi officials and interested departments . . ~f the government. The home location of Goering's Re3aar~h ~ ,. b:.ire.s-.u was Berlin, Charlottenburg 2J Sch1llerstrasse I~rs. -·-16-.:::.2-+

. ~ ~ :;_n.e diSCO)Te£Z of ~ FA ~;y: n t:i}Ji, .. . The Research Bureau 2p~ears to have been tne. azr-Party Cryptanalytic Agency. The existence of this intelligence agency was / unknown t. 'J ' B::. ' itish and American sources prior to it.s dis­covery by ~.: t.cc. ;,~ . ~J.c01;1 Team 3 learned of the existence

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of such an agency while question:tng members of the ,Foreign 0.f.fice Cryptanalyt:!.c _Section at Burgscheidungen .on 28 April 1945 and on 9 May 1945 Team l discovered the abandoned quar-

, ters of this organization tn the barracks near the airfield 'at Kaufbeuren, 50 miles 3outhwest of Munich. A file of administrative papers, including a direc-tive, signed by Gottfried Schspper, the head of the bureau, were .found which gave the organization at that time and served as a basis for further investigation. ·

3. Sco.ttie of this paper and 1nd1'~~t1on or sources. used .. This report is an his toricaI descriptfOn of the RI:."M/l~A andA a.n evaluation of its operations. For conveni~nce the abbre­viation FA will be used in this pa.per whenever Goering 1 s Researcn bureau is mentioned. (This is .the standard ref­erence used by the Germans themselves for the organizaticn.) It will be seen that the FA was founded by Goering and protected under the cover name of Reich Air Ministry Research Bureau (Re1chslu.ftfah.rtminister1ums/Forschungsanit) although the FA was actually not an operational division of' the Air Ministry but was .the Nazi Party ;rival of the milita.i .. Y signal 1ntel:J.,1gence agencies. · In Appendix I details of its crypt­analytic successes are given. Appendix II is a translation of the Kau.fbeuren directive which sets .forth the organiz.a.tion of the FA at tl1e end of the wa.r e.nd indicates the content or other papers • . Appendix III is an autob1.ography ()f Sehapper, the la.st ·head oi" the FA. Tab ffeontains all known pE;;rsonnel

. ......___of the l41A, names of all other persons mentioned., ider.r.tif 1-cation or all placesll terms, titles s.nd abbreviations used., and a bibliography of references consult;ed in this paper. It is intended to present the details o.f its organization

,,and to ~Lndicate the nature and success of its · operations in as objective a manner a.s possibleo The report is based on the val:'iou~ TICOM/Interrogation Reportsl and .as such is considerably subjective in that the interests o.f the inter­rogators . and the opinions of the informants are reflected. Objective check of the' stat~ments elicited in the interro­gations is possible .from miscellaneous '.rICOM Documents

) 1. FoiI' conve11ience, , these TICOMl'.Interroga.tions will be :-ei'erred to as I in the fc»otnote~~ . ~

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- . which reveal details of cryptanalytic success and liaison with other a.gen61es2; pre~s reports.J, various non-TIC OM.· .Prisoner of War Intei"rogat1ons1t, rela.ted -entries in Intelli­gence rep'?rts5, and in part~-cglar lzly va.ri_ous a.dminlst.ratlve " memoranda f _ound at Ka.ufbeuren • · . Since the primary commit­ment of the TICOM ·Teams lay with' German- cryptana.1.ysis their investigations properly covered German methods, successe·s, teclu'liques, and equi.iJment 1n that field. In the case of the FA, however·, cryptanalysis was.but one of. several .activities and, as ~pe following _pa.ges will show, by no means . the major

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2Pers • . z~ Yearly Repo.rt .·~r Brlti~h h"'mpire section for 1941 and · 1942. D:· lc .er· . . Appendix I ·£:r1t1sh . systems.

}IF 188 . . F·our st,,_ories based on· telephone· conversations be­t,.1een high German officials a.t the time of the Anschluss by .an .Associated Press reporter, Daniel De -Luce, appeared on 4,5,6, and. 7 November l945 with a. Berlin dateline . . These· stories not only revealed. the extent of the telephone mo~i,_ toring carried on by the FA but also indicated its success·· in rea.cl.ing a. French diploma.tic 13ysteni. at that time. -An ~ffort.has been niade to secUl'e the origiria.1 documents . on · which these stories w-er~ based. TICOM _representatives in Europe 1 however, have reported 2.1 May ~6 - tha't the De·. Luce mate~i:-~l ~Pt~ not indicate _. any French Code a~ having been broken nor did it give any 1nfortnat1on .on cryptanalytic ·. ~technique~ nol' did it lndic'a:te any successes with Allied.­C iphera". · - ' .

_ ... 4Both the CSDIC (C~6lnb:tned >: serv1c.~ Detailed Interrogation Center) and regular PW.Inte~rc>gations have yielded consider­able information and op1ni'en·an the Forschungsamt. Info!"­mation so obtained mus:t·-he caref'ul.ly contr:_olled with con• sideration or the .informant 0s probable reliability. The opinion expressed ts of'ten tinged w:ith jea;lousy or based

_ ~n rumor and as such is of ·alight. value _~ven 1;1s gossip.· ~ . · . . . . .· -·The }!~e~ly Intellig~nce Summary (Office or · the Assistant Chief of- Stal'r.,, G-2; Headqua?'tars, United States Forces, E:.1 i-opean Theater) has reported on the FA . (Number 12 of · 4 OctoiiC~ .1945), IFl43. , and :roeferred to 1 ts wire~tapJ;>1ng activ,_t1e3 (Number 15- of 25 Qctober 1945), IFl.32. 6 ·. .

Ticom Do<:.~w::ent 240 -~fPILM _34). ·

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one. It happened that the FA personnel available for ques"."' tioning did not 61ve the impression of having been excep~ tionaliy cQmpetent crypt§nalysts.. The grandiose claims ma.de by Goering! and Scha.pper are. balanced by the generally low opinion of the FA appearing throughout the Interroge.tions. A final evaluation Of the FA 0 s cryptanalytic work lies somevhere between these extremes. Such present~tion, with the FA crypta.nalys is placed in terms of . the overa.ll oper­ations of the FA, constitutes the followihg report.

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8p1na1' H.epox•t of Team 1, Appendix 2JJ (I 15).

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VOLUME 7

Chapter II ~ The History and Organization of .the FA

A. · 'I1he History o.f the PA. Paragraph ? ~""­

The Fqunding or the FA • . • • . •. • • . • • • • • . • • 4~ - - s Relations of the FA with oth~r cryptologic agencies .. 5 - - - - I\· The FA as a Nazi organlzation (relations with

. Hirrimler through ~chellenber~ of the Reich Ma.in Security Off ice - RSHA). • • • • • • • • • • • 6 - - - - - IV

Operations of the FA, Apr•il, l _933 - M~.y, 1945. 7 - - - - - 11.

4. ,The Found1~ of the FA. The establishment of the FA· was brought abou bY-Goe1•1ng, himselr, although the actual conception of the role of such an organization seems to be due to Schapper, the.· la.st head of the FA, and his predeces~ ­

sors, Schimpf and von Hesse. Independent statements by Goering~ and by SchapperlO a.re available which a.re in agree­ment on the details of the planning and founding of the FA. Coni"irma.tion and ~~{lig..'11.t supplementation is found in the interrogations of ex-members of the FA and of individuals who had d~al 1ngs with 1 ·t}l ·

9 _.I_,108 I 143 pp 12 ff.

-l0Fina1 _Report of Team l~ Appendix :? (I 15)

llMembers of · the FA include senior specialist .Dr. Martin P~etzel, specialist Otto Fingerhut, specialist Hoeckley

-Oden, Dr • . Heinz .Kla.utsche~ prioc1pa.l specialist Seifert (I 25 and 54) and Lother Guenther (CSDIC, MU 500, HQ 7th Army, Re:f. No. 708, 29 January 19.1.15; I 46). Various members of the Foreign Ofi"ice Cryptanalytic Section gave e.n outline of the organizati.on of the FA (I l) a.nd Mettig (I 131) of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme .Command of the Armed Forces was acquainted with its outllne--l•~.~tt1g to . a surpri'sing degree.

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· The first 1nterroga.tion of Goering is of a generri_l nature.and is filled out by the second inter.rcga.tion. The opinion of tl1.e !nterroga.tors · that Goering talked readily and reliably but had no mind for details appears to be correct 1n 20. far as his statements can be checkedl2. The first interrogation summarizes Goeringo s statenients as follows:

. This name (Forschungsamt des Reichsluft~fahrt · Ministeriums-German Air Ministry Scientific Resea:r>.ch Office) is merely camouflage as this office was ·not con-cerned with the Air Ministry in any way. It was conceived and founded by Goering in 1933 for the pur~

· pose of a central control over the collection and dissemination of vital information of m111ta.ry, com­me:rcia.l,, .and political nature. This information was obtained by the monitoring of all communicattons sys­tems such •a.s domestic and foreign radio, ca.bles, . etc.

Previous to 1933 the Foreign Office had established· a. sim::tlar monitoring system, for intercepting. wireless messages,, and the police had monito1 .. ed tel.ephone con­versations etc. but Goering wanted an organization of his own whiph could handle ~.ll phases under one central contro]b. •... By various mea.ns he was able to obt.~1n the se:-r>vices· of some of · the most able men in Germany for• th~ construction arid administration of this project. Goering was responsible authority, issued all direc­tives, and dictated the poltcy. Under~secret~ry Paul Ko~rner was second · in C()D'!1!l8,nd '.-Thile the actual me naging director was Ministerial D:Lrect.or l[Gottf'r1e~SchEpper· . .

12r 108, 11: "PW Goering cannot be considered a strictly · truthful character when dismissing personal relations,, posses­·Sions,, etc. and when an. investigation of his income and for­tune is ma.de. At the sa.me t1me he has been considerably shaken in his bloated be;l.ie.f in his oun grandeur. He talks readily and, if is believed, reliably on questions about tt~e Nazi state, personalities 1 the Air Corps, .conduct ot: the ~-rar, etc. He is a. drug addict. He has no mind for · deca.1:13 and apparently cqnsidered such beneath him."

In f.::1 irness to Goe:ring it should be noted that, accord~ 1ng to e.~1 £-.ssociated .Press story in the New York Times cf ·23 Novemb:Jl' J.9t~5, Goering possesses the nighest 11 1 .q_." of the Nuremb'..trg War Criminals· (l}f.H} and .. is assuming "lead­ershipN in their deportment at the tri:Lls.

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·e The main of'fice we.s situa,ted tn Berlin 0 • • •

Employees were civilians, at least in the responsible positions but the total nwnber of employees, distribu­tion etc. were minor details with which source did not concern himself".

The information was collected, decoded, classified and disseminated. All ministries were recipients of the finished product, receiving however, only that ma.teria.1 which concerned their own particular province~ •..• Goering's gr'oup was most successful .due to the out­standing ability of his experts and technicians .. 13 ·

This is expanded in the second interrogation where Goering is quoted to the effect:

That Signals Intelligence had been of. very great value, and particularly so as regards · the product of the RLM/Fors.chungsamt. He had personally founded the FA in 1933; it had never- in actual fact been a pa.rt of · the Luftwaffe or or the RLM, but as some sort or camou­flage was desirabl~ for an organization of this nature it had been nominally attached to the German Air Minis­try for the purpose of "cover". In 1933 he had dis­covered to his astonishment 'that no organization existed within· the Reich to deal w.ith cryptanalysis on anything approaching a broad general basis. In its early days the FA had covered · a.11 fields of traffic·-· economic, political, diplomatic, privates military, etc.

The work of the FA comprised two elmost completely sepaz•ate activities, firstly,, that of telephop.e moni\D toring; and secondly that of interception and crypt-analysis. • ·

He was very satisfied with the FA, which was a firs1; class organization emplpying the very best crypt­analytic staff and with intercept arrangements for ta.king all ava~lable traffic. He thought that they were able to dc3al with 32 different languages. The virtues of tl":'e organization lay in the fact that they did not

l3I 102 pp 2 .and 3.

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confine themselves to any particular field of intelli­gence and had no political axe to grind, ~or ideology to follow; they were just given the technical requ1re-

. ments to intercept and break traf'fic and to d13sem1nate intelligence. · · ·

He did not control the work pi;ogra.ms of the .crypt­analys ts; they .Qad a gene!'al direot1 ve to ta..ke eve.ry-- . thing and to read everything; further detailed direction vas lert to the head or the FA. If it was a question of needing additional star~ tbey applied .to State Secretary Koerner who also dealt wi·th all of' theiz:a -' higher administrative matters. The f .1rst .head of the FA had been Kapitanleutnant ~chiinpf; he had been suc-

1· ceded by Prince Christoph v~. H~~~.~.!.l.11 who had eventually returned to tl).e LUftva.ffe; the post had then been ta.ken ·over by Herr Schappe.r~ who had ·aiways belonged to the organization and wlio was probably the best tecl:mica.l man of' them all~ Goering used to visit them only onc.e every ye.ar because the organization worked so well on its own. Th~ high level channel or responsibility was from ·

· Schappe1·1~o Koerner and from him to the Reichsm.a.rschall . himself'. . . ·

Scha.pp~1·, in the outline of' the FA vrhich he prepared fo:r Team l at' Augsburg on 1 Jw1e 1945, preseI?-ts essentially the same facts as does Goering, although Schapper claims a greater . !.~le for . himself':

"""- -· The Forschungsamt • .

1) Founded: April 1933

2) Reasons for the roundati·on: My work · in the cipher bureau of the Reichswehr Ministry ·(·1927-1933) had shown ·me the incompetence of the methods employed there so that I, with several of my colleagues, re~:ig­

ned from it and proposed to Goering the formation of an Intelltgence Bureau for the Reich Government that should be free of departmental ties and extraneous 1nf1uence.

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3) Name: Goering consented, and only requested the camouflaging or the bureau under the name Re1ch­slu.f't:f a.hrtmin1s ter ium-Forschu.ngsam t. My request.I> that we should, however, be independent of the Air Ministry,, was granted: the bureau became independent, with its own administration and establislun.ent; it was also not subordinated .to the Reich Air- Ministry ( Staatssek:J:>etllr Milch), but allocated tor supe.rv1s1on to Staatssel{l•et!lr Koerner or the Prussian Ministry cf State; finance was -regulated directly from the (Prussian) treasury (Finan-zhof). -

4) The nature of the bureau: The bureau was consequently a civilian in.sti tution. For reasons of security a small number of its officials was put ".lnto Ge:r•man Air Force uni,form as Armed Forces ·Officials for the duration of the war. This was done only With those of.ficials vho had to cooperate with outside authoritles.

The research bureau restricted itselt to inter­cepting and processing signals that c

1ou5ld not lf sirJ be

intercepted by technical means. o •• .

Schapper,, as will be seen from his autobiography (AppendixIII), · had served in an administrative capacity as a Signal Intelli­

gence Of'flcer during the .first. world War. His position in __ the Defense Ministry is not elear although he stated that it was administrative. His record as a Nazi is perhaps even more'',signii"ica.nt. He stat~d that he knew Goering well f'rom the firs·t -world War. He was a member of' the ".Matione.l Society o~ Berlin to Rescue the Reich from t , evolution;' and as such took pa.rt 1n the Kapp-Ludendorf sch. Because of tr~uble with "collDJlunists" he migrated to M -ich where he joined the Nazi Party 1n 1920, resigning ~te~the 1923 Putsch hut rejoining in 1931. From 1933 to 1937 or 1938 he admits ·to membership in the Allge111ei:ne SS (General Elite Gaurd}. All o-r these facts ~e significant for an under­standing of the position of the FA and Scha.pper 1 s role _in it.

The statement or Seif"ert, Principal Specialist in che.rge ~r- Evaluation in the FA, ind1eatee that the fi~st head of the FA, Schimpf, was also responsible for its formation:

15scha.pper, IF 15 Appendix 2.

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. . The bureau was f ou.nded in 1933 at the instigation , of a cel'tain, Kap. (?) ·Schimpf in order to provide diplo­

ma tic and conunercial intelligence or an absolutely re­.liable kind by the monitoring of' telephone,, ·cable, .and wireless links from the Reich outward and in the case of wireless from all countries, and to insure by the . setting up of a new and independent organization the elimination of all bias which.might have resulted from assQciation. ,wit..'11 the old established .ministries. The objective of the departme11t was the production of a purely objective and scientific picture £~ the world .. wide political and commercial situt:tt1.on. .

' And again Seifert_ and Paetzel, Senior specialist in charge of Cryptana.lytic ~esearch for the FA:

Q~ When. was the Forschungsamt :roundeQ.? Seii'ert: In 1933

Q. Who initiated it? Seit"e~t: It was started by Korvette,n KapitHn

·Schimpf who committed suicide .• Q. Who ·was the driving force behind your organization?

S.ei.fert: It .was· started under the Air Ministry with the intention of its being an inter-service organization. · ·

Q. l~1ere did Goering fit · into the Organization? . · se:trert: The Fuehrer directed Goering to run this organization. I do not kn.ow more as I only joined at the end of 1933. , Paetzel: I joined a.t the en9. of July 1933. The organization had then been running for two or three months.17 ·

Still another interrogation may be cited which associates The FA with the Nazi Party:

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.. · With the advent of the Nazis came the creation of the Forschungsamt which was directly :responsible to G8ring. This vas placed under the command of a Ka.pit!n~Leutnant Schimpf" who had previously been Na.val Liaison Officer

16r ·54 p 3.

171 25 p 3. It should be pointed out that the 1 Air Ministry , wss established by a .decree of 5 May 1933 (RGBl. I,po24l). The "two or three months" of Paetzel,, a.nd 'Schapper 0 s "April" are not a .discrepancy but :rurnish addittoal evidence that the . - ... FA was separate ~rom the Air Ministry ab 1n1tioo

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at OKH/Chi. Forschungsaint was really concerned with the interception of all connnunlcations - including tele-

fhones .P telegraphs, postal correspondence, television sic) and radio - which might help the Nazi Party to

perfect its hold on 11.fe_ within Germany .lts ·

5. Relations of the FA with other. cryptolos.ic ajencies~ From the reports cited above it seems clear that the A was created by Goering at the suggestion of Schapper and Schimpf o

(As Schimpf ~as the first head of the organization his influence with Goering was probably greater than that of Schapper.19) In spite of the cover name, the FA was not a part of ·l:;he Air Ministry and the ·chain of command from Goering through Prussian State Secretary Koerner {rather than Milch

· of the Air Ministry) to the head of the FA emphasizes this independence. The first head was Kapitaen-L.eutnant Schimpf, · :formerly liaison of:ficer :f o~ the cipher se·c ti on of the

. Defens-3 -"M-fnis try (Reich::nrehrminis terium/Re.fera te G?) to. the . Navy'--ctpher section.11 whose full name0is unknown and who is reported to have committed suieide.2 · His successor was Prin~e Christoph von Hesse, who is only known as head of the FA .. 21 Gott.fried Schapper, the final head of the FA, became direc·tor in the fall of 1944. Both Lt. Colo Mettig and · Dr. Htittenhain, Senior Specialist» of the Signal Intelli­~ence Agency o~ the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

· l OKW/Ch1), ,refer to .the reeru1.ting of Defense Ministry cryptanalytic personnel by the FA and imply that this was the cause of some 111 feeling between the two

l8r 85 p 2 (This is a joint interrogation of Specialist Flicke, · T·Jchnical Inspector Pokojewsk1, and Staff' Inspector Hatz of )he Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Commando~ the Armed Forces.

' ·19SchEipper, IF 15, refers to "Goering, whom r knew well from the f'i . .:•st world var.'' ·There is no evidence of Schimpf' s rele.t~.ons with Goer1nga

20se~.rert, I 25, says that he committed suicide. Goering, loc.cit.., merely states that he.died.

2louenther, IF 46 p 3, states that Schapper·a s predecessor wa.> ".Prince von Hesse, who died in the .fall of ·1944" Goering$ l<·C.cit~, states ·that he returned to the Lu.f"1twaf:re, and gives hts Chl•1st1an name.

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orga.nizations.22 Schapper ha.dse;r.ved under Fenner, the · head .o:r the ''Language Division" of the Signal Intelligence./ .. Agency or the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW/Chi~ the successor of the Defense Ministry) and Seifert had alsb been a member of the senior organiza.tlon although his posi­tion there is not known. Tho FA was the last entrant into the cryptanalytic field and it had ~he reputation cf paying 1 ts employees "exoepti'onally well." 3 . ·

Relations betw~en the FA and the cipher section of t;he Defense Ministry and the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces ( OKW/Chi) ,.,ere always stl'ained. A letter of Dr o Pn.~cr..ke of the Foreign Office . Cryptanalytic Section (Pers ·:2~>; of 19 February 193llr is ·. available which discusses.plans for liaison between the cipher section of the Defense Ministl'.'y and the ·Foreign Office and speci:fically excludes the FA:

. On 19 II Capt Oschmann ca.lled on me ·to . talk over with me technica.l details concerned' in our (proposed) colla.bora.tion.

22Metti.g, I 131 · p 3: "The FA was a pa:rt of the. R.eichslui't­fal"i~tmiriisteriurn ·and ·was di.erectly subordinate to Staats<>~- . kreta:a.:r Koerner, and through him~ to Reichsmarschall Goering. ~he head of this department -was Minist;erialdirigent Tschapper Ks1~ who, prior to the establishment of the FA, had worked in OKW/Gh1 and served under Minis terialra t Fenner. Another :fo~mer o.f.ficial of OKW iri the FA was Regierungsrat Seifert. Collaboration between the FA and OKW/Ohi was poor. This well may have been due to the parsonai differences between . M1n1ster1alrat Fenner and his former subordinate Tschapper&" · Huettenha1n 1 · I 21 JJ l, refers to "some personnel transferred to the FA f'rom OKW/Ch1. This .was not well received in the 'lattel" organization as they were regarded as lJeople who has . 'deserted the ship 8 n. Also cf. Schapper•s owh statement, it~Ma~ 't."rlat he left the service of the Defense .Ministry · . because of his dissatis:f"action with their antequa.ted methods.

>c:-} ;?Wert.her·JI I 121 p 12. W'erthe~ was company conuna.nder of .J LlJ. .REGT 353.

12

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--

In the. course of the conversation he ' mentloned an utteranc.e by his chief, Corvette Capt. Patz1g, to the , ,effect that a.11 cryptanalytic connections with the FA should be dropped since cryptanalytic work did not belong in the province of the FA.

Details or the collaboration .were then dra\rn up . 1n bro¢ ou~l1ne.

Berlin, 19 II 1934

Dratt(The ~a.ft ot the proposed collaboration then follows)

signed: Paschke24

There is no evidence that l1a1son·on·crypta.nalyt1c mat te:rs was ever achieved between the t:wo organizations • .. Afr w111· be shown below, however, the FA did supply the · Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Signal Intelligence Agene1with interaeepted trs.f'f1c and was ·r~presented on that agency•s committee on cryptographic se·curity • . Hu~ttenha1n reveals that this lack of coope:ra.tion extended to·.:. the IBM

. machinery developed by the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces ( OKW/Ch1) . which va.s ottered to the Signal Intelligence Agency ot the .Al'my High Command (OKH/GdNAJ,, the Signal . Intellt~ence Agency ot the · Ail' Force High Command (OKL/LN Abt . 350),, the Signal Intel­ligence Agency or the Navy High 9omman~ (OKM 4 Sl\L/III) · but -not to the FA: . ·· . _

·owing to personal friction, polit1c81 .considera­tions (Nazi "taint"?) and othel'unsavory.matters there vas no-·1·1a1son vith the FA and they were not offered .the machinery developed by ·OKW. Fenner was pa.rt1cula.rly. prejudiced against Goering• s ·party - 1n any case the · general impression was that they2~eh1eve3d very little--they employed no mathematicians t .· . ,

24,. DF 17~ This 1s a translation by Dr Pettengill ot T 3273, · _a,~aer1es or letters by Paschke and other Fore:Lgn Office Cr1ptanalytic Section personnel.

25I 31 p 10. Actually Paetzel of. the FA was a mathema.t1-o1an.

l}

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DOCID: 3486670 ,

·e-

M~ttig stated that the FA attempted to take over· -the radio broad.cast m9f\1tor1ng carried out by the Signal Intelli&ence · Agency ot the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces ( OKW/Chi) 26 and there w~re rumors that the "empire building" policy of . the· FA had resulted in an attempt by the FA to take over the entire agenoy after the disg:ra.oe of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW') in the 20th of July 1944 plot.21 (Himmler, Reichsfuehrer SS •El1te Gaurds- actually did take over the Signal Intelligence Agency of the ~upreme Command

··of· the Armed Forces ( OKW/Ch1) through Walter Schellenberg, the head of Amt VI ot the Reich Main Security Off'ice-Reichs­sieherh.eitshs.uptaillt, RSHA) .28. The membe1•s . or the FA who uere 1nterrogat.ed gave ·no hint of any such intention on the part of the FA. Thereva.s necessary exchange of' ini'ormation on of-f1e1al keys and key changes . used for inter communication between the FA and section X of the Sigr..a.l Intel~igence

.Agency of .the Supreme Command of the Armed forces at lea.st in 1945.29 The FA was also reported to have received ~ . copy · or all traffic interc'epted by all other agencies .-'o ·

For fUl'ther details of the relations between the FA and the other cryptolog1.c agencies the ,~onclU:ding chapter on liaison, under the specific agency, may be consulted~ In general the best relationship ex1ste<l with. the Foreign Office Crypta.na.lyt:l:c Section but there ts evidenoe _of tech­nical exchange with the Navy, Army, and Air Force Signal Intelligence Agencies. Finally, the relationship between the FA a.nd the , Abvehr (--the Ge~ Intelligence Agency of tjle Supreme Command of the· Armed Forces) and with the . Gestapo can only be mentioned. The point or contact. ca.ine

261 131 p 3

27Mettig I &,5 p ·2

28r 86 P. 2. ·Cf. IF 164 and discussion in following para­graphs.

, .

29T1comDoe 240, Items 33,38,39,40,43 and 44, contain ' the mes'sages from Oh."W/\iIW/Ch1 to the FA with key changes .for January through M~y 1945.

301 82~p.5,, .Fl1cke, . Pokojewsk1 and Ratz of the Signal Intel'9 ligence Agency of the Supreme Comwl.nd Qf the Armed Forces.

14' I . , I ..

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DOCID: 3486670

•• · in the field of telephone monitoring. The off'icial regu-la. t ions tor German war time censorship of all communications a.re available. In them the war time .responsibility is given: to the A'bwehr but the peace time I'Ole of' the FA and of the · . Gestapo are indicated and it is apparent that .. the monitoring stations or the .FA continued in opere.tion.31 There is insuf­ficient e:vtdence, however.; to show the loea.t1on of" FA tele­phone monitoring stat1on8. It appears that they co~perated With the Abwehr·Wehrkl'eis organization through out all of . GeI"many and occupied territol'y;. Evidence to be" presented -below shaws. that the Gestapo eventually took over the tele­phone monitoring of the Abwehr and or the FA in the middle of 1944. It 1s probable that the existing organization 1 .

continued with the reports being routed to Amt IV ot; the Reioh: Main Security Oftice.~2 Finally, among the adminis­trative papel's found at Kauf'beu:ren was a hand'Wl"itten rough draft of a letter wh1~h appears to have been a cover letter for material to be t'ol'Varded, possibly from FA-9, to the Stapoleit in Prague. The material was a.n undetermined num- .

· ber or "Czech messages". . It is not ~nown 1f these messages . were read through cl'yptans.lysis on the part or the FA but. an add1t10na.l instance of liaison between the FA and the pol1~e is a.rrorded.-'> The messages were for the attention or. a.· Herr. Rummel •

31 Die Ueberwaohung des NachrichtenverkellI's im Kriege, TF 29. Ticom Document 240 contains various administrative . memoranda. of' the FA, -'l.mong them orders from AQWehr Wehrkr1~s VIII (at Bl'eslau) wa.rn~ng of an increase in Russian Agent · · activity With the app~oach or hostilities ·to Bl'eslau. . Also contained 1n these memoranda. is 1nd1ea.tion that the telephone moni:tortng stations :i.n ·Prussia and Poland vere ope~ating at the end of 1944. Howevel'~ ~t shou~d be-noted that they were still controlled.by the. FA.

32 -This is to be assumed from Goering's statement that the Ge'stapo took over telephone monitoring, 9onf"1rmed by Goer·1ng and by Schellenberg, who differ onl.Y as ·to the date at which this occurred. Fuller discussion of this point is to b~ -found 1n the.following section which deals with the rel~tioll.s between the FA and the Reich Maµi Seeurity Oi"fi.ee.. See also the discussion of the FA field stations in .the section on the Operational organization qt the· FA.

3> Ticom ., Docliment ~40 · 1 tam 42.

15

DOCID: 3486670

·9

~: ·( • ~ .

--' .

-·~ __ ·-

6. The FA as !! ~ organization. From consideration of the ev1"dence It seems proper to regai-d the FA as ~he Nazi party signal intelligence agency and it seems reason­able to assume that it was created· by the party to provide a countarpa.11t for the Vlll'ious service Signal rn-telligence Agencies and that of the Foreign Office on whose loyalty the Naz1 11 s could not rely at ~e date the FA was erected (1933)~ This is . supported not only by the definite · suspi<:rions ex­p?tessed in the 1ntert.9ogat1ons ·but by the histoi-y and organi­zation of' the :fA. · It has been seen that the origin.B.l found­ing of the organization was due to t~iendship between Goering and 5ehapper, probably between Goering and Schimpf, and presumably be.tween Goering and Prince ·von Hesse .-'4 Besides the statement of Fli~ke et !£, attributing the creation of , th~ FA to the Nazis.?::> th~re is s.upport from Goering who re­la.te,s the assignment of' all telephone monitorin§ (within the Reich) to the FA by Hitler at the end or l933;J reference to coordination by th& Regular Police ( Ordl}yngspolizei or . · Orpo) Qf telephone monitoring with the FA;:n evidence that .

. the Reich Main Seeur~ty O:ffice {RSHA) referred, cryptanalytic problems t9the FA;-' and 1nd1ca.tton t~t H~er tried to

34It .is known that other members of the von Hesse family were friendly with Goering and other Nazis and, held high diplo· ma tic pos1.tons. CF IF 188. 35see above Para.·4. (I 85). 36r -143 p 13. 37I 91 . P 2 Robert Soh18.ka (Genera.l-Major)i the chief or oommun;tcations in the main office of . the Ordnungspolize1, reported coordina.tion ·Vlth the FA in 1935-1937 • . Also see Sauerbier.1 I 162, for Orpo-FA liaison on Agents. 3.SI · 54 p 4 > the interrogation . of · five membezts of the FA cap­tured at. Flensburg, repo~ts that: "None of the five l<:ne~ any'."

· thing about a cryptanalytic section of the warren SS. Sei- · f'er1i thought that there couldn. 9 t have been such .a thing as he h,&d 'seen intercepted cipher telegrams sent to them from·the RSHAwhich RSHA had no facilities for deciphering. Paetzel, on the. o~er hand, rel!l&rked somewhat dryly that from what · he knell of the stubborn 1ndependence ·1n this matter of the· various sei-v1ees a,tid the Foreign Office he would nc;>t be at all . surpriseQ. if such a thing did in fact exist. However, he had no knowledge . or 1 t". Sauerbi.er I . I 162 pp }-4·, 8 tates that the Ord-nungspol1ze1 sent'.h1m Russian agent traffic • . Werther,.· I 121 p 13, · conf'used the ~{\,....and the E11.te G~d,s and seemed to think that an Elite ~d Officer had attempted to recruit his services ror a · c.rfPt8.na.1yt1c agency bended by a former Naval officer (Schimpf?)'. ·

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DOCID: 3486670

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take over oont:rol or the FA.39 (As will be shown, Himmler, .· through Schellenberg•s arr~ents .with Koerner who control­led theFA :t:_inances ·1n the Prussian Sta.ta Ministry, had achieved some eont:rol of the FA in 1945). On 24 January ·1945 the , Gestapo (Amt IV of. the Reich Main Security Offic~,

,. sent an agent~ message to Seetio~~ _or the FA( the section !. dealing with Sle.von1e languages) with a. request that it be deciphel'ed.~O According to Mettig,, the Signal Intell~gence Agency of the Supreme .command of the Armed Forces was origi­nally a pa.rt or the Abwehr "Derense~, actually the espionage and counter ·1ntelligence agency of the ·Defense Ministry __ subsequently inco:rporated 1n the Supreme Command of the Armed_ Forces; a.nd eventually ~en over py Himmier):

. •••• ' in the days of t~e Reichsve~, OKW/Ch1 was orga.nisttea.lly part or the ::Abwehr -and .the liaison had been ma1nta.1nedo The directives given by Keitel' s. O:ff'ice vere very general., they were ampl1.f1ed and made more_ !Peei:fic by Ca.ne.r1s a.nd Hanson (heads . of the · .AbvebJD, who bri'ef'ed _the head of O:KW/Chi ~ He then deei~ed cryptanalytic details. After the 20th of July 1944 the Abvehr was ta.ken over by the RSHA. .

· · O'his chronology is not correct, see discussion beloi) o

Briering was then done.by Schellenberg ••• oAt one time there vas a :row with the.FA, provoked py the empire building ;>ol 1cy of th.at body. The . FA wished to take .

, over OKW/Chi. It was emphasized that Schellenberg · had no control over the FA and. (perhaps f'or that reason) wou1d have · p;tteferI'ed to take over OKW/Ch1 himself. . . The RSHA or the SS d!~ n9t maintain any aryptanalytic bureau of' their own. ·

The exact :form which Schellenberg•s . control of the SigMJ. Intelli~ence Agency or ·the 'Supreme Command ·o'f the Arm.ed Fol'ces tOKW/Cb1) tQok is not certain and need not .be gone 1ntQ at any length here. As will. be seen from the 1nte;r-'

. rogatton Of Schellenberg given next,, the acting heads of . that agency expressed agreement with his views a.nd appeared

}9. Guenther, IF 46.

40 Ticc>m D<?cument, . ~tems · ll A & B~ (Film 34).

41 I 86 p 2

.,

DOCID: 3486670'

-·· to model their eve.eua~ion plans on hiso42 Schallenbergss evidence concerns both his etrorts to ts.lee over the FA and to control·the 81gna.l 'Intelligence Agency or the Supreme Command of the ~ed Forces:43 ·

VIII. Deeipherins."

24. The deciphering department Qf the OKW undar Colonel Kettler supplied daily great quantities or deciphered messages which were ealled ever since· the. time or . · Ludendort.f "VoN" (Verlaessliche Na.chrichten) o They· we~e printed on thin white paper and carried a broad red edge. Schellenberg had established relations with the deciphering.department a.t the OKW 1,n 1942., because he wanted to exploit the experiences o.f the Wehrma.cht both in ''W/T Abwehr" as also in the development of German coding "methods" tor his own use. · Schellenberg made very .early contact with General Fellgiebel, chief of the Wehrma.chtnachrichtenverbindungen (in the OKW) as well as Gene:i-s.l Thiele, deportment -chief under· Fellgiebel • Both these men were killed · 1n · ~onnec ti on with .the 20th o.f July. Schellenberg's relations with Theile were very good. They h,ad come close ta· one another through their joint work in the Boa.rd of Dir• e-etors of the Stands.rd Electric company (the .former American Holding company) •. Theile 1 after the arrest of' Fellgiebel had becOI11e Fellg1ebel 8 s successor •. In this capacity he wanted to bring a.long discussed plan

. · to f'rui tion, 1. e. unite all . deciphering services/ o.f the Reich in one ha.nd and to put them at the exclusive

·- disposal of' the .Gehebn'e Melde(iienst for- ·systematic · 1nterpreta\~1on and use.

. ·--=------

- I

25. Apart .from the .Geman Foreign Of.flee which pos­sessed a.n extensive deciphering seriiiee., the Forsehung.­samt vas above all the . organ1za. ti on which had not. only '

·. 42For discussion ot the relations of the Abwehr, the RSHA and the Signal IntelligeneeAgency of the Supreme Command ot the Armed· Fol1'ees see Vol. III Para. 2. · .

43IF 164. This is a.long and:rambl1ng report of an inter~ rogatioh Qf WaJ.ter Schellenberg, ss-Brigade:ruehrer in charge

· of Dept VI of the RSHA~ SD Amt. VI. Ausland. .

. i·

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1 .... .. ~ -

~, ----- .-

.· .. : .. • .~ ; ,_. '. • "·'1' ;ji;·· ~- - - ~ --. I , ,' -· ·

-- ,, -

an extensive - one eould almost say 100% - telephone monitoring serviee, but aleo a very -large dee1Pher1ng department. It also monitored normal bPoadcast ser­v1.ces • _- (This -was dona too by the Foreign Off ice, -the Pro:pa.gan.da. Minis try, and the .. OKW ?-) -The Forschungsa.mt also embraced S.J.l extensive press and publication inter~ pretation department as wel,1 as. one of the best existing archives. Schellenberg maintains that apart from the obvious reason·s of saving personnel and other grounds of economy, th~ Amt Ausland together with the deciph­ering department of 'the Fo:rsehungsamt was rea.lly a domain of the Ge}leime Meldedienat. Schellenberg also saw · that there was no need for the -telephone monitoring service to be independent, but that it really belonged to the domain of Amt IV. Sinee 1942 Schellenberg in- ­sisted that Himmler should speak w:itih Goe:ring -who had

- resertred the Forschungsamt as his purely personal field or work and ·to insist that he (Schellenberg) should

- take the Forschungsa.mt over~ ___ - ·

26. HimiDler always refused -this. He _decla.red that Goer'ing would never do it as he believed that he .would thereby make him (Himmler) and the SS too strong. -Al1otber very strange e.rgument was, B.dded to this: -Himmler said Goering should Qear vis : a vis Hitler the

, respon~ib111ty for all telephone mon1tor1ngp for if he, _ Himmler, - would do this Hitler might suddenl.y ·conceive -the idea that his own teleplione conversations were overheard • . Schellenberg ther~upon · s.cted inciependently. He needed the re-sul ts both o-r the Forschungsamt 8.s a

- whole and of the vork of' the deciphering department of the ·oKW. At the beginnins of 1943 ··schellenberg ~hs.d come_ to a working ~eement with Secretary o:f -State Koerner {Prussian. State Secretary, in charge of FA ­f'inancial matters) and a.t the. end of 194:4 Kpe:rner was

,.,,Y,-',_ prepared to concede to Schellenberg the Forschungsamt with the exception of' the telephone monitoring_, which -sinc_e _the middle o!" 1944 ·belonged to _Amt IV. _ Sand- · berger -8.Ild Rapp b~gan in Fe'bruary _l945 to take -the Fors­chungsamt ove~. Owing to the general development .of . -the situation, however.11 this move did not .take practic~.l shape. After the. arrest of Theiie, a general, whose ~aIDe .Schellenb~rg has forgotten, was appointed chief -, of the Wehrmachtsnachrichtenverbinndungen. A general c~alled Gimmler was ;mt in charge or the Amtsgruppe .{deciphering a.nd W/T Ab'Wehr). Colonel Kettler during

lY

DOCID: 3'486670

• tne time when Theile was in prison had continued to ~ seek close contact with Schellenberg. Schellenberg put Kettler in .touch with Dr Schmitz who entered and remained in close relationship with him. Kettler model~ led his evacuation measures on those of Schellenberg because he had always thought, just as G1mmler had done, that Schellenberg by taking over t _he Forschungs-amt ·would acquire decisive influence over· the deciph-ering department. ·

' ,.

A b!'iei' review or Nazi history with particular attention to the Elite .Guards of Heinrich Himmler-will clarify the posi-

~ tion o:f th<:('· .Reich Ma.in ·security Office of that organization and,it is hoped, indicate the integral role or the FA. The Reich Main Security Office (RSHA) was organized in 1936 as a s-ingle headquarters for the Party secur1 ty Service ( Sicher ...

, he1tspo-lize1, SIPO). The Security Service vas 1n 1 ts origin a purily party orge.nizati~n. It vaa 1n fact the µttelli­gence army ot ·tbe Elite Guards whose origL"l and history are relevant.' The .Elite Guards were organized in 1925 to a.et as the 'bodyguard f'or t(he . leading men ,of the Party. .In 1929 Himmler was appointed by Hitler as Reichsfuehrer SS and under his guidance ·the SS (Elite Guards) grew iD.to the · · watchdog of-the whole Party and the rormatipns controlled by it. In June or 1934 the Elite Guards served as the ex­ecutive agency in. the purge. · 'At this time the Elite Guards were made independent of their parent body, the Storm Troops

· .- _(Sturm Abte1iung, SA), whose head,,RBhm, was one of the lea.di.rig victims. At this time it was decre_ed that the Security Service alone ·should be responsible for Party

. political 1nt~ll1gence. ' In June or 19}6 Himmler was appointed _as chief of .German Police . and reorganized the p1olice . set'vices,, organi~ing the Party security services in a single Main r

· Office,, the Re!chss1cherhe1thauptamt., paralelled by a similar main o:r:fice for the regular police 11 the Ordij~gspolizei( or ORPO -Constabulary), the Ordnungspolizeihaupta.mt •. 44The ·a.ccount .given in the above paragraph is take~ .-from IF 216 B; . Sicherheitspolizei und Sicherheitsdienst,,Ultra/Zip/Pal 4 of l/l/44. For details of' the Ordnungspol1ze1 organization . see 1n Tab A. Note that the or9nungspol1ze1 are not a Party orga.rU.zation and were independent of Kaltenbrunner and .

. Schellenberg~ This independence is seen in reported rivalry with both the Gestapo and the Abwehr and Radio.Defense Corps

t (OKW/WFSt/Ag WNV/Fu III) in counter measure·s against Allied . . . - Agents (IF 176; and Volume 8 or these reports). .

·20

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• . The RSHA, vhieh now 0.Pril 1945) controls the whole ' .

German Secret Service. for intelligence,.sabotage, and secur­ity, both inside and outside Germany .11 is the GHQ of, the S:tpo and SD whose head, {Che:r der·s1po und SD, abbreviated CDS), SS Obergrupent"uehrer Kaltenbrunner.11 reports directly to · Hinlmler. Of' .the ma.in German police, secur1 ty, a.nd special servi~es, only the or.po, or unif"ormed const.abulary, is out• side its con~rol. The Stpo and SD between them comprise t~ee services: · · ll. Geheimestaatspolizei !Gestapo)

2 Kr1m1nalpol1ze1 . Kripo) 3 31cherhe1tsdienst SD)

l -Sipo

The SD 1sf'urther ' subd1v1ded into two depa.rtme.nts, one col­leet,ing intelligence f'rom outside the Re:l,eh,.,, the other from inside Germany and occupied territory •. ~ .The ~D, both inside· · and outside Germany, is a .fact finding d~pa:rt;ment which takes no of'.f1e1a.l. aotion and t:ries to be as l. 1t~?-e )al9w a.a pos-

. sible. ·. . . . ' . .

The .RSiiA is divided into seven - departqie~ts (Aemter) vi th the f'ollowing official functions: · ·

Amt I Personnel Amt II Administration Amt III HQ or SD within the Heich A,mt IV HQ of' Gestapo Amt V HQ of Kripo Amt VI Foreign Intelligence (Amt Ausland, head~ Schel-

lenberg)45 . .

As has been shown in the previous discussion, Am_t VI took over the Abwehr, the intelligence agency of the Supreme ComJ:na.nd of the German Arme.d Forces, in 1944. This control was strengthened by the 20th July 1944 plot which marke~ the .failure or the milital:'Y to throw orr ~he increasing dom1nanoe o.f the Pa.rty and Himmler. -

.:··';..; .... -The FA was created tn 1933 when the Party first ca.me

into political control or the Reich. The emphasis la.id by Goering, 3chapper, a.rid others on the supply of' reliable "political" intelligence seems to imply that the FA was

45If' 216 The German Inte.lligence Service (Secret. SHAEF, Colinter1ntell1gence War Room, London: April; 1945) Para.­graphs 5 and 6.

21

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DOC ID: "34 86670

... ~ •. ·• }

created beoause the ·Party could not rely on the existing Service and Foreign Office organiza.tinns. · .Goering received the responsibility for this organization while Himmler . directed the Elite ~d. Schellenberg 0s testimony to Himml.ergs unwillingness to infringe upon Goeringss field

. even in 1942; evidence ·of collaboration on cryptana1ytic matters, .coupled with the lack of evidence that the ~lite Ga.urd organization possessed a. cryptologic unit of its own; and the import~nce placed on the FA in Schellenberg 1 s plans fora glorified intelligence service after the Party had completed its dominat.1on of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Intelligence { OKW/ABW:!!'liR) and Signal Intelli­gence Agencies (OKW/Ch1) indicate the real position of the FAw1thin the Nazi organization. Additional evidence of the close relationship between the Elite Gaurds and the FA may

· perhaps be inferred from Schapper 8s admission that he joined the Allgemeine SS (General Elite Gaurds as distinct from the Wa.ffen SS, . Armed Elite Gaurd) . 1n 1933, the· time at which he left the cipher section of . the Derange Ministry a.nd cooperated in the formation of the FA.

7. operations of the FA, .A,eril 1933 - May 1945. . Only a sketchy outline of the FA's operational history can be drawn. . It was created in April 1933 and by the end of that year had been assigned the task of monitoring all tele­phone oircuits within the Reich.· It is rumored

4to have been

concerned in the "blood'purge" of 30 June 1934. 7 At the time of' the Anschluss (March 1938) the telephone monitoring and deciphering act·iv1t1es of the FA were in .operation. A series of Associated Pr~ss despatches(!) reveal monitoring of the ' conversations of Goering with various German diplo- . mats .and officials in .Austria~ Apparently the FA prepared a speeial· copy of' these records and presented them to Goering. The file conta1n1n& this material was round 1.n the ruins or the Air Ministry a.nd a newspaper "stor'y" based on them. Also · 1nd1:cated in the newspaper columns was FA success in read-ing me~~S.$es from the French foreign Office . '1to all min.'1s"7' ters."4<S rt · is probable that these messages were not read .

. through.I cryptanalysis as Goering refers to the ciphers oti:. the French Foreign Off'ice at the Quai d 0 0rsay having been·

46see his "Curriculmn Vitae" in .Appendi.X 3.

47Flicke~ Pokojevski, and Hatz; I 85 p 2.

48cr note . 3, ·Chapter l, P. 3. ·

22

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C' ·e

(j

"obta.in.ed."49 In September 1941 the FA produced a book containing the names or all foreign diplomats in Berlin, their partners

56n all conversations, and summaries of these

conversations. The FA continued its work on available diplomatic and commercial material and press broadcasts throughout the war. Operations ~ere hampered by bombing. On l November 1943 and again on 7 July 1944 the Schiller­s_tra.sse quarters of the FA :were heavily bomb~d and after each bombing a part· of the FA was evacuated.:Jl An admini­strative nucleus remained in Berlin at lea.st until the closing of the Russian seige lines a.round that city .52 The Bezalin offices seem to have always included the ·administrative and personnel sections and during the last months of the war special arrangements in addition to the normal liaison c.hs.nnels were necessary. As is to be expected, the organi­ze.ti.on fluctuated considera.bl;y during the final Ill'onths of the var a.nd only the paper .organization, learned from the administrative directives found at Kaui'beuren~ can be des­cribed. .The move to Bresla.u seems to have left Main Section I

4Yr 143 #74

50IF 143 p l This is nn article from the weekly Intelli­gence Summary #15, HQ,' United States Forces European Theater containing 1nf'ormation available from interrogation of a Major Johannes Gaenzer who was a member of Section III F of Abwehrstelle Berlin.

;.

51Paetzel ·and Oden, I · 2.5: ''The whole establishment was · comp-1.etely destroyed by bombing (in N·ove~ber 194)) n. Scha.pper, IF 15,p.22J> stated . that the FA moy~d to Breslau in December 1943. . Guenther,, · IF · 46,, and Rentschler, , IF. 15, p 18,. stated that the move to Bre~lau was forced by the bombing of 7 July. It. appears,· cherei"ore, that a.fter each bombing .further ev!locua.tion was necessary. sa.uerb1er, I 162 p 4, stated that tne ~move or Hauptabte1.lung IV to B:i-eslS:u took place early in 1944 and remarked that working conditions .in Breslau were poor and the work sufr.ered in co~2equence.

52Ttcom Document 240 contains various memoranda. to and from .administrative offices in Berlin. A special organization, the Z ~:~igstelle or "Branch Office" Berlin was set up in March 1945. A speci~ liaison and reporting center under the head of the Evaluation center 1 Se:l.fert, was als_o set up at this time .~ · Seif'ert and various personnel of the Branch Off ice escaped from the se1ge and were rinally fqund with the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Navy High Conunand ~t Flensburg. (I 25, l 54, I 93 P 18). . ·

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DOCID: 3486670

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and Schapper (or his predecessor, von Hesse) in Berlin. There is a directive dated 30 September 1944 at Breslau which 1s signed by Schr9~der _ and is directed to all of the Main Sections except I.'' The directive itself is of pass- _ 1ng interest as it contains a :niemo from the Abwehroffizier . of Wehrkretskommando VIII warning of the danger of enemy agent activity with the approach of the Eastern front to Breslau. · )

Various directives are available concerning the evac­uation of Breslau. Evacuation was completed and the va.rious

54 offices in that city were closed down as of 26 J~.nuary 1~45. It seems from the evidence that the FA was organized into at ·least three Office-Branches (Amtesbereiche) ir+ Berlin, · ,_ LUebben (51 ·::56aN i3u54"E1 alsq the site of an .FA intercept station) and Jueterbog, \51 9 59N 13°40"EL the successor of the Amtesbereich Breslau. The Jueterbog branch was under the direction -of Seifert and included Main Sections III,IV and V (Sections 4-13). It should be noted that Jueterbog was the last location of the FA known to .the personnel of the Foreign O:fi'1ce Cryptanalytic Section.5:, As Jueterbog was also a location of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command it is possible that information held by various Army personnel about the FA was gained ·at this time. Luebben was the location of 'Main Section II a.nd was responsible for administration of the various ,out sta­tions. As Main Section I is not specifically mentioned · it is to be inferred that it remained in Berlin, especially as Section l, charged with all security matters, is stated

- to be located there. Schap,&:>er ,- who signed the directives referred to above, dated them from Luebben._ By early March a further movement of the FA had been effected and a.11 . or · the Main Section3 (less Section l5) had been reassembled at Ka.ufbe~r~µ_ (47°53nN lOD37"E) with the organization 1nd1cat~d on the- cha.rt and from Kau:fbeuren a small remnant of the FA moved onto Rosenheim (47052 11N l2i04"E)56 Within this · . . . , 53Ticom Document 240, item 37A. 54

T1com Document· 240 items 22 and 29 -.

551 l, P. 18.

56IF lS, . p.l. -. :\{:autbeuren is approximately SQ miles south­west of Munich and Rosenheim is approximately 25 miles southeast of Munich. The a.ir-line d'istance between Kauf­beuren and Rosenh~im is roughly 75 miles.

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DOCID: 3486670

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perlodp either at the beginntng of 1944 or the beginning of 1~45, 1~he telephone monitoring of the FA was given to the Gestapo (Amt IV of the. Reich Main Security Office). However, the documents providing for the closing down of the Br'eslau outstations reveal that · ·relephone monitoring stations we:r.e then (January 1945) still controlled by the FA.5r The Breslau/.Kaufbeu1'ben/Rosenheim party was under the direction of Schapper a.nd this aprty remained ~he central body of the FA. A document found by Team l in the FA quarters· at K_auf'beuren and signed by Scha.pper ggves a re;l.iable picture of the final organization of .the FA.'.:> The liaison officers responsible for passing FA materials to the other ministries remained in Berlin and a special section for Evaluation was set up under Seifert. A Berlin Branch Office and the Berlin Out­station also continued to runction. Five members or the FA were ·transferred to OKM 4 sla.. III. (The Signal. Intelligence Agency of The Navy High Command) on 16 May 1945 where they worked until arrested on 23 May 1945.59 'rhese five men

-were the departmental heads left .in Berlin and it is obvious that· a carefully coordinated split into both a northern and southern section of the FA had been arranged just as had been done for the Signal Intelli~ence Agency of the Supreme Corum.and of the Armed Forces ~OKW/Ch1). 0u Happ and and Sa.ndberger, the two men named by Schellenberg as ''taking over the FA 11 in February 1945, were last knovrn by Schellen­berg to have been in Flensburg and Marquardstein (near · Rosenheim) respectively~ However, this is ·not necessarily

. 57T1co~ Document 240 item 22. Schellenberg, IF 164, ~ tated that all FA · tele'phone m_oni toring vas ta.ken_ over in 1~44. Schapper, JE,)~5, state_d that it was in 1945 .

. i::::B - -'.· , ·_,"' ·~ Ticcm Doc. 240.P Item }4, A-D. rr'his. document is translated in'appendix.2.of this report. lt is clear from this, direct­ive that the Kaufbeuren group WB.s the ·controlling body but it is also 'clear that special arrangements for .continued ·

. service in Berlin -had been made under the direction of Seifert and that an adequate functioning organization had remained there. As Rentschler is ,concerned in the directive found at Ka.ufbeuren and was cine of ·the last to leave Schapper he·wa.s·undoubtedly .fully aware of the final organization and d~liberately misled the interrogators.

59I 25; I 54; I 93, P 18.

6oThe interrogators of these five members of the FA .also failed to discover that they' had formed a special section left tn Berlin. This point only becomes clear froin the docu­ment found by Team l.

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due to any continuing connection with the FA. Rapp is stated to have been in c_harge of a "northern" section. of Amt VI when the officer of the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA) were divided into northern and southern sections. 61 Sa.ndberger was one of the key AMT VI officials and may be · a~sumed to have accompanied the southern section. _

The FA was originally located in Berlin_. Charlctten­burg6~, Sch1llerstra.sse, /116/124, occupying a large build-ing·. On moving to Breglau it took over the Ha.rtlieb Barracks in Klettendorr. :3 At Kauf"beuren the FA was found py Ticom Team l to have been :Located 1g4

11 ~ix blocks" of a barracks near the K.a.ufbeuren .a1l'f1eld. In the moves from Be·rlin the number of personngl decreased from the estimated 1500 to 2000 employed,there. 5 Only some 450 persons con­tinued on to Kaufbeureg6a.nd a mere 100 odd were ieft with Sehapper at Rosenheim. The administrative documents · · rererred to previously contain evidence of a constant shuf­fling of' pers·onnel in the c:b.·osing· months of the wa:r. A

6l1F 164 p 3~. -62rF l5 p l.8, Guenther, IF 46 p l.

63quen the:r, IF 46, stat.es that tll.e FA occupied a "Flak.kaserne" and the Pers z.s. interrogees, 1 l, state that the FA was in the Hartlieb Barracks.

D 21, the translation of a document giving distribution of work among the different cryptanalytic bureaus of the other German Armed Forces and. Civil Departments, taken from a German Admiralty 4/s:KL III folder entitled"Resea.rch Progress l/12/43 - l/ll/44 "{T1com Document No. T 519) gives · as" #4 RLM/Forschungsa.mt at Breslau/Klettendorf: Crypt­ana1ys1s of diplomatic cyphers and GESTAPO matters. C0ollabor­a tion with the Nsvr. lately still only on fundamental ques­tions of research. ' Ti com Document 240 1 tem 32, Jueterbog, 2_ '"January 1945 lists ni,ne members of FA 9 who moved .regis­tered materials . from "Klettendorf" to J'ueterbog.

64IF l.5, p 16.

65Rentschl.er, and approximately the

66IF 15, I 54.

Schapper, IF 15, and Seifert, I 54, gtve same figUl'es.

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special section was created in Berlin to deal with the closing down of. the Breslau Forschungsleitstelle and a1l members ·releaaed for duty were to be _ imme~iately reported available to FA 3 }H Administrative officers -were shifted. and trained evaluators were reassigned during the Kaufbeuren period but the details . ·need not be given here. In addition

~:i~~~6~in~~e P~~;~~nri:1 w:~e t~~1~!e~e~~~e~~~~~;r{~~;~ous-

ly?) well paid.o~ At Kaurbeuren the personnel section was · concerned ·wit.h such matters as their soap ra10on and arrange­ment of laundering facilities in Kaufbeuren. ·

67 . . Tic om Document 2401 Item 22.

I

6Srt1com Document 240 ~ · See Appendix 2 for Summary of · contents.

69werther, I i21 p l2.

70T1com Document 240 Item 23.

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B. Operational Organization of the FA. 1~ - · ParaHraph 1~ Organization or the Main Bureau. • • . • • • • • • • . • • ~(

a. Ma.in Section I .(Adl:r:lin1stration and Security) . . ,A'

b. Main Seot1on II (Personnel). J '" a. Main Section III(rntercept1on,, .sorting, anq.

Examination}. · JO

d. Ma.in Section lV (C~des and Ciphers). , 3!/ e. Main Section V (InforZIU,ltion,, Collection,, a.nd

Eva.luatiori) ~ · 3 ! f. Ma.in Sectlon VI (Teehnieal). ~ t./L{

War~time expedients, the Branch Office Berlin and . Reporting Center Se1£ert. .. • . • • • • • • • • . 9

The Liaison Officers . • • • • • • • • • , • . • . . • • .10 The Intercept .stations and liegional Offices of the FA •• ll Persons named as members of the FA or concerned with

it but not asstgna.ble in its organization • • • • • .12

· . 8 • . Orga.n1za.t1on of' the Ma.in Bureau. The following operational organization or the FA is intended to represent its structure while in Berlin. What historical changes can be determined will be indicated in the specific section in­volved. At the head was the D1rector(M1n1ster1al Direktor) responsible fol" the management_ of all official business,, and under him was the Main o.ffioe at Berlin as well as the liaison. ot".f1ees, Regional Offices and intercept sta.tl.ons.71 The main of".f!ce was composed of six main sections, H'aup­~abte1ll,1Ilg,. which wer_e subdivided into :fifteen sections ,

A.bteilung, which in turn were broken down into various sub-seotions. As it was in the Hauptabteilung and Abteil­ung that the actual work. or the FA wa.s nccomplished the .. · best method of appraisal of its opera.t1.ons is to pres~nt the ass.ignment, strength and history of each of these. units with what little can be 1earned of their respective successes and personnel. · ·

a~ Hauptabteilu~ I - Administration: This main sect­ion wa.s the adill1n1strJl:lve headquarters being charged with organization,, established personnel and administration. At '·

71schapper, IF 15. pp 20,-22 ~ · IF 1)5 . . \ .

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• the head ·was Principal Specialist Bergeren.72 There were. about 50 persons divided among two sections, Abteilung 1 with a Senior Specialist (ORR) Rosenhan at the head a.nd Abteilung 2 under Senior Specialist (ORR) Kunsemu.ellero · Sect1ori. ~,the "Central Abteilungjl" was responsible for the off.icial correspondence, the basic problems of personnel administration and 'budgetal""Y matters,, Civil Service Personnel (the higher officials 1 job descriptions etc.) a.nd Security-. This security included the guards 1 the electric eye system 1

passes and identification, and cover names and camouflage · measures necessary to safeguard the secrecy of the organi­zation a.nd the nature of its work. The various adminis~

· trat1ve directives found at Kaufbeuren emanated from Main Section I or II in general. They typify the nature of the functions of the section. They range .from an order concerning the drill 9f an FA' Volksturm company at Kaufbeuren, through d'etails of work shifts, Air Raid Precautions, and soa.p rations, to reissue of exhortase.che (SECRET and TOP SECRET) cle;ssif'i­cations. This last memo, dated Berlin, 25 February 1945, declared that the Fuehrer had been greatly displeased to learn that Reuters (The British News Agency) had published a. German SECRET paper.73 . .

'9 - 72No hard and fast hierarchy in the rank ·or German civil servants can be drawn. The three·ra.nks most commonly refer­red to 1.n the FA ere Ministerial Rat or Principal $pecie,11st (Min. Rat.), Oberregierungsrat or Senior S:pecia.list (ORR),, and Regie:rungsrat or Specialist (Reg. Rat.). Var.iations, as in the case of Oden, whose title is Reg. Rat. Dipl. Ing. -­Regierungsrat with Engineering Diploma, also occur. Sch&pper, as Ministerial Director, is above this hierarchy. Schroeder's Rank, Minister Dirigent, has no equivalent. A rather .in- . volved and not too relevant comparison to the P ratings of our own civil service is possible. Fenner, 0£ The Signal Intell1$ence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed

----------"' --·- ----- ~~---- . . .···

'Forces (OKW/Chi), was both Min. Rat. a.nd Oberst (Colonel). It would thus be possible to equate ORR with a Lt. coionel and a Reg. Rat' With Major. Civil Service here rates a Major as equal to a P-5.

73T1com,Document 240 item 45. The nature of the Reuters story is not known. For further examples of these direct­ives see Appendix 2 •

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' Section ·2 was the Administrative section.74

b. Hauptabteilung II - Personnel: Personnel, pre­sumably records etc, was the responsibility of this main section and .its only section, Abteilun.g 3. Senior Special­tst (ORR) Kempe was in charge of this section which con-sisted of .from Bo to .100 persons. . · · i

c. Hauptabteilung !II - Intercept: · Senior Special ls t (Min. Rat.} Breuer was in charge o"f this . Mai~ Se.ction which va.s responsible for intercept, including intercept control and the actual intercept stations, and sorting and prelim­inary examination of the intercepted materials. The ·depart­ment wa.s composed of about 200 persons and was divided into two sections. Section 41 under 3pecia11st.~opp, was res­ponsibl.e for all FA intercept~ This included intercept control, determination of cover priorities, location of · stations (described by Schapper as 0 employment of inter- -cept fore.es 11

) and actual administration· of the intercept pezasonnel. Section 5 was under Special l st Harrius who·was relievefsof duty and replaced by Speciaiist Dr Henke on . 9 . March. This e:>ction served as a "message center'1 receiving

74Except where specifica1ly cited as from other sources, this and the .following paragraphs dealing witi.-i.i the organization of the FA are based on IF 15, 132, 135; I 25 and 54, and T1com document 240. The statement of' Schapper, which can be checked by the captured directive written by him and the interrogations of Seifert, Oden, Paetzel, Fingerhut and Klautachke-from which la.st the personnel strength figures are taken-are the most important and contain few if &ny contradictions. The interrogation of Rentschler, on-the contrary, is incomplete and he appears to have c·onsciously with.11.eld or. evaded giving information. The interrogation of Guenther is also incomplete but he appears to have been a minor worker and consequently poorly informed. The infor­mation taken from WeeklY Intelligence Summary i/12, IF 132, is oft~n unique. so statements about the use of electric eyes and that Hauptabteilung IV developed codes and ciphers ror the use of the FA are not indicated in the Ticom mater- . ia.ls avail.able-. (IF 132 is based on the interrogations of Georg Schroeder and a. "Report rrom Ce.ptured !'ersonnel and Material Branch Military Intelligence Division,"· United· Sta-tes ·war Department, 25 June 1945, neither of which are 1n- the. p'o,~session of Ticom. ) · ·

75IF ·135, Co?lrected as or 14 Mareh. The 29 March order is available on Film 34 (Ticom Doc. 240).

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al,l intercept and sortiM and :distributine it to the proper section of Ma.in Se.ction IV o~ Main Section V. This sorting does NO'r ;·~ppear to involve . traffic analysis but is merely a.n idE;ntifleation of traffic type and a. prelimiriai:•y sort; as by

· language and · system. Clear text m..~terial~ including ·pz·ivate and conunercial messages, · pJ\ess broa.dcast'3, . the res.ults of telephone monitoring and the like, vere sent direct to . Hauptabteilung V for eva.luation. Code a.nd ·eipher text was sorted as to type~ -e. z.~, !Jlilltary, diplomatic, and commer.,. cial. Military intercep1;; was .passed' to ?he Signal . Intelli­~ence Agency of' the Sup~eme Gommand of the Armed Forces \OXW/Chi) and diplomatic traffic wa.s sha.r~d according to previous arrangement between the Foreign Office,. The Sig~a.l Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Arnied · Forces l0KW/Ch1) and the FA • . (Rentschler states that this could be· done by sortin.g on "the first group of the message wh"lcn· reveals the type • ")76 ':):1ha. t ·ma teria.l which was to be · worked on by the FA was sent to . the appropriate section of

' Hauptabteilung IV • . According to Fl1cke, Pokojewskl andHatz .the FA receiv.ed duplicates of messages f .rom ~ll inter~ept . ··.

·. sources anO. :was the only agency to receive these facilities. 77 · . .

• d. Ha.upta.bteilung IV - Codes a.nd Ciphers: This Main Section o:f some . . ieo persons under Ministerial Dirigent Georg Sc(l_l'o~der was concerned with cryptana:l,.ysis of all codes and c.,tptj.egs. Because of the prepondera:r:it interes.t of· the Ticom 'teruJis1~; iri cryptanalytic activities most of the FA info:rmation . obt£inable from the Interrogat1Qns of working personnel . . is concerned with cryptana1ys1s. , According to Kurt Sauerbier78

76R~ntsehler, IF 46.

771 85 p 3. . . . .

781 .162: "Sauerbier is. 4l years OldD neat and anxious to impress. 'He joined. the FA in 1 ts infancy in 1935 on the strength or .a knowledge of Swedish and some. English. He has ho special mathematical training or qualifications a.nd was a;nol"dinary bank clerk in a Ham,burg bank who was out of a job and heard that the FA vas looking for men who knew la.ng-q.ages. His poor .ma~er of exprecsion and . the lac'lc of conciseness and detail or his answers combined to give a total .impression of distinctly mediocre . !l-b.ility and or an attitude typical of' tne · . entrench~d ·civil servant, pr~ud of his own little pev but seeing very little beyond · it. ,.

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· there were onl:y about. a dozen c;ryptanal'Y:tic per-sprL,~e~ .in the F ~ wnel'i h? Joiped ln l.:935 ~. Sa.uerbier toqk a s4.9,;>~ (:qµi~se in

.. t.n.efungamenta.ls and ;th.en we~ to ·w'ork on ¢.oromeitc1~1 c;Q4e · . . ; traff'~.c ~ ~he h:~ad of' the crypt.analy:tfic. s.~.etio~>(wl,tj:ch la~er

· becP..me Hauptabte,i lung IV) ·was . tnen, and· rem.a:L:ned,~ ?~inc1paJi .·· Specialist .· (lat~r . Miri.· Di1""ig·) Schrp.eder·. wt th th$· .qutbreak ·or ,·th~ waz•. the office ·wa,s . :reorge;nized and t4is ~~lf; h~~e ·be?~ t}fe time e.t which the Haupta.bteil.un.gen we~e created~ ·.Late in · 1943 various .. sec ·tions · qf· the ,$'A. we:r>e for·c~9, to, mpV:e to . Bpeslau.·. due to bomb 'ciamage . to the·ir Berl~n qua:rteI·s. ~ · · saue;rb~~r has ··.·• · ·

. stated t:P.a. t the que,rters , :t.n Bres~a.u were inad~quat.e and that p:rod9:cti:on ac.co;rdingl,Y • sut"fezted .19 ·. We .·kl'>.o:w that ~J.?,¢. ... :Oreslau

· Br?<nch .was. ,U1,i'1er ·.the direction of schroed.e:v. . as a . G;U-ec:ti v.~ , .·· .. . from li:tm. to . I!R III,::i:V, V:,I i}2,·3., 4 ~·5~ 6 ,7; 8;19 ·~ l0.P'.ll ,l~~·13,~.4 J1·15, ancl 'vAw · s~hule

0 {th~ Sch<:)ol' , for, Evaluators '..; ·AuaV.f.e~;:t\>.ngs .·

Schui.e·?11). · of )O .Septeniber 1944 is .available .. · (T.lie di.·rect.ive

~:t.rc~la:teq a photocopy of: a commun1ca:t1op:,. i'rom t!le l3,~eslau , ... · Ab.we:rir · Offic.et . (wew~·e~skommando ·vr11·.J\:oweru>J ~ <.m .. ,ip.~ ·aa~lg?r qt Russ·:tan . 'and P tjl;J.sh. ag_e!n·~s ;: l.ncrea$ :1;pg t 4eir _actiyi ty ,!n·· B,z-es,.. . .

· .. l:a.:uJ._89 - ·Froip Bre:;:Jl~.\l M'0.1n .Sect:L9!l r; moved to. ~u~te~bog .· · .' . · ·

~~~~~pe~1 !~p!;;s~~ r~~~~e~~:e~.a~~d~~~~~,_~;r~~!~~e~t:ID~~i;ert ~ . additional personnel ot · rv .returned to Berlin or fe'll ·ca~-

. · · ualt:t;~~ to th~ ·mpvement. ':L'h~ 'movemerit· io Ju~~bog ~~s . com~ pieted. by' 2 February :J9.45 as a letteX> . of ~h~t 9;a:t¢i . ~.x!sta .· ·'· .

·. which .nsi.mes nine .. l'.ilemJ::ie:rs , of. FA 9 who. ~ssist~~:r .1n .:tran~poi."·tint;

cl:al3:~1;ti~d; matet'ials rrorii ·B:resla.u~ ·~2 'rhe 'cfa,t·e .. 9t :th~ ·mo:ve : · .. · ·· . . · 'to>~{l\ifbet.Wen · 1s:: nQt icriowri· nor -Or .· any: detail~ '.or · .:the., sub,.; · . .•.. · - seqtl~nt ·move .to Rosenhetill avail.able~ .. At Kauf"betW.~:n " t.he< . Main·-~~focJions J +e~s FAl5/• were'· reunited 'µride;r .. : Z),ena.p.P.~1< . .. FA . IV :incJ.uQ.ed . . se•ctions · 6,:7, ~h and . 9 pu·t by<.th~ .e114 ;. o.f ~1arc}l . FA'6 Q;oes nqt. appear .on ·the ·;[>·outings 9f FA me~o~afula.~ . ·. . . ·p;a.~.tzel, ·. d;eputy 11.ead. Of >FA I V. ti:nCl. head of ];"A "6 wl!,~ · &t·. ~Uf .. beuren '0ori 5. Ma,rch :but was · ta.ken pr1~onel9 ~t. :F:J,.ens'Qurg with .··

.· .. v~ri:()u~:<f"'g1t1.V~t;i · frOl'.Il Battl,•~n. His presence. at ¥,aufbeqren. ·· · - ~ -.- : . . . . . . . - ·~. . . . . : , ·-. . . . . . . .

. ' . . :· ... :.· .. . ··: . .: .·

. 19 ~;-. . h · I_ :lV4:J> p , ~ ~

·. 8~~c;.n nocum~~t : 24o;· item .31 .~ ·

81.:Tt"~~ Doc·ument ~40 items. 2~ · ~no.· 29 o

. Sarie'drti :·bo~¢ument· :21*0 i.~~ril · 33 .• ..

32

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i ..j

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in March is known from'two dil"ectives concerned with air raid pr~cautions, orie originated by him and one na.m1ng,h1m, Senior Speciali~t Waechter, Wenzel, and Sehu1ze, Specialist Kroeger, and.three o~her Speeia.l1sts 1 Lehr, Kagelka., and von Stubenfa.uch who are otherwise unknown but may be assumed to be members of FA IV .83 . · · ·

Section 6 was a "Research" section. .Paetzel stated that ~! ' '

Was head ·or this Abteilung which came into exist­ence only in 1941 and had fewer.members than the others» in tact about 3'0. Whereas the-other Abtellu~endealt wf th material. which he described as "Aktuell "I Abt. · 6 worked on problems which could not be dealt with by the others currently and was also in the nature of a research section to work on new systems. They dealt ,in'the ~in with diploma.tic trai"fic of America, EngJ.and1 Japan, Free France, Spain and Spanish America. Their main machine success was with the sw1s·s Enigma as long as the same machine setting wa.s used·over a longish period. He also said that they had been able to break the Finnish Hagelin on a single m~ssage tr they had 4,000·1etters or more or text. . He knew no details . of the method as he

.ha.d not worked on it himself. That had,been done by RR ·Kroeger. ·They could also break 1t, of co\lrse, on a compromise. When asked if" they had ,...solved othe;r machine systems, he replied that ,they had broken· a. Japanese system in •41.- 142.which was thought_ to be a machine system though their.solution was not.mechrulical but

·employed simply paper· strij)S. _They hadvorked also on e.n;w.erican strip system wh~re 30 out of' a matrix of 50 strips were employed in a setting. · · This tl'aff le was

·. AID.erica.:..Europe ·but wnether Was:Ui11gton .. London or. Wash-1r..i;ton ... .Pa.rls was not kno~. Paetzel also described a Spanish.additive system· on which he had been working shortly before the end. The systems differe.d according· to trat'.fic link. Ea.ch link had 10 tables, with 100 · four Qigit groups on ea.ch ,table.·" The indicator was the serial.number {He·did not knowhow it worked}. It came in the 2nd or 3rd place a.nd he believed that it wa.s · · unenciphered a.s Lt· ca.us:ed no trouble. · No other. Spanish

8}T1com Doc'\mient: 240 -item 3cf •

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traffic vas known to Pa.etzel;,4

some links,, however, bad more tables tba.n others.o

. . During the interrogation ot. the "Flensburg Con'tJ~nt" or the FA, Oden, the ~'machine branch" representative (see Iiauptabteilung VI) was questioned about IBM equipmento The quest1on·va.s answered, however; by Paet.zel, who enumer­ated the fol loving mach1nes:.

1 Alphabetic Tabulator 2·n~11·ca1culat1ng Tabulators 3 or 4 Sorters . 1 Reproducer "Many" Punchers85 .. .

They did not bave a "Kartenm1scher" [Collator J. . It has been estimated th.at the equipment lis.ted would have required ten to fifteen key punches. The personnel strength of the re­search section is sufficient to have operated this mMequip­ment in conjunction vith their' other duties and the various statements about the compartmentization or the FA and the isolation of the orypta.nalysts 1n particular SUPP§fjt the _ assumption that IBM was not in a se~rate sectiqn. . ·

Schroeder is quoted to the effect that the FA developed its own codes and .ciphers although nQ evidence or this is to be found in the available materials • (j7 Howev_ar 1 Kroeger, "[Cipher} machine specialist" of the :research section .1s· named as the repre~entative to the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command or the Armed Forces (OKW/Ch1) Code and Cipher Committee set~~P by Theile and G1mmler with Huettenha.in as chairman.~ ·

841 54 p 2.

851 25 Passim.

86Sauerb1er, I 162, states that the cryptanalytic section merely forwarded the untranslated text of its decodes to Evaluation and never heard what action or interpretation was taken on them. IF 132, presumably based on an interro-gation or Schroeder which is not available to TICOM, also . indicates this isolation, stating tbat the var1ous·sect1ons were envelOJ>ed in extensive security regulations. 87IF .l32 88 ' · Huttenhain and Fricke, I 84. It is stated that Kroeger

vaa unable to attend all the meetings as the FA had moved to Bres lau •

DOCID: 3486670

:------.:,-. . . .,.-

It is probable that the success with a Russian Tele­type machine, attr.ibuted to the FA by Buggisch, although the 1nfo.rmation was admitg~dly second ·hand with him, was achieved in this section• This is fUrther supported by· the fact that Sauerbier, who worked 1n the section dealing v1th Slavonic languages, did not know of an1 1najor Ruaslan success and specif'ica.lly ?nentions abandonment of work on s. Russian Di1olomatic· system •.

The· exact history or Abteilung 6 is not clear. Paetzel states t·bat ·ttha section came into e:xistenae in 1941. Accord­ing to Rentschler it remained in Berlin .. ~. Paetzel, hovever, names Kroeger as a. membeia ot·tbesection and.Huettenha1n· states that he was unable to attend the Code and Cipher · Committee meetings regularly because of the move of' the FA· to Breslau.91 The directive found at Kaurbeuren, moreover, carries Paetzel as J:iead of Atteilung 6 and· makes no 1nd1c&t1on that either he or the section .were not at Kaufbeu:ren.. Support :ror.RentB,.chler's statement, none the less, comes from the · fact that Pa.etzel vaa :round at Fl~nsburg with Sei:rert, Gden, Klautsc~~ and Fingerhut, all of' vhom were in the "northern section .• "

·Section 7, overseas and Southwest, was under the direction or Senior Spec1a.11st Waechter &nd·CODS1sted of from 60 to. 70 persons. Their work included USA, England, I.at1n America, Spa.in, Portugal, Turkey, Egypt, and the Far Ee.st. In the "Far East" besides Japanese and Chinese traffic Manchurian systems

89sugg1sch quotes. Doering and gives coris:I,derable information on the process involved. Even though second hand the story

. appears r~liable I 64 p 2, I 176 p 6.. · ·

.90IF l5 p l9 . . 9lsee I 84 ,· .of IF 132 ~

92speculat1on over this point is unneeessar,. It is clear that there vas a· speeia..l research section which vorked on mY.chine traffic and it 1$ also cleaJ> that Kroeger was a ma.chine special­ist. Sauerbier., I 16'2, says tbat section :tV moved to Breslau in 1944, working conditions vere not good and the work suffered, · and that a11~aections ot the office vere scattered after Bl'esleu was evacuated.

}5

DOCID: 348·6670

... --

were studied and evidence of work .on 8. Thai system was found. Only one Japanese translator is lalowc to have been available,, Dr Erfurtll who also translated. Chinese and Turkish. Senior Spec1.al1at Waechter is mentioned several times as th~ expert on American systems although this ma.y have been parti.a.lly due to a desire of Ps.etzel to· avoid spec11"ia. questioning. This section scored one ·of· the more ·. timely successes of the FA whe.n it (or the predecessor or it in the pre-war FA) read Cha.mberlain•s message to London for Hitler at the time ot Munich • . As ?\esponsible fQr English and United States systems,, it also dealt with tbe ·messages of Harrison ( U ·~ s o Charge d 'Aftaire) from Berne and .for cooperation with the Navy on British Interdepartmental cipher and various consular systems •

. · Section . 8, West and South. under Senior ·· Specialist S~hulze, was composed ot 30 to .40 persons .. . It worked on France, -Belg1um, Holland, Switzerland, Italy and Rumaniao Major succ~_sses were achieved in the case or France. At · the time · of' the Anschluss decodes · we?'(' furnished :Hitler (the code ha.q apparently been ''secured"·) vhich revealed ~t -France·would take no military action because of the refusal of England t.o back her Q In the opinion of' Rentschler Vichy systems were the eas.1est to bre&k of all worked on by the · FA. Rentschler, however, was not a cry.ptanalys t himse l.t. '.1•

··Section 9,, East, Southe&.$f, Middle : and North, under · Senior Specialist Wenzel,, was composed of 60 to 70 pedple according to Paetze'l but according to Sauerbier, ·who w&s . a member or it, of 45 during the var. For the s-trength . or ' FA 9 at Kaurbeuren a partial l1s~irtg . is .possible based on a list of' names,, headed FA 9,, vith the signatµres or the>se present or an indication of their trs.ns:fer·. This list is given in appendix 2; None of t~ names on this list a.re otherwise knovn nor has any check o:f these persons been made~ '!'he proportion Of men to V01D9D is Of . interest (21 men - three wJ.tb a Doctor"s degree - and 1,2 women). se.ction 9 was divided into at least ·three sub..;.sections ae SS.uerb1er vaa the head of Referat 9 .. c . This sub ... sect1on ap:Pears to· have been a catch-all foz· aasorted problems that did not .fit 1rito ·an7, other section •. · Its eommittments were: the dip- , loma.tic ·a;na _eonsuiar traffic of ·swede~, Denmark,, and Norway; the ~ommerctal tra.:f:fic or neutral eotiHtries; the ship tr~ffie or Northel"n European count:ries; the secret messages or de­tained pel'sons; Russian Agents. Tratf10o Among the successes

36

1' .

.•

DOCID: 3486670

----

•

v1th commercial codes clai111EJd bJ Sauerbier are . the code ot MABANK, a. code of the Skoda Works, and Turkish shipping codes. 9-A is stated to have solved a Poli.sh code arid either 9·A or 9-B may be presumed to have dealt with the Russian ' commercial traff1~ receiv9d· by Seifert. ·

sauer.bier•s evaluation ' of the · cryptanalyt1c section and its · heads 1n particular 1s vorth quoting, although it is not felt that his sta.t~ments are to be taken at their

·face value: · · ·

Sauerbier gives a general picture of a highly burea~~ratic organization dominated bJ red tape and proeed·\ire 1 so th.at no department knev. whs. t . the others

· vere doing. Schzioeder vae old and fussy, liking quiet and disliking innovation. Paetzel v~s also vecy petty &ild academic in his outlook. ·

This narrowness affected relations:. or the FA with tbs Ausvaertiges ~t, OlOf, and oKiI.. Liaison was handled_ bJ a · single representative and never involved any exchange of visits by operations personnel. Sauerbier said he did not know one single.person in any of the other organ!~ zat1ons. ·

Similarly there vere no close relations between solution and evaluation work. The crypt sections s1mplJ' did their .vo:rk and handed the untranslated product over to the evaluation sectiOJ:LVithout ever knowing what became or 1 t thereafter o ~j · · ·

There is evidence that 5auerb1er is either deliberat·ely misleading his -interrogators or vas considerably misinformed. Lt .. Schubert, the expert on Agent•s traffic :for the Russian Sec_tion or the Signal Intelligence Agency ot, the Arrq High

·Command, state·d that "in January 1945 a RR Wenzel _vas sent · to me t'l'om the FA by the· WNV Fu III which vaa 1n charge ot

Agents sistems to eolla.borate on Polish Resistance Movement traffic. Schubert knew that the -FA he.d worked on Polish

935auer~1er, I 1621 p 4., These statements probably reflect more a "sour grapes" . (or ~our hops?)- attitude of Sauerbier

· himself n.ther tl)an an accurate picture or the Bauptabteilung. For .tuller discussion arid. evaluation or the liaison between PA and the other agene1es . see b9lov. ·

-a _ ·~<.' ; -

t, 37

•

DOCID: 3486670

'A . ., .. -· '

~-.~ :: .\ :-- . .:

systems, but as far as he knev be.d not read any.94 This . is evidence not only ot an exchange of vorking personnel but involves the head of Sauerb1er«s ovn sect1on in connection vith sauerbier•s self claimed specialty .95 It further sho1:1s a coordination of cryptanalJt1c work on Agent's traffiy by the authorized agency 1 The Radio Defence Corps (WNV Fu.!:rri)JI ot the vo:rk of the FA and the Army !Ugh Command. Finally among the Kautbeuren directives is a letter from the Reich main Security Offict.

6to FA 9 requesting that an agents message

be deciphered • ~ · . . . .

Details of all systems worked on by the FA v1th all TICOM references discovered are given in Appendix I and it was not felt necessary to duplicate this material in this organizational outline. ·

e.. Ha.uptabteilun~ V - Evaluation: Principal specialist 3e1.fert, thiiliea.d ot t ls. Miin section,, had 400 ·people under him, the greatest number in any of the se~tions of the· -"Bureau" prope.r. Seifert himself vas captured e.t Flensburg and· .proved one of the most cooperative and talkative of 'the prisoners. The information releases or·this section.repre­sented the finished product of .the. FA. Seifert was head of the temporary Jueterbog Branch and then bec~me head .. or a ~porting center · in Berlin lmown by his name • He · himself states that his presence at Flenebu~g was to orgapize the receipt or press and broadcast traffic .. Senior Specialist

·Dr. Kurzbach, the head. of section 11,, was alternate :ror Se1.fert in cbarge o:r V at X&uf'beuren .... Seifert o s statement or the objective or his department is as follows:

The object Of the department V&S the production Of a purely objective and scie·nt1fi-c picture of the world­

. vide political and commercial situa.tlon.

94r 26 p 7 •

· 95z .164 1~ a ,f:ltUdJ by sauerbier of his special field, .Russian . Agent• .s 'l.Taff"1o •

·96T1com Voe'. 240 Item ·11.

)

..

DOCID: 3486670

' .

' I

The new material prov1dedbJ'1ts soureesvas for­warded after processing to the mtn1str1e~ concerned undezt three different · categories v1zo: .

l) The individual items ot current 1rite:rest .("Ak-tuelle Meldungen"). · ·

2) Collected items · on a given single subject ( "zusammenga.fas s te "J. · .

3) Consol1dat~ reports ("S:JDthesen") e.g., Japanese-Russ1an relations. ·

' The 'bulletl.ns or the FA were ''Braun Mel:dungen"-Brovn Reports (or the "JBraunblaetter"-Brown Sheets). These were : sent to the highest officials only; Keitel (Chief of Armed li'orces), Jodl (Chief' of Operations start), Goering, Ribbentrop (For­eign Minister), and Doenitz (Grand Admiral) admit having received them and the~ were of course also sent to Hitler hims.elf ~9B Special reports vi th an even more restricted distribution were aent: · ··

• ,. • only to Goering and to Hitler; it depended on the subject and the existing circumstances,, some of . them might subsequentlJ be passed .by Hitler to the minister for Foreign Affairs. '!'7P1eal examples were the Berl1n­Rome telephone oonversationsbetveen Mussolini and Ciano., . .

H1tler•s view or the products or the . FA was tha.t they were ve-rs :reliable,; the material had .to· be pre­sented tactually to Hitler .with no argUment or appreci­ation, onl7 the verbatim conversation or actual deciph­ered text. · Editors were given verJ definite orders not

. to make guesse$ where there vere gaps; 1.f _an1 portion vere _m1sa.1ng or was not clear, a row .of d.ots had to· be inserted a.nd the appree.1at1on, it any~ inserted within paranthise·s. There vaa a special courier service . vi th particular dispatch boxes ot vhich only Goel'1ng, Hitler

·· and Ribbentrop possessed the ke1s. The couriers b&d to travel in special motor cars and not ·1n ra.ilwa1 trains. Al1 ·the reports .had to be returned and sometimes ther~ -vere d1tt1cult1es because odd single sheets bad been extracted and retained~ In such cases a r .eminder was -~ent asking for the missing sheets. There were special

97I 54 P 3.

96x i43 P is.

39

, I

": :::- ' .

- _ ,, .. . .... . • '.

DOCID: 3486670

• security regulations to prevent the reports being banded on from person to person.99 .

The best description of the routing of material to Hauptabte1lung V a.nd its processing there is given by Rent­schler:

Material vh1eh reached Main Abteilung V for eval­uation came either from Abteilung 5 or Main Abteilung IV, depending upon whether it had been received in plain language or in code or ciph,er. ~lateria.l from the de­coding Abtellungen ca.me to Abteilung V already trans­lated while clear text material came as it was received except tor Japanese and otber_non European la.ngus.ges 'Which also vere translated into ~r.me.n by experts •• o o

. Most of the . material sent to Main Abteilung V was obtained .from plain language source~; foreign radio, foreign press, telephone and telegraph messages to and rrom both toreign and occupied coun~ries and internal communications. The quantity ot decoded material var1eq vi th tJ:ie various sections . of Ma.in Abte ilung V; i .n ·

· Abtetlung 11 perhaps 30% ·or the t .otal was decoded . traff 1c; 40~ clear text, and anothe·r 305' ca.me from radio b:road- · cast and the press, in Abteilung 12 a. considerably smaller percentage consisted of' decoded·ms.terial; in · Abteilung 13 only about 7% or 8%. of the total came from decodes. ·

9~r 143 : p 15. In regs.rd to Hitler 1 s opinto1.1 of' Signal Intel­ligenC?e~. hOvever, Ribbe~t~op,. in tlie SB.Ille interrogation . (I · 143) attri~tes a .. divet'gent view: ·"Ribbentrop, on being· asked · how valuable Signal Intelligence was to him and which countries provided the best material he hesitated for a long time; the . value of this intelligence did not amount to ver-s much _.;. Hitler ba(l a queer, rather particular v1ev about it ·-- he did not like this tn>e of' intelligence very much and said 1t vas unreliable and c>tten misleading; ·· it was bette?' to use one 8 s own common sense. R1bbe-ntrop .sa1d that occasionally arealll' . important piece of intelligence vas· produced but even vhen pressed could notreeollect a single· specific example." . Ribbentrop vasdeser1bed by the interrogators as highly suspecioµs and uncommunicative 1D distinction toGoering, 'who needed no prompting, and to .Doenitz, Keitel and Jodl. See d1acuss1on of these points under FA Liaison belov •

. . .... '

.. : .· ·4o.· ... · .

:· •• 1 • • •

~--~-'-- ·~ "· .r

DOCID: 3486670

·• Most decoded t.ra:f.fic was read about 2~3 days after

it was sent with some up to a week oldo Apparently only Japanese tra.f"f1c vas read up to four or five weeks oltl

0

Rentschler professed almost complete ignorance or tl'w workings of Hauptabteilung IV which wa3 guarded by VE:ry rigid and strictly enforced security x•egulatio11s 0 _

On 31 Me.y Rentschler was taken up on apeci~ie points of the previous days interrogation. Abteilungen 11-13 reported on an average 80 messag«~s Pt day, includ­iJ;Jg d~codes a.nd PL (Kllirtext) ·• They we:r•e given all tti!::irts, and then separated reportable from nop-report-able ~ Abteilung 11, the one dealing vi th traffic of interest to . the Foreign O.ff1ce, :reported perhaps 20-30 . messages a day o This is interesting in view of Scl'$1.ppez' 1 ~

statement that this office put their ma.in cryptographic e.f.f.ort on diJ>lomatic ciphers .100 . .·

Goering thought that hi~ organiza.t·1on mg been able to deal with 32 differe11t lo.nguages o His Inter:t•oga.tion revealed ~ e.

~ .. _ The virtues of the organization lay in th~ fact ·

that they d~.d not confine themselves to any pa.rticulit!' field of intelligence and bad no politlca.l axe to gr:tnd;i nor ideology to follov; they we:t>f! just given the tech-· nical requi!'ements ta intercept and break trnff.ic and to disseminate intelligence. When they ma.de an 1nt&ll1"'." gence resume of' some particular subje·ct ~ for example that of aircraft product.ion in the USA or the Ynlta. and Teheran conferences they produced an accu~ata ractual &(!count -with no political bias$ Reports such as ·these, often covering quite ·con~fide.rable periods,

. were frequently produced •. - · · · ·

Goering's main principle bad always been to keep the FA free from outs:tde influences; Admiral Canar:ts » t .he Geetapo.9 and the Foreign Office had continua.lly tx·iecl to interfere but he bad 100.naged to head thew. Off " At, one ttme the · head of' the FA had formed the :ldea that tlwy · should also d-eal with agent's tra.f.fic. G<:)ering ha.d . round this out in about 1934 and had strictly forbidden any such a.ction,; such matters should be left to t.he concern of' the Secret Service, and in any· ·case the intelligence was generally unreliable.·

'; lOOIF 15 pp · 19~20

4i . . ·•

DOCID: 3486670

-A · -

\.l-,:·-. . .a ,._

Goering said that the rec1p1ents or the d&ily o bulletins~ .the "Brown Sheets"· (Br&Wlblltter) always emphasized the gual1ty and reliab,ili'ty ot the service o

In 1940~1941 the selected rile of reports which vas passed to him,da.117 contained-a.s·much as tvo hours reading.. 'l'h1s report 1ncluded 1Jltell1ge.nce !'rom both types of FA; he vas· unable to say vhat proportion consisted ~r decodes. (However 1 The intelligence resulting from decoded telegrams vas not always useful, they orten consisted of' absolute rubbish.. The extent to vhich me'mbers ot tbe diplomatic corps spread and retailed fantastic rumors vas surprisinga He him-self had of tan made arrangements to have rumors planted and v1th1n a t0v days be observe~ them being passed on and spreadingo

'the vork of' the FA comprised tvo almost completely separate activities, flrstlJ that or telephone moni­toring, and secondly that o~ interception and crypt; ana.l7aia. As. regards the f'irst co:mmittment this bad or1ginall7 been limited to listening to telephone conversat-ions to and t'rom Foreign Embassies and those of inlportant visiting foreigners -- 1n order to obtain political and econom:lc.1ntellig9nce. At a.l&ter'd&te Bitler laid de1Vn that all telephone monitoring vas to be Goering's responsibility, aa f'ar aa he remembered this vas at the end of 1933; hitherto internal telephQne. monitoring bad been bSnd,led ~ the police • Inevitably the Reicbspost vere also concerned tor a. vhile since their cooperation and asaiatance vere'necessaey for work­ing out the technical _aide and ~or arranging special co.im,~tions; tbe FA diapended with as much or this liai­son as possible as soon as the7 round thelr feet. It vas laid dovn that the post off'ice bad to obtain a spec1f'1c permit :trom the FA 1t .ror·a.ny reason the7 vished to carry our monitor.J.ng themselves; lateron.11 however, the Gestapo introduced tbemeelve~ into the business and vorked 1Ddependentl7 and. vitbout authori­zation from Goering, theJVOl'ked cl.a.ndest1nelJ and for their own purposes; he: t:hought it ertremel;y probable. that latterl7 all of bia own telephons· conversations

42

- ---------

DOCID: 3486670

~--1.·.··· r

ha.d been l'l'!onitored by them 101

Hauptabte1lung V wae divided into' tour sections a Section lOJI under the direction of." Specialist Dr0

•• -Met1s was named as "Information Dissemination" by Schapper 8 s directive. Accord­ing to RentschJ.er it se~ved as the library, archives~ and reg1strat1on center, also confirmed by Fingerhuto Also1e~cord­ing to Rentschler, it 1ncl~ded five or six translatorso, The files of the library have· been described as:

••• voluminous rues of practically every type or informa.t1.on .from every country. It maintained very complete cross-refarenee indices, recordings of inter­cepted phone and radio messages and ~ranscriptions of public broadcasts or important world r1gures. In· ~ddition this section possessed a huge library of text­books~ maps, ·telephone directo~ies, city planss news- · pa9ers, and per-iodiea.ls. All in all this section pro­vided the material that all other section.a needeid in evaluating Pf8Qerly the messages inte~cepted by the field stations. ~~ ·

Thie is a. typically thorough example· or the needs of the information section of s:ny intelligence agency. s·ection ll, Foreign Policy Evaluation, under Sen:to!"' Specialist Dr. Kurzba.ch (both Rentschler and Fingerhut we.!,'e .former members of this sec'ticn) has left no specific record of tts a.ctivi­tie~. Section 12, Economic Evaluation, was under Acting BeEbd Brieschke. At Kaufbeuren.11 replaced on 20 March by , RautenY'...ranz. Among the reports prepared by them were, in peace time, stock ma:&.,.ket "tips" based on examination of ·brokerage reports etc o , which vere used by ·the various

lOlI 143. The ~ta.tements based oil.the interrogation in the document cited have been slightly rearranged in the above paragraph. Note that the date given.by Goe:ring for the taking ovez• of all telephone monitoring by the FA would allo~ su.f~icient time ~or those monitoring aetivitiss to have bean im.po:rta.nt 1n _connection with the ~l-.,od Purge mentioned earlier/in t..~1s paper as having been conneated in aome w~y with the_ FA.

l02Pingerhut, I 54 p }~ · Rentschler, IF 15 P 19. l03IF 1}2

-------~~- -

DOCID: 3486670

.,..,._ --,_.... P·

German economic agencies in purcbas.- and sale ot .fol'eign securities. Preswnbl7 these reports vere ,utilized bf.the various _ 1nd1v1dua.l members ot the Nazi party rece1v1.Dg them (according to Guenther all Baz1 o.rtic:lals down ~o Ga.ul1eter received FA reports) 'to theil' ovn pro:tit~ The bead: of this section is given by Rent;schler as Dr. Rautenkranz but his name does not.appear on tbe ltaut'beuren document. Section 13, Internal Atta1rs Evaluation, vas u.nder Specialist· Rentschler.. He st.a.tea that he beceJDEJ bead or the section in 19.lf!J nnd tb&t vhile st11.l 1n Be.rlin it e111plo1ed about 80 people. BJ the time the remns,JJ.ts .or Baupta.bte1lung_ v ·reached Hoaenheim, however, onl7 16 men and 4 girls vere lett in&ll or v. A special school tor "Evaluators" 1n the headquarters and in the Aussenatellen vas set up 1D 1~3 under Spac1&11st Heinz Fingerhut. He stressed, hovev~r, that this. school did not tra.in ne¥ pe?'aonnel since. they · had DO intake but indeed lost people to the armed .t"o:Z.ces,, but e:x1stect ma.1111)' to pr()vide refioesber courses ror Aus:"'. verter.vho b:v the nat\ll'e or1Blf81r vork required· a high degree o.f' expert lmovledge ._ · · . . ·. ·

r. Haupta.bte11ung VIi Technical. The Main Se.ct1o __ . n vas in ebarp orsenlor Specli lat · blpl. Ing. Sta.benov-.. llis alternate at . .lauf'beuren vas Sen1o~ Specialist Dro Hupperta­burg, the bead or Section l!I .. '?bis section, tbe only .one shovn, 1.s called Tecbn1cal . by the Xaurbeuren doc\!ment .. · Rentschler gives·tvo section,, 14 Development or OVn M9.eh1nesp .and 15, · Comparison and EVe.luation ot captm-ad Ma.chineey.. · _ Oden; hovever, a aamber or 149.1.D· Section VIg gives the~ f'ollov- .. · ing description or his section:.

, · · B&upta.bteilung VI, o•s own d~partma.nt~ b&d-- two · ·. subsections, a) .Pr@nif'unf und Entv1ck115 ·a.JJd. b) Betriebc Be -was the bead ot tbi aff81' · subseetrOii. · Be. vs.a thUs · responsible pneral17 ror th& mt.1nta.inence·of' all · RLl!VPAfs commun1cat1ona but was not concerned at all vlth devising or d•vel~ping r:in apparatus which vaa tbe

104 . . \ · · I 5lJ p 3. T1com Document 2~0 item 36 is the orde!l tra.ns .... terring Special 1st Dr. Raute:nkl'&Dz .from the School or the FA to PA 12 as bead, effective 20 March 45 and also tra.nsfe~s DJt. Fingerhut to the Reporting Center Seirert. Item 37 in ... eludes ~ .Sobule AW (School or Evaluators?) · m its :routing.

: .~, t ' .

' f \

DOCID: .348667:0 :-·· · .

task of' Abteilung a. When questioned a.bout bi.a con­nection vlthOXW on cipher securitJ msttera, h8 ea.id tb&t this va.a purely ad hoc· • . Be vaa presen1; onl7 at discussions on · tbe seouritJ ~r the T52 and attended more b7 v-irtue .or bia previous emplOJJDent v1th Siemens w.d lf&lake th&n bJ his present position vith RLM/FAo They had no liaison vitb Va Preut VII except· 1n eon-

. nectton v1f8s. aueb appa.ratua as vas auppl~ed " tl:Jem bJ this body. . . · . · ·

As . Oden rem.ined 1n Berlin and Dro Buppertaburg vent tc butbeuren a reorganimition in the course orvbicb Abteilu.ng 15 vaa dropped is a reaaon&blJ p~aumpt1on • . ID bis.· earlier in_terrog&tion Oden stated that he bad joined tbs FA in 1936. having previou&lJ' been an ~lect~1ca.l engineer., and vaa·

·.responsible ~or the. equipment of' the !J)tercspt stations, tbe1r • ,1D:taiperice, and. tor c•rta1D per80DD91 •tterso •. In this interrogation he stated that some ot the ·emplo)'ees or

·· ArmJ ~ce, Developing and. Test~g~O\lp~ Signals ~&nch bad been claaam&tea of" bia at school. Both Ruppertsberg and Oden are specif'ica.llJ mentlo~ed bJ Boner or_ the German Air Force as concer11ed vith. telepholie monitoring. ·Boner .. e ·. · . stated tbat the last known 10C&.tiOD Of the telephone .lll()Di-toring station. under Dr. Buppertaberg, vas at Gluecks~t · (HolstemJ &nd that Oden. would

1• be able to giv,e details. 7.

'r1-re vere appi-ozimatelJ' 200persona emplo1ed1.D B&uptab-

l' .

.

·- :· · ·~, ·:·.r .. "·~ r:i:.·.·"'···~ ·-· . , i'

. te1lung VI. It DB7 be assumed tmt· tbe FA. · alone. among·. the Signal ilntelligence Agencies.; MD its OVD CO:mmuD1ca.t1onso !be· COlmlllllD1cat1cna or the S1gn&l Intelli~nee Agene7 ot the 5~prezmt Command or the Armd Forces.. (OXV/Chi) ot the Air· toroe (0El/Ch1) &iJd Ba~ (OD IJ Sn/III) Sipl Intellt .. gene• Sel'Yices. ot the Radio Dehnce Corps (OXW/vrf'l/F,a <.tII').

·. or. the Abwehr. &Dd or tbD Foreign o.tr1ce w4!tre all run by seetion_V ot the Signal Intelligence Ageno7 or ·tbe Supreme Command or -the Armed Fo:rcea.108 _ The absence or the FA 1D

l05r·54 P 1.

106I 25 h . d 8 PP ., an . "

l07I 17 P 3.

loBiJp 9, Activ1tJ r,eport ot the Signal Intelligence Agenc1 ot the Supreme Command ot the Armed Forces for period l Jan 19'14 tbrough 28 J'une 1944 •

;• ;· '

DOCID: 3486670 . :.•-:

---

this company is significai~t.: It appears . to ·reflect the antt­path1 ot·the Signal Intelligence Agenc;r ot' thtt Supreme Com­ms.nd ot tbe Armed Forces· arid the FA tovards each other .. Secur1_tJ' of FA cipher!! is thought to baye been v1th1n the functions of section 6, • vh1.ch see.. . .

.AmO.ng ; the documents received bl' 'l'icom is a telephone . d1.rector;y eont$1n1ng names of menibers ot the FA aud of the Air lqnis~n as vell as ke7. ~t:f 1cials in otb8r government ·· m1.n1strie:a~l09. The documant appears to refer· to· tbe official

· (government) te lepbone net iii Berlin. A tracing s. ttac~ .· .to tbe (f.ccument shovs direct telephone communications fiaom Dr Huppertsburg (~hose n&me appears) to Luebben, Conatanc6 1

Cologne; .T3mplin,·srealau and other knovn locatie>u~ at FA .. tnstall.&tions on. the one b&nd. and to the Air Minist17 a.nd the Supi-8!1!' Comfll9.Bd of the Armed Foreee· (OXW) ori the other. Tbre>ugh the avitehboaro ot:.the Supra:me Commsnd or tba A;r-med

·.Forces ccnnectiona could be Dade .vlth. tbs Army High Command (~nd its field telephone neta), Tbs Reich Main Securit1 · · .Oft1ce, The Foreign Off"lce, Tbt N&vy High Command,, the Prussian State Min1atl"J'~ the Retcbspost and tbs ·ElitG Gaurd HaadqU&rters (SS Fuehrungabauptamt)o ·Through tba·A1r M:Ul1-stry nltchbo&rd comaections ve:re poasible vlth all 'branches of.the Air K1D1str,am· Air Force and a connection to Goer1ng'3 estate at Karinba.ll 1s ahovD.. Telephone numbers. ror all -eonnecticna are given.,' (some o~ the mmsm. of of·fieials given in the director,. vlll be discussed st the conclusion or this eba.pwr) •. It ms.1 be assumed t'rom the appeara.?Jce or DJt HuppertsbUrgos name on the tracing that he vas·raapor..elble tor maintaining telephOne co:t1mnm1cat1ons ~or tb!J FA•

· 9·. Wai:>· Time· E~dients o . The Branch Of't1ce Ber11D and the aectliig centereitert.. Ari aiiminlstratlve nucleus.· or mia:eterm ned strength vas. a!vaya min~ined in Berlin 1n addi t1Qn to various monitoring station.a. located tllfire.. · The admtnlstrative documents captUl"ed at Kauf'beui•en :have

. revealed vhat is known of this administrative organiza.tiono

l09D 22 .• · The d1reetorj 1s- said to be undatedo. It was round at Berchtesgaden by T1~om ~am l. .All names appear-: ing in the. directory have been included in Tab A. In the case of.members ot the FA the1;i> inclusion in the dlreetoey is indicated by the citation or D 22 in tbe entry under their D&UllfJ • .

46

DOCID: 3486670

A directive .or 9 March 1945. signed by Sc11!:D~r, set up the Branch Office Berlin (Zveigatelle Berlin). 1 Its functions appear to have duplicated those of FA I and II to a consider­able extent and.in addition the Branch O.ft.ice Berlin would seem to have assimilated FA 15. Its functions vere or an &dm1n1strative nature, 1nelud1ng security, cor·respondence. admfnisti-.a.tive detail, personnel matters and, in addition~ te·cbnlcal ma.1nta.1nence ot equipment'. and communications. 'J'be bead of the Branch Oi"fice Berlin vae Senior Specialist Ste.benow and he exercised administrative control over the .Reporting Center Se1.tert and the various Li&ison Offices .. A member of FA 9, Dr 1'leuenhott, 9tbervise unknovn .. vs.s named as.a requeil!d liaison man betveenBraneh O.ftice Berlin and his section. A Spee1s.11st Progich or the !~uebben . intercept $tation was also assigned fiH1 tional dutie& as. · liasison man vi th the Branch O.ff'ice. · Specialist Henke,

:::hh~~1~! :~i~no~ :r~r~~~t13va~ a:;;:i: .~~ i~: . personnel work handled in Berlin is e. request·f'romFA9 that Frau Helene Gertz, born Sponholz, be assigned' to work in an intercept station. She is described as h&ving a good knowledge of French and. a reading knowledge of Russia.no

·This requ~st is addressed to Czvalinns. at Marchstrasse 25 b on 27 March 1945 suggesting that the Branch O.frice Berlin vas

4not, or was not all .located in the Schiller­

strasse .11

Even less is known ot the Reporting Center Seifert (D1enststelle Seifert) than is knovn ot the Branch Office Berlin. The dlrectiive setting up the Bra.nch Office Berlin

110 .Ticom Document 240 item 34.

111 Ticom Document 240 item 14.

112 Tic'·om Document 240 1 tem 36.

113 Ticom Document 240 items 19 and 35.

114 Tioom Document 240 item 18.

47

•.• ' 1

DOCID "·'i 3486670 t/

•

--

&lso created the BeportiJlgCenter Sei.te:rt.115 8e1.tert remained the head ot. Main Section V and bad prev1o~alJ been th8 head ot the Jueterbog·Brancb ot the FA .. llb The. adm1n1strat!ve documents reve&l the assignment of various persons to· Settel't but there is no indication of the nature ot their duties. On 13 April an El'lla La.rigS (othe"ise · · · 117 unknown) and Liselotte Brott of FA 9 vere assigned to Sei:fert. On 20 M!lrch 1945 Specialiat·DR. Fingerhut vas assigned to · the Reporting Center .118 . . . .

10. 'l'he Liaison Ot"t"1ces or the FA. To assure liaison v1th other aepartments or tb8 governmental agencies Liaisc:in Otticers to the various departments vere set up~ The ott1e1als charged viththese reapansib1lit1es worked in the ministrJ to vhieh t}leJ vere assigned and vere 1n telephonic commun1-ca. t 1on _vith the PA (either with the Main Bureau, or, after it ha.d evacuated Berlin,, with the Branch Office .Berlin) .. :Liaison vith the Foiaeign Office (AA) vaa directed by Dr .. · _Gers tmeier, tm t vi th the Supreme Comm&nd of the ~med · Forces (OltW) by Dr .. llautsohke; that vith the Reic.h Main . . Security Otf'ice (RSliA) by Specialist with Eng1nee~1ng Diplom Scholz; tba.t with the Propaganda Ministry (JUl!VP) by Herr severitt; and tmt vitb the Economic JUn1atr1 ant\ llln1syn: ror liar Production (RWiM) b;y Speo1al1st Dr., H11~1gardtc i.~

· Dr·.. H1111pi'dt was replaced· on 1 April 1945 b:y Brieschke g

vho ha.d previously served as bead ot FA 12, to vh1ch seetion H1ll,igardt 11as assigned although not in an a.dminlatrative . eapa.cit7.l20 Details or the nature or thi"s liaison are known t:rom the interrogation or Dr. Jtl&utsebke vhose st&teme:ot follows:·

D.autscbke v&s the liaison off'icer(Ve:r,-bindungs­nabb} to OltW and also OXM~ OIL,, and OIH o Although a member ot tbs FA,, he b&d his of'f"ie~ 1n OltW... It vas.

115 ~1com Document 240 item 3~.

1i6 'l!1co~ Document 240. iteJ.Q 29 •.

ll7 'l':lcom Document 240 1tem7.

118 Tieom Document 240 item 35~ I 119 Ticom Document 240 item 3~·

120 ficom DocWll8nt 240 item 36 .•

48 /.J; .

DOCID: 3486670

. "'·e -

-~----

his Job to receive IjB.teria.1 from tbs FA and lJS.Ss it on to the section concerned at OKW -etc o At OIJil he supplied Keitel ·and various departments, for example VFST/Amt Gr Ausl, Feldvi:rstcba.f'tsamt, Atta.che AbteilUl'lg; AbVebr, and AWA.. At OltM besides Doen1tz be supplied · 3SltL and Ma.rineruestungswnto At OXL Milch, LY Fueh­rungssta.b I C, Chef Techniache L Ruest (Genamj. Dies­s1ng) • At Olm ·General Sta.ft" 1 Fremde Heere Vest arJd · Fre:mde Heere Ost. ·

There vere similar liaison otticers vlth the other ministries such as Dr. II1111gardt at Ruestungsmin1steriuB1 and Re1chsq!ra.tcbattminiater1um and Dr . . Gerstmeye~ wtth ·the Ausve.ert1ges Amt.

His liaison duties vere concerned solely with the passing or intelligence trom FA 'to OKV etc. and of' pa.rt1cula.r intelligence requests in the other direction. Aa :far as he lmev there ~as no liaison on c:z•ypta.nalytic

·matters betveen the tvo. Certe.1n raw material, however, which was not worked on a.t FA vas passed regularly to OltWu for e~ample military traffic. · When asked if his connection vith the OKV/ATT. Abt meant that the FA J&ndled attaebe ciphf!rs he said no, th&~ only tbs

- telephone conversations of their Allies• attaches in Berlin vere concerned. These vel'e mostly about their girl f'rieoos, and never · contained anything or illlport­anee because the attaches kDev the'J vere monitored a,121 .

· This inwrcept trai".tic furnished by the FA to the Signal Intelligence·Agene:y or the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces ~onst1tuted &bout 1/3 o~ all intercept coming to their C17l>t section.122 ·

121! 54 p li.

122DF 9 • . An Act1v1t~ Report ot the Signal Intell.igence Agenc1 of the Supreme Command ot the Armed Forces vas cap­tured 1n the Strub barracks near Berchtesgarden and eon-

. tained this 1.nrormat1on. ZIP/SAC/ Paragraph 10, p 3.

DOCID: 3486670

11. The Intercept stations ot the FA and its Regional Ottiees. !lie operational tUnct1ons of the .entire organl­za£1on were carried out bJ intercept stations or five differ­ent t7pes •. 'l'he.se · stations vere knovn as Forscbungsstallen ·

· .. and vere o&tego:rized as tollovs:

-- A

r •. r ·

--

;-- a _

---· ·

A Stations B Stations C Stations D Stations F stations

Telephone Intercept Wireless Intercept Radio Broadcast Monitoring Teletype and Telegraph Intercept Ma.11 Censorship 123

A 11st1ngor all' places at vhich FA installations vere or bad been maintained vith 1nd1cat1on or the nature of auch installations is included 1n Tab A 1n a.a tar &8 such a list can be determ1.D8d. ·

The A stations vere scattered all throuP;h GertllBny a1i4 · later in the occupied countries. TbBse ata.t1ons · vere equipped vith one or tvo interceptor svltehboards which enabled the opera.tors'.· to cut 1n on 8JlJ conver­sation at an7 time.. The tapping vas dons at the main telephone exchange ot the post ottice and piped directly to the station~ vhich vaa usually located 1D a private building. Included 1D the .At<Juipment of each listsning post vas a viret1pe recorder, vbich could be brought into use Mbenever des!:rred. ' ...

The operations ot the A stations unde~ent a change v1th the advent or the var. Prior to September, 1939, the telephone intereept stat1ons .vel'8 most valuable in providing intorms.tio.n from the maDJ' international lint'Js .'; then operating in Oernan7. Berlin, ot course,, bad a huge A station to . tap- the CODY~ra&t1ons or the diplo­nat1c coFps .. The caJ)i tal station bad a start or more

· ·. then a huDdred people, inclwU.ng 1°11"t7 to. sixtJ' inter~ ceptora. Atter var brola;l out, . thi;s source or infor­mation was completel7 eliminated and the .·A stations turned their attentions l.argel7 to the pz-oblems or

. var production bottlenecks, att1tudes ·otvar1ous large 1Ddustr_~es, am other domestic atraua 41

l.23IP 132 p 3. Tb1s intorma tion 1a presumably derived from . Schroeder and poasibl~ bom other prisoners not available to Tic om .•

DOCID: 3486670

----

. Tbe B stations were usually outside or tovns at points of good vireless reception, not being f'aced "With the problem or necessary proximity to telephone or cable lines.. Radio massages ve?'e intercepted by short vava and then were.relayed in vritten form to the headquarters ot the FA.· After var st&rted, this tJPB . of intercept became lncreasingl7 important !nsot'ar as l'ol'eign 1n­rormt1on vas concerned because or the end ot tale­phOnie commun1eat1on·.rrom German7 to other ~ou:ntries ..

. Only one c station ·existed. Thie performed a . pure monitoring service or public broadcasts ~om other countries. Tbe tµree D stations were located at Berlin, Vienna, and Dortmund, the ohiet centers of cablegrams leav1Dg Germat)J'. The :f'unctiona of the D stations :were also greatly d'iminished arter the cmtbrea.k of' the varo .The F stations vere or@!lnized srter Germn1 va.s at var

''and they vere naver vers ext.enstve in their oper&tions. Censorship offices vere opie1"a tad by OXW and la.ter . by the BSHA. The F stations consisted or snm.11 groups &tt&che<l to these censo:rship .posts.

, In 'addition to the stations ope:i.""&ting in Germany" . the FA was quick to' set up operational units .. in occupied countries. In Holl.and and :Pola.nd, -ror example, A stations vere installed by task rorce$ operat~g'Vith front line troops. In Vienna. an A station 11as functioning tvo days after the occupation. Both A and .B oft1eee were qule]cl7 estab).1sbsd in the Ba.llm.nsl' inBelgium, and in the.Baltic countries. In Dl.nzig a station had been · installed secretly even be.tore the anne.xationo Mobile 'lin1ts.'t!fere &lso used during the Polish campaign.but they are reported.to bave been largely unsuccessfU::l-A

4eh1e:fly

because or lack of' cooperat:ion .from.the army • .LG .

That the PA ws.s conoe:rned with.postal censorship ls eonfirnictd by document&ry:-evidence recentl7 made available to TICOM.125

1214 !bid. P&:rt ot thls inf'ormation is . confirmed by 1nterro.­gat1ons available to Ticom. Guenther, IF 46,, states that a. spec1al'G1ftkueche ror 'tapping the conversations or Nazi ot"fielals was loeat.ed in Berlin. 125-rF 29,,. see pp 12, 38, and Am.AaE 9.

· ... 51,'

DOCID: 3486670

.~•' ·--

A German publication, Die Ueberwaehung des 'Nacbrichtenver­kehl's im Kriege,' vh1ch provides for the censorship organ1:.. zat1on. to cover all forms or communication and gives*'.full details of the duties and respons1bil1t1.es., ls ava'-JAble • These . .regulations make careful d1st1net1o,n betveen pea.ce time, vhen the FA and the Gestapo a.re· specifically nflmed as active 1n censorship and time ot var vhen all censorship functions devolve on Abteilung .III of the Abvebr a The . regUlations provide considerable detail on liaison and eooper.-stion be.tween Abweh.r III units and tba FA and contain com.;. · plete directions tor fOl"fard1ng all pertinent information · obtained trom censorship to allp&l'tiea .interested. These censorship regulations are undated but it is presumptive th&t they vere drawn up before.the var as the .lbwehr is c~earl7 distinguished :trom the Reich kin Seourity O.ttice.

Oden .s~tea that there vere fro= 100 to 150 sets at th& Templin a.nd Luebben stations and hom 20 to 30 at Cologne, Konat&nz, Eut1n, and Gola.· Trarr1c was for­warded by cipher teleprinter, the T. 52, e,d, and e. The FA U$US.lly di~ not develop its ovn intercept equip­ment, using tb&t ot the Ar'f/I3. the Reicbspost, or in-

. dustZ.., exce.pt 1.n eases Vbel!e theJ felt the~ vere not getting vhat va,~. _'ilantttd .l2t> · .. .

. ID\Jigbt into the organization or the Regiona.l·Ofticea and Intercept Stations (ForschUngsleitstellen and Forschungs­stellen) has been derived f'rom the administrative papers found at X&utbeuren. In particular- an order or 26 Ja.nua.r1 · 1~5 closing dovn the Breslau Forschungsleltstelle is 1m­portant.l.2l Effective with close of business 26 Januar7, the Forscmmgsleitstelle Breslau and its subordinate · .. Forschungsstellen were closed. These Forschungsatellen were listed as f'ollovs.

Forschungsstelle . Forschungsatelle Forschungsatelle Forachungsstelle Forschungsstelle Forschungsste.lle Fors~hungsstelle

~~6I 25 p 9.

"A" Breslau vith "D" :runctions. "B" Breslau-Deutsch Lissa "C" Breslau-Deutsch Lissa "A" Litznitnnsta.dt (Lodz) "A" Kattov1tz (Katowice) ·n A" Posen . ( Posnan) . "B" Leba

127Ticom Document 24~ item 22.

52

DOCID: · 3486670

•• · .. ~::

--·

In addition, the Forschwigstelle ~A" Danzig vas .1nstruoted to move as quickly as possible to Berlin and unite with .the Forschungsleitstelle Berlin • . The · head ot Porschungsle1~· . stellC!J Br.eala.u vas relieved · and Sobm!dt was a.ppointe(l }lead . ot & °'closing dovn .section" or Forschungsleitstelle Breslau µi Berlin and 1nstrue.ted to send all personnel released f'rom dut1 to FA 3 tor reassignment o . (Specie.list · Niedermeyer~ · the relieved head. ot Forschtmgsleitsteile Bl'esla.uD was ap- .· pointed .chief" or start tor the J'ueterbog Bmneh or ,tbe FA on

. the same date and . on 9 MQrch he vaa made .he~ or the F<?J:$­chungsle1 ts telle Munich, entering on dut1 · on 20 Mar~b~ 4 i~8 . . The <ULrective tor the reorganization ot the FA at ltauf"beuren ot 9 Mareh .reveale.1 the existence of four Pors~ihungsle1 t .. · stelle~ ~t that time 9129 These vereg · ,

Forschungaleitstelle Berlin · .. - 5pec1al1at Thieme . Fo!-schungsleitstelle .Bamburg :.. · senior · Specislist

· < . Xlrb&cb: ..... Forschungsle1tstelle Vie~ - senior 5pecialist,eng1n ~

eering Diploma -Flalsch· · .mann '

Forschungsle1tstei1(t Jt;;.n1ch ·- specialist Jlfiede~eyer . . . , I

.As ma.1 be seen f'Jtom tba above, the FA regional of'tices lrere so located .a.s to pr.ovide area. coverage of' Germany 'and or · .Um ·

. occupied . countries· •. ·.The Brealau Forscbung8le1tstelle· covered Eastern Germany and Pol&nd. the Munich Porsehungsleitstelle

. cavered Southern Germany I tbs Vienna Fo:rschungale!tstelle covere"' Austria, the. Hamburg Foraehungsle1tstelle-:· covered Western -Germany (and possibly DenmarJCI and 'tbe Berli.D Fors.-. ebungsle1tstollt;l covered Central . Germa.n7 •. ·This monitoring . · service, part1c'1la.rly the telepho.nemon1tor1ng ("A") sta.tioris)p vas probably ch1etly .involved in liaison v1th the Abwehr and

. (later) the Reich Ma!D. Security Of'fice·., Unfortunately no details ot' tbe cbs.nnela tor this liaison and coope·ra.tion are knwn ... An order of ·14 April :i,945 gil~8- eviderice or the . Copenhagen and StettinForselnmgatellen~ j Onth1sd&te the Copenlsgen "A" Forscbtingstelle Md mOYed . f'rom its to:rmer location to N)'l'opsg&de 17/11. in Copenhagen. The nev tele­phone ia~r .is given as Pa.la.a 9469 extensions 35. 8, 9,, and 30

,"'' •:; "v • ~

128!riaom Ik>cument 2~0 1 tems. 34 ·&nd. ·35. 129T1oom Document 240 · item .34. ··

130'1'1com Document 240 item. 10.

-53

DOCID: '3486670 · .

,- •...

1 ·

-~-'a r. .•

and the "Arme<l Forces· liaison telephone" ia said to be un~ changed •. h.lae. ts. one of the central ezchanges in Copen-.

·.hagen ... The same order· stated tbat the Stettin "A" Fors- .· chungsstelle })ad moved to Grief'wa.ld, Ba.na.bof'f'strasse 16/47, telephone Griefvald 3307, on 29 March.. No strength figures tor these regional of'f'lces, nor ror the 1.ritercept stations, s.re available o A member or. FA-9.11 Fl'&u ~elene Gerta.,, vho _ vas uw1.ll,1ng to remain at Jti9.utbeuren attar. the first of May,, vas suggested: to .tbs personnel section as suitable for: employment at the Luebben intercept station .. Herquali:t'i­cations were said to include a knowledge or French and & reading <lmovl~dge or Russ!a.n ,.131· The existence of ·a. "D" ·. · station (telegraph and cable intercept) in. Berlin 1$. con- · firmed by a request trom this Forschungsstelle tor the tor-. warding address of FA-9 at_Xau1'beureno Thii

3~quest reveals

t~t the Berlin 19UJ.tion was designated D-2. · . ·

12. Persons immed. as member.a of tbe FA or· concerned with lt but not aesimble In lts organization. ?Inail:y :tliire . remain to·'be menoneCl several parsons-vfiOse names have. been

. associated with the FA but whOee connection can not be definitely explained either·v.ith tba above expesition of the histor1 or of

· tbe organization. · ·such persons fall ·into tvo cat;egories.P apparent members or tbe FA.and o.f'.tic!als o~ other.prgsniz&tions Mcipienta or FA material·or concerned vith its operations. The ce.ptured telephone·direetoey or tbe:FA is the chief' source of. tbe names 1D11olved~: ··In- thia directory a "Beeker" is · ~rried as "RJ.Jli/FA/V/3" •and a "s.enior _specia.11st. Boettger" is given as m19rel1 "RIJJ/FA" but ·their names are otberv1se urumovn,,

. A man b1. the name of "Kell" is given a~I · 99Research Of'.tice: Al/2 Bet'lin~ Exploitation Center (RLM/FA/AWXoptJ" and is presur;ia.bly a membeJ> ot the Berlin Fol'sohungsleitat;elle. . One other ,man 11 1,na.med as a member of. the FA in -pri~oner !nter• :rogations~l3,.. This-18 tm_tol"l4f1r Austr1an·el'Jptanal7st, Rudolf B&1lov1c • Ba1lov1c vas a member ot the AustrifUl · Cipher section betore the Anachlus and retused ·to· S\IR9ndf3r. the ke7a o~ bis departmantto tbe Nazis at thetime or the Anachluss~ He vas relegated to~ minor position· in the 13ltrt.com Document 240 1 tem 18.

132!1'1.com Document 240 1 tem ~8.,.;

13~ - . 4' · '"'JD 22; Ticom Doc. 2 9 1 found at Berchtesgaden.

l34I 8~, I 118. IF 126.

DOCID: 3486670

•

Austrian civil service but Generals Fellgiebel and The1le brought ·him to Germany to emplo1 his services as a cryptanalyst~ Be is said to have worked for the FA tor a rev months when he quit the PA and was then employed with the Signal Intelligence Agency or the f!.,rmy High Collllldnd and fin8lly at the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces as head or a section dealing with Balki'!n traffic. Towards the end of the var he is stated to have served more as an administrator than as a cryptanalyst. He is further said to have lived a quiet life with his v1te,making no concealment of his strongly anti-Nazi views and refusing to wear German decora­tions when in uniform. In view of the attested strong anti-Nazi views of Bailovic it seems possible that his short association with the FA (where,,1nc1dentally,the nature of his duties a:re unlmovn) vas due. to the"Nazi.taint" of Goering~s organization. Finally the iderlt1ty or one other or the members of .the Re1chewehrm1n1ster1uma Cipher section who vent over to the FA upon 'its creation has been discovered. In.the correspondence or the Austrian Cipher Bureau, f'ound amoitlg the archives of the Signal Intelligence Agency or the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, is a letter from the vell Jcnovn Austrian cryptanalyst Andreas' Figl Wl"itten upon his ret1re­·ment to his friends and collaborators in Germany.*The letter refers to members or the Re1chswehl'm1n1ster1um(c1pher section) who: " have aided in establishing todays collaborat1on:Messrs v .. Buschen­bagen and v. Rezniczek". _,.. pencilled note after v .. Rezn1czek states "now with FA "

. .

In th.e second category or recipients of FA material are Koerner~ Secretal')' of State in the Prussian State M1n1stry,vho has been ident1f'ied previously as controlling the .FA finances;Principal Specialists Drape and Legler or the Prussian State Ministry and

, connected vith the Four Year Plan; in the Air Ministl_7'10olonel Bokelbu:rg,Group Leader or the Monitoring Department (RLM/Z.A./uEW.Ao ), General der Flieger Bodenschatz,Head of the Office or Ministers, Lt.Gen. v. Doering,Group Head or the Equipment Department,Field Marshal Milch,Secretaey of State for Air and Inspector General of the G.A.F.,and Colonel Simson,Counnandant of the Air Ministry. In the Re1chss1cltlerhe1thauptamt Schellenberg 1a given as head of Amt IV and the names or Lt. General of Police SS Gruppentuehrer Mueller (head ot the Oeatapo),Sen1or S::g)ec1al1st Bock,55 Obe:rsturmbanntuehl:-er,,Head ot the State Police Central Office in Berlin,and"Krim.Komm" Ebeling,SS Obersturmf"ueh:rer of the State Polee Central Office Section IV N. Two members of .the Reichs~st are also included in the directory, Postrat Bormann ,head of work connected with service matters"(RPZ/ We-E),~ Principal Specialist W'1chmann,Head or the office of . m1n1sters'·and Department VII ot the Re1chspost.

* D 74,, p. 17. This item was brought to. the writers attention after the completion of the pa.per.As it is believed to be significant evidence it has been inserted here. Neither the name of v. Rezn1czek nor D 74 appear in Tab A.

55

DOCID: 3486670

•

VOLUME .7 ·

.. · Cha.pte~ ·Ill .., Evaluation · ot the FA . . . ·. .·. .· . . . . .· . . . . . . . . p &r&g,l"&J?h .

· Et.fectiveness of' the FA and 1ta liaison with othel' . ·· . c~tologic and intelligence e.gencies in .the ·. ·

op1n1one ot varioua high 1fa.z1s o • ~ • ·• · o " o .. o · l3 . a. Op!liion of' Jodl, · Chlet or Armed Forces :\

Opera tio!;).a s tarr. · · . · .· . . . b. Opinion· o~ X.ei tel, Chief ot . Armed .Force a. . c.. Opinion ot Doeni tz, Grand Admiral . an.cl · j~-- --- -· · . Re1ehachanoello:lt. . · . · · ·

· d .• · Opinion.- ot Ribbentrop, FoF91gn M.in.1ster., . . S· ~ · opinion ot Goering, Field Marshall and Air.' - - --. --. · · M:tn1s ter · ·· t. ··opilion attl'ibuted to J!itler.

·Extent or Liaison at· operational level between ·~ll~ )~~ - .·. , . anc other signal il'itelligence agencies .. . . · ~ , ~ ~, · ; ,v.t. ·a. Liaison vitn the Signal lntelligenc.e., ,A\8~~9.~f 9,.~ · e

. the : Supreme · Coimnand of the Armed Forces~ . . · . ·• . b~ .. Li&±aon v1th · the Sj_gnal Intelligence ~~n~~ '.:<#.

the Army High Cormnand o . · · •· · . · · . .

· c. Liaison vi th the Signal. lntell1g~n~e; .A.@~~:.t q~ th~. A1r Poree H1gh Command. . . ·': .· · · · ~ -

d. Liaison vith the ·s1gnal . Intelligence ,AgeJ).~Y ·Qf the Navy High . Co~. . · : ... ·. -· · '"' , · ·

. !Ba. Liaison with the Foreign Office. Crypt~J.it1~ Section. . ·. · · · · · · · · ·' · ..

Pinal Evaluation of· the . FA . . . .. . . .. .. .. ••• 15

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. • :t, Pro~ th~ ~cc~vnt ~!~~rt! ~;~£Qwe ~ . ·~t ~~ -O'i~Wi<,.u.~ ·tr~t tJ:le '~-" r~.*~1~ea ·& .vast amoWl~ pt;-~:t.~:r4al1 ·p~o.eee~ed :· 1~~ ,-·~ ·:·

: p0.t1ifee~· :tt. ·on .~ tt}}®.ll : P..eX-sdn.~ ~hoi coµla . ~ u3e ot . . it'. ·Th.le . . . . · actu~l ·.· t-~o®t :jif. _·eooP,el'°&tlan .~t:tye~n_: the·· lf!A ' ~ :'th~ S1ir.o.a.l

· -~ ~te1::u.~~e.e 1..gsncy _of the . · ~U;preme ,.Commim.d ·:of -~® . ~c · . . · . fo~~e~~. th~.>~~i~l· · . Iiiitell1e~nce .. A$~n~y . ot.' .. t.ne ·•.~1·.~.JI18~>· · . .. ' Co~e;~.& : :~hie,; .. :·si.~~i 1n~e111~ence · _A;ge~cy _or· ~e · AJ.~£9~~~ ·: .. ··

· . R,1@. :~~~~ii' ~.ne Si~sl ~~~ll~ge~q~ · :Ag~cy . of t~e ·.:mavy. · -High: ·c9~~j: ~cl :.t!)fFCi-.YP.tW'~~yt1.c • Section ct ~: ~:f'qrej~ .

. Otf'1ci~ ~ 1~v -fi1.f.fj:cult· · , to est.lOOt~ ·~ . Too ~tat®ments .· o:f .in,... • .-.· : d:i.-vi~U$1a· :.e~1.?~t1 ·:.~. :t1J'.e- .11~1ous . Ql!genci~s . '~·. ?>~~~]#e•t.'-i .· . ·det.eat1st< in ::~one: but ·this. iG ~ li'ttle . Ci11!Se fo~ tr.onde.l.;,;~ · '.·.FA P~.r.~rq~e~~ c_omp_lii~ _:that · .. t~e;f-. k'a~v:· .notbiM, or:, .the~# ·:~j~.~~- · · ••

· tio,n&:J.; :; 90.µnt.e~~pt,~ in:·tAe:· o_thar ; ~encieB ,~d :p~FS:Q~:~ · :biJ. . _the · o·t}Wre<~n¢ies · rai~ed : t~ ·.~ co~l~t 2xid> CM~g~ :'·

.-.. t~.t ·t.pe~.,FA _'nir~~·: :pe'culi~ii ~xcluij111s: oot1: s:tanu.;.;o:ff+sh. ·'in :: · .... . 1~0·· Nli%ti,"one ' ~it;4.- them~ .. Y¢.~ ®~$tiei1 ot &.citiyi;t;t< .. '.·: . ·

,.repplr·t.s~ :'!i~arly: .. ret)e~s:_;; c~p-ture4. woic>lt. books;~~ ' ~~o·~~~a. . . reve:~l -.~i·~~tiv@.: ~~eh~~ bp.t~een e\~~ . tiie . ,?:®1l.e.~.t ·.oJrie~~ · ·· it:Lnt 'S~etio~:.i;;f' _. tecr..ni~al · <i21'~i · eoo~~ti~·:. $ita_:~ s~~i.rita: · . . of.· as$igt\m~t,s~>~"(J.• exci~~ of .p~1~8.o.nnol~ . :>· : .· ::-:/· .-_ '.,''.;' · ·

, •: .'1 • .... ~ • •· ,', • ; • ' :- • • '•. I .' .. • • : • • • • .' •1." ' ;.

. . . ::·~ ·. : ·.: : : : ; ..• : ) ~ ~ . \' .. ... · .. =. ~ . · .• ~ : . '.. . . : . • . : . • . • . . . •' . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . '· - • .

, ':.: : ··At: :·fie Jrl.ghest lev~l .'qf: the ~~.z.i ·Reich .the.~~ · ~- . : .. . . ap:pi'~i~is/~i<.lll. o.£ the. v11,lua . o; · ~i~54. :Kntelll$e~~< ~(f1 , ~t.

times ···~· · ~u~p~ls:lng k1Jowledgitf of : te~hxdc~l· ~·~~~1~ ·-~·.~~: .. ·: · avcil'.!~"ttoti 'of: .. the ' ttet:i·ou.S . ~encie~ 0 ... : uene:i?~l.:,; ·.:o~ra:t<> .·· . •.

· Jo~l·~ : Cl:ii~<·ot '~4 F.¢~ceflil· ;;Opet>&tiqiia Sta!f.; ·a~~ · Ad0 · .

mi-r~r Doeiii:t&'» · Co~rl~ir' 1~ G~~f of:" . t-h~ · ~3~~iy .··~a .. '~~~~· ··. · R~ich~e.himeell¢1\~ : . '11.~l~ ~ah&ll, . ~ital:~·· ::c~~t, ' o~'<:'t~· > .· .. · =~~~t;:=~1~~-~;!~~::;~;g!~;~~ ~~:~~is-~:::~r:~

1~

te~tim;Q~;J. ' ~1( s~izett in the follow~ _pG;l\r~aj>~; ·.; '. ·

. .. ·i:;?l;~.~·4;·~ ~,-.~:~·: fut~~~-68~~o~~ ; atat$4~;t.h~t ·'·:n,~11 : ~ti~<~~i)~~~~-~ · · · . with~ 1~he ... $$teepti.on .fjf :•f"1bl)e~t~p~ · .. ~~pp~r~d:· '.Witi~-, t:9 ..• ~~~e~.

· .' t~ .:~~4(_be~t.· ~f : the~i~ .abilltt tP,~; Q.~eatjl;oo.a, pu~ ·,tc,: t¥BG~ :··-:, : :tt · .. ·· ··.· W$$ ;.c:teQ. to ,tlw inte~roga.tor~ t11$t· f,hS _ -.pioieo~r~ivf~ .· t.hG· ·. ·

.• . ·s,~h.)e,c;t . of" ·; .s~als :·til~.~111gen~e • .$ • ..;~·~i_c~ ···~1~e~ :··~3~.F't~t · · -:t9 ,, that of : ~~~pq.nB1.°Q4l.i~Y< ;foJLll 'WQ? :· _c~~s~ · ~t :mµ~.t <'b~ :,}oo:rme· / ·, fri ':~d. · that>th.esl6. :.tilte~.i>og&tiona. JNtQ.tdted. & · ·$:oij!ev)la;t 'dit~ ··

.. ·· · · ~te~nt ~l.1~:. t~OTii ~- ·p:r~y~gu~ no~ :ox . !l'~e·omfpr§c~:(lU~~. : · ·· Be~au131e . of- the.· :Potential -. oocur.ity dsnge~ ~ren.~ . in : tn;,·;~. · .

. }· t61'::~hco~: w~. :. ~ilt ; .tri~ls~ .· :Wliel1 .~·:t¥3e:. mqn ?;il~ .. J1i ·pu~r·. ·.li..oly .... ~~P.~~~ut~9·;~.; tr:1~1 .. speu t~o~ -.~he: b~~~ ·:it. va~:; !!ti-- . :

. . . ~o-~.~ible :; ·~o fixi>l.o~~ : th:em : tQ • ~h~ f'U~l--~ ; , W~'Y · -~~t:S..e~~ ·. ·· · .. : lead#J 1r .. ~hti:i:: . :~:.:~o ..• pe .. neglec-~~~ by :.tA:e·· intex>p~~ .. t~Jr~~.: . · ·.

• . .... ···/ 7· . . ·• :,::.··· ':.' -~. ,;::·: · .: ·' i:- . : . :·.. : . ~: : •. . ·... . ·. .. .

. : \. '· . . ~ . ·~ :~; . . ' . . ... . : .. ·.. ':( . : • . . ., . ;• . ~ -.. ·. : .. · ; ... :

.51

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·.Ji

DOCID: 3486670

a. Jodl recailed V&l'1ous sp~cifi~ successe'sJI among·· · them iii.formation derived .from an American official in CA.i:ro 1n 1942 whose meaaages vere read by a. German Army intercept unit 1li Italy vhich stopped vhen the key changed and mess­ages from Harrison in Berne which he .attributed to the FAo J'odl did not know the names of any cryptanalysts a.no. vas unwilling to d1scrim1nate betveen the work of the burea~ ­

He knev ot ·the Foreign Office bureau and described the. FA · as large and eft1c1ently organized but 91Goering' s special · a.ftair." He :received copies ot FA results which were selected for him rrom a larger amount of such FA reports

. by Keitelo

b. Keitel knew veey little about th~FA beyond the tact tha.t it was "the th11'4 eolilpetitor" vhose so-called Brown· reportsn he .used to receive. He "vaa never · able to fathom the apec1el and rather mysteriou~ selection vhich had been made specially for him; it appeared to h1m to be .on anorrat1c: and .1rrat1ons.l baa1a. 0 Xeitel. hoped .that ther.e ~d been ·

· adequate liaison· ·and remarked that Goering a.ud Ribbentrop had been ·eompletely ~t any suggestion o:f a combined intelligence agency (and admitted that he himself' would have been reluctant to give up .his own agencies) o •· · . . .

. .. . .

c • . Doenitz was much more familiar with the activity of the Ba~ Signal Intelligence Agenci. .He knew of such ceypts.nalyt1a details a.a "depth~ .and kQy cl~ea". He knew the names. of several of· the leaders of the, ?lavy organi­

. zat1on but ·oenied receiving the reports of any other organi­zation and knew very ll ttle. about them. · . . .

cL Ribbentrop vas describ~d as .!;he most d1.f.ficu1t o.f the prisoners to "prime" for talking on the subject of signal intelligence. It was very hard to. reduce the statements of .his jLnterrogat10ll to cohe~en1? form. However, Ribbentrop stated that when he took over the ·M1.n1stry of Foreign Atta1ra 1n 1938' he discovered that pract1ceJ.ly nothi.ng existe<i.

·a the vayof a political intelligence organ.1.zat1on a.nd that nearly everything was 1n the band.a or the . lfehrmacht and SS · 1Armed Porces-Abvehr?-and Elite Gaurds). He atated that .

. thi~ vaa lallf'ortunate beeauae everything went to Hitle~. and there was no clearing house. 0 It seems clear that Ribbentr'op was &t first talking about "political intelligence" as some-

: tll1.ng distinct from signal intelligence as the subsequent statements concern cryptanal.ysia and it may be assumed that

58

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DOCID: 3486670

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I>' ___ _

I .

he had discovered w~ere the interests of his interrogators lay. · He . knev that ·· the Foreign Office Cryptanalytic Sec- · tion Pers ZS was under Herr Selchow v~o had been engaged 1n this 11rork during the first world var.' He did not know the details ot the organization but .he stated that Selchow . ril1a1sed closely vith the RLM/Forschuiigsamt, tho organi­zation vhich produced the 'Brown Reports. He sav between one and three or these Brown Report decodes everyday and

·remarked that 1n general the PA .pl'oduced their decodes more quickly .thari ·the Foreign Office but their texts ve::re far lesa clear and "tended to be inaccurate•" The FA · "covered ·precisely .· the same .field as Pers ZS &rid there .was unfortunately almost complete dupl1eat10.n. 11 vhicl.1 he believes he may have once tried to . correct ana also coordinate in­telligence activities in general. He stated that Selchov maintained a "lieJ.son on technical matters with Ollf/Ch1 and probably compared notes . with them·t! and _believed . that there wassome ,sort or "tecluUca1 exchange between OKW/Chi: &ri.dthe Porschungeamt" • . His reason . tor f&1ling to s.chi~ve ·. eoor<11n-a tion o.r intelligence services is of' interest: '1as the system 1n .roree vas ~or .. everyone to.· go .p,rivately and cllrectly to Hitlero it va.s scal'cely vorth trying. · By comparison Keitel recalled that Ribbentrop was exceptionally jealous it anyone gave 111 t ·ler a diplomatic decode directly instead o-f passing 1 t through the . Po:r•e1gn Of't1ce. ·

' . . . .

e. Goering vas of course fulsome in his praises or the FA and has been cited 1n considerable detail for 1ts history . and accomplishments. He stated · that he . did not control the work program or the cryptanalyats alld thererore should not . be expected to lmow too much technical detail although he mentions the use of · spec~ ial cipher keys::. or a change of key when something 1mporta.nt was happeniiiS~ · Specific examples recalled by Goerillgvere the "messages ot · thc American .Minister 1n Berne n ·and the "Japanese Ambassador in Berlin . repo:rt1ng home." · In the matter or liaison he sts.tedthat the FA did not deal .with purely Ciilitary trattic which was handled by the bureau of the Army, Bavy end Air Fore.a v1th whom the FA maintained liaison and exchanged int~rcepted · tratfic.

He knew tl1at· the Fore'lyi Off'ice · ~· the 51gnal Intelligence _Agency of the .SupreJlle Command of the Armed Forces also ·worked on civil ·. c'iphere arid th&t there vas a veey close liaison with the Poreign Office to •void unnecessary dup-lleat;lon. · ·. · · ·

.. . 59 ..

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DOCID: 3486670

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i~ H1 tler' s opinion or · s1gnal intelligence is mentioned< by' both Goering and Ribbentrop and the opinion expressed le completely divergent at first glance. Ribbentrop stated:

Hitler m..d a queer, rather particulal" v~ev about 1t-he did not l~e - this type ot intelligence very much and said' it. vas unreliable and otten ;mislead1ng, it was better to · uae one 's ovn common sense.~

Goeri.ng, havever~ declared that:

Bitler' s viev of the products of the Forse:ll1lllg8S.Jllt . . vas that they were very reliable; the mater18ils :baQ _to . be presented tactually to Hitler v1th no . ar~nt nor . &ppreciat1on, only . the . verbatimcoriver.sa~i9n or.act.ual te)tt. · ·

Goering's .'.remarks came . in a context vhere the teleph9n~ _ mon1tor1Dg ~d broadcast _monitoring act1v1t1.e_s or · ~e ,A · were .. cle~iy in hie mind. . . In connection vi:th d.tp;Lo~tig d~codea Goerin6 had previously- remarked that: ·

The intelligence resulting f":s:-om aecoqed telegram~ . · .· waa no~ always usetul, ·they oi-ten cQDs1sted ot absolute

. rubbish; the . extent . to which the ~mbera .f:>~ . the dip];o­matic eor:Ps spread and .· retailed f'antastic ~:rs was

, surprising • . lie himself had often me.de arrangements to ·have 1-1..uuors .plantedand v1th1n .afev days _he" observed · them bo1ng ·ps.ssed on and spreading. ·

Ribbentrop's -remarks about the' opWon or Hitler V8l'e imined1 .. a~ely p~ceded by discussion ·of ·diplomatic decode~ exclusively. · It 1~ l1kely ·that · H1tle:r _uaa familiar with FA res~ts f'rom . the period before the w~r~ . Keitel refers to an· .untortunate · instance of' iurrma..e:r passing a single _message to Hitler with­our coll&tlng it &~st otht)r .1nto~tion and stated .that . Hitler had .. his <>vn 1·1a1son o1'~1Qers to each agency 1il. &n'Y case·.

· . . 14. · Extent of liaison !t the · operational ievel bet~e-en . the FA and other signal liite 1lsence Hencies.. At : the . opera"."' · tionil !evel It is possible to reconszc:act as&t!sfactory · picture of llai~on and cooperation between the FA and the

·. ' . . . . . . .

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DOCID: 3486670 \

other signal intelligence agencies. In many cases the . personnel ot the other . agencies express opinions and pre­judices or repeat rumors about the FA vhieh can be pos·1-

. t1vely refuted or revealed as prejudice a.nO m1s1nf"ormatlon" Much or the evidence for FA success lJas .been ·derived·trom the archives and records of the .other orge.n1zat1ons~no trace ot the official archives or the FA has been round. The, picture so reconstructed shows active and detailed

, cooperation, its details are set out 1il the following · par~aphs and 1n the listing o·f FA successes in the appendix.

' . a • . Liaison between the Signal Intelligence Agency of the ~upreme Command ot the Armed F.orces (OlOf/Chi) and the PA is known to have existed. A special liaison officer of the FA vas a_asigned ·to the Supreme Command Qf the Armed Forces al- ·

. though not to : the Signal Intelligence . Agency. .. This man.I' · · · know from the Xautbeuren directive, · wa3 Dr • .. 10.autsCbke,, end he h&s h1mse-lf' testified 'on the form which his ·.liaison ·· took the ' i"orm of_ passing .intelligence to· the Su:;;>reme · Comma.na and ansvering specif'ic req:uesta from tliem.- .He did no·t con­cern h1mselt with el'yptanalytic matters and states that liaison ·on these matters .did not ex.1.stol.:>o As has been: amp·ly documented in the sections of this paper deal~· with the early history ot .the. FA considerable 111 .fe·~liilg . existed between the FA and signal. ·.Intelligen.ce --~~ncy ot the Supreme ·. Command of the .Armed Forces orypta.nalysts. Instructions to ' · exclude the FA trom Foreign ottice &nd Defense .Ministery

·· . Cipher Section cooperation" rei"erences ·to 111 feeling by · Fenner for Sch&pper,p _and re1'tisalof Signal Intellige~ce Agency of' the ,Supreme . Command of ·the. :Armed Forces IBM .·. developmenta to t.."'ie FA have · been Mentioned. All of . these cases -ca.n ·be derived f'rc;>m the ·111 reeling ~tveeri _Scha:pper

·arid F~Joner~ . It seems eleal' that intercepted traf'f'ic vas · exchanged,, indeed tho Activity Report o~ the serv1-ce organj_.­zation, aign~d by Xettler., the head, .shovs that one third

. ot 8:11 mtero.ept I'eceived by the S~l Intelligence Agenc.y 1

_7 of . the Supreme . vommand or.·· the Armed Force.s came trom the FA o ;;

Mettig refers to attenJPtS of the FA to take over the bro,adcaet

l:36see above par&o 5 and er 154~ l37DF9

DOCID: 3486670

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monitorin8 of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the,Sup~eme Co:mmand of the Armed Forces.138 The unvillingness of' the­Signal Intelligence Agency or the Supreme Command of the Armed_ Forces to give up their monitoring is understandable but in view of the 1...""1.terest _-a.ncl activity or the FA 1n th:ts field it would seem tJ.?.at the duplication.was unnecessary. In Security matters there wa.s a.n effort at coo;peration; · Kroeger. the cipher machine Cr'JPtanalytic expert of the FA was a member of Huet t'en.~s cipher security comm! t te,e a.no

- Huettenhain knev enough ot. his activity to explain that he was Unable to·&ttend ,all.meetings· because his section had m~ved to Breslau. It should be n9ted that the FA~ as run­ning .:tta own communications,, was in a· position to ignore Huettenhain and _the v1111.ngness to have a pel'm&Ilent member or· the commi_ttee may, be accepted a.s -a symptom of willingness to cooperate. Fina.lly a typical example ot ignorance or the FA

·may be cited. Fricke; of the Signal- Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of. the A.med Forces .P was told that_ the FA employed over 2000 people a.nd remarked: "For thei:r de­ciphering they.should h&ve needed a handful. ~ey must have had other work to dg but wlla.t the devil could they have done with 2000 people~ ''l.:>9 _ _ · - -- _ _

b. As 1n the case of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command or the Armed Forces. crypta.nalysts of the Signal Intelligence Agency or the ArmY High Cor.mnand vere ·not too well·illo:rmed ·on the· organization or operations of' the FA. However,, it is evident that-co.tisi.derablygree.ter liaison existed betveen the FA 6.p.o the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Al"IDY ll1gh Command than had existed betveen the FA and .the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme ·Command . of the Armed Forces. Thia liaison took the tomn of actual division or tasks and sharing of personnel as vell as l_iaison over IBM developments. Vl"..at vould appear to have been one of the most i.mportant cryptanalyt~o achievements of the PA is_knovn only from the testimony or _Bilggisch ot the SigJ?.al Intelligence Agency ot the Al'mY High Command who testifies (and the infor­mation was so important that two interrogations refer to tns subject although.in considerably less detail than might be

1381 . l3l See above para. 5 .

1?91 20.

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DOCID: 3486670

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desired) that the FA was able to break and N&d Russi~ telet~ tr&ffic.140

140 . ,, . ·1 64 p 2 ~ Buggioch heard 111 1943 ths.t the PA had. claimec1

some success on a Russian teletype machine and had' recon­etru.cted the machine. · It was a machine vith a very long cycle being not prime but ·theproduct of' several .smaller . cycles-like the sz 42 . . Bugg1s·ch did not know the cycle of. all or the individual wheels or ·eJ>,y other· details. He heard ·this ·rrom Doering . ~ho was · ~hen doJ.ng hia research on th,, . T ~2 bu.t liaison vith FA vaa bad anyway {.M&jo?:" Me:ttig was . particularly opposed· to the SS taint) and the next :ne heard was th&t .the traf'fic found by the FA had stopped •. Buggisch remembered only ·that .the c~·cle of one 01: the· wheels vas 37·; the o~hers he · thought varied · widely, from 30 . to So~ ~' Thia . testimony · 18 · adJn1 t tedly at second hand vhere 1 t ·. concerns' .the . conatruction -of . the Russ1a.n. machine o · However JI the 1nd1- · · cat:J.on thatMet~iG d~strusted the FA because of.an as taint . is or ·. j,nterest 1n evaluating h1a . evidence quoted previously . Bugg1aeh vas . questioned a second time on vha.t spectl'ieall~/ · "vere the results o~ the PA, mentioned 1n. connection vith

·. Russian cipher teleprinter" and 'his . ansver reveale · ad.d1-tional l1a1sonbetveen · the Signal Intell1gen~e . J\gency C)f · the.· Army High Command .. and the FA~ I 176 . p 6·: . ·.·· "Th,e PA . .

(Jt'orschlJ.ngsamt} bad analysed a Russi&n cipher te.leprinter . · · system in 1943 and rec9gn1zed . t~t 1t must have 'be.en based .· ·on a •Chine having certe.in similarities ttith the. Geriian

sz· 40 o After a short tirie the Rus31&n8 alt~red the system .. The FA then eo:mnu.nlcated i:ta results to. my unit and vas· given aa a kind of recompense a report on the solution or a German ·cipher· teleprinter. Th!e was one ot the veey rare eases ,.rhere FA and In· 7/VI exchanged results. · I did not study the FA results at that time,; as I was not responsible f.orvork .on cipher' teleprinters. and hence can give no detailso

. At a1'l events · the Russian: machine (just as 1n the Ge1'1n&n types · sz 4o~ SP ·42. but 1n cC>ntl'ast to .T .52 a,b,c,and d)gava only 32 dU'ferent substitution .. alphabet&j, the· succession ot which became periodic only · at.ter an ·astronomically large number. ot steps • . Thia succession. was given·. by a sy$tem o:r pin. vbeels, the peripheries or which were pri.-ne to each other and at an estimate lay between 30 and 90. In any case. there was no complieat~d mutual .intluf)nce ot

11 the· pin wheels on each other

· (as t:or example in · the T· 52 D) •

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DOCID: 3486670 ·

P~~ -..

. ._,,;· .... ; .. _, .... . ; :•, . . -·-

There .is yet another example ot FA liaison with the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army ·High Command on Russia~ Lt. Schubert, the 'officer 1.ti charge of the section or the Army High. Command Signal Intelligence 8el'v1ce on the Eastern Front responsible tor agent traf't1c, reported that the · . Radio Defence Corps (WDV/Pu) sent Specialist Wenzel or the ·

. FA to vork v1th hlm'on Polish Resistance Movement Traffic.141 In' the dase of Turkish diplomatic traffic (the specific system is not known) collij)lete cooperat1on 1s :revealed. 'rne FA · gave ·the Signal Intelligence Agenc~ of the Army lll.gh Command tlle ma1:1on of covering . and reading all traffic~ ... Traffic ''vas 1ntercep~~d by . Xona· 4 and relayed to In 7 /Vl; referate of. Bailovic. · .42 Onl~ decoded messages vere · . fUrnished .to · the PAa T'4e. Signal Intelligence Age~c·y-' of t.he . Al'my lligh · Command took the lead &!Dong the Gennan a.gelici~e in the development and appl1eat1on or~ machinery. to . ceypta.nalytic vork. This maehineey .vas ma.do avail~ble to the at.her ·: agencies. Tranov, ot the Signal I.ritelligence · Agency of the Navy High Command stated; . · · ·

. . . . .

. ~ .·· . . ": .·Ab~~t March 1942 we ·pa1d .. a visit, in .conjunction, .. : ·. '.with the German .Air Foree and the FA$ to the OXR .

" Hollerith .department: 1n Berlin_p . Vi.ct~r1astra3se. o lli3

This ls . in marked ci:>ntrast t :o the poli.cy ot the SJ,gn8.l . Intelligenc~ ·.ASency or the · Supreme Coman.d· of' .. the, Armed Forces · ~eported by Huettenhain and cited· above~ · ·Aaomevhat peculiar reference to the .errect of the creation of' . the FA on 'the ·c1pher section or the . Defence Ministry by.personnel or the .· Signal Intelligence Agen~y (Jf the .·A'rmY Rish command

. -needs .no dis·cussion as 1.t can not be determined whether the Defe~se 1Mili1stry or the. Signal.lnteli1Sf3nce Agency . .: . . ·. . . .

.. · . . ·. ,.

!;ll~ Siciions; :~6~~ ~he d18~Ufision under \ienzel 9 s section

i42u. ·12e; .' p a~ · See f"u.rther d·tseU.~s1on 6f D i26 in note 145 · followi.Dg. .

i 43I 146 •

. ' ........ ~..:. ... . --.... ,:, :.:.. ,, ,, .

. . ' '•<-· .. . :· 1. • . • • • • ·. •': - ..

.. ·:.:;: • t .. .. . · : ·, · .,. \ ,·

. ',• ..

. ··· ·· 6'4' . . .:: -::

... ·.· '.:, ·.:.: . •:. ' · ~ .

. . ' . . . ; .-:. . ,•'·' ·. ·.··

._,. . ·. '

•

DOCID: 3486670

~.·

of the Arn1Y4H1gh Command are involved and.the. mean1ng is

ambiguous. l 4 ·. An equally unverified. statement· by· two former members of the Signal Iil.te·llJ.gence Agency of' the Army High Command declared that: ·

OXH In 7/vI wo~ked for the FA 1n the field of diplomatic codes (f'o,r instance, they b?>oke the Turkish. · code vhen the FA V&$ ;}laving tl!"Ouble 'f'J'ith it.) .FA received reports from the Signals Intelligence Evalu­ation. section of' the Army.High. Command .from the Navy lUgh Command, trom the.· An.11ecr Forces High . Command and from the Fol'eign Office .1~5 · · ·

l441 85 p ). FlickeJPokojewsk11

and H&tz~" b) the expansion ·.of OEH/Chi. As a result of the. si.tue.tion created by .the advent. of the FA, General Schliecher., in the summer or .. 1933» began to la~ plans ror the expansion·or OKH/Ch1.· This· in valved the ae~ting up ot three new ste.tlons· "." to cover Cz.echoslovakia. ana ·the Balk&Da ~ Progress was . very slow •••• By July 19}9 the necessity ·for intercepting Czech traffic ha.d ceased a.nd it vasdec1ded to place the .inter­ception of diplomatic t.ratt1c under OKW; just createdo" It is barely possible that this reveals a. d1vis.1on of labor under which the ·n OXH/Chi" group vas· to cover ·the Balkans diplomatic .. txwaf'f'ic. while the FA concentrated Ol'l; commer-cial tratfic •. This hypothesis.might·aecount tor.the Turkish diplomatic traffic handled by the Signal Intelligence Agency

· of the Army lligh Command although Rentschler, IF 15, claimed FA success vith "high grade Turki~h D1plomat1cer but he · cites .. no date o · i'he only C:z;ech commercial traffic of Skoda,

. claimed fol' 1935 by Sauerbier, IF 162 o ·Such a division seems unlikely., hoveverR and Paetzel, in I 25, mentions Bulgarian,·Yugoslav6 Hungarian and Greek traf.fic worked on by. the FA.

l451p 105 B. This ~epor1;.P and IF '126,, are b~sed on inter­rogations of l!einz B.oscheJ.nen arid Walter Xotschy~ IP 105 B .· is a special PW interrogation carl'ied out by a ·us T'.a.ird . AFmY Signals o:fticer. The cover letter of' tb4s of'!'icer's·

65

DOCID: 3486670

··-

~· ·

~·· ~~. -

Finally, Dettman, and Sa.meonoff, the heads of the Russian referate on the Eastern Front for the Signal Intelligence

continuation ·of footnote 11~5.

report states that the original notes of the interrogation had been destroyed for security reasons. This interrogat+on took place on 29 November 1944. In t.he cov~r letter .from Col. Bicher submitting· the interrogation it was stated that the whereabouts of the prisoners was unknown l>ut that they would) be sought for further .questioning. Actually Boscheinen and Kotschy were then (15 December) in the hands of CSDIC

· in the u. K., and the results of CSDIC interrogations . . were issued as SIR 1326 (equals IF 126) a...11d SIR 1335 (equals : IF 105). IF 126 is an interrogation of a general nature · · and corresponds essentially . to the 29 November interrogation. What differences exist between IF 105 B and IF 126 are presum­ably due to misapprehension a...Tld condensation by the writer ·of the former. IF 105 is a 11 follow up 11 interrogation .to IF 126 whic~ concerns a training school for Turkish translators which seems to have been pperated by the Abvehr or Milo Amt. Unfortunately it wa& not at first recognized that IF 105B wae a separate document and it was thougb.t to be a duplicate of one of the two CISCIC interrogations. · It was accordingly mistakenly marked as a. duplicate, and a.a a duplicate ot IF 105 rather than of IF 126 which it does ressemble in material covered. References to 'both IF 126 and IF 105 B.have been corrected in the present volume and it is hoped that errors in cit.ation arising fx-om the faulty identification as a duplicate of · IF 105 have been discovered elaeC:tfhere •. Both IF 105 B and IF 126 discuss the Army High Command Signals . Intelligence organization and the details of Ko~a 4 in partic­ular. Both state that the Army High Command broke and read Turkish diploma.tic for the ~A. In both interrog~tione the FA is identified as being apart of the Air Ministry but it is confused with the .Signals Intelligence Agency of the Air­Force High Command. Aa there are references to agent acti­vity in both interrogations it :seems clear that the prisoners had confused the FA with either the Abwehr of the Mil.Amt. IF 126 states that the FA received and sent Evaluation re­ports to the Army High Command :while IF 105 a ·states that the FA received them. In IF 126 a chart shows the FA receiving the results of telephone monitoring of a telephone 1ntercep't, company of the Bulkan command as direct liaison while. other repor·ce to the FA go from Kona 4 through In 7/VI.

66

DOCID: 3486670

~ . . e· ······.-·· · -- ·' · ·~ .. . ....... -------- ··-': _,., ..

. ·~--~ .. ~, .

... :. . .-.. . .;. ':. ·:· ··:,. .·. . . ·: ~ ·, .

"--..... A8~~~1 ~t tli~ , n~Y · ·liigl{ _ -coim:n·~ci ~£20~,1· tii~t · tiiez-e~:na<a . oe·en · . no i'elations with the ·:FA atter·:'1944 when, the stgM;l Intelli·~ . genQ~ Ageno:r ·of, the -.~my H1.gl1. Co~riq ~~cl .up v.1..th . th~ · ·

· ~i~l Int~·llis:ence :.Ag_ep.oy of' the _s.upreme CommtS.Jld of ·: th(9 .. Armed ~ Forcea.~~fJ · .· . ·.. . . ·. . · · .

... · .,

· · · . ·. '· o. · . f!>he· p·osi t19~ :·~at_ .· tJ:>.E( FA ~d .. the S,ignl\1 Iliteliigence .Agency or; :the · Airforc·e 'High C~d::· wide!¥. Goel"i.ng sho~l.O: ... · have f'a~ii.itated ' ~ e~c~ "bet•~~ . t~~m •.. The . $bae11e.e.~ 1n .the inte~roge.tions~ ·o.f 'fli.x>.J r~f'er-.ce to 11·1 te.el!Dg 'bet1'een. them .1nd.1oatea . ·that .;such vas :the . oase • . • .There ·are ·a.'. tev ... . · ·. :$p'eeit1c reterenoe~s ·:tQ: -'an exc~~ . ot . te_ehnice.l'. wo-.tl®: . "011 _.spe_citic.·prcblem,a ~- · '·Tpe .turict1.oth&l <U.visi;QJ! · ilet~fin them8 • ·

:ho~sve.r., pNcluded e.ni .11eed for. con~t&111t li&isolil.v i nt) .. <.: · : .signal I.Dt&11J.gence·: :ABenc1 - ~o.r the ·Air Foree -Hi&n · (fo~d ·

. ' vaa. : ·~once.r:nSd ·. vi:th air. t:iAa.f'tic Vhich,, . .'a,s 8UC·h" vaa. )ho _qon~ c:.ern· of ' t#.he WA. The . F.A.o ~on the cp11tra;ry .P di.a, ·aupply an · ·

: .W1aeteNlilled oolint ;of· d1p1omat1e .Md· general ;intelligence . ~ .: t.o . /t~~ ,·Alr .l'oroe JI1.sh . ~C~d and :to , 1t$ . 51p1 · ~t~lli.;. ·.· ·

.· . gen,ce Agen~t,. : The he&d ot:: the .Signal Intelligence ~Agency

.- · -~- . of .the Ai~ .:~0.PCe ~e~: ;~-0~~$ ,,riedeJtDic~D $t~ta~l·: : · . . ... ,

. · He did no:t .. W:O,l'k '.Wl-th them (the RlJ!i/FAl, except to . the· extent that· .vos_gele (~e elder ceypt~lyst) sQme ~ . . · timea ,•t v:lth .'CnJP.t@al:ysts tr.om · thie · ~d : .other · agencies · · .. to:. ·disouas general. prob1e~. · ~ FA ~ahe.d .· t.~e GA!t . .·

· i4.~1' ·1i6 . :: ~- ~-~ . ·. :. "subJe·ci~ ~id~,hot ·· ~ · vhetiie~ .. :ifuM/,~ ~~~kecj .. · 9n · m.a~hine ·a.Q:a/oJtl' .&udat ·tr&.ftie. OWCh1 li&d no .c~,ctiona

with' t~ · ·fA. ·.e.tter · 1944 w.hen the ·tox-mer o.rgM!zatio.n -~ · up 111th ·omt./Chi ~ · ··Howeye:rD". ae a ·matter . of' opWon·; they do · not believe. FA aid• " .· ·· lt-_ · :is .~ous tlj&t Det~.man . :an.4 , Sem~

·:··a·QJ:lof.f .. "!ere :ignox-ut .of ·the,_Rµsai;e.n ~ipher :. telep~tet- . '.Whi.ch

. '· the>PA npor»t~d on .a!ld which was known to :Buggis_C,h ~ ">:.lt ,1~ · . · ·· to . be ' presumed thet there ·ha.d been "la.t1ona betveen the · . two agencies priqr to 1944 (~ugsiech · dated the -teletme ·

· matter. to .1943e ·it .may be note'(\) tr.om ·their statement-.· .that . .. · · · . th~" -:,.,ere :·none . a~~e~ .J.;944. T;b.~ l.&sttiiig autipatnt. · ot: ;~he ·

. . ~.isnal · tn.tel.ligenae . Ag_~noy of the . ~i"8me CoDllD6D.4 .. :C;f · t~ . . · . . · " Armed ·P.orcea to the PA agai;n_ a toppe·d ·any lia:ispnJI ' ~ t .appear_, .. . ·, . .. . '• . ·.- - . .

· .. ·

... ~- . :.:.: ·:-. . : ....

__.;·.

........ -· .. . - · .· _: ·

!,.!: • ·~ .,...

• J

' ~ . .

i '

DOCID: 3486670 ..

--

--~ ·. ; -·-·

vi th !;pp1~op:i?iat0 traffic on occasion. We asked what was the:. :fuw.;:tion of the FA. He said its purpose ~a.s

,·.:'really hidden from the scxsvices 9 who were not allowed · entr--J to the establishment. Only Voegele had any ·

contact with them and that only with cryptana.lysts •••• 147

Vc•egele,,. the· chle.f crypta.t1alyst of the Si~al Intelligence . . Agency of the· Air Force High Command, 1n :]J.omework'1 he pre­pared fo1• · TICOM.:: 1~ererred to an ex.change of additive t:Pr the

. (Bx'itish) Inter Departmental Code vith th~ Signal' Intel.li­!jence J\.gency · of the Supreme. Conmie.nd . of the Armed Fol."cee..., ti."1e pignsJ. Intelligence ~~ency of the Ha.vy High Comt:m.nd, and the FA in 19l4.0742 .. 11+8 · Zet.sche (Hauptman in cha:rge of' \ G1~oupe A <)f' ForeJgn Air Foi..,ce West \.llllder Chet• le) repo:rted t:ti .... '9.t the FA 1:epoJ.'."ta _contained a great deal of. signif'icemt infor;r.ast:!.on .concer.ni.ng economic and political matters. 'l'he rcipor-its ~rom J:or<eign broadcastop as tho3e of the BBC, irnre

147 I 29 p 3. .F:r0 iederich knev that they car:z•ie'd out moni­toring of telephone and telegraph for Goering and the Nazis •. Re · thought that Goering had f'ounded it personally~ ''It was completely political, not military .. ltfnen it vorked on · fo:t>­cign s~"stems 1 t worked oxtly on rea:t.~ area tra.f'!'ic 3 eucl:l as industrial traffic, it thought t~~c Army might . not be )w...12dling adequately. They worked perti-~µ1a.rly on inner Runs!e.n traffic. Asked 1f he could riamc e..ny FA person.ne.l he said they a.re always chw.r;ing. 'J:he1.~e vas a Min. Rat .Schaper (vith one P] who tras not .a soldier but a civilian off'icia.1.-" PriodeY·ich appe:ar>£ to be well 1nf.or~ec1 on tl1e FA when compared to some otb.cr T.)1'1sorier-s. ItLn l'!le.ution of' :tnner Russis.n tra.i"f.ic 1s interest:t:n.g:: a.s Seif Pert ( l 25) stated that thls va.s the outstanding FA succe:Js.

68

DOCID: 3486670

·-e

pa.rtiC:ula~ly ir~~ortan-t, e~pec.1ally f'or. the period ootveen the iU'Y8S..i.Oil:, &110 •. th.0 COlla.pse When · they ~ere often thy only source of r~li&b1e information on the war situation.1Li9 · ·

. d. L~aiHon between_ the FA arid th~ Sign~l Intelligence Agency i::>f tine Navy P.JLgh Vomm&m~ +s documented . b:,i re.ferences to 'the, FA ln Yearly Progress,· :<"epo1~ts p:z'lepa.red by. the Navy and by the 1ntey;rogation of' the chief ll!a.vy crypta.nalyat 9 'r;.•ano\'r • . ·. As seen. in 'the p:receding p~~graph, · the FA and Alr Foy;ce cooperated with.the Nevy .orithe British Inter-D~pa.rtmenta1 · Cipher: · · ·

' , ! L"'lformed the FA~ the OKW,, and the GAF o.f the ·ext.s'Lence of this c:J.pher 1n 1940 M.d the FA and the Navy wo~ked on it. The OKW e.:nd the GAF rest~icted th"mselvea rather to receiving the cypher ·at;.ta when timrked (>U t. The GA.Fi O.id a little uork orl 1 t _, hov­evo 2t ~ &nf.1 passed a:ny recovered k~ys on t·o us~

\

1491 159: !16. Of special interest and va.l!.!e 'Jere' th~ ·:• : b:t•oa.dcast liliks bct11cen the news agencies a.no their corres­pondents in th.e ·l!arlous ca.pi tals of the world. gr broad­casting stations_, the B.B.C. and S'.(liss stations life~ con­~~:ider;:;'d t.he ·most y>elia.ble ~ Daventry in pa:rt1cule:r· being a.pp:r-ec:is.ted ?ol! its figures · conce-rni.ng Allied ·sorties a...vid los sa~\. . L'ldeed.1 C.uriilg the period between the ·invasion. and ~ollapse.'/ B.B.O. reports were often the only source of re- · liable :1.nforme.t;lon on the var situat.1on. 7. Radio moni.­toring wa .. s done by OKW/C.hip its !Ia.val counterpe.rtu the Seehe.u~C:U.:..~)nstJ) . and the FA., the result~ oein.g sorted out and cUst!'lJ:n.1ted hy · Ic/Lufh.resen •..• 9. Intelligence con­cerning for•.sign ·diplomatic. exchanges i:ras received from the · FA { m~~bordin.ated directly to Goerlng) through Ic/Luftwesen/ .Abwehr.o 'a"nd was give.n e. re3t:ricted distribution., It con-s il3 t.ed of .tn. tex>cep ted .Allied radio telegrams (e.g .. , 'London­Stockho:!.m) ~ ordina~y radio reports '(e.g., Atlantic Radio} and inte:?.>ccpted traffic between d.iplome.ts a..rid ministers over- cert.atn l:L-iks, e.g. , Anka.1."a-Moscov (Turk) :1 Berne­\1eshington (Ame!'icari..), and London-Wnshington {Pol.es). · ).0. ~1he . l&3t .mentioned SOUI'Ce 't>.'8~ c,f great V&lue be.fore end dur1ug the :tnva.s:ton a.r1cl · afte:r ·the breakin,g off or GeJ:'n.lW'l··Turk1sh z·elations o In general the FA reports co.:n­tained s. great del:..l of significant 1nforme.t1on concerning: economic and political matters .. ·"· ·

DOCID: 3486670

r.'·e - 'l'he cypher- ~ent out of use 1n December 1942. Th.at was the la.st of it. I believe it wa.e a.fteNards still u8ed occasionally at e few stations. I stopped "Work on it .fol' the navy &bout the end or tni.d.dle of December> 1942- The FA continued to send us occasional · results. In pa:rti.cular these consisted· agafu and . . . e.g&i:n of information . about ov . .r U-boat · 1osse11 and the · British shipping loss~s etc.150 . · . · ·

According t.o TI;&.now 2 to 3% of all :Mavy traffic came: from . the FA 'G"h'? ~m:ppl~ed the German Navy tt1t.h t7&rfi.c from com­r.ie r·c:tal l:i.nks .15 .. t A Yearly Progress Repor~ of the Slgxml Int?lllgence Agenc.¥ o~ the Mavy lagh ComxnanrJ refe~§ to tra.fflc .1.n · 1 .Bent.lE~;y rs Code ·1 vnich was supplied by tl!e F'A. l.'2 . . . .ho1Iever-» .1 t should be ntitoo that Tranov ,p · wheI;A t ·old by the j _:aterrogators tl1e~t a number of meeaages deal.1.rig l:rith North Rust'3ie.J1 convoy personnel matte.rs uere paesed ove?" coI.iJmercial c i rc.u:i..ts, st.at.ea that . the Navy ha.d never seen them-- 11 This mr;;.terial lt:rov.lc1 ha.ve been done by the FAJ, '. 1~7.a.n.y sucl1 Ji.m.teri&l was interce.pted it ~as not passed to us. ·•l:.;1.; Tra.nov did not ment ion receipt of" repol'"ts based on broadc~at mqn1 to~ing. Eowc1r.r:: l", he d1.d zie!'Cr to 11 fivs FA men ·under Stabenov vho had been doing press broadcest .. M&lys1~~1 turning up at ·

' F l en.sbui:>g a.fte r the 1l&.r ended • ..1.?,. This presumably refers to Se~i.fe2?ti; .Puetzel Oden~ Xlau.tachke., and Finge~hut who uel'e fou.n.d W-d 5.ntev:rogate~ by Ticom at Flansbll,I"g vl1ere they Vel"'e conti:nuing to issue ~ :'nevs bulletin" b~sed on bJ.•oe.dcast~

1:?01 1}~7 p 11.

151-.L 93 p 13m

l52J) 17 .. F:,A) . 03 13. -"""! -? p

15'..}r 9-, :.J p 18.

DOCID: 3486670

;:-- _~· . .

.. . . . .. -·· ~ ... •

rnonito~f',ed there .155

e. 11he status ot liaison between the FA and the Foreign Office C~ypts..i~alytic Section is more .fully knoun than that betw.;;en M.~r other of· the agencies. Ribbentrop stated that Selchow; the ~irector of the Foraign Office bureau, . Lia..isoned closely·' Y1th the FA.156 T!1e extent or this

liaison ca.'1 be learned 1n detail in the chapter on liaison in the discussion of the .Foreign Office Cr~'J>tan.alytic . Section (Volume VI) and in the appendix of FA successes at tl1e end oi"' this 1.~olume. · As specifi.c exaxr.iples of the knowledge of the FA possessed by Fo:.re1g.,vi Of'fice Personnel and .of actual liaison a .fe1ir instances uill suffice here. 1'be Foreign Office Cl"ypte.nalysts from vhom TICOM Team l fir~t learned of the e.x.tstence of the FA created an outll.ne of the FA . 13.nd kneu the , names of I12anY of th~ section heads in Depe.1~t­~en t IV (Rauptabteilung IV .- Ccdl~7and Ciphers) with which -die-y 1:re3:e immediately conce~ed. . The Yearl~ Report · for 1942 of the Foreign Office, · intea.rlia., reveals a.n exchange of code book recoveries. The name of' Senio.r 5pec1al1et Waecll.ter cif th~ FA · appears ill this document, and the · names of other · F'A personnel· occur .in r~aonDtructcd code books in the Forelg.n Of:lfice archives~ :> From _this evidence

155 . ·. . . . ~~tabenow ~ f:rom this evidence .11 seems to have been at

Flensbu1•g. He .. we.a the head or ·the Berlin Branch Of'fice (see the Kaufbeuren Cl1rec~1ve} e.na could certainly have escapeO from Berlin a.long vi th the other FA people. .HoweveJ", ~11con.

a1d not f'L'"ld anc1 interroge.te him. It is not- knoVJ.l vhy this "J.ead '' of' T1~&1ow' s to · l_lis pres.ence w&s not !'allowed up o

156T~1e :l.ntel"'r-ogators o.f Ribbentrop (I 143) stated tliat he traa the most :poorly inf!o:rnied and hsrdest to extract i.vll'OJ"m&tion from of· the high :Nazi 1 s questioned at Nuremburg. For · this reason hJ.s statement that there wa3 close liaison ls a.pt to be .·a1s:rE1ga1.•ded. The evidence .for 11s.1.son ·· be,tveen th~ FA and Fore:tgn Office J however 6 adequately · bears · out his statement a.ild sugg0ste ·that he va.s better informed on the matter th~ the interrogators had assumed. ,

lS'lIF 15:

l5oD I6. OtI1er e.xam:ples a.re cited in the appendix with source reference.

71

DOCID: 3486670

~._.

-::rte e.J~is. tence of technical cryptanalysis liaison between the FA and the , other c?yptologic agencies can not be denied and ,the categoi-ical de.nlal that technical liaison existed must be se:riou;sly quc5tioned. Certainly there is good evidence fo.:r close 11a1aon betveen the FA and the Foreign Office, Signal Intell1gence Agoncy o:f the _Airforce High Comm~d .11 the Signal Intell:Lgence Agency cf the Navy High Command. Close cooper­ation 1:fith the. Elite Gau:rda and Abwehr is to be interred~ Only ill the case of the S1gna_l Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Co~d of the Ar.med Forces · is thez•e diI'ect evidence that cx•;jptana.1ytic lis.1son did not exist. Even. here,, however, there y~s . 11a.1~on on security matters, . an exchange of de.- · codes;1~)9 interch!l,,nge of intercepted traf.f1c, and a definite agreeme.n.t thra.t the FA voul.d not \Tork on military t1~affic .160

l?. .Final EvaluB.tion or the FA. The historical outline of the.'l!A's operationsrevealea th.at their vork continued even .under the vic.1.asitudes brought on by bombing and 1::1o~ing • . Careful arrangements f'or dissemination of in.format.ion existed a.nd . theA-e is evidence that this exchange functioned &t e.11 1.evc·J.s. 'l'he. FA undoubtedly had many .faults a.a ail intell:t­gence agency but they seem to have been faults !nheren.t in its history (·the personalities involved, the Nazi taint~ etc.::) a.nd also occu:i:'I".i.'!lg in. other Geman intellig0ricc agencies. Crypta.nalys1s· supplied l.ef;ls than 20% .of' the in­formation del!ve2-ed by the FA, aud the other 8-0% ~as con­sidered SO importD~~t that 3pecial arrangements Vere made ·r,or 1 tf~ coµtinued p:roduct1on .at Berlin and .finally at Flens;.. bu.1'g up to the· TJel"Y end. A ahift in emphasis by the FA from telephone monitoPin..g to commercial traffic and press and broa.3cast mate1"i&l is indicate.d through the course of its existeiwe . . The crypt~alytic element probably z:ems.1ned of c:cnstant 1.mpo:rtance throughout the historyof the FA, . with the pr~~ss monitor'ing increasing towards. the end of' the var e,s oth~n"' sources of readily available inf'ome.tion dimim.shed. Ev~n at Ke"ufbeuren ' (vhen, according t? Schellenberg, the FA

ir;o . . J:7C.f Goering,, I 11f3,, vho said he i•sav OKW/Chi decodes~ •• 0

and f~ibhent:rop who "sa.-w 2 or 3 Brown Reports a dsy.

160cf Rentschle19# lF 15.

72

DOCID: 34866.70

~-.-· .. --

should no longer have been concerned in telephone moni­tor·ing) the remaL11s of a gfrd 'Index based· on telephone con.veX>sa tio.ns ~u.ras found •1. · In the light of all the. ev i-oence e.vallst.le tho FA must be recognized as a highly succeas.ful source o'f' intelligence L'l the ·fullest sense of' the vox•d. So lmpo:rtan.t was tp.e intelligence produced. that caref1.ll arrangements vere• ms.de for fu!'nishing 1 t throughout the fi.n.a.l stages of the v~l". The relationship between the FA and the Ab'vehr', Qestapo:i and Police in genera.l censorship operations s.nd L'l counter-measures aga.il1st. agents can only be indicated. The FA docs appear to have served the Abvehr_, and so the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces_, 1n telephone ro.oni tor.i:ng in Germany and in · occupied ter1"i tory ~ and .1 t ser1md the Elite Gaurds, the Reich Ma.in Security Office., the Regular.Po11.ce, and the Radio.Defense Corp~ as a crypt­analytic agency for agent traffic. J:,.ny attempt to evaluate :t'c.s ability in collecting and evaluating press broadcast and si.rn.tla:r ma.terie,l is LJJ.vidious due to the lack or in.t'orm&tion on the ll.lCh1evements of the other agencies performing.this

·. f'unction,, the Supreme Command o:r the Armed Forces, the Fore:tgn Offj_ce (tl1e Seehli.u.sdienst)~ and the Propaganda.

. ~i"1~+~,f . j 1 ___ J....i..U U.1.-..: .,

1611F 15 p 16 (appendix 2).

DOCID: 3486670

""'' -~ -·-

Appendix I.

This eppendu presents the available information on ·the c :ryptruw.lytic phase of the FA' s operations. Only eighty odd references to traffic worked on have been glea.ned from the 0.vailable ma;terial concerning the FA. Many of these refe:l'­a.nces al'.'e vague and tenc1 (especially when FA persoruiel vere being questioned) to statements that .traf't'ic · of such and. such a count1•y Yas only sorted according to link or that the · dJ.ploma.tic tra?f1c of a c.ountry had been 1dentifie.d but not. read. . The a:l'ch5.. ves w1d )~eports of the Cryptanalytic Sect Jen

" "'f the }{'01.,e.:tgn Offi<".:e,, of the Signal Intelligence Agency ·of' the m!t.vy 1!.tgh Command, and even the Signals Intelligence : Agency o:f the Sup1:>eme Command o:r the Armed Forces reveal

, coJJ.s~.derably more detail as to just which systems were worked on by the FA in llaison with the other.German agencies. It . should be noted that there ls considerable evidence that the ff A 'possessed copies cf a surprising number o.f code books e,lthough there is n<> indica.tioµ in Tfcom Interrogations as to how the FA procured these items or even a hint that they were in the FA 9 s poasession. The .following aumms . .ry reveals six cases in l>?hich code books or ciphers we1 .. e 1n .the posses­sion of the FA. In t..'b.i~ appendix all · available references to traf'f:tc worked on by the FA have been collected and the sou1~ce 1ndlca.ted. ·

t! .;) . ~ ~

A~!"!q,sJ:!..J..United States} 3:IsteJ!!!

American . Strip System. . . :Paetz.el stated that "11e attempted .a strip system and

reed. it here B.nd the:r:ee but not curA"ently. · Ve finally gave it, u.p as it took too wmy personnel." He did n9t. remember any of the originators. Tra.ff'icwa.s America to Europe bu:t vbeth<3I" Washj~n.gton-London or 'Wa.sh1ngto.n.,.Pa.r1s he did not rece.11 .. The system.employed 30 out of' a ma't;rix of' 50 strips in a. settili.g~ . ! I 25 p ); I 54 ;e!!SBim). ·FA ability t.o read th1a sys;[,em r:ic.y ha"tl'e been du.e to liaison with the Foreign Ot".fice although there is no indtcation ·that sueh is the case.

DOCID: 3486670

~--· . ' -f . ' • ,

Am.el"ican Five Figure Syst~m vi,th Monoalphabetic an.d Bigr~ Substitutiona · Paetzel stated t11at US plain sy~tem.S were read and

subsequently a US aystem .consisti.ng of . a .five letter book enciph(~:z>ed by monoalphabet1c an.a . big~am substitutiono Thia system was.not solved currently $3 they only read back mater:la.l se~·era.l ruont4s to a year old. · The tables changed within the messca.ge ·and this che.nge Yas shovn by an indicator. The successor to this system was not broken because there vas ~o indicator :in the .middle of the . message to show where the tables . changed. (I ;z5 p .3.) . . · ·· ·

. '

Arn.er:lca..n State Department System · used by Hs.rr.:11:!"on . f!•om Be r.ne • . . The· messages of llarrison ·in Berne vere mentioned _a.s.

examples cf signals Litellig~nce by Joell and · Goering and by cn~yptenai:3:st::r. of several agencies . . These mes.Se..ges were sent in the cornprom:tsed Br-ol>."ll code and Rentschler stated th.a.'t they h&Ci been "read up untll quite recently''. (I 143: IF 15).

. . Joint P.JD.erican all.d British. Systems~ Paetzel l'efers to FA success v1th .Am,er1can G.nd Britil:lh

unenctpheZ'e;d codes but knef1 of no instance. of e.n ilnporta.n.t message being sent in a. lm1 gre.de system. Rentschler knev th~t Auierica.n and B1~1tish commercial messages were read, some of_ v:rh1cn concerinea ship movements. These Yere mainly concem.ed 1·11. th . tndi viclue.1 ships; convoy J.nforma. tion was not , dealt 11i th. by i::.5.s section \Evaluation). Tranov, of the -Slg!1s.l Intel11geyice Agency of the Nsvy High Command, :ref'erred to commercial messages supplied to the Navy by the FA. {I 25 p)+; IF- 15; I 93). -

, ~iaJJ_S1stems

Belgian Unenciphered books.. _ Paetzel stat.edthe.t the Belgians used one . book v:I.th and

'ttlthout s-ubstituti.on encinherment. - It was rea.d· :L"'l both cases. (I -25 p.2~) -

)

75.

DOCID: 3486670

~)!::;;:: . ..... -,,. ~-~ .... -.~ - ·.

British Systems

Br! ti sh· Consula.1~ Sys te-ms. . . . Rentschler stated that a message from the British consul

at Cairo gave some lnforir:.ation and J'odl recalls impo:rtant info:rma.tion. having · been gairied from this source. (The :r·efer­ence by Jodl is p1·e~umed to be to a FA decode.} · In t _he Pers . 2.S Yearly .. Report i"or 1942 1 British Empire Section:, there is refero:rice 'to s statement by ORR W~chter of the FA of a. f:x1uitless attempt on v~ Teneriff'e-I~s Palm.as Consular code~ }le also .r·eported .that a systec us~d between Tener1ffe and 1Jas l'al:mas l~ad been VOFked on by the'· FA in February 1942 . -Which provad to be a · cc.ee of' transposed plain text. (IF · 15s I ~ll-3, D· 16).

Bi"i !i:tsb. :Dlplomatic Systems. · . Schroeder stated th&t. Ilit.ler delayed his diecus:sions

wlt.h ~he B:"i tieh ?r:1.me Min.1ster .11 ChB..mberlain~ during .the B~dGodesbu:rg [Nunich) Conference f'or seveZ'nl hours while a mes:::ie.ge S(?J2t. . to London by the Prime Minister could be decoded~ Se:Lfert · s;tates that.work on .Brit.ish Di.plomatic

. cipher syntems was useless and no success was obtained • .

11 Thore Mas an occasional ph~sica.l compI>omise. We captured clear t'<~xt and a bar:!ic bocik in ?lol"way but had no success 111lth them cry:ptographi1Jally 11

• He did not t=emember whether the cleat~ te.xt was ever avo.ilable to Hauptabt~ilung V but dld reoe!n.ber the ·oa.sic booka. I..'111 regard to low grade systems Seifert gtated that u.n-enciphered books were atta~ked and read. Rents-chle:c• stated that second» thim.11 and fourth grade B~itish Diplomatic Codes could be read. (.IF 132; l 25 p. 2; IF 15) G .

Britishlnteroe:ps.rtmental Cipher and/or Code. . . Trsmov ii of the Si~l Intelligence Agency of the :Navy

High Corum.and, stated: 1'From the middle of 1942 results fell. off because o.f lgss m.s.t.erial. novever, ve continued .to deci­pher e. very good percentage of vhat material came in. The millte.r~r situation !'lad now che...nged. Russia. had entered the w.~1". TreS.fic with A.n:kara. and Stockholm-va.s very heavy b1.1t e,ctua,l ~e.vy_ tra.ff'.ic dropped e·ons1d~rably. · 1 .· .tnf'ormed · the

· FA~ the O:Kli, a.'ld :the GAF of the existence ot "~his cipher in 19!>0 and the FA S':.11.d the Navy. -worked on it . The O.Klf and the GP.Ji~ i'ei.:Jtrictec. the1nselv~fl rather to recG.iVing the cypher

76

r -

DOCID: 3486670

data when ·worked out. The GAF did a little work on it, however,, a.i:id passed sny recovered keys to us. The cypher went out of for.ce in December 1942. That vas the last of it. I believe it was afteNa11ds still used occasionally at

·a few ~tatio.ns. I stopped·\lork on it. at the Navy about the end or midal~ of December 1942. The FA continued to. send

· occa.s.! 'onal xiesults. In particuis.r the.se consisted a.gain and, ag~Sr>.. of infor:matlon a.bout our U-Boa~ losses and the B:r1 t1sh shipp:Lng losses etc. This. vas t:"· the first months of 1943 12.p to the .su.mme:r of that year. ·

1Pae~zel me.rely thought that

the FA ·worked on Interdepart~nta.1·ciphar9 Voegele, chief of Seetio.n "En of Chi Stelle {0KL/LN Abt 350) stateci that .. there ~a.s rui. exchal'!..ge of'" recyphering book res:ul ts for the Interdepartment Qode (italics m.ineJ vi.th OKW,OKMp and the. FA 1.n 1940 up to 1942"r:- · The British Empire Section. of the . . .?e11 s ZS Y~arly Report for 1942 stated that the work on this ::iys tem u.a.s stopped L'l the summer . of 1942 because the traffic rece1v~d t-ras alight and .in consequence the additive sequencee, which were rece.tved only late from the Ministry of Aviation (FA) revealed fragments o.f a text wll1ch wa.3 generally uninter­esting. Miss Hagen!) the head of the P~r~ ZSEngl1.sh Group,, stated ;;theZ:'e vas n.o l:la.ison v1th th~ FA except on the subjac.t of the Interdepartmental Ciphers"~ · (1147; I 25 p.3; ~ 112 . p. 9.; D 16 reports 3 and }..l; I 172 ~f:l3) • · ·

'!Code 'B-30~ 11 • I

The BritishEr:ipire Section of the ·Pers ZS Yearly Report · for i942 refers to FA llaison in that year: uln February · 19112.;· et the·. request of ORR Waechter of the FA, an attempt was made to esta.bligh contact iilith theF'As which however; dld not g~t beyond a general exchange of ideas. The only conc1 .. fte results werr~ that the FA placed .at our di~posal · a list of approximately 50 ~B-30~ recovered groups·'. (D 16 report·i+ page l)'.

Bank of England . Cocfe • . Sauerbier states tl1at · a Bank of England Code was broken

in'l9~·l · (see INTABru"\!K below. I 162).

Bulgarian Systems •.

---=~~ulgarian Cqdes. · Paet.zel' . .stated that Bulga.z•ian systems were basically a.·

few filr1;i digi t=codes vi th repaginations or relinea.tions. A 1940 r·epoi;•t :rrom t11e Pers ZS Bulgari.an Group mentions that

11

'

. ":'.:.·J

DOCID: 3486670

tne FA Jv:'.d furnished them with photocopies of two Bulgarian c .Jd es • { I 25 p. 8; T 20 38, Report of Bulgarian Grou1) 1 January 1940). Ticom Doc. 240 (Film 34) has a list of Bulga.riai1 material in the possession of the FA. It is not kn·::>l~-n whether this material was at Kaufbeuren or not. . 'l'he list c9ntained some . twenty entries, including Dicti.onaries and Work Books, and was marked "To be De,stroyecl". · .

Chinese Systems

Chinese 'l.'raffic. Ch.1nese traffic was .worked on ;at one time, according

t ·j P ·"i~tzel., but: not towards the end. Some· progress was made but nothing was read. (I 25 p. 7.) .

· Clandestine. Traffic.

Clandestine Traff'.ic M"'. Detained Persons o

q.andest.1_ne traffic . of . detained persons, according to Sauerbler,, was mostly scattered messar;es in indiv!dualistic s~stems which were rarely solved. (I 162.)

Cz_echoslovakia System~.

Skoda. Company Commercial Code. - Accordlng to Sauerbier one of the major unc1ertak:ir,Lgs

in the prewar FA was the .code used by the (Czech) Skoca f 1rm to !ran and Ira,q 1ri 1935. This was concerned almost. enti:i. .. eiy. with briaee building projects. (I 162.} · Ticom Document 240 Item 42 is a cover letter for .!'Czech · Messages" to be sent to the "sta. Poleit, Pra.g".

Danish Systeni3.

Dantsh Diplomatic Code. Sauerbier said that about. 507b o.f the traffic in the old

Diploma.tic code was read up until 1940. . lllothing was solved thereafter except en occasional message in the o~d code on so:ne mlnor · cormnercial matter. · "(I 162.)

. Ethiopian Systems .

. ,..,,_,_Kthiopian -Co(]e. Pae_tzel said that the .FA had 11 done a little work ·on an

hthiopian coae-11• (I 25 p.8)

78

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DOCID: 3486670

Finnish Systems.

Finnish Ma.chine Ciphers. Paetzel said that the FA a.tone timeha.d cribs for ~he ·

F'innish (or Swedish?) Hagelin and broke in. He subsequently stated that it was possible to break the Finnish Hagelin if the~ had·4,obo letters or more 6f text. (~25, ~ 54).

French sxstems.

Frenc.h Diplomatic Ciphers. Goering stated that "the ciphers of the French Fore:l~ .. n

Office at the Quai de Orsay had been obtained" but he ·cue] n:Jt remember the oetails nor give the. date of th::.s compro- · mise. ·An. Associated lJress st9ry, based on Goering 0 s ·perscij.&l · · copy of hls own telephone conversations at the time. of the· . Ansch1uss,, ·1na1ca.tes that the ciphers mentioned above may

. well have been a veJ:>y high grad~ ;system. Goering was reason­ably gau}:>ded in his telephone conversation and the nevspaper tra11slation.itse1r·1s not technically perfect from our specialized· viewpoint. The conversations .reveal Goerir:ig telephoning Hitler (j.n Austria to celebrate the triumphal , of the Anschluss) that no action by France was to be feared oece.use Lngland ,had refused to back her in display of force. Goering· assured Hitler that the information was certain because. it was based on· information from the Brown Rep0rts taken from deeoded telegrams of the French Foreign Officeo The mention of the Bx•olin Reports indicates that· the FA· was involved. The conversation was a~ .follows: "Tell the Fuehrer that the Brovn Reports have .. h;~st cc;wie ·which. are completely clear because they were st0ized t.? Clear because the. clphers were "seized 11 ??) • • • The French indeed l:i'ail.ted to go int.o action wi tl1out any reservation a.:n.d so pressed most hard- ciri' the Br1 tish. I can send. you all .the decoded cables. And only because England declined the ¥hole action has blown. up . . . 1rode.y France tells its ministers in the various ·countr•ies ·it can do nothing because England refused

•. ri (I 143., IF 183). . .

French Code. . ~·.

Pers ZS records referred to work in 19~-l on a 10, ooo gr·oup figure code designated as "19". ~he first solution was

. saJ.a to >iave been achiev~d by the FA using captured tables wh:l.ch we:N:'! la.ter turned over to Pers ZS. Dr. B:ranqes !'! the 11ead of the Fi"ench Language section in ·Dr. ·Pa.schke 0 s sub

..... ~-. -----··· ,:

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DOCID: 3486670

section of Pers-ZS, stated that he wa.s responsible for liaison with the FA for the group. According to Seifert, the FA had success ·with all French unenc:tphererl books (,,This was pa:rticularly prodictive bec~use the French used a. large numb~r of these books"). (D 54, p. 13, report 8, page 18; I 25 p. 2).

. ·Vichy French Code. RcntschleriBtated ·that the easiest system to break of

all of those worked on by.the FA was "French (Vichy period, De Gaule used Allied codes and consequently his diplomatic

·traffic. is not !'ead) since Vichy ch~ed ·its code only a.bout every four weeks. (IF 15). (This statement of . . Rentschler appears contradictory. It would be expected.that Vi.chy codes wo.uld be available to the Germans without necessity for breaking, and the. reference to 11 captured tabJ.e's 11 in t11e para.c;r•aph above would support th.ls belief. However, it may be that -tlle FA and-Foreign Office did not receive diplomatic·. codes or ciphers through the German Arniistice commission which may not have been interested in such liaison~

German Systems~

Commercial Codes. Sauerbier said that in peacetime lie was concerned almost

entirel:y· u1 th commercial codes in the German language. This involved the traffic of German firms to foreign countries during the four year plan. (I 162.)

Creek Systems ..

Greek Codes. Paetzel said that just two Greek plain codes were

read. (I 25, p. 8. ) ·

He.1~elin Machines.

Paetzel said that HageliJ1 messages were never br9ken because they were never long enough. He estimated that pe1"haps 5000 letters would be needed. However, in a second interrogation he contradicted himself in coruiection with Finnish and Swedish systems where he stated that cribs had been secured ·ana the Hagelin read. He also st_ated that 11 it'· -:Jould be read on 4000 letters. (I 25 p. 6; I 54.)

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DOCID: 3486670

Hungarian Systems.

Additive S~' stem. . .Pa.etzel stated that the Hungarians used an additive

, changing vi th the message which was not solved. (I 25, p. 8. )

Inta.bank Syatell!.

. Inta.ba.nk Code. Sauerbier .described the · solution in 1944 of the code

used by Intab~k, the · Internatiob.al Bank at Basle, as a maJor effoJ:'t of the section. The code used was an old Bank of'

. 1•.nc;land code wl1ich had been solved in 1941. The pages were shuffled a~ui an encipherment added but solution was ach.ieved b~ the use of crib3 and common foI'l'Il · messages of which the best was a statement of the dail;Y exchange .rates between the various .countr•ies. The detail of the enclpherment was as . follows: the b~sic system was bieram subst1t~t1on from a table different !'or ea.ch l.ink and changing each. three months. The text was divided into segments of three . or four groups, and the pla:I.n text bierams f'or encipherment were prearranged pai:rs as 1 and 15, 2 and 14, 6 and 10 s etc. VeT~:i long depths a.nd nea.r-deptl1s were produced on closely similar numbe r values e.n¢1. this was the entry. The whole solution took about six months,. starting with 1942-43 and working up to 194~. ~Che lnter•ception of the . traffic was not syste­rnat:tzed a.t any time and Sauerbier did not believe that more than 50;; of all the traffic was read as a result . of' the solut ion. · (I 162) .

·. Irish Systems. '

. Enciphered Code.... , Paetzel ·said that FA/7 worked on Irish enciphered codes

wi.th cona1derab1e success up to the end of the wa.r. Inter­l"'Ot;a tion of Fe.rs ZS prisoners referred to the Government Telegraph · Code; which ''was used by the Irish .. government for diplomatic communication.s, with an encipherment by two substitu.tio.n alphabets. The FA solved the keys used on tne Berl1n and Madrid links in 1943. Pers ZS took over the keys from the FA in 1944. (I 54; I 172 p. 11.)

8l .

DOCID: 3486670

r·~--Italian Systems.

Enciphered code. . Rentschler claimed some success on high g:ra..de Italian

diplomatic systems. '11he Annual Report of the .Italian Group of Per~: ZS for 1940 indicated a fairly e.Xtensi ve Pers zs­FA cooperation on Italian systems. Intercept of the FA was made available to the Fore.fgn Office and from 1939 through 1940 t.here was a regular exchange of' encipherment tables. In September 1940 and· in November 1940 there was a mutual exchange of book groups on t 1 ... ·o codes "AR 38 and RA l". (IF 15 ii T2252. ) . . . .

J2pa.nese Systems.

Diploma.tic S~stems. · . Rentschler claimed some success with iJapanese diplo-

ma tic. Goering remembered that information was obtained from the Japanese ambassador in Berlin reporting home. Paetzel described a. J'apa.riese niiA.ln diploma.tic system which employed e. code. bool{ enciphered by a combination of trans.;;. position and Raster. They were successful with this up until

. the last phase of the war. He also mentions a transposition wi tl1 nulls over two and foul" letter code. This had a com.pll­cated · i.ndicator system. It was worked on in the middle of 1943 and again in January 1945·when it was believed to be the same system. (IF 15; I 143; I 25 5 p. 7; I :A.)

Machine System.: Paetzel stated that a Japanese system vas brol{en in

19~·1-1942 w.hich .was thought to be a l:laclline system· although tlleir solution was notmecllanical but employed slmply paper strips. (I 54). ·

Latin American Systems.

Paetzel stated that the FA ; read all .Mexican. (traffic) and some smallel" countJ:•ies like Costa Rica,, Pa1"aguay !) and Venez~ela.. They were 'us11a.lly periodic substitution but Mexico had codes. 11 (I 25, p. 8.) . ·

Manchurian Systems.

Paetzel said that M&nchurian trafric was worked on but he knew nothing about it. (I 25,, p. '{.)

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DOCID: 3486'670

Mexico - see Latin America.

Mil1ailovitch System.

Pe.etzel stated that tl1e FA ha.d success with Yugoslav traffic whic.11 he thinks was Miha.ilovitch. It was . five digit or five letter t~rit'.h dinome substitution of tl1e corresponding position of pairs of code groups. (I 25~ pp 7-C).

Norwegian S~'S terns. . .

Diplomatic Code. Seuerbier said that an unenciphered five letter code

was :t"ee.d completely up to 1940. Nothing was read after the · Norwegian government.moved to London. Sauerbier had a. ·vacue impression th~t· they had gone over to a machine. (I 162).

· Polish Systems.

Polish Diplomatic .code. The FA was interested in Polish systems between r~ondon

and Washington, Berne, · Cairo, and Jerusalem but tlad only sorted them by link. In describing the work or F A/9, . . Sauerbie:r onl~i recalled . the solution of a Polish diplomatic code in 1940-41'. Thi3 he remembered as using one a.ddi ti ve of apec1fic length.: which after 1943 became too long to nroduce depths, so after that ·da.to 1 t was not solved. . ' (T1.11s .sounded to the Interrogator more like a. Polish Home Office System than a. Foreign Office system). 1.rhe Situation report cf the Pers ZS Polish Group dated l Januar:; 1940, rovealed ·that at that time both. the FA and Pers ZS were . w6rk:l.ng on a seconda:r.y consular system and that Pers ZS received Polish intercept from the FA. (I 22, I 162» T 2038.) .

Polish Agents' Systems. Seifert remembered traffic of Polish Agents .in Czecho­

slovakia. · !'aetzel described these systems as nu.qerous aperiodi~ S'!;'Stems employing man~ cover names but · va.s unable (or unw:tll1rig?) to give any information about . the ke;y. Lt. Schubert, in charge of wo:rk on Agent Systems on the Ee.s'te!'n :B'rorit :for the Signal Intelligence Agency of the · Army High Command {OKH/In 7/VI) mentions Wenzel .or the FA as an expert on·Poli.sh .Resista.nce Movement traffic although he does not knov i.r any of this traff 1-c l1ad been 'read by the FA~ .· ( I 25, I 54, I 26.) .

DOCID: 3486670

•,

,.

_fortu.gu.ese Systems.

Portuguese Codes. !'aetzel said that the '!Portuguese were · ver~ conser•

vative. The~ used~ five.di~it ?ode ~lus substitution. It WlW v•3r;/Jl very simple_. t I 2~ p. 8.)

Hussian System~.

Dlplomatlc Gode and Additive. .

\.

Saue:rbier m'3ntions :'a few people who were engaged in a fruitless attack on Russian diplomatic traffic. 11l:lis attack · culminated in t.i1e belie.f that t.ii.e s;ystem ·was a code wit..i1 . a non-rep~ating additive. (I 162.)

Comn1erc5-al Systems • . Seifert menticns work by the FA on economic traffic

ps.ssing bet-wean various points in Russ.la. "our greatest success was obtained ,on internal Russian traffic which -enabled us to discover U1e various bottlenecks in tr1e Russian supply

. or,sanizatlon." Pa.etzel said tha.t this traffic comp:t•is~d several hundred messages a day and was clear.text mixed wlth cover ~es and was used by. industrial pl~ts,, foun.ciries, arr:w.ment works, plane factories and so c.n. · (I 25,, ppl-5)

. Russian Teletype Traffic. Buggisc~1 (a. specialist at both the Signal Intellicence

Agency of t;1e Supreme Command of the Armed Forces and at the Signal I11telligence Agency of the· Army Hig:1 Command on macri:i.nes a.nd _Hussian) . "heard in l943 that the FA had cle.imed

. some s\:a.ccess on a Ru8s1.an teletype machine and had ;recons­t:r•ucted the machine" It was. a raac~1ine witn a ver.•y long cycle \Je1ng not px•ime 'but the product of several mi1aller c~cles-11ko the SZ 42 - ;• Buggisc!1 did not know the cycle of all the individual i!h(1 :.;> ls --er · any otheI' deta.:l.ls. He hea.'.i."d this from Doering '\rho was then doing his research on the T 52 but· liais0n with the FA 1Jas bad an~rwa.y (Mettig was particularly opposed to . t1;ic SS taint) and the next Buggisch heard wa.s that the traffic found by the FA 11a.d stopped. BucGisch remembered ' only tJ.1at the cycle of orie of the wheels was 3T; the ethers he th.ought varied widely, from 30 to 80.!! Buggisch was again questioned about this telety:ne rl1Rcll1ne

. !(

success of the FA on what specifically were the results

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DOCID: 3486670

,c- a . ·----

of -r.l1e f'A 1 mentioned in connection. w1 th the Russian cipher teleprinter a:..r1d a.nsver.ed in written homework that: . the FA had analysed -a Rus·s1an c·ipher teleprinter system in 1943. a.no recogntzed that it must.have been based on a machine having ce r·t~J..in simila:ri ties ·with the German SZ 40. · After a short ttme the Hussia.n.s altered the system. The FA t:i.1en communi­cated lts results to Tir~l unit and were eiven as a kind of recompense a report on the solution·of a.German cipher telepriD.ter. '11his was one of tlle ver:r r~re cases where the FA. a.i.,_d In '(/VI exc.i.1anged resul:ts. I did not .study the PA results fit tha,t time as I was not responsible for work on cipher teleprin,ters, and hence can. give no deta.i.ls. At all events the Hussian machine (just as ·in the German ty-pes SZ 40, SZ 42 but 1-n contrast to the T 52 a,b,c, and d) gave only 32 difi'erent substitution alphabets~ tlle succession of which became pel'.'iodic only after an astronomicallJ·la.rge number or steps .. '.l.'llis succession was given by a.s;ystem of pin 1'rhcels, the per:tpheries of which vere. prime to each other at an estime,te la~· between 30 and 90. In any case there was no. complicated mutual influence of the pin wheels on ea.ch . other (as for exanple in the T 52 d)." (I 64 p. 2; I 176 p. 6~

. Agent Tr.!iffic . . Sa.ucrbier-, who wor·ked on Russian Agent Systems for the

Ordnungspollzei (Orpo) and wrote a leneth;y p~pet> on the type of systems involved, stated that he vas approached by the Orpo in 1941 with a request for cryptographic advice on the .systems used by the. Russian agents. · They gave him copies of systems tha,t were captured ·with a.gents, and 'he grouped. these by categorie~. Analysis was limited almost entirely to a stud~/ of clw.ra.cteristics and recognition signals with a view to advising on the possibility of a. "Gegenspiel" (counte:r>-·gawe--empl.oying the agent after capture or pre­tending to be. the e.gent .1 This work was done fir~t in · Sauerbier' s 01111 time. lJenzel.11 his chief J opposed his involve­ment in it bu.twas powerless· to prevent it a.s the requests later ca.me. clown througr1 proper channels Qirected. to Sauerbier. It. was a one man job en.tirely vith only.occasional help of a. girl flle clerk.'. It generally.took about one half of Sauerbier's time. He estimated that a total of.1500 differ~ ent keys pe..ssed through his hands;, mostly hand si1bstitution systems.:i mostly in Russian but many in German (Sauerbier hin'tself dtd not kno1'1 any Russian). Of these only 4 or 5 . were solved without a.completely captured ke-y. One of the

DOCID: 3486670

••

•

-

. . achievements of' 'tfhich Sauerbier was proudest 111as the use of an ordinary book left behind by ~ agent to solve his traffic. Sal,lerbie:r vas never concerned with radio proceduxaes 1 but pul'ely "11th the cipher systems used. He was able to give advice on · the· P,rob.ia.ble group to which an agent belonged and could then consult his recoZods tor an account of the success or failure of a.. pa.rticuiar technique· of ''Gegensp1el'! against this group. ( I 162; I 164. ) · · · . . A possible additional example or FA ~.success r: against the ~usslana was chanced upon after the comj>letion of· this paper al'ld he.s been . inserted here vithout evaluation. While going through &Il inventory of .the various boxes of material recovered by TICOM from the Foreign Office Cryptanalytic Section (Pers ZS ) the· following item was noted : "Box 13,item . 18. Grieen folding box containing: a) Pink folder marked 'Russisches

. Beutema.ter1al (Ueber FA)' ·containing,, (l) Photostats of Russian book of add~t1ve tables (including instructions for use)(dated · 1940.(2) Some photosts.ts of 5 figure Russian traffic. (3J Blue

· folder containing photo·stats on ' Inst~tion f-&r die B~h8rden des NKWD zur Fuhrung de:r Chiffre-Arbeit. 111

• This· material is . available as TICOM DOCUMENT 6 on Film l. .

Saudi Arabian Systems •.

Saud1-Arsbia.n.06de • . When asked if the FA had done any work ·lfith Arab;tan codes 1 . ·

as Saudi~Arabian,Pa~tzel expressed surprise · and asked if Saudi Arabia had a system of its own. ( I 2? p. · 8.) ·.

Scandinavian Systems.··'

Dr Mueller. or Pers zs· stated that he "had some unotf'icial liaison with the people 1n tlie PA vhovere working on Scandinavian" .but specified no date for the collaborat~on. ( I 22 #182.) ·

Spanish Systems.

. Spanish Additive System • . Paetzel describ~d a system or additives differing accordiilg

to traffic link.Each link had ten tables,with 100 four digit groups on each table. The indicator (unenc1phered) was the serial

·number and came in the second or third place. Paetzel stated that this was.the most recent thiilg he had worked on personally. {I 25, p. 6.)

· Spanish Code ~ . . . The ·Pers ZS Yearly Report tor 1942 mentions a Sran1sh "o4"

r. Code which was not worked on by Pers ZS because of a lack of. traffic. The. FA worked on it and believed it was a machine

.system. It vas·a four digit code with.04 the indicator. (D 16,, R~port 4,p.4 .) · . .. 86 /

'

DOCID: 3486670

Swedish Systems.

Swedish Consular Traffico l

Although Rentschler stated categorically that there was no success with Swedish systems Sauerbier ment1,ons a !+ o!' 5 digit non alphabetic code especially" used on the link between Stockholm and Tokyo~ Almost all ·of the other · links went over to .machine 1n 1939 but Tokyo was .Un.able to cori.ve1"t. Th~ ma.chine was Swedish made and was culled the "KRYTAA". Sauerbier thinks it had 15 numbered.wheels. (This sounded to the interrogator like· a thoroughly garbled versio11 of el ther the KRYHA or Hagelin .machine. Sa,.uerb1er did_not seem sen.sitive 'on'the'point or to be garbling de.libe·rately). He stated that none of the main consular links to Wasnington~ London, or Paris were eyer read nor wns thBre any success with Swedish diplomatic in FA/9-Co (I 162.) . . ~ - ·. . ·

::hredish Ha.gelin. . . . Pe,etzel 3ta.ted that they had thfs type of traffic.

See the discussion under Finland for his statement that . either the Sv.edish or. Fii:mish Ua.gelin was broken and contrast

Sauerbj_er j_rnmediately . preceding. ·fl 25" p. 6; I . 54.) .

~· - ·- . · Swedj_sh.,,Turkish Commercial. Sauerbier stated . that co.inr.aerc1a.l traffic between Turkey

and Sweden was a.tta.cked particularly a.nd solved but yielded none of the expected information on shipping possibilities. (It ls not clec:,r, whethe·:r this is Swedish or Turkish traffic.)

Swiss Systems.

-S1dss Enigma. Ma.chine• . . . Paetzel stated that the Swiss Enigma. was formerly . broken

for a while_, but only wh~n it was improperly used. ~he same internal settj.ngs ;were usec:l for a long t~me ~ After the inner settings · changed ue dic1 ·not have any more solution. At first we · reconstructed the wheels from cribs.and ·:rrom the fact that the inner settings remained the same. In his 1941 Report Dr B:rE-l.D.des of. Pers ZS nient1ons solution o:f the Swiss Enigma.. Apparently the FA f'urnished Pers ZS wii;h a pa.rtiel solution · which Dr Kunze was able to . complete. ... Thereafter there was a.n exchange of keys bet"d'een the tvo agencies~ · ·. (I 25 p. 3; D 54 weport 8, p ~ 6. ) · -. · · · · ·

87

DOCID: 34~6670

-----

E?-< ·• l- ..

' Swiss Three Letter Code~ The Pers ZS Yearly Report for 1941, Report Nr. 8,

mentions a. 2304 group.11 three letter code. Its tables were .first solved by the FA and later by Pers ZS. _(D 54 report 8)

Thailand Systems.

Thailand Code. At the beginning.of 1942 Pers ZS turned over a Thailand·

code to the FA to copy. (Pers ZS Yearly Report 1942, D 16.11. report 4~ page 3.)

r:J;_ur~i.sh S:i:s tems •

1ru1"kish Commercial-see Swedish ... Turkish Commercial.

Turkish Diplomatic Systems. . Rentschler claimed-some success with high grade Tu~kiah

~iplomat1c systems. · Kotschy and Bosche1nen stated that . ·o.KH 1n 7/VI broke the Turkish Diplomatic Code when the FA

was havj_ng cUfficulties with it" and subsequently stated that the FA turned over Turkish diplomatic to Kona 4 in the Balkans_, receiving only decoded traffic from In 7/VI. (IF 15, ·n:r 105B,, IF J.26. }. .

:Ur.1te<:!._State,s Systems-see Amer.ica.n Systems.

Vatican Systems.

Vatican Code. In a captured Pers Z'S reconstruction of a Vatican Code

Book the signature of a Fraulien Titschak appears with the date of August 1939 and a notation that she had copied out values at that tlme for tbe FA. (Fi•au11en Titschak wa.a a. member of the Foreign Office Cryptanalytic Bureau). The Annual Heport ·of the Italian 01-.oup. of Pers ZS for 1940 indicatE~s tha.t ·while Pers ZS did some work on Vatican systems most of the identifications on Vatican systens w~rereceived , from th~~ FA. ( T 93"' film F; T 2252.)

Yugosla.!.!! Systems-see Mihailovitch.

88

DOCID: 3486670

• APPE..'lllDIX II

Translation of aForschungsamt directive signed by Sche,pper, found in the quarters occupied by the FA at

. Kaufbeur en on 9 May 1945 by Ticom Team 1. 'l'icom document 240 item 34, IF 135.}

'\

GEHEIME REICHSSACHE

1-29/;~5 gRs . (Secret s.ta.te . Document) ·

(14/3/45-:in ink)* Kaufbeuren, 9 March 1945,_

to: I, II, ·III, IV, V, VI . l,2,374,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14 Service Post Seifert

. Branch Off ice Berlin Ourstation Berlin

11 Hamburg " Vienna 11 Mwiich

Liaison Off'ice .· Foreign Office "

11 Ministry-of Economics II II OKW "

11 Reich Security Office II Ii Propaganda. Ministry

Subject; Organization; Present Reorganization of the Bureau and Branch Organization.

1. I have determined on ·the following organization of the Bureau:

Bureau Director:

Main· section I: . (Hauptabteilu.ng)

i/c Section I · (AbteilUl}g)

. ·Direction of Bureau Opera.­a tioris Ministerial Director Scha.pper

~rj?~zation; secrecy; . ~~; secur1ty~ · off1c1al

correspondence; Civil· Serv1.ce Personnel; basic problems of personnel adrninistra.tion and budgetary tra.nsa.c t1.ons.

Principal Specia,list Bergeren Central Abteilung ~s; · Secur1 ty ;· Air Ra.id Defence;

*C1~ossed out . 1n ink, apparently a correction as of 14 .March.

DOCID: 3486670

Main i/c

lV~8,5rn

1./c

Main

e i./c ... >

Main

i/c

1/c Section 2 i/c

Section I!:

Section 1/c

3

Section III:

~.ection 4 i/c Section 5 i./c

Sect.ion rv; Sect;ion 6 :i/c .Section 7 :i./c

8 Section i/c Section 9 i/c

Section V:

Section 10 1/c

90

Organization; Correspon­dence; Secrecy; Camouflage, Special problems. Senior Specia.11.st Rosenha.hn Administration Principle Spec1a1·1a t Kunsemueller

Person.'1.e 1 Senior Specialist Kempe Personnel Seri.ior Specialist Kempe

Interception, Sorting and Examination · Principal Specialist Breuer Interception Specialist Popp Sorting RR Dr. Henke

Codes· and Ciphers Minister Dirigent· Schroeder / Research Senior Specialist Dr. · Paetzel Overseas, Southwest Senior Specialist Waechter West and . South Senior Specialist Schulze East JI Southeast,, Middle, -I'lorth Senior Specialist Wenzel ·

Int(Jrriia.tion co.llect1on and Evaluat,ion Principal Specialist· Seifert While Principal Specialist Seifert heads the Service. . . Post Seifert . (as is ment:··· . · ioried belov.) Senior Special­ist Dr. Kurzbach ':replaces .

. him in Kaufpeuren.

Inf'ormation Dissemination Specialist Dr. i-iews

DOCID: 3486670

• . .

Main i/c

Section 11 i/c

Section 12 1/c Section 13 ' I .J../ c

Section VI;

Section 14 1/c

Service Post Seifert in Berlin . (Dienststelle Seifert) 1/c

Foreign ~· 011 ti cal Evaluation Principle Specialist Dr. Kurzbach Economic Evaluation Acting Head Brieschke Internal Affairs Evaluation Specialist Rentschler

Technical Senior Specialist Dipl. Ing. Stabenow While SeniQ~ Specialist Dlpl. Ing. Stabenow heads the Branch Office Berlin (see paragraph 2 below) he wi,11 be replaced at Ka.ufbeuren by Senlor Special:.z.s.t Dr. Huppertsberg Techn1ca1 · Senior Specialist Dr. Huppertsberg

Inf'o.rmation Hea<;l, Special instructions of . the Bureau branches. Principal Specialist Seifert

2. Subordinate to th~ Bureau are: a) The Branch Off.ice

Berlin . · (Zt:;'eigstelle Berlin) 1/c . · Senior Specialist Dipl.

Ing. Stabenov I have determined OD the following organization of the Branch Office Berl1n:

Work Section l: {Arbeitsgebiet) ·

1/c Work Section 2:

~l

Security: ARP; Gaurds: Camouf'laging ("Cover") of' special correspondence; special· assignments; Passes

. (Badges?) special supplies, ' courl'ier service.

Civil Servant Dr. Gerth Administration

DOCID: 348f,i670

--------------------- - - - --- ·- - -- . . --

1/c ,. Work Section 3: 1/c Work Section 4: i_/c

\.fork Section 5: 1/c

Specialist Henke Personnel Adm:lnistra.tion Specialist Czwa11Illla Technical Development Acting Head Specialist Truebenbach Technical Maintenance

. Specialist Oden

b) The Outstation Berlin. of the Forschungsamt · · (Forschungsleitstelle) ·. ·. · 5./ c' Specialist Thieme · The outstation Hamburg of the Forschungsamt i/c · Senior Specialist K11•ba.ch The Outstati.on Vienna of .the . Forschungsamt

· i/c Senior Specialist Dipl. ' Ing. Fleischmann

-The Out.station Munich of the Forschungsa.mt i/c · Specialist Niedermeyer

c) The Liaison Ofrice-Foreign Office (Verbudungstelle) ·

. j_/c · . · · Civil Servant Dr. Gerstmeyer 'I'he Liaison Office-OKW J./c Civil Servant Dr. Klautschke The Liaison Office-Heich Security Office i/c Specialist Dipl. Ing~ Scholz The Liatson Office-Economic Ministry and Ministry for War Production· i/6 Specialist Dr. HL111gardt. The Lis,ison· Office-Propaganda Minist.ry · i/c °Civll Servant Severitt

3. :Pc.sta.l Address For the convenience. of all concerned I give th,e following Postal address of the·Forschungsamt:

For the Branch O.ffice Berlin, Outstations Berlin and HBinburg, and the Liaison Offices:

Reichs1uftfa.hrtmlriister1ums-Forschung~a.mt

(l.) Berlin-Charlottenbur& 2. Schillerstra.sse 116/124

· Por all hie;her offices: . Reich3luftfahrtministeriums-Forschungsamt

( 13b) l"\Aufbeuren/ Al lg. · .

Y2

DOCID: 3486670

_, __

··~--

The cou:r'tier service between Berlin a.nd Ka.ufbeuren continues, a.t this time it is the qulckest possible connect.ion.

4. Adm:Lnistrative Re1e.t.lon: a) 1'he Reporting Center ·seifert is administratively

subordinate to the Brau.eh Office Be'rlin. b) T.he' L1a.ison Offices are administratively subordi­

nate t.o the Branch Office Berlin.

Authority · a) The head of the Reporting Center Seifert has

essentially the authority oZ a Main Section head conformable .to Standing Orders.

b) The head of the Br'anch Office Berl.in has essenti­e.lly the authority of the head of an Outstation conformable to standing orders.

signed Schapper

93

witnessed: Eulenbe1 .. g author

-- - · - - - - - - ---- -

DOCID: 3486670 '

Description of 'l'icom Document 240 (Film 34)

Place of Item ~~li."t!e --~~Y~lo __ r_· __ o_r_i_..g.._in_-___ C_o_n_t_e_n_t_s

1· 1.0/9/43 2 10/4/45

'? ')

3 A-H '? '?

5 A-C 11/4/45

6 ?

7 13/4/45 ?

8 A-ff 17/4/45 Kemp(3

9 '? ?

10

Berlin Kaufbeuren

?

?

Kaufbeuren

?

List of equipment. List of destroyable Bulgar­ian Code books_, Dict1Ql'.l:'.". aries, worlc sheets. - _ . _ Faintly legipile ha.i'io written instructions for wiring, probabl~ of a teletype machine. , Hand drawn chart showing floor plan of IBM room, presumably made by T1com Team 1 at ·Kaufbeu1•en. Instructions for formine a.n FA V8lksturm·compa.n;y.

Names of five members of .. FA 9: Otto Lechner_, Herml.i.n Plagens·, Fritz Simon, Gottfried Gottsbhalk, Georg Krenzke.

Ka«.ifbeuren Notice of tr>ansfer of Liselotte Brott and Erna Lange to Seifert in Berlin.

Ka.ufbeuren. Notice of ._dr-111 schedule fo:I" FA Volksturm company.

? Names of five members of FA 9: August Woisch, Juergen Deggau, Helmut Kuepper~ 'Georg Matts, Walter Schubert.

Kaufbeu:ren NOtice of movement or tvo A Forschungsstellen. C_gpenhagen A station has moved from its previous , address to Nyropsgade 17/11~ telephone number Palae 94q9 extension 35,8,9, and 30.

DOCID: 3486670

The Wehrmacht liaison . d1d not change {phone did

·not?)~ The A Station at Stettin moved on 29 March to Griefwald Banahof · Sti•asse, 16/47. Telephone G;rief'wald 3307.

11 A 2~/1/£~5 Gestapo Berlin Letter from Amt IV A-5a. of the Reich Main Security OI'f'ice to the FA with an agents message to be de-

11 B . ~5/1/'+5 FA Berlin . ciphered. , Cover letter forward1nB t~~ :?

above to Ka.ufbeuren.

12 ABC 7 /4/!}5 Kuebbier Kempe

Ka.uf'beuren Kuebbler, of' FA 9 requests pe1"1Uiasion to stay overn1·d~. with his family at Hirsch­zell. · The request is re­fused on the ground that his family, residents of ·Hamburg/Salle, shoulq have eva.c.ua.ted to· Saxon-y and Thur1ng1a, not to South Bavaria..

1.3' 6/~/45 . Schapper Kaufbeuren Memoranda on interdepart-

14 7 /4 /!J.i-; . : ? ., · I • -

15 6/11/45 Schraidt

16 I L L E G I B L E

17 ?

ment phone service.

Kaufbeuren Request that Dr. Neuenhoff be appointed a speclal liaison man to Berlin f9r

'FA 9 ..

Ke.ufbeuren Memo on laundry service with example of f9rm to be filled out.

? . List of personnel of. FA 9, with signature or notation of t:r>ansfer:

DOCID: 3486670

!~' · · ~ :

~··. · . ... ; .·, ·. :

.

' . ..

' \

~-.a

•~-I". ' .' ,~· ~- ~---

18 2T /3/45 4.Wenzel

ArnoldJ! Moritz Brott, Liselotte Deg~ti, J"uergen

. Gertz, Helene. , Grothe, Edity GuelleJ! Otto Gott~chalk, · Gottfried

Gra.~adus J; AleJta.rider /Berlin Jentsch, Julius 5.1~.45 to

Rubbler · Kiewa.dt,, Ilse, transferred

to ·FA 3.7.3 Kirstein, Karl · Krenzke, Georg . Kuebbler, Fe:Pdinand Dr. ·Kuepper, ·Helmut Lad.e, Karl Lechner, Otto . Dr. Ludwig, Helmut Matys,, Georg Mayr,, Ma.rga.:rete, signed for

by Brett Mein..tia.rd, Pauline Nusbaum, Ingeborg Drr Plagens, · Hermann Rernwerts-Lukjansky, Dimitri Richter, Helga., signed for

· by Remwertz Roth, Liselotte, 5.4.45 to Ruffler Rurfler, Georg 5.4.45 to

Berlin Siemon, Fritz S~he1tin6er, Josef Schira.jcff ~ Erika Schube:rat, Walter Steffens, Gerda Thomas, Hildegard . Wa.lger, Egon

Kaufbeuren Note to. Czvalinna, Berlin, . Ma.rchstra.sse 25 b. Frau Helene Ge:rtz 9 born Spon-holz ·va.nts a transfer. A Forschungsstelle ia suggested. She is good in French and reads Russian~

\. . .

(~ r:i

- - - - - ============~~~=~~~~~~~===~=~"---". - - ~~

DOCID: 3486670

..,,.... a .,, __ _

~.·~.:. ·-··. ' ---IJ=.~-'~- ·~ ..

19 9/3/45 ·. . ~fohapper :Ka.ufbeuren Order replacing RR Ha~rius with RR Drv Henke as leader of FA 5.

20 20/3/45 Rosenhal1n Ka.ufbeuren Memo showing official seal for 2nd quar·ter of year.

21 12/2/45 Schapper Berlin Note on transport for move from Breslau to Berlino

22 A--D26/1/1~5 Schapper Luebb.en Order closL:ig dmm the Forschungsleltstelle Breslau a..Tld 1 ts branches.

23 A··F 9/3/45 Bere;eren · l\aufbeuren Memo on laundry .service.

21+ A-B 2/3/45 . Schapper

/

25 6/3/45 Kempe

26 5/3/45 Neyer

27 5/3/45 Paetzel

28 A ? ?

B 6/3/1+5 ?

Gives soap ration for FA members. ·

Katifbeuren · s.cha.pper circulates an ordE~r Hitler on papers of ident1 ... · fication.

Kaufbeux>en Order on military service and Volksturm drill .

.Kaufbeuren Meyer~ for FA 2, passes a notice on q-uarters for 0

.members of the FA.

Kaufbeuren Memo to IV,,7,8; and 9 on .Air Raid Precautions.

Berlin Handwritten note from Forschungsstclle D-2

·wanting to know the cor­rect address for FA 9.

Kaufbeuren FA-9 answers that its address is Kaufbeuren,, Allg. 13 b.

29 A-G~6/1/45 schapper Luebben Order of Schapper setting up Berlin, Luebben and Jueterbog branches of the · FA· after the· move fro1:n

. Breslau.

97

" DOCID: 3486670

)

30 A-B 5/3/45

31 A-B31/l/45 Metzger

32 A-B 1/3/45 f1layer

33 2/2/45 ?

Ka.ui'beuren

OKW/WNV/Chi

Ba.rely legible directive , from FA IV to 7,8j9 on special air raiq pre­cautions, working schedules, evacuation of material.

· Names mentioned are: RR Lehr RR Kagelka (?) RR von Stubenfauch RR Kroeger ORR Dr. Martin Paetzel ORR Waechter ORR Schulz' ORR Wenzel

Telet~-pe message addressed to RLM/FA for ORR W~nzel with cipher keys for. Febr­uary use.

Kaufbeuren Forwarding a memo on · air ' raid precautions from a · Major Esgele of the Ka.ufbeuren airfield.

Jueterbog Memo rrom FA 9 to FA 3 stating that the following persons assisted in moving classified materials from Breslau to Jueterbog; Karl Kirstein Alexan.de~ Graudes Juer8en Deggau Erika Schirajef f Georg Krenzke Karl Lade · Fritz Simon Otto Lechner Egon Walger

34 A-D 9/3/45, Schapper Kaufbeuren Directive reorganizing the· . FA with the main bureau at

,Ka.ufbeuren, less FA 15r

DOCID: 3486670

J

. -- .-"-':> --

Setting up of a Berlin Branch Office and a Report­ing Center under Seifert.­Assignment of control of the Forschungsstellen a.nd Liaison officers . . (Trans­lated as first pa~t of this appGndix. Note item 19, of the same day, which emends the· above order.)

35 12/3/45 Scha.pper Kaufbeuren Order r;iving dates for. en­trance on duty of' various officials named in item 34: RH N1ederr~eyer enters on dut:; at the Forsschungs­-lei tstelle Munich on 20/3/45; RR Henke reports at the Branch Office Berlin on 1/4/45; a.nd ORR Kunse-. ouoller in Kaufbeuren on 10/4/45.

36 A-B~?0/3/45 · Schapper Kauf'beuren Additional assignments and

99

·' ..

· transfers of personnel: Item 34 is again emended with RR Dr. Rau tenltra.nz. transferred from the School ·of the FA to head of FA 12 as of 20 (corrected .t0 22,) /3/45; Brieschke is. releiv- . ed as a.c ting head of' FA 12 · and appointed Liaison Officer with the Ministry for War Production as of 1/4/45; RR Dr. Hill'iga.rdt . is relieved as Liaison . Officer to the Ministry for· War Production and assigned to FA 1214145; RR Dr. Fin- · gerhut is transferred to Seifert's · Reporting Center in Berlin 22/3/45; RR Pro­gich(?), vhile ·retaining his present position a.t the Waldlager, . Luebben, is also a liaison official \-:1th the Berlin Branch Offic~ •

DOCID: 3486670

~•

)

37 A-C30/9/44 Schroeder Breslau

3& 13/1/4·5 Metzger Drestbn

39 3/2/45 Metzger Dresden

l~O 26/2/45 :Metzger Dresden

41 28/3/!f5 ' ? Kaufbeuren

42 ·23/3/45 ? ?

· ,. >,

Metzger Dresden

Schroeder forwards a memo on 8{$ents (Polish and Russi­an, "Kundschafter, Spione, Saboteure '' ) from the Abwehr . Officer of Wehrkreis Kom- · mando ·VIII. Photocopy wa.s made by Schroeder and circu­lated.

OKW/wFSt/A:gWNV/Ch~ III A sends o.fficial key for March to the FA. Signe~ by Ma.jar Metzger. Address. of Metzger ls ' Dresden N 31, Hindenburg­kaserne. ·

Same as above, key for March, a new emer•gency key.

· same as · 3'7; key for April.

Hardly legible, is to .FA 6,7,8,9 with FA 6 marked as for ini'orma.tion.

Ha.ndwritten, not very legi-91e, seems to refer to Stapoleit~ Prag. Copies of

·Czech messages are to be sent to Herr Rummel of the Stap oliet at a Prague

· address~ .

A new cipher key for Feb~ ruary from OKW/Chi~

44 26/3/45 Metzger · Halle/Salle 11 Cipher key for April; a . new key. ·

Rosenhahn Kaurbeuren rii~mos on security circu­lated for information of FA departments. B refers to

lOO

DOCID: 3486670

46 A~B 12/4/45 Bergeren

•

publication by Reuters of a matter with Secret classi­fication and repeats Hitler's orders on handlln~ secret and Top Secre~ (C}.

Kaufbeurt·n Directive from · Borman for­bidding party members (Gauleiters) to try to cor1~espond wi t.!1 old party friends .in occupied (Allied occupled) territory, circu-

·1ated by Bergeren. ·

lOl

DOCID: 3486670

I .. · , .. " ~~ •. ~_

........... ; . .....

· .. · 1:

Appendix III

Autobiography of Gottfried Schapper, le.st h~ad of the FA. Prepared by Ticom and included as appendix 2 of IF J_5.

Curriculum vitae of the former Ministeria.ld1rektor Gottfried Schapper.

Born 16/12/J.888 in Groszmoeringen, Kreis Stendal, son of' the Lvan.gel:ical laster, Dr. Karl Scha.pper~

:::.chools: Elementar-y school, Classical hig.i1 school, r.aa.tricula­tion certificate 1910. 1910 Falmenj'unker and Lieut. in Railway Regt No 2. 1913 1rransferred to Signals. 191'+-1918 In the First World War: 0. C. Heavy W/T Sta.tlon 15 in the west ~ii th AOK 5 (Crown Prince). In. the east with G.K.X.J (Errunich) _

,. I Inf ·n1v (Konta) '' 11th Bavarian. Inf Div (Kneupel) " AOK Linsingen .

Sou thees t (Balkans) with o ;K. ritacI<:ensen as O. C .. Declphering Station Ba.lkanl'3.·

1916-1917: o. C. Wireless Section High Cor,wand .. .of the Army a.t GHQ and Director of the Cryptographic Bureaµ (.Geheim­wlssen.schaft 1. Abt.) of the High Command of the Army. (Interception, Deciphe1~1ng, Intelligencing ·of all m111 tary and pol.i tic al signals. int.erceptable by. technical devices) . 1918: Divisional Signals Commander with various divisions in the west. 1919: Discharged with rank.of captain. 1919-19;20: Married, fell into the ~'.lands of revolutionary .

. swindlers, without work or food, harried by Communists, sold newspapers and other things on the streets, did odd jobs to ward off starvation. · 1920: Secretary of the National Society of B{frlin for Res­cuing the Reich from the Revolution. Took part in the Ka.pp­Ludenclorf Putsch. Persecuted by 0ommunists, moved to Munich. 1920~~1927: In l:'lunich~

1 Various jobs .as business manager of .

National ol'.'gan.izations, of clubs,, businesses, and newspapers. 1920-1923: Member of the N.S.D.A.P. resigned after the P·.itsch of 1923.

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1927-1933: In Ber~lin: Administrative officer and head of departr11ent in the cr:;ptograph1c . bureau of the Reichswei1r Minist:l:'y. Resigned. 1933; as I could not agree wi.th the ti1or-oughly :lncompetent methods of the cryptographic bureau,. Therefore. , 1933-Ap:ril 1945 I went ove:r to Goering, whom I !mew well from the first world war; founding of the Forschun.gsamt (see my .:report on the Fo:rschungsamt): head of sub-sectionJ then. head of sec ti.on,, and f:rom 1944 director of this burea.u. 1931 ! Joined the Nazi part:y and remained B. simple member· of it until April 1945. , · 1933·-1937 or 38: Member of the Allgemeine SS,, from which I resigned, as they 1.,efused .to recog..Yl.1ze my Christian phil'.)sophji · of life. ../ 1934: A Son was born to me~ 1939.: 1945: Employment of the Forschuugsamt in t .he second ·.<·,~··Jd War, undm:> my direction, first · as deputy head, then independently f:r·om 19!~4: at first in Berlin, after the bo~ubings out., in Bresla.u and subsequently in Kaufbeuren. April i9J+5: release and residence in Soellbrun-Niederwall near RosenJ1eim.

- May: Arrested by CIC, interrogation in Rosenhe1~1, imprison­ment a:nd interrogation in Salzburg,, then ca.pti vi ty .tn Augsburg.

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VOLUME 7

Tab A

Abte11ung. Section, Indicated by Arabic numerals. Abwehr. Military Intelligence and co\lllter espionage section

ot the.Supreme Command of' the Armed Forces. Taken ovel' by RSBA in 1944. . .

Air Force High Command (Oberkomma.ndo. der, Lurtwafte q. v.). Amt Ausland. Amt VI of RSHA q. v. Arnold, Moritz. Member or FA-9 at Kauf'beuren •

\

.-Arbelts Gebiet. Work Section, Subdivision of ·aranch Of':f1ce Beru. Army.High Command - see Oberkommando des Heeres. Ballovic, Senior Specialist Rudolf. Bailovic is an Austrian

and is reported to be violently anti-Nazi. He vas a member of the Austrian cipher bureau {Austrian Chancellery

. Secret Section) and at the time of the .Anschluss he re­fused to hand over the key of the secret d~binet·. He therefore fell into disgrace ·and .was re;tegate_d1 to an . inferiC>r posi tio11 in the goverr.&IDent. Fenner and. Fell­g1ebel brought the best Austrian personnel to Germany,,and .Bailovic vas rirst given to the FA. No details.of his stay there are known but he next appeared in the Signal Intelligence AgenQy of the Army High Command where he headed a Balkan section. Later he transferred to' the· Signal Intelligence Agency of' the.Supreme Command.o:f the Armed Forces. Recently he has been employed more in an administi-ative caps.city than as a cryptanalyst. Be · was said to have ref"used to wear any German medals vh11e in uniform and 11 ved quietly w1 th his wife .•

Beeker, ........ • Holder o~ an FA telephone number as a member ot Main Section V-3, whatever that may bev

Bergeren,. 1 Principal Specialist. Head ot Main Section I o:f FA.

Berlin: The Main Bureau (April.1933-Novembel- 1943), the ··- S&:rvice Post Seif'ert and the Forschungsle1 tstelle Berlin

were located here. The Main Bureau vas in Charlottenb\.irg, a 8\1 sublll'b of" Berlin. The address vas Berlin, Charlotten­b\ll'g 2, Schillerstrasse Nrs 116/124.

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In addition a telephone monitoring station (including · a· special "Poi son K1 tchen" for mon! toring the conversa­tions of Top Nazi officials}, and two radio intercept

. stations st. Templin and Luebben (q.v.) were located here. Forschungsstelle D02 was also in Berlin.

Bock:, , Senior Specialist. SS Oberstm-mbannfuehrer, Head · oi" State Police lCJeatapot7 Central Office, Berlin. · ·

Bodenschatz,. , Genel'al der Flieger. Head of the Office ot Ministers. · o .

Boettger, .· , Senior 3pec1al1st. Given as a member of the FA and hiving an FA telephone numbe:r, othervis~ unknown ..

BQkelberg, · , Col. Group leader of the Monitoring Depart-ment of the Air Ministry (Rl.M/S. A. UEWA.) · .

Bosehe1nen, Heinz: Non Commissioned Officer. Turkish Inter­pretel" •. Member of Bailovic •a section of .. In 7 /VJ.. Worked in Evaluation. · ·

Branch Of rice Berlin. --Zweigstelle Berlin. : · · . . • El'andes, Dr. Wilhelm-, Senior 3pa~1al1st { Oberregiei-U1,1garat ),·

in charge of .Language Groups France, Belguim, Holland, and Switzerland at the Foreign Office Cryptanalytic Section. ·

Bre::ilau .• 41'07"N.17' 00" E. · Lo«iation of a Forschungsleit­stelle and o:f a radio. intercept station. After the 194l bombing or the·Be:rlinbeadquarters a. part .or the Main Bureau was located in the Hartlieb barracks in Kletten-dorf. .

Brauer, , Principal ~pec1alist. Head of Main 5ect1on· III or FA. '

B1•i1eschke, Herr. Acting head or Section 12 at Kauibeuren. . On 20 March he was relieved as head of .FA 12 .. and appointed Liaison Officer vi,th the Economic Ministry and·Min1st17 for War Production. · ·

Brott, Liselotte. Member of FA 9 transferred to Seif'ert in Berlin. · ·

Bugg1seh,; Dr. Otto. Cryptanalyst of' In 7 /vl. . Burgscl)e1.c1ungen. Final location of the Foreign Office Crypt ..

analy~1c Section (Pers Z s). 51'13"N 11 1 47•E. . Can.aris_, Admiral. Head of' the Abvehl', executed fol" involve­

. ment in 20th July Plot. Cha.rlottenburg: Bee Berlin. . · . · Chi. Stelle/Oberbef'ehlshaber der .. Lurtva.ffe.--S1gnal Intelli-

·gence Agency of the Commander ·In Chief of' the Air }C'orce. 0Bd.L/Ch1). Replaced in November 1944 by Signal Intelli­gence Agency o.f the Air Force High Command (O'Kl./Ui Abt 350 ).

105

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Cologne. 50• 56" N 06 1 57" E. Location of a Forschungs~ stelle for radio intercept.

Constance. 57' 39" N 09' 10" E. Forschungsatelle, radio inte!'eept. . .

·; Control Station for Signal Intelligence ot the ArlDJ' High Command - Oberkommando dee Heeres Leitstelle der Nach­richtenauf'klaerung. Became Si'gn.al Intelligence Agency

. · of the Army High Command after November 1944. · ,Copenhagen 55' 41" N 12 • 35" E. Site of an "AA" station, \

N~opagade 17/11, telephone Palae 9469, local 35, 8, 9, and 30.

Criminal Police. See Kriminalpolize1 CSDIC.-- Combined Service Detailed Interr>oga.tion Center. D-16. -- ASA translations of yearly Progress reports of Pers ·

Z S for 1927, 1941, and 1942. - .. D-17.-- OKM 4/ SKL III Yearly Progress report for 1/12/43-

1/11/44. . . . . . D-21.-- Translation of OKM 4/SKL Research Progress report

1/12/43 - 1/11/44. T 519 - · · · ~ D-22.--Translation (and chart) of telephone d1recto17 giving

Forsehlingsamt numbers. D-51~.--Translations Of Pers Z S reports on cipher systems of

various countries. Danzig. Forseh\lngs s te lle. 54 • -21" N 18 • 40" E. Deggau. Juergen •. Member of' FA-9 at Kauf'beuren, assisted in

transferring materials from Breslau to Juet~rbog. Dettmann, Alex, 1st Lt. Head of C~yp~an$.lysis at BLS 057;

later head of Section 3, Group IV, Gd.NA. Specialty: Russian systems.

Deutsch Lissa. · 51~ 08" N 16° 53" E. Town in Prussia between Breslau and Posnan. Site of a .Band C station.

DF-9.-~Activ1t7 Report or OKV/Chi~ for period 1 Jan. 1944 through 28 Jl.Ule 1944, s1gned ·by Col Kettler.

DF-1.7.--Translation or T 3273, letter of Dr. Paschke and other Pers Z s personnel. Translated by Dr. Pettengill. (T-165).

Dlen.ststelle Sei:f'ert. --Service Post Seifert. · Diessing, General Major (Brig. Gen.). Supplies FA information

to Klautschke. D1pl. ~. Graduate Engineer. 'Doenitz, Grand Admiral, Commander in chief' of German N~vy, .

Reich Chancellor. Doering, Dr. ·Mathematician with In 7/VI., later Gd.NA. Spec1aley:

machine cipher, mathematical research.

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von Doering, , Lt. General. Group Head of EqUipment department (D 22), Air Ministry.

Dortmund. Forschungsstelle ror cable 1nterceptD ',sit 31" N 01' 27" E.

Drape, , M1nRe.t. Prussian State Ministr~ and 4 Year · Plan. .

Ebell1ng. Krim KoDDD SS Obersturmf"uehrer. State Police Central Office Section IV N.

Ege:rt, Herr. , Translator tor Chinese, Turkish, Japanese mentioned , as released 10/5/45. , , ,

Eulc9nberg. This name appears on the Kaut:t>euren directive .as' , the secretary who prepared 1 t ror Schapper • s signature.

, Name is not legible. , Eutin. Forschungsstelle tor radio intercept. 54• 09" ,M

10' 37" E. FA• Forsohungsamt q. v. -FelJLgiebel, Lt. Gen. Erich. Chier Signal, O.t.ficer ot Army and

Armed Forces.High Commands from beginning of var until he ~as executed~ 1944. _

,Fennez', , . , Principal 5pe~1al1st. Chief" of Section J.V ot . . OKW/Chl • I .

F1ns;erhut, Otto, Specialist. Member of the FA since 19'7. He was employed in Main Section V and tn 1942 became head or a school for Evaluators, giving rerresher courses to members of the branch offices and stationo In civil lite he 11as W'issenschat"tlicher Assistentoat the Un1versit7 of . Gre1fswald, a philologist in Scandinavian languages. Be specialized on Italy, Russian, and the Far East in ~in · Section v. He was assigned to the Reporting Center Seifert on 20 March 1945. · , ·, , ,

Fleischmann, with Engineering Diploma.· Senio:r S~c1al1st, Head of the Forschungsleitstelle in Vienna.

Flensburg. 54• 56" N 09' 27" E. Final locat1'on of the Signal Intelligence Agency ot the Navy ,High Command (OXM 4 SICL III)~

Flicr,e, , Specialist. , In ch.ai-ge or technical matters at OKW Intercept station at Lauf'. · , ·

Fore:lgn Office Cryptanalytic Section (Pers Z s.) , Foraehungaamt. The Goering controlled Waz1 intelligence agency,

responsible tor radio, telephone .and cable monitoring and eryptanal,.sis ot encoded or enciphered messages.

Forst:hungsle1 tstelle. Outstation. , , , .Fricke, 'l'echnician (1..1.eutenant Grade) ~. · Walther. Head of'

, llb, OXW/Cbi: Development ot systems, etc. Fricke, '. · · , SS First Lt.: Liaison 01".fic~r, RSHA -OKW.

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Friecer·ich, Lt. Col. Chief of Division 7 of the Office · of the Chief Signal Officer of the Germ&n Air Force and chief of the Chi Stelle (Chiffrierstelle) or the Oberbe.fehlshaber der Luftwaffe, which after November 1944 became LN Abt 350.

Ga.e.nzez•, Major Jo.ha.nnes. Member of Section IIIF (counter espionage .and penetration) of Abwehrstelle Berlin.

GEHEIMESTAATSPOLIZEI,, (Gestapo). Secret State Police. Part · oJ~ the. 81cherheitspolizei q. v. .

General Leutnant.--Major General (Rank held by Scha.pper in Luftwaffe as head of FA). ,

Gerstmeyer, Dr. Liaison officer with the ForeignOffice. Gerth, Dr. Head of Section 1 of the Branch Office Berlin. Gcrtzt Frau Helene, born Sponholz. Member of FA 9, had reading

knowledge of French and German. Suggested for assignment to the Forschungsstelle Luebben. ·

'Gestapo. Gehe1mesta.atspolize1 q.v. Gimmler, Maj. Gen. Chief of Signal Equipment and Testing

· · Branch (Wa Pruef 7), 19}9-194}. Chief Signal Officer~ Commander 1n Chfef West, 1943-1945. · ·

Glueckstadt (Holstein) Telephone monitoring. 53' '·"8" N 09 11 25" E. Goebbels,, Dr. Paul. Propaganda. Minister. · Goering, Herma.r..n, ·Field Ma.rshal. Comn11,mde:r in Chief of Air

· Force A1r ·.Minister. :;• ' ·~·;· · ·. ···, Goering's Research Bureau .·~-Forschungsamt q. v. Gols. Radio intercept station, near Vienna .. 47' 51" N.

l.6' 56" E. Gottschalk, Gottfried. Member of FA-9 at Kaufbeuren.

· Qraud~1, Alexander. Member of FA-9 at Kauf'beuren. Assisted 1.n transferring material from Breslau to Jueterbog.

Gre1fawa1d. 54'41" N i3t23" E. '\he Stettin A station was evacuated to Greifswald ·in A;.:<r~11 1945.

GrothE~.; Edith. Member of FA-9 at Kaufbeuren. Guelle, Otto. Member of FA-9 at Kaufbeuren. Guentller, Lothar. A member of the FA until some time towards

· the end of 194} when he vas drafted. Taken prisoner, h1.s . . interrogation vas one or the 1"1rst sources of information . dn ~:the FA (Interrogated 29 January 1945) although th~ ·

lnt'ormation did not reach TlCOM until later. Was a JUr1st 1n civil life. May have been.a member of Ma.in Section V.

Hamburg. 53' 33" N 10' 00" E. Forschungs1e1tstelle and a · For'schungsstelle. ·

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Hanson. A subordinate.of Cana.r1s in Abvehl', executed for · .involvement in 20th July plot.

Ha.:rrius, Dr. Head of Sections of the FA. The Ka.utbeuren directive gives his name, which is crpased out in ink in a eorl'eotion of 14 March 1945.

Hatz, Heinrich, Staff' Director. In charge of administration, OKW intercept station at Laut.

Haupt Abteilung. Main Section, indicated by Roma.n Numerals. Henke, Dr. Named as alternate to HaITius in Section 5 of the

FA and carried as head or that section by the 14 March 1945 correction of the Kauf°beuren ~irective. On l April 1945 he was to report to the Branch Office Berlin.

von Hesse, Prince Chl'istoph. The second head or the FA. He wa·s . suceeede.d by Schapper · in 1944 at vhich time he either "died" {Scha.pper and Guenther) or "returned to the Air Force" (Goering).· . ·.

High Command of the Armed Forces. See Oberkommando der Vehrmacbt. H1111gardt, Specialist, Dr. Liaison Officer with the Economic

- Ministry. Relieved by Brieschke on 20 March when H1111gal'dt vas assigned to FA 12. ·

Himmler, Heinrich. Reichsfuehrer SS, Minister of the Interior, Head of the Elite Guard, Head of the Reserve Army. Cb1et of German Police, in which capacity he controlled both the regulaJ> police f'oroe, the Constabulary (ordnungspolizei through the Ordnungspolize1 Hauptamt) but also the Secui-ity Police,, Sieherhei tsdienst and Sieherhei tspolize1 ·(SD and Sipo) through the Reich Main Security Office (Reichs­sicherhei tshauptamt, RSHA) which took over the Abwehr into its Amt VI.

Hitler, Adolf. "Der Fuehrer? Hofm!l.nn. Postrat, head of work connected with service matters.

Reichspost. · Buettelihain, Senior Specialist Dr. Erich. Chief cryptanalyst

tor OXW/Chi from 1937. Hupp1ertsburg, Senior Specialist, Dr. Head or Section 14,, alter-

nate head of Main Section VI. . I-1 "Final reports of TICOM group 3 on final exploitation of

BURGSCHEIDUNGEN. ~ A TICOM publication. ' I-17 "Extra'cts of SHAEF interrogations ot Maj. Gen. Boner,.

Col. Grube,, Lt. Col. Mettig, Maj. Rottler". A TICOM . publication. -

l-20 "Interrogation of Sondertuehl'er Fricke of OKW/Ch1,.formerly ot OKH/Ch1 at the OKM Signals School in Flensburg on 16-17 June 1945·." A TICOM publication.

DOCID: 3486670

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I-21 "Preliminary interrogation of Col. Kettler,, R. R. Dr. Huettenhain, Sdf Dr. Fricke (OKW/Chi} and Lt. Schubert (OKH/Chi) a.t ;!chlosa Glucksburg near Flensburg on 14 June J.945 .. " A- TIC UM publication. .

I-22 "Interrogation of German cryptographers of the · Pers ZS c1f the Auswaert .1 .. 11<r~s Amt 1n the U. K. at seven meetings during May 1945. rr A TICOM publication. · .

I-25 "Interrogation of five members of the FA at. Schloss C+lucksburg on 15 and 21 June 1945. 11 A TICOM publication.

I-26 ~Interrogation of 1st Lt. Schubert (OK11/Chef HNW/GendNA) on Russian military and agents systems a.t OKM Signals School, Flensburg on 17 June 1945." A TICOM publication.

I-29 "Third Interro§ation of Lt~ Col. F:r1edr1ch at Beaconsfield c•n 4 July 1945. · A TICOM publication~

I-31 · "Detailed interrogation of Dr. Huettenhain at Flensburg on 18 - 21 June 1945. " A TI COM publication. ·

I-54 "Second interrogation of five members of the RLM~ors­chungsamt at Dustbin Kransberg near Frankfurt on 28 Jruly 1945." A TICOM publication.

I-64 . "Answers by Buggisch of OKH/Chi to questions set by TICOM." A TICOM publication. ·

I-84 11 Further interrogation of R. R. Dr. Huettenhain and Sdf .~Dr. Fricke of OKW/Chi on questions set by Mr •

. F'riedman." A TICOM publication. · I-85 "POW interrogation report on R. R. Flicke,, Tech. Insp.

I'oko.jewskl,, and ;;.tabsintendant Hatz." A TIOOM publication. I-86 "Interrogation of Lt. /Col. Mettig of OKH and OKW/Chi on

the highest .direction of German Cryptanalytic Work. 11

I-91 "Interrogation report on .Maj. Gen. Robert Schlaka,, chief of Communications of the Ordnungs Polizei. A TICOM publication. . · .

I-93 "Detailed interrogation of members of o~ 4 SXL III at F'lensburg." A TICOM publication. ·

I-108 "Interrogation of Goering on the RLM/Forschungsamt. 0

1.~ ·.TIC OM publication. , I-112 "Preliminary interrogation of Regierungserat Voegele and

Major Fe1chner of the GAF·Crypt. Bureau,, (OKL)." A TICOM publication. , ·

I-116 "Report of Interrogation of Lt. Dettman and Oberwacht- . meister Samsonow or OKH (Gen d NA) at OOberursel,, Germany,, during August 1945." A TICOM publication.

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I-121 "Translation of ho?r.{1~orkbfi . Obltn w. Werther, company commander of 7/LN Regt. 35..}. 1 A TICOM publicatlon.

I-131. . "Lt. Col. Mettig of QKW/Chi on Wa Pruef 7 and RLM/-Forschu,ngsamt." A TIC OM publics. ti on. . . .

I-l43 "Report ·On the interrogation of five leading Germ.ans (Jodl, Doenitz, Keitel, Ribbentrop, ~d . Goer1ng) at

· Nuremberg on ·27 Sept. 1945." A TICOM publication. I-146 . "Detailed interrogation of members of OKM 4/SKL III

. at Flensburg." A TICOM publication. . I•l4'jr "Detailed :lnterrogation of members of OKM 4/8.KL III.

at Flensburg." A T:J:COM publication.- , · . I-159 · "Report on GAF intelligence based on interrogation

of Hauptman Zetzche." A TICOM publication. I-162 "Report on interrogation of Kurt Sauerbter 7 RLM/

Forschungsamt• ·held on 31 August 1945." A TICOM publi-cation. :

I-16·~ "Homework by Kurt Sa.uerbi.er ·or RLM/Forschungssmt, on . Russian Agents• Traffic." A TICOM publication.

I-172 "Interrogations of ·Hagen and Paschke or Pers ZS." . A •rrcoM publ1c.at1on. . · . . ·

I-176 11liOn!$WOrk by Wachtmeister Dr. Otto Bugg1sch or OKH/Ch1 . . and OKW/Cb.1." A TICOM publicat..1. on. · l-IP- 15 Final Report of TlCOM Team l on the exploitation of

Kau.fbeuren and the Berchtesgaden area. From TICOM. \..I-F-46 Interrogation of Lother Guen~er, dated 29 January

1945. CSDIC,- MC 500, Hq 7th Army, NB. 708. . CJF-105 CSIDIK (U.K.) SIR .1326. lllterroga.tton Report ·on

· POW Heinz Boscheinen and Walter Kotschy. --Continuation ·. · cf IF 126, 105 B::..-summary of preliminary interrogation

of these prisoners in the field. Received through · · Col. Bieber. · . ·. ·· 'ff-l.26 CSIDIK (U.K.) SIR 1335. Interrogation report on L Kotschy and Boscheinen. · · .·

IF-1}2 Da8 Forschungsamt._ des Luftfahrtminsteriums." Hq USFET. rL.. . · weekly Intelligence summary # 12, 4 Oct. 1945. IF-l35 Directive of Schapper setting up organization of FA

· at Kaufbeuren and 'the branches and outstations. .Dated 9 March 1945. . ,·

C-fF-14' Weekly Intelligen~e Summary # 15 (25 Oct. 1945); . (Office · of . the Assistant Chief of Sta.ff 1 ··G-2; Headquarters United States Forces, European ~heater), ·# 15-(25 Oct. · 1945). This contains information on FA wire tapping given by. a Major Johannes Gaen~er of Abwehl'stelle Berlin/ III F.

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c;tr-164 Interrogation of Walter Schellenb~~rg,, Brigade Fuehrer . 'and· head of Amt VI of RSHA.

vIF-188 Four Sto:ries by Daniel DeLuce of Associated Preas,· ·Berlin, 4, 5, 6, and 7 November 1945 be.sad on material

__ fc>und by him in the rubble_ of the Air Ministry. v-lF-216 The German Intelligence Service. (SHAEF, Counter

Intelligence war room; London; April 1945). C-lF-2i6.;B "S1cherhe1tspol1ze1 und 51cherhe1tsd1enst."· Ultra/

r / zip/Pal 4, l/l/44. · · V'J:F-255 Glossary ot German administrative and political ·

Terminology for use by off 1cers and officials of the American .Armed Forces of occupation (Hq 7th Army, APO 758). ' .

"IF-256 · G.erman-English Dictionary of German Administrative - Terms. Civil affairs mtide. War Department Pamphlet

Nr. 31-16a, 3 July 1944. IF-257 German Army and Air Force abbreviation, NU CX/MSS/S. 168 IN 7/VI: Control Station of ~ignal Intelligence of the ArlDY

H1.gh Command,, Inspecto:rate 7. After November 1944 this became the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Amy High Command • · _ -

Inspectorate 7/VI - Control Station or Signal Intelligence of th.e Army High Command, abb In 7/vI. Became Signal Intelli~ gence Agency of the Army High Command after November 1944.

Jentsch, Julius. Member 0£ FA-9 at Kauf'beuren. May have gone to Berlin with Ruf'fler. ·

Jodl,, Alfred, Colonel General. General Oberst, Chief of armed forces operation staff.

Juterbog. 51'59'1N 13'40 11 E. Temporary location of a branch of the FA in early 1945. Aleo a location of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command.

Kagelka·, ·.Specialist. Member of FA IV? Katowice (Kattowitz) 50 1 16 11 N 19'01 11 E. Site of an 11 A11 station

in Upper Silesia (Poland). Ka.ttowitz. See Katowice. ' Kaufbeu:tten. 47'53"N l0'37"E.. The Main Bureau was located 1n

ba:rracks at the Kaufbeuren airfield. .The postal add~ss wa.1s. Kaun>euren/Allgemeine.

Kalten ln-u:u.1l0r • Himmler's head of RSHK. Keitel,\~; Field Marshal. Chief of the Armed Forces. Kell,, · • Given as a member of the FA in the telephone

Ql'jre'Ctory: "Research Office Al/2 Berlin. Exploitation Ce11ter. (Rlm/FA/AW - Kopf).'' This may mean he was 1n the BeJ:-lin Forschungsleitstelle.

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Kempe, Specialist. Head of Main Section II and Section 3 of FA. .

· 'Kettle1•, Col. ,Hugo. Chief of OKW/Ch1, 1943-1945. Kiewadt, Ilse.. Member of FA-9, transferred to FA 3 on 7 March

45. . Kirbach, Senior Specialist. Head of Forschungsleitstelle in.

Ha.mbu;rg. · Kirstein, Karl. Member of FA-9 at Kaufbeuren, assisted in

transferr1ng materia.1 from Breslau to Jueterbog. Klautschke, Specialist Dr. Heinz. Liaison Officer with the.

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW not just OK'rl/':­Ch.1). Stated that he had 1 ~university tra!iirng in Eco-· nomics and Poli tics. ri .

Koenigsberg, 54'42''N 20'30''E. Forschungsstelle (IF-15). Koe ln. See Cologne • · ' Koerner, Dr~ Pe.ul. Prussian.Secretary o.f State. Financial

control of the FA. Reported to have negotiated with Schellenberg to hand over the FA to Schellenberg.

Konstanz. See Constance. · Kotechy, Walter. Nonconun1ss1oned officer. Hungarian Inter­

preter • . Member of Italian section of Afrika Korps. Trained 1n ''encoding and decoding'· at In 7 /vI.

Krenzke, Georg. Member of FA 9 at Kaufbeuren . Assisted 1n mo·ving documents from Breelau to Jueterbo'5.

Kr1m1na 1.; ol1ze1 (Kripo). Criminal Police. Part ot the S11cherhe1 tspol1zei q. v.

Kripo. Kr1m1na l;&;\ ol1ze1 q. v. Kroeger, Specialist. Member of Section 6 of the FA

11 Ma.chliief, specialist of the FA, presumably cipher machines. Probably responsible for .success with Russian Teleprinter. St1:1.ted to have broken Finnish· Hagelin. A member of HUetten-

. ha:ln's Cipher Security Committee. .-Kuebblejtt1 Ferdinand. A member ot FA 9 at Kaufbeuren. He re-

quested permission to visit his family at night at . Hirschzell but was refused on the grounds that his family, reaidents of Hamburg/Saale, should not have evacuated to

. Ba,1ar1a but to Saxony or Thur1ng1a.. · Kuepper, Dr. Helmut. Member of FA 9 at Kaufbeuren. Kunsemuoller, , Senior Specialist. In charge of Section 2

of the FA. Was to report in Kaufbeuren on 10 April 1945. Kunze, Werner, Dr. Senior Specialist (Oberregierungsrat) head

-of Pers ZS mathematical cryptanalytic subsection.

--- --- -- - · -

DOCID: 3486670 ·----:1.,

~p~

- ,• ______

. -

r-- - • . ... ---

Kurzbach, I Senior Specialist Dr. Head or Section 11 and alternate head of Main Section V of the FA. Was last seen in Kaufbeuren by Rentschler.

Lade, Karl. Member of FA-9 at Kaufbeuren, as-s1sted 1n moving documents from Breslau to Jueterbog. -

Lange, Eran. Member of FA transferred from .Kaufbeureh to Berlin. Her previous section is unknown. .

Leba (Pomerania). 54'45''N 17'33"E. Forschungsstelle. . Lechner, Otto. Member of FA 9, assisted 1n transferring material

fr·om Breslau to Jueterbog - was at Kaufbeuren. Legler, M1nRat. Prussian State Ministry and 4 Yeax Plan, D 22 • . Lehr, _____ , Specialist. Probably a member of FA rv. Liaison Office. Verbinduilgst:v:;·:U:o. Litzmannetadt. See Lodz; Lodz (Litzmannstadt). 51 1 46 11 N 19'26"E. Poland. Site of an

. A Station. Ludwig, Dr. Helmut. Member of FA-9 at Ka.ufbeuren. Luebben/Spreewald. 51'56''N 13 '54.''E. Radio intercept Fol's­

chwigsstelle, 65 kilometres south of Berlin • .Main Section • . Hauptabteilung. · Marquardste1.n. 47' 46''N 12 '28"E. Near Rosenheim, location of

Amt VI of RSHA at conclusion of hostilities. M~tys, Georg. Member of FA 9 at Kau.fbeuren •

. Mayr, Margareta. Member of FA 9 at Kaufbeuren. · Meinhard, Pauline. Member of FA-9 at Kau:rbeuren.

Mettig, , Lt. Col. Second in command or OKw/Chi, Dec. · . 19Jf3 to 1945 • . . . -Meyer, • Author or a memo on quarters for FA personnel

at Kaufbeur.en. Mews, , Specialist Dr.

ITbral'Y and archives. chler).

Head of Section 10 of the FA1 the Was last seen in Kauf'beuren \Rents-

M1lch,.t£a'hard ,Field Marshal. Secretary of State for Air. and . . · Inspector General of the G. A. F. Minister1ald1rektor - untranslated non TICOM definition· is:

di:ttector i t. a ministry, head of, one or more divisions 1n a 1ninistry. Schapper held this rank as head of the FA and·claimed it was equivalent to General Leutnant per · Lurtwatr e .

Miniate:l'ial Dirigent - untranslated German civil Seri vce · Rank · h11gher than M1n1~ter1al Rat {q 1~ v.),, and is possibly equi-

valent to Brigatt . ..:-.r· General or P-$ • .

DOCID: 3486670

--

"=-'•. ·­~ - ., .

Ministerialrat abb Min Rat -- Principal Specialist (non TICOM . •:.ranslat1on is Superior Counsellor in a ministerial . department (title or a Referent (Principal) . in the first ministerial grade). This Civil service Rank is approxi­mately equivalent to Colonel or "P 7."

MinRa~t - Ministerialrat q •. v. · Muell.er, Lt. Gen. of .Police,, SS Gruppenfuehrer,, Head of RSHA

Section IV •. Muenc:hen. See Munich. Munic:h. 48•o8"N 11 '35"E. Forschungsleitstelle and Fors ..

chungsstelle. · "•'

National Defense Forces. ~ee Reichsvehr. National Ministry of .Defense. See Reichsvehrministerium. Ne.t1c>nal·M1n1stry of War. Reichskriegsm1n1ster1um q. v. Natic>nal .Pol-ice. See Re1chspol1ze1 Navy High Command •. See Oberkommando der Kr1egsmarine. Neuenhoff,, , Dl'. Special ! ... 1a1son man between F.A-9 and

Bra.heh Office Berlin.

. ; r ! ··.·

Niedermeyer 1 ,, Specialist-~· - Head of Forschuiigslei ts tel le Breslau to 26 January 1945 when he was relieved and appoint­ed C,hief of Staff for Seif'ert in Jueterbog. On 9 March he vas· appointed head or the Forschungsle1tstelle Munich.

Nu•tTILbe.l'g. see Nuremberg. Nuraniberg. 59'27"N ll'05"E. Forschungsstellen. Nusbt:Lum,, Ingeborg. Membel' of FA 9 a.t Kaufbeuren. Oberkomma.ndo der Kriegsmarine abb OKM - High Command of the

Navy. (Combines military and administrative authority). . · Preceded (1829-1~19) by Reichsmarineamt, (1920-1934) by

Marinelett.ung 1n Re1chswehrm1 n1ster1um,; under the ·.Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine. ·

Oberkommando der Luftwaffe abb OKL ~ Airforce High Command. · (See Re1chsluftf'a.hrtmin1ster1um). ·

Obe~kommando der Marine 4 Seekriegsleitung/III. Signal Intelli­gence Agency of the Navy High Command.

Oberkommando des -Heeres abb OKH - Army High Command or High Command of the Army. (under the Oberbefehlsha.ber .des

· -Heeres; organization based on Wehrgesetz and edict of 4 February 1938. . ,

Oberkommando des Heeres General der Nachr1chten Aufklaerung. Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command. _

Oberl~ommando des Heeres Leitstelle der Nachrichten Aufkla.erung-­Signal Intelligence Agency of the ~my High Command (prior to November 1944). . . · ·

_.· 115

DOCID: 3486670

..... -· e· -· .. '. ~

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht abb OKW - High Command of the Armed · Forces or Supreme Command or the Armed Forces. (Fo~erly

. Re1chskr1egsmin1.ater1um, 1935-1938, previously Re1chs­wehrmin1ster1um, 1919-1934~ The Re1chskr1egsm1nister1um

. vas dissolved by the decree of 4 February 1938. At the /.- .-_,. ... h13ad of the OKW is the Chef des Oberkomm&ndos der Wehr­~!1.cht subject to Hitler himself who is Oberster Betehl­shabeza der 'Wehl"maeht 1nconaequence ot the laws ot. 6 March 1935 and -or 21 May 1935. .

Oberkonnnando de.r Wehrmacht Ch1ffr1er Abteilung. Signal Intelli­eence Agency . of the Supreme . Command or the Armed Forces (OXW/Chi). . . .

· Oberregierungsrat, abb ORR • Senior Specialist (non TICOM de­finition is: Higher Government Counsellor or a Referent (Principal) 1n the second ministerial grade). · Civil· 5orv1ce rank approJtimately. equivalent to Lt. Col . or 1'P-6. 1' . .

Oden, Specialist with engineering diploma, Hoeckley. ·Head of ·section 15 of the FA · and head ot Section 5 of the Branch Qj~fice ·Berlin. Had been employed by Siemens und Halske and classmate or various member.a of Wa Pruer 7 and therefore collaborated on production· O'f T 52 e.

OKH - Oberkommando des Heeres q.v. . OKH/Chi. Loose Terminology f~r: The Signals Intelligence AgencY.

or the A:rmy High Command, OKH/GdNA, Oberkommando des Heeres7 General der Nachrichten Aufklaerung, after Nov. 1944, prior to then ·Inspecto'J;'ate 7/VI (abb In 7"/VI), Control station of Slgnal Intelligence or the Army High Command (OKH/LNA).

OKH/GdNA. Abbreviation tor the Signal Intelligence Agency o.f the Al'IDY High Command •

OXL - Oberkommando der Luftvatre q.v. OKI/Chi. S18nal Intelligence Agency of the A1rforce High · Command. Properly OBdl/Ch! o?., after November 1944,

OKL/LN Abt 350. · S1cherheitspolize1 abb. 81po - Security Police. One ot the · two main bra.riches of the Police (Reichspol1ze1 q.v.)

01•gan1zed 1n the Re1chsatcherhe11dlauptamt ( RSHA~ 1 t included the Kr1m1nal.p,.olize1 (Kripo) and Geheime , ~· taatspolizel (G~stapo) • . The head of the RSHA was Kaltenbrunner who was

· responsible to Himmler. Signal Equipment and Testing Branch (Wa. Pruer 7) or OXH. Signal Intelligence Agency or the Air Force High Command.

, ' Chi 8telle of the Oberbefehlshaber der Lu.ftwa.fte, which became Luftwaffe Nachrichten Abteilung 350 after Novem-ber 1940. ·

116 . .

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DOCID: 3486670

· ~ --. ~ .

. . -'----

OKM. See Oberkormnando der Kriegsmarine. OKM .4 8KL/III. Signal Intelligence Agency of the Navy· High,

Cc>mmand. OKW. f>ee Obel'kommando der Wehrmacht. OKW/Chi. See Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme

Command of the Armed .Forces. Onl/wWl/FU. Radio Defense Corps qv. OrdnUI1gspolizei abb Orpo - Regular Police, Constabulary.

oz•ganized into a Main Of'tice Constabul·.:.::y, under the Chef der deutschen Polizei (Himmler). Constabulary is divided into five sections; Schutzpolize1 .(abb. Schupo, the Security Police, which is divided into Inspektionen or• Administrative police, Abschnitte or Section police, Re,v1ere or Prec1n.ct police, and Wasserschutzpol1ze1 or He.rbor police; Gendarmie (rural police); Technische Nothilfe (abb ~ or Teno.-orf1ce for Emergency Operation of Utilities); Feuerschutzpol1ze1 (Fire Protection Police); an.d Verwaltungspolizei (who regulate traffic, public health etc). By resions the Constabulary has been subdivided · in.to Landes-( regional), Kreis-( district), and ortspol1ze1 · (local police) • ' · · . ·

Orpo. Ordnungspolize1, q.v. ORR. Oberregierungsrat q.v~ Oechm&n.n, /1 Captain. ·orf1e1al or Defense Ministry Cipher

Se·ctlon. Outs tat.ion. --Forschungsle1 tstelle. Paetzel, Mal'tin, Senior ·Specialist Dr. Head of se·ction 6

· an.d alternate head or Main 8ecti,on IV of' the FA. r Paschke, Adol.f, Dr., Senior f)J:>ecialiet. Co-head or head of

Pers ZS and head of the L1nguistic-Cryptanal7tic Subsection. Also in charge or Wehrmacht liaison, {Fol'eign Office Cryptanalytic Section). .

- Patzig, , Corvette Captain. Official at Defence Ministry, · cipher section.

Pers ZS. Abbreviation for 1' SJ>11derd1enst des Referats z in der ·Personal .Abteilung des Auswaertigen .Amtes. '' The German Foreign Office Cryptanalytic Section • . ·

Pllgens, Dr. -Hermann. Member of FA 9 at Kau.fbeuren. Pokojewski,Kurt, Technical Inspector. Subordinate to civilian

1n charge of OKW intercept station at Laut; later became ~ivilian in charge.

1 Pol1ze1, Reiche. See Re1chspol1ze1. Popp, __ , Specialist. Head of Section 4 or the FA.

117

DOCID: 3486670

--Pose1n. See Posna.n. Posnan, (Posen). 52'25 11 N 16'58''E. Poland, site ot an A·

station. PriILcipal Specialist~ See Ministerial Rat. Progich~ , Specialist. A' member of the intercept station

at Luebben. He was also assigned liaison functions with the· Branch Office Berlin. .

. Rapp, , SS Standartenfuehrer. Named by Schellenberg as working with Sandberger to take over the FA into Amt VI

· of RSHA in February 1945. Head of a no~thern Section or Amt VI at Flensburg.

R~utenkranz, · , Dr. A member of the Danzig Forsohunga- .. stelle. Last kno'Wll as a prisoner in the 7th Al'llly cage qt Augsburg but not questioned by TICOM. · On 20 M&rch 1945 . he vas · transferred from the School (School for Evaluators)

· tc head of FA-12. . Reg.terungsrat abb RR. Specialist (non TICOM definition is:

Governmental Counsellor (title ot a Referent (Principal) 1n the third ministerial grade). Civil Service rank approximately equivalent to Major or· ''P-5".

Regular . Police. see Ordnungspolizei. Reic~h Air Ministry Research Bureau. FA q.v. Reieh Main Security Office. The headquarters of Himmler,

SIPO, and SD, (Security Police and Security Service) of the SS. . · ·

Re1chskr1egsmin1ster1um. German Wa.r .Ministry (in charge of Army and Navy, 1935-1938, dissolved by decree of 4 Feb­ruary 1938(GBl •. I,p.lll) ( functions taken over by Ober-kommando der Wehrr,nacht. J . . · _

Re1oheluftfahrtm1n1ster1um, abb. RLM. National Air Ministry, established by decree of 5 May 1933. In consequence of the reorganization or the Wehrmacht the Air Ministry 18 also the Oberbefehlshaber des Oberkommandos der Lui'twarre. Including Austria, the whole German territory is sub­divided into Luftlottenkommandos e..nd Luftgaukommandos.

Re1c~hsluftfahrt-~m1nister1um/Forschungsamt. Forschungsamt q. v. Re1c~hspol1ze1 •. National Police. Established by edict of 17 . Julie ·19'6 under Chef der deutschen Polize1 within the

jurisdiction of the Re1chs1nne~1steril.lm. The whole police administration has been divided .into Hauptamt Ordnungspol1ze1 and Hau~tamt 81cherhe1 tspol1ze1 (see ·. Reichacherhe1tapol1zei}. Himmler is Jhef der deutechen volize1. . .

118

DOCID: 3486670

"

Re1chsatcherhe1tshs.uptamt~ abb. RSRA. Reich Main Security Office. Main Office of the 8icherheitspol1ze1, q. v •.

Re1chswehr. Na.ti.onal Defense (Land and Naval) Forces. Term used after-the firs.t world war during the time the Defense A.ct of 23 March 1921( imposed by Versailles treaty, was in .force ( 1919- 1935 J • · ·

Reichsweh,rm1n1ster1um. Garman Defense Ministry, 1n charge of army and navy (1919-1934). leter called Reichskriegs- . miniaterium.

Remwettz-Lukja.nsky, Dimitri. Member of FA 9 at Kaut"beuren. Rentschler, Specialist Erwin. Head of Section 13 of the FA,

formerly a· member of Sect1on ll es French expert. Joined the FA 1n 1934~ Waa interrogated by TICOM at Aa.ufWbeuren.

von Ribbentrop, Joachim. Foreign Ministei-. Richter, Hel*a. Member of FA 9 at Ka.ufbeuren. Riga. 56'57 'N 24.'09"E. Forsehu.ngestelle. RLM. Re1ohsluf'tfahi-tmin1sterium q.v. · RLM/F A. Forschungsamt q. v • , -Rohm,. Ernst. Leader of SA,p executed 1n "Blood Purge" 9

June 1934. -Rosenhahn, , Senior Sfieoialist. Head of Section l of the FA. Rosenheim. 57"1'"52"N 12'08'E. Final location of the Main Bureau. Roth, Liselotte. Member of FA 9 at Kaufbeuren. Probably went

to Berlin with Ruffler on 5 April 1945. RR. Hegierungsrat q.v.

_ RSHA. Reich&llcherhe1 thaupta;:-.t- · q. v. Ruffler, Georg. M~mber or FA 9 at Kaufbeuren. The notation,

to Berlin with Ruffler, a.ppe.a.rs b_eside his name and that or several other members of FA 9 with the date or 5, Api-11 1945. .

SA. s,tol'Ill Troops (Sturm Abteilung) • . Sa.ms on.off, M/Sgt. Sergins. Head of Sect.ion 32 of group _IV of

GdNA. -:Specialty~ (Russian Secret Polic:i_~ Systems. 'NXVD). Sa.ndberger,,· • Head of Amt VI Kultur of RSHA and one of t.he

k:ey officials assigned job of taking over the FA in Febr­u.ary 1945 by Schellenbe·rg.. La.at knovn at Marquartstein near Roeemheim 1n ch&rge ot a southern section of Amt VI.

-Sauerbier~ Herr Kurt. .In charge of sub-section C of Section 9 o,f FA. A specie.list on Agent ciphers. Formerly a bank c.lerk.11 he joined the FA in 1935 .•

'Schade. Head of Forschungastelle in Dan.zig.

ll9

DOCID: .3486670

_-- --

Schapper, Minister Director Gottf:ried. · · Head of the FA at the . end of the war. Was associated with Schimpf, von Hesse and Goering ·in founding the FA. Had been in Signals Intelligence in World War I and a member of the cipher section of the De.fense Ministry (predecessor or OKW/Chi) prior to founding of FA. Was third head of FA, holding rank equivalent to that of a. General-leutnant of the Germ.an Air Force. Was interrogated by TICOM and furnished a.n outline of the FA, its history, and an e,utobiographr (for whi.ch last aee Appendix III). . .

Sche1t1nger, Josef~ Member of FA 9 at Kaufbeuren. . Sch~llenberg, SS Brigadef'uehrer Walter. Maj. Gen. of Police.

Head of Amt VI of R3HA. Took over Ab,1ehr as Mil. Amt of Amt VI, attempted to take over FA and did achieve

. control of it through an arrangement with Koerner. Also controlled OKW/Chi to some extent at the end.

Schimpf, Corvette Captain. First Head of FA1 comnlitted suicide. E:a.d been liaison officer from Defense Ministry to the

. predecessor of O:KM. Founded FA v1th Goering 1n 19''· Schira.jeff, Erika. Member of FA-9, assJ.sted in moving documents

froni Bresla.u to Jueterbog. Last known at Kau.fbeuren. Schlaka, Robert, General Major. Chief or Communications in

. . the Ordnungspolizei. · . · ·schm1dt, · • Appointed bead of the closing down section· or

t.he Forschungsleitstelle Br~slau 1n Berlin. on 2~ January. A Schmidt is author of a. memo on laundry service from FA I.

Schmitz, • Member of RSHA,, A.mt VI. Scholz., , Specialist with engineering diploma. Liaison ·

officer with the Reich Main Security Office. Schroeder, M1nister1ald1rigent Georg. Head of Main Section IV

c•f the FA. Schube:rt,, lst Lt .• Horst. GdliA specialist on Russian Agents'

systems. Schubert, Walter.. A member or FA 9 at Kaufbeuren. Sohul2;e, Senior Specialist. Head of Section 8 of the FA. SD. S1cherheit£d1enst or Security Service. The Nazi Party

~ecret police~ formed out of the SS. It vas organized lir1th the RSHA and included with KRIPO and GESTAPO.

Sectic1n. Abteilung. Secur:tty. Police. See Sicherheitspolize1. Secur:tty Service. See Sicherheitsdienst. Secret State Police. Geheimestaatspolizei q.v.

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DOCID: 3486670

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Seifert, Principal 5pec1a.11st Walter. Head of Main section V aud. of the Reporting Center Seifert in Berlin. He came to the FA from the cipher section of the Defense Ministry in 1933. (He should not be -confused with the Austrian Hofrat Seifert who wa.a employe·d in OKW/Chi 8..fter the Anschluss.) Seifert had been head of the Juterbog Branch of the FA. .

Seifert, Hotrat,, Dr. Head of the Austrian Cipher Bureau. Csme to OKW/Chi atter the Anschluss where he. was the Specialist on known codes and broke Polish, Tul'kish,, Greek, and Vatican basic books. Head of Greek sub-section OKW/Oh1: .V 6. · Dia not confuse with Walter Se.11'ert of the FA. . .

Senior· Specialist. Oberregierungsrat . q.v • . Sever1.t ·t,, Herr. Liaison Officer with MinistPy or l;nfol'ID&tion

and Propaganda. Sicherheitsdienst, Abb• SD • . Security Service, part of the SS. Signal. Intelligence Agency of the Air Force High Command.

Crberkommando der Luf'twaffe Luf'tnachrichten Abteilung :!•50 ( Oltl,/LN 350). Its predecessor vas 1 prior to Novem•. ber 1944, OBdL/Ch1 Stelle. · ..

Signal. Intelligence Agencyof the .Al'my High Command. Ober­kommando des Heeres/General der Nachr1chten Aufklaerung. (OKH/GdNA) Its predecessor prior to Novemberl944 this

· \ras Inspectorate 7/VI of the Leitstelle der Nachric~ten Auf'klaerung of the Oberkommando des Heeres. (O~/uiA/ J:n 7/VI). .

Signa.J. Intelligence Agency of the Commander in Chief ot the J~ir Force. Chi Stelle, Oberbetehlehaber der Luttvatfe.

Signal Intelligence Agency of the Navy High Command. Ober- · · kommando der Marine 4 Seekriegsleitung III. abb. OKM 4

:~KL/III • : · Signal lntell1gence ~ency . ot the Supreme Command of the .

Al'Dled Forces. ( Oberkommando de·::.· Wehrmacht/Chitfriet' Abte1lung, abb. OKW/Chi) • .Formerly the Cipher sec.tion . c)f the Def"ense Ministry.

Simon., Fritz. Member or FA 9 at Kaufbeuren ass~.sted 1n 1noving documents. from Breslau to Jueterbo~. .

S1msoJ1, , Col •. Command.a,n.t of the Air Ministry D 22. Sipo; see S1cherheitspolize1. Sponh1:>lz. See Frau Helene Gertz. Spree1;rald. See Luebben/Spreewald • .

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DOCID: 3486670

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SS. Schutzsta.ffel-Elite Guard. The Armed SS (Waffen SS) and General 85, (Allgemeine SS). SS was responsible for the party security service, SD, and the RSHA.

Stabenow, , Senior .Specialist. Head of Main Section VI of the FA~ Head of the Branch Office Berlin. Possibly at Flensburg at the capitulation but not traced. (I 25, 54, 93, IF 135, D 22) . · . · .

. Steff'ens, Gerda. Member of FA 9 at Kaufbeul'en. Stett.1n. 53'?5 11 N 14'34 11E. Forschungsstelle. von ::Jtubenfauch, , Specialist. Member of FA IV? Supre·me Command o? the Armed Forces. See Oberkommando der

Wehnna.cht ·~ (This is the TIC OM transl.a ti on, of f1c1al . translation is High Command of the Armed Forces.) .

Tallinn. 59'24 11 N 24 1 45'1E. Forschungsstelle. · Templin. 53'07"N 13'30 11 E. Radio intercept Forschungsstelle •

. ·ro kilometr~s north of Berlin. . TF 29. Die Ueberwachung des Nachrichtenverkehrs 1m Kriege. · - - (The Superv1s1on or Inf'ormation Channels 1n War) •

German book containing regulations and organization for censorship of all communications. Responsibility given to Abwehr and cooperation of SS and SD and the FA, Deutsche Reichspost etc.

Thiele, Brig. Gen.: Chief of Staff to Chief Signal Of.ficer of the Army.

Thieme, , Specialist. Head of Forschungsleitstelle Berlin. Thoma.a,, Hildegard. Member of FA 9 at Kau.1'beuren. TICOM. Target Intelligence Committee. Loosely used 1n this

. paper for the entire project,, tor the committee members·,, and for the publications . . Activities and materials of. that committee according to context. . ·

T-240. · This 1a the film (Film 34-16 millimetre) of the adminis­trative d1rec.'t1ves found by Team l at Kaufbeuren. A sum­mary or the contents, and complete translation of item 34 is given in appendix 2.. Item 34 is also available as IF 135. . .

Trano1w, , Prineipal Specialist. Head or English Crypto-graphic Section (III-F) or OKM 4 SKL/III. .

Verblndungsstelle. --Liaison Office. · · · Vienil~. 48'12':N 16'22"E. Forschungsle1tstelle and Forschungs-

stelle. · ·

122

DOCID: 3486670

e· Voegele; Fe:·.r.d!nand, RR, chief cryptanalyst and chief or

Section E of the Chi Stelle of the Sigtt.al Intelligence Agency of the Air Force.

Waechter, , Senior Specialist. Head ot Section 8 of the FA. Specialist on English and American systems concern- · ing which he 11a1.soned with the cipher section of the Foreign Office.

Wa Pruer·7. Signal Equipment and Testing Branch of OKH. Walger, Egon. Member or FA 9 at Kaufbeuren. Assisted 1n . moving documents from Breslau to Jueterbog. Wenzel, , Senior Specialist. Head cf Section 9 of the FA •

. Werther·, · ~ . Company Commander of 7 /I.Ji Abt 353. Co CO of 7th Co 2nd Bttn Airtorce Regiment 353.

Wichmann, ~ MinRat. ·Head. of -ofticeof m.1n1sters and · Department VII. Reichspost.

Wien. see Vienna. Work Section. Arbeitsgebiet , q.v. Zetsche, • Captain in charge of Group A ot Foreign Air-

torce West. Zweigstelle Berlin. Branch Office Berlin.

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